CU-H03318-67-P001654

The American Political Science Review

Articles and Essays by Fred R. Dallmayr, David G. Lawrence, George C. Edwards III, Fritz Nova, Roger Cobb, Jennie Keith-Ross, and Marc Howard Ross, Robert Gilpin, John H. E. Fried

---

Robert C. Fried
Party and Policy in West German Cities

James I. Lengle and Byron Shafer
Primary Rules, Political Power, and Social Change

Benjamin Ginsberg
Elections and Public Policy


Jonathan D. Casper
The Supreme Court and National Policy Making

Austin Ranney
APSA Presidential Address: "The Divine Science"

Published Quarterly by

The American Political Science Association

Vol. LXX March 1976 No. 1



Now available in a new FOURTH EDITION

AMERICAN DEMOCRACY in WORLD PERSPECTIVE

William Ebenstein ★ C. Herman Pritchett
Henry A. Turner ★ Dean Mann

Now in its Fourth Edition, this successful introductory text brings a unique comparative approach to the study of American government. Focusing on the conflicting forces throughout the world that shape American politics, the book provides comprehensive and balanced coverage in a compact, paperbound format. The fully updated Fourth Edition includes factual discussions of current, critical, and controversial issues. The changing balance of power in America is reflected in the chapter on the presidency, now the longest one in the book. Public policies in the areas of economics, energy, and welfare are examined in depth. Among the topics new to or newly emphasized in this edition are integrity in government, trends toward legal equality of the sexes, crime control and due process, changes in voting patterns, the impact of Watergate, new policies on farming, American attitudes toward foreign policy, and the crisis in relations between rich and poor nations.

Tentative: 512 pages; $9.95; paper. February 1976.
Instructor's Manual by Bruce W. Robeck.

A lively new book on practical politics

IN THE ARENA:

The Care and Feeding of American Politics
Vernon F. Anderson and Roger A. Van Winkle

Facts, analysis, insight, and commentary are candidly revealed by political participants and seasoned observers in this unique book on running for public office. The smoothly integrated text and readings show how the serious game of politics is actually played in local and national arenas and how the campaign process fits into the broad scope of American government. Case studies and many previously unpublished materials are included. A class-tested campaign simulation offers students a realistic exercise in applied politics.

Tentative: 384 pages; $6.95; paper. Fall 1976.

To request examination copies, write to Lilian Schein, Dept. 197. Please include course title, enrollment, and present text.

10 East 53d Street
New York, N.Y. 10022

1817

Harper & Row

P 1654

The American Political Science Review

67

EDITORIAL BOARD: NELSON W. POLSBY, *Managing Editor, University of California Berkeley;* CHARLES O. JONES, *Managing Editor Elect, University of Pittsburgh;* PHILIP SIEGELMAN, *Book Review Editor, San Francisco State University;* SHLOMO AVINERI, *The Hebrew University of Jerusalem;* LUCIUS BARKER, *Washington University;* BRIAN BARRY, *University of British Columbia;* RICHARD A. BRODY, *Stanford Universiy;* SAMUEL D. COOK, *Dillard University;* ELMER E. CORNWELL, *Brown University;* S. RUFUS DAVIS, *Monash University;* ROBERT J. JACKSON, *Carleton University;* ROBERT JERVIS, *University of California, Los Angeles;* DALE ROGERS MARSHALL, *University of California, Davis;* RUSSELL D. MURPHY, *Wesleyan University;* JOAN M. NELSON, *Washington, D.C.;* J. ROLAND PENNOCK, *Swarthmore College;* SAMUEL L. POPKIN, *University of California, San Diego;* ROBERT D. PUTNAM, *University of Michigan;* DOUGLAS W. RAE, *Yale University;* AUSTIN RANNEY, *American Enterprise Institute;* GIOVANNI SARTORI, *University of Florence;* MICHAEL J. SHAPIRO, *University of Hawaii;* JAY STARLING, *Southern Methodist University;* STEPHEN V. STEPHENS, *Baltimore, Maryland;* GEORGE E. VON DER MUHLL, *University of California, Santa Cruz;* RICHARD A. WATSON, *University of Missouri;* RICHARD WINTERS, *Dartmouth College.* **MANUSCRIPT EDITOR:** ELLEN Y. SIEGELMAN. **EDITORIAL ASSISTANTS:** BETSEY COBB, RITA WILLIAMS. **EDITORIAL INTERNS:** ROBERT ARSENEAU, JONATHAN BENDOR, KENNETTE BENEDICT, BETH CAPELL, DON CHISHOLM, SHAI FELDMAN, STEPHEN GENCO, EVELYN DEBORAH JAY, JOHN Q. JOHNSON, ELAINE KAMARCK, PAUL D. KARPS, JAMES I. LENGLE, DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DAVID RICHMAN, JENNY RING, STEVEN ROSENSTONE, STUART A. ROSS, SERGE TAYLOR, PHILIP J. WILSON, JOHN ZALLER

VOL. LXX 1976

Copyright, 1976, by THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

GEORGE BANTA COMPANY, INC., MENASHA, WISCONSIN

CONTENTS

Number 1–March 1976

Party and Policy in West German Cities. *Robert C. Fried* 11
Primary Rules, Political Power, and Social Change. *James I. Lengle and Byron Shafer* 25
Elections and Public Policy. *Benjamin Ginsberg* 41
The Supreme Court and National Policy Making. *Jonathan D. Casper* 50
Beyond Dogma and Despair: Toward a Critical Theory of Politics. *Fred R. Dallmayr* 64
Procedural Norms and Tolerance: A Reassessment. *David G. Lawrence* 80
Presidential Influence in the House: Presidential Prestige as a Source of Presidential Power. *George C. Edwards III* 101
Political Innovation of the West German Federal Constitutional Court: The State of Discussion on Judicial Review. *Fritz Nova* 114
Agenda Building as A Comparative Political Process. *Roger Cobb, Jennie Keith-Ross, and Marc Howard Ross* 126
APSA Presidential Address
Introduction. *Pendleton Herring* 139
"The Divine Science": Political Engineering in American Culture. *Austin Ranney* 140
Communications 149
Editorial Comment 181
Book Reviews and Essays 184
The Political Economy of the Multinational Corporation: Three Contrasting Perspectives. *Robert Gilpin* 184
The Great Nuremberg Trial. *John H. E. Fried* 192

Number 2–June 1976

Mobilized and Proletarian Diasporas. *John A. Armstrong* 393
Public Affairs Television and the Growth of Political Malaise: The Case of "The Selling of the Pentagon." *Michael J. Robinson* 409
A Reassessment of Conventional Wisdom About the Informed Public: National Political Information in Ghana. *Fred M. Hayward* 433
Comment: Further Reassessment of the "Conventional Wisdom": Political Knowledge and Voting Behavior in Rural Kenya. *Joel D. Barkan* 452
Clashing Beliefs Within the Executive Branch: The Nixon Administration Bureaucracy. *Joel D. Aberbach and Bert A. Rockman* 456
Generational Change and the Decline of Party Identification in America: 1952–1974. *Paul R. Abramson* 469
Local Autonomy in China During the Cultural Revolution: The Theoretical Uses of an Atypical Case. *Lynn T. White III* 479
Four Theories in Search of a Reality: James Burnham, Soviet Communism, and the Cold War. *John P. Diggins* 492
Prediction Analysis in Political Research. *David K. Hildebrand, James D. Laing and Howard Rosenthal* 502
Communications 536
Editorial Comment 557
Book Reviews and Essays 560
"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954. A Review Essay. *Geoffrey S. Smith* 560
Political Participation in America: A Review Essay. *Jerrold G. Rusk* 583
Recent Writing on Northern Ireland. *John H. Whyte* 592

Number 3–September 1976

Standing to Sue: Interest Group Conflict in the Federal Courts. *Karen Orren* 723
The Theory of Political Ambiguity. *Benjamin I. Page* 742
A Majority Party in Disarray: Policy Polarization in the 1972 Election. *Arthur H. Miller, Warren E. Miller, Alden S. Raine, Thad A. Brown* 753
Comment. *Samuel Popkin, John W. Gorman, Charles Phillips, Jeffrey A. Smith* 779
Comment. *Frederick T. Steeper and Robert M. Teeter* 806

Comment. *David E. RePass* 814
Rejoinder. *Arthur H. Miller and Warren E. Miller* 832
Performance and Instability in Military and Nonmilitary Regime Systems. *R. D. McKinlay and A. S. Cohan* 850
Science and Rule in Bacon's Utopia: An Introduction to the Reading of the *New Atlantis*. *J. Weinberger* 865
"Virtue, Obligation and Politics" Revisited. *Richard M. Bank and Steven R. McCarl* 886
The Future of Community Control. *Norman I. Fainstein and Susan S. Fainstein* 905
Communications 924
Editorial Comment 937
Book Reviews and Essays 939
On the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*. *Ralph Ross* 939
Philosophy and International Violence. *Terry Nardin* 952

Number 4–December 1976

Editorial Comment 1030
Industrial Conflict in Advanced Industrial Societies. *Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr.* 1033
The Political Psychology of Religion in Plato's *Laws*. *Thomas L. Pangle* 1059
Politicians in Uniform: Military Governments and Social Change in the Third World. *Robert W. Jackman* 1078
Political Compliance and U.S. Trade Dominance. *Neil R. Richardson* 1098
Primates and Political Authority: A Biobehavioral Perspective. *Fred H. Willhoite, Jr.* 1110
Political Processes and Public Expenditures: A Re-examination Based on Theories of Representative Government. *R. Kenneth Godwin and W. Bruce Shepard* 1127
Crude Communism and Revolution. *David Resnick* 1136
Comment. *Shlomo Avineri* 1146
Rejoinder. *David Resnick.* 1150
Explaining Party Cohesion in Congress: The Case of Shared Policy Attitudes. *Helmut Norpoth* 1156
Symmetric Spatial Games Without Majority Rule Equilibria. *Richard D. McKelvey and Peter C. Ordeshook* 1172
An Interorganizational Analysis of Power, Conflict, and Settlements in Public-Sector Collective Bargaining. *James L. Perry and Charles H. Levine* 1185
Hollow Victory: The Minimum Winning Coalition. *Russell Hardin* 1202
Communications 1215
Book Reviews and Essays 1234
Government and the Media. *Ithiel de Sola Pool* 1234
Detente, Arms Control and Strategy: Perspectives on SALT. *Colin S. Gray* 1242
Index to Volume LXX 1394

Announcing
the Outstanding Candidate in '76



the new Third Edition of

DEMOCRACY UNDER PRESSURE
An Introduction to the American Political System

MILTON C. CUMMINGS, JR., The Johns Hopkins University
DAVID WISE

...the best-selling introduction to American government, acclaimed in its previous edition as "The most current, topical, and provocative introductory textbook of its kind."* *Democracy Under Pressure* offers a critical yet balanced examination of the processes and structures of the American political system written in a style that is at once scholarly, highly readable, and thought-provoking. And this new Third Edition—as current, topical, and provocative as its predecessors—analyzes such recent developments in American politics as:

- the 1976 presidential primaries, nominating conventions, and election
- election reforms and the workings of the new Federal Election Commission
- abuses of power by federal intelligence agencies; the Church and Pike committee investigations; the new Senate oversight committee and its proposed legislative reforms.
- the impact of the Burger Court on civil rights and civil liberties
- multinational corporations and their growing influence both at home and abroad
- our growing awareness of the limitations of governmental solutions to national problems
- our understanding of the restraints on American power throughout the world
- the issues raised by our energy needs vs. ecological stability

Publication: *Spring 1977*

*William J. Jervey, Florida Technological University

DEMOCRACY UNDER PRESSURE

...the winning candidate in '76

Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc.
New York · Chicago · San Francisco · Atlanta

The American Political Science Review

Vol. LXX March 1976 No. 1

CONTENTS

11 Party and Policy in West German Cities — Robert C. Fried

25 Primary Rules, Political Power, and Social Change — James I. Lengle and Byron Shafer

41 Elections and Public Policy — Benjamin Ginsberg

50 The Supreme Court and National Policy Making — Jonathan D. Casper

64 Beyond Dogma and Despair: Toward a Critical Theory of Politics — Fred R. Dallmayr

80 Procedural Norms and Tolerance: A Reassessment — David G. Lawrence

Presidential Influence in the House: Presidential Prestige as a Source of Presidential Power — George C. Edwards III

114 Political Innovation of the West German Federal Constitutional Court: The State of Discussion on Judicial Review — Fritz Nova

126 Agenda Building as A Comparative Political Process — Roger Cobb, Jennie Keith-Ross, and Marc Howard Ross

APSA Presidential Address

139 Introduction — Pendleton Herring

140 "The Divine Science": Political Engineering in American Culture — Austin Ranney

149 Communications

181 Editorial Comment

184 Book Reviews and Essays

184 The Political Economy of the Multinational Corporation: Three Contrasting Perspectives — Robert Gilpin

192 The Great Nuremberg Trial — John H. E. Fried

391
·005

...ation: Curtis Reed Plaza, Menasha, Wisconsin.
...P. S. King and Staples, Ltd., Great Smith Street, Westminster, London.
...tage paid at Washington, D.C., and at additional mailing offices.
...ted States of America by George Banta Company, Inc., Menasha, Wisconsin.
...by The American Political Science Association.

UNIVERSITY

Effective January 1, 1976, all manuscripts submitted for possible publication in the *Review* should go to

Professor Charles O. Jones, Managing Editor Elect
Department of Political Science, Mervis Hall
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15260

Correspondence about all issues up to and including the issue of September 1977 should continue to be addressed to the managing editor in Berkeley.

ARTICLES

11 **Party and Policy in West German Cities.** This paper attempts to measure the impact of party ideology focusing on policy making in West German urban government. An effort is made to determine whether city governments under the control of leftist parties sponsor different, possibly more leftist policies than cities under conservative control. It is found that while "leftist" control of municipal administrations does not produce leftist policies, conservative control does have a major impact in inhibiting the growth in the scope of local government.

Several reasons for the only rough correspondence between party control and policy are examined. The low correlation between leftist (SPD) control and municipal output is traced to differences among SPD cities in the power of the SPD majority, in class structure, and in degree of financial independence. It is also traced to the lack of intercorrelation among the forms of "leftist" performance and the incremental nature of most urban policy making. Other factors—the power of municipal counter-elites and the federalistic structure of the West German government—are discounted as possible intervening variables.

By ROBERT C. FRIED, Professor of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles.

---

25 **Primary Rules, Political Power, and Social Change.** This paper examines the relationship between the kinds of delegate allocation rules used in Democratic presidential primaries (Winner-Take-All, Districted, and Proportional) and the power of various states within the national Democratic party. It demonstrates that these rules are often, in the short run, more important than a state's voters in determining the fate of particular candidates. It shows, in the middle run, that different types of states are clearly favored by different sets of primary regulations. It closes with some speculation about the long-run impact of these tendencies.

By JAMES I. LENGLE, Supervisor, American History and Institutions Office, University of California, Berkeley, and BYRON SHAFER, Acting Instructor, University of California, Berkeley.

Elections and Public Policy. In the absence of historical opinion survey data, studies of the linkage between popular voting and American public policy have been confined to relatively recent time periods. Questions about these linkages, however, necessarily have a temporal dimension—what is the relationship between voting and policy over time?

This paper establishes criteria for citizen policy choice that do not depend on opinion surveys. Data drawn from national party platforms and U.S. statutes, and aggregate voting data are compared to determine the extent to which majority choices are translated into national policy over time. Analysis of these data suggests that whether or not voters are completely aware of all of the implications of their actions, over time, popular majorities appear to govern.

By BENJAMIN GINSBERG Assistant Professor of Government, Cornell University.

---

50 **The Supreme Court and National Policy Making.** The role of the Supreme Court of the United States in national policy making has long been a subject of debate among students of the American legal system and of democratic theory. Both the relative influence of the Court vis-à-vis other political institutions and the implications of judicial review for principles of majority rule and democracy have been central to this discussion. Perhaps the most influential account of the role of the Court offered in recent years is Robert A. Dahl's 1957 article, "Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Role of the Supreme Court in National Policy-Making." Dahl argues that the Court, like other political institutions, is a member of the stable ruling coalitions that dominate American politics, and that its decisions are generally supportive of the policies emerging from other political institutions.

Consideration of the way Dahl interprets his own evidence, of Court decisions since 1957, and of other relevant evidence that is excluded from his analysis (particularly the activities of the Court in statutory construction and in cases arising out of states and localities) suggests that the Court participates more significantly in national policy making than Dahl's argument admits.

By JONATHAN D. CASPER, Associate Professor of Political Science, Stanford University.

---

64 **Beyond Dogma and Despair: Toward a Critical Theory of Politics.** In contradistinction both to positivist empiricism and to the essentialism of "traditional" political thought, the paper delineates an approach to political study and theory stressing the critical interrogation between inquirer or participant and the experienced world. The approach—which relies chiefly on existential phenomenology and recent writings of the Frankfurt School—is illustrated and explicated in three contexts: those of philosophical anthropology, of epistemology, and of ethics and political action. With regard to the conception of "human nature," critical theory refuses to equate man either with a reactive mechanism or with pure consciousness, preferring to treat him as an embodied creature concerned (in Heidegger's terms) with the sense of his existence. In the domain of epistemology, the sketched

outlook deviates from simple "mirror" doctrines by emphasizing the experiential underpinnings of cognition and the need for continuous symbolic articulation. Concerning ethics, the perspective opposes both cognitivist and noncognitivist formulas in favor of the critical reconstruction of standards implicit in everyday life. The concluding portion of the paper indicates the relevance of such standards for practical politics and contemporary democratic theory.

By FRED R. DALLMAYR, Professor of Political Science, Purdue University.

---

80 **Procedural Norms and Tolerance: A Reassessment.** This paper is both a criticism and extension of a small existing literature on procedural norms and tolerance which has been influential in several interpretations of American politics but which suffers from both conceptual and empirical shortcomings.

The existing literature concludes that tolerance is not widely distributed in the American mass public: unpopular groups such as Communists or atheists would not be allowed political activity by most Americans despite supposed acceptance by all of the principle of minority rights. The literature suggests that hostile attitudes towards the issue or group involved prevents application of the tolerant general norm in specific instances.

By failing to adequately measure or control for either issue orientation or general norms, however, the existing literature risks misrepresenting the actual extent and character of tolerance. This study discusses the weaknesses of the existing literature, describes how such weaknesses can be eliminated, and reports data which modify and expand the findings of past research for an updated set of issues, groups, and political acts.

By DAVID G. LAWRENCE. Assistant Professor of Political Science, Fordham University.

---

101 **Presidential Influence in the House: Presidential Prestige as a Source of Presidential Power.** Presidential prestige or popularity has often been cited as an important source of presidential influence in Congress. It has not been empirically and systematically demonstrated, however, that such a relationship exists. This study examines a variety of relationships between presidential prestige and presidential support in the U.S. House of Representatives. The relationships between overall national presidential popularity on the one hand and overall, domestic, and foreign policy presidential support in the House as a whole and among various groups of congressmen on the other are generally weak. Consistently strong relationships *are* found between presidential prestige among Democratic party identifiers and presidential support among Democratic congressmen. Similar relationships are found between presidential prestige among the more partisan Republican party identifiers and the presidential support by Republican congressmen. Explanations for these findings are presented, and the findings are related to broader questions of American politics.

By GEORGE C. EDWARDS III, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Tulane University.

---

114 **Political Innovation of the West German Federal Constitutional Court: The State of Discussion on Judicial Review.** The Watergate controversies and especially the recent decision in Richard M. Nixon versus the United States on July 24, 1974 have again raised in the United States the problem of the political limits to judicial policy making and the need to strike a new balance among the three branches of government for preserving and maintaining a democratic policy. In this paper, which is based on largely primary judicial, political, and academic German sources up to the year 1972, the development of jurisprudence of the West German Federal Constitutional Court is analyzed and discussed, particularly the Court's experience with judicial review. The article is geared toward the student of comparative constitutionalism and comparative government, offering possible lessons to the United States and other Common Law constitutional courts. Less concerned with the practical work of the Court, except for brief comments on actual performance, the paper focuses on such problems as past and present German approval and disapproval of the notion of judicial review, the often erudite disputation on the merits of constitutional—especially "creative"—jurisprudence; the discussion on the political limits of judicial review; and trends in particular philosophical positions of the Court in contemporary West Germany.

By FRITZ NOVA, Professor of Political Science, Villanova University.

---

126 **Agenda Building as a Comparative Political Process.** Agenda building is the process through which demands of various groups in a population are translated into issues which vie for the attention of decision makers (formal agenda) and/or the public (public agenda). This paper presents three models for the comparative study of agenda building. The *outside initiative* model describes groups with minimal prior access to decision makers, who must consequently first expand their issues to a public agenda before they can hope to reach the formal agenda. The *mobilization* model accounts for issues which are placed on the formal agenda by political leaders, who subsequently attempt to expand these issues to the public agenda to obtain the support required for implementation. The *inside access* model refers to leaders, or to those having close contact with these leaders, who seek to place issues on the formal agenda directly, and for whom expansion to the public agenda is both unnecessary and undesirable.

Propositions are stated about intergroup variation in patterns of agenda building within societies; about variations in success rates for different strategies and probabilities of occurrence for the three models in different types of societies; and about characteristics of the agenda-building process which hold in all three models and in any social setting.

By ROGER W. COBB, Associate Professor of Political Science, Brown University, JENNIE-KEITH ROSS, Associate Professor of Anthropology, Swarthmore College, and MARC HOWARD ROSS, Associate Professor of Political Science, Bryn Mawr College.

APSA Presidential Address

139 **Introduction**

By PENDLETON HERRING, Princeton, New Jersey.

"The Divine Science": Political Engineering in American Culture. The American polity's designers proceeded from what John Adams called "the divine science of politics"—an approach very close to that of modern empirical political science. It was rooted in their conviction that truth is best discovered by the systematic investigation of experience; they investigated experience with methods primitive by modern standards but advanced for the eighteenth century; they applied their findings to the design of political institutions; and they regarded all institutions as experimental, to be revised when experience indicates. This faith in political and social engineering has remained ever since a major element in American political culture. It has recently been shaken by Vietnam, Watergate, and other systemic failures; but it is still far preferable to alternative faiths, especially if we today can cool our rhetoric, moderate our expectations, and recapture the pragmatic, experimental mood of those who created "the divine science."

By AUSTIN RANNEY, Professor of Political Science, University of Wisconsin, Madison.

---

149 COMMUNICATIONS

From Max Neiman; Richard Child Hill, William Lyons and David R. Morgan, John Wanat and Phillip W. Roeder, Douglas D. Rose, Kazuhiko Okuda, N. Patrick Peritore

---

181 EDITORIAL COMMENT

---

184 BOOK REVIEWS AND ESSAYS

184 **The Political Economy of the Multinational Corporation: Three Contrasting Perspectives.** Jagdish Bhagwati, ed., *Economics and World Order: From the 1970's to the 1990's*; Kari Levitt, *Silent Surrender: The American Economic Empire in Canada*; Raymond Vernon, *Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises.*

By ROBERT GILPIN, Professor of Politics and International Affairs, Princeton University.

192 **The Great Nuremberg Trial.** *The Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Nov. 14, 1945–Oct. 1, 1946.* With a New Introduction by Gerhard L. Weinberg; *Report of Robert H. Jackson (on) The International Conference on Military Trials, London, 1945.*

By JOHN H. E. FRIED, Professor of Political Science, City University of New York.

---

198 **Political Theory, History of Political Thought and Methodology**

Benjamin R. Barber, *The Death of Communal Liberty: A History of Freedom in a Swiss Mountain Canton.* Jurg Steiner, p. 198

Robert Brown, *Rules and Laws in Sociology.* Arthur L. Stinchcombe, p. 199

K. Fan, ed., *Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao: Post Revolutionary Writing:* and M. Rejai, ed., *Mao Tse-tung on Revolution and War.* Stuart R. Schram, p. 200

R. L. Hamblin et al., *A Mathematical Theory of Social Change,* Samuel A. Kirkpatrick, p. 202

James F. Herndon and Joseph L. Bernd, eds., *Mathematical Applications in Political Science, VII,* Kui B. Rai, p. 202

Institut de Sociologie, *Le nationalisme, facteur belligène.* Pierre Hassner, p. 203

Herman Kahn and B. Bruce-Briggs, *Things to Come: Thinking about the 70's and 80's.* Philip Hone Auerbach. p. 205

Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The Revolution of 1848–49: Articles from the Neue Rhenische Zeitung.* David Hillel Ruben, p. 206
Matthew Melko, *52 Peaceful Societiel.* Kenneth E. Boulding, p. 206
Arthur J. Slavin, ed., *Tudor Men and Institutions: Studies in English Law and Government.* T. B. Pugh, p. 207
Beryl Smalley, *The Becket Conflict and the Schools: A Study of Intellectuals in Politics.* Ernest L. Fortin, p. 208
Sterling Stuckey, *The Ideological Origins of Black Nationalism;* and C. Eric Lincoln, *The Black Muslims in America.* Hanes Walton, Jr., p. 209

---

210 American Government and Politics

Bernard Asbell, *The F.D.R. Memoirs: A Speculation on History.* Paul T. Heffron, p. 210
Ralph J. Bunche, *The Political Status of the Negro in the Age of FDR.* Robert E. Martin, p. 211
John D. Buenker, *Urban Liberalism and Progressive Reform.* Robert E. O'Connor, p. 212
James MacGregor Burns, *Uncommon Sense.* Franklin L. Burdette, p. 213
William R. Corson, *Consequences of Failure.* Arnold Beichman, p. 214
William M. Dick, *Labor and Socialism in America: The Gompers Era;* Carl Reeve, *The Life and Times of Daniel De Leon;* and Sally M. Miller, *Victor Berger and the Promise of Constructive Socialism, 1910–1920.* David Kettler, p. 215
W. Scott Ford, *Interracial Public Housing in Border City.* Leonard S. Rubinowitz, p. 217
F. Chris Garcia, *Political Socialization of Chicano Children: A Comparative Study with Anglos in California Schools.* James W. Clarke, p. 218
Edward L. Henry, ed., *Micropolis in Transition: A Study of a Small City.* Russell D. Murphy, p. 219
Herbert Harvey Hyman, ed., *The Politics of Health Care: Nine Case Studies of Innovative Planning in New York City.* Eveline M. Burns, p. 220
Nathaniel S. Keith, *Politics and the Housing Crisis Since 1930.* W. Scott Ford, p. 220
Harald B. Malmgren, ed., *Pacific Basin Development: The American Interests.* Donald C. Hellman, p. 221
Rufus E. Miles, Jr., *The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.* Harold Seidman, p. 222
Irene L. Murphy, *Public Policy on the Status of Women.* Norma Noonan, p. 223
Jane H. Pease and William H. Pease, *Bound with Them in Chains: A Biographical History of the Antislavery Movement.* Peter Kolchin, p. 224
Kirk R. Petshek, *The Challenge of Urban Reform: Policies and Programs in Philadelphia.* Miriam Ershkowitz, p. 224
John Snetsinger, *Truman, the Jewish Vote, and the Creation of Israel.* Alan Fisher, p. 225
Dennis P. Sobin, *The Working Poor: Minority Workers in Low-Wage, Low-Skill Jobs.* Kathleen A. Frankovic, p. 226
Melvin T. Urofsky, ed., *Perspectives on Urban America.* Betty H. Zisk, p. 227
Harry M. Ward, *Statism in Plymouth Colony.* Paul R. Lucas, p. 228
Robert Paul Wolff, ed., *1984 Revisted: Prospects for American Politics.* Joseph A. Schlesinger, p. 229
Alan J. Wyner, *Executive Ombudsmen in the United States.* William B. Gwyn, p. 230

---

232 Comparative Government and Politics

Irma Adelman and Cynthia Taft Morris, *Economic Growth and Social Equity in Developing Countries.* Karl de Schweinitz, Jr., p. 232
Robert J. Alexander, *Agrarian Reform in Latin America.* Peter Ranis, p. 233
Edward Allworth, ed., *The Nationality Question in Soviet Central Asia.* G. Jukes, p. 234
Paul Alpert, *Partnership or Confrontation?: Poor Lands and Rich.* Gunnar Adler-Karlsson, p. 235
Elaine Baldwin, *Differentiation and Co-operation in an Israeli Veteran Moshav.* Khayyam Z. Paltiel, p. 236
E. A. Brett, *Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa: The Politics of Economic Change, 1919–1939.* Bruce J. Berman, p. 237
Ronald Cohen and John Middleton, eds., *From Tribe to Nation in Africa.* Michael F. Lofchie, p. 238
D. W. Fokkema, *Report from Peking: Observations of a Western Diplomat on the Cultural Revolution.* G. Eric Hansen, p. 239
Theodore Geiger and Frances M. Geiger, *Tales of Two City-States: The Development Progress of Hong Kong and Singapore.* Robert E. Gamer, p. 240
George M. Haddad, *Revolutions and Military Rule in the Middle East: The Arab States, Vol. III—Egypt, The Sudan, Yemen and Libya.* Abdo I. Baaklini, p. 241
Carroll Hawkins, *Two Democratic Labor Leaders in Conflict: The Latin American Revolution and the Role of the Workers.* Robert J. Alexander, p. 242
Martin O. Heisler, ed., *Politics in Europe: Structures and Processes in Some Postindustrial Democracies.* Norman Furniss, p. 243
William Henderson, *West New Guinea: The Dispute and its Settlement.* Ralph R. Premdas, p. 244
Judith M. Hughes, *To the Maginot Line: The Politics of French Military Preparation in the 1920's.* Jonathan M. House, p. 245
Joel Hurstfield, *Freedom, Corruption, and Government in Elizabethan England.* Frank F. Foster, p. 245

Thomas Karis and Gwendolen M. Carter, *From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa, 1882–1964, Vols. I & II.* James P. Barber, p. 246
A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, *Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria: A Documentary Source Book, 1966–1970.* Richard L. Sklar, p. 247
Vincent Lemieux, *Le Quotient Politique Vrai.* Robert J. Jackson, p. 248
Kenneth Medhurst, ed., *Allende's Chile.* Michael J. Francis, p. 249
Eric A. Nordlinger, *Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies.* Fred R. von der Mehden, p. 250
James Petras, ed., *Latin America: From Dependence to Revolution.* Kenneth Medhurst, p. 250
Arturo C. Porzecanski, *Uruguary's Tupamaros: The Urban Guerrilla.* Ronald H. McDonald, p. 252
Robert D. Putnam, *The Beliefs of Politicians: Ideology, Conflict and Democracy in Britain and Italy.* Leon D. Epstein, p. 253
Itamar Rabinovich, *Syria Under the Ba'th, 1963–66: The Army-Party Sumbiosis.* Leonard Binder, p. 254
Erik Rasmussen, ed., *Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. VII/1972.* Eric S. Einhorn, p. 255
Abderrahman Robana, *The Prospects for an Economic Community in North Africa.* Yassin El-Ayouty, p. 256
Donald Rothchild, *Racial Bargaining in Independent Kenya: A Study of Minorities and Decolonization.* David K. Leondard, p. 258
Muhammad Sadik and William P. Snavely, *Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates: Colonial Past, Present Problems and Future Prospects.* Fred J. Khouri, p. 259
Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-Sik Lee, *Communism in Korea, Vol I: The Movement: Vol. II: The Society.* Princeton Lyman, p. 260
Stuart B. Schwartz, *Sovereignty and Society in Colonial Brazil: The High Court of Bahia and its Judges, 1609–1751.* Keith S. Rosenn, p. 262
William Shawcross, *Crime and Compromise: Janos Kadar and the Politics of Hungary Since Revolution.* John C. Campbell, p. 263
Dusan Sijanski, *Political Decision Making Processes: Studies in National, Comparative and International Politics.* Linda P. Brady, p. 264
David R. Smock and Audrey C. Smock, *Cultural and Political Aspects of Rural Transformation: A Case Study of Eastern Nigeria.* Robert Melson, p. 265
Leon E. Stover, *The Cultural Ecology of Chinese Civilization: Presents and Elities in the Last of the Agrarian States.* John K. Fairbank, p. 266
Kakuei Tanaka, *Building a New Japan: A Plan for Remodeling the Japanese Archipelago.* Ardath W. Burks, p. 267
Bruce Thordarson, *Trudeau and Foreign Policy: A Study in Decision-Making.* Roger Frank Swanson, p. 268
Fred R. von der Mehden, *Comparative Political Violence.* Cynthia H. Enloe, p. 269
Donald P. Whitaker et al., *Area Handbook for the Khmer Republic (Cambodia).* Stanley J. Heginbotham, p. 270
Richard D. Wolff, *The Economics of Colonialism: Britain and Kenya, 1870–1930.* Robert L. Tignor, p. 271
Oliver Woshinsky, *The French Deputy: Incentives and Behavior in the National Assembly.* William H. Hunt, p. 271
Yuan-li Wu and Robert B. Sheeks, *The Organization and Support of Scientific Research and Development in Mainland China.* Alice Langley Hsieh, p. 272
Norman L. Zucker, *The Coming Crisis in Israel: Private Faith and Public Policy.* Paul Ritterband, p. 273

---

274 International Politics, Law and Organization

Nobuya Bamba, *Japanese Diplomacy in a Dilemma: New Light on Japan's China Policy.* Hideo Sato, p. 274
James Barros, ed., *The United Nations: Past, Present, and Future.* Harold K. Jacobson, p. 275
C. Fred Bergsten, ed., *The Future of the International Economic Order: An Agenda for Research.* Benjamin J. Cohen, p. 277
Frank Browning and Dorothy Forman, eds., *The Wasted Nations: Report of the International Commission of Enquiry into United States Crimes in Indochina, June 20–25, 1971.* Douglas Kinnard, p. 278
Elizabeth A. Finch, *The Politics of Regional Integration: A Study of Uruguay's Decision to Join LAFTA.* Russell H. Fitzgibbon, p. 279
Mohamed Heikal, *The Cario Documents: The Inside Story of Nasser and His Relationship with World Leaders, Rebels, and Statesmen.* R. H. Dekmejian, p. 280
Roger E. Kanet, ed., *The Soviet Union and the Developing Nations.* Bernard P. Kiernan, p. 280
Don E. Kash, Irvin L. White, et al., *Energy Under the Oceans: A Technology Assessment of Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Operations.* Charles O. Jones, p. 282
George W. Keeton and Georg Schwarzenberger, *The Year Book of World Affairs, 1973.* Peter R. Baehr, p. 283
Lawrence B. Krause and Walter S. Salant, eds., *European Monetary Unification and its Meaning for the United States.* Edward A. Kolodziej, p. 284
Charles B. McLane, *Soviet-Asian Relations.* Kurt L. London, p. 286
Tibor Mende, *From Aid to Recolonization: Lessons of a Failure.* Susan Aurelia Gitelson, p. 286
James William Morley, ed., *Japan's Foreign Policy, 1868–1941: A Research Guide.* Chalmers Johnson, p. 287
R. C. Mowat, *Creating the European Community.* Stuart A. Scheingold, p. 288
Thomas G. Paterson, *Soviet-American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War.* Bernard S. Morris, p. 289
Michla Pomerance, *The Advisory Function of the International Court in the League and U.N. Eras.* Edward Gordon, p. 291

Ernest H. Preeg, *Economic Blocs and U.S. Foreign Policy*. W. Andrew Axline, p. 292
Bruce M. Russett, *No Clear and Present Danger: A Skeptical View of the U.S. Entry into World War II*. Morton J. Tenzer, p. 293
Solomon Slonim, *South West Africa and the United Nations: An International Mandate in Dispute*. Marinus Wiechers, p. 294.
Arthur A. Stahnke, ed., *China's Trade with the West: A Political and Economic Analysis*. Daniel Tretiak, p. 295
Richard W. Sterling, *Macropolitics: International Relations in a Global Society*. Kenneth N. Waltz, p. 296
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *The Arms Trade with the Third World:* and Miles D. Wolpin, *Military Aid and Counterrevolution in the Third World*. Colin S. Gray, p. 297
James D. Theberge, *Russia in the Caribbean*. Carl C. Moses, p. 300
Stephen R. Weissman, *American Foreign Policy in the Congo, 1960–1964*. M. Crawford Young, p. 300
Charles W. Yost, *The Conduct and Misconduct of Foreign Affairs: Reflections on U.S. Foreign Policy Since World War II*. Earl C. Ravenal, p. 302

The American Political Science Association

1527 New Hampshire Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

President: JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, Williams College; *President-Elect:* SAMUEL H. BEER, Harvard University; *Vice Presidents:* RICHARD F. FENNO, University of Rochester; BARBARA HINCKLEY, University of Wisconsin, Madison; AARON WILDAVSKY, University of California, Berkeley; *Secretary:* FRED I. GREENSTEIN, Princeton University; *Treasurer:* BETTY A. NESVOLD, San Diego State University; *Program Co-Chairpersons:* BENJAMIN R. BARBER, Rutgers University, and FRANCES FOX PIVEN, Boston University; *Executive Director:* EVRON M. KIRKPATRICK, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036; *Managing Editor, APSR:* NELSON W. POLSBY, University of California, Berkeley.

COUNCIL: (Above-named Officers *ex officiis*), 1975–76: HAYWARD R. ALKER, JR., MIT; LEONARD BINDER, University of Chicago; SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, Stanford University; DALE ROGERS MARSHALL, University of California, Davis; SAMUEL C. PATTERSON, University of Iowa; FRANCES FOX PIVEN, Boston University; MULFORD Q. SIBLEY, University of Minnesota; JOHN E. TURNER, University of Minnesota; 1976–77; JAMES DAVID BARBER, Duke University; SUZANNE BERGER, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; JAMES B. CHRISTOPH, Indiana University; DANIEL J. ELAZAR, Temple University; HERBERT JACOB, Northwestern University; M. KENT JENNINGS, University of Michigan; INEZ SMITH REID, Barnard College; JAMES N. ROSENAU, University of Southern California.

FORMER PRESIDENTS: FRANK J. GOODNOW, ALBERT SHAW, FREDERIC N. JUDSON, JAMES BRYCE, A. LAWRENCE LOWELL, WOODROW WILSON, SIMEON E. BALDWIN, ALBERT BUSHNELL HART, W. W. WILLOUGHBY, JOHN BASSETT MOORE, ERNST FREUND, JESSE MACY, MUNROE SMITH, HENRY JONES FORD, PAUL S. REINSCH, LEO S. ROWE, WILLIAM A. DUNNING, HARRY A. GARFIELD, JAMES W. GARNER, CHARLES E. MERRIAM, CHARLES A. BEARD, WILLIAM B. MUNRO, JESSE S. REEVES, JOHN A. FAIRLIE, BENJAMIN F. SHAMBAUGH, EDWARD S. CORWIN, WILLIAM F. WILLOUGHBY. ISIDOR LOEB, WALTER J. SHEPARD, FRANCIS W. COKER, ARTHUR N. HOLCOMBE, THOMAS REED POWELL, CLARENCE A. DYKSTRA, CHARLES GROVE HAINES, ROBERT C. BROOKS, FREDERIC, A. OGG, WILLIAM ANDERSON, ROBERT E. CUSHMAN, LEONARD D. WHITE, JOHN M. GAUS, WALTER F. DODD, ARTHUR W. MACMAHON, HENRY R. SPENCER, QUINCY WRIGHT, JAMES K. POLLOCK, PETER H. ODEGARD, LUTHER H. GULICK, PENDLETON HERRING, RALPH J. BUNCHE, CHARLES MCKINLEY, HAROLD D. LASSWELL, E. E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, V. O. KEY, JR., R. TAYLOR COLE, CARL B. SWISHER, EMMETTE S. REDFORD, CHARLES S. HYNEMAN, CARL J. FRIEDRICH, C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, DAVID B. TRUMAN, GABRIEL A. ALMOND, ROBERT A. DAHL, MERLE FAINSOD, DAVID EASTON, KARL W. DEUTSCH, ROBERT E. LANE, HEINZ EULAU, ROBERT E. WARD, AVERY LEISERSON, AUSTIN RANNEY.

The American Political Science Review

Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley 94720

EDITORIAL BOARD: NELSON W. POLSBY, *Managing Editor, University of California Berkeley;* CHARLES O. JONES, *Managing Editor Elect, University of Pittsburgh;* PHILIP SIEGELMAN, *Book Review Editor, San Francisco State University;* SHLOMO AVINERI, *The Hebrew University of Jerusalem;* LUCIUS BARKER, *Washington University;* BRIAN BARRY, *University of British Columbia;* RICHARD A. BRODY, *Stanford University;* SAMUEL D. COOK, *Dillard University;* ELMER E. CORNWELL, *Brown University;* S. RUFUS DAVIS, *Monash University;* ROBERT J. JACKSON, *Carleton University;* ROBERT JERVIS, *University of California, Los Angeles;* DALE ROGERS MARSHALL, *University of California, Davis;* RUSSELL D. MURPHY, *Wesleyan University;* JOAN M. NELSON, *Washington, D.C.;* J. ROLAND PENNOCK, *Swarthmore College;* SAMUEL L. POPKIN, *University of California, San Diego;* ROBERT D. PUTMAN, *University of Michigan;* DOUGLAS W. RAE, *Yale University;* AUSTIN RANNEY, *University of Wisconsin;* GIOVANNI SARTORI, *University of Florence;* MICHAEL J. SHAPIRO, *University of Hawaii;* JAY STARLING, *Southern Methodist University;* STEPHEN V. STEPHENS, *Baltimore, Maryland;* George E. VON DER MUHLL, *University of California, Santa Cruz;* RICHARD A. WATSON, *University of Missouri;* RICHARD WINTERS, *Dartmouth College;* **MANUSCRIPT EDITOR:** ELLEN Y. SIEGELMAN. **EDITORIAL ASSISTANTS:** BETSEY COBB, RITA WILLIAMS. **EDITORIAL INTERNS:** ROBERT ARSENEAU, JONATHAN BENDOR, KENNETTE BENEDICT, BETH CAPELL, DON CHISHOLM, PETER COWHEY, SHAI FELDMAN, STEPHEN GENCO, EVELYN DEBORAH JAY, JOHN Q. JOHNSON, ELAINE KAMARCK, PAUL D. KARPS, JAMES I. LENGLE, IAN LUSTICK, DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DAVID RICHMAN, JENNY RING, STEVEN ROSENSTONE, STUART A. ROSS, SERGE TAYLOR, PHILIP J. WILSON, JOHN ZALLER

About the American Political Science Review

The American Political Science Review, published quarterly during the months of March, June, September, and December, is supplied to all APSA members. Membership dues are charged according to the following schedule:

Membership Category	*Dues*
Regular	
Annual income	
Under $12,000	$25
$12,000–14,999	$30
$15,000–19,999	$35
$20,000–24,999	$40
$25,000–29,999	$45
$30,000 and over	$50
Student and Retired	$12
Family	$5
Life	$1000
Institutional (includes *APSR* and *PS*)	$50 domestic $52 foreign

Student memberships are limited to five years per person. Foreign currency at the official exchange rate will be accepted for foreign subscriptions and foreign membership fees. The equivalent of $3 for additional postage should be added for foreign subscriptions.

Current issues are priced at $10.50 per copy; for *back issues prior* to 1970 address Walter J. Johnson, Inc., 355 Chestnut St., Norwood, New Jersey 07648; for issues 1970 and later send request directly to the American Political Science Association.

Applications for membership, orders for the *Review*, and remittances should be addressed to the Executive Director. The American Political Science Association, 1527 New Hampshire Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. *Notices of changes of address* should be received in the Washington office by the 25th day of the months before publication.

INSTRUCTIONS TO CONTRIBUTORS

Address correspondence about contributions to the *Review* concerning issues before the issue of September 1977 to Nelson W. Polsby, Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, California 94720, and issues after September 1977 (including all new manuscripts) starting January 1, 1976, to Charles O. Jones, Department of Political Science, Mervis Hall, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15260. Address all correspondence about pending manuscripts to Charles O. Jones.

Please submit *four* copies of a manuscript to be considered for publication. *Unfortunately, due to increased postage costs, we can no longer return manucripts to the author.* Manuscripts must be typed, mimeographed, or photocopied, with all written material double-spaced (including footnotes and quotations). Footnotes must appear at the end of the manuscript, not at the bottom of the page. Since manuscripts are sent out anonymously for evaluation, the author's name and affiliation should appear only on a separate covering sheet and all footnotes identifying the author should also appear on a separate sheet. An abstract of less than 150 words should accompany the manuscript.

Figures should be drawn on white paper with India ink and the original tracings or drawings retained by the author (for transmission later to the printer). Copies only should accompany the manuscript. Tables should be typed on a separate page. Insert a guide line, e.g., "Table 1 about here," at the appropriate place in the manuscript.

Consult recent issues of the APSR on other style matters. A style sheet is available and may be obtained by writing Mrs Kendall Stanley, Department of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pa. 15260.

Address books intended for review to Paul A. Beck and Robert S. Walters, Book Review Editors, *American Political Science Review*, Department of Political Science, Mervis Hall, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15260. Information, including News and Notes, for the Association's news-journal, *PS*, should be sent to 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036; advertising, reprint and circulation correspondence should be sent to the Executive Director at the Washington office. Domestic claims for non-receipt of issues must be made within six months of the month of publication; overseas claims, one year. Advertising information and rates are available from Nancy Edgerton, Adv. Manager, APSA, 1527 New Hamphsire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

Articles and notes appearing in the *Review* before the June 1953 issues were indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature*. Current issues are indexed by *The International Political Science Abstracts* and the *Social Sciences and Humanities Index*. Microfilm of the *Review*, beginning with Volume 1, may be obtained from University Microfilms, 313 North First Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106. A *Cumulative Index of the Review*, Volumes 1–62; 1906–1968, may also be obtained from University Microfilms. Articles appearing in the *Review* are listed regularly in *ABC Pol Sci* and *Current Contents: Behavioral, Social & Management Sciences*. Book reviews are indexed in *Book Review Index*.

Party and Policy in West German Cities*

ROBERT C. FRIED
University of California, Los Angeles

Of the larger cities in the world, half or more are governed under some form of competitive local democracy. We are just now beginning to study in systematic fashion the extent to which the forms and outcomes of political competition in those cities have an impact on policy.[1] We are examining such questions as the following:

Does community politics have an apparent, direct impact on policy?
Does it have an independent impact?
Does it have more impact than other variables?
Does it have an impact in the generally expected direction?

For more than a decade, some students of American subnational government have been suggesting that key aspects of state and local political systems, such as the degree of interparty competition and the ostensible political orientation of the controlling party, have little power—statistically speaking—to account for observed diversities in the scope and direction of local government policy. However, other students of American state and local government have found political variables to be of major importance in shaping policy and have argued that the weakness of political variables has not yet been properly demonstrated.[2]

The same issues are now being studied in non-American contexts, with particular attention to the impact of *party* politics on policy. Quantitative comparative studies of the partisan dimensions of municipal policy have been made for cities in about a dozen, mostly advanced nations.[3] Efforts are also being made to study the determinants and consequences of urban policy on a cross-national basis.[4] In general, the expectation has been that party politics would play an important role in shaping urban policy in Western Europe and Latin America where cities are governed by parties and where these parties are often polarized on the basis of class, ideology, and religion. While Republicans, Democrats, and nonpartisan personal fol-

* For assistance in the preparation and publication of this paper, I would like to thank the following: The Ford Foundation; the Academic Senate, Campus Computing Network and University Research Library of the University of California, Los Angeles; Professors Val Lorwin and Kenneth Newton; Ms. Jessica Wolfe; and Mr. Sigmund Wimmer of the German Municipal Association.

[1] For a synthesis of recent comparative studies of urban policy making, see Robert C. Fried, *Comparative Urban Performance*, Working Paper No. 1, European Urban Research, UCLA, which, in revised form appears as chapter 6 in volume 6 of *The Handbook of Political Science*, ed. Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975). The unimportance of political factors in policy making was first argued by Richard E. Dawson and James A. Robinson, "Interparty Competition, Economic Variables, and Welfare Policies in the United States," *Journal of Politics*, 25 (May 1963), 265–289; and by Thomas R. Dye, *Politics, Economics and the Public: Policy Outcomes in the American States*. (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966).

[2] The possible importance of politics in policy making is counter-argued in several pieces, including Ira Sharkansky, "Economic and Political Correlates of State Government Expenditures: General Tendencies and Deviant Cases," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 11 (May 1967), 173–192, *Spending in the American States* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968), and *Regionalism in American Politics* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970); Robert L. Lineberry and Edmund P. Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities," *American Political Science Review*, 61 (September 1967), 701–716; Terry N. Clark, "Community Structure, Decision-making, Budget Expenditures, and Urban Renewal in 51 American Communities," *American Sociological Review*, 33 (August 1968), 576–593; Michael Aiken and Robert R. Alford, "Community Structure and Innovation: The Case of Public Housing," *American Political Science Review*, 64 (September 1970), 843–864; Robert Eyestone, *The Threads of Public Policy* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971); Brian R. Fry and Richard F. Winters, "The Politics of Redistribution," *American Political Science Review*, 64 (June 1970), 508–522; Bernard H. Booms and James R. Halldorson, "The Politics of Redistribution: A Reformulation," *American Political Science Review*, 67 (September 1973), 924–933; and Peter B. Natchez and Irvin C. Bupp, "Policy and Priority in the Budgetary Process," *American Political Science Review*, 67 (September 1973), 951–963.

William Bicker argues that the case against the importance of politics as an output determinant has not yet been properly established in "The Effects of Malapportionment in the States: A Mistrial," in *Reapportionment in the 1970's*, ed. Nelson W. Polsby (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971).

[3] The countries: the United States, Belgium, Canada, England, Scotland, West Germany, Austria, Switzerland, France, Italy, and Venezuela. For references to these studies (as of 1973), see Fried, *Comparative Urban Performance*, pp. 63–81, where the reader will also find references to works concerning the impact of other kinds of political variables (e.g., party competitiveness, citizen turnout, etc.).

[4] On one such cross-national study, see Robert C. Fried, "The Performance of Cities: Explorations in Cross-National Comparison," Working Paper No. 4 (July 1964), European Urban Research project, University of California, Los Angeles. The EUR project is also conducting within-nation studies of the relationship between party variables, ecological variables, and policy variables for the 43 largest French communes (those over 100,000 population in 1968), the largest 38 Dutch communes (those over 50,000 population in 1965), and the largest 20 Swedish communes (those over 50,000 population in 1968).

lowings might not be expected to sponsor or produce distinctive local policy outputs, it is logical to expect greater diversity among the cities of Western Europe and Latin America, where local government is highly politicized and where the spectrum of ideology runs from neo-Fascism through Maoism to nihilism. In European cities, in particular, the socialist movement, with its stress on class solidarity, party discipline, and redistribution, has been active and influential in city government since World War I and before. It has recently been asserted, in fact, that European cities are, at least in this sense, more democratic than American cities because of the explicit representation in urban government of the working classes and the poor by socialist and communist parties.[5]

Great differences should logically be found in the policies pursued, for example, by Italian cities, which are governed by a wide range of political forces. But despite the political polarization within and among Italian cities, variance in the scope, orientation, and quality of Italian municipal government is more readily explained in terms of economic, social, and cultural variables ("ecological" variables) than in terms of party control variables. Only minor differences at times existed in the policies of municipal governments controlled by communist, Catholic, and neo-Fascist administrations. Partisan differences are much less important than regional (i.e., North-South) differences in accounting for differences and uniformities in the policies adopted by Italian city councils, at least in the larger communes. Indeed, region seems to be decisive not only in shaping municipal policy, but also in shaping whatever small impact party politics has had on municipal policy. Communist strength has been associated with conservative policies in the North and progressive policies in the South; Christian Democratic power, in contrast, has been associated with progressive policies in the North and conservative policies in the South. Exactly what variables, or complex of variables, make for the regional impact—which holds up even when socioeconomic variables are held constant—is still not clear.[6]

In any case, the study of Italian cities does suggest that party variables are relatively weak in shaping local policy and that there are sometimes major discrepancies between the kinds of policies we might expect to be associated with different sets of political forces and the kinds of policies with which, in practice, they are actually associated. Studies of the relation between party and municipal policy in other countries have produced mixed results. In some instances, party impact has been found to be strong and independent and to take the direction predicted by party location in the political spectrum. In many instances, however, party impact has been weak and, in some instances, contrary to prediction.[7]

Party and Policy in West Germany

This study of West German cities is concerned with the same kind of question: namely, the extent and direction of party impact on municipal policies. West German cities are particularly suitable for this kind of study. In the first place, comparative data on many aspects of municipal government in Germany have been systematically collected and published for many decades. The first statistical yearbook of the German Municipal Association dates back to 1890. Thus, abundant materials for the comparative study of German cities exist, though they have seldom been subjected to social science analysis.

West German cities are interesting also because municipal government in that country is competitive, party government. Thus in West German cities one can test the relative impact of party on policy, as well as the direction of party impact, if any. Where municipal government is nonpartisan or is dominated nationally by the same party, neither of these two questions can be directly examined. In West Germany, municipal government is party government. Local branches of the three dominant national parties—the Social Democrats (SPD), the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU), and the Free Democrats (FDP)—contend periodically for control over city councils and posts in the city executive.[8] The times of election,

[5] L. J. Sharpe, "American Democracy Reconsidered," *British Journal of Political Science*, 3 (January 1973), 1–28 and 3 (April 1973), 129–167. Similar comments applying to Rome may be found in Robert C. Fried, *Planning the Eternal City: Roman Politics and Planning Since World War II* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), pp. 255–256.

[6] See Robert C. Fried, "Communism, Urban Budgets, and the Two Italies: A Case Study in Comparative Urban Government," *The Journal of Politics*, 33 (November 1971), 1008–1051. Two other studies on Italian urban policies have been published; one by Pietro Giarda, "Un' analisi sui determinanti delle spese degli enti locali," in *Studi sulla finanza locale*, ed. Cesare Cosciani (Milan: Giuffrè, 1967), and the other by Giorgio Galli and Alfonso Prandi, *Patterns of Political Participation in Italy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970). Studying 85 small towns in the Milan metropolitan area, Giarda found party to be of modest explanatory power as did the Fried study of the 31 largest Italian communes (over 100,000 population.) The Galli and Prandi study of 13 communes in the 100,000–200,000 population bracket and of the 92 provincial capitals found no systematic or consistent association between political orientation of the local government and budgetary policies (p. 241).

[7] For further discussion, see Fried, "Comparative Urban Performance," 63–81.

[8] On German local party politics, see Otto Ziebell, *Politische Parteien und kommunale Selbstverwaltung* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1964). On the historical aspects of local party politics, see also Gerhard A. Ritter, *Die*

just as the form of municipal government, vary from place to place since the framework of West German government is federal and each state (*Land*) of the federal union is free to establish its own system of local government.[9] Nonetheless the same national political parties are active in city government throughout the country.

It makes sense to study the impact of party politics on municipal policy in West German cities for still a third reason: the relatively great autonomy which municipal governments in the Federal Republic enjoy.[10] Local parties can have a direct impact on municipal policy only where local governments have discretion enough to make significant policy choices. West German cities have been given considerable resources by their state governments. Thus, the impact of party politics on local policy will be more detectable than when municipal governments are subject to a high degree of central direction.

The Contexts of Performance. The present study focuses on the policies and scope of government in fifty-three of the fifty-seven large West Germany cities—the so-called *Grossstädte* with 100,000 people or more. The fifty-seven cities are distributed among the *Länder* of the Federal Republic as shown in Table 1. Comparisons made in the study involve only 53 cities since in the three so-called "city-states"—Hamburg, Bremen, and Berlin—state and local functions are so closely intertwined that it is impossible to separate out figures on municipal-level functions and employment with which to make comparisons with the other cities. West Berlin, Hamburg, Bremen, and Bremerhaven (located in Bremen *Land*) have thus been dropped from comparative analysis.

Table 1. Distribution of the *Grossstädte* Among the *Länder* in West Germany

Land	Number of Cities
Lower Saxony	7
Bavaria	5
North Rhine Westphalia	25
Saarland	1
Berlin	1
Baden-Württemberg	5
Rhineland-Palatinate	4
Hesse	5
Hamburg	1
Bremen	2
Schleswig-Holstein	3

Each of the remaining 53 cities is an independently organized municipality or commune (*Gemeinde*). Some of these political jurisdictions are geographically self-contained and isolated, while others, most notably the twenty cities located in the Rhein-Ruhr district, are parts of a single, vast urbanized region.[11] The 53 cities differ from each other in a variety of other ways, as illustrated in Table 2.

As Table 2 shows, the 53 cities differ remarkably in religion, demography, occupational and age structure, size, density, physical age, growth rate, and affluence.

The cities also differ in political orientation and in the pattern of party control since World War II. Previous studies of the partisan impact on policy making in West German cities have attempted to detect that impact at one point in time or within a relatively short period of time.[12] In this study the impact of party on policy has been measured over a relatively long period of time—roughly 1950 to 1970.

Because of the availability of long-term com-

Arbeiterbewegung im Wilhelminischen Reich (Colloquium Verlag: Berlin, 1959); James J. Sheehan, "Liberalism and the City in Nineteenth-Century Germany," *Past and Present*, No. 51 (1971), pp. 116–137; Helmuth Croon et al., *Kommunale Selbstverwaltung im Zeitalter der Industrialisierung* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1971); William H. Dawson, *Municipal Life and Government in Germany* (London: Longmans, 1914).

[9] On West German local institutions, see Roger H. Wells, *German Cities* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1932), *The States in West German Federalism* (New Haven: College and University Press, 1961), and "Local Government," in *Governing Postwar Germany*, ed. E. H. Litchfield, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1953). See also Herbert Jacob, *German Administration Since Bismarck* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), and Frido Wagener, "Gemeindeverwaltung," in *Handwörterbuch der Sozialwissenschaften* (Stuttgart: G. Fischer, 1952–65), IV, 323–338.

[10] The remarkable strength of municipal autonomy as a German political tradition is shown in the lip-service paid to its principles even by the National-Socialist regime. See, for example, the essay on changes made in German local institutions under the Nazi regime by Erich Gaertner, "Der Wandel des kommunalen Aufgabenkreises von der Machtübernahme bis zur Jetzzeit," in *Jahrbuch für Kommunalwissenschaft*, vols. 6–7 (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1939–1940), 1–64, and Horst Matzerath, *National-sozialismus und kommunale Selbstverwaltung* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1970). It should be noted that local autonomy, rather than *democratic* self-government, was the political tradition involved and that Nazi practices were as little respectful of the principles of local autonomy as they were of the principles of nationalism and socialism.

[11] For a comparison of German and American urban concepts and definitions, see Conrad J. Weiler, Jr., "Metropolitan Definitions in Comparative Political Research," *Comparative Politics*, 3 (April 1971), 429–446.

[12] The study by Stuart Rakoff and Guenther Schaefer, "Policy Responsiveness of German and American Cities: A Time-Series Analysis of Municipal Expenditures" (paper presented to the 1973 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in New Orleans, September 1973), does not deal with party variables.

Table 2. The Range of Urban Environments (53 Cities)

Socio-economic variable	Minimum (City)	Maximum (City)	Median
% Protestant	15% (Regensburg)	87% (Lübeck)	52%
% Catholic	7% (Kiel)	83% (Würzburg)	42%
1961 Population	80,000 (Gottingen)	1,085,000 (Munich)	245,000
% workers	30% (Bonn)	62% (Bottrop)	46%
% white collar employees	19% (Wanne Eickel)	41% (Frankfurt)	31%
% youths under 15	14% (Munich)	25% (Salzgitter)	19%
% people over 65	8% (Leverkusen)	14% (Kiel)	11%
% East German refugees	5% (Saarbrücken)	48% (Salzgitter)	19%
private cars/1,000 residents (1963)	115 (Wanne Eickel)	232 (Saarbrücken)	173
% of dwellings built since 1949 (1961)	24% (Wilhelmshaven)	71% (Würzburg)	43%
Area (1968)	21.3 sq. km. (Wanne Eickel)	310.6 sq. km. (Munich)	85.7 sq. km.
Per capita income (1963)	DM3790 (Wilhelmshaven)	DM12640 (Leverkusen)	DM7335
Density (persons/km^2) (1961)	520 (Salzgitter)	5020 (Wanne Eickel)	2443
Metropolitan area population increase, 1951–1964	−2% (Lübeck)	40% (Münster)	26%
Center city population increase, 1951–1964	−7% (Regensburg)	56% (Neuss)	25%
Center city share of metropolitan area population (1961)	1% (Leverkusen) (Neuss)	85% (Lübeck)	39%

parative data on policy in West German cities, it is relatively easy to trace variations in municipal policy over time. Data on party politics, however, are much more difficult to obtain. Local elections occur at different times in the different *Länder*, making difficult the collection of uniform election statistics. A further difficulty arises from the fact that there are three important parties in German municipal politics: the same municipal council may produce different ruling coalitions. Thus it is not possible to infer the pattern of party control precisely from the pattern of party membership on the city council. Nor is information on the pattern of party control over the council and over the executive available in the centrally collected statistics of the Municipal Association.

In face of these difficulties and uncertainties regarding the pattern of actual party control over West German cities, I have developed from different sources two measures of party control over time. Each indicator of party control measures the length and extent of party control. The first measure refers to the length of time between 1950 and 1970 that the Social Democrats held a relative majority on the city council. Table 3 shows the overall pattern of relative majorities as it has evolved in the postwar period. Here we find a contrast between six cities in which the SPD has never held a relative majority and 31 cities in which the SPD has uninterruptedly held a relative majority since 1946. (The average length of time during those 24 years in which the SPD has enjoyed a relative majority is 18 years.) Data on the size of the SPD relative majority are derived from council composition statistics published by the West German Municipal Association.

The second indicator of party control is based on the length of time that the SPD has held the post of *Oberbürgermeister* in a city and presumably enjoyed relative dominance in city politics. Using this measure, we have the contrast between eight cities in which the SPD between 1950 and 1970 never elected the mayor and the 20 cities in which the mayor between 1950 and 1970 was always a Social Democrat. Data on occupancy of the mayor's office are derived mostly from the *Politisches Jahrbuch der CDU/CSU*—the political yearbook of the Christian Democratic party.[13]

A third indicator of party control—the percentage of the vote won by the SPD, CDU, and FDP in elections during the period 1957–1962—is also used to detect party impact on policy indicators from the mid-1960's.[14]

The correlations among these political-control measures are only moderately high, suggesting that we are dealing with related but not identical dimensions of the local political process.

Contrasts in Policy and Performance. West German cities are quite varied in their policies: some tax their citizens and business firms much more than others; some spend much more on welfare; some incur larger debts; some employ many more people. Some have been much more active than others in buying up land within their territories. Important differences in the behavior of West German cities are also to be found when their performance is examined over time. The scope of government in some West German cities—as measured by the size of the municipal budget and the size of the municipal bureaucracy—has expanded at vastly different rates in different cities. In some cities, there were fewer municipal employees in 1970 than there were in 1950, while in other cities, by 1970, the number of municipal employees doubled. In some cities, municipal spending rose by one-fifth between 1952 and 1970, while in others, spending rose four times as much. There are clearly major differences among West German cities in the scope of government and the rate at which that scope is expanding.[15]

[13] Data on occupants of the mayor's office are drawn from the Christian Democratic party, *Politisches Jahrbuch der CDU/CSU*; from the series *Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, published by Carl Heymanns Verlag, Cologne; from *Wer is Wer? Das Deutsche Who's Who*, Walter Habel, ed., published by Arani Verlags, Berlin; and *The Yearbook of the Socialist International*, ed. Julius Braunthal, published by International Socialist Yearbook Publishers, London (1960–1961).

[14] Data on council composition and elections for the period 1957–1962 are taken from the *Statistisches Jahrbuch Deutscher Gemeinden* (henceforth, SJDG), 1963, pp. 379–380.

[15] Data on postwar city outputs have been drawn from the *Statistisches Jahrbuch Deutschen Gemeinder* (*SJDG*) as SJDG 1950 (municipal employment, 1950); SJDG 1952 (spending, 1952); SJDG 1963 (taxation; owner-occupancy; financial dependency); SJDG 1964 (public safety employment; education employment; utility employment; general employment; city land ownership); SJDG 1965 (welfare, libraries, spending); SJDG 1970 (hospitals); SJDG 1971 (city land; 1968 housing data, including public assistance, owner-occupancy, multi-family dwellings); SJDG 1972 (spending, 1970).

Table 3. Party Majorities in Postwar West German Cities

	Relative Majority as of								
Party	*1946*	*1950*	*1954*	*1958*	*1962*	*1966*	*1970*	*1973*	
SPD	35	41	45	45	48	50	49	45	
CDU	21	15	12	12	9	7	8	12	
FDP	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
	56*	56*	57	57	57	57	57	57	Total Number of Cities

* In 1946 and in 1950, Saarbrücken, one of the 57 cities, was not yet part of the Federal Republic. Thus in those years, n = 56. The figures include Berlin, Hamburg, Bremen, and Bremerhaven—cities excluded from the other tables of this paper.

Expected Links between Party and Policy. The links between party and policy in West German cities that one expects to find depend on the *source* of one's expectations. If one bases his expectations on previous studies of policy outputs in West German cities, he will expect the impact of party to be either weak or nonexistent. In my previous study of West German cities, little correlation emerged between measures of party voting strength and such measures of output as per capita city debt, taxation, general spending, spending on welfare, or spending on public libraries.[16] A fairly strong correlation (.54) between CDU voting strength and crowding in the public schools was found in reality to be a correlation between inadequacy of schools and school location in the state of North Rhine Westphalia. The major impact of party strength seemed to be on the size of the municipal bureaucracies: CDU voting strength was negatively correlated with public safety, public education, and total municipal employees per resident (−.41). Correlations between SPD strength and these indicators of bureaucratization were weaker, but positive.

In my previous study, political variables generally emerged as much weaker than "ecological" (i.e., social economic, or cultural) variables in predicting and explaining diversities in policy outputs. Party variables did have important associations with outputs, however, once the dominant ecological variables were held constant. Party variables were useful, if secondary, elements in the regression formulas derived to predict six of the eight outputs examined.

One would expect party variables to play minor roles in explaining outputs also on the basis of Lothar Deppe's study of social and cultural expenditures in 222 communes of North Rhine Westphalia.[17] Deppe argues theoretically that "political activities" of private groups and of city governments are important as secondary influences on municipal spending in social and cultural affairs. Unfortunately, he does not attempt to weigh the impact of political variables on outputs in the empirical section of his study.

In contrast, if one's expectations are based on statements by West German local political leaders, one would expect to find direct and intense partisan impact. In the eyes of CDU spokesmen, for example, there are strong differences between the *Kommunalpolitik* of the CDU and those of the SPD.[18] The SPD is said to favor "*Gemeindesozialismus*" ("municipal socialism"), entailing municipal activism in all cultural, economic, and social spheres and a tendency to discourage private, particularly church, activities in those spheres. Consequently, one of the marks of a city run by the Socialists should be extensive *Kommunalisierung* (municipalization)—the proliferation of municipal enterprises, such as public utilities, hospitals, homes for the aged, nurseries, libraries, and cultural centers. Another mark should be the lack of subsidization for private institutions that rival public enterprises in the cultural, educational, or economic sphere.

The SPD is also said to favor various kinds of collectivism, including municipal ownership of land and large, publicly sponsored housing projects. While the CDU claims to encourage private property and small-scale housing, the SPD is said to favor public ownership and massive residential buildings. In the words of one CDU spokesman:

> The residential blocks of the big Social Democratic cooperatives are the best means of hindering a genuinely Christian family policy. In these mammoth buildings, it is easy for the [party] functionary to distribute the newspapers of the 'Red publishing houses'; to collect party dues; to sell tickets to Socialist-sponsored theater productions and to educational and cultural events; to place children, as a friendly gesture, in the nursery of the workers' welfare association; to occupy the leisure time of growing youth in the social-activity rooms of these elephantine buildings—all in accordance with the demands of the program of central party headquarters.[19]

The SPD's image in CDU propaganda as an activistic, collectivistic, and expansionistic political party is fully in keeping with traditional SPD party principles, as expounded in party programs since the 1920's.[20] The CDU depicts itself as being the party of private property and private initiative.[21] Are party principles—whether those of the SPD or of the CDU—reflected in municipal policy? Does knowledge of the party in power enable one to predict the nature of municipal policy?

[16] R. Fried, "Politics, Economics, and Federalism: Aspects of Urban Government in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland," in *Comparative Community Politics*, ed. Terry Clark (Beverly Hills: Sage Publishers, 1974), 313–350.

[17] Lothar Deppe, *Das Verhältnis der kommunalen Ausgaben zur Grösse, Struktur, Funktion und Finanzkraft städtischer Gemeinden: Untersucht am Biespiel der sozialen und kulturellen Ausgaben in Nordrhein-Westfalen* (Münster: Institut für Siedlungs- und Wohnungswesen der Westfälischen Wilhelms-Universität Münster, 1966), p. 232.

[18] For an interesting analysis of the differences between the SPD and the CDU in power and policy, see Günter Triesch, "Kommunalpolitik und Parteiarbeit," in *Dokumente zur parteipolitischen Entwicklung in Deutschland seit 1945*, Ossip K. Flechtheim (Berlin: Wendler, 1965), vol. 4, part 1, 208–221.

[19] Wilhelm Ritter, "Christliche Kommunalpolitik in den Ratund Kreishäusern," in *Polititisches Jahrbuch der CDU/CSU: 1960*, 107–115 at 108.

[20] Ziebill, *Politische Parteien*, pp. 30–31.

[21] See, e.g., Triesche, "Kommunalpolitik," p. 210.

Findings: Party as a Determinant of Municipal Outputs

To test the impact of party on policy, we have grouped policy outputs into three categories, as illustrated in Table 4.

In Table 5, the correlations between party variables and output variables are shown, together with the correlations between ecological variables and outputs.

Of the seventeen outputs listed in Table 5, only

Table 4. Forms of Performance in West German Cities

Form of Performance	General Nature	Empirical Indicator
Activism	Scope of government	Average per capita spending, 1952–1970 Police/10,000 residents, 1963 Education employees/10,000 residents Municipal employees/10,000 residents Per capita taxation, 1964 Per capita welfare spending, 1963 Per capita library spending, 1963
Collectivism	Preference for public ownership and enterprise	% of multifamily dwellings, 1968 % of city territory owned by city % of owner occupancy, 1968 % of publicly assisted housing, 1968 Municipal utility employees/10,000 residents % of patients in public hospitals, 1969
Expansionism	Tendencies towards increased activism and/or collectivism	Per capita spending increase, 1952–1970 Increase in municipal bureaucracy, 1950–1970 Increase in municipal employees, (*Angestellten*), 1950–1970 Increase in municipal functionaries (*Beamten*), 1950–1970

Table 5. The Determinants of Municipal Output: Party vs. Ecology

	Activism							Collectivism						Expansionism			
	Spending	Police	Education	Municipal employees	Taxation	Welfare Spending	Library Spending	Multifamily Dwelling	City Land	Owner Occupancy	Public Housing	Municipal Utilities	Public Hospital	Spending	Bureaucracy	Employees	Functionaries
SPD vote					.26			.33					.35				
SPD majority								.26		−.36							
SPD mayor								.23		−.41							
CDU vote	−.31	−.33	−.23	−.46	−.26	.27		−.22			.33	−.38	−.36	−.42	−.25		−.46
FDP vote										.32							
Turnout	−.41			−.36		.36		−.29				−.26		−.41			−.24
Population size	.38				.57					−.41				.38	.29	.35	
Population growth			−.26														
Catholic													−.29				
Aged	.30			.39				.25	.35				.39	.30	−.25	−.31	
Cars	.79	.31			.44	−.29					−.31	.41	.26				.47
Area	.38	.46	.44	.29	.45			.26				.55		.38			
White Collar	.67	.24		.50					.44			.34		.68			
Income	.74			.57							−.24	.46	.30	.74			.27
Workers	−.39			−.36		.28			−.34	−.26				−.39			−.26
Metropolitan Population Change			−.35								.25		−.27				
City/Metropolitan Population Change	.39	.26		.44								.27		.39			.36
Density								.46		−.52			−.31				−.25
% New Housing	.31										.25			.31	.27	.27	.24
Youths	−.63	−.39	−.34	−.55	−.46	.28		−.39			.36	−.51		−.63			−.37
Manufacturing	−.42	−.37		−.37		.26		−.32		−.26						.26	−.41

two (owner occupancy and publicly assisted housing) are more strongly correlated to party variables than to ecological variables. City size, motorization, and per capita (private) income are the most powerful single predictors for twelve of the outputs. *The "merely" secondary impact of party variables on performance appears to be reconfirmed.*

Table 5 reveals not only the intensity of party impact, but also its direction. The lack of correlation between the three measures of SPD control and the measures of activism, collectivism, and expansionism is rather striking. SPD influence is modestly correlated with one form of activism (taxation); with three forms of collectivism (multifamily housing; lack of owner occupancy; public occupancy; public hospitals); but with no form of expansionism. On the other hand, CDU influence is correlated at a significant level (.05 or better) with 13 of the 17 outputs, including all three forms of performance. CDU influence correlates with low levels of spending, taxation, and public employment; with low levels of multifamily housing, municipalization, and public hospitalization; and with low levels of expansionism in both spending and bureaucratization. Prediction of the direction of CDU impact on the basis of party principles seems accurate enough, except for the one instance of publicly assisted housing. Rather surprising is the lack of correlation between CDU voting strength and the diffusion of owner occupancy in housing.

In Table 6, outputs in the six CDU strongholds have been contrasted with those in the eight cities where the SPD power has been greatest.[22] Predictions based on ideology are correct for twelve of the seventeen outputs. But contrary to expectations—or at least those based on party ideology—CDU cities spent more on public libraries; owned slightly more of city territory; spent on an average 12 per cent more money; and had slightly more publicly-assisted housing than the SPD strongholds. Also, in CDU cities, there was a lesser decline in the number of bureaucratic functionaries between 1950 and 1970 than occurred in the SPD cities.

The identification of the SPD with activism, collectivism, and expansion and of the CDU with the opposites of these things is, while on the whole correct, only roughly so. In the next section, we shall see why the correspondence between party principle and party policy is only approximate.

[22] The CDU strongholds are: Aachen, Bonn, Koblenz, Mönchen-Gladbach, Münster, and Neuss. The SPD strongholds are: Bochum, Dortmund, Frankfurt, Gelsenkirchen, Hannover, Herne, Kassel, and Mülheim.

Table 6. Performance Contrasts Among Socialist and Christian Democratic Cities

	Median Output for:		
	CDU cities (n=6)	Top SPD cities (n=8)	Expected direction on basis of ideology?
1. *Activism*[a]			
Police	58	64	Yes
Employees	124	139	Yes
Taxation	DM2,894	DM3,044	Yes
Welfare	DM1,871	DM1,872	Yes
Libraries	DM367	DM291	No
Education	55	58	Yes
Spending	DM5,864	DM5,233	No
2. *Collectivism*			
Multifamily dwellings	70%	78%	Yes
City land ownership	29%	27%	No
Owner occupancy	25%	15%	Yes
Public-assisted housing	35%	34%	No
Utility employees	702	962	Yes
Public hospitals	0%	10%	Yes
3. *Expansionism*			
Spending	332%	397%	Yes
Bureaucracy	−14%	−6%	Yes
Lower civil servants	19%	37%	Yes
Functionaries	−23%	−31%	No

[a] For the units involved, see the output definitions in Table 4.

Reasons for the Weakness of Party Impact on Policy

The impact of party ideology on policy and performance may be weak for a variety of reasons, some of which can be tested empirically. The weakness of ideological impact, of course, seems more characteristic of the SPD than the CDU: CDU voting strength is, after all, correlated, albeit moderately, with output, while SPD strength, measured three ways and over time, is not. Ideological impact may be weak, particularly for the SPD, for at least the reasons to be outlined in the subsections that follow.

(1) The Weakness and Transience of SPD majorities. The SPD may have difficulty translating party principles into policy because of the weakness of the SPD in some cities as compared to others. Conceivably, party principles are more easily translated into practice where SPD voters are numerous, where the SPD has had majorities over long periods of time, and where the *Rathaus* remains for similarly long periods under the direction of an SPD *Oberbürgermeister*. This proposition can be tested by contrasting outputs in two different sets of SPD cities: those where the SPD held a relative majority for at least twelve years but less than 24 years between 1946 and 1970 (the "weak SPD" cities) and those where the SPD held a relative majority throughout the period.[23] Doing so gives some confirmation to the proposition that the disuniformity in output among SPD cities (leading to low correlations between party and output) is partly produced by differences among the SPD cities in the strength of the SPD over time. Outputs seem more socialistic in the stronger SPD cities than in the weaker ones for most forms of activism (except welfare) and most forms of collectivism (except city land ownership). The weaker SPD cities, however, display greater expansionistic tendencies in spending and employment. This is logical since in the weaker SPD cities, the SPD in most cases achieved a relative majority only some years after the War and perhaps expanded employment and spending rapidly in order to make up for lost time.

(2) Diversities in Socioeconomic Environment. Another reason for the weakness of ideological impact might be the diversity of environments in which the SPD fights to maintain control as compared to the (relative) homogeneity of CDU cities. But this contention is easily disproved: as Table 7 shows, the CDU cities, if anything, are even more diversified socially and economically than the SPD cities. Uniformity in the CDU impact on municipal policy is achieved in spite of the diversity of contexts in which the CDU operates. There is likewise a strong contrast among the SPD's cities, particularly between the proletarian cities of the Ruhr and the white-collar commercial centers also run by the SPD. Conceivably, we might find more correspondence between principle and policy in proletarian SPD cities than in white-

[23] Here, as in several other places, lack of space precludes publication of the actual statistical findings. These will gladly be supplied by the author to interested readers on request.

Table 7. The Intercorrelation Between Party and Ecology[a]

	SPD Vote	Years SPD Majority	Years SPD Mayor	CDU Vote	FDP Vote
% Protestant	.34	.64	.40	−.54	.32
% Catholic	−.31	−.53	−.45	.47	−.37
1961 Population	.30	.28	.25		
% Workers	.41	.35	.37		−.29
% White Collar	−.33	−.26	−.32	−.21	.39
% Youths					
% Aged		.23		−.34	.30
Cars/residents	−.26			−.27	.36
Manufacturing	.44	.42	.32		−.36
% New Housing Area	.27	−.24 .27		−.28	
Per Capita Income			−.35		.23
Density			.21		
Metropolitan Increase				.35	
City Increase	−.26	−.36		.36	
City/Metropolitan Area			−.24	−.34	

[a] All correlations with significance levels above .05 have been omitted.

collar SPD cities, such as Frankfurt, Hannover, or Munich.[24]

Surprisingly, the SPD is more socialistic in its middle-class cities than in its proletarian strongholds. Middle-class SPD cities are more activistic (except for welfare spending), more collectivistic (except for publicly assisted housing), and more expansionistic than proletarian SPD cities! (See Table 8.)

Table 8. Outputs in Different Types of SPD Cities

	Median for:	
	Proletarian SPD cities (n=10)	White-Collar SPD cities (n=6)
1. *Activism*		
Policemen	55	377
Education	51	72
Employees	1,136	2,050
Spending	DM4,878	DM7,379
Libraries	DM259	DM272
Welfare Spending	DM2,158	DM1,584
Taxation	DM2,883	DM3,867
2. *Collectivism*		
Public Hospital patients	0%	36%
Multifamily dwellings	78%	81%
City Land %	25%	34%
Owner occupancy	16%	17%
Publicly assisted housing	42%	25%
Utility employees	525	2,031
3. *Expansionism*		
Spending	404%	474%
Bureaucracy	−7.5%	19.3%
Employees	28%	54%
Functionaries	−35%	57%

(3) The Power of Establishments. Both parties may find it hard to translate principle into policy because of the relative weakness of political parties in the city as compared to (a) bureaucratic elites; (b) private economic elites; (c) ecclesiastical elites; or (d) labor union elites. In a crude way, we can test the possibility that party impact is blunted by the power of some counterelite by examining the links between party policy and outputs, holding constant variables which may just possibly measure the power of some non-party elites.

To measure the power of the *bureaucratic* elite, we shall use one of the outputs—the rate of expansion in the functionary group between 1950 and 1970. The power of the bureaucratic elite is perhaps reflected in the ability to expand its ranks. To measure the power of the community *business* elite, we shall use per capita yields from the municipal tax on business and payrolls. The power of an economic elite is perhaps reflected in the amounts of money it pays (and may possibly stop paying) into the city treasury. To measure the power of a putative *clerical* elite, we shall use the percentage of Catholics in the community, making the assumption that the power of Roman Catholic church leaders in German cities bears some relationship to the proportion of Catholics in the population. (Perhaps this indicator also measures the weakness of Lutheran clerics in the community.) Statistics on labor union membership in German cities are not available with which to test the power of union elites.

Table 9 shows the results of this attempt to "partial out" the power of community counterelites. The bureaucratic counterelite seems to intervene appreciably in the relationships between party and policy, reducing somewhat the negative correlation between CDU voting strength and the size of city bureaucracies.[25] The power of Church elites, however, if that is what we are measuring, is most imposing. Table 9 suggests that CDU negativism is even stronger than it appears in the simple correlation coefficients of Table 5; the inference is that Church elites operate to mitigate that negativism. Only the power of the business elite seems, by this admittedly crude test, not to possess much influence on party-policy relationships.

(4) Differential Municipal Autonomy. The lack of strong correlation between party and output, particularly for the SPD, may be due to the variance among West German cities in financial autonomy.[26] Low correlations between SPD power and policy outcomes may result from the fact that only financially independent SPD governments are able to pursue socialistic politics, while the others must be content with the less costly policies of laissez faire. To test this hypothesis, I have contrasted outputs in financially dependent SPD cities (those with at least 15 years of SPD relative majority, 1950–1971, and with more than 25 per cent

[24] The proletarian SPD cities include: Bochum, Dortmund, Duisburg, Gelsenkirchen, Hagen, Herne, Oberhausen, Recklinghausen, Salzgitter, and Wanne Eickel. The middle-class SPD cities include: Darmstadt, Frankfurt, Hannover, Karlsruhe, Kassel, and Munich. On the class basis of West German party politics, see David P. Conradt and Dwight Lambert, "Party System, Social Structure, and Competitive Politics in West Germany," *Comparative Politics*, 1 (1974), pp. 61–86.

[25] CDU spokesmen have often accused the SPD of packing the upper levels of municipal bureaucracies with SPD functionaries, selected more for their party loyalty than their expertise. SPD power, which is thus built into the city bureaucracy, then makes it difficult, claims the CDU, to reverse municipal policy even when the CDU wins control of the council and the executive. For these charges, see Triesche, "Kommunalpolitik," 215. We lack data on the party affiliations of municipal bureaucrats which would help us to weigh the validity of these accusations.

[26] See Karl-Heinz Nussmacher, "Parteien in kommunalpolitischen Zielbildungsprozess," *Osterreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft*, 1 (1973), 39–65.

Table 9. Party and Policy Correlations, Holding Establishment Power Constant

		Controlling for:		
	Simple Correlation Coefficient	Bureaucratic Power	Business Power	Church Power
1. *Activism*				
Police SPD				.24
CDU	−.33		−.24	−.48
Employees SPD				
CDU	−.46	−.26	−.42	−.57
Spending SPD				
CDU	−.31			−.38
Welfare SPD				
CDU	.27			.30
2. *Collectivism*				
City Land SPD				
CDU				
Public Hospital SPD				
CDU	−.36	−.31	−.31	−.26
Utility SPD				
CDU	−.38	−.32	−.31	−.42
Owner occupancy SPD				
CDU	−.46	−.46	−.45	−.45
3. *Expansionism*				
Spending SPD	.27	.28		.25
CDU	−.42	−.37	−.36	−.41
Bureaucracy SPD				
CDU	−.25			−.29
Employees SPD				
CDU				
Functionaries SPD		—		
CDU	−.46	—	−.44	−.61

of their budgets derived from grants-in-aid) with outputs in financially independent cities (those with similar SPD majorities over time but less dependence on grants). The results tend to confirm the hypothesis that financially independent SPD cities are more able than financially dependent SPD cities to pursue "socialistic" politices. (See Table 10.)

(5) The Nature of Performance. Undoubtedly, party ideological impact is weak because the forms of performance—activism, collectivism, and expansionism—are not highly intercorrelated. Activistic cities are not necessarily collectivistic or expansionistic. There is among West German cities no single syndrome of high performance, whether judged from a socialistic or an antisocialistic perspective. Empirical ties among the forms of performance—among the forms of activism, collectivism, and expansionism—are not very strong. Indeed, in some cases, they seem to be mutually opposed (as, for example, between city landownership, on the one hand, and utility employment and bureaucratic expansionism, on the other). Nor are the links very strong *within* the three categories of performance. There are surprisingly weak associations among the forms of bureacratic expansionism: expansionism at the lower levels (*Angestellten*) apparently follows different "laws" than does expansionism at the functionary (*Beamte*) level.

The nature of performance also may help to

P1659

explain why the CDU, as compared to the SPD, has a more uniform impact on policy. The CDU stance is predominantly negative and consists of resisting all forms of activism, collectivism, and expansionism. Lack of intercorrelation among the forms of performance suggests that even the more activistic political force may be constrained by limited resources to pick and choose among the forms of activism, collectivism, and expansionism. The statistically measurable impact of SPD principles on policy may be reduced by the lack of uniformity in the choices made by SPD cities among the available tradeoffs.

(6) Federalism. The (statistical) impact of party on policy may be greater within the *Länder* of the Federal Republic than when it is viewed from a nationwide perspective. Lack of nationwide uniformity in the policy outputs of the same political force may result from differences among the *Länder* in legislation, finance, and policy as related to local government. Parties may find it difficult to apply the same political principles uniformly from state to state. To determine whether or not this is the case, we can look at the relations between party and policy in a single state—North-Rhine-Westphalia—which has within it half the large cities of West Germany. In North-Rhine-Westphalia state, the legislative and financial context for performance is uniform; any party impact on policy in its 25 large cities should therefore be readily detectable. But when we compare the differences among cities in the entire Federal Republic with those among cities in North-Rhine-Westphalia, we find that, far from being stronger within North-Rhine-Westphalia, interparty differences in most cases are less pronounced. Federalism, with its attendant diversities in state and local relations, is apparently *not* an important reason for the lack of strong nationwide correlations between party and policy.

(7) Reformism. Perhaps a more plausible reason that socialist control does not correlate with socialist policy is the by now traditional gap between Social Democratic theory and Social Democratic practice. Social Democratic theory since at least Weimar, and especially under Weimar, has been to the left of Social Democratic practice, both national and local.[27] A study by this author of outputs under Weimar—assuredly a period of ideological fervor and commitment—shows little correlation between SPD municipal power and such measures of activism as spending and public housing.[28] Since Weimar, in fact, it has become normal for the German Left to denounce the opportunism or "false pragmatism" of the SPD, especially when the SPD is in power.[29]

Table 10. Contrasting Performance of SPD Cities: The Financially Dependent vs. The Financially Independent

Forms of Performance	Median Outputs for: Financially Dependent SPD Cities (n=12)	Financially Independent SPD Cities (n=24)
1. *Activism*		
Police	61	78
Teachers	58	57
Employees	1,203	1,636
Spending	DM4,516	DM6,653
Libraries	DM434	DM298
Welfare	DM1,901	DM1,906
Taxation	DM2,809	DM3,346
2. *Collectivism*		
Hospitals	0%	43%
Multifamily Dwelling	77%	79%
Owner Occupancy	17%	18%
Public Housing	35%	31%
Utility Employees	671	741
Per Capita City Land	870	1,017
3. *Expansionism*		
Spending	424%	454%
Bureaucracy	−15%	−2%
Employees	19%	41%
Functionaries	−26%	15%

Conceivably, the behavior of the SPD *Fraktion* on the city council and of SPD members of the executive becomes more opportunistic and less socialistic in orientation where certain conditions obtain: (a) when there is a low ratio of party members to party voters; (b) when there is a low proportion of manual workers among party members; (c) when there is a low proportion of Young Socialists (*Jusos*) among party members; and/or (d) when there is a low proportion of leftist-faction members among members and in the party delegation in the city government. Unfortunately, data are not available with which to test the correlation between variations in internal SPD politics. Testing these correlations remains a future task.

In defense of the SPD, it should be said that it has tried in the postwar period to close the gap between theory and practice, mostly by abandoning its more radical principles and adopting princi-

[27] Heino Kaack, *Geschichte und Struktur des deutschen Parteiensystems* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1971), pp. 135–36.

[28] Fried, "Politics, Economics, and Federalism," in Clark, pp. 322–338.

[29] The expression "false pragmatism" comes from a long denunciation of alleged SPD opportunism by the Young Socialists, (JUSOs) in December 1969, reprinted in H. Kaack, *Geschichte*, pp. 534–536. See also *SPD und Staat: Geschichte, Reformideologie, "Friedenspolitik,"* Friedhelm Ernst, ed. (Berlin: Verlag Klaus Wagenbach, 1974).

ples more acceptable to middle-class and Christian voters. The transformation of the SPD from a Marxist revolutionary party of the working class into a pragmatic reformist *Volkspartei* (or party of the whole people) has been conscious, open, and, as it were, principled.[30]

The result of *Entideologisierung* in the SPD has been a new set of programmatic principles which will make the SPD impact even less easy to discern in the future than it has been in the past. When the SPD proclaims principles such as "*Eigentum für alle*" ("Property for All"), it acquires a policy stand difficult to distinguish from that of the other political parties.[31] A distinctive party impact on policy will be hard to discern when parties are no longer differentiated by principle or known differences in orientation.

(8) "Antiparty Affect." It may be difficult to translate party principles—old or new—into practice because of the hostility in German political culture to partisanship in local government. It used to be said under Weimar that there was no Social-Democratic or German-National way of paving the streets. The role of parties in local government was seen as unfortunate, to be minimized. The same "antiparty affect," in Heino Kaack's phrase, persists under the Bonn Republic and it may be one of the reasons for the apparent hesitancy of the parties to attempt the militant translation of party principle into policy.[32] Energetic implementation of party programs and invocation of party ideology may alienate a largely unpolitical, centrist, and antipartisan electorate. Antiparty feeling is, of course, strongest in the smaller local jurisdictions, which consequently are often run on a non-party basis. In the big cities party control is more accepted. But if there are variations in local political culture that affect the acceptability of overtly partisan policy making, these have not yet been examined; thus we cannot at this point probe for the possible impact of "antiparty affect" on local policy making.

(9) Incrementalism. It is now a truism that much policy making usually consists of making only minor adjustments in existing policies and that public budgeting consists of making only minor changes in budgets inherited from the near. sometimes remote past. It should therefore be only mildly surprising that, in the case of West German cities, one can fairly accurately predict per capita municipal spending in 1970, using as a predictor per capita municipal spending in 1928! Per capita 1928 spending, in fact, accounts for nearly half the variance in average per capita spending in the period since World War II. Local policies can evidently persist through upheavals of historic proportion.

Assuming incremental change, is the impact of party to be found in the deviations from incrementalism? Is party related to the size and direction of the residual—the discrepancy between observed output, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, output as predicted on the basis of previous output? Are party variables more related than ecological variables to deviations from incrementalism?

If we predict (a) average spending for 1952–1970 on the basis of 1928 spending, (b) 1970 per capita spending on the basis of 1928 per capita spending, and (c) 1970 per capita spending on the basis of 1952 spending, and then test the capacity of party variables to predict the size of the residuals (the deviations from incrementalism), we obtain the results displayed in Table 11.

In all three cases, negative departures from incrementalism ("under-spending") are found in communities with large proportions of CDU

Table 11. Deviations from Incrementalism: Party vs. Ecology

	Size of the Residual, Predicting		
	Average spending 1952–1970 using 1928 spending	1970 per capita spending, using 1928 spending	1970 spending using 1952 spending
1. *Party*			
SPD vote			
CDU vote	−.41	−.51	−.59
SPD majority			
SPD mayors			
2. *Ecology*			
Population size			
Protestant			
Workers	−.33	−.34	−.29
Cars	.50	.50	.65
Area			
White Collar	.44	.46	.56
Income	.59		.61
Youths	−.51	−.45	−.48
City/Metropolitan area share	.57	.54	.42

[30] See the references in H. Kaack, *Geschichte*, p. 11, and in particular, Douglas A. Chalmers, *The Social Democratic Party in Germany: From Working-Class Movement to Modern Political Party* (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1964). and Harold K. Schellenger, *The SPD in the Bonn Republic: A Socialist Party Modernizes* (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1968).

[31] See Georg Leber, "Unser innerpolitischer Auftrag," in *Mündige Gesellschaft: Die SPD zur zukunft der Nation*, Klaus Dieter Arndt, ed. (Hannover: Verlag Dietz Nachf., 1967), pp. 62–66 at p. 63.

[32] O. Ziebilt, *Politische Parteiein*, p. 30; K.-H. Nussmacher, "Parteien"; and H. Kaack, *Geschichte*, p. 476. Kaack actually uses the phrase "*Antiparteieneffekt*"; Nussmacher suggests that "*Antiparteienaffekt*" is what Kaack really means to say, (Nussmacher, "Parteien," p. 46, n. 23).

voters, workers, or youths.[33] Positive departures from incrementalism ("over-spending") are common to cities with high personal income, high proportions of white-collar workers in the labor force, or high ratios of autos to residents. Overspending (using incrementalism as the norm) is also characteristic of cities occupying a large share of the total metropolitan area population, i.e., cities without vast suburbs not under the jurisdiction of the central city. This last finding is surprising, since we would expect overspending in just the opposite circumstances—where central cities had to provide services for large daytime populations of suburban commuters. However this may be, we can see from Table 11 that party variables have about the same correlation with the residuals as ecological variables: knowing a city's politics enables one to predict its departures from past budgeting choices about as well as knowing the city's size, religion, class composition, age structure, or central-city/suburb ratio.

Conclusions

Party control over cities has sometimes been regarded as a variable with little or no impact on city policy making. When party control was observed to have an impact, it was sometimes in a direction contrary to expectation based on knowledge of party principles. This study, however, indicates that party control can, indeed does, play an important role in shaping the scope of government over extended periods (20–30 years). The results of this study indicate that the trend toward discounting the impact of party politics on local policy may be premature: party control of urban government can be one of the important determinants of city policy making. In West Germany, although Social Democracy does not have uniform impact in the direction of activism, expansionism, and collectivism, CDU control is associated with negative performance on all three counts.

Low correlation between SPD power and municipal output can be traced to a variety of factors: differences among cities controlled by the SPD in the size of the SPD majority; differences in the class composition of SPD cities; differences among SPD cities in degree of financial independence; lack of intercorrelation among the forms of "socialist performance" and the negative requirements for implementing CDU principles; and the incremental nature of much urban policy making. Certain factors do *not* emerge as crucial intervening variables: the power of municipal counterelites and the federalistic nature of West German government. Some variables of great potential interest variables involving local SPD membership characteristics and "antiparty affect" in local political culture cannot be tested because of lack of data.[34] Party control, however, clearly affects policy, although we have yet to determine fully its role and function in municipal policy making.

It is hard to know whether party control is more important as a "determinant" or "explicator" of municipal outputs in West German cities than in the cities of other countries. This is because there are no cross-national municipal policy studies and because comparative urban policy is being conceptualized and analyzed in such different ways in individual country studies. Policy studies are most easily carried out *within* countries, where one is likely to find some uniformity in the way urban government is regulated and the way policy for cities is generated. It is relatively easy for students of comparative urban policy in a given country to agree on standards for estimating the weight of various policy determinants. On a cross-national basis, however, the cultural and institutional uniformities do not exist which would reassure us that we are comparing equivalent phenomena.

Further development of the comparative study of urban policy will come, therefore, not only from greater sophistication at the single-country level but also from greater efforts to make single-country studies comparable at the cross-national level. Further development at the single-country level will come from greater attention to the following: (a) the diffusion of party impact over time, (b) policy in a wide range of fields, (c) non-budgetary indicators of policy, (d) central-local policy interactions, (e) indicators of distributional and redistributional outcomes of policy, and (f) output preferences and satisfactions (subjective performance). Further development at the cross-national level will require some common, if crude, measures that will allow us to compare the impact of party on policy in different countries with some degree of precision. At both the single-country and cross-national levels, further development will also require the identification of the mechanisms that tie together determinants, outputs, and consequences. Only by identifying the mechanisms or processes involved in the urban policy process will we be able to use the accumulating mass of empirical findings to establish some reasonably firm (for the moment) truths about competitive party politics and urban policy.[35]

[33] This accords well with the correlation of −.42 that we have found between CDU voting strength and spending increase between 1962 and 1970 (Table 3).

[34] Nor do we have data on the age of the mayor—frequently asserted as being predictive of municipal outputs.

[35] For some recent efforts, see the papers presented at the Conference on Politics, Policy, and the Quality of Urban Life, Bellagio, Italy, June 20–24, 1975.

Primary Rules, Political Power, and Social Change*

JAMES I. LENGLE AND BYRON SHAFER
University of California, Berkeley

For want of a nail, the shoe was lost;
For want of a shoe, the horse was lost;
For want of a horse, the rider was lost;
For want of a rider, the battle was lost;
For want of a battle, the kingdom was lost;
And all for the want of a horseshoe nail.
—*Mother Goose*

The Invisible Participant

The late 1960s and early 1970s were boom times for predictions about the future of American politics. Grand organizing concepts abounded—a "new ethical consciousness," an "emerging conservative majority," the "triumph of social engineering," a "revolt against the future," etc.—and each was asserted to be the trend which would sweep away institutional obstacles and human opponents, the "theme" which historians would use (50 to 100 years hence) to summarize our era.

Scholars who are more concerned with the mechanics of American politics were not often drawn into this argument, but many must have suspected that while history is often *written* in these terms, it seldom *occurs* that way. Instead, American political history wells up out of the situational calculations of candidates, activists, and voters. If any given tendency is to be judged, retrospectively, to have dominated the politics of our own era, it must reach that domination through the decisions which these actors make in order to influence public policy, and especially through the decisions which individual politicians make in order to gain and hold public office. If the rules of politics reliably cause the latter to seek votes in certain ways, to stress certain issues, and to address a certain clientele, those rules—far from being rolled over by the "current of history"—may be crucial in determining how that current will run.

The regulations governing presidential primaries are a shining example. These ground-rules—mandating either Winner-Take-All, Proportional, or Districted allocations of primary delegates—remain nearly invisible when compared with the groups, issues, and personalities that are the stuff of campaign coverage. Yet these inconspicuous channeling devices may ultimately affect the destinies not just of a few office-seekers but of entire political parties and major public issues as well. So far, only the Democrats have had enough contests in one year to support any sensible predictions, but that year makes it difficult to overrate the importance of primary rules. In 1972, a few simple alterations in these unseen "participants" could easily have produced a different Democratic nominee. (See the next section.) If 1972 is an adequate guide, altered primary regulations, over the medium run, could well determine which blocs will be influential within a party, thereby working fundamental (if unintended) change on that party. (See the third section.) Finally, in the long run, such ground-rules may even shape the grand conflicts of an epoch, indirectly but powerfully favoring some causes and not others.

In the last presidential nomination race, the beneficiary of the power hidden in the rules of the game was Senator George McGovern. Most primaries offered delegates by (Congressional) District, and Districted primaries maximized McGovern's strength. One simple shift, however, to generalized Winner-Take-All laws, would have *minimized* that strength, in the process guiding a healthy plurality of primary delegates (along with the nomination?) to Senator Hubert Humphrey. A second change, to Proportional regulations, would have undercut both McGovern and Humphrey, leaving only Governor George Wallace to derive electoral satisfaction from primary rules.

But beyond the fate of three particular politicians (none of whom may ever again seek the Oval Office) lies the fate of the social groups whose fortunes they hoped to advance, and whose backing they hoped to parlay into a presidency. The influence of these groups, too, was sharply affected in 1972 (and probably, for the foreseeable future) by the way primary rules modified the comparative power of different states within the national party. The old, eastern, industrial states, which had previously been essential to any Democratic nomination, shrank in importance. Two newly powerful blocs—one, of the persuasion known as "Southern Democratic," the other, Midwestern-Western (and presidentially Republican)—filled the vacuum, thanks to primary election

* The Institute of Governmental Studies, at the University of California, Berkeley, provided the secretarial support necessary to collect the data on which this paper is based. Charles A. Bann advised on how best to present these data. Eugene C. Lee, Ivan B. Lee, Alan V. McAllister, Nelson W. Polsby, Arnold R. Shore, and Aaron B. Wildavsky each offered some balance of criticism and encouragement as the paper took shape. William Farnsworth, Barbara Davidson, and Carolyn Ponturo typed various drafts.

laws which helped compensate for their smaller populations and which capitalized on their political homogeneity.

Nothing guarantees that the interplay among Democratic candidates, states' voters, and formal regulations in 1972 is essential to the prediction either of political trends in the late twentieth century or of what historians a half-century hence will say about them. Dramatic events (major wars or severe economic declines) may move the bulk of the general public so powerfully that no institutional arrangements can redirect the trend. But in the absence of such events, or if such events should occur but leave no enduring political legacy (i.e., until there is good reason to believe that the *pattern* of interaction between social forces and formal regulations which surfaced in 1972 will change), that interaction can be extrapolated to hint at the drift of American politics in the years to come.

The Primaries: Other Rules, Other Results

Political ground-rules are not always overlooked, underanalyzed, or passively lamented. Between 1968 and 1972, the Democrats' Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection reconsidered all of the party's internal regulations. The Commission deliberately instituted numerous changes in traditional party practice.[1] It inadvertently created as many others, one of the most crucial being a vast increase in the percentage of delegates available in primaries.

The Commissioners did not want to multiply the number of primaries. Yet by issuing eighteen additional guidelines for delegate selection, they in effect announced eighteen new ways to unseat state delegations. Many state party leaders responded with what was apparently the surest method of avoiding this threat: They simply threw all aspiring delegates on the ballot. Thus states as diverse as Rhode Island, North Carolina, and New Mexico, which in 1968 had done their party business at state-level conventions, added primaries to the list for 1972.

The increase in the number of "effective" primaries was even greater, however, because (required) reforms upgraded previously less significant arenas into serious campaign sites. In fact, the biggest rise in the number of delegates along the primary route came not from new entries but from changes in old ones. In 1968, nearly half of all primaries had been "advisory," i.e., either voters could express a presidential preference but delegates would be chosen *independently* in party conventions, or, more commonly, a presidential preference could not be logically connected with the *separate* vote for delegates. By 1972, the linkage between candidate preference and delegate selection had been tightened so much that the free agents of past primaries—"favorite sons," "bosses," and "uncommitted" delegates—had almost disappeared.

The pattern of successes and failures in these primaries is already a historical footnote.[2] The lightweights (Lindsay, Hartke, Yorty, Mills, etc.) and one ostensible heavy (Muskie) were squeezed out early. Three major factional leaders (McGovern, Humphrey, Wallace) then campaigned through the pre-California contests. With a victory in California, McGovern effectively smashed the last organized pre-Convention opposition, and moved "inexorably" (at least by hindsight) to the nomination.

What this familiar account omits is the tremendous impact of state primary *rules*, rather than state primary *voters*, on these candidates and their fortunes. While a first glance shows nearly as many recognizably different sets of rules as there were state primaries,[3] all of these are in fact minor variations on three basic plans:

A) *Winner-Take-All:* The candidate with a *plurality in the total statewide vote acquires all that state's delegates*, regardless of the size of his vote or lead. Thus Rhode Island gave all 22 of its delegates to McGovern, whose 16,000 votes were twice Muskie's total, though still only 2 per cent of the eligible electorate.

[1] See its final report: Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection, *Mandate for Reform* (Washington, D.C.: Democratic National Committee, 1970).

[2] For the chronology, see Theodore H. White, *The Making of the President, 1972* (New York: Atheneum, 1973).

[3] Among the 22 states with presidential primaries, there were, in fact, 18 recognizably different primary plans. A heavy majority of states did use Districted regulations, but the variety within that designation was such that no state needed to apologize for a lack of institutional creativity. There were Districted states which put their delegates in Congressional Districts (Wisconsin), State Senatorial Districts (Pennsylvania), and Counties (New Jersey). There were Districted states which apportioned these delegates by prior Democratic vote (Ohio), by population (Maryland), or by a combination of the two (New Hampshire). There were Districted states which allowed persons elected to other offices (e.g., the Democratic State Committee) to pick a small share of the delegates on a Winner-Take-All basis (Florida) or on a Proportional basis (New York). Districted states which allowed delegates who were elected under Winner-Take-All (Maryland) or Proportional (Pennsylvania) rules, and Districted states which reserved seats for persons not connected with that election at all (the Democratic National Committeemembers from Nebraska). There were Districted states in which voters could pick individual delegates from different slates pledged to different presidential candidates (West Virginia), Districted states in which voters could pick the delegates but could not tell whom they were pledged to (Indiana), and Districted states in which voters could decide to whom the delegates should be pledged but could not pick the delegates (Tennessee).

Three more states adopted Proportional plans, incorporating a percentage cut-off (5 per cent in Michigan), a

B) *Proportional:* Each candidate who tops a statewide vote threshold (usually expressed in percentage terms) gains a share of the delegation; *his percentage of the total vote cast for all candidates who pass the threshold determines the exact number.* Thus North Carolina used a 15 per cent cut-off, which only two entrants (George Wallace and Terry Sanford) out of five met; Wallace, with 57 per cent share of the two-man total, got 37 delegates, leaving Sanford with 27 (43 per cent).

C) *Districted:* Delegates are apportioned to pre-established units (almost always congressional districts) on a fixed basis (past party vote, straight population, or half of each); the candidate with *the plurality in each district receives (all) its delegates.* Thus Florida put from 4 to 7 delegates, depending on prior Democratic vote, in each of 12 congressional districts. George Wallace carried 11 of these for 54 votes, and Hubert Humphrey picked off one for 7.

Individual states mixed or matched these three plans to suit local political needs. The desire to avoid credentials challenges, to preserve a strong state party organization, to enhance reformers' new-found clout, or just to get some sort of primary rules through a hostile (Republican) legislature were each major considerations in one or more states. Few, however, intended to favor one particular presidential aspirant. Fewer tried to guess how their regulations would affect the distribution of power within the "national party," which is, after all, a quadrennial fiction, not an ongoing body. None attempted to predict what their decisions would contribute to historians' judgments fifty or one hundred years later.

But while purely local, tactical needs shaped most primary rules, this in itself promised only that any bias for or against a particular candidate or state would be accidental—not that it would be absent, nor that it would average out by convention time. In fact, a strong, consistent bias was operating. It escaped notice during the campaigns because any given primary could be conducted under only one set of rules. The final popular vote was filtered through a particular state's primary law, delegates were distributed among various contenders according to these results, and candidates and newsmen then rushed off to the next contest.

Table 1. Pre-California Primaries

State	Date	Delegates
New Hampshire	March 7	18
Florida	March 14	81
Wisconsin	April 4	67
Pennsylvania	April 18	182
Massachusetts	April 18	102
Ohio	May 2	153
Indiana	May 2	76
Tennessee	May 4	49
North Carolina	May 6	64
Nebraska	May 9	24
West Virginia	May 9	35
Michigan	May 16	132
Maryland	May 16	53
Oregon	May 23	34
Rhode Island	May 23	22

A lack of neutrality in the rules becomes very apparent, however, if *the final popular vote is used three different times to get three different delegate distributions for each state*—one Winner-Take-All, one Proportional, and one Districted.[4] When the recorded vote is filtered through each of these three basic plans, the primaries can in effect be "rerun" to highlight the power inherent in their regulations.

candidate cut-off (the top two finishers in New Mexico), or both (a 15 per cent cut-off *and* a four-man cut-off in North Carolina). Finally, four states used 'simple' Winner-Take-All rules, but even these varied according to whether the candidates had greater (Rhode Island) or lesser (California) control over who could stand as a delegate for them. Nine other states reserved some (usually small) share of their delegations for the statewide front-runner on a Winner-Take-All basis, a share that ran from 2 delegates (Oregon) to 38 (Ohio).

A good example of the intricacies which could arise from an imaginative mix of the three basic plans was Pennsylvania, where: (a) 137 delegates were apportioned among State Senatorial Districts according to a formula based 50 per cent on Democratic vote and 50 per cent on population; (b) 27 more delegates were chosen, at-large, by the first 137 delegates (who were elected on a Districted basis), by standards that were roughly (but only roughly) Proportional to the presidential preferences of this first 137; and (c) 18 additional delegates were chosen by the (independently elected and Party-Districted) State Democratic Committee, and were then pledged to presidential candidates in (*very*) rough approximation to those candidates' support among the first 137 (Senate-Districted) delegates. To get this process moving, the Pennsylvania citizen had to mark his ballot at least three times—once at the top of the ballot to indicate his presidential preference, and then two to four times at the bottom to elect delegates who might (but need not) be committed to that presidential preference.

[4] For states which asked their citizens to mark the ballot twice—once at the top for a presidential preference, and once at the bottom for district delegates—we have used the top (presidential preference) line as the "recorded vote." This insures comparability across the three basic sets of primary rules, since both Winner-Take-All and Proportionality demand a statewide vote. It has the additional research advantage of *underestimating* our findings. If we were, instead, to construct an artificial "statewide vote" by averaging the votes for district delegates whenever possible, this second figure would magnify our estimates of the impact of Proportionality and, especially, of Districting. Thus the top ballot line, which is more useful for comparison, is also more likely to provide a tough test of our argument.

The three major primary plans to which this vote was applied were defined as follows: (a) WINNER-TAKE-ALL: All of the state's delegates were awarded to the candidate who got the largest popular vote (on the top ballot line); (b) PROPORTIONAL: All of the state's delegates were divided among the candidates who got at least

Before the California result took the delegate hunt off the hustings and into the Credentials Committee, there were fifteen primaries which were entered by a major candidate (McGovern, Humphrey, or Wallace) and in which presidential preferences can be reliably attached to voters' choices.[5] (Table 1). When these fifteen are rerun on paper, they show the "invisible participant" hard at work.[6]

Pennsylvania is the starkest example. Keystone voters thought most highly of Hubert Humphrey, who would have amassed the largest share of their delegates under *any* of the three basic plans (Table 2). But by leading the field under Districted rules, Humphrey garnered only half of what the same performance would have gotten him via Winner-Take-All—although this was still nearly half again as much as it would have given him under Proportional regulations. In fact, the *difference* (in delegates) between winning Pennsylvania through Winner-Take-All and winning Pennsylvania Proportionately is greater than the total number of delegates available in twelve out of the first fifteen primaries (see Table 1). On abstractly statistical grounds, then, Humphrey-for-President partisans might reasonably have cared more about primary law in Pennsylvania than about whether anyone at all voted for their man in, say, Massachusetts.

Table 2. Pennsylvania Results Change Radically Under Different Primary Rules

	Winner-Take-All	Proportional	Districted
Humphrey	182	66	93
Wallace	—	40	16
Muskie	—	38	34
McGovern	—	38	39

The runner-up in the Pennsylvania balloting, George Wallace, was also disadvantaged by the method for awarding delegates. His solid second would have gotten the Alabama governor the second greatest delegate total if his vote had been filtered through Proportional ground-rules. Under the actual Districting procedure, it made him a poor fourth in convention representatives—with the worst return per vote of any candidate entered. Clearly, without asking a single *voter* to change his mind, Pennsylvania state *legislators* could have juggled between one-sixth and two-thirds of the delegates going to their winner, while making either Wallace (Proportional), McGovern (Districted), or no one (Winner-Take-All) the "runner-up" (Table 2).

15 per cent of the popular vote, in proportion to their share of that vote. The 15 per cent figure will be required in all Proportional primaries in 1976, and seems likely to be continued in the future. (But see footnote 9 for an estimate of the effect of substituting a 5 per cent cut-off.); (c) DISTRICTED: All of the state's delegates were placed in Congressional Districts and apportioned according to a formula based 50 per cent on prior Democratic vote and 50 per cent on population; the candidate with the largest vote in each district then received its delegates. This was the most common version of Districting in 1972 (all but four Districted states adopted it), and most of the other variants in use that year have been outlawed for 1976.

In view of the nearly infinite minor variations that are possible within these three arrangements (see footnote 3), it might seem that the general impact of Winner-Take-All, Proportionality, or Districting could be substantially altered by manipulating subrules within any one plan, rather then by having to scrap the plan itself. In fact, this does not appear to be true. Some of these variations actually have no effect at all, and most have measurable but trivial effects when compared with the differences *between* the three basic primary laws. An example of the former is the provision which permits some states' elected delegates to choose a small additional share of their delegations. As long as they choose by Proportional rules (as most do), this has no impact on the strengths of presidential aspirants or on the power of states within the party (although it might still influence the behavior of these delegates at the national convention). An example of the latter (clear but minimal impact) is the provision which permits some states' voters to select individual delegates from different candidates' slates. In 1972, exactly 11.5 out of 3,016 convention votes were changed by this subrule, and no candidate faced a loss/gain of more than 4 delegates through it. In the same way, the permission for states which used Districted rules to apportion their delegates either entirely by past Democratic vote or by half-Democratic-vote/half-population would have shifted no more than 2 delegates in any one state, and all the shifts (though trivial) would have reinforced our argument in the third section.

[5] Two primaries which occurred during this period, Illinois (March 21; 170 delegates) and the District of Columbia (April 18; 15 delegates), are ignored because they could not meet both of these criteria.

[6] A detailed example of the way this was done might be useful:

Table A. The Tennessee Primary, Under Three Different Primary Election Laws

THE RECORDED VOTE

	Wallace	*Humphrey*	*McGovern*	*8 Others*
1st Cong. Dist. (5 Delegates)	17,580	5,430	3,051	2,200
2nd Cong. Dist. (6 Delegates)	25,066	10,231	7,463	3,521
3rd Cong. Dist. (6 Delegates)	33,128	8,450	5,163	3,556
4th Cong. Dist. (6 Delegates)	50,342	9,418	3,855	5,567
5th Cong. Dist. (6 Delegates)	52,001	9,311	6,525	4,294
6th Cong. Dist. (6 Delegates)	47,433	6,507	3,081	4,510
7th Cong. Dist. (6 Delegates)	63,737	9,352	2,651	4,598
8th Cong. Dist. (8 Delegates)	46,571	19,151	3,762	14,716
TOTAL (49 Delegates)	335,858	78,350	35,551	42,962
Percentage (100%)	68.2%	15.9%	7.2%	8.7%
Percentage for those over 15%	81.1%	18.9%	—	—

THE DELEGATE DISTRIBUTIONS

	Wallace	*Humphrey*	*McGovern*	*8 Others*
Winner-Take-All	49	—	—	—
Proportional	40	9	—	—
Districted	49	—	—	—

But if candidates can lose up to two-thirds of their delegate potential through the intervention of particular primary rules, they can also win those primaries in more than one way. Primary elections, of course, allow someone to amass the most delegates; this is the traditional notion of victory. Unlike the November election, however, they also allow contestants to "win" by attracting favorable notice through a "surprisingly strong" showing. Newsmen are the custodians of this second form of "victory," and a switch in the rules in Pennsylvania would undoubtedly have altered it as well.

Under existing Pennsylvania regulations (Table 2), there were two wins, one loss, and one draw in the media war. The "draw" went to Hubert Humphrey. By primary time, Humphrey was expected to win, but not romp. When he did just that, he picked up a sizable bloc of delegates, but only a ho-hum from the press. Gains with the latter were instead recorded by McGovern, who drew measurable support in a state that was widely thought to be "not his type" (while also piling up 102 delegates in Massachusetts that day); and by Wallace, who ignored Pennsylvania nearly completely but came in second anyway. Commentators pinned a "must-win" label on Edmund Muskie before the primary, and a "loss" on him after it. Muskie's camp concurred, and he deactivated his candidacy after the Pennsylvania votes were counted.

In a primary occurring as early as Pennsylvania's, media-pronounced victories can be worth every bit as much, in terms of future resources, as larger delegate collections. Such "victories" can in fact be crucial for renewing a potential nominee's reservoir of financial contributions, activists' energies, and popular support. By mid-April, no rules change short of vote fraud could have garnered favorable press reviews for the Muskie candidacy, but the other Pennsylvania press judgments ("wins" for McGovern and Wallace, with a "draw" for Humphrey) were really deduced as much from primary law as from the vote distribution. They would surely never have survived a Winner-Take-All primary, resulting in *182* delegates for Humphrey, and *0* for McGovern and Wallace together.

Pennsylvania was a particularly strong example of a relatively common, though not universal, phenomenon—the "intervention" of primary rules between the distribution of votes and the division of the delegation. In similar states, like Ohio and Indiana, similar percentages of delegates' allegiance derived from primary law rather than from voters' commands[7] (Table 3). Thus a switch from Ohio's actual Districted system to Winner-Take-All would have altered the loyalties of close to forty per cent of the state's convention representatives. A second move from Winner-Take-All to Proportional would have swung nearly fifty per cent. An only slightly milder version of the same effect appeared in Indiana, where one-third and one-half of the delegates, respectively, would have shifted with these changes.

Table 3. Other States Show the Same Strong Effect of Primary Rules

3a. Ohio

	Winner-Take-All	Proportional	Districted
Humphrey	153	78	96
McGovern	—	75	57

3b. Indiana

	Winner-Take-All	Proportional	Districted
Humphrey	76	40	49
Wallace	—	36	27

Primary ground-rules might still be judged unimportant if the advantages which they concealed had eventually cancelled out. In theory, benefits might have gone randomly to candidates, with, for example, the Districted plan favoring McGovern in Ohio, Humphrey in Pennsylvania, Wallace in Indiana, etc. In fact, such averaging did *not* occur. When possible outcomes for the fifteen pre-California primaries are summed, alterations in "minor" rules lead to impressively different results (Table 4).

Table 4. The Differential Impact of Rules of the Game Does *Not* Even Out in the Long Run

	Winner-Take-All	Proportional	Districted
Humphrey	446[a]	314	324
Wallace	379	350	367
McGovern	249	319	343
Muskie	18	82	52
Others	0	27	6

[a] Delegate totals for fifteen pre-California primaries.[8]

[7] In states with a different kind of social base, the rules had a much more muted impact on delegate disbursements. Tennessee is such a state (footnote 6), and analogous rules changes would have had little effect on the loyalties of its delegates. This interaction between primary rules and the various types of states is analyzed in the final two sections of this paper.

[8] The actual results of these fifteen contests—Hum-

Under the existing welter of regulations, of course, George McGovern had become the "man to beat" by the June 6 California showdown. But if he had first faced fifteen Winner-Take-All primaries, he might well have loomed tiny as California approached. For given uniform Winner-Take-All ground-rules, Hubert Humphrey would have squeezed the most from the states with delegates on the ballot. He would have been pressed most closely by Governor Wallace, who would have been followed by a relatively distant Senator McGovern. Humphrey, who under the actual rules could never match McGovern's delegate collection, would have almost doubled his rival's total.

Unfortunately for Senator Humphrey, a majority of states actually adopted Districted primaries. If they *all* had, the Winner-Take-All leader (Humphrey) would have dropped from first to last, jettisoning a substantial share of his delegate potential in the process. The primary election crown would have passed to Governor Wallace, with about the same number of delegates under both plans. But the candidate for whom Districted rules would have been most congenial would have been Senator McGovern, who could have squeezed *half again as many* delegates out of a change from Winner-Take-All to Districting.

Governor George C. Wallace, alone among the three major factional leaders, could have looked with equanimity on any set of rules. Proportionality might have offered some added attractiveness, since it would have provided him with his largest lead, but Districting still would have made him the primary king, and Winner-Take-All regulations would have given him his greatest raw total of delegates. Proportional rules would also have pumped the maximum amount of "medicine" into the ailing candidacy of Senator Edmund Muskie, although the extra (thirty to sixty) delegates would hardly have been enough to save the patient.[9]

Since candidates and voters are not laboratory animals, the primaries must be rerun on paper, rather than in the voting booth. These "paper elections" are an excellent way to unmask the magnitude of the impact of different primary rules, but they are only a reasoned approximation to the (precise) number of delegates which particular candidates might have obtained if things had been different. If the rules had been changed, the strategic decisions of some participants would surely have changed, too, with some (changed) electoral outcomes. Yet only massive strategic shifts—the kind which are highly unlikely in the short run, where candidates are well known and citizens have reliable voting habits—could have altered the general thrust of each primary plan. Strategic shifts of a scope sufficient to keep the rules of the game from having *any* major impact on candidates' chances are, in practical terms, unimaginable. In short, in 1972, primary regulations were extremely important in determining who the nominee would be.

In fact, the ground-rules often did as much as the vote in establishing who "won," and by how much. Because they did, they give rise to a final, long chain of speculation: Changes in the rules would have significantly influenced the strength of early contestants, might well have altered (or neutralized) the result in the "key" California primary, could subsequently have led to a different (if unpredictable) nominee, and might ultimately have delivered "four less years"—in the same way that a single, unnoticed, fabled nail once toppled a kingdom.

---

phrey 284, Wallace 291, McGovern 401.5, Muskie 56.5, Others 59—do not, of course, match the outcomes which a consistent application of any of these three plans would have created, mainly because different states used different basic plans. Thus McGovern's ability to surpass his apparent "optimum," and the inability of Wallace and Humphrey to attain their apparent "minimums," are partially due to the way their varying *levels* of electoral support within states meshed with the type of primary rules in effect in those same states.

Humphrey and Wallace each suffered from one other rule-related problem, stemming from the way the *social status* of their respective supporters interacted with the rules. Because lower-income voters were most likely to fail to mark their ballots completely, and because Humphrey's voters were more likely to be from the lower-class parts of the party, Districted rules (with their usual two-step voting requirement) deprived him of delegates in areas where he was the favorite; conversely, McGovern, with higher-income support, picked up delegates in areas where he could do no better than third in the preference poll. In Pennsylvania alone, Humphrey lost 20 delegates (more delegates than there *are* in the New Hampshire primary) through this "voter fatigue;" McGovern picked up 15 of them.

Wallace's supporters were a "problem" at a much earlier stage. Unlike the more middle-class followers of George McGovern or the party/union activists of Hubert Humphrey, George Wallace's early enthusiasts were often not sufficiently organized (or perhaps, organizable) to mount delegate petition drives. Consequently, Wallace occasionally placed his name on the presidential preference line without providing delegates who would stand for him on the lines below. In Pennsylvania, he finished comfortably ahead in districts which should have delivered 16 delegates, but since they contained only 2 pledged Wallaceites, he lost 14 of these 16 to the other candidates (Humphrey, Muskie, and especially, McGovern).

[9] If these Proportional rules had used a 5 per cent cutoff, rather than the tougher 15 per cent, Muskie's total would have continued to grow—to 113. These additional delegates would have arrived *after* he had withdrawn from active candidacy, courtesy of states where his name was still on the ballot. The biggest gainer from the reduced vote threshold, however, would have been the category "Others," where a collection of long-shots (Chisholm, Lindsay, Sanford, Jackson, and Yorty) stood to amass 74 delegates. Humphrey, Wallace, and McGovern would have surrendered delegates to these others in about the same proportions, coming to rest at totals of 292, 324, and 289, respectively.

Primary Rules and Political Power

Technical party regulations, no matter how great their power, are rarely debated during election campaigns, and 1972 was no exception. Once the presidential election was past, however, combat over party rules began again within the Democratic party. The site for the debate was the new Commission on Delegate Selection and Party Structure, and, while press attention was concentrated on the issue of representational quotas, primary ground-rules were also on the Commission's agenda.

On October 5, 1973, the Commissioners voted to outlaw Winner-Take-All regulations, and to limit states to a choice of Districting or Proportionality.[10] The Winner-Take-All primary was killed off by a coalition of those who believed that the latter plans would increase the power of Democrats with the same policy preferences, those who felt that the latter plans were simply more "democratic," and those who were looking backward to the experience of one particular (1972) candidate or forward to the chances of a new (1976) one. Some combination of the same three criteria—the internal distribution of party power, conceptions of democracy, and candidate loyalities—will necesarily guide anyone else who passes judgment on the Commission's decision.

Diehard candidate loyalists, as always, have a very simple decision-rule at hand. Whichever primary system favored their man is equitable; all others are distortive. Thus Table 4 suggests that: (1) Devoted McGovernites may rest content with the actual mix, but could encourage the proliferation of Districted primaries; (2) Fervent Humphreyites should see justice solely in Winner-Take-All plans; (3) Rabid Wallaceites, alone among the partisans, might take the statesmanlike view. Proportionality may hold a special place in their hearts, but they could swallow Winner-Take-All or Districted regulations without difficulty.

Such hero worship is never very helpful in evaluating political arrangements, partly because it is far from objective, but mainly because heroes suffer political mortality while the rules which favored them live on. Reformers who want to avoid these selfish, personalized, and transitory standards can turn instead to "democratic theory," a realm untainted by past partisan attachments. For these rule-makers, party law should be deduced from general standards of democratic government and then extended to all facets of party activity, including primary elections.

Unfortunately, democratic theorists offer few consensual standards. Those who favor Proportionality claim the closest approximation to the actual vote, along with the greatest incentive for any and all hopefuls to enter the primaries—both clearly "democratic." Winner-Take-All advocates counter that by driving aspirants out of the race and by forcing voters toward compromise, they insure meaningful choices before the Convention and a chance of winning the election after it—both clearly "democratic." Lastly, Districting supporters hold out the "golden mean," promising some diversity in candidates but some hope that they will be forced to coalesce—and that is also "democratic."[11]

Fortunately, there is a middle-ground between abstract theoretical guidelines and particularistic personal loyalties because all primary plans also advantage specific geographic areas; in other words, they give political power disproportionately to some states (and hence to some states' *residents*) and not to others. Since they do, primary rules can be used deliberately to alter the balance of power within a political party. In fact, regardless of whether reform commissioners consider the internal distribution of party power, their decisions *will* benefit either politically liberal or conservative areas, either electorally competitive or noncompetitive areas, and either reliably Democratic, waveringly Democratic, or regularly Republican areas.

The Democratic National Committee has always recognized this impact of the rules on constituents' fortunes when it allocates Convention delegates to the states. At this (earliest) stage of the delegate selection process, the D.N.C. engages in some deliberate manipulation of party blocs, through an allocation formula which rewards both sheer (Electoral College) size and past Democratic support. The party-voting criterion, by inflating states which normally go Democratic, is an attempt to guarantee that individuals who are most typical of the Democratic vote will have the most weight within the party. The size criterion, by rewarding states which have most to offer in the Electoral College, is an attempt to guarantee that the nominee will be a winner. Inadvertently, it also increases the likelihood that he will be devoted to the social-welfare policies and coalition-of-minor-

[10] See its report to the Democratic National Committee: Commission on Delegate Selection and Party Structure, *Democrats All* (Washington, D.C.: Democratic National Committee, 1973). Guideline 8("Unit Rule") abolishes the Winner-Take-All primary. Guideline 9.A covers Districted primaries, and Guideline 11 contains the Commission's recommendations on Proportionality. The Democratic National Committee raised the cut-off figure in the Proportionality section (from 10 per cent to 15 per cent), but otherwise accepted the Commission's guidelines as written.

[11] If the argument of the last two sections is correct, however, this claim (that Districting is a "mean" between Winner-Take-All and Proportionality) is true *only* in formal-structural terms. In terms of the plan's effect on state power within the national Democratic party, it is, instead, the most extreme case (see below).




Figure 1. Winner-Take-All[a] Rules Maintain Original Delegate Advantages

[a] Bars represent the state's "political value," i.e., the delegate *margin* obtained by the candidate who finished first in that primary. Under Winner-Take-All rules, the "political value" is the same as the size of the state's delegation; under other rules, it may not be (see Figures 2 & 3). The seven primary states with the largest delegations have the striped bars in Figures 1, 2, & 3; the eight primary states with the smallest delegations have the plain bars.

ities politics which traditionally characterize the national Democratic party, and which find special favor in the big, urban, industrialized, working-class, ethnic- and racial-minority-oriented states.

As long as top state party officials could select and direct their delegations, a state's power at the Convention faithfully reflected the size and Democratic-vote criteria. The bigger the state, the more claim it could have on potential nominees. The more reliably Democratic the state, the more muscle it could throw behind its choice. Thus the dozen largest states were more important than all their brethren combined. And thus, for states of similar population, a look at the last presidential vote would predict comparative importance at the next convention.

The proliferation of (reformed) primaries since 1968 has changed all this. The first allocation of delegates no longer insures the internal party power of large and/or reliably Democratic states if their delegates end up on the ballot. To be sure, there are primary plans which maintain the original advantages bestowed by the Democratic National Committee, there are also systems which neutralize these advantages, and there are even arrangements which reverse them. In 1972, primary regulations had a strong, unintended impact on which states were vital to candidates' fortunes: They magnified the influence of Democrats in areas which are likely to go Republican in most general elections or which, while remaining Democratic for most lower offices, are apt to desert the party at presidential election time.

If all states had implemented Winner-Take-All primaries in 1972, this redistribution of state party power would not have occurred. A state's "political value"—the delegate *margin* obtained by the candidate who finished first in its primary—would have corresponded exactly with the size of delegation authorized by national party rules (Figure 1). The key battlefields would have been generally northeastern, urban, industrial, minority-oriented, populous, and two-party competitive in November, while the lesser ones would have been southern and western, more rural, agricultural, homogeneous, sparsely populated, and politically one-party.

Candidates would have been forced to attend to




Figure 2. Proportional Rules[a] Erode Original Delegate Advantages

[a] Bars represent the share of the state's *political value* (under Winner-Take-All rules) which it can retain under Proportionality.[12]

the former states, on pain of losing any chance at nomination. Campaigners would have been particularly drawn to states like Pennsylvania and Ohio, which are not just competitive at the general election, but are highly competitive within the state Democratic party itself. Narrow victories there (and victories would predictably be narrow) could swing a huge phalanx of delegates. Consequently, such states would have a maximum opportunity to extract policy promises from candidates. Pennsylvania, for example, offers multiple bases of support for presidential aspirants: the coal regions, inner-city Philadelphia or Pittsburgh, wealthy suburbs, extensive farm belts, etc. The man who could best appeal to a plurality of these Pennsylvanians would receive a net gain of 182 delegates; the man who attracted New Hampshiremen, by contrast, would inherit one-tenth of that. In fact, placing first in Pennsylvania would have been worth as much as a comparable performance in all six of the smallest primary states *combined* (New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Nebraska, Oregon, West Virginia, and Tennessee).

The position of the largest states would begin to erode seriously if all primaries were instead run Proportionately. Where a Winner-Take-All plan favors states with the greatest *total number* of delegates, and in effect offers a bonus to those which are internally competitive, a Proportional arrangement favors those which can generate the greatest *vote difference*—an extra reward for the noncompetitive (Figure 2). As a result, the more politically homogeneous of the middle-sized states would increase their ability to command candidates' attention and to wield power within the party, at the expense of the more politically diverse among the big states.

Tennessee, in 1972, was the outstanding example of the way that Proportionality would confer benefits on such middle-sized, noncompetitive

[12] For example, Tennessee gives its first-place finisher a margin of 31 delegates under Proportional rules, compared to 49 under Winner-Take-All; thus it retains 63 per cent of its original political value—the best record among these fifteen states. Comparable figures for the remaining states are: Massachusetts 43 per cent (44/102); Oregon 41 per cent (14/34); Florida 38 per cent (31/81); West Virginia 31 per cent (11/35); Michigan 26 per cent (34/132); Rhode Island 18 per cent (4/22); North Carolina 16 per cent (10/64); Pennsylvania 14 per cent (26/182); Maryland 13 per cent (7/53); New Hampshire 11 per cent (2/18); Wisconsin 9 per cent (6/67); Nebraska 8 per cent (2/24); Indiana 5 per cent (4/76); Ohio 2 per cent (3/153).

states. Given Proportional rules, George Wallace's Tennessee landslide (75 per cent of the ballots cast) would have been worth as large a lead in delegates (an edge of 31) as Hubert Humphrey's much narrower victory in Pennsylvania (a margin of 26). Tennesseans would have generated the same delegate margin for their favorite as Pennsylvanians did for theirs—even though the latter were entitled to four times as many convention votes. Politicians would have had to learn to calculate accordingly: The magnitude of a potential winner's lead, not the size of the states he could win, would become the key to nomination hopes.

The benefits which Proportionality could have brought to Tennessee would have been felt as severe costs in, for example, Ohio, where a net gain of *three* delegates would have been skimpy spoils for the victor (Figure 2.) A three-delegate *lead* in Ohio would not be trivial in the winner's quest for a convention majority, since it still represents a large *total* of delegates. (See Table 3a.) But it would not be too much consolation either, since at least one other candidate (and possibly more) would be gaining only three fewer convention votes.

Because it has a substantial delegation in total size, Ohio would not be crossed off the itineraries of presidential aspirants; they would still be well advised to rally their partisans there. But if they had the capacity to attract Tennesseans as well, they should certainly transfer more of their time and, presumably, policy promises to the Volunteer state. Even if they could not do so—and not everyone can roll up three-quarters of the vote in Tennessee—they would still be facing a changed environment within the party. Where Winner-Take-All rules once made Ohio (153 delegates) more than three times as large as Tennessee (49), Proportionality would now reverse the situation (+3 versus +31). In tactical terms, a candidate who finished first in Ohio and a poor third in Tennessee could, historically, have thumbed his nose at a competitor who finished first in Tennessee but third in Ohio; he would, after all, have beaten the latter by better than 3-to-1. In the post-Winner-Take-All era, however, the Ohio winner would have to stifle his contempt, since a Tennessee victor could often eclipse him in the delegate race.

Tennessee and Ohio were, of course, extreme cases. In general, Proportional plans would subtract unevenly from the edge of the big states, since these states are not necessarily more internally competitive than their medium-sized or tiny counterparts. Residents of Michigan or Massachusetts, for example, voted as lopsidedly in their primaries as anyone. The big states which *are* competitive would shrink in importance, relative to both noncompetitive big states and noncompetitive smaller ones. Their slack would be taken up by the more one-sided among the middle-sized. Few of the states in this size range could derive as dramatic gains as Tennessee, although the fact that these states are predominantly southern might have substantial policy implications for the party as a whole (see last section.) The smallest states (New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Nebraska) would derive much less of an advantage, since a huge *percentage* victory in any of them still represents a comparatively small *number* of delegates (e.g., nine in Rhode Island). Under Proportionality, then, big, competitive states decline in importance; middle-sized, noncompetitive states rise, and small states stay at the bottom of the heap.

The latter could be rescued from this position by a broad-scale implementation of Districted primaries. If all primaries had been Districted—as most were—the net benefits coming with a first-place finish would have been almost unrelated to size of delegation, and hence to Winner-Take-All margins (Figure 3.) Where a Winner-Take-All victory in Pennsylvania would have been equivalent to victories in all *six* of the smallest states, any *two* of these states could have offered about the same delegate margin as the Keystone state under Districted regulations, and North Carolina and Tennessee could have matched its political value by themselves. In the battle for power within the Democratic party, it would have been North Carolina over Pennsylvania, Tennessee over Ohio, Nebraska over Indiana, and Oregon over Wisconsin.[13]

[13] It might be argued that our definition of a state's "political value" (the delegate margin which it can provide to its favorite) is not the ideal measure of the impact of primary rules on power within the Democratic party. One could argue that, for purposes of understanding presidential politics in the long run, the crucial consideration is not what a state can give to any particular candidate, but how much of a margin it can generate for its favorite *wing* of the party, i.e., for each group of candidates (the left-Democrats, the liberal-Democrats, or the conservative-Democrats) *as a group*.

In 1972, the question of which measure to use—the "candidate margin" or an artificial "ideological margin"—was, of course, irrelevant, because two of the first four primaries, and all of those after the fourth (Pennsylvania), featured a maximum of three serious contenders (McGovern, Humphrey, or Wallace), one for each wing of the party. Collectively, they would have amassed well over 90 per cent of the delegates from the first 15 contests under any set of rules (Table 4).

Future nomination campaigns are very likely to follow this same pattern—a rapid thinning of the field until there is a champion for each major faction—because the central problem in seeking a major party nomination is the scarcity of political resources, especially activists, finances, and popularity. An aspirant must succeed in monopolizing these within his wing of the party, and must then defeat the standard-bearers of the other wings. If he fails to drive other contenders who resemble him out of the race early, he will surely find that the resource situation allows one of them to drive him out instead—witness Lindsay (elimi-

The shift from universal Winner-Take-All to universal Districted plans sharply alters the tactical environment on the way to the convention. The largest states suffer a tremendous diminution in political influence because they contain pockets of strength for any number of candidates. The smaller states will never face this problem; each of the six primary states with the fewest delegates could have given exactly the same share of those delegates—100 per cent—to its favorite under either Winner-Take-all or Districted rules (Figure 3). Where once a candidate could only hope to gain the nomination if he had substantial muscle in the eastern industrial states, the change to Districted primaries should make it every bit as feasible to pursue a "southern" or "western" strategy. A presidential contender can now secure a decent minority of districts in the biggest states and then aim for all the districts in either those states which are normally Republican in the November election (mainly western or midwestern) or those states which are of the hybrid persuasion known as "Southern-Democratic."

Selection of delegates by District is, in fact, an excellent example of the way that one set of rules (those governing primaries) can nullify the effects of another (those governing apportionment of delegates to the states). A Winner-Take-All system supports the original apportionment formula, giving extra power to large and/or reliably Democratic states (Figure 1, where the striped bars precede the plain ones). Proportionality operates to neutralize the formula (Figure 2, where the striped and plain bars are mixed randomly). Districting works to *reverse* it (Figure 3, where the plain bars precede the striped ones).

Each primary plan, by the way it parcels out delegates, favors a particular blend of delegation size and internal competition. Consequently, each plan leads to a different distribution of power within the party. A Winner-Take-All system fragments *no* delegations, thereby making the larger and more competitive states more powerful. A Proportional system, on the other hand, fragments *all* delegations, making the larger and less competitive states more powerful. A Districted system takes the final step by fragmenting the delegations of the big states but not those of their less populous counterparts—in effect maximizing the power of the smaller and less competitive states. The widespread adoption of Districted primaries after 1968, or the prohibition of Winner-Take-All primaries after 1972, were not, then, just inconsequential decisions to hand out delegates via a certain mechanism. They were indirect, apparently accidental, but far-reaching choices about the types of candidate who would bear the party's standard, the types of voter who would have the power to choose those standard-bearers, and the types of issue with which both groups would try to shape history. They were, in short, a decision on how to (re)construct the Democratic party.

Primary Rules, Political Power, and Social Change

Primary rules necessarily change the balance of power within a party. In any single campaign, that altered balance can elicit moderate tactical adjustments; it cannot remake political personalities. A presidential aspirant is, after all, a man with a past. In his political career, he will have accumulated friends and enemies, and have arrived at stands on most major questions of the day. If his following is mainly urban, not farm-belt, Democrats, he cannot practially desert Ohio for Nebraska (although he *can* shift barnstorming time). If he has built a name in civil liberties, he cannot court street-crime victims by urging unlimited detention of suspects (although he *can* switch positions on other, less publicized controversies). Even if he can discover ways to remodel himself to benefit from changed conditions, he may not make the

---

nated early by McGovern), Muskie (isolated from his potential resource base by Humphrey), or Mills (smothered by Wallace) in 1972.

It is probably extremely fortunate that investigation of the political role of primary rules does not require the analyst to lump one candidate's voters or delegates with another's, and then to assert that they form a bloc, since this would introduce severe distortions into the results. An observer might conclude, for example, that McGovern, Chisholm, and Lindsay make up one bloc, that Humphrey, Muskie, Sanford, and Jackson are in another, and that Wallace, Mills, and Yorty form a third. Yet this assumes both that the second choices of lesser candidates' voters will lie within the same bloc, and that the convention voting of minor candidates' delegates will mirror the votes of delegates pledged to the bloc's front-runner—both patently untrue assumptions. Among the "minor" candidates, Muskie attracted the greatest number of voters and delegates. But while Muskie and *Humphrey* appear to hold similar ideological positions, potential Muskie *voters* were torn between Humphrey and *McGovern* after their hero had suspended operations; in fact, some commentators viewed the California primary not as a contest between Humphrey supporters and McGovern supporters, but as a contest between Humphrey and McGovern for the allegiance of (former) Muskie supporters. The same picture emerges from attempts to create delegate blocs. Muskie may have most closely resembled Humphrey, and he may even have asked his delegates at the convention to follow Humphrey's leadership temporarily, yet these delegates split (roughly in half) on the floor, some staying with the Humphreyites, but many going with the McGovernites.

(It might be noted, parenthetically, that even though we advise against pretending that these "ideological blocs" are real entities, we did carve up primary voters into the three blocs outlined above, to see what effect this would have on the role of primary election plans. It had almost none: Winner-Take-All was still the optimal plan for the the large, competitive states; Proportionality was still the middle-sized, noncompetitive states' plan; and Districting still favored the smaller states, whatever their level of competition.)




Figure 3. Districted Rules[a] Destroy Original Delegate Advantages

[a] Bars represent the share of a state's *political value* (under Winner-Take-All rules) which it can retain under Districting.[14]

effort. If attaining the presidency had required Senator McGovern to accept the war in Vietnam, Senator Humphrey to back away from universal medical insurance, or Governor Wallace to forsake the neighborhood school, the presidential contest would have had three fewer entrants.

But if primary regulations do change the balance of power within a political party, they do so regardless of the ability or desire of any particular contender to adapt. Any given man may move only slightly in response to an altered political enironment, but the types of contestants, of issues, and of electoral strategies which characterize politics will shift more markedly. If candidates must attract newly powerful areas in order to campaign realistically for the nomination, candidates will appear who can attract those areas. If a certain set of issues is important there, champions will arise who have those issues as their major claim to fame. Over the course of several elections, the men who seek the nomination, the voters they must appease to get it, and the policies they use to do so will, together, constitute a recognizably different era in American politics.

A theoretical outline of what would happen *if* a new political environment were produced by primary rules is not, of course, a description of that new environment; it is not evidence that the new "era" will continue beyond the election in which it was first detected; it is not a set of logical deductions about what the new situation implies for

[14] For example, Tennessee gives its first-place finisher a margin of 49 delegates under both Districted and Winner-Take-All rules; thus it retains 100 per cent (49/49) of its original political value. Comparable figures for the remaining states are: Massachusetts 100 per cent (102/102); West Virginia 100 per cent (35/35); Oregon 100 per cent (34/34); Nebraska 100 per cent (24/24); Rhode Island 100 per cent (22/22); New Hampshire 100 per cent (18/18); North Carolina 81 per cent (52/64); Florida 73 per cent (63/81); Michigan 70 per cent (92/132); Wisconsin 52 per cent (35/67), Maryland 51 per cent (27/53); Pennsylvania 30 per cent (54/82); Indiana 29 per cent (22/76); Ohio 25 per cent (39/53).

(future) national politics. The previous section of this paper is an attempt to meet the first of these objectives, and it contains an implicit argument about the second: If "size" and "degree of internal competitiveness" are in fact the key links between primary rules and a state's influence within the Democratic party, then the new political environment should endure. This is not to say, on the one hand, that charismatic leaders or dramatic events (sufficient to overwhelm any rule-related effect) cannot appear, nor, on the other hand, that party officials might not reverse themselves and restore the pre-reform regulations. But by assuming the absence of both of these situations, it should be possible to meet the final objective—and to produce some deductions about the policy outcomes of a new and different balance of power within the national Democratic party.

The inadvertently retailored Democratic party toward which Districted primaries contribute features two groups of states on the rise and one in decline.[15] The biggest losers are the northeastern, industrial states (plus, in the future, California?), which have always been the mainstay of the Democratic party, and which remain essential for the election of a Democratic president. These are the states which epitomize the old coalition-of-minorities politics, and which are the heart of support for "social-welfare" programs (e.g., aid to education, plentiful jobs and guaranteed employment, Social Security, Medicare and universal health insurance). Their residents have been opposed to the more radical "social engineering" approach to policy making (busing, job quotas, etc.), but that opposition has not (in most cases) induced them to react against progressive legislation in the social-welfare mode.

Under Winner-Take-All rules in the primaries and then in the Electoral College, the ten largest of these states can nominate a Democrat and elect him. Obviously, primary rules which shift control over the nominee to areas favoring social engineering, or areas desiring a reaction against it (see below), risk cracking the Democratic coalition in the large states. Because the latter are usually highly competitive in November, substantial cracks in the coalition are likely to drive them into the Republican column, and that, in turn, should be enough to decide most presidential elections. The party power of the large, politically heterogeneous states is thus intimately tied to a style of politics, a wide-ranging set of policies, and a strategy for winning elections.

[15] By mid-1975, it appeared that at least 28 of the 32 primaries in 1976 would be Districted, and both the number of primaries and the incidence of Districting may yet increase. This is already a situation much like the pure Districted arrangements shown in Table 4, or the state power picture presented in Figure 3.

Recent alterations in primary law reduce that power, and increase the party role of two (mutually hostile) groups of smaller, more politically homogeneous states—each with its own preferred course for the Democratic party. First are the Midwestern and Western states, which can deliver well over three-quarters of their delegates to the same man without any need for a Winner-Take-All provision.[16] Unlike the Northeastern states, where policy preferences, party politics, and general election strategy form an internally consistent package, these (Midwestern-Western) areas present a contradiction: While most are presidentially Republican across the state as a whole, and while as a group they provide the bedrock of which senatorial and congressional conservatism is founded, their *Democratic delegates* often support candidates who are markedly more liberal than the bulk of the party.[17] These delegates were the essential base for a liberal-left challenge to Northeastern candidates and social-welfare policies even before the reform of the delegate selection process, and that tendency was exaggerated afterwards.

Increased power for the plains and mountain states, then, promises a double result: First, greater convention support for social engineering policies, and second, sharply curtailed electoral prospects for the nominee. More influence for Midwestern-

[16] If more of these states should add primaries to the list in the future, Districting will provide an even more inflated edge for this segment of the party, thanks to a peculiarity in delegate apportionment which Districted primaries accentuate. Because half of all convention delegates are assigned according to a state's share in the Electoral College, because more Electoral Votes go to the smallest states than they are entitled to by population, and because small states are disproportionately Midwestern-Western, this group of states receives "extra" delegates. This is hardly unfair or unreasonable; presidential voting is done through the Electoral College, so the relevant size figure is not census population, but Electoral College "population." Since Districted rules, however, will allow these areas (if they institute presidential primaries) to cast their (extra) convention votes as a bloc, the combination of apportionment peculiarities and the distortions involved in Districting will be additive: It will further undercut both the middle-sized (Southern-Border) states, which get no bonus delegates from the apportionment formula, and the big (Northeastern industrial) states, whose delegations are fragmented by Districted rules.

[17] This support is probably not directly rooted in any mass favorability toward social engineering policies, even among Democrats. Rather, it can be explained by two other factors characterizing Democratic party politics in the plains-mountain states. First, mass electorates in these areas, compared to the rest of the nation, prefer "cleaner," more "purist" candidates on stylistic grounds, and this tendency is reinforced by a preference for potential nominees who are not identified with the industrial Northeast. Second, a continuing party leadership structure is nearly nonexistent, so that there is no regular party organization to resist a quadrennial take over by independent, liberal activists. As a result of this combination, apparently conservative states are very likely to produce left-liberal delegates.

Western areas means greater irritation for the other (Southern-Border) areas which primary rules have revitalized, making it even more likely that the Democrats will not carry the latter (see below). A larger role for the plains-mountain states is at the very least an additional problem for electoral politics in the big states, since the policy concerns of (delegates from) the former are unlike those of the industrial core of the party's voters. Finally, and ironically, greater party power for these areas will probably not make it more likely that any more of them will go Democratic in November. Even if it were possible to "trade" the Midwest and West for the Northeast, the deal would be a bad one in numerical terms, but in reality the question is unlikely to arise: The plains-mountain states are still solidly Republican presidentially, and greater delegate power at the Democratic Convention will do little to overcome that.

The Southern and Border states make up the second group for which Districted (and even Proportional) regulations are a major boon. Like their Midwestern-Western counterparts, all of the states below the Mason-Dixon line can deliver more than three-quarters of their delegates to one man, in the absence of any aid from Winner-Take-All provisions. Compared with the plains-mountain states, however, these areas have historically been more conservative before the nomination and more Democratic at election time. They remain more conservative in convention, but the situation at the presidential level has changed over the past decade: Southern-Border electorates have increasingly been attracted by generalized attacks on social change and, when Democratic nominees have failed to endorse such attacks, have subsequently crossed over to the Republicans.[18] A combination of historical ties plus social-welfare programs (a presumed "need" in the lowest-income section of the country) has kept them from doing the same thing at the senatorial and congressional levels; although their legislators have been restless on social-welfare matters and have defected to the Republicans on many others. Whether the same combination can be used to allay the general Southern suspicion that the national Democratic party has been captured by social engineers, and thus to bring the presidential vote back into line with the vote at lower levels, is an open question. Whether future Democratic national conventions will make the effort is equally open.[19]

New patterns of convention decision making do seem very likely to follow the new party power configuration, and such decisions will, in turn, be critical in determining what the party stands for, and how much of that can be implemented. These new patterns may, again, be accelerated or delayed by the American economic or international situation. They may even be interrupted entirely by the appearance of charismatic figures or unforeseen events. Barring such developments, however, the power distribution created by primary rules does provide a basis for speculation on the direction in which future conventions will take the party, and on its subsequent fate. At the very least, the combination of more potent Midwestern-Western (left) and Southern-Border (right) wings should decrease the probability of Democratic presidential election victories, although the amount of the decline is, as yet, unclear. More imaginative political analysts can certainly find more extreme scenarios: The new political environment, for example, could permanently detach a huge minority of all Democrats from their (former) party and convert them into registered Republicans.

Of the three basic primary plans, Districting promises the most sharply divided conventions and the most severe problems in postconvention electioneering. Under this plan, the more radical candidates on both ends of the party's ideological spectrum will have a maximum number of delegates. Aspirants at the center will, conversely, be at their weakest, leaving the convention with a dilemma. It can appease the delegates on the left, settling on a contender who favors social engineering policies, and who will drive off more conservative Democrats in November. Or, it can placate the delegates on the right, settling on a candidate whose electability is purchased through a closer resemblance to the Republican standard-bearer, a much closer resemblance than pre-reform Democratic nominees needed or wanted.

[18] Desertions by the voters have been less regular at the senatorial and congressional levels, but the old lines are seriously breached there, too. While this can hardly be chalked up to presidential primary rules, it can also hardly be slowed (much less reversed) by primary arrangements which have the net effect of favoring the Republicans at the presidential level.

[19] This seems to suggest that those who desire both to obtain primary rules reform and to avoid doing serious damage to the party's electoral prospects should back Proportionality, and so they should if these were the only factors in the analysis. Many (perhaps most) reform advocates, however, are interested in the cause of rules reform because they believe it will lead to more liberal policy positions by the party's presidential nominees, i.e., because it will create a more change-oriented party. Judged by these standards, Proportionality is the least attractive primary plan—less attractive than Districting, which promises more liberal nominees and reform, but a decreased likelihood of winning elections; and less attractive than Winner-Take-All, which promises more liberal nominees, no reform, and an increased probability of winning elections.

Under Districting, the bargaining capacity of the big industrial states is reduced severely, to the point where their old-line party "regulars" may well be unable to insist on the usual moderate-liberal candidate with a social-welfare program. Instead, they will have to join either a left-leaning or a right-leaning coalition. Because the regulars are (so far, at least) unwilling to move toward the Republicans on basic economic issues or on civil rights and liberties, conventions will in all likelihood compromise to the left. But since Districting also increases the influence of the party's more conservative members, providing them with recognized leaders in the process, a left-leaning compromise at the convention is very likely to shove them into the Republican column in November. If the same rules which strengthen the Midwestern-Western bloc and its sympathizers did not also magnify the power of the Southern-Border alliance and its affiliates, conservative Democrats might be swept along at the general election. But because the rules do empower both extremes, they inevitably foster short-run defection.

Prognosticators who are willing to drive this argument to a further conclusion might well argue that the problem of desertion by a sharply defined (and large) body of registered Democrats will not be a long-lasting one. No major group is likely to work hard year in and year out to influence the nomination of one party, and then just as regularly be forced to flee to the opposition on election day. If subsequent Democratic conventions persist in deferring to their Midwestern-Western wing, with the nomination and/or with major policy concessions, the problem of debilitating dissension within the party could ease: The South, the Border states, and a significant share of the Northern working class could simply leave permanently. Defections by Democrats would decline sharply, as the most likely deserters became Republicans. Harmony and consistency would be restored—within the new *minority* party. A minimum of political difficulty would then surround the selection of a left-liberal contender who could present a far-reaching program of social engineering, and public policy debate would center on these new issues. The costs of restructuring the American policy agenda in this way might well, however, include: First, the loss of social-welfare program expansion, and second, a continual rejection by a majority of the American people of both the policies and the candidate of the (new, minority) Democrats.[20]

[20] There is a growing literature in the field of American party politics which is related to the same concerns as our final section—namely, large-scale changes in electoral coalitions, and their associated shifts in public issues and candidate orientations. This concern with what have come to be called "realignments" had its roots in the work of V. O. Key, most particularly in V. O. Key, Jr., "A Theory of Critical Elections," *Journal of Politics*, 17 (February, 1955), 3–18.

By the mid-1970s, the concepts which Key first pulled together had ramified (and rarefied) to the point where a student of American politics can find support in them for nearly any view of the future which strikes his fancy. There are those who foresee the breakup of old political alignments and the forging of a protracted Republican era, e.g., Kevin P. Phillips, *The Emerging Republican Majority* (New Rochelle, N. Y.: Arlington House, 1969), but there are those who see the same breakup with a recoalescence around the national Democratic party instead, e.g., Lanny J. Davis, *The Emerging Democratic Majority* (New York: Stein & Day, 1974). There are those who forecast the disintegration of old arrangements without any subsequent realignment, and who view this as a "new sophistication," e.g., Walter DeVries and Lance Tarrance, Jr., *The Ticket-Splitter* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans Publishing, 1972), but there are those who predict disintegration without realignment, and who interpret it as the "new anomie," e.g., Walter Dean Burnham, *Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1970). There are those who think that a new majority coalition is waiting to be born, but has not yet been called into existence, e.g., Samuel Lubell, *The Hidden Crisis in American Politics* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1970) and there are those who think that it is already in existence, but is waiting to be claimed by one party or the other, e.g., Richard M. Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg, *The Real Majority* (New York: Coward, McCann, 1970).

The only threads common to all of these studies are the "gut feeling" that "something's happening," a willingness to make rather sweeping assertions about what that "something" is, and a belief that the social forces which are loose at the moment are so strong that institutional factors are inconsequential barriers in their path.

We have, in our final section, laid out our own set of realignment-type scenarios, each of which, we feel, has some plausibility. Our own suspicion about the realignment controversy, however, is that the state of the literature mirrors the state of its subject matter, i.e., that there has been no new coalitional movement in American society substantial enough to make one of these perspectives true, and the others false. Our view, obviously, is that changes in the rules of the game at this point are particularly likely to facilitate the resolution of social instabilities along whatever lines those new rules favor. This is, however, merely a subproposition of our general belief that there will always be continued, minor movements in American society in nearly any direction you can imagine, and that a major determinant of whether these develop into more far-reaching changes in the political climate is whether the political rules of the game facilitate them, or whether they run at cross-currents to them.

If Districted rules remained in effect, but if a greater share of party leaders began to agree that left-leaning coalitions were electorally risky, conventions might compromise toward their Southern-Border wing instead. This might, in turn, permit retention of both reformed regulations and hopes for victory. A right-leaning compromise would generate some desertions by left-wing Democrats, but these would be limited by the fact that there is nowhere (at least at present) for dissident leftists to go. Such desertions as did occur

would, in any case, be politically less costly than conservative defections, since they would not be gains for the Republican candidate. The (newly conservatized) Democratic party could retain a mild social-welfare orientation, while retrenching on civil rights and civil liberties, but it could probably put this program forward only after remarkably acrimonious conventions.[21]

Even if one were programmatically undismayed by these developments, however, Southern-oriented compromises at the convention might still have some serious tactical drawbacks. If the Democratic party leans toward its right, its nominee and his policies would be less clearly distinguishable from those of the Republicans. In one sense, this makes it unnecessary for conservative Democrats to jump the fence. But in a second sense, it makes defection less costly. If a convention is characterized by virulent protests on the part of Midwestern-Western delegates and their sympathizers, and if it does not both squelch these firmly *and* produce the vigorous advances in bread-and-butter economic matters which would attract lower-income conservatives, many Democrats might decide to desert anyhow.

Proportional regulations could rearrange the same dilemmas, reducing the chance that the party will be captured by a minority on its left, but maintaining the risk of substantial defections to the right. By restoring the bargaining power of the big industrial states, Proportionality would make traditional Democratic presidential politics (the "moderate-liberal with a social-welfare program" approach) at least more practical. By cancelling the advantages which Districting (and only Districting) offers to left-liberals, Proportionality ought to give them the sole option of joining a moderate-liberal coalition at the convention or of forcing the moderates to turn to the conservatives for support. By removing left-liberalism as a realistic "threat," Proportionality should, finally, lessen conservative Democrats' incentive to desert.

But the same tactical problems which a right-leaning coalition presented under Districted rules would probably be only very partially solved by Proportionality. Attempts to contain potential right-wing defections by broadening the nominating coalition to include (many) Southern-Border delegates should, indeed, be more common under Proportional rules than under Districting. Resulting coalitions would have familiar policy consequences—a diminished social-welfare program, plus retrenchment on civil rights and liberties. They would generate a familiar political irony—a mild shift toward conservatism, propelled by reforms which ostensibly were designed to make the party more change-oriented. And, ultimately, they would face a familiar tactical problem—some defections on the left, coupled with the (more serious) possibility that a narrowed gap between Democrats and Republicans would facilitate crossovers, rather than eliminate them. This latter problem might be exacerbated by Proportional rules' generosity to the type of splinter movements which cannot hope to secure a nomination, but which can generate extremist delegates and which may guarantee a high enough level of dissension at the convention to reliably infuriate conservatives. A plan which maximizes the number of Southern-oriented delegates can hardly make their displeasure less evident to those who follow the convention. By the same token, it can hardly make the Democratic right-wing less able to organize a party bolt at election time.

Each primary plan, then—like all of the laws that regulate politics—is itself "political" because it distributes power in one way rather than in others. Each different power distribution, in turn, leads directly to a different set of strategies for winning elections and a different policy agenda. Thus each basic plan can be judged not only for its theoretical structure or through the particular men it favors in any one year, but by the social interests it rewards and by the kind of politics and policies this should create. In these latter terms, the contribution of primary rules reform is toward the emergence of a more conservative era in American politics.

In the longest run, an era of consolidation and order, rather than experimentation, may be in the wind *regardless* of any party's regulations. It may be that the American people are tired of governmental intervention in the market system of delivering health care and other services, tired of a standard of living for the poorest elements of society which is artifically augmented, and tired of aggressive assertions of civil liberties. There must be many, however, who think that it would be more than a shame if history recorded that after 1968 the American people grew tired of all these things—when what really happened was that the Democratic party changed its delegate selection rules.

[21] Democratic conventions dominated by conservative coalitions would be a highly ironic result of reform. The rules alterations which led to a multiplication of primaries were motivated by a feeling that the pre-reform party was not sufficiently aimed at facilitating change. Thus if right-leaning coalitions subsequently became more frequent, or if such coalitions were *necessary* in order to win elections under the new rules, reform would have seriously miscarried. If either of these conditions were to accompany Districting—and we have argued that one or the other is quite likely to accompany it—then the pre-reform (Winner-Take-All) primary regulations could promise a greater likelihood of carrying the election, along with more generous social-welfare programs and more extensive civil rights and liberties.

Elections and Public Policy*

BENJAMIN GINSBERG
Cornell University

The central questions of democratic politics concern the relationships between popular choices and public policy. With the advent of survey research, these relationships have been the objects of intensive scrutiny. Although the techniques of survey analysis are essential for dealing with many important questions about the linkages between voting and policy, it is not true that all major problems in this area require survey data for an adequate solution. Moreover, to the extent that survey analysis is of relatively recent vintage a capacity to examine voting and policy linkages without such data would add considerably to our understanding of historical periods for which opinion surveys are unavailable.

Though much of this analysis must be considered exploratory and tentative, my aim is to examine the links between public policy and popular voting between 1789 and 1968. To this end, criteria are established for citizen policy choice that permit drawing meaningful conclusions without interview data. Then, data from party platforms, United States statutes, and aggregate voting statistics, are used to determine to what extent electoral choices are translated into policy decisions over time.

Voting and Public Policy

The absence of historical survey data precludes inferences about the reasons behind an individual's electoral decisions. Our lack of information, however, does not make this decision any less of a choice. Whatever the preferences of voters, votes are, in effect, choices among alternatives. In the same sense that the behavior of consumers vitally affects the national economy whether or not consumers are completely aware of the differences among products, the decisions made by voters can have major policy consequences whether or not voters are fully aware of the implications of their actions.

If we concentrate on the effects of voting behavior, two factors become particularly important. First, the effects of voting behavior are conditioned by the alternative policy positions represented by opposing candidates and parties. Given the presence of alternatives, the electorate makes at least implicit choices. If opposition candidates offer policy alternatives substantially different from those defended by incumbents, electoral choices can result in changes in national policy. In European political history, for example, the presence of radical alternatives offered the potential for change even when voters did not take advantage of these possibilities. Second, voting behavior can directly affect public policy to the extent that winning candidates and parties implement policies based on their preelection positions. If winners behave randomly in relation to their preelection positions, the electorate's choice is irrelevant. If sets of winning candidates, in fact, implement policies based on their preelection positions, the electorate's implicit choices are translated into national policy.

The effects of voting behavior are, thus, a function of both the magnitude of the choices available to voters and the extent to which electoral choices are implemented. Given these criteria, we can ask to what extent, over time, popular majorities govern.

Public Choice and Electoral Realignment

Our principal clues about the historical relationships between voting behavior and public policy are provided by the theory of critical elections. Seminal studies of American voting behavior conducted by V. O. Key and others suggest that during critical periods in American political history, major reorientations have occurred in the partisan attachments of large portions of the electorate.[1] The voter alignments established during these critical periods, 1798–1800, 1826–36, 1852–60, 1874–80, 1892–96 and 1928–36, support, over relatively long periods of time, the dominance in government of the victorious party.

Schattschneider, Burnham and others have suggested that voter realignments involved choices about national policy.[2] During realigning periods discontented elements penetrated or replaced one

* The author wishes to thank E. W. Kelley, Duncan MacRae, Jr., and Robert Weissberg for their many ideas, corrections and suggestions. David Greenstone, Theodore Lowi, and T. J. Pempel read and carefully criticized earlier versions of the manuscript. Sandra Ginsberg, Richard Joslyn, and Richard Klein provided valuable assistance in the collection and analysis of data.

[1] V. O. Key, "A Theory of Critical Elections," *Journal of Politics*, 17 (February, 1955), 3–18. Walter Dean Burnham, *Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Electoral Politics* (New York: Norton, 1970), p. 10. Also, Walter Dean Burnham, "Party Systems and the Political Process," in *The American Party Systems*, ed. William N. Chambers and Walter Dean Burnham (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 289.

[2] E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semi-Sovereign People* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960).

or the other of the two major parties, altered the terms of partisan conflict and substantially increased the magnitude of choice available to the electorate. Alteration of the substance of electoral alternatives, "redefinition of conflict," in Schattschneider's terms, forced voters to make new decisions and thus had the effect of altering the voting behavior of some segments of the electorate. The emergence of the Republican party in the 1850s, for example, resulted in redefinitions of partisan conflict to emphasize competing sectional rights. Populist control of the Democratic party in the 1890s presented the electorate with the opportunity to vote in favor of redistributions of economic rights in favor of small-scale agrarian entrepreneurs. Our first problem is to determine empirically whether the suggestions made by Schattschneider and Burnham are correct. We want to discover whether voter realignment was associated with increases in the magnitude of choice available to voters. We shall, then, examine the policy consequences of voter choices.

The content of all Democratic and Republican national party platforms (1844–1968) has been analyzed employing seven broad categories of issues.[3] Some results of this research are reported elsewhere, but for the sake of clarity the essentials of the analysis are repeated here.[4]

Platforms were analyzed in terms of the following categories:

(1) *Capitalism:* the aggregation of wealth and control over the distribution of wealth by business, financial and mercantile elites.
(2) *Internal Sovereignty:* exercise of the power and increase of the sphere of action of the central government *vis-à-vis* states, localities, and individuals.
(3) *Redistribution:* reallocation of wealth in favor of the economically disadvantaged.
(4) *International Cooperation:* open-ended cooperation with and friendship toward foreign objects.
(5) *Universalism:* equality of rights and privileges for domestic minorities.
(6) *Labor:* labor and labor organizations.
(7) *Ruralism:* farms, farmers and the rural way of life.

These categories were selected, in part, because of their inclusion of policy areas which have been important throughout American history. The categories were defined in such a manner as to permit the scoring of positive and negative advocacy statements. The unit of measure is the paragraph. A score indicates that within a given paragraph there occurred a statement or symbol of positive or negative advocacy of the category as defined above. Thus, the statement, "We oppose federal interference in local affairs," would be considered a negative advocacy of Internal Sovereignty, i.e., opposition to "the exercise of the power and increase of the sphere of action of the central government." A paragraph containing this statement would, if the symbol "federal interference" were found in the set of dictionary entries under Internal Sovereignty, be scored as a negative mention of the category for the appropriate party and year.

Any given paragraph may receive a maximum of fourteen scores—one positive and one negative for each of the seven categories. In practice, because the platforms tend to be divided into relatively short, thematic paragraphs, the range tends to be zero to three scores per paragraph. To compare platforms, absolute scores were converted into percentages based on N, the number of paragraphs. The rescoring of a sample of one-third of the platforms by a second coder resulted in a .94 overall level of agreement as determined by a standard intercoder reliability equation. The scores reported by the first coder were employed throughout.

To determine whether the degree of choice available to voters increases during critical eras requires examination of the scope of the alternatives presented to voters by the Democratic and Republican parties over time. The degree of difference between the two parties on any issue involves at least two elements. First is the relative polarity of the parties' positions on the issue dimension in question. Liberalism and conservatism, for example, define differential polarities of position along some issue dimensions. The second element defining the degree of difference between the two parties is the relative weight or importance assigned by the parties to the policy area in question. In those instances, for example, when the parties present differential polarities of position on some particular policy, given the expectation of relatively fixed budgets of money and time, they may also differ on the issue's salience or priority on the agenda of public policy. The total degree of difference between the two parties on any issue is a function of the interaction between differences of polarity and salience. The issue alternatives presented by opposing parties are conventionally said to be radically different, for example, when differences of polarity on issues are exacerbated by differences on the salience or priority of the issues.

In a hypothetical case, the Democratic and Re-

[3] We are aware that few voters read platforms. Platforms are employed as indicators of the general preelection positions of the two parties. Although some historical problems are raised, Democratic and Whig platforms were compared in 1844, 1848 and 1852. Source of party platforms: *National Party Platforms*, ed. Kirk H. Porter and Donald B. Johnson (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1966), and 1968 supplement.

[4] Benjamin Ginsberg, "Critical Elections and the Substance of Party Conflict: 1844 to 1968," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 16, No. 4 (November, 1972), 603–625.

publican parties might offer voters a choice both of differential issue polarities and of the importance to be assigned to social welfare policy. The distance between the positions of the two parties, and thus the degree of choice available to voters on the issue is a function of both the differential polarities and the weights assigned to the issue by the two parties. This total distance between the positions of the parties can be defined as the product of the two differences, or $P_D S_D$, where P_D equals the difference in polarity and S_D is equal to the difference in salience assigned the issue by the two parties.[5]

In any given year, the two parties may differ on a number of individual issues. The total degree of difference between the "bundles" of issue polarities and weights presented by the two parties defines the overall degree of choice available to voters. This total difference is defined as the sum of the products of the differing polarities and weights of the parties on each individual issue or $\sum_{i=1}^{N} P_D S_D$. The larger this overall difference, the greater the total distance between the bundles of issue positions presented voters by the two parties.

For any issue, the difference in polarities between the two parties is given by the percentage difference between the positive percentages of references to that issue by each party weighed by the total salience of the issue.[6]

Set: A = the proportion of positive references in the Democratic platform
B = Democratic, negative
C = the proportion of positive references in the Republican platform
D = Republican, negative

Then for any issue the difference in polarity, P_D, is equal to

$$\left[\frac{AD - BC}{(A + B)(C + D)}\right][A + B + C + D]$$

The differential salience between the two parties on any issue, S_D, is given by

$$(A + B) - (C + D)$$

Then, the total distance between the positions of the two parties on any individual issue is given by $P_D S_D$. The overall distance between the positions of the two parties across issues is $\sum_{i=1}^{N} P_D S_D$.

Table 1 reports the overall distance between the issue positions of the two parties during each national election year from 1844 to 1968. Differences on each individual issue are reported by Table 2. For convenience, signs appearing on Table 2 always indicate the relative direction of Democratic polarity.[7]

Table 1. Overall Differences of Issue Position Between the National Parties Over Time

Year	Degree of Difference
1844	.016
1848	.177
1852	*.292*
1856	*.228*
1860	.111
1864	.118
1868	.132
1872	.029
1876	.017
1880	*.075*
1884	.008
1888	.016
1892	.063
1896	*.094*
1900	.080
1904	.063
1908	.018
1912	.054
1916	.028
1920	.009
1924	.031
1928	.007
1932	*.069*
1936	.017
1940	.026
1944	.014
1948	.008
1952	.019
1956	.009
1960	.007
1964	.041
1968	.013

The data reported by Table 1 indicate that the overall degree of difference between the issue positions of the two parties has varied considerably over time, with the greatest degrees of difference occurring during periods of voter realignment.

Extremely large issue differences occur throughout the Civil War and pre–Civil War periods, centering particularly around 1852 and 1856. Indi-

[5] Every unit of difference in polarity is acted upon by a unit of difference in salience. We are, therefore, interested in the product of the two differences. Intensity and polarity cannot be summed in either a scalar or vector sense. The vector sum or Euclidean solution might be appropriate if the two independent variables were comparably measured and addable. Not only is this not the case, but our assumption is that the effects on the dependent variable are the results of a multiplicative interaction. Whether this assumption is correct depends upon whether our results are consistent with the hypothetical results.

[6] We assume that the magnitudes of differences in polarity are, in part, related to the total importance of the issue.

[7] Signs indicate the polarity of the Democrats relative to the Republicans not the absolute polarity of the Democratic position.

Table 2. Degrees of Difference Between the National Parties Over Time

Year	Capitalism	Internal Sovereignty	Redistribution	International Cooperation	Universalism	Labor	Ruralism
1844	−.009	0	0	+.007	0	0	0
1848	−.046	−.100	0	−.031	0	0	0
1852	−.050	−.239	0	−.001	−.002	0	0
1856	−.030	−.144	0	+.054	0	0	0
1860	0	−.023	0	−.059	−.029	0	0
1864	0	−.118	0	0	0	0	0
1868	−.018	−.084	0	−.027	−.003	0	0
1872	0	−.011	0	+.018	0	0	0
1876	+.012	−.005	0	0	0	0	0
1880	−.021	−.023	0	0	−.031	0	0
1884	0	−.005	0	−.003	0	0	0
1888	−.011	0	0	+.005	0	0	0
1892	−.051	−.008	0	+.004	0	0	0
1896	−.086	0	0	+.008	0	0	0
1900	−.045	0	0	+.035	0	0	0
1904	−.006	−.005	0	+.052	0	0	0
1908	−.015	0	0	+.003	0	0	0
1912	−.049	−.003	0	−.002	0	0	0
1916	−.015	0	0	+.013	0	0	0
1920	+.001	0	−.001	+.007	0	0	0
1924	−.029	0	0	.001	0	.001	0
1928	−.004	0	0	+.003	0	0	0
1932	−.064	0	0	−.005	0	0	0
1936	−.007	+.005	+.005	0	0	0	0
1940	−.015	+.004	+.004	+.003	0	0	0
1944	+.002	0	0	−.010	0	.002	0
1948	−.006	0	0	+.002	0	0	0
1952	−.005	+.004	+.004	−.005	0	.001	0
1956	−.005	0	0	+.004	0	0	0
1960	−.001	+.002	−.002	+.002	0	0	0
1964	−.002	+.002	+.009	+.020	+.001	0	0
1968	0	+.006	+.006	+.001	0	0	0

* The absence of a sign indicates that polarities were virtually identical.

vidual issue differences, reported in Table 2, indicate that differences on "Internal Sovereignty" issues account for the bulk of the differences between the two parties during this period.[8] Issue differences between the parties during the Populist period, centering at 1896, rank second in order of magnitude. These differences occur primarily in the "Capitalism" category. Relatively large issue differences are exhibited in 1880, at the close of Reconstruction, primarily in the "Capitalism," "Internal Sovereignty," and "Universalism" categories. The 1932 platforms rank fourth in terms of degree of issue difference between the two parties. The bulk of this difference occurs in the "Capitalism" category. All these findings indicate that during each realigning period, the overall degree of difference between the two parties and thus the relative degree of choice available to voters was considerably greater than usual.[9]

While data on the attitudes of voters during these periods do not exist, electoral realignment appears to have been associated with increases in the scope of choice available to voters. During these critical periods, the insurgent party exhibited considerably more than usual policy disagreement with the incumbent party. Whatever the attitudes of voters, these increases in the scope of voter

[8] This finding is very much in accord with Stokes's assertion that the period just prior to the Civil War was *the* era in American political history when political conflict was most nearly focused on a single issue dimension. Donald E. Stokes, "Spatial Models of Party Competition," Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, *Elections and the Political Order* (New York: Wiley, 1966), p. 177.

[9] It is interesting to note that 1912 and 1964, years often associated with substantial amounts of partisan conflict and changes in voting behavior, rank fifth and sixth, respectively, in terms of the magnitude of the difference between the two parties. It is also interesting that the level of conflict between the two parties appears to have diminished considerably over time. Analysis of the causes and consequences of this diminution of conflict is, unfortunately, beyond the scope of this paper.

alternatives meant that votes in favor of the insurgent party during each of these periods were also implicit choices favoring policy changs. During two realigning eras, 1828–36 and 1892–96, voters defeated insurgent parties, while during the four remaining periods, 1798–1800, 1852–60, 1874–80, and 1928–36, voter realignment resulted in victory for insurgents and changes in party control of the government. The data suggest that during these four periods the electorate's behavior represented, in effect, a majority choice in favor of policy changes.[10] Now, let us see whether the electorate's implicit choices were translated into national policy.

Changes in Public Policy Over Time

To determine whether major changes in public policy occur in 1801, 1861, 1881 and 1933, the dates immediately following insurgent victory during critical eras, all United States statutes between 1789 and 1968 were analyzed.[11] Each statute was scored as nominally favoring or opposing policy objectives within the same seven broad categories used in the analysis of national party platforms. For example, a statute which granted privileges or property to a railroad corporation received a +Capitalism score as nominally promoting "the aggregation of wealth by business, financial and mercantile elites." Because a single statute might be aimed at more than one object, multiple scores were permitted. Each statute could, therefore, receive a maximum of seven scores, one positive or one negative in each category. The object, in the case of each statute, was the nominal intention of policy makers rather than the law's impact or effect. The focus of concern is whether policy makers nominally attempt to implement policies consistent with their preelection positions. Obviously, policies often fail to achieve their objectives, but the reasons for failure are numerous and not necessarily related to the aims of policy makers.

These procedures required reading and analysis of each of the more than 60,000 public laws issued in the United States over a 180 year period. Fortunately, American public laws in the 18th and 19th centuries, at least, tended to be short and to the point. The precise intent of most statutes is obviously subject to varying interpretations. In every instance we attempted to make as general and straightforward an interpretation of the stated intent of the law as the statute's wording would permit. With the aid of historical materials and congressional hearings and records, it proved relatively easy to determine the place of a statute in the broad domains defined by our policy categories. The recording of samples of statutes by additional coders resulted in an overall level of intercoder agreement of .86.

In spite of the many months of labor required, analysis of statutes rather than some other form of policy output (governmental expenditures, for example) appeared to represent the method best suited to the purposes of this study. Since the aim was to determine whether the preelection positions of policy makers were implemented in public policies, it appeared to us to be necessary to look directly at the substance of the relevant public policies. Governmental expenditures offer another reasonable type of indicator and are extremely useful for some purposes. But, expenditures are based, at least in part, on the actual cost of effecting policy aims. Differential costs of implementing various aims make comparisons across types of policy difficult.

Clearly, some statutes are more important than others, and statutes vary considerably in the magnitude of the policy objectives they attempt to achieve. This analysis, which weighs each statute equally, ignores important qualitative differences among statutes. It is, however, difficult to conceive of any procedure which would permit systematic qualitative comparisons of the importance of laws. The aims of policy makers in any policy area can best be characterized in terms of their overall behavior. The behavior of policy makers in the case of a relatively minor piece of legislation is not necessarily a less important indicator of their general aims than is their behavior in the case of a major piece of legislation. This assumption is also implicit in most studies of roll call voting, for example. In addition, during the course of the analysis an impressive consistency became evident, during each year, between the nominal aims of minor and major pieces of legislation in each individual policy area. It is very probable that many statutes which are generally thought important are so considered because, and only if, they set the tone for other pieces of legislation, i.e.,

[10] Because of the temporal limitations of our data we can, of course, only make inferences about the 1798–1800 period. The 1874–80 period, in many respects, respresents an anomalous case. Voter realignment during this period primarily, but not exclusively, involves the return of the Southern Democratic vote. Party competition during this period includes the Conservative Republican and Southern Democratic alliance which led to Hayes's disputed election in 1876. Changes in Radical Republican policy, though of different types, were espoused by both parties during this period. In some respects, the election of 1880 represented the electorate's implicit ratification of the results of the elite compromise reached in 1876, i.e., to proceed with rapid industrial expansion while permitting the formal return of the South to national political participation. This compromise meant that the South would be an economically and, for a time, politically subordinate region but, would be autonomous in the area of race relations.

[11] *United States Statutes at Large* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1789–1968), Vols. I to LXXXII.

are trend breaking or trend setting. For these reasons, to determine the extent to which policy makers attempted to effect policies consistent, on the aggregate, with the implicit choices made by voters, each U.S. statute was analyzed and each was weighed equally.

To search for changes in public policy over time, a variant of a procedure suggested by Ezekiel and Fox[12] and used by Burnham in his analysis of electoral data was employed.[13] The time series provided by each category of policy has been separately regressed on time, the linear trend removed, and a residual series obtained for each category.

[12] Mordecai Ezekial and Karl A. Fox, *Methods of Correlation and Regression Analysis* (New York: Wiley, 1959), p. 343.

[13] Burnham, *Critical Elections*, p. 13.

A *T*-test for difference of means was then applied to successive sets of five residuals within each category—years 1 through 5 compared with years 7 through 11, and so on. It should be noted that *T* is not used here as a conventional statistical test. Since we are dealing with a population rather than a sample, there is no question of statistical significance. Therefore *T* is simply a convenient aggregative device: the numerator compares true population means, the pooled deviation in the denominator smoothes out the effects of isolated deviant years.

This search procedure permits comparison of the magnitudes of the differences between all successive five year periods in each policy category. These magnitudes are reported by Table 3. The data reported in Table 3 do not directly permit us

Table 3. Changes in Public Policy Over Time

Year	Congress	Capitalism	Internal Sovereignty	Redistribution	International Cooperation	Universalism	Labor	Ruralism
1799	1	2.404	.4627	2.080	.6059	−1.258		−2.034
1801	2	3.242	− .5872	1.628	.3531	.3558		−3.126
1803	3	2.442	− .2490	1.809	.8696	1.540		−5.157
1805	4	2.754	.2646	3.389	2.008	1.044		−5.453
1807	5	2.725	− .4130	1.595	1.188	2.566		−3.765
1809	6	.6497	− .9051	− .0809	.8588	1.372		−3.185
1811	7	.1249	−1.303	.0947	.8176	.0197		−1.375
1813	8	.0644	−1.199	− .7543	− .7217	− .5746		− .9991
1815	9	− .3686	−2.062	−1.576	−3.645	− .5741		−1.133
1817	10	.0463	− .7611	−1.287	−2.753	−1.378		−0.4637
1819	11	−1.249	.6290	− .6445	−1.948	− .2224		− .8654
1821	12	1.250	2.632	−1.818	−2.251	.7890		−2.309
1823	13	.8284	2.219	−1.762	−1.545	.7883		−1.843
1825	14	1.931	1.335	−2.170	−1.948	.7874		−1.057
1827	15	.9497	.4042	−1.850	− .3269	.7867		− .4348
1829	16	1.646	− .3936	−1.391	− .4465	1.469		.0851
1831	17	1.535	−2.002	−2.016	+ .3362	.0452		1.552
1833	18	.5960	−1.086	−1.929	.0218	.4525		2.983
1835	19	.2163	− .2727	−1.827	.8070	.4529		2.798
1837	20	.1433	+ .6916	− .0513	1.285	.4533		1.406
1839	21	.0422	+1.448	− .6049	1.444	.4593		1.017
1841	22	−1.083	+1.820	1.047	.3105	2.318		1.230
1843	23	− .0304	+ .7740	1.245	.2865	.9749		.2161
1845	24	− .7008	+ .2114	1.836	− .0261	.9792		−1.029
1847	25	−1'012	− .7630	1.394	−2.047	.9834		− .6953
1849	26	−1.023	−1.521	3.398	−2.376	.5208		−1.721
1851	27	.0485	−1.468	2.831	−2.410	− .9617		−2.645
1853	28	− .4774	−1'974	1.267	−1.626	−1.060		−1.001
1855	29	− .5709	−1.723	2.710	−1.746	−1.520		.1227
1857	30	.4708	−1.741	.8729	−2.137	−2.102		.8435
1859	31	− .4557	−2.247	.4010	−1.157	−3.737		3.459
1861	32	−1.680	−1.836	.2166	− .5131	−5.404		4.219
1863	33	−2.172	.3797	−1.432	−1.893	−1.405		2.022
1865	34	−1.802	.4246	− .5248	− .6049	− .5779		1.233
1867	35	− .7695	.7320	1.067	− .2604	.6924		.0331
1869	36	.3661	1.651	− .0884	.0701	2.014		−2.057
1871	37	1.463	2.057	− .2197	.2371	3.920		−3.766
1873	38	1.860	3.822	.5447	1.745	1.814		− .7491
1875	39	1.300	4.214	− .3133	2.156	1.904		.5416

Table 3. Continued

Year	Congress	Capitalism	Internal Sovereignty	Redistribution	International Cooperation	Universalism	Labor	Ruralism
1877	40	− .4939	2.629	.4837	2.669	1.961		2.044
1879	41	−1.838	3.669	1.594	2.355	3.079		2.108
1881	42	−3.329	2.935	1.813	1.873	6.095		4.303
1883	43	−4.532	.9464	.8442	2.841	2.892	−3.610	2.333
1885	44	−6.494	.8770	1.729	1.900	1.859	−2.722	.8434
1887	45	−3.352	.3538	.8962	.3324	.5711	− .3363	.3344
1889	46	−1.272	− .4317	.5892	−1.122	.1783	+1.096	.8014
1891	47	−1.070	− .1263	.8852	− .5680	.0543	1.325	1.368
1893	48	− .7090	.8583	1.206	− .8249	1.264	2.544	.6042
1895	49	− .4614	.3872	.7299	− .5897	1.584	3.428	.3561
1897	50	− .2047	.4540	.4078	− .2153	1.658	1.898	.3211
1899	51	−1.309	− .0323	.0796	1.542	1.111	1.417	−1.299
1901	52	− .3272	− .1618	.1809	.6232	.0492	.3198	−4.712
1903	53	.8196	−1.009	.0726	.8418	−1.111	− .1174	−3.285
1905	54	1.527	−2.230	.4442	.4496	−1.809	−1.800	−1.945
1907	55	1.997	−2.494	− .5348	.5268	− .8971	−2.420	−2.224
1909	56	1.998	−3.837	.4979	1.018	−1.141	−1.863	−1.899
1911	57	2.117	−3.959	.0376	1.224	−1.183	.2429	−2.389
1913	58	1.962	−3.012	.4169	1.146	−1.285	.7035	−2.963
1915	59	1.503	−2.467	.5045	1.192	−1.287	2.064	−2.231
1917	60	2.109	−1.197	.5630	.9470	−2.524	3.510	.8564
1919	61	1.806	+ .6090	− .0605	−1.109	− .2001	6.087	.1816
1921	62	3.838	1.581	.9064	−1.414	.6271	3.160	1.827
1923	63	3.569	.9089	.9591	−1.306	1.257	1.463	3.012
1925	64	2.464	1.424	− .2818	−1.293	1.312	− .1819	1.010
1927	65	2.227	.7017	−1.097	−1.080	1.578	−1.100	−1.161
1929	66	3.743	.4354	−1.977	− .3414	1.236	−2.483	−1.471
1931	67	3.882	.7295	−3.152	1.704	1.565	−2.975	−3.111
1933	68	3.777	'0949	−3.499	1.285	.6000	−5.261	−4.427
1935	69	4.868	.4640	−2.445	1.863	1.960	−4.938	−2.113
1937	70	3.644	.4185	− .7498	2.219	1.983	−5.706	− .3685
1939	71	3.384	.3852	− .5285	2.390	− .1929	−2.863	1.056
1941	72	2.352	− .2912	− .3880	1.827	− .1921	−1.234	1.883
1943	73	.8203	−1.064	− .9960	− .0030	− .4547	− .7014	2.436
1945	74	− .5583	−3.444	− .5833	−1.055	−1.425	1.106	2.088
1947	75	.0693	−3.718	−1.036	−1.371	−2.625	1.786	.5297
1949	76	.3789	−3.820	−.0473	−1.427	− .9545	1.218	− .5189
1951	77	.6324	−2.596	.0698	−1.217	−2.408	1.736	− .4934
1953	78	1.375	−1.078	1.405	−1.006	−2.928	3.587	−1.226
1955	79	1.465	.3420	.2967	.4166	−1.709	1.833	− .5184
1957	80	.4668	.9128	− .6556	.3896	− .9949	.9864	.9305
1959	81	.9521	2.071	−1.921	.7790	−1.356	1.590	1.536

Positive Score = *Decrease*
Negative Score = *Increase*

to determine whether insurgent victory during realigning periods is associated with major policy changes; discrete changes in national policy may result from any number of factors unrelated to realignment—international events, economic changes, and so on. To determine whether the policy changes occurring at 1801, 1861, 1881, and 1933 are of a greater magnitude than changes occurring during other years, the means of the absolute values of the T scores in each policy category for each year were obtained. The resulting summary scores, reported in Table 4, indicate the overall magnitude of the difference between public policies before and after each year. The highest summary value occurs in 1881, followed in order of magnitude by 1933, 1805, and 1861. Each peak value summarizes a set of policy changes occurring around that year. 1805, 1861, 1881, and 1933 appear, indeed, to mark center points of transition for national policy.[14]

[14] We should note that minority party victory is, on the average, associated with greater than usual degrees of policy change:

Mean change following critical years: 2.52(.124).
Mean change following other minority victories: 1.66(.064).

Table 4. Total Change in Policy Over Time

1799	1.475	1881	3.391
1801	1.549	1883	2.571
1803	2.011	1885	2.346
1805	2.486	1887	.882
1807	2.042	1889	.784
1809	1.175	1891	.771
1811	.624	1893	1.144
1813	.810	1895	1.077
1815	1.560	1897	.737
1817	1.115	1899	.970
1819	.926	1901	.911
1821	1.842	1903	1.037
1823	1.498	1905	1.458
1825	1.538	1907	1.584
1827	.792	1909	1.751
1829	.905	1911	1.593
1831	1.248	1913	1.641
1833	1.178	1915	1.607
1835	1.062	1917	1.672
1837	.672	1919	1.436
1839	.837	1921	1.915
1841	1.310	1923	1.782
1843	.588	1925	1.138
1845	.797	1927	1.278
1847	1.149	1929	1.669
1849	1.760	1931	2.446
1851	1.728	1933	2.706
1853	1.734	1935	2.664
1855	1.399	1937	2.156
1857	1.361	1939	1.543
1859	1.910	1941	1.167
1861	2.312	1943	.925
1863	1.551	1945	1.466
1865	.861	1947	1.591
1867	.592	1949	1.195
1869	1.043	1951	1.307
1871	1.944	1953	1.872
1873	1.756	1955	1.012
1875	1.738	1957	.763
1877	1.714	1959	1.458
1879	2.441		

Reexamination of Table 3 to determine the elements that account for each summary value indicates that the 1805 peak is composed primarily of negative changes in the Capitalism, Redistribution and International Cooperation categories, and positive changes in the Ruralism category, all occurring in the period from 1801 to 1805 following the Jeffersonian victory. The primary components of the 1861 peak are positive changes in the Internal Sovereignty and Universalism categories and negative changes in the Ruralism category, from 1860 to 1863. The 1881 peak is accounted for primarily by positive changes in the Capitalism category and negative changes in the Internal Sovereignty, Universalism and Ruralism categories from 1875–1885. The major components of the 1933 peak appear to be negative changes in the Capitalism category and positive changes in the Redistribution, Labor and Universalism categories from 1933–1935.

In each case, while the issue categories suggested by our analysis of platform content are among the principal elements of policy change, large changes also occur in other categories. Although random association cannot be excluded, historical analyses of party ideologies in many instances suggest relationships between these additional changes in policy and the set of issues on which we expected to find policy change. While issues related to "Capitalism" were emphasized by the two parties during the 1928–36 period, for example, belief systems during this period associated negative positions on Capitalism with positive positions on "Labor" and "Redistribution," so that the coincidence of changes in these three categories is not surprising.[15]

Given such historical associations, the clusters of policy change we have identified seem to be consistent with the Schattschneider-Burnham thesis and our analysis of platform content data. Thus, the policy changes associated with Jefferson's victory in the election of 1800 are consistent with an electoral choice in opposition to a pro-British foreign policy and neomercantilist economic policy.[16] Republican victory in 1860 is associated with changes in national policy consistent with an electoral choice in favor of national sovereignty and opposing the expansion of slavery.[17] The policy changes centering around 1881 are consistent with an implicit electoral choice favoring the termination of Reconstruction and the expansion of industrial and commercial activity.[18]

Mean change, all other years: 1.32.

The mean degree of choice available to voters prior to both critical changes and other minority party victories is given in parenthesis. The number of cases is too small to permit the use of measures of association. The 1848 election is included as a minority victory although the Whigs captured only the presidency.

[15] William E. Leuchtenburg, *The Perils of Prosperity* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), Samuel Lubell, *The Future of American Politics* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1955), and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Age of Roosevelt* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1957), vol. I, remain excellent sources.

[16] Two excellent sources are William N. Chambers, *Political Parties in a New Nation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963) and Noble E. Cunningham, *The Jeffersonian Republicans* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1963).

[17] Among the best historical accounts are William W. Freehling, *Prelude to Civil War* (New York: Harper, 1966) and Eric Foner, *Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party Before the Civil War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970).

[18] Stanley Cobben, "Northeastern Business and Radical Reconstruction: A Reexamination," in *The Economic Impact of the American Civil War*, ed. Ralph Andreano

Changes in policy after 1933 are in keeping with voter choices favoring alterations in the economic system and redistributions of opportunities in favor of urban working class elements.

It appears to be the case that the choices made by the electorate during these critical periods are translated into major changes in national policy.

Electoral Choices and Voter Alignments

Approximately once in a generation, voters are given the opportunity to alter national policy significantly. The decisions made by voters during these critical periods define the termini of broad epochs in American political history.

Between critical periods, the degree of issue difference between opposing parties and the opportunity for voter choice are diminished. In the case of two issue areas, "Internal Sovereignty" and "Universalism," the implicit choices made by the electorate at the termination of radical reconstruction—in effect to leave the South politically subordinate but autonomous in the area of race relations, and to affirm the changed status of blacks while making no further changes in race relations—were not offered again until the 1960s. In these policy areas, the electorate's role ended when it made its choices in 1876 and 1880.

In every other instance, however, choices continue to be available to the electorate following realignment. While the magnitude of the difference between the two parties and thus the opportunity for voter choice generally diminishes following the critical era, in each case, the general terms of choice established by the two parties prior to voter realignment persist following realignment. Some opportunity for choice thus continues beyond critical periods. Stable voter alignments, in effect, represent continuing policy choices on the part of the electorate. Our findings suggest that voter alignments are, in effect, organized around substantive issues of policy and support the continued dominance in government of a party committed to the principal elements of the choice made by voters during critical eras. Stable partisan alignments are, in effect, the electorate's choice in favor of the continuation of a particular set of policies. Partisan alignments form the constituent bases for governments committed to the translation of the choices made by the electorate during critical periods into public policy over a relatively long period of time. The absence of major policy changes between realigning periods suggests that these implicit voter choices in favor of continuity are also translated into national policy. The policy-making role of the electorate is, in effect, a continuing one.

A perennial question of American politics involves the extent to which national policy represents the choice of the people. This question necessarily has a temporal dimension. While some particular policy may or may not be in accord with the wishes of a majority at any particular point in time, the more general and perhaps more significant question is whether, on the whole, national policy is related to electoral choice most of the time.

Our longitudinal analysis indicates that American public policy is shaped to a significant degree by the behavior of voters. Whether or not voters are completely aware of all of the implications of their actions, popular majorities appear, over time, to govern.

(Cambridge: Schenkman, 1962), pp. 144–164. Also Louis Hartz, "Government-Business Relations," in *Economic Change in the Civil War Era, Proceedings of a Conference on American Economic Institutional Change, 1850–1873*, ed. David T. Gilchrist and W. Donald Lewis (Greenville, Delaware: Eleutherian Mills-Hagley Foundation, 1965).

The Supreme Court and National Policy Making*

JONATHAN D. CASPER
Stanford University

The role of the Supreme Court in national policy making has long been a subject of debate among students of the American legal system and of democratic theory. The relative influence of the Court vis-à-vis other political institutions and the implications of its activities for principles of majority rule and democracy have been central issues in this discussion. One of the most influential treatments of this issue in recent years is the argument advanced by Robert A. Dahl in 1957.[1] Dahl offers a sophisticated "political" view of the role played by the Court, arguing that it is an active participant in the ruling national coalitions which dominate American politics but that the Court does not perform the task of protecting fundamental minority rights that is often attributed to it. The Court, like other political institutions, says Dahl, is a member of such ruling coalitions, and as such its decisions are typically supportive of the policies emerging from other political institutions. Dahl's account has endured so well because it frames the questions precisely and brings to bear a carefully selected body of evidence upon a dispute long characterized by anecdote and example.

I argue here that Dahl's account is not adequate for understanding the role of the Supreme Court in policy making. Consideration of the way he interprets his own evidence and of other relevant evidence that is excluded from his analysis suggests that the Court participates more significantly in national policy making than Dahl's argument suggests.

My argument begins with a summary of Dahl's analysis of the role of the Court and then proceeds to a discussion of events that have occurred since he wrote, bringing his body of evidence up to date. The third section examines the way in which Dahl treats his own evidence and then discusses evidence that Dahl excludes from consideration, particularly the decisions involving statutory construction and federal constitutional issues in cases arising from states and localities. The final section focuses upon the model of policy making that is implicit in Dahl's analysis and argues that it is too narrow. If a broader conception of the policy-making process is adopted, the contributions of the Court may be more adequately understood.

* I am indebted to several friends for advice and assistance with this paper: Paul Sniderman, Douglas Rae, Milton Heumann, John Manley, Richard Brody, Heinz Eulau, Brenda McLean, and David Danelski.

[1] Robert A. Dahl, "Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker," *Journal of Public Law*, 6 (Fall, 1957), 279–295. Dahl integrated and somewhat revised this article as a chapter in two editions of his American government text. See Robert A. Dahl, *Pluralist Democracy in the United States* (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1967), chapter 6; in the 1972 edition, called *Democracy in the United States*, see chapter 16. Because the original is the clearest and most widely read version of his argument, I shall focus upon it here.

Dahl's Argument

After a brief discussion of "traditional" and "realistic" views of the role of the Supreme Court in American society, Dahl concludes that the Court is inevitably a "policy-making" institution. Like other political institutions, the Court is frequently called upon to select among alternative policies about which there is disagreement in society and uncertainty about the consequences of various choices. Dahl then poses two questions: Who benefits from the choices made by the Court? How does the Court's role as a policy maker square with our notions of a democratic political system? His exploration of the Court is, in many respects, an attempt to assess the commonly offered argument that the Court acts as a protector of fundamental minority rights against majority tyranny.

How can we tell whether the Court has often intervened to protect the fundamental rights of minorities when majorities have attempted to deny them? Answering this question requires, Dahl argues, that we examine situations in which there have been conflicts between the preferences of the majority and the policies of the Supreme Court. Even with modern survey research techniques, there are difficulties in establishing the preferences of the majority of citizens, and in the period before such techniques were developed, what indicators are available? Setting aside electoral results as inadequate indices, Dahl selects as his measure of majority preferences what he calls a "lawmaking majority"—the approval of a majority of members of the Senate and House and of the President which is necessary for the passage of federal legislation. After noting difficulties in making inferences about the preferences of citizens from the expressed preferences of legislators and the President, Dahl argues that such a notion of "lawmaking majority" is as reasonable a surrogate for a "national majority" as is available.

This, then, establishes his framework for determining whether the policy choices of the Court

have often run contrary to those of national majorities and, when they have, whether the Court has typically acted on behalf of the fundamental rights or interests of minorities. The data to be used are Supreme Court decisions declaring federal legislation unconstitutional. Some might suggest that the Court protects the rights of "national majorities against local interests in federal questions"—by overturning state and local statutes on the basis of the federal constitution—but Dahl argues that the "role of the Court as a policy-maker is not usually defended in this fashion." He adds that "therefore, I propose to pass over the ticklish question of federalism and deal only with 'national' majorities and minorities."[2]

We shall return to this issue, but for the moment we have seen how Dahl has cleared the decks for his test of the role of the Court as a national policy maker, and how his test has been operationally defined. To use terms to which we shall return, Dahl asks three questions about this class of Supreme Court decisions: What is the *frequency* of such decisions? What is their *direction* (who has benefitted and who has been harmed by such decisions)? What has been the *decisiveness* of such Court activity (has the Court's policy survived, been modified, reversed, or ignored)?

Dahl finds that through 1957 only eighty-six provisions of federal law had been struck down in 78 cases during the 167-year history of the Court. He notes that a new Justice has been appointed to the Court about every two years. Given the propensity of presidents to appoint and of Senate majorities to confirm primarily those whose general political philosophies are not radically different from their own, the recruitment process provides a powerful mechanism for promoting some level of consensus among President, Congress, and Court majority. " . . . [P]olicy views dominant on the Court are never for long out of line with the policy views dominant among the lawmaking majorities of the United States." To put the point more generally, " . . . the Court is least likely to be successful in blocking a determined and persistent lawmaking majority on a major policy and most likely to succeed against a 'weak' majority; e.g., a dead one, a transient one, a fragile one, or one weakly united upon a policy of subordinate importance."[3]

Supporting this proposition is the fact that only one-half of the decisions of unconstitutionality have come within four years of the enactment of the legislation—the period during which Dahl asserts it is reasonable to expect that the law-making majority is still viable. An examination of the decisiveness of this group of decisions (more than a third of which involved New Deal legislation) reveals that the Court's policy, especially for what Dahl calls "major policy" issues, has not endured—it has been reversed by Congress or by subsequent Courts. Thus, generally speaking,

> the application of the majority criterion seems to show the following: First, if the Court did in fact uphold minorities against national majorities, as both its supporters and critics often seem to believe, it would be an extremely anomalous institution from a democratic point of view. Second, the elaborate "democratic" rationalizations of the Court's defenders and the hostility of its "democratic" critics are largely irrelevant, for lawmaking majorities generally have had their way. Third, although the Court seems never to have succeeded in holding out indefinitely, in a very small number of important cases it has delayed the application of policy up to as much as twenty-five years.[4]

Moreover, examination of the direction of the cases in which the Court succeeded in delaying policy for extended periods of time does not suggest that the Court acted as protector of fundamental rights against majority tryanny. The Court's rather successful battles against child labor laws, the federal income tax, and application of workmen's compensation laws to longshoremen do not quite fit the mold of protector of fundamental minority rights. Finally, the direction of the other half of Supreme Court decisions of relevance here—those that occurred more than four years after enactment of the statute—seems to undermine further the libertarian view of the Court. Very few of these decisions were based upon provisions of the Bill of Rights, and many were of a less than libertarian case—e.g., upholding the rights or interests of whites vis-à-vis blacks or property-holders as against wage-earners. Though employers or slave-holders were a "minority" of the population when these cases arose, their interests were not "fundamental" in the sense that defenders of the Court seem to have in mind when offering their justifications for judicial review. Thus, Dahl argues that the Court has not, in general, effectively substituted its policy goals for those of law-making majorities, and when the Court has attempted to do so, the record does not bespeak consistent attempts—successful or unsuccessful—to protect fundamental rights or liberties against tyrannical majorities.

Although these findings run contrary to much rhetoric surrounding the Court, they should not, Dahl argues, be particularly surprising. National politics in this country is generally dominated by relatively stable alliances of political interests, and the Supreme Court—whose members are socialized by the same forces as are others active in politics and whose membership is selected by repre-

[2] Dahl, p. 282.
[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 285–86.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 291.

sentatives of these political interests—is itself typically a member of such stable coalitions.

> Except for short-lived transitional periods when the old alliance is disintegrating and the new one is struggling to take control of political institutions, the Supreme Court is inevitably a part of the dominant national alliance. As an element in the political leadership of the dominant alliance, the Court of course supports the major policies of the alliance. By itself, the Court is almost powerless to affect the course of national policy. In the absence of substantial agreement within the alliance, an attempt by the Court to make national policy is likely to lead to disaster, as the *Dred Scott* decision and the early New Deal cases demonstrate. . . . The Supreme Court is not, however, simply an *agent* of the alliance. It is an essential part of the political leadership and possesses some bases of power of its own, the most important of which is the unique legitimacy attributed to its interpretations of the Constitution. . . . It follows that within the somewhat narrow limits set by the basic policy goals of the dominant alliance, the Court *can* make national policy. Its discretion, then, is not unlike that of a powerful committee chairman in Congress who cannot, generally speaking, nullify the basic policies substantially agreed on by the rest of the dominant leadership, but who can, within these limits, often determine important questions of timing, effectiveness, and subordinate policy. Thus the Court is least effective against a current lawmaking majority—and evidently least inclined to act. It is most effective when it sets the bounds of policy for officials, agencies, state governments or even regions, a task that has come to occupy a very large part of the Court's business.[5]

He closes by suggesting that occasionally the Court is in a stronger position to influence national policy and pursue an independent course of action:

> The main task of the Court is to confer legitimacy on the fundamental policies of the successful coalition. There are times when the coalition is unstable with respect to certain key policies; at very great risk to its legitimacy powers, the Court can intervene in such cases and may even succeed in establishing policy. Probably in such cases it can succeed only if its action conforms to and reinforces a widespread set of explicit or implicit norms held by the political leadership; norms which are not strong enough or are not distributed in such a way as to insure the existence of an effective lawmaking majority but are, nonetheless, sufficiently powerful to prevent any successful attack on the legitimacy powers of the Court. This is probably the explanation for the relatively successful work of the Court in enlarging the freedom of Negroes to vote during the past three decades and in its famous school integration decisions.[6]

The Supreme Court and Federal Legislation, 1958–1974

Dahl's article was published in 1957, appearing at the end of a decade that had seen one of our periodic episodes of national political repression. Fear of internal subversion by Communists and fellow-travelers had produced not only intense public concern but a variety of federal and state programs aimed at control of the thought, expression, and behavior of allegedly subversive elements in our society. The rulings of the Supreme Court in this period did not mark it as a bastion of individual rights standing against a fearful and repressive national majority. The Court vacillated on the civil liberties issues raised by the loyalty-security programs and generally placed the imprimatur of legitimacy upon a variety of constitutionally questionable governmental activities (e.g., prosecutions under the Smith Act, employee loyalty-security screening programs, legislative investigations.)[7] In this particularly salient issue area, then, the Supreme Court did follow the deferential path suggested by Dahl's analysis.

Since then, we have witnessed the work of the Warren Court and are currently in the midst of the emergence of the Burger Court. The Warren Court, by general reputation at least, was quite different from most of its predecessors. Indeed, one associates with it precisely the characteristics that Dahl found lacking in the Supreme Court—activism and influence in national policy making and protection of fundamental rights of minorities against tyrannical or indifferent majorities. The first step, then, in examining Dahl's thesis is to look at what has happened since he wrote. Do events since that date suggest the possibility of a different pattern of Supreme Court participation in policy making?

With respect to the dimensions of frequency, decisiveness, and direction, the data since 1957 are somewhat mixed. During this period, the Supreme Court declared 32 provisions of federal law unconstitutional in 28 cases. In the entire previous 167-year period, 86 provisions had been declared unconstitutional in 78 cases. Putting the two sets together, we note that more than a quarter of all cases involving a declaration of unconstitutionality (28 of 106) have occurred since 1957. In terms of frequency, the Supreme Court proved more active in recent years than it typically had been in the past.

But Dahl's argument does not rest simply upon the frequency of Supreme Court holdings that federal statutes are unconstitutional. Since he focuses upon the relation of policy emerging from the Court to policy emerging from the "lawmaking majority," particular attention is paid to

[5] Dahl., pp. 293, 294.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 294.

[7] For a discussion of the role of the Supreme Court during the 1950s, see Walter F. Murphy, *Congress and the Court* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962); and Jonathan D. Casper, *The Politics of Civil Liberties* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), chapter II.

the period of time that occurs between passage of legislation and the declaration that it is unconstitutional. Dahl lays great stress upon declarations of unconstitutionality occurring within four years of enactment—"where the presumption is . . . that the lawmaking majority is not necessarily a dead one." Table 1 reproduces his findings about the time intervals between enactment and Court decisions and also brings them up to date. Recent decisions seem to follow the same pattern as before—the bulk of cases involve a Court decision somewhat removed in time from the passage of the legislation. In sum, the data suggest that although the period since 1957 did involve a substantial amount of Supreme Court activity in declaring legislation unconstitutional, only about a fifth of the cases involved clashes between what Dahl would call "live" national majorities and a Court bent upon pursuing other policy alternatives.

Table 1. Cases in which Federal Legislation was Held Unconstitutional, Arranged by Time Intervals Between Legislation and Decision

Time Interval (in years)	1789–1957[a]	1958–1974	1789–1974
2 or less	30%	7%	25%
3 to 4	18	14	17
5 to 8	24	11	20
9 to 12	11	21	13
13 to 16	6	21	10
17 to 20	1	7	3
21 or more	10	18	12
	100% (N=78)	99% (N=28)	100% (N=106)

[a] See Dahl, p. 290.

Dahl also pays attention to the decisiveness dimension—what happened *after* the Court declared laws unconstitutional within four years of enactment. Especially in matters involving what he calls "major policy," Dahl found that the Court policy has typically been reversed, either by legislation, constitutional amendment, or a change of heart by the Court itself. In the six cases during the 1958–74 period in which the Court held legislation unconstitutional within four years after passage, one seems clearly "major" and was reversed by a quickly passed constitutional amendment (*Oregon* v. *Mitchell*,[8] holding that the provision of the 1970 Voting Rights Act lowering the voting age in state and local elections to 18 was beyond the power of Congress). Since Dahl does not offer a definition of "major" and "minor" policy, it is difficult to classify the other five cases. They involved the residency requirement for welfare recipients in the District of Columbia,[9] military trials for civilian dependents and employees stationed abroad with servicemen,[10] and a form of censorship of mail from Communist countries.[11] The Court's decision was not followed by reversal or a change of mind in any of these cases. The same was true with the 22 cases holding federal statutory provisions unconstitutional more than four years after enactment—all were followed either by positive congressional acceptance (e.g., amending the law to conform to the Court's holding or formal repeal) or by acquiescence. Thus, the evidence appears to support the view that the Court intervened decisively in these 22 cases holding federal legislation unconstitutional. In the next section, however, we will discuss a peculiar feature of the way in which Dahl treats his evidence—he considers the decisiveness dimension only for cases occurring within four years of enactment. Those occurring more than four years after enactment are excluded on the ground that we cannot be sure that the law-making majority continues to be "alive" and hence that the clash of preferences required to judge relative influence exists. As a result, it is not clear how to interpret the 22 cases during the 1958–1974 period. For some—particularly those dealing with internal security matters—the view that the law-making majority was no longer "alive" seems plausible; for others—those dealing with the administration of justice, citizenship rights, and welfare programs—an account attributing influence to the Court seems more plausible.

Thus, because of the nature of Dahl's coding rules, evaluation of the Court's recent work on the decisiveness dimension is difficult. Given that there has been only one instance of reversal in 28 cases, one must conclude either (1) that the ambiguity in Dahl's coding rules makes the issue unanswerable for the recent period (and, it is argued in the next section, for the period Dahl himself covers); or (2) that the recent experience does not support the Dahl thesis.

On the dimension of direction, the pattern of decisions since 1958 is clearly at variance with Dahl's findings. With the exception of *Oregon* v. *Mitchell*, all of the 28 decisions were based upon provisions of the Bill of Rights (primarily the First and Fifth Amendments) and the Fourteenth Amendment. In addition to furthering the interests of all in the society in greater freedom of expression, equal application of the laws, and procedural fairness, the decisions had special impact

[8] 400 U. S. 112 (1970).

[9] *Washington v. Legrant*, 394 U. S. 618 (1969).

[10] *Grisham v. Hagan*, 361 U. S. 278 (1960); *McElroy v. Guargliardo*, 361 U. S. 281 (1960); *Kinsella v. Singleton*, 361 U. S. 234 (1960).

[11] *Lamont v. Postmaster General*, 381 U. S. 301 (1965).

upon such groups as aliens,[12] communists and other alleged subversives,[13] criminal defendants,[14] war protesters,[15] and poor people.[16] The Court attempted to extend to these groups rights and privileges that the law-making majorities had not chosen to extend.[17] For example, a series of decisions struck down statutes that took away citizenship for such activities as voting in foreign elections, desertion from armed forces, leaving the country to avoid military service, and extended residence in country of origin. By the same token, the heart of the McCarran Act—its registration provisions and restrictions upon employment in sensitive industries for members of Communist action organizations—was struck down on Fifth and First Amendment grounds.

We have now examined the recent decisions in terms of Dahl's three dimensions. The results, while not wholly conclusive, do not tend to support Dahl's thesis. The Supreme Court has, in recent years, struck down federal legislation more frequently than in the past. The Court's decisions, with one exception, were not met with reversal by legislation, constitutional amendment, or a reversal by the Court itself (though a few have occurred sufficiently recently that this outcome may still occur). By the same token, however, the bulk of the decisions did not involve legislation passed shortly before the Court intervened, so one cannot, under Dahl's rules, be sure that the law-making majority on the issue was still alive. Finally, in terms of direction, the recent cases demonstrate a concern for and protection of basic liberties and rights of minorities that is different from the picture Dahl draws from past cases. With the exception of *Oregon* v. *Mitchell*, none can be adequately interpreted as protecting the privileged at the expense of the poor or a majority at the expense of an insular minority.

It would be somewhat improbable—in either a statistical or substantive sense—for the Court in 16 years to erase a pattern that had stood for nearly 170 years before. My updating of Dahl's argument does not render his conclusions invalid or totally inapplicable to more recent events. By the same token, recent experience does suggest that the Court may operate differently from the way in which Dahl suggests it has and, even more important, from the way he suggests it must.

The Evidence Considered

One of the most appealing aspects of Dahl's argument is his careful specification and gathering of evidence. In dealing with an issue that has long been the subject of discussion and argument based upon impression and example, Dahl offers a carefully developed specification of the question and of the evidence that he believes is required for an informed resolution of the conflicting views that have been offered. Yet analysis of what Dahl has done and what he has not done reveals problems both in his mode of analysis and his conclusions. The issues I wish to raise in this section deal with both the way in which he treats his own evidence and with relevant evidence that is excluded from his analysis.

Dahl considers only cases in which federal legislation has been declared unconstitutional, and offers two justifications for casting his evidentiary net in this way. The first centers around the proposition that relative influence in policy making can be determined only when there are disagreements among participants,[18] and upon his selection of the "lawmaking majority" as the most useful criterion for majority preferences. The second is based upon the assertion that it is *national* (for which he substitutes *federal*) issues that defenders of the importance of the Court in policy making have in mind:

> A case might be made out that the Court protects the rights of national majorities against local interests in federal questions [i.e., cases involving challenges to such activities based upon the federal constitution], but so far as I am aware, the role of the Court as a policy-maker is not usually defended in this fashion; in what follows, therefore, I propose

[12] *Trop v. Dulles*, 356 U. S. 86 (1958); *Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez*, 372 U.S. 144 (1963); *Schneider v. Rusk*, 377 U. S. 163 (1964).

[13] *Aptheker v. Sec. of State*, 378 U. S. 500 (1964); *U. S. v. Brown*, 381 U. S. 437 (1965); *Albertson v. SACB*, 382 U. S. 70 (1965); *Afroyim v. Rusk*, 387 U. S. 253 (1967); *U. S. v. Robel*, 389 U. S. 258 (1967).

[14] *U. S. v. Romano*, 382 U. S. 136 (1965); *Marchetti v. U. S.*, 390 U. S. 39 (1968); *Grosso v. U. S.* 390 U. S. 62 (1968); *Haynes v. U. S.*, 390 U. S. 85 (1968); *U. S. v. Jackson*, 390 U. S. 570 (1968); *Leary v. U. S.*, 395 U. S. 6 (1969); *U. S. v. Covington*, 395 U. S. 57 (1969).

[15] *Schact v. U. S.* 398 U. S. 58 (1970); *Chief of Police v. J. Rankin Brigade*, 409 U. S. 972 (1972).

[16] *U. S. Dept. of Agriculture v. Murry*, 413 U. S. 508 (1973); *U. S. Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno*, 413 U. S. 528 (1973).

[17] Six of the total of 28 cases in which federal legislation was declared unconstitutional in the 1958–74 period were discussed in the text above (see notes 8–11); 19 of the cases are cited in notes 12–16; the remaining three cases are as follows: *Blount v. Rizzi*, 400 U. S. 410 (1971)—holding unconstitutional a procedure by which Postmaster General was authorized to deal with allegedly obscene material sent through the mails; *Tilton v. Richardson*, 403 U. S. 672 (1971)—declaring unconstitutional on Establishment grounds a section of the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963; and *Frontiero v. Richardson*, 411 U. S. 677 (1973)—holding unconstitutional a form of discrimination against women members of the armed forces in eligibility for quarters' allowances and medical benefits for dependents.

[18] Dahl's "ruling elite model" article, published in 1958, argues that influence can only be measured effectively in such situations. See "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model," *American Political Science Review* 52 (June, 1958), 463–69.

> to pass over the ticklish question of federalism and deal only with 'national' majorities and minorities."[19]

Both of these justifications are plausible, but they produce a very narrow evidentiary net. Later in this section, I shall suggest a variety of relevant evidence that is excluded. First, I shall discuss the way in which Dahl analyzes the data that he does utilize.

Dahl's Evidence and Coding Rules. Dahl asks three questions about Supreme Court decisions declaring federal legislation unconstitutional: what has been their frequency, their decisiveness, and their direction? In analyzing the cases to determine whether they support the view that the Court plays an influential role in national policy making, he relies almost exclusively upon the decisiveness dimension. Thus, in dealing with two typical sequences of events, he codes them as follows on the dimension of relative influence of Court and law-making majority:

Type I (Court Influential)
(1) Law-making majority acts
(2) Court reverses policy within 4 years
(3) Court's policy stands

Type II (Law-making Majority Influential)
(1) Law-making majority acts
(2) Court reverses policy within 4 years
(3) Court's policy reversed

Thirty-eight of the 78 cases he discovered fell into one of these two categories, and, of these, 19 fell into what I shall call Type II (law-making majority influential). Moreover, applying a distinction between what he calls "major policy" and "minor policy" cases, 17 of 23 "major policy" cases fell into Type II.

He takes special note of the fact that in some of these Type II situations the overriding of the Court's policy has taken a period of many years (e.g., those dealing with child labor legislation, the federal income tax, and workman's compensation for longshoremen). But his analysis of the decisiveness dimension concludes that, particularly in cases involving "major policy" issues, the Court has not generally succeeded in resisting the law-making majority. This finding is the linchpin for his conclusion that the Court does not play the significant role in national policy making that many of its defenders have suggested.

Yet Dahl considers the decisiveness dimension *only for cases in which the Court declares federal legislation unconstitutional within four years of the enactment of the statute.* What of the forty cases in which the Court's decision came more than four years after enactment? His analysis of this group of cases—which comprises more than half of his data—is restricted to a discussion of the *direction* of the Court's policy. He notes that the bulk of the Court decisions were neither based upon provisions of the Bill of Rights nor protective of fundamental rights of minorities. He provides neither data nor discussion of the decisiveness of these decisions.

Dahl's reasons for this approach are discussed only casually. He obliquely asserts that in situations involving a period of more than four years between enactment and Court decision, the law-making majority cannot be assumed to be still viable, and hence we cannot judge relative influence. For example, he introduces his discussion of what I call here "Type I" and "Type II" cases (declarations of unconstitutionality *within* four years) by saying that in these cases "the presumption is . . . that the lawmaking majority is not necessarily a dead one."[20] In his discussion of the cases that occurred more than four years after enactment (what I will call Type III), he asks, "Do we have evidence in these [cases] that the Court has protected fundamental or natural rights and liberties against the *dead hand of some past tyranny* by the lawmakers?"[21] If more than four years have passed, then, we lack the evidence necessary to judge relative influence.

There is logic to this argument, but it has implications that are largely unexamined. Not only do we lack data relevant to assessing the decisiveness of Court action in nearly half the cases, but the logic of Dahl's argument seems to load the dice strongly against the possibility of discovering influence by the Court if we *did* gather such data. Consider the following sequences of events:

Type IIIa
(1) Law-making majority acts
(2) Court reverses policy more than 4 years later
(3) Court's policy stands

Type IIIb
(1) Law-making majority acts
(2) Court reverses policy more than 4 years later
(3) Court's policy reversed

Common sense would suggest that Type IIIb is one in which the law-making majority should be judged to have been influential. By the same token.

[19] Dahl, "Decision-Making in a Democracy," p. 282.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 287.

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 292, emphasis added.

Type IIIa is one in which the Court ought to be judged to have exercised influence. Assume, for example, that the Court declares an act of Congress unconstitutional more than four years after its enactment. Assume that there is no move to reverse the Court or that there is a move to reverse the decision by further legislation or a constitutional amendment but that such an effort is defeated. What are we to make of the relative influence of the Court under such circumstances? The Court appears to have played a decisive role: without its intervention, the original policy would presumably have been continued. Yet Dahl's coding scheme asserts that the law-making majority was "dead" by the time the Court acted and hence we cannot judge relative influence (and cannot conclude that the Court has intervened in an important fashion). If we did gather data on cases occuring more than four years after enactment and most of them fell into Type IIIb—if the bulk of such decisions were reversed by the law-making majority—it would be reasonable to conclude that they, like those of Type II, support Dahl's conclusion that the Court has not been able to intervene decisively against the law-making majority. But suppose most of them fell into Type IIIa? Dahl seems to assert that this would not be evidence for decisive intervention by the Court because we cannot assume that the law-making majority is still viable. Under such a view the Court *cannot* be judged to be influential in circumstances that compose more than half of his evidence. If the Court's policy is reversed, it has clearly not been influential; if the Court's policy stands without discussion or is debated but not reversed, again the Court has not been influential. With such coding rules, heads and the law-making majority wins; tails and the Court loses.

This feature may assume increasing importance as the workload of the Court becomes heavier. The time required for the typical case to get to the Supreme Court for resolution is now on the order of two to three years and seems to be growing. As a result, the probability that an issue will reach the Court in time to fall within the category when we can, under Dahl's rules, assess relative influence, is decreasing.

In sum, more than half the cases Dahl discovered fall into a category in which under his coding rules it is not possible to conclude that the Court (or law-making majority) has been influential. Not only does he fail to provide the relevant data, but he seems tacitly to assert that if such data were gathered and appeared to indicate decisive interventions by the Court (Type IIIa), such data would not be interpreted in this fashion. This feature of his treatment of the evidence suggests that the conclusions based upon his analysis, though by no means disproved, are potentially a product of an asymmetry in the coding rules as well as of the nature of the evidence itself.

The Evidence Excluded.

Dahl limits his consideration to cases in which the Court held federal legislation unconstitutional. Yet cases involving tests of constitutionality of federal legislation compose only one segment of the work of the Court.[22] Two other types of activities also stand out as particularly important arenas in which the Court contributes to national policy making. The first deals with statutory construction and the second with federal constitutional issues arising out of state and local legislation or practice.

Statutory Construction. The Court is frequently called upon to interpret the meaning of federal statutes, and in the course of doing so, important policy choices must be made. If we adopt for the moment the notion that influence in policy making is most accurately judged in situations in which various participants conflict with one another, it is clear that the interpretations that are made by the Court—even when they are based on "legislative intent"—are often quite different from those that members of Congress and the President had in mind when the legislation was passed. The Court's doctrine that it will, if at all possible, interpret a statute in such a way as to "save" it from being declared unconstitutional means that the Court will often significantly twist and change the ostensible provisions of a statute. Thus, in interpreting statutes the Court often makes important policy choices, and these choices are at least arguably quite contrary to the preferences of the law-making majority that passed the legislation. The more influence the Court exercises by virtue of statutory construction, the less influence it will appear to have in terms of Dahl's coding rules. When the Court "saves" a law by interpreting it rather than declaring it unconstitutional, its contribution to the course of public policy is excluded from consideration under Dahl's rules.

Pennsylvania v. *Nelson*[23] illustrates the use of the statutory construction technique in rather stark

[22] The summary of the Supreme Court's work published each fall in the *Harvard Law Review* provides a useful account of the Court's business. In the 1972 term, for example, of 164 cases decided with full opinions, 69 involved the federal government as a party; of course many of these cases involving the federal government did not involve a challenge to constitutionality, but issues of administrative procedure, statutory construction, etc. See Note, "The Supreme Court, 1972 term," *Harvard Law Review*, 87 (November, 1973), 307–09.

[23] 350 U. S. 497 (1956).

detail. The case involved a prosecution under a so-called "little Smith Act," a state statute modeled after the federal Smith Act that punished those who advocated the violent overthrow of the government of the United States or of Pennsylvania. The Supreme Court struck down the statute, holding that federal legislation dealing with such subversive activity (particularly the Smith Act of 1940) so occupied the field that Congress had left no room for state activity and that problems of possible conflict between federal and state prosecutions required that the supremacy clause be invoked. Forty-three other states as well as Alaska and Hawaii had similar laws, so that the decision had an impact throughout the country.

The three dissenters in the case made a very cogent argument that members of Congress had been quite aware of such state laws when the Smith Act was passed and that there was little reason to believe that those who supported the Smith Act had any intention of doing away with similar legislation in the various states. Moreover, the dissenters were able to point out a section of the U.S. Code (in the same title as the Smith Act itself) that explicitly stated that "nothing in this title shall be held to take away or impair the jurisdiction of the courts of the several States, under the laws thereof."[24] Finally, they dealt quite persuasively with the majority's concerns about state interference with federal enforcement of the Smith Act. The dissenting opinion cited an *amicus curiae* brief filed by the U. S. Department of Justice which stated that since the passage of the Smith Act no difficulties had been created by the existence of similar state statutes. In short, the dissenters were able to muster rather cogent arguments to the effect that whatever one might think about the policy of state anti-sedition statutes, the supercession argument did not seem to have compelling force either in terms of congressional intent or administrative difficulties. Subsequently, a series measures was introduced in the Congress to reverse the *Nelson* decision, easily passing in the House and only narrowly defeated in the Senate.[25]

Recent years have seen a variety of similar instances of important policy making by the Court in the context of statutory construction. The extension of conscientious objector status to those without formal religious training,[26] restrictions upon the use of delinquency provisions against opponents of the Vietnam War,[27] restrictions upon residency requirements for welfare recipients,[28] limitation upon the power to use surveillance techniques without a warrant,[29] elimination of the "man-in-the-house" rule for welfare recipients,[30] and freedom for broadcasters to refuse to sell air time to individuals and groups wishing to speak out on public issues[31] have all been based wholly or in important measure upon interpretations of various federal statutes.

In some of the examples cited, especially those in which attempts by Congress to reverse the interpretation offered by the Court failed to pass, the mode of Dahl's analysis might suggest that the law-making majority was no longer viable, and hence the influence of the Court not significant. Yet this argument has the peculiar implication discussed above: if the Court acts and Congress overrides, then the Court has not been influential; yet if the Court acts and Congress *fails* to override, then, again, the Court has not been influential for we assume the law-making majority no longer exists.

In sum, then, one must consider the work of the Court in the area of statutory construction in any discussion of its role in policy making. Dahl's exclusion of this activity in his consideration of the role of the Court constitutes a serious omission, and its inclusion will significantly increase the scope of Court influence that one is likely to observe.

The State and Local Cases. The second major area of the Court's work that is excluded from Dahl's analysis involves constitutional issues arising in cases involving state and local statutes or practice. As suggested above, this exclusion is justified on the grounds that we lack evidence about the preferences of the lawmaking majority in such cases and that these cases have not been typically cited by defenders of the Court as the basis of their view that the Court plays a significant role in national policy making. Although there are, to be sure, difficulties in establishing the preferences of the national majority in these cases, a review of them suggests that many do indeed involve the Court in important issues of national policy.

To use the schematic device introduced above, the state and local cases deal with situations in which the Court may be conceived of as speaking first and in which the law-making majority is placed in the position of responding to the policy promulgated by the Court. Applying the type of

[24] 18 U.S.C. s. 3231.
[25] Murphy, especially chapters 7, 9.
[26] *U. S. v. Seeger*, 380 U. S. 163 (1965); Welsh v. U. S. 398 U. S. 333 (1970).
[27] *Oestereich v. Sel. Service Board*, 393 U. S. 233 (1968); *Breen v. Sel. Service Board*, 396 U. S. 460 (1970).
[28] *Shapiro v. Thompson*, 394 U. S. 618 (1969).
[29] *U. S. v. U. S. District Court*, 407 U. S. 297 (1972).
[30] *King v. Smith*, 392 U. S. 309 (1968).
[31] *Columbia Broadcasting System v. DNC*, 412 U. S. 94 (1973).

coding rules that Dahl follows, one might code the following sequences of events in terms of relative influence:

Type IV (Law-making Majority Influential)
(1) Court promulgates policy
(2) Law-making majority reverses policy
(3) Law-making majority's policy stands

Type V (Court Influential)
(1) Court promulgates policy
(2) Law-making majority fails to reverse policy
(3) Court's policy stands

The decision in *Chisholm* v. *Georgia*[32] asserting federal jurisdiction in diversity suits against state governments and the subsequent passage of the Eleventh Amendment is an example of a Type IV sequence.

Type V situations are more significant for our purposes. Here the Court speaks "first," and its policy is not followed by reversal by the law-making majority. In the various cases discussed below, this appears to have been the pattern followed, despite frequent attempts at reversal by legislation or constitutional amentment. After a brief review of these cases, we shall return to the problem of whether they are consistent with the argument that Dahl presents and what they suggest about the role of the Court in national policy making.

In the nineteenth century, a long line of important Supreme Court decisions dealt with the development of interstate commerce and relations between the national and state governments. Cases like *McCulloch* v. *Maryland*,[33] *Gibbons* v. *Ogden*[34] and *Cooley* v. *Board of Wardens*,[35] are merely the landmarks in a gradual development of a set of rules designed to produce a national government and economy. In citing the power of Congress via the supremacy and interstate commerce clauses, the Court was not simply legitimizing assertions of power by the national government vis-à-vis the states but took the initiative in offering its own theory of the nature of the union and of the most satisfactory distribution of powers among the various levels of government. Such cases are excluded from Dahl's analysis.

In the area of individual rights and liberties during the second half of the twentieth century, the contributions of the Court are equally striking. A simple catalogue of the issue areas in which the Court has become involved suggests the breadth of its contributions to national policy that emerged in the context of state and local cases.

In the area of reapportionment, the line of decisions beginning with *Baker* v. *Carr*[36] and proceeding through *Reynolds* v. *Sims*[37] and on to the recent decisions in *Mahan* and *Gaffney*[38] have produced significant changes in the districting of local, state, and congressional districts in nearly all the states. Although questions have been raised about the impact of such changes upon party competition and policy outputs of legislatures, it seems clear that such widespread reform in legislative apportionment would not have occurred without the Court's intervention.

In the religion cases, especially the *Engel* and *Schempp*[39] decisions, the Court set forth a policy toward devotional exercises in public schools that affected all schools, not just those in particular localities. Though the decisions were by no means greeted with total compliance, they have not been reversed and still stand as national policy. By the same token, a string of decisions dealing with aid to parochial schools has restricted the nature and types of aid that states and the federal government have been permitted to offer. Though the decisions have not cut off such aid, they have shaped these programs in ways that run contrary to the directions that they would have gone without such intervention.[40]

A long line of confusing and confused decisions emerged as the Court attempted to define obscenity and thus to determine what enjoyed the protection of the First Amendment and what did not.[41] Though the Court is still grappling with this problem and has even further confused the situation recently,[42] the upshot of this line of cases has been to expand greatly the range of materials available to the society.

In the area of race relations, the Supreme Court played a vital role in the development of national policy. Its decisions in the 1950s and 1960s placed a stamp of legitimacy upon claims for equality on the part of black citizens that was crucial to the development of organizations and activities that

[32] 2 Dall, 419 (1793).
[33] 4 Wheat 316 (1819).
[34] 9 Wheat 1 (1824).
[35] 12 How. 299 (1852).
[36] 369 U. S. 186 (1962).
[37] 377 U. S. 533 (1964).
[38] *Mahan v. Howell*, 410 U. S. 315 (1973); *Gaffney v. Cummings*, 412 U. S. 735 (1973).
[39] *Engel v. Vitale*, 370 U. S. 421 (1962); *Abington Township v. Schempp*, 374 U. S. 203 (1963).
[40] See, for example, *Lemon v. Kurtzman*, 403 U. S. 602 (1971); *Levitt v. Committee for Public Education*, 413 U. S. 472 (1973); *Sloan v. Lemon*, 413 U. S. 825 (1973); *Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist*, 413 U. S. 756 (1973).
[41] For example, *Roth v. U. S.*, 354 U. S. 476 (1957); *Manual Enterprises v. Day*, 370 U. S. 478 (1962); *Jacobellis v. Ohio*, 378 U. S. 184 (1964); *Memoirs v. Massachusetts*, 383 U. S. 413 (1966); *Ginzburg v. U. S.*, 383 U. S. 463 (1966); *Mishkin v. New York*, 383 U. S. 502 (1966).
[42] E.g., *Miller v. California*, 413 U. S. 15 (1973); but also see *Jenkins v. Georgia*, 41 L. Ed. 2d. 642 (1974).

eventually succeeded not only in the streets but in the Congress as well.[43] Though a solid consensus against *de jure* segregation did subsequently emerge, the Court played a crucial role in this process rather than merely reflecting developments in other political arenas.

In the area of criminal procedure, the Court developed a federal constitutional code of criminal justice, ranging from initial contacts of suspects with police, through the development of evidence, the adjudication of guilt or innocence, the imposition of penalties, the appellate process, and the treatment of offenders by probation and correction agencies.[44] From a wealth of cases reflecting the diverse policies of various jurisdictions the Court produced a series of rules aimed at vindicating the adversary system and vouchsafing substantive and procedural rights ignored in many localities. Surely uniformity of treatment has not been achieved in doctrinal, much less behavioral, terms. Yet the Court has moved us toward policies that were not emerging from state legislatures or Congress. The criminal justice cases illustrate an issue area in which the Supreme Court itself took up the burden of being the major advocate for a group in the society that was politically powerless and subject to deprivation of basic procedural rights.

This brief review of some of the Court's work in the area of state and local statutes and practice suggests several issues relevant to Dahl's analysis. First and most important, the policy questions at stake in these cases are not narrow, local or regional issues. In all of these areas the policy promulgated by the Court, although emerging in the context of cases arising out of states or localities, was directly aimed at and had an effect upon governmental activities throughout the nation. *Miranda* v. *Arizona*, *Gideon* v. *Wainwright*, *Reynolds* v. *Sims*, *Abington Township* v. *Schempp*, *Cooley* v. *Board of Wardens*, *Memoirs* v. *Massachusetts*, *Brown* v. *Board of Education* all came from cities or states. Yet the policies that were enunciated had relevance to the whole nation in ways much more manifest than many of the cases involving federal legislation with which Dahl deals.

Did the Court prevail? Was it reversed by a subsequent act of the law-making majority? Did the Court itself take back what it had said? In some areas, these questions are difficult to answer at this time, for a few of the decisions are recent. In terms of one crude indicator, the Court has not been substantially reversed in any of these areas by the passage of legislation or constitutional amendment. In some areas, though, the pattern Dahl suggests does seem apposite: unpopular decisions became part of the country's political agenda, and changes in political regimes affected recruitment to the Court. The replacement of the Warren Court by the Burger Court is to some extent verification of his thesis. Recent decisions in the areas of obscenity, [45] reapportionment,[46] and criminal justice[47] suggest modifications in policy to some extent congruent with the demands of Court opponents. So the thrust of this argument is not that new evidence unambiguously indicates a role for the Court that is radically different from the one that Dahl suggests. The Court *is* a member of ruling alliances and does respond to others. But examination of the state and local cases does reveal that the arena in which the Court makes policy is substantially broader than the limited area Dahl selects for discussion. Moreover, it suggests that the Court can and does get its way a good deal more frequently than his analysis implies.

Assuming that the Court has not been reversed and has not reversed itself in several important issue areas arising out of state litigation—a plausible account of the areas of civil rights, religion, and the basic thrust of policy in criminal justice and reapportionment—what are we to make of this fact in assessing the relative influence of the Court in our political system? One of the problems with dealing with such cases—and one of the reasons why they were excluded from Dahl's analysis—is that it is, to be sure, difficult to make the determination of the preferences of the national majority that Dahl says is necessary in order to decide whether the Court's policy was influential. Yet these cases did involve issues of broad national significance, and none of the decisions was struck down by legislation or constitutional amendment, even though such efforts were attempted. Thus, in formal terms the Court seems to have "won" (setting aside for the moment the possibility that new appointments may lead the Court to step back to some degree in some issue areas). On the other hand, Dahl's analysis might suggest that the very lack of overriding legislation indicates that the Court was not acting contrary to the preferences

[43] E.g., *Brown v. Bd. of Education*, 347 U. S. 483 (1954); *Holmes v. Atlanta*, 350 U. S. 879 (1955); *Boynton v. Virginia*, 364 U. S. 454 (1960); *Turner v. Memphis*, 369 U. S. 762 (1962); *Watson v. Memphis*, 373 U. S. 526 (1963); *Johnson v. Virginia*, 373 U. S. 61 (1963); *Edwards v. South Carolina*, 372 U. S. 229 (1963); *Robinson v. Florida*, 378 *Brown v. Louisiana*, 383 U. S. 131 (1966).

[44] For a useful review of the Warren Court's decisions dealing with criminal procedure, see A. Kenneth Pye, "The Warren Court and Criminal Procedure," in *The Warren Court*, ed. Richard H. Sayler et al. (New York: Chelsea House, 1969), pp. 58–77.

[45] E.g., *Miller v. California*, 413 U. S. 15 (1973); *Jenkins v. Georgia*, 41 L.Ed.2d 642 (1974).

[46] E.g., *Mahan v. Howell*, 410 U. S. 315 (1973); *Gaffney v. Cummings*, 412 U. S. 735 (1973).

[47] E.g., *Harris v. New York*, 401 U. S. 1 (1971); *North Carolina v. Alford*, 400 U. S. 25 (1970); *U. S. v. Robinson*, 414 U. S. 218 (1973); *U. S. v. Calandra*, 414 U. S. 338 (1974).

of a law-making majority. The difficulty with this argument, of course, is that it places the Court in a no-win situation: if it acts first, regardless of what happens subsequently, it is judged not to have exercised influence.

Another facet of Dahl's argument is relevant to this issue. He suggests that, in general, the major function of the Court, as a member of the ruling alliance at any particular time, is to "confer legitimacy on the fundamental policies of the successful coalition." He goes on to note that at certain periods—when the ruling coalition in an issue domain is weakened and decaying or when a stable coalition has not emerged in the issue area—the Court may "at great risk to its legitimacy powers" intervene and even "succeed in establishing policy." The Court, in such situations, is likely to be successful only when its "action conforms to and reinforces a widespread set of explicit or implicit norms held by political leadership." Dahl refers to the work of the Court in dealing with civil rights as an example of this ability of the Court to intervene when stable coalitions do not exist.

The areas in which the Court has been particularly active in recent years—civil rights, reapportionment, criminal justice, religion, obscenity, privacy—do seem to have been characterized by substantial division both within the political stratum and in the society at large about the most preferable policy alternatives. The Court's intervention has been followed by substantial controversy and attempts to modify its policy as well as attacks on its institutional powers. Both types of opposition have been unsuccessful, and the activities of other members of the political leadership stratum have been of great importance. Lyndon Johnson's activities as majority leader during the late 1950s were crucial in thwarting attempts to modify decisions dealing with loyalty-security programs and to punish the Court for its libertarian decisions in the 1956–57 terms.[48] John F. Kennedy's support for the bible-reading and school prayer decisions was, again, an important element in cooling off attacks on the Court as an institution and attempts to reverse its policy by constitutional amendment.

Assuming, though, that many of the Court's most important contributions to public policy in recent years have involved situations in which the Court was appealing to norms implicitly held by other influential policy makers and that the ability of the Court as an institution and the policies it has promulgated to survive have required support by others, what are we to make of these facts? Dahl's argument stresses the importance of the values and activities of other policy makers rather than the influence exercised by the Court. In one sense he is of course correct, for no institution can successfully carry the day when others are cohesively arrayed against it. But the overall impression that his analysis yields is somewhat misleading. He argues that the Court's activities are best understood by examining the constellation of other political interests willing to support its policies even though they were not united and powerful enough to promulgate such policies on their own. An equally plausible interpretation of such events would suggest that the crucial role was played by the Court, by its willingness to set forth policies that other state and federal institutions were unwilling or unable to promulgate. To be sure, support for such policies by others, or at least their grudging acquiescence, was crucial to the viability of the Court's policies (just as the Court's acquiescence is often crucial to the success of policies promulgated by the law-making majority). But if we are to identify the crucial participants in the policy-development process, to minimize the role of the Court, as Dahl is inclined to do, provides a view of policy making that does not do justice to the potential or actual contributions of the Court.

In sum, there are several difficulties with the evidence that Dahl gathers and the ways in which he utilizes it. The coding rules he employs have a certain asymmetry such that much of his own evidence is excluded from analysis and if further relevant information were gathered it would not be possible to conclude that the Court has been influential. He also excludes from consideration a large body of evidence that seems highly relevant to determining the Court's role in national policy-making. Consideration of this evidence indicates a substantially more influential role than Dahl's argument admits.

The Court and Policy Making

Dahl's analysis is based upon the premise that policy making is most fruitfully analyzed in terms of concepts like influence or power, a view that the crucial questions deal with winners and losers. The argument that Dahl sets out to confront and evaluate—the view of the Court as a protector of fundamental minority rights against majority tyranny—is itself framed in terms of influence. Moreover, Dahl's article was written at a time when he was developing and conducting his research on community power. In his article dealing with the "ruling elite model" published in 1958, Dahl asserts that "one cannot compare the relative influence of two actors who always perform identical actions with respect to the group influenced. What this means as a practical matter is that ordinarily one can test for differences in influence only where

[48] Murphy, chapter 9.

there are cases of differences in initial preferences."[49]

If one can judge relative influence of various individuals, groups, and institutions only when there are disagreements among them, focus upon Court declarations that federal legislation is unconstitutional appears to make sense. From this basic posture about the way in which to study influence, Dahl moves to a view of the policy-making process that focuses upon disputes among policy makers and determines who prevails and who does not. His view of the way to measure influence shades into a conception of policy making that stresses its zero-sum characteristics.

There are several difficulties with Dahl's account of policy making and the role of the Court in it. Some deal with his specific conclusions about the role of the Court; others center about the relatively narrow conception of policy making that underlies his argument.[50]

To begin, let us assume that the winners and losers view that Dahl utilizes is a reasonable way to conceive of the policy-making process. Dahl's basic conclusion is that, except for its important role as a legitimator, the Court does not play an especially influential role in national policy making. There are three major difficulties with this view, the first two of which may be disposed of briefly. First, as argued above, the exclusive focus upon cases in which federal statutes are declared unconstitutional ignores a good deal of what the Court in fact contributes to national policy making. Second, Dahl does not place sufficient emphasis upon those cases in which the Court succeeded in delaying policies for periods of up to 25 years. He focuses upon the dénouement—upon the ultimate rejection of the Court's policy—while an equally salient feature of these examples is the extensive period of time in which the law-making majority was prevented from working its will.

The third and most important objection to Dahl's characterization of the influence of the Court—assuming that we accept the winners and losers approach—is that he engages in a somewhat misleading contrast in comparing the influence of the Court to that of the law-making majority. Dahl concludes that the Court does not typically play a decisive role in national policy making. "Acting solely by itself with no support from the President and Congress, the Court is almost powerless to affect the course of national policy." He essentially stops here, contenting himself with an effective antidote to the mythology that the Court stands as a lonely bastion single handedly thwarting tyrannical majorities from trampling upon the rights of despised minorities.

Although he does not address the question in detail, at this level of generality such a proposition is true of all institutions of government as well as other groups and individuals in the society. Certainly this comports with Dahl's emphasis upon the building of coalitions, upon the notion of minorities' rule, and upon the great restraints that such stable coalitions place upon the policy choices that may be made at any point in time. But because he frames the question in terms of who wins or loses—Court versus President and Congress—and because he does not in this article emphasize the degree to which *no* institution is really capable of the decisive role he argues the Court fails to possess, the impression of the Court's relative insignificance is cemented. Thus, the framing of the question as one of relative influence produces a view of policy making in which such influence seems to be the touch-stone of significant participation, and this produces a view that the Court, except in its legitimizing role, simply is not a particularly important participant in national policy making.

The arguments offered above suggest that even within the framework for analyzing policy making that Dahl adopts, there is room for disagreement with his basic conclusion that the Court does not frequently exercise an important influence on the national political outcomes. There is another set of objections that center about the rather narrow conception of policy making that seems to inform Dahl's analysis.

The policy-making process involves more than clashes among political coalitions and institutions, more than winners and losers.[51] The winners-and-losers view implies that there are decisive outcomes to disputes about issues—that among the variety of policies that might be selected, one outcome ultimately prevails. It implies (1) that when interests or institutions clash, the position of one side or another prevails; (2) that the outcomes in policy

[49] Dahl, "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model," p. 464.

[50] I shall not discuss here the problem of taking account of "anticipated reactions" in discussing the relative influence of the Court in the policy-making process. It seems plausible to argue, though, that just as the Court in its decisions may take account of the breadth and intensity of support for various policies, members of Congress may take into account their predictions of potential rulings by the Court in making choices about what legislation to pass. For a discussion of the role of constitutional considerations in the legislative decision-making process, see Donald G. Morgan, *Congress and the Constitution* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966), and Paul Brest, "The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation," *Stanford Law Review*, 27 (February, 1975), 585–601.

[51] Much of Dahl's work is consistent with this view and has added to our understanding of the ways in which these processes operate. Yet in the article under consideration here, a narrower view of the nature of the policy-making process emerges from the fashion in which he formulates the question and gathers his data.

making that occur as a result of such disagreements somehow "settle" disputes; and (3) that the crucial contributions to policy making consist in promulgating policies that prevail. All of these are implicit in the conception of policy making that informs Dahl's approach to the Supreme Court, and none is adequate.

Dahl argues that when the Court clashes with the law-making majority we can assess its significance in policy making by examining whose policy prevailed. The consistent "winner" in such clashes is judged to be influential and the loser to be a less significant contributor to the policy-making process. This view assumes that when such clashes occur the policy of the "winner" is adopted and the policy of the "loser" is discarded. In fact, when such clashes occur, the policies that eventually emerge are affected by the interaction among institutions that takes place.

For example, when we examine the role of the Court in policy making in the area of economic regulation in the first third of this century, Dahl's view suggests that the Court, although delaying certain policies, was ultimately not influential because its laissez-faire policy was discarded. But one could argue that the Court played a particularly important role in this episode of policy development. Not only for the period in which its decisions thwarted the law-making majority, but also for its role in leading other groups and interests in society to come to grips with laissez-faire economic policy and the interests that supported it. The laissez-faire decisions contributed to the development of the coalition that led to the election of Roosevelt, the legislation of the New Deal, and the eventual discarding of the Court's policies in favor of a conception of public welfare policy that had not heretofore enjoyed the political base it subsequently developed. In this way, both the nature of subsequent policies—their breadth, their statutory and administrative form—and the constellation of political forces in the society were shaped by the activities of the Court. What emerged at the "end" of this struggle was quite different from what had been proposed by the law-making majority at its beginning.

To suggest another example, suppose that changes in Court decisions or a constitutional amendment were to "reject" the Supreme Court's politices since 1957 dealing with the freedom to distribute and possess "obscene" materials. Two features of this hypothetical case suggest difficulties with the notion of examining winners and losers in policy making. First of all, it is hard to imagine what the supposed "winning" policy might be that we could compare with the "losing" policy of the Court. Because there was almost no federal constitutional doctrine on the subject of obscenity before 1957, almost any new "winning" policy would produce a policy outcome different from the pre-1957 status quo.

Second, suppose the new "winning" policy permitted states and localities a substantially greater discretion to restrict the dissemination of such materials. Surely events of the past 18 years affect what types of material would remain available. Experience with the availability of pornography—for example, the fact that substantial numbers of people in the society have come to enjoy it or to believe that it is less harmful than they once believed—would probably produce policies permitting substantially greater availability than existed in the pre-1957 period. Moreover, the political and economic interests with an investment in protecting the freedom to distribute and profit from such materials have greatly increased in recent years and would also operate to dampen to some degree the ability of the "anti-obscenity" interests to impose restrictive policies. In this fashion, the very enunciation of a policy by one institution is likely to affect future policies, even if the original policy is "reversed." The notion of a "winning" and a "losing" policy when institutions clash imposes an artificial distinction that obscures a dynamic process in which even "losers" contribute importantly to outcomes that eventually emerge.

The second objection is related to the first, and it simply states that many of the issues in which national political institutions become involved are not "settled" but continue to recur. Conflicts among political institutions produce not "winning" and "losing" policies, but rather tentative solutions that themselves become the basis for future policy making. Consider, for example, recent developments in national policy dealing with racial equality, legislative apportionment, the relationship between church and state, and criminal procedure. All of these were issues that had long smoldered beneath the surface of American politics. Regardless of the decisions of the Warren Court, these issues have surely not been resolved: we have not succeeded in defining, much less in embracing, racial equality; malapportionment remains a disputed issue; religious practices continue in many schools; and the typical criminal defendant does not enjoy the rights that the Court has doctrinally afforded. Yet all of these issues have become increasingly salient features of the national political agenda in the past twenty years; what was latent conflict has become manifest, and both the general public and political institutions have been forced to confront the policy questions involved. The dénouement is not clear, any more than it was twenty years ago, for these are questions that our society presumably will always have to confront. Though at various times one position or another may carry the day, ultimate resolutions are not discovered, and the Court, like other poli-

tical institutions, has and will continue to make important contributions to the "solutions" that carry the day, become the subject for further debate, and are modified or rejected.

This suggests a third point. The policy-making process—and the exercise of influence within it—involves more than producing outcomes that prevail. Providing effective access to participants who wish to take part in decision making, placing issues on the agenda of public opinion and of other political institutions, providing an imprimatur of legitimacy to one side or another that may affect its ability to attract adherents, mobilize resources, and build institutions—these are all important parts of the policy-making process that may get lost if we pay attention only to winners and losers. One reason that courts may have particular importance in placing issues on the agenda of other political institutions and in development of interest groups is that "success" in a court requires only that a party convince a relatively small number of decision makers. At the trial level, success requires only a favorable decision from a single individual; at the Supreme Court level, success requires the approval of five of nine. Thus, interests that lack resources for effective influence in legislative, executive, or administrative arenas may find the legal system an attractive spot in which to attempt to influence public policy. "Success" in a court then becomes useful in participation in these other arenas—the court's decision may require other institutions to come to grips with an issue they have ignored; the legitimacy conferred by victory in court may be useful in attracting members and resources and mobilizing others. For example, the civil rights decisions culminating in *Brown* contributed to the growth of civil rights organizations like SCLC, CORE, and SNCC that became active in the streets as well as in the Congress. The right-to-counsel decisions contributed to the development of a more respectable criminal bar and widespread use of organizations like Public Defender offices that have become active in behalf of criminal defendants not only in trial courts but in appellate courts, the legal community, and legislative settings as well.

The burden of this section, then, is that the view of policy making that informs Dahl's analysis is too narrow. Even in Dahl's own terms, he does not take account of the Court's influence on public policy. Moreover, the winners-and-losers approach leads to a view of policy making that diverts attention from a variety of ways in which the Supreme Court makes significant contributions to national policy making.

Beyond Dogma and Despair: Toward a Critical Theory of Politics

FRED R. DALLMAYR
Purdue University

That political thought has fallen on bad days is a commonplace among diagnosticians of our age. Although distressing, the circumstance is perhaps not surprising, given the general political malaise and social disarray prevalent in Western societies today. Obviously, the infirmity of political thought signifies neither an end of politics nor necessarily a cessation of philosophical reflection as such. Our century has not been marked by a lack of political drama or ideological commitment; politics—conceived both as spontaneous activity and as the more systematic planning and implementation of social panaceas—has left its indelible imprint on the physiognomy of our age. At the same time, intellectual endeavors have netted remarkable advances in terms of analytical rigor and methodological refinement; academic philosophers have made great strides in clarifying the logical and conceptual arsenal of inquiry. What is at issue is not so much the analytical sagacity of our time but the fate of political philosophy and, more broadly, the relationship between thought and everyday practice. By and large, contemporary philosophers have been reluctant to venture beyond academic boundary lines; encouraged by the inhospitable character of the political arena, they have been insufficiently concerned about the lot of their fellow-men to exchange the ivory tower for the hazards of the market place. To this extent, the dearth of political theory illustrates and corroborates a basic symptom of the crisis of our period: the disintegration of public deliberation and discourse among members of the political community.

To professional students of politics, it is true, the situation may seem less bleak than indicated. As is well known, political thought as a field of study has been cultivated during recent decades by a devoted group of scholars in the discipline; as a result of these efforts, we have even been told of a "revival of political theory" in our time.[1] Regarding intellectual outlook, this group or school has adhered by and large to what one may call a stance of "metaphysical realism"—a posture claiming direct access of the mind to a domain of ultimate and objective reality; in a sense, since positive knowledge of this final domain is postulated, the outlook might also be labeled "higher positivism."[2] The point here is not to challenge the dedication and scholarship of individual members (nor even, for the moment, the cogency of the adopted stance); at issue is simply the philosophical character of the group's enterprise. To a remarkable extent, this enterprise has remained apart from major currents or trends in contemporary philosophy—apparently on the assumption that the questions raised by these trends are either not worth asking or not worth answering. With few exceptions metaphysical realists in political science have preferred to open interrogation the reiteration of past doctrines or ancient wisdom, a preference sometimes shading over into a fascination with esoteric knowledge. A similar segregation persists with regard to empirical political inquiry. Despite periodic (and increasingly ceremonial) clashes between realists and empiricists, the discipline has for all practical purposes accepted a division of labor which assigns to positivists the terrain of concrete research and to theorists the privilege of final insight. Not surprisingly, as a corollary of these types of intellectual enclosure, the discussed outlook has been virtually immune from the dilemmas and agonies of contemporary political and social experience. In all these respects, professional political theory approximates what Merleau-Ponty at one point called "thought in retreat." While "to philosophize is to seek," he noted, we today prefer the pretense of having found: "We 'return' to one or the other of our traditions and 'defend' it. Our convictions are founded less on perceived values and truths than on the vices and errors of those we do not like."[3]

[1] See, e.g., Dante Germino, *Beyond Ideology: The Revival of Political Theory* (New York: Harper & Row, 1967).

[2] The above comments are not directed against ontology as such, but only against an objectivistic or deterministic ontology which (in Heidegger's terms) levels Being into the world of objects. For a critical appraisal of metaphysical realism or "ontological determinism" compare Hwa Yol Jung, "Leo Strauss' Conception of Political Philosophy: A Critique," *The Review of Politics*, 29 (October 1967), 492–517; also his communication to the editor in *American Political Science Review*, 67 (September 1973), 964–965.

[3] Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *In Praise of Philosophy*, trans. John Wild and James M. Edie (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1963), p. 41. As he added: "Each of us is expiating for his youth. This decadence is in accord with the course of our history. Having passed a certain point of tension, ideas cease to develop and live. They fall to the level of justifications and pretexts, relics of the past, points of honor; and what one pompously calls the movement of ideas is reduced to the sum of our nostalgias, our grudges, our timidities, and our phobias."

In these pages I propose to delineate an alternative perspective which broadly may be described as "critical theory of politics." The term "critical" in this context is meant to refer not simply to a desire to challenge opposing postures, but to a general willingness to submit the premises of one's argument to scrutiny and inspection. A critical outlook of this kind, in my view, can draw inspiration primarily from two major currents in contemporary thought: one is existential phenomenology; the other, critical Marxism, especially as articulated by members of the so-called Frankfurt School. To be sure, the two currents are not entirely congruent; in fact, if Marxism is identified with materialism and phenomenology with the intuitions of subjective consciousness, their concerns appear diametrically opposed. Yet, as it seems to me, there is sufficient common ground between the two currents to support the suggested linkage.[4] Critical Marxism derives important impulses from the writings of the young Marx (discovered some four decades ago) which clearly reveal Marx's debt to, and involvement in, the legacy of philosophical discourse. In equal measure, neo-Marxists have been influenced by Georg Lukács's early studies, especially by his plea (in *History and Class Consciousness*) that Marxism be treated not as a series of fixed assertions but as a critical method of inquiry intent on interpreting particular phenomena in the light of the broader fabric of social experience. Relying on these and similar precedents, the Frankfurt Institute of Social Research during the prewar period developed a program of "critical theory" in order to unravel the dilemmas of bourgeois society. As articulated by its initial protagonists, the Frankfurt program was not entirely free of doctrinaire beliefs; in the writings of the young Horkheimer, for example, the effort of comprehensive assessment was marred at crucial points by an indiscriminate fusion of theoretical insight and practical advice, of concrete observation and political commitment.[5] In all these respects, recent investigations by Frankfurt theorists have tried to overcome ideological preconceptions by applying the standards of critical inquiry to such diverse fields as epistemology, ethics, and the theory of language. The leading protagonist of these efforts is the philosopher-sociologist Jürgen Habermas; he has been seconded and sometimes undergirded by Karl-Otto Apel, a philosopher broadly conversant with the major theoretical trends of our time and generally sympathetic to the Frankfurt program.

Phenomenology from its inception has never claimed to be a finished system of propositions. Husserl's celebrated call "to the things themselves" was an exhortation to abandon preconceived doctrines in favor of fresh observation and interpretation; rather than vouchsafing simple introspection or confinement in a solipsistic consciousness, the procedure of "*epoché*"—the "bracketing" or suspension of naive assumptions about reality in favor of reflection—encouraged open-ended inquiry and the sustained scrutiny of knowledge claims. While stressing the embeddedness of all human endeavors in an ongoing and prereflective social life-world, Heidegger's hermeneutical perspective involved the purge of routine conceptions in an effort to permit renewed investigation and exegesis. Combining and reconciling Husserlian and Heideggerian themes, Merleau-Ponty formulated the contours of a critical phenomenology attentive to concrete experience. His inaugural lecture at the Collège de France, entitled *In Praise of Philosophy*, was a eulogy of the Socratic method. As he tried to show, philosophy is not a set of ready-made doctrines but an endeavor comprising "inseparably the taste for evidence and the feeling for ambiguity"—without lapsing into equivocation. "Even those," he noted, "who have desired to work out a completely positive philosophy have been philosophers only to the extent that, at the same time, they have refused the right to install themselves in absolute knowledge." Following in the footsteps of his Greek mentor, Merleau-Ponty added, the Socratic thinker is equally far removed from haughty detachment—the pretense of esoteric insight—and a spurious complicity in practical schemes: "The irony of Socrates is a distant but true relation with others." Seen from this perspective, philosophy is bound to be a precarious and "limping" enterprise: "It dwells in history and in life, but it wishes to dwell at their center, at the point where they come into being with the birth of meaning."[6]

[4] For a general comparison of the two currents compare my "Phenomenology and Marxism: A Salute to Enzo Paci," in *Phenomenological Sociology: Issues and Applications*, ed. George Psathas (New York: Wiley, 1973), pp. 305–356. More recently I have tried to indicate in more detail the similarities and divergencies between existential phenomenology and Habermas's version of critical theory; see "Einleitung" and "Epilog" in *Materialien zu Habermas' "Erkenntnis und Interesse"* (Frankfurt-Main: Suhrkamp, 1974), pp. 10–21, 418–432

[5] See, e.g., Max Horkheimer, "Traditional and Critical Theory," in his *Critical Theory: Selected Essays*, trans. Matthew J. O'Connell et al. (New York: Herder & Herder, 1972), pp. 188–243. Regarding the Frankfurt School compare Martin Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, 1923–1950* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1973); Trent Schroyer, *The Critique of Domination: The Origins and Development of Critical Theory* (New York: Braziller, 1973); and regarding Georg Lukács his *History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics*, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1971), esp. p. 1.

[6] *In Praise of Philosophy*, pp. 4–5, 38, 58. Commenting on Husserl, Merleau-Ponty noted at another point:

Critical thought in the Socratic mold militates against both disdain for truth and doctrinaire rigidity. Philosophical doubt and self-scrutiny are not equivalent to skeptical indifference or agnostic despair—just as growth in understanding offers no shield against further examination. It is a perspective of this kind that Paul Ricoeur invoked when he spoke of "a rational feeling that is regulative and purificative both of skepticism and fanaticism: skepticism which refuses to look for meaning and fanaticism which declares it prematurely." In a similar vein, Merleau-Ponty linked the philosopher with the "common man" whose latent thought he expresses, arguing that both are aligned against "the important one who thinks by principles and against the roué who lives without truth."[7] Given the open-ended character of critical inquiry, the following pages cannot aim to offer a full-fledged doctrine or a systematic set of propositions; rather, the goal can only be to sketch the implications of critical thought for selected areas of discourse. For present purposes, three broad topics or problem areas have been selected. After exploring the parameters of everyday experience or the "human condition" underpinning more reflective types of endeavor, the paper turns to questions of cognition and the search for valid knowledge, with particular focus on social and political research. A concluding section shifts attention to the justification of ethical standards and the relevance of such standards for democratic theory and practical political life.

The Human Condition

One of the major developments in our century has been the impressive growth of scientific knowledge and especially the expansion of scientific research into the recesses of human and social experience. Assisted by biological science, behavioral analysis has mapped out the basic parameters of human dispositions and their nexus with environmental conditions. As a result of these advances, it is claimed, "human nature" has become amenable to objective explanation and predictive control. It matters little in this context whether the human "core" is located in innate genetic endowments or in a reactive mechanism transforming stimuli into behavioral responses; in either case, man is seen as an empirical factor in a knowable and manageable universe. The concern with an objective "human nature" is not limited to behavioral scientists but shared by many adepts of "traditional" political philosophy; the conflict between positivists and metaphysical realists in this respect concerns not so much the goal as the procedures of verification. From the realist perspective, man is viewed as a distinctive and definable creature integrated into a larger cosmos which, in turn, is animated by an intelligible purpose.[8]

Countering both positivist and realist arguments, critical thought erodes the solidity of the postulated "human nature." From its beginning, phenomenology opposed conceptions identifying man either with internal dispositions or with a reactive mechanism (or with a combination of the two dimensions). In introducing and developing the notion of intentionality, Husserl sought to overcome the gulf customarily erected between internal or mental capacities and physical endowments, or (in Cartesian terms) between matter and thinking substance. With the stress on intentionality, man emerged as an inquiring creature, a creature able to question both his environment and himself. Once man was seen in this light, the compactness of human nature was bound to disintegrate. For, how can any delimitation be definitive, given man's intentional self-awareness—the ability to view himself as his own alter ego? First of all, any proposed model or theoretical construct of man operates on a different level from empirical or substantive findings and cannot, thus, be explained in their terms. More important, any substantive delimitation opens itself up to self-awareness and reflection—a reflection which inevitably adds a new dimension to the postulated model and pushes man beyond his delimited alter ego. Against this background, man appears at best as the horizon of his empirical operations and substantive qualities.

The implications of this view of man have been explored and patiently delineated by Heidegger and other existential phenomenologists. Heidegger's notion of *Dasein* pictures man as a unique "being-in-the-world," a creature intimately enmeshed in the fabric of ongoing social and cultural practices. Yet, although thrust into this web, man is not simply a reactive apparatus or a blind victim

perpetual beginner, which means that he takes for granted nothing that men, learned or otherwise, believe they know. It means also that philosophy itself must not take itself for granted, insofar as it may have managed to say something true; that it is an ever-renewed experiment in making its own beginning; that it consists wholly in the description of this beginning, and finally, that radical reflection amounts to a consciousness of its own dependence on an unreflective life which is its initial situation, unchanging. "The philospher, as the unpublished works declare, is a given once and for all." *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. Colin Smith (New York: Humanities Press, 1962), p. XIV.

[7] See *In Praise of Philosophy*, p. 63; Paul Ricoeur, *History and Truth*, trans. Charles A. Kelbley (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1965), p. 12.

[8] For examples of positivist (behavioralist) and realist postures compare Heinz Eulau, *The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics* (New York: Random House, 1963), pp. 3–11, 133–138 ("Introduction: The Root is Man," "Epilogue: The Goal is Man"); and Eugene F. Miller, "Political Philosophy and Human Nature," *The Personalist*, 53 (Summer 1972), 209–221.

of natural causes. Overcome by "eeriness" (*Unheimlichkeit*), man discovers the dilemma of being involved but not properly at home in the objective universe; moved by "care" (*Sorge*) he becomes concerned and inquires about his condition and about the point of his involvement in the world. *Dasein* in this light is at best an incongruous and precarious enterprise, a relationship rather than a fixed substance. In the words of one observer: "Man is the gap which separates and at the same time unites subject and object"; instead of fitting into a compact scheme of things he discloses "a rift within Being."[9] Man's incongruous condition, however, does not simply sanction mental self-enclosure or the retreat into subjectivism; the need to inquire about the significance of his condition offers no warrant for private speculation. As Heidegger is wont to insist (especially in his later writings), genuine questioning presupposes openness toward a dimension of reality which, though immune from reification, lies beyond subjective fancy. In raising questions, the *Introduction to Metaphysics* states, "We seem to belong entirely to ourselves. Yet it is this questioning that moves us into the open, provided that, in questioning, it transform itself (which all true questioning does), and cast a new space over everything and into everything."[10]

Heidegger's conception was corroborated and in some respects amplified in Merleau-Ponty's writings. The characterization of the human condition as "être-au-monde" was meant to accentuate man's precarious and incongruous involvement in the world. Elaborating on Hegelian insights, Merleau-Ponty argued that man, "as opposed to the pebble which is what it is," should be defined "as a place of unrest (*Unruhe*), a constant effort to get back to himself, and consequently by his refusal to limit himself to one or another of his determinations." Arguing against both empiricist and idealist premises, he stressed that man is neither an object nor a "constituting consciousness" but a special "intentional" creature: "oriented toward all things" but "not residing in any." Together with Heidegger, he rejected the label "humanist" for his outlook—"if one understands by 'man' an explanatory principle which ought to be substituted for the others." As he noted in his address before the Collège de France: "One explains nothing by man, since he is not a force but a weakness at the heart of being, a cosmological factor, but also the place where all cosmological factors, by a mutation which is never finished, change in sense and become history."[11] As in Heidegger's case, the stress on intentionality was not an endorsement of subjective whim. Following Gabriel Marcel, Merleau-Ponty focused attention on human "embodiment"—a term referring both to man's bodily constitution (governed by the laws of the physical universe) and to the body's function as key in an intersubjective search for meaning. In his later writings, he expanded phenomenological inquiry progressively to the levels of preconscious and unconscious experience, an endeavor which, in the words of one observer, transformed his philosophy into an "archaeology which does nothing but excavate the meaning of the world which is already before us to be discovered."[12]

To some extent, phenomenological and existentialist arguments find a parallel in critical Marxism. In his *Theses on Feuerbach* Marx himself rejected a naturalistic brand of humanism which reduces man to a fixed substance among other empirical factors. In a similar vein, Lukács in *History and Class Consciousness* commented that the treatment of man as the measure of things was plausible only if this measure as open-ended horizon was applied to man himself in his concrete or substantive manifestations.[13] Among neo-Marxist thinkers, no one has probably been more persistently concerned with the dilemmas of the human condition than Ernst Bloch. The cornerstone of Bloch's thinking has always been the incongruity and dark tension implicit in the lived moment, a tension pushing man beyond the immediate presence toward the "not-yet" of a future whose contours can at best dimly be anticipated or divined. Intentionality in his view means a relentless

[9] Karsten Harris, "Martin Heidegger: The Search for Meaning," in *Existential Philosophers: Kierkegaard to Merleau-Ponty*, ed. George A. Schrader, Jr. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), pp. 171, 185. Compare also Helmut Fahrenbach, "Heidegger und das Problem einer 'philosophischen' Anthropologie," in *Durchblicke: Martin Heidegger zum 80. Geburtstag* (Frankfurt-Main: Klostermann, 1970), pp. 97–131.

[10] Heidegger, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, trans. Ralph Manheim (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), pp. 29–30. As Richard E. Palmer comments: "Questioning, then, is a way that man contends with and draws being into showing itself. It bridges the ontological difference between being and the being of beings." *Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969), p. 150.

[11] See *In Praise of Philosophy*, p. 44; and *Sense and Non-Sense*, trans. Hubert L. and Patricia A. Dreyfus (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), pp. 66 ("Hegel's Existentialism") and 72 ("The Battle over Existentialism"). Compare also his statement that man is "like an open notebook in which we do not yet know what will be written"; *The Primacy of Perception and Other Essays*, ed. James M. Edie (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), p. 6.

[12] Hwa Yol Jung, "The Radical Humanization of Politics: Maurice Merleau-Ponty's Philosophy of Politics," *Archiv für Rechts-und Sozialphilosophie*, 53 (May 1967), p. 239.

[13] Compare Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, pp. 186–190; also my "History and Class-Consciousness: Georg Lukács' Theory of Social Change," *Politics and Society*, 1 (November 1970), 113–131, at 129.

striving beyond present confinements toward a world free of despair and oppression. "The desiderium, the single honorable quality of men," he wrote in the *Principle of Hope*, "has not been investigated. The not-yet-conscious, the not-yet-become, although it fulfills the mind of every man and the horizon of all being, has not even broken through as a word, let alone as a concept." Because of the rift between present circumstances and aspirations, man's condition is basically characterized by incompleteness and deficiency; subject to detours and reversals, the human "venture is not yet successful" and in fact "no man yet really lives." In his actual state, according to Bloch, man should be described not so much as a substance but as a lack—as a hidden creature or *homo absconditus* searching for self-realization. This search, in his view, is not simply an idiosyncratic exercise but is supported by a latent proclivity in nature: the proclivity toward a "humanization of nature" corresponding to man's reconciliation with his habitat.[14]

Frankfurt theorists have long been preoccupied with similar issues—although early formulations (by Horkheimer and Marcuse) tended to alternate unevenly between the stress on human freedom or indeterminacy and the notion of a predictive teleology. Later statements reflect a more circumspect approach. In an essay on "philosophical anthropology." Jürgen Habermas in 1958 argued that man should be viewed simultaneously as a creature of nurture and of culture and that his condition should be examined both in terms of biological evidence and cultural significance: "To speak, act and produce means not only to make use of certain bodily organs but to disclose a meaning." As he noted, the dual aspect was distantly related to Kant's distinction between a "physiological" and a "pragmatic" anthropology—the former dealing with "what nature made of man" and the latter with what man makes of himself. In Herder's terminology, man had to be seen as "the first emancipated creature of nature"—a perspective which, however, does not imply a complete indeterminacy. In comparison with animals, man is marked by instinctual diffuseness and disorientation—a deficiency which is compensated by, and one of the chief impulses for, the establishment of cultural institutions and norms. "Human existence," Habermas commented, "denotes a peculiar combination of environmental confinement and purposive openness. By itself, the one or the other aspect would be applicable to animals or angels; but man is placed between both." As he added, the attempt to transform man either into a compact creature (with a fixed environment) or into a pure spirit is bound to lead to a substantive definition—with hazardous political consequences: "When clinging to a substantive (ontological) procedure by focusing on the unchanging or permanent features of human life, anthropology becomes uncritical and encourages in the end even a dogmatism with political implications (the more dangerous because presumably scientific)."[15]

In developing his argument, Habermas relied in large measure on the insights of one of the pioneers of "philosophical anthropology," Helmuth Plessner, whose work seems at least broadly compatible with the Frankfurt perspective. Equally attentive to the findings of biological and physiological research and to contemporary philosophy (including phenomenology) Plessner in his writings has delineated a broad-gauged and complex interpretation of the human condition. Like Merleau-Ponty he pictured man as an embodied creature—with the dual connotation that he experiences the world through his bodily organs and that he "has" a body and is able to reflect on his empirical situation. Marked by a "natural artificiality," human existence from this vantage point appears lodged at the crossroads of nature and history, of physical adaptation and the search for meaning. Drawing on Uexküll's studies of the closed ecological milieu of animals and of the fixed linkage between instincts and stimuli in animal behavior, Plessner argued that man is distinguished by a peculiar instinctual deficiency and incongruity, by an "excentric position" in regard both to himself and his environment. Eccentricity, in this context, does not denote a complete removal from physical and environmental bonds but rather the lack of a stable ecological habitat. Instead of being safely enmeshed in a life-cycle or the stimulus-response nexus, man has to "lead" his life by designing a web of symbolic meanings and by embodying himself in cultural and institutional settings. In Plessner's view, such settings provide at best a temporary and precarious refuge; contrary to the opinion of some anthropologists (especially Arnold Gehlen), cultural and institutional arrangements offer no shield against continuing scrutiny and interrogation. At the same time, eccentricity and

[14] See Ernst Bloch, *Das Prinzip Hoffnung* (Frankfurt-Main: Suhrkamp, 1959), vol. 1, pp. 4, 225, 327; *Subjekt-Objekt: Erläuterungen zu Hegel* (Frankfurt-Main: Suhrkamp, 1962), p. 471. Compare also David Gross, "Ernst Bloch: The Dialectics of Hope," in *The Unknown Dimension: European Marxism Since Lenin*, ed. Dick Howard and Karl E. Klare (New York: Basic Books, 1972), pp. 107–130; and Pierre Furter, "Utopia and Marxism according to Bloch," *Philosophy Today*, vol. 14 (Winter 1970), pp. 236–249.

[15] Habermas, "Anthropologie," in *Fischer-Lexikon: Philosophie*, ed. Alwin Diemer and Ivo Frenzel (Frankfurt-Main: Fischer, 1958), pp. 19, 21, 32–33. Compare in this context also Martin Jay, "The Frankfurt School's Critique of Marxist Humanism," *Social Research*, 39 (Summer 1972), 285–305; and Christian K. Lenhardt, "Rise and Fall of Transcendental Anthropology," *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, 2 (September 1972), 231–246.

open-ended inquiry are not synonymous with a simple withdrawal from role patterns or a retreat into a purely private or subjective "authenticity." Constrained to find himself through interaction with others and yet impelled to question existing arrangements, man is at best (in Kant's phrase) a "crooked timber" and his disposition toward others an "unsociable sociability."[16]

Epistemology and Political Inquiry

The implications of the sketched view of the human condition are numerous and complex; one issue which has intensely preoccupied both phenomenology and neo-Marxism is the contemporary "knowledge explosion" and its significance for human life. As has frequently been observed, our century has witnessed an unprecedented accumulation of scientific and technological information and an impressive refinement of the methodological tools of analysis; these advances, however, have not been paralleled by a comparable clarification of human purpose. Indeed, an inverse relationship seems to prevail: to the extent that scientific inquiry has gained in rigor and rational lucidity, the parameters of private and public conduct have tended to become blurred and obscure. The circumstance is not entirely fortuitous; in large measure, the contrast is built into the prevailing theory of knowledge. According to the dominant (though no longer uncontested) versions of positivism, the role of the human observer is marginal if not detrimental to objective inquiry. Among early empiricists, the assumption was widely shared that knowledge involves a simple verbal replication of factual data and thus a direct correspondence between findings and description. More recently, because of a growing recognition of the importance of theoretical formulation, positivism has paid closer attention to conceptual and semantic rigor—with the result that knowledge has come to be identified both with logical consistency and with the indirect factual adequacy of propositions. While useful for theoretical innovations, the experiential qualities of the researcher from this perspective are reduced to a "heuristic" function if not to the level of psychological idiosyncrasy.[17] In all these points, metaphysical realism parallels or at least approximates the positivist position; both insist on objective "correspondence" and some degree of rational articulation the difference residing mainly in the aspect that positivists limit knowledge claims to empirically testable statements while realists do not.

Despite differences in detail, both phenomenology and critical Marxism have tried to maintain or revive the nexus between analysis and purpose or between knowledge and human experience without being ready on this account to abandon valid cognition to subjective preference. Throughout his life, Husserl strove to uncover and elucidate human consciousness as the vital infrastructure of all cognitive endeavors. In his early writings, it is true, consciousness tended to be portrayed as transparent receptacle of objective reality; once purified through "bracketing" (*epoché*), the observer's mind was supposed to have access not only to surface appearances but to the "essence" or inner core of phenomena. In the long run, however, the program of a rigorously "scientific" philosophy proved less satisfactory or manageable than initially expected. For, assuming as end goal the correspondence and coincidence of mind and reality, how could philosophy be maintained as a perpetual beginning and renewal? Moreover, how could consciousness articulate its findings without relying on language and intersubjective understanding? In his later writings, Husserl turned his attention steadily to the human "life-world" as the prereflective dimension of experience underpinning conscious investigations. Instead of denoting a collective psychology or a mere reservoir of heuristic guesses, the life-world gave direction to inquiry and findings acquired meaning against its background. To be sure, prereflective experience is not self-explanatory and needs to be clarified through rigorous scrutiny. At this point, a certain ambiguity persists, since the relationship between the "natural attitude" and transcendental analysis and consciousness is open to diverse interpretations. Perhaps the most balanced statement of Husserl's epistemological approach can be found in his *Experience and Judgment*—a posthumously published work which, according to its

[16] Compare on the above points my "Plessner's Philosophical Anthropology: Implications for Role Theory and Politics," *Inquiry*, 17 (Spring 1974), 49–77. Regarding the notion of man as a "crooked timber" or an "anthropology of disproportion" see also Paul Ricoeur, *Fallible Man* (Chicago: Regnery, 1965), and his essay "The Antinomy of Human Reality and the Problem of Philosophical Anthropology," in *Readings in Existential Phenomenology*, ed. Nathaniel M. Lawrence and Daniel O'Connor (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1967), pp. 390–402.

[17] The heuristic importance of theoretical models or frameworks has been stressed primarily by Karl R. Popper and his school; e.g., in his *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (New York: Basic Books, 1959). In a more radical departure from orthodox positivism, other philosophers of science have come to view the community of investigators as a "context of discovery" shaping the successive "paradigms" of inquiry (but with a bent to treat this context as a sociological or psychological environment); see, e.g., Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962; 2nd ed., Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1970); and Norwood R. Hanson, *Patterns of Discovery* (Cambridge: at the University Press, 1958). For the controversy between the Popper school and Kuhn's approach compare *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*, ed. Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (Cambridge: at the University Press, 1970).

translator, is dedicated to the thesis "that, even at its most abstract, logic demands an underlying theory of experience" and which traces the "genealogy of logic" from pre-predicative conditions over structures of predicative judgment to the level of conceptual thought and valid knowledge.[18]

The dimension of the life-world and pre-predicative existence became the focus of exploration in Heidegger's interpretive or hermeneutical phenomenology. As he forcefully argued in *Being and Time*, human consciousness and cognition presuppose the factuality of man's being-in-the-world, his involvement in a prereflective matrix of experience. As a living context, "world" in Heidegger's usage referred neither to an external environment nor to a subjective construction, but rather to an intersubjective fabric of relationships (*Bewandtnisganzheit*) pregnant with latent meanings and connotations. Even prior to investigation, man encounters objects and events as significant in a dimly perceived sense and thus as implicitly interpreted and understood. Conscious thought raises the structure of pre-understanding to the level of an explicit and articulate interpretation; in doing so, thinking moves in the so-called "hermeneutical circle" in the sense that every exegesis draws upon (without being rigidly confined by) the implicit pre-understanding of the life-world.[19] Merleau-Ponty pursued and elaborated on the implications of Heidegger's "being-in-the-world"—without forgetting Husserl's plea for lucidity and rational scrutiny. He was centrally preoccupied with the infrastructure of human knowledge, especially with the prereflective, perceptual nexus between man and the world. As he tried to show in the *Phenomenology of Perception*, "the perceived world is the always presupposed foundation of all rationality, all value and all existence." The relationship between thought and experience, he insisted, was not one between a detached intellect or thinking substance and an opaque environment but rather one between a primary web of latent meanings and a derivative effort of clarification. Scientific rationality, in particular, was not a self-contained universe of propositions; rather science was "built upon the world as directly experienced" and any effort to grasp its presuppositions must begin "by reawakening the basic experience of the world of which science is the second-order expression." The chief task of phenomenology, from this perspective, was to promote such reawakening: "To return to things themselves is to return to that world which precedes knowledge, of which knowledge always *speaks*, and in relation to which every scientific schematization is an abstract and derivative sign-language, as is geography in relation to the countryside in which we have learned beforehand what a forest, a prairie or a river is."

As in Heidegger's case, Merleau-Ponty's notion of perceptual experience was equally far removed from private or idiosyncratic feeling and from detached predicative judgment; apart from linking the individual and phenomena, it was the passkey to a world of intersubjective understanding and reciprocal correction: "The thing imposes itself not as true for every intellect, but as real for every subject who is standing where I am." In addition to eluding the subject-object dilemma, moreover, perception militated against other customary dichotomies. The perceived world was neither derived from the synthetic acts of a transcendental consciousness, nor was it a set of empirical data, since their significance was never fully exhausted: "Thus there is a paradox of immanence and transcendence in perception. Immanence, because the perceived object cannot be foreign to him who perceives; transcendence, because it always contains something more than what is actually given." While stressing the primacy of perception, Merleau-Ponty was unwilling to renounce the task of reflection and analytical scrutiny. He readily admitted that "we cannot rest satisfied with the description of the perceived world" and that "it appears as a psychological curiosity if we leave aside the idea of the true world, the world as thought by the understanding." As an attentive student of Husserl's opus, Merleau-Ponty fully appreciated the importance of "bracketing" and of the temporary suspension of familiar involvements; the aim of such suspension in his view, however, was not to sanction retreat into an ivory tower but to bring everyday life into fuller view and to rekindle amazement and "wonder" in the face of the world: "Reflection does not withdraw from the world towards the unity of consciousness as the world's basis; it steps back to watch the forms of transcendence fly up like sparks from a fire." Bracketing and experience thus were intimately linked; far from contradicting Heidegger's "being-in-the-world," Husserl's procedures were destined "to bring back all the living relationships of experience, as the fisherman's net draws up from the depths of the ocean quivering fish and seaweed." The movement from perception to valid cognition, against this background, was not so much a straight or linear progression, but a complex process of clarification in which experience "gradually rectifies itself and proceeds by dialogue

[18] See Edmund Husserl, *Experience and Judgment: Investigations in a Genealogy of Logic*, ed. Ludwig Landgrebe, trans. James S. Churchill and Karl Ameriks (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), pp. xxi–xxii ("Translator's Introduction").

[19] Compare Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962); also *On Time and Being*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, 1972).

with itself and with others"—a dialogue which is not aimless chatter but enveloped by a common horizon of truth.[20] In his posthumously published work, Merleau-Ponty expanded the range of reflective scrutiny by delving into the unconscious and submerged layers of experience—but without rupturing the linkage between inquiry and the world which (we are told) "exists in the interrogative mode."[21]

On the Marxist side, questions relating to knowledge and cognition had long been neglected; or rather, they were widely presumed to have been conclusively settled. At least since Lenin's *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, a realist correspondence theory of truth—according to which the function of the mind is to mirror reality—was accepted as official doctrine; with the accumulation of empirical evidence, the adopted realist stance was expected to be raised to the level of positive scientific knowledge. Lenin's realism and incipient positivism, however, were never uniformly endorsed in the Marxist movement. The legacy of the Hegelian dialectic was bound to have an unsettling effect on the notion of a static correspondence; even among Hegelians, however, cognition was treated as a secondary issue—an issue overburdened with connotations of a Kantian "pure synthesis" of perception. Critical neo-Marxism, intent on clarifying its premises, thus was confronted with the task of re-examining the epistemological domain and of formulating a new approach to the problem of knowledge. Recent publications by Frankfurt theorists and cognate thinkers testify to the scope and intensity of this endeavor. Karl-Otto Apel's early writings were animated by the effort to uncover the complex underpinning of cognition, an effort strongly influenced by existential phenomenology. Drawing on the insights of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, Apel argued that every type of cognitive inquiry presupposes a prereflective matrix of ongoing practices and relationships, a "bodily involvement" (*Technognomie*) of the researcher in some dimension of the life-world. Bodily involvement in his treatment, it is true, was not presented as sufficient condition for valid judgments; knowledge, he granted, depended also on a temporary reflective suspension of everyday practices. His later writings, broadly speaking, pursue the exploration of experience and reflection in the direction of a critical or "transcendental" hermeneutics in which truth is assumed to emerge from the universal discourse of mankind conceived as community of investigators.[22]

Among Frankfurt theorists, the most comprehensive and penetrating scrutiny of the epistemological domain has been undertaken by Jürgen Habermas, especially in his study *Knowledge and Human Interests*. While substituting the term "interest"—prominent in the Marxist tradition—for the broader notions of experience or perception, the study in its basic thrust paralleled phenomenological investigations by concentrating on the prereflective premises of human cognition. As Habermas tried to show, epistemology on a grand scale had last been practiced by Kant in his critiques of human understanding; but the framework of cognition had in this case been lodged in the categories of an abstract and invariant consciousness. While maintaining the ambition of universal knowledge, both Hegel and Marx ultimately eroded reflection on the genesis of cognition—the former by identifying spirit and nature, the latter by submerging thought in human self-production through labor. Under the impact of Comte and his positivist followers, finally, cognition was stripped of its philosophical and experiential parameters, a development which led to the triumph of scientific methodology. The later part of the nineteenth century witnessed an assault on the positivist paradigm along two major lines: in Peirce's notion of a "community of investigators" as the pragmatic context of scientific inquiry and in Dilthey's reliance on the socio-cultural lifeworld for purposes of historical exegesis. Moving beyond these beachheads, *Knowledge and Human Interests* postulated that knowledge claims of any type had to be traced to an underlying experiential matrix, to the level of basic cognitive competences or "interests." These competences, in Habermas's view, denote neither pure transcendental categories nor mere empirical impulses or instincts. "Cognitive interests," he observed, "mediate the natural genesis of mankind with the logic of its cultural learning process" and are "not meant to reduce this process to a naturalistic dimension." As he added, the linkage between knowledge and interest was ordinarily complicated and indirect; only in the recesses of self-reflection was thought able to penetrate and merge with its experiential basis.[23]

[20] See Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, pp. viii–ix, xiii, xv; also "The Primacy of Perception and Its Philosophical Consequences," in *The Primacy of Perception and Other Essays*, pp. 13, 16–17, 19, 21.

[21] See Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, ed. Claude Lefort, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968), p. 103.

[22] Compare Karl-Otto Apel, "Technognomie: Eine erkenntnis-anthropologische Kategorie," in *Konkete Vernunft: Festschrift für Erich Rothacker* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1958), pp. 61–78; "Sprache und Wahrheit in der gegenwärtigen Situation der Philosophie," *Philosophische Rundschau*, 7 (Fall 1959), 161–184; and "Einleitung: Transformation der Philosophie," in *Transformation der Philosophie* (Frankfurt-Main: Suhrkamp, 1973), vol. I, pp. 9–76.

[23] Compare Jürgen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press,

Since its first publication, Habermas's study has been the target of numerous critical assessments and reviews. Central among objections raised were complaints about the hazy and ill-defined character of "cognitive interests" and about the stipulated nexus between such interests and the pursuit of knowledge. In some of his subsequent writings, Habermas responded to the arguments of his critics and, in doing so, reformulated and partially revised his outlook. The central thrust of the reformulation pointed in the direction of a certain loosening of the linkage between cognition and prereflective interest, between the validity of knowledge claims, on the one hand, and the genesis as well as application of knowledge, on the other. The loosening was effected chiefly through the introduction of the notion of "discourse" and its differentiation from everyday practice or experience. In Habermas's definition, discourses are efforts to provide reasons or justifications for knowledge claims. While in everyday experience cognitive assertions or intersubjective norms tend to be naively accepted or taken for granted, discursive exchanges involve a temporary suspension of belief in the interest of thorough investigation and interrogation. As he noted, discourses of this type are roughly comparable to the phenomenological procedure of bracketing, especially to the "reduction" of existence to potentiality: "To speak as Husserl does, in discourse we bracket the general thesis" (of reality). To be sure, while Husserl's procedure was performed by a transcendental consciousness, Habermas's approach involved intersubjective communication and a reciprocal testing of propositions.[24]

Knowledge and Human Interests, together with subsequent elaborations, made a contribution not only to contemporary epistemological discussions in general, but also to a clarification of the character and status of social and political inquiry. Drawing at least in part on past distinctions between cognitive pursuits—especially between natural sciences and *Geisteswissenschaften*—the study differentiated among three main types of knowledge: strict empirical science; historical and hermeneutical inquiry; and "critically oriented" social and political investigation.[25] These types were all held in some manner to be animated by and linked with underlying experiential dispositions or interests. The methodology of empirical science revolved around the formulation of hypothetical propostions connecting observable phenomena, propositions which, following empirical experimentation or testing, serve to support law-like theorems endowed with explanatory and predictive capacity. Contrary to the intimations of positivism, however, the parameters of the empirical model were not themselves derived from observation nor from purely logical deduction; rather, they were anchored in the pragmatic context of the success and failure of experimental or instrumental operations. For this reason it seemed plausible to argue that empirical analysis approaches reality from an instrumental perspective, a perspective guided by an interest in the "technical control over objectified processes." Hermeneutical inquiry, on the other hand, aimed at the understanding of meaning rather than empirical observation and explanation; the testing of law-like theorems was replaced by the interpretation of symbols or texts. Paralleling the positivist misrepresentation of empirical methodology, historicism had misconstrued hermeneutical study in an objectivist direction, by reducing the records of human history to relics in a "*musée imaginaire*." As Habermas insisted, however, hermeneutical understanding always presupposed the interpreter's perspective; interpretation implied a merger of horizons, an effort to grasp the meaning of the past by relating and applying it to the interpreter's situation. As a result it was possible to affirm that hermeneutics is guided by a practical interest: the interest in the maintenance and expansion of the domain of intersubjective communication and understanding.

With regard to social and political inquiry, Habermas admitted a certain disarray and proliferation of contemporary orientations and methodological preferences. To some extent, present-day social research emulates the empiricist paradigm as it has been developed primarily by the natural sciences; by embracing the "nomological" model, behavioral social and political studies aim at the explanation, prediction, and potential control of social events. Countering the behavioral strategy, other approaches concentrate on the con-

1971), pp. 196–197; also my "Reason and Emancipation: Notes on Habermas," *Man and World*, 5 (February 1972), 79–109.

[24] On the above, see Habermas, "Introduction: Some Difficulties in the Attempt to Link Theory and Praxis," in *Theory and Practice*, trans. John Viertel (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973; translation of the 4th rev. edition of *Theorie und Praxis* of 1971), esp. p. 19; also my "Critical Theory Criticized: Habermas's *Knowledge and Human Interests* and Its Aftermath," *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, 2 (September 1972), 211–229. More recently, Habermas has formulated a discursive or "consensual" theory of truth, according to which truth and valid knowledge emerge from a universal discourse and exchange of propositions—propositions which are virtually uncontaminated by experiential bias. Compare his "Wahrheitstheorien," in *Wirklichkeit und Reflexion: Festschrift für Walter Schulz* (Stuttgart: Neske Verlag, 1973), pp. 211–265.

[25] For a historical sketch of past distinctions between types of knowledge (including the dichotomy between natural sciences and *Geisteswissenschaften*) and their relationship to political inquiry compare my "Political Science and the 'Two Cultures,'" *Journal of General Education*, 19 (January 1968), 269–295.

crete understanding of social experience, on the interpretive exegesis of past or present symbolic communications.[26] By and large, the mentioned avenues of research do not transcend the prevailing models of science and hermeneutics; according to Habermas, a novel and unique paradigm can be found, however, in the case of "critical" social and political analysis. Proceeding from the distinction between invariant laws of nature and in principle changeable social constraints, such analysis has as its goal the unmasking and dismantling of ideologically camouflaged social manipulation and political oppression. In pursuing this aim, the "critique of ideology" is able to combine and reconcile explanation and understanding: once accepted and assimilated by the victim of domination, explanations of law-like social conditions can engender a process of reflection which, in turn, can lead to greater self-awareness and a liberation from spurious or unintelligible constraints. The paradigmatic model employed by critical inquiry is that of Freudian psychoanalysis. Moving beyond the domain of purposive and communicative interaction, Freud's "depth hermeneutics" was concerned with the decoding not only of intended but of systematically distorted or repressed meaning patterns. For this reason, causal explanation was intimately linked with interpretation: the analysis of pathological symptoms served the therapeutic goal of deepened self-understanding and the recovery of personal identity. Transposed to the social arena, psychoanalysis offers guidelines for critical social and political investigations, to the extent that explanatory propositions seek to rescue social discourse from suppression and corruption. The experiential framework for such investigations is the human capacity for self-reflection, a capacity which, because of its recuperative effect, can be said to be permeated by an emancipatory interest.[27]

Apart from the legacy of the *arbor scientiae* and traditional classifications of branches of knowledge, Habermas's typology of modes of inquiry can find support in past and present philosophical teachings, both inside and outside the Marxist camp.[28] In a preparatory essay to his epistemological study, Habermas listed as precedent Hegel's lectures during the Jena period in which, contrary to Kant's a priori reasoning, knowledge was presented as result of a complex learning process revolving around man's interchange both with his environment and his fellow-men. As Hegel specified at the time, this learning process occurred on various levels and comprised distinct patterns of mediations: especially the patterns of language, work, and communicative interaction. While work, abetted by instruments and utensils, channeled man's involvement with his environment in the direction of technical control, communicative interaction centered on the struggle for mutual recognition and on the disruption and restoration of moral bonds; language, finally, provided the general symbolic mediation between reflection and experience. Habermas in the same context also pointed to Marx's distinction between "forces" and "relationships" of production, between work and the social organization of the productive process; as he noted, however, social interaction in orthodox Marxism has tended to be subordinated to instrumental labor, a subordination inviting a positivist interpretation of human praxis.[29] More intimate and suggestive parallels can be detected in contemporary philosophy and especially in existential phenomenology. In delineating the basic experiential categories of the human condition, Heidegger's *Being and Time* sketched a "triad of care" comprising the different modes of man's involvement in the life-world: concern for workday things and practical designs; solicitude for others; and care for the self in its quest to be free from deception and unintelligible restraints. Adopting a somewhat more condensed formula, Paul Ricoeur in *History and Truth* concentrated on the dialectic between "work" and the "word," on the nexus between "saying and doing, signifying and making." It is the task of the humanities, he observed, "to compensate for the adaptation of man as worker to finite tasks by the interrogation of critical man upon his human condition in its entirety and by the chant of poetic man."[30]

Ricoeur's formula, to a large extent, is reminiscent of Merleau-Ponty's arguments regarding the

[26] Compare, e.g., Alfred Schutz, *The Phenomenology of the Social World*, trans. George Walsh and Frederick Lehnert (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967); Harold Garfinkel, *Studies in Ethnomethodology* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1967); Herbert Blumer, *Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1969); John B. O'Malley, *Sociology of Meaning* (London: Human Context Books, 1972); Maurice Natanson, ed., *Phenomenology and the Social Sciences*, two vols. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973). For a critical review of divergent approaches to social inquiry see Jürgen Habermas, *Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften: Materialien* (Frankfurt-Main: Suhrkamp, 1970).

[27] The above presentation relies both on Jürgen Habermas's *Knowledge and Human Interests* and on the lecture of 1965 with the same title which is reproduced in the Appendix, pp. 301–317.

[28] For an argument closely akin to Habermas's typology see Apel, "Szientifik, Hermeneutik, Ideologie-Kritik: Entwurf einer Wissenschaftslehre in erkenntnis-anthropologischer Sicht," *Man and World*, 1 (February 1968), 37–63.

[29] See Habermas, "Labor and Interaction: Remarks on Hegel's Jena *Philosophy of Mind*," in *Theory and Practice*, pp. 142–169.

[30] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, Sections 41–42; Ricoeur, *History and Truth*, pp. 4–5, 213. For the reference to Heidegger I am indebted to Theodore Kisiel's essay "Habermas' Purge of Pure Theory: Critical Theory without Ontology?" (forthcoming).

relationship between philosophical, and especially hermeneutical, inquiry and exact empirical science. Strict science, he wrote in "The Philosopher and Sociology," designates "the effort to construct ideal variables which objectify and schematize" the lessons of experience, while philosophy refers to reflective awareness "of the open and successive community of *alter egos* living, speaking, and thinking in one another's presence and in relation to nature." Husserl's great merit, in Merleau-Ponty's view, was "to mark out a realm and an attitude of inquiry where philosophy and effective knowledge could meet." Despite his insistence on the "rigorous distinction" between the two cognitive dimensions, his investigations of the life-world and especially his notion of a "psycho-phenomenological parallelism" led him in the end "to the idea of *reciprocal envelopment*." In application to social inquiry, the problem was how social life "can be both a 'thing' to be acquainted with without prejudices, and a 'signification' which the societies we acquaint ourselves with only provide an occasion for—how, that is, the social can exist both in itself and in us." Sociology, Merleau-Ponty insisted, could not restrict itself to a "mere recording of facts" devoid of interpretation and a concern for the meaning of data: "If objectivism or scientism were ever to succeed in depriving sociology of all recourse to significations, it would save it from 'philosophy' only by shutting it off from knowledge of its object." Conversely, hermeneutical interpretation could not sever its ties with empirical knowledge without deteriorating into empty speculation: "The philosopher thinks about his experience and his world. Except by decree, how could he be given the right to forget what science says about this same experience and world?"[31]

Apart from juxtaposing and correlating the perspectives of empirical science and interpretive understanding, Merleau-Ponty during the later years of his life came to appreciate increasingly the significance of Freudian psychoanalysis as a key for decoding human experience. The Freudian approach, in his view, diverged both from positivistic scientism and from a hermeneutical phenomenology limited to the level of conscious intentionality. In an essay published shortly before his death, Merleau-Ponty strongly endorsed the endeavors of those who "separate psychoanalysis from a scientistic or objectivistic ideology, who consider the Freudian unconscious as an archaic or primordial consciousness, the repressed as a zone of experience that we have not integrated." Phenomenology and psychoanalysis, he noted, were linked by close bonds of affinity—provided the thrust of phenomenology was broadened beyond the range of a simple "philosophy of consciousness." Given such a broadened conception, the basic terms of phenomenological inquiry were altered. Although consciousness was always "consciousness of something or of the world," this something or this world could no longer be treated as "an object that is what it is, exactly adjusted to acts of consciousness"; rather, consciousness emerged now as the "soul of Heraclitus" and "Being which is around it rather than in front of it" as "a Being of dreams, by definition hidden." Only by descending "into its own substratum" could phenomenology be reconciled with the Freudian enterprise. By contrast, a "phenomenological idealism" narrowly clinging to subjective intentionality was philosophically "insufficient" and a direct "threat to the Freudian heritage." Psychoanalysis, from this vantage point, appeared as a remedy both to the pretensions of reflective thought and to the arid myopia of empiricism; by delving into the realm of unconscious or preconscious experience, it successfully bypassed "idealist" as well as "objectivist" deviations—and perhaps the two dangers "are not so opposed at that."[32]

As in the case of Habermas, Freudian analysis in Merleau-Ponty's treatment combined the virtues of scientific knowledge and therapeutic insight; one should note, however, some differences of accent. As presented by Merleau-Ponty, depth psychology constituted a genuine synthesis rather than an amalgam of elements; knowledge and hermeneutical exegesis were able to blend because both perspectives were conceived from the beginning as congenial and mutually complementary. More importantly—and partly as a result of this convergence—psychoanalysis furnished not only critical weapons for combatting individual or social ills, but also an arsenal of coded or cryptic guideposts to recovery; viewed as an "archeology" of human experience, Freudian therapy emancipates from present constraints by uncovering submerged memories of the past. In all these respects, Merleau-Ponty's arguments are corroborated by Paul Ricoeur. In several of his writings, Ricoeur has insisted on the close linkage and complementarity between scientific explanation and hermeneutical interpretation. Science and exegesis, he has noted at one point, can no longer be rigidly separated as in Dilthey's time: "If understanding

[31] Merleau-Ponty, "The Philosopher and Sociology," in *Signs*, trans. Richard C. McCleary (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), pp. 99, 101–102, 110. As he added (p. 98): "We need neither tear down the behavorial sciences to lay the foundations of philosophy, nor tear down philosophy to lay the foundations of behavorial sciences. Every science secretes an ontology; every ontology anticipates a body of knowledge."

[32] Merleau-Ponty, "Phenomenology and Psychoanalysis: Preface to Hesnard's L'Oeuvre de Freud," in *The Essential Writings of Merleau Ponty*, ed. Alden I. Fisher (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1969), pp. 81, 84–86.

passes through explanation, explanation is completed in understanding." With regard to psychoanalysis, his *Essay on Interpretation* placed Freud's approach at the crossroads of two kinds of inquiry: a "hermeneutics of suspicion" concerned with the unmasking of systematic distortions and mystifications, and a "hermeneutics of reminiscence" aiming at the recovery of latent meanings and aspirations.[33]

Ethics and Political Life

In addition to elucidating cognitive endeavors and the acquisition of knowledge in various domains, critical thought also contributes to a clarification of normative issues and to the reintegration of such issues into contemporary politics. Probably, this contribution is paramount—given the prevailing disarray of individual and social norms and the enormous discrepancy between the wealth of empirical information and the lack or dearth of purposive benchmarks. While science and technology today provide the potential for global destruction, the criteria of individual or social choice have become cryptic or confused. To a considerable extent, this dilemma is the outgrowth of the positivist fact/value dichotomy and the concomitant devaluation of normative-practical considerations in favor of empirical knowledge. According to the ethical or metaethical teachings of positivism and logical empiricism, normative standards—unless expressly equated with statements about empirical conditions or dispositions—are outside the pale of rational or intelligible argument. While "cognitivists" tend to view moral preferences as informative assertions about the world or factual states of affairs, "noncognitivists" treat the same preferences as emotive effusions or arbitrary commands. The difference between cognitive positivists and realists in this domain is chiefly one of emphasis and limited to the meaning of cognitivism—especially to the question whether normative yardsticks are subject to empirical verification or reflect intuited layers of reality. In the assessment of one observer, the positivist fact/value dichotomy has deeply permeated contemporary social and behavioral science, with noncognitivism constituting "the assumption underlying most modern writings dealing with empirical research" and also "the dominant view among political theorists" in our time.[34]

Actually, the present situation is considerably more fluid and complex than the preceding portrayal would indicate. During recent decades, philosophical trends in a variety of contexts have pointed toward a revival of moral argument even in the absence of cognitive premises; by means of a careful and critical scrutiny of normative statements, philosophers of different persuasions have progressively uncovered the distinctive and autonomous status of moral discourse vis-à-vis empirical propostions. The trend has been particularly prominent within the domain of analytical philosophy or linguistic analysis. Relying on Wittgenstein's delineation of "language games" as social life-forms, "ordinary language" theorists in recent times have probed the multi-faceted meanings and connotations of moral terms in everyday interactions or communicative exchanges.[35] Although emerging from a vastly different background, similar developments can be detected in Continental European thought. In the context of phenomenological inquiry, the cognitive intuition of objective (or absolute) values has increasingly given way to hermeneutical explorations of the meaning patterns of the "life-world" and of the moral implications of everyday practices. Despite its advance beyond positivist constraints (especially the cognitivism-noncognitivism bifurcation), however, the sketched reorientation has not removed all ethical or metaethical quandaries. In the writings of analysts as well as phenomenologists, ambiguity persists regarding the justification or validity of normative standards. According to many language theorists and some phenomenologists, the task of ethical reflection is simply to provide a descriptive account of ongoing language games or community practices, including the conventions of moral argument. The result has been a perspective—which might be labeled linguistic or phenomenological "descriptivism"—in which ethics and habit, moral conviction and prejudice tend to be precariously fused. Coupled with other defects, this danger has quickly aroused the protest of dissenters who view moral judgment as the outgrowth of free choice—a choice inspired by general imperatives prescribing yardsticks for human conduct. Unfortunately, as presented by most "prescriptivists," the binding character of postulated rules remains in doubt—especially if

---

[33] Compare Ricoeur, "Ethics and Culture: Habermas and Gadamer in Dialogue," *Philosophy Today*, 17 (Summer 1973), 163; also "The Model of the Text: Meaningful Action Considered as a Text," *Social Research*, 38 (Autumn 1971), 529–562, and *Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970).

[34] Felix E. Oppenheim *Moral Principles in Political Philosophy* (New York: Random House, 1968), p. 166. The above comments are not meant to belittle the difference between noncognitivism and realism, but merely to suggest similarities between positivists and realists in respect to cognitivism. Compare, e.g., Bruce E. Wright, "A Cognitivist Program for Normative Political Theory," *Journal of Politics*, 36 (August 1974), 675–686.

[35] Compare, e.g., Stephen E. Toulmin, *An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics* (Cambridge: at the University Press, 1950); also Paul Edwards, *The Logic of Moral Discourse* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1955).

the selection of rules is itself predicated on arbitrary preference.[36]

Quandaries of this kind throw into relief recent initiatives by members of the Frankfurt School in the domain of ethical and metaethical theory. The notion that descriptive and prescriptive elements somehow need to be joined in ethical argument has for some time been recognized (albeit dimly) by philosophical pioneers in our century, including critical Marxists; in a sense, the entire history of ethics (at least in Western thought) seems to revolve around the tensions and shifting accommodations between the two elements.[37] Implicitly, a philosophical reconciliation was suggested or foreshadowed in Merleau-Ponty's writings. Turning against the pretensions of a naturalistic or teleological cognitivism, Merleau-Ponty in the "Battle over Existentialism" denounced the view that men "like things" are "nothing but a nature heading toward its perfection." As he insisted, ethics was inconceivable without the premise of free choice: "If I can say yes or no to my destiny, then the Good is not my good unless I agree to it." Freedom of choice, however, was not synonymous with arbitrary preference or private whim, and the conception of norms could not be divorced from the broad patterns of human experience. "If we admit," he noted in a different context, "that our life is inherent to the perceived world and the human world, even while it recreates it and contributes to its making, then morality cannot consist in the private adherence to a system of values."[38]

A similar thrust, although formulated progressively in a more elaborate and complex manner, can be found in Habermas's thought. From the time of his earliest publications, Habermas viewed social interaction or the "public domain" as an arena of practical-moral argument devoted to the clarification of common purposes—an arena whose steady erosion and decay he deplored. In *Theory and Practice* he denounced both cognitivist and noncognitivist doctrines as inimical to moral discourse. The cognitivist fallacy, he observed, was represented in our time especially by scientism with its bent to deduce policies or goals of action from empirical analysis; noncognitivism, on the other hand, tended to abandon rational judgment in favor of blind, emotive decisions or commitments.[39] In his subsequent writings, Habermas couched his arguments increasingly in terms of contemporary language philosophy and linguistics. Regarding ordinary language analysis and hermeneutics, his attitude on the whole has tended to betray a mixture of approval and criticism: while agreeing that ordinary language and everyday experience provide the basic parameters for human endeavors in all fields, Habermas has resisted the lure of a linguistic or hermeneutical descriptivism. This stance has significant implications for the formulation of a critical ethics or metaethics. Although grounded in ongoing interactions and meaning patterns, moral discourse and the justification of norms—in his view—cannot be grasped adequately either through the descriptive portrayal of prevailing practices or through the stipulation of abstract, prescriptive rules; rather, their understanding requires an effort to reconstruct and explicate in a critical manner the normative standards implicit in intersubjective communicative encounters.

Habermas's posture toward ordinary language theory and hermeneutics was delineated succinctly in an essay exploring the presumed "supremacy" or universal application of interpretive understanding. As he acknowledged, contemporary "philosophical hermeneutics" (especially as articulated by Hans-Georg Gadamer) has persuasively demonstrated the nexus of language and thought and the intimate linkage between interpretive understanding and human experience in its diverse forms. The interpretive thrust, he added, played a particularly important role in our age dominated by science and technology: by revealing the communicative underpinnings of scientific research and by fostering the reintegration of technological discoveries into everyday communication. While endorsing these features, however, Habermas was weary of the presumed self-sufficiency of understanding—the tendency to treat ordinary speech as the unassailable canon of philosophy. Elevated to a position of supremacy, hermeneutics was in danger of obfuscating the distinction between opinion and reason or between valid judgment and prejudice. Several strategies, he argued, were available for debunking this pretense; the discussed essay focused on a limitation arising within the arena of intersubjective encounters: the issue of systematically distorted or corrupted communication. Present to a greater or lesser extent in most

[36] Compare, e.g., Richard M. Hare, *The Language of Morals* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952) and *Freedom and Reason* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963); also Hans Albert, "Ethik und Metaethik," in Albert and Ernst Topitsch, eds., *Werturteilsstreit* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1971), pp. 472–516. For a critical comparison of descriptivism and prescriptivism see esp. William D. Hudson, *Modern Moral Philosophy* (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1970).

[37] To some extent, Aristotle and Kant may be said to typify the descriptive and prescriptive legacies in Western thought—provided that descriptivism is defined as an outlook tying norms to preponderant inclinations (happiness), and prescriptivism as a doctrine stressing duty and the adherence to universal imperatives.

[38] Merleau Ponty, "The Battle over Existentialism," in *Sense and Non-Sense*, pp. 75–77; "The Primacy of Perception," in *The Primacy of Perception and Other Essays*) p. 25.

[39] Habermas, *Theory and Practice*, pp. 253–282.

social interactions, distortions or breakdowns of communication could not be disentangled through simple exegesis but required the diagnostic and therapeutic procedures of depth psychology. In trying to decode corrupted meaning patterns and to unlock the secret of repressed layers of experience, psychoanalysis relied on insights exceeding ordinary speech, while at the same time postulating the possibility of uncorrupted and nonrepressive communicative interaction. "A critically informed hermeneutics which differentiates between insight and deception," Habermas noted, "incorporates into its perspective the findings of depth psychology regarding the factors entailing systematically distorted communication. Such an outlook ties understanding to the principle of rational discourse according to which truth is guaranteed only by a consensus arrived at and maintained under the idealized conditions of unlimited and nonrepressive communication." The stipulated standard, moreover, was not merely of theoretical but also of practical significance owing to the close interdependence between undistorted communication and a nonrepressive life context: "In this sense, critical understanding implies an anticipatory vision of the good life."[40]

The notion of nonrepressive communication as a standard of social interaction was developed at greater length in other essays, from a vantage point inspired chiefly by recent trends in linguistics. Relying on Noam Chomsky's concept of "linguistic competence"—and subsidiarily on the notion of "speech acts" delineated by John Austin and John Searle—Habermas formulated a theory of "communicative competence," a theory designed to reconstruct the basic rules governing speech situations and enabling individuals to participate in communicative encounters. The purpose of the argument, however, was not simply to modify and expand Chomsky's monological perspective in the direction of social dialogue; the aim was also to disclose a normative thrust in such dialogue. According to Habermas, all speech acts and communicative exchanges are geared toward mutual understanding and agreement and, ultimately, toward a standard of justifiable conduct. Ordinary language, in other words, is permated by the anticipation of reciprocal consensus, a consensus achievable on the level of nonrepressive discourse or "ideal speech." Equally applicable to the validation of propositions and the justification of norms, the anticipatory thrust cannot be questioned or rejected—since such questioning involves the same anticipation of consensus. As Habermas added, the mentioned yardstick is neither prescriptively postulated nor derived from empirical observation and description; rather, embedded in the very core of communication, its tenets need to be carefully explicated and reconstructed. Given the prevalence of distorted or mangled communication patterns, to be sure, actual practice regularly falls short of the norm of ideal speech; yet, because of the consensual thrust, ordinary encounters always proceed on the implicit (though normally counterfactual) presumption that the norm is operative and observed. The distance between actual and projected patterns, in Habermas's view, involves not so much a logical conflict as a practical challenge and political task: from this challenge, "the critical theory of society takes its departure."[41]

Habermas's efforts to articulate a critical ethics and metaethics find a close parallel in Apel's writings, especially his essay "The Apriori of Communication and the Foundation of Ethics." Under the impact of positivism—Apel argued in that essay—contemporary ethical thought had bifurcated into two equally untenable positions: cognitive scientism or dogmatism and noncognitive relativism, with the former submerging moral choice in empirical demonstrations and the latter reducing it to private whim. In trying to overcome the pitfalls of the positivist paradigm, the paper discussed and assessed two major strategies or lines of argument: the strategies of linguistic and phenomenological descriptivism and of critical reconstruction. As Apel indicated, descriptivism was valuable for many reasons, in particular for challenging the positivist fact/value dichotomy and the rigid segregation of normative from empirical statements. In the view of both hermeneut-

[40] Habermas, "Der Universalitätsanspruch der Hermeneutik," in Karl-Otto Apel et al., *Hermeneutik und Ideologiekritik* (Frankfurt-Main: Suhrkamp, 1971), p. 154. An English version of the middle section of the essay (with slight alterations) appeared under the title "On Systematically Distorted Communication" in *Inquiry*, 13 (Autumn 1970), 205–218, and as first part of a longer essay entitled "Toward a Theory of Communicative Competence" in Hans P. Dreitzel, *Recent Sociology No. 2: Patterns of Communicative Behavior* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1970), pp. 115–130. Compare also Paul Ricoeur, "Ethics and Culture: Habermas and Gadamer in Dialogue," and Theodore Kisiel, "Ideology Critique and Phenomenology," *Philosophy Today*, 14 (Summer 1970), 151–160.

[41] Habermas, "Vorbereitende Bemerkungen zu einer Theorie der kommunikativen Kompetenz," in Habermas and Niklas Luhmann, *Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie—Was leistet die Systemforschung?* (Frankfurt-Main: Suhrkamp, 1971), p. 141. A preliminary draft of the essay in English appeared under the title "Toward a Theory of Communicative Competence" in *Inquiry*, 13 (Winter 1970), 360–375, and as the second part of the essay "Toward a Theory of Communicative Competence" in Dreitzel, *Recent Sociology No. 2*, pp. 130–148. Compare also Thomas A. McCarthy, "A Theory of Communicative Competence," *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, 3 (June 1973), 135–156; and for a further development of Habermas's ethical and metaethical views the third chapter in his *Legitimation Crisis*, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975), pp. 95–143.

ics and ordinary language theory, normative preferences form an intrinsic part of the life-world of everyday experience and communication. This outlook, he added, reflects an important philosophical premise or insight: that of the "apriori of communication" or of the embeddedness of all thought in intersubjective language and discourse. While opposed to "monological" types of analysis, the premise buttresses the significance of interpretive understanding in human inquiry. Despite these and other advantages, however, Apel noted several deficiencies of the sketched approach. Descriptivism, first of all, has difficulty in grasping the impact of extralinguistic factors—such as technology or power—on the human life-world. More importantly, a descriptive account of language and meaning patterns tends to contract or shortcircuit the justification of norms, transforming moral judgment into a synonym for habit. To counteract self-enclosure, discourse thus has to be viewed as an open-ended, "quasi-transcendental" matrix of thought, amenable to critical evaluation. Ordinary language, the essay noted, "is insurmountable only in the sense that it constitutes the vehicle—the only available vehicle—for anticipating and implementing the normative goal of consensus."

While also relying on everyday discourse and experience, critical reconstruction preserves the open horizon of language. According to Apel, action or purposive endeavor is always enmeshed in an intersubjective and morally significant fabric of meaning—an involvement which is not a matter of private choice or preference. Thinking and intelligibly choosing, he emphasized, are impossible apart from the matrix of communication; every moral decision purporting to be intelligible, therefore, testifies to an underlying framework of mutual understanding and to an implicit intent of reciprocal justification (a process requiring "recognition of participants as equal partners in the discussion"). Intersubjective validation of norms from this perspective constitutes not merely a heuristic assumption, but rather a prereflective and primordial premise of argument and practical conduct; as long as language is supposed to make sense, "the moral standard implicit in argument can be termed unconditional or categorical." Although focusing on ongoing interaction, the reconstructionist approach does not simply derive moral yardsticks from prevailing social opinions. In contrast to contractual doctrines stressing factual agreement, the consensus uncovered by critical reflection discloses the transcendental parameters of thought and experience—parameters akin to the Kantian "fact of reason." Needless to say, reconstruction or explication of implicit norms does not insure their implementation or observance. Together with Habermas, Apel acknowledged the discrepancy and even antagonism between factual interactions and the ideal demand of justice or reciprocal justification; like the former, he interpreted this divergence as a tension which needs to be faced and sustained in everyday life and in the "unfinished dialectic" of history.[42]

Given the linkage between standards and social life patterns, the outlined ethical perspective has distinct implications for politics and political thought. Heeding the normative significance of ordinary experience, critical theory aims at universal interaction and discourse—politically speaking, at the establishment of a global democracy maintained by autonomous moral agents and committed to intersubjective equity and decency. This goal is not simply an abstract or groundless fantasy, nor is it synonymous with prevailing practices or trends; instead, it may be described as a "concrete utopia": a social and political benchmark combining the need of mankind's effective survival with the broader aspiration of the "good life." In a similar vein, the term "democracy" cannot simply be equated with empirical arrangements or the reign of factual opinion; nor can the term be identified with speculative doctrines or principles.[43] Among phenomenologists, no one has been more eloquent than Merleau-Ponty in denouncing the pretense of a "judicial politics" oblivious of concrete human agonies and concerns. "Whatever one's philosophical or even theological position," he wrote at one point, "a society is not the temple of value-idols that figure on the front of its monuments or in its constitutional scrolls; the value of a society is the value it places upon man's relation to man." From the perspective of a critical phenomenology, politics thus revolves basically around intersubjective experience and around the way people treat each other in everyday life. Political action is seen as embedded in social meaning patterns which are morally relevant but free of ideological obfuscations: "To understand and judge a society, one has to penetrate its basic structure to the human bond upon which it is built; this undoubtedly depends upon legal relations, but also upon

[42] See "Das Apriori der Kommunikationsgemeinschaft und die Grundlagen der Ethik," in Apel, *Transformation der Philosophie*, vol. 2, pp. 358–435. For a more detailed portrayal of Apel's argument compare my "Toward a Critical Reconstruction of Ethics and Politics," *Journal of Politics*, 36 (November 1974), 926–957.

[43] For the contemporary debate about "democracy" compare, e.g., Mustafa Rejai, *Democracy: The Contemporary Theories* (New York: Atherton Press, 1967); and Peter Bachrach, *The Theory of Democratic Elitism: A Critique* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1967). Regarding the notion of a "concrete utopia" compare Ernst Bloch, *Geist der Utopie* (1918; rev. ed. Frankfurt-Main: Suhrkamp, 1964); also "Über die Bedeutung der Utopie" in *Tübinger Einleitung in die Philosophie* (Frankfurt-Main: Suhrkamp, 1963), vol. 1, pp. 124–132.

forms of labor, ways of loving, living, and dying."[44]

In focusing upon the life-world and in opposing mystification, critical theory also remains attentive to the hazards besetting the quest for consensus—especially to the prevailing inequalities of status and power. Actually, given the dialectical nexus of concrete conditions and aspirations, a simple neglect of power and a retreat into private innocence tends to perpetuate existing modes of exploitation. "In advocating nonviolence" under all circumstances, Merleau-Ponty wrote, "one reinforces established violence, or a system of production which makes misery and war inevitable." At the same time however, he was equally aware that "in the return to the play of violence there is the risk of permanent involvement." The central issue of political life, in his view, was that of the relationship between power and equity or between "humanism and terror"; from the vantage point of a critical Marxism, the "essential task" was "to find a violence which recedes with the approach of man's future."[45] In his "Note on Machiavelli," Merleau-Ponty portrayed the Florentine as a critical analyst equally far removed from cynicism and spurious hope—as a thinker who managed to offend "good feelings in politics" while simultaneously unmasking the strategies of the powerful. In exposing the sinews of political conflict and removing ideological camouflages, Machiavelli did not simply glorify force or oppression, but rather made "a contribution to political clarity"; at the same time, without false rhetoric or bigotry, he "formulated some of the conditions of any serious humanism." His originality resided in the fact that "having laid down the source of struggle," he went beyond it "without ever forgetting it" and that he discovered in conflict the seeds of mutual recognition: "By putting conflict and struggle at the origins of social power, he did not mean to say that agreement was impossible; he meant to underline the condition for a power which does not mystify, that is, participation in a common situation."[46]

Far from being tailored to the narrow issue of power politics, Merleau-Ponty's comments link up with his broader concerns and especially with his interpretation of the mentor of Western philosophy: the image of a non-Machiavellian Machiavelli betrays some of the peculiar "limping" qualities characteristic of Socratic inquiry. The present pages have tried to explore these qualities or accents in a variety of contexts—including the contours of the human life-world, the framework of epistemology and political knowledge, and the dilemmas of moral and political life. Patterned after the Socratic mold, critical thought correlates but does not collapse theory and practice: involved in practical experience but aware of its hazards, the perspective shuns both blind activism and the lure of total contemplation (a posture which presupposes a finished universe). In his eulogy of the Socratic philosopher, Merleau-Ponty spoke of "the rebellious gentleness, the pensive engagement, the intangible presence which disquiet those who are with him." As a corollary of the nexus of experience and reflection, critical theory is lodged also at the interstices of knowledge and ignorance, of agnosticism and dogmatic belief. Pledged to the quest for truth and the good life, critical inquiry involves necessarily a reverent and devoted attitude or disposition; despite its theoretical fecundity, skepsis is "only the beginning of an attention, a seriousness, an experience on the basis of which it must be judged." By the same token, precisely in order to continue its search, inquiry has to remain aware of its shortcomings, including the temptations of prejudice and arrogance. For this reason, thinking cannot divest itself of critical doubt—unless the horizons of experience are to be closed off and philosophy is to be transformed into idolatry. The Socratic enterprise, Merleau-Ponty noted, simply "presses to the limit that criticism of false Gods" which the Judeo-Christian tradition had introduced into history. "Yes," he added, "where will one stop the criticism of idols, and where will one ever be able to say the true God actually resides if, as Maritain writes, we pay tribute to false gods 'every time we bow before the world'?"[47]

[44] Merleau-Ponty, *Humanism and Terror*, trans. John O'Neill (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), p. xiv. As he adds: "In refusing to judge liberalism in terms of the ideas it espouses and inscribes in constitutions and in demanding that these ideas be compared with the prevailing relations between men in a liberal state, Marx is not simply speaking in the name of a debatable materialist philosophy—he is providing a formula for the concrete study of society which cannot be refuted by idealist arguments." Compare also Henri Lefebvre, *Everyday Life in the Modern World* (New York: Harper & Row, 1968).

[45] *Humanism and Terror*, p. xviii. As Hwa Yol Jung observes: "In Merleau-Ponty's discussion of Machiavelli and Marxism, it becomes apparent that the political problem is the problem of power and humanity." See his "The Radical Humanization of Politics," p. 243.

[46] Merleau-Ponty, "A Note on Machiavelli," in *Signs*, pp. 211, 215, 223.

[47] *In Praise of Philosophy*, pp. 33, 46–47.

Procedural Norms and Tolerance: A Reassessment *

DAVID G. LAWRENCE
Fordham University

People would stare to know on what slight single observations those laws were inferred which wise men promulgate and which society receives later and writes down as canons.

Emerson

Introduction

Procedural norms have long been considered a major component of political systems, particularly of democratic systems. Yet we really know rather little of these norms or of the role they play in political life; V. O. Key wrote in 1960 that "the procedural context of American public opinion has been little explored,"[1] and little has happened since to expand our knowledge. This paper reports a replication and extension of the few existing studies that have been influential in explanation of American politics but which suffer from both conceptual and empirical problems.

By procedural norms I mean rules governing the way in which political decisions are made; they are not concerned with the content of any decision except one which alters decision-making procedures. Three theoretically significant reasons for concern with procedural norms exist. First, procedural norms are basic to our understanding of what democracy is. Democracy is often defined in purely procedural terms.[2] Many argue that democracy is more than simply a set of procedures;[3] but it is not unreasonable to maintain that even if democracy is *more* than a system of government, it is nevertheless *at least* a system of government.[4]

Second, each of the two theoretically important aspects of procedural norms is central to understanding how political systems actually operate. *Objective* procedural norms are rules which describe how decisions are actually made in a political system; a system's objective procedural norms are a primary determinant of the content of political decisions in that they specify who actually makes decisions, who can try to influence decision makers, what political resources are legitimate, and how resources may be used. *Subjective* procedural norms, on the other hand, are attitudes about the way in which decisions *should* be made: these norms may be a means of evaluating the political behavior of others, a guide to how one should behave politically, a basis for orienting oneself towards both the political system as a whole and the outputs that it produces. Agreement by citizens on subjective procedural norms has been seen by many theorists as essential to political stability and, if the norms involved are democratic, to democracy.[5]

Third, procedural norms are particularly relevant to American politics of the early 1970s because they have themselves become the subject of political controversy. On the one hand, the left, students, and blacks have claimed that the nominal rules of American democracy are being consistently violated in the internal workings of government and political parties, the making of foreign policy, and political control of black communities; on the other hand, the demonstrations and occupied university buildings of the late 'sixties

* This research is based on a larger study conducted by the National Opinion Research Center training fellows, under the direction of Norman H. Nie, in 1971. Training fellows other than myself were Kristi J. Andersen, Barbara Currie, Richard Daft, David Helfant, Wayne L. Hoffman, Sidney Hollander, Jean Jenkins, Marque Miringhoff, and Goldie Shabad. NORC itself provided time on its spring amalgam survey, and both it and the Department of Political Science at The University of Chicago provided money for computer analysis of survey results. Professor Nie, Paul E. Peterson, Marvin Zonis and Sidney Verba provided helpful criticism of an earlier draft of this paper; I, of course, bear sole responsibility for the final product.

[1] V. O. Key, Jr., *Public Opinion and American Democracy* (New York: Knopf, 1961), p. 553.

[2] Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (New York: Harper, 1950), chap. 22, especially pp. 269–70, 242. See also: Robert A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 37–38, 63–89; Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971, Chap. 1; Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs?: Democracy and Power in an American City* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), p. 311; Ernest S. Griffith, John Plamanatz and J. Roland Pennock, "Cultural Prerequisites to a Successfully Functioning Democracy: A Symposium," *American Political Science Review*, 50 (March, 1956), 131–32; Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," *American Political Science Review*, 58 (June, 1964), 363; Jack Dennis, "Support for the Institution of Elections by the Mass Public," *American Political Science Review*, 64 (September, 1970), 819.

[3] See Jack L. Walker, "A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy," *American Political Science Review*, 60 (June, 1966), pp. 285–295; and Peter Bachrach, *The Theory of Democratic Elitism: A Critique* (Boston: Little Brown, 1967). Bachrach, however, in arguing that persecution of Christians, etc., is inherently non-democratic is himself using a procedural definition; see p. 19.

[4] See Plamanetz in "Cultural Prerequisites . . .," p. 115 and Dahl, *Polyarchy*, pp. 1–16.

[5] See Dahl, *Preface*, p. 75–81 or David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York, Knopf, 1964), especially chap. 4.

have aroused others who believe that new forms of political activity approach or exceed the rather vague outer limits of what the American democratic creed considers permissible. The second group assumed particular importance in 1970 with the emergence of what Scammon and Wattenburg call the "Social Issue," a set of attitudes "concerning the more personally frightening aspects of disruptive social change" of which the Vietnam protest movement was a major component.[6] The decision of the Republican party to run its 1970 congressional campaign against protestors is an indication that procedural norms are not the exclusive concern of academic political scientists.

Procedural Norms and Civil Liberties

The Literature on Tolerance. The particular aspect of procedural norms of concern here is that associated with tolerance and civil liberties: the particular norms involved are those pertaining to minority rights, the ways citizens are to be allowed to participate in politics and how non-elites are to influence the behavior of authorities.[7]

Three major studies have dealt with the distribution of democratic or tolerant subjective procedural norms in the United States. Samuel Stouffer investigated the extent of concern with communism among Americans in the McCarthy period of the early 'fifties and how Americans reacted to a perceived Communist threat.[8] He asked both a national cross-sample and 1500 community leaders about extending civil liberties to admitted Communists, suspected Communists, atheists, and socialists. Each respondent was asked whether a book written by such a person should be allowed in the public library and whether a member of each group should be allowed to speak in public, teach at a college or university, or teach at a local high school.[9]

Stouffer found rather low levels of tolerance in the mass public: only 27 per cent of the sample would permit an admitted Communist to speak in public; only 37 per cent would allow an atheist to do so. Nearly one respondent in three would not permit somebody who had merely been accused of being a Communist to speak publicly.

The elite differed little from the cross-section on questions concerning firing a person from a job; on the explicitly political items, however, the elite was considerably more tolerant. Of the cross-sample, 58 per cent would permit a socialist to speak; among the elite, the figure is 84 per cent.[10] The finding is particularly interesting in that some groups represented in the elite sample, such as the DAR and American Legion leaders, would tend to be particularly concerned with the Communist threat.

Based on a Guttman scale of these tolerance items, the population was divided into "more tolerant" and "less tolerant" groups.[11] Although only 31 per cent of the cross-sample is considered more tolerant, 66 per cent of the elite is. Within the cross-sample, tolerance is highly associated with education: among college graduates, 66 per cent were more tolerant and 5 per cent less tolerant; among those with only a grade school education, 16 per cent were more tolerant and 22 per cent less tolerant.

Finally, Stouffer related perceived threat from Communists to tolerance of them. Within both elite and cross-sample, tolerance increases as perceived threat decreases. Although perception of Communist threat is slightly less among the elite than the cross-sample, the difference does not account for differences between the groups in tolerance: 57 per cent of the elite sample which sees a serious Communist threat is classified as more tolerant, compared to only 27 per cent of the cross-sample.[12]

A second study of procedural norms was conducted in Talahassee and Ann Arbor in 1960 by James Prothro and Charles Grigg; in each city they interviewed slightly more than one hundred people.[13] Prothro and Grigg's survey questions were more clearly tests of adherence to political norms than were Stouffer's; they consisted of two parts, the first being five general questions about democratic norms—one about democracy itself and two each about majority rule and minority rights. Because, however, "democratic ideas and rules of the game are ordinarily encountered not in pure form or in isolation but in substantive con-

[6] Richard M. Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg, *The Real Majority* (New York: Coward-McCann, 1970), p. 43. Kevin Phillips makes similar observations from a very different perspective in *The Emerging Republican Majority* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor, 1970). My own analysis of the ICPR presidential election studies indicates that the social issue was quite prominent by 1968.

[7] As indicated above, this is but one of several theoretically significant questions relevant to procedural norms. For their role as an object of orientation for individual members of the political system towards the system itself, see David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York: Wiley, 1965), particularly chap. 12.

[8] Samuel A. Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties: A Cross-Section of the Nation Speaks Its Mind* (Gloucester, Mass.: Smith, 1963).

[9] Of these acts, the first and second are clearly procedural norms related to minorities; teaching is clearly a political act only if the teacher tries, as some respondents must have assumed he would, to teach his own political ideas.

[10] Stouffer, p. 31.

[11] One-third of the population was classified as more tolerant and one-fifth as less tolerant.

[12] Stouffer, p. 194.

[13] James W. Prothro and Charles M. Grigg, "Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement," *Journal of Politics*, 22 (May, 1960), 275–294.

texts that are bound to influence the ways in which we react to them,"[14] ten additional questions were asked: five each about application of majority and minority norms in specific situations.

Prothro and Grigg found near unanimity on their five general questions; the percentages agreeing with them ranged from 94.7 per cent to 98.0 per cent, indicating that there does exist a consensus on the most general principles of democracy. But a quite different pattern emerges from the ten specific questions. On these items there is a democratic majority on only four items and a democratic consesus (a majority of 75 per cent or more) on only three.[15] Prothro and Grigg found both education and income positively associated with tolerance; but even the most highly educated rejected five of the ten specific items.

A final source of data on adherence to procedural norms is a 1964 study by Herbert McClosky consisting of a national cross-sample and a survey of delegates to the 1956 political party conventions.[16]

Some of McClosky's individual items are somewhat ambiguous, as are his reasons for linking any individual item to the dimension it supposedly measures;[17] but marginals on several of them are interesting. McClosky finds consensus in both his elite (89.4 per cent) and mass (88.9 per cent) samples on a relatively general item: "I believe in free speech for all no matter what their views might be." Two more specific items found both less agreement and increased differences between the elite and mass samples: 65.6 per cent of the elite and 47.6 per cent of the mass agreed that "people ought to be allowed to vote even if they don't do so intelligently"; and 36.7 per cent of the mass but only 17.3 per cent of the elite agreed that "a man oughtn't be allowed to speak if he doesn't know what he's talking about."[18]

Conclusions about Tolerance. These few studies have produced four sets of conclusions that have been reported as valuable in themselves and as relevant to larger theories of American politics.

First, they are unanimous in maintaining that nothing approaching a *consensus* (75 per cent or more) on democratic procedural norms exists in the American public; on questions applying such norms to unpopular minority groups there is not even a democratic majority.

Second, there is great inconsistency between the norms people claim they adhere to in principle and those they are willing to apply in specific instances, at least to "controversial" issues or groups;[19] Prothro and Grigg found near unanimity (90 per cent or more) in agreement with their general procedural norms but tremendous fall-off in willingness to apply them to blacks, Communists, or socialists.

Third, the explanation for inconsistency is that citizens are unwilling to extend democratic rights to those they dislike or fear; tolerance is issue-related, or dependent on the situation in which it is to be extended. Stouffer found tolerance tied to perceived threat from Communists; although Prothro and Grigg do not explicitly examine this question, the specific groups and issues investigated in their study were selected precisely because it was presumed that an average citizen would be hostile to them.

Fourth, the data indicate that tolerance and respect for civil liberties are more common among those with high levels of education than among others: both Stouffer and Prothro and Grigg found tolerance positively associated with education.[20] Similarly, issue-relatedness, the sole basis in the studies for defection from tolerant general norms in specific instances, is more common among the less educated. Stouffer, in addition, found that his elite sample of civic leaders was more tolerant than the cross-sample, although he did not test whether it was more tolerant than non-elites of similar education levels.[21]

The Elite Theory of Democracy. These findings have been incorporated into an influential interpretation of American politics in which democracy is dependent on the adherence of elites to democratic procedural norms; a democratic system can survive the intolerant attitudes of the masses as long as they are balanced by the tolerant attitudes of the politically active. Stouffer observes that his elites are more likely than others to act politically, and that they are likely to serve as opinion leaders for others; in either role, their adherence to democratic norms helps preserve democracy.[22] McClosky, similarly, argues that those

[14] McClosky, p. 376.

[15] Prothro and Grigg suggest the 75 per cent figure as a minimal definition of consensus.

[16] McClosky.

[17] A question such as "If Congressional committees stuck strictly to the rules and gave every witness his rights, they would never succeed in exposing the many dangerous subversives that they have turned up" is at least triple-barreled.

[18] McClosky (p. 365) also asks a question relevant to the role of procedural norms in legitimizing political decisions: "I don't mind a politician's methods if he gets the right things done." Disagreement with the item indicates that the procedures by which decisions are made *are* important; 57.6 per cent of the mass sample and 74.4 per cent of the elite disagreed.

[19] The characterization is from Bachrach, p. 52.

[20] Prothro and Grigg found the same for consistency, which is for them equivalent to tolerance.

[21] Nathan Glazer and Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Polls on Communism and Conformity," *The New American Right*, ed. Daniel Bell (New York: Criterion, 1955), pp. 149–150.

[22] Stouffer, p. 48.

least likely to support democratic norms are also those least likely to participate in poltics: "Democratic viability is, to begin with, saved by the fact that those who are most confused [?] about democratic ideas are also most likely to be politically apathetic. . . ."[23]

V. O. Key and Robert Dahl have constructed more fully-developed arguments. Key suggests that, in the absence of a democratic procedural consensus, other attitudes may allow the system to function as if consensus existed. Among poltical activists, "a consensus does need to prevail on the technical rules of the game by which the system operates," although activists may disagree on substantive matters.[24] Because the activist elite constitutes the group that actually participates in politics, and because the non-elite ordinarily allows the elite great discretion in its actions, lack of adherence to democratic procedural norms in the mass public does not undermine democratic civil liberties.

Dahl, also, argues that lack of democratic consensus need not lead to lack of democracy.[25] Most citizens do accept the democratic creed at its highest level of abstraction, and most assume it to be operative in the United States. Disagreement with specific applications of the creed exists, but much more often in the mass public than in elites, who utilize their political resources relatively frequently and settle disagreements among themselves according to the democratic norms they support. As long as political controversy remains within the elite, lack of democratic consensus on specifics in the non-elite is of little consequence; "the beliefs of the ordinary citizen become relevant only when the professionals engage in an intensive appeal to the populace."[26]

Why Reassess? In light of the agreement among these three independently gathered sets of data and the ease with which their findings have been incorporated into larger theories of American politics, it is reasonable to question whether a reopening of the question of procedural norms and civil liberties is necessary. The serious conceptual and empirical problems with each of the studies on which the literature of procedural norms and civil liberties is based suggest that it is.

The weakest of the three studies is McClosky's. McClosky's article is largely atheoretical: he provides no justification for assigning individual questions to the theoretical dimensions he thinks they measure; many of the questions are themselves multi-barreled, irrelevant, or meaningless. Several individual items are interesting, but the article is primarily a collection of underanalyzed marginal distributions.

Furthermore, McClosky provides no contextual information with which to interpret his marginals: he wants to attribute intolerance to attitudes toward unpopular issues or groups, but he has no independent evaluation of the issues or groups involved (as Stouffer does); nor does he have an independent test of general norms (as Prothro and Grigg think they do) which would allow investigation of consistency.

Stouffer's study is more substantial. He demonstrates clearly that tolerance of politically unpopular groups was not great in the early 'fifties and that political elites and the more educated were more tolerant than others. Stouffer's study, however, examines only slightly more than McClosky the context within which tolerance and civil liberties occur. Stouffer does in part relate tolerance to the attitude one has towards the group (Communists) being tolerated or not tolerated, asking whether Communists are regarded as a threat to the United States and finding that as perceived threat increases tolerance decreases. But he fails to ask the simple question of whether Communists or the other groups are liked or disliked: each was in fact selected because it was *assumed* to be unpopular. Failure to determine this more general issue-orientation prevents Stouffer from identifying respondents who do not dislike Comunits, atheists, etc., and whose intolerance must therefore clearly be based on other grounds.[27]

Stouffer has no independent evaluation of the acts he asks about in connection with his groups. He provides no reason to assume universal approval of public speechmaking in the mass public and, therefore, no reason to attribute unwillingness to let Communists speak solely to hostility to

[23] McClosky, p. 376. Glazer and Lipset (pp. 159–164) are more generally concerned with factors intermediate to non-democratic attitudes and behavior; they attribute the relatively anti-McCarthy attitudes of the South, despite the region's low level of tolerance in Stouffer's study, to its Democratic party affiliation; general intolerance provided no guide to evaluation of McCarthy because opinion leaders in the McCarthy controversy were Democrats who opposed the Wisconsin senator on partisan grounds.

[24] Key, p. 555.

[25] Dahl, *Who Governs?*, pp. 314–325; see also "The American Oppositions: Affirmation and Denial," *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies*, ed. Dahl (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 34–69, esp. pp. 40–42, on the relationship between education and agreement with procedural norms related to civil liberties.

[26] Dahl, *Who Governs?*, p. 324.

[27] Selection of more "popular" groups may have served the same purpose, as I suggest below. Stouffer's work is also vulnerable to the charge of being out of date: the groups investigated are of limited relevance to current problems of civil liberties. Also, Stouffer is concerned with only one explicitly political act, a problem made serious by Hyman and Sheatsly's finding that the public differentiated activities that Communists should and should not be permitted. See Herbert H. Hyman and Paul B. Sheatsly, "Trends in Public Opinion on Civil Liberties," *Journal of Social Issues*, 9 (1953), 11.

them. A permissive position on the general norm of speechmaking is assumed, as is a negative issue-orientation; neither is explicitly examined.

The most obvious problem with Prothro and Grigg's study is the reliability and generalizability of their samples; one should be cautious in generalizing from two university-town samples of under two hundred persons each. Three other serious problems also plague the study. First, Prothro and Grigg, like McClosky, employed some ambiguous items such as the question concerning the legitimacy of group voting.[28] Second, Prothro and Grigg provide no independent evaluation of the issues or groups involved in their applied procedural norms; respondents are again assumed to be hostile to the issues or groups involved. In Ann Arbor, in particular, the assumption that Negroes were disliked and that this dislike was responsible for their being denied civil liberties might be quite inaccurate. A third serious problem with Prothro and Grigg's study is their failure to independently evaluate the acts they ask about in their specific questions. They maintain that approval of these acts follows syllogistically from the universally approved general principles of democracy, but they provide neither logical nor empirical evidence for their claim.

Whether any particular combination of democratic principles and attitudes towards particular acts is in fact required by logic is perhaps best left to philosophers; but the question also has a serious empirical dimension. Two models could account for Prothro and Grigg's findings: first, respondents might approve of public speechmaking in general because of their commitment to minority rights, yet fail to apply it because of the issue or group involved; second, respondents, rightly or wrongly, might not see a commitment to minority rights as requiring approval of public speechmaking for any group. Prothro and Grigg, because they fail to independently test attitudes towards particular acts, confuse the two types of inconsistency: inconsistency in moving from general principles to a particular facilitating act cannot be distinguished from inconsistency in moving from the act to specific instances of that act involving particular issues or groups.

Prothro and Grigg's general questions are at point *C*, *A*, on Figure 1; they involve general principales and specify no particular issue or group. Their specific questions are at point *D*, *B*; they involve application of norms about specific acts to specific issues or groups. Prothro and Grigg, therefore, can state that inconsistency of some kind exists, assuming that they can demonstrate the

[28] The question text asks whether professional organizations such as the AMA have a right to increase the influence of doctors by getting them to vote as a bloc. Such activity can be seen as democratic in that democracy certainly allows individuals to form groups to advance their common interests; yet it also suggests manipulation of individuals.




Figure 1. Two Dimensions of Specificity of Tolerance: The Literature

logical tie between the general principles of democracy and their particular acts; but they cannot demonstrate *where* inconsistency occurs or, therefore, what it means. They cannot determine whether inconsistency is due to increasing specification of act (axis *CD*) or to increasing specification of issue or group (axis *AB*).[29]

In addition to correcting for methodological shortcomings, a second reason for the re-opening of the question of subjective procedural norms and civil liberties is to look at the new acts, issues, and groups contained in Scammon and Wattenburg's "social issue." The social issue suggests that large segments of the American electorate are concerned with the subjective procedural norms relevant to civil liberties. Furthermore, unlike what Key and Dahl would have us expect, at least some political elites have not acted to defuse popular intolerance; Scammon and Wattenburg themselves urge politicians to take a hard line on demonstrations and other protest activity. To some extent this change in elite behavior is due to the emergence of new forms of political activity—disruptions and public demonstrations—which may exceed the vague outer limits of the democratic creed; or change may be due to emergence for the first time in twenty years of the possibility of partisan gain by taking a hard line on procedural matters. Whether or not the specific cases involved in the social issue are democratic or not is not of primary concern here; what is important is how citizens perceive these issues and how they relate them to other political attitudes and to political behavior.

Tolerance of Political Activism

Tolerance, Issue-Relatedness, and Consistency. Throughout the three studies under review, the three concepts of tolerance, issue-relatedness, and consistency are confused both conceptually and empirically; we can now begin to disentangle them.

By tolerance I mean willingness to allow others to engage in political activities, particularly those activities near the outer limits of what is generally defined as legitimate; such tolerance is indicated by responses to questions asking about application of procedural norms in specific situations. Although there has been ambiguity in particular questions, the studies have focused rather well on the extent to which tolerance exists and who is most likely to be tolerant, at least within a limited range of acts, issues, and groups.

Both issue-relatedness and consistency are related to yet distinct from tolerance; both are central to a comprehensive understanding of procedural norms and civil liberties, but both have been studied indirectly by means of rather questionable assumptions, rather than explicitly. By issue-relatedness I mean the relation between orientation toward a group or issue and willingness to be tolerant of an act involving it. Orientation toward an issue or group may mean simply whether it is liked or disliked, or it may be a more complex attitude involving procedural concerns as well. For example, Stouffer's Communists were presumably denied civil liberties not only because they were disliked, but also because they were perceived as hostile to democratic procedural norms.

Issue-relatedness could be related to tolerance in any of four ways. First, one might have a negative issue-orientation and yet be tolerant by applying a permissive general norm; these are Prothro and Grigg's consistent democrats. The second possibility is that one has a negative issue-orientation and is intolerant; this situation is often found in the literature and is attributed to the overriding of a tolerant general norm by the negative issue-orientation. Third, one might be favorably issue-oriented but not be tolerant; in this case there is presumably some reason such as opposition to the particular act involved which overrides the issue-orientation. Finally, one might have a favorable issue-orientation and be tolerant; in this case the issue-orientation is an alternative to the common explanation of tolerance—i.e., that a tolerant general norm is being applied consistently. The literature has focused on the first two possibilities, those in which issue-orientation is negative; but with the partial exception of Stouffer they have only assumed, not demonstrated, that issue-orientation is in fact negative.

By consistency we mean willingness to apply general procedural norms to specific issues and groups. Consistency is explicitly considered only by Prothro and Grigg, but it is implicit in all three discussions of tolerance in general and of issue-relatedness in particular. Each study assumes unanimity on democratic norms in general; it is this unanimity that gives issue-orientation its explanatory power in analyzing intolerant reactions to specific situations. If nondemocratic attitudes are held on the acts themselves, general norm position and issue-orientation become equally plausible explanations of intolerance in a particular context.

Prothro and Grigg escape this complexity by making consistency identical to tolerance; because they find unanimous approval of their general principles of democracy, the only consistent answer to a specific question is a tolerant one. If, however, the attitudes relevant in evaluating consistency are not the most general principles of democracy but, as argued above, specific acts

[29] I in fact deal with both kinds of consistency, although the second is much more important here.

through which these principles are realized, tolerance and consistency might be quite different. It is entirely likely that either because of faulty logic or because of legitimate disagreement about how to operationalize democratic principles, Prothro and Grigg would have found disagreement as well as agreement with allowing the particular acts in their specific questions to take place.

The type of consistency of primary interest here involves application of a general norm about a particular act to specific instances of that act: where the general norm is tolerant, application of it in a specific instance is to be tolerant; where the general norm is intolerant, however, a consistent application of it in a specific instance would of course require intolerance. Anybody who does not favor speechmaking in general would be acting consistently, if undemocratically, in refusing to allow Negroes, Communists, or little old ladies to make speeches.

The substantive conclusions of Stouffer, Prothro and Grigg, and McClosky are not necessarily wrong; their reinforcement of each other and the ease with which they have been incorporated into larger theories of American politics argue against easy dismissal of them. But the conclusions have certainly not been demonstrated: they have been based on unwarranted assumptions about general procedural norms and issue-orientation; each suffers from both conceptual and empirical failure to distinguish and relate the three dimensions of tolerance, consistency, and issue-relatedness. I can now describe the NORC study and report its data on tolerance itself; in the following sections I use the data to investigate issue-relatedness and consistency; finally, I present an analysis of tolerance involving general norms and issue-orientation simultaneously.

The NORC Study. The data reported here were collected by the National Opinion Research Center as part of a nationwide study (number 4119) in March 1971. The study did not examine the most general democratic principles investigated by Prothro and Grigg; they found nearly unanimous agreement with these norms, and we saw no reason to doubt their findings. The study did, however, ask for respondents' general attitudes towards four specific acts relevant to tolerance and civil liberties. In order to examine a broad range of subjective procedural norms, we chose acts which varied in hardness or softness: we wanted at least one act which almost all respondents would permit, one on which the public would be rather evenly divided, and one which few would permit. The four acts selected were (in order of presumably increasing hardness) circulating a petition, criticizing a government decision, holding a peaceful demonstration, and temporarily blocking entrance to a government building.[30] A general norm position for each act was determined through a closed-ended question about whether the act should always, sometimes, or never be allowed. These questions occurred very early in the questionnaire and were separated from others reported here by completely unrelated sections of the questionnaire.

We similarly wished to sample attitudes on a range of issues and groups which could be involved in tests of civil liberties. Again, we wanted items which would range along a continuum of hardness: those which would arouse the sympathy of most respondents and those for whom this would be unlikely. Two soft issues selected were whether the government should act to prevent pollution and whether or not crime is a serious national problem; the hard issues and groups were radical students, black militants, legalization of marijuana, and governmental action to prevent racial discrimination in sale or rental of housing.[31] The issues were selected to sample several different issue-areas as well as different levels of hardness.

For each issue, respondents were asked to place their opinion on a seven-point scale, both ends of which were defined for them; respondents were asked to place each of the groups on a one-to-five scale ranging from like very much to dislike very much. No effort was made to determine whether groups were liked or disliked because of their position on procedural norms; we dealt with the attitude toward them regardless of its cause. These questions were in the middle of the questionnaire; no tie to the general norms was suggested, and they were interspersed with items asking respondents what they believed President Nixon and the Democratic party leadership thought of the same issue.

Finally, we asked a series of questions analogous to those asked by Prothro and Grigg et al. designed to test tolerance itself: these questions were at the end of the questionnaire; they involved application of three of the general norms—petitioning, demonstrating, and blocking—in specific situations involving one of the issues or groups asked about previously.[32] Specific questions asked

[30] For evaluative purposes, we assume that petitioning, criticizing, and demonstrating were within the limits of what is democratic.

[31] The housing issue is, of course, hard only for whites; only they were asked the relevant matrix item.

[32] Only data for demonstrating and petitioning are reported here. Matrix items on blocking were asked but are not reported here because of the very different nature of blocking as a political act. No matrix questions about criticizing were asked in order to reduce the total number of matrix items and to prevent both learning (i.e., seeing through the survey instrument and imposing an artificial pattern of consistency) or boredom (which led to random responses) which were found on earlier drafts of the questionnaire in pre-tests.




Figure 2. Two Dimensions of Specificity of Tolerance: The NORC Study

whether each of the three acts should be allowed to urge the government to legalize marijuana, to urge that something be done about crime in the streets, to call for government activity against pollution, and to urge the government to secure open housing for blacks. We also asked whether black militants and radical students should be allowed to petition, demonstrate, or block. A further set of questions asked whether "a group of your neighbors" should be allowed to engage in each act; this group was meant to be extremely soft, suggesting people like the respondent towards whom he would be favorably oriented. In each instance a respondent was asked to answer either "yes" or "no."

These questions yield what we call a "matrix" of twenty-one items which constitute the basic data of the study. Each of the twenty-one involves an act for which we have an independent evaluation given earlier in the interview; similarly, all but three[33] involve a specific issue or group for which we have an earlier evaluation. We can therefore control each matrix item by the appropriate general norm and the appropriate issue-orientation; we can investigate both the consistency with which general norms are applied in specific instances and the relationship, for both individuals and groups, between issue-orientation and tolerance.[34]

To express this graphically, Figure 2 is a replication of Figure 1 with Prothro and Grigg's points *C, A* and *D, B*, drawn in; what we have done is to draw in point *D, A*: We can therefore speak about increasing specification both of act (*C, A* to *D, A*) and of issue (*D, A* to *D, B*); we can observe both processes that occur as tolerance moves from the level of most general democratic principles to application of norms about specific acts in situations involving specific issues and groups.

The Extent of Tolerance. The first question raised by the literature is the simple one of tolerance itself, which is indicated by responses to the matrix questions. The percentage permitting each matrix item for demonstrating and petitioning is reported in Table 1: The extent of willingness to allow the two acts in context of specific issues and groups is surprisingly large. Majorities of the population were willing to allow demonstrations for each issue except marijuana; for that issue, the percentage tolerant is 41.3 per cent. The percentage allowing other demonstrations ranges from a high of 80.7 per cent for the soft issues of crime and

[33] Those involving neighbors.

[34] Specific details of questionnaire design are available from the author.

Table 1. Percentage Permitting Demonstrating and Petitioning On Various Issues and by Various Groups

	Demonstrate	Petition
Because they were concerned about crime in their community	80.7%	94.6%
By a group of your neighbors	80.7%	94.6%
To ask the government to stop a factory from polluting the air	79.5%	93.2%
By a group of black militants	60.7%	69.0%
By a group of radical students	59.9%	71.9%
Calling for the legalization of marijuana	41.3%	52.0%
Calling for the government to make sure that blacks can buy and rent homes in white neighborhoods (whites only)	55.2%	69.9%

Entries are percentage of the population (of whites for open housing) who will permit each of the matrix acts in connection with each issue and group.

neighbors through 60.7 per cent for black militants to 55.2 per cent for open housing.

Tolerance of petitioning is even greater: respondents are nearly unanimous in allowing it on the softer issues; 94.6 per cent would allow it on crime or by a group of neighbors. Even on the harder issues a substantial majority would permit petitioning, although a sizable minority would not. The exception is again marijuana, on which only a slight majority of 52.0 per cent is tolerant; but 69.0 per cent would allow petitioning by black militants and 71.9 per cent by radical students.

The data certainly do not indicate anything remotely like a democratic consensus except on the softest act for the softest issues. But with the sole exception of marijuana, a majority of the population would permit both demonstrating and petitioning on each of the hard issues. Clearly, sizable intolerant minorities exist: three of ten would refuse black militants and radical students the right to petition, and four of ten would not let them demonstrate. Nevertheless, compared to Stouffer's findings and to those of Prothro and Grigg, our considerably harder acts and roughly comparable issues and groups indicate a surprisingly great amount of tolerance in the mass public. Prothro and Grigg found 44 per cent of their sample willing to allow a Communist to speak in public; we found 59.9 per cent willing to allow radical students to hold public demonstrations. Stouffer found 37 per cent willing to allow a speech against religion; we found 41.3 per cent willing to permit a demonstration in favor of legalizing marijuana.

The Effects of Education. We are also interested in the *distribution* of tolerance throughout the population. Ideally we would like to compare a national cross-sample with an elite sample similar to Stouffer's. Since we have no elite sample, however, we must test the parallel but less powerful finding that education is associated with tolerant attitudes. Table 2 presents the relationship between tolerance and education for each matrix item:

Table 2. Education and Tolerance of Demonstrating and Petitioning

		Percentage Tolerant			
	Somer's D	Grade school	Some high school	High school grad	College
Demonstrating					
Crime	.08***	73.0	77.3	82.2	88.3
Neighbors	.09***	71.9	75.7	84.5	87.4
Pollution	.07***	72.1	77.5	80.4	86.1
Black militants	.16***	47.6	51.3	63.3	76.3
Radical students	.19***	44.7	48.0	64.8	76.3
Marijuana	.21***	24.2	31.3	39.6	63.9
Housing	.23***	33.1	47.1	57.5	75.8
Petitioning					
Crime	.05***	88.7	93.6	96.8	97.9
Neighbors	.05***	87.2	94.7	97.3	97.7
Pollution	.06***	85.4	93.7	94.3	98.2
Black militants	.17***	55.3	60.4	71.1	84.9
Radical students	.19***	53.2	64.6	76.3	88.3
Marijuana	.21***	32.7	44.9	52.8	73.0
Housing	.20***	50.6	47.1	57.5	87.5

*** Significant at .001 level.

The left column contains Somer's *D* (asymmetric) between education and tolerance of each matrix act; the other columns indicate the percentage of those at each level of education who will allow each matrix act.

Education is only weakly associated with tolerance of demonstrations of petitioning in connection with the softer issues. Large majorities of each education category are tolerant, although a tolerant consensus exceeding ninety per cent exists only on petitioning and only among the more educated.

Significant differences do occur, however, for both acts on the harder issues. Larger *D*s on the hard items are due to the relatively great fall-off in tolerance among the less-educated as the issue becomes harder, although even the college-educated fall off somewhat. On each of these issues a majority of the college-educated is tolerant of both demonstrating and petitioning; even marijuana produces tolerant majorities of 63.9 per cent on demonstrating and 73.0 per cent on petitioning, and percentages are considerably higher on the other hard issues. Grade school respondents, however, produce a tolerant majority on none of the hard matrix items involving demonstrations; the closest they come is 47.6 per cent permitting demonstrations by black militants. Small majorities of the grade school-educated, however, do permit each hard petitioning item except marijuana.

Issue-Relatedness of Tolerance

The Tie Between Issue-Orientation and Tolerance. The independent evaluations we have of respondents' attitudes towards the issues involved in demonstrating or petitioning permit us to test Stouffer's conclusions (and those implicit in other works) about issue-relatedness more rigorously than he did by examining the relationship between tolerance and issue-orientation.[35]

Responses to questions on issues and groups have been recoded into three categories: attitudes sympathetic to the goals of a matrix act or to those engaged in it, attitudes unsympathetic, and those neutral.[36] The first of these is referred to as a positive or permissive issue-orientation, in that it would presumably predispose a respondent towards allowing the matrix act, all other things being equal. The other orientations are referred to as negative and neutral. Each respondent has either a positive, neutral, or negative issue-orientation for each matrix item except crime, for which there is no negative issue-orientation: even those completely unconcerned with crime as a national problem would not as a result oppose demonstrations or petitioning to urge a reduction in it.[37]

Table 3 presents the relationship between issue-orientation and tolerance for each matrix item.

In the population as a whole there is considerable issue-relatedness of tolerance. Large consensual majorities of those favoring the goals of demonstrators or petitioners will allow the acts for all six issues. As issue-orientation becomes increasingly negative, however, the population becomes increasingly intolerant. On the soft issues, issue-relatedness is relatively small because a negative issue-orientation reduces the percentage tolerant only to around seventy per cent. On the hard issues, however, issue-relatedness can be considerable; a negative issue-orientation is relatively effective in generating intolerance. Large majorities of those who have negative issue-orientations are *intolerant* of demonstrations on marijuana (70.0 per cent) and open housing (59.1 per cent); on the two other hard issues the percentage tolerant falls to 56.3 per cent. Even on petitioning a negative issue-orientation produces an intolerant majority for marijuana (58.2 per cent), and a barely tolerant one for open housing of 56.4 per cent. The *D* between issue-orientation and tolerance is as high as .36 for demonstrating for marijuana, although for pollution, black militants, and radical students it is in the range of .10 to .17.

The Effects of Education. We can also examine the implication of earlier studies that increased education reduces the impact of issue-orientation on tolerance.[38] Table 4 presents the relationship between education and tolerance for each issue-orientation separately.

Table 4 indicates that association between education and tolerance persists on the hard issues at each issue-orientation separately. Clear majorities of the college-educated will permit demonstrations on each hard issue except marijuana (only 46.6 per cent tolerant) despite their negative issue-orientations; but in ten of twelve instances the less educated produce intolerant majorities where issue-orientation is negative.

Even on the softer act of petitioning, a negative issue-orientation on the hard issues produces regu-

[35] For marijuana, open housing, and pollution we recorded respondents' attitudes on the issue involved in the matrix item; we asked respondents' views toward black militants and radical students; our issue-control for crime is less direct, consisting of whether respondents think crime is a particularly serious problem. The neighbors items are excluded from this phase of analysis.

[36] For marijuana, open housing, and pollution, the middle polition was considered to be neutral; the three categories on each side were positive and negative. For groups, a similar procedure was followed, although there were only two categories on each side of the mid-point,

[37] I exclude here the relatively small proportion of the population who are themselves criminals.

[38] For marijuana and open housing there is some possibility that the zero-order relationship between tolerance and education is due to the greater frequency with which the more educated have positive issue-orientations.

Table 3. Relationship Between Issue-Orientation and Tolerance

		Percentage Tolerance		
	Somer's D	Permissive issue-orientation (+)	Neutral issue-orientation (0)	Negative issue-orientation (−)
Demonstrating				
Crime	—	80.8	80.5	—
Pollution	.12**	83.9	74.5	70.4
Black militants	.17***	88.5	68.8	56.3
Radical students	.15***	81.4	70.0	56.3
Marijuana	.36***	74.6	68.2	30.0
Housing	.30***	77.7	66.4	40.9
Petitioning				
Crime	—	95.1	92.1	—
Pollution	.10***	95.7	92.1	73.1
Black militants	.15***	91.8	74.3	65.4
Radical students	.10**	82.4	78.2	69.7
Marijuana	.32***	81.1	77.0	41.8
Housing	.19***	88.7	80.5	56.4

*** Significant at .001 level.
** Significant at .01 level.

lar, if only small, intolerant majorities among grade school respondents. On the soft issues, education differences, although positive and for the most part statistically significant, remain small; large majorities of each education level at each issue-orientation are tolerant, although the more educated are more so.

While the educated are regularly more tolerant, their tolerance is not less issue-related. Table 5 presents the relationship between tolerance and issue-orientation for each education level separately: *D* in Table 5 is a measure of issue-relatedness of tolerance for each education group; the percentages on which *D* is based are not shown because they are the same as in Table 4, arranged differently.

On demonstrating, there is no systematic relationship between issue-relatedness and education. Those who attended but did not graduate from high school are the most issue-related, but there are no differences among the other groups over the range of hard issues. On petitioning, the top two education categories tend to be slightly less issue-related than the others, but there is no difference between the top two groups. The absolute amount of issue-relatedness is considerable for all education levels. The less educated are not less tolerant at negative issue-orientations because an increasingly negative issue-orientation affects them more than it does the more educated; rather, they are less tolerant at each issue-orientation, and as issue-orientation changes, all education groups are affected more or less equally.

Consistency in Applying General Norms

Consistency and Tolerance. Consistency is quite closely related to tolerance; they are either the same or opposite sides of one coin. If a general norm is permissive, a tolerant matrix response is consistent; if the general norm is negative, a tolerant matrix response is inconsistent. Prothro and Grigg finessed the complexities of consistency by asking a series of general norm questions so abstract and general that they found nearly unanimous approval of them. We accept Prothro and Grigg's finding that at the highest level of abstraction—the principles of majority rule and minority rights—a democratic consensus exists in the United States; rather than assume that our matrix items follow directly from these abstract principles, however, we asked respondents about their general views towards the acts used in the matrix.

Table 6 contains marginal distributions for demonstrating and petitioning, as well as for the two other acts.

Very few respondents (4.9 per cent) would completely forbid petitioning: 58.9 per cent would always allow it, and an additional 36.2 per cent would sometimes allow it. Nearly half the sample would allow criticism of the government and demonstrating under all circumstances, a finding unexpected in light of popular opposition to demonstrations supposedly underlying the social

Table 4. Relationship Between Education and Tolerance for Each Issue-Orientation

			Percentage Tolerant			
	I-O	D	Grade school	Some high school	High school grad	College
Demonstrating						
Crime	+	.09***	73.2	77.4	82.2	89.1
	0	.05	75.2	75.9	81.5	84.2
	−	—	—	—	—	—
Pollution	+	.04	79.3	83.3	83.5	87.7
	0	.10**	65.8	68.1	77.8	82.8
	−	.06*	64.3	—	—	—
Black militants	+	.10	77.8	88.2	97.9	100.0
	0	.17**	57.0	63.8	75.8	86.0
	−	.19***	41.2	43.1	59.0	73.3
Radical students	+	.20**	62.5	72.2	75.0	97.5
	0	.18***	54.5	73.3	70.1	92.3
	−	.19***	41.0	41.9	63.3	71.8
Marijuana	+	.26***	43.5	50.0	75.0	88.8
	0	.15**	42.5	63.7	59.7	79.0
	−	.12***	21.1	22.8	29.9	46.6
Housing	+	.17***	57.1	74.5	76.3	89.6
	0	.18***	38.6	65.5	64.4	79.6
	−	.26***	24.2	29.1	45.6	62.3
Petitioning						
Crime	+	.05***	88.9	94.4	97.1	98.8
	0	.02	91.7	86.2	94.5	93.0
	−	—	—	—	—	—
Pollution	+	.03**	91.2	96.4	95.3	98.8
	0	.08***	83.9	90.0	94.8	97.8
	−	.13	63.0	—	—	—
Black militants	+	.09	81.5	91.2	93.9	100.0
	0	.14*	64.9	70.2	77.4	90.9
	−	.20***	48.9	53.7	67.6	82.9
Radical students	+	.24***	56.3	72.2	78.6	100.0
	0	.13**	66.2	82.6	75.8	97.4
	−	.20	49.6	60.6	76.1	85.8
Marijuana	+	.19***	56.5	66.7	81.3	91.3
	0	.16***	44.4	69.0	76.7	86.1
	−	.14***	30.3	38.9	43.2	59.2
Housing	+	.13***	75.5	84.3	85.5	99.1
	0	.17***	59.1	74.5	79.0	93.0
	−	.20***	39.2	46.4	62.7	74.5

*** Significant at .001 level.
** Significant at .01 level.
* Significant at .05 level.

Table 5. Issue-Relatedness of Tolerance of Each Education Group

	Grade school	Some high school	High school grad	College
Demonstrating				
Pollution	.12*	.10**	.08**	.05
Black militants	.21***	.30***	.20***	.18**
Radical students	.15*	.29***	.08	.22***
Marijuana	.23**	.32***	.34***	.32***
Housing	.23***	.35***	.21***	.19***
Petitioning				
Pollution	.12***	.05	.03***	.02*
Black militants	.20***	.25***	.16**	.11*
Radical students	.13	.18*	.01	.12**
Marijuana	.21*	.28***	.33***	.25***
Housing	.27***	.29***	.16***	.17***

Entries are Somer's D (asymmetric) between issue-orientation and permitting a matrix act for each of the education groups listed; issue-orientation is independent.

*** Indicates significant at .001 level.

** Indicates significant at .01 level.

* Indicates significant at .05 level.

Table 6. Agreement With General Norms

	Always	Sometimes	Never
"Do you think people should be allowed to circulate petitions to ask the government to act on some issue?"	58.9%	36.2%	4.9%
"If the government makes a decision that most people think is a good one, do you think other people should be allowed to criticize it?"	48.4%	40.1%	10.2%
"Do you think people should be allowed to hold a peaceful demonstration to ask the government to act on some issue?"	46.8%	35.7%	17.4%
"Do you think people should be allowed to block the entrance to a government building for a period of time to get the government to act on some issue that they think is important?"	5.6%	16.4%	78.1%

issue; only 17.4 per cent would never permit demonstrating. Blocking is clearly seen as a different kind of act than these three: 78.1 per cent would *never* allow it.[39]

Although the data indicate widespread general acceptance of the four acts by the public, they nevertheless indicate a high rate of defection from general democratic principles once these principles are translated into specific political acts. Clearly, at least some of the inconsistency Prothro and Grigg found in applying general norms in specific instances occurs in the increasing specification of act and not, as they assume, because of increasing specification of issue and group.

Second, we are interested in the extent to which citizens apply their (not necessarily tolerant) general norms in specific instances. The relationship between general norm attitudes and each matrix item is presented in Table 7.

[39] The public clearly sees blocking as we did in constructing the survey.

Table 7. Percentage at Each General Norm Position Permitting Each Matrix Item

	Always	Sometimes	Never
Demonstrating			
Crime	95.2%	85.3%	32.5%
Neighbors	94.8%	87.0%	29.6%
Pollution	93.4%	82.6%	35.6%
Black militants	81.4%	62.4%	2.7%
Radical students	82.2%	58.9%	3.1%
Marijuana	62.7%	32.5%	1.9%
Housing	77.3%	57.4%	1.7%
Petitioning			
Crime	98.2%	93.6%	59.7%
Neighbors	98.1%	93.1%	63.9%
Pollution	97.9%	89.9%	64.4%
Black militants	76.1%	62.3%	32.9%
Radical students	81.1%	61.9%	34.2%
Marijuana	65.9%	33.8%	19.2%
Housing	78.1%	60.9%	24.0%

Large majorities of the population in fact apply their tolerant general norms consistently on even the hardest matrix issues: only for marijuana do even a quarter of those who had said that they would always permit an act say they would not permit it in a specific situation, and even on marijuana more than sixty per cent remained consistent with the tolerant general norm.

There is, furthermore, considerable defection from intolerant general norms. Approximately a third of those who had said that they would never permit demonstrations in fact permit them on the three soft matrix items. On petitioning, this defection is even greater: majorities of those who would never in principle allow petitioning would in fact allow it on crime, neighbors, and pollution; for each hard issue except marijuana, defection from the intolerant petitioning general norm is more frequent than defection from the tolerant one!

The Effects of Education. General norm position on the two acts is itself related to education, as Table 8 indicates:

cation continuum with allowing the particular acts intermediate to the most general principles of democracy and application of these principles in concrete situations. Educational differences in tolerance may therefore not also be educational differences in consistency; even if educational levels are equally consistent in applying their general norms, tolerance will increase with education because the more educated have more permissive general norms.

Table 9 examines education differences in consistency: The left side of Table 9 presents *D* between education and tolerance at each general norm position. For those with permissive or negative general norm positions *D* in Table 9 is a measure of differences in consistency as well as of tolerance. A positive *D* indicates that tolerance increases with education: for positive general norm positions, consistency and tolerance are the same thing; for those who would never permit an act, however, a positive D means that the upper education groups are less consistent in applying their intolerant general norms.

Table 8. Relationship Between Education and General Norm Position

			Percentage Tolerant		
	Somer's D		Always	Sometimes	Never
Demonstrating	.20***	gs	36.8	37.4	25.8
		shs	35.2	41.4	23.4
		hsg	44.6	41.1	14.3
		col	67.0	23.4	9.6
Petitioning	.23***	gs	39.5	49.0	11.6
		shs	48.5	46.1	5.6
		hsg	63.2	34.1	2.6
		col	78.8	19.9	1.3

D between education and a permissive general norm position on demonstrating is a fairly strong .20; for petitioning it is .23. A large majority of the college-educated, 67.0 per cent, would always permit demonstrations; only 9.8 per cent would never permit them. At each of the other education levels, however, the proportion with permissive general norm positions on demonstrations is less than half.

Table 8 indicates that as education increases citizens are more likely to translate their agreement with the most abstract principles of democracy into general approval of demonstrating and petitioning. We know from Table 2 that education is positively associated with tolerance on individual matrix items; Table 8 suggests that at least some of the differences in Table 2 are due to greater disagreement at the lower end of the edu-

Educational differences in tolerance are not an artifact of differing general norm positions; consistency in applying a general norm does increase with education. Among those who would always permit an act, education differences in tolerance/consistency are large: on the hard issues *D* ranges between, .15 and .25 on demonstrating and .18 and .23 on petitioning. In each case, college-educated respondents rarely abandon their tolerant general norm; even on marijuana more than eighty per cent of them answer the matrix item consistently. Among the less educated, however, inconsistency is far more common. Majorities of grade school respondents who had said that they would always allow demonstrations in fact will not allow them on marijuana and open housing; the same holds for petitioning on marijuana. On the soft issues these differences are smaller, but the

Table 9. Relationship Between Education and Tolerance for Each General Norm Position

		Demonstrating					Petitioning				
	Norm	D	gs	shs	hsg	col	D	gs	shs	hsg	col
Neighbors	+	.03*	93.7	89.4	95.9	96.5	.01	96.0	97.9	98.9	98.4
	0	.06	81.0	85.7	89.7	91.4	.05**	88.5	92.9	96.7	96.2
	−	−.05*	28.9	37.1	32.8	11.1	.16	53.8	81.3	66.7	—
Crime	+	.04**	92.8	93.1	92.7	98.8	.02*	95.2	97.5	98.9	99.3
	0	.02	83.9	84.1	85.9	88.2	.01	92.0	93.6	95.4	93.5
	−	−.06*	31.0	41.4	36.7	11.4	.13	52.6	64.7	66.7	—
Pollution	+	.05**	86.8	95.1	91.8	96.9	.02**	93.7	99.3	97.8	99.0
	0	−.00	84.7	80.6	81.6	83.9	.03	86.5	90.7	89.5	94.9
	−	−.06*	34.1	45.7	39.0	13.9	.21	53.8	70.6	75.0	—
Black militants	+	.15***	63.5	75.7	82.7	91.2	.18***	58.8	63.9	75.4	89.9
	0	.03	61.3	58.4	64.3	65.9	.06	52.4	66.2	65.4	68.8
	−	−.04	5.7	2.8	0.0	0.0	.05	35.9	23.5	41.7	—
Radical students	+	.15***	61.8	76.9	85.6	91.3	.18***	55.7	73.6	83.8	92.9
	0	.08*	54.5	50.0	65.1	64.4	.08	55.8	60.3	64.5	72.7
	−	−.04	6.9	2.8	0.0	0.0	.05	33.3	23.5	50.0	—
Marijuana	+	.25***	37.1	53.8	59.2	81.1	.23***	40.9	53.7	65.5	82.6
	0	.07	24.2	35.2	32.1	40.7	.03	29.0	38.7	31.1	37.7
	−	−.03*	5.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	−.00	20.5	11.8	25.0	—
Housing	+	.19***	48.9	73.3	77.6	88.6	.18***	58.3	66.9	77.4	90.9
	0	.14***	40.7	58.0	58.5	71.8	.12*	50.0	60.4	63.8	73.9
	−	−.03	4.2	1.5	0.0	0.0	.20*	16.7	14.3	37.5	—

Entries at left are Somer's D (asymmetric) between education and tolerance for respondents with each general norm position separately; education is independent.

*** Significant at .001 level.

** Significant at .01 level.

* Significant at .05 level.

less educated are nevertheless considerably more likely than others to abandon a tolerant general norm.

The *D*s between education and tolerance among those who would never allow demonstrations are quite small but regularly negative; as education increases, respondents are increasingly likely to remain consistent with their general norm even if it causes them to be intolerant on a matrix issue. On soft issues, considerable minorities of each education level other than the college-educated defect from an intolerant general norm; on the hard issues, none of the more educated and only a few of the less educated defect.

For petitioning, however, this pattern is reversed: only among those who would never allow petitioning are the educated *more* likely to abandon their general norm, although the finding is highly suspect. Only one of the six relationships is statistically significant; and the number of college-educated respondents who would never permit petitioning is so small that the relationship is due almost entirely to the pattern among respondents who had never been to college.

The Relative Impact of General Norms and Issue-Orientation

The Interaction of Norms and Issues. Tolerance is of course never a product of either general norms or issue-orientation alone; the effects of general norm position and issue-orientation on tolerance should be considered simultaneously. Doing so allows us to investigage the relative importance of general norms and issue-orientation as determinants of tolerance in the population as a whole, providing a direct test of the conclusion that negative issue-orientation commonly prevents application of a permissive general norm in specific contexts; it also allows us to investigate the relative importance of general norms and issue-orientation at different educational levels.

There are four ways in which general norm position and issue-orientation might be related to each other: first, they might reinforce each other; in a given instance both might be either permissive or negative. Second, one factor might be neutral while the other pushes in a certain direction: a neutral general norm might be paired with a positive or negative issue-orientation, or vice versa. Third, both general norm position and issue-orientation might be neutral. Fourth, general norm and issue-orientation could oppose each other: the general norm could be positive and issue-orientation negative, or vice versa. The last combination in a sense forces a respondent to choose between his general norm position and his issue-orientation; it may be taken as a particularly hard direct test of the relative importance of general norms and issue-orientation.

These possibilities can be restated as in Figure 3; each situation corresponds to one or more cells in the Figure:

	General Norm		
Issue-Orientation	Always	Sometimes	Never
	Cell 1	Cell 2	Cell 3
Positive	tolerant issue-related consistent	tolerant issue-related —	? ? ?
	Cell 4	Cell 5	Cell 6
Neutral	tolerant — consistent	? — —	intolerant — consistent
	Cell 7	Cell 8	Cell 9
Negative	? ? ?	intolerant issue-related —	intolerant issue-related consistent

Figure 3. Combinations of General Norm Position and Issue-Orientation.

The first two possible combinations of general norm position and issue-orientation provide a more or less clear guide to matrix response. Cells 1 and 9 represent conditions under which general norms and issue-orientation reinforce each other: we would expect that in these cells matrix responses would conform quite closely to the direction indicated in the Figure—consistent, issue-related, and tolerant for Cell 1 and consistent, issue-related, and intolerant for Cell 9. The extent to which these expectations are accurate provides a test of the completeness and accuracy of our model.

The second pattern applies to Cells 2, 4, 6, and 8: either general norm position or issue-orientation provides a guide to matrix responses, but the other is neutral; the result is a weakly or partially determined matrix response. Cells 2 and 8 have a neutral general norm position: respondents in them would therefore be led by issue-orientation, which for Cell 2 is positive and would lead to tolerance and for Cell 8 is negative and would lead to intolerance; no respondent in either cell could be either consistent or inconsistent. Similarly, for Cells 4 and 6 there is a general norm position but no issue-orientation: matrix responses would therefore be guided only by the general norm, towards consistent tolerance in Cell 4 and towards consistent intolerance in Cell 6.

The second two types of combination of general norms and issue-orientation provide no guide to matrix response. Of these the less interesting occurs when both general norms and issue-orientation are neutral, as they are in Cell 5: a respondent in Cell 5 cannot be either consistent or inconsistent with a general norm, nor can his matrix response be either issue-related or issue-unrelated; in terms of the model, tolerance is completely undetermined.

Much more important is the situation in which general norm position and issue-orientation conflict with each other, as in Cells 3 and 7: in either cell one is in effect forced to choose between general norm and issue-orientation in responding to a matrix item. These cells in effect permit a respondent alternative types of consistency: in Cell 3 he could respond consistently with his intolerant general norm or "consistently" with his tolerant

issue-orientation; in Cell 7 a respondent must choose between responding consistently with his tolerant general norm or consistently with his intolerant issue-orientation. Respondents in Cells 3 and 7 will therefore have their matrix response either consistent with their general norm or issue-related, but not both; tolerance will be determined by which type of consistency is chosen. Cells Three and Seven provide a direct test of the relative importance of general norm and issue-orientation in determining matrix response.

Table 10 presents the relationship between tolerance on each matrix item and the combination of general norm position and issue-orientation.

Table 10 reproduces Figure 3 for each matrix issue separately: each cell contains the percentage of respondents with a particular combination of general norm position and issue-orientation who will permit the matrix act; entries under each column are *D* between tolerance and issue-orientation for each general norm position.[40]

General norm position exerts a powerful independent effect on matrix response. A permissive general norm position is, with one exception, sufficient to produce a tolerant matrix majority regardless of issue-orientation; Cell 4 and even Cell 7 (with that one exception) generate substantial tolerant majorities. Similarly, a negative general norm position is on all but the softest issues on the softest act sufficient to produce an intolerant matrix majority.

Issue-orientation, also, has a powerful independent effect on tolerance, although the pattern of its influence is somewhat more complex. Changing issue-orientation while holding general norm position constant regularly changes the percentage tolerant in the manner that our model would predict. Furthermore, except for demonstrations to legalize marijuana, a permissive issue-orientation is sufficient to generate a tolerant majority on a matrix item when general norm is neutral. The effects of a negative issue-orientation are not so great, however: on both demonstrating and petitioning a negative issue-orientation will not produce an intolerant matrix majority unless the general norm is also negative.

Although both general norms and issue-orientation have a large independent impact on tolerance, when their effects are compared general norms emerge much the stronger of the two. The softer test is simply to observe the impact of each factor when the other is neutral: the percentages consistent with general norms in Cells 4 and 6 compared with those consistent with issue-orientation in Cells 2 and 8. A permissive general norm position is in fact slightly more powerful than permissive issue-orientation in causing tolerant matrix responses; a negative general norm position is considerably more powerful than negative issue-orientation in producing an intolerant matrix response.

The more powerful test of the relative strengths of general norm position and issue-orientation is to observe what happens when they conflict with each other, as they do in Cells 3 and 7: Cell 7 represents the classic situation of the tolerance literature, in which a tolerant general norm must be applied to an issue or group which the respondent does not like; Cell 3 involves application of an intolerant general norm to an issue or group that is liked.

The data indicate quite clearly that in Cell 7 most respondents remain consistent with their tolerant general norm even when asked to apply it to an issue or group they dislike. On both demonstrating and petitioning, clear majorities remain consistent with a positive general norm rather than negative issue-orientation except on demonstrating for legalization of marijuana, where a bare majority of 52.7 per cent defect from the general norm. Issue-orientation is not without effect: minorities as large as thirty-five per cent do desert the general norm on harder issues other than marijuana; but the overall pattern is clearly one of permissive general norms' dominating intolerant issue-orientation. A tolerant general norm is sufficient to produce a tolerant matrix majority regardless of issue-orientation.

For the most part, the intolerant general norms of Cell 3 also constitute a powerful predictor of matrix response. The exception is the softer issues on our softer act of petitioning. There a permissive issue-orientation is far more powerful than a negative general norm, with a clear majority abandoning the intolerant general norm to permit petitioning on pollution. Even on demonstrating, significant minorities defect from general norm position to permit acting on pollution and crime. Defecting from general norms in specific instances is in fact most likely to occur when intolerant general norms must be applied to "soft" issues rather than when a permissive general norm must be applied to an unpopular "hard" issue; inconsistency is more likely to lead to tolerance than to intolerance.

The Effect of Education. Our findings about differences in applying general norms in specific situations by different education levels and about the relative importance of general norms and issue-orientation for the population as a whole can be combined to yield a series of expectations about the relationship between education and tolerance in each Cell of Figure 3. We know that the upper-educated are in general most likely to remain consistent with general norms, whether tolerant or in-

[40] Tables or percentages based on extremely small numbers of cases per cell are excluded from the data reported.

Table 10. Tolerance Controlling for General Norm and Issue-Orientation Simultaneously

Demonstrations

Crime

	A	S	N
+	95.0	85.5	33.0
0	96.4	83.0	28.6
−	—	—	—

Pollution

	A	S	N
+	94.2	85.7	42.0
0	92.5	79.7	28.4
−	84.2	80.0	—
	.03	.06	.10

Black Militants

	A	S	N
+	98.7	86.1	—
0	83.3	81.7	7.3
−	70.6	56.0	1.9
	.12***	.26***	.04

Radical Students

	A	S	N
+	94.3	63.0	—
0	85.4	73.9	6.9
−	80.3	55.1	2.7
	.09*	.15**	.03

Marijuana

	A	S	N
+	91.6	44.7	0.0
0	82.8	52.0	0.0
−	47.3	27.8	2.1
	.35***	.20***	.02

Housing

	A	S	N
+	92.7	76.8	8.6
0	80.5	67.4	0.0
−	65.0	42.4	0.6
	.20***	.25***	.04**

Petitioning

Crime

	A	S	N
+	98.4	94.2	63.1
0	97.1	89.5	33.3
−	—	—	—

Pollution

	A	S	N
+	98.5	94.2	70.0
0	97.9	88.5	60.7
−	80.0	69.0	—
	.02***	.07***	.08

Black Militants

	A	S	N
+	98.6	86.8	—
0	80.2	72.1	—
−	73.0	57.3	21.3
	.15***	.19***	—

Radical Students

	A	S	N
+	90.1	72.0	—
0	88.8	71.9	—
−	79.0	59.0	33.0
	.10**	.12*	.03

Marijuana

	A	S	N
+	88.5	61.1	—
0	84.6	54.4	—
−	54.7	28.9	18.5
	.28***	.27***	.13

Housing

	A	S	N
+	95.5	79.4	—
0	86.3	74.0	—
−	64.4	47.2	20.7
	.23***	.25***	.07

A = always, S = sometimes, N = never; + = positive, 0 = neutral, − = negative.

tolerant; we also know that within the mass public there is considerable deviation from general norms once the effects of issue-orientation are considered. We might therefore expect that it is among the less-educated that issue-orientation is most effective in generating defection from general norms. The lack of systematic differences across education levels in the zero-order issue-relatedness of tolerance might conceal a complex pattern of differences that emerge only when we control for different general norm positions.

If these expectations are valid, we would expect there to be relatively small educational differences in tolerance of those in Cells 1 and 9 of Figure 3: even if the upper-educated are being driven by general norms and the less-educated by issue-orientation, they are at least being driven in the same direction. Cells 3 and 7 provide the sharpest con-




Figure 4. Average D: Issue-Relatedness of the Four Education Groups on the Four Hard Issues Among Those Always Permitting The Matrix Acts

trast to Cells 1 and 9. In them, general norm position and issue-orientation push against one another: the more educated would therefore tend to be pushed towards consistent tolerance in Cell 7, whereas the less educated would be pushed, at least relatively, toward issue-related intolerance. In Cell 3, on the other hand, the more educated would be pushed toward consistent intolerance and the less educated toward issue-related tolerance. The result would be relatively great educational differences in each of the Cells. We would expect moderate differences in the other Cells.

These expectations result from an assumption that issue-relatedness and education are negatively associated when we control for general norm position. If the less educated are *not* more likely to be affected by issue-orientation at each general norm position, we would expect to find similar educational differences in tolerance in each of Figure 3's nine cells; the greater tolerance of the more educated in Cells 1, 2, and 3 would merely be maintained, since all respondents are equally affected by increasingly negative issue-orientation.

The data reveal that the first set of expectations is substantially correct. Where general norm position and issue-orientation reinforce each other, either positively or negatively, the educated are very slightly more likely to apply the general norm consistently; in Cell 5, where both general norm and issue-orientation are neutral, educational differences are again small, and the more educated are not always more tolerant.

At least moderately large educational differences in tolerance occur in the six other cells for which there are adequate data. The largest differences, however, occur in only three cells, two of them involving direct conflict between general norms and issue-orientation. In Cell 3, where an intolerant general norm confronts a tolerant issue-orientation, tolerance of the soft matrix issues is negatively associated with education; the more educated respondents are more likely to apply their intolerant general norm despite a positive issue-orientation, although the pattern is almost entirely one involving differences between the college-educated and all other respondents rather than a monotonic relationship across the four education levels.

Even larger differences exist in Cells 4 and 7. Where a tolerant general norm is combined with a neutral or negative issue-orientation, tolerance varies directly with education; on the hard matrix issues, the less educated are considerably more likely than others to abandon their tolerant norm unless it is reinforced by a positive issue-orientation. On demonstrating, the large differences occur equally in Cells 4 and 7; on petitioning, they are greater in Cell 7. Cell 7 produces large tolerant majorities among the college-educated; majorities of the less educated groups, however, abandon their tolerant general norm on both acts.

The more rapid fall-off in tolerance of the less educated as we move from Cell 1 to Cell 7 is due to the greater issue-relatedness of the less-educated among those with positive general norm position. Figure 4 shows average *D* of issue-relatedness for each education group for the four hard issues: The pattern is not monotonic, since grade school respondents are less issue-related that we would expect; but over the three higher education levels and for the population as a whole the relationship holds. As education increases, the effectiveness of

increasingly negative issue-orientation in causing defection from a tolerant general norm becomes smaller.

Where general norm position is neutral, however, there are no systematic differences in the issue-relatedness of different educational levels. Issue-relatedness is greater for all groups than it is when general norm is positive, as one would expect. But the increase is greatest among the most educated, thereby eradicating the pattern found when general norm is positive. It is only among respondents with a positive general norm that issue-relatedness decreases with increased education.

Conclusion

Conclusions about Tolerance. Five major substantive conclusions emerge from our data. (1) There was considerably more tolerance of political activity by unpopular groups or in connection with unpopular political issues in 1971 than one might have expected from earlier studies. Although intolerant minorities exist and are numerous, a majority of our sample will allow each matrix act except demonstrating to legalize marijuana. Where tolerance falls off on the harder issues and groups, it does so primarily among the less educated: sizable majorities of the college-educated will allow each matrix act, whereas a majority of the grade-school educated will not permit demonstrating in connection with most of the harder issues and groups.

(2) Tolerance is highly issue-related. Respondents who are sympathetic to the goals of demonstrators are considerably more likely than those neutral or hostile to permit the demonstration to take place. There is no pattern of association at the zero-order level between issue-relatedness of tolerance and education, however: as education increases there is no tendency for respondents to be decreasingly affected by their issue-orientation.

(3) Large majorities of respondents with tolerant general norms apply them consistently in specific situations, even on the hardest issues and groups. For petitioning, defection from intolerant general norms is more common than defection from tolerant general norms for three of the four hard issues and groups. Intolerance is as much due to failure to derive attitudes towards demonstrating and petitioning from general principles of democracy as it is to antipathy toward the issues and groups involved in demonstrations and petitioning. Consistency in applying tolerant general norms to unpopular issues and groups increases with education.

(4) Although both general norms and issue-orientation are of importance in determining tolerance in specific instances, general norms are clearly the more powerful of the two. General norm position is more powerful when it acts alone than is issue-orientation when it acts alone; and when the two conflict with one another general norm position is clearly dominant. Only for demonstrations to legalize marijuana does a majority desert a tolerant general norm to answer consistently with an intolerant issue-orientation, and there the intolerant majority is only 52.7 per cent. The only instance in which issue-orientation dominates general norm position is when a permissive issue-orientation is paired with an intolerant general norm on petitioning; in this case, inconsistency produces tolerance, not intolerance.

(5) Differences between educational strata are greatest where general norms are positive and issue-orientation neutral or negative. Where tolerant general norm and tolerant issue-orientation reinforce each other, differences in the tolerance of different educational groups are slight; as issue-orientation becomes increasingly negative, however, it is those respondents with relatively little education who are particularly likely to defect from the tolerant general norm.

Conclusions about Democracy. We can also ask what implications our findings about tolerance have for the "elite theory of democracy" discussed above, in which the greater tolerance of elites prevents the (relative) intolerance of ordinary citizens from determining government policy. Our data confirm certain elements of the theory: tolerance does increase with education, as does consistency in applying tolerant general norms in specific situations; we have no data for political activists, but we may assume that they, being disproportionately high in education and disproportionately steeped in American political culture, would also be more tolerant and consistent than the population as a whole.

But it does not therefore follow that the elitist theory of democracy is valid. Our data and the logic of the elite theory in fact produce no one determinate course for the future of civil liberties in the United States. The raw material exists for either erosion or preservation of effective democratic procedural norms.

Let us state the pessimist's case first: first of all, tolerance is not unanimous even among the elite; where intolerance is widespread, even a few nontolerant members of the elite might see political gain in breaking with the previously complete agreement. Dahl writes that beliefs of ordinary citizens become relevant only when professionals engage in an intensive appeal to the populace;[41] emerging popular opposition to some aspect of civil liberties may crack the previously solid democratic elite. Second, even if the elite remains

[41] Dahl, *Who Governs?*, p. 324.

solidly on the side of democratic procedural norms, the public is always capable of producing new competing elites who are less tolerant. When procedural norms and civil liberties themselves become the substance of political controversy, as they did in the late 'sixties, on a series of political issues on which the public has an overwhelmingly negative issue-orientation, it is difficult to insulate decision makers from the intolerant demands of their constituents.

If the elite theory of democracy does not seem as impressive a defense of civil liberties in 1974 as it did earlier, there is still not necessarily cause for despair among civil libertarians. First of all, the 1971 public is more tolerant than previous data would have led us to expect. In almost all contexts this tolerant portion of Americans constitutes a clear majority of all citizens; if they can in fact be activated when the need arises, as Truman suggests they can in his discussion of potential groups,[42] America can yet be kept safe for public demonstrations. Second, there is great slack in the system that can be exploited by civil liberties-oriented political elites: the large number of citizens with neutral general norm positions on demonstrating and petitioning could perhaps be moved toward the permissive position through an "education" campaign stressing the logical tie between the most general principles of democracy and always permitting demonstrations and petitioning; emphasis on the logical constraints between attitudes aimed at those who would always permit a political act could decrease still further the already reasonably small proportion of them defecting in specific situations.[43]

Scammon and Wattenburg's advice to liberal politicians to be hard on the social issue in order to advance their other concerns therefore may not apply to those aspects of the social issue involving explicitly political activity. By judiciously selecting the level of abstraction at which they appeal to the populace, or by exercising the "leadership" that civics textbooks often but behavioral scientists never urge upon them, political elites may well be able to improve the prospects for democratic procedural norms.

Finally, the general increase in level of education in the population may eliminate some of the intolerance and inconsistency reported above, although two factors argue against great optimism in this regard. First the mere number of years spent in a classroom explains only a part of the tie between education and tolerance; education is used here as a general indicator of social status as well as of education itself. Furthermore, to the extent that increased years of education are achieved by changing what goes on in the classroom, the effects of schools in the socialization process might also change; high schools graduating students unable to read may also be incapable of inculcating successfully principles of democracy.

Yet education does clearly serve some socializing function; and nearly half of our respondents who had not attended high school (47.0 per cent) were sixty-five or older. As these older, highly uneducated, highly intolerant respondents die and are not replaced by similarly uneducated young people, the overall level of tolerance and consistency in the population may well increase.

[42] See Truman, chap. 6, on potential groups.

[43] See Frank R. Westie, "The American Dilemna: An Empirical Test," *American Sociological Review*, 30 (August, 1965), esp. pp. 536–537, for evidence that when contradiction between liberal general principles and nonliberal specific attitudes is brought to a respondent's attention, he most often changes the specific attitude in the direction of greater tolerance.

Presidential Influence in the House: Presidential Prestige as a Source of Presidential Power*

GEORGE C. EDWARDS III
Tulane University

Introduction

There are many suggested sources of presidential influence in Congress. Among these are the President's party leadership, messages to Congress, personal persuasion, status as Chief of State, "professional reputation," and prestige. This study deals with presidential prestige (or popularity, the terms will be used interchangeably) as a source of presidential influence in the House. The concern here is not with how a president becomes popular[1] but with the more important question of whether it makes any difference if the President is popular or unpopular.

It must be understood that when presidential prestige is discussed here, the reference is to general approval of the President and not to support for a specific policy. In other words, this study is concerned with the strategic and not the tactical level of presidential power.[2] It examines one possible factor (presidential prestige) which increases a president's chances of success in influencing congressmen in any instance and not in just one particular circumstance.

This paper focuses on the relationships among three central aspects of American government (the presidency, the Congress, and public opinion). Presidents expend considerable effort to encourage public support for themselves. Another large portion of their time is spent in developing, presenting, and advocating their legislative programs. Similarly, congressmen spend a large percentage of their time responding to presidential initiatives and to public opinion. On a broader scale, the response of congressmen to public opinion or to certain segments of public opinion is of central significance to democratic theory. Finally, the dependent variables (measures of presidential support in the House) represent clearly identifiable policies and not merely "interesting behavior" with no clear relationship to anything outside the institutional arena in which it takes place.

The most noted proponent of the view that presidential popularity engenders presidential support in Congress is Richard Neustadt, who cites presidential prestige as a central source of presidential power.[3] Many other scholars have argued that presidential popularity is a major source of presidential influence in Congress,[4] but they have based their conclusions on insight and selected examples and have not systematically marshalled

* I wish to express my appreciation to the Research Committee of the University of Wisconsin-Madison Graduate School and Tulane University for the funds necessary to conduct this research.

[1] The best-known study of the sources of presidential popularity is found in John Mueller, *Wars, Presidents,* and *Public Opinion* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1973), chaps. 9–10. For another interesting study see Richard Brody and Benjamin Page, "The Impact of Events on Presidential Popularity: The Johnson and Nixon Administrations" (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in Los Angeles, September 7, 1972).

[2] The terms "power" and "influence" are used interchangeably throughout this research to denote the ability of the President to move congressmen to support him when they otherwise would not. It is quite clear that there are numerous and as yet unresolved problems with the concept of "influence." These include the relative costs to both parties of the use of influence and, more generally, simply proving that *A* caused *B* to do *X* at time *T*. We shall not be concerned with long-term costs here. Rather, the focus will be on the immediate effects of a power source while controlling for alternative explanations of those effects whenever possible. For some relevant discussions of the concept of power see Robert Dahl, *Modern Political Analysis,* 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1970), chap. III; Jack Nagel, "Some Questions About the Concept of Power," *Behavioral Science,* 13 (March, 1968), 129–37; J. Harsanyi, "Measurement of Social Power," *Behavioral Science,* 7 (January, 1962), 67–80.

[3] Richard Neustadt, *Presidential Power* (New York: The New American Library, 1964), chap. 5.

[4] For example see Edward S. Corwin, *The President: Office and Powers,* 4th rev. ed. (New York: New York University Press, 1957), pp. 273, 285; Wilfred E. Binkley, *President and Congress,* 3rd rev. ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1962), pp. 295, 306, 350, 356; Pendelton Herring, *Presidential Leadership* (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1940), pp. 20, 46; Louis Koenig, *The Chief Executive,* rev. ed. (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, Inc., 1968), p. 184; Robert Hirschfield, "The Power of the Contemporary Presidency," *Parliamentary Affairs,* 21 (Summer, 1961), 353–377, esp. pp. 361, 369; James Sundquist, *Politics and Policy* (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1968), pp. 488–89, 496; George Reedy, *The Twilight of the Presidency* (New York: The World Publishing Co., 1970), pp. 45, 46, 81, 82, 130, 147 but see p. 49; Dorothy James, *The Contemporary Presidency* (New York: Pegasus, 1969), p. 115; Rowland Egger, *The President of the United States,* 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1972), p. 172.

For more skeptical views, see Philippa Strum, *Presidential Power and American Democracy* (Pacific Palisades, Cal.: Goodyear Publishing Co., Inc., 1972), p. 6; Dale Vinyard, *The Presidency* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971), pp. 22, 97, 98; Grant McConnell, *The Modern Presidency* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967), p.

empirical data to test their hypotheses.[5] Such an empirical assessment is what this research will attempt.

The Dependent Variables

The dependent variables in this study are Presidential Support Scores calculated by the *Congressional Quarterly*. Using them allows one to measure the level of support for the President's program manifested by each congressman or by any group of congressmen without having to limit oneself to a measure for the House as a whole.[6]

In addition, these indices of presidential support satisfy the test of reliability, since the same criteria for formulating them have been used since 1953. Separate indices of support based on roll-call votes have been calculated for each member of the House for each year. Thus, no sampling procedures were used or needed. We have a universe of congressmen with which to work in the 1953–1972 period. Furthermore, except for 1953–1954 and 1971–1972, separate indices for domestic and foreign policy have been calculated in addition to indices for overall presidential support.

The *CQ* analyzes all the public statements and messages of the President to determine what legislation he personally desires or does not desire. Only issues on which the President has taken a personal stand are included in the indices. Moreover, *CQ* includes votes only if the legislation the President originally supported is voted on in similar form. Likewise, issues are excluded if they have been so extensively amended that a vote can no longer be characterized as reflecting support of or opposition to the President. Furthermore, it is the position of the President *at the time of the vote* which serves as the basis for measuring support or opposition, because the President may have altered his earlier position, or he may change his view after the vote takes place. Finally, key votes to recommit, reconsider, or table are included while appropriations bills are included only if they deal with specific funds that the President requested be added or deleted. This latter point helps distinguish between the President and the institutionalized presidency. Thus, the indices of presidential support meet the test of validity.

Two further points need to be made. First, the visibility of these roll calls provides a link between the public and congressmen. Second, the indices of *aggregate* presidential support we are using take into account Neustadt's warning that "rarely is there any one-to-one relationship between appraisals of [a president's] popularity in general and responses to his wishes in particular."[7] Moreover, congressmen are likely to be more concerned about responding to constituency opinion on a string of votes than on most individual votes.[8]

Nevertheless, these indices of presidential support do present some problems. First, they are based solely on roll-call votes, and it is quite evident that not all important decisions in the House are made on roll-call votes. Many significant decisions are made by committees, party leaders, nonroll-call votes, etc.[9] The roll-call votes utilized here, however, are all significant decisions, and although there is no systematic evidence on this point, it is reasonable to argue the *most* important votes on a President's programs are roll-call votes. Moreover, roll-call votes provide the only systematic data with which we have to work, and they do cover a wide range of issues. The average number of votes included in the overall index in the 1953–1972 period for the House is sixty-three (ranging from 34 to 127 per year).

Another problem is that of nonvoting. Support scores are lowered by absences because the *CQ* makes no attempt to interpret nonvoting on the ground that most absences are due to illness or official business. This explanation may be generally correct, but some absences occur when congressmen desire to support or oppose the President but feel constrained from doing so publicly. There simply is no way to know how to interpret absences. Thus, we are forced to assume that reasons for nonvoting balance out and are evenly distributed throughout the House. This is probably a safe assumption since congressmen from each region have similar rates of voting participation on these sets of roll calls. Moreover, those who were unable to participate in voting because of prolonged illness, death, or resignation were eliminated from the analysis.

73; Elmer Cornwell, *Presidential Leadership of Public Opinion* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965), pp. 302–03; and Malcolm Jewell and Samuel Patterson, *The Legislative Process in the United States*, 2nd ed. (New York: Random House, 1973), p. 309.

For an interesting approach between these polar positions see Stuart Gerry Brown, *The American Presidency* (New York: Macmillan, 1966), pp. 3, 4, 182, 183, 259; Brown differentiates between types of presidential popularity and finds the "partisan" type more useful than the "unpartisan" type in passing controversial legislation. Unfortunately, however, he fails to clarify the distinction between the two. For general agreement with this point see Neustadt, *Presidential Power*, p. 89.

[5] For a brief but suggestive effort see *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports*, September 16, 1966, p. 2173.

[6] It is important to reiterate that what we are examining here is the President's success in gaining support from congressmen for his legislative program and not his success in passing legislation per se. A measure for the latter would give us only one figure per session of Congress and would mask any variability in support between individual congressmen or groups of congressmen.

[7] Neustadt, *Presidential Power*, p. 89.

[8] John Kingdon, *Congressmen's Voting Decisions* (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), pp. 41–42.

[9] See Aage Clausen, *How Congressmen Decide: A Policy Focus* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973), pp. 19–20 for the view that roll-call votes reflect less visible decisions.

A final concern is that of weighting. Both between sessions and within each session each vote is weighted equally with every other vote. The reason for this weighting is that even if we knew the President's complete set of priorities (which we do not) and even if he had a comprehensive set of priorities (which he does not), each member of the House responds to presidential requests with his own set of priorities (to the degree that the member has one). Thus, it seems wisest to treat each issue as equal while remaining fully cognizant that this assumption will be violated on occasion but also realizing that no satisfactory method of handling this problem has been developed and that there is no reason to expect any systematic error in measuring the variable.

Whatever the relationships between presidential prestige and presidential support, the overall figures may mask stronger or weaker relationships for different groups within the House. Thus, we might expect freshmen to be more responsive to public opinion in general and to presidential prestige in particular than nonfreshmen because of the relative insecurity of their positions and their lack of national experience and therefore alternative cues. "Freshman" will be operationalized here as any congressman who has not served, i.e., voted, in the immediately preceding Congress.

Likewise, those from competitive constituencies may be expected to be more responsive to public opinion about the President than their colleagues from safer seats because of the marginality of their electoral bases. Conversely, those from secure seats may have developed more cosmopolitan orientations (encouraging responsiveness to nationally oriented cues) in their generally long tenures than the conventional wisdom attributes to them, while those from marginal seats may be forced to be more attentive to purely local factors unrelated to presidential popularity. Or congressmen from noncompetitive constituencies may find it easier to discern voters' attitudes because the latter are more internally consistent than those in less homogeneous, competitive districts. Moreover, legislators from safe seats may know their constituents' views better than their less electorally secure colleagues because of their generally longer tenures. In addition, if a congressman from a noncompetitive seat votes against the majority opinion of his constituency, he will alienate more voters than similarly voting representatives from more marginal seats.

As there is no standard definition of "safeness," both 55 and 60 per cent of the vote were used as breaking points to designate electoral security. The 60 per cent figure was the more discriminating, and the results reported below are those using this measure.

It is also plausible to expect that members of the two major political parties may respond differently to nationally oriented public opinion. In a study that overlaps with much of the period under examination here, Mayhew has found that House Democrats were more inclusive and less ideological than House Republicans.[10] Therefore, although Mayhew does not make this argument, it is possible that Democratic congressmen are more responsive to broadly based indicators of public opinion than their Republican colleagues, as evidenced by the greater willingness of the former to support legislation which is not of direct interest to their constituencies.

The Independent Variable

We can make use of public opinion polls to serve as an indicator of the President's popularity with the electorate. The Gallup Poll[11] has been asking exactly the same question concerning the President's popularity for over two decades: "Do you approve the way President _____ is handling his job?"[12] Clearly, this is not a precise question relating to specific policies. It does fit the nature of public opinion, however. As Neustadt has written, "Presidential standing outside Washington is actually a jumble of imprecise impressions held by relatively inattentive men."[13] The wording of the question is also consistent with the general indices of presidential support discussed above. In other words, members of Congress can be expected only to respond in a general way to general levels of presidential popularity.

The question has been asked several times a year. In the period covered by this study the fewest times the question was asked in any one year was six (1955, 1956, 1957), and the average number of times per year the question was asked was nine. Thus, it seems likely that presidential popularity in any year has been tapped by our use of the Gallup Poll.

Since the *CQ*'s Presidential Support Scores are computed on a yearly basis, it is necessary to average the polls for each year to arrive at a comparable measure of presidential prestige. There is another good reason for averaging the polls. As Neustadt points out, "since the general public does not govern, presidential influence is shielded from the vagaries of shifting sentiment."[14] Thus,

[10] David Mayhew, *Party Loyalty Among Congressmen* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966).

[11] The Gallup Poll data used here come from the *Gallup Opinion Index* and the Roper Public Opinion Research Center at Williams College in Williamston, Massachusetts.

[12] As Mueller points out, because the percentage of "no opinion" answers has little variation over time, the trend in the "approval" rating of the President is largely a mirror image of the trend in his "disapproval" rating. See Mueller, *Public Opinion*, p. 203.

[13] Neustadt, *Presidential Power*, p. 89.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 91.

sharp short-term fluctuations are not likely to alter the basic attitudes of congressmen toward supporting the President.

The question arises whether a president's popularity and public support for his programs are separate concepts. A number of political observers have argued that there is little connection between a president's prestige and the public understanding of and support for his program.[15]

Numerous authors have shown, however, that significant changes in presidential popularity occurred concomitantly with major events having widespread consequences such as unemployment, inflation, and war.[16] This is strong evidence that presidential popularity and policy are related. In addition, Neustadt points out that "sharp changes in the popularity of men whose public manners were substantially unaltered" have taken place. While the personality of a president can affect his prestige, serving as "a cushion and a prop," what people see happening to themselves is more important in altering the prestige of a president.[17]

On a more abstract level, Schlesinger, writing about President Kennedy, argues that his popularity "was packed with a whole set of intellectual implications which were preparing the nation for legislative change."[18] Moreover, Stokes writes that the candidacy of a particular man for President "has implications reaching beyond sheer popular appeal. A candidate for the nation's great office is a focus for popular feelings about issues and questions of group benefit as well."[19]

Thus, it is reasonable to believe that the Gallup Poll has tapped not only presidential popularity but also general programmatic views as well. Therefore, it would be logical for a congressman to use presidential prestige as an indicator of his constituents' views when he considers his votes on the President's requests.

Two Explanations for Congressmen's Responding to Presidential Prestige

Although numerous authors have argued that presidential prestige is an effective tool in influencing congressmen, they have provided only very general explanations of this relationship. I suggest that there are at least two explanations for a congressman's responding to an increase in presidential popularity by increasing his support for the President's legislative program. The first is derived from role theory. The second is based on the incentive for re-election. Davidson's study of roles in the Eighty-eighth Congress found that 82 per cent of the members of the House considered the primary or secondary aim of their activities ("purposive" role) to be that of a "tribune." In other words, the congressmen saw discovering and reflecting public opinion as a very significant aspect of their positions. Davidson also found that 69 per cent of the members of the House replied that at least to some degree they adopted the role of "delegate." That is, they felt they should accept instructions from their constituents.[20]

In addition, Davidson, O'Leary, and Kovenock show that "the public expects Congress to cooperate with the President and to expedite major aspects of his legislative programs."[21] Presumably, the strength of this expectation is related to the strength of the public's support for the President. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that if congressmen respond to expectations (whether their own or the public's), they should increase their support for the President as the public increases its support for him.

There may be many other varieties of purposive and representational roles than those which have been examined in the literature. Moreover, the role studies on Congress have not shown that role perceptions necessarily lead to the behavior described by these roles. But the significant point is that role theory provides a plausible explanation for presidential popularity influencing support for the President's policies in the House.

The second explanation is based on a different motivation than the first. It is based on the incentive for re-election rather than the motivation of following expectations. In other words, if only for purposes of re-election, congressmen may desire to remain close to or independent of the President, depending on the latter's popularity.

The leading exponent of this view of presidential influence is Richard Neustadt. He argues that the "essence of a President's persuasive task with congressmen . . . is to induce them to believe that what he wants of them is what their own appraisal of their own responsibilities requires them to do in their interest, not his."[22]

Several components must fit together to make

[15] See for example Jewell and Patterson, *Legislative Process*, p. 309; Brown, *American Presidency*, p. 7; and those authors cited in Cornwell, *Presidential Leadership*, pp. 301–02 and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965), p. 714.

[16] Brody and Page, "The Impact of Events;" Mueller, *Public Opinion*, chaps. 9–10; Neustadt, *Presidential Power*, p. 96; Sundquist, *Politics and Policy*, pp. 496–97.

[17] Neustadt, *Presidential Power*, pp. 94, 98.

[18] Schlesinger, *Thousand Days*, p. 726.

[19] Donald Stokes, "Some Dynamic Elements of Contests for the Presidency," *APSR*, 60 (March, 1966), 19–28, at p. 26.

[20] Roger Davidson, *The Role of the Congressman* (New York: Pegasus, 1968), pp. 79, 80, 117.

[21] Roger Davidson, David Kovenock, and Michael O'Leary, *Congress in Crisis: Politics and Congressional Reform* (New York: Wadsworth Publishing Co., Inc., 1966), p. 64.

[22] Neustadt, *Presidential Power*, p. 53.

this a reasonable model. First, most of those involved in governing must have interests of their own which lie beyond the realm of policy objectives. This seems to be particularly true on the national level where political ambition has been a long-term concern of most of the participants, who, on the average, have long political careers.[23]

Second, congressmen must gauge and be concerned about the President's standing with the public outside of Washington.[24] One incentive for this is the lack of systematic indicators of public preferences. Few people communicate at all with congressmen, and few of the communications which are received are issue-related. Moreover, those that do deal with issues generally come from atypical sources and are frequently too obscure or too late to affect the behavior of a congressman.[25]

Furthermore, the views expressed in newspapers are no more representative than those received through the mail or in conversations, quality opinion polls cost too much for all but a few congressmen to make use of them, and questionnaires sent out under the franking privilege are frequently not reliable because the questions are sometimes "loaded" and there is usually an unrepresentative response. In sum, despite numerous sources of constituency information, members of Congress "suffer from an 'information gap'; they face grave difficulties in discovering what are the preferences of their constituents."[26]

In this situation the President's popularity provides a guide to the public's views. As the most central figure in American politics the President is the object of a constant stream of comment and evaluation by all segments of society including those who are unlikely to articulate specific policy preferences.

The third component of the incentive model is that congressmen must anticipate reactions from the public to their behavior towards the President and his policies. This is also true, according to Neustadt, because dependent men must take account of popular reaction to their actions.[27] Moreover, Davidson points out that "many congressmen are hypersensitive to anticipated constituent reaction, regardless of the real threat that may be involved." Therefore, "most members are keenly aware that constituents impose certain boundaries on their activities."[28]

Further evidence of congressmen's concern for public reactions to their behavior comes from research by Miller and Stokes and by Cnudde and McCrone. They show that even though the public is generally ambiguous about their policy preferences, its representatives in the House behave in accordance with what they believe its views are anyway.[29] Likewise, Kingdon argues that congressmen overestimate their visibility and the issue orientation of the electorate and therefore attempt to anticipate the reactions of the electorate.[30] Moreover, even though the electorate may be unclear about specific acts of congressmen, it may well hold images of them.[31]

Thus, given the visibility of the President and the potential importance of presidential prestige as an indicator of constituency preferences and given the phenomena of anticipated reactions, it is plausible that congressmen are concerned with public reactions to their behavior toward the President.

Finally, for the incentive model to hold, congressmen must *act* on the basis of the President's prestige. This is the major question of this study. At this point there is reason to believe that congressmen will respond to public opinion about the President because they feel they ought to, because it is in their interest to do so, or both.

A question relevant to both of the above explanations is that of how do congressmen learn of the President's prestige? While it is reasonable to assume that congressmen are aware of the changes in the overall level of presidential prestige because of the high visibility of the Gallup polls, the figures for presidential popularity among subgroups within the population may not be sufficiently visibile for us to assume that all congressmen could use them as cues in their voting on presidential requests. We can, however, view these results of the Gallup polls as indicators of what congressmen hear of presidential prestige from all sources

[23] Joseph Schlesinger, *Ambition and Politics* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), pp. 90–99; see also Neustadt, *Presidential Power*, p. 54.

[24] Neustadt, *Presidential Power*, p. 88.

[25] Lewis A. Dexter, "What Do Congressmen Hear: The Mail," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 26 (No. 1, 1956), 3–29; Donald Tacheron and Morris Udall, *The Job of a Congressman* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966), pp. 282–83; Leroy Rieselbach, *Congressional Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973), p. 216; Kingdon, *Congressmen's Voting*, pp. 56–57; Lewis Dexter, "The Representative and His District," in *New Perspectives on the House of Representatives*, ed. Robert Peabody and Nelson W. Polsby (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963); Raymond Bauer, Ithiel Pool, and Lewis Dexter, *American Business and Public Policy* (New York: Atherton, 1963), pp. 419–20.

[26] Rieselbach, *Politics*, p. 218.

[27] Neustadt, *Presidential Power*, p. 88.

[28] Davidson, *Role of the Congressman*, p. 121.

[29] Donald Stokes and Warren Miller, "Party Government and the Saliency of Congress," *POQ*, 26 (Winter, 1962), 531–46; Miller and Stokes, "Constituency Influence on Congress," *APSR*, 57 (March, 1963), 45–65; Charles Cnudde and Donald McCrone, "Linkage between Constituency Attitudes and Congressional Voting Behavior: A Causal Model," *APSR*, 60 (March, 1966), 66–72.

[30] John Kingdon, *Candidates for Office* (New York: Random House, 1968), p. 145. See also Kingdon, *Congressmen's Voting*, pp.59–61.

[31] Miller and Stokes, "Constituency Influence," 55.

including constituents, the media, and fellow party elites as well as from the polls themselves. While any of these additional sources of information may represent a biased sample, together they provide congressmen with a triangulation of measures of presidential prestige, increasing the reliability of what they hear.

Analysis

Table 1 shows the relationships between overall presidential popularity as measured by the Gallup Poll and overall, domestic, and foreign policy presidential support, respectively, within the House as a whole and within the subgroups described earlier. Positive relationships are predicted here, i.e., the more popular the President, the more support he should receive in the House for his programs. (The direction of causality will be considered more fully below.)

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Table 1 is that it shows that foreign policy presidential support is the most highly positively related to presidential prestige. The overall relationship between support of the President's foreign policy in the House and his overall popularity is .40[32] while the similar correlation for domestic policy is only −.03.

Table 1. Correlation (r) Between Overall Presidential Prestige and Presidential Support in the House for Overall, Domestic, and Foreign Policy

Congressmen	Overall Policy 1953–1972 (1)	Domestic Policy 1955–1970 (2)	Foreign Policy 1955–1970 (3)
All	.12	−.03	.40
Democrats	.10	.03	.32
Republicans	−.07	−.08	.12
Freshmen	.34	.07	.43
Nonfreshmen	.07	.02	.31
Marginal Seats	−.06	−.23	.14
Safe Seats	.19	.06	.48

The higher correlation for foreign policy matters is not surprising. The President has a more prominent role, relative to that of the House, in foreign than domestic policy. Therefore, congressmen have fewer vested interests involved in foreign than domestic policy making and should be more willing to accept "external" cues in foreign policy decisions. They also should defer more to the President. Moreover, while Miller and Stokes show that congressmen attempt to follow the desires of their constituents on foreign policy questions,[33] it is reasonable to believe that there are fewer constituency cues on these issues than on domestic policy due to the more direct and tangible nature of the latter.[34] Thus, with few cues as to constituency opinions and with the President playing such a significant role in foreign policy, it is understandable that congressmen appear to be influenced by presidential prestige in their voting on foreign policy issues.

One implication of this analysis is that the greatest casualty of a decrease in a President's prestige will be support for his foreign policy. A contemporary example of this was the action of the House moving for the first time to cut off funds for the war in Indochina as Richard Nixon's popularity dropped to the lowest levels in his tenure in office.

Aside from the relative strength of the correlations for foreign policy, it is important to note the weakness of the correlations for overall and domestic policy support. The weak correlation for overall support is a product of the fact that there are more domestic than foreign policy issues in the overall support score. The domestic policy support of the President is fairly stable (standard deviation of 4.79), particularly in Democratic presidential years. It appears to be immune to the rather sizeable alterations (standard deviation of 10.27) in presidential popularity that occurred in the period under study here. Thus, the correlation between overall presidential prestige and domestic policy presidential support is only −.03, and that for overall presidential support is only .12.

Turning to the subgroups of the House, we find that, as expected, Democratic presidential support is more positively correlated with presidential prestige than is Republican support for the overall, domestic, and foreign policy indices.[35] Likewise, the presidential support of freshmen is more positively correlated with presidential popularity than is that of nonfreshmen, also as expected. Although all these comparisons are true for all three support indices, the differences for domestic policy are minor.

Finally, the presidential support of congressmen from the most electorally secure districts shows stronger positive correlations with presidential popularity than does that of their colleagues from

[32] Significance levels are not appropriate here because we are not dealing with a sample of members of the House. Thus, there is no possibility of sampling error. Also neither the dependent nor the independent variables take on extreme values which would bias the findings.

[33] Miller and Stokes, "Constituency Influence," pp. 45–65.

[34] Bauer, Pool, and Dexter, *American Business*, passim; Clausen, *Congressmen Decide*, pp. 223–24.

[35] When it is stated that the presidential support by one group of congressmen is more or less positively correlated with presidential prestige than is the support displayed by another group, this is not the same as saying that one group of congressmen has a higher or lower level of presidential support than another group. In fact, it is possible for the group of congressmen most responsive to presidential prestige to display the lowest level of presidential support.

more electorally marginal districts.[36] This is at least partially explained by the fact that those from secure seats in the 1953–1972 period were disproportionately Democrats, while those from marginal seats were about evenly distributed between the two parties. Since there is a higher positive correlation between presidential prestige and Democratic than Republican presidential support, it follows that the correlations for those from safe seats would be higher than for those from marginal seats if district competitiveness itself did not counteract this party influence. This appears to be the case here. Moreover, district competitiveness seems to augment this relationship, possibly due to the reasons outlined earlier in the discussion of dependent variables.

The most significant fact about the preceding analysis remains that the relationship between the President's overall prestige and his support in the House is quite low for all but foreign policy issues.[37] This may be because congressmen simply do not respond to presidential popularity at all. Or it might be that congressmen or groups of congressmen only respond to the opinions of certain groups within the population.

This second possibility suggests a specific modification of the line of reasoning presented above. It has been argued that congressmen will respond to the President's overall prestige. Several authors have suggested, however, that congressmen do not necessarily define constituencies as all the voters who live within the legal boundaries of their districts. In effect, congressmen choose which groups within their constituencies they will represent. These groups will generally be part of their successful electoral coalitions. In addition, it is these groups with whom the congressmen are likely to communicate most frequently.[38] Thus, it may be that rather than responding to overall presidential prestige, congressmen respond to presidential prestige among the groups which are most likely to support them. They may do so because of role perceptions or for electoral security. Thus, this reasoning is congruent with both the role and the electoral incentive explanations discussed earlier.

For the period from 1965 through 1972 the Gallup Poll has made available the levels of approval of the President of various demographic groups in the population. This period covers full terms of President Johnson, a Democrat, and President Nixon, a Republican. The population breakdown is by sex, age, religion, education, occupation, income, local governmental unit size, region, and political party identification.

Because there are so many independent variables here (the levels of presidential prestige among demographic groups), it is necessary to weed out redundancy. First, the intercorrelations of the categories of each variable were examined to see whether they were sufficiently differentiated to warrant the use of the variable at all. A bivariate correlation of .85 or more was used as the standard to identify those categories which were not distinctive measures of public opinion. This figure is necessarily arbitrary, but it is high enough to weed out redundancy while not so high that truly different measures of presidential prestige will be excluded.[39] The remaining variables were placed in a correlation matrix to test for redundancy between variables.[40]

Thus, of all the original independent variables the only ones that remain are those for party identification and socioeconomic status. Since, however, these are both basic and politically salient demographic groupings, they should serve our purposes well.

[36] This is consistent with Miller's finding that congressmen from safe seats are more likely to reflect what they understand to be constituency preferences than their colleagues from marginal districts. Warren Miller, "Majority Rule and the Representative System of Government," in *Cleavages, Ideologies, and Party Systems*, ed. Erik Allardt and Yrjo Littunen (Helsinki: Transactions of the Westermarck Society, 1964), pp. 362, 363, 368.

[37] There does not appear to be a time lag between a rise or decline in presidential prestige and a commensurate rise or decline in presidential support. Although frequently the two variables do not appear to be related at all, they are more closely related as correlated here than if the presidential support measures were lagged one year on the possibility that it would take congressmen a year's time to become cognizant of presidential prestige.

[38] Dexter, "The Representative," pp. 3–29; Clausen, *Congressman Decide*, pp. 126, 127, 182, 188; Kingdon, *Congressmen's Voting*, p. 34; Neustadt, *Presidential Power*, p. 215; Miller and Stokes, "Constituency Influence," pp. 49–50; Duncan MacRae, *Dimensions of Congressional Voting* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958), p. 264.

[39] For both the eight- and six-year periods under study here all the categories of the variables of sex and age failed the criterion of distinctiveness and were eliminated from the analysis. Moreover, for both time periods the categories of the variables which serve as indicators of socioeconomic status (education, occupation, income, city size) were partially intercorrelated. This occurred when there were more than two categories within a variable and some, but not all of the categories were related at .85 or more. In this case the most representative of the intercorrelated categories (the category most highly correlated with the others) was used and the rest were dropped from the analysis.

[40] Occupation, income, education, and city size were highly intercorrelated. Occupation was selected as the most representative and the most internally differentiated of these, and the other three variables were excluded. Occupation was then dichotomized as high and low socioeconomic status, and these terms are meant to signify general concepts and not precise delineations on the socioeconomic spectrum.

A similar situation occurred for the variable of religion (Protestant, Roman Catholic). The former correlated strongly with high SES while the latter did the same with low SES. Hence, religion was also eliminated from the analysis as SES is more politically salient.

Table 2 covers overall presidential support in the House for the period of 1965 through 1972. It shows the bivariate correlations between presidential prestige among segments of the public and the overall presidential support of members of the House as a whole and of significant groups in the House. These groups are the same as those utilized in the examination of the influence of overall public approval of the President on presidential support in the House.

Examining columns two and three of Table 2, we can see that the correlations between House Democrats and lower SES opinion and between House Republicans and upper SES opinion are positive and moderately strong—a finding that is congruent with the theory that members of Congress will respond to the views of those who form their electoral bases. As every student of politics knows, the Republicans draw most of their support from upper SES voters and Democrats from lower SES voters.

Moving down columns two and three, we note that the correlations become even more impressive. The correlation between the presidential support of Democratic congressmen and presidential prestige among Democrats in the public is .92, while that between Republican congressmen and Republican identifiers is .83. Conversely, the presidential support of Democratic congressmen shows a very high negative correlation with presidential prestige among Republican identifiers, and the same is true for Republican congressmen and Democratic identifiers. Thus, congressmen from the two parties appear to be responding to two clearly different sets of public opinion.

Since party identification of voters is an even better indicator of sources of support for congressmen than SES, the finding that congressmen seem to respond to identifiers with their own party is precisely what our theories predict. Congressmen from each party respond to the President's prestige within their electoral bases (i.e., Democratic representatives to Democratic party identifiers and Republican representatives to Republican party identifiers). The reasons for this may be role perceptions, pragmatic concerns about reelection, or both.

The fact that voters with no party identification occupy a middle position in regard to correlations with congressmen from the two parties lends further support to this explanation. Independents do not form a consistent base of support for one party, and, in general, they vote less frequently and have less well-developed ideas politically than members of either major party.[41] Thus, it is more difficult and less profitable for congressmen to respond to the views of Independents than to those of the supporters of their own parties. This is particularly so for Democratic congressmen, who are more likely to come from safe seats than are their Republican colleagues.

All of this also explains the figures in column one. The presidential support of the House as a whole correlates more highly with presidential prestige among Democratic party identifiers and low SES persons than their opposites because there were more Democrats than Republicans in the House in the 1965–1972 period.

As expected, the presidential support shown by freshmen is more positively correlated with presidential prestige among all the population subgroups here than is that shown by nonfreshmen, just as it was for overall opinion. Furthermore, the presidential support by congressmen from marginal seats is less positively correlated with presidential prestige than is that by congressmen from safe seats. This was also the case for overall presidential popularity.

Table 3 presents the correlations for domestic policy covering the period of 1965 through 1970. With one exception they follow the same general patterns and levels of strength as the correlations for overall presidential support. The exception is

[41] Frank Sorauf, *Party Politics in America*, 2nd ed. (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1972), p. 173.

Table 2. Correlation (*r*) Between Presidential Prestige Among Groups and Overall Presidential Support in the House, 1965–1972

	House Presidential Support						
Presidential Prestige	All (1)	Democrats (2)	Republicans (3)	Freshmen (4)	Non-freshmen (5)	Marginal Seats (6)	Safe Seats (7)
Low SES	.22	.30	−.41	.75	−.17	−.52	.62
High SES	−.22	−.44	.39	.20	−.41	−.48	.03
Democrats	.63	.92	−.93	.80	.34	−.01	.81
Republicans	−.51	−.85	.83	−.32	−.47	−.32	−.44
Independents	−.12	−.32	.29	.33	−.32	−.44	.14

Table 3. Correlation (r) Between Presidential Prestige Among Groups and Domestic Policy Presidential Support in the House, 1965–1970

	House Presidential Support						
Presidential Prestige	All (1)	Democrats (2)	Republicans (3)	Freshmen (4)	Non-freshmen (5)	Marginal Seats (6)	Safe Seats (7)
Low SES	.11	.05	−.26	.70	−.30	−.52	.53
High SES	−.14	−.44	.34	.29	−.35	−.48	.13
Democrats	.57	.85	−.90	.80	.22	.04	.78
Republicans	−.39	−.79	.74	−.15	−.39	−.40	−.28
Independents	−.04	−.35	.30	.38	−.27	−.42	.22

the correlation between Democratic presidential support and presidential prestige among those of low SES. Here the correlation is only .05. Thus, although the correlation between House Democrats and Democratic identifiers in the public is an impressive .85, Democratic congressmen were unresponsive to a group which has traditionally provided a large segment of their electoral support. And this group of voters includes many who supported George Wallace and not Hubert Humphrey in the 1968 presidential election.[42] Nevertheless, the major finding remains that the presidential support of congressmen is highly correlated with the President's prestige among those citizens who are likely to support them.

Table 4 deals with support for the President's foreign policy. The correlations are generally stronger and in a more positive direction than those for domestic policy shown in the preceding table. The exception is row three (Democratic opinion) where the domestic policy correlations are the most strongly positive of any row in either of the tables. The reasons for the generally higher correlations for foreign policy support, as suggested above, are the President's more prominent role in foreign affairs relative to that of the House and the lack of alternatives to presidential prestige as an indicator of the public's views.

The finding of more positive relationships here reflects what seems to be a greater consensus among congressmen on foreign policy than on domestic policy. Thus, the differences between the correlations for groups of congressmen, including representatives of the two parties, are less extreme on foreign policy. This may be because of diminished party salience in foreign policy[43] or fewer divisive constituency cues, or both.

Despite these findings, the basic patterns of relationships which occurred for overall and domestic policy support also hold for foreign policy support. In other words, Democratic congressmen appear to respond most to Democratic identifiers and Republican congressmen appear to do likewise to Republican identifiers. Furthermore, freshmen and those from safe seats seem to be more positively responsive to presidential prestige than nonfreshmen and those from marginal seats.

In addition, the correlations between the presi-

[42] Philip Converse, Warren Miller, Jerold Rusk, and Arthur Wolfe, "Continuity and Change in American Politics: Parties and Issues in the 1968 Elections," *APSR*, 63 (December, 1969), 1083–1105.

[43] Julius Turner and Edward Schneier, *Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress*, rev. ed.; (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), p. 104; Clausen, *Congressmen Decide*, p. 168.

Table 4. Correlation (r) Between Presidential Prestige Among Groups and Foreign Policy Presidential Support in the House, 1965–1970

	House Presidential Support						
Presidential Prestige	All (1)	Democrats (2)	Republicans (3)	Freshmen (4)	Non-freshmen (5)	Marginal Seats (6)	Safe Seats (7)
Low SES	.53	.42	−.15	.82	.13	−.23	.89
High SES	.40	.02	.37	.42	.17	−.08	.57
Democrats	.48	.82	−.73	.79	.20	−.07	.72
Republicans	.12	−.38	.70	−.04	.07	.01	.12
Independents	.45	.09	.34	.47	.21	−.06	.63

dential support by Democrats in the House and presidential prestige among low SES voters are considerably higher on foreign than on domestic policy. This finding supports the contention that the Democrats lost the 1968 presidential election because they failed to satisfy many potential supporters on domestic policy (and not foreign policy).[44]

At this point it is important to discuss several possibilities which could lead us to modify the most significant findings noted above. First, we have assumed that congressmen follow public opinion about the President and do not lead it. If the reverse were true, then it would follow that presidential support could not be a response to presidential prestige. That there is some opinion leadership emanating from Congress, particularly from key members, seems plausible, but the extent is unmeasured and perhaps unmeasurable. Nevertheless, most members of Congress are not highly visible to their constituents[45] and are unlikely to influence very much the President's popularity among them.

Another possibility is that yet a third factor influences both presidential prestige and presidential support. In this case the relationship between the two variables would be spurious. One such possibility is that members of each party in the public react positively or negatively to the President because of his proposed legislative programs and so do members of each party in the House. Thus, presidential programs and not popularity would be responsible for presidential support.

This reasoning, however, assumes that both the public and congressmen respond similarly to presidential programs, which is unlikely given their differences in backgrounds, responsibilities, and access to information on presidential proposals. In addition, to accept this line of reasoning one must assume that public and congressional evaluations of the President are based solely on his legislative programs. Thus, one would have to assume that the President's failure to propose programs, his policies which are not voted on by the House (appointments, administrative decisions, much of our foreign policy, etc.), and his handling of other matters (Watergate, State of the Union messages, etc.) have little influence on presidential popularity or support. Again, it would be difficult to accept these assumptions.

An assertion that both the public and congressmen respond similarly to the President's general performance fares no better. Again, one would have to assume similar responses on the part of both groups. Moreover, congressmen would have to translate their general evaluations into specific votes on legislative proposals which in turn matched changes in the public's level of general presidential approval. This is hardly likely.

Another possibility—and one more worthy of testing—is that most of the variance in both presidential popularity and presidential support in the 1965–1972 period is due to the shift in the party of the President from 1968 to 1969. In other words, we might expect that the party of the President would have some influence on his public popularity and his congressional support.[46] Thus, the strong correlations between presidential prestige and presidential support might be due to the influence of presidential party on them both.

To test for this possibility we shall employ a "dummy" variable[47] to control for the party of the President in the theoretically significant relationships between presidential popularity among Democratic and Republican party identifiers and the presidential support by Democratic and Republican congressmen, respectively. The results of this procedure are shown in Table 5.

Examining the Democratic half of the table first and comparing columns one and two, we find that the original correlations are reduced. Nevertheless, the relationships remain strongly positive.

[44] Richard Scammon and Ben Wattenberg, *The Real Majority* (New York: Coward-McCann, 1970), pp. 181–84.

[45] Stokes and Miller, "Saliency of Congress," pp. 531–46.

[46] I wish to thank Douglas Rose for his suggestions regarding this point.

[47] Presidential party is operationalized here with "1" representing Democrat and "0" representing Republican.

Table 5. Simple and Partial Correlations Between Presidential Prestige and Presidential Support in the House

	Democrats		Republicans	
Presidential Support	Simple Correlation (1)	Controlling for President's Party (2)	Simple Correlation (3)	Controlling for President's Party (4)
Overall Policy, 1965–1972	.92	.61	.83	−.41
Domestic Policy, 1965–1970	.85	.49	.79	−.49
Foreign Policy, 1965–1970	.82	.73	.70	−.12

Thus, our earlier conclusions about the importance of presidential prestige in explaining the variance in presidential support in the House remain basically undisturbed for the Democrats.

Moving to the Republican side of Table 5 and comparing columns three and four, we find major differences between the simple and partial correlations. Not only are the original correlations reduced in strength, but more significantly, they become negative. *Clearly, Republican congressmen are not responding in their support for presidential policies to presidential popularity among the mass of Republican party identifiers in the public.*

It is still possible, however, that Republican congressmen are responding to presidential popularity, but among a more exclusive grouping of fellow party members than is the case for their Democratic colleagues. This possibility is suggested by a work of Converse, Clausen, and Miller which provides evidence that Republican elites may respond to the more "partisan" opinion within their party.[48] Furthermore, McClosky, Hoffman, and O'Hara have shown that the views of Republican party leaders are less congruent with those of the Republican rank-and-file than are the views of Democratic party leaders with the Democratic rank-and-file,[49] a finding that has been corroborated in a more recent study of mass and elite opinions.[50]

Within each individual there is a nonpartisan response to individuals and events in the political arena. For some, notably Independents, this is all there is. For those with partisan identifications, however, a partisan element is added to their responses. As an individual's partisan identification increases, the magnitude of the partisan element and of its domination of responses also increases—to the point that persons with extremely strong partisan identifications will have nearly totally partisan responses to political persons and events.[51]

It is to the strongly partisan group of Republicans that we suspect Republican congressmen may be responding.

While ideally we could separate out this extreme group, this is not possible here because we only have data on presidential popularity among Republicans in their entirety. Nevertheless, it is possible to isolate partisan modes of responses *within* individuals. By controlling for presidential support among Independents (with nonpartisan responses), we can isolate the more partisan responses of Republicans, which we can reasonably expect to be concentrated among highly partisan Republican identifiers.[52] For comparative purposes this procedure will also be carried out for Democratic identifiers.

Table 6 presents the correlations for the relationships between presidential popularity among identifiers of each party and the presidential support by congressmen from each of the parties, respectively, while controlling for the less partisan component of presidential prestige.

Table 6. Correlation Between Presidential Prestige and Presidential Support in the House Controlling for the Less Partisan Element of Presidential Popularity

	Partial Correlations	
Presidential Support	Democrats	Republicans
Overall Policy, 1965–1972	.90	.96
Domestic Policy, 1965–1970	.90	.92
Foreign Policy, 1965–1970	.82	.78

Looking at the Democratic column, we find that the figures remain very nearly the same as the original correlations shown in column one of the previous table. Thus, it seems clear that Democratic congressmen are as responsive to Democratic identifiers in general as to the more partisan element of the party.

Conversely, the figures in the Republican column are considerably more strongly positive than the original correlations shown in column three of Table 5. Thus, they support the hypothesis that Republican congressmen are responsive to presi-

[48] Philip Converse, Aage Clausen, and Warren Miller, "Electoral Myth and Reality: The 1964 Election," *APSR*, 59 (June, 1965), 321–36.

[49] Herbert McClosky, Paul Hoffman, and Rosemary O'Hara, "Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Party Leaders and Followers," *APSR*, 54 (June, 1960), 406–27.

[50] William Shaffer, Ronald Weber, and Robert Montjoy, "Mass and Political Elite Beliefs about the Policies of the Regime" (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in New Orleans, September 7, 1973, pp. 14–16). See also a mid-1974 column by Rowland Evans and Robert Novak which discusses "a potentially disastrous Republican syndrome of mistaking the blind pro-Nixon loyalty of precint workers for popular opinion. What's more, they press this misconception on congressmen. . ." " 'Potentially Disastrous' Republican Syndrome," *Washington Post*, May 19, 1974, sec. C, p. 7.

[51] Philip Converse, "The Concept of a Normal Vote," in *Elections and the Political Order*, ed. Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966), pp. 9–39; Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960), pp. 128–36.

[52] This is reasonable despite the fact that there are high correlations between Independent and Republican opinion (.74 for 1965–1972 and .83 for 1965–1970) while there are very low relationships between Independent and Democratic opinion (−.08 and −.02, respectively), because presidential popularity among Independents does not influence Republican presidential support (the partial correlation for overall support is −.86). It should also be noted that the correlations above tell us nothing about levels of presidential prestige.

dential prestige within the more partisan element of the party. Before reaching a conclusion, however, we must add the control of presidential party.

The results of correlating presidential popularity among Republicans in the public with the presidential support by Republican congressmen while controlling for both presidential party and the less partisan component of presidential prestige, are shown in Table 7. The partial correlations are lower than the zero-order figures as well as those in Table 6 above. Nevertheless, the figures are strongly positive, as opposed to those in column four of Table 5, where the only control was for presidential party. Indeed, the correlations very closely resemble the Democratic figures in column two of that same table. Therefore, it appears as though Republican congressmen are responsive to presidential prestige in their decision making on presidential support—but to a more exclusive grouping of their partisan supporters than is the case for Democratic congressmen.

Table 7. Correlation Between Presidential Prestige among Republicans and Republican Presidential Support in the House

Presidential Support	Partial Correlations Controlling for Presidential Party and the Less Partisan Element of Presidential Popularity
Overall Policy, 1965–1972	.61
Domestic Policy, 1965–1970	.49
Foreign Policy, 1965–1970	.68

Despite these findings, a caveat is necessary because of the multicollinearity between presidential party and presidential prestige. In the 1965–1972 period, the two correlate at .87 for Democrats and −.96 for Republicans. (The figure for the Republicans is negative due to the scoring of the dummy variable for presidential party.) For the 1965–1970 period, the figures are .80 and −.95, respectively. This makes it difficult to assess the relative importance of the two variables in their influence on presidential support.

Much of the relationship between presidential prestige and presidential support has been found to be closely tied to partisanship. What is unclear, because of the multicollinearity, is whether or not presidential party links the two in whole or in part. In other words, all, none, or some of the influence of presidential party on presidential support could work through presidential popularity. If none of this influence is indirect, i.e. through presidential prestige, then most of the relationship between presidential prestige and presidential support would be spurious.

Although it is not possible to reach a firm conclusion, it seems likely that at least some of the influence of presidential party on presidential support is indirect (see Figure 1). First, the findings above of relationships between presidential prestige and presidential support are consistent and reasonable. In addition, there is variance in presidential support even within the tenure of a single president, indicating that presidential party does not necessarily or soley determine presidential support.




Figure 1. Paths of Influence Between Presidential Party, Presidential Prestige, and Presidential Support

Moreover, while there is little question that congressmen respond to the party of the President when voting on some presidential requests,[53] it is also true that recent research has shown that this influence may be overrated. Clausen found that on most policy dimensions there was no shift in the policy positions of congressmen from either party when the presidency switched from Eisenhower to Kennedy-Johnson to Nixon.[54] Congressmen voted the same general way on policies no matter which party held the White House.

Thus, in the absence of variables other than presidential party which might affect the basic relationship,[55] it appears that presidential prestige has a significant influence on presidential support in the House.

The Findings in Perspective

The major findings of this research have their most direct implications for executive-legislative

[53] Kingdon, *Congressmen's Voting*, pp. 173–75.

[54] Clausen, *Congressmen Decide*, p. 196.

[55] The independent variables which Mueller uses in his work on predicting presidential popularity on a near-monthly basis (see footnote one) are not useful here because they are largely invariate over the time period under study and/or because the dependent variables here are aggregated on a yearly basis. Moreover, doubt is cast on the explanatory value of Mueller's variables in Douglas Hibbs, "Problems of Statistical Estimation and Causal Inference in Time-Series Regression Models," in *Sociological Methodology 1973–1974*, ed. H. L. Costner (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1974), pp. 252–308. While there are many other plausible reasons for congressmen supporting the President's policies in addition to presidential party and presidential prestige including ideological preference, patriotism, a desire for presidential favors, a desire to avoid presidential wrath, and presidential charm in personal relations, they should not systematically influence the relationships between presidential popularity and presidential support because they do not affect the former.

relationships and the separation of powers. "What the Constitution separates," writes Neustadt, "political parties do not combine."[56] Since the President is the primary initiating force in national politics, he must solve this problem inherent in our system of separation of powers if he is to see his programs enacted into law. Thus, a President interested in increasing his congressional support should not overlook the influence potential of his personal popularity. In other words, he should attempt to influence congressmen indirectly by strengthening his support among the American people. Moreover, he should be concerned with his prestige among members of both parties, because congressmen from both parties respond to his prestige, particularly his popularity among their electoral supporters.

Presidential prestige, however, is not solely determined by the President himself. Such diverse factors as political scandals in the executive branch, the extent of his personal and media charisma, international events, and activities in the private sector of the economy can and do affect a president's prestige.[57] At the same time these phenomena may be largely beyond his control. Although the image of a president is fairly stable, "the values men assign to what they see can alter rather quickly." A president's prestige is threatened by people's frustration from what they see happening to themselves.[58] Thus, although presidential popularity appears to be an effective tool of presidential influence, it is not one easily manipulated by a president.

Moreover, there is nothing inherent in presidential prestige which makes it useful only as an instrument of presidential influence. It may also serve as a restraint on the President. Presidential policies which require positive congressional action such as providing the necessary authorization or resources may be constrained by the lack of presidential support in the public. Therefore, opponents of presidential policies should emphasize the meanings which the public places on presidential actions (which in turn affect presidential prestige) in addition to attempting to directly persuade congressmen to oppose the President.

In integrating these findings into larger theories of congressional voting, the first point to be made is that presidential prestige must be added to the list of variables which have been found useful in explaining roll-call behavior. Moreover, it is a more purely "political" variable than many of those which have served as indicators of popular demands such as the demographic characteristics of constituencies, states, and regions. Thus, it has greater value in explaining linkages between citizens and their elected representatives.

A second important finding concerning legislative voting behavior relates to constituency influence. It has been found that in making decisions on presidential support, congressmen seem to respond not to presidential prestige among the public as a whole but to presidential prestige among their electoral supporters. Thus, they appear to define their constituencies less comprehensively than the legal boundaries of those units imply. This is consistent with Kingdon's finding of closer relationships between the attitudes of the majority element in a congressional district and the voting of that district's congressman than between such voting and constituency attitudes as a whole.[59]

Nevertheless, members of the House do seem to respond to public opinion about the President, and those from both ends of the socioeconomic scale are included in winning electoral coalitions in different constituencies. Thus, presidential popularity provides a ready vehicle through which the public can express its general views to congressmen and can have an effect on congressional behavior without having detailed views on specific policies.

[56] Neustadt, *Presidential Power*, p. 33.

[57] See Mueller, *Public Opinion*, chaps. 9–10, for example.

[58] Neustadt, *Presidential Power*, pp. 95–96.

[59] John Kingdon, "Politicians' Beliefs and Voters," *APSR*, 61 (March, 1967), 137–45; see also Miller and Stokes, "Constituency Influence," pp. 49–50.

Political Innovation of the West German Federal Constitutional Court: The State of Discussion on Judicial Review *

FRITZ NOVA
Villanova University

Past Theories on Political Adjudication

As is commonplace, the Basic Law—the constitutional document of the German Federal Republic—conferred upon the newly created Federal Constitutional Court (in this study to be referred to henceforth as FCC) the power to examine and to adjudicate a variety of constitutional disputes. These include cases of alleged violations of and incompatibilities between the Basic Law and a federal law, a state law in conflict with a federal law, state laws in conflict with each other, controversies arising out of the application of an international agreement and the federal law.

This power, referred to in German as "*richterliche Normenkontrolle*" and "*Verfassungspruefungsrecht*," and broadly corresponding to the English concept of judicial review, has reopened in West Germany the discussion on the nature and implication of political jurisprudence (adjudication), specifically whether the courts could engage themselves with political, as distinguished from "strictly" legal, controversies.

It should be noted at the outset that there is a basic difference between the United States and the German system of judicial review: The FCC rules on the constitutionality of the law as such, whereas United States courts deal with the decision of a concrete case. The Supreme Court's jurisdiction is limited by the definition of judicial power under Article III. On the other hand, the FCC is limited in its jurisdiction to dealings with constitutional questions (a jurisdiction which is entirely original), whereas the United States Supreme Court exercises an extensive appellate jurisdiction.

The principal, though widely divergent, positions toward political adjudication in the Federal Republic (besides those of Professors Werner Weber, Hans Schneider, Hans Nawiasky, and others) have been taken by Professors Carl Schmitt and Hans Kelsen, with Professor Gerhard Leibholz presently seeking to create a bridge between them. Under the influence of Guizot (*Des Conspirations et la Justice politique*, 1848), who held that a mingling of judication with politics would inevitably lead to a politicization of justice, and Montesquieu (*De L'Esprit des Lois*, 1758), who coined the much overquoted maxim that a judge was "*en quelque façon nulle . . . la bouche qui prononce les paroles de la loi*,"[1] Schmitt and his followers warned against any association between the political and judiciary branches and rejected emphatically the power of judicial review. Schmitt's most cogently formulated thesis is contained in his essay "Das Reichsgericht als Hueter der Verfassung," in *Die Reichsgerichtspraxis im deutschen Rechtsleben* (*Reichsgerichtsfestschrift*, 1929) in which he asserted that only a higher echelon political institution, endowed with a specially intense political power, should be entitled to be the guardian (custodian) of the constitution. The judiciary, Schmitt held, was entirely unqualified to be this guardian, unless it was determined, of course, to surrender its judicial character altogether. As soon as the courts were entitled to decide on matters pertaining to contents of the constitution, they ceased to perform judiciary functions. It would then be more appropriate to speak of the courts as institutions engaged in legislative processes in the form of a judicial procedure. Being authorized to examine and, if necessary, to nullify legislative enactments, the courts were in fact performing the functions of law makers, not of law determiners. This would result, Schmitt concluded, in politicizing justice and in establishing a government of judges, with all the debilitating further consequences for a viable legislative system.[2]

Carl Schmitt was always an advocate of strong executive power, reacting strongly to the weakness of the legislative assemblies. For him the problem of judicial review was linked to the problem of the relationship between law and politics, and the relationship among separation of powers, pluralism, and popular sovereignty. Ultimately he

* This study is the result of research which was made possible by the author's Senior Fulbright Lectureship at the Seminar Fuer Politische Wissenschaft of the Friedrich Wilhelms University of Bonn, 1971–1972.

[1] Charles L. de Secondat Montesquieu, *De L'Esprit des Lois*, ed. Robert Berathé (Paris: Garnier Frères, 1973), book ii, chapter 6, pp. 173, 176.

[2] "Die Reichtsgerichtspraxis im deutschen Rechtsleben," *Reichsgerichtsfestschrift*, I, pp. 154–178. Cf. also Schmitt, *Verfassungslehre* (1928; rpt. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1954) p. 185. Note 1, Cf. Heinz Laufer, *Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit und politischer Prozess* (Tuebingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1968) p. 275 f; Peter Wittig, "Politische Ruecksichten in der Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts?" in *Der Staat*, 8 (1969) 137–158; Ulrich Scheuner, "Probleme und Verantwortungen der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in der Bundesrepublik," in *Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt* 67, No. 10 (May 15, 1952), p. 293.

ended up justifying the strong Nazi state, at least in its earlier phases. For Schmitt any form of insecurity and discord tended to open the doors to "state-neutral," anarchical, and pluralistic foces which would eventually split the state and tear it into pieces. A strong monist state alone was the *sine qua non* of any state's efficiency.[3]

A counterposition was taken by Hans Kelsen who is his "Wesen und Entstehung der Staatsgerichtsbarkeit" (Vol. 5, *Veroeffentlichung der Vereinigung Deutscher Staatsrechtslehrer*, 1929, pp. 30 ff.) and his "Wer soll Hueter der Verfassung sein?" (1931) asserted that, since all political actions of the state also had judicial aspects, Schmitt's distinction between law and politics was irrelevant, if not erroneous. No essential difference existed, according to Kelsen, between the functions of the judiciary and the legislature, except in a quantitative sense. Kelsen therefore endorsed the notion and institution of a political constitutional judicature, contrary to the teachings of Montesquieu and to the tradition of German political jurisprudence before World War II. For Kelsen it seemed irrelevant whether or not constitutional tribunals still dispensed "genuine justice." He assumed that intentially or unintentionally no gaps (*Lueckenprobleme*) existed in constitutions, except in a merely mechanical sense.[4] Kelsen denied that a dichotomy existed between the judiciary, parliament, and government, inasmuch as their functions and operations were organically intertwined. Because of this presumed interrelationship, Kelsen, in contrast to Schmitt, approved of a constitutional tribunal as guardian over the constitution (while Schmitt's thesis was appropriately referred to as "dezisionistisch," i.e., opposed to courts as decision-making constitutional entities). Kelsen's position may be explained by his having been Minister of Justice in Austria during the immediate post-World War I period, and his work on the Constitutional Court may be in some respects a specialized reaction to specialized conditions of post-Habsburg Austria.[5]

A more recent debate on the nature and function of constitutional adjudication, reminiscent of the Schmitt-Kelsen confrontation, has centered around Professors Erich Kaufmann, at one extreme, and Ulrich Scheuner, Hans Spanner, and others, at the other. Kaufmann's thesis, briefly summarized, was that only "genuinely" legal cases could be decided by the courts, that constitutional litigation, like all other litigation, was subject to the ordinary courts, provided it fitted into the category of "genuine" legal subject matters. The judges in those cases, Kaufmann assumed, were totally dependent upon, and acting with specifically circumscribed references to legal norms. Nongenuine constitutional subject matters, i.e., those which extended to political, not judicial, disputes, were normless and therefore unjusticiable. Constitutional tribunals, where they existed to supplement the regular courts, were competent only to hear cases which by their nature could be decided on "genuine" legal grounds, but not to render judgment on political controversies. To use Kaufmann's own concrete example, he objected to the jurisdiction of the FCC in cases of alleged unconstitutionality of a political party—for him a political, not a legal matter to decide. As to the tribunal's power of judicial review, Kaufmann reasoned, it had to be limited to cases of administrative enactments and to the rarer cases of a violation of the Basic Law by the Legislators, provided the constitutional tribunal operated within narrowly set confines.[6] Kaufmann, not unlike Schmitt, although politically disengaged, reacted against the weakness of parliamentary government in the era of the Weimar Republic, which tended to color his writing and thinking on constitutional law.

Professor Scheuner denied Kaufmann's distinction between legal (justiciable) and political (nonjusticiable) controversies. Scheuner reasoned that law and politics were in no way opposites, and that political questions, properly formulated, were equally justiciable. He drew the distinction between types of political controversies, such as (1) those which had political effects or were of some political interest, e.g., a criminal procedure against a politically prominent personality; (2) those controversies which were not concerned with the interpretation of an existing law, but rather with the change of a law or with questions which were still to be solved, e.g., as in changing a legal situation or adjusting stipulations of a treaty to changed conditions; and (3) those controversies that were political by virtue of their subject matter, such as constitutional law, which for Scheuner was "political law."[7]

Approaching the argument from a different angle, Professor Spanner took issue with Kauf-

[3] Schmitt, *Die Diktatur* (1928; rpt. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1964), p. 109. Cf. Schmitt, *Staat, Bewegung, Volk* (Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1935), p. 33.

[4] Kelsen, in discussion on "Wesen und Entwicklung der Staatsgerichtsbarkeit," *Veroeffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer*, 5 (1929) p. 119; also Laufer, p. 278, "Wer soll der Hueter der Verfassung sein?" in *Die Justiz*, Vol. VI, p. 576 ff, particularly p. 183 f. Scheuner, p. 294.

[5] Kelsen, *Reine Rechtslehre* (Vienna: Franz Deuticke, 1960) pp. 100 ff. Cf. Martin Drath, "Die Grenzen der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit," in *Veroeffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer*, 9 (1952) 17–111, at pp. 91–92.

[6] Senatspräsident Ule, "Die Entwicklung des Oeffentlichen Rechts: Grenzen der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit," in *Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt*, 65 (1950), p. 748.

[7] Scheuner, pp. 295–296.

mann's thesis that a wide discretion was vested in the legislature (a sort of "legislative review"), even in matters of treaties with foreign powers.[8] The competence of the constitutional court, as judicial reviewer, should extend, Spanner suggested, to all cases in which law and politics were inseparably linked. Furthermore, the court was entitled to base its decisions on political considerations, complex problems requiring complex approaches. He warned against putting a straitjacket on the constitutional court by limiting its decisions (as Kaufmann had insisted) to strictly normative legal considerations.[9]

Most of the West German constitutional political scientists have refrained from identifying themselves very closely with the extreme positions of either Schmitt or Kelsen and have generally approved of constitutional adjudication within circumscribed limits. Leading among these "moderates" is Professor Leibholz, whose position is today most generally representative. In a recent symposium appraising the first twenty years of the existence of the FCC (on the bench of which he served from its beginning through 1971), Leibholz referred to the FCC as the instrument of "legal realization": the FCC had performed "genuine judicial decisions," not by limiting itself to the role of mechanical technicians, but by finding and probing into the constitution-makers' intention.[10] What mattered alone, according to Leibholz, was that the decision of the FCC conformed to legal standards; that there existed a genuine legal dispute; that the intention of the constitution makers, which was to be examined by the Court, was ascertainable by legal means; and that the constitutional judge was in the position to fill possible gaps left by the constitution-makers by specific points of reference, principle, or other criteria contained in the Basic Law.[11]

As I shall explain below, the contemporary discussion on the nature of judicial review has switched to a different level: instead of a highly abstract dialogue on the matter of approval and denial of political constitutionalism, along the lines of argumentation of Schmitt v. Kelsen or Kaufmann v. Scheuner et al., the discussion has moved to more concrete problems of the degrees and extent of political adjudication, a discussion which will form the bulk of this study.

Also the formerly much too theoretical discussion of whether constitutional adjudication was a proper single or collective designation is now considered as largely unnecessary: Professor Ernst Friesenhahn maintained that constitutional judicature was merely a collective term covering different types of adjudication,[12] while Professor Ulrich Scheuner affirmed the feasibility of constitutional judicature as a unified (unitary) designation, organically embracing various forms and aspects. Among them he distinguished the functions performed by preserving the peace in the Federal Republic and in the constitutional realm in general; by safeguarding the preeminence of the constitution over statutory enactments, by securing constitutionalism in a wider sense, and by guaranteeing the fundamental rights.[13] Instead of prolonging a rather inconsequential although highly sophisticated debate, Scheuner has proposed a greater concentration on the deeper immediate problems and implications of judicial review which he appropriately referred to as "the most sensitive and by the Basic Law least excogitated area" of all constitutional controversies.[14]

My research has also indicated that other sorts of reproaches, reservations, outright condemnations, and rebuttals of constitutional adjudication —at least with the former overemphasis on abstraction—have abated, perhaps because the FCC has been approved by the general public and has proved itself "a piece of social reality" in the Federal Republic.[15] Instead, the FCC has attracted a more wholesome, more technical attention, as evidenced by the wide discussion in the professional law and political journals, indicated at the time of the law case of the Southwest State, the Equality before the Law case, the Natural Law Guideline case, the atomic rearmament referenda cases, the outlawing of the Communist Party case, the Reich Concordat case, and the second German Television case.[16]

This evident change in the discussion, (from excessive abstraction to a greater measure of realism) and the growing acceptance of the FCC as an institution of judicial review do not mean that the FCC has come to form a third force, or third power factor in the Federal Republic, in the sense of having changed the original balance-of-power

[8] Erich Kaufmann, "Normenkontrollverfahren und voelkerrechtliche Vertraege," in *Forschungen und Berichte aus dem oeffentlichen Recht*, ed. Otto Bachot (Munich: Guenther Olzog, 1955) pp. 445–446.

[9] Hans Spanner, "Verfassungsrecht und Politische Wirklichkeit der Rechtskontrolle von Staatsvertraegen," in *Die Moderne Demokratie und Ihr Recht*, ed. Karl Bracher (Tuebingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1966), II, 626.

[10] Gerhard Leibholz, "Der Status des Bundesverfassungsgerichts," in *Das Bundesverfassungsgericht 1951–1971*, (Karlsruhe: C. F. Mueller, 1971), pp. 31–57.

[11] Cf. also Laufer, *Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit und politischer Prozess*, p. 287.

[12] Ernst Friesenhahn, in *Handbuch des Bundes Deutscher Staatsrechtler*, vol. 2, p. 526.

[13] Scheuner, p. 296.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 297.

[15] Wittig, "Politische Ruecksichten," p. 139. Cf. also Laufer, p. 19 ff.

[16] *Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts* (abbreviated BVerfGE) 1, 14; BVerfGE 3, 182; BVerfGE 3, 225; BVerfGE 8, 104 and BVerfGE 8, 122; BVerfGE 5, 85–393; BVerfGE 6, 309 f.

system. More appropriately one could speak of judicial review by the FCC as an indication that it has increased its control without thereby having transformed West Germany into a judge-dominated or authoritarian "Gerichtsstaat." The power of judicial review under the Basic Law and under the impact of the FCC decisions has been cogently referred to by at least one analyst as a "new type of democracy" in which the power of the state emanates from the people *and* the courts.[17]

Contemporary German Views on Political Adjudication

The contemporary discussion in Germany on aspects of political adjudication seems to have taken a more practical turn toward considering such questions as: Does political adjudication tend to expand into judicial innovation (activism)? Is there a causal relationship between democracy and judicial creativity and, if so, can a newly established democracy afford to engage in judicial neutralism? Has the dynamics of modern life eliminated the last shreds of difference between law and politics, i.e., has modern constitutional practice already turned into innovativeness and neutralism? Can boundary lines be established between objective and subjective methods and criteria of judicial interpretation? Can the FCC be expected to exercise self-denial, or would it not tend to seek an ever-widening competence and application? Is judicial positivism justifiable, or must the commonweal of the state take precedence over a rigid "Rechtsverpflichtung" (duty to conform to legal norms)? Do recent analyses of the sociological makeup of the judges justify entrusting to them the sacred task of determining the constitutionality of statutory enactments? Should they be arbiters on the compatibility of an international commitment with a national law, on determining the reliability of a political party, on alleged infraction of a person's fundamental rights, or on the omission or improper performance of a governmental obligation prescribed by the Basic Law?

After more than twenty years of the existence of the FCC, no neat classification of these issues can be made. A large literature exists, but it is far from clear and its polemical tone is often stronger than its persuasiveness.

Professors Willi Geiger and Martin Drath, two contemporary West German scholars, are among the most prominent and forthright in their endorsement of the nexus between political adjudication and judicial activism (and in advocating the desirability of judicial activism). Geiger's position may be summarized as follows:[18] In one of his lectures Geiger, who served on the FCC bench himself, suggests that to understand the Court one must realize that is essential function was not to act as a mouthpiece of a tight, complete, all-embracing, normative system, immune to the possibility of future contingencies. By its nature constitutional law (and those who interpret and apply it) is subject to change, and one must allow for implementation and expansion, rather than stifling constitutional growth in the name of a rigid *status quo*. Vast areas of politics are indeed deliberately left unregulated by norms. Among such uncharted courses are the practices of parliamentarism, in fact, the entire style of parliamentary performance and political decision making, and the broad political guidelines of government. Neither, Geiger maintains, does constitutional law prescribe to the lawmakers or government how they are to use their powers, how the government is to be formed, and its members recruited; nor does it regulate the conduct of an election campaign, the lobbies and other interest groups, etc. Constitutional law consists of general legal principles, of dicta which for their application require decisions on values, and depend on unstable political circumstances, changing constellations and the actions of pluralistic societal groups. At many times a constitutional norm only expresses a broader, vaguely formulated frame of aims and objectives which can be attained by more than one means, although in conformity to the constitution, or at least not in conflict with it. Reflecting the nature of constitutional law itself, the FCC must in exercising its jurisdictional power be given the freedom to acknowledge the variety of meanings and the changeability of circumstances. It should therefore be endowed with a large discretionary power of creative interpretation. The German judicial system should adopt, or at least approximate, therefore, Geiger believes, Justice Frankfurter's statement that the Constitution of the United States is what the Supreme Court says it is. As in the case of the United States, the German Basic Law should be understood, as the FCC has gradually come to realize, by means of decisions. That would mean that the Court could (and should) if necessary deviate from the intentions of the

[17] Ekkehard Schumann, *Verfassungs- und Menschenrechtsbeschwerde gegen richterliche Entscheidungen* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1963) pp. 22 ff.

[18] Willi Geiger, "Verfassungsentwicklung durch die Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit des Bundesverfassungsgerichts," lecture at the Rechts- und Staatswissenschaftlichen Vereinigung, Duesseldorf, October 28, 1965. Cf. also Geiger, *Gesetz ueber das Bundesverfassungsgericht vom 12, Maerz 1951*. Kommentar, particularly "Normenkontrolle auf Antrag von Verfassungsorganen", (Berlin: Franz Vahlen, 1952) pp. 238–353. Cf. also Geiger, "Einige Probleme der Bundesgerichtsbarkeit," in *Die Oeffentliche Verwaltung*, 5, No. 16 (August, 1952), 481–487.

framers of the constitution, from the original political interest groups, and from the viewpoints of the political scientists.

Nevertheless, Geiger does not go as far as to equate the verdict of the constitutional judge with the legislative norm, except in his suggestion that over a long period of time, by acquiescence, the opinion of the court may develop into an opinion by necessity (*opinio necessitatis*), undergoing a transition from customary to constitutional law. The other organs of government and political groups will be inclined, because of the authenticity of the court's interpretation, to "adjust" themselves to the Court's decision; in short time a kind of *opinio communis* will be formed. Constantly reexamining its own decisions and recognizing the possibility of improving upon them would guarantee constitutional elasticity and organic growth without which, according to Geiger, a healthy society cannot be sustained.

A slightly different approach is taken by Professor Drath (a member of the FCC from 1955 to 1963) who is willing to concede that constitutional courts do not, in political reality as well as in the hierarchy of legal institutions, stand *over* the other constitutional organs, but by virtue of their political functions stand by their side in the order of arrangement ("neben-geordnet").[19] Drath admits that the decisions of constitutional courts are only as effective as the framework of constitutional norms within which they operate. He believes that Montesquieu's statement still applies to modern government, i.e., that the three powers of government are forced to advance in *unison* (*d'aller de concert*).[20] Furthermore, Drath realizes that the participation of the FCC in political and social development is curtailed by the FCC's not having the right in the Basic Law to originate a case on its own initiative.[21]

Nonetheless Drath approaches Geiger's view that the FCC does, indeed have the creative functions by emphasizing that frequently its decisions have been instrumental in concretely inducing, in fact compelling the legislature and the administration to act, and in bringing about practical changes of political attitudes.[22] This Drath attributes to the facts that the architects of the constitution cannot foresee or prevent all future constitutional contingencies, that constitutional norms are held in general proclamations of principle, and that these proclamations contain intentional or inadvertent gaps, if not clear contradictions. And even where clearly formulated norms exist, since for many cases in court the legal situation is unique, a strict application of existing norms can result in inequitable decisions.

From this Drath concludes that, although constitutional courts cannot freely and independently undertake any attempts to solve political and social problems, and although the constitutional judge is subject to the norm, he must provide for an interpretation relevant to the case at court and must concretize it by taking into consideration all the objective and subjective constitutional factors involved in the specific case.[23]

Above all, Drath continues, the constitutional judge has no choice but to take into consideration the *entirety* of the constitution, the rational and meaningful connection ("sinnvolle Zusammenhaenge") of norms and constitutional institutions, indeed, the entire reality of political life."[24] For Drath the constitution serves the constitutional courts as a sum total of more or less clearly defined fundamental concepts. These are inevitably accompanied by political, social, and other deficiencies and inadequacies. Therefore, the constitutional lawyer cannot refer to the constitution by simply and exclusively quoting from it.[25]

Drath emphatically notes that it is mistaken to assert, like Montesquieu, that judges were only to declare the law, but not to create it. Drath believes that the decisions of the constitutional courts have shown, in all significant cases, that the judges not only concretized the legal norms by formal interpretation, but also, by their far more independent and original creative action born out of the spirit of the constitution itself, helped to create it.[26] For Drath every decision of a constitutional court is "more or less" an independent act of participation in the formative process ("Gestaltung") of political and social life. Therefore, by participating in this manner, the FCC is "not only a constitutional organ in the formal, judicial sense, assumes not only a controlling and restrictive, but necessarily also an *active political function.*"[27] Drath reaches the extreme further conclusion that the constitutional courts themselves must exercise (within the looser framework of the constitution) the *pouvoir constituant*, which need not even stop before the original (documentary) constitutional law.[28] While other courts are *bound* by the norms, the constitutional are *unbound*, as they become "legitimizing" powers.

According to Drath, more than the judge in a civil case who under certain conditions has to consider the consequences of his decisions, the constitutional judge is always under obligation to

[19] Martin Drath, "Die Grenzen der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit," p. 103.
[20] *Ibid.*, p. 104.
[21] *Ibid.*, p. 104–105.
[22] *Ibid.*, p. 105.
[23] *Ibid.*, p. 92.
[24] *Ibid.*, p. 93.
[25] *Ibid.*, p. 93 f.
[26] *Ibid.*, p. 94.
[27] *Ibid.*, p. 95.
[28] *Ibid.*, p. 96.

antipate the immediate political effects of a political order which may follow his decision. Drath sustains the theory that the power of decision, vested in the constitutional courts, confers upon them the obligation to decide also with a view toward the future; especially must the constitutional judge be concerned about the long-range social and political consequences of his decisions.. In summary, the power of judicial decision is organically connected with its consideration of the *effects* the decision may have for the future. For most constitutional issues it can be said, according to Drath, that past constitutional conditions rarely apply to those of later times, except by vague approximation and analogy. For that reason alone the constitution must be kept from degenerating into a form of inflexible legal catechism.[29]

I want to emphasize that the positions taken by Professors Geiger and Drath are hardly representative of the majority views on judicial innovation. Most writers indeed who consider the FCC to be more than a "mere" custodian of the constitution prefer a moderate or pragmatic position which is willing to concede a mild political activism to the constitutional court but only within the confines of the normative system of the constitution and essentially still within the original division of powers.

One period in the history of the FCC, however, stands out for its receptiveness toward the pragmatic use of judicial review: Under the second presidency of the FCC since 1954, Joseph Wintrich, the President, Rudolf Katz, the Deputy-President, and Gerhard Leibholz, the Court came closer to accepting the theory expressed by the Brandeis Brief, i.e., to admit "extralegal" social and economic evidence for the Court's consideration.[30] Whether their ventures in federal constitutional theory amounted to an acceptance of a degree of judicial innovation is a matter of conjecture, although it may be reasoned that a court which expresses concern for human rights to the degree of judicially experimenting with the constitution, in actuality tends to contribute to constitutional innovation. At any rate, although the FCC continued to impose upon itself a measure of judicial restraint in avoiding interference into "non-justiciable" determination, it came very close to the notion of American pragmatic jurisprudence, particularly under Katz's presidency.

Another jurist who has contributed to the discussion of constitutional innovation is Gerhard Leibholz, who belonged to the FCC from its foundation until his retirement in 1971 and is a rather consistent albeit cautious advocate of the principles of judicial restraint, political neutrality, and constitutional conformity wherever possible. He nevertheless has recognized and evidently approved the Court's tendency to widen its sphere of competence. Leibholz contends that the Court's justiciability has extended not only to cases in which "rational standards" could be applied, but also to those containing "less concrete" principles (such as implied in and resultant from the Basic Rights).[31] The FCC, according to Leibholz, "has been able . . . to widen the constitutionally-protected freedom of profession that it has, in the area of judicial review, drawn in considerations which play a role in *actual law making*."[32]

Another roundabout way of demonstrating the West German inclination toward increased judicial innovationism through creative adjustment of old positive law rules is (or rather was) the discussion on the merits of dissenting opinions in rendering a court decision. This discussion was particularly heated during the time that the West German court procedure did not permit dissenting opinions to be publicly recorded and known (i.e., 1951–1970). In fact, only since 1970 has such recording been officially permitted, by an amendment to the original judiciary act of March 12, 1951 which set up the FCC. For instance, Professor Wolfgang Heyde, commenting on the excellence of an article written by Charles Aikin, "The United States Supreme Court: The Judicial Dissent,"[33] states that dissenting opinions not only promoted a sense of responsibility and prestige of the individual judge, but gave greater depth to the discussion about judges' arguments. Above all, recording the dissenting opinions put the legislature in the position of recognizing weaknesses and defects in statutory enactments, indicating areas of normative changes or at least emphasizing certain "new accents" and perspectives. Whatever was said in a dissenting opinion of the court, Heyde reasons, could serve later as a point of reference for changes, should they be needed. Yesterday's dissenting opinions, as has been seen in the United States, may become the accepted majority view of the court tomorrow.[34]

Peter Wittig, expressing his concern that as the result of legislative and executive pressure, the

[29] *Ibid.*, p. 97.

[30] Cf. Edward McWhinney, "Judicial Restraint and the West German Constitutional Court," *Harvard Law Review*, 75: 1 (1961/62), 5–38, at 18. Professor McWhinney suggests that this may be due to the fact that Judges Katz and Leibholz, as refugees from Nazi Germany, familiarized themselves with the legal practices of the United States and Bratin, to which they fled. p. 19, note 58.

[31] Leibholz, "Legal Philosophy and the Federal Constitutional Court," in *Politics and Law*, ed. Gerhard Leibholz (Leyden: A. W. Sythoff, 1965), p. 299.

[32] *Ibid.*, p. 300, underscoring supplied.

[33] In *Jahrbuch des Oeffentlichen Rechts*, 18 (1969), 467–474.

[34] Wolfgang Heyde, "Dissenting Opinions in der Deutschen Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit," *Jahrbuch des Oeffentlichen Rechts*, 19 (1970), 202.

jurisdiction of the FCC might be curtailed, suggests building up the Court's resistance to such pressure by authorizing dissenting opinions "to personalize and politicize" the jurisdiction.[35] Similarly the constitutional judge's right to dissent is endorsed by Geiger when he points out the storm and stress which lead to the proper recognition of the right law, constantly going on and renewing it, and preventing it from ever being petrified to an immutable norm. Constitutional law, according to Geiger, is well equipped to play this role of a renewing force, particularly because it contains "an element of valuational decision, which ultimately could not be comprised rationally." It must respond to changing political conditions, political values, and general prevailing circumstances. By necessity constitutional law must leave legal matters "deliberately unregulated" (*bewusst rechtlichungeregelt*).[36]

Among those who approve of judicial innovation as a consequence, if not prime objective, of the practice of judicial review, a number of contemporary students of the subject have recommended that it should be encouraged because a direct relationship exists between constitutional jurisprudence and democracy. Geiger, for instance, deems them to be closely related, when he writes that "with the establishment of the Federal Republic, next to parliamentary democracy and presidential democracy, the liberal-constitutional democracy of the Third Power has made its entry."[37] Similarly Scheuner praises the British system in which, according to him, parliamentary self-restraint has been conditioned and perfected by a voluntary interplay of political forces, traditional moderation, mutual respect, and a common heritage. He holds it even more important that the British judge traditionally "has not been the servant of a norm, but the custodian and founder of the law and of the legal tradition."[38]

Freedom of decision may be vested in a sovereign parliament in a non-normative constitutional system; sovereignty may be functionally dispersed is a system of separation of powers which depend upon a higher constitutional norm under judicial control. In either case constitutional jurisprudence is, Scheuner concludes, fully consonant with the principles of the democratic state. It does not matter to him whether constitutional control is carried out through legislative self-control or whether it is transferred to a higher constitutional institution: As long as effective constitutional control is exercised the requirement of democracy is fulfilled. At the same time, however, Scheuner contends that no necessary nexus exists between constitutional adjudication and constitutional democracy. Constitutional adjudication depends "on the expression of a precise conception of the hierarchical relationship of the constitution and the means of adjudication, of the law as a normative expression, of the conceptual inclination of the judge toward normative law, and finally of the attitude of the courts toward the totality of the state."[39]

Considerable division exists among contemporary West German scholars on the degree of dynamics of innovation (constructivism or activism, as these terms have been employed interchangeably), and the degree to which constitutional judges should be requested to consider the long-range implications and effects of their judicial reviews. Thus, when Leibholz distinguishes law from politics, he finds them incompatible because politics was linked to the "dynamic-irrational" sphere, seeking to adapt itself to the ever-changing conditions of life. On the other hand, law was fundamentally "static-rational," seeking to restrain the dynamic elements for the sake of security which the law has the duty to guarantee. There exists for Leibholz, therefore, a latent conflict or inner tension ("Spannungsverhaeltnis") between the political forces which seek to adhere conservatively to the existing legal structure and those which prefer to shape society creatively (progressively), a conflict which Leibholz refers to as "Normativitaet" (normativeness) versus "Existentialitaet" ('existentiality,' if such word existed in the English language). However, Leibholz makes also the distinction between *purely* political disputes which he does not deem justiciable and other political controversies which can still be subject to the court's legal constitutional control, since conventional justiciable norms can be applied to them. For this latter category the "conflict of inner tension" can be removed.[40]

[35] Wittig, "Politische Ruecksichten," p. 158.

[36] Geiger, *Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit*, p. 15. Cf. also Edward McWhinney, "Federal Constitutional Courts and their Judges as Instruments of A Democratic Polity," in *Die Moderne Demokratie und Ihr Recht*, II, pp. 513–530. After pointing out that the practice of dissenting opinions in the USA and Commonwealth countries has not always turned out to be an unmixed blessing, McWhinney concludes that judicial dissent or disagreement "has undoubtedly helped introduce a marked element of flexibility and fluidity into the constitutional law that those courts were interpreting and expounding, immensely increasing the opportunities for a subsequent judicial 'distinguishing' of unwanted earlier precedents" (p. 517).

[37] Geiger, "Einige Probleme der Bundesverfassungsgerichtsbarkeit," p. 481.

[38] "Probleme und Verantwortungen der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in der Bundesrepublik," pp. 294–295.

[39] *Ibid.*, pp. 294–295. Cf. also Professor Apelt in *Neue Juristische Wochenschrift*, 1952, p. 733.

[40] Leibholz, "Das Spannungsverhaeltnis von Politik und Recht und die Integrationsfunktion des Bundesverfassungsgerichtes," in *Integritas: Geistige Wandlung und Menschliche Wirklichkeit* (Tuebingen: Rainer Wunderlich, 1966), p. 215. Cf. also Leibholz, *Politics and Law*, p.

Despite his limited notion of justiciability, Leibholz must be counted among the more cautious advocates of the dynamics in constitutional adjudication. He is inclined to accept the views of self-restraint expressed in Justice Stone's dissent in *U.S.* v. *Butler* and Justice Frankfurter's statement in *American Federation* v. *American Sash and Door Co.*[41] There is, however, evidence that Leibholz, too, genuinely appreciates innovative dynamics, as for instance when he writes that "the judgments of a constitutional court have mostly a meaning which transcends the actual case itself and points to the future."[42]

Differing from Leibholz, Geiger may be regarded as more strongly in favor of recognizing and approving the dynamics in constitutional adjudication, provided also for him that the constitutional judge maintains at all time a proper minimum restraint. For Geiger the development of the Basic Law has given the FCC the "ultimately decisive" influence over the other constitutional organs of the government, whose competence and power it can determine. According to him the FCC has therefore taken a central position in the West German constitutional system and established a democracy which, built on the principle of the separation of powers, "dominates as *Third Power.*"[43] It is primarily in the exercise of the power to interpret the constitution. Geiger holds, that the vitally important innovation of policy can be accomplished, pointing to new avenues of reasoning and understanding how to adjust the objective law to political reality. By every act of interpretation a dynamic process, "a piece of unpredictability," is being performed by the FCC. Since human language was limited, and even the judicial language imperfectly precise, legal principles must be understood and applied in terms of concrete situations ("sachhaltsbezogen"). There is a reciprocal relationship between law and the nature of a specific case in court. Only rarely is there an entirely clear-cut, ultimate state of conditions for which only one absolutely definitive interpretation exists and to which all judges in a case could agree spontaneously.[44]

Several writers are willing to subscribe to the thesis of judicial dynamics, but not to the extent of permitting the constitutional court to pass judgment for the future. Among them Professor Friedrich Klein, while going beyond Leibholz's restriction of justiciability to cases which are not *purely* political, wants the Court's innovationism denied in cases involving future uncertain circumstances. He denies (somewhat vaguely) the Court's power to engage in political prognosis, without, however, excluding the power—in fact, the duty—of the Court to "project" the future.[45] Similarly, Wittig who fully endorses the power of the FCC to consider the political circumstances of the past in its decisions, identifies himself with an FCC decision according to which the Court cannot be guided by consideration of prognosis.[46] Wittig cites the Weimar Supreme Court decision of December 27, 1927, that it must limit itself to applying objective law only, without being permitted to consider the political consequences of its adjudication.[47] In the Saar Statute case, too, the FCC declared that prognoses for political development were outside the realm of constitutional jurisdiction.[48]

Related to the current discussion about how dynamically or statically the FCC should function is the question whether, and to what extent, the judges should be guided by the probable effectiveness of their decisions, immediate or long-range, as well as how *wirklichkeitsbewusst* (conscious of the reality) they ought to be. Klein supports the notion that this question has never been debated conclusively by West German scholars. The matter is complicated by two allegedly contradictory FCC decisions (of April 5, 1952, re: the Schleswig-Holstein electoral law of 1951, and of March 1, 1953, re: the EVG Treaty): In the former, the Court ruled that the FCC must consider the political consequences which might result from its decision. In the latter decision, the Court stated that possible political consequences which might result from its decisions must not play any role at all; the Court had to decide exclusively according to the normative prescription of the law.[49] Klein contends, however, that the second and apparently contradictory decision must not be interpreted as a categoric rejection of the principle of political reality and that it could still be taken into consideration in other types of disputes.

Leibholz, too, affirms the principle: "In the realm of constitutional law," he writes, " . . . the constitutional judge is compelled to relate each

273. Cf. BVerfGE 1, 101; BVerfGE 2, 96; BVergGE 7, 188. Cf. also Laufer, "Typus und Status des Bundesverfassungsgerichts," in *Die Moderne Demokratie und Ihr Recht*, II, p. 445.

[41] 297 U.S. 78 and 335 U.S. 542.

[42] G. Leibholz, "Das Spannungsverhaeltnis von Politik und Recht," p. 214. Also his "The Federal Constitutional Court in the Constitutional System of the Federal Republic of Germany," in *Politics and Law*, pp. 271–285.

[43] Geiger, "Einige Probleme der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit," p. 482.

[44] Geiger, "Verfassungsentwicklung durch die Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit des Bundesgerichts," p. 14.

[45] "Bundesverfassungsgericht und Richterliche Beurteilung Politischer Fragen," in *Schriften der Gesellschaft zur Foerderung der Westfaelischen Wilhelms Universitaet zu Muenster*, No. 59, 1966, p. 24 ff.

[46] Wittig, pp. 147–148.

[47] Wittig, p. 148, footnote 35.

[48] BVerfGE 4, 157 at 175.

[49] BVerfGE 2, 143, at 181.

single clause of the constitution to political reality." The constitutional court cannot behave indifferently to the political order. Formalistic positivism is inadmissible. Instead, the judge must bring constitutional principles into a "reasonable relationship" with the given political order. He must therefore be fully familiar with the concrete facts and contemporary social forces as a "participant or even author of a continuous change in the meaning and effectiveness of the constitution."[50] More than having recourse to grammatical, logical, and historical methods of interpretation, the modern constitutional judge must grasp the sense of the constitution as a whole. This includes, Leibholz emphasizes, the duty to concern himself with the political consequences of his decision.[51]

As Laufer points out, contrary to the practice of the High Court of Justice during the Weimar Republic, the FCC has in fact taken into consideration the political circumstances and consequences of its decisions in a number of cases (e.g., in the decisions on the Saar Statute, 1955, the Electoral Apportionment case, 1963, and the so-called "All-Phases Income Tax" case in 1966).[52] Wittig emphasizes the need for setting up boundaries for the consideration of political consequences of the FCC decisions. He seems to identify himself with the view of the first President of the FCC, Hoepker-Aschoff, that the Court must be always concerned about the political consequences of its decisions and particularly of the possible effects these may have on the liberal, democratic, fundamental order of the state.[53] Yet he wishes to limit the consideration to those cases in which it was evident that economic, financial, domestic, and foreign consequences of the Court's decisions were liable to jeopardize the capacity of the state to function properly. In all other cases, he declares, the Court should not concern itself with the consequences of its decisions.[54]

A few writers who are not principally opposed to the idea of constitutional innovation object, however, to conferring upon the Court the power of considering the expediency (suitability) of a norm which it was about to review constitutionally. Their objections are echoed by a large number of FCC decisions.[55] The objectors identify themselves with Justice Stone's statement that "for the removal of unwise laws from the statute books the appeal lies not to the courts, but to the ballot and to the processes of democratic government."[56]

Leibholz here again formulates the problem most cogently: In checking upon the legislative bodies the Court should impose upon itself a maximum of self-restraint and concede to them the greatest discretion. In case the question was raised whether the government or lawmakers had overstepped their legislative boundaries, they ought not to be authorized to question the use of the discretionary power vested in the legislative bodies on grounds of expediency, but maintain in its decisions an attitude of political neutrality. Under no circumstances should the Court substitute its own political consideration for that of the government and the lawmakers.[57] "Only if the government and lawmakers had misused their free discretion," Leibholz alleged in a memoir on March 21, 1952, "and the act of lawmaking or other forms of governmental measure coming before the Court can be characterized as arbitrary, can there be talk of a violation of a right which it is for the Federal Constitutional Court to correct."[58] Similarly, the FCC ruled on December 17, 1953, that the Court "has certainly not to find whether the lawmaker has in particular instances employed the most suitable, the most rational, or the most just solution."[59]

The discussion on the problem of expediency extends also to cases of alleged conflicts between international agreements and the national law. Professor Spanner raises strong objections to the conservative point of view: Commenting on a treaty between the Federal Republic and France (concerning the Saarland) of November 23, 1954, which the Court examined for its constitutionality in 1955, Spanner wrote that the judgment pointed to the fallacy of denying the Court the right to be guided by considerations of expediency—especially, Spanner contends, in disputes for which a "factual adjudication" was impossible. The dilemma of the requirement for constitutional conformity was most difficult when, as in the Saarland case, the Court found the treaty to be unconstitutional *per se*, but acknowledged at the same time that it had observed in the treaty a "certain approximation to a condition which the Basic Law endeavored to attain." This reasoning established

[50] Leibholz, "Das Spannungsverhaeltnis von Politik und Recht," p. 217.

[51] *Ibid.*, p. 217. Cf. also Leibholz, "Der Status des Bundesverfassungsgerichts," in *Das Bundesverfassungsgericht, 1951–1971*, p. 41.

[52] H. Laufer, "Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit und Politische Kontrollen" in *Politisches Vierteljahrsschrift*, Sonderheft 2, 1970, p. 232. Cf. also Wittig, pp. 149–150. Cf. the cases BVerfGE 16, 139; 21, 12.

[53] Hoepker-Aschoff, *Das Bundesverfassungsgericht*, p. 3 f.

[54] Wittig, p. 149.

[55] Cf. enumeration in Laufer, "Typus und Status des Bundesverfassungsgerichts," p. 445.

[56] Leibholz, "Der Status des Bundesverfassungsgerichts," p. 47.

[57] Leibholz, "Das Spannungsverhaeltnis von Politik und Recht," p. 221. Cf. also Leibholz, "Legal Philosophy and the Federal Constitutional Court," p. 297.

[58] *Jahrbuch des Oeffentlichen Rechts*, 6 (1957), 120 ff; cf. also Leibholz, "Legal Philosophy and the Federal Constitutional Court," p. 297.

[59] BVerfGE 3, 182.

the complex obligation for the Court, in this and in future cases, to examine the degree of the nearness and remoteness between a treaty stipulation and the Basic Law or statutory enactment: such an examination, Spanner holds, would inevitably lead to an ever-increasing consideration of political reality and expediency by the Court. In an extreme case the Court might even be compelled to rule that in the name of political reality and expediency and after having judiciously weighed the pros and cons of a treaty vis-à-vis the Basic Law, the Court should be prepared to sustain the treaty, e.g., to prefer the treaty to the Basic Law, striking down the allegation of unconstitutionality. At the same time, however, Laufer warns against the danger of conceding to the Court too large a discretion when deciding on grounds of political considerations and expediency.[60]

Conclusions on Political Adjudication

The foregoing discussion should not make us forget that the problems pertaining to judicial review in the Federal Republic of Germany have not reached major proportions. Not only is the general public largely uninformed and unconcerned about it, but the voice of moderation which has characterized post-World War II West Germany (with minor exceptions) seems to have affected as well the debate on the FCC in its exercise of judicial review.

In addition, the consensus seems to exist among proponents of constitutional innovation that wherever feasible the Court should rule in favor of constitutional conformity. When it is possible for the Court to rule that a given statute was consonant with the constitution and could be interpreted in harmony with it, even in cases of substantial doubt, the presumption of constitutionality should prevail. As the Court has said in a number of cases, only when the presumption could *not* be possibly sustained, should a statute be designated as unconstitutional.[61] The Court cannot give a law an interpretation which was clearly not intended by the lawmakers. The overall necessity to abide by the principle of constitutional conformity is hardly contested in West German politico-juridical literature.[62] For the sake of legal security, continuity, and justice the greatest discretion for government and lawmakers is generally accepted.[63] The majority of writers, as I have indicated, maintain that questions of expediency, suitability, or necessity should not be the concern of the FCC, which is expected to refuse to hear such cases.

The decisions of the Court which indicate its voluntary self-restraint are too numerous to permit listing them here. Suffice it to say in summary that the FCC has decided from its beginnings that the discretion of the government and lawmakers can be limited only if the Basic Law itself has drawn these limits; in all other cases the discretionary power and freedom of action will be respected by the Court. It has declined to compel federal legislative bodies to provide for legislation in case of inaction, even when a need for such legislation was recognized or when state legislation was found incapable of dealing with a matter effectively.[64] With exceptions, the West German jurist is still essentially under the spell of Radbruch's classical dictum that the judge must interpret the law as the "objectivated" will of the lawmaker.[65] Accordingly, the FCC has normally followed the conventional grammatical, systematical, logical, and historical methods of statutory interpretation; this does not prevent the Court from repeatedly exercising a degree of subjective interpretation, particularly in borderline cases in which the meaning and intention of a statute were not clearly comprehensive and ascertainable. Justice Heck of the FCC recognized the existence of such borderline cases during the Heidelberg Colloquium on Constitutional Jurisprudence in the Present, when he raised the question of the limits to constitutional adjudication in cases where the Court would interpret a law in compatibility with the literal contents of the enactment, but clearly in incompatibility with the real intentions of the lawmakers.[66]

In summary, the FCC has in practice manifested self-restraint and, to borrow Justice Frankfurter's terms, "professional humility," has preferred inaction when it must have been tempted to act, has at times deliberately been circumscriptive when it

[60] Spanner, "Verfassungsrecht und politische Wirklichkeit," 626–627. Cf. also Erich Kaufman, "Normenkontrollverfahren und voelkerrechtliche Vertraege."

[61] BVerfGE 2, 266 at 282.

[62] Cf. BVerfGE 8, 28 at 34; 2, 236 at 340. Cf. also Gerd Pfeiffer, *Die Verfassungsbeschwerde in der Praxis* (Essen W. Ellinghaus, 1959), p. 363.

[63] Cf. Laufer, *Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit und Politischer Prozess*, pp. 351–354.

[64] Hans G. Rupp, "Judicial Review in the Federal Republic of Germany," in *American Journal of Comparative Law* 9 (Winter, 1960), 29–47, at 38. Cf. Rupp, "Some Remarks on Judicial Self-Restraint," in *Ohio State Law Journal* 21 (1960), 503–515. Cf. also Gebhard Mueller, "Das Bundesverfassungsgericht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," in *Journal der internationalen Juristenkommission*, 1965, pp. 220, 230, 244. Cf. Wittig, pp. 145–146.

[65] Cf. Spanner, "Die verfassungskonforme Auslegung in der Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts," in *Archiv des Oeffentlichen Rechts*, 91 (1966), 510–511. Cf. E. Friesenhahn, "Die Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," in *Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in der Gegenwart* (Cologne: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 1962) p. 152.

[66] Spanner, "Die verfassungskonforme Auslegung," p. 514.

could have been outspoken.[67] It has clearly proved that under no circumstances was a mere change in legal conceptions, specifically in the interpretation of uncertain legal terms, a sufficient ground for reopening a case that had been adjudged.[68] The FCC, as McWhinney writes appropriately, "sought to build for the future"; it has pursued a policy of "hastening slowly and non-involvement"; in brief, it has been conspicuous for a conscious judicial policy of delay.[69]

On the other hand, as this study indicates, a number of writers have expressed their preference for a less cautious, a more experimental, and active view of constitutional adjudication; the extremists among them, indeed, come close to preferring a "government of judges" to a "government of law." But even among this more "progressive" group of writers, the moderates seem to prevail. Their views were reflected in a significant speech by the former West German President, Gustav Heinemann, on December 8, 1971, at the occasion of introducing the new President of the FCC. President Heinemann emphasized that it was the special task of the FCC, over and above its formal obligations, to see that the "fundamental values" which formed the basis of the Basic Law were put into political practice. The Court had not yet overstepped the (narrower) boundaries of its prescribed competence. The judges, however, Heinemann asserted, should constantly recognize that they were themselves subject to the changing social climate, and that they must adjust themselves to it. As an example the President listed the guarantee of protecting private property which for him should not form an insuperable barrier to necessary, long over-due reform.[70]

If any generalizations can be drawn from the great variety of positions outlined in this study, they would include the following:

(1) Few West German scholars of political jurisprudence continue to maintain that the Basic Law was originally intended and should still be considered to be a rigid set of exclusive norms from which no deviations must be allowed.

(2) Constitutional norms and reality need not be incompatible. Gradual, organic adjustments can and must be made, as implied in Edmund Burke's notion of "prescription." The FCC would fail to perform its functions if it acted as a mere rubberstamp or neutral bystander. It is far more than an institution which registers and administers the legislative will in a fixed, normative constitutional system. Instead it must interpret and develop the constitutional norm with respect to political reality.

(3) The system of separation of powers has essentially proved and retained its validity and should not be thrown overboard nonchalantly. At the same time, however, the traditional system of the separation of powers, at least in its pure form, has ceased to be so compartmenalized in modern constitutional life and the judicial power, in due course, has now become extended to the legislative sphere.

(4) If one cannot substantiate any clearly recognizable trend toward a new judicial activism of the FCC, one can at least note the evidence for a widened competence of the Court. This widened power is transferred partly by lawmakers who have chosen to restrict their own discretion while conferring new powers upon the Court (e.g., by giving it the power to determine the principles of equality and universality of elections and in judging whether a splinter party may be a danger to political stability); the increased jurisdiction has also resulted from the FCC's attempt to seek new power.

(5) Although the Constitutional Court has turned out to be more than the mouthpiece (*la bouche*) of the government and of the lawmakers that Montesquieu had recommended, there is no justification for speaking of a domination by a "third chamber in perpetual session," a "*noblesse de robe*," or a judicial "*suprema potestas*." It has checked its exercise of power with a strong sense of self-restraint. There is no evidence that an alleged dichotomy between dynamic-irrational and static-rational forces have brought the Federal Republic to the brink of chaos. Self-restraint coupled with a limited creativity has characterized the performance of the FCC.[71]

[67] Laufer, *Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit und politischer Prozess*, p. 361.

[68] BVerfGE 2, 395, 396.

[69] McWhinney, "Judicial Restraint," p. 12.

[70] Reported in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, December 9, 1971, No. 285, p. 7.

[71] Cf. Leibholz, "Legal Philosophy and the Federal Constitutional Court," pp. 298–299. It may be deemed as a *non sequitur*, but we should like to point out here parenthetically that the limited acceptance of judicial activity and the small appreciation for the subjective importance of the West German judges are reflected by the quite embryonic literature and meagerness of behavioral and statistical data on the constitutional judges on the Federal Republic. A promising sign of beginning, at least for other higher judges, is Walter Richter's "Die Richter der Oberlandesgerichte der Bundedrepublik, eine berufliche und sozialstatistische Analyse," in *Hamburger Jahrbuch fuer Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftspolitik*, 5 (1960), 241–259, and Ralf Dahrendorf, "Deutsche Richter: Ein Beitrag zur Soziologie der Oberschicht," in *Gesellschaft und Freiheit: Zur Soziologischen Analyse der Gegenwurt* (Munich: R. Riper & Co. 1962), pp. 176–196. Cf. also the highly sophisticated discussions on the newly created members of the FCC in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, December 8, 1971, No. 284. Of significance is also No. 294 of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* of December 18, 1971, in which Friedrich Karl Fromme's article, "Ein neues Wahlverfahren fuer die Verfassungsrichter," p. 2, criticizes the

(6) The West German Constitution represents one of the more obvious successes in federalism of the postwar era. It has practically accommodated to the needs of effective leadership in a period of external political difficulties and of phenomenal economic-industrial growth. Thus the FCC has come to play a significant role as an arbiter between the government and the people and to serve as an excellent object lesson for students of jurisprudence in other countries.

---

former Federal President Heinemann's statement that the several candidates for the FCC had been too much discussed in public. Fromme condemns any prohibition of public discussions on the personal background and make-up of prospective judges and considers a return to the old-fashioned "rein sachliche Richterbestellung" (purely factual appointment to the judgeship) obsolete and hypocritical, in view of the political criterion of their present form of appointment. For updated comments on literature on the problems discussed in this paper see Rudolf Schaefer, "Politikwissenschaftliche Analysen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts," in *Neue Politische Literatur*, No. 2, 1974, p. 209, and Theodor Maunz, *Deutsches Staatsrecht: Ein Studienbuch* (Munich: C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1973), pp. 283–284.

Agenda Building as a Comparative Political Process*

ROGER COBB
Brown University

JENNIE-KEITH ROSS
Swarthmore College

and

MARC HOWARD ROSS
Bryn Mawr College

An essential characteristic of any polity is the way that different groups participate in the process of policy formation. Previous analysis of strategies for influencing public policy has concentrated on the success and failure of attempts to influence decision makers' choices among policy alternatives. More recently the source of these alternatives and the processes by which they are defined for decision makers have been identified as crucial, if less visible, determinants of public policy.[1]

In most communities, the number of potential public issues far exceeds the capabilities of decision-making institutions to process them.[2] Issues or their proponents must consequently compete for a place on the decision-making agenda. The process by which demands of various groups in the population are translated into items vying for the serious attention of public officials can appropriately be called agenda building.

Agenda building is a process ideally suited to comparative analysis. All communities must decide which issues will be the concern of decision makers. At the same time, there is great variety in the ways this is accomplished, and in the proportion of potential issues which eventually are seriously considered by the community leaders. Our goal is to develop a model and propositions, useful both across and within polities, which can account for variation in the ways issues get on the agenda and in rates of success at achieving agenda status.

* We wish to thank Barney Brown for his help in collecting and analyzing the case materials for this project.

[1] For example, see Roger W. Cobb and Charles D. Elder, *Participation in American Politics: The Dynamics of Agenda Building* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1975); and Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "Two Faces of Powers," *American Political Science Review*, 56 (September 1962), pp. 947–952.

[2] As a result a system must develop filter or gatekeeping mechanisms which will determine which issues attain visibility. See David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York: John Wiley, 1965), pp. 87–96. The problem is further compounded by issues continuing to survive in different forms once the initial issue has been resolved. See Charles E. Lindblom, *The Policy-Making Process* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968).

The Agenda-Building Perspective

The study of agenda building requires an understanding of the ways in which different subgroups in a population become aware of and eventually participate in, political conflicts, whether the issues are initiated by groups in the general public or by political leaders. The model must also account for strategies used to prevent the success of initiating groups.[3]

Two types of agendas can be distinguished: the public agenda consists of issues which have achieved a high level of public interest and visibility; the formal agenda is the list of items which decision makers have formally accepted for serious consideration. It can be found in such places as a court calendar, a legislative docket, or the list of cases to be heard by a tribal council. Not all items on the formal agenda receive serious attention from decision makers, however. For example, many bills introduced in the U.S. Congress have symbolic appeal for constituents, but are never considered in committees and consequently never reach the floor. Our interest in formal agenda items is limited to those issues that receive serious attention from decision makers, and does not include "pseudo-agenda" items.[4] Agreement that an issue merits serious consideration of course does not imply that the outcome of this conflict will correspond to the goal of the issue's proponents or even that the outcome will be action in any form.[5]

[3] Examples of strategies used for conflict containment include: Michael Lipsky, "Protest as a Political Resource," *American Political Science Review*, 62 (December, 1968), 1144–1158; Jack L. Walker, "A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy," *American Political Science Review*, 60 (June, 1966), 285–295; and Arthur J. Vidich and Joseph Bensman, *Small Town in Mass Society*, (Garden City: Doubleday, 1960).

[4] Cobb and Elder, pp. 14–16.

[5] See Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, *Power and Poverty* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press 1970); Raymond E. Wolfinger, "Nondecisions and the Study of Local Politics," *American Political Science Review*, 65 (December, 1971), 1063–1081; and Frederick W. Frey, "Comment," *American Political Science Review*, 65 (December, 1971), 1081–1102.

The public agenda consists of all issues which (1) are the subject of widespread attention or at least awareness; (2) require action, in the view of a sizeable proportion of the public; and (3) are the appropriate concern of some governmental unit, in the perception of community members. An issue requires the recognition of only a major portion of the polity, not of all its members. Operational referents of terms such as "wide-spread," "sizeable," and "major portion," will vary not only cross-culturally; but also from community to community.[6] Every local community will have a public agenda. If this community is subsumed in a wider political system there will be some overlap of items from the public agendas of communities at higher levels.

Issues typically arise in small groups. These groups are always concerned with expanding awareness of the issue, either because they want to promote expansion or because they want to prevent it.[7] Such characteristics as social status, economic mobility, length of residence in a community and degree of residential separation are latent resources which, given the right conditions, can be used to promote group interest, unity and action.[8] Given different resource bases, groups work to get an issue on the agenda in different ways.

The possibility of issue redefinition is an additional source of power inherent in the process of issue expansion. Redefinition involves the substitution of one issue for another, usually a more specific issue being redefined into a more general one.[9] An extended expansion process is likely to include several redefinitions of the issues, as increasingly diverse groups become involved.[10]

Expansion is far from automatic. Opponents will actively attempt to contain expansion, in particular if the status quo is to their advantage. Second, those initially committed to a cause may become disillusioned as they perceive the conflict being redefined away from "their" interests. Finally, the proponents of an issue in many political systems face overwhelming odds of apathy and inertia among those they seek to involve.[11]

Agenda building, then, is a problem particularly appropriate for comparative analysis. It occurs in every political system from the smallest to the largest, from the simplest to the most complex, while at the same time there are important variations in its form and structure. Despite the great variation possible in the history of any particular issue, we suggest four major stages which shape all issue careers: initiation, specification, expansion, and entrance. Three models of agenda building are also proposed to describe variation in origination of issues inside or outside government, and in the degree and direction of efforts to expand issues beyond the initiating groups. In the final section, we present two kinds of propositions: (1) cross-cultural propositions about agenda building which identify differences in the process across polities, and (2) intrasocietal propositions which identify effects on agenda building of different social, structural, and political positions within the same society.

Models of Agenda Building

Analytically we identify three different models of agenda building depending on variation in the four major characteristics of issue careers: initiation, specification, expansion, and entrance.[12] The first, the *outside initiative* model, accounts for the process through which issues arise in nongovernmental groups and are then expanded sufficiently to reach, first, the public agenda and, finally, the formal agenda. The second, the *mobilization* model, considers issues which are initiated inside government and consequently achieve formal agenda status almost automatically. Successful implementation of these issues often requires, however, that they be placed on a public agenda as

[6] See Matthew A. Crenson, *The Un-Politics of Air Pollution* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), pp. 88–91; and Cecile Trop and Leslie L. Roos, Jr., "Public Opinion and the Environment," *The Politics of Ecosuicide* ed. Leslie L. Roos, Jr., (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), pp. 53–63.

[7] E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semi-Sovereign People* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), chapter 1.

[8] For emphasis on a wide variety of characteristics, see: Robert L. Crain et al., *The Politics of Community Conflict: The Fluoridation Dispute* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969); Joseph Gusfield, *Symbolic Crusade: Status Politics and the American Temperance Movement* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1963); Norman H. Nie, G. Bingham Powell, Jr. and Kenneth Prewitt "Social Structure and Political Participation: Developmental Relationships, Part I," *American Political Science Review*, 63 (June, 1969), 361–378; "Part II," 63 (September, 1969), 808–832; and Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie and Jae-on Kim, "The Modes of Democratic Participation: A Cross-National Comparison," *Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics*, 2, No. 01-013 (Beverley Hills, Calif., Sage Publishers, 1971).

[9] Schattschneider, chapter 4.

[10] *Ibid.*, chapter 4; James Coleman, *Community Conflict* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957); Peter Bachrach and Elihu Bergman, *Power and Choice: The Formation of American Population Policy* (Lexington, Ma: Heath, 1973); Lewis A. Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956); and Paul Peterson, "British Interest Group Theory Reexamined," *Comparative Politics*, 4 (April, 1971), 381–402.

[11] Crain, *The Politics of Community Conflict*, pp. 226–227.

[12] Nelson Polsby has also investigated the sources of successful issue initiation and found two general strategies which he has called "inside" and "outside" patterns of access. Nelson W. Polsby, "Policy Initiation in the American Political System," in *The Use and Abuse of Social Science*, ed. Irving Louis Horowitz (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1971), pp. 296–308.

well. The mobilization model accounts for the ways decision makers attempt to implement a policy by expanding an issue from the formal to the public agenda. The third, the *inside initiative* model, describes issues which arise within the governmental sphere and whose supporters do not try to expand them to the mass public. Instead these supporters base their hopes of success on their own ability to apply sufficient pressure to assure formal agenda status, a favorable decision and successful implementation. In this model, initiating groups often specifically wish to prevent an issue from expanding to the mass public; they do not want it on the public agenda. A more detailed discussion of each of these models in terms of the four general characteristics of initiation, specification, expansion, and entrance, will provide a framework for cross-cultural investigation of these important variations in the policy-making processes.

Outside Initiative Model.

(1) *Initiation* is the first phase of this model. It is the articulation of a grievance in very general terms by a group outside the formal governmental structure. For example, for many years old people in America complained about their generally poor financial condition, and in particular about the financial crises caused by extended illness. The degree of organization of a group which considers itself aggrieved is highly variable. Individuals who share concern about an issue may or may not be united by other concerns. They may also be more or less visible to others in the society as a distinct category. The degree of visibility may be related to the group's previous experience and success in articulating issues.[13]

(2) *Specification.* General grievances may be translated into specific demands in a variety of ways. Demand articulation may or may not be the basis of a specialized role. In Bushman or Pygmy society, for example, no individual specialists have the function of translating diffuse grievances into specific demands,[14] a role which labor leaders, for instance, perform in many industrial societies. Members of groups which share grievances may or may not be united in their articulation of them. Diverse demands can be derived from a common grievance and may be expressed by various members of a group.[15]

Precedence for specific demands by a group may have more than one source. The group itself may or may not have experience with the articulation of demands; and the wider society to which demands are expressed may or may not have heard similar issues expressed by other groups. In most African countries during the 1950s, for example, there were often many different groups presenting similar demands for political independence and competing with each other for public support.[16]

(3) *Expansion.* In order to be successful in getting on the formal agenda, outside groups need to create sufficient pressure or interest to attract the attention of decision makers. Typically this is done by expanding an issue to new groups in the population and by linking the issue with pre-existing ones. The dilemma for the group which originally initiates the issue is that while expansion is crucial for success, it may lead to losing control of the issue entirely as more powerful groups enter the conflict and the original participants grow less important.

In discussing issue expansion, Cobb and Elder identify four different groups that can become involved in a conflict as an issue expands beyond its original participants. Different strategies are necessary to involve each of these groups in the controversy, as they have different levels of initial interest in the particular issues and different levels of involvement and interest in public affairs in general.[17]

The first individuals likely to become involved in an issue as it expands beyond the immediate initial participants are the members of the *identification group*, those people who feel strong ties to the originators of an issue and who see their own interest as tied to that of those raising the issue. The members of the identification group are not only the first to be mobilized but are also most likely to support the position of the originators. At the same time, the identification group is not likely to be particularly large, and success in reaching the public agenda usually requires further issue expansion. A typical example of the expansion of an issue to members of an identification group is the definition of a controversy in terms of regional, ethnic, or religious interests.

[13] For example, see James B. Christoph, *Capital Punishment and British Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962) pp. 26–33; Jennie-Keith Hill [Ross], "The Culture of Retirement" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Anthropology, Northwestern University, 1968); and Jennie-Keith Ross, "Social Borders: Definitions of Diversity," *Current Anthropology*, 16 (March, 1975), 53–72.

[14] See Lorna Marshall, "Sharing, Talking and Giving: Relief of Social Tensions Among !Kung Bushmen," *Africa*, 31 (1961), 231–246; and Colin Turnbull, *The Forest People* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1961).

[15] See Crenson, *Un-politics-of-Air Pollution*, pp. 42–44; Josephs Himes, "The Functions of Racial Conflict," *Social Forces*, 45 (September, 1966), 1–10; and Ronald Inglehart, "The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in Post-Industrial Societies," *American Political Science Review*, 65 (December, 1971), 991–1017.

[16] For example, see Dennis Austin, *Politics in Ghana: 1946–1960* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1964), and Richard Sklar, *Nigerian Political Parties* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

[17] Cobb and Elder, *Participation in American Politics*, pp. 103–109.

Attention groups are groups in the population which are likely to be aware of a conflict early on, and which can be mobilized relatively rapidly whenever an issue enters the group's sphere of concern. Whereas identification group involvement centers on the group affiliations of the combatants, attention group participation tends to be more dependent on the issues involved in a conflict.[18] Because attention groups are highly interested in public issues, they often become involved in controversies regardless of the wishes of the identification group. Thus, for example, an agricultural protection group in France may quickly become involved in a conflict which begins with a consumers' group arguing that agricultural protectionism increases food prices. From the perspective of the consumers' group the involvement of the agricultural group is a mixed blessing. Their entrance into the controversy is, needless to say, on the other side. At the same time, their interest and involvement is useful in attracting attention to the issue and in increasing public knowledge about it. In some controversies, expansion of an issue to various attention groups in the population is sufficient to attain formal agenda status and serious consideration from decision makers. In other situations, further expansion to the mass public may take place first.[19]

Within the mass public, Cobb and Elder distinguish between the *attentive public* and the *general public*. The former usually comprise a small minority of the population and include those people who are most informed about and interested in public issues. While they have strong views on many public issues, members of the attentive public may be far from united. Thus, as an issue expands and attracts more attention and as more members of the attentive public become involved, they are likely to be drawn into *both* sides of the controversy. Furthermore, because they have strong views on most public matters, they are likely to be among the least persuadable elements of the population once an issue gets defined in a particular manner, whatever the efforts of the early participants.

In contrast, the general public is the last group to become involved in controversies. Its interest in most issues is likely to be short lived; effective and sustained involvement of the general public in an issue is relatively rare. At the same time, when issues can be defined broadly enough, the involvement of the general public is often crucial in forcing decision makers to place an item on the formal agenda.[20]

A good example of an issue which was effectively expanded to the general public is that of independence in many African and Asian countries in the 1950s and early 1960s. In many countries, independence movements led by relatively small, educated elites were successful in forcing the colonial powers to consider seriously the possibility of political independence only after large numbers of the general public became involved in mass movements.[21]

In many traditional societies, disputes arising among community members provide a large number of issues which vie for a place on the formal agenda, and studies of the legal process by anthropologists provide a wide range of cases for comparative analysis. Among the Arusha in Tanzania, for example, individuals do not usually bring cases directly to the entire community for settlement. Instead they must expand their issue to other community members who might support their side in a dispute or present their case to a formal tribunal; these attention groups may be age-sets or kinship groups.

Among the Arusha, resolution of a case depends upon the relationship between the disputants. Cases involving age-mates are heard before an age-group enclave, intra-parish disputes are presented to the parish assembly, while disputes between members of the same lineage are heard by a lineage conclave. Finally, when disputes remain unresolved through all the lower levels, they may eventually be taken to the courts.[22] There are a number of potential arenas in which a dispute may be heard and resolved, or in our terms, within Arusha society there are a number of formal agendas. Once an issue is on the public agenda it can relatively easily reach the formal agenda also, probably in part because there are several of these available.

(4) *Entrance.* Success in issue expansion may place an issue on the public agenda. It then becomes a problem that concerns a relatively large number of people who view it as an appropriate focus for formal action. Entrance represents movement from the public agenda to the formal agenda, where serious consideration of the issue by decision makers can take place.

The difficulty of making this transition varies widely across political systems. For the Arusha, as we have seen, public agenda status makes highly probable formal consideration of an issue. Among the Bushmen entrance is such a minimal problem that the public-formal distinction almost disap-

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 106.

[19] Peterson, "British Interest Group Theory Re-examined," pp. 381–402.

[20] Cobb and Elder, *Participation in American Politics*, pp. 107–108.

[21] For example, see F. M. Bourret, *Ghana: The Road to Independence 1919–1957* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960).

[22] See Philip H. Gulliver, *Social Control in an African Society* (Boston: Boston University Press, 1963), pp. 173–275.

pears. An individual speaking loudly about some concern can attract the attention of others in a cluster of huts; and they will often join in immediately to try to resolve the problem.[23]

In many industrial societies, on the other hand, the movement between the two agendas is far from automatic, as some issues can remain stalled between the two for long periods of time. Particularly in situations where *any* decision is likely to arouse great opposition from the public, governments often refuse to give an issue any serious consideration whatsoever. In effect, there is a decision to make no decision, or what Bachrach and Baratz describe as a nondecision.[24] The idea of a nondecision, in our view, is most applicable to issues which achieve public, but not formal agenda, status. Issues which attain neither public nor formal agenda status can also be viewed as nondecisions in the sense that Bachrach and Baratz use the term, but in effect represent trivial and noninteresting examples. Questions such as the treatment of American Indians by the United States government for many years represent the latter, not in terms of the intrinsic importance of the issue. but because it was never expanded sufficiently to the public agenda and therefore never required any decision *not* to make a decision. In contrast, civil rights issues, or public financing of medical insurance were on the public agenda in America many years before attempts to place them on the formal agenda had any success. These two sorts of issues present very different problems in the study of agenda-building. In the case of the Indians, the question is why expansion to the public agenda was unsuccessful, while in the case of civil rights or public medical insurance we would be interested in the problem of moving from the public to formal agenda. Although we do not have the space to consider this problem here, such an analysis must include the resources, interests, and strategies not only of the proponents of an issue, but also of opponents seeking to contain the issue expansion and to keep the issue off the formal agenda.

Strategies. Strategies of conflict expansion are crucial to outside groups seeking to place their issue on the formal agenda. Two general problems of strategy are apparent in the stages we have identified: (1) the movement of an issue from a small core associated with the stages of identification and specification to a larger public associated with the expansion stage, and (2) the movement from expansion to entrance. Often the same strategies are used at both stages, although this is not always the case, and at times it is useful to distinguish between expansion strategies (associated with [1]), and entrance strategies (associated with [2]). Expansion to new groups enhances the possibility of attaining public agenda status, which will, it is hoped, create sufficient pressure on authorities to force their serious consideration of the issue. Groups seeking expansion of their issue must compete with other groups demanding attention for other issues, as well as with opposition forces trying to limit expansion.

Expansion strategies can aim at existing, relatively small groups in the population, such as interest groups, or they can work directly for mobilization of the mass public. Another variation is to create particular small groups whose goal is the promotion of a specific issue in the wider public. The major advantage of such a group is that it is not associated in the public mind with any other issues which may produce opposition by association. At the same time, because it is not associated with other pre-existing issues, its possibilities in terms of issue expansion are also more limited as it does not draw on pre-existing cleavages and combatants.

In seeking to achieve issue expansion a group with a grievance has two primary assets: (1) the characteristics of the issue itself, and (2) the financial and material resources as well as personal commitment of group members and their organization. Each provides different opportunities to groups seeking to place an issue on the public agenda.

Cobb and Elder offer a series of propositions suggesting how *issue characteristics* are likely to affect expansion. They suggest that the more ambiguously defined, the greater the social significance, the more extended the temporal relevance, the less technical, and the less available any clear precedent, the greater the chance that an issue will be expanded to a larger population.[25] Through public statements as well as private discussions, leaders of the grievance group, particularly at the outset of the conflict, have a great deal of freedom in their definition of the issue and in determining its characteristics.

At the same time there is no assurance that outside groups or the public will fully accept the grievance group's definition of the issue. There is virtually always some change in the definition of the issue as it expands to public groups.[26] One good example in recent years is the women's liberation movement which has usually tried to characterize its cause in terms of equality, human potential, and freedom. At the same time, opponents refuse to accept this definition and substitute such

[23] Marshall, "Sharing," pp. 231–246.

[24] Bachrach and Baratz "Two Faces of Power," pp. 947–952.

[25] Cobb and Elder, *Participation in American Politics*, pp. 112–113.

[26] Crenson, "Un-politics of Air Pollution," pp. 58–75.

specific and negative symbols as "lesbians."

An important strategy in issue expansion is to associate a particular issue with emotionally laden symbols which have a wide acceptance in the society.[27] In America both the civil rights and women's liberation movements have stressed the symbols of equality; in Ireland, groups seeking independence for Ulster have stressed the notion of a "united free country."

The use of these relatively familiar and positive symbols in connection with a new issue helps to develop an initial favorable reaction in the mass public, which might otherwise be hostile or skeptical. At the same time this is a way of saying to the established authorities that the group does not pose any particular threat to the government and in fact is working within the context of the existing framework. It is a way of preventing government harassment and opposition at a time when public support for the group or issue is not very strong.[28]

In addition to the issue characteristics and emotional symbols used in defining an issue, a grievance group has at its disposal the material resources as well as the energy and commitment of its members. How a group utilizes these resources in seeking to attain public agenda status can vary greatly. Some will choose to invest a great deal of their resources in trying to obtain widespread public attention through the mass media, while others are more likely to work in private for the support of existing attention groups. The use of expansion strategies is partially determined by the types of interests a group reflects. A group with a minimum of financial resources but with a large following tends to use the outside initiative strategy. Given no other resources, their only hope is to attract sufficient external support to reinforce their own position.[29]

In general, we would expect that the greater the resources a group expends, the greater its chances of success. At the same time, it is important to recognize that success is not likely to be a simple function of resources expended, and in fact, unless the issue characteristics are also considered, large resource expenditure can produce small returns. A striking example of this is the pro-United Nations campaign launched in Cincinnati in 1947. Despite a large number of messages in all the media, survey results showed that virtually no one in the city was even aware that the campaign was being waged, much less changed their views on the organization.[30]

One of the most frequent weaknesses of organizations seeking to expand an issue is that their campaigns "convince the convinced," rather than bringing in new groups who have no opinion on the issue or who see no connection between the issue and their own concerns. Frequently the commitment and enthusiasm of grievance group members blind them to the symbols which would be most effective in attracting additional supporters.

Strategic choices, not always consciously made, are also important as grievance groups, or more properly, coalitions working to expand an issue to the public agenda, also seek entrance to the formal agenda. At the same time, they must be aware that the strategy used in getting on the formal agenda may affect the way in which the issue is decided. Although we discuss four different strategies for attaining entrance, these may also be used in the expansion stage; in some cases the distinction between the stages is analytic rather than temporal, i.e., they may occur simultaneously. Four basic strategies are: (1) violence and threats of violence;[31] (2) institutional sanctions, such as withholding votes, money or work;[32] (3) working through brokers such as political parties and interest groups; and (4) direct access.[33] The method(s) a group chooses will depend on its position(s) in the society, the importance of the issue to the group, the length of time that an issue has remained on the public agenda without moving to the formal agenda; and the group's estimate of the probability of attaining a position on the formal agenda as a result of each strategy.

In evaluating the outside initiative model, three key considerations are: the type of issue being discussed (e.g., how threatening is it to the established groups in power), the extent to which a group is isolated in making its claims (e.g., is it running out of options to advance its cause?), and the length of time lag in attaining formal agenda status once it is on the public agenda. In general, we expect that a) the more important the issue, b) the more isolated the original grievance group, c) the longer

[27] See Murray Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1964); and *Politics as Symbolic Action: Mass Arousal and Quiesence*, (Chicago: Markham, 1971); and Richard Merelman, "Learning and Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review*, 60 (June, 1966), 548–561.

[28] For example, see William A. Gamson, *Power and Discontent* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey, 1968); and "Stable Unrepresentation in American Society," *American Behavioral Scientst*, 12 (November–December, 1968), 15–21.

[29] Michael Lipsky, *Protest in City Politics: Rent Strikes, Housing and the Power of the Poor*, (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1971), p. 7.

[30] Shirley A. Star and Helen MacGill Hughes, "Report on an Educational Campaign: the Cincinnati Plan for the United Nations," *American Journal of Sociology*, 55 (January, 1950), 389–400.

[31] See H. L. Nieburg, "Violence, Law, and the Informal *Polity*," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 13 (June 1969), 192–209.

[32] See, for example, Lipsky, *Protest in City Politics*, pp. 175–181.

[33] Cobb and Elder, *Participation*, pp. 151–159; and Crenson, *Un-politics*, pp. 133–158.

the issue has been on the public agenda, and d) the lower the likelihood that the authorities will consider the issue on their own, the more likely that the entrance strategies will include the use of violence or threats of violence along with institutional sanctions, and the less likely that formal agenda status will be achieved through the use of brokers and direct access.

A good example to illustrate these points is the political conflict in France which culminated in the uprising of May, 1968. Students, some workers, and other left wing political groups had demanded a number of reforms in French society, particularly in its educational system, for a number of years. The government of General de Gaulle, which itself had instituted a number of changes and reforms in France since coming to power in 1958, was moving too slowly or not at all as far as these groups were concerned. Following the violence and the restoration of order in 1968, the French government moved quickly to initiate reforms in numerous areas of social policy. While the rioters and their tactics were widely denounced, there was a far greater acceptance of the need for widespread internal reforms which the uprising highlighted. Thus, violence and threats of its continuation were successful in placing on the formal agenda a number of issues which had been on the public agenda for years, but had never before received serious government attention, despite many earlier attempts through both brokers and direct access.[34]

Outside initiative model: summary. The outside initiative model applies to the situation in which a group outside the government structure 1) articulates a grievance, 2) tries to expand interest in the issue to enough other groups in the population to gain a place on the public agenda, in order to 3) create sufficient pressure on decision makers to force the issue onto the formal agenda for their serious consideration.[35] This model of agenda building is likely to predominate in more egalitarian societies. Formal agenda status, it should be recognized, however, does not necessarily mean that the final decisions of the authorities or the actual policy implementation will be what the grievance group originally sought. Quite the contrary, either outright rejection of the grievance group's position or its widespread modification are not only possible but frequently occur.

[34] For a review of the events, see Bernard E. Brown, *The French Revolt: May, 1968*, (New York: McCaleb-Seiler Publishing Company, 1970).

[35] The stages we identify in each model are analytic and not necessarily temporal. For example, efforts to achieve entrance may in fact occur prior to expansion, although successful entrance usually requires that expansion take place before it. This argument is similar to Smelser's "value added" model for studying collective behavior. See Neil J. Smelser, *Theory of Collective Behavior* (New York: Free Press, 1962).

Mobilization Model. The mobilization model describes policies and programs which decision makers want to move from a formal to a public agenda. These issues have been placed on the formal agenda either by the decision makers themselves, or by people with direct access to them: there has been no preliminary expansion to various publics. This expansion becomes necessary, after some decisions, in order to implement them. The mobilization model, employing the same stages as the outside initiative model, describes the process through which decision makers try to promote the interest and support needed for implementation of these issues. Mobilization is necessary when a policy requires widespread, voluntary compliance. Decision makers may lack the resources, institutional or financial, or both, to implement their policy without mobilization. Mobilization may be needed because in a given cultural context, coercion in inappropriate, impractical, or simply too expensive. In a mirror image of the outside initiative model, then, the mobilization process shows decision makers trying to expand an issue from a formal to a public agenda.[36]

(1) *Initiation.* When a new program or policy is announced by a prominent political leader, it is automatically on the formal agenda; in many political systems this announcement also represents the end of the formal decision-making phase, since the new program is also official government policy. While there may be a good deal of debate within the government before announcement of the new program, there is typically little public interest or knowledge. The source of the initiative is the political leader. This model is often found in countries where great social distance between leaders and followers is expressed by differences in education, speech, life style and world view, or by attribution of supernatural powers to the authority.

Obvious examples are government initiated development programs found in most countries in Africa and Asia. President Julius Nyerere's Arusha Declaration in Tanzania in 1966 presented both the ruling political party and the nation as a whole with a sweeping set of proposals which, in effect, became official government policy at the moment they were announced. Nyerere argued that industrial development in Tanzania could not be achieved in the near future. Instead the party and government needed to recognize that the country's greatest need and greatest potential were in village development.[37] Programs of self-

[36] For illustrations, see Everett M. Rogers, *Diffusion of Innovations* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962); and *Modernization Among Peasants: the Impact of Communication* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969).

[37] For a presentation of his views, see Julius Nyerere, "The Arusha Declaration and TANU's Policy of Socialism

reliance for both the nation and local communities were required, and there would be severe restrictions on capital accumulation and wealth, particularly by politicians. Large banks and businesses within the nation were to be nationalized and the capital they produced used in financing local development.[38] "Other nations aim for the moon, while Tanzania aims at the village," concluded the President.

Another issue which requires mobilization of the public is population planning. Often there is widespread ignorance of a plan even after it is announced. The problem for the nation's leadership is making the plan visible to large segments of the population.[39]

(2) *Specification.* The announcement of a new policy, such as the Arusha Declaration in Tanzania or the War on Poverty in the United States, usually provides few concrete details. Following the initial announcement political leaders and their associates begin spelling out what is expected of the public in terms of cooperation or support, material resources, work, or changes in behavior patterns. Through specification the leaders hope to make the program clearer to the public, at the same time both building support and letting citizens know what is required of them. In a study of Tswana in South Africa, Schapera reports that chiefs often presented to the public assembly laws drawn up in prior consultation with their advisers.[40] In one particular case, Isang, chief of the Kgatla, felt that there was an excess of beer drinking. He called a meeting of his close advisers and the local ward-heads who voted to support the chief's proposal to curb beer brewing and drinking. The decision was then presented to the public, although the popular assembly was not asked to discuss and approve the law. It was assumed that its acceptance by the ward leaders represented public approval.[41] Compliance with the law depends upon the local actions of the ward-heads as the chief alone is unable to implement new law effectively. Thus, in this situation, a political leader places an issue on the formal agenda and insures that it will be heard. Then, before a group of lower political authorities, the public specification takes place. Its implementation, however, will further depend upon local actions and public support.

(3) *Expansion.* Even though the new programs may become government policy as soon as they are announced, implementation is often contingent on public acceptance and changes in behavior, which may range from the payment of new taxes to the donation of labor to the community. Under Nyerere's program, rural communities in Tanzania were asked to hold meetings to discuss ways in which they could meaningfully implement programs of self-reliance.[42] Rural meetings and resulting programs required a prior support for the program in general, and an understanding, at least by local leaders, of ways in which it could be implemented. The problem is not at all trivial, because one of the most important barriers to the implementation of general development programs on the most local level is that no one is very sure what they mean in local terms. There may be several political meetings where everyone applauds the leaders for their new policy, but no consequent tangible changes at the village level.

To attempt to combat this problem, political leaders who initiated the new program try to expand the issue to new groups in the population in the same way that outside grievance groups seek expansion of their issue in the outside initiative model. The purpose is the same. It is an attempt to draw additional participants into the effort to implement the program, as particular groups are shown how the program is relevant to them. The issue begins with the identification group, which in this case consists of political leaders who announce the new program. They first take the issue to attention groups, seeking their public statements of support as well as explaining in a more private setting what the new program means, and how the group should participate in its implementation. Attempts at informal and formal cooptation of leaders of specialized elites are often part of mobilization efforts.[43]

This aspect of mobilization can also be illustrated in Tanzania. In the period immediately following the announcement of the Arusha Declaration, local branches of the political party, as well as women's organizations, labor unions, ethnic groups, and other existing groups in the society pledged both their public and private support to the program and began taking steps to implement it. This is not to suggest there was no opposition. Because of Nyerere's control of the party and government as well as his widespread popularity, however, opposition was more private than public. For example, many political officials

and Self-Reliance," in *African Politics and Society* ed. Irving Leonard Markovitz (New York: Free Press, 1970).

[38] See John Hatch, *Tanzania: A Profile* (New York: Praeger, 1972), pp. 195–197.

[39] For a description of such a campaign, see Jason Finkle, "Politics, Development Strategies and Family Planning Strategy in India and Pakistan," *Journal of Comparative Administration*, 3 (December, 1971), 259–295.

[40] See Isaac Schapera, *Tribal Innovators: Tswana chiefs and social change, 1795–1940* (New York: Humanities Press, 1970).

[41] Schapera, p. 27.

[42] Hatch, *Tanzania*, pp. 197–198.

[43] For example, see Frederick J. Fleron Jr., "Cooptation as a Mechanism of Adaptation to Change," *Polity*, 2 (Winter, 1969), 176–201.

privately grumbled about their salary cuts and the restriction on house ownerships. Nonetheless, they publicly supported the policy and personally complied with it.[44]

Often, the opposition of a crucial attention group can mean the failure of a mobilization effort. In the instance of birth control, the position of key religious groups, particularly the Catholic Church, can determine the program's fate. Church opposition in Malaysia led to the ultimate failure of the program in the late 1960s, even though less than 2% of the population was Catholic. The Church was highly mobilized, had articulate leaders and was strong in urban areas where the program was focused. Even the opposition of a major attention group, however, does not guarantee defeat for a program. In the Philippines, a birth control campaign also launched in the late 1960s was more successful even though the Church did not endorse the endeavor. While the percentage of Catholics was higher in the Philippines than in Malaysia, the Church was undergoing a series of power struggles which meant that all other issues were subordinated in importance. The government was able to exploit a power vacuum by encouraging different factions in the Church to vie for power while implementing its population program.[45]

A second target for issue expansion is the attentive public. In situations where policies are initiated by political leaders, as we have outlined in the model, expansion to a well-informed attentive public is relatively easy. The announcement of a new program almost always attracts the attention and interest of members of the attentive public. Prominent officials have much easier access to the agenda of public discussion than outside grievance groups. What is more problematic, however, is how the attentive public will react to the new program. The French Education Minister knows that a series of proposals for educational reform will be a topic of discussion and concern among the attentive public, while at the same time, he is far less sure of their support for his proposals.

The presentation of the new program to the attentive public, as well as to various attention groups, is crucial, because in effect they become the links between the political leaders and the mass public. These people are likely to be key opinion leaders who channel not only information, but, even more importantly, their opinions about the worth of the program to the rest of the population. For the government program to be implemented successfully, efforts both by attention groups and by the attentive public are necessary. Their acceptance of the program followed by inaction is the equivalent of a nondecision to ignore the government's priorities and, in effect, to kill the program.

(4) *Entrance.* The problem of entrance is one of moving from the formal to the public agenda, as a significant portion of the public comes to recognize the program of the government as dealing with an important problem (even if they disagree with the specific ways in which the government proposes to deal with this problem).[46]

Strategies. The same strategic assets are available to the government, as it seeks to expand the issue to the public agenda, as are open to grievance groups in the outside initiative model: (1) issue characteristics, and (2) material resources.

While the material resources of governmental groups initiating a policy are almost always larger than those of outside grievance groups, the characteristics of the issues as they are presented to the public remain a crucial element in whether or not the policy is successfully implemented. Of great importance is the association of the new program with known and accepted emotional symbols while, at the same time, the public is persuaded that the new program "is not just more of the same old thing." It must be new enough to be exciting, but traditional enough to be understood and to produce positive affect in the population. In India and Pakistan, attempts to win public support for a population control effort in the 1960s were largely unsuccessful because of the type of campaign used. The issue was defined in terms of long range gains focusing on complex statistics which made it difficult to gain public acceptance.[47] What may have been needed was definition of the issue in terms of more immediate benefits, such as better nutrition for a smaller number of children.

In addition to the problem of issue definition, mobilization efforts may fail because of faulty planning. Often, bureaucrats in various parts of the country have insufficient information about national issues to gain access to public agendas at the local level. Bureaucrats may also become jealous of their prerogatives and maintain their power at all costs. Mobilization efforts can fail if if there is a poor information exchange and if national leaders are unable to convince bureaucrats that local level implementation of programs would be in their own self-interest.[48]

[44] Hatch, pp. 199–205.

[45] For example, see Gayl Ness and Hirofumi Ando, "The Politics of Population Planning in Malaysia and the Philippines," *Journal of Comparative Administration* 3 (December, 1971), 296–329.

[46] Expansion from formal to public agenda on the national level may be followed or accompanied by a public to formal agenda-building process as the issue is placed on lower-level agendas.

[47] Finkle, "Development Strategies" pp. 259–295.

[48] See Aaron Wildavsky, "Why Planning Fails in Nepal," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 17 (December, 1972), 508–528.

Organizational structure also influences the extent to which mobilization efforts are successful. If there is some structural mechanism which enables leaders to meet with representatives from the various groups or regions frequently, it can help bridge the gap between formal announcement and public awareness. In Liberia, the government announced a Unification Policy in the late 1960s and it was able to reach local public agendas in part because the local chiefs had access to the government through frequent Executive Council meetings and served as a bridge between national and local officials. The campaign also stressed the use of positive symbols such as "equality" and negative symbols referring to the enemies who were opposed to the Unification Program.[49]

Mobilization model: summary. The mobilization model describes the process of agenda building in situations where political leaders initiate a policy, but require the support of the mass public for its implementation. Announcement of a new program automatically places an issue on the formal agenda, and in fact may represent the end result of governmental decision making as well. The crucial problem is to move the issue from the formal agenda to the public agenda. The mobilization model is most likely to appear frequently in more hierarchical societies, and in those where supernatural powers attributed to the leader emphasize the distance between him or her and the followers.

Inside Access Model. A third model describes the situation in which it is easiest to be successful in achieving both formal agenda status *and* implementation of the proposed policy with the fewest changes. In this model policy originates within a governmental agency, or within a group which has easy and frequent access to political decision makers. As in the mobilization model, the issue reaches the formal agenda relatively easily because of the position of the initiating group.

The inside access model significantly differs from the mobilization model, however, in that the group originally articulating the policy does not seek to expand the issue to the public agenda—i.e., it does not try to force decision makers to place it on the formal agenda (as in the outside initiative model) or to build support for its implementation (as in the mobilization model). Instead expansion is aimed at particular influential groups which can be important in the passage and implementation of the policy, while at the same time, the initiators try to *limit* issue expansion to the public because they do not want the issue on the public agenda. Instead they seek a more "private" decision within the government, and generally stand to be defeated when the issue is sufficiently expanded to include public groups that might be opposed to it. Bureaucrats are also often afraid that the public will misunderstand a technical problem if it becomes a matter for public debate.[50]

This strategy, for example, was used in the early phases of the American supersonic transport (SST) conflict in 1971 and is often attempted by groups seeking potentially controversial defense contracts in the United States. Similarly, highly placed bureaucrats in developing countries often adopt this attitude. They suggest that the public does not (and cannot) understand the technical issues involved in development planning; development is then best left in the hands of those people who do know what is going on (themselves).[51]

(1) and (2) *Initiation and specification.* An "inside" group, meaning a group or agency within the government, or a group with close ties to governmental leaders, may articulate a grievance or a new policy proposal. Following the initial statement of a problem, which is aimed primarily at other governmental leaders and decision makers, the originating group or agency makes a series of concrete proposals. Despite their close ties to the decision makers, the originating group is not yet assured of success, for typically, more issues are presented to top leaders than they can possibly consider. Thus, in order to give their issue a higher priority, its initial advocates seek limited issue expansion. Groups using the inside access model tend to be more homogeneous than groups attempting to advance their cause using the other two patterns. Because of their privileged position, inside groups tend to be closer knit in background, mores and goals; such congruence is an asset in attempts to attract support.[52]

(3) *Expansion.* Limited issue expansion means that the policy initiators might seek to involve an identification group and selected attention groups, both of which may help create the feeling of urgency and importance necessary to attain a quick and favorable response from decision makers. This is done in a relatively private setting as the attentive

[49] Thomas P. Wrubel, "Liberia: The Dynamics of Continuity," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 9 (July 1971), pp. 189–204.

[50] For example, see Lewis Anthony Dexter, "Congressmen and the Making of Military Policy," in *New Perspectives on the House of Representatives*, ed. Robert L. Peabody and Nelson W. Polsby (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963), pp. 305–324.

[51] See, for example, Lucien W. Pye, *Politics, Personality and Nation-Building:* Burma's Search for Identity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962); and James Scott, *Political Ideology in Malaysia* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1968).

[52] G. William Domhoff, *The Higher Circles: The Governing Class in America* (New York: Vintage Books, 1970), pp. 111–155.

public may be only dimly aware that the issue is being considered at all, and the mass public is totally unaware of its existence. The supporters of the proposal feel that selective pressure from groups close to the decision makers is preferable to public pressure, which may create a situation in which they lose control over the issue.[53]

In a parliamentary system, for example, one ministry can easily become involved in a problem that concerns one or more additional ministries. High-ranking civil servants, or even the ministers themselves, may then approach officials in the other ministries seeking support for their proposals. A second example is the efforts of an interest group seeking special favors from government to approach either officials in a ministry where it has particularly close ties or members of the legislature who can be expected to work behind the scenes in its interest.

(4) *Entrance.* Entrance means attaining formal agenda status. It does not mean that the issue is on the public agenda. In general, entrance is not spectacular and public. Violence and threats of violence are almost never employed. The preferred strategies for attaining entrance are through direct access or through brokers. Institutional sanctions may be used against individuals resisting the program, although what is more likely is the use of special favors and the payment of money to those who cooperate.[54]

Strategies. Expansion strategies are aimed at bringing in identification and attention groups which can be crucial in assuring support for the program, and at the same time, avoiding expansion to the attentive and mass publics. The road to the formal agenda is not through the public agenda. In Illinois, for instance, the Corps of Engineers planned to build a dam site which would require bulldozing certain property valued by conservationists. Conservationists found out about the intentions of the Corps and made the issue public, stressing that other alternatives were not explored, that the benefits did not override the costs, and that the proposed dam was not economically justified. As a consequence, the Corps retreated and proposed a more limited alternative. Ordinarily, those trying to reach a formal agenda through inside channels will not fare as well if the issue becomes public, regardless of the symbolic ploys at their disposal.[55]

In comparison with expansion strategies under the outside initiative and mobilization models, the inside access model places greater emphasis on tangible, as opposed to symbolic, rewards for those groups and individuals supporting the proposals.[56] In attracting support, the initiating group employs bargaining and administrative language styles, as opposed to hortatory and legal ones. At the same time there may be a large-scale organizational commitment to behind-the-scenes action to obtain support for the proposal. Logrolling, or agreements between groups to support each other's proposals, also occurs.[57] Not all policies that originate within the governmental units necessarily fit this model. When governmental leaders as well as civil servants, believe that passage and implementation can only occur if sufficient pressure is brought from outside on other political leaders, they will attempt to involve the public in an issue through the processes described in the outside initiative model.

Inside access model: summary. The third model describes a pattern of agenda building and policy formation which attempts to exclude the participation of the public. Proposals arise within governmental units or in groups close to the government. The issue is then expanded to identification and attention groups in order to create sufficient pressure on decision makers to place the item on the formal agenda. At no point is the public greatly involved, and the initiators make no effort to get the issue on to the public agenda. On the contrary, they try to keep it off. The inside access model will occur with greatest frequency in societies characterized by high concentration of wealth and status.

Agenda levels and combinations of agenda-building models. In the previous discussion, and in the propositions which follow, the models are treated separately. These are conceptual rather than empirical models; most occurrences of agenda building will certainly be more complex, combin-

[53] For example, see Cobb and Elder, pp. 71–77.

[54] This resembles very closely the literature on political corruption; for example, see James C. Scott, *Comparative Political Corruption* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972), "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia," *American Political Science Review*, 66 (March, 1972), 91–113; Arnold Heidenheimer, "The Analysis of Administrative Corruption," in *Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis*, ed. Arnold J. Heidenheimer (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston 1970); and Jeremy Boissevain, "Patronage in Sicily," in Heidenheimer.

[55] See Bruce Hannon and Julie Cannon, "The Corps Out-Engineered," in *The Politics of Ecosuicide*, pp. 220–227.

[56] For examples of such cases, see Andrew Hacker, "Pressure Politics in Pennsylvania: The Truckers vs. The Railroads," in *The Uses of Power: 7 Cases in American Politics*, ed. Alan Westin (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1962); and Edward Furash, "The Problem of Technology Transfer," in *The Study of Policy Formation*, ed. Raymond Bauer and Kenneth Gergen (New York: Free Press, 1968).

[57] Peterson, "British Interest Group Theory Re-examined," pp. 381–402.

ing models as well as levels of agendas. In most societies, an issue may potentially appear on many agendas. Attempts to achieve agenda status for any issue may be aimed at one of these agendas at a time, in different possible sequences, or at some or all of them simultaneously. Since the three models of agenda building may also occur in various combinations during the history of any issue, many permutations of agendas and agenda building are possible. An issue which reaches higher level decision makers via either inside access or outside initiative, for example, may in a second stage be transmitted by them, through mobilization or inside access efforts, to lower level agendas of local communities or associations. Many issues take the opposite route, from lower level to higher level agendas; and some groups try to put their concerns before several different sets of decision makers at the same time.

III. Agenda Building and Comparative Politics

The outside initiative, mobilization and inside access models describe three ways in which the public can influence the structure of political agendas. Initially, we hypothesize that examples of all three models can be found in any society, although there will be clear tendencies for some types of polity to favor one of the models over the others. A second area for comparative analysis is variation in the rates of success at achieving agenda status in different political systems, a variable which we would also expect to be related to the model of agenda building predominant in a system. A third important problem in agenda building is variation in the process within a single political system, which then can be compared to patterns in other polities. Here research might focus on the strategies that different groups utilize depending upon their position in the social structure. A fourth area of concern is development of generalizations about the agenda-building process across both polities and models in order to identify common factors influencing conflict expansion, mobilization of group interests, and ultimate success or failure in attaining agenda status. Some examples of these four types of propositions follow.

Occurrence of the models across societies

Are there agenda-building styles that tend to dominate in different political systems? We think so, although we are less certain about the exact nature of this dominance. In addition, if it exists, this dominance will probably be more marked in distinguishing successful attempts to achieve formal agenda status than those which fail. As mentioned earlier, one of the most important clusters of variables is the structure of wealth and status in a society; agenda access is expected to vary with patterns of stratification:

(1) The more egalitarian a society, the more likely that the outside initiative pattern will predominate;
(2) The greater the concentration of wealth and status in a society, the more likely that the inside access pattern will predominate:
(3) The greater the social distance between political leaders and followers, or the more political leaders are seen as endowed with special insight or supernatural powers, the more likely that the mobilization pattern will predominate:
(4) The more complex the social structure and economy of a society, the less likely that any single pattern will predominate.

Variation in success rates across societies

Success refers to placing an issue on the formal agenda for serious attention by decision makers, not necessarily to emerging victorious after the decision-making stage. So far our reading of case materials suggests that achieving agenda status is more problematic in modern nations than in small face-to-face communities. In addition:

(1) The greater the social homogeneity of a community, the higher the success rates in achieving agenda status;
(2) The greater the rate of internal migration and population increase in a community, the more difficult it will be to attain agenda status;
(3) The greater the number of potential agendas on which an issue can be placed, the more likely that success rates will be high;
(4) The less potential issues require redistribution of material resources in a society, the higher success rates will be.

Intergroup variation in patterns within societies

Some of the most important variations in the agenda-building process are a result of differences in social and political positions across groups within any society. As a result, these groups utilize different means of trying to achieve agenda status.

(1) Groups that are relatively weak in material resources, but potentially large in numbers are most likely to succeed in using the outside initiative pattern:
(2) The more isolated the original grievance group (i.e., identification group), the more likely the group will be to utilize violence or threats of violence in trying to place the issue on the agenda;
(3) The greater the extent to which regions or neighborhoods are economically or ethnically homogeneous, the more mobilizable their residents will be in agenda conflicts:
(4) The more a group represents lower status interests in a society the more likely it is to use the outside initiative pattern; the more it represents upper status interests, the more likely it is to use the inside access pattern.

Cross-model generalizations

Finally, there are aspects of the agenda-building process that hold across models and across societies.

(1) Issues may move from the public agenda to the formal agenda after a time lag under the outside initiative model. The relationship between the length of time an issue is on the public agenda and the probability of its reaching the formal agenda is curvilinear;
(2) The greater the proportion of unsuccessful issues (issues not achieving formal agenda status), the higher the level of discontent and political instability in a community;
(3) The greater the time gap between the achievement of public agenda status and the achievement of formal agenda status, the greater the level of political instability in a community.

These hypotheses about agenda building remain untested so far, although we hope that they will eventually be examined through two major strategies. The first is the coding of existing cases from a wide number of political systems ranging from traditional societies studied by anthropologists to small community studies in western societies, to studies of national policy making. Building up a large sample will permit relatively rapid confirmation or refutation of the hypothesized relationships in our scheme. Second, the development of an adequate understanding of agenda building requires the collection of original data in a wide variety of settings chosen to make possible development of generalizations on both cross-cultural and intrasocietal levels.

Although the effort needed is great, it is important. Previous studies of participation in policy formation have focused on the success or failure of attempts by various groups in a population to influence decision makers' choices among policy alternatives. The concept of agenda building makes possible investigation of participation in the less visible but crucial processes by which these alternatives are defined for decision makers. The strategies used by various groups competing to place issues on the agenda and the factors which influence their success or failure reveal patterns of participation in policy formation obscured by a focus on the decision-making process alone.

APSA PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS, 1976

"The Divine Science": Political Engineering in American Culture

AUSTIN RANNEY

Introduction

PENDLETON HERRING
Princeton, New Jersey

When one admires and respects the accomplishments of a friend it is difficult to condense the thoughts and happy associations of many years into a brief introduction. And when the individual in question has covered a lot of ground both intellectually and geographically it is no easier to be concise. Austin Ranney's career as a student took him to Northwestern for his B.S., to Oregon for a M.A. and to Yale for his doctorate. Then teaching and administrative duties at the University of Illinois 1947–61, more than a decade at Wisconsin, this past year at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, and now on to Berkeley.

Research pursuits have meant inquiry into the politics of candidate selection in Great Britain and in another vein, inquiry into vintage selection in the Burgundy district. The field work in both instances was stimulating and rewarding. The very years of his work abroad are thus recorded in the vintage charts of Burgundy: of 1961—"sensationally good; GRANDE CLASSE;" for 1962—"a very great vintage, wines at their peak." To be laboring in the vineyard of research in a great vintage year: How explain such a coincidence! What a sense of timing, or what a streak of luck! But then our man had been appointed to a full professorship at Illinois in 1959, a year known in Burgundy as the Vintage Year of the Century.

Austin Ranney ranks with those who have given hard thought to the direction and systematic development of our field. I am particularly mindful of his long standing professional concern with why American political parties behave as they do and with his analysis of proposals for responsible party government. The debate over these matters has lent a focus and useful continuity of attention in our discipline. I find particularly relevant his insistence that problems of "party reform are bound up with some of the most fundamental, difficult and unresolved issues of political theory." In his writings over the years he has exhibited a command of empirically and quantitatively oriented research methodology and a sensitivity to political thought historically viewed.

I find refreshing his capacity for combining realistic detachment and analytic skill with a cheerful readiness to engage in efforts at reform. As a member of the Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection he demonstrated how successfully to function as a political activist on occasion and still preserve his scholarly role.

I think of his leadership in the Social Science Research Council and of efforts to stimulate the study of policy content and of the impact of public policies.

There is much more that could be said about his distinctive research, his success as a teacher, his congeniality as a colleague and his administrative talents, but I want to take this occasion to emphasize his service to the profession of political science and his concern with the problems and growth of the discipline as such. After several years as Book Review Editor, he became Managing Editor of the *American Political Science Review* over the five year span of 1966 through 1970. This was a period of rapid change and growth. The editorial load was heavy and included service on the Executive Committee of the Association. And now as he completes his term as President this ceremony today offers a most appropriate opportunity for me to express, on behalf of all of us gathered here, our deep sense of appreciation. Above all I stress the generous and sustaining spirit with which he has contributed to the advance of our discipline and won in full measure our confidence, respect and affection.

"The Divine Science": Political Engineering in American Culture*

AUSTIN RANNEY
The University of Wisconsin, Madison

Like my seventy-one predecessors, I hold the presidency of the American Political Science Association for one year. My term ends on September 5th, it is not renewable, I cannot be impeached, and my duties are largely ceremonial—for example, addressing such learned convocations as this. That being the case, I am especially sensitive to the fact that, by Act of Congress, the nation's official celebration of its two-hundredth birthday began on March 1st of this year.

Since the creation of the United States of America was, above all, a *political* act, it seems to me that we political scientists have a special obligation to celebrate the Bicentennium. *But how*? For guidance on this question, I turned to *Webster's Unabridged* to see just what a "celebration" is. As in previous safaris into that work, I found several meanings, and there is some question about which is most suitable for political scientists. One meaning is: "to honor by conducting religious, commemorative, or other solemn ceremonies or by refraining from ordinary business." Not bad—especially if it means refraining from grading bluebooks or serving on committees; but would our institutions continue to pay our salaries if we engaged in that kind of celebration? Another meaning is: "to demonstrate grateful and happy satisfaction [in a past event] by engaging in festivities, indulgence, merry-making, or other similar deviations from accustomed routine." That is more like it; yet I doubt that all political scientists would go along with the part about "grateful and happy satisfaction" in the past event. Even more promising is a third meaning: "to observe the occasion of an achievement, reunion, anniversary, or other notable occasion with gaiety [by engaging] in hilarious festivities, usually including drinking." Now *that* is not merely beguiling; it is empirically descriptive. But could we get our institutions to reimburse our expenses for celebrating in *that* manner, however traditional it may be for our profession?

So in the end I conclude we must settle for a fourth kind of celebration: "to portray [an event] in a way to contribute to public awareness [and] edification. . . ."[1] I want to suggest in this paper that one way we can contribute to such a commemoration is to portray the creation of the American polity as history's first great political experiment and massive effort at political engineering. And by "political engineering" I mean the application of empirically derived general principles of individual and institutional behavior to fashion institutions intended to solve practical political problems.

Let me begin by explaining why that portrait, while certainly not the only one possible, is both accurate and useful.

The American Polity as an Experiment

Before the 1770s, with a few minor exceptions, no political system had ever been deliberately created at a single point in time to maximize certain general principles. All systems had "emerged" in the mists of history; they had evolved and changed; some had grown, others had declined, and some had died or been swallowed up. Consequently, all the people eager to *change* their systems—and there were many such before the 1770s—were constrained by multitudes of givens and enjoyed only small areas of freedom for maneuver.

But the visionaries who established "the first new nation"[2] in 1776 felt no such constraints. Anyone who reads their public broadsides and private letters cannot help being struck by how vivid was their sense of facing a *tabula rasa*, of having complete freedom to sweep away all the errors and injustices of the past and fashion *de novo* a truly just and enduring order. For example, in January, 1776, John Adams wrote to George Wythe:

> You and I . . . have been sent into life at a time when the greatest lawgivers of antiquity would have wished to live. How few of the human race have ever enjoyed an opportunity of making an election of government, more than of air, soil, or climate, for themselves or their children! When, before the present epocha, had three

* Many of the ideas presented here were generated in talks with various colleagues at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences during 1974–75. In addition, I am grateful to Joseph A. Ranney III for reading the manuscript and making many welcome contributions. All share much of the credit but none of the blame for its final version.

[1] *Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged* (Springfield, Mass.: G. & C. Merriam Company, 1965), p. 359.

[2] This is, of course, the felicitous title of Seymour Martin Lipset's study of the creation of the American nation: *The First New Nation* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books edition, 1967).

millions of people full power and a fair opportunity to form and establish the wisest and happiest government that human wisdom can contrive?[3]

And the Reverend John Witherspoon, President of the College of New Jersey and teacher of James Madison, declared:

> All the governments we have read of in former ages were settled by caprice or accident, by the influence of prevailing parties or particular persons, or prescribed by a conqueror. Important improvements indeed have been forced upon some constitutions by the spirit of daring men, supported by successful insurrections. But to see government in large and populous countries settled from its foundation by deliberate counsel, and directed immediately to the public good of the present and future generations . . . is certainly altogether new.[4]

How, then, did the nation's founders use this new and exhilarating freedom? If I am correct, they used it to create a new polity and thereby launched the world's first large-scale political experiment. Let me briefly list the reasons why I characterize the situation in these terms.

First, the new nation's political institutions were deliberately created at particular identifiable points in time—e.g., 1776, 1783, and 1787. Second, the new institutions' forms were the products of highly self-conscious efforts to apply to particular situations principles held to be universally valid. And third, those principles were derived largely from observations of and reflections upon historical and contemporary *experience*.

Yet the nascent American polity was not unique in any of these respects. Over a century earlier Oliver Cromwell's Puritans replaced the ancient political order they had smashed at Naseby and Marston Moor with England's first and only effort at a written Constitution. Their Instrument of Government was also promulgated at a single point in time (1653); and it too was based upon a series of universal principles, those which had won general acceptance in the parliamentary army's debates of the 1640s.[5] But not only did that Constitution survive for only seven years; its Article XII institutionalized a principle entirely foreign to the ideas and institutions cherished by the men of Philadelphia in 1776 and 1787: " . . . the persons elected shall not have power to alter the government as it is hereby settled. . . . "[6]

The designers of the American polity had much in common with Cromwell and his Ironsides, but in at least three respects they went much further and thereby gave the world a kind of political system it had not seen before. First, they did not regard the success or failure of their new institutions as matters to be deduced from First Principles or reaffirmed by declarations of faith; rather they were matters to be continually considered and reconsidered in the light of *experience*. Second, they both wished and expected that the institutions and their underlying principles would be changed if subsequent experience so indicated. And third, they built into their constitutions and charters orderly procedures for making whatever changes experience might require.

Thus the new American system was truly an experiment where Cromwell's Commonwealth was not. To be sure, if judged by the canons of twentieth-century social science, which require for an experiment the prior specification of all relevant variables, the exact matching of experimental and control groups, and the careful isolation of cause-effect relationships from all others, it was neither well designed nor complete. But even by those demanding (and seldom fulfilled) standards, the new polity was nevertheless experimental in spirit as no other had ever been: future generations of *people*, not divine forces, were to be its judges; change, not petrification, was its expectation; and, above all, a political *science* provided its intellectual foundations.

The Political Science and Engineering of America's Designers

The Designers' Belief in "Political Science." To begin with, anyone who reads widely in the writings of the Republic's designers will be impressed, as I was, by how often and approvingly they spoke of "the science of politics." John Adams did more than any other to popularize the term. In 1774, for example, he wrote in his first pamphlet on politics: " . . . as the divine science of politics is

[3] In Charles Francis Adams, ed., *The Works of John Adams* (Boston, 1856), Vol. IV, p. 200.

[4] Quoted in Clinton Rossiter, *Seedtime of the Republic* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1953), pp. 414–415. The mood persisted: David Ramsay, a historian writing in 1789, said of the Revolution: "In no age before, and in no other country, did man ever possess an election of the kind of government under which he would choose to live. The consituent parts of the ancient free governments were thrown together by accident. The freedom of modern European governments was, for the most part, obtained by the concessions of liberality of monarchs or military leaders. In America alone, reason and liberty concurred in the formation of constitutions," *History of the American Revolution* (1789), I, 356, quoted in Bernard Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1967), fn. 39, p. 273.

[5] The document's origins and political theory are described in C. H. Firth, *Oliver Cromwell and the Rule of the Puritans in England* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1902); and Perez Zagorin, *A History of Political Thought in the English Revolution* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954).

[6] The Instrument of Government (1653), Article XII, in C. H. Firth and R. S. Rait, eds., *Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum, 1642–1660* (London: H. M.'s Stationery Office, 1911), II, 813–822.

the science of social happiness, and the blessings of society depend entirely on the constitutions of government . . . there can be no employment more agreeable to a benevolent mind than a research after the best."[7] Moreover, the phrase meant to him very much what we mean by it; for he identified its basic goal and main procedures thus: " . . . aim at an exact knowledge of the nature, end, and means of government; compare the different forms of it with each other, and each of them with their effects on public and private happiness."[8] And he added a remark about the divine science that only some of us will approve but all will recognize. In 1774 he wrote to James Warren: "You and I have too many cares and occupations, and therefore we must recommend it to Mrs. Warren, and her friend Mrs. Adams, to teach our sons the divine science of politics; and to be frank, I suspect they understand it better than we do."[9]

As Bernard Crick has correctly, though disapprovingly, pointed out, both the label "political science" and the ideas it represented were embraced by most of the new polity's designers. The times, Crick suggests, demanded it: "In a young Federation of States, where many were fully conscious of how much its tenuous national unity depended upon deliberate political arrangements, it would not have been unexpected to see such a study at once spring forth, like a new Pallas Athene from the brow of Zeus, adult and fully armed."[10]

Most of the designers not only believed that a science of politics was possible and desirable; they were convinced that it had developed so much in their time that it had become the most reliable source of basic principles for engineering the new political institutions. Thus, Hamilton wrote in the Ninth *Federalist* paper:

> If it had been found impracticable to have devised models of a more perfect structure, the enlightened friends to liberty would have been obliged to abandon the cause of that species of government as indefensible. The science of politics, however, like most other sciences, has received great improvement. The efficacy of various principles is now well understood, which were either not known at all, or imperfectly known to the ancients. The regular distribution of power into distinct departments; the introduction of legislative balances and checks . . . are wholly new discoveries, or have made their principal progress towards perfection in modern times. They are means, and powerful means, by which the excellencies of republican government may be retained and its imperfections lessened or avoided.[11]

The other designers agreed with James Wilson's admonition that "the foundations of political truth have been laid but lately: the genuine science of government, to no human science inferior in importance, is indeed but in its infancy. . . ."[12] But they also agreed with Hamilton's judgment that the new political science was a good deal better than any other foundation available for building the new institutions. As he put it in the Thirty-First *Federalist*:

> Though it cannot be pretended that the principles of moral and political knowledge have, in general, the same degree of certainty as those of the mathematics, yet they have much better claims in this respect than, to judge from the conduct of men in particular situations, we should be disposed to allow them. The obscurity is much oftener in the passions and prejudices of the reasoner than in the subject.[13]

George Washington, indeed, regarded instruction in the science of government as the most important mission of the national university he asked Congress to establish in 1796. He told them: "The more homogeneous our citizens can be made in these particulars, the greater will be our prospect of permanent union; and a primary object of such an institution should be, the education of our youth in the science of government."[14]

Congress did not follow Washington's advice. In our own time, sad to say, university budgets and foundation grants do not reflect the wisdom of the Father of Our Country any better. But at least Washington and his colleagues left us a good statement of educational priorities we may yet follow!

Indeed, some of them founded a short-lived but intriguing organization that might well be called the first American political science association. It called itself the Society for Political Enquiries. It was founded in Philadelphia in February, 1787, and it was in many respects the true philosophical ancestor of associations like this one. Its Charter proclaimed its central purpose to be "mutual improvement in the knowledge of government, and . . . the advancement of political science."[15] And it declared this purpose to be of the highest order, because "the moral character and happiness of mankind, are so interwoven with the operations of government, and the progress of the arts and

[7] *Works*, IV, 193.
[8] *Ibid.*, II, 59.
[9] *Ibid.*, IX, 339.
[10] Bernard Crick, *The American Science of Politics* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959), p. 4.
[11] *The Federalist Papers* (McLean ed.; New York: Mentor Books, 1961), pp. 72–73.
[12] Quoted in A. J. Beitzinger, *A History of American Political Thought* (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1972), p. 233.
[13] *The Federalist*, p. 194.
[14] Address to Congress, December 7, 1796, quoted in Crick, *The American Science of Politics*, p. 3. For Washington's other declarations along similar lines, see Merle Curti, *The Growth of American Thought*, 2nd. ed. (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1951), p. 155.
[15] Quoted in Beitzinger, *A History of American Political Thought*, p. 232.

sciences is so dependent on the nature of our political institutions, that it is essential to the advancement of civilized society to give ample discussion to these topics."[16]

We can mark how much our discipline has grown by observing that the Society for Political Enquiries had forty-two members, compared with the twelve thousand individuals who now belong to the APSA. We can also see, with some pain perhaps, what has happened to the quality of the discipline's *leaders* by noting that the President of *that* association was Benjamin Franklin. And we can learn a lesson—though I am less confident of this—from the fact that the Society did not last very long nor do very much. Nothing I have read *completely* explains its early demise, but one of Franklin's biographers gives us a clue in his comment that "although the society had forty-two members, the meetings were only sparsely attended, since one of their number monopolized the proceedings with his incessant talking [although] Franklin said but little after a subject was broached."[17] He does not identify the incessant talker—a type which still injects an element of hell into our divine science—but the only other two Society members he names are James Wilson and Thomas Paine. We may all form our own hypotheses.

But then as now, the science is more important than the scientists. Accordingly, I turn now to a description of the origins and main characteristics of the designers' political science and engineering.

The Origins of the Designers' Science of Politics.

1. *In Western Europe and England.* Despite Professor Crick's expectations, the designers' approach to politics did not "spring forth" instantaneously, "adult and fully armed." It emerged from a philosophical milieu which had developed in Western culture for three centuries. The epistemological and political consequences of the waning of the middle ages have been exhaustively analyzed by many great scholars, including Huizinga, Allen, Gierke, Lovejoy, McIlwain, and Sabine; and their accounts are far too complex to be discussed in any detail here. For my purposes, however, I have found particularly useful W. H. Greenleaf's brilliant work, *Order, Empiricism and Politics*,[18] and the next few paragraphs are heavily indebted to his analysis.

In political thought as in all other aspects of intellectual life, the medieval world was a world of authority and order based on divine revelation interpreted and expounded by the clergy of the universal church as the only source of truth. This world was shattered both by the Reformation, with its repudiation of the authoritative Church and clergy, and by the discoveries of the rapidly developing natural sciences, particularly astronomy and physics. Out of the debris emerged what Greenleaf identifies as the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries' three competing ways of viewing politics.

The first, he says, was the *theory of order*. It was expounded by such varied theorists as James I, Richard Hooker, Edward Forset, and Sir Robert Filmer. It rested upon revelation and metaphysics, and it sought truth mainly by the method of "argument by correspondence" or "analogy." In politics its devotees generally supported claims of divine right and royal prerogative.

This outlook was challenged in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by what Greenleaf calls the *theory of empiricism*. This new way of looking at things was first advanced by Francis Bacon and later by James Harrington, Sir William Temple, and Sir William Petty. It was based on the inductive analysis of facts observed from both history and the experience of contemporary governments. Its adherents were highly skeptical that valid or useful truth could be discovered by *any* form of purely deductive reasoning. And in politics they generally supported the ideas of "balanced government" and "limited monarchies."

As one of their principal tools the English empiricists developed "statistics" in the original meaning of the word. The point is worth noting briefly. The empiricists sought to foster what they called "statists"—that is, men who had had wide personal experience in and knowledge of political affairs and had, as a result, gained skill in their management. So the "statists" developed "statistics"—which, in its original seventeenth-century usage, meant simply "an empirical, comparative approach to the study of politics without any necessary or exclusive numerical emphasis."[19] As William Kruskal points out, "This activity gradually centered on numerical tables of economic, demographic, and political facts, and thus 'statistics' came to mean the assembly and analysis of numerical tables."[20] But up to the mid-nineteenth century it continued to mean *any* systematic collection of facts about governments.[21]

[16] Quoted in Paul W. Conner, *Poor Richard's Politicks* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 106–107.

[17] Alfred Owen Aldridge, *Benjamin Franklin, Philosopher & Man* (Philadelphia and New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1965), p. 390.

[18] W. H. Greenleaf, *Order, Empiricism and Politics: Two Traditions of English Political Thought, 1500–1700* (London: Oxford University Press, 1964).

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 249.

[20] In David L. Sills, ed., *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: The Macmillan Company and the Free Press, 1968), XV, 209.

[21] M. G. Kendall in Sills, XV, 224.

The empirical persuasion persisted through the eighteenth century and beyond, and those of its later adherents best known to the designers of the American Republic included Blackstone, Hume, Bolingbroke, Vico—and, above all, Montesquieu. It is the direct ancestor of the American science of politics, and one important element, though by no means the only one, in the ideology of the American revolution.

It was accompanied, and in some respects superseded, by a third way of looking at politics—that which Greenleaf calls the *theory of radical rationalism.* This approach was most prominent in the *Leviathan* of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke's *Two Treatises on Government.* It moved away from the empiricists' sole reliance on the analysis of experience for the reasons most succinctly stated by Hobbes: " . . . the records [of experience], seeing they are of things done only, sometimes justly, sometimes unjustly, you can never by them know what right they had, but only what right they pretended."[22] Hobbes adds that from history, only "examples of fact" can be derived. and not "any argument of right."

Radical rationalism relied mainly on deducing descriptive and prescriptive truths, not from divine revelation, but from First Principles, especially the Law of Nature. Historical and contemporary experience were considered not the sole source of truth but merely a quarry from which illustrations could be mined to clarify and lend persuasive force to the truths deduced by Right Reason from First Principles.

2. *The Ideas of the American Revolutionists.* It would be highly misleading to portray the men who made the Revolution of 1776 as single-minded disciples of empiricism or of radical rationalism. Most scholars agree with Gordon Wood's view that they drew their ideas from a mélange of sources. They both drew conclusions and bolstered their polemics from the empiricism of Bacon, Hume, Montesquieu, as well as the radical rationalism of Locke and Rousseau, and even the Puritan theology of Jonathan Edwards. Wood sums it up thus:

> However imprecise, confused, and eclectic the colonist's gleanings from history and quotations from philosophers may seem to us, they represented to eighteenth-century Americans the experience and reason of the Western world. To most of the Revolutionaries there was no sense of incompatibility in their blending of history, rationalism, and scripture; all were mutually reinforcing ways of arriving at precepts about human and social behavior, ways of discovering those fundamentals "applicable to every Sort of Government, and not contrary to the common Understanding of Mankind." The coherence and significance of the Americans' incredible jumble of references from every conceivat time and place come ultimately from the overridi purpose to which these references were put—the und standing of what John Adams called "the divine scien of politics."[23]

All very true; and Bernard Bailyn calls our atte tion to another significant characteristic of t Revolutionary pamphlets and broadsides:

> " . . . for all their variety they have in common one di tinctive characteristic: they are, to an unusual degre *explanatory.* They reveal not merely positions taken b the reasons why positions were taken; they reveal motiv and understanding: the assumptions, beliefs, and ideas– the articulated world view—that lay behind the manifes events of the time."[24]

When at last the Revolutionary authors an their readers broke free from the dominion an institutions of England, a new need—and a new mood—arose in the land. The need was to construct new institutions to replace the old, and it was accomplished by the new state constitutions written and rewritten from 1775 on, by the Articles of Confederation, and, above all, by the new Federal Constitution written in 1787 and promulgated in 1789. While these needs were being faced and met, the nation's mood shifted more and more from the headiness of radical rationalism to the sobriety of empiricism.[25]

Out of this confluence of Western intellectual heritage, revolutionary zeal, and pressing institutional necessities arose the new American political science and the institutional engineering based on it. That "divine science" and its application to the era's problems not only created the new polity. It also launched a faith in political and social engineering that has persisted ever since as one of the main elements in American political culture and one of the prime forces in American political behavior. I shall conclude this paper by assessing the problems and promise of this faith for our own time. But it seems to me we can understand it best by first examining its original version. I shall therefore now outline what seem to me to be the principal characteristics of the "divine science of politics" as preached and practiced in the 1770s and 1780s.

[22] Quoted in Greenleaf, *Order, Empiricism and Politics,* pp. 274–275.

[23] Gordon S. Wood, *The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1969), pp. 7–8. For other expressions of this view, see Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, passim.;* Rossiter, *Seedtime of the Republic, passim.;* Curti, *The Growth of American Thought,* chap. VI; and Randolph Adams, *Political Ideas of the American Revolution* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1922), *passim.*

[24] Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution,* p. vi.

[25] Cf. *ibid.,* p. 231.

Characteristics of the "Divine Science of Politics."

1. *Empiricism.* The political science of the nation's designers was, in the first instance, fundamentally *empirical.* That is, it was rooted in the conviction that the truth of propositions about politics is best tested by checking them against carefully observed experience. This note is sounded repeatedly in the Federalist papers. In the Twentieth paper, for example, Madison declares, "Experience is the oracle of truth; and where its responses are unequivocal, they ought to be conclusive and sacred."[26] And in the Fifty-Second paper, Madison, after posing the difficult practical question of how frequently elections should be held, avows, "Let us consult experience, the guide that ought always to be followed whenever it can be found."[27]

But what if experience contradicts well-established maxims? Hamilton faced just such a situtation in the Thirty-Fourth paper when he confronted the clash between the new federal principle of coordinate status between states and nation on the one hand and on the other the often-cited maxim of Bodin that sovereignty is indivisible. In such a situation, Hamilton said:

> To argue upon abstract principles that this co-ordinate authority cannot exist would be to set up theory and suppositions against fact and reality. However proper such reasonings might be to show that a thing *ought not to exist*, they are wholly to be rejected when they are made use of to prove that it *does* not exist contrary to the evidence of the fact itself.[28]

What kinds of experience provided their data? The answer is: any they could lay their hands on. For example, the discussions of the Articles of Confederation, the deliberations in the Constitional Convention, and the ratification debates were all loaded with references to the experience of the Amphyctionic Council and Achaean League of classical Greece, the Roman republic and empire, the medieval German states, the constitutional history of England, and the more recent experiences of such confederations as Poland, Switzerland, and the United Netherlands. But the experience most often cited was that of the various states under their post-Revolutionary constitutions and the nation under the Articles of Confederation.[29]

2. *Primitive Methods.* The analytic and synthetic methods of the 1780s were pretty primitive by the severe standards insisted on by Blalock, Tufte, and the article referees of our contemporary political science journals. The technique most often used was what C. B. Macpherson calls "the indolent inductive."[30] That is, both in making up their own minds and in arguing with others, the men of the 1780s typically ruminated on what they remembered from their history and travel books, the works of the great philosophers, their own experience in state governments, the reported experience of others, the state of affairs under the Articles, and a good deal of plain introspection.[31]

We modern political scientists, peering down at them from our lofty perch built on multiple regression, path analysis, polynomial conjoint analysis, and the like, may be inclined to view our forebears' primitive methods condescendingly (after all, none of them had the benefits of a Yale Ph.D.). We might even deny their claim to be developing a true "science of politics." But then there are today many physicists, microbiologists, and—God save the mark—*economists* who are just as ready to dispute *our* claim to be called "scientists." Condescension can be a double-edged sword. And in any case, I believe we should say of the men of the 1780s what Macpherson said of Sir William Temple and the English empiricists: "It is the kind of questions [they asked] and the way [they believed] they are to be answered, rather than the very imperfect way [they answered] them, that place [them] among the 'political scientists.' "[32]

3. *Eagerness for Engineering.* Political scientists during the past thirty years have done a good deal of agonizing over whether the discipline can or should devote much of its talent and energy to developing knowledge immediately useful for the solution of practical social problems. The nation's designers were free of such agonies. They had no doubt that the purpose of the divine science was to develop ever better institutions, and they were confident that the state of the art was already well advanced and capable of achieving that purpose far better than it could be achieved by any other means. Indeed, they were always eager to take the best possible immediate action rather than eschew all action until they could be sure that what they did would survive unchanged for all time.[33] That,

[26] *The Federalist*, p. 138.

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 327.

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 206, emphasis in the original.

[29] Cf. James Bryce, *The American Commonwealth* (London and New York: Macmillan and Co., 1888), I, 35–37. For many specific illustrations, see Arthur Taylor Prescott's useful speech-by-speech account of the Constitutional Convention: *Drafting the Federal Constitution* (New York: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1968), for example, pp. 64–82, 211–212.

[30] C. B. Macpherson, "Sir William Temple, Political Scientist?", *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, 9 (February, 1943), 39–54, at p. 46.

[31] For an account of how important introspection was to John Adams, see John R. Howe, Jr., *The Changing Political Thought of John Adams* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 16.

[32] C. B. Macpherson, "Sir William Temple, Political Scientist?", p. 47.

[33] Cf. Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution*, pp. 300–301; and Wood, *The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787*, pp. 594–595, 613–614.

I think, explains why they were often impatient with critics who attacked the new institutions because they were less than perfect. In the Thirty-Seventh *Federalist*, for example, Madison reviewed many of the difficult conflicts the Constitutional Convention had confronted and resolved, often by compromise. He added, with an understandable testiness, this comment: "[It is not surprising that] under the pressure of all these difficulties, the convention [was] forced into some deviations from that artificial structure and regular symmetry which an abstract view of the subject might lead an ingenious theorist to bestow on a Constitution planned in his closet or in his imagination . . ."[34]

4. *Experimentation and Revision.* Of all the leitmotivs sounded in the divine science, the most often heard was the theme that all political institutions should be viewed, not as sacrosanct in every detail forever, but as best approximations of the moment, which should be revised as experience, improved science, and changed circumstances dictate. That is how they viewed the institutions they were revising. For example, Edmund Randolph, in presenting the Virginia Plan to the Constitutional Convention, "professed a high respect for the authors [of the Articles of Confederation], and considered them as having done all that patriots could do in the then infancy of the science of constitutions and confederacies. . . ."[35] And John Jay observed in the Second *Federalist* that the authors of the original union

> . . . formed it almost as soon as they had a political existence; nay, at a time when their habitations were in flames, when many of their citizens were bleeding, and when the progress of hostility and desolation left little room for those calm and mature inquiries and reflections which must ever precede the formation of a wise and well-balanced government for a free people. It is not to be wondered at that a government instituted in times so inauspicious should on experiment be found greatly deficient and inadequate to the purpose it was intended to answer.[36]

Moreover, the framers of the Constitution viewed their own handiwork in exactly the same experimental mood. In the Convention and afterward they repeatedly stressed the importance of building into any constitution mechanisms for review and amendment. Madison put this crucial point in the Thirty-Seventh *Federalist* as follows:

> It has been shown in the course of these papers that the existing Confederation is founded on principles which are fallacious; that we must consequently change this first foundation, and with it the superstructure resting upon it. It has been shown that the other confederacies which could be consulted as precedents have been vitiated by the same erroneous principles, and can therefore furnish no other light than that of beacons, which give warning of the course to be shunned, without pointing out that which ought to be pursued. The most that the convention could do in such a situation was to avoid the errors suggested by the past experience of other countries, as well as of our own, *and to provide a convenient mode of rectifying their own errors, as future experience may unfold them.*[37]

5. *Model for Mankind.* The final characteristic of the designer's political science is their conviction, permeating everything they did, that the principles they were discovering and the institutional experiments they were launching provided a model for the rest of mankind. There are many expressions of this conviction, but the following statements by three of the divine science's greatest practitioners should give the flavor:

The first paragraph of the First *Federalist* paper, written by Alexander Hamilton, declares:

> It has been frequently remarked that it seems to have been reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the important questions, whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force. If there be any truth in the remark, the crisis at which we are arrived may with propriety be regarded as the era in which that decision is to be made; and a wrong election of the part we shall act may, in this view, deserve to be considered as the general misfortune of mankind.[38]

In the same vein, George Washington in his First Inaugural Address said: "The preservation of the sacred fire of liberty and the destiny of the republican model of government are justly considered, perhaps, as *deeply*, as *finally*, stated on the experiment intrusted to the hands of the American people."[39]

And James Madison, reflecting in his twilight on the significance of the system he had helped so much to create, wrote to a friend: "The free system of government we have established is so congenial with reason, with common sense, and with a universal feeling, that it must produce approbation and a desire of imitation. . . . Our country, if it does justice to itself, will be the [workshop of

[34] *The Federalist*, p. 230.
[35] Prescott, *Drafting the Federal Constitution*, p. 47.
[36] *The Federalist*, p. 39.
[37] *Ibid.*, p. 226, emphasis added. For an overview of the Framers' experimental mood, see Adrienne Koch, *Power, Morals, and the Founding Fathers* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Great Seal Books, Cornell University Press, 1961), pp. 1, 131–132.
[38] *The Federalist*, p. 33.
[39] Quoted in Rossiter, *Seedtime of the Republic*, p. 351, emphasis in the original.

liberty], to the Civilized World, and do more than any other for the uncivilized."[40]

The Problems and Promise of Political Engineering Today

That is how it seemed to the men who first developed and applied the divine science of politics. And that is how they came to embark upon their great experiment, the American way of government. Today, two hundred years later, that experiment and its consequences are still being praised, condemned, and—above all—*studied* all over the world.

And so they should be. Whatever else it may be, the Bicentennium is surely a time for students of government to ask questions of far more than antiquarian interest: How has the experiment worked out? But what standards should we evaluate it and all other experiments like it? What modifications in the original design have been made? With what consequences? What further modifications should be made? At what costs and with what anticipated benefits?

Prudence and compassion alike restrain me from using the few remaining pages of this paper to dispense my own answers to these tough questions. I want instead to suggest that whatever we may think of their craftsmanship, the Republic's designers launched a new faith in political engineering that has persisted strongly in American culture ever since. The main articles of that faith still hold that for every problem there is a solution. That it is better to do something about a problem than to do nothing even though the something may be less than perfect. That, above all, if we can figure out and establish the right *institutions*, the right policies are bound to follow.

That faith has animated our history's most powerful political movements. It sparked the Jacksonians' drive for long ballots, rotation in office, and convention-based parties. It undergirded the adoption of the Civil War constitutional amendments and the civil rights acts of the 1870s. It inspired the Progressives' crusade to cure the ills of democracy with more democracy, in the form of the initiative, the referendum, and the direct primary. And in my own lifetime it has stimulated and sustained the reforms of the New Deal, the New Frontier, and the Great Society.

It is, I suspect, a faith to which most in our profession still cling. Yet many of us today view it and its origins through the smoked glasses of Vietnam, Watergate, inflationary depression, and the other great public failures of our grim times. Is it any wonder that we question, as our forebears seldom did, the whole idea of political and social engineering? We have too often seen how vast and disheartening are the gaps between the rich promises and the poor payoffs of so many of the public institutions and policies we count on most.

For example, who in my generation can ever forget the exaltation we felt when we heard John Kennedy declare in his inaugural: "Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty."[41] But also who among us can forget that Rusk, Rostow, MacNamara, and the other knights of Kennedy's Camelot joined with Lyndon Johnson to convert that noble sentiment into an ignoble war—a war which not only failed to secure either survival or liberty in South Vietnam but shook our confidence in ourselves and the world's confidence in us as never before?

By the same token, who can forget the excitement and hope with which we hailed Johnson's massive commitment of federal resources to a much nobler War on Poverty in 1964? Yet who can deny that eleven years later the modest gains for the poor have been matched or exceeded by the increasing tax burdens of the middle and working classes?

Then came John Mitchell, Spiro Agnew, and Richard Nixon. "Judge us by what we do, not by what we say," they said. Fair enough. By that standard, while they *spoke* often and eloquently of the need to restore law and order to America, what they *did* was to perpetrate the most corrupt and criminal national administration in our history.

With such enormous failures all too fresh in our minds, what place can we honestly give *today* to our traditional faith in political engineering? I, for one, feel that faith still merits a judgment once made by a wise man about the process of growing old: "It's not for sissies," he said, "but it beats the alternative." If the alternative in this case is the resigned acceptance of human impotence and passivity in the face of human misery, then surely political engineering, with all its faults and failures, beats that.

But perhaps we can improve it. Perhaps we can modify some of its flaws so as to narrow future gaps between promise and performance. Perhaps, for one, we can supplement the faith with an article of the physicians' creed: *first, do no harm.*

[40] Quoted in Koch, *Power, Morals, and the Founding Fathers*, p. 128. For other descriptions of the Framers' millennial sense of providing a model for the world, see Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1955), pp. 37–38; Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution*, pp. 139–140; and Rossiter, *Seedtime of the Republic*, p. 415.

[41] John F. Kennedy, Inaugural Address, January 20, 1961, in Jay David, ed., *The Kennedy Reader* (Indianapolis, Ind.: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1967), p. 8.

Perhaps our leaders can present their programs as reasonable probabilities to alleviate some evils, not as moral certainties to end them forever. Perhaps we ordinary citizens can help our leaders achieve this enlightenment by paying more attention to what our political candidates have done and less to what they say they will do—and to how they say it. If you and I stop yearning for ideal leaders who sound like Churchill in the Battle of Britain, perhaps our actual leaders will less often seem like Hitler in the Battle of the Bunker.

Above all, perhaps we can recapture the *experimental* mood of the men who created the divine science, and constantly remind our students and ourselves that *every* institution and program is at best a reasonable guess about what might work; that we must constantly check experience to see how well or badly it is working; and that we must always stand ready to preserve what is working and change what is not.

Like every people and every polity, we must, in the end, risk our lives, our fortunes, and our sacred honor upon faith, not certainty. But let that faith rest on Madison's conviction that *experience* is "the guide that ought always to be followed whenever it can be found."

Conclusion

Finally, then, what can we in the long night of Vietnam and Watergate say about the birth of the divine science of politics in the golden age of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution? Looking back on that epoch through the dimness of our remoteness and our disillusion, perhaps we can say of it only what the elderly Wordsworth said while musing on his youthful enthusiasm for the French Revolution:

> Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive,
> But to be young was very heaven.[42]

I think we can do better than that for our own Revolution. I think we might well give the final say to the *Fourth* President of the American Political Science Association. The first words of James Bryce's *The American Commonwealth* do very well as the last words of this paper:

> The institutions of the United States are deemed by inhabitants and admitted by strangers to be a matter of more general interest than those of the not less famous nations of the Old World. . . . They represent an experiment in the rule of the multitude, tried on a scale unprecedentedly vast, and the results of which every one is concerned to watch. And yet they are something more than an experiment, for they are believed to disclose and display the type of institutions towards which, as by a law of fate, the rest of civilized mankind are forced to move, some with swifter, others with slower, but all with unresting feet.[43]

And he added: "American history, of which Europeans know scarcely anything, may be wanting in colour and romance when compared with the annals of the great states of the Old World; but it is eminently rich in political instruction."[44]

[42] William Wordsworth, *The Prelude*, Book XI, lines 108–9.
[43] James Bryce, *The American Commonwealth*, I, 1–2.
[44] *Ibid.*, I, 6.

COMMUNICATIONS

Social Stratification and Governmental Inequality

TO THE EDITOR:

In testing a social stratification explanation of "governmental inequality," Richard Hill employs the median family income as a measure of a municipality's capacity to produce public goods and services.[1] Hill admits that median family income is a crude indicator of a municipality's capacity to generate public goods and services, since family income ignores other municipal resources. Hill proceeds, nevertheless, to examine the correlates of inequality in the distribution of family income, presuming thereby to be shedding light on governmental inequality in metropolitan areas.

My contention is that Hill's use of family income to measure fiscal capacity is irreparably deficient as a test of the complex social stratification model he poses. To capsulize his theoretical discussion: Hill contends that social classes are increasingly differentiated in urban space, and that this segregation along primarily racial and economic dimensions is reinforced by the use of suburban municipal incorporation. A by-product of this process has, according to Hill and others, resulted in public resources being increasingly insulated from those who most need them. Metropolitan areas are, in other words, characterized by increasing race and class segregation, actuated and maintained by the operations of the increasingly smaller and more homogeneous suburban municipality. The process is then viewed as the cause of the isolation of resources from those most in need of them. Social inequality, according to the social stratification theory promulgated by Hill, leads to governmental and public policy inequality, which, in turn, reinforces social inequality. Hill's statement regarding this is worth noting:

> Residential segregation by class and race shapes interaction patterns, friendship ties, marital selection, and social consciousness. The distribution of income and residential location shapes political relationships between collectivities with discordant interests and creates differential access to public goods and services. Access to public goods and services—in particular, education and cultural facilities—controls access to jobs and income. In this manner an interdependent set of local institutions gives rise to the structure of inequality in the modern metropolis.[2]

Hill is stating that social inequality *causes*, at least to some significant degree, governmental inequality, and that over time social inequality is also buttressed by governmental inequality. Yet, Hill uses median family income as the basis for his measure of *governmental* inequality, despite its prima facie appeal as a measure of *social* inequality. The major dependent variable of Hill's analysis is operationalized by measuring one of its presumed causes! Notwithstanding Hill's caveats, income cannot be blithely assumed to accurately measure the capacity of a municipality to generate services. Unless there are sound data indicating that family income is positively correlated with support levels for municipal government policy, no reasonable confidence can be invested in the assumption that low family or personal income means low levels of support for government policies.

My contention is that instead of *assuming* that social stratification directly measures capacity to support public services, a superior strategy is to develop *separate*, non-tautological measures of both social stratification and capacity to support government services. It is then possible to examine more closely some key propositions implicit in Hill's use of family income as a proxy for more direct measures of governmental inequality.

The present analysis involves 39 suburban municipalities in the suburban fringe of the Milwaukee SMSA. Narrowing the analysis to one SMSA from the 127 involved in Hill's paper may appear to some as a dramatic reduction of generality. The narrower focus is compelled, however. As will be shown shortly, I measure support for government services *directly*, instead of using family income as a surrogate for capacity to support government policy. Several studies have dramatized and verified that state-local relations vary considerably.[3] Unfortunately, despite rather conclusive evidence concerning the effects of interstate variations in formal state-local relations, there are as yet no available indexes or scales measuring these differing relations, and it is, therefore, currently impossible to adjust for them. Yet, without such adjustments, statements concerning the interstate differences in local policy support may be quite unreliable. Under these circumstances, it is better to examine municipalities within given SMSA's independently of those in other metropolises. Finally, the Milwaukee SMSA has been the focus

[1] Richard Child Hill, "Separate and Unequal: Governmental Inequality in the Metropolis," *American Political Science Review*, 68 (December, 1974), 1557–1568.

[2] *Ibid.*, 1558.

[3] Y. H. Cho, "Effect of Local Government Systems on Local Policy Outcomes in the United States," *Public Administration Review*, 27 (March, 1967), 31–38.

of several studies, each making a rather strong case that the Milwaukee SMSA is typical of the metropolitanizing process. There is no evidence, in any case, that Milwaukee is in some way deviant.[4] It should be mentioned, in conclusion, that the City of Milwaukee is excluded from this analysis. I strongly agree that substantial differences exist among metropolitan-area municipalities and that previous research was preoccupied with aggregate central city and suburban differences. Nevertheless, central cities are still different from their suburban neighbors in important ways. And, in any case, if the Hill formulation applies, my findings should not be influenced by deletion of the City of Milwaukee from the analysis. Deleting the central city from the analysis provides a more stringent test of Hill's contention that the relationship between social stratification and governmental inequality is general among metropolitan municipalities and is not solely a central city versus suburban issue.

For a municipality to be included in this analysis, it was required to have, at the time of the 1960 census, at least 1500 residents.[5] Thirty-nine of the Milwaukee SMSA municipalities met this criterion, and data for three sets of measures were gathered. One set of data contains four measures of *social stratification*, as conceptualized by Hill. The second set has two measures of nonincome based measures of municipal *capacity* to support public services (as distinguished from actual resources extracted for public service support). The third set has two measures of municipality *support* for services and two indicators of *effort* required to attain given support levels.

The following are the social stratification indicators employed here:[6]

(1) Percentage of owner-occupied housing in the municipality having a market value of $14,999 or less, 1970 (low status measure).
(2) Percentage of families in municipality with annual incomes between $10,000–11,999, 1970 (low status).[7]
(3) Percentage of residents categorized as professional, technical, and kindred, 1970 (high status).[8]
(4) Percentage of families in municipality with annual incomes of $25,000 or more (high status).

Table 1 reports the intercorrelations among the measures of social stratification. The findings strongly support the conclusion that Milwaukee SMSA municipalities are marked by substantial stratification and differentiation, based on the economic and social standing of their respective residents. The measures of high and low status respectively are positively and strongly correlated, while the high and low status measures are substantially and negatively correlated. This is as it should be, if Milwaukee-area municipalities are socially stratified and if the social stratification measures are, in fact, tapping what we claim they are.

Table 1. Zero-Order Correlations Among Social Stratification Measures for 39 Milwuakee SMSA Suburbs

	1	2	3	4
1. Per cent owner-occupied housing with market values of $14,999 or less.	1.000			
2. Per cent of families having annual incomes between $10,000–11,999.	.623	1.000		
3. Per cent of residents categorized as professional, technical, and kindred.	−.712	−.846	1.000	
4. Per cent of families with annual incomes of $25,000 or more.	−.423[a]	−.753	.634	1.000

[a] This correlation is significant at the .01 level, and the other cells have coefficients that are all significant at the .001 level.

[4] Remi Boelaert, "Political Fragmentation and Inequality of Fiscal Capacity in the Milwaukee SMSA," *National Tax Journal*, 23 (March, 1970), 83–88; Donald J. Curran, *Metropolitan Financing: The Milwaukee Experience, 1920–70* (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1973).

[5] The municipalities are: In Milwaukee County: Bayside, Brown Deer, Cudahay, Fox Point, Franklin, Glendale, Greenfield, Oak Creek, St. Francis, Wauwatosa, West Allis, Greendale, Hales Corners, River Hills, Shorewood, West Milwaukee, and Whitefish Bay. In Ozaukee County: Cedarburgh, Mequon, Port Washington, Grafton, and Thiensville. In Washington County: Hartford, West Bend, and Kewaskum. In Waukesha County: Elm Grove, Hartland, Menominee Falls, Mukwonago, and Pewaukee.

[6] These data were collected from U.S. Census Bureau information provided to the Southeastern Wisconsin Regional Planning Commission and aggregated by the latter organization to the municipal level.

[7] The validity of this measure being interpreted as a measure of low status is heightened because it is positively correlated with lower categories of income and is negatively related to higher measures of income.

[8] This measure of upper status is negatively and significantly related to other measures of lower status, such as the percentage of community residents in various blue-collar and other working class occupations. Write author for supporting data.

The measures of municipal resources to support public services were incorporated because it is not valid to assume automatically that social stratification generates inequality respecting capacity to support public services. The inclusion of more direct measures of resource capacity reflects my dissatisfaction with Hill's notion that income measures resource capacity. I adopt Donald J. Curran's view:

> One might think that the income level of a community should be listed as a resource. This view is based on the oft-repeated statement that all taxes are ultimately paid out of income. Although there is much truth in the statement at the macro or national level, the relation between public resources and income can be somewhat strained at the state level, and thinner still at the local level of government. Thus the use of income as a measure of resources is often worse than uninformative; it can all too easily be the source of serious error.[9]

Two measures of muncipality resources are included here:

(1) Percentage of municipal land zoned for industrial and manufacturing purposes, 1970.[10]
(2) Per capita market (not assessed) value of real property in the municipality.[11]

These measures of capacity to support public services are examined for their relationships with our measures of social stratification. According to Hill's social stratification thesis, the measures of high status should be related positively to the measures of resource capacity, while resources should be negatively related with the low status measures. Table 2 reports the results of the analysis of relationships between status and municipal capacity to support public services.

The findings do not support Hill's social stratification thesis. The data, in fact, suggest the opposite from what would be expected on the basis of Hill's theoretical formulation. Lower status communities, apparently, have substantially more industrial-manufacturing than do higher-status communities. The importance of this relationship is heightened by the significant relationship between amount of land zoned for industrial-manufacturing the greater the market value of municipal prop of municipal property; specifically, the greater the amount of land zoned for industrial-manufacturing the greater the market value of municipal property ($r = .504$; significant beyond the .001 level). To the extent that lower-status municipalities are disadvantaged by lower incomes and less valuable residential property, they may be enabled to overcome their disadvantage by containing within their municipal boundaries higher proportions of valuable industrial manufacturing realty.

Table 2. Zero-Order Correlations[a] between Measures of Social Stratification and Public Service Support Capacity

	Per cent land zoned industrial and manufacturing	Per capita market value of real prop.
1. Per cent owner-occupied housing with-market values of $14,999 or less.	.537 (.001)	−.006 (.486)
2. Per cent of families in municipality with annual incomes of $10,000–11,999.	.466 (.003)	−.159 (.184)
3. Per cent of residents who are professional, technical, and kindred.	−.603 (.001)	−.053 (.383)
4. Per cent of families in municipality with annual incomes of $25,000 or more	−.349 (.022)	.150 (.198)

[a] Level of significance in parenthesis.

In defending his use of median family income as the basis for measuring unequal municipal capacity to support public services, Hill argues, ". . . median family income only captures part of the real tax base of municipalities. Because it fails to take account of industrial and commercial property values directly, this measure probably understates the severity of governmental inequality in the metropolis."[12] The opposite is suggested by my analysis; Hill's use of income to measure public service capacity probably *overstates*, rather than mutes, the level of resource inequality.

Although the social stratification and fiscal ca-

[9] Curran, *Metropolitan Financing. . . .*, p. 52.

[10] A direct measure of the amount of land used for industrial and manufacturing use was not available at the data-gathering stage. Subsequently, it was determined that there is a very high correlation between the amount of land zoned industrial and the amount of land actually used for this purpose. Obviously, some amount of land zoned for this purpose is not used at all, while other land is zoned for some other purpose, but is actually used for industry or manufacturing.

[11] The term market or "real" value is a term used to distinguish the equalized assessment by the state of local property for state purposes, and is not meant to suggest that this value of housing is the selling price of homes. This data, as well as the data for land zoned for industrial and manufacturing purposes, was also obtained from the Southeastern Wisconsin Regional Planning Commission.

[12] Hill, "Separate and Unequal," p. 1562.

pacity measures are not related in ways *assumed* by Hill, it is not clear how social stratification and capacity to support public support levels interact (i.e., the transformation of municipal wealth into revenue for public services). In order to examine the relationship among social stratification, fiscal capacity, and public service support levels, a stepwise regression model is applied.[13] The social stratification and resource measures are posited as independent variables that influence actual support levels for public services. Two dimensions of public service levels are examined. One is the support *level* of resources allocated; the other is the support *effort* involved in extracting municipal resources.[14] Support level is measured by:

(1) the per capita general property tax for municipal purposes, 1970;
(2) the per capita revenue raised by the municipality for the local school district, 1970.

The support effort measures are:

(1) the property tax rate on the real market value of property for municipal purposes, 1970;
(2) the property tax rate on the real market value of property for school purposes, 1970.

Results of the regression analysis are reported in Table 3. In the case of the two measures of property taxes, or the amount of resources extracted from the municipal tax base, the regression model indicates the overwhelming importance of available resources. Indeed, the findings do not indicate any general, patterned relationship between social stratification and public service support levels. The data indicate that for municipal purposes the property tax revenues extracted are somewhat influenced by the low status indicator, the percentage housing with values of $14,000 or less. This suggests the oft-cited observation that municipalities with less expensive housing tend to require higher municipal services.[15] But clearly the impact of the

[13] A variation of multiple regression, stepwise regression provides a means of choosing independent variables which will provide the best prediction possible with the fewest independent variables. This regression routine chooses the single variable that best predicts the value of the dependent variable, and then proceeds to select other variables in order of their ability to predict the dependent variable best, in conjunction with variables already included in the model. In this instance, variables are no longer included, once they no longer add five per cent explained variance to the equation. See Norma H. Nie, Dale H. Bent, and C. Hadlai Hull, *SPSS: Statistical Package for the Social Sciences* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1970), pp. 180–181.

[14] The following items were gathered from sources published by the Wisconsin Department of Revenue, Municipal Audit Division.

[15] Dick Netzer, *The Economics of the Property Tax* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1966); Robert C. Wood, *1400 Governments* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961).

Table 3. Step-wise Regression of Measures of Public Policy Support Levels and Support Effort on Measures of Social Stratification and Resource Measures[a]

	R	R^{2b}	Per cent housing valued at $14,999 or less	Per cent family income $10,000–11,999	Per cent municipal pop. with professional occupation	Per cent with family income of $25,000 or more	Per cent zoned indust. and manuf.	Per capita real market value of property
1. Per capita property tax for municipal purposes	.802	.643	.319[c]	—	—	—	—	.738
2. Per capita tax for schools	.941	.885	—	—	—	—	—	.941
3. Tax rate for municipal purposes	.650	.423	—	.411	—	−.338	—	—
4. Tax rate for school purposes	.387	.150	.715	—	—	—	−.458	—

[a] Empty cells indicate that the variable did not add at least five per cent to the amount of explained variance for that regression.

[b] R^2 here is based solely on the variables included in the regression. The values of R^2 using standard regression, where all the variables are included (stratification and resource capacity) are .702 (for per capita tax for municipal purposes, .911 (for per capita tax for schools, .427 (for municipal tax rate), and .216 (for school tax rate).

[c] The values in the columns other than R and R^2 are standardized regression coefficients (beta-weights). Partial correlation coefficients are not reported, because they are redundant of the results revealed by the beta-weights. All the betas are at least 1.5 times their standard error and are considered significant.

per capita tax base is dominant for municipal and school support levels.

In the case of the indicators of effort required to raise revenue, we find mixed evidence. The regression for the municipal-purpose tax rate suggests that both measures of lower status lead to higher tax rates. The upper-status measure, on the other hand, suggests that as the status of the municipality increases, there is a corresponding tendency for tax rates to decline. Some may prematurely embrace this datum as support for Hill's stratification thesis. After all, this finding would be consistent with the idea that lower-status communities need to spend more with lower levels of resources (hence, a higher tax rate). Unfortunately, other explanations not consistent with the Hill formulation are also possible. It has been shown that there is a moderately strong relationship between lower status and the amount of industrial and manufacturing base in the municipality ($r=.537$ and .466 respectively for both low status measures). For at least some lower-status municipalities, higher tax rates fall not only on residences but also on valuable industrial-manufacturing property. In cases where the total amount of industrial-manufacturing realty value is a significant proportion of the total property value, the revenue gained from industrial-manufacturing property may more than outweigh the burden imposed on residents by the rate on their homes. This is particularly true since industrial-manufacturing property generates more in revenues than is required for such property in the way of public services.[16] Such inferences are, however, mainly speculative, since greater assurance would require data indicating the relative contribution of different classes of property to the total tax base.

The regression for school-purpose tax rates indicates that the lower-status measure of low residential values is positively related to the tax rate. On the other hand, the much larger beta-weights for the effect of industrial-manufacturing property suggests lower tax rates. And since there is a positive and significant correlation ($r=.537$) between our measure of less valuable housing and industrial-manufacturing property, it is reasonable to argue that some poorer communities can apparently obviate the effects of this low residential tax base through access to a lucrative industrial-manufacturing base. This is some tentative support for the preceding speculation.

This issue is dramatized by Table 4, which reports the average per capita tax base for two classes of communities in our sample. One class is virtually entirely residential and upper status, while the other class is is lower-status and generally zoned heavily for industrial and manufacturing use. The industrial suburbs clearly outstrip the higher-status communities in the value of their tax base. Yet, the industrial suburbs have much lower proportions of upper-income families. Such relations as these are the reason that serious reconsideration has occurred in a number of states about the assertion that property tax systems are inequitable in favor of higher status municipalities. It has been found in California that lower-income communities are often the greatest beneficiaries of the "inequitable" workings of the property tax system, respecting school revenues. Great harm to lower income communities, who rely on valuable non-residential property for generating public service revenue, can result if analysis and policy are premised on the idea that low income necessarily indicates low levels of public service capacity.[17]

Table 4. Mean Values for Property and Income Measures of Milwaukee SMSA Suburbs

	Per capita real market value of municipal property	Per cent families with annual incomes of $15,000 or more
1. Residential, high status suburbs ($N=10$)[a]	$10,964	48.5
2. Industrial suburbs ($N=8$)[b]	$15,187	26.5
3. All suburbs ($N=39$)	$11,525	35.7

[a] This class of communities has the following zoning characteristics: At least 20 per cent of the municipality's residential land is zoned for low density; that is, for lots of 1 acre or more.

[b] Industrial suburbs are those where land is zoned for industrial and manufacturing use for at least 20 per cent of the land area.

Source: Southeastern Wisconsin Regional Planning Commission.

Insofar as our Milwaukee SMSA suburban sample is typical of national trends, Hill's social stratification thesis cannot rest on family income as a measure of governmental inequality. The analysis here suggests there is no direct, simple translation of social stratification into governmental inequality. Nevertheless, this discussion should not be viewed as a debunking of the social stratification theory, since there is great merit in and need to explore the impact of social structure, particularly the inequalities of social structure, on political institutions and public policy. Let us con-

[16] Netzer, *The Economics of the Property Tax.*

[17] "Serrano's Potential Victims," *California Journal,* 5 (May, 1974), 169–170.

clude, then, with some necessarily brief and selective thoughts concerning a more constructive research agenda for those interested in the interplay between social stratification and the workings of the political order.

First, Hill's interest in social stratification appears to derive from a prior, unarticulated stance against social and political inequality. His critical tone, however, is not adequately grounded, not theoretically and certainly not empirically. For example, in dealing with social stratification and inequalities in the metropolitan arena, the so-called public choice theorists argue that social and governmental stratification is the natural consequence of households and other social units moving into locales and organizing into political jurisdictions (generally municipalities) on the basis of life style and public service preferences, as well as on the basis of their personal resources. These theorists contend that people are where they are and maintain their particular life-style and public-service mix either because they want these things or that is all they can afford. Attempts to provide or argue in favor of more benefits for people than they can pay for is viewed as income redistribution and a "negative externality" imposed on the haves for the benefit of the have-nots. In other words, does the social stratification theory posed by Hill argue for the inherent evil of social inequality, regardless of how it came about, or is Hill critical because social stratification is inevitably linked to the birth of political processes, institutions, and decisions that worsen the inequality of society's distribution of advantages and disadvantages?

Let us assume that Hill takes the latter position (although it is not obvious that he does), i.e., that social stratification is pernicious because of its instrumental relation to further levels of stratification. This formulation raises two rather complicated issues. First, it forces the researcher to isolate and define institutions and policies that presumably reinforce and enhance the position of society's upper social strata. Even when these are defined, however, there remains the need to empirically verify that social stratification is significantly affected by such institutions and policies. It is insufficient to argue that social stratification is associated with unequal distributions of private and public advantages. What is necessary is to indicate that political advantages stem from social advantages, that, in turn, exacerbate social stratification. At the urban and local level, research would involve the workings of such institutions as annexation and municipal incorporation law, zoning and other land use regulations, state and federal aid to local political jurisdictions, administration and support of transportation networks, property, and tax administration.

The second, related problem arises from th causal sequence implied by the social stratificatio thesis. The thesis is a dynamic one in the followin sense. Hill argues that social stratification at given *time* (t) later leads to social and politica arrangements (at $t+1$) that subsequently reinforc and increase social stratification (at $t+2$). Longi tudinal analyses, using data with appropriate time properties, are necessary to provide long-term confidence in the expected, theoretically derived propositions. This is complicated by the fact that one must obviously expect social stratification, independently of its relation to political factors, to be an *independent* cause of social stratification at a later period, without considering the effects of political institutions and public policy. The independent effect of prior stratification on future stratification must be discounted. The issue for political scientists, then, is not whether social stratification leads to differential distributions of advantages and disadvantages, but to what extent social stratification gives rise to race- and class-biased systems of access to political institutions and public policy, and how these, in turn, affect social structure.

MAX NEIMAN
University of California, Riverside

The Social Stratification and Governmental Inequality Hypothesis: A Rejoinder

TO THE EDITOR:

In a recent paper in this *Review*[1] I argued that political incorporation by class and status into municipal enclaves is an important institutional mechanism for creating and perpetuating inequality among residents in metropolitan communities in the United States. Inequality in the distribution of fiscal resources among municipal governments in metropolitan areas, I suggested, is an integral part of an evolving stratification system. My specific purpose in that article was to examine the pattern of empirical relationships between governmental inequality and other salient dimensions of the structure of urban inequality. With this objective in mind, I assumed median family income to be a "very rough indication of the fiscal capacity and the level of service needs" in a municipality.[2] I then conducted a comparative investigation of factors associated with inequality in the distribution of fiscal resources among municipal governments in metropolitan areas in the United States in 1960. The empirical results of that investigation, I concluded, offered support for the thesis that govern-

[1] Richard Child Hill, "Separate and Unequal: Governmental Inequality in the Metropolis," *American Political Science Review*, 68 (December, 1974), 1557–1568.

[2] *Ibid.*, 1562.

mental inequality plays a reinforcing if not a determining role in a structured system of urban inequality in the United States.

Max Neiman questions my conclusions on logical, empirical, and normative grounds. I will treat each facet of his critique in turn. In the process I will demonstrate, I believe, that Nieman's analysis cannot support the weight of his argument.

Neiman argues that measuring governmental inequality by the distribution of family income among municipalities is tautological since median family income has "*prima facie* appeal" as a measure of social inequality. The dependent variable is measured by "one of its presumed causes." What is needed, he argues, is the construction of nontautological, "independent" measures of both social stratification and the capacity to support government services among municipalities. Thus, Neiman apparently wishes to treat the distribution of fiscal resources, expenditure levels and tax effort among local governments as logically independent of the urban stratification system. But in my paper institutions of local government are by definition part of the urban stratification system. Since local governments accumulate and allocate scarce resources among metropolitan residents, they cannot be treated as if they were independent of the structure of urban inequality. My thesis is that the unequal distribution of fiscal resources among local governments both is determined by and reinforces economic, political and social inequality in the metropolis. Yet if local governments redistributed resources from the more to the less advantaged citizens in the metropolis they would still play an important role in "who gets what and why."

Second, Neiman suggests that industrial concentration and per capita property values are "non-income based measures" of municipal capacity to support public services and therefore do not embody the tautological measurement flaws of median family income. But this argument is misleading. All individual and family income is ultimately derived from returns to property owned, or from labor expended, or from government transfer payments. Therefore, taxes on industrial and commercial firms must ultimately come out of lowered profits and dividends to property owners, out of lowered wages and salaries to workers, or through price increases passed on to consumers lowering their real income. The income effects of taxation on property are complex, and may or may not be absorbed by the taxing jurisdiction, but this does not divorce property relationships and taxation policies from the distribution of income nor negate the salient role they play in the urban stratification system.

Finally, measuring local government fiscal capacity by median family income, and exploring the empirical relationship between inequality in the distribution of income among families in the metropolis as a whole and inequality in the distribution of income among municipal governments, is not tautological. The positive empirical relationship between these two variables revealed in my study is not a logical necessity but rather reveals municipal institutions as instruments of class segregation in the metropolis.

Neiman's empirical critique is potentially more damaging to the argument presented in my paper. He correctly asserts that I assumed but did not attempt empirically to demonstrate: (1) a positive relationship between municipal fiscal capacity and municipal revenue and expenditure levels; and (2) an inverse relationship between municipal fiscal capacity and municipal tax effort. Neiman measures municipal fiscal capacity by the percentage of land zoned industrial and the per capita market value of real property and attempts to test these assumptions through a correlation and regression analysis of 1960 data on suburban municipalities in the Milwaukee metropolitan area. The findings revealed in his stepwise regression analysis support both assumptions.

Neiman's analysis also reveals, however, (1) an inverse, *zero-order* correlation between various socioeconomic characteristics of Milwaukee suburbs and the percentage of land zoned for industrial and manufacturing purposes; and (2) essentially no *zero-order* relationship between the socioeconomic characteristics of Milwaukee suburbs and the per capita market value of their real property. On the basis of these findings Neiman speculates that the fiscal capacity of low-income suburbs is likely to be bolstered by concentrations of industrial property. Therefore, median family income in a municipality is an "irreparably deficient" predictor of fiscal capacity, tax effort, and revenue and expenditure levels of local government. Finally he suggests that the assertion that metropolitan property tax systems are inequitable in favor of higher status municipalities merits serious reconsideration. If Neiman's interpretations of his data are correct, and if the findings from his case study of Milwaukee can be generalized to other metropolitan areas,[3] he has cast serious doubt upon the conclusions presented in my paper. The generality of Neiman's conclusions can only be demonstrated through comparative research. There are clear grounds, however, for questioning

[3] There is a longstanding and continuing theoretical debate in the public finance literature over the most appropriate indicators of fiscal capacity among local governments. This debate, I might add, Neiman chooses to ignore. For arguments in support of personal income as a measure of fiscal capacity, cf. Robert Reischauer and Robert Hartman, *Reforming School Finance* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1973), pp. 32–34, 69–72.

the validity of Neiman's argument as it applies to metropolitan Milwaukee.

A number of factors warrant caution in accepting Neiman's interpretation of his empirical findings. First, percentage of land zoned industrial and per capita property values may be valid indicators of the level of fiscal resources in a municipality. But they must be interpreted with care. Property values are translated into actual fiscal resources through assessment procedures. And the correspondence between assessment valuations and the real market value of property are frequently shaky at best. Gaffney's research in metropolitan Milwaukee, for example, indicates that industrial land is not only underassessed but regressively assessed.[4]

Second, Neiman's revenue indicators are difficult to interpret because he appears to lump capital and operating revenues together. During any given year, some municipalities are mustering large sums for new capital construction projects. Therefore, combining capital and operating revenues yields misleading comparisons of the actual level of services provided among muncipalities.

Third, merely comparing revenue levels among municipalities does not provide an accurate indication of how municipal revenues are actually spent. Evidence on the Milwaukee metropolitan area, for example, indicates that industrial suburbs allocate a larger share of their revenues to infrastructure services that facilitate profitable conditions for private industrial and commerical capital accumulation (e.g., sanitation and fire services), while residential suburbs allocate a larger share to consumption expenditures more directly tied to the life-style of their residents (e.g., education).[5] Clearly, municipalities with comparable revenue levels may vary markedly in actual services provided and thereby structure the life chances of their residents in quite different ways.

Fourth, Neiman's central thesis is that the concentration of industrial land and business property in low-income suburbs bolsters the tax base of low-status municipalities, vitiates family income as an accurate clue to fiscal capacity, and renders the property tax system much less inequitable that is commonly supposed. Now there is no question that casual observation of any given metropolitan area is likely to reveal the presence of working-class, industrial suburbs. But the key issue is whether this phenomenon is sufficiently widespread to justify accepting Neiman's conclusions. Testing Neiman's thesis requires a distinction between industrial and residential suburbs and an investigation of the relationship between level of income and salient fiscal characteristics among municipalities *without* significant concentrations of business property. This method of analysis would specify whether Neiman's conclusions constitute a qualification to my argument or, as he appears to suggest, merits it's rejection *in toto*. Unfortunately, Neiman does not perform the kind of analysis necessary to resolve this issue for Milwaukee.

John Riew, however, has conducted a systematic investigation of the fiscal structure of metropolitan Milwaukee which provides evidence directly pertinent to the points at issue. Riew investigated the fiscal characteristics of the 29 incorporated municipalities in the Milwaukee SMSA in 1960. Riew classified the 29 municipalites by economic function and by income. The functional classification of incorporated suburbs is based on the ratio of business property to total real property within each municipality. *Industrial municipalities* are those in which total equalized value of business real properties (mercantile, manufacturing and utility properties) constituted more than 60 per cent of total real property in 1966. *Balanced municipalities* are those in which this ratio was between 40 and 60 per cent. *Residential municipalities* are those in which the business to total real property ratio is below 40 per cent. Riew divided residential municipalities into high-, medium-, and low-income suburbs on the basis of 1965 adjusted gross income per state income tax return. Riew's classification yielded the central city, 5 balanced municipalities, 2 industrial municipalities, and 21 residential municipalities. The latter group was further divided into 6 high income, 7 medium income, and 8 low income suburbs.

At the outset it is worth noting that Riew classifies more than 25 per cent of the incorporated suburban municipalities in the Milwaukee SMSA as low-income residential suburbs without significant concentrations of business property. This finding casts a pall over Neiman's speculation that the fiscal capacity of low-income suburbs is largely compensated by concentrations of industrial property.

Second, Neiman's argument that family income is an "irreparably deficient" clue to the fiscal capacity, tax effort, and service level of suburbs implies essentially no relationship between family income level and salient fiscal characteristics among the residential municipalities (which constitute 75 per cent of the incorporated suburbs in the Milwaukee SMSA). The findings from Riew's

[4] Mason Gaffney, "What is Property Tax Reform?", *American Journal of Economics and Sociology* (April, 1972), and "Adequacy of Land as a Tax-Base," in Daniel Holland, ed., *The Assessment of Land Value* (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1970).

[5] John Riew, "Fiscal Disparities in the Milwaukee, Wisconsin Metropolitan Area," in Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *Fiscal Balance in the American Federal System*, Vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967), Table 20, p. 299.

Table 1. Selected Fiscal Characteristics Among Types of Municipalities, Milwaukee SMSA

	Central City	Balanced	Industrial	Residential			Total
				High Income	Medium Income	Low Income	
1. Mean, per capita adjusted gross[a] income, 1965	$2387	$2446	$2046	$7180	$3146	$2490	
2. Total, mean, per capita equalized[b] property values, 1966	$5454	$8982	$25239	$10937	$7180	$5799	
3. Mean, full value local+school[c] tax rates, 1966	30.3	20.1	17.7	20.5	20.9	22.0	
4. Mean, per capita total municipal[d] operating expenditures, 1966	$81.30	$62.50	$142.90	$118.50	$55.80	$47.90	
5. Mean, per pupil school operating[e] expenditures, 1965–66	$508	$636	$630	$762	$642	$578	
6. Mean, per capita shared taxes,[f] 1966	$39.05	$48.10	$174.56	$109.75	$40.59	$33.10	
7. Mean, per capita total state trans-[g] fer payments, 1966	$87.70	$113.80	$314.60	$161.40	$103.80	$90.40	
Number of Municipalities	(1)	(5)	(2)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(29)

Source: John Riew, "Fiscal Disparities in the Milwaukee, Wisconsin Metropolitan Area," in Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *Fiscal Balance in the American Federal System*, volume 2, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 278–324.

[a] Riew, Table 18, p. 297; [b] Riew, Table 11, p. 292; [c] Riew, Table 5, 286; [d] Riew, Table 24, p. 302; [e] Riew, Table 25, p. 303; [f] Riew, Table 28, p. 305; [g] Riew, Table 36, p. 314.

investigation, however, do not support Neiman's conclusion. As indicated in Table 1, among the 21 residential suburbs there is a direct relationship between level of municipal income and salient municipal fiscal characteristics. Next to the central city, low-income residential suburbs have: (1) the lowest equalized property values; (2) the highest overall tax rates; (3) the lowest level of per capita municipal operating expenditures: (4) the lowest per pupil school operating expenditures; (5) the lowest per capita shared taxes; and (6) the lowest per capita state transfer payments in the Milwaukee metropolitan area.

In sum, Riew's study rather conclusively demonstrates that: (1) far from being an "irreparably deficient" clue to fiscal capacity, the income level of residential suburbs is directly related to salient fiscal characteristics in the manner assumed in my paper; (2) that industrial concentration does not compensate for low income for the majority of working class suburban municipalities; and (3) that *both* income and business property value indicators are necessary to provide a complete picture of the distribution of fiscal resources among municipalities in the Milwaukee metropolis. In sum, Neiman's "closer empirical look" simply isn't close enough.

Finally, Neiman is disturbed by the critical tone permeating my paper. My critical stance, he speculates, is derived from a prior, unarticulated posture against social and political inequality which is neither adequately grounded in theory nor in the empirical evidence at hand. By way of response, Neiman expresses his own attachment to the normative position of the so-called "public choice theorists." From that ideological perspective, governmental inequality is the "natural consequence of households and other social units moving into locales and organizing into political jurisdictions . . . on the basis of life style . . . public service preferences . . . [and] personal resources." Accordingly, in the contemporary U.S. metropolis, "people are where they are and maintain their particular life-style and public-service mix either because they want these things or that is all they can afford." Attempts to redistribute resources from the more to the less privileged are most appropriately viewed as "negative externalities" imposed on the haves for the benefit of the have nots.

I will leave it to the reader to assess the merit of

the theoretical and empirical conclusions presented in my article. But since Neiman's concluding remarks raise the fundamentally important issue of the social uses and political implications of social science theory and research, and since he presents a particular ideological perspective, I am obligated to respond briefly to his normative criticism of my paper.

To "articulate" my own position on the issue of inequality, let me simply state that I oppose social, economic, and political arrangements which function to rob individuals of their dignity by denying them the institutional capacity to determine their own fate collectively and democratically. As in other areas of social inquiry, conflicting perspectives on the structure and functioning of institutions of local government both express and help shape ongoing struggles among social classes in the United States. In particular, the urban literature reveals three contending perspectives on the structure of local government in urban areas in the United States: laissez-faire capitalist, state capitalist, and socialist. Each perspective is rooted in the material and symbolic interests of particular class segments of the population.

The model of the "public choice theorists," briefly outlined by Neiman, takes the parameters of the capitalist market as given, conceives of local government as a species of business to be regulated by the forces of the market, and thereby transforms the meaning of local citizenship into a "species of real estate consumerism." Equating political sovereignty with consumer sovereignty, "public choice theorists" perceive the city to be a purveyor of commodities like any other business firm and the allegiance of citizen-consumers to be properly transferred from one residential subdivision to another much as trade is shifted from store to store.[6] If faced by a serious dilemma, and if in possession of sufficient resources, local citizens are encouraged to solve their problems individually and privately by "voting with their feet" rather than collectively through political struggle. Those unable or unwilling to escape frequently find themselves fighting an uphill battle against demoralization and alienation from a deteriorating central city or inner-ring suburban environment.

This is not the place to recount the theoretical and empirical inadequacies of the "public choice" model.[7] Suffice it to say that to equate the complex institutional consequencies stemming from the strikingly unequal distribution of market capacities among social classes with the concept of *public* choice, and to suggest that governmental inequality is a *natural* consequence of geographical mobility, merely demonstrates the historically specific, ideological content of this perspective. Rooted in the domain assumptions of laissez-faire capitalism, the public choice model reflects and legitimates the material and symbolic interests of the suburban middle class in the United States.

Since World War II, however, the competitive, market-dominated path of urban development and the proliferation of fragmented, class-segregated institutions of local government have increasingly come into conflict with the imperatives of a political economy distinguished less by individual competition than by shared monopoly. While political fragmentation and government segregation continue to satisfy the consumption demands of a large share of the middle class, they simultaneously pose significant barriers to the profitable accumulation of capital and threaten the legitimacy of local institutions of government. In an increasingly interdependent metropolitan space economy, political fragmentation and government segregation: (1) frustrate efficient coordination and allocation of resources; (2) prevent the possibility of local solutions to a diverse range of externality problems; (3) prevent important conflictual issues from being placed in any political arena; and (4) increasingly relegate impoverished segments of the working class to segregated and relatively powerless political reservations.

In response to these disaccumulating and destabilizing urban tendencies, urban planners and other groups reflecting the interests of large-scale corporate capital have pushed for the creation of state capitalist urban governmental arrangements. The state capitalist model combines state, metropolitan, municipal and special district forms of government into a centralized urban political system governed from the top down by principles of corporate planning. Productivity in government becomes the rallying cry for a fundamental alteration in the relations of revenue accumulation and production and distribution of government goods and services in the metropolis. The inadequate handling of spill-overs, inequities in service and tax levels among local governments, and the fiscal imbalance among levels of government are to be reduced by shifting the fiscal burden to higher levels of government. A centralized government

[6] Norton Long, "The City as Reservation," *The Public Interest*, (Fall 1971), 23.

[7] For incisive criticisms of the "public choice" model see, for example, Dick Netzer, "Is There Too Much Reliance on the Local Property Tax?" in George Peterson, ed., *Property Tax Reform* (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1973), pp. 13–23; Ann Roell Markusen, "The Economics of Social Class and Metropolitan Local Government" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Economics, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan, 1974); and K. Newton, "Social Class, Political Structure, and Public Goods in American Urban Politics," *Urban Affairs Quarterly*, forthcoming.

budget is to be used to set goals and translate them into efficient and effective activities geared to the twin imperatives of private capital accumulation and political stability.[8]

The transfer of fiscal responsibility and managerial initiative to state and metropolitan governments implies the destruction of the political autonomy of suburban fiefdoms. It also implies a considerable increase in the level of taxation experienced by suburban white collar groups and some segments of the organized working class.[9] The price paid for a measure of resource redistribution is centralized rule according to the imperatives of state planning for private profit and the political impoverishment of the mass of metropolitian residents.[10] Large-scale corporate capital, in combination with some executive agencies of federal and state governments, has taken steps toward regional government and regional planning. But the fragmented system of local government is entrenched in law and tradition, and powerful suburban-rural coalitions dominate the legislatures of most state governments. Unsurprisingly, the history of comprehensive metropolitan reform attempts to date has largely been one of failure[11] meeting "the opposition of the majority of Congress, clientele agencies in the federal executive, local business, branches of organized labor, white collar and middle-class suburban governments, and minority and radical community organizations and groups."[12]

The emerging socialist model of the city contrasts sharply with the state capitalist perspective. The immediate problem for adherents to the socialist perspective is to devise alternatives to the market mechanism which allow for the transfer of productive power and the distribution of the economic surplus to areas where the unfulfilled needs of deprived and impoverished urban residents is so starkly apparent. Over the long haul, urbanization governed by socialist parameters involves the redefinition of social needs and the concept of surplus itself. In the mature socialist city, socially necessary labor produces socially beneficial use values for present and future residents. The surplus arises out of unalienated labor and loses its class content as city residents yield their surplus labor for socially defined and agreed upon purposes.[13]

Thus the transition to socialist urban forms portends radical transformations in the relations of revenue accumulation and the production and distribution of public goods and services. Revenue accumulation is governed according to the principle of community ownership of the community's wealth.[14] Relations of production and distribution are governed by the principle of social production to meet social needs. The market is replaced by a decentralized planning process rooted in the neighborhoods.[15] Technology is demystified, all claimed economies of scale are challenged, and science and technology are put in the direct service of human needs, aspirations, and imagination.[16]

As I have argued in more detail elsewhere, I believe that only the socialist model approximates a conception of urban institutional arrangements conducive to the realization of human dignity and freedom.[17]

RICHARD CHILD HILL
Michigan State University

[8] In particular see The Committee on Economic Development, *Reshaping Government in Metropolitan Areas* (New York, 1970); The Committee on Economic Development, *Modernizing Local Government* (New York, 1970); The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *Fiscal Balance in the American Federal System*, volume 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), and Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *City Financial Emergencies* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973).

[9] For the case of education, see Reischauer and Hartman, *Reforming School Finance*, p. 82.

[10] For a more detailed analysis of the state capitalist urban model see Richard Child Hill, "State Capitalism and the Urban Fiscal Crisis in the United States," unpublished ms., Department of Sociology, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan, July 1975.

[11] For a comprehensive review of metropolitan reform attempts, see John C. Bollens and Henry J. Schmandt, *The Metropolis*, 2nd ed. (N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1970), chapter 11.

[12] James O'Connor, *The Fiscal Crisis of the State* (New York: St. Martins Press, 1973), p. 103.

[13] David Harvey, *Social Justice and the City* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1973), p. 235.

[14] See, for example, Edward M. Kirshner and James Morey, "Controlling a City's Wealth," *Working Papers for a New Society* (Spring 1973), pp. 10–19.

[15] For an excellent discussion of this issue see Lewis Friedman, "City Budgets," *Municipal Performance Report* (August, 1974), pp. 1–30.

[16] For one fascinating discussion of efforts in this direction see Nicholas Wade's discussion of Community Technology, in *Science* (January 31, 1975), pp. 332–334.

[17] Richard Child Hill, "Black Struggle and the Urban Fiscal Crisis," paper delivered at the Conference on Urban Political Economy, New School for Social Research, New York, N.Y., February 15, 1975.

"Multi-Level Analysis in State Politics"

TO THE EDITOR:

Recently in the pages of this journal, Douglas Rose argued that the American states are not sufficiently independent of national and regional forces to serve as appropriate units of analysis in comparative policy research.[1] If such a devastating charge is true, it might well signal the end of a

[1] Douglas D. Rose, "National and Local Forces in State Politics: The Implications of Multi-Level Policy Analysis," *American Political Science Review*, 67 (December, 1973), 1162–1173.

heretofore blossoming field of inquiry or, at least, result in far-reaching changes in the approach so heavily used by practitioners of aggregate output research. But we believe the following analysis demonstrates that Rose did not really make his case and that, in fact, the states are important analytic units that possess meaningful independent variation in areas of interest for political scientists.

Essentially, Rose seems to be saying that since the American states exist within a federal system, the socioeconomic and policy differences that appear unique to the states are really the result of either national trends and pressures, regional effects, or variation that exists at a substate level. The states, he insists, are not political systems, only parts of a political system that increasingly are dominated by national norms in such a way that there is great policy similarity among states. These arguments have intuitive appeal and undoubtedly merit careful consideration.

Policy decisions, while formally the product of one level of government, may not be solely due to forces operative at that particular level. State policy scholars have not been particularly sensitive to the limitations of single-level analysis, with some exceptions to be noted below, and the effects of federal leadership, sometimes bordering on coercion, have perhaps not been fully represented in such policy studies. Much state and local policy analysis has nonetheless included the impact of federal grants-in-aid on various policy areas, normally treating this effect as a separate independent variable along with various socioeconomic and political characteristics.[2] Apparently the influence of federal grants on state and local affairs has increased over the past thirty years to the extent that it undoubtedly limits the effects of state-level variables in determining state and local spending. Stephens has recently argued, however, that the real losers in this increasing centralization process are the local units of government, not the states.[3] Thus, we are not convinced on the basis of this type of research that states should be abandoned as a focus for policy analysis.

The influence of region on state affairs is not a new issue. In 1968 Sharkansky reported that measures of regionalism could account for considerable policy variation among the states after the effects of three economic characterstics had been considered.[4] And, as Rose points out, a year later Walker made an important contribution when he identified regional patterns of leadership among states in the area of policy innovation.[5] Despite these valuable results, the use of region as an explanatory variable in the social sciences has been seriously questioned. As Bertrand observed in response to Sharkansky's article above, "To say that regionalism contributed to or 'causes' these policies to be similar, is to me, misconstruing cause and effect."[6] This regional sociologist preferred to conceptualize region as an end product of homogeneities that develop as a result of a variety of social and economic forces. As Lineberry and Fowler also noted in their response to Wolfinger and Field's attempt to use region to explain differences in local government structure, ". . . we have grave reservations that the substitution of the gross and unrefined variable of 'region' for more refined demographic data adds much to our knowledge of American cities."[7] These authors, correctly it seems to us, insist that region, as an undifferentiated potpourri of socioeconomic, attitudinal, historical, and cultural variations, is too complex an indicator to use as a primary explanatory factor in accounting for political variation.

A third aspect of Rose's argument concerns intrastate variation. He insists that more differentiation on characteristics of interest to political scientists occurs within states than among states. Before taking up his endeavor to confirm this statistically, we might again acknowledge that he addresses a proposition that needs to be considered more carefully by those engaged in comparative policy research. Nonetheless, just how much variation exists at the substate level and whether it is of such magnitude to effectively preclude state-level analysis remains to be seen.

We must now deal with the issue of how to determine systematically the variation unique to the states in contrast with other levels of aggregation. Rose employed a standard one-way analysis of variance to reveal the amount of independent variation represented by states (as opposed to the population as a whole) for a group of 24 policy, policy-impact, and socioeconomic variables. The tabular entries for each of his measures express the amount of ". . . national policy differences [that] are reflected in state average policy differences." He purports to be dividing the total population

[2] Ira Sharkansky, *Spending in the American States* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968), pp. 60–66; Roy W. Bahl, *Metropolitan City Expenditures* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1969); and Alan K. Campbell and Seymour Sacks, *Metropolitan America: Fiscal Patterns and Governmental Systems* (New York: Free Press, 1967).

[3] G. Ross Stephens, "State Centralization and the Erosion of Local Autonomy, *Journal of Politics*, 36 (February, 1974), 44–76.

[4] Ira Sharkansky, "Regionalism, Economic Status and the Public Policies of American States," *Social Science Quarterly*, 49 (June, 1968), 9–26.

[5] Jack L. Walker, "The Diffusion of Innovations Among the American States," *American Political Science Review*, 63 (September, 1969), 880–899.

[6] Alvin L. Bertrand, "Comments by a Regional Sociologist," *Social Science Quarterly*, 49 (June, 1968), 36.

[7] Robert L. Lineberry and Edmund P. Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities," *American Political Science Review*, 61 (September, 1967), 701–716.

into two parts: "differences among individuals within a state (deviation from the state mean) and differences among states (deviation of the state average from the national mean)."[8] As a result of this division he finds that the states account for almost no variation on the policy and policy-impact measures and very little variation on the socioeconomic variables. While the amount of variance attributable to among-state differences is presented in several tables, he does not specify precisely which measure of association is being used. It is apparently Eta^2 or E^2 (correlation ratio),[9] which is similar in nature to R^2. He finds that states can explain from absolutely nothing for rapes per capita ($E^2 = .00$) to a high of 7.65 per cent for urbanization per capita. The highest proportion of explained variance for a policy measure is only 2.34 per cent for state and local taxes per capita. On the basis of these extremely low E^2's, Rose concludes that "Policies are the same across states; they differ almost entirely within states."[10]

We do not object to the use of analysis of variance as a way of assessing variation peculiar to the states. Nonetheless, we have serious reservations about the particular way in which Rose has used this technique. As best we can determine, Rose calculated "variation" among individuals within a state by measuring each person's deviation from a particular state mean. This was done, apparently, by placing individuals into dichotomous categories—those that either "receive" a policy or those that do not. For example, if 7 per cent of the population in Oklahoma receive public assistance, this figure would represent the mean for Oklahoma on that measure. This percentage becomes the point from which individuals in that state deviate. But in this case, they can only deviate dichotomously—they either are or are not on welfare. By assigning everyone in the state a 0 (not a recipient) or a 1 (recipient), and measuring the extent to which these two groups depart from the mean (7 per cent), Rose arrives at a within-state sum of squares. This way of calculating within-state variance is equivalent to $\sigma^2 = n(PQ)$ or $n(\%)(1-\%)$. The next step is to use the deviation of means of all states from the national mean in calculating between-states sum of squares. A standard one-way analysis of variance routine follows, using only a national mean, state means, and state populations to arrive at between and within sums of squares.

If this is what Rose has done, and we see no other alternative given the source of data he cites, we reject it as an inappropriate use of analysis of variance. Aside from the violence this approach does to common sense notions of variation, the more fundamental problem lies with the use of a dependent variable that has been dichotomized. We can find no justification for the use of anything but real interval-level data as a dependent variable when using ANOVA. When true interval-level dependent variables are used, E^2, the statistic used to demonstrate the power of the independent variable (states), becomes larger as individual cases cluster around their category means. In fact, E^2 indicates how much reduction in "error" (variance) would occur by knowing the mean for the category (state) rather than just knowing the mean for all states (grand mean) in a particular case. Take welfare payments, for example—E^2 would become larger (indicating states account for more variance) as states differed in their average payments and individuals within a given state receive similar amounts. Under such conditions. E^2 would indicate the extent to which knowledge of the state in which a recipient resides would aid us in predicting the level of payment for that individual.

The interpretation of E^2 for the kind of dichotomous dependent variables used by Rose is quite different. If the variable is coded only 0 or 1, these values cannot cluster around the category (state) mean in any realistic way unless the category mean approaches 0 or 100 per cent. The within sum of squares becomes totally a function of the size of the category mean (e.g., per cent). The E^2 with such data can only tell us how much the knowledge of the state within which a person resides helps us in predicting whether the person is or is not on welfare, for example. The algebraic cards are stacked against finding any meaningful "reduction in error" in this instance. To illustrate, if the national percentage possessing an attribute was 50 per cent and a state's mean was 40 per cent, "error" would be reduced by the amount (E^2) that n (.4)(.6) is less than $.4n(.5) + .6n(.5)$—i.e., 4 per cent. Thus, if in half the states containing half the people, 60 per cent of the population possessed this attribute, while in the other half of the states 40 per cent of the population had the same characteristic, E^2 would be only 4 per cent, leaving 96 per cent of the variation "unexplained." We believe this way of conceptualizing variance is basically nonsensical. The only acceptable approach to assessing within-state variance, in our opinion, is to find a meaningful and policy-relevant unit of analysis below the state level which also manifests socioeconomic and policy variation, and to calculate how much the

[8] Rose, "National and Local Forces," p. 1164.

[9] Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., *Social Statistics*, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972), pp. 354–355. The correlation ratio E^2 involves taking the ratio of the explained to the total sum of squares:

$$E^2 = \frac{\text{between } SS}{\text{total } SS}$$

[10] Rose, "National and Local Forces in State Politics," p. 1166.

means of those subunits vary from the state mean.

This is more than a debate about levels of analysis. While Rose purports to be measuring individual variation, the use of only state means and dichotomous dependent variables does not permit us to say anything meaningful about how people in a state differ except as they may belong in one of two basic categories (they either are or are not police officers, for example). Surely we should reserve the term "individual variation" to apply to differences in degree among real people as derived from survey research rather than relying on aggregate information from the *Statistical Abstract* for that purpose.

We should also emphasize that there is nothing inherently defective about using per capita measures as dependent variables in state policy analysis. For example, in 1971 the selective service exam failures per examinee in the state with the highest rate of failures (Mississippi) was almost 200 times greater than the state with the lowest rate (Oregon)—21.1 per cent compared to .1 per cent. This would suggest that states vary considerably on this measure, but the Rose technique produces a proportion of explained variance for the states of only 2.13 per cent. While in some cases per capita variables may not differ that much by state, it is not the use of these measures that is the real problem, it is rather the peculiar results obtained when they are subjected to this abnormal use of ANOVA.

At this point we present a reanalysis of certain policy and socioeconomic measures using one-way analysis of variance and employing where possible the same indicators used by Rose. Two separate substate units of analysis are included to represent within-state differences—all counties in the U.S. and all cities of more than 25,000 population.[11] While our primary focus is on the share of variance common only to the states, this seems best derived by letting the substate level account for variation and considering that which remains as peculiar to the states. Thus, state variation is considered to be that over and above the variance attributable exclusively to city or county. The test statistic, E^2, indicates how much policy variation is attributable to states compared to those subunits within the states.

The results of our initial one-way analysis of variance and the corresponding figures from Rose are shown in Table 1. The E^2 coefficient is the percentage of variation explained by the states and is apparently the measure originally used by Rose. Only a few variables available in the *County and City Data Book* are identical with those used in the earlier study. Therefore we also report (Table 2) ANOVA results for additional measures similar to ones used by Rose. But first, it should be noted that the difference in Table 1 between our findings and Rose's are dramatic. Obviously, our results indicate that states are responsible for considerable variation when only among- and within-state differences are compared. Where Rose finds almost minuscule state-attributable variation, as with state and local employees per capita (.10 per cent) or state and local taxes per capita (2.34 per cent), we indicate that states explain considerable variation (64.2 per cent and 51.2 per cent respectively). Other results are similarly divergent. We should note that several of our policy variables are measured as average payments per recipient which we believe are far better for policy analysis purposes than the measures used by Rose.

Table 1. State Share of National Variance, One-Way Analysis of Variance for Selected Policy, Policy Impact, and Socioeconomic Variables:[a] Rose E^2 and E^2 from Reanalysis

	Rose E^2	E^2 (reanalysis)
Policy		
State and Local Taxes, per capita	2.34%	64.2%[b]
State and Local Employees, per capita	0.10	51.2[b]
Old Age Assistance Recipients, per capita	0.74	[c]
Average Old Age Assistance Payments, per recipient	NA	65.9
AFDC Recipients, per capita	0.27	[c]
Average AFDC Payments, per recipient	NA	55.9
Policy Impact		
Rape, per capita	0.00	NA
Burglary, per capita	NA	24.7[b]
Hospital Beds, per capita	0.03	07.4[b]
Socioeconomic Variables		
Urbanization, per capita	7.65	11.9
Income, dollars per family	2.48	41.4
Education, years per person over 25	2.46	NA
Education, median school years	NA	48.9

NA not available.

[a] Source: *County and City Data Book, 1972;* data for within-state variance are for counties (1970) unless otherwise noted ($N=3141$).

[b] For all cities over 25,000, 1970 ($N=845$).

[c] Not calculated; average payment levels used instead as more indicative of a "policy" than number of recipients per capita.

[11] These data from the *County and City Data Book 1972*, are on tape and were made available through the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research, University of Michigan. We would like to thank Sam Kirkpatrick for assisting us with data interpretation.

Table 2 presents the results of the analysis of eight additional policy and socioeconomic variables that were not included in the original article. The purpose is to further reveal the striking differences between our results and those reported by Rose. The relatively high E^2s demonstrate that states *do* represent an important independent source of variation, at least when the variation

Table 2. State Share of Variance for Additional Policies, Impacts, and Socioeconomic Variables[a]

	E^2
Policy	
Average benefit per retiree	57.1%
Policy Impacts	
Crime per capita (city)	20.9
Robbery per capita (city)	12.5
Assaults per capita (city)	20.8
Auto theft per capita (city)	15.9
Socioeconomic Variables	
Per cent less than 5 years of school	53.6
Per cent more than 4 years of high school	54.7
Per cent with over 4 years of college	18.3

[a] Source: *County and City Data Book, 1972;* data for within-state variance are for counties unless otherwise indicated ($N=3141$).

within their respective boundaries is considered. It should also be noted that the states generally account for more variation with respect to the policy measures as opposed to the socioeconomic variables. Not only is this finding at odds with the earlier study, but it further emphasizes the importance of states as policy-relevant units of government. The lowest level of explained variance is consistently found in the policy-impact category, which we offer solely to make our results more comparable with the earlier study.

In our research in progress, we are also attempting to sort out the independent contribution made by each of the three levels of analysis—region, state, and local—to explaining socioeconomic, policy, and policy impact variables. At this point, however, we are convinced that states do account for important variance and that, while the effects of regional and substate variation should not be ignored, states can continue to be profitably employed as units of analysis for comparative policy research.

WILLIAM LYONS
University of Tennessee
DAVID R. MORGAN
University of Oklahoma

The Relative Impact of State and National Forces: A Comment on Rose's "National and Local Forces in State Politics"

TO THE EDITOR:

The relative impact of state and national forces was considered in a recent article[1] by Professor Douglas D. Rose in which he called into question the rather widespread notion that states are useful and meaningful units of policy analysis. On each of twelve "policy" measures and five indices of "policy impact," he performed a one-way analysis of variance on individual-level data using states as the classification category. On none of the seventeen measures did states account for more than 2½ per cent of the total variance, and on fourteen of the seventeen, states accounted for less than 1 per cent of the variance. Having thus displayed the dismal showing of the states, Professor Rose left his seventeen policy related measures to argue *on other grounds* for the importance of federal forces on state politics.

We feel Rose's argument lacks a needed symmetry. To make his point not only must one show the weakness of state level forces on a given set of policy measures but one must also demonstrate the strength of national forces *on the same set of measures.*

This research note will briefly outline why Rose's methodology precludes assessing the impact of federal forces on his set of seventeen policy related variables. It will then develop an approach that allows the simultaneous appraisal of state and national forces on the same data. Finally the technique will be applied to evaluate the relative salience of state and national forces on selected policy related measures.

The approach used by Rose was to decompose population variation into two parts, variation among individuals within states (as measured by deviation from the relevant state mean) and variation among states (as measured by deviation of the state means from the national mean). If i indexes the individual and j indexes the states, this population variation is usually expressed as:

$$(1)\quad \sum_j \sum_i (X_{ij} - \bar{X}..)^2 = \sum_j \sum_i (X_{ij} - \bar{X}._j)^2 + \sum_j \sum_i (\bar{X}._j - \bar{X}..)^2,$$

where $\bar{X}..$ is the national mean and $\bar{X}._j$ is the mean in state j. In other words the total sum of squares consists of the within sum of squares plus the between sum of squares. Because the state mean

[1] Douglas D. Rose, "National and Local Forces in State Politics: The Implications of Multi-Level Policy Analysis," *APSR*, 67 (December, 1973), 1162–1173.

is used to represent the whole state, the between sum of squares measures the impact of the states. This suggests why the national impact cannot be measured by Rose's formulation of population variation. In no part of equation (1) is the national mean, the representation of national impact, expressed as a deviation from some base point. It is, in fact, used as the base point. Hence national impact on the variation cannot be judged by this approach.

However, there is no intrinsic reason why, in a decomposition of variation, the mean has to be used as the base point. Although tradition points to the mean, any fixed point will do. When data are interval level, have a wide range, or lack some empirically nice base mark, the mean has certain very desirable characteristics. But in Rose's study, sixteen of the seventeen policy related variables are dichotomous, e.g., either a person is an AFDC recipient (coded as a 1) or is not (coded as a 0). Either of these values can function as a base point, although the "0" value facilitates algebraic manipulation. More importantly it is substantively imperative to use zero as the base point since we are interested in accounting for the incidence of some policy related characteristic (such as AFDC recipient) which is coded as a "1." Therefore the base point obviously must be different from "1." Moreover, to use "1" as the base would imply we are seeking to account for the incidence of "0," those not on AFDC. We now derive a decomposition of total variation about zero that allows assessing both state and national effects.[2]

Consider an individual score expressed as follows:

$$X - 0 = X - \bar{X}.. + \bar{X}.. - 0$$

squaring,

$$(2)\quad (X-0)^2 = (X-\bar{X}..)^2 + 2(X-\bar{X}..)\cdot(\bar{X}..-0) + (\bar{X}..-0)^2$$

$$X^2 = (X-\bar{X}..)^2 + 2(X-\bar{X}..)\cdot(\bar{X}..) + \bar{X}..^2$$

Summing over all individuals in all states,

$$(3)\quad \sum_j\sum_i X_{ij}^2 = \sum_j\sum_i (X_{ij}-\bar{X}..)^2 + 2\sum_j\sum_i (X_{ij}-\bar{X}..)(\bar{X}..) + \sum_j\sum_i (\bar{X}..)^2$$

[2] Donald Stokes, "A Variance Components Model of Political Effects," in *Mathematical Applications in Political Science* (Dallas, The Arnold Foundation, 1965), p. 65, suggests the possibility of this basic approach at one point, althought he does not himself use it.

Note that when summed, the middle term on the right hand side of equation (3) equals zero, leaving

$$(4)\quad \sum_j\sum_i (X_{ij})^2 = \sum_j\sum_i (X_{ij}-\bar{X}..)^2 + \sum_j\sum_i (\bar{X}..)^2.$$

The total variation about zero is thus expressed as a sum of the variation of individual scores about the mean and the variation of the national mean about zero. By substituting equation (1) in equation (4) it is possible to further decompose the total variation about zero into national, state and other (or perhaps individual) sources of variation.

$$(5)\quad \sum_j\sum_i (X_{ij})^2 = \underbrace{\sum_j\sum_i (X_{ij}-\bar{X}._j)^2}_{\text{unexplained effects}} + \underbrace{\sum_j\sum_i (\bar{X}._j-\bar{X}..)^2}_{\text{state effects}} + \underbrace{\sum_j\sum_i (\bar{X}..)^2}_{\text{national effects}}$$

The impact of the state and of the national effects can be gauged very simply by taking the ratio of the relevant term on the right-hand side of equation (5) to the left-hand member.

Because the data in sixteen of seventeen of Rose's policy related variables are coded 0 or 1, computational difficulties are minimized. Let there be a total of N persons in the population, N_c of which possess a policy characteristic, such as being an AFDC recipient, and hence are coded as 1. The remaining $N-N_c$ members of the population are coded as 0. It follows that the total variation is simply N_c. To ease computation of the state effects one need only note that $\bar{X}..=N_c/N$ and that $\bar{X}._j=N_{cj}/N_j$, where N_{cj} is the number of people in state j possessing characteristic "c" and N_j is the relevant population in state j. Similarly it follows by elementary algebra that the national effects (i.e., the sum of squares of the national mean about zero) equal N_c^2/N.

By the computations above, it is clear that the proportion of the total variation about zero attributable to the national level effects is simply N_c/N, the ratio of those possessing the policy characteristic to the total population. Because for many of the policy related measures used by Rose the ratio N_c/N is very small, the analyst is led to suspect that national level forces may not be very important, although they may, as he suggests, outweigh state level forces. To test that conjecture, data were collected from the 1973 *Statistical Abstract of the U.S.* for variables comparable to those used by Rose, and their variation about zero was decomposed according to equation (5).

Table 1 displays sixteen of the seventeen policy related variables used by Rose to demonstrate the weakness of state level forces. These data clearly support Rose's contention that state level forces lack explanatory power. In all instances the proportion of variation attributable to national level forces is greater than the variation attributable to state level forces.

Table 1. Decomposition of Variation on Selected Variables

	Percentage of Variation Attributable To:		
	State Level	National Level	Unexplained
"Policy Measures"			
Selective Service Exam Failures 1972 (population is those taking the exam)	.94%	46.98%	52.08%
Selective Service Exam Failures 1972 (population is total population)	.00	.10	99.89
Auto Registration 1972	.65	46.77	52.59
State Employees 1972	.11	1.42	98.48
Divorces 1971	.05	.36	99.59
State and Local Police 1971	.02	.22	99.76
Old Age Assistance Recipients 1972	.60	.92	98.48
AFDC Recipients 1972	.41	5.15	94.44
Aid to Blind Recipients 1972	.01	.04	99.95
Disabled Assistance Recipients	.13	.55	99.32
General Assistance Recipients 1972	.15	.28	99.57
Unemployment Compensation Recipients Weekly 1972	.19	.86	98.95
Infant Deaths per Live Births 1968	.01	1.92	98.07
Rapes 1971	.00	.02	99.97
Physicians 1971	.01	.15	99.83
Hospital Beds 1971	.03	.74	99.23
Mental Health Inmates 1972 (Public Facilities)	.03	.13	99.54

Due to rounding, entries may not sum to 100%.

The most striking aspect of these data, however, is the fact that most variation is unexplained by either state or national level forces. In only two cases do national level forces account for a sizable amount of variation, and both of these cases are somewhat unusual. The high proportion of variation at the national level for auto registration (46.77%) is easily explained. Large numbers of people in every state own automobiles and every state requires these vehicles to be registered, therefore there is not likely to be much state by state variation.

Selective Service Exam failures per examinee can be largely explained by national level forces (46.98 per cent); however, failures in the total population cannot. This suggests that by the time the registrants are screened (or screen themselves) and eliminated from contention, only certain types of people remain. The characteristics of these remaining few are apparently relatively homogeneous and evenly distributed throughout the states. The point is that in neither case would one expect there to be much interstate variation.

For the remaining variables, rarely do national forces account for more than 1.00% of the total variation. It is ironic that Rose has commented on a similar situation:

> While ultimately political science ought to explain nearly all policy, a sense of priorities should lead us to deal first with the 98–100 per cent of the policy variance which is not accounted for by state differences. Similarly, statistical theory and practice indicate that we can have little confidence in our variables that account for only 1 per cent or even 10 per cent of the variance.[3]

Given the lack of explanatory power of both state and national forces, one is faced with at least two possible conclusions. First, it may be that these governments have little or no impact on individual behavior. Perhaps it is as Samuel Johnson has said,

> How small of all that human hearts endure
> That part which laws or kings can cause or cure.

This does not appear to be a very defensible conclusion, especially based on such meager evidence. In addition, it is a somewhat self-destructive conconclusion for political scientists. A more plausible conclusion is that Rose has merely chosen inappropriate measures of "policy" and "policy impact."

Rose begins his analysis with a discussion of what constitutes policy and the problems with previous conceptualization and measurement in this area. After arguing that the use of per capitized payment averages for certain policies might be conceptually and statistically misleading, Rose proceeds to calculate the state share of national variance for certain measures of policy and policy consequences with no discussion of why these particular variables are more valid indicators of the concepts in question than per capitized payment averages.

We would argue that if one is going to examine and compare the relative effects of levels of government on certain public policies, one must *a priori*

[3] Rose, p. 1164.

select variables that theoretically or plausibly could be affected by governmental actions. For example, why should one expect either state or national government policies to affect infant mortality in this country? Rose implies that infant mortality is a "consequence" of some unspecified policy or policies; however, neither state nor national government provide any services that might *directly* affect pre- or postnatal care. One would also be hard-pressed to discover what impact either state or national government might have on the number of physicians. We would hypothesize that state and national policies would not greatly affect the number and distribution of physicians in this country, and our analysis tends to support the hypothesis. (One might hypothesize that within-state variation will be greatly dependent on certain nongovernmental factors such as relative wealth or size of population in counties or cities within the state. Doctors in our "free enterprise" system tend to go where they are likely to find a high proportion of wealthy sick people.)

In regard to Aid to the Blind recipients, it would seem that only a blind person can get Aid to the Blind assistance and blindness is hopefully not a result of government action. Perhaps the incidence of the blind availing themselves of governmental aid would be a better measure of policy impact than the incidence of aid to the blind recipients in the total population. Similarly, the number of recipients of social welfare aid is a function of the number of disadvantaged, their knowledge of availability of assistance, the mixture of private and public charitable associations, discretion of program administrators, and the nature of the governmental aid available. Finally, while state law may ease or hinder divorce and while a national ethos may generate a uniformity of attitude toward divorce, the decision to divorce will fundamentally be based on interpersonal reasons. In these and other variables examined by Rose, it is likely that nongovernmental factors will have more impact than governmental forces.

The implication of Rose's approach is that the research goal of political scientists is to explain incidence of infant mortality, divorce, rape, OAA recipients, selective service exam failures, etc. Rose is apparently interested in explaining why some people become doctors and others do not, or why some infants die and others do not, or why some applicants fail the selective service exam and some do not. These are certainly legitimate concerns and worthy of scientific research, but if one is concerned with policies of governments and the possible impact of these policies, one will try to answer different questions. As students of state-local government and politics we are interested in the collective behavior of these territorial units of government and how and why they behave differently, and how these behaviors might affect the citizens within their boundaries.

JOHN WANAT AND
PHILLIP W. ROEDER
University of Kentucky

State Public Policy and Variance Analysis: A Reply to Wanat and Roeder and to Lyons and Morgan

TO THE EDITOR:

Wanat and Roeder, Morgan and Lyons, and myself report such conflicting variance shares that the reader may doubt our claim to be working from the same data. Tables 1–4 show why and how we arrive at contrasting results. As Table 1 implies for an illustrative variable, the *actual* variance attributable to any level is fixed. We do not differ on actual variance calculations. We even would agree on the results for assumed or hypothetical variance using three base points. The actual figures are quite clear: regional, state and local variance are very small compared to individual variance or any assumed variance. The assumed variance varies enormously depending on the base point.

The single major source of conflict is what variance levels are included in analysis, as indicated in Table 2. A state systems analysis includes only state and regional variance, hence is analyzing only a small amount of variance. Lyons and Morgan add localities to the traditional analysis but still are using only a small amount of variance. When, as in my article, all the variance within the U.S. is analyzed, there is an enormous jump in how much variance is being examined. The further addition of assumed variance changes this amount by a great deal or little at all depending on the particular assumptions. Thus, we differ not on actual variance but in what variance we include.

The inclusion or exclusion of variance affects the *percentages* of variance attributed to the levels. A small actual variance can be a large percentage of a small, exclusive total, as is the case for states in the state systems analysis, or a small percentage of a large, inclusive total, as is the case for states in Wanat and Roeder's *a priori* analysis. The percentages in themselves have no meanings unless you know: percentage of what? The conflict is over what *should* be the "what." The conflict is not over the data, but over what data should be examined.

Finally, a complete sorting of variance among levels was not performed in any of the analyses. As Table 4 indicates, the state systems study allocates the regional variance to the states, as do Lyons and Morgan. I allocate local variance to individuals, as well as regional variance to the states, and

Table 1: Allocation of Variance among Levels for State & Local Employees, 1971

	Assumed			Actual			
Level:	National A Priori #3 (base 1)	National A Priori #2 (base $\frac{1}{2}$)	National A Priori #1 (base 0)	Regional	State	Local	Individual
	900,945[a]	201,764	2,583	30	18	46	48,142

[a] Entry is variance (times one million)

Table 2: Inclusion of Variance in Six Analyses, by Level and Total

	Variance (times one million)					
	Assumed	Actual				Total
Level:	National	Regional	State	Local	Individual	
Analysis:						
State Systems	x[a]	30	18	x	x	48
State & Local (Morgan & Lyons)	x	30	18	46	x	94
U.S.A. (Rose)	x	30	18	46	48,142	48,236
A Priori #1 (Wanat & Roeder)	2,583	30	18	46	48,142	50,819
A Priori #2 (Rose)	201,764	30	18	46	48,142	250,000
A Priori #3 (orphan)	900,945	30	18	46	48,142	949,181

[a] Level not included in this analysis

Table 3: Allocation of Included Variance among Levels, Six Analyses, in Percentages

	Assumed	Actual				Total
Level:	National	Regional	State	Local	Individual	
Analysis:						
State Systems	x	61.9%	38.1	x	x	100.0%
State & Local	x	31.7%	19.5	48.8	x	100.0%
U.S.A.	x	.1%	.0	.1	99.8	100.0%
A Priori #1	5.1%	.1	.0	.1	94.7	100.0%
A Priori #2	80.7%	.0	.0	.0	19.3	100.0%
A Priori #3	94.9%	.0	.0	.0	5.1	100.0%

Table 4: Allocation of Included Variance Among Collapsed Levels, Six Analyses, in Percentages

	Assumed	Actual				Total
Level:	National	Regional	State	Local	Individual	
Analysis:						
State Systems	x	x	100.0%	x	x	100.0%
State & Local	x	x	51.2%	48.8	x	100.0%
U.S.A.	x	x	.1%	x	99.9	100.0%
A Priori #1	5.1%	x	.1	x	94.8	100.0%
A Priori #2	80.7%	x	.0	x	19.3	100.0%
A Priori #3	94.9%	x	.0	x	5.1	100.0%

the *a priori* models allocate in the same fashion. This deflates the regional and local figures and inflates the state and individual percentages, though the inflation is trivial except for the state systems and Lyons and Morgan analyses.[1] At the end of this process, as indicated in the "State" column of Table 4, the percentage "results" vary as much as they possibly could in the six analyses, though the actual state-level variance remains exactly the same in the six analyses.

The main argument is about what variance should be included in analysis.

(1) Should local variance be included? The "no" position is not represented here, so my original critique of the traditional position is not contested.

(2) Should individual variance be included? Lyons and Morgan take the "no" position, saying that differences at the individual level on dummy variables are not "differences in degree among real people." I shall take up this argument below, showing that it rests on a misconception of variance. Note here, though, that Lyons and Morgan have not objected to the inclusion of all individual-level variance, only individual-level variance on dummy variables. Thus they would accept the original results I reported for education in years (state percentage of U.S.A. variance = 2.46 per cent), income in dollars (state percentage of U.S.A. variance = 2.48 per cent), and state and local taxes paid in dollars (state percentage of U.S. variance = 2.34 per cent).[2] They appear to believe these results *must* be higher than those using dummy variables, such as selective service failures (state percentage of U.S.A. variance = 2.1 per cent), urbanization (state percentage of U.S. variance = 7.65 per cent), and congressional election turnout (state percentage of U.S. variance = 4.28 per cent)[3] Obviously, I think they have not examined the matter thoroughly.

(3) Should national variance be included? Wanat and Roeder and myself would answer "yes," because the national pattern affects the other levels.

(4) Should assumed variance be included? Wanat and Roeder answer "yes," but they do so only for instrumental reasons. What they would like to do is measure national variance, and to do this they need some pool of variance larger than the nation. This does not mean that the pool has to be assumed; the pool could be cross-national variance or variance over time, both based on actual rather than assumed variance. It is not clear why Wanat and Roeder reject the empirical approach, which leads to different results from their *a priori* approach.

(5) Does the national impact reduce or increase variance? In my article, I indicated that the national impact reduced variance, as in *a priori* #2 analysis. That is, we are more similar to each other as U.S. citizens than we would be if we had no national society in common. Wanat and Roeder, on the contrary, assume that there would be no difference between people except for the impact of nationalization, as in *a priori* #1 and #3 analyses.

(6) Finally, in deciding between *a priori* #1 and #3 analyses, Wanat and Roeder must decide whether the policy is one of *doing* as much as is done or *not doing* more than is done. The issue arises only for the national impact and only in their model. Though the amount done and the amount not done are logically equivalent and perfectly negatively related, Wanat and Roeder come out strongly against "seeking to account for '0,' those not on AFDC." In their approach, unfortunately, these opposite sides of the same policy yield totally different conclusions about the national impact, as Table 4 shows.

Below I take up the issues raised by Lyons and Morgan, then the national impact issues of Wanat and Roeder.

Lyons and Morgan wish to consider some types of variance illegitimate, and their exclusion of individual level variance rests on the validity of their view of variance. They distinguish variance between states (groups) from variance between individuals, and they distinguish variance for graduated variables from variance for dichotomous variables. They declare that the combination of individual-level variance and variance for dichotomous variables is illegitimate, while approving of the three other combinations. Below I show that all variance is reducible to individual-level variance on dichotomous variables; if this combination is illegitimate, then so are all combinations.

According to the conventional formulas given for variance, the mean is an essential part of variance, since variance is measured as the average squared difference of cases from the mean. Lyons and Morgan state that they know no other way to

[1] Lyons and Morgan are correspondingly at pains to deny that geographical proximity of states (region) has any consequences for the behavior of states or cities. I disagree with their absolutist position and believe proximity is often a facilitator and sometimes a necessary condition of types of interactions among states. I agree, however, that region cannot be used analytically unless its role is carefully modeled. For a further discussion, see my "Citizen Preference and Public Policy in the American States," in *Perspectives on Public Policy-Making*, William B. Gwyn and George C. Edwards III, editors, Tulane Studies in Political Science, Vol. XV (New Orleans: Tulane University, 1975), 55 ff., and "Comment: The American States' Impact on Voter Turnout," *American Political Science Review*, 69 (March, 1975), 126, 130.

[2] "National and Local Forces in State Politics," *American Political Science Review*, 67 (December, 1973), 1164–1165.

[3] *Ibid.*

compute variance than by using the mean. In fact, the mean is merely a computational shortcut in calculating variance and has no import in variance formulas aside from the individual scores it represents.

In Table 5, four variance formulas are equated. Two of these formulas (the third and fourth) use the mean and are the standard formulas given for computing variance. The other two formulas do not use the mean. The second formula appears (in incorrect form) in Hays in a section on "meanings of the variance," where the prime interpretation of variance is in terms of this formula: "variance summarizes *how different the various cases are from each other*" and is "*the average squared difference between all pairs of observations.*"[4] The first formula does not appear anywhere, as far as I know. The first and second formulas are not used in computation because they are more tedious than the third or fourth formula.

All four formulas are equivalent. Any point about variance which is true must be true for all. Particularly, any point giving the mean any other role than as a computational shortcut is not a point about variance. The mean has no substantive interpretation or role apart from the cases it represents. It has no "power" over individual scores.

[4] William L. Hays, *Statistics for Psychologists* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963), p. 180.

Table 5: The Equivalence of Four Variance Formulae[a]

Operation	Formula 1	Formula 2	Formula 3
Verbal Interpretations:	Average product of a case's differences from each of a pair of cases	Average squared difference between pairs of cases	Average squared difference between a case and the mean
Formula:	$\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N}\sum_{j=1}^{N}\sum_{k=1}^{N}(X_i - X_j)(X_i - X_k)}{N^3}$	$\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N}\sum_{j=1}^{N}(X_i - X_j)^2}{2N^2}$	$\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N}(X_i - \bar{X})^2}{N}$
Multiplying out:	$\frac{\sum_i\sum_j\sum_k(X_i^2 - X_iX_j - X_iX_k + X_jX_k)}{N^3}$	$\frac{\sum_i\sum_j(X_i^2 - 2X_iX_j + X_j^2)}{2N^2}$	$\frac{\sum_i(X_i^2 - 2\bar{X}X_i + \bar{X}^2)}{N}$
Moving constants outside summations:	$\frac{N^2\sum_i X_i^2}{N^3} - \frac{N\sum_i X_i\sum_j X_j}{N^3} - \frac{N\sum_i X_i\sum_k X_k}{N^3} + \frac{N\sum_j X_j\sum_k X_k}{N^3}$	$\frac{N\sum_i X_i^2}{2N^2} - \frac{2\sum_i X_i\sum_j X_j}{2N^2} + \frac{N\sum_j X_j^2}{2N^2}$	$\frac{\sum_i X_i^2}{N} - \frac{2X\sum_i X_i}{N} + \frac{\bar{X}^2N}{N}$
Dividing and dropping redundant notation	$\frac{\sum_i X_i^2}{N} - \bar{X}\bar{X} - \bar{X}\bar{X} + \bar{X}\bar{X}$	$\frac{\frac{1}{2}\sum_i X_i^2}{N} + \frac{\frac{1}{2}\sum_i X_i^2}{N} - \bar{X}\bar{X}$	$\frac{\sum_i X_i^2}{N} - 2\bar{X}\bar{X} + \bar{X}^2$
Summing:	$\frac{\sum_i X_i^2}{N} - \bar{X}^2$	$\frac{\sum_i X_i^2}{N} - \bar{X}^2$	$\frac{\sum_i X_i^2}{N} - \bar{X}^2$
Equals Fourth (Computational) Formula?	yes	yes	yes

[a] The substitution of "N" for "$N-1$" in the denominator makes no difference in the equivalence of the four formulas. Formula 2 makes clear why the "$N-1$" adjustment occurs: each case gets compared with itself. Since the results of these comparisons must be zero, and since there are as many self-comparisons as there are cases, the maximum nonzero comparisons number $2N(N-1)$ rather than $2N(N)$. Only the comparisons across cases can produce differences, so only these comparisons are included and averaged. If the self-comparisons were to be included, the measured variance would tend to decrease as sample size decreased (more zeroes per total pairs for smaller samples), making variance from samples of different sizes noncomparable.

If an individual score changes, the mean and variance change; without an individual score change (any individual), the mean, and variance will not change.

For any group, the total variance is the variance within that group, that is, the average squared difference between cases in the group. The variance within New York is calculated exactly the same way as the variance within the U.S. When, as with states and the nation, one group is a subset of another, the variance within the states is a part of the variance within the nation; it is the part which considers pairs of cases which come from the same state. The within-state variance in a one-way analysis of variance is simply the average across individuals of the average squared difference between one individual and the other individuals in the same state. This within-state variance is computed the same way as total variance, the only change being the pairs of cases considered: all possible pairs (total variance) or all possible pairs within the same state (within-state variance). The state means are not involved, except for computational shortcuts. Both total and within variance have clear meanings in terms of original individual scores, and these original scores are all that is necessary to calculate these two variance figures.

The second variance formula can be rearranged to reflect the fact that all individuals are part of some state (subgroup):

$$\frac{\sum_{s=1}^{50}\sum_{i=1}^{N_s}\sum_{r=1}^{50}\sum_{j=1}^{N_t}(X_{si}-X_{tj})^2}{2N^2}$$

Statistically, this can be arranged as:

$$\frac{\sum_{s=1}^{50}\sum_{t=1}^{50}(\text{Variance within } s)\frac{N_s}{N}+(\text{Variance within } t)\frac{N_t}{N}}{2}+\frac{\sum_{s}\sum_{i}\sum_{t}\sum_{j}(\bar{X}_s-\bar{X}_t)^2}{2N^2}$$

which is the normal partitioning for within and between variance components. The unsophisticated reader might think that "within-state variance" was the part of the total occurring among individuals in the same state and that "between-state variance" was the part occurring among individuals in different states. In fact, some statistical juggling is required to get "between-state variance" from the individual scores, and the "within-state variance" based on individual pairs within states is extrapolated to all pairs. When state "s" is the same as state "t," pairs of cases within the state are being compared: that is within variance. When state "s" is different from state "t," the individual differences are broken into two parts: those expected from the within-state variances and those not expected. This requires dividing individual scores into state mean and deviation from state mean components. The state mean portions alone are counted as contributing to between-state variance.

The between-state variance is the difference between the total variance (which has an individual-level meaning) and the within-state variance (which has an individual-level meaning); but the between-state variance does not have an individual-level meaning in terms of individual scores, aside from being a residual. The between-state variance can be expressed in terms of the state means and their difference, but these in turn are no more than the "unexpected" parts of the total, i.e., a residual after statistical operations. At this point, most analysts, including Lyons and Morgan, succumb to the notion that the mean is a real cause and component of individual scores and discuss the "power of the independent variable (states)."

A moment's reflection should prevent drawing this conclusion: in variance itself, individual scores are prime, undetermined by anything else. A shift of one individual's scores, with no other individual-level changes, will affect *all* the variance measures because it will affect that individual's relationship to individuals everywhere—within his own state, in other states, and in the nation as a whole. Because the variance measures merely average and allocate such individual differences, the whims of one individual can change them all. A number of causes unrelated to states (except in a statistical sense) affect the score of at least a few individuals and so potentially affect the between-state variance. In relative terms, this potential is at its peak when there is great variation at the individual level but when there is little between-state variance. Thus, a shift involving a relatively minor share of the within-state variance could produce a shift of a relatively large share of the between-state variance. Suppose, for example, that the within-state variance was 99 per cent of the total; then a shift of 1/99 in the within-state variance could either double or eliminate the between-state variance. Even if we could explain 98/99 of the within-state variance, we still might not be able to explain the individual-level changes that eliminated or doubled all differences between states.

With dichotomous variables, the mathematical computations involved in calculating variance are greatly reduced. As each score can have only one

of two values, for example, $50 and $0, the squared differences between cases can only have two values, $2,500 and $0. The former occurs whenever cases are different, the zero whenever cases are the same. Computationally, the zeroes add nothing, so the variance formula reduces to the difference squared times one-half the probability that cases differ.

A dummy variable is a dichotomous variable with values of zero or one (presence or absence of some trait). The squared difference for dummy variables is one, so the variance of dummy variables is simply one-half the proportion of case pairs which are different. A dichotomous variable's variance is simply the dummy variable's variance (representing frequency of differences) times some weight squared. Note that the variance of a dichotomous variable depends on the variance of the accompanying dummy variance representing frequency: if the dummy variable has zero variance, so will the dichotomous variable. For the dichotomous variable to be meaningful, the underlying dummy variable must be meaningful.

The between-state variance corresponds to the variance in a dependent variable (individual scores) "accounted for" in a regression on all the states (subgroups). The model is the familiar

$$Y_j = \sum_{i=1}^{50} b_i X_{ij} + e_j$$

where "X_i" is a dummy variable for the presence or absence of state "i," and "b_i" is the regression coefficient for that dummy variable, which turns out to be the state mean score on Y. Thus, the between-state variance reduces to a function of a series of dummy or dichotomous variables representing states (subgroups). The variance of each of these dummy variables is simply one-half the probability that citizens differ on whether they live in the state. If dummy-variable analysis at the individual level is nonsensical, as Lyons and Morgan believe, then the between-state variance is nonsensical, because the between-state variance is a summary of individual-level dummy-variable analyses. Of course, between-state variance and dummy-variable analysis at the individual level *are* nonsensical when the independent variables (living or not living in a particular state) do not have any effect on the dependent variable, but otherwise they are quite sensible. If between-state variance is sensible, then dummy-variable analysis must be sensible; and states must have an actual, not merely statistical accounting, impact on their citizens' scores.

Take the above model and change the meaning of X_i to make it a dummy variable for the presence or absence of a particular score, and change the meaning of b_i to the regression coefficient of that variable, which turns out to be the score itself. This is now a model of variance as a function of the frequency of particular scores. The variance of each of the components is one-half the probability that individuals differ on possessing a particular score. Again, the variance itself has no meaning unless these dummy variables have meaning at the individual level. Of course, in this case the "independent" variables do have an impact on the "dependent" variable. The point is the same as in the between-state variance cases: if dummy variables at the individual level do not make sense, neither does their aggregate, the variance of a graduated variable.

Because total, between-state, within-state, graduated variable and dummy variable variance all depend on the validity of dichotomous variables at the individual level, the distinctions among them do not rest on a dummy variable versus interval variable difference. The differences lie in whether such dichotomous variables are aggregated or not. For between-state variance and graduated variable variance analysis, a great number of dichotomous variables are lumped together, so that it is unclear what is statistically producing the variance. Many of the concerns of variance analysis trace to this problem: if, for example, a few "outliers" produce the variance, great care must be taken in its use and interpretation. The stress on graphing data is a stress on sorting out the dichotomous variables which have been lumped together. Thus, a between-state variance of graduated variable variance score is much more ambiguous than a within-state variance or a dichotomous variable score, where the individual level contributions can be more easily seen. Lyons and Morgan thus have things backward when they say that a dichotomous variable analysis "does not permit us to say anything meaningful about how people in a state differ except as they may belong in one of two basic categories." In fact, this is the most complete information possible, and it is precisely the lack of this meaning that makes between-state and graduated variable variance difficult to interpret. Sorting out the dichotomous variable frequencies for various inputs into variance is so important that we make heavy use of assumed distributions—such as the normal distribution—which can pinpoint the frequency which accompanies each score. These distributions are based on assumptions about the frequencies of dummy events. The information that Lyons and Morgan reject is the basic and most desirable information in a variance analysis.

In terms of variance itself, Lyons and Morgan are misguided in their notions that the mean has some power over individual scores, that between variance can be calculated when individual variance cannot, that graduated variables are superior to dichotomous variables, that dummy-variable

analysis at the individual level can be discarded without discarding all other analysis, and that dummy-variable analysis at the individual level is less revealing than other types of analysis. What is involved is not what they or I would like to be true but mathematical proofs on formulas that they accept.

Lyons and Morgan believe that the "algebraic cards are stacked" against between-state variance on dichotomous (or dummy) variables. From what I have said above, it is obvious that if the cards are stacked for dummy variables, they are stacked in all instances. Mathematically, all other instances are reducible to the "stacked" instance. The example of stacking given by Lyons and Morgan is also somewhat misleading. The *maximum* variance accounted for by the states on a dummy variable is equal to the maximum difference between state means. If the maximum difference between states were 50 per cent or 100 per cent, then states could account for a maximum of 50 per cent or 100 per cent of the variance.

Lyons and Morgan's problem is that, in order for states to account for large amounts of variance, the difference between states must be sizable even if the differences between individuals are fairly small. That is, states must truly account for some variance, not merely reflect some of the other influences around. In fact, states seem to reflect whatever else is going on: as the total variance increases, so does the between-state variance; as the total variance decreases, so does the between-state variance. Thus, between-state variance is fairly accurately reflected simply as a percentage of total variance. The cards are not stacked against states.

This belief in card-stacking leads Lyons and Morgan to prefer graduated variables, such as welfare payment amounts, over dichotomized variables, such as welfare recipients, to measure policy. At one level, the argument is a nonissue since governments both give to selected persons and give various amounts; as separate aspects of government action, both measure policy and neither is superior. If, however, we conceive of the policy as encompassing both aspects—giving nothing to some people and varying amounts to other people—then we can ask which is a better policy indicator. Which accounts for more of the variance in the total policy?

Table 6 divides the variance of public assistance (AFDC, OAA, General Assistance, Aid to the Blind, Disability) into two components, the dichotomous recipients-nonrecipients share of the variance (mean payment squared times variance of recipients) and the graduated-payment levels share of variance (mean recipient times variance of payments among recipients). As the table indicates, Lyons and Morgan are incorrect; the dichotomous variable accounts for much more of the variance and is the better indicator of total policy.

Table 6. Variance in Public Assistance per Family, 1969, Allocated by Recipient Status, in Percentages[a]

	Percentage of Variance
Between Recipients and Non-Recipients	58.9%
Among Recipients	41.1
Total	100.0%

[a] Data source: *Sources and Structure of Family Income, 1970 Census of Population, Subject Reports* PC(2)-8A, U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1973, Tables 1, 4, 7.

The above does not indicate which measure is better for indexing the state role in total policy, however. There are two questions: (1) is there a total policy in the states to be indexed? and (2) which measure accounts for more variance? If there is no state-level interaction among recipients and payments, there is no total policy as an empirical reality and the whole question is meaningless. If the cards are stacked against states for dummy variables (recipients), then states should show much less variance on the per recipient measures than on the payment measures. As Table 7 shows, there does not seem to be a total policy, as there is little interaction between payments and recipients; and (the table does not show this) the interaction which occurs follows no consistent pattern across states. On balance, not even considering the much larger size of the AFDC program, the variance accounted for by states through the dummy variable (recipients) is slightly more than the variance accounted for by states through the graduated variable (payments). Thus Lyons

Table 7. Variance Allocated to States in Two Welfare Programs, by Payment and Recipient Source, in Percentages[a]

	AFDC	OAA
Between Recipients and Non-Recipients		
Due to States	13.3%	5.1%
Not Due to States	80.1	83.7
Among Recipients		
Due to States	5.5	10.9
Interaction Between Payments and Recipients		
Due to States	1.1	.3
Total	100.0%	100.0%

[a] Data source: *Statistical Abstract of the U.S. 1973*, U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1972, Tables 12, 488-490.

and Morgan are incorrect in stating that payments are a better policy measure than recipients because (1) there is no overall policy to measure, and (2) payment variance is not a greater source of total variance than is recipient variance.

Lyons and Morgan are wrong on both the mathematics and the empirical realities. Therefore whatever interest their measure of the region and state share of region and state and local variance may have for other purposes, it is not a valid basis for disputing my original conclusions.

Measuring the national impact on policy is a major problem, and Wanat and Roeder have invented a measure which is both elegant and easy to apply. However, I do not think it is a good measure.

The general thrust of *my* remarks on national impact was that a single national society produced similarities among citizens, that the particular American national government produced commonalities in the effects of states on their citizens, and that this national impact was highly complex. Wanat and Roeder do not address themselves to any of these topics. Indeed, their approach measures national impact only under the assumption that I am wrong.

Wanat and Roeder assume that, without a national impact, there would be *no* dissimilarities or variance among individuals. The national impact moves the society toward dissimilarity by moving the mean from zero (or one). For an equivalently simple measure, I would assume the opposite: that the national impact instead reduces variance which would otherwise occur. Operationally, this is equivalent to *a priori* #2 analysis, where a base-point of one-half, corresponding to maximum pre-national variance, is assumed. As the reader may remember from Table 4, the assessment of national impact depends strongly upon which assumption is used. My assumption is that state and local government employment would increase without a national society: states would take over defense, postal, veterans, resources, economic regulation and other functions of the present federal government. Wanat and Roeder's assumption is that without a national society there would be no state and local government employment (hence no state and local governments, hence anarchy).

In splitting variance into three separate components (national, state, individual), Wanat and Roeder also imply that the national society has no impact on the states. While I shall point out below that this is a misreading of their own model mathematically, consider the substance of the assumption. The fact that all states and localities have little military, postal, and diplomatic employment and much educational, highway, police, fire, and sanitation employment is taken to be unrelated to the fact that the federal government has the reverse pattern of employment. I would have thought the two were related.

In Wanat and Roeder's approach, the national impact is the same for every citizen in every state; it is always the national mean. There is no relation between the national impact on one variable and another variable at the citizen, local, or state level. The national impact on employment is to give each citizen part of a job and the national impact on income is to give each citizen some money, but the two are not related. Consider a contrary view: the national impact is not the same for all citizens (though its overall trend is toward similarity, e.g., widespread unemployment in an economic boom); the national economic impact on one variable is, at subnational levels, related to the national impact on other levels; and the national impact is redistributive among states and localities. It cannot be measured in the simple Wanat and Roeder format.

The assumption underlying Wanat and Roeder's measurement of national impact—i.e., that without an American national society, the scores of all variables would be zero—runs contrary to fact. There is no society with zero infant mortality. Non-national societies, even those contaminated by the importation of elements of a national society (doctors, medicines, anthropologists), have *higher*, not lower, infant mortality rates than national societies. Among national societies, the U.S. has relatively *low*, not high, infant mortality —less than $\frac{1}{3}$ of many societies and twice the rate of no societies.

For almost all of their variables, deriving even crude estimates of national impact from a model which did not grossly violate what is already known would be a great deal of work. If Wanat and Roeder do not want to do the work, that is fine with me; but they should not report conclusions without doing the chores involved.

Leaving aside for the moment state impacts (whose analysis does not affect estimates of the national impact), there are three sources of scores at the individual level in Wanat and Roeder's model: the base point, the national mean, and some unexplained sources. The base point indicates what would happen without a national society; since it is constant for all individuals on all variables in all national societies, it does not affect variance and can be forgotten. National forces are indicated by "the national mean, the representation of national impact." The remaining sources of scores are a problem.

At the individual level in Wanat and Roeder's model, the remaining sources are dependent on the national impact. Further, at the aggregate level, these additional sources always sum to zero, whatever the national mean, and they contribute




Figure 1. Wanat and Roeder's Approach as a Causal Model

no variance independent of the mean, the national impact. In a word, the national impact on variance is the only impact in their model. If we wish to calculate the share of the variance attributable to "the national mean, the representation of national impact," it is simply 100 per cent. For example, if the national mean is zero, all scores are zero and the variance is zero. The national impact is always the total impact.

In causal model terms, Wanat and Roeder's analysis is indicated in Figure 1. The national impact is, in their discussion, split into two measured components, then re-united. Both variance components are completely dependent on the national impact on these equivalent consequences is quite different, as shown in Figure 2, and the total national impact via the two routes is also quite different. Specifically, the measured national share of the variance on unemployment due to the same national force will be one minus the employment share, or 99 per cent. As the national employment policy impact on employment increases, its impact on unemployment decreases by the same amount. I do not recommend trying to make sense of this. The logical contradictions, by the way, do not exist if a base point of .5, assuming national impact reduces variance, is used, in which case the measured national impact on both




Figure 2. Impact of a Single National Force on Two Logically Equivalent Variances, Wanat and Roeder's Approach

national mean and, aside from the 1:1 impact of the mean on variance, perfectly negatively related. Given the logical relationship between the two parts, it is impossible to give them independent meanings or indeed any substantive meaning at all; the splitting is spurious, the distinction meaningless.

The lack of meaning, though not lack of statistical results, may be seen when two logically equivalent consequences of national impact are considered. If some percentage of the population are employed as state government employees, than that figure represents the national input in such employment in Wanat and Roeder's model. Consider two consequences at the individual level: a person is so employed or he is not so employed. The two consequences are perfectly negatively related, logically equivalent. The measured consequences is 94 per cent, not 1 per cent.

The problems with Wanat and Roeder's approach to national impact are, in summary: (1) they get the wrong results, because (2) they make dubious assumptions, which (3) ignore what empirical evidence already exists, and involve (4) spurious distinctions and logical contradictions.

DOUGLAS D. ROSE
Tulane University

The Social Phenomenology of Alfred Schutz

TO THE EDITOR:

In a recent article of this *Review* (69, March 1975, 132–40), Mr. Peritore advances the thesis that, in spite of his elaborate and "the most consistent" attempt at a philosophical grounding of

social science methodology, Schutz's sociology lacks, in the end, a rigorous foundation and allegedly "avoids the epistemological (first-level) problem" (p. 133). Peritore further argues that Schutz essentially failed to provide a theory of intersubjectivity because of an inadequate account of his "general thesis of the alter ego" for the social sciences. What is needed and what Schutz's sociology lacks for providing an epistemological certitude, Peritore asserts, is a "rigorous philosophical foundation in an eidetic science of the social" (p. 140), which Husserl's transcendental phenomenology is claimed to provide. Measured in the light of Husserl's "promise," or "phenomenological ideal of science" as the norm, Schutz's phenomenology consequently leads to a type of *Weltanschauung* analysis, "a naive empiricism," or "a methodological individualism" (pp. 137, 136, 134).

In this brief note, I wish to refute Peritore's thesis which entails certain glosses and misreading of both Husserl and Schutz (this is, I think, due partly to leaving out Schutz's later works from Peritore's consideration in his article) and to advance the following observations which bear the counterevidence to Peritore's contentions. In what follows, I would like to point out the source of Peritore's confusions: I will show, first, that Schutz's phenomenological description of the meaningful experience is carried out within the natural (and not the naturalistic) attitude and not to be confused with the objective, or scientific standpoint; secondly, that Schutz well realizes that the problem of intersubjectivity cannot be resolved by the transcendental ego as Husserl proposed; and thirdly, that Schutz's phenomenology cannot be construed as "a methodological individualism" as Peritore alleges.

In essence, Peritore confuses Schutz's elucidation of human subjectivity with the epistemological status of science (i.e., the problem of observation). That means that Peritore's misinterpretation is due to his failure to appreciate the radical nature of phenomenological empiricism and to distinguish it from a traditional empiricism of Lockean type, a *Weltanschauung* analysis, Dilthey's method of empathy, or an introspective psychology, which leads Peritore to the confusion of the natural attitude with the scientific (theoretical) attitude. Peritore criticizes Schutz in the following way:

> Schutz's case for a mundane sociology is further weakened by his admission of a realm of 'intimate personal experiences' in the observer, which cannot be reproduced with clarity and are given merely as 'there.' He includes pain, movement, sexual sensation, mood, feeling, and affect in this category of lived but unthinkable experience. Obviously, this range of intimate experience is not available to the observer for his analysis of the other if it cannot be made choate or thematic within himself. Now, phenomenology should be able precisely to thematize such experiences and extract their essence under the discipline of the *epoché*. Herein lies its prime *raison d'être* as opposed to that of ordinary introspection (p. 138).

Furthermore, concerning Schutz's phenomenological analysis of the meaningfulness of experience, Peritore accuses Schutz of maintaining the proposition that

> . . . only past experience in meaningful, Schutz must reject the *noematic* element in the intentional stream of consciousness, which gives the 'object-of-consciousness' meaning 'as such' during the time it is being revealed in intentional perspectival variation within an Act of attention. As expected, Schutz rejects the *noema* on Bergsonian ground (p. 138).

It must be stressed, first of all, that Schutz's analysis of the "meaning-structures" of human experience and action is the immanent description of subjectivity prior to the scientific observer (the theoretical attitude). His discussion here is strictly concerned with the actor's perspective of how he (the subject) himself makes his lived experiences thematic or meaningful. To say that "a realm of intimate personal experiences can only be lived but never thought" is to assert that experience in the flow of duration (*durée*) is a state of living in that experience and is not yet thought by the experiencing self. This experience is *not*, as Peritore charges, "unthinkable": on the contrary, it is thinkable but only when the experiencing self stops the flow of duration through a reflective act or glance. The *noema* as a revealed experience by the subject is the result of his act of attention (i.e., reflection) which constitutes the *noetic-noematic* correlation of consciousness. Thus experiencing itself is meaning*less* (unthematized) and only through the actor's attentive or reflective glance can it be made meaningful (thematized). As Schutz explicitly states:

> The simple experience of living in the flow of duration goes forward in a unidirectional, irreversible movement, proceeding from manifold to manifold in a constant running-off process. Each phase of experience melts into the next without any sharp boundaries as it is being lived through; but each phase is distinct in its thusness, or quality, from the next insofar as it is held in the gaze of attention. However, when, by my act of reflection, I turn my attention to my living experience, I am no longer taking up my position within the stream of pure duration, I am no longer simply living within that flow. The experiences are apprehended, distinguished, brought into relief, marked out from one another; the experiences which were constituted as phases within the flow of duration now become objects of attention as constituted experience.

> Meaning . . . is not a quality inherent in certain experiences emerging within our stream of consciousness but the result of an interpretation of a past experience looked at from the present Now with a reflective attitude. As long as I live *in* my acts, directed toward the objects of these acts, the acts do not have any meaning. They become meaningful if I grasp them as well-circumscribed experiences of the past and, therefore, in retrospection. Only experiences which can be recollected beyond their actuality and which can be questioned about their constitution are, therefore, subjectively meaningful.[1]

Contrary to Peritore's assertion, then, Schutz does *not* "reject the *noema* on Bergsonian grounds" (p. 138). Schutz shows that the *meaningfulness* of experience does not pertain to the ongoing process of experience, but it becomes meaningful only through a reflective glance. Here Schutz for analytic purposes differentiates and elucidates the two inseparably linked *noetic-noematic* structures of consciousness in which lived experience is rendered meaningful through a reflective act (the intentional act of consciousness). Schutz's effort is to clarify Weber's ambiguous notion of meaningful action in order to give the latter's *verstehende Soziologie* a philosophical foundation. Without this insight into subjectivity[2] the observer (the observational understanding) may hazardously impute his own meaning to the actor (the motivational understanding) under observation.[3]

Second, the most crucial gloss upon which Peritore's thesis is based is to have mistakenly pitted Husserl's transcendental phenomenology against Schutz's constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude. Schutz rightly makes the strategic move for the methodology of the social sciences when he realizes the insurmountable difficulty that transcendental phenomenology encounters in the issue of *social reality*. Schutz makes this point most clearly when he says:

> In summing up, we may say that the empirical social sciences will find their true foundation not in transcendental phenomenology, but in the constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude. Husserl's signal contribution to the social sciences consists neither in his unsuccessful attempt to solve the problem of the constitution of the transcendental intersubjectivity within the reduced egological sphere, nor in his unclarified notion of empathy as the foundation of understanding, nor, finally, in his interpretation of communities and societies as subjectivities of a higher order the nature of which can be described eidetically; but rather in the wealth of his analyses pertinent to problems of the *Lebenswelt* and designed to be developed into a philosophical anthropology.[4]

In keeping with Husserl's philosophical insights into an ontology of the life-world (*Lebenswelt*) for the empirical social sciences, Schutz undertook to describe the meaning-structures of the social world, social action, and the social distribution of knowledge—to name just a few—which provide the social sciences with a much needed philosophical foundation.[5] Nor does Peritore, on the other hand, mention the fact that Husserl in his philosophical career became increasingly aware of the immense difficulty and problems involved in the constitution of intersubjectivity by way of the transcendental ego. It is more correct to say, *contra* Peritore, that Husserl, in the last analysis, anticipated Schutz's constitutive phenomenology

[1] Alfred Schutz, *The Phenomenology of the Social World*, trans. F. Walsh and F. Lehnert (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967), pp. 51, 45–53; *Collected Papers*, Vol. I, *The Problem of Social Reality*, ed. M. Natanson (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), p. 210; with Thomas Luckmann, *The Structures of the Life-World*, trans. R. Zaner and T. Engelhardt, Jr. (Northwestern University Press, 1973), pp. 52–56.

[2] For the most elaborate description of the phenomenological notion of subjectivity and its cardinal importance and implication for the social science methodology, see Hwa Yol Jung, "The Crisis of Political Understanding: An Insight into Subjectivity in Political Inquiry," a paper delivered during the APSA Annual Meeting in Chicago, September 24–30, 1974.

[3] Schutz, *The Phenomenology* pp. 86–96. It is important to note that Schutz has elaborated in his *Phenomenology* Weber's inadequate distinction between action and behavior according to which only the former is sufficiently considered meaningful whose main characteristic is the presence of a project. See pp. 57–63, esp., p. 61. Peritore criticizes Schutz's procedure (a constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude) as divesting "himself of the discipline of the *epoché*" through which, Peritore contends, an "ideation of the essence of 'the social' must be found (133). While Schutz never rejected the possibility of 'objectivity' or making the social world thematic, Peritore simply "prefers with Husserl" (p. 137) insisting an edietic science of the social which is in fact based on an idealization of "pure intersubjectivity" (133). The preference without critical inquiries into the nature and the problem of intersubjectivity (which Schutz has done) hardly gains any epistemological status for science! In fact, a citation from Zaner (in Peritore's article, p. 133) contradicts Peritore's position with Husserl and renders Schutz's efforts more comprehensible.

[4] *Collected Papers*, I, 149.

[5] For the fundamental agreement of Schutz with Husserl, see *The Phenomenology*, pp. 44, 97 note 2, 171; *Collected Papers*, I, 132, 139, 149; *Collected Papers*, III, *Studies in Phenomenological Philosophy*, ed. I. Schutz (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), p. 83. In Schutz's phenomenological investigations of the methodology of the social sciences, one can find, for instance, the most elaborate asymmetry thesis of social and natural sciences, and an important distinction between common-sense (the first-order) and scientific (the second-order) constructs of social phenomena. Cf. "Concept and Theory Formation in the Social Sciences," and "Common-Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action," in *Collected Papers*, I, 48–66, and pp. 3–47; *The Structures of the Life-World*, Chapters 3 and 4 and p. 156 for his explicit statement on the nature of knowledge. For an interesting discussion on a different methodological perspective between Schutz's phenomenology and Garfinkle's ethnomethodology, see Maurice Natanson, "Phenomenology and Social Role," in his *Phenomenology, Role, and Reason* (Springfield: Charles C Thomas Publisher, 1974), pp. 190–204.

of the natural attitude. In his later career, Husserl spoke of it:

> We have already spoken of the possibility and the significance of such an ontology of the life-world on the natural ground, i.e., outside the transcendental horizon of interest, and we shall have occasion to speak of it again in another occasion.[6]

Thirdly, since Peritore misconceives the radical empiricism of phenomenology, his conclusion concerning Schutz's methodology is erroneous. Let me here cite in full Peritore's position:

> Moreover, Schutz's methodological individualism, because not grounded in an eidetic or essential science of 'the social,' fails to cut through mere synchronic empirical regularities to the subtle and dark forces underlying social interaction. Relying solely on observational empiricism, it fails to ask questions which might lead to knowledge of those cultural and historical forces that twist rationally projected action into unintended forms. An elaborate Schutzian analysis of a woodcutter's acts reveals the structure of a role and its necessary ideal motivation, but ignores what could well be historically crucial circumstances, for instance, the alienation and reification of wage labor at a certain stage of capitalism. Schutz's method can treat such historical forces only by reducing them to biographical-situational 'because-motivation.' History would then be studied only as reflected in individual consciousness, in order to save its "subjective meaning" and assert "the unity of social world" (p. 137).

What confuses Peritore throughout his analysis of Schutz's phenomenology is the phenomenological notion of "subjective meaning" which must be given an elucidation in relation to social reality, intersubjectivity, and history. As Schutz repeatedly states, the notion of 'subjective' is not meant as a solitary, pure interiority enclosed in the psyche, but is at the outset the intersubjective, incarnate subject living in the socio-historico-cultural world (*Lebenswelt*). Precisely because, according to Schutz, each one of us lives in the intersubjective nexus of social reality (the nexus of predecessors, consociates, contemporaries, and successors), his phenomenology is an attempt to describe the meaning-structures of social reality—the phenomena of our meaning-giving (*Sinngebung*) without reducing them to "a garb of ideas."[7]

Social reality, for Schutz, is neither the sum of individuals locked in "a collective soul" or "a collective consciousness" nor individuals without intersubjective relations with others. To define social reality either as the work of individuals alone or as the product of collective conduct alone would be to fall into the false option of methodological individualism or methodological holism. Indeed, Schutz does not reject or ignore the "interindividual" process of history. In this sense, Schutz insists that "social relations are always interindividual," and that

> . . . for these sciences [the empirical social sciences] do not have to deal with the philosophical aspects of intersubjectivity, but with the structure of *Lebenswelt* as experienced by men in their natural attitude, by men, that is, who are born into this socio-cultural world, have to find their bearing within it, and have to come to terms with it. This world is pre-given to them and taken for granted—"unquestionably" in the sense that it is unquestioned until further notice but may be called into question at any time.[8]

Under whatever circumstances we may live, the world-meaning must be above all revealed by the living subjects themselves. As Natanson succinctly puts it: "As an interpreted reality, the world is meaningful in the first instance to those who intend it as *world* . . . it is the actor on the social scene rather than the observer who is the primary source and locus of meaning."[9] With these insights, Schutz's constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude is anchored in the analysis of the structure of the life-world, whose nature, I repeat, cannot be reduced to a constitutive element of the transcendental ego. Nor can the notion of "subjective" be construed as a "biographical situational because-motivation" in the introspective sense, but it must be seen in the sense of the "inter-

[6] *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, trans. D. Carr (Northwestern University Press, 1970), p. 173. More on this point, see pp. 124, 132–5, 140–1, and more importantly, chapter 51. It is true as stated by Peritore that Schutz discredited the possibility of accounting for the constitution of transcendental intersubjectivity in the transcendental sphere (i.e., the reduced ego). But, Schutz was careful to add that "It is to be surmised that intersubjectivity is not a problem of constitution which can be solved within the transcendental sphere, but is rather a datum (*Gegebenheit*) of the life-world and therefore of all philosophical anthropology. As long as man is born of woman, intersubjectivity and the we-relationship will be the foundation for all other categories of human existence." Cf. "The Problem of Transcendental Intersubjectivity in Husserl," *Collected Papers*, III, 51–91, at p. 82. Concerning a theory of embodiment, Schutz did not delve into developing 'an eidetics of expression' although he was aware of its importance for the phenomenological problem of the constitution of intersubjectivity, i.e., intercorporeality which is extensively analyzed by Maurice Merleau-Ponty. For Schutz's further reflection, see his *Reflections on the Problem of Relevance*, edited, annotated, and with an Introduction by R. Zaner (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), pp. 171–4, 179; *The Structures of the Life-World*, pp. 5, 62, 66, 70, 73, 101–3, 106. Nevertheless, Peritore must be reminded (see his article, p. 138) here that if one evokes a theory of embodiment for the constitution of intersubjectivity, one may have to give up Husserl's egologism.

[7] Schutz, *The Phenomenology*, pp. 207–14, 54, 244, and Husserl, p. 51.

[8] *Collected Papers*, I, 144, 145.

[9] M. Natanson, *Edmund Husserl: Philosopher of the Infinite Tasks* (Northwestern University Press, 1973), p. 108, emphasis in the original.

individual." Peritore's misnomer of "observational empiricism" is derived from his misconception of Schutz's radical empiricism, which is a philosophical groundwork, *par excellence*, of the "interpretive sociology" enunciated by Max Weber.[10]

KAZUHIKO OKUDA

University of Toronto

[10] For further discussion and elaboration on the relationship between phenomenology and the social sciences and particularly political science, see Hwa Yol Jung, "An Introductory Essay: The Political Relevance of Existential Phenomenology," in *Existential Phenomenology and Political Theory: A Reader* ed. Hwa Yol Jung (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1972), pp. xvii–lv.; and (see) my "The Present State of American Social Science," *Gendai-Shiso: Revue de la pensée d'aujourd'hui*, 3 (February, 1975), 190–203.

TO THE EDITOR:

I would like to address myself to what I consider the misinterpretation of Husserl's program which lies at the base of Professor Okuda's critique of my recent article on Schultz, "Some Problems in Alfred Shutz's Phenomenological Methodology" [*APSR*, 69 (March, 1975)]. My purpose in writing the article was to furnish an example of radical criticism by showing the problems involved in ignoring the ultimate philosophical questions raised in methodology. Okuda's critique generates three areas of contention: the transcendental ego problem, theory of meaning-giving, and Schutz's notion of "intimate personal experiences."

First, the problem of the transcendental ego and intersubjective constitution is absolutely central for the Cartesian-Kantian-Husserlian tradition of idealism because it is this *ego cogito* which provides the foundation for knowledge of others and of the world. It is true, as Okuda said, that I "fail to appreciate" "phenomenological empiricism," or "radical empiricism," because phenomenology is no such thing. Phenomenology is monistic transcendental idealism; Husserl remained an idealist from the second volume of *Logical Investigations* to the end of his life. As he said in the late preface to *Ideas I* (W. Boyce-Gibson, trans., Collier Books, 1962),

> I am the Ego who invests the being of the world . . . with existential validity, as an existence (*Sein*) which wins for me from my own life's pure essence meaning and substantiated validity . . . (p. 11) . . . this Ego, as the presupposition of the knowledge of the world, cannot be and remain presupposed as having the existence of a world and must therefore, in respect of the world's being, be brought to its pure state through phenomenological reduction. . . . (Ibid., p. 12)

This transcendental *ego cogito*, the condition of the possibility of all consciousness of the world and the ultimate ground of truth for all phenomenological statements, cannot airily be dismissed without the collapse of Husserl's philosophy into a species of naive realism. Nor can the social sciences ignore the ultimate epistemological problems of "other minds," "embodiment," etc., raised in regard to the transcendental ego, without forfeiting their claims to science, and thus remaining ideological.

Therefore, Okuda should not applaud Schutz's "strategic move" from the phenomenological to the natural attitude if it involves, as it does, dogmatic transference of structures of consciousness discovered under the *epoché* from one sphere to another. Transcendental alterity-constitution is the precondition for positing the philosophical validity of insights in both the phenomenological and natural attitudes. As Schutz himself said, "Hand in hand with the solution of this problem will come the solution of the intersubjective validity of our experience of the world in general" (*Phenomenology of the Social World*, Walsh and Lehnert trans. Northwestern University Press, 1967). Schutz later discovered that Husserl's solution of this problem in the fifth *Cartesian Meditation* was unsatisfactory, and turned to the position that intersubjectivity is a given (*Gegebenheit*), " . . . the fundamental ontological category of human existence in the world" (*Collected Papers* Vol. III, p. 82).

But this shift of position does not solve the problem, and in addition turns one of the most crucial areas of phenomenological clarification into an opaque *Ding-an-sich*. Pure phenomenology, on the other hand, in order to avoid Kantian dualism, refuses to accept ontological entities except as constituted by intentional consciousness under the *epoché*. Because, to Husserl, only the pure *ego cogito* has being, the world has "being" only as intended by this active ego; in Husserl's terms the world has its "being" as the noematic correlate of noetic judgment-forms which specifically posit the "being" of the *noema*—the *Urglaube* or *Urdoxa*. Husserl said, " . . . only transcendental subjectivity has ontologically the meaning of Absolute Being, that it only is nonrelative . . . the real world exists, but in respect of essence is relative to transcendental subjectivity, and . . . it can have its meaning as existing (*seiende*) reality only as the intentional meaning-product of transcendental subjectivity" (*Ideas I*, p. 14). This being so, Okuda is wrong in thinking that analysis of the ontological structures of the lifeworld " . . . cannot be reduced [sic] to a constitutive element of the transcendental ego." Indeed, Landgrebe said of the lifeworld:

> Only when this predelineation is also exhibited in its

origin as deriving from accomplishments on the part of the transcendental ego—only then has the task been completed. Only then can we say that the origin of the world as horizon has been clarified, and that our transcendental constitutional analysis has fully displayed the sense of the world as something fashioned in transcendental subjectivity (Ludwig Landgrebe, "The World as Phenomenological Problem," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 1, 1940).

Husserl's lifeworld represents preconstitutive "reality" which, under the *epoché*, becomes phenomena constituted in the noetic-noematic structures of consciousness, the apodictic ground of which is the transcendental ego. Thus, the lifeworld is itself a philosophical problem, not a solution as Okuda seems to think. (On this point see J. N. Mohanty "Consciousness of Life-World," *Social Research* 42.1, 1975 pp. 147–66.) Okuda's quote from the *Crisis* section 51 (his footnote 6) gives him no support because it is out of context and needs to be considered in relation to the entire section.

Contrary to Okuda's position, the "empirical" social sciences cannot merely describe lifeworld structures, but must instead ground themselves in Husserl's *mathesis universalis*. This "science of essences" is made up of a system of noetic judgments (pure apophantics) and correlative pure noematic "objects" of judgment (pure or regional ontology), both within the intentional stream of consciousness. This "eidetic science" is ultimately grounded, in respect of truth-value, in the transcendental ego. It serves, in turn, as the conceptual framework and hypothesis generator of the "empirical sciences," giving truth value, within a founded deductive system, to the merely nominal statements derived from empirical methods. This unified eidetic science (sketched in the *Formal and Transcendental Logic*) is absolutely central to Husserl's program; it is the "telos of Western man" in his unique development of Reason. It is no mere idiosyncratic addition to empiricism but the very foundation which unifies and gives sense to the "empirical sciences." A descriptive, empirical science without this ground is naive τέχνη, not ἐπιστήμη. Okuda's social science is thus distinguishable from ordinary functional or behavioral "science" only in its utilization of phenomenological terminology without the philosophical groundwork which warrants its adoption.

I am well aware both of Husserl's inability to escape transcendental solipsism and of Schutz's excellent critique of the effort. But the problem remains for those who count themselves phenomenologists: all ontic givens require ultimate intersubjective constitution. My article merely showed the ways in which Schutz's failure in this regard vitiates much of his methodological system. It was written not to provoke defense, but to encourage philosophical consideration of a vital problem.

Second, the issue Okuda raises in regard to Schutz's theory of meaning rests on a inaccurate equation of attention and reflection with meaning-giving (see Okuda's fourth paragraph); probably the result of reading Husserl through Schutzian eyes. It is phenomenologically incorrect to speak of " . . . the act of attention (i.e., reflection) . . . " or to equate attention or reflection with the thema, or the thema with meaning-bestowal. These terms must be differentiated. (A) "Thematic is that toward which man's attention is turned" (E. Husserl, *Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy*, trans. Q. Lauer, Harper, 1965, p. 166). (B) Attention is " . . . the wandering glance, which alternately enlarges and restricts its mental span, signifies a special dimension of correlative modifications noetic and noematic . . . " (*Ideas I*, p. 249). Attention delimits the background out of which intentionality will raise the figure. It does not signify specific contents but " . . . describes ways in which the pure Ego in . . . the general mode of the cogito, lives therein as the 'free essence' which it is" (*Ideas I*, p. 249). Note that "The attending ray gives itself out as radiating from the Pure Ego . . . " (*Ideas I*, p. 249). Thus, attention does not constitute meaning, although it plays a role in transformation of polythetic into monothetic syntheses, which process cannot however be confused with meaning-giving. (C) Meaning is given in the *noema*, the "thing" which consciousness is "consciousness of," the core of identity around which perspectivally varying phenomena are clustered in their "sameness." "The meaning (*Sinn*) . . . is this Noematic 'object in its modal setting' . . . (*Ideas I*, p. 339). " . . . 'meaning' figures as a basic portion of the noema. . . . It cannot be lacking in any noema, nor can its necessary center, the point of unification, the pure determinable X" (*Ideas I*, p. 339). (D) Reflection is a phenomenological problem for Husserl and clearly does not replace the noema's function of meaning-giving. (See *Ideas I*, sections 77–79 and 108.) As Husserl states, ". . .it would be absurd to suppose that experiences are epistemologically guaranteed only in so far as they are given to us in the reflective consciousness of immanent perception. . ." (*Ideas I*, p. 204). Thus, Okuda's critique is ill-founded because it confuses important phenomenological distinctions in the theory of meaning-giving.

Third, my critique of Schutz's notion of "intimate personal experience" (*absolut intime Person*) criticized in Okuda's paragraph three, is directed against Schutz's own claim that ". . . those internal perceptions that lie close to the absolute private core of the person are irrecoverable as far as their How is concerned. . . . That which is irrecoverable . . . can only be lived but never 'thought': it is

in principle incapable of being verbalized" (*PSW*, p. 53). Schutz's mistaken theory of meaning-constitution leaves a core of opacity around moods, feelings, affects, and corporeal experiences. Husserl would not agree with this assessment of phenomenology's incapacity to research personal experiences. See for example his remarks on "background experiences" in *Ideas I*, section 84, and his phenomenology of "the joy of thought" in section 77.

In sum, I am aware of the problems in Husserl's doctrine of transcendental egology, and in fact now hold that this notion is a fatal hypostatization of the very intentionality of consciousness which is an unexplicated presupposition of the entire phenomenological approach, i.e., it is an elaborate *petitio principii*. I am also aware of the effect of Gödel's Proof on the Hilbertian formalism which underlies Husserl's theory of mathematics and science. There are historico-philosophical reasons for this contemporary crisis of idealism (see Georgy Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness*, fourth essay). But the crucial point is that philosophy does not allow one to choose only those concepts which are pleasing and discard their attendant problems—problems which arise from their systematic connection to a corpus of ideas progressing logically from ground to consequent. The current social scientific style of work (eclecticism, pragmatism) which is merely sterile in its own field becomes absolutely meaningless when transferred to philosophy whose concern is truth not "results."

N. Patrick Peritore
University of Missouri

EDITORAL COMMENT

Milestone. This *Review* is edited and published in a nation now celebrating the 200th anniversary of its political independence. With predictable contentiousness, scholars have divided over the question of whether they can add anything to the occasion. Some argue that the proper role of the political scientist is to stand outside the dominant ideologies which sustain the state and act as critic and goad in behalf of higher, unrealized ideals. Others maintain that the nation is entitled to command the highest loyalties and best efforts of all its people, not least those among its people privileged to be called to the study and teaching of the arts of statecraft and the duties of citizenship.

This is a useful battle, since it helps scholars to clarify their own views on a matter of the utmost moral urgency. There is such a thing, however, as measure and moderation in the application of even the sternest injunction. Anniversaries and other festive occasions ought to provide moments of relief. On this occasion—and without prejudice to any side in the ongoing controversy about the ordinarily proper stance for the scholar—an editor of a scholarly journal may be pardoned for taking note of certain officially protected conditions of freedom and tolerance that prevail in the United States. It is conditions such as these that make possible the receipt and dissemination of all sorts of ideas about politics, the steady maintenance of untrammeled conversation among scholars and students, and the nurturance of the life of the mind.

Freedom of inquiry and advocacy, within very broad limits, are a part of what American citizens celebrate on the bicentennial of independence. American scholars—and especially political scientists—are perhaps less inclined to celebrate than to use freedoms such as these. It is therefore worth reminding ourselves that not all our colleagues the world around are so free to pursue our calling. It is for their sake, as well as for our own, that we remember the good fortune that permits us to write and publish about politics as our consciences and our knowledge dictate.

Reminder. All new editorial correspondence should go to Professor Charles O. Jones, Managing Editor Elect, Department of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15213.

Articles Accepted For Future Publication

Joel D. Aberbach, University of Michigan and Bert A. Rockman, University of Pittsburgh, "Clashing Beliefs Within the Executive Branch: The Nixon Administration Bureaucracy"

Paul R. Abramson, Michigan State University, "Generational Change and the Decline of Party Identification"

C. Arnold Anderson, University of Chicago, "Conceptual Framework for Political Socialization in Developing Societies"

John A. Armstrong, University of Wisconsin, "Mobilized and Proletarian Diasporas"

John M. Bacheller, Kirkland College, "Lobbyists and the Legislative Process: The Impact of Environmental Constraints"

Richard M. Bank, University of California, Santa Barbara and Steven R. McCarl, University of Denver, "Virtue, Obligation and Politics Revisited"

Robert A. Bernstein, Texas A&M University, "Divisive Primaries Do Hurt: U.S. Senate Races, 1956–1972"

Steven R. Brown, Kent State University, "Toward An Experimental Analysis of Political Literature"

Charles D. Cary, University of Iowa, "A Technique of Computer Content Analysis of Transliterated Russian Language Textual Materials: A Research Note"

Clarke E. Cochran, Texas Tech University, "Authority and Community: The Contributions of Carl Friedrich, Yves Simon, and Michael Polanyi"

Neal E. Cutler, University of Southern California, "Demographic, Social Psychological, and Political Factors in the Politics of Age: A Call for Research in Political Gerontology"

Barbara Deckard, University of California, Riverside, "Party Realignment and the Transformation of the Political Agenda—The House of Representatives, 1925–1938"

Shaheen F. Dil, Princeton University, "The Cabal in Kabul: Great Power Interaction in Afghanistan

Lowell Dittmer, State University of New York, Buffalo, "Thought Reform and the Cultural Revolution: An Analysis of the Symbolism of Chinese Polemics"

Robert Eyestone, University of Minnesota, "Confusion, Diffusion and Innovation"

Norman I Fainstein, Columbia University and Susan S. Fainstein, Rutgers University, "The Future of Community Control"

Richard F. Fenno, Jr., University of Rochester, "Congressmen in Their Constituencies: An Exploration"

John A. Ferejohn, California Institute of Technology, "On the Decline of Competition in Congressional Elections"

John V. Gillespie, Dina A. Zinnes, Philip A. Schrodt, G. S. Tahim and Richard Rubinson, Indiana University, "An Optimal Control Model of Arms Races"

R. Kenneth Godwin and W. Bruce Shepard, Oregon State University, "Political Processes and Public Expenditures: A Re-examination Based on Theories of Representative Government"

Robert W. Jackman, Michigan State University, "Politicians in Uniform: Military Governments and Social Change in the Third World"

Bryan D. Jones, Wayne State University, "Bureaucratic Response to Citizen-Initiated Contacts: Environmental Enforcement in Detroit"

Russell Hardin, University of Pennsylvania, "Hollow Victory: The Minimum Winning Coalition"

Fred M. Hayward, University of Wisconsin, Madison, "A Reassessment of Conventional Wisdom About the Informed Public: National Political Information in Ghana"

Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, "Industrial Conflict in Advanced Industrial Societies"

David K. Hildebrand, University of Pennsylvania, James D. Laing and Howard Rosenthal, Carnegie-Mellon University, "Prediction Analysis in Political Research"

M. Kent Jennings and Gregory B. Markus, University of Michigan, "The Effect of Military Service on Political Attitudes: A Panel Study"

Sam Kernell, University of Minnesota, "Presidential Popularity and Negative Voting: An Alternative Explanation of the Mid-Term Congressional Decline of the President's Party"

Michael S. Lewis-Beck, University of Iowa, "The Relative Importance of Socioeconomic and Political Variables for Public Policy"

Michael Margolis, University of Pittsburgh, "From Confusion to Confusion—Issues and the American Voter (1956–1972)"

Richard D. McKelvey, Carnegie Mellon University and John H. Aldrich, Michigan State University, "A Method of Scaling, With Applications to the 1968 and 1972 Presidential Elections"

Richard D. McKelvey and Peter C. Ordeshook, Carnegie-Mellon University, "Symmetric Spatial Games Without Majority Rule Equilibria"

R. D. McKinlay and A. S. Cohan, University of Lancaster, "The Political, Military, and Economic Performance of Military and Nonmilitary Regime Systems: A Cross-National Aggregate Study"

J. Miller McPherson, Susan Welch, University of Nebraska, and Cal Clark, New Mexico State University, "The Stability and Reliability of Political Efficacy: Using Path Analysis to Test Alternative Models"

Paul E. Meehl, University of Minnesota, "The Selfish Voter Paradox and the Thrown-Away Vote Argument"

Abraham H. Miller, Louis H. Bolce and Mark Halligan, University of Cincinnati, "The J-Curve Theory and the Black Urban Riots: An Empirical Test of Progressive Relative Deprivation Theory Using Both Objective and Perceptual Indicators"

Arthur H. Miller, Warren E. Miller, Alden S. Raine, and Thad A. Brown, University of Michigan, "A Majority Party in Disarray: Policy Polarization in the 1972 Election"

Edward N. Muller, State University of New York at Stony Brook, "Behavioral Correlates of Political Support"

Garrison Nelson, University of Vermont, "Partison Patterns of House Leadership Change, 1789–1976"

Helmut Norpoth, University of Cologne, "Explaining Party Cohesion in Congress: The Case of Shared Policy Attitudes"

Thomas C. Nowak, Waynesburg College and Kay A. Snyder, Michigan State University, "Politics and Administration: The Philippines Before Martial Law"

Karen Orren, University of California, Los Angeles, "Standing to Sue: Interest Group Conflict in the Federal Courts"

Benjamin I. Page, University of Chicago, "The Theory of Political Ambiguity"

Thomas L. Pangle, Yale University, "The Political Psychology of Religion in Plato's *Laws*"

James L. Perry, University of California, Irvine and Charles H. Levine, Syracuse University, "An Interorganizational Analysis of Power, Conflict, and Settlements in Public Sector Collective Bargaining"

James H. Qualls, The Johns Hopkins University, "Barber's Typological Analysis of Political Leaders"

David Resnick, Cornell University, "Crude Communism and Revolution"

Neil R. Richardson, University of Texas at Austin, "Political Compliance and U. S. Trade Dominance"

Michael J. Robinson, The Catholic University of America, "Public Affairs Television and the Growth of Political Malaise: The Case of *The Selling of the Pentagon*"

Barry S. Rundquist, University of Illinois, Urbana, Gerald S. Strom, University of Illinois at Chicago Circle, and John G. Peters, University of Nebraska, "Corrupt Politicians and their Electoral Support: Some Theoretical and Experimental Observations"

Lester M. Salamon, Duke University, "Economic Power and Political Influence: The Impact of Industry Structure on Public Policy"

Thomas Schwartz, Carnegie-Mellon University, "Collective Choice, Separation of Issues and Vote Trading"

Gerald S. Strom, University of Illinois at Chicago Circle, and Barry S. Rundquist, University of Illinois, Urbana, "A Revised Theory of Winning in House-Senate Conferences"

Peter J. Steinberger, University of California, Riverside, "Hegel as a Social Scientist"

J. Weinberger, Michigan State University, "Science and Rule in Bacon's Utopia: An Introduction to the Reading of *The New Atlantis*"

Lynn T. White III, Princeton University, "Local Autonomy in China During the Cultural Revolution: The Theoretical Uses of an Atypical Case"

Fred H. Willhoite, Jr., Coe College, "Primates and Political Authority: A Biobehavioral Perspective"

Gerald C. Wright, Jr., Florida Atlantic University, "Contextual Models of Electoral Behavior: The Southern Wallace Vote"

Marvin Zetterbaum, University of California, Davis, "Equality and Human Need"

The Political Economy of the Multinational Corporation: Three Contrasting Perspectives*

ROBERT GILPIN
Princeton University

The books considered in this review essay address themselves to the relationship between the multinational corporation (MNC) and the nation-state, illuminating the three prevailing perspectives on the relationship between international economics and international politics.**

My intention in this review essay is to contrast the varying positions of these three books on the implications of the rise of the multinational corporation for the nation-state system. This is perhaps the most critical issue in the burgeoning literature on the multinational corporation and the political economy of international relations.[1] Moreover, I shall set forth reasons for the success of the multinational corporation and discuss its probable future as a so-called transnational actor.

First, however, what is a multinational corporation? Definitions of the multinational corporation are numerous; it is sufficient to note a number of its characteristics. In the first place, multinational corporations make direct investments in foreign countries. In contrast to portfolio investment, which involves the purchase of equities in a firm, direct investment is the establishment of a foreign subsidiary or branch, or the takeover of a foreign firm. The goal of the investment is manageria control of a production unit in a foreign country

Second, an MNC (multinational corporation) is characterized by a parent firm and a cluster of subsidiaries or branches in various countries with a common pool of managerial, financial, and technical resources. The parent firm operates the whole in terms of a coordinated global strategy. Purchasing, production, marketing, research, etc., are organized and managed by the parent in order to achieve its long-term goal of corporate growth. Through vertical integration and centralization of decision making, the parent corporation seeks to perpetuate its monopoly position with respect to technology, access to capital, and so on.

The differences between portfolio investment, loans, and similar forms of capital export practiced by British and European capitalism in the last century, on the one hand, and the more recent American emphasis on direct investment, on the other, are of immense political importance. In the first, the underlying motive is largely financial, that is, to obtain a higher return on investment capital; managerial control in general continues to rest with the borrower, and the liabilities incurred by debt borrowing can be liquidated through repayment. The motivation for direct investment and for the possession of foreign subsidiaries or branches, on the other hand, is primarily the acquisition of markets and managerial control. A permanent position and source of income in the foreign economy are desired. As a consequence, even though mutual economic benefit may result, direct investment creates economic and political relations that are more permanent and significant.

American corporations began to expand abroad as early as the 1890s; this process was accelerated during the interwar period. Following the Second World War, and particularly after the creation of the Common Market, the magnitude, direction, and character of this American direct investment abroad changed. Starting in 1946 with an initial accumulated investment of only $7 billion, by 1970 American direct investment abroad totaled nearly $80 billion. And while before the war, Latin America accounted for most of this investment, after the war, Canada, Western Europe, and other industrial areas absorbed the great bulk of it. Furthermore, although investment in the production of raw materials and traditional manufacturing industries has remained strong, a large fraction

**Silent Surrender: The American Economic Empire in Canada.* By Kari Levitt (New York: Liveright Press, 1970).

Economics and World Order: Fom the 1970's to the 1990's. Edited by Jagdish Bhagwati (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1972).

Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises. By Raymond Vernon (New York: Basic Books, 1971).

** The ideas and argument of this article are further developed in my book, *U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation* (New York: Basic Books, 1975).

[1] In its classical meaning, the term "political economy" referred to the proper management of the national economy. This, however, is not the focus of the current revival of interest in political economy; instead contemporary writers are concerned with two rather different subjects. One subject is the application of economic models to an understanding of political phenomena: voting, bureaucracy, arms races, etc. For an excellent presentation of this conception of "political economy," see, William Mitchell, "The Shape of Political Theory to Come: From Political Sociology to Political Economy," in *Politics and the Social Sciences*, ed. Seymour Lipset (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969). pp. 101–36.

The other conception of political economy is the interaction of economics and politics. What, for example, is the relationship of the international economic system (including trade, monetary affairs and investment) and the international political system? The present article falls within this latter meaning of "political economy."

of postwar investment has gone into advanced manufacturing industries. Another large fraction of U.S. foreign direct investment is in petroleum; this $20 billion investment accounts for about 40 per cent of American direct investment in the less-developed countries.

In 1970, the output of American overseas subsidiaries was approximately $200 billion—representing several times the amount of goods that American corporations exported abroad—and the ratio of foreign sales to exports continues to grow rapidly. Obviously, the United States has become more a foreign investor than an exporter. Moreover, approximately 25 per cent of all American exports are really intracorporate transfers. Thus, the multinational corporation looms large in America's economic and political interaction with the rest of the world.

These, then, are the facts. What such facts may mean for the international system and the future of the nation-state is a matter of intense controversy. Although writers on the multinational corporation may accept a common set of data, they differ profoundly in their interpretations of the data. The books under consideration in this review essay represent the three dominant perspectives on the significance of the multinational corporation, reflecting three differing conceptions of the nature of political economy. The first position, liberalism, is represented by Raymond Vernon in his influential book, *Sovereignty at Bay* and by several contributions to the Bhagwati volume. The second, Marxism, is the position taken by Stephen Hymer in his original and stimulating article in the Bhagwati volume. And, third, mercantilism is represented by Kari Levitt's *Silent Surrender*.

Three Conceptions of Political Economy

These three prevailing formulations of political economy differ fundamentally on the nature of economic relations, the goal of economic activity, the assumed nature of the actors in international economic relations, and the relationship of economics and politics (see Table 1).

The basic assumption of liberalism is that the nature of international economic relations is essentially harmonious, a view given its first full expression by Adam Smith. Disputing his mercantilist predecessors, Smith argued that international economic relations could be made a positive sum game. Following Smith, liberalism assumes that there is a basic harmony between true national and cosmopolitan economic interests. Thus, in response to the radical critique of a liberal international economy, a prominent member of this school of thought has written that the economic efficiency of the sterling standard in the nineteenth century and of the dollar standard in the twentieth century serves "the cosmopolitan interest in a national form."[2]

Liberals argue that given this underlying identity of national and cosmopolitan interests in a free market, the state should not interfere with economic transactions across national boundaries. By means of a free exchange of commodities, the removal of restrictions on the flow of investment, and an international division of labor, everyone will benefit in the long run because the world's scarce resources will be more efficiently utilized. The national interest will therefore be best served, liberals maintain, by a generous and cooperative attitude in economic relations with other societies. In essence, the pursuit of self-interest in a free, competitive economy achieves the greatest good for the greatest number in the international, no less than in the national, society.

Both mercantilists and Marxists, on the other hand, begin with the premise that economic relations are essentially conflictual. There is no underlying harmony; indeed one group's gain is another's loss. Even where all may gain in absolute terms through economic intercourse, members of these schools of thought emphasize relative gains. What is most important, they believe, is the distribution of wealth and power in society. Thus, in the language of game theory, whereas liberals regard economic relations as a nonzero-sum game,

[2] Charles Kindleberger, *Power and Money: The Economics of International Politics and the Politics of International Economics* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1970), p. 227.

Table 1. Comparison of the Three Conceptions of Political Economy

	Liberalism	*Marxism*	*Mercantilism*
Nature of Economic Relations	Harmonious	Conflictual	Conflictual
Nature of the Actors	Households and firms	Economic classes	Nation-states
Goal of Economic Activity	Maximization of global welfare	Maximization of class interests	Maximization of national interest
Relationship of Economics and Politics	Economics *should* determine politics	Economics *does* determine politics	Politics determines economics

both Marxists and mercantilists view economic relations as essentially a zero-sum game.

For the liberal, the goal of economic activity is the optimally efficient use of the world's scarce resources and the maximization of world welfare. While most liberals refuse to make value judgments about income distribution, Marxists and mercantilists stress the distributive effects of economic relations. For the Marxist the distribution of wealth among social classes is crucial; for the mercantilist, the distribution of wealth and power among nation-states is most significant. Thus, the goal of economic (and political) activities for Marxists as for mercantilists is the redistribution of wealth and power.

These three perspectives differ even more decisively in their views about the nature of the economic actors. In Marxist analysis, the basic actors in both domestic and international relations are economic classes: the interests of the dominant class determine the foreign policy of the state. For mercantilists, the real actors in international economic relations are nation-states; national interest determines foreign policy. National interest, they believe, may at times be influenced by the peculiar economic interests of classes, elites, or other subgroups of the society. Yet factors of geography, external configurations of power, and the exigencies of national survival are primary in determining foreign policy. Thus, whereas liberals speak of world welfare and Marxists of class interests, mercantilists recognize only the interests of particular nation-states.

Although liberal economists such as David Ricardo and Joseph Schumpeter recognized the importance of class conflict and although neoclassical liberals analyze economic growth and policy in terms of national economies, the liberal emphasis is typically on the individual consumer, firm, or entrepreneur. The liberal view is summarized in Harry Johnson's statement that "the nation-state is ceasing to be a relevant form of social organization. . . ."[3] Liberals believe that the nation-state, because of its manifest inability to satisfy the economic needs of the modern world, has been placed on the defensive by the multinational corporation. In the oft-quoted words of George Ball, "[w]hile the structure of the multinational corporation is a modern concept, designed to meet the requirements of a modern age, the nation-state is a very old-fashioned idea and badly adapted to serve the needs of our present complex world."[4]

Finally, these three perspectives differ on the relationship of economic and political activities. For both liberalism and Marxism, economics is primary; for mercantilism, politics is primary. In the view of liberals, the exigencies of economic efficiency and production *ought* to determine political organization. Marxists, however, go one critical step further and argue that the necessities of production *do* determine political organization, at least in the long-run. Mercantilists, on the other hand, hold that the *political* struggle among nation-states determines the economic organization of the world.

The Liberal Conception of the MNC

Most contemporary writers on the multinational corporation take the liberal view, a perspective that is consistent with much recent theorizing on the nature and future of international relations. Since World War II, many writers on international relations have assumed that the nation-state is fading away or at least, that it is being seriously circumscribed by various processes and institutions. Although writers have assumed that the age of unchallenged national sovereignty was ending, they have identified differing agents as the probable cause of the demise of the nation-state. Thus, two decades ago, the emphasis was on universal international organization. Subsequently, regional and functional organizations were thought to be the appropriate agents. And, today, the transnational actor in general and the multinational corporation in particular are said to be undermining the nation-state.[5] After three centuries of the dominance of national sovereignty in international affairs, sovereignty is said to be at bay because the multinational corporation, which can outperform the nation-state, will so enmesh nation-states in an interdependent world economy that they will no longer be able to pursue their destructive ways.

The compression of time and space arising from revolutionary changes in transportation and communications has opened the globe to the activities of multinational corporations. Liberals differ in their explanations of why American and other corporations have taken advantage of this technological shrinkage of the world. Yet Vernon in his *Sovereignty at Bay* is representative of this liberal emphasis on economic and technological factors.

For Vernon, the rise and success of the multinational corporation is explained by the operation of the so-called "product-cycle." In its essentials,

[3] Harry Johnson, "World Trading and Monetary Arrangements." in *Economic and World Order*, ed. Bhagwati, p. 180.

[4] George W. Ball, "The Promise of the Multinational Corporation," *Fortune*, 75, (June 1, 1967), 80.

[5] Though Joseph S. Nye and Robert O. Keohane do not take this extreme and normative position themselves, their writings provide the best analysis of the importance today of transnational actors and processes. See in particular their introductory section to *Transnational Relations and World Politics*, ed. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1972).

the product-cycle theory, holds that development of a product requires: (a) the introductory phase; (b) the maturing phase; and (c) the standardized phase. Because of the scale of their home market (demand) and the resources available for research and development (supply), American corporations have a comparative advantage over their foreign competitors in the introductory stage, i.e., the development of new products and production processes. During this stage of the product-cycle, American corporations enjoy a monopolistic advantage arising from their technological sophistication, marketing experience, patent rights, etc. Initially, therefore, American corporations can satisfy the rising foreign demand for the product through exporting. But as the foreign market for the product grows and as the technology identified with the product diffuses abroad to potential foreign competitors, the strategy of the American corporation changes. During this maturing phase of the product-cycle, an American firm begins to lose the comparative advantage identified with its technological lead. As the technology becomes available through diffusion or imitative development, the advantage shifts to foreign production partly because of proximity to the local market and because of lower labor costs. Therefore, according to Vernon's thesis, if the American corporation is to maintain a profit on its investment and to forestall competition, either it must establish foreign subsidiaries (as American corporations have done in Europe) or it must sell its license to a foreign corporation (as in Japan) which will pay royalties to the American corporation. In short, the threatened loss of an export market and the rise of foreign competitors is the all-powerful stimulus for the establishment of foreign subsidiaries.

Understood in Vernon's terms, direct investment and the establishment abroad of subsidiaries by American corporations are largely defensive. In order to forestall the rise of foreign competitors producing at lower costs and to maintain its market position, the American corporation feels obliged to begin manufacturing abroad. According to this concept of defensive investment, therefore, the multinational corporation is a response to a world in which all the factors of production other than labor have become increasingly mobile and comparative advantage has become increasingly dynamic and transitory. Advances in transportation and communication have increased the flow of raw materials, capital, and technology. In order to extend the life of its product and to maintain (or increase) its share of world markets, the multinational corporation goes abroad where it too can enjoy the benefits of low-wage labor or proximity to the local market or both. Thus, while there is an expansionistic element in the rise of the American multinational corporation, Vernon believes that investment is more importantly a response to threatened *relative* industrial decline.

The liberal proponents of multinational corporations like Vernon or Johnson see very little relationship between politics and economics. Government and corporations are said to "hold each other at arm's length."[6] In this view, the MNC, freed from the confining jurisdiction of individual nation-states, is regarded as an increasingly independent actor on the international scene. Since these corporations take a global view of research, marketing, and production, the policies of these transnational actors are circumscribing the sovereignty of nation-states with an ever widening web of economic and technological interdependence. In essence, for this position, the MNC represents the transcendence of politics in the interest of world peace and development. In the interest of world efficiency and welfare, therefore, the nation-state's control over economic affairs is giving way as it should, to the multinational corporation and eventually to other international institutions better suited to a highly interdependent world economy of which the multinational corporation is the predominant expression.

The Marxist Conception of the MNC

Marxist economists of the sort represented in the Bhagwati volume share this vision of an increasingly interdependent non-Communist world economy dominated by the multinational corporation rather than by sovereign nation-states. But, whereas the liberal believes the multinationals will radiate development and raise the standard of living throughout the globe, Marxists believe the MNC's represent merely the latest expression of capitalist exploitation and imperialism. Like the nation-state itself, the multinational corporation is held by them to be an instrument of the international class struggle supplanting the bourgeois nation-state precisely because it is a more efficient means by which the capitalistic economies can dominate and exploit the less-developed economies.

Undoubtedly, the best and most vivid presentation of this view is that of the late Stephen Hymer in the Bhagwati volume. Hymer analyzes the rise and importance of the multinationals in terms of what he calls the two laws of development: The Law of Increasing Firm Size and the Law of Uneven Development. The Law of Increasing Firm Size, Hymer argues, is the tendency since the Industrial Revolution for firms to increase in size "from the *workshop* to the *factory* to the *national corporation* to the *multi-divisional corporation* and now to the *multinational corporation*." The Law

[6] Vernon, p. 213.

of Uneven Development, he continues, is the tendency of the international economy to produce poverty as well as wealth, underdevelopment as well as development. Together these two economic laws will produce the following consequence:

> [A] regime of North Atlantic Multinational Corporations would tend to produce a hierarchical division of labor between geographical regions corresponding to the vertical division of labor within the firm. It would tend to centralize high-level decision-making occupations in a few key cities in the advanced countries, surrounded by a number of regional sub-capitals, and confine the rest of the world to lower levels of activity and income, i.e., to the status of towns and villages in a new Imperial system. Income, status, authority, and consumption patterns would radiate out from these centers along a declining curve, and the existing pattern of inequality and dependency would be perpetuated. The pattern would be complex, just as the structure of the corporation is complex, but the basic relationship between different countries would be one of superior and subordinate, head office and branch office.[7]

The Marxist or radical critique of the MNC, well represented by several of the contributions to the Bhagwati volume, may be summarized as follows: (1) Because of internal contradictions in the American capitalistic system, the large corporations are forced to expand outward in search of new markets, investment opportunities, and sources of raw material; (2) the foreign policy of the United States reflects the expansionist interests of this dominant capitalistic class; and (3) the foremost interest of this corporate elite is to eliminate all obstacles (e.g., the nation-state) to corporate expansionism and to increase at the expense of less developed countries. From this set of premises, it is a short step to viewing direct investment as imperialism and to regarding the underdevelopment of the southern half of the globe as the consequence of this corporate drive for power and profits. One man's transnationalism after all is another's imperialism.

In fact, one can make a very strong argument that there is an institutional imperative for particular corporations to expand abroad. This is certainly the implication of Vernon's product-cycle theory. The basic problem, the economist Richard Caves and the political scientist Theodore Moran have pointed out, is that there is "low inter-industry mobility of capital" in the American economy.[8] The experience and technology of corporations create "sector specific capital." This is to say, a corporation tends to have diminishing returns unless it invests in areas with which it has had experience. For such a firm—and this is characteristic of the large oligopolies—the choice is frequently between investing abroad in areas it knows well and therefore obtaining a relatively high rate of return, or investing in the home market with a relatively lower rate. As a result, foreign investment is very attractive for these corporations even though there may be domestic investment opportunities in other sectors that they are ignoring.

Although neither Caves nor Moran are Marxists, the argument that there is an "institutional necessity" for foreign investment is fundamental to the Marxist theory of imperialism. The search for foreign investment outlets is held to be a function of the law of the falling rate of profit, which is due in turn to the accumulation of surplus capital in mature capitalist economies. In the Marxist theory of imperialism, the struggle among mature capitalist economies for outlets for their surplus capital is the cause of imperialism and international conflict in the capitalist era. Marxists hold that Cold War in general and the Vietnam War in particular are explicable in terms of this outward thrust of American capitalism for investment outlets.[9]

The difficulty with this thesis is its failure to show empirically how this "necessity" is translated into foreign policy. In specific cases, it certainly can be done. But there are too many important examples of conflict between corporate interest and American foreign policy. For example, Marxist theory cannot explain major American economic concessions to Japan at a time when American corporations were pressing the United States government to force the Japanese to open their economy to American investment. What the Marxists attempt but fail to elucidate can be far better explained through reference to the mercantilist position on the relationship of economics and politics.

The Mercantilist Conception of the MNC

The argument of Levitt (which I share in part) is that mercantilism provides a more meaningful interpretation of the relationship of the MNC and the United States government than does either liberalism or Marxism. In character, as Levitt argues, the multinationals are more similar to the trading corporations of the mercantilistic era such

[7] Stephen Hymer, "The Multinational Corporation and the Law of Uneven Development," in Bhagwati, p. 114.

[8] Richard Caves, "International Corporations: The Industrial Economics of Foreign Investment," *Economica* 38 (February 1971) 1–27, at p. 2; Theodore Moran, "Foreign Expansion as an Institutional Necessity' for U.S. Corporate Capitalism: The Search for a Radical Model," *World Politics* 25 (April 1973), 369–86.

[9] Gabriel Kolko, *The Roots of American Foreign Policy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969). For an excellent critique of Marxist and other theories of imperialism see Benjamin J. Cohen, *The Question of Imperialism: The Political Economy of Dominance and Dependence* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1973).

is the British East India Company than to the free traders and finance capitalists that characterized British enterprise in the nineteenth century. In short, the giant American corporations which comprise most of the world's multinationals are the descendants of the East India Company and other mercantile enterprises that dominated the world economy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries:

> The central thesis of our argument is that the subsidiaries and branch plants of large American-based multinational corporations have replaced the operators of the earlier European-based mercantile venture companies in extracting the staple and organizing the supply of manufactured goods. In the new mercantilism as in the old, the corporation based in the metropole directly exercises the entrepreneurial function and collects a "venture profit" from its investment. It organizes the collection or extraction of the raw material staple required in the metropolis and supplies the hinterland with manufactured goods, whether produced at home or "on-site" in the host country.[10]

According to this mercantilist argument, the multinational corporation reflects a contemporary form of the economic expansion of particular nation-states. In other words, only *particular* nation-states have been on the defensive, not the nation-state as a political entity; indeed some nation-states, especially the United States, have been on the economic *offensive*, expanding at the expense of other nation-states. As a Canadian nationalist, Levitt in her volume calls for a strengthening of Canadian nationalism and a counteroffensive against these corporations and the nation-states which stand behind them.

In Latin America, Canada, Europe, and elsewhere, a burgeoning literature (represented above by Levitt and several of the contributors to the Bhagwati volume) has begun to attack these "new mercantile mini-powers." Both Marxists and conservative nationalists have risen in defense of the nation-state as a means to protect weaker people against economic exploitation, political dependence, and cultural inundation. According to this view, the MNC is an instrument of expansion of particular powerful nation-states which seek to compromise the sovereignty of lesser states. For these critics of the MNC, the nation-state is a necessary counterbalancing institution.

One need not go as far as Levitt and accept entirely the mercantilist critique against the multinational corporations in order to acknowledge the basic premises of this position: the emphasis on the nation-state and the close identity of interest between the multinational corporations and their home governments. This essentially political perspective is in my view far more enlightening than either the liberal or the Marxist positions.

The government of the United States and its foreign policy are not the instruments of these powerful corporations; rather, political and corporate leaders in the United States tend to share overlapping interests and perspectives. Frequently, of course, as in the case of the policy toward Japan, the views of corporate and national leaders have diverged. In certain cases the power of the corporations to influence decisions in a direction which favors their interest has prevailed: ITT in Chile appears to be a case in point. But in general the role of the MNC has been viewed by political leaders in the mercantilist terms of maintaining America's share of world markets, of securing a strong position in foreign economies, and of controlling access to raw materials. Even more important, the MNC is judged to be a major generator of the foreign earnings required to ensure national prosperity and to finance American military and political commitments overseas.

The most explicit acknowledgment by an American official of the political importance of the MNC was perhaps that of Henry Fowler, made in 1965, when he was U.S. Secretary of the Treasury and quoted by Levitt. In referring to these "mighty engines of enlightened capitalism" he declared that for the United States, "they have not only a commercial importance but a highly significant role in the United States foreign policy that has met with general approval by the Atlantic countries." He then added that in order to finance its military position overseas "the United States government has consistently sought, and will continue to seek to expand and extend the role of the multinational corporation as an essential instrument of strong and healthy economic progress through the Free World."[11]

The underlying rationale of this position has been based on the assumption that the multinational corporation is the most dynamic sector of the American economy; these corporations represent America's greatest economic assets. Given her high wage structure and the rapid diffusion of her technological superiority, the United States, it has been argued, could not compete against other expanding industrial powers without the multinationals. To survive economically, therefore, American corporations must go abroad to forestall the rise of foreign competition and to maintain their relative position in world markets.[12]

[10] Levitt, pp. 23–24.

[11] Quoted in Levitt, p. 100.

[12] These themes underlie the two most extensive and important official studies of American foreign economic policy carried out in recent years. U.S. Council on International Economic Policy, *The United States in the Changing World Economy, A Report to the President*, 1971 (The

This is not to argue, however, that an absolute identity of purpose exists between corporate managers and the managers of the national interest. While these political and corporate elites have interests in common, they also have divergent interests. At the same time, therefore, that public officials attempt to utilize corporate power to advance perceived national objectives, the corporate executives seek to maximize their freedom from *all* government restrictions and to utilize national power for corporate advantage. But generally, in the relationships between American business and government the activities of the corporation are seen by public officials to advance the larger security and economic interests of the nation.

In the pre-1914 world, mercantilism was characterized primarily by the desire for an export surplus or for the income from portfolio investments. In the contemporary world of highly mobile technology and dynamic comparative advantage, a mercantilist position would require that the U.S. maintain its share of world markets and its control of decisions over the distribution and location of economic activities, industrial production, and technological development through the multinational corporation. Among extractive industries, American multinationals until recently have largely controlled the non-Communist industrial world's access to petroleum and many other raw materials; they have also determined who would reap the monopoly rent and have been a source of political leverage. Thus, through the instrumentality of the MNC, the U.S. has sought and will seek: (1) to prevent America's exclusion both from world markets and from sources of raw materials; (2) to maintain a favorable balance of payments; and (3) to enhance its power position with respect to other states. If British global hegemony in the nineteenth century was based on the doctrine of free trade, then one can argue that America's in the twentieth has been based on that of free investment.

In conclusion, the argument of Levitt and of this review essay has been that the MNC exists as a transnational actor today because it reflects perceived national interests of the world's dominant power, the United States. This view does not discredit the analyses of economists who argue that the MNC is a response to contemporary technological and economic developments. The argument is rather that these economic and technological factors have been able to exercise their profound effects *because the United States*—sometimes with the cooperation of other nations and sometimes over their opposition—*had created the necessary political framework.*

Today, however, the political order established by the United States at the end of World War II seriously disarrayed. The growth of powers hostile to the United States (the Soviet Union and China), the rise of strong foreign competitors (Western Europe and Japan), and the emergence of new centers of economic power in the so-called underdeveloped world (the Arabs, Iran, Brazil, etc.) challenge the political and economic framework which has benefited the American multinational. The diminution of what has been a *Pax American* and the rise of powers hostile to the global activities of American multinational corporations threaten these MNC's reign over international economic relations. Again, in the words of Fowler (quoted by Levitt) " . . . it is impossible to overestimate the extent to which the efforts and opportunities for American firms abroad depend upon the vast presence and influence and prestige that America holds in the world."[13]

If, as many believe, the "presence and influence" of the United States are now on the wane, what does this portend for the multinational corporation? On the one hand, to some analysts the cresting wave of economic nationalism directed against American foreign investment and the counter-offensive of the nation-state as in the case of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) suggest a continuing diminution of the power of the multinational corporations.[14] Vernon, on the other hand, regards this eventuality as highly unlikely. In his view, the multinational corporation represents a response to inexorable economic and technological forces; the costs of rejecting the benefits of the capital, technology, and know-how conferred by the MNC's would be too great. The MNC is simply too entrenched in world economic affairs to be dislodged at this late date. General Motors will not follow the flag in retreat. There is no Nixon Doctrine of American overseas retrenchment for IBM.

One need not, however, agree that the only alternatives are either the demise or the enthronement of the multinational corporation. As Samuel Huntington has argued, both the nation-state and the multinational corporation are here to stay.[15] But the terms of their relationship are changing, and changing to the advantage of host nation-states. No one can yet forecast what the terms of

Peterson Report); and U.S. Commission on International Trade and Investment, *United States International Policy in an Interdependent World*, Washington, 1971, (The Williams Report).

[13] Levitt, p. 100.

[14] See, for example, C. Fred Bergsten, "Coming Investment Wars?" *Foreign Affairs* 53 (October 1974) 135–52.

[15] Samuel P. Huntington, "Transnational Organizations in World Politics," *World Politics*, (April 1973) p. 361. For my own position, see Robert Gilpin, *U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1973) pp. 215–262.

their relationship will be. But surely one thing is clear, as exemplified in the case of Middle Eastern petroleum and the restrictions now placed on manufacturing investment in Canada. Increasingly host governments will force the multinationals to serve their interests. From this perspective, one can expect that with the relative decline of American power and influence, a larger and larger share of the benefits from foreign investment will flow to the host governments and consequently, that the role of the multinational corporation as an instrument of American foreign policy will diminish.

Moreover, as foreign corporations owned and managed by Japanese, Arab, and German investors penetrate the American economy, reservations regarding foreign investment and the multinational corporation will receive greater attention in the United States. Already Congress has established a study of foreign investment in the United States and legislation has been introduced to restrict investments in this country. There is an amazing parallel between the U.S.'s growing fears about foreign ownership and those expressed by other nations that one encounters in Levitt and Bhagwati.

But most important of all, as American foreign investment is increasingly forced to serve the interests of *other* nation-states, one will witness a reassessment of American public and official attitudes about the MNC's usefulness to the U.S. As Americans become more concerned over high unemployment, inflation, industry, there will be increased pressures to restrict the outflow of American capital and technology. More and more groups will join American organized labor in challenging the thesis that what is good for Exxon and IBM is good for the country. The issue of the multinational corporation will become increasingly politicized both domestically and internationally.

The Great Nuremberg Trial*

JOHN H. E. FRIED
City University of New York

Professor Weinberg, an authority on World War II and its documentation, and the AMS Press merit great credit for republishing this principal source material on the trial of the 22 "major" Nazi leaders by the International Military Tribunal (IMT). Although during the two and one half years after the case against Hermann Goering *et al.*, twelve other trials against a total of some 200 defendants—most of them also of high position and vast power—were held in the same ornate courtroom by tribunals composed exclusively of American judges, it is the IMT case, as the most historic of these altogether 13 trials, with which the name of Nuremberg (previously identified with Hitler's pomp-and-frenzy rallies) has been linked ever since.

The original official 42-volume publication on the IMT trial (known as "blue series" because bound in blue) has long been out of print. Of poor quality paper and binding, the sets that are still available are falling apart. As Telford Taylor, the U.S. Chief Prosecutor after Justice Robert H. Jackson, recently said, "Nuremberg" has become a myth. The myth adds to the ominous confusion concerning essentials of international behavior. Because "Nuremberg" remains relevant, and factual knowledge about it should be spread, the publisher's suggestion that libraries (even those still holding an original set or what may be left of it) acquire the new edition and that interested parties acquire individual volumes while available, is well taken.

The trial was, of course, unique in its sheer magnitude.[1] The record is unique as the authentic tale of history's worst war and of its *antecedents;* unique as a battle of wits about trends, concepts and forces that were at work then, and have largely remained determinative since; unique as documentation of the degradation to which ideological obsession can lead; unique in showing the psychology, personalities, and the unassailable immutability of most (but eventual contrition of some) of the protagonists. Even a reader who merely scans this record will be impressed by the vistas which "Nuremberg" opens.

Also those who do not wish to study the trial more thoroughly, should become acquainted with its flavor—the dimensions of the matters it dealt with—as an antidote against the glibness with which "Nuremberg" has been variously invoked or criticzed. Because it was a major, many-faceted event, "Nuremberg" can legitimately be viewed from various perspectives; and there is no need to defend it in each and every aspect. Yet, even a small degree of familiarity with its record cannot but inspire an elemental feeling of awe in the face of so much evil and tragedy—and heroism, and render to specialists in politics, international law, and related fields a heightened sense of their responsibilities for the shaping of the future.

Since this series is a reproduction, and not a revision, of the original edition, it contains the shortcomings of the original. Those shortcomings, the editor's very informative 20-page introduction frankly admits. A fully satisfactory revision would require a very large research project in order to give, *i.a.*, completely adequate Indices and cross-references, as well as explanatory annotations (allusions to the period up to 1945 are becoming decreasingly self-evident), and to provide information on pertinent developments *after* the I.M.T. trial. For example, in order to evaluate the testimony of top-ranking defense witnesses, the reader should be told where to find the record of (or still better, be given quotations from) what they said and what transpired when they themselves were afterwards tried as suspected war criminals by American, British, Polish, etc. tribunals. Until such data will become easily available, the present edition remains indispensable; and while seeming

---

* *The Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Nov. 14, 1945–Oct. 1, 1946.* With a new Introduction by Gerhard L. Weinberg. Reproduction of the English Language Edition published at Nuremberg, 1947–1949, 42 volumes, and 2 supplements: The Indices of the German language edition (Vol. 43, 637 pp.) and *Report of Robert H. Jackson* [on] *The International Conference on Military Trials. London, 1945* (Vol. 44, 441 pp.). New York (56 East 13 Street)—London: AMS Press, 1971. $1,300.00 (buckram), $1,150.00 (paperback). Single vols., $31.00 (buckram), $27.50 (paperback).

[1] Statistical data about "this gigantic trial," given in Justice Jackson's final report to President Truman, include: Over 100,000 captured German documents were screened or examined: "about 4,000 were translated . . . and used, in whole or in part, in the trial as exhibits." Sections from "[m]illions of feet of captured moving picture films" and over 1,800 from over 25,000 captured still photographs were used as exhibits. "The U.S. staff . . . , including lawyers, secretaries, interpreters, translators and clerical help numbered at its peak 654 . . . British, Soviet and French delegations aggregated approximately the same number." ("Report to the President by Mr. Justice Jackson, Oct. 7, 1946, in: Supplement Vol., *Report of Robert H. Jackson . . . , l.c.*, 432–440, at 434, 433.)

a little overwhelming at first sight, it has a good logic of its own.

Structure of the Set

The set falls into four parts of unequal length: (*a*) Volume 1 contains the basics of the IMT trial, such as the composition of the Tribunal, the Prosecution, and the Defense; the 4-power (U.S.-U.K.-Soviet-French) Agreement and Charter for the I.M.T.[2]; the 4-power Indictment; essential procedural rules and initial decisions;[3] the Judgment[4] (pp. 171–341); the Soviet Judge's dissent from some of the Judgment's findings (pp. 342–364); the sentences and acquittals. (*b*) For anyone wishing to delve more deeply, or concerned about any of the enormous political, military, ideological, legal, economic, and other issues debated at the trial—which neither could nor needed to be *completely* covered in the Judgment[5]—Volumes 2 through 22 give the full official *transcripts*, in English, of the proceedings. (*c*) Two volumes (no. 23 and 24) contain some 1,600 pages of Indices. (*d*) Eighteen volumes (no. 25 through 42) reproduce Nuremberg documentary evidence, mainly in the original German.

[2] One of the two supplemental volumes in this series reproduces Mr. Jackson's Report on the 4-Power London Conference of July 1945 (originally published by the State Department in 1949). It shows the evolution at that Conference of the Nuremberg Charter which formed the basis of the IMT and the other 12 Nuremberg trials, as well as of the Tokyo international trial of the major Japanese War Criminals, and of what became known as the Nuremberg Principles. A *caveat* must be expressed concerning this printed version of the minutes of the London Conference. They constitute transcriptions of the stenographic notes taken in English by Mr. Jackson's secretary, and hence include translations of the statements by the Russian (Judge I. T. Nikitchenko, assisted, *i.a.*, by Prof A. N. Trainin) and French (Judge Robert Falco, assisted, *i.a.*, by Prof. André Gros) delegations. As pointed out in the Foreword, "The minutes [were] *not* submitted to the French, Soviet or British Delegations for verification or editing [before being printed in this volume]." (p. xiii; italics added).

[3] Including severance of the case of old Herr Krupp von Bohlen (too senile to stand trial) but not of Rudolf Hess (able to stand trial). The respective medical reports are also reproduced in vol. 1.

[4] The reading of the Judgment in open court took the last two days of the trial (Sept. 30, Oct. 1, 1946). Its text therefore also appears in the record of those days (vol. 22, pp. 411–589), and shows how the four Judges alternated in the reading. This has been of interest to analysts who believe (with certain internal justifications, but without proof) that each Judge read the sections about the topics primarily assigned to him.

[5] The arch-major criminals, Hitler and Himmler, escaped the trial through suicide. Nevertheless, Nuremberg had to deal with them, especially insofar as their orders concerned the defendants. The supersecret documents emanating from them reveal their policies and intentions in dimensions of enormity still largely not realized. On the other hand, the Nuremberg materials also throw light on various other aspects stressed by the Defense—such as the support certain Nazi aims received from important non-Germans.

The Transcripts of the Court Proceedings

The transcripts (volumes 2–22) begin with the Preliminary Hearings, the Opening Statement on November 20, 1945 by the President of the Tribunal, Lord Justice Lawrence (U.K.), and the famous opening oration (vol. 2, pp. 98–115) by the U.S. Chief Prosecutor, Supreme Court Justice Robert M. Jackson ("this trial represents mankind's desperate effort to apply the discipline of law to statesmen who have used their power of state to attack the foundations of the world's peace . . . "). They go through to the Tribunal's adjournment on October 1, 1946.

In a total of some 215 sessions—a record for concision—the four Prosecutions, by pre-arrangement, and the Defense developed their cases on the charges: aggressions, and conspiracy to commit aggressions; the slave labor program; the genocidal measures against Jews, Poles, other Slavs, Gypsies;[6] the starvation and exploitation of occupied territories; the concentration and extermination camps; the slave labor program; etc. All of those policies, carried out on enormous scales, involved complex arrangements between governmental, party, police, and military agencies, which also had to be unravelled in the trial and are very instructive for the political scientist.

The Tribunal was able to base its findings on contemporary documents, in the light of testimony not only by the indicted protagonists themselves but by other top-ranking decision makers.[7] No such evidence—laying bare the inner workings of a regime whose impact on the future is still unpredictable—had ever before been available to any court anywhere.

The nine-day testimony of Goering covers almost 400 pages (vol. 9, pp. 235–657, interrupted on pp. 457–491 by testimony of his witness, the Swedish businessman Birger Dahlerus on Dahlerus' last-minute efforts in summer 1939 to bring about a German-British understanding.) Less lengthy but also of great historical importance are the testimonies of the Chief of the High Command of the *Wehrmacht*, Keitel (vol. 10, pp. 468–647; vol. 11, pp. 1–28); Keitel's Chief of Staff, Jodl (vol. 15, pp. 284–561); Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop (vol. 10, pp. 223–444); *Reichsbank* President Hjalmar Schacht (vol. 12, pp. 417–602, vol. 13, pp. 1–49); Arthur Seyss-Inquart, master

[6] The *term* "genocide" does not occur either as formal charge or in the Nuremberg Charter or Judgment. This would have been retroactive, as the crime was technically defined only in the Genocide Convention of 1948.

[7] "Defense Counsel are advised that the Tribunal will not ordinarily regard as competent evidence, extracts from books or articles expressing the opinions of particular authors on matters of ethics, history, or particular events" (Ruling by the President, 22 March 1946, vol. 9, p. 673).

of occupied Poland, and then of the occupied Netherlands (vol. 15, pp. 610–668, vol. 16, pp. 1–113); Hitler's Vice-Chancellor and ambassador Franz von Papen (vol. 16, pp. 236–422), etc.

Among the defense witnesses were several surviving German Fieldmarshals, some of whom were themselves subsequently tried and convicted as war criminals: von Brauchitsch (vol. 20, pp. 567–594); von Manstein (vol. 20, pp. 594–646, vol. 21, pp. 3–17); Milch (vol. 9, pp. 44–133); von Rundstedt (vol. 21, pp. 21–50); Kesselring (vol. 9, pp. 174–234). Fieldmarshal Paulus, the Commander in the battle of Stalingrad, was a Prosecution witness (vol. 7, pp. 253–304), as was Intelligence chief Walter Schellenberg (vol. 4, pp. 374–385).

Other witnesses for the Defense—who, incidentally, were more numerous than those for the Prosecution—included the powerful Hans Heinrich Lammers, Hilter's right-hand man as Chief of the Reich Chancellery (vol. 11, pp. 28–154); Rudolf Franz Hoess, Commandant at Auschwitz during part of the war (vol. 11, pp. 396–422); the Acting Minister of Justice, Franz Schlegelberger (vol. 20, pp. 263–278); top Foreign Office men such as State Secretaries Adolf Freiherr Steengracht von Moyland (vol. 10, pp. 106–157) and Ernst von Weiszaecker (vol. 14, pp. 277–297); and the former high Gestapo officer Hans Bernd Gisevius who had participated in the plot against Hitler's life of 20 July 1944 (vol. 12, pp. 167–305).

The panoroma of the trial was wide, covering as it did the evolution of National Socialism; its gradual undermining of Weimar Germany and then the Versailles system; the nazification of German political, constitutional, social, and economic life, and the organization of a warfare state; relations with Germany's allies and their leaders, especially Italy and Mussolini; the evolution and implications of an ever more integral racism, spreading over ever wider territories; the use of foreign peoples as "colonials" and of foreign countries as resettlement areas for ethinic Germans; the extent and excusatory weight, if any, of collaboration by the Vichy regime in France or the Quisling regime in Norway; the multiple horror, especially in Yugoslavia, of triangular war involving two warring factions plus foreign invaders.

The transcript also gives a picture of the range which the Tribunal granted to the Defense for the presentation of their arguments, and thus allows the reader to form his own opinion about the fairness of the trial. Undeniably a high point of the trial was the elaborate attack by Professor Hermann Jahrreiss (Defense Counsel for Fieldmarshal Jodl) on behalf of all defendants against what he termed the concept of "war as a function forbidden by international law" and on such other basic issues as responsibility for crimes committed under superior orders (vol. 17, pp. 458–494).

For a variety of reasons, the doctrinal and factual presentations, as well as examinations by the four Prosecutions, and especially the final statements by Justice Jackson, Sir Hartley Shawcross, M. Champetier de Ribes and General Rudenko (vol. 19, pp. 397–618) are of great interest.

In order to find his way among these 21 volumes of transcripts, the reader has to consult vol. 23, the first of two fat index volumes. In its 70-page "Chronological Index of the Trial Proceedings" Vol. 23 gives capsule information for each of the IMT's sessions, such as names of witnesses heard, topics discussed, rulings, etc.

Documents. Essential to the understanding of the IMT trial is the fact that it was based on the availability of a mass of contemporary German documents, of high (*Geheim*) and highest (*Geheime Reichssache: Nur durch Offiziere*; etc.) secrecy ratings, which had fallen into Allied hands and which often emanated from, were addressed to, or referred to individual leaders in the dock. These conference minutes, letters, orders, reports, official files, etc. cover every aspect of the trial.

Much of the second main part of this set, namely, the 18 document volumes (no. 25 through 42) are given to the reproduction in full or in part of the most significant of those documents[8] in their German original. In precise, archival rendition, they show, for example, handwritten marginal notations, abbreviations, "receipt" stamps, and other indicators of their probative value—essential also to professional research. Because of space limitations, only some of them can be illustratively listed here: the minutes of the conferences at which Hitler revealed his initial war plans (including the "Hossbach" conference of November 5, 1937, 386-PS. Exh. USA-25, vol. 25,

[8] Not *all* documents accepted in evidence at Nuremberg (and certainly not, all that were available) are reprinted in this set. Many more of them are contained in the U.S. Government publication prepared at Justice Jackson's initiative, "*Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*" (Washington, D.C., 1946–1949; known as the "red series"). In these bulky 10 volumes, all documents are given in English, but the translations, done at Nuremberg under great pressure, are not completely reliable. Finally, it should be noted that the 15-volume "green series" edited by Drexel R. Sprecher and myself, "*Trials of War Criminals Before the* [U.S.] *Nuremberg Military Tribunals*" (Washington: Govt. Printing Office, 1950–1953), covering the 12 subsequent trials of altogether almost 200 defendants (cases against Krupp; I. G. Farben; Fieldmarshals and generals; Cabinet ministers and diplomats; the Acting Minister of Justice and high judges; *Luftwaffe* and other physicians involved in the "medical experiments," "euthanasia," castration programs; leaders of the concentration camp system, and of extermination units; etc.) contain many documents (all in carefully checked English translations) that had been used by or were available to the I.M.T. Unfortunately, it was not possible to provide the "green series" with indices.

pp. 402–413 and the Schmundt minutes of the conference of May 23, 1939, 079-L, Exh. USA-27, vol. 37, pp. 546–556); Hitler's instructions to his Supreme Wehrmacht commander Fieldmarshal Keitel of October 17, 1938 on the "future of Poland" (a source of labor and a possible military deployment area for Germany; what parts of Poland to become Reich territory, to be cleansed of "Jews, Polacks and trash"—("*Juden, Polacken und Gesindel*"); etc. 864-PS, Exh. USA-609, vol. 26, pp. 377–383); Hitler's instructions for the subsequent invasions, starting with his directive of 20 Nov. 1939 for invasion of the Low Countries (440-PS, Exh. GB-107, vol. 26, pp. 37–40), and culminating in the Barbarossa directives for the invasion of the USSR, such as the one of 18 Dec. 1940 (446-PS, Exh. USA-31, vol. 26, pp. 47–52); minutes of secret conferences involving, among others, Goering, Keitel and Jodl, about the lynching of downed American "terror pilots," and Hitler's advice to Japanese Ambassador Oshima at the Berghof on 27 May 1944 to "hang, not shoot" them ("*jeden amerikanischen Terrorflieger aufhaengen, nicht erschiessen*") (3780-PS, Exh. GB [Great Britain]-293, vol. 33, pp. 74–80, at 79) about which the British Prosecutor, Sir David Maxwell-Fyffe, examined von Ribbentrop on 1 April 1946 (vol. 10, at 384).

Numerous other documents show the still unfathomable, continent-wide program of the "final solution of the Jewish question"; and the connection between the Nazi aims of annihilating Jewry and annihilating communism ("Bolshevism is the doctrine of Jewish Satanism—*die Lehre jüdischer Satanei*," Robert Ley stated as early as at the 1936 Olympiade Party Rally, Nuremberg) (2283-PS, Exh. USA-337, vol. 30, at p. 129). There are long excerpts (370 printed pages) from the 38 volumes of the diary of Hans Frank as Governor-General of occupied Poland, 1939–1944 (2232-PS, vol. 29, pp. 356–725); the complete transcript of the trial before the notorious "People's Court" of Fieldmarshal von Witzleben, Count Yorck von Wartenburg and six other conspirators in the unsuccessful attempt to kill Hitler on 20 July 1944 (3881-PS, Exhibit GB [Great Britain]-527, vol. 33, pp. 299–509; full text of the "People Court's" judgment, pp. 510–530); and SS General Stroop's report on the final massacre, against heroic resistance, of the survivors of the German-erected Warsaw Ghetto, "*The Warsaw Ghetto Is No More*" of 16 May 1943 (1061-PS, Exh. USA-275, vol. 26, pp. 628–642).

The reproduction of these documents in their original German puts them beyond the reach of many American readers. However, the most telling parts of the most significant documents were the core of the trial; cited in court in all four official languages, they are to that extent recorded in English in the Transcripts, part of the present series (Vols. 2–22). For example, the British Prosecutor Elwyn Jones, M.P., in cross-examining Dr. Wolfram Sievers, the manager of Himmler's Race Research agency *Ahnenerbe* (Ancestral Heritage Society), about the most gruesome medical experiments, read into the English record (vol. 20, pp. 516–553) large sections of documents which in the full German texts appear in vol. 38.

It is also of some help that each German document has been given an English title, and English capsule description. Furthermore, some important Nuremberg documents are in English in their *original*, and hence are reproduced in English in Vols. 24–42. For example: Reports by the Duke of Hamilton, on interviews with Hess after the latter's landing in Scotland, 10 May 1941 (116-M to 119-M, vol. 38, pp. 174–184); numerous affidavits, including those by two American diplomats, George S. Messersmith and Raymond H. Geis, about their experiences in Berlin (2385 & 2386-PS, Exh. USA-68, 750 in vol. 30, pp. 295–311, 311–328); a Report by the Judge Advocate Section, Third U.S. Army, on their investigation of Flossenburg Concentration Camp (2309 PS, vol. 30, pp. 158–164); Report of a special 12-member bipartisan Congressional Committee headed by Senate majority leader Alben W. Barkley of 15 May 1945, about their personal inspection (requested by General Eisenhower) of Buchenwald, Nordhausen and Dachau concentration camps (159-L, Exh. USA-222, vol. 37, pp. 605–626); and the official English text of the "Czechoslovakian Report on German Crimes against Czechoslovakia" (998-PS, Exh. USA-91, vol. 26, pp. 429–522). English defense documents include, *e.g.*, the written testimony by Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, U.S. Navy, on the principles concerning the rescue of survivors of sunk enemy ships that governed naval warfare in the Pacific (Doc. Doenitz-100, vol. 40, pp. 108–111). Some documents are in French. For example: the official French government report on the fate of French intellectuals, heads of political parties and workers' organizations, Jews, and other persecuted groups (274-F, Exhibit RF [République Française]-301, vol. 37, pp. 116–188); list of 29,660 fusillaled French hostages (420-F, Exh. RF-266, vol. 37, pp. 211–212); sworn statements of French and Belgian concentration camp survivors (vol. 36, pp. 261–387).

Indices. A publication of this complexity requires some comments on its indices, and their quality.

First, there is a large *Subject Index*, consisting of 660 pages in vol. 23. Regrettably, it was prepared from the *Transcripts* of the court proceedings *alone*. Hence, the Subject Index covers only

matters that were discussed in court and, as far as the documents are concerned, therefore refers only to the topic(s) on which a document, or some passage from it, was *quoted in court*. Any *other* topics contained in the document are not picked up in the Subject Index, although they may be of much greater significance for the researcher.

Even within this limitation, the Subject Index is incomplete. For example, one of the trial's main issues was the treatment of, and the law concerning partisans (or guerrillas, maquis, resistance fighters). Yet, the subentry "International law [concerning] partisan warfare" gives altogether two citations: one on "German *adherence*" (ital. supplied) to that law, the other on "Violations committed during" partisan warfare. Both citations refer to altogether two pages in the court transcript (vol. 21, pp. 293 and 292, respectively) which reproduce a defense counsel's argumentation about the probative value of certain prosecution and defense evidence on partisan warfare, but there is no reference to any of the documentation showing German mass atrocities against partisans, partisan suspects, partisans' families, villages hiding partisans, etc. Similarly, readers interested in the Tribunal's handling of the French Maquis question will find under "Maquis movement, French" only: "see France; occupied territories; Resistance"; and none of these entries has a subentry for "Maquis."

The Subject Index pedantically records many unimportant items, but omits matters which are crucial for the understanding of Nazi war policies and postwar plans. For example, the entry "Slavs" omits references to one of Himmler's most horrifying speeches (Poznan, 4 Oct. 1943, 1919-PS, US Exh. 170, vol. 29, pp. 110–173): the Russians are not the "noble people" ("*edles Volk*") described in German soldiers' letters home (p. 117) but "human rejects" ("*menschliche Minderware*") (p. 118), "human animals" ("*Menschentiere*") (p. 123); "We need slaves for our culture . . . Whether in the building of an antitank ditch 10,000 Russian females (*Weiber*) collapse from exhaustion (*aus Entkraeftung umfallen*) interests me only insofar as the ditch be finished. . . ." (p. 123).

Similarly, the Subject Index has no entry on the *future wars* for which Himmler, in this and other programmatic statements, made far-reaching plans: the ultimate Armageddon to be between a biogenetically strengthened Germany reaching beyond the Urals, in combination with a racially-cleansed German-dominated Europe, against the "1 to 1.6 billion hordes (*Masse Mensch*)" of Asia (vol. 29, p. 172). If readers relying on the English summary title locate the document, they will hardly be able to guess Himmler's relentlessly pursued visions from the tepid English summary, "plans for the future" (vol. 29, p. 110).

The entry "Children" does not even contain a subentry on the major Nuremberg topic of the systematic kidnapping of foreign children of "good blood" by a special Himmler organization. Himmler expected the policy (one of his obsessions) to yield eventually 30 million additional Germans, and discussed it not only in his 1943 Poznan speech but elsewhere and much earlier (for example, nine months before the start of the German attack on the U.S.S.R. in his "Otherwise Germany will not be able to dominate the earth" speech of 7 September 1940, 1918-PS, U.S. Exhibit 304, vol. 29, pp. 98–110).

Of overriding significance is the Nuremberg evidence about the Third Reich's "extermination of Communism" policies, which the Subject Index (vol. 23, p. 193) correctly spells out as extermination of Communists ("Communists, Extermination.") but for which it gives only six secondary references. Actually, this war aim was fully discussed, as recorded, by Hitler, Fieldmarshals, the SS and SD leadership, even prior to the start of the attack on the USSR on June 21, 1941, and was often linked with plans for depriving the USSR, after conquest, of its main food supplies. (Example: "Many tens of millions of people . . . will [thus] die or have to emigrate to Siberia"—for which migration no trains will be available. (Economic Policy Directions for "Economic Organization East," of 23 May 1941 Doc. 126-EC.) The famous memorandum of 25 Oct. 1942 by a top official in Rosenberg's East Ministry criticizing the atrocity policies in the occupied Soviet areas as adverse to the German war aims of "annihilation (*Vernichtung*) of Bolshevism"[9] and "obliteration (*Zertrümmerung*)" or "dissolution (*Auflösung*)" of the Soviet Union (294-PS, Exhibit USA-185, vol. 25, pp. 331–342, at 332) is only mentioned, without capsule contents, in the Name Index under the memorandum's author, Minister Dr. Braeutigam (vol. 24, p. 316) but is omitted, like many other documents frankly discussing German war aims, in the Subject Index short entry, "War Aims, German" (vol. 23, p. 716).

The second Index volume (no. 24) opens with a *Document Index*, which lists the documents exhibited by the four Prosecutions and the Defense, but only by numbers, and without thumbnail descriptions. The bulk of the volume, almost 500

[9] Among various statements to the same effect, see, for example, Directives by the Economic Staff East (*Wirtschaftsführungsstab Ost*) of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW) of September 1,1942: "Germany must be the power that obliterates (*zertrümmert*) Bolshevism, and the Führer must be celebrated (*gefeiert*) by the peoples of the Soviet Union as the liberator from the bolshevist yoke." (347-EC, Exh. USA-320, vol. 36, pp. 331–355, at 346). There is no entry, "Bolshevism" in the Subject Index.

pages, contains the *Name Index*. But like the Subject Index, the Name Index is culled from the transcripts only. It merely refers to the persons appearing, or mentioned, in the proceedings.

Again, within this restriction, the Name Index is not complete. To illustrate: The inclusion of Rudolf Hess (as Hitler's former Deputy, the highest-ranking defendant) in the trial has been criticized in view of his "amnesia." Strangely, his sensational admission in court on 30 Nov. 1945, of having simulated ammesia (recorded in vol. 3, p. 496: "Henceforth my memory will again respond to the outside world . . . The reasons for simulating loss of memory were of a tactical nature . . . I also simulated loss of memory [to] my . . . defense counsel. . .") is omitted in the Name Index, under "Hess, Rudolf," subentries "Health" and "Mental condition" (vol. 24, p. 424) and there is no subentry for "simulation" or for "amnesia." (Incidentally, although his amnesia and simulation were carefully discussed subjects, there are no such entries in the Subject Index, either.)

I must agree with Professor Weinberg, who says in his Introduction (p. xxiii) that whereas the Index volumes provide "fairly" good orientation for the *Proceedings*, "the indexing of the *documents* (ital. supplied) is wholly inadequate." To remedy this shortcoming, he added to this reprinted edition, as a supplemental volume, the single combined Index of the (1949) *German*-language edition of the "Blue series." He finds it better organized, and containing more document references, albeit by document number only. Alas, this supplement volume indicates the (parallel but of course not identical) pages and volumes of the *German* edition. If all this seems complicated, it at least gives an inkling of some of the linguistic and logistic difficulties of an international trial conducted in four official languages.

All this, too, pales in the light of the significance of the Principles, or message, of Nuremberg,—that in order to prevent the disasters of *governmentally organized international mass criminality*, the individual policy makers are bound by the fundamental rules of the world community. This record shows the reasons why, and the way in which, the Tribunal unanimously—and, in the end, with the consent of at least some of the defendants and their counsel,—reached that conclusion; as well as the precautions it added so as to make obedience to the Principle neither "unpatriotic" nor demanding martyrdom. Also, for example, in an era when organized terrorism has become an increasingly dangerous threat, attention should be paid to the criteria by which the Tribunal declared certain entire "organizations," for example, the Gestapo to have been "criminal organizations"—so that voluntary membership constitutes in itself a legal (but, as the Judgment underscores, individually disprovable) presumption of a punishable offense.

The series, then, has many uses. One, highly desirable beyond academe in view of the widespread confusion about the crucial meaning of the trial, is to get acquainted with what the trial was really about. The Nuremberg courtroom drama gives a picture, unavailable elsewhere, of the antecedents of World War II and of the Third Reich's conduct and policies during it. In a strictly chronological sense, those events lie now more than a generation behind us. But their effects and repercussions are still with us. And these materials, by showing as they do the nature and impact of Hitler's onslaught, also explain the depth of the trauma which the cataclysm created in the different nations involved (including the Americans and the Germans).

That trauma—further intensified by the profound political changes in Europe as result of the war—has by no means been overcome; indeed it explains much that has happened since and is still leading the world on an increasingly ominous course.

In other words, the Nuremberg materials allow us not only to evaluate the factual findings, and the law of Nuremberg, but beyond that to understand the psychological and ideological *aftereffects* which Hitler's onslaught continue to exercise on world politics. Such understanding may be vital; and this exploitation of the Nuremberg materials has hardly begun.

Those interested in specific subjects, on the other hand, find here information never meant to be disclosed, on matters ranging from propaganda to high finance, from military history to euthanasia, and learned debates about the criminality or not of aggressive war, about the main defense objections ("retroactivity"; "the victors tried the vanquished"; "duty to obey even criminal orders"), to the skillful attempts to justify, or make plausible, the Nazi policies including the wars themselves; and why the entire Nuremberg effort consisted in denying such justifications, in memory of the victims, and out of worry for our own future.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Death of Communal Liberty: A History of Freedom in a Swiss Mountain Canton. By Benjamin R. Barber. (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974, Pp. 302. $12.50.)

It is rather unusual to find a picture of a beautiful mountain valley on the jacket of a political science book. Professor Benjamin R. Barber obviously likes to support his arguments with illustrations. The main argument of the book is contained in two pictures with the titles "Direct Democracy" and "Representative Democracy." The picture representing direct democracy depicts serious men participating in an outdoor political meeting with the snow-covered mountains in the background. The picture illustrating representative democracy is much less peaceful: An ugly demonstration in rainy weather with two policemen fighting with a young demonstrator.

The two pictures make clear where the sympathies of Barber are. He first experienced representative democracy in the United States and found it unsatisfying in many respects. He then went to the Swiss mountain canton Graubünden, first as a student and later as a teacher. Here he found many forms of direct democracy and was enthusiastic about them. Barber does not try to hide his normative bias; he makes explicit that his study is "guided by a normative focus and an engaged passion" (p. 8). He does not want to be objective, he has "neither pretensions of nor aspirations toward social scientific 'objectivity' " (p. 8).

What then, is the goal of the book? It is supposed to be "an attempt to challenge liberal constitutionalism as a philosophy and as a political way of life—to uncover its limitations and to explain certain of its failures—through a sympathetic examination of the political life of an alpine people over the last 1,500 years" (p. 7). Barber is aware that such a study can not "pretend to establish decisively the philosophical validity of alternative views of liberty and democracy. At best it can suggest the alternatives while disestablishing the claims to exclusivity of constitutional liberals" (p. 8). Barber wants to accomplish "more than the rehearsal of adversary arguments in the abstract" (p. 7). He says that we need "the weight of arguments embedded in their own historical traditions, carrying the authority of an actual political experience" (p. 7).

The philosophical thinking of Barber is close to the ideas of Rousseau, and, at one point Barber calls Rousseau "an invisible presence throughout our study" (p. 16). Barber has found the ideas of Rousseau realized not so much in contemporary Graubünden as in its history. In former times "the initiation, deliberation, and ratification of policy remained wholly with the citizenry . . . real power was not delegated to officials . . . the individual appeared to experience none of that atomization that attends freedom in representative systems, none of the alienation which so often emerges as the obverse side of individuality in liberal regimes (pp. 175–8). The citizen of Old Graubünden corresponded to the ideal type of the informed citizen: "He grew up in politics, listening to his father and neighbors distilling political wisdom from the chaos of European affairs. By maturity he was not only thoroughly familiar with the minutiae of various league and jurisdictional civil and criminal statutes but could pass on technical questions relating to Raetia's treaty obligations to Venice or the Swiss Confederation. No referendum question was too complicated, no jurisdictional quarrel too entangled for him to comprehend" (pp. 199–200).

Myself a Swiss citizen, I am surely tempted by the flattery of such an account of his ancestors. But I fear that affection for Graubünden has carried Barber much too far. To be sure, he can support his argument often with quotes from local historians. But the problem is that many of these historians too see the past in an excessively idealistic way. What they report is often merely the present ideology about the past. Sometimes Barber tries to support his argument with colorful anecdotes from the past. Thus he mentions the story of a Raetian muleteer who replied to a foreign prince: "And I too am a prince." The comment of Barber is that the citizen in Old Graubünden was self-governing, self-sufficient, and free like a prince. Such anecdotes, however, tell us much more about the present ideology of the past than about the past itself. It would have been helpful if Barber had tried to base his judgment a little more on historical research of his own. He writes in the introduction that he does not want "to compel the Swiss to conform to the theoretical infrastructure precipitated by liberal democratic thought" (p. 9). But has he not compelled the history of Graubünden to conform to the thinking of Rousseau? Barber tries to save his main argument at all costs. Thus, he claims that "the selling of offices was tolerated in part because the election of officers, in the eyes of the Raetians, did not carry the real burden of democracy" (p. 176). Would it not be more plausible to interpret the selling of offices as an indication that a financial investment in a political office was worthwhile in terms of political power?

In contemporary Graubünden Barber sees the ideal of direct democracy much less realized because modernity has destroyed the preconditions

—namely, intimacy, simplicity, autarky, equality, and public-spiritedness. Barber complains that the Swiss try to adapt their democracy to modernity. In his view, today "the radicals are those who plead for conservation and the restoration of community" (p. 240). He is aware, however, that simply going back in time is not possible, but he hopes that the dying forms of direct democracy "contain the promise of an alternative mode of political life, the importance of which can only increase as the viability of modernity diminishes" (pp. 240–1). In the very last sentence of the book Barber argues for a "radical remaking" of the world. I have doubts whether Graubünden ever came close to the normative model advocated by Barber. There were probably always many more elitist elements in the political life of Graubünden than Barber suspects. This is of course not to speak against the normative model of Barber, but perhaps against the present ideology of the history of Switzerland.

Jürg Steiner

University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Rules and Laws in Sociology. By Robert Brown. (Chicago: Aldine, 1973. Pp. x, 181. $7.95.)

I sometimes think that people who talk about causation in terms of "necessary and sufficient conditions," of "events" being "changes in state," of changes being the only things that can cause anything, can never talk to people of a statistical bent. This is a critique of the statistical sociology of prejudice by a person who learned his philosophy of science mainly from Hume and Mill; things obvious to Hubert M. Blalock (much discussed) or to me seem mysterious to him, and things that seem obvious to him seem obviously wrongheaded to me. Since I am not the sort of person the book is written for, I cannot evaluate it for its potential reader. The reader has to be a person to whom it makes sense to say that "All Australian prime ministers have been men" is an "accidental generalization" (p. 92). For a book on prejudice, that's not very illuminating. Let me instead try to analyze why statistical and classical approaches to causation seem to be talking about different things altogether.

The original issue of the authoritarian personality studies, discussed in the book, is roughly as follows. Hitler or General Amin of Uganda kill or exile minority ethnic groups for no good reason; each is obviously something of a nut; each got to power because his society was all screwed up; each got an amazing amount of support from the German workers or the poor Blacks. Is this support due to a mild infection of the general public with an analogous form of insanity, or an analogous screwing up of their social lives, or both? If so, what does the analogy consist of?

The results come in, that a scale of "authoritarianism" is correlated 0.29 with a scale of "ethnocentrism," 0.45 with a scale of "anomia," and "anomia" and "ethnocentrism" are correlated at 0.43 (p. 55, reporting Srole). Brown shows that the scales are measures of poorly defined concepts, that one can't tell whether the concepts are states or events or processes, that the concepts are not necessary or sufficient conditions for each other or for their measures. From this he concludes, as near as I can make out, that the correlation is all nonsense. "Explaining, in general, why some people become authoritarian will be no more useful, and no more specific, a solution than explaining why some people become bored" (pp. 68–69). As a person who explored at great length a correlation of comparable size about why some people become bored in school, I simply do not see what is ridiculous about it. What he thinks ridiculous is that he can think up strange counter cases, such as employers refusing to hire people more able than themselves (to shore up their authority) and so preferring to hire people they think inferior, (p. 109), or I suppose a bright ambitious child held by his school for three days in a gray windowless room.

I think what happens is this: I take the fact of a correlation of 0.45 as the thing to be explained. I refuse to conclude after tearing apart an old theory of that correlation that it must not be really there. Yes, the questions are vague, the concept neither necessary nor sufficient for measure, but to me 0.45 is out there in the world. If it doesn't fit in with Hume, too bad for Hume. The argument of the book strikes me then as showing the uselessness of philosophy of science, not the uselessness of sociology. For the questions it asks are not ones that lead to explaining the facts—no explanation of the 0.45 is ever offered, even by suggestion—but rather ones that lead us to conclude we are all muddled. The problem is to get out of the muddle, not to describe it exquisitely.

Hume taught us to reason about one case at a time, and to state necessary and sufficient conditions for what happens that once in universal form. R. A. Fisher taught us to think of conditions (necessary or sufficient, events or states) as having a distribution, being members of a population; of the distribution of necessary conditions being partly independent of the sufficient ones, so that on the average people with the necessary conditions (e.g. perhaps social estrangement and hostility) are more likely to have the necessary and sufficient conditions (e.g. ethnocentrism plus living in Uganda plus guns) for the event (e.g. driving the Asians and Israelis out).

The fact that I have only a very vague notion of why authoritarianism and anomia as measured should be correlated, or even what either of them

is, worries me a lot. Why should events like genocide be apparently related to a bunch of foolish questions about children being seen but not heard? But the hard fact seems to be that they are, and that is one thing a book on prejudice ought to be about. This one is not.

ARTHUR L. STINCHCOMBE

National Opinion Research Center and University of Chicago

Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao: Post-Revolutionary Writings. Edited by K. Fan. (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1972. Pp. xxiv, 536. $2.95, paper.)

Mao Tse-tung on Revolution and War. Edited, and with an introduction and notes, by M. Rejai. (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1970. Pp. xii, 452. $1.95, paper.)

Anyone who sets out to compile an anthology of Mao Tse-tung's writings faces two basic choices. The first is the familiar one of whether to let the author speak for himself, by presenting full texts or substantial extracts in chronological order, or to select bits and pieces, arranged to illustrate a particular interpretation. The second concerns the nature of the sources to be used. Should the original versions of Mao's earlier writings be preferred to subsequent revisions? Should materials circulated in recent years for internal use only, which were divulged during the Cultural Revolution, but have never been officially published, be included?

It has been suggested that because Mao Tse-tung is a living author, the problem of authenticity does not arise, the definitive text at any given moment being the revision which he has most recently chosen to issue. Every author has the right to change his mind, but this does not justify replacing what he actually said by what he decided twenty years later he should have said, and denouncing his rivals or opponents because they did not say it at the time. If, on the other hand, one is concerned not with historical truth, but with expounding and analyzing what constitutes authentic doctrine today, then obviously it is the post-1949 revisions which must be used. Mr. Rejai, whose interpretation of Mao Tse-tung's thought is based almost exclusively on the Chairman's writings prior to the conquest of power, was therefore justified in drawing the extracts from which he has constructed this intellectual edifice from the four-volume Peking edition of the *Selected Works.*

Professor Rejai's decision to include only officially published materials was made, and justified (p. xi) on methodological grounds. Professor Fan, who likewise uses only "authorized versions published . . . in Peking" appears to have been motivated rather by considerations of ideological orthodoxy—though, as indicated by his title, the context in which he made this choice soon changed dramatically. In the preface, dated November 1971, Mr. Fan recognized that Lin Piao was "no longer Mao's 'heir designate,' " but argued that he was "a major architect of Chinese policy during the Cultural Revolution, whose influence is lasting," adding that "together Mao's and Lin's works constitute a comprehensive statement of the official Chinese Communist thinking since the founding of the People's Republic" (pp. x, xii.) By the time these words were written, Lin Piao was already dead, and Mr. Fan must have known at least that Lin was under a very deep cloud. Why, under the circumstances, he chose to publish this anthology as it stands, in view of his obvious desire to align himself with "official Chinese Communist thinking," is hard to say. In any case, whether he was actuated by scholarly integrity, or by nostalgia for the heady days of the Cultural Revolution, the decision to leave Lin Piao in was misguided. Whatever his power and influence from 1959 until 1970, as a theoretician Lin was always a bean-curd tiger, and the two hundred pages of his speeches and writings included here add little indeed to our knowledge of the thinking underlying Chinese policy today.

Mr. Fan's editorial comments are so brief and self-effacing that his book can be judged only as a collection of materials. As such, it is valuable and timely, for it brings together in one convenient and relatively inexpensive volume a more complete selection of Mao's officially published post-1949 speeches and writings than can be found in any other single place. Mr. Fan himself is apparently not satisfied with this not inconsiderable achievement, and makes the extravagant claim that those items in his anthology written after October 1, 1949, "have not been collected in book form" (p. ix). In fact, well over half of them have appeared in one volume or another—sometimes in several—and eighty pages are taken from the one-volume *Selected Readings from the Works of Mao Tse-tung* published in Peking. The remaining items, however, while they can nearly all be found in a decent library, are not always easy to lay one's hands on. The editing is careful and scrupulous (for example, in his abridgement of Mao's speech of June 23, 1950, Mr. Fan has not removed the statement that the socialization of agriculture belongs to the "distant future" [p. 94]). In sum, these 140-odd pages of less easily available materials are well worth the price of the book for students of China and for those interested in political ideas as well.

Mr. Fan has contributed documentation, but few ideas; Mr. Rejai, though he offers nothing in the way of new or inaccessible materials, has very definite ideas about how the old sources should

be interpreted. His views on the nature of Mao Tse-tung's achievement are, in fact, summed up in the title: *Mao Tse-tung on Revolution and War*. Mao, he suggests, made his main contribution to the theory and practice of revolution in the course of two decades of armed struggle in the countryside; the four main original traits in his thought (pp. xix–xx) are derived from this experience, and the relevance of his thought in the world today lies primarily in the extension of his theory of "people's war" to a global scale. This conception is stated briefly in the introductory notes, but it is perhaps even more eloquently illustrated by Mr. Rejai's choice of documentation. Although he manifestly aims to define the contemporary significance of Mao Tse-tung's thought, he includes substantial extracts from only one major text written since 1949, the speech of February 1957 on contradictions among the people.

No one would deny that the heritage of Yenan, and of the Chingkangshan, is still alive in China today, and significantly influences Mao's percepceptions of both internal and external problems. But are the post-1949 metamorphoses of "Mao Tse-tung's Thought" really immanent in his writings of the 1930s and 1940s? And is "war" really the key to the whole edifice?

Mr. Rejai's attempt to construct an overview of the Chairman's thinking begins and ends with the problem of imperialism. Chapter I deals with what imperialism did to China, and how China fought back; Chapter VI is devoted to global strategy against imperialism. Together, they include 48 pages of Mao's writings prior to October 1949, 24 pages by Lin Piao, and only 8 pages of recent statements. There is no doubt that Mao sees the Chinese and world revolutions in the context of the struggle against imperialism and "social-imperialism" (which is brought in by Lin Piao in his speech to the Ninth Party Congress). But do such materials as these provide an adequate framework for understanding China's internal policy, which is covered in Chapters II to V?

It is true that in Chapter II, entitled "Stages of Revolutionary Development," Mr. Rejai introduces some further general considerations about the pattern of the Chinese revolution as a whole, but his analysis is not particularly convincing. He argues, for example, that with the proclamation by Mao in 1949 of a "people's democratic dictatorship," there was "a change in . . . class relationships," the "four-class alliance of new democracy," though it continued to persist, being henceforth "expressed in a new formula—worker-peasant alliance. . ." (p. 86). In fact, Mao repeatedly made plain in the late 1930s that the worker-peasant alliance (hardly a "new" formula, since it was advocated by Lenin in 1905) should constitute the heart of the "dictatorship of all the revolutionary classes of China, headed by the proletariat" which he advocated during the "new-democratic" stage of the revolution. He made this point in many different texts, including some that appear in Mr. Rejai's own volume (pp. 99, 199, etc.). Even more puzzling is the statement that "Mao Tse-tung's theory of revolution is the theory of 'uninterrupted revolution,' " supported by a reference to a text of 1937 in which Mao said explicitly that he did *not* advocate the "Trotskyite theory" of permanent or uninterrupted revolution (p. 88; cf. *Selected Works*, Vol. I, pp. 290–91). Would it not have been better to cite some materials of 1958, by which time Mao had changed his mind, and come out in favor of this theory?

Far more serious and basic are the misgivings aroused by Mr. Rejai's failure to devote any serious attention to the stages in China's economic policy since 1949. In a twenty-page survey of the record of "the Communists in power" (pp. 18–37), economic development is one of the "three principal areas" discussed, but it rates only three pages, compared to seven for "national unification," and nearly ten for foreign policy. In Chapter II of the anthology (which is the only one in which these problems are covered at all), the sole item on patterns of organization in the countryside is the Central Committee's resolution of August 1958 on the communes. Neither Mao's speech of July 1955 on agricultural cooperativization (which is mentioned in passing in the introduction, p. 25), nor a single one of the Chairman's many other statements on industry and agriculture since 1950, is included among the texts selected.

Mr. Rejai, of course, regards "war" as more important in Mao's scheme of things than economic development. This prejudice is reflected by his decision to put Chapter IV, on the army, before Chapter V, on the Party, in his exposition of Mao Tse-tung's ideas regarding the institutions which dominate the Chinese political system. It is true that for twenty-two years, from 1927 until 1949, the Chinese Communist Party developed in a context of armed struggle, and owed its very existence to the main instrument of that struggle, the Red Army. But if this experience is the matrix out of which today's Party and army have grown, it does not determine completely either their nature today, or the relations between them. Nor, with reference to the PLA itself, can four fragments (two from 1928–29 and two from 1948) be taken as covering adequately the problem of "democracy" within the army (pp. 255–260; the quotation marks are Mr. Rejai's), before or during the ten-year reign of Lin Piao. The record of the past is indispensable to the understanding of the present; it is, in itself, no substitute for the analysis of present reality.

STUART R. SCHRAM

University of London

A Mathematical Theory of Social Change. By Robert L. Hamblin, R. Brooke Jacobsen, and Jerry L. L. Miller. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973. Pp. 231. $12.50.)

The quantitative analysis of social phenomena has entered a new scholarly era in recent years, and this advanced book by three sociologists is good evidence of the basic characteristics of that trend—attention to mathematical theories with tests utilizing empirical data. The book espouses a worthwhile goal of theoretical and mathematical explication plus tests for a mathematical theory of social change closely tied to the Coleman tradition. It consists of a set of ten basic equations which are either investigated or discovered by the authors and eventually reduced to three axioms and eight elementary laws of social change. By definition, the book is relatively narrow in scope, well defined, precise and limited to a specialized audience familiar with social change theory and higher mathematics, including calculus. Although the authors recognize the necessary level of reader sophistication, they attempt to appeal to a broader social science audience through clear prose—a goal which is only partially achieved. But for specialists, the book is important albeit elementary in its treatment of social processes. Its axioms are drawn from mathematical systems theory and behavioral sociology (largely reinforcement theory) with roots in experimental research—all a refreshing deviation from more usual functional fare. Its ingenious reliance on a wide range of social, economic, and political data at both the individual and system level is also an important departure from purely model-building treatises. Most of these data indicate a high level of statistical explanatory power for the equations developed throughout the book; an impressive record to challenge more timid, less applied modelers.

The book is organized around three basic change processes: (1) *adaptation* to social and physical environments for organizations and individuals alike—reflecting heavy reliance on theoretical and empirical research on organizational adaptation. This first substantive chapter contains a detailed discussion of learning curves and yields three basic equations for social adaptation. (2) Social *diffusion*—or the spread of adoption of various mechanical and social innovations through time—consumes four subsequent chapters. Data for model testing are drawn from a wide range of invention categories (transportation, education, marriage, leisure) and various adopting agencies including individuals, firms and governmental units. Particular attention is paid to "exponential epochs" of diffusion and various societal or political forces which interrupt change processes. (3) *Innovations* and their modifications over time are treated in three remaining chapters focusing on the distribution of patents for several mechanical inventions, the combination and recombination of innovations characterized as an exponential process, and several relationships between these elements which yield a socioeconomic theory of development. The final chapter presents the formal development of an integrated axiomatic theory of social change, accompanied by useful rules for scientific research and provocative suggestions for future inquiry.

Although the final chapter is desperately needed following a bombardment of equations and marshaling of data throughout each previous chapter, it does not save the book from a weakness resulting from the parsimony and formal precision of mathematics. While the book has a firmer theoretical base than the raw empiricism of early mathematical sociology, and while there are some verbal descriptions of equations, it is much like a large monograph, technical paper, or support document for a verbal theory—where the reader is *told* the theoretical context of the book without an elaboration or sufficient verbal theoretical explication and with meager development of the meaning or relevance of what the authors are doing. The latter will be clear to only a limited number of readers; others will find little help for understanding the *process* of diffusion or adaptation, and will have little appreciation for why social change occurs in certain isolated patterns which at times appear relatively simplistic and trivial. Yet political scientists can find much to emulate in the precision of this book and in the scientific certainty with which these quantitative sociologists approach the real world. In addition, they will find that the book fits nicely with recent quantitative developments in political science; with a traditional concern for social, economic and political development; and with a growing interest in innovation, diffusion and long-term change. Indeed, political science is ready for more perspectives on the policy sciences and for the investigation of alternative management policies governing rapid social change.

SAMUEL A. KIRKPATRICK
University of Oklahoma

Mathematical Applications in Political Science, VII. Edited by James F. Herndon and Joseph L. Bernd. (Charlottesville: The University Press of Virginia, 1974. Pp. 84. $9.75.)

This is a valuable addition to the earlier series on mathematical applications in political science. Its most distinctive feature is the blending of substance and method. The substantive issues considered are primary elections, congressional voting, judicial behavior, and the analysis of aggregate data. The methods employed are decision theory, correlation, discriminant function

analysis, and regression. Of the four essays in the volume, "Dimensionality and Change in Judicial Behavior" by S. Sydney Ulmer reflects the most effective blending of substance and method. Ulmer questions the earlier studies (e.g. Herman Pritchett, *Civil Liberties and the Vinson Court*, [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954] and Glendon Schubert, *The Judicial Mind*, [Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1965]) which employed techniques such as Guttman-scale analysis and factor analysis and clearly implied in their conclusions that all the judges in a particular collegial court are positioned on the same or separate dimensions. The author suggests going beyond simplified dimensional assumptions in judicial behavior research. Ulmer uses discriminant function analysis for analyzing five Supreme Court justices' positions on political activism during the period 1937–68. Conceptualizing political activism as a dynamic dimension in this period, he shows with appropriate as well as adequate data that the 'probability of dimensional existence' was higher for two of these judges (Douglas and Black) than for the other three (Frankfurter, Clark and Reed).

The other three essays are on "Optimal Voting in a Two-Party Primary" by Lawrence S. Mayer, "Subjectivity and Objectivity in Dimensional Analysis: Illustrations from Congressional Voting" by Aage R. Clausen, and "The Uses of Statistics in Aggregate Data Analysis" by Charles Lewis Taylor. Mayer uses decision theory and establishes certain rules governing the optimal behavior of a voter in a two-party open primary. With the use of elementary statistics, Mayer presents clear and elegant proofs of certain theorems, establishing such rules. These rules also apply to a bloc of voters, and Mayer claims that his analysis could be used by a campaign manager to decide the optimal spending of the available funds.

In constructing optimal behavior for a voter, Mayer makes certain assumptions, some of them too simplistic even for deductive theory, to which Mayer's paper unquestionably makes a contribution. Thus, he assumes that the primary contains two parties with one of which the voter *identifies*; the voter cannot abstain; and a voter's choice affects the choice of no other voter. In fact, there is more of method than substance in this paper. Although Mayer establishes rules for a real political situation, there are no real political data in the paper.

Aage R. Clausen argues that "objectivity in research needs to be complemented by subjective evaluations of the phenomena under study" (p. 15). The stagement is self-evident. Clausen does admit that this is not a novel idea, but he maintains that "it is not explicated and implemented to the extent that it deserves" (p. 15). In order to establish his "thesis" Clausen considers the use of dimensional analysis, as exemplified by factor and Guttman-scale analysis, on congressional roll-call data. While demonstrating his preference for the "conceptual" approach over the objective approach, he emphasizes judgment prior to the analysis. As he writes, "If you don't know where you are going, how can you possibly know when you have arrived?" (p. 38). Clausen's contribution is in reiterating with sound logic and excellent data what most researchers believe in and practice.

Charles L. Taylor also emphasizes the essential theme of this volume: "Political sophistication must be at least as important as methodological sophistication in understanding politics" (p. 84). He questions "barefoot empiricism" in aggregate data analysis and suggests the integration of theory in the analysis of data. He argues that data analysis and theory construction are basically identical processes.

Taylor questions some of the assumptions made in order to be rigorous. He points out that the most basic assumption of random sampling in statistical inference is violated in aggregate data analysis. He discusses at some length the use of regression analysis, giving particular attention to residuals. His main arguments are well presented and do clarify some of the pitfalls in the use of aggregate data; however, he could have used political data instead of data on GNP and scientific authorship to strengthen these arguments.

KUL B. RAI
Southern Connecticut State College

Le Nationalisme, facteur belligène. By Institut de Sociologie, Centre de sociologie de la guerre. (Brussels: Emile Bruylant, 1972. Pp. 387. No price indicated.)

All symposia are uneven, but some are more uneven than others. This book, which is made of the apparently unedited papers and transcripts (complete with "Excellence, Mesdames, Messieurs," with rhetorical flourishes, and with forensic jokes) of a conference held in Brussels, may well have a good claim to primacy in this respect. This is not because of the lack of a central idea, even less of a guiding theme. Most of the authors do refer to the question raised by the title: to what extent is nationalism responsible for wars? (Why anything having to do with war must be expressed in pseudo-Latin, like "belligène" and pseudo-Greek, like "polemology," two terms of which the book makes an utterly immoderate use, defies any explanation other than in terms of an almost touchingly naive desire for presenting old thoughts in new, apparently scientific disguise.) The general inspiration—to encourage the sociological study of war, to do it through a multidisciplinary effort and to build

bridges between traditional approaches and the methodogically and politically more revolutionary or trendy movement of peace research—could not be sounder. Some of the papers make genuine contributions to the understanding of the problem. Yet, as a coherent effort, the book certainly is a failure, sometimes verging on the ridiculous.

This is not only due to the sizable proportion of papers which should just have been eliminated because they consist of circumstantial speeches or of barely intelligible outlines. The main reason is that the substantive papers themselves fall into three very different categories.

A first type, which is the most representative of the organizer's intentions, addresses the question of the meaning of nationalism and of its relations with war at a very general level, that of a broadly descriptive discourse. Often witty or erudite, but just as often complacent and rambling, these pieces address such questions as: "The Nation as a Belligenous myth" (Prof. J. Willequet) "Why is Nationalism a Belligenous Factor? (General Werner), "Nationalism and the Army (Prof. Lory), "The Religious Spirit and Nationalism (Prof. Abel). Their general theme is that while patriotism is good, nationalism is bad and relies on insecurity, aggression, and idolatry. They do not seem, except through an occasional insight, to add much to existing interpretations of nationalism as a new religion. An exception must be made, in this group, for General Werner's article: it is a serious piece of work, based on genuine erudition; it tries to stick to the analytical distinctions it posits at the beginning, and it insists on the impact of the psychological disruptions and insecurities caused by social, demographic, economic, and technological change as a crucial factor encouraging the resurgence of nationalism (whose possibility is always implicit in the political division of mankind into sovereign states) as a defensive and potentially agressive reaction at this particular time.

The second group, which is not presented explicitly as being composed of case studies, nevertheless concentrates heavily on the specific case of French nationalism in the nineteenth and twentieth century. A very detailed and competent literature report by Nadine Bernard on "Nationalism and War in France" (1871–1914) sums up recent French historical research on the question of Alsace Lorraine, on the influence of textbooks, on the attitude of the worker movement. The fascinating question of the sudden nationalist revival at the turn of the century is approached from many angles, although obviously not solved. Equally fascinating is an article by Prof. Henri Bernard, on the link, in the same period, between nationalist ideology and the prevailing French military doctrine of unconditional offensive. Prof. Raymond Poitevin sums up—in twelve pages—his important thesis about Franco-German economic and financial relations, showing they were more influenced by ideological and political factors than vice versa. All these chapters contain highly interesting material but are not related to the general problem by any analytical framework or any serious discussion aiming at drawing the general lessons, if any, to be learned from their studies.

Finally, three papers stand out as providing the combination of generality and precision which the volume lacks as a whole. Prof. M. Weyembergh on "The Philosophical Bases of Nationalism" has deliberately chosen to avoid vague generalizations and to concentrate on a specific case, that of the influence of Fichte's thought on German nationalism. But he does so on the basis of a very rigorous and rewarding attempt at defining the nature of ideology, its relations to philosophy and at raising important questions about the political influence of ideas.

Prof. Goriely's paper, on "The Social and Psychological bases of Nationalism" also concentrates on a specific case, that of World War I. But in his quite brilliant discussion of its origins, as well as of the Versailles settlement, he manages to contribute illuminating insights to the question of relations between nationalism and imperialism and to the polemics between Marxist and non-Marxist interpretations.

Finally, Prof. Röling's paper, "Peace, a Problem of World Structure" is the most general of the group I have singled out and even of the book as a whole, since it is a general presentation of the author's views about peace and peace research. But its intellectual virtues are such that it does shed light on the problem of nationalism as well as on that of war. The central point, presented in the terms of the debate which was raging in Europe, a few years ago, between classical and revolutionary peace research, or between the advocates of negative and of positive peace, reminds one of K. Waltz's discussion of the three images in *Man, the State and War*. Essentially Röling shows the danger of confusing the search for justice and the search for peace, of implying that social inequality, however defined, is the cause of war and of neglecting the specific character and dangers of the interstate structure as such.

To the extent, then, that a message emerges from the best articles in the collection, its points to the importance of political, psychological, and cultural factors and to the obscurities of their links with social and economic changes, tensions and conflicts. Many areas (like the Third World) and aspects are practically left untouched. But, uneven and chaotic as it is, the book does serve a useful function: it shows (at least implicitly) the mutual relevance of discussions which are usually kept separate. It leads the way towards a reconsidera-

tion of peace research in the light of political philosophy and of current polemics on nationalism and the fate of the nation-state in the light of detailed historical studies.

PIERRE HASSNER
Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques (France)

Things to Come: Thinking about the Seventies and Eighties. By Herman Kahn and Barry Bruce-Briggs. (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1972. Pp. 262. $6.95.)

Things To Come is supposed to enlighten a concerned and educated public about the issues, problems, and opportunities of the seventies and eighties. It is also an introduction to the assumptions, methods, and language used by the Hudson Institute.

Kahn and Bruce-Briggs update and popularize ideas discussed earlier in Kahn's *The Emerging Japanese Superstate* (1970) and Kahn and Anthony J. Wiener's *The Year 2000* (1967). Readers familiar with these works will recognize the "Long-term Multifold Trend of Western Culture" (somewhat modified) and the extensive use of tables, "chartpages," scenarios, historical analogies, and "surprise-free projections" illustrating the spread of military technology, possibilities of nuclear and conventional war, continued growth in the Japanese economy, and possible changes in the distribution of power in the international system.

New material appears in a detailed comparison between the contemporary world and "La Belle Epoque" (1900–1914) and in a thoughtful warning that uncontrolled technological advances in an "undersized and underorganized" environment may lead to a disastrous technological crisis around 1985. For the domestic American scene the authors develop neutral, optimistic, and pessimistic scenarios, consider domestic consequences of a Vietnam debacle, explore potential confrontations between countervailing forces (the Reformation and Counterreformation act as analogies for the counterculture and possible populist or "ideological renewal" reactions), and comment schematically on the nature of postindustrial society.

The intended audience may find the presentation of these topics less appealing than do the authors. Wells, Huxley, and even Toffler show much greater sensitivity to the interests, dreams, and fears of contemporary Americans. Besides, readers will search in vain for meaningful examples portraying life in a future America, general themes uniting the disparate chapters, or any apparent overall organization by subject matter. There is no bibliography and few references to other published research, and the promised "introduction to the techniques and assumptions of futurology and policy research" (p. 4) is extremely disappointing. The authors simply do not furnish enough information on their methodology, sources, or reasoning in specific cases to allow the average reader to arrive at an independent judgment. One might argue that the reasoning underlying the forecasts may be more interesting than the forecasts themselves.

Readers will be reminded frequently that nothing becomes obsolete more rapidly than a work on the future. The expectations of better ballistic missile defenses and continued hostile relations with Peking are less striking in light of recent events in the Middle East (an area virtually ignored) than is a touching confidence in continued high rates of economic growth, agricultural overproduction, and the decreasing relevance of military force. The rise of a dictator or the assassination of a president may be impossible to predict, but given its resources one would expect that the Hudson Institute would not overlook basic features of the physical and social environment. Nevertheless, the authors do not consider seriously the *possibility* of major changes in weather patterns, the cumulative effects of population growth and the technology of synthetics, simultaneous high rates of inflation and unemployment, stagflation, the political use of natural resources by the Arab nations, or the dependence of Japanese industrialists and Green Revolution farmers on large amounts of inexpensive oil.

The extensive use of historical trends and analogies is based, I suspect, on the sound belief that only an analysis solidly grounded in the past is capable of distinguishing between important changes and superficial, local, or short-term phenomena. Nevertheless, in the absence of any explanatory model of historical development or any theoretical framework integrating social and cultural phenomena, the static historical analogies between contemporary society and La Belle Epoque or the Hellenistic world serve more as scholarly cosmetics than as sources of persuasive insights into future developments in Western society.

Equally disturbing are stereotype portraits of social groups and national character, ambiguous or simplistic statements in tables and scenarios, and serious flaws in theory and methodology. For example, the ethnocentric list of "The 12 Traditional Societal Levers" (p. 78) caricatures anthropology and psychology when the authors argue that twelve disparate and nebulous factors [e.g., 1) "Religion, tradition, and authority;" 4) "Defense of frontiers (territoriality);" 8) "The manly emphasis;" 9) "The puritan ethic;" 11) "Other sublimation and/or repression of sexual, aggressive, aesthetic, and/or other instincts;" and so forth] historically provided "meaning and purpose to life" for Western man. In the subsequent

discussion of the erosion of these "levers" among upper and upper-middle class youth, it becomes apparent that "Western man" also includes Mexico, Colombia, and Japan. Another example is "The Long-term Multifold Trend of Western Culture" (p. 8) which is made up of different classes of phenomena in no way exhaustive or mutually exclusive. More important, the absence of cultural, historical, or geographic distinctions suggests an improbably uniform route of development for all Western societies, while leaving in limbo the fate of the non-Western majority of the world.

Kahn and Bruce-Briggs create a credibility gap, particularly for a younger generation, when they claim, "We have tried to take a 'value-free' perspective, indulging in attempts to achieve what Marxists sneeringly call 'bourgeois objectivity' " (p. 244). The optimistic and pessimistic scenarios in chapter six, the chart comparing "probably healthy" and "probably unhealthy" life styles (p. 79), the smug, unsympathetic description of the counterculture (p. 92), the speculations about a confrontation between the "responsible center" and the irresponsible "humanist left" (p. 82) leave little doubt about the authors' real sympathies.

In conclusion, the defects of *Things To Come* are likely to deter the general reader, unless he is searching for an all-too-revealing insight into the mentality of a think tank which is as influential among politicians and businessmen in France and Japan as it is in North America. It is obvious, however, that considerable research and thought have gone into the formulation and organization of the numerous tables and scenarios. Specialists in international affairs and future studies will find these to be useful sources of interesting ideas and stimulating insights. The whole may be less than the sum of the parts, but many of the parts deserve close attention.

PHILIP HONE AUERBACH
Cornell University

The Revolutions of 1848–49: Articles from the "Neue Rheinische Zeitung." By Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels. (New York: International Publishers, 1972. Pp. 302. $2.25, paper.)

More than ever before, we have now in English, in readily available and inexpensive editions, the writings of Marx and Engels. Some, like *The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* and the *Grundrisse*, were unknown to Marxian scholars of twenty, or even ten years ago. International Publisher's recent volume, *The Revolution of 1848–49: Articles from the "Neue Rheinische Zeitung"* is a welcome addition to the growing list of easily accessible primary documents, for it brings together in compact form some of the most important of Marx and Engel's journalist writings of that important era of European revolution. The complete "Neue Rheinische Zeitung" contributions of Marx and Engels will appear in the forthcoming English edition of their collected works.

This growing list of readily available primary texts is important. When pieces like *The German Ideology* or *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* made their appearance, minor revolutions in the interpretation of Marx occurred. Those documents initiated the early-late Marx controversy. The more recent publication in English of *The Grundrisse* has further complicated the picture of Marx's intellectual development, and of what we are to make of it. The lesson, then, appears to be this. The Marxists and anti-Marxists of, for example, the period of the Second International had a very truncated, one-sided view of Marx. As more texts come to light or make their impact by being widely disseminated, our picture of Marx and Engels grows fuller and richer. No one restricted to English can, I think, arrive at any "final" understanding of Marx and Engels until the English-language edition of the collected works appears, for only then will we have a fully formed picture of just what they said. One impression that occurred to me after reading the present selection, for instance, is the implausibility of the claim that Marx contemplated a nonrevolutionary road to communism, a claim put forward by Shlomo Avineri in his *The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968). One cannot select suitable parts of Marx and Engel's writings; each part must be interpreted in the light of the whole corpus. When this is done, whatever slender "evidence" there may be in Marx for a nonrevolutionary road becomes swallowed up by the larger picture that emerges from, for instance, his writings of the 1848–49 period.

The volume itself is, happily in this day of inflation, inexpensively priced at $2.25. It comes with a useless, eleven-page foreword signed by one "S. Z. Leviova," which reads like a Soviet school textbook on European history. The subtlety of Marx and Engels' own analyses are caricatured by the banalities of the foreword. A less strident, more straightforward introduction setting out clearly the main developments of the 1848–1849 period would have been a useful addition for those readers who lack familiarity with nineteenth century European history.

DAVID-HILLEL RUBEN
University of Essex

52 Peaceful Societies. By Matthew Melko. (Ontario, Canada: Canadian Peace Research Institute Press, 1973. Pp. 223. $7.00, cloth; $3.00, paper.)

This is a pioneering study, somewhat in the tradition of Lewis F. Richardson's *Statistics of Deadly Quarrels*, of an extensive sample of societies which have had 100 years or more of peace, from 2560 B.C. to the present. The societies are all "historical" in the sense that information about them is derived mainly from written records. These episodes range widely over time and space; there is hardly a century in the last 2,000 years, at least, when there is not a century of peace going on somewhere in the world, and every continent is represented with the rather odd exception of South America, Costa Rica being the only Latin American representative.

The definition of peace is perhaps open to question. The author who teaches at S.U.N.Y. at Genesco, N.Y., in effect defines peace as existing for a territory when actual physical violence on a large organized scale is not proceeding within the area. Many of the countries which he cites are at war elsewhere in the period which he defines as peace, so that the essential criterion is whether actual combat is taking place within the area concerned. Consequently, some of his peaceful centuries involve a great deal of fighting on the part of the societies concerned, but as long as this is carried on elsewhere, the situation is defined as peace. The author seems a little uneasy himself about this definition, but it can be defended as a significant social state.

What the author calls "peace," therefore, might perhaps better be called "non-battlegrounds." If the author had defined these in terms of smaller areas, rather than national units, the number of periods of peace would have been very much larger. Thus, we might visualize a large matrix in which, say, every ten square miles of the earth's surface is laid out on one axis and every year for the last 5000 years on the other. We could color each square red if warlike operations were going on in it, white if it were not. Then the "peace" that we are really studying equals the white squares of this matrix. The matrix would almost certainly show, incidentally, that peace is by far and away the prevailing pattern of human activity. One would be a little surprised if more than 5 per cent of the squares of this matrix would be colored red. In order to identify war rather than peace, we would require a much more complex three-dimensional matrix, showing all national war-making units on two axes, with all possible pairs in the triangle between them and the time dimension on the third axis. A red cube would show where any two countries had been at war on a given date. This, however, would have to be the subject of another study.

Having identified the periods of peace on this definition, the author then proceeds to study their common characteristics. He finds they frequently originate with a charismatic leader, followed by an organizationally skilled consolidator. He classifies the societies into four types—insular, imperial, inter-state systems, and interstice states or buffer states. After the establishment of a well-ordered society, at least, mediocrity and efficiency, tepid ideologies, modest ambitions, and the tendency not to make alliances seem good recipes for a long peace. The form of the political and economic system, common languages or cultures, arms control and disarmament agreements, and population densities seem to have made very little difference. The consequences of a long peace seem to be benign; it does seem to produce prosperity—peaceful societies are often vital and active in the arts and are not dull.

On the other hand, the conditions which produced the long peace always eventually seem to erode. The author does not make use of the theory of threat systems, which obviously would seem to be helpful here, but it is clear that insofar as a long peace rests on a certain stability in perceptions of threat, this will erode as old threat centers decay and new ones arise. Peace ends perhaps because the mediocrity and modesty which produce it are not adaptable enough to deal with new situations. Mediocre people can end a peace very easily; it takes rather exceptional people to establish it.

The book is very clearly written and embellished with useful tables and maps. Students will find it fascinating. It would be extremely useful in the burgeoning peace studies programs, but it would be useful, also, in more conventional international relations courses. It would give the student a sense of the totality of the international system as it spreads out over time and space. It is an excellent exercise in what might be called the "entification" of history, that is, a perception of space-time entities within the total pattern of space-time and the classification of these entities into species. The "long peace" entity, which the author identifies, is perhaps a somewhat arbitrary species—many others could be delineated—but it is at least as clear and as interesting as most social species, and further studies of this kind are much to be recommended.

KENNETH E. BOULDING
University of Colorado

Tudor Men and Institutions: Studies in English Law and Government. Edited by Arthur J. Slavin. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1972. Pp. viii, 294. $11.95.)

Tudor men rather than Tudor institutions dominate this volume published in honor of Professor Walter C. Richardson. In the first of these ten essays Stanford E. Lehmberg surveys one of the most spectacular success stories in English history,

the remarkable career of Lord Chancellor Thomas Audley (d.1544) and investigates how he acquired his vast wealth. (This inquiry is all the more valuable because there is still no study of the property accumulated by Thomas Cromwell.) Mortimer Levine on "The Fall of Edward, duke of Buckingham" is disappointing and misleading; although he was the most powerful English nobleman of his day, the last Stafford duke of Buckingham cannot be regarded as "a great magnate of the fifteenth-century type" (p. 34), nor did he enjoy an enormous annual landed income of over £6,000. In "Lord Chancellor Wriothesley and Reform of Augmentations: New Light on an Old Court," A. J. Slavin publishes for the first time (from a manuscript in the Hampshire County Record Office) an important memorandum probably written by Wriothesley late in 1546, shortly before his fall. J. R. Lander's skeptical and well-documented essay on "The Hundred Years War and Edward IV's 1475 Campaign in France" will command attention, but it does seem incongruous in a volume devoted to Tudor studies.

Three of the more substantial contributions deal with aspects of the judicial activities of royal courts. By analyzing the plea roll for 1506–1507, DeLloyd J. Guth shows that although royal justice was expanding in the early Tudor period, the common-law jurisdiction of the Exchequer of Pleas had become relatively insignificant. In the late sixteenth century the Exchequer of Chester had lost its fiscal jurisdiction, but as a court of law it had gained a new place in the Tudor governmental system; W. H. Jones's "The Exchequer of Chester in the last years of Elizabeth I" (the longest chapter in this volume) examines the difficulties that this court was encountering before 1600 and considers its eventual failure in the seventeenth century to meet the judicial needs of the county palatine. In "The Enforcement of Royal Proclamations under the Provisions of the Statute of Proclamations, 1539–1547," R. W. Heinze concludes that after the Statute of Proclamations of 1539 royal proclamations were enforced by the Court of Star Chamber (and not by the new court created by that statute). Connoisseurs of administrative history will find this book indispensable, and ecclesiastical and legal history have not been neglected. In "The Essex Puritan Movement and the Bawdy Courts, 1577–94," Jay P. Anglin's main theme is the limited success that accompanied the efforts of Archbishop Whitgift and Bishop John Aylmer (d.1594) of London to secure clerical conformity in Essex. A major expansion in the Inns of Court at which lawyers were educated took place during Elizabeth I's reign; in "The Matriculation Revolution and Education at the Inns of Court in Renaissance England," Louis A. Knafla studies the causes and consequences of one of the most important developments that occurred in higher education in Tudor England.

The last writer, G. R. Elton on "The Rule of Law in sixteenth-century England" is likely to prove the most controversial (and widely read) of these contributors. Dr. Elton regards "the essential character of the Tudor state" as "a slightly old-fashioned problem" (p. 265). While refuting the views of W. H. Dunham, Jr., and Joel Hurstfield, and maintaining convincingly that even in Henry VIII's reign Tudor government never became a despotism, Elton observes that "Tudor rulers, like all rulers, occasionally did things that were not lawful." He sees the executive power of the crown in sixteenth-century England as subject to two great limitations; these were royal "dependence on a network of self-reliant men throughout the realm" (p. 294) and the rule of law. This interesting volume is a fitting tribute to one of the most distinguished of Tudor historians; its usefulness would have been enhanced by the inclusion of an index.

T. B. Pugh
University of Southampton, England

The Becket Conflict and the Schools: A Study of Intellectuals in Politics in the Twelfth Century. By Beryl Smalley. (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1973. Pp. 258. $13.50.)

Professor Beryl Smalley writes with the noble simplicity and charm of a medieval Master. The theme of her book, as the title suggests, is not Becket himself, whose story has been told many times, but the role played by contemporary theologians in his struggle with Henry II over the liberties of the Church in England. On the issue at hand Smalley professes to remain neutral. Her purpose is not to pass judgment on the various theologians involved in the controversy but to determine (a) what their political views were and (b) whether they were prepared to act on them "when the crunch came" (p. 17).

Recent historical research has shown that the twelfth-century schoolmen (Smalley's "intellectuals") were far from being as free from political pressures as was once commonly thought. They depended on the Church for their livelihood and protection and would normally have been expected to side with her in the event of a conflict with the secular authority. The Becket controversy, which "marked high tide in the claims of *sacerdotium* against *regnum*" (p. 239), provided a unique test of the sincerity of their intellectual convictions. It gave rise, among other things, to a new kind of political theology promoted mainly by the Paris schools, whose Masters were to have an immediate and decisive influence on the formation of clerical opinion.

The book reveals beyond the shadow of a doubt that, contrary to what has often been asserted, these theologians were not bribed and willing agents of the papacy; nor were they detached scholars indifferent to the burning issues of the day. Most of them were politically committed clerics whose ardor had to be restrained rather than stimulated by the Pope (see p. 157). Their views differed widely. The Paris Masters and their followers rallied behind Becket and became his most effective propagandists. Others, like the Henrician Gilbert Foliot, were against Becket from the start and never wavered in their opposition to him. What is remarkable is that virtually all of them seem to have been guided by principle rather than by self-interest, as is borne out by their readiness to suffer poverty, loss of ecclesiastical or political favor, and, in Becket's case, martyrdom for the sake of their cause.

Smalley's "hero," if the term is not inappropriate, would appear to be neither the uncompromising Becket nor his opponent, Henry, but Pope Alexander III, who emerges as the true "theorist" of expediency (p. 159). Like Becket, Alexander was fully dedicated to the defense of the Church, but he also proved to be a man of keen political sense. If the author is correct, it was he who first devised the theory of *raison d'Eglise*, by which he managed to save his own face all of the time and that of his theologians most of the time (p. 239).

Equally instructive from the standpoint of the history of Church-State relations are the side effects of the controversy. Not long after Becket's death, his own admirers began to develop "second thoughts" about the whole matter (pp. 216–34). Even Herbert of Basham, who had been his closest friend and advisor, was forced to concede that the bitter conflict had brought harm to both the religious and the secular powers. The prevailing mood at the end of the century is best illustrated by the example of Albert of Louvain, whose assassination at the hands of the Emperor, Henry VI, in circumstances not unlike those of Becket, created barely a ripple in ecclesiastical circles. Albert's murder came "too late to be noticed" (p. 215). Becket's successors had learned to approach their task with a more practical, down-to-earth outlook. New problems and new modes of thought had already started to solicit the attention of the schoolmen, who now took a more positive view of the secular authority and recognized its indispensable function in promoting the good of society.

Smalley is obviously more at home with the complexities of history than with the abstractions of political theory. She is at her best when she describes the careers and political activities of the twelfth-century Masters, the academic reaction to Becket's assassination, and the cult which grew up around the martyr in the years that followed his demise. Her remarks on the subject of political allegory (pp. 30–36) add much to our knowledge of that important but often neglected genre and serve as a useful complement to H. de Lubac's classic study of medieval exegesis. One regrets that, in the case of certain, more subtle thinkers, such as John of Salisbury, greater care has not been taken to penetrate beneath the surface of the argument to the level at which the inconsistencies noted by the author (e.g., p. 100) might find their deeper unity.

ERNEST L. FORTIN

Boston College

The Ideological Origins of Black Nationalism. By Sterling Stuckey. (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1972. Pp. 265. $8.95.)

The Black Muslims in America. By C. Eric Lincoln. (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1973, originally published, 1961. Pp. 302. $2.95.)

The nature, scope, and manifestations of black nationalism in this country have recently gained significant attention from social scientists. Recent movements such as the Black Power Movement, the Republic of New Africa Movement, the Black Panther Party and the rise in black elected officials have aided in the emergence of new studies and explorations such as these two works.

Professor Stuckey's work journeys into the past in search of documents and spokesmen for black nationalism and he succeeds in finding some. The documents in his book, he notes in the introduction, "indicate that black nationalist ideology, contrary to the view advanced in certain quarters, developed at least two decades before Martin Delany became nationally known for his advocacy of black hegemony" (p. 2). Using seven documents ranging from Robert Alexander Young's *Ethiopian Manifesto* issued in 1829, to Martin Delany's *The Political Destiny of the Colored Race* issued in 1854, Stuckey shows that black nationalism did exist and indeed flowered during the nineteenth century. In his introduction, he indicates how each man in this period used the resources then available to him to propogate his ideas on the destiny of the black race.

In the first document by Robert Young, the inferior place in society relegated to those of African decent is clearly set forth. David Walker's document is an address in nationalist language urging the slaves to rebel. In the third document, Reverend Lewis Woodson lays bare a plan for the moral elevation of black people based on the creative dimensions of Afro-American culture. The fourth and fifth documents argue for and advance numerous schemes for building a black nation relying primarily upon self-help. And the final

document by Martin Delany shows the search for a land for black people. An excellent introduction by the editor, Stuckey, ties all of these documents together.

Stuckey concludes by stating that during this era, "there were no monolithic conceptions of black nationalism projected by (any) nationalist figures." The idea of black nationalism then as now lacked unity, and specificity. These insights and some of the documents which cannot be easily obtained elsewhere make the volume extremely valuable.

On the other hand, Professor C. Eric Lincoln's revised work on the Black Muslim movement captures an organizational manifestation of black nationalism in contemporary society. The book is still the *best* study of how a segment of the black community has operationalized aspects of black nationalism to save and improve their self-concepts and adjust to a white racist society. Lincoln writes: "The Muslims have abandoned the fundamental principles of the American creed and have substituted in its place a new system of values perceived as more consistent with the realities of their circumstances" (p. xxix). This new system of values for the Muslims embraced the fact that not only should they

> resist assimilation and avoid interracial participation in the life of the community, but the Muslim creed assigns all non-blacks to the sub-human status of "devils" (and promises to treat them as such); the sustaining philosophy is one of black supremacy nurtured by a careful inculcation of suspicions of the white man and his characteristic institutions. (p. xxix).

The revisions which have been made in chapters 1 and 5–9, set the Muslim movement in the context of the Civil Rights movement of the sixties as well as linking it to some of the new black organizations that came into existence then. In addition, the book also sheds some light on those blacks of the "Moslem" faith that oppose the Black Muslim sect in this country.

Both books provide visions into one aspect of black political thought, its conflicts and ambiguities as well as its practical applications. And both works provide an array of insights into the forces seeking to combat this sociopolitical ideology. For the political scientist, the historical work by Stuckey gives depth and a longitudinal thrust, while the sociological work by Lincoln depicts the institutional realities. These unique approaches provide the background for the possible forthcoming political expression of this present socioreligious phenomenon.

HANES WALTON, JR.
Savannah State College

The F. D. R. Memoirs: A Speculation on History. By Bernard Asbell. (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1973. Pp. 461. $10.00.)

Bernard Asbell, a free-lance author, has added to the voluminous literature on Franklin D. Roosevelt by ghost-writing the President's memoirs nearly thirty years after his death. This is his second book on Roosevelt. In an earlier study, *When Roosevelt Died* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), he described public reaction to the death of the thirty-second president. The idea for the present work came up when the author and two editor friends were discussing presidents and lamenting that FDR had not lived to write his memoirs. Asbell accepted the challenge of filling the historical gap, believing that through this unusual technique he could reveal more fully the mind and character of a complex personality.

Actually the author takes two approaches to his subject. One is through a first-person narrative, extending in time from preinauguration days through the end of the second term. In these chapters he has FDR re-creating the crisis atmosphere, expounding his political philosophy, and explaining the strategy for enacting specific programs for coping with the economic and social ills of the nation. There are also appraisals of political friends and foes, as well as commentary on the deficiencies of Congress and the Supreme Court. A second approach is through biographical vignettes which focus on selected aspects of FDR's life. These are included at the end of each memoir chapter as an aid to understanding the linkage between Roosevelt's public acts and private life. Such is the format of the book.

Reading the memoirs is reminiscent of listening to the fireside chats. The tone is conversational and the style simplistic. The President is speaking again to the people about agricultural crops, conservation, emergency relief, the Blue Eagle, wages and hours, and other New Deal landmarks. It is a familiar story told in an uncritical way and offering no new insights or revelations to scholars in the field. The memoirs will be of interest primarily to the general reader and secondary school student looking for a novel and readable introduction to the New Deal period. Whether Roosevelt himself, in retrospect and with perspective, would have written such a superficial account of the first eight years it is impossible to know. In any case the ghosted posthumous memoir serves as an inadequate substitute for an original.

The biographical essays are well done. Asbell made use of the Roosevelt papers at Hyde Park, conducted interviews, and assimilated a great deal of secondary literature. The analyses and interpretations of FDR's relationship with his mother, of the Lucy Mercer affair, and especially of the

role of Missy LeHand in his life, are illuminating and perceptive. These chapters are a necessary and valuable complement to the memoirs. Through them the author succeeds to some extent in penetrating to the inner man. The book as a whole, however, does not live up to the claim on the cover of being a creative breakthrough in the art of biography.

PAUL T. HEFFRON

Library of Congress

The Political Status of the Negro in the Age of FDR. By Ralph J. Bunche. Edited with an Introduction by Dewey W. Grantham. (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1973. Pp. 682. $17.50.)

This publication contains the basic findings presented in a massive report prepared in 1940 by Ralph Johnson Bunche for the Carnegie Corporation's study of the Negro in the United States. Entitled "The Political Status of the Negro," this report strongly conditioned Gunnar Myrdal's treatment of the black political experience in writing *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy*, the most comprehensive study of race relations in America ever undertaken. Dr. Bunche, then a young professor of political science at Howard University, was a principal member of Myrdal's staff of scholars and helped to develop the research design for the study.

The report, one of four memoranda Bunche prepared, was based upon extensive field notes on several hundred interviews conducted by Bunche, Myrdal, and Bunche's assistants. However, the report also reflected Bunche's experience as a black American, and his long interest in the black political experience.

Developed as a working paper for Myrdal's use, Bunche's memorandum, he emphasized, was "not a finished product" (p. vii), because meeting stringent deadlines had inevitably resulted in "a terribly hurried, poorly integrated, and roughly written job" (p. viii). Thus the editor, Professor Dewey W. Grantham, somewhat overstates the manuscript's weaknesses in explaining the editing he did—which was relatively minor. He found it nevertheless, to be "impressive" and could "only admire the ambitious scope of the study, the care with which it dealt with many aspects of the subject and the seriousness of purpose and scholarly commitment that are reflected in its pages" (p. xxxi).

Consisting of 1,660 typed pages in its original form, this comprehensive report is divided into 19 chapters. The first parts examine the American political tradition and the historical background for the study of the political condition of black Americans in modern times. Other chapters deal with politics in the contemporary South, restrictions on registration and voting, the white primary, the poll tax, the Negro at the polls in the inner and outer South, Negro participation in the Agricultural Adjustment Administration's (AAA) cotton referenda, Negroes in selected southern cities, the Negro as an issue in southern politics, benefits derived from black political activity, Republican politics in southern states, liberalism in the South, black political participation in the North, and the Negro and New Deal agencies. An extensive bibliography prepared by the editor is included.

In his careful examination of the entire southern political process, Bunche focused upon three salient features: (1) the extreme decentralization, looseness, and incredibly corrupt political practices; (2) the tremendous extent of disfranchisement of both blacks and whites; and (3) the almost complete lack of effective reform movements at the local level. Though there were variations between and within states, all across Dixie overwhelming evidence was found of a pattern of inefficient, unfair, and fraudulent electoral administration, often in an atmosphere of intimidation and violence. Ignorance, dishonesty, and deepseated prejudice were found to be rampant among southern election officials. Voluminous testimony indicated that in support of corrupt county and municipal political machines, "Votes are controlled, and checked by registration slips, the 'chain letter' system, vote buying, poll tax payment, double voting, vote stealing, 'counting out' unfortunate candidates, employment of 'agents' to sign up voters, and many variations of these methods" (p. xviii).

Despite black southerners' enormous political and economic burdens and feelings of hopelessness, Bunche perceived the Southland to be in a period of transiton. For although the black masses remained disfranchised, he detected significant beginnings of change. With growing numbers of Negroes showing increasing determination to enter politics, "there has been a gradual easing of barriers. . ." and black registration and voting were slowly expanding. Despite the many obstacles placed in their way, Bunche reported, blacks in some parts of the South, like those in the North, were learning that the ballot is negotiable and can be used to secure better public services, jobs, fairer treatment, etc.

This volume reveals the nature of Bunche's view of the race problem and his perceptions of the human condition. Nowhere can there be found a more incisive and forthright indictment of the failure of American society toward black citizens, whose conditions "make a mockery of the Constitution." He recognized that in 1940 "the United States has all the necessary raw materials for a native American fascism," and that "the Negro is no longer indispensable in this country. . ." (p.

113). But, though deeply sensitive to the disabilities of blacks, Bunche never succumbs to racial chauvinism. He is also concerned about poor, exploited whites and other minority groups. He believes "that there is a virtual identity of fundamental interest between Negro and white citizens" (p. 104). And he insists that

> . . . it is useless to think in terms of full Negro citizenship so long as white and black citizens must engage in daily violent struggle for the wherewithal of life. This is the process that feeds fuel to the fires of race prejudice and perpetuates those mores which stand guard against Negro entrance to the polls. The economy must afford a far larger measure of security for all before the Negro can hope for much greater political advancement (p. 117).

Assessing its significance, the editor notes that numerous scholars have used Bunche's manuscript and have been influenced by his interpretation of southern politics. It should be added that a generation of students, impressed by Bunche's scholarly insights, have addressed many of the questions he posed for study. Accordingly his impact upon the literature of black politics and the American system has been substantial and lasting.

Perhaps Professor Grantham's main error was his view that Bunche may have "exaggerated the significance of the black man's participation in the cotton referenda" (p. xxv). I myself was able to confirm Bunche's evaluation of the importance of this voting experience in an intensive study of "Negro-White Participation in the AAA Cotton and Tobacco Referenda . . ." (Doctoral dissertation, University of Chicago, 1947).

This remarkable and very useful document is of great historical significance as an instrument by which to measure meaningful change in the political status of black Americans. The second Reconstruction cannot be assessed without knowledge of the conditions illuminated so effectively in Dr. Bunche's memorandum.

ROBERT E. MARTIN
Howard University

Urban Liberalism and Progressive Reform. By John D. Buenker. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973. Pp. 299. $8.95.)

Professor Buenker tells us that:

> U.S. history, until very recently, has been almost exclusively the story of the native, Protestant middle class. Only . . . with the rise of significant numbers of non-British-American historians, have the sagas of blacks, Indians, Chicanos, and others been investigated to any degree. Even then, the greatest problem has been integrating their experiences into the entire fabric of American history, because they square so little with prevailing interpretations. (p. 212)

The "prevailing interpretation" which Professor Buenker challenges is that of the limited or negative role of the urban new-stock masses in the making of the reforms of the Progressive Era. Instead, Buenker argues that the urban new-stock working class elected Democrats who were a crucial component of most of the reform coalitions.

The primary data are newspaper reports and official legislative records of debates and votes in the state legislatures of New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Ohio, and Illinois. Buenker uses these data to demonstrate that, on the key reform issues, the bulk of the urban ethnic Democrats consistently supported reforms.

Chapters are devoted to early welfare legislation, business regulation and taxation, reforms in the political system, and the prohibition movement. Urban legislators were strong supporters of early welfare legislation including workmens' compensation, industrial health codes, limitations on the number of working hours, and restrictions on the employment of women and children. These same legislators supported efforts to regulate big business (especially public utilities) and to ratify the income tax amendment.

Contrary to the "prevailing interpretation," the roll-call record of the urban legislators is also positive on most "good government" reforms. The urbanites favored the direct election of senators, home rule, reapportionment, initiative and referendum (means of bypassing rural controlled legislatures), and direct primaries. They opposed civil service, the city manager and woman suffrage although most adjusted to the inevitability of woman suffrage and supported the amendment in the end.

Urban lawmakers broke with middle-class progressives over the issue of prohibition. Buenker argues that the ritualistic religious traditions to which most of the urbanites adhered contrasted to the middle-class pietistic traditions which stressed the responsibility of its adherents to improve the individual morality of everyone. Out of these pietistic traditions came the crusade for prohibition. Although the new-stock machine politicians and the middle-class reformers could and did cooperate on many issues (most reform could not have taken place without such coalitions which often included labor), they were at loggerheads over prohibition.

Does Buenker make a convincing case for the reform contributions of the urban new-stock Americans? Yes, but there are still some doubts.

First, the terms urban, new-stock, machine, and Democratic are used almost interchangeably. But, many legislators from urban areas were neither new-stock nor Democratic nor supported by a machine. Buenker show convincingly that urban

legislators provided crucial support on many progressive votes, but rarely differentiates among types of urban legislators.

Second, there are no criteria supplied for the selection of the seven states. Would the conclusions have been the same in, for instance, Pennsylvania with its Republican machine of Matthew Quay, Boise Pentrose, and the Vare brothers?

Third, Buenker wishes to applaud the urban, new-stock masses for their progressivism, but his data entirely deal with elite behavior. Since at least on the national level, the linkage between constituency attitudes and representatives' behavior is weak (Miller and Stokes, 1963), the electing of progressive legislators is not by itself convincing evidence of the progressive attitudes of the urban masses. Referenda data, which might provide a more direct measure of the views of the urbanites, are mentioned sparingly and unsystematically.

Fourth, the book is both an extensive overview and a series of intensive case studies. As such, it suffers from some of the limitations of both kinds of study. It covers the reform battles in seven states, yet these data are hardly sufficient to permit generalization to the entire country. On the other hand, dealing with seven states over a twenty-year period on a myriad of issues in under three hundred pages produces oversimplifications and leaps beyond the limitations of the data (e.g., [p. 107] "popular agitation forced the Republican party to propose a corporation tax in 1910. . . .").

Nevertheless, *Urban Liberalism and Progressive Reform* is an important work on a neglected topic. Buenker demonstrates that archival sources can be used to produce sound research into the origins of public policy at the state level. He also shows that machine politicians were a leading component of the coalitions which enacted progressive legislation. While not beatifying "Bathhouse John" Coughlin, George Washington Plunkitt, Martin Lomasney and their compatriots, Buenker does emphasize the tangible policy accomplishments of the urban machine politicians. This book, replete with clearly testable propositions, is an important step in the development of a balanced and accurate understanding of the role of political machines in the early years of the twentieth century.

ROBERT E. O'CONNOR
The Pennsylvania State University

Uncommon Sense. By James MacGregor Burns. (New York: Harper and Row, 1972. Pp. xi, 196. $6.95.)

Like many other citizens, James MacGregor Burns is unhappy with the thrust and fragmentation of American governmental policy. In this short book he turns his notable analytical powers and stirring literary style toward examining causes of difficulties and proposing changes that may serve to remedy them. In the spirit of the bicentennial period he calls for a reapplication of that uncommon sense necessary to reorganize a polity.

"It is the failure of government," Burns writes (p. 7), "to anticipate and manage . . . social change . . . that most directly lies at the source of our difficulties." Historic governmental weakness and the strength of competing social institutions, as well as frequent confusion of means or processes with basic social ends, have contributed to that failure. Those social goals, he submits, must have a new and effective priority. They are essentially two in number: (1) individual liberty, both positive and negative, and (2) equality not only of opportunity but also, to a far greater extent, of condition. Subsumed within them (pp. 11–12) are other problems of high priority: the economy, poverty, crime and violence, education, the environment, drug addiction, military and industrial concentration. Protecting the environment is one of Burns's highest priorities (p. 14) because he is convinced that such action will enhance both liberty and equality.

There is far more in this book than institutional analysis and prescription. Illustrative accounts of America's modern travails, domestic and foreign, add framework and perspective. In orientation they are sensitively but in the main moderately liberal. Burns is opposed to violence, pointing out (p. 61) that revolutionary thinkers in America have been "highly deficient" in analyzing "the extent to which they can bring the morality in their own goals to bear on the means they propose to adopt." Uncompromised values (p. 117), not polarization, are his objective. Interspersed appraisals of major presidents from Theodore Roosevelt to Nixon are signally candid and evenhanded.

Burns's prescriptions are chiefly institutional or political. Economic analysis is not a major focus of his book. In foreign policy he strikes notes of caution, commenting that circumstances are often beyond American control and observing that Communist nations are likely to act in concert and to be slow in internal liberalization. He remains an advocate of a strong presidency, warning that (p. 53), particularly in foreign affairs, "no legislature can provide the steadiness, the restraint on the military and the activists, the timing, the concerted action, the consistency of policy that can at least be hoped for from the executive."

In domestic administration Burns would (p. 121) "establish the effective authority of the national government" over civil rights, abolition of poverty, and protection of the environment. Several hundred regional agencies should be established (p. 132) to bypass local governmental fragmentation and, if necessary, federal departmental levels.

He favors (p. 123) presidential power, subject to broad limits set by Congress, over spending and application of the tax laws. But he believes that Congress should be "nationalized" under far more party backing and discipline. A national party "fit to govern" is imperative. A coalition (p. 150) —perhaps unstable, if one may interpolate— might have as its core the urban poor, the blacks, the young, organized labor, and sizable sections of the white-collar middle class. But a national reform-minded party "fit to govern," whether it be the Democratic or a new party (pp. 153–154), must be goal-minded and inclusive while at the same time unattractive to conservatives.

Written before the impact of excesses broadly associated with the Watergate rubric, this idealistic but generally sensible book is all the more attractive now. Like Rexford G. Tugwell's longer and more historically oriented *The Emerging Constitution* (New York: Harper's Magazine Press, 1974), Professor Burns's book is fascinatingly suggestive rather than a probable blueprint for specific change. While it takes into account the weight of precedent in familiar institutions, it gives little notice to the changing moods of public opinion under varying and often unexpected economic pressures. One cannot be unmindful that the nation's centennial occurred in times of deepening crisis, even despair, and that if history has any lesson it is that the future will be different than we may suppose it now.

FRANKLIN L. BURDETTE
Late of University of Maryland, College Park

Consequences of Failure. By William R. Corson. (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1974, Pp. 215. $7.95.)

This book was completed in early 1973 and was published in September 1974, apparently without revisions. The result is a book in large part overtaken, even overwhelmed, by events. Ostensibly it is concerned with the meaning of our "failure" in Vietnam. (I use inverted commas because Dr. Corson gives the word a special meaning in contrast with the word "defeat.") In actual fact, it is a sermon for Americans on a variety of subjects— "creeping fascism" (a variation on Bertram Gross' "friendly facism"), "ecological genocide," and why this nation has "gone past the point of no return" (p. 151). Chronologically, the author could not foresee Watergate and its consequences; as a result his book is rather like a book about Noah which ends the first day he and his entourage entered the ark. It may also account for a peculiar sympathy for President Nixon who "reduced" wire-tapping, yet was unable to persuade the American people, because of their "general paranoia," that he had done so (p. 109).

To put it bluntly, Dr. Corson's book contains some high-sounding nonsense, all of which is too bad because when he writes about what he knows, he writes convincingly. The blurb tells us only that the author is a retired Marine of undetermined rank, who fought in World War II and Korea, that he has "lived, worked and traveled in Japan, China, Indonesia, Thailand, Burma, Laos and Cambodia throughout the Cold War years (and speaks the languages of these nations)." Whom he worked for or what he did in these countries the blurb does not say. He is presently described by his publishers "as a business and financial consultant."

The most hair-raising chapter focuses on the American military's "critical condition [which] is primarily due to America's failure in Vietnam" (p. 103). Our military has "become psychologically enfeebled and physically weakened to the point where its capacity to deter or repel real aggression is inadequate" (p. 74). In addition, the author says that the armed forces may soon be unable "to function in the real world" because of the high rate of desertions. There may be "one dubiously 'combat ready' division in the Army but it is doubtful that there are two" (p. 86). He adds that "mutinous behavior" has been institutionalized, while "internecine conflict in the military is a tragedy of epic proportions" (p. 89). If true, this is a rather serious finding in the era of "semi-alerts." The effect of Vietnam on the military is an aspect of the war which merits discussion particularly because there is evidence that military leaders opposed Asian adventurism in the early 1960s. (See Theodore Sorenson, *Kennedy*, p. 723; Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days*, pp. 302 and 306 and Roger Hilsman, *To Move a Nation*, pp. 128–9.)

After so fearsome an exposé of the internal state of the American military establishment, it is strange to read the author's prescription that the military should be given a "domestic action" role in order to help solve current social problems and to "help cure social ills while maintaining combat readiness" (p. 164). One might argue that praetorianism may be a short step away from the "creeping fascism" which concerns the author (p. 143).

One of the obstacles to evaluating the book is the paucity of sources for some of the more startling statements. For example, the author says that not only has the country's military leadership failed to solve the GI drug problem but, worse, the military leadership has also allowed " 'no-fire zones' [to be] designated to protect areas where opium poppies are known to be cultivated" (p. 82). From the context, it would appear that the author is talking about Vietnam. Now Alfred W. McCoy in *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972) writes: "Since

opium is not grown inside Vietnam, all of her drugs have to be imported" (p. 152). The imported narcotics come from what is called the Golden Triangle, 150,000 square miles of northeast Burma, north Thailand and north Laos. There are some opium-growing areas in North Vietnam, concentrated in the northern provinces bordering China. If Corson is not referring to "no-fire zones" in South Vietnam, where opium is not grown, is he implying that North Vietnam poppy-growing zones were declared off-limits to B-52s? Or is he suggesting that the Air Force should have bombed Thailand, Burma and Laos, the Golden Triangle, where poppies are cultivated, or what? It is unclear who is responsible for designating these "no-fire zones" and where, if not in Vietnam, they are located. Is the U.S. military in business with narcotics syndicates?

Another example of his difficulty with source material is his estimate that the Vietnam war cost $250 billion (p. 142). An Associated Press dispatch (International Herald Tribune, 25 January 1973) gave a figure of $137 billion, quite a difference. Corson criticizes the U.S. for attempting to preserve "the fiction of South Vietnam as a nation" (p. 18). Yet the Hanoi-Washington agreement signed on 27 January 1973 recognizes South Vietnamese nationhood in Article 9, clauses "a" and "b." Corson looks upon the Vietnam war as utter failure, defined as "nonperformance of something required or expected" (p. 15), yet Edwin O. Reischauer, a critic of the war, has written that "losing the war, then, has proven, in strict balance-of-power terms, much more beneficial than winning it" (*Saturday Review*, December 1972). Having been in Vietnam as a correspondent during and after the Diem regime, I would disagree with Corson's judgment that Diem was a "totalitarian" (p. 19) dictator. The entire concept of "totalitarianism" is as vague as the concept of "fascism."

The appendix contains the text of "National Security Study Memorandum Number 1, February 1969," prepared by several government agencies at the request of Henry Kissinger in his role as special assistant to the President on national security affairs. Although the document was leaked a couple of years ago and finally ended in the Congressional Record (10–11 May 1972), it still makes fascinating reading.

This volume is one of the few written by a military professional to have appeared so far about the Vietnam War. With all of its deficiencies and a disturbing lack of verifiable sources, parts of *Consequences of Failure* are important reading for the reaction of a Marine writing as a civilian who has benefitted by serious research studies at Miami, Chicago, and Wisconsin Universities. He is writing about a war which, as far as the U.S. is concerned, has been forgotten and entombed in less than two years.

ARNOLD BEICHMAN
University of Massachusetts at Boston

Labor and Socialism in America: The Gompers Era. By William M. Dick. (New York: Kennikat Press, Inc., 1972. Pp. 211. $10.95.)

The Life and Times of Daniel De Leon. By Carl Reeve. (New York: Humanities Press, Inc., 1972. Pp. 193. $6.50.)

Victor Berger and the Promise of Constructive Socialism, 1910–1920. By Sally M. Miller, (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Publishing Co., 1973. Pp. 275. $11.50.)

Two considerations, apart from general curiosity, may move a political scientist to study three books dealing with American socialism between the 1880s and the First World War. First, there is the hope that historians can help us find better ways of dealing with the interplay between expressly formulated doctrines and other aspects of political life. Second, there is the fact that several of the influential interpretations which have portrayed American political culture as comparatively resistant to political actors espousing "forensic ideologies" have been expounded in connection with the failure of American socialism. Two of the three books under review advance theses meant to counter leading arguments of the latter sort, while the third works out of a tradition which has always rejected all such claims.

William M Dick challenges the view that the American political environment compelled labor to entrust its interests to "business" or "pressure group" unionism and rendered socialism an alien, transient force, whose brief influence depended on temporary and localized conditions. Against such "environmental determinism," which he ascribes to social scientists, Dick puts forward a view he considers more congenial to the historian and more adequate to the historical facts: that it was because of judgments and decisions made by leaders that unionism and socialism in the U.S. failed to build up the mutually beneficial sustained interdependence exemplified in the story of the English Labour Party. As its subtitle indicates, Dick's book is an essay on Samuel Gompers and "Gomperism."

American reformist socialism, Dick argues, did not founder on the psychological resistance of American workers captivated by the Lockean individualist American dream; it failed because Gompers failed to see the basic compatibility between such a movement and his own social ideal-

ism, because the contours of the emerging movement were distorted by voluble dogmatists, and because the diverse actors interplaying in the light of their diverse perceptions created new situations which destroyed the original possibilities.

In a book that is more carefully documented than Dick's, Sally M. Miller addresses a question complementary to his: Why didn't reformist socialism mount and sustain a more effective alternative to Gomperism and to the major parties, given its base in the working class, its capacity for adapting to American conditions, its vitality during the decade before the First World War? She opposes Daniel Bell's thesis that American socialism failed because its proponents, putting forward a doctrine alien to the real political world within which they operated, had to adopt that ethic of ultimate ends which Max Weber had contrasted to an ethic of responsibility and had shown to be antithetical to an effective political vocation. Miller counters that Weber had also projected an ideal politician who synthesizes the two patterns, and she maintains that Victor Berger closely approximated this ideal in many respects and for a considerable time. As a major figure in the effective leadership of the Socialist Party of America, Berger had a principled and coherent vision of a collectivist social order democratically controlled in the interest of egalitarian welfare, Miller contends. She maintains that he skillfully undertook the political work of winning trust through persuasion, pursuing immediate goals, accepting responsibility for government, while he steadily furthered movement toward his broader objectives. His failure came, she argues, when he failed to remain true to himself in the crisis of the First World War; and this, in her view, was a matter of personal responsibility, not impersonal social forces. If the dominant right wing of the Socialist Party, led by Berger, had accepted the reality of American participation in the war and had concentrated on promoting reforms in domestic war-policy, the Socialist Party might have achieved a good deal and could have played a major role after the war. As it was, Miller claims, the organization was discredited and splintered. Democratic socialism missed its opportunity in the USA.

Carl Reeve locates his account of Daniel De Leon's career within quite a different political and temporal context. For Reeve, the story of American socialism is not the story of a lost opportunity but the story of continuing revolutionary tradition, and De Leon's "life and times" are to be pondered as an instructive chapter in this larger whole. Within that tradition, as Reeve expounds it, there already exist a number of authoritative judgments on De Leon's work. Engels chided the Socialist Labor Party for its sectarian impatience with the Henry George movement and its poorly defined quarrels with organized labor; Lenin praised De Leon's conception of a disciplined, centralized party; William Z. Foster, Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, and Ella Reeve Bloor attacked De Leon's dual unionism but praised his adamant hostility to "opportunist" socialists and labor leaders, and, above all, his educational work in translating and popularizing the great classics of revolutionary socialism. Reeve builds his brief narrative upon these judgments.

Reeve's work exemplifies Marxist traditionalism, not scholarship informed by Marxist theory or modeled on the founders of the school. The influence of revisionism among organized workers gets no explanation beyond cursory references to the opportunist character of the leadership, and the vicissitudes of revolutionism get no social explanation at all, beyond the strengths and weaknesses of some leaders. When the author interrupts his biographical narrative for an account of the changing historical context, he offers a few stereotyped assertions about the dominant tendencies of the moment, taken for the most part from a single introductory survey of American history. Reeve's book contains very little new information, and no critical commentary on contemporary research or alternate interpretations, and it depends too much on a few books in its own tradition. Reeve gives us hortatory reflections on a flawed exemplary figure and precursor, rather than critical inquiry.

Dick's work is an interpretive essay of another sort. He presupposes a reader familiar with scholarship on the subject, but he assembles fresh evidence to support his major novel contentions. The argument is suggestive, but the evidence is far from making it definitive. To credit (or charge) a political figure like Gompers with working out a posture expressible by an organized body of ideas requires some systematic concern with the difficulties encountered when interpreting selected utterances made in diverse contexts and designed for various rhetorical purposes. Dick proceeds very casually in these matters, although the claim that Gompers's "plain and simple" unionism has more in common with European syndicalism than with the business unionism that followed is central to his thesis. In assessing the importance of industrial unionism as the issue creating a fatal chasm between Gompersism and socialism, Dick's reasoning depends a good deal on his assumption that revolutionary socialism was an excrescence upon American socialism—the hobby of some ambitious intellectuals or a metaphorical language for unpolitical populist radicals. On this view, revolutionary socialists get their chance to distort the Socialist Party and finally to embitter the AF of L only because the responsible leaders of both organizations failed to organize the new industrial

work force. Dick's conception of the Left in American socialism would require much more support than he gives it, if it is to bear the weight he puts upon it.

Miller shares Dick's view that the Left was an irrelevant force capable only of disruption; and, as she sees it, the "promise" of socialism in America depended on the prosperity of the Right, exemplified and led by Berger. The crux of her case is the contention that Berger committed a decisive and avoidable error when he accepted the party's stand against American participation in World War I. But on the evidence she has collected Berger's action could just as well be taken as a sign of the moral centrality of the Left within the American socialist identity. Moreover, we are still faced with the question of whether the reformist activities which Dick and Miller think might have been carried on by a revisionist socialist party in America had not already been taken up by other organizations in most American constituencies. Miller contrasts Berger's collectivism with the individualism of midwestern reformers like La-Follette, but fails to consider the main stream of urban Progressivism in trying to ascertain whether Berger's "constructive socialism" could have maintained a distinct political identity without the mythology and elan of the Left.

Dick and Miller have contributed to the ongoing reconsideration of ideological politics in America, helping above all to counter the easy acceptance of certain plausible generalizations. The nature of the questions they leave unresolved, as well as the uncertainties created by their strong hostility to the Left, make it all the more regrettable that Reeve's book on De Leon cannot be recommended as an effective corrective. The books have little to offer from the standpoint of method or theory, since both authors are quite unreflective about the structures of political thought and language and pay no special attention to problems of interpretation. But their stress on the purposive actions of political actors usefully challenges the social scientists' preoccupation with impersonal processes and structural determinants.

DAVID KETTLER
Trent University, Peterborough, Ontario

Interracial Public Housing in Border City. By W. Scott Ford. (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Co., 1972. Pp. 98. $10.00.)

Public policy in this country in the mid-twentieth century has strongly supported the coming together of blacks and whites. The courts, and to a lesser extent, the legislatures and the executive branches, have attempted to bring about desegregation of a variety of public and private facilities. In schools and municipal swimming pools, in motels and public housing projects, desegregation has become the law, and in some places, the practical reality. In short, government has attempted to change the behavior of blacks and whites by forcing, or at least permitting, them to interract in a variety of contexts. It is hoped that these policies can also lead to a reduction in racial prejudice by both races.

For several decades, social scientists have studied the relationship between interracial contact and tolerance among the races. This research has helped to inform public policy makers' efforts to achieve equality. *Interracial Public Housing in Border City* is a useful addition to the literature of race relations. The book is a well reasoned, clearly written study of interracial neighboring in public housing in a border state city. It is a test of the "contact hypothesis," which suggests that when blacks and whites associate with each other regularly, and as social equals, racial tolerance increases. The study was designed to fill in several gaps in earlier studies of race and residence. First, it focused on a city in a border state, unlike earlier studies of northern urban and deep South communities. Second, much of the previous research analyzed the reactions to interracial contacts of whites only. Professor Ford chose to give equal emphasis to black responses to interracial neighboring. Finally, the author caught the process at an unusual point in time, shortly after federally mandated desegregation of the public housing project. The black and white people who were interviewed were asked to respond to an ongoing desegregation process which provided them with the opportunity for relationships with members of the other race. (As the author acknowledges, this study is subject to all the limitations of a case study. The focus of one border state city, at a point in time, in a particular [and unusual] kind of public housing project implies that the findings may not be generalizable far beyond that situation, either in time or place.)

In giving equal emphasis to black reactions to contacts with whites, the author raises some thorny questions. Perhaps the most difficult and important is the definition of "equal status contacts." Professor Ford does an excellent job of teasing out the ambiguities embedded in this concept. As Ford suggests, it is difficult to determine which contacts are equalitarian, particularly if the search is for contacts that are similarly or identically interpreted by blacks and whites. In addition, "more important than any 'objective' appraisal of an interracial contact situation is the respective participants' 'definition of the situation' " (p. 5). Given this country's history of racial subordination, it may be that few interracial contacts would be viewed as equal ones by blacks and whites alike. The author attempted to identify in-

terracial neighboring in a desegregated public housing project as such a situation. The contact hypothesis, however, was not strongly supported as applied to blacks. Blacks did not become significantly more tolerant of whites after contact in the project. In interpreting these divergent findings for blacks and whites, the author raises the crucial questions of black perception of these "equal-status contacts." Perhaps the black respondents did not consider even this situation as equalitarian. My own experience as an inadvertent participant-observer at a northern public housing project tends to confirm this interpretation. As a teacher at the school adjacent to this predominantly black project, I began to sense that many of the black tenants seemed to regard themselves as being of lower status than the white tenants, partly because whites were perceived as "outwardly mobile." As in the border city desegregated project, blacks had generally lived in public housing longer than whites.

Perhaps many blacks would perceive interracial contacts as equalitarian only if they were in an "objectively superior" position. As the author suggests, more research is needed on the application of the contact hypothesis to blacks. An important place to start would be to attempt to identify kinds of interracial contacts which are interpreted by blacks as equalitarian. If reduction of prejudice is a goal of policy makers, this goal must apply to blacks as well as whites. And if promoting contact is to be a means toward that end, it is critical to know which types of contact are likely to serve that purpose. One context where this research might be done would be housing where there is racial *and* economic mix.

In summary, Professor Ford has performed a service in moving along our understanding of the "contact hypothesis." In particular, the emphasis on responses of blacks to interracial neighboring is a worthwhile addition to previous research in this area. As is the case with much useful research, Ford's study raises as many new questions as it answers.

Finally, a personal note. It is an encouraging sign of the "desegregation" of academia that a lawyer may review a book by a sociologist for a political science journal.

LEONARD S. RUBINOWITZ
Northwestern University

Political Socialization of Chicano Children: A Comparative Study with Anglos in California Schools. By F. Chris Garcia. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973. Pp. 280. $16.50.)

This is a difficult book to review because, on the one hand, it represents an important addition to the political socialization literature; on the other, the book appears limited by a familiar problem in the *interpretation* of the findings that raises serious questions about the validity of many of its conclusions. Let me first attempt to describe briefly the design of the study and selectively summarize its major conclusions before going into its limitations.

The study by Professor Garcia, is based on a questionnaire survey of Anglo ($n=544$) and Mexican-American ($n=683$) children in grades 3, 5, 7 and 9 who were distributed among eight public schools in east Los Angeles County and the Central Valley of California. The response represents, in the author's words, an "availability sample," which is to say, it is nonrandom and probably unrepresentative. But since there are few other comparable studies available at this time, the results can be legitimately considered exploratory and suggestive in their implications.

With this qualification in mind, the results indicate, that Mexican-American children tend to be very much like their Anglo counterparts in most of their political attitudes. Ninth-grade Chicanos tend to be somewhat more cynical than comparable Anglos, but overall there does not seem to be the strong dimension of alienation or cynicism among Chicano children that one might expect given the widely publicized activities of Cesar Chavez and the Huelga movement in this part of California. Chicano children tend to have even *more* positive feelings toward the American political community and the values of American democracy than do Anglo school children; Chicano children tend to be slightly *more* trusting of government (Table 5.3)—the author's contrary comments in the conclusions notwithstanding (p. 133)—but feel less "efficacious" and possess a weaker "sense of citizen duty" than Anglos. When social-class differences are observed, the usual case is that rural, lower-class Chicano children tend to vacillate more between negative and positive attitudes than their middle-class, urban counterparts.

It is possible that the relative absence of strong feelings of expressed hostility observed among Mexican-American children in this study may be due to the absence of a well-defined sense of *relative* deprivation in the family—regardless of the deplorable *objective* conditions under which many of them live. Anyone who has traveled through the vast reaches of rural northern Sonora and Baja and witnessed the arid, unforgiving terrain, the scrawny cattle and barking rib-bare dogs, the barren shelves of the *tienditas* in the villages, and the homes made of cardboard and tin dangling from gnarled mesquite frames, can appreciate the notion that the squalor north of the border in barrios and migrant labor camps may, in comparison, represent some improvement. For some reason, the migration continues north—not south.

Since the study suffers from the same atheoretical perspective of most socialization studies, there is little convincing explanation to accompany the findings. This observation is not intended as a specific criticism of this book. Rather it is simply a fact concerning the state of theoretical development in a subfield which has, for the past fifteen or so years, devoted more than enough time and print to describing public opinion surveys of school children in the context of the Easton "systems model."

The more specific theoretical problem in the study—and again let me emphasize that this problem is not unique to this study—has to do with the inherent difficulties in attempting to reconcile developmental theorizing with cross-sectional research designs. The author is studying *different* children at roughly the *same* point in time (at least within a six- to twelve-month period). What is required in any study of developmental processes is, of course, an examination of the *same* children at *different* points in time.

In the final analysis, the value of this book will depend to a large degree on a reader's willingness to accept the "quasi-longitudinal" assumption upon which it is based. In my opinion, however, there are serious theoretical pitfalls in suggesting that third graders (in 1970) will as ninth graders, six years later in 1976, express virtually the same political attitudes/orientations as ninth grade students did in 1970. The assumption ignores the probable impact of events such as the continually changing character of the Chicano movement itself—not to mention Watergate, a president's disgrace and resignation, and other developments that represent potentially important discontinuities in the socialization process.

My refusal to accept this assumption and the developmental interpretations of the findings that flow from it should not, as I mentioned at the beginning of this review, detract from the book's overall value in providing an important descriptive reference point in this neglected area of ethnic political research.

JAMES W. CLARKE

University of Arizona

Micropolis in Transition: A Study of a Small City. Edited by Edward L. Henry. (Collegeville, Minn.: Center for the Study of Local Government, St. John's University, 1971. Pp. 395. $8.95, cloth; $4.95, paper.)

Visions of the good society are legion, and among the more durable is the vision of social life organized on a limited scale, in small humane as well as human settlements. Much of this vision, to be sure, consists of wistful images of lost innocence in a Golden Age that never was or utopias that never can be. Nevertheless the ideal has had an enduring influence, helping to shape each generation's quest for a more perfect human environment.

Micropolis in Transition is one perspective on this quest—the perspective from St. Cloud, Minnesota, population 39,691 (1970), a small city situated some seventy miles northwest of Minneapolis, the state's largest metropolitan area, a city with its own rural hinterland dependent on it for public and private goods and services. For much of the 1960s, the city was headed by Mayor Edward L. Henry, a former Professor of Government who had, as it were, left the academy for the agora and has since returned as Director of the Center for the Study of Local Government at St. John's University in Collegeville, Minnesota. With his colleagues and students from the University along with others from neighboring colleges and the community, Henry has edited a collection of essays, reflections and case studies concerned principally with political life during his years in office (1964–1970). The vantage point thus is not so much of the researcher who in Norton Long's quasi-irreverant phrase "hides under the mayor's bed" as it is the mayor's bed itself.

For an administration to chronicle its own experiences is of course a perilous undertaking. All too often, it seems, such chronicles are little more than self-serving testimonials that reveal only that political leaders can indeed be vain. To his credit, the editor is fully aware of this difficulty and on the whole has managed a balanced and remarkably detached account of his years in office.

If not a testimonial to Mayor Henry, neither is it a romanticized account of small city life. True, the writings reflect a decided preference for this life style, and the editor suggests at the outset that cities of this size offer an attractive alternative to those weary and wary of other forms, be they urban, suburban, or rural. But the book's purpose is not the promotion of St. Cloud or comparable cities. Rather it is an examination of the city's efforts to anticipate and provide for a future that had discovered "micropolis," efforts the administration believed would help the community avoid the crush of urban growth.

For the Henry administration this meant policy initiatives designed to modernize the municipality's physical plant (its storm sewers and airport, for example), and to adjust its corporate boundaries (annexation) and its governmental structure (strong chief executive) to expected future demands. These issues are examined in individually written case studies and are supplemented by chapters on the city's historical development, its "power structure," its council, and its residents, the last of which includes the findings of a survey undertaken in connection with the research.

In a general way much of the material in this book is familiar. The struggles, conflicts, strategies, politics, and personalities encountered here are of a type encountered elsewhere. Even so the studies are well worth reading for they are instructive as well as informative. Throughout there is an awareness of the broader issues—not the least of them the inner complexities of any democratic system and the dilemmas of a progressive, popularly elected official confronted by a sometimes reluctant and unaware electorate—and an effort to illuminate general propositions with the case material. In this respect the book differs, happily, from the formless case study that consists in large part of nothing more than facts in search of a theme.

While the material is generally well presented and thoughtfully analyzed, the book is characterized in part by a perhaps excessively sanguine outlook on the potentials of "micropolis," and in particular on its capacities to avoid the "ills of Big City, USA" (p. 4). If "micropolis" does emerge as an alternative—as a "key to demographic relocation" and a "nucleus for population resettlement" (p. 8)—policies such as those instituted in St. Cloud may well facilitate the transition. But whether they would be entirely adequate depends largely on the magnitude and character of the change. One wonders, for example, how effectively "micropolis" would respond if resettlement were to include substantial numbers of the urban poor or those afflicted by the social-personal pathologies and disabilities so much a part of the urban crisis. As far as I can tell, this particular "micropolis" has not dealt with these issues. While it has planned and evidently planned well, St. Cloud has yet to face, if indeed it ever does, a challenge some believe is largely beyond the wit and ingenuity of civic leaders, whether in large cities or in small.

RUSSELL D. MURPHY
Wesleyan University

The Politics of Health Care: Nine Case Studies of Innovative Planning in New York City. Edited by Herbert Harvey Hyman. (New York: Praeger, 1973. Pp. xiv, 208. $16.50.)

The editor and chief author of this book is professor of social planning with major emphasis on health planning at Hunter College's Department of Urban Affairs, and eight of the nine other authors are holders of Masters degrees from that department. The book is a comparative analysis of nine health programs initiated in the 1960s, from their inception to 1971, with a view to discovering how they were "transformed from someone's idea at a higher level of government to actual working programs that served people at the local level of government" (p. 4). The editor also sought to identify the role and functions of the professionally trained health planner in the programs but wryly reports that they have had no role except in the implementation stage of comprehensive health planning.

The changes that took place in the objectives sought by the initiators of these new programs are analyzed by Professor Hyman in a final chapter utilizing a model based on a modification of Richard Warren's Five-Step Action System. The model adopted uses four steps: T1, Inception of the Action system; T2, Expansion of the Action System or Development of Opposition; T3, Legitimation of the Objectives; and T4, Implementation and Operation of the Action System. By T4, all but two of the nine programs had significantly changed their objectives, with most of the changes occurring in T4.

Dr. Hyman suggests that the studies support the theory that organizations have a life of their own in which continuation of the program becomes more important than achievement of the program's initially conceived goals. The changes resulted in programs that were more in accord "with the financial capacity, the usual organizational structure and procedures, and the traditional programmatic style of the established health forces" (p. 195). As a result, "there are new, but not significantly different, health programs operating; there are new, but not really innovative, organizational arrangements to accommodate them; and there are some new, but not sufficient, sources of financial inputs to mount them" (p. 195).

Most of the individual authors did not closely follow the data collection outline suggested by the editor. Many of them became involved in describing the content and functioning of their program. Hence, while some of them provide an informative and useful account of the work of the various agencies involved with specific programs (notably Planned Parenthood and Ambulatory Health Centers), the editor must have been hard pressed to derive a coherent sociological analysis from such disparate material. The chapters also vary greatly in quality and in the extensiveness of the research on which they are based.

EVELINE M. BURNS
Columbia University

Politics and The Housing Crisis Since 1930. By Nathaniel S. Keith. (New York: Universe Books, 1973. Pp. 232. $8.50.)

This book is a welcome addition to the comparatively few volumes which lend to a comprehensive understanding of housing in the U.S. Although it is not the product of social research, it

does provide a valuable narrative of the political successes and failures in establishing a national program designed to build and maintain adequate housing for twentieth century America.

The book is divided into thirteen chapters most of which correspond to the term of office of the incumbent presidents—for example, Chapter 10 is entitled, "The Great Society and The Urban Crisis, 1963–66." Mr. Keith illustrates throughout these chapters some of the most important political, social, and economic forces which have helped and hindered the creation of an effective national housing program. In the last chapter, he presents his prognosis for the future.

Nathaniel Keith writes with the insight and experience that could only be gained from the inside looking on. His knowledge of the individuals and institutions on Capitol Hill are impressive. He served in the Federal Housing Agency, and, for the past decade and a half, has been the president of and the lobbyist for the National Housing Conference. The author, therefore, is hardly unbiased, but his criticism are nonpartisan and frequently shed light upon the process of Congressional politics.

The most important contribution the book makes is that it provides a good illustration (lesson?) of how federal legislation has operated heretofore in order to solve or ignore vitally important national issues. The reader cannot help be impressed and/or frustrated by the amounts of time and effort necessary to keep an idea alive, far less to have bills passed and programs enacted. Of particular interest are examples which demonstrate, on the one hand, that powerful groups in concert *can* affect the political process in Washington (all the more so if there is a perceived crisis) and, on the other hand, that *intragroup* conflict can frequently be more damaging than opposition from without. The AFL support of the proposed public housing program in 1935 is an example of the former, whereas the difficulties within the Roosevelt administration and their effect upon the U.S. Housing Bill illustrate the latter.

There are two aspects of Keith's book which trouble me. The first is the implicit assumption that I find throughout which suggests that increased legislation for public housing would substantially improve our nation's housing problem. In fairness, the author does briefly discuss the necessities of providing housing subsidies to the not-so-poor and also alludes to those problems beyond Capitol Hill in local communities in which public housing is to be built. He repeatedly returns to public housing, however, giving the impression that it (still) represents the "liberal" answer. Whereas I assume public housing fits within the community development program which Keith mentions frequently, nowhere is it made clear what this development is to be like.

A second problem is that I simply cannot share the author's optimistic prognosis for the immediate future (to 1990). Keith concludes by stating "Can the nation afford to reach a full housing economy? The answer is yes, if the political force of the American public and its response in Congress and in the Executive Branch of the Government insist on policies assuring a reasonable priority" (p. 232). Given the author's documentation of housing politics over the past decades, this must be largely a statement of faith rather than a projection based upon any observed trend. He does argue several points which he feels support his view, but I believe these are unconvincing. I sincerely hope to be proven incorrect.

Politics and The Housing Crisis Since 1930 can be especially profitable to those social scientists and planners who do not follow national politics closely. It provides a lesson in political reality.

W. SCOTT FORD
The Florida State University

Pacific Basin Development: The American Interests. Edited by Harald B. Malmgren. (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1972. Pp. 148. $10.00.)

This book fills a neglected gap in the enormous number of recent publications regarding the role of the United States in East Asia, by stressing the sweeping and fundamental economic changes that occurred in this region in the 1960s. Based on papers presented at a series of seminars sponsored by the Overseas Development Council, it sketches in broad and clear strokes the new and vastly expanded patterns of trade, aid, and investment that have pushed Japan and the United States into the forefront as the dominant regional powers. This slim volume is distinctive not so much for original contributions as for a concise and readable survey of American economic involvement in Asia, which should prove attractive to the academic specialist and international businessman alike.

Of particular interest are the two contributions of the editor, Harald Malmgren, both because of their substance and because the author carried his views into a high position on the White House staff (Deputy Special Representative for Trade Negotiations) in the Nixon administration. Malmgren rightly takes a political economist's approach to international affairs and stresses that any future "power balance" in the region will necessarily involve a scrupulous consideration of economic as well as security interests. Despite this refreshingly appropriate perspective, he does tend to be too general in defining what American interests are and too optimistic about their tractability. Whether, in fact, a higher level of economic well-

being will lead to an increased capacity for Southeast Asian nations "to withstand external as well as internal security threats" in the next decade or two, is, to put it mildly, a questionable assertion in view of the persisting political quagmire in this area. Just how economic and geopolitical interests are linked and what are the appropriate priorities for American policy are not really clarified. Despite this rather high level of generality and a tone of optimism that seems especially strange in the world of scarcity and uncertainty that has now emerged, the thrust of the argument takes the right direction. By emphasizing United States economic involvement in the region and probing for a political posture appropriate to these links, it stands in refreshing contrast to the vapid debate on the U.S. military role in the region held over from the Vietnam War and to the increasing stentorian and undifferentiating demands to get out of Asia on which the policy dialogue centers. What is sketched is the economic dimension of the so-called Nixon Doctrine, and it is a constructive place to begin assessing America's present and future place in Asia.

Another useful corrective to the debate on America's Asian policy is the importance accorded Japan in the international relations of the Pacific. The careful description of the last two decades of Japan's aid policy (by J. Alexander Caldwell), a more analytic article comparing the Japanese and American roles in Asian economic development, and a general stress on the dominant, if not predominant, place that Japan has in the regional economy, are matters that have rarely been accorded more than journalistic attention in this country. Alas, the arguments as presented here have been somewhat dulled by recent events. The serious impact on Japan's growth and balance of payments of global resource scarcity and inflation make the euphoric appraisal of the future of the Japanese economy a bit unreal. Moreover, the failure to consider fully the place of China in the economy of the Pacific basin, at a time when Peking is moving toward full participation in international affairs, provides a curiously inverse coloration to the discussion of American policy in which Tokyo, not Peking, is the focal point.

Articles dealing with the prospects for economic cooperation in the region, especially regarding the place of the multinational corporation, touch on the critical issues regarding the future of the Pacific basin (defined in this book as East and Southeast Asia). How will the U.S. be able to affect these patterns of development; through the multilateral international organizations or the multinational corporation, through regional or global arrangements? It is at this juncture that argument turns to conjecture and policy proposals take on a quixotic quality. There can be no prospects for economic growth in East Asia unless a suitable and stabl geopolitical structure is built. The political hors must precede the economic cart in the region. While *Pacific Basin Development* does not reall confront regional international relations fron this viewpoint, it does provide a prism through which important features of the Asian landscap can be seen more clearly. It deserves a hearing.

DONALD C. HELLMANN
University of Washington

The Department of Health, Education and Welfare By Rufus E. Miles, Jr. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974. Pp. 326. $10.00.)

For Rufus E. Miles, Jr. the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare is "the foremost institutional expression of five social revolutions that have, within a single generation, completely altered the relationship between U.S. citizens and their national government" (p. 1). He identifies these as the New Deal, the education revolution, the civil rights revolution, and the health revolution. His book, the latest addition to the Praeger Library of U.S. Government Departments and Agencies, provides a valuable guide through the maze of programs administered by HEW, but it does not contribute materially to our understanding of the institution and its unique culture and subcultures.

Miles, a retired public official and professor, acknowledges the impossibility of packing into three hundred pages an adequate characterization of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. Rather than probe the HEW psyche, he has chosen to concentrate on what HEW does. His lucid summaries and critical evaluations of such complex and varied programs as social security, public assistance, aid to education, health research, and health services constitute something of a *tour de force*. For the student and scholar they provide a useful introduction to the field of Federal social legislation.

Except for some excellent brief analyses of the contrasting styles of HEW's ten Secretaries, Miles tells us very little about the people who give HEW its special character. The key to understanding HEW is to understand the role of professions and associated professional organizations within the Department. HEW is the most "professional" of the executive departments. Miles recognizes that the struggle between professionals and generalists underlies many of HEW's current management problems, but he does not attempt to analyze in any depth the significant influence of professionals on the organization and administration of HEW. The story of the decline and fall of the Public Health Service certainly merits fuller treatment than it is given in the book.

Rufus Miles, Jr. is that rare combination, a scholar-practitioner. In discussing such problems as delegations to generalist regional directors, the potential and limitations of the Secretarial role, management of Federal grants, super-departments such as the proposed Department of Human Resources, and the future of HEW, he provides fresh insights gained from his experience as a top career official in HEW and the Bureau of the Budget. His observations will be of interest to all those concerned with Federal administration. One only regrets that these themes are not more fully developed in the book, perhaps owing to the constraints imposed by the Praeger series format.

HAROLD SEIDMAN
University of Connecticut

Public Policy on the Status of Women: Agenda and Strategy for the 70s. By Irene L. Murphy. (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1973. Pp. xi, 129. $11.00.)

This book may well achieve recognition as a seminal work in American policy studies. Beginning with an overview of existing policies on the status of women, the author proceeds to evaluate those policies and to propose an agenda for the coming decade. Many people working in policy studies have favored a process approach, in which their focus has been a specific policy or set of policies; they normally trace the evolution of a policy from issue formation through impact. Although Dr. Murphy engages in analysis of the origin, formulation, implementation and impact of specific pieces of legislation, the fundamental purpose of the book is less an analysis of the policy process than a concern for policy outputs and their efficacy and for political advocacy. Relatively few, if any, political scientists have wandered into the area of policy evaluation and policy goals and strategy to the degree that Ms. Murphy has done. With policy-making experience at both the national and local levels, Dr. Murphy, a member of the Kennedy administration and now an elected local official in Maryland, dares enter into the arena of policy recommendation which most political scientists avoid. Political scientists, in fact, have often asked whether policy advocacy is an appropriate arena for the discipline to enter.

A very concise work, this book contains a pithy, detailed synopsis of legislative and administrative policies affecting particularly the occupational and economic status of women. The author's time frame is the last decade, with special emphasis on the policies of the Nixon administration. The analysis of the policies includes an explanation of policy intent and objectives as well as an evaluation of their accomplishments and impact.

The major sections of the book deal with the prevalence of rhetoric over policy, the activities of the first Nixon administration, the work of Congress (especially the 92nd Congress), the women's rights lobby, an agenda for the 1970s, and strategies for women's groups.

Murphy convincingly presents the point of view that the policies which exist as of the early 1970s are merely a beginning in coping with the issues of achieving equality for men and women on the job and in the society generally. Her analysis of the Women's Bureau of the Department of Labor as an agency more concerned with enforcement of laws on women's employment rather than with reform is particularly insightful. The juxtaposition of goal differences between the feminist movement and the Women's Bureau is especially useful for one trying to understand why the Women's Bureau has not pushed vigorously for women's rights. Murphy's disappointment with the Nixon administration and its failure to implement some of the policy recommendations of its own task force is a criticism often repeated in the book but well substantiated. Her agenda and strategy for the 1970s are ambitious and thorough, yet possible if the varied women's rights groups are able to focus considerable, united energy on issues affecting the general economic and social status, and particularly the occupational status of women. Many women tend to think that the Equal Rights Amendment, if ratified, will be a panacea, when, in fact, it will be only a catalyst for change.

The strengths of this book are many, including its brief exposition, summary, and evaluation of existing policies, as well as its presentation of the author's extensive and well-reasoned policy strategies for the women's movement to adopt. All of these are justification for recommending this book. Dr. Murphy has drawn on documents and reports as well as used survey research and interviews to gather data. The volume also contains a good bibliography of books, articles, and documents on the status of women.

Its weaknesses are relatively few, but should be noted. The book might be read with satisfaction by the individual totally unaware of existing policy on women, but the author assumes that the reader will have considerable background knowledge of the policies, of the policy process, and of specific governmental agencies. Since one of Dr. Murphy's goals is to involve more women, especially less-educated and lower-income women, in the process of advocating women's rights, it may be unfortunate that the book assumes a background in government that most lay persons are not likely to have.

Technical yet clearly written, the book can be a useful resource for the social scientist and also for women's rights groups which are in the process

of defining their policy goals. Its freshness and boldness in the area of policy advocacy make this a strong contribution to the field of policy studies within political science.

NORMA NOONAN
Augsburg College

Bound with them in Chains: A Biographical History of the Antislavery Movement. By Jane H. and William H. Pease. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, Inc., 1972. Pp. 334. $12.50.)

Protesting that previous historians have been insufficiently sensitive to the complexities of the abolitionist movement, Jane H. and William H. Pease, professors of history at the University of Maine, present us with brief biographical sketches of ten antislavery leaders "deliberately chosen for their diversity" (p. 4). The ten are all middle-level figures—missing are the most famous abolitionists such as William Lloyd Garrison, Lewis Tappan, and Frederick Douglass—who, although well known in their own day, are hardly household words today. They include, in order of presentation, Maria Weston Chapman, Cassius Marcellus Clay, Benjamin Lundy, Hiram Wilson, Samuel Eli Cornish, Henry Highland Garnet, Stephen Symonds Foster, Elizur Wright, Joshua Reed Giddings, and Samuel Joseph May. The central—indeed the only real—theme of these essays is that of diversity. "To view abolitionism broadly, . . . " the authors write, "is to comprehend a wide spectrum of differing motives, goals, and methods undistorted by hypothetical categorical uniformity" (p. 4).

Although the Peases convincingly demonstrate the existence of such diversity among opponents of slavery, they also create a good deal of confusion by failing to differentiate between the terms "abolitionist" and "antislavery." Most historians have used the word "abolitionist" to describe a relatively small number of moral reformers who from about 1830 on demanded the immediate overthrow of slavery, and have distinguished these abolitionists from other antislavery men. The Peases, however, avoid this distinction, including in their volume men such as Joshua Giddings, the antislavery Whig congressman from Ohio, and Cassius Clay, the "Kentucky squire" who opposed slavery because he considered it harmful to the white South, not because he sympathized with the slaves. As a result, the authors are really talking about the diversity of the antislavery movement, not of the abolitionist movement. There is nothing intrinsically wrong with such an approach, but it does diminish the significance of their argument in two respects. First, their thesis loses whatever originality they might have claimed for it, since historians have long recognized that different people opposed slavery for different reasons, in different ways. Second, their attack on other historians for improperly categorizing abolitionists loses its force, since they themselves are talking about a much broader movement.

Also disappointing is the Peases' unwillingness to attempt any explanation of their subjects' motivations. Indeed, they appear to reject the very possibility of such explanation. "Neither ancestry, education, nor social position necessarily marked Maria [Chapman] for reform in general or antislavery in particular" (p. 31) they state at one point; a little later they declare that "there was little in [Benjamin] Lundy's background that foreshadowed his role as a major antislavery colonizationist" (p. 91). One wonders in vain why these ten men and women joined the antislavery ranks. The closest the Peases come to an answer is their statement that abolitionists opposed slavery because until it was abolished "every abolitionist felt himself in some way bound, restricted, unfree, as the slave was bound, restricted, unfree" (p. 315)—in other words, they became abolitionists because they disliked slavery.

This is, then, a book with conceptual limitations. Nevertheless, it is a useful book, one that provides good, well-researched biographical sketches of several relatively unknown antislavery leaders, many of whom were not important enough to merit full-length biographies of their own. For anyone interested in learning about one or more of these people, *Bound with them in Chains* is a good place to start.

PETER KOLCHIN
University of Wisconsin—Madison

The Challenge of Urban Reform: Policies and Programs in Philadelphia. By Kirk R. Petshek. (Philadelphia, Pa.: Temple University Press, 1973. Pp. 336. $10.00.)

The late Kirk R. Petshek, an economist, has written a history of the Philadelphia municipal reform movement of the 1950s and early 1960s. Dr. Petshek offers detailed descriptions of the major industrial development, housing, urban renewal, and transportation programs begun during this period in Philadelphia. He supplements this with rich insights into the roles played by a number of individuals and organizations within the government and outside of it.

Professor Petshek sees the 1950s and early 1960s as a period of renaissance in Philadelphia. Led by two reform Democratic mayors, Joseph S. Clark and Richardson Dilworth, during the conservative Eisenhower era, the city embarked on a number of innovative developmental programs that predated by a decade the heightened national awareness of urban decay. The active

white middle-class civic groups and the professional public administrators formed a productive coalition that permanently changed Philadelphia but left some important problems unresolved. For example, very few gains were made by local blacks, and some of the urban renewal and housing programs seriously disrupted local black community life.

Why didn't the reform movement last more than a decade and a half? Professor Petshek points out the many obstacles to a permanent reform organization or third political party in the City of Brotherly Love. Strict enforcement of the rule that all elected officials and civil servants had to live within the city limits worked against the reformers because many of their potential supporters lived outside Philadelphia. Those reformers who resided in the city clustered in two or three areas. The citywide support for a permanent reform political organization could not be mustered. The author wisely notes that reformers often do not cherish the notion of a highly structured political organization.

Those seeking fresh insights into the question of the pluralist or elitist nature of Philadelphia reform-era policies will be disappointed, as will those seeking significant generalizations on ethnic politics in the city or the role of the parties during the reform era. Professor Petshek has collected important data on these questions, but he does not offer any extended analyses useful to the political scientist.

Professor Petshek draws heavily on data he collected during his tenure as Philadelphia's Urban Development and Economic Coordinator under Mayors Clark and Dilworth. Additional data are drawn from an extensive series of interviews with local policy makers conducted several years ago. An excellent appendix lists the names and positions of over 100 interviewees, 27 local reports, and a chronology of significant events. Political scientists seeking to reconstruct this critical period in American urban political history will find this volume highly useful, but the definitive analysis of the Philadelphia reform movement has yet to be written.

MIRIAM ERSHKOWITZ

Temple University

Truman, the Jewish Vote, and the Creation of Israel. By John Snetsinger. (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1974. Pp. 208. $6.95.)

Both the advantages and disadvantages of this monograph lie in its simplicity and directness of focus. It addresses the issue of the title directly. But the reader ought to be prepared to do much additional reading, however narrow his interest.

There is a dearth of material written by political scientists and historians on the policy impact of ethnic voting. For this reason alone this book is a welcome addition. Of major interest are the many diaries and personal letters of persons in the Truman administration, plus a considerable literature written by Zionist commentators about America and Palestine. Professor Snetsinger is familiar with much of this literature, as the myriads of footnotes attest, but the information would have been more useful if incorporated within the text. The monograph is 140 pages, followed by 52 pages of footnotes. It would have been preferable to spend more than five pages on Zionism, the American Jewish community and involvement with Palestine before 1945. Some important and highly relevant material does not appear. This includes Arthur Morse's *While Six Million Died* (New York: Ace Books, 1968), a careful recounting of Jewish political activity during the war, and of the Roosevelt administration and State Department indifference to the refugees and Palestine; useful background information on the predicament of the British is provided by Ben Halpern, *The Idea of the Jewish State* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969); the cultural bias and religious idea of Israel as a Jewish entity is found in Hertzel Fishman, *American Protestantism and a Jewish State* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1973).

The theme is Truman's vacillation between two sets of polarized forces, and his inability to satisfy either side. These factors include the oil interests—about which almost nothing is written—the State Department, the military (especially Forrestal), and the pattern of friendly relations with Great Britain and increasingly hostile relations with the Soviet Union. The State Department, recognizing the strategic importance of the Arabs, urged a policy that would not antagonize them. Arab intransigence and threats to move toward the Soviet camp reinforced State Department opposition to a Jewish state. On the other side were the pressures of the American Jewish community, exerted on a president whose political situation was precarious. Another factor, which the author minimizes, was Truman's genuine concern with the Jewish refugees for whom Palestine was the only home. In *The Man From Missouri* (New York: Putnam, 1962, pp. 304–8), Alfred Steinberg has neatly outlined the forces and interactions. What Snetsinger contributes is extensive first-hand documentation. He sees Truman as taking a pro-Israel position when forced by domestic pressure, especially before election time when he was deluged by importunate requests of Democrats, particularly from New York. When this pressure abated, Truman was more ready to listen to the advice of Forrestal, Marshall, and the State Department. But ultimate recognition and support was more com-

plicated than a political response to the votes and financial support of Eastern, big-city Jews.

Although he tends to neglect the role of certain Senators, especially Robert Wagner, Sr., Snetsinger reveals the importance of two close presidential advisers, David Niles and Clark Clifford. A very important source for Niles's role is uncovered in David Sachar's undergraduate thesis (Harvard University, 1959), "David K. Niles and United States Policy Toward Palestine." In most instances, observations adhere closely to the evidence. Not the least of Snetsinger's virtues is his honest, relatively nonpartisan approach, in an area where this is rare.

Most of the shortcomings result from the narrow focus. There is little insight into the British position—the desire to maintain the Empire although faced with an uncontrollable situation in Palestine. There is no reference to the split within the Zionist movement between the aggressive faction led by Abba Hillel Silver and those more wedded to Democratic politics, particularly Stephen Wise. The most dramatic claim is that Truman was directly responsible for Ambassador Austin's speech, reversing policy from support of partition to support of a U.N. Trusteeship. There is no attempt to disprove those observers who saw this incident as a surprise to the president. In general, the proof that Truman followed a policy for partisan political reasons remains primarily circumstantial. One ought not to expect a political figure like Truman to have neglected political ramifications, but this is not to claim that they were the decisive factors. Since Truman's constituency was much larger, he did not always agree exactly with the Zionist leadership, though he remained sympathetic to and acted in behalf of their cause.

One consequence of this book will be more material for the rate-the-presidents game. Truman does not fare well. He is, I think, too harshly portrayed as vacillating and uncertain. The world was in a state of extreme flux, new alignments being created, notions of warfare and resource requirements undergoing radical change. The Arab states were rigid. Truman had only recently inherited the mantle of world leadership. There had to be adjustments to external and internal developments. And Truman had his own commitments—to the refugees, the Allies, the U.N., to preventing another world war. Serious observers have said that the state of Israel would not have come into existence had Roosevelt lived. That is partly a reflection of political changes, partly of Truman's strong sympathy for the war refugees. As an afterthought, one cannot help wondering whether some of the millions of Europeans slaughtered for racial and religious reasons might not have lived had Truman ascended to the presidency earlier.

ALAN FISHER
Small College, California State College, Dominquez Hills

The Working Poor: Minority Workers in Low Wage, Low-Skill Jobs. By Dennis P. Sobin (New York: Kennikat Press, 1973. Pp. 19 $8.50.)

This book, research for which was conducted a part of a U.S. Department of Labor study i Cleveland, Newark, and Baltimore, is an attemp to assess the potential for violence among th working poor—in this case, 108 black workers the majority of them unskilled laborers in publi institutions and industry. The study itself grew out of the famous National Advisory Commissior on Civil Disorders finding that it is the under employed black in a low-level, "dead-end" jot who is most alienated from the system, and therefore, the most likely to explode in anger and frustration. Professor Sobin's book is meant to show the actual impact of these menial jobs (dishwasher, assembly-line worker, packer) on the ghetto resident, by studying his attitude towards government and community, and his limited political participation. It concludes with a prescription for government and business should they attempt to find solutions.

All this is commendable, but Professor Sobin seems to make too much of very limited data. The sample of 108 workers is subdivided in various ways—first into residents of the three cities (a distinction strongly made in Chapter 2 and then discarded), next, into employees of the public and private sectors, then into paraprofessionals and unskilled workers. It should be noted that the 32 paraprofessionals sampled (the vast majority of whom are women) are used as a control group in the analysis, and that the data consistently show a greater degree of alienation among the unskilled laborers.

The crucial problem with the sample is the sex distribution. Of the 32 paraprofessionals, 26 are women, while 40 of the 76 unskilled laborers were also female. Sobin bases conclusions about what has been thought of as the black *male's* potential for violence on only 36 unskilled male respondents, drawn from three cities, and two sectors of employment.

The small number of respondents is understandable, given the exigencies of his research method and the necessity of piggy-backing onto an already conceived government study. The empirical findings as a whole, however, serve to reinforce social scientists' perceptions of the nature of unskilled employment and its impact on the work-

-ers. Even within the racially homogeneous group here, differences between the paraprofessionals (who are required to be high school graduates, starting at $110 a week) and the unskilled workers are apparent. The unskilled workers are less trusting of government, belong to fewer organizations, are less likely to vote than the paraprofessionals. The unskilled laborers almost uniformly disliked their jobs—for the simple reasons that they were unsatisfying, routine, and therefore boring. Their negative attitudes carried over to their neighborhood—the ghetto, and surprisingly, toward their view of violent protest. More than half the unskilled workers felt that the effects of riots were negative (in contrast to a plurality of paraprofessionals who believed that rioting had beneficial effects).

The summation of Sobin's research is in the formulae he suggests for business and government—formulae to change the status of "unskilled" workers, many of whom are clearly capable of moving into supervisory and skilled positions. He recommends a governmental program that includes continual use of government contracts to fight job discrimination; worker upgrading programs; and increased and better planning at the local level. Industrial changes include the creation of purposeful entry-level work, upgrading of current jobs, and elimination of discriminatory practices, as well as increased sensitivity among white supervisors.

On the whole, the book exposes some problems of the black unskilled laborer but does not address itself to what may be the critical problem. The impact of low-level, menial employment on individuals transcends racial divisions, and Sobin does not deal with the relative importance of race vs. employment. The raw data, however, are extremely valuable for those who study political attitudes. One important finding, not discussed at length in the book, involves the impact of workers' attempts to change their situation on their level of frustration. Those individuals who have tried and failed express the greatest degree of alienation from the system, as opposed to those who have accepted their fate. This not only reinforces some current research on efficacy and political behavior, it merits further work along the same lines.

KATHLEEN A. FRANKOVIC
The University of Vermont

Perspectives on Urban America. Edited by Melvin T. Urofsky. (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1973. Pp. 307. $2.95.)

This is an uneven, internally contradictory, dated, and generally atheoretical set of essays. At the same time, a few authors provide new insights on contemporary urban problems, while those whose work seems dated or simplistic at the very least offer food for thought. I was given the option —as are all *APSR* reviewers—of recommending that a book "of very poor quality or not significantly relevant to the interests of political scientists" not be reviewed. This option hovered over my shoulder almost unto the end of my reading. My decision to review the book, for better *and* worse, came simultaneously with the decision to assign it, for purposes of stimulation, to my sophomore class in urban politics.

The theme of the collection is that, contrary to "current American truisms," urban problems are not exclusively urban in nature *or in solution*. This is, of course, a theme discussed on the theoretical level by many urbanists (Is the urban political system unique or simply a microcosm of the national system? Can we consider the urban system as somehow "bounded" or isolated, for analytical purposes?)—but very seldom is the point handled explicitly at the programmatic level. A subtheme, stressed in the editor's preface, is that the problems, while gargantuan, are not insurmountable—indeed there are "many hopeful and innovative efforts to deal with them." "The cities [are] still alive and vibrant, with at least a chance to solve these dilemmas" (p. x). The individual authors—mostly teacher-activists, educational administrators, and staff members of such agencies as the Urban Institute and the League of Women Voters—handle such topics as urban poverty, racism, the environment, education and—more important for present purposes—discuss the role of planning, citizen participation, and federal impact on urban politics.

The two articles which deal explicitly with the relation between social theory and social reform are among the most interesting, from both heuristic and research perspectives. Paul Meadows argues, in "The Idea of Community in the City," that both macrosociologists (Weber, Tonnies) and microsociologists (the Chicago school) have overlooked the vitality and diversity of the urban community, stressing instead a romantic and consensual past. The consensual view is a poor and misleading model, he believes, for urban reform: it is unrealistic and it points toward the wrong set of goals. In an analogous fashion, Ross A. Evans (in "Psychological Problems of the Urban Poor") considers three different models of poverty: Moynihan's "Subcultural Deviance Model," Hamilton's "Subcultural Colonization Model," and Valentine's "Subculture Difference Model." He prefers the latter (more pluralistic) explanation, although he specifies a great many unanswered

questions—e.g., precisely which subcultural patterns must be altered? Who shall decide?

In contrast, the three authors who deal with urban planning (Shirley Passow), citizen participation (Melvin Mogulof), and the federal impact (Anona Teska) are simply taxonomic in their approach—each covering much the same ground (housing and urban renewal, Model Cities, the dismantling of OEO, and the prospects of revenue sharing), often reaching different conclusions. It is here that the book seems most dated: the authors conclude that federal policies toward the poor show great hope, if only firm leadership is forthcoming (Mogulof) and the executive-congressional struggle is resolved (Teska). Teska is dubious about the merits of revenue sharing without a resolution of this conflict; Passow, in contrast, sees revenue sharing as "the medicine the sick cities need" (p. 238). None of these authors proved prescient (in 1973) about the crisis (in 1974) over the future of programs involving citizen participation, and the apparent unwillingness of many cities to continue—via their new "shared" revenues—the programs begun by the OEO.

Several authors reject the optimism of the editor's preface and of the chapters just cited. Charles Wilson ("The White Problem of the Cities") and Daniel Levine ("The Crisis in Urban Education") reach angry and pessimistic conclusions. Both insist that educational (and other) problems can only be solved within the context of a realistic appraisal of urban social relations. For Levine, this implies facing up to the existence of rigid social stratification; for Evans, it means understanding the consequences of white racism. Levine's piece in particular seems marred by an overdrawn contrast between the problems and prospects of middle-class suburban youth and their inner city counterparts. For the former, the future is uniformly rosy; for the latter, it is unmitigatedly bleak. True to a degree, but even in 1972 (when the article was probably written), the deteriorating job market for new entries—regardless of class or race—was already evident. No hints of the relation between the health of the national economy and the viability of the educational programs advocated by Levine appear in his chapter. This is surprising in a book which hopes to show that urban problems cannot be understood apart from national phenomena.

It is impossible to do full justice, in limited space, to the variety of strengths and weaknesses of the twelve authors. Suffice it to say that their sometimes angry and often simplistic essays are seldom boring, and may well serve as a starting point for many fruitful classroom discussions. They might even yield testable hypotheses for urban research. One might wish for more documentation, for a more theoretical stance, and for some attention to some of the tough questions plaguing urban scholars (what is uniquely urban about what we do? around what central concepts can we organize our work? what are the points in common and the differences between small "urban places" and large metropolitan centers?) Perhaps sprightly or angry insights and scholarly caution make uncomfortable bedfellows.

BETTY H. ZISK
Boston University

Statism in Plymouth Colony. By Harry M. Ward. (Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, Inc., 1973. Pp. 193. $9.95.)

"Statism," writes Harry Ward, is the "placing of external controls in the state at the expense of the rights of the individual," as well as "the exercise of power by the state for the sake of power." (Preface). The inhabitants of Plymouth Colony avoided the temptations of "statism" and created, instead a free society in which "individual liberty had a breadth that was novel for the time" (p. 168). In the process Plymouth contributed much to the development of America's tradition of democratic liberalism by making an early affirmation of the dignity and worth of the individual.

Plymouth's history, as Professor Ward perceives it, reflected constant tension between libertarian and statist tendencies. Most of that tension resulted from conflicting ideals imported from England. For example, although the Pilgrims believed in political democracy, they placed equivalent stress on the social utility of political consensus and domestic tranquility. Thus, they made few attempts to guarantee minority rights and were content to let an oligarchy of magistrates interpret the will of the majority. In religion, the Pilgrims exalted the worth of the individual but they sought uniformity of belief and practice as well. Consequently, they gave the state the power to silence dissenters. In economic affairs the Pilgrims were both capitalists and mercantilists. They believed "that all members of society should have equal opportunity in economic self-improvement" (p. 36), yet they allowed the state to regulate economic activity in accordance with what the magistrates perceived to be the welfare of the whole.

Gradually these contradictions between personal freedom and state power began to disappear. After 1640 the influence of both church and state declined as the cohesiveness fostered by the Pilgrims' initial zeal for a holy commonwealth failed to take hold among members of the second generation. Political authority passed "to a fragmentation of town democracies," (p. 158) economic regulation gave way to *laissez-faire*, and moral conformity evolved into liberty of conscience. By

the time of Plymouth's absorption into neighboring Massachusetts, the libertarian tendencies inherent in the ideals of the Pilgrim founders had triumphed.

Though *Statism in Plymouth Colony* represents an admirable attempt to deal with an issue of fundamental historical importance, the book's thesis is marred by some significant flaws. Not the least of these is the author's failure to provide adequate documentation for several important conclusions. In Chapter One, for example, Ward argues that early Plymouth was a collective capitalistic enterprise which fostered political democracy. The reader finds little evidence of that linkage. Chapter Three suggests that the Pilgrims believed in equality of economic opportunity. But, again, documentation is slim. Chapter Four reveals that the authority of the church declined after 1650 but the reader is not told how or why. Chapter Six contends that the collapse of church authority forced the state to assume responsibility for personal morality and led to an increase in state supervision of private conduct. Unfortunately, the reader is not shown the process whereby the church gave way to the state in this area, nor is he given statistical data to support the charge of greater state interference. But the most damaging omissions are found in Chapters Seven and Nine where the author theorizes that the state's political power decreased drastically in the last years of Plymouth's existence. Much of the book's efficacy hinges on the validity of this argument but Ward gives us very little evidence demonstrating such a decline.

Equally disturbing is the confusing and contradictory nature of some arguments in *Statism in Plymouth Colony*. For example, Ward characterizes Plymouth's founders as Separatists and Pilgrims. He believes that they were less statist than their New England neighbors because they were not Puritans and therefore had few ideological axes to grind. Not only is the assertion of Plymouth's libertarian stance not supported, but terms like "Puritan" and "Separatist" are left undefined. Later, the confusion grows worse when the author refers to Puritan ideals and practices in Plymouth and credits the decline of statist policies to the collapse of the founders' dreams of a holy commonwealth.

The reader will encounter similar problems in Ward's chapter on militarism in Plymouth. The author assumes that statism fosters a military spirit and that militarism exists whenever the state "regards military efficiency as a paramount end and when it subordinates other interests to those of the military" (p. 129). Following Ward's general thesis of statism's decline in Plymouth, one could expect militarism to be an insignificant factor in the colony's history. The author is not so sure. He sees "a subjective fusion of civilian and military authority" (p. 141), and concludes that "the idea of a democratic soldiery, ready to respond at a minute's notice, enhanced the military arm of the state probably to a greater degree than if a small regular army had been maintained entirely separate from civilian life" (p. 141). Such arguments force the reader to conclude that *Statism in Plymouth Colony* adds little to our understanding of the struggle between freedom and authority in America's past.

PAUL R. LUCAS

Indiana University

1984 Revisited, Prospects for American Politics. Edited by Robert Paul Wolff. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973. Pp. 201. $6.95.)

Within a decade we shall reach 1984, the portentous date of George Orwell's prophetic novel. By extrapolating trends visible in the politics of the 1940s to a specific but not too distant time, Orwell gave us a target we should all very much like to miss. As 1984 draws closer we can expect a mounting number of assessments of just how far we have come down Orwell's path to totalitarian repression. Orwell, of course, would be the last to be surprised if the arguments over his prophecies did not also become weapons in the ideological struggle to control men's views of reality.

In the volume under consideration, Robert Paul Wolff, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Massachusetts has brought together an opening salvo from the viewpoint of the Left of the 1960s. Six academic adherents of the "movement" were asked to examine the future up to 1984 in a specific area of American politics. Their credentials as figures of the left are prominently displayed in the book. Michael Lerner was indicted for organizing an antiwar demonstration in Seattle; Gene Mason was sentenced to a year in a Kentucky penitentiary for purchasing a stolen typewriter in the midst of a campaign he was waging against an incumbent congressman; Ira Katznelson was editor of *Politics and Society*, a counterculture journal; Frances Fox Piven helped organize the National Welfare Rights Organization; and Todd Gitlin was prominent in the Students for a Democratic Society. Robert Nakamura is the only contributor who is not assigned a special role in the 1960s movement.

The premise from which most of these authors work is that American society is already repressive; its democratic institutions are a sham working in the interests of a few; its economy rests on imperialistic exploitation. This is not the sort of position from which we might expect to get a measured assessment of our descent into Orwell's abyss. For if the 1960s rhetoric is to be taken seriously, then 1984 has been upon us for a long time.

Thus the projections of these essays are less efforts to see how various institutions may become more oppressive than they are speculations about how we might break out of an existing state of injustice.

In the one essay which directs itself to the Orwellian theme of repression and thought control, Gene Mason lays out the catalog of devices such as wiretapping, "no-knock" laws, and computer files which have made supervision of private behavior ever more efficient. But such widely regarded dangers are not sufficient for Mason, for he must find repression everywhere, even if he must redefine the term to cover any ". . . control through the ordering of human activity" (p. 63). In his hands the term loses all of its customary meaning and we are lost in Orwell's Newspeak, the first principle of which was to reduce the choice of words to a minimum so as to diminish the range of thought. It is the same tactic which not so long ago took such terms as brutality or genocide and sought to control our perceptions by expanding their meaning far beyond our common understanding.

Todd Gitlin's piece, "The Future of an Effusion: How Young Activists Will Get to 1984," sets forth alternative paths for the now defunct movement. He rejects the possibility that radicals will simply melt into the mainstream. His "minimum future" would find radicals playing discrete roles in various parts of the society, never adding up to anything like a movement, but acting as gadflies to liberal reform. His "maximum future" would see the coming together of working- and middle-class activists in a common radical cause. It is never clear, however, just how this is to be brought about.

Two essays deal with national institutions. Robert Nakamura provides what is in this context a relatively conservative analysis of presidential-congressional relations. The Vietnam experience he perceives as having weakened the hand of the president and strengthened that of the Senate in foreign affairs. On the other hand he argues that the House of Representatives is so institutionalized in its ways that even the reform of such rules as seniority would not revive it. Michael Lerner's analysis of the two-party system looks forward to the possibility of the development of a "People's party" to compete with the dominant "Property" party, i.e., the Republicans and Democrats. With the decline in America's imperialist fortunes, the ruling elite will seek to transfer the costs to the working class, thus planting the seeds for a radical party.

Two essays deal with the cities, both thoroughly pessimistic about the possibilities of any radical changes there. Ira Katznelson sees the various efforts of the '60s to meet the urban problems as counterrevolutionary. If they succeed they will ". . . impose on our cities a soft version of 1984, in the beneficent guise of liberal, participatory reform" (p. 140). In a similar vein Frances Fox Piven demonstrates how the many programs developed in response to the demands of urban blacks, have worked to benefit organized producers, teachers, city employees, and welfare workers. What is worse, Piven charges, the system itself, by pitting the disadvantaged against each other, submerges the basic issue of inequities in the distribution of wealth.

The real enemy which keeps popping up in these essays is "repressive reform," or the ability of liberals to ameliorate the miseries of the masses. Whatever optimism we see here comes from the expectation that the American system will face disasters with which it will be unable to cope, thus producing the grounds for an effective radical movement.

Another theme in these essays is the search for the errors of the 1960s Left. They were all written in the early 1970s, in the hangover period of the movement, when it was first apparent that one could indeed throw a demonstration and not have anyone show up. They show concern for the arrogance of the Left, for its anti-intellectualism, and for its inwardness. The authors realize that they must expand their appeal beyond the middle-class white college youths who dominated their movement. But nowhere in these writings is there evident the continued will to organize or the readiness for long personal sacrifice which has characterized the leaders of historically successful revolutionary movements.

What strikes one, however, is that the world of 1984 to these authors is not likely to be much different from what it is today. Perhaps it is their academic training which has given these radicals such a healthy respect for the capacity of American institutions to absorb demands without changing its basic character. Or it may be that the time set for their projections is too close upon us. Those who predict doom tomorrow are only fit subjects for *New Yorker* cartoons. Respectable prophets require more time. After all, 1984 was 35 years away when Orwell's book first appeared, a time soon enough to touch his readers, yet not so soon as to violate their sense of reality. Today's futurologists talk of the year 2000 and beyond. The shorter the projection, it would seem, the more one is restrained by the cautionary thinking of the social sciences. These essays are addressed to the convinced. Skeptics will find little evidence to support the major themes.

JOSEPH A. SCHLESINGER
Michigan State University

Executive Ombudsmen in the United States. Edited by Alan J. Wyner. (Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of Governmental Studies, 1973. Pp. 315. $5.50.)

This collection of essays on executive-appointed centralized complaint handlers is one of the very useful results of the Ombudsman Activities Project of the University of California, Santa Barbara, which owed its existence to OEO interest and Santa Barbara expertise in ombudsmen. The research of most of the contributors was subsidized by the project, as was the book itself, which probably is the most important publication on complaint handling in the United States since Walter Gellhorn's *When Americans Complain* (1966). Eight state or urban organizations are described and assessed, as well as the complaint handling experiences of three lieutenant governors. Unfortunately, as is often the case with books of this sort, the writers are inclined to go their own ways with little or no effort to produce comparable data that would allow further and sounder conclusions to be drawn. For example, there is no information about the cost of the organizations in Honolulu, Nassau (N.Y.), and Puerto Rico.

What is an executive ombudsman? According to the editor, Alan Wyner, he is "a centralized complaint-handling officer who has been appointed to office and who serves at the pleasure of an elected or appointed chief executive" (p. 10). Wyner observes that the executive ombudsman differs from other institutions that handle complaints against governmental administration by being centralized, and the executive ombudsman differs from classical ombudsmen by being appointed and removed by a chief executive. If mode of selection and dependence on a chief executive were the only characteristics distinguishing the organizations discussed in this book from classical ombudsmen, it would be sensible to use the term "ombudsman" for both species. Indeed, until it was transformed by legislation in 1972 into a classical ombudsman, the Iowa Citizens' Aide Office does appear correctly to be designated an executive ombudsman. It operated very much like the classical species and handled the same kind of complaints. This, however, cannot be said of the other so-called executive ombudsmen described in the book, who, I believe, are not ombudsmen at all in the technical sense of the word.

The classical ombudsmen of Scandinavia, New Zealand, and the United States, although some of their incidental activities are the same as the main activities of executive ombudsmen, are primarily concerned with investigating complaints against alleged abuses of administrative authority. Wyner notes that most executive ombudsmen are able to take on much larger caseloads than classical ombudsmen. The reason for this difference, as Wyner and his colleague John E. Moore point out, is that most of what executive ombudsmen call "complaints" are not the "complaints" investigated by classical ombudsmen. In Moore's view, an important distinction must be drawn between complaints against administrative action and requests for administrative services, although Moore realizes the difficulty of drawing the line in some communications from the public so that one or the other category. Most of the activities of the American executive ombudsmen described consist in helping people to secure the volume of services, which involves no more than referring individuals to appropriate administrative or telephoning agencies to expedite the processing of services. While classical ombudsmen sometimes provide such assistance, this is not the activity which consumes most of their time and is the reason they have been called "ombudsmen." A request to an executive ombudsman that a dead cat removed from a backyard is quite different from a complaint to a classical ombudsman that an administrative agency had abused its authority in deciding to deny the complainant some social service. The methods by which the executive ombudsman handles the first type of "complaint" and the classical ombudsman the second are totally different. There is an investigation in the second case, while there is none in the first. Moore's assertion that investigating complaints against alleged maladministration and telling people where to receive services are different points in a single continuum blurs the important distinction he has made between the two quite distinct types of activities.

If Moore rejects a dichotomy where it would have been appropriate, his colleague Stanley V. Anderson makes the opposite error in his essay which concludes the book by creating a dichotomy between "passive" classical and "active" executive ombudsmen. By distinguishing sharply between the classical ombudsmen, "who wait passively in some secluded office for complaints to come in," and the executive ombudsmen, who "have the opportunity to go out into the community in order to solicit complaints" (p. 308), he obscures the significant fact that American ombudsmen of both types have made themselves more accessible to complainants than have the ombudsmen of other continents. It is true, as the book shows, that executive ombudsmen in America have gone further in this direction than the classical ombudsmen. The former are able through outreach programs to encourage as many people as possible to bring their troubles to them, for they are not bothered by jurisdictional problems and spend only a few minutes on most cases. Classical ombudsmen have precise jurisdictional limits, generally accept as cases only those complaints which have already been pursued through regular administrative channels, and require considerably more time to investigate a complaint than that needed for executive ombudsmen to refer one. The inability to handle large case loads and the fear of encouraging people to come forward with cases they cannot ac-

ical ombudsmen from
cept seem to inhibit the manner of executive
reaching out for
ombudsmen.
the volume, including An-
ow very different classical and
Several
men are when they argue that
derson,
ons perform complementary func-
the services of both institutions are
exc
ntemporary society. John Moore re-
the Honolulu Office of Information and
t and the Hawaiian Ombudsman do in
plement rather than duplicate each other's
while P. N. Burgess, C. R. Hofstetter, and
. Higgs show from Puerto Rican experience
the two functions can be performed by two
y different parts of a single complex organiza-
ion.

Only one of the authors appears to recognize that executive ombudsmen can be a mixed blessing. As Dean Mann points out, "Getting a family into public housing or finding a job through extraordinary efforts may, in fact, short-circuit a process established to ensure all applicants a fair chance of better housing or employment" (p. 277). Future research on centralized organizations for assisting persons to receive public services should pursue this problem of dysfunctional consequences.

WILLIAM B. GWYN

Tulane University

Economic Growth and Social Equity in Developing Countries. By Irma Adelman and Cynthia Taft Morris. (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1973. Pp. 257. $10.00.)

Professors Adelman and Morris have written a sequel to their immensely interesting *Society, Politics, and Economic Development.* In that book they used factor analysis to quantify the elusive forces of modernization. Using forty-one social, political, and economic indicators scaled on data covering the 1950s and early 1960s and drawn from seventy-four non-communist countries, they categorized these countries as exemplifying one of three levels of socio-economic development and observed the statistical associations of the variables at each level. They concluded that "the process of economic development in underdeveloped countries consists basically of the separation of the economic sphere, first, from the complex of social organization and the norms that govern it, and, subsequently and to a lesser extent, from the political environment by which it is constrained" (p. 267). Since they are strongly oriented toward policy, they advised that the preponderance of foreign assistance should go to the "high" level countries which were best equipped to apply economic criteria in using it and where their data "show a significant positive association between long-run economic performance and the establishment of representative political institutions" (p. 276).

In *Economic Growth and Social Equity in Developing Countries* Adelman and Morris narrow their inquiry to the effect of economic development on political participation and the distribution of income. They draw on data from the same seventy-four countries (chapters 1 and 2, accounting for half of the present volume, are an edited version of chapter 2 of the previous volume) with the indicators expanded from forty-one to forty-eight. In their treatment of political participation they apply discriminant analysis, in income distribution a stepwise analysis-of-variance technique. To their dismay they find that "economic modernization has had little direct effect on the sharing of political power" (p. 186). Moreover, their "findings strongly suggest that there is no automatic, or even likely, trickling down of the benefits of economic growth to the poorest segments of the population in low-income countries. On the contrary, the absolute position of the poor tends to deteriorate as a consequence of economic growth" (p. 198).

Whether or not the analysis can bear the weight of these conclusions is reason enough for political scientists to be interested in the book. The authors are trying assiduously to quantify a world that many of us write about qualitatively, intuitively, or anecdotally. As they well understand, multivariate analysis, no matter how sophisticated, can be no better than the data going into it, and working with sources—often inadequate—from seventy-four countries across forty-eight indicators is a hazardous venture. How, for example, does one scale administrative efficiency in countries as diverse as Gabon, Nepal, Ceylon, Mexico, and Kenya? In classifying these and other countries in this performance dimension, Adelman and Morris have interviewed regional and country experts. They also have consulted recent country studies and, in this instance, checked their classification with Banks and Textor's character of bureaucracy in their *A Cross-Polity Survey.* Can there be consistency in the judgments rendered when so many judges are involved? One is inclined to regard their struggles with this and other problems as they attempt to bring quantitative order out of qualitative vagueness rather like Samuel Johnson's view of a dog walking on its hind legs: it is not done well; but you are surprised to find it done at all.

For those who are not put off by methodological difficulties, the substantive conclusions of the book are intriguing. Adelman and Morris have given a new lease on life to Marx's immiserization thesis as well as to the role of politics in modernization. Their data show that economic growth is not a benign force that affects other subsystems in

society positively. If we are to have our cake and eat it too, that is, to have growth *and* equity, the state must play an active role. " . . . the most important instruments for increasing political participation . . . are those that involve fundamental changes in socio-economic and political structure as well as a basic reorientation of development strategies" (p. 198). Moreover, "If a country is to avoid stagnation at a low level of development, it must not only eliminate expatriate or neocolonial elites but replace them with indigenous entrepreneurs and administrators who are quite widely spread throughout the country" (p. 194).

One senses that Adelman and Morris are chastened by their conclusions. The policy recommendations in *Economic Growth and Social Equity in Developing Countries* are made with less assurance than those in *Society, Politics, and Economic Development*. Indeed they have a certain rhetorical and hortatory quality. Committed to equity as a proper goal for developing societies, and persuaded by their own research of the need for institutional reform, they have, in effect, passed the modernization baton to political and other social scientists with the injunction that they must have a "thorough knowledge . . . of the complex interrelationships among the society, the bureaucracy, and the economy" (p. 200). Readers of this journal are not likely to quarrel with this view which, after all, is very largely what the literature of political modernization is about. Yet they, too, should feel chastened because it is far from clear that that literature contains solutions to the policy problems Adelman and Morris pose.

KARL DE SCHWEINITZ, JR.
Northwestern University

Agrarian Reform in Latin America. By Robert J. Alexander. (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co. Inc., 1974. Pp. 118. $5.95.)

Part of a series on key Latin American issues edited by Samuel Baily and Ronald Hyman, this book by Robert Alexander promises more than it delivers. In the preface we are assured that the books in the series will focus on crucial and controversial cross-cultural hemispheric issues handled within the context of a Latin American perspective, countervailing the usual North American cultural bias likely to be shared by many student readers. It is not a satisfying study. It is technically flawed, blandly written, and absolutely noncontroversial.

The problem begins with how the author conceives of a basic issue such as agrarian reform. He mentions all the proper shibboleths about its importance to economic, social and political factors but then proceeds to disembowel the issue of its profound structural impact on the whole societal and human condition. The fault lies partially with a reflexive need to cover again the whole historical land pattern, to treat Mexico, Bolivia, Venezuela and Cuba serially in each chapter, and to outline simplistically who gets the land, how the landlords are paid and what is needed after the land is redistributed.

Although the author has had much experience in Latin America, he recounts only one personal anecdote, which took place in Bolivia in 1954 after the MNR revolution. The book has only ten footnotes, several marginal in their value; only two of them postdate 1965, and there are none from the '70s. There is not a single reference to the many excellent accounts of agrarian reform from such sources as Hirschman on Colombia, Kaufman on Chile, and the many articles and papers produced by the affiliates of the University of Wisconsin's Land Tenure Center.

Thus from a man who has written so feelingly of many varied themes in Latin America, this performance is a keen disappointment. It is a linear, legalistic, pedestrian, antiseptic account of the methods, means, and varieties of this and that agrarian program. No apparent interest or passion for the subject seems to bubble through. Redundancies abound, well-known Spanish terms are misspelled, and even the English grammar is unedited.

Although the descriptions are accurate, there is little attempt to explain the agrarian reform policies of these four countries within the total societal context of value conflicts, economic and social structures, international influences and interventions, elite interaction, and the policy-making process itself. Alexander rarely describes the human and material dimensions of a single agrarian policy. Never do we read about the already documented accounts of corruption, cooptation, exploitation, interest-group interlinkages, patronage, rural violence, elite strategies, peasant movements. Reading this apolitical treatment of a thoroughly political process is something like reading a Chase Manhatten Bank brochure of how they changed the tile inlays on the sidewalks in front of their Rio de Janeiro branch.

It appears that Alexander's own predisposition makes him partial to the Venezuelan land reforms, overtly hostile to the Cuban experiments in rural programs, and disinterested in the late Allende government's agrarian reforms in Chile. His predilections concerning cooperative or collective farming are most manifest in the Mexican case; he argues that the Mexican *ejidos* are not productive either because of the uncertainty of individual land tenure or because the peasants are too sure of tenure and thus invest their energies elsewhere. The author has it both ways, and neither is probably correct. Alexander goes on:

The author has seen the effects in practice. In one *ejido* he visited, given over to growing corn, there was a sharp contrast between one *ejidatario's* long ribbon of corn land and his neighbor's. In one, the corn was seven feet tall, the irrigation ditches were in very good condition, there were no weeds among the corn. In the other, the corn was no more than five feet high, the irrigation ditches were in a bad way, and the weeds were threatening to choke out the corn. However, because the unproductive farmer was not allowed to sell or otherwise dispose of his property, the other farmer could not buy him out. As a result, the overall productivity of the *ejido* was probably lower than it would have been if each member had had full title to his land. (pp. 54–55)

This is certainly one way to have viewed that scene.

PETER RANIS
York College, City University of New York

The Nationality Question in Soviet Central Asia. Edited by Edward Allworth. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973. Pp. 236. $16.50.)

Central Asia receives comparatively little attention from scholars in Soviet Studies, compared with that given to Russia itself or some of the non-Russian European nationalities, and much of the study of Soviet Central Asia is not so much of the Central Asians themselves, but of the policies of the Soviet party and government toward them. This is better than no study at all, but it necessarily involves some degree of objectification of the Central Asian nationalities, which is unfortunate, because Soviet Central Asia is a fruitful area for study in itself.

This book (which is basically a set of conference papers and comments on them) concerns itself with only one issue, that of nationality, but deals with a number of aspects of it. Although there were some equivocal signs of a nascent nationalism in the Bukharan Republic at the outset of Soviet rule, the devils which the Communist party was most concerned to exorcise were those of Panturanianism and Panislamism, because nationality in the European sense did not exist. Soviet policy chose to implant the concept by administrative act, setting up five "Republics," each based on predominance of a single ethnolinguistic group. Over fifty years the concept has become so well rooted that it threatens the ideological objective of "convergence" into a single Soviet nationality, and creates possible problems for the future through a combination of national self-assertiveness with a birthrate much higher than that in the European USSR.

In literature, as Robert J. Barrett's very lucid paper argues, a rather difficult and delicate policy is being pursued which attempts to halt divergence and promote convergence of Central Asian nationalities with Russians rather than with each other—a policy which clashes with the growing preoccupation of many Central Asians with their own past and appears to be fighting a losing battle with it despite reiterated calls by party figures and the literary establishment for added emphasis on officially approved themes.

Several papers are devoted to an attempt to decide whether the short-lived Bukharan State exhibited a nascent Central Asian nationalism sufficiently strongly to constitute a threat to Soviet hegemony and motivate the subsequent administrative division of it. Timur Kocaoglu concludes that it did, but to make his case comes close to creating a distinctive type of Asian state-formation, multilinguistic, multiethnic and distinguished from an allegedly "European" type based on ethnolinguistic unity (a false antithesis when applied to Switzerland, Yugoslavia, Canada, or to the Soviet Union itself). He also has to utilize the doubtful argument that the title "Bukhara Khālq Shoralar Jumhuriyāti" signified an attempt to indicate "separateness and independence" rather than a straight translation of a Russian equivalent (Bukharan People's Soviet Republic). Use of the coinage "Conciliar" (which properly refers only to *ecclesiastical* councils) is a mere device to avoid the unpalatable term "Soviet" of which "Shoralar" is clearly a translation, used in 1921 because it was common to the two main languages of the area and few Bukharans would then have known what "Soviet" meant.

Seymour Becker, William N. Hanaway, Jr., and Ian Matley do not claim a "Bukharan nationality" existed. Becker, however, argues that a threat of "Turkestan nationalism" was nascent among the intelligentsia, including Communist party members. But his argument does not distinguish clearly between it and Panturanianism, and leaves unargued the question why a "divide-and-rule" policy was imposed only *after* the Basmachi threat in Bukhara had been brought under control and the Panturanianist danger had diminished, i.e., when the greatest need for it had passed. Hanaway's conclusion that an "urban solidarity" not amounting to "national awareness" existed, depends to some extent on accepting that the word "millat" carries the same overtones as the word "people" which is used to translate it. Its Ottoman equivalent ("millet") did not, so it is possible that even his moderate conclusion is slightly overstated for the Turkic elements in Bukhara. Ian Matley's sober and judicious examination of the wide range of factors inhibiting the growth of a "national identity" (ethnic heterogeneity, poor communications, tribalism, nomadism, and so on) carries the most conviction in this section.

The papers by Edward Allworth on "Regeneration," Ralph Scott Clem on "Demographic and

Socio-Economic Forces," Ethel and Stephen Dunn on "Intermarriage and Cultural Convergence," Ronald Wixman on "Recent Assimilation Trends," M. Mobin Shorish on "Who Shall be Educated?", and John Hanselman on "Leadership and Nationality," are all cogent and well researched, but indicate what needs to be done to avoid Central Asian "particularism," namely to examine other areas of the Soviet Union in order to distinguish between phenomena which are general and those which are particular to Central Asia. This is especially necessary in respect of attitudes of youth to the concepts of "Soviet nationality" and "convergence," or the degree to which "Europeans" dominate the higher levels of party, government, bureaucracy or industrial management (e.g., by comparison with Armenia, Georgia or the Baltic States), or in considering relative levels of industrialization (where Soviet statistical publications have indicated over a number of years that in all the Central Asian Republics industrial productivity is well below the Union average both absolutely and in rate of growth, a factor which would tend to inhibit establishment of new industries there and hence perpetuate its dependence on primary production).

The relevance of Soviet Central Asia to Soviet foreign policy also needs to be examined, because of its role in Soviet relations with the Asian and African states, both as a "showcase" for visiting statesmen and as a source of influence through use of Central Asians in Soviet diplomatic, technical and cultural missions abroad. Obviously these issues could not all be covered at one conference, but the present volume is promising enough to give grounds for the hope that there will be others in which the frame of reference will be broadened.

G. JUKES

Australian National University

Partnership or Confrontation? Poor Lands and Rich. By Paul Alpert. (London: Collier-Macmillan LTD and New York: The Free Press, 1973. Pp. 269. $10.00.)

Behind the catchy title Paul Alpert has presented a broad survey of the economic development problems of poor nations with some added suggestions about what the rich lands should do to help. For 25 years the French author has worked with the United Nations. His writing also resembles the country studies of UNDP or the World Bank in its competent but not very stimulating assembly of facts.

Alpert's basic idea is that while the East-West tension is diminishing "a conflict of far greater scope is emerging as the major threat to peace, continued progress, and the very survival of our civilization" (p. ix) the one between rich and poor nations with its racial overtones.

This could be a fruitful hypothesis, even if it is hardly novel. It could give the foundation for a challenging study helping us to understand, for example, the tensions revealed in the UN Special General Assembly of spring 1974. My main criticism of the book is that instead of realizing this potential, Alpert has written a survey of development problems of a sort that by now is common.

The book starts off with a few facts about three "precedents for economic development"—Western Europe, Japan, and the Soviet Union. It continues with a discussion of three groups of domestic issues of development in the poor nations, human problems, policy problems, and some regional problems.

We are told, for instance, that the most important aspects of development relate to changes in human values, that human resources must be maximally utilized, that education is of paramount importance, that family planning is an "obvious solution," and that "major efforts must also be made to provide productive employment for the urban unemployed."

Among other similar generalities the author, on page 36, states that one of the most serious effects of sudden overpopulation in poor nations is the sharp increase in unemployment. It is regrettable that he does not relate the unemployment problem, as well as several other issues, also to social institutions and to social systems. This is the more surprising, because in the preceding paragraph he takes up Chinese family planning efforts. China can be considered overpopulated in comparison with Brazil, with seven times as many individuals per square mile, but it is Brazil and not China that is plagued by unemployment. In the treatment of "policy problems" we are offered similar insights about the proper balance between private and public enterprise, laissez-faire and planning, agriculture and industry, with some consideration of trade, foreign investments, and external aid added. The copious academic writing of the last two decades on neocolonialism, unequal exchange, or the role of the multinational companies in poor nations is not referred to, and it seems questionable if the author has taken the trouble to go to those many books.

Four pages on Latin America's special regional problems, two on Africa's, and two on Asia's complete this section. Part Three of the book repeats some of the many pious wishes about what the rich nations should do on trade, foreign investments, and aid, in order to speed up the development process in the poor nations. But Alpert does not advance this dicussion beyond what has for long been common in many U.N. documents.

Part Four takes up the concrete development experience of Algeria, the Ivory Cost, Tanzania,

Cuba, Mexico, (which is considered the outstanding success), China, Iran and South Korea. A number of detailed features are here quite interesting, e.g., the description of the gradual but methodical elimination of the French influence in the Algerian oil and gas production, or the story of the growth of the South Korean export economy which, if it were generalized to the more populous Asian nations, could really create employment problems in the rich nations.

In a concluding chapter Alpert discusses the necessity and the feasability of a "world strategy for economic development," mainly keeping to that of the UN Second Development Decade. The author is sadly aware that this strategy consists more in "lofty proclamations" than in real actions. He ends up with a warning, similar to that of Robert Heilbroner in *An Inquiry into The Human Prospect* (New York: Norton & Co., 1974, pp. 42–46) about the risks of nuclear blackmail from the poor nations, if the rich ones do not change their present behavior.

With the energy crisis adding about as much as all Western aid to the import bill of the nonoil-producing nations in the Third World, with the nine European Community nations hardly able to agree on a three-year aid program of a size smaller than the profits of the British Petroleum for the first quarter 1974 to this "Fourth World," and with India's atom bomb, this prospect of nuclear blackmail may have advanced a bit since the book was published.

In summary this is a very well-meaning, but neither a deep, novel, or challenging book about one of the most serious problems of the present world situation.

GUNNAR ADLER-KARLSSON
Roskilde University Center, Denmark

Differentiation and Co-operation in an Israeli Veteran Moshav. By Elaine Baldwin. (New York: Humanities Press, Inc., 1972. Pp. 240. $11.75.)

The work before us is another in the brilliant series of monographs written under the supervision of Professor Max Gluckman in the Department of Social Anthropology of the University of Manchester. With this study of one of the oldest co-operative smallholders villages in the Sharon plain, Dr. Baldwin joins D. Weintraub, M. Shokeid, E. Marx, and S. Deshen among others who have demonstrated the relevance of the techniques and methods of social anthropology to an understanding of Israeli society and its political system. The study is important not only as a description of the processes of change within a particular village called "Kfar Hefer" but as an examination of the routinization of ideology.

The first *moshav*, or co-operative smallholders village, Nahalal, was established by a breakaway group from the first kibbutz, Degania. In place of collective living and collective cultivation of commonly held lands, the moshav was structured on the basis of single-family units cultivating equal family-held plots while practicing co-operation at the marketing and purchasing levels. The village is administered by a general meeting of all the member settlers which in turn selects a Council and a village Executive made up of social and economic committees; the day-to-day management of a village is carried out by two officials, an internal secretary who deals with organizational, planning, agricultural, and social matters within the village, and an external secretary who is responsible for the village's financial affairs and dealings with governmental and public agencies and moshav organizations. In the course of time, power and authority in the villages have tended to become concentrated in the narrower bodies and among the full-time "professionals." This has occurred concomitantly with the emergence of economic considerations as a dominant factor in the villages' decision-making processes.

The original ideology of the moshav movement stressed egalitarianism, self-work as opposed to the employment of hired labor, mutual aid, and co-operation. The rise of the state of Israel and the growth of central planning through bureaucratic structures have substituted rational economic goals and methods for the ideological and communal goals of the original settlement movement. Changes have also occurred within the villages. Some farmers have been more successful than others. Others have no male children or sons-in-law who can assure the continuity of the family farm. The result has been growing social and economic differentiation within the villages between the more and less successful, the less successful being compelled to give up or sell their "quotas" of water, poultry production, etc. to the more efficient. Together these developments have created social tensions. Efficiency has become a slogan of the successful, with ideology increasingly the refuge of the weak and the less successful. All these have put the old moshav values to a severe test, the outcome of which is not yet clear.

Increasingly important decisions are made by external, governmental, and public agencies with the informal social controls of scandal and gossip being relegated to personal relationships. The old unity of the villagers has been shattered. Whether the moshav can survive in anything like its original form is questionable. Dr. Baldwin makes no predictions. She says simply, "A re-definition of economic relationships invariably carries with it a redefinition of other ways of life" (p. 225). We feel the measure of her sympathetic understanding of

the people of "Kfar Hefer" as we agonize with the villagers over the fate which overtakes all of us who are involved in the process of modernization.

KHAYYAM Z. PALTIEL
Carleton University, Ottawa

Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa: The Politics of Economic Change, 1919–1939. By E. A. Brett. (New York: NOK Publishers Ltd., 1973. Pp. 330. $16.00, cloth; $4.95, paper.)

During the past six or seven years the established theories of political and economic development of the 1950s and '60s have increasingly been abandoned in the face of their manifest inability to deal with the political and economic failures of the so-called "developing" nations. This transition has reflected a rejection of the ahistorical character, preoccupation with indigenous variables, and sanguine optimism of much previous research for a more historically rooted, global perspective that is essentially critical of and pessimistic about the impact of linkages between developed capitalist states and the Third World. E. A. Brett's book is a product of this process. It began as a doctoral thesis written in the empiricist and largely uncritical ethos of the Institute for Commonwealth Studies of the University of London and was subsequently extensively revised to reflect the author's concern with "the broader questions of colonialism and underdevelopment which have now forced themselves into the centre of all serious work in this general field" (p. ix).

The substance of the study is Brett's analysis of how the state and capitalist interests in Britain and East Africa interacted to produce dependent primary-product export economies in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika. Using some Cabinet papers as well as a rich variety of other public and private documentary sources, he shows that during the interwar decades British interest in colonial development began during the post-World War One economic slump as an effort rooted in British economic weakness, particularly the lack of competitiveness of British industry; the need for cheap raw materials and soft, controllable markets; and the fear of the political instability which might result from excess capacity and unemployment. During the depression of the 1930s interest increasingly focused on the protection of colonial export markets in East Africa from Japanese competition. The constraints on the development of the East African economies showed up in the lack of metropolitan interest in colonial industrialization out of the fear among capital and labor of local competition in the colonial markets and the reluctance among humanitarian interests to see Africans subjected to the rigors of industrial labor.

Brett also examines in fascinating detail the development of the specific form of a dependent colonial economy in each of the three territories. He notes the crucial choice which had to be made between the alternative strategies of basing the primary product export sector on African peasant, corporate plantation, or individual settler production. In Kenya the settler community emerged as the predominant force, despite real and continuing economic weakness, only at the cost of a substantial transfer of resources from the African population to the inefficient settler producers. In Tanganyika and Uganda, African peasant production predominated in the face of more limited plantation and settler activity, although Brett shows how in Uganda metropolitan corporate interests dominated marketing and processing and collaborated with the local administration in the entrenchment of oligarchic controls at the expense of the African producer. Focusing on land, transportation, marketing, and financial policies, Brett depicts how colonial economic institutions granted differential access to the market place and to the appropriation of the surpluses generated by increased production.

Several problems remain, however. The most serious is Brett's failure to distinguish between colonialism and imperialism, which are treated as synonymous throughout the work. But imperialism is better understood as a general abstract relationship between metropole and dependency which can assume a variety of specific forms. Colonialism itself is that pattern of relationships established where indigenous political and social forms are incapable of sustaining the relationship desired by the metropole, and the latter directly establishes the infrastructure of political and economic control with its own agents. The internal "colonial" relationships of domination over the subject population are personal and intense, and ultimately far less flexible than the external, largely impersonal intersystemic linkages with the metropole. Brett thus dismisses the conflicts between metropolitan and local administrative and settler interests as issues of detail that did not affect the basic structure, when in fact these were linked to fundamental differences which widened greatly after World War Two and gave impetus to the decolonization process in which the metropole divested itself of local colonial agents who were becoming increasingly costly to maintain.

For the above reason, as well as for the general and surprising neglect of internal documentation from the Colonial Office and the individual colonial governments, the treatment of colonial administration is generally weak. Thus, for example, the colonial governments, particularly the field administrations which were the backbone of control, did not find their "ideological roots in the Weberian tradition of scientific administration" (p. 304), but were instead more archaic in their

ethos. Furthermore, Brett accepts at face value the notion of "indirect rule" as characterizing the modus operandi of colonial administration, while in reality it was nonexistent in Kenya, little more than a facade in Tanganyika, and operated in approximation of the theory only in the African kingdoms of Uganda.

These problems are reinforced by the constriction of focus to the interwar decades. Brett can therefore only hint at the important watershed in East African development represented by the Second World War and the ensuing 15 years of rapid growth and rising African nationalist opposition. Thus, in the last chapter, when he leaps to a consideration of the contemporary impact of the colonial political economy, the effort is not wholly convincing.

Brett's work is nevertheless a solid and important case study which presents a theoretically and historically sophisticated approach to the political economy of African development. It deserves wide reading and serious attention.

BRUCE J. BERMAN
Queen's University, Canada

From Tribe to Nation in Africa. Edited by Ronald Cohen and John Middleton. (Scranton, Pa.: Chandler Publishing Co., 1970. Pp. 276. $8.75, cloth; $4.75, paper.)

The editors of *From Tribe to Nation* begin with the premise that anthropologists have traditionally disregarded the importance of the nation-state in Africa in favor of comparative analysis of cultural subunits, while political scientists, ethnocentrically oblivious to the importance and richness of African societies' multiple subcultures, have focused almost exclusively at the level of the new national units. Questionable as this argumentative premise may be, it in no way interferes with the quality of ten substantive essays which examine processes of absorption and assimilation within a number of subnational cultural groupings in Africa. The principal common denominator of these essays is the proposition that the process of cultural absorption, which seems so vitally important if African nations are to develop a viable basis for political stability, has been a fundamental part of the social experience of African communities since long before the colonial division of Africa; and that state structures exercising administrative and political powers over culturally heterogenous populations have existed in Africa for many centuries.

If any social scientists concerned with Africa have ever operated on the relatively simple assumption that cultural assimilation unidirectionally involved the upward transfer of personal loyalties from the tribal grouping at one level to the nation-state at another, *From Tribe to Nation* should certainly put an end to this sort of thinking. It shows that cultural incorporation is an almost infinitely complex process which involves the continuous adjustment of personal orientations and allegiances at various levels of society.

Among the many oversimplified assumptions which would need to give way in the face of the essays in this volume, perhaps the most widespread concerns the supposed cultural homogeneity of historic subnational units. African societies, which vary widely in scale and political organization, have frequently played host to highly variegated groups of stranger minorities. The absorption of these minorities into the political, economic, and cultural life of regionally dominant ethnic communities is, in certain respects, as important a part of the overall social integration of modern Africa as is the integration of subnational units into the politicoeconomic framework of the new nation-state.

One useful way to compare the various patterns of cultural assimilation considered in this volume is to consider the various institutional vehicles through which integration is initially accomplished. In almost every case of cultural integration, this process proceeds on the basis of one particular starting point of contact between dissimilar groups and then gradually unfolds to include other dimensions of social life and behavior. Thus, among communities which possess strongly articulated systems of chieftaincy, this institution seems to play a crucial role as the initial structural bridge between diverse cultural elements. In his discussion of the Alur people, for example, Aidan Southall comments that "Alur incorporation of non-Alur has depended mainly upon the constant proliferation of Alur chiefship and the gradual envelopment of new subjects in its realm" (p. 76). Once non-Alur groups accepted Alur chiefs there was a pronounced tendency for them to bring other aspects of their culture into alignment with that of the predominant group.

The Nyamwezi of western Tanzania provide a second illustration of the importance of chieftainship with the important distinction that whereas the Alur system has depended entirely upon chiefs of Alur descent, the pattern of chieftaincy among the Nyamwezi poses no institutional barrier to non-Nyamwezi ascending to the position of chief. The important point is that every non-Nyamwezi in the Nyamwezi area has been considered to possess full rights of citizenship in a subchiefdom and full entitlement to the ritual services of chiefs. R. G. Abrahams notes that since these rights were often fairly similar from one cultural subcommunity to the next, chieftaincy provided an extremely effective unifying and integrative framework. In West Africa, Elliott Skinner notes the supreme im-

portance of chieftaincy as the vehicle whereby the Mossi people were able first to dominate, then to assimilate, non-Mossi groups. One of the unique aspects of the Mossis' system was their ability to generate and implant a series of historical and ritual myths which gave their chiefs a strong degree of legitimacy among subordinated elements. Chieftaincy has also been the cutting edge and *sine qua non* of cultural assimilation between Tutsi and Hutu in Rwanda.

Where chieftaincy is not strongly developed, as among the peoples of northern Ghana which lack the institution of chieftainship, other institutions provide the basis for initial contact and assimilation. Jack Goody documents the extreme importance of intermarriage as the basis for cultural unification among a wide assortment of northern Ghanaian peoples. He notes that "for most purposes, the situation in northern Ghana can be summarized in the proposition that the rate of incorporation (I) varies directly with the rate of out-marriage (OM)" (p. 137). As in the case of societies where chieftaincy functions as the initial vehicle of cultural contact, other dimensions and aspects of culture begin to align themselves once the first institutional relationship has been established.

It is tempting to hope that Africa's long tradition of cultural incorporation and interethnic assimilation will abet the process of building unified nation-states in the contemporary era. This hope is given strong implicit expression both in the editors' Introduction and in the essays that follow. For the moment, however, the most that can be said is that cultural integration at the level of the nation-state has ample precedent historically and that identical processes have been occurring at the subnational level since the beginnings of African history.

MICHAEL F. LOFCHIE
University of California, Los Angeles

Report from Peking: Observations of a Western Diplomat on the Cultural Revolution. By D. W. Fokkema. (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1972. Pp. viii, 185. $7.50.)

D. W. Fokkema was a Dutch diplomat posted in Peking during the period between April 1966 and February 1968. His book is an account of the course of the Cultural Revolution through the Ninth Party Congress in 1969. Now a professor of East Asian Literature at the University of Utrecht, Dr. Fokkema gives us a study that is at once journalistic and a piece of analytic scholarship.

Fokkema the journalist gives a vivid firsthand account of the events of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, and a good deal more: he explores its temper. The events composing a social and political phenomenon as complex as the Chinese upheaval have been given to us before in a number of accounts—accounts which often prematurely imposed meanings and explanations. Fokkema's approach is significantly different in this respect. The narrative is there (often in a confusion of names and dates), but beneath this is a sensibility which explores a conflict of attitudes, attitudes rooted deeply in historic Chinese culture and the revolutionary process which China has experienced for two generations. Fokkema has rightly suggested that the Cultural Revolution was a political conflict, a confrontation of opposing personalities and factions in the conventional sense; and it was also a conflict of policies and national priorities. But in addition, he suggests that such a profound disorientation of a society was more than political because it was a conflict of values and tempers reaching deeply into the consciousness and processes of a society which was experiencing profound change. "During the Cultural Revolution the impossible and unbelievable happened," Fokkema asserts (p. 161). Only because the animus was "ideological" was this possible.

In Fokkema's view the Cultural Revolution represented Mao Tse-tung's vigorous reassertion of an ideology of uninterrupted revolution and voluntarism. It represented Mao's fear that China was entering a postrevolutionary age of bureaucratic organization, technocratic thinking, and materialism. Against this trend he urged selfless dedication to revolutionary consciousness, spontaneous human effort, and a reaffirmation of *will* in the building of a socialist society. The libretto of the Cultural Revolution thus involved factional strife, the rise and fall from grace of individuals and groups, and mass campaigns and organizations of various sorts; but the more important underlying music was impelled by nothing less than an attempt to create and recreate a new consciousness. The end of the Cultural Revolution was thus revolution itself. If the revolution often seemed to be chaotic, out of control, and politically erratic it was precisely the enthronement of the revolutionary process which made this possible and necessary if Mao was to achieve his wider goal.

Dr. Fokkema's training in language serves him well, and his use of content analysis to study the various poster campaigns and attendant polemics represents a particular strength of his book. He has understood that a problem in reading the language of revolution is to take it either too seriously or not seriously enough. That "the medium is the message" can be asserted for much of the discourse of the Cultural Revolution, and Fokkema even gives us a study of the calligraphy of Lin Piao as a kind of window into one of the minds which animated the Chinese struggle.

I think Fokkema is wrong in asserting that

Mao's revolution in consciousness was essentially "anti-intellectual" (p. 3). It is true that intellectuals often carried the brunt of the Cultural Revolution, but I would suggest that in fact Mao's campaign was supremely intellectual: if it was directed against intellectuals it was only to substitute one dispensation (analytic, organizational, "bureaucratic" thinking) with another (humanistic, willful, intuitive). No one could be more intellectual than Mao in believing that society should be ruled by values and ideas rather than by materialistic or organizational considerations. It was in fact Mao's fear that China was in a fundamental sense becoming less intellectual in its foundations that prompted his campaign against the intellectuals whom he held responsible for this state of affairs. If Fokkema really wants to assert that "Mao Tse-tung wanted to use the Cultural Revolution in order to settle an ideological dispute" (p. 168), he can hardly call it a campaign against "intellectualism," except within a very narrow meaning of the latter term.

In Fokkema's view the net results of Mao's revolution were negative. It produced deep division, not unity. It did not settle the basic ideological question which it proposed; it only degraded a number of personalities associated (rightly or wrongly) with "revisionist" and "opportunistic" ideas and policies. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution rather emerges as but another of those intense "self-investigations" in which China has engaged since she has had to come to terms with the modern world during the last century. Students of contemporary Chinese history and politics will find Fokkema's well-documented study of great value in their own investigations.

G. ERIC HANSEN

Golden Gate University

Tales of Two City-States: The Development Progress of Hong Kong and Singapore. By Theodore and Frances M. Geiger. (Washington, D.C.: National Planning Association, 1973. Pp. 239. $3.50.)

The investor considering Singapore or Hong Kong will find this book an invaluable introductory guide. With statistical data and clear discourse, the authors tell what to expect by way of taxes, fiscal limitations, characteristics of the labor pool, governmental involvement in business activities, union pressures, protectionist threats, growth rates, and political stability. There is a well-integrated chapter on "Chinese Sociocultural Background."

Associated with this analysis of what has been successful industrial growth are optimistic assertions as to the present and future viability of the two city-states. The authors see dangers ahead, but express confidence that these dynamic people and governments will continue to overcome future challenges. The declining proportion of Singapore's family budget spent on food (one example among many of the casual, optimism-oriented mode of analysis) "indicates that levels of living have been rising" (p. 203), rather than the unstated alternative possibility of a diminution in food consumption because of higher housing and transportation costs. Trade union membership is declining; this is probably a sign of contentment (p. 207), rather than disaffection over their low effectiveness. The activities of multinational corporations are being kept in line with "national interest" (p. 30), even though the governments place highest priority on promoting investment and show few signs of interfering with the profits of successful firms. The problem of increasing protectionism in Japan, Western Europe, and the USA—perhaps not accidentally the key customers of both city-states—"will probably" be solved by flexible "macro-adjustment processes" and "imaginative leadership." Those few—mostly academics—who would prefer greater government spending on social welfare (in Hong Kong) and more democratic inputs (in Singapore) could "reverse" the delicately balanced budgets and investment incentives which have induced economic progress and which offer security in the event of recession.

The authors went to the two countries, talked with government and business leaders, and intelligently synthesized their conventional wisdom. Those social scientists who feel it is their role to examine whether such wisdom is descriptive of reality will be disappointed. This is not investigative reporting. Statistics and thoughts are largely presented in the form in which they emanate from official sources. No comparisons are made with other countries. Political development literature is ignored. The authors feel encouraged by the fact that the man on the street seemed supportive of this conventional wisdom (e.g., p. 216) even though they are aware that dissent is sublimated and discouraged. They place an aura of natural harmony upon the actions of the two governments—and on Communist China as well. All three (with differing emphases) are carrying forward Confucian principles of subordination and authority in a modern setting (e.g., cf. pp. 134, 223), whatever that means. It is noted in passing that leaders in other developing nations, too, should be able to create similar successful pragmatic and flexible development strategies (p. 23).

Optimism is essential for a healthy business climate. It is easiest to maintain when there is little dissenting opinion, or examination of hypotheses. This happens to also suit the interests of incumbent regimes. If what is right for today's

business and incumbent regimes (e.g., Hong Kong and Singapore's investment climates) is right for all nations at all times, and welfare spending is synonymous with improved living standards, the Geigers' book should set everyone's mind at ease.

ROBERT E. GAMER
University of Missouri—Kansas City

Revolutions and Military Rule in the Middle East: The Arab States. Vol. III—Egypt, The Sudan, Yemen and Libya. By George M. Haddad. (New York: Robert Speller & Sons, Publishers, Inc., 1973. Pp. 444. $12.50.)

The defeat of the Arabs in the Six-Day War of June 1967 brought with it a torrent of critical literature that came to be known in the Arab World as the "Self-Criticism Literature." Professor Haddad's book is one instance of this literature. The volume under review is the third and last volume of a series on military rule in the Middle East. It deals with military rule in Egypt, Sudan, Yemen, and Libya.

While the author states in his preface that the purpose of writing this volume was to "contribute to the understanding of the contemporary Arab" and "to explain the consequences of the intrusion of the military into radical politics" and the result of such an intrusion, the reader cannot fail to notice that the real purpose is what the author claims to be his conclusions, namely "to refute the assumption that the military was the only force for reform and stability in the Arab World and that their socialist revolutionary regimes gave the Arabs more dignity, unity and strength."

The book advocates the thesis that military regimes and the radical socialist transformation they brought with them, especially after 1955, if compared to the liberal democratic regimes they replaced, are characterized by "more instability, more inefficiency, more demogogy, more lust and struggle for power, more humiliation and defeat, and less freedom, less equality and less prosperity" (p. 414). To support his thesis, the author includes newspaper reports, journalist editorials, statements of political refugees, psychological warfare literature produced by foreign embassies and intelligence units, political opponents' diatribes, gossip and rumors. Unfortunately, the abuses, the injustices and the cruelties of the oligarchies that preceded the military are forgotten; instead, a golden age of liberal democracy is resurrected. King Idriss Sanussi of Libya, for example, becomes a progressive whose only concern was the advancement of Arab causes and the prosperity and dignity of the Libyan people, while the military revolutionaries become an obstacle whose "inexperience" and "suspicion and resentment of foreigners and former local officials consequently slowed down the economy" (p. 339).

The author fails to explain the socioeconomic and ideological variables that led to military intervention in the Middle East; what factors shape the military-civilian relationship; and how military regimes managed to survive, and in the case of Nasser, to enjoy wide range popular support, in and outside Egypt. The relationship of increased military professionalism, the nature of the economy, the socioeconomic background of political and military elite, or the contribution of urbanism, tribalism, or peasant societies to military interventions are questions that are not discussed. Nor does the author address himself to the impact of external inputs by the superpowers in terms of arms, technologies, training, and ideologies on the role that the military plays in small societies.

The main villain in the whole book remains Nasser, whose success as a ruler is attributed to his ability as a conspirator, propagandist, and willingness to use force, intrigue, subversion and violence in the pursuit of his goals (p. 146). Nasser's real aim, the reader is told, was to attain power and to keep it. According to Haddad, Nasser failed in Egypt, in the Arab World, in the international context, and in Africa, bringing misery to his people and to others while failing

> to provide a stable government . . . to guarantee the people's civil rights and freedoms . . . to reform the administration and improve the work of the bureaucracy, to build a strong army, to run the new economic system efficiently, to raise the standard of living among the poverty stricken ignorant masses and to create a new moral and mental outlook that reflects itself in more efficient work . . . (p. 149).

The author concludes his book with a violent attack on the military and the radical socialist regimes and the class warfare that they produced, calling upon the people of the area to revolt and restore the kind of liberal democracy that respects human dignity and freedom (pp. 417–19).

For those political scientists who are interested in theory building or proposition testing, the present volume has very little to offer; in fairness to the author, it was not intended to do those things. For those who are interested in knowing why the military came to power and what are the political dynamics and achievements of military regimes, the present volume offers a myopic vision, perhaps intentionally so, as a reaction to what the author conceives as the docility of the Arab intellectuals to speak out against the negative effect of those so-called "revolutionary regimes" (p. 411). The action is dominated by a few personalities whose only rationale is that of power attainment.

Perhaps the volume's main asset is that it reintroduces to political science the concept of power as a focus of analysis after it has been submerged

under the system theories approach. The book will certainly appeal to those who were victimized by the various military regimes in the Arab countries and in other parts of the world, without satisfying those who yearn for change and for the establishment of a new political, social, and economic order. It certainly failed to anticipate the performance of Arab armies in the 1973 war and the impact of such performance on their role in modern Arab societies. In the same vein, his predictions about the direction of Egypt under Sadat, (p. 157–164), of Libya under Qadhafi, and Sudan under Numeiri have not been substantiated by later developments.

ABDO I. BAAKLINI
State University of New York at Albany

Two Democratic Labor Leaders in Conflict: The Latin American Revolution and the Role of the Workers. By Carroll Hawkins. (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1973. Pp. 141. $11.50.)

Since its inception in the late nineteenth century, the trade union movement in Latin America has had contacts with the international labor movement. Unions of the area have been affiliated with one or another of the worldwide labor confederations. At the same time, a series of groups has brought together national labor organizations from various Latin American countries, as well, sometimes as those of North America.

The broadest-based hemispheric group, in political terms, was the Confederación de Trabajadores de América Latina (CTAL), organized in 1938. Although founded as a united front of labor organizations with very differing political orientations, during World War Two it came completely under Communist control.

By the beginning of the 1950s, the CTAL had lost most of its influence, and its place as the principal hemispheric labor group had been taken by the Organización Regional Inter-Americana de Trabajadores (ORIT), regional grouping of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. It largely dominated organized labor in the Americas during the 1950s, although in the middle 1950s a rival to the ORIT was established, the Confederación Latino Americana de Sindicalistas Cristianos (CLASC), regional affiliate of the International Federation of Christian Trade Unions.

Today, ORIT and CLASC (rechristened Confederación Latino Americana de Trabajadores—CLAT), are the two functioning hemisphere-wide trade union groupings. Professor Hawkins studies them through the medium of the men who were until recently their secretaries-general. One is Arturo Jauregui, Secretary General of ORIT throughout the 1960s. The other is Emilio Maspero, an Argentine, the most vocal spokesman of CLASC during most of the 1960s. Hawkins has interviewed both men extensively. He has also obtained information about them and their organizations from many sources in Latin America, the United States and Europe.

Maspero and Jauregui are vividly contrasting figures, and their contrast, as Hawkins rightly points out, reflects to a considerable degree the kinds of organizations which they have headed. Although both profess to seek basic changes in the economic, social and political life of Latin America, their approaches to achieving these changes are strikingly different.

Jauregui for a long time headed an organization, ORIT, which included not only the largest United States and Canadian labor movements, but also the principal labor groups in Mexico, Venezuela, Peru, Colombia, Costa Rica, Brazil, and various West Indian countries, as well as unions in Argentina and other countries. It therefore has had within its ranks organizations with a very wide range of ideological and political orientations. This, and the added fact that it was Inter-American and not just Latin American, meant that Jauregui needed to draw heavily on his talents as a diplomat and political tactician. He could not afford to rush recklessly into print.

The CLASC and CLAT, on the other hand, has been a group of small organizations, relatively homogeneous in philosophy and ideology. Only in Ecuador and the Dominican Republic has it had the largest national labor group. The cost of high-flung oratory has therefore, been relatively small for Maspero.

Professor Hawkins makes all of this clear. He discusses the attitudes of the two men toward the United States, the U.S. labor movement, the influence and activities of the Communists, the kind of basic transformation which Latin America should undergo. Through direct quotations from the two men, and an analysis of these, he clearly brings out the differences between Jauregui and Maspero.

Useful as this volume is to an understanding of Latin American labor and general politics, I have several bones to pick with Professor Hawkins. The first is that the book lacks an overall assessment of the national organizations in ORIT and CLASC. Such a discussion might have made more obvious one of the roots of the bombast of Maspero and the relative caution of Jauregui: a relatively small and weak organization has to speak in somewhat shrill tones to get attention and to establish its own importance in relation to a much larger and more solid group. It also might have made clearer that Jauregui had much to lose by speaking rashly, while Maspero had little to lose by doing so.

My second quarrel with Professor Hawkins is that, on balance, he finds Maspero's approach more appealing than Jauregui's. The obvious question arises: If the revolutionary rhetoric of Maspero is more in line with the needs of the Latin American workers than is the more pragmatic approach of Jauregui, why have workers' organizations for the most part stayed with ORIT instead of joining CLASC?

A third point is that Hawkins fails to recognize that the ORIT type of trade unionism, which concentrates largely on collective bargaining although not slighting political issues, has brought substantial gains to the members of the organized labor movement—so much so that some left-wing critics now talk about organized labor in Latin America as a "labor aristocracy."

Finally, a fundamental question is raised by Professor Hawkins's discussion: Can a trade union movement in fact be revolutionary, in the sense of having as its basic goal the fundamental transformation of society, rather than improvement of working conditions and general well being of its members? Three-quarters of a century ago, Lenin, in *What Is To Be Done?* answered this question in the negative, asserting that revolution had to be the primary objective of a political party, and that a trade union movement could never be expected to carry out revolution. I happen to agree with Lenin, not with Maspero and Hawkins.

ROBERT J. ALEXANDER
Rutgers University

Politics in Europe: Structures and Processes in Some Postindustrial Democracies. Edited by Martin O. Heisler. (New York: David McKay Company, 1974. Pp. 415. $12.50, cloth; $4.95, paper.)

A compendium of papers on European politics presents a reviewer with two major assessment criteria. One can compare the work with others of its type, of which there are many. Or one can measure the volume against its internal claims. Because in this case the outcomes differ so markedly, I shall use both perspectives.

On the one hand, it is in comparison with similar works on European politics that the merits of the book are most apparent. In the first place, the articles are original (the almost total exception of Lindberg's contribution—which is basically a section from his book *Europe's Would-Be Polity*—shows how valuable this criterion is. Interested readers should be familiar with his argument already). Second, many of the "postindustrial democracies" studied (Austria, Belgium) are relatively underexplored in the literature. Third, many of the papers are of sufficient length to allow for a sustained argument that goes beyond the mere presentation of data.

Finally, we should note the particular quality of some of the contributions. Stiefbold ("Segmented Pluralism and Consociational Democracy in Austria"), in an insightful essay, develops and refines the typology suggested by Lijphart by showing the links between elite and mass opinion as a source of strain for Austria's experiment with the Grand Coalition. Heisler ("Institutionalizing Societal Cleavages in a Cooptive Polity") reviews the recent upsurge of linguistic discord in Belgium with its associated stress on, and subsequent transformation of, the political party system. And Peters ("The Development of Social Policy in France, Sweden, and the United Kingdom: 1860–1965"), using a rather elegant mix of historical commentary and quantitative measures of public services, offers a number of insights into the pronounced differences of historical development among the countries studied and the implications of the now general switch to more administrative modes of service delivery.

These, then, are the strengths of the volume—original, usually lengthy essays, some of which are first rate, on matters or countries often neglected by political analysts. From the perspective of the self-expressed goals of the book itself, however, the record is more mixed. Briefly, in addition to collecting original and discretely useful articles, the editor aims to construct what he calls a model of the "European polity" and to relate the contributions to it. Neither task is happily resolved.

Turning first to the theoretical claims, it must be stated that "European Polity Model" as outlined in Part I is far from persuasive. Among the major confusions are that it is *not* a model in the generally recognized sense but rather a "pretheoretical statement" (p. 22). Nor does the comment that "we attempt neither to sketch the outlines of the whole matrix within which the European polity is located nor to make empirically grounded assertions about the relationship of the system type under discussion to other types of political systems" (p. 34) help the reader to formulate the essential *distinctions* among system types. It seems rather that the "European Polity" is the end state toward which all advanced industrial states are vaguely headed. Perhaps because of this lack of distinctiveness, the generalizations attributed to the model (pp. 38–78) seem curiously old-fashioned, often a mere repetition of the end-of-ideology argument. Nowhere, for example, is there significant mention of the general disenchantment with politics as usual in many European states, the emerging debate on participation in *corporate enterprises*, the unstabilizing effects of inflation. This is not to say that the model should involve a current events commentary, but it should provide a framework within which these developments can be understood.

Next, not only does the "European Polity Model" fail to perform the tasks generally associated with a "model," it also encompasses very little of the European continent. To detail the restrictions, there is first the usual (but still unfortunate) exclusion of all but the European "democracies." In addition, it soon becomes clear that the major emphasis is on the smaller democracies. Finally, even this set is found too inclusive; real attention is limited to the smaller, *segmented* democracies. It is suggested that these somehow are beating the path for other states to travel.

Given these restrictions it is obvious that many of the contributions (e.g., Peters and, indeed, all of Part III) bear only a tangential relationship to the themes outlined in the first part of the book. When it is recalled, however, that the theoretical perspective is, in my opinion, less than compelling, the implications of this discontinuity are rather ambiguous. In short, we can conclude that while the volume contains some excellent articles, in the final analysis it shares with other readers on European politics the characteristic of the whole being less than the sum of its parts.

NORMAN FURNISS
Indiana University

West New Guinea: The Dispute and its Settlement. By William Henderson. (New Jersey: Seton Hall University Press, 1973. Pp. 281. $7.50.)

The appearance of yet another book on the West New Guinea dispute which was settled in August 1962 between Indonesia and the Netherlands faces the problem of justifying its publication at this time. Irian Jaya, as West New Guinea is now called under Indonesian sovereignty and administration, is not without current interest in the Melenesian region, partly because Papua New Guinea, which occupies the eastern half of the island, is scheduled for independence sometime in 1975. This forthcoming event has stimulated some interest in the border separating Irian Jaya from Papua New Guinea. The West New Guinea settlement, however, has not brought the Indonesian infiltration and attempts at subversion of the eastern half of the island that some have predicted. Papua New Guinea, in fact, lives harmoniously with Irian Jaya, although a Free Papua Movement based along the border carries out periodic skirmishes against Indonesian troops. Relations between Papua New Guinea and Indonesia over the West Irian border have been normalized, and the Indonesians have allowed the clans and tribes which straddle the border to move about without official hindrance. Further, the movement of refugees from West Irian to Papua New Guinea has been routinized under an arrangement whereby refugees are given "permissive residence" status in Papua New Guinea so long as they do not participate in politics affecting Indonesia.

Professor Henderson, then, re-examines the West New Guinea dispute without the benefit of current international, or even much Papua New Guinean interest in it. One must therefore look for other kinds of justification for this work. From the point of view of substantive content, the materials are basically a rehash of old familiar data with a clearly visible anti-Indonesian bias expressed in many parts of the book. The anti-Indonesian sentiment is particularly emphatic in the chapter that deals with the "act of free choice." Here, the author's previous balance in using a variety of sources breaks down almost completely. It is probably in this very area, dealing with the follow-up of the settlement, that Professor Henderson could have made a contribution on the substantive aspects of the dispute. Unfortunately, the book is weakest exactly in this area because of the author's reliance on very partial secondary sources.

On what grounds, then, can this new book on the West Irian dispute be recommended? Henderson has attempted in the latter part of the book to examine the dispute from the point of view of the effectiveness of third-party intervention in international crises. Using theoretical materials drawn from Oran Young's *The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), he has attempted to show that the effectiveness of a mediator's role needs not in all circumstances depend upon such factors as neutrality and independence. Specifically, Henderson contends that despite the United States' close friendship with the Netherlands, the United States was accepted by the Indonesians to settle the dispute. The point, however, does not negate Young's contention that effective third-party mediators must be impartial; clearly, the Indonesians did not reject the mediatory role of the United States because the latter was interested in a pro-Indonesian solution. What the settlement of the dispute does show is not the limitations of Young's prerequisites for effective third-party mediation, but rather the capacity of a major power to coerce a militarily and economically dependent ally to accept a solution which it would ordinarily reject. The Netherlands, which tenaciously held on to West Irian for over a decade, in the face of the larger interests of the United States to keep Indonesia out of the Communist bloc, quickly succumbed to pressures to accept a pro-Indonesian settlement.

Specialists in Indonesian politics, then, will find that the book does not offer them much substantively. From the standpoint of theory, especially with regard to the role of third parties as intermediaries in settling disputes, again its value is limited. The book could readily be recom-

mended, however, to those who know very little about West Irian. For them, Professor Henderson has done a capable and commendable job in bringing some order out of a vast amount of materials written on the West Irian dispute.

RALPH R. PREMDAS
University of Papua New Guinea

To the Maginot Line: The Politics of French Military Preparation in the 1920's. By Judith M. Hughes. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971. Pp. 300. $9.00.)

The First World War exhausted France, depriving the country of both the physical means and the moral drive to fight another total war. Successive French governments had to satisfy public opinion by reducing the burden of defense to a bare minimum, while limiting and ultimately confronting a much stronger Germany. This situation accounted for much of France's inability and unwillingness to risk war in the 1930s, and for the late date at which the nation began to rearm.

Judith Hughes has attempted to trace the motivations of French decision makers grappling with national security during the crucial postwar decade. Both government restrictions on the use of documents (restrictions which have been loosened since this research was done) and the breadth of her topic prevented the author from contributing major new facts and concepts to the topic. What Hughes has produced, based on memoirs and published sources, is an able summary of the more sympathetic interpretations of government actions.

According to the author, French political and military leaders shared a common viewpoint on the essentials of their situation. Given France's position relative to Germany, the problem was to assure the support of allies and to provide the troops needed to defend the nation until those allies and the limited French war potential could be fully mobilized. Since Germany had never lost the capability of rearming itself, enforcement of the Versailles treaty was obviously a luxury which France had to give up when such enforcement risked alienating Britain and increasing French defense costs. Yet once France agreed to evacuate the Ruhr and ultimately the Rhineland, it lost its political levers and its strategic outworks against Germany.

Even before this, Dr. Hughes tells us, progressive reductions in the size of the army and the length of conscripted service forced the French commanders to plan for an initial defensive in case of war. These reductions were due in part to public opinion and in part to the demands of finances and colonies. The generals acquiesced because they were promised that the resulting economies would be used to improve the numbers and pay of career soldiers. The Rhineland evacuation, however, obviously militated against such a weak defense system. The best solution appeared to be a set of fortifications designed to delay a German "sneak attack" and to provide a secure flank for mobile operations in Belgium. Thus the author portrays the center and right-wing French politicians as trapped into a weak and defensive policy by the basic situation and by their own unconscious desire to avoid another holocaust.

As a brief political summary of a moderate viewpoint, *To the Maginot Line* is more than adequate. The problem with this work lies in its lack of depth on any one of the men and decisions involved. The author presents events as predetermined, neglecting the background to the individual actions for the sake of brevity. The book is also sparse in its political analysis of Pétain, Painlevé, and the other controversial leaders of this period. Such omissions limit the utility of an otherwise valuable essay.

JONATHAN M. HOUSE
The University of Michigan

Freedom, Corruption and Government in Elizabethan England. By Joel Hurstfield. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973. Pp. 368. $11.00.)

Although he has produced four longer works, Joel Hurstfield, Astor Professor of English History at University College, London, excels as an essayist. This book brings together eleven articles, all published previously but mostly hidden away in other people's books. While concentrating on sixteenth-century England, the essays cover more than the title indicates, but they do not constitute a monograph on either freedom, corruption, or government.

There is no unifying theme for the essays, but the author believes most concern the "frontier between what the individual has liberty to do and what the state has authority to restrain" (p. 18). In half the studies, however, the reader is more teased than informed by the treatment of that theme. The two on religion demonstate the astute statesmanship of William and Robert Cecil. The one on Wiltshire is an introduction to local government, especially the work of the JPs. An analysis of office holding places that subject in the context of inflation, royal taxation, and social ambitions among the upper ranks. The article on the English Renaissance is an excellent short synthesis. So far the author is keenly sensitive to the Tudor setting and in command of manageable questions.

The other essays lack the same sharpness and cogency. What is corruption? His definition ("If

we assume that the object of the state is the welfare of all its members, we may define corruption as the subversion of that object for other ends") ([p. 141]) is too broad, and his examples neither encompass the possibilities nor adequately examine any of them. Clientage, for instance, is condemned less by evidence than such generalizations as "the system [the Cecils' clientage] carries the taint of corruption for it sacrificed the public to the private interest, the need for a first-class body of public servants to the interests of a leader of faction" (pp. 152–53). Yet considering the paltry number of professional officials, perhaps a faction loyal to the state was the only means of achieving a coherent and effective government, and of avoiding the more dangerous corruption of a George Villiers, Duke of Buckingham. The manifest harm done to individuals by selling wardships is mentioned, but this is termed an abuse, not corruption. Careful weighing of the particulars in each case, Hurstfield argues, is necessary to establish corruption in taking fees, gifts, and other perquisites of office. But since the author fails to do this one wonders whether the prosperous careers of the Cecils resulted from peculation or more accepted practices, or both.

Concerning freedom Hurstfield raises some fundamental questions but leaves them largely unanswered. Nevertheless, all the essays are stimulating and written with surpassing craftmanship. He shows that liberty had more to do with national independence than individual freedom, and that contemporaries, to judge by Shakespeare's plays, equated liberty with license, violence, and mob rule. Henry VIII exercised a despotism of intent, though his accomplishments never equaled his desires. Robert Cecil is acquitted of age-old charges that he instigated or encouraged the Gunpowder Plot of 1605.

Several conclusions are implicit in the studies. Neither rulers nor ruled often understood what the twentieth century calls liberty or freedom. Effective administration was impossible without what we would call corruption. Government had little to do with popular consent. These are valuable reminders, but they offer no fresh appraisals of Tudor government. This is disappointing since the author's experience, skill, and interest in social history give him exceptional qualifications for a more direct examination of the constrained cooperation between a vulnerable, albeit authoritative, dynasty and the realm's powerful, ambitious, yet quarrelsome and undisciplined social elite. Instead the author presents a masterful but traditional review of politics as seen from Westminster: leading ministers, royal officials, privy council, a nod toward parliament and a wink at the counties.

FRANK F. FOSTER
University of Colorado at Denver

From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa, 1882–1964, Vol. I & Vol. II. By Thomas Karis and Gwendolen M. Carter. (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution, 1973. Vol. I: Pp. 378. $14.50. Vol. II: Pp. 536. $17.50.)

The volumes under review are the first two of a three-volume collection of documents on African politics in South Africa. The final volume will cover the period 1953–1964.

Without question this publication is of major importance in the study of South African politics. Scholars will draw upon the documents in many ways—as a source of reference, as material for general political studies of South Africa, as a framework upon which to build more specialized research, or simply to provide an overall picture of African political activity over the last century.

The documents are arranged in chronological periods, subdivided into subject areas. For example, Part Two of Volume II, which covers the period 1937–1949, has documents grouped under four heads: "The Revival of the African National Congress 1937–1945"; "The Failure of the Natives' Representative Council 1946–1947"; "The Rise of the A.N.C. Youth League"; and "Other Non-European or Left Wing Activity." There are editorial introductions to each period, which set the documents in a context. The editors approach this task in different ways. While Dr. Sheridan John III, who edits Vol. I and the first part of Vol. II, gives brief introductions which are closely tied to the documents, Professor Thomas Karis, who edits the final two sections of Vol. II, writes longer, more ambitious articles which could stand as pieces of scholarship in their own right. In guiding the reader through the documents, however, it would have been more appropriate if Karis had divided the articles into smaller groups, with shorter introductions for each group.

Having acknowledged the significance of the collection, one must recognize the inevitable limitations which the editors have had to impose upon themselves. In the first place most of the documents are formal records—minutes of African National Congress meetings, records of interviews with government ministers and officials, declaratory statements issued to arouse public support, etc. There are no private records, such as correspondence or personal diaries, to put flesh upon the official bones. Some aspects of political activity are therefore not recorded, or at least are under-represented. For example, we do not have documented the immense organizational difficulties faced by political bodies with few resources in a large country with a diverse, scattered population—difficulties of retaining even the simplest communications network, of arranging meetings,

and ensuring that resolutions are followed up. Also while elements of rivalry and conflict, both between individuals and groups, are revealed much of this informal activity is unrecorded. We cannot gain from these documents a full picture of the private stands that were taken, the bargains that were struck, the passionate clash of personality, the strong grip of regional and ethnic interests. Nor do the documents cover local political activity. There is no record here of the activities in particular townships, or "native areas," where, because of the problems of central organization, much African political activity has taken place. At the other end of the scale there is reference to international influences but no documents dealing directly with this issue.

These limitations are not raised by way of complaint, for even if such personal and local records exist it would have required an immense number of volumes to publish them. The limitations are noted simply to make clear what the documents do offer. They provide an important record of African political activity at the center of South African politics, derived mainly from the records of the African organizations involved. The nature of the documents emphasizes the output and reactive elements of political activity, rather than revealing processes within the "black boxes" of the African organizations.

One striking feature which emerges from the documents is the persistence of many grievances. In its earliest document in this collection, dated about 1903, the South African Native Congress (which later developed into the African National Congress) was already repeating well-established complaints about land, taxes, labor conditions and pay, the treatment of Africans before the courts, and the small expenditure on African education (Vol. I, p. 19). Statistics are quoted to reveal the inequality of expenditure on blacks as compared with whites. A similar document could be prepared today which would differ in detail but not in substance. Where more change is found in the African organizations is in the methods employed to alleviate the grievances. Africans have always had limited choices because they have no direct voice in South Africa's government. They are therefore limited to using influence through the very narrow official channels open to them, or to recruiting the support of others (white liberals, the United Kingdom government, the United Nations), or to direct confrontation with the government. The influence/confrontation debate persists throughout the period, with a gradual acceptance that since influence carries no weight, confrontation is the only viable alternative. With increasing acceptance of confrontation, the debate then centers upon the use of peaceful or violent means. What these documents reveal clearly is that it was only after long years of frustration, in which legitimate appeals for greater equality and a share in the government had been persistently rejected, that the African organizations turned to confrontation and more recently to the use of violence. Perhaps the strongest single message which comes from these documents is the failure of the white response, rather than the African claims.

The editors are to be congratulated on making available a store of material which should be valuable not only to scholars, but to African leaders, and, it is hoped, government ministers and officials in South Africa.

JAMES P. BARBER
The Open University, United Kingdom

Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria: A Documentary Sourcebook, 1966–1970. By A. H. M. Kirk-Greene. (London: Oxford University Press, 1971. Vol. 1: January 1966–July 1967. Pp. 459. $14.50; Vol. II: July 1967–January 1970. Pp. 528. $18.00, set.)

This two-volume work consists primarily of 227 selected documents relating to the political conflict and civil war in Nigeria between January 1966 and January 1970. Each volume also includes a long chronological narrative of events. Volume One begins with a "prologue" to the *coup d'etat* that smashed Nigeria's first republic; it concludes with the invasion of secessionist Biafra by federal forces in July 1967. Volume Two reviews the course of wartime events, culminating in Biafra's exhaustion and unconditional surrender to the Federal Military Government.

Judged by his avowed principal aim—to record "the verbatim statements made by the leading *dramatis personae* of the Nigerian tragedy of 1966–70 as they were uttered and before they disappear or are dangerously half-remembered"—Mr. Kirk-Greene's achievement would be difficult to fault. In addition to the selected documents, the author-editor's comprehensive narrative includes many citations of important documents that have not been reproduced. Many researchers are already indebted to Kirk-Greene for his valuable listing and classification of sources. It should be noted in this recently commissioned review that his study, completed some two month's after the war's end, is thus far unrivaled as the standard reference work on its subject.

Historians and others will debate the issues of political conflict before and during the Nigerian civil war for years to come. Many such issues are suggested by Kirk-Greene's narrative, for example: the alleged role of British and American diplomats in forestalling secession by the Northern Region after the army mutiny of July 1966, which brought Lt.-Col. Gowon to power; the extent to

which Lt.-Col. Ojukwu and his supporters were committed to a secessionist policy even before the notorious massacre of Ibos in Northern Nigeria in September 1966; the effect of Soviet support for the federal government upon British policy; the motivation of De Gaulle's support for Biafra in September 1968 at the apparent expense of French economic interests; the explanation of the federal government's long toleration of humanitarian relief flights into the secessionist enclave.

With prudent modesty, Kirk-Greene prefers to claim less authority for his carefully considered narrative than it may actually command. Its freshness and dedication to significant detail will enable the attentive reader of these tightly packed passages to relive the political events of those grim years. Yet Kirk-Greene wisely cautions future authors to expect large gaps and misleading signposts in his and other current histories for two very good reasons: the inaccessibility of essential archival materials and the lack of detachment on the part of contemporary historians. Furthermore, his is a specifically political study; he makes no attempt to write a military history. Nor does he present more than a cursory account of the trials and accomplishments of the beleaguered Biafrans.

Following Weber, it may be said that objective scholarship consists in the attempt to recognize and combat one's biases. If this work falls short of excellence, it may be because Kirk-Greene, who candidly avows his wholehearted commitment to the federal government's cause, fails to combat that bias in his narrative of events. The traces of his partiality are especially obtrusive in Volume Two, where all who questioned the British policy of military support for the federal government, including *The Times*, *The Economist*, Lord Brockway, and the Archbishop of Canterbury, are put down as having been misguided or wrongheaded. Yet Kirk-Greene endorses the dubious parallel drawn by federal Nigerian spokesmen between the American and Nigerian civil wars. He is alert to the flaws of Biafran propaganda but far less critical of the Nigerian vintage. Curiously, he suggests an analogy between the elusive "quick-kill" strategy favored by the federal Nigerian (and British) government and the American decision to drop an atom bomb on Hiroshima.

Kirk-Greene suggests that anything short of a decisive Nigerian victory would have endangered the long-term political stability of Africa. His viewpoint appears to equate the interests of the African people with the national interests of their existing states. This is also the ruling principle of the Organization of African Unity, which never deviated from its commitment to the federal Nigerian cause. This conception was challenged by Nyerere, Kaunda, and others during the Nigerian civil war. It will surely be challenged again under conditions which are less trying for principled Pan-Africanists.

RICHARD L. SKLAR
University of California, Los Angeles

Le Quotient Politique Vrai. By Vincent Lemieux. (Quebec: Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 1973. Pp. 274. No price indicated.)

The role of Quebec in Canadian politics has become more noticeable in recent years possibly because of the 1970 Quebec Crisis and the rise of nationalistic fever in Canada. The key to understanding both of these issues is found in the politics of the province of Quebec, the only province with a predominantly French-speaking population, which regularly elects mainly French-speaking deputies to its provincial parliament and provides the foundation for the National Liberal party that dominates federal politics in Canada.

This newly discovered importance may mean that academicians will turn to Professor Vincent Lemieux's new book, *Le Quotient Politique Vrai*, expecting to discover some new facts about Quebec which might help them understand the Canadian situation. Indeed, our readers will be able to use this volume as a source book, an assembly of facts about Quebec politics. But they will be disappointed by the book as an intellectual exercise, for the volume consists of a series of disjointed, unevenly written and researched articles strung together on a very weak chain. Professor Lemieux introduces the volume by discussing the two notions of "equivalence" and "prevalence" which roughly translated refer to "equality" and "superiority." These two Cartesian-like concepts are used to organize the first chapter, and they reappear at the end of the volume as a conclusion. Between these two minor parts of the book there are no references or meaningful uses of the concepts. The attempt to found the book on this conceptual dichotomy fails not only because it is not utilized throughout the book but also because it provides the erroneous impression that there is a clear logical framework for the writer's thought which will be reflected in the text.

The best part of the book summarizes well-known facts about the Quebec political situation, analyzes the votes for the Social Credit party and provides some explanations of nationalism in Quebec. The book is set in the context of the elections of the 1960s. In modern times Quebec has had three of her sons become leaders of the Liberal party and Prime Minister—Laurier, St. Laurent, and Trudeau. This fact, the author argues, is part of the reason the National Liberal party has consistently been able to attract more votes in Quebec than the combined total of the remaining parties—Conservative, New Democratic, and Social Credit.

Another successful part of this volume is the discussion of electoral law and its effect on voting and seat distribution in Quebec and Canada. Mr. Lemieux seems at home in this kind of discussion, and he handles it well.

The book is most suspect and least helpful in those sections which attempt to demonstrate that the unemployment variable explains much of the voting behavior in the province. Such assertions are made with little evidence and are confused with the desires of French-Quebecers for equality among the provinces or equality between Quebec and the rest of Canada.

Mr. Lemieux has made significant contributions to the study of Quebec and to voting behavior in Canada. It is unfortunate, however, that he has wasted his considerable talents attempting to mould together a series of essays written in different styles and intended for diverse audiences. While readers and collected volumes of essays do have a role in political science literature, they must be organized around the consistent application of a set of principles or methodology. This fundamental point has been overlooked by the author of this reader. If he feels strongly about his conceptual tools, perhaps Mr. Lemieux should write another book to demonstrate their theoretical utility in explaining recent voting patterns in Quebec and their effect on the Canadian federation.

ROBERT J. JACKSON
Carleton University, Ottawa

Allende's Chile. Edited by Kenneth Medhurst. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1972. Pp. 202. $8.95.)

Unfortunately before we begin this series of essays we know the ending of the Allende saga and the authors do not. This tends to make the optimistically pro-Allende pieces sound naive and to give an air of omnipotence to those with doubts as to the Allende government's ability to hold the economy and political fabric of Chile together. But these essays, which were published in *Government and Opposition* in 1972, nevertheless constitute some extremely valuable insights to the Chilean situation during the first year and a half of the Allende government.

The singular feature of the book is that it is largely written by Chileans. This Chilean perspective contrasts with the American or English point of view that dominates most of the available writing on Chile. Unfortunately, evidence of the multimillion dollar C.I.A. expenditure in Chile which, assuming some competency on the C.I.A.'s part, helped produce the tensions that wracked Chile, is not available to the volume's contributors.

Medhurst, a Lecturer in Government at the University of Manchester, begins the book by giving a well-balanced background to Chilean politics. His claim that the Chilean Communist party's cautiousness stems from its experience of being outlawed during the late 1940s and much of the 1950s would be more convincing if other Latin American Communist parties were not following a similar policy. One of the ironies of the Chilean situation is that, despite the Chilean Right's conviction that after the Allende election the Communist party would prove to be the gray eminence of the coalition and sweep aside the Chilean political system, in fact the Communists fought to keep the MIR and left-wing Socialists from doing exactly that and, one can plausibly argue, Allende would still be in power if he had followed the moderate counsel of the Communists.

Three of the essays are essentially pro-Allende: "Chile 1971: A Revolutionary Government within a Welfare State" by Joan Garcés; "Political Opposition to the Government of Allende" by H. Zemelman and Patricio Leon; and "The Economic Aspects of Allende's Government: Problems and Prospects," by Gonzalo Martner. Since all of these were written in the afterglow of the wildly successful first year of the Allende government, they contain some elements of unreality.

Garcés, in the best of the three essays, discusses a number of dilemmas but eventually finds no insurmountable obstacles in Allende's road. Perhaps it is a form of academic whistling-in-the-dark when he states that "anyone who faces the Chile of today with realism must have the courage to recognize that there is no social or class antagonism between the government of Allende and the coercive power of the state," (p. 31). The article is strongly in favor of adhering to the existing Chilean legal structure. This is ironic in view of the fact that the current Chilean dictators credit Garcés, an advisor to Allende, with authoring "Plan Z"—an elaborate document detailing a leftist coup which the Chilean military supposedly acted to prevent.

The John Biehl de Río and Gonzalo Fernández R. essay "The Political Pre-requisites for a Chilean Way" is an extremely valuable summary of Chilean electoral forces. The closing comment that "if the collapse of the government's economic policy comes before the political clarification [speaking of a workable strategy to obtain a congressional coalition], then the prospects for the *via Chilena* seem very gloomy" (p. 72) proves eerie in its accuracy about how events developed.

H. E. Bicheno, a historian of English and Chilean descent, presents a fascinating (albeit somewhat rightist) discussion of "Anti-Parliamentary Themes in Chilean History: 1920–1970." The crux of his interpretation is that, while the democratic traditions were largely maintained, there were always plots and counterplots very near the surface when times were bad.

Luis Quiros Varela's discussion of the interplay between agrarian reform and political processes is an excellent, balanced survey. He is realistic in discussing the shortcomings of the Christian Democratic efforts between 1964 and the split within the Allende program between legality and the MIR-promoted land takeovers. He rightly considers the problem of the peasant mentality versus mobilization politics.

There will be a flood of books attempting to interpret the Allende experiment, but it would be unfortunate if this one were lost sight of simply because it was published prior to the conclusion of Allende's efforts. The pro-Allende essays give an excellent insight into the thinking of Allende's advisors. The other essays constitute a solid, and not particularly hostile, analysis of the situation within which Allende was operating.

MICHAEL J. FRANCIS
University of Notre Dame

Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies. By Eric A. Nordlinger. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972. Pp. 137. $4.00, paper.)

In this short but very stimulating monograph the author seeks to generate hypotheses regarding the regulation of conflict in divided polities. The study is limited to open societies which have experienced severe conflict and deals only with those periods of high level stress when conflict was being successfully controlled. Professor Nordlinger "tests" his hypotheses through the analysis of six states chosen on the basis of available secondary source material, variations in time and space, and their success in regulation: Belgium; the Netherlands, 1890–1971; Austria, 1945–1965; nineteenth-century Switzerland; Lebanon since 1943, and Malaysia since independence in 1957. Other cases are briefly noted.

Professor Nordlinger states that he does not seek to test rigorously the hypotheses he presents in explanation of the successful regulation of conflict but only to generate points for possible future viable methods of analysis. The fact that Professor Nordlinger consciously decided to analyze his propositions only in terms of successful cases of regulation and has employed only a half dozen examples obviates the possibility of such testing in this volume; I, for one, wish that he had brought into his analysis the many failures in contemporary history.

Following a careful effort to define the area of discussion and terms of analysis, the author notes the necessary presence of one of six regulating practices if conflict is to be contained: stable government coalition, the principle of proportionality, mutual veto, purposive depoliticization, compromise, and concessions. At the same time he rejects as ineffective and dangerous means of regulation both democratic decision making (defined largely in majoritarian terms) and the rapid development of national identity. In this chapter, as in others, he illustrates his hypotheses from the six case studies.

Perhaps the strongest sections of the monograph are the chapters arguing the centrality of group leaders in controlling violence. While the elite is motivated by the need to meet external threats, look after the economic well-being of its clients, acquire or retain power, or avoid bloodshed and suffering, it acts on these motives in accord with the political culture in which the leadership itself operates. Professor Nordlinger's stress on the critical nature of the elite and the necessity of its structured dominance over the nonelite if conflict is to be successfullly regulated is the most interesting and provocative part of this work; and his questioning (sometimes he says "rejecting") of several hypotheses regarding the role of the nonelite is stimulating reading. Of considerable interest are the author's critical evaluation of theories of cross-cutting division in relation to democracy and conflict and his briefer discussions of the harmful effects of modernization on conflict regulation.

No new empirical data are presented here and the book contains a few factual errors such as the incorrect number of Malaysian sultans (p. 28). However, the author is honest in admitting the tenuousness of his hypotheses and evidence and careful in delimiting the boundaries of his analysis. The monograph is obviously intended to raise more questions than it answers. This truly comparative work will reward the reader with a multitude of ideas for research and contemplation.

FRED R. VON DER MEHDEN
Rice University

Latin America: From Dependence to Revolution. Edited by James Petras. (New York, London, Sydney, Toronto: John Wiley and Sons, 1973. Pp. 274. $9.75, cloth; $5.95, paper.)

James Petras is prominent amongst that group of American social scientists which adopts a "neo-Marxist" approach to the analysis of Latin America's political problems. By contrast with those scholars who have sought to identify groups which might promote stability and orderly change in Latin America the "neo-Marxists" have focused on the fundamental conflicts of interest that they see inhering in the region's economic structures. The latter, above all, subscribe to a "theory of dependence" which attributes economic underdevelopment and political instability to Latin America's domination and exploitation by foreign capitalist interests. Local politics are generally

viewed in terms of class conflicts between local elites, who depend on the support of external business interests, and other exploited strata of the societies in question.

This volume makes a useful and sometimes stimulating contribution to the growing body of literature on "dependency." It is uneven, but at its best it shows how models of the type alluded to above can draw due attention to aspects of a given situation whose significance might otherwise be underestimated, if not ignored. Credit for this can, in large part, be taken by Professor Petras who not only edits the book but is also personally responsible for much of its content. He contributes the two opening chapters on recent Chilean political developments (pp. 9–60) and is the co-author, with Thomas Cook, of two particularly interesting essays on the attitudes of Argentina's business elite (pp. 163–192). Equally, he shares responsibility with Robert LaPorte Jr., H. Michael Erisman and Charles Mills for two chapters on United States-Latin American relationships (pp. 195–271). Two chapters on Brazilian economic development (contributed jointly, in one case, by M. C. Tavares and José Serra and, in another case, soley by José Serra) are the only portions of the book in which the editor has taken no direct hand.

The usefulness of the general approach adopted in this volume is shown in Professor Petras's discussion of Chile, which makes plain how President Allende's necessarily very limited freedom of maneuver was further circumscribed by potentially disastrous economic pressures. Equally, the two well-documented chapters on Brazil offer an acute analysis of the country's "economic miracle." The authors brush aside official rhetoric by confirming that the benefits which economic growth has brought to limited sections of Brazilian society and to foreign investors have been largely the result of officially inspired attacks upon the living standards of the bulk of the population.

If the value of a given mode of analysis may be judged by its predictive possibilities then the usefulness of some of these essays can be further underlined. Professor Petras's chapters on Chile were written before the final collapse of Allende's regime occurred but evidence assembled by the author clearly points to the possibility of disaster. Similarly, detailed study of the attitudes of local and foreign businessmen operating in Argentina revealed a weakening of support for military rule on the part of those who had once been amongst its chief beneficiaries. Thus James Petras and Thomas Cook correctly foresaw the possibility of an at least temporary return to a more open style of politics.

The valuable data, incisive analysis and acute judgments that at some points characterize this book must, however, be set against certain other more negative factors. Given the extent to which James Petras has impressed his personal stamp upon these papers he must accept responsibility for the weaknesses in question. First, the underlying assumptions of the book, which sometimes engender fruitful hypotheses may, in certain circumstances, prevent the editor or his colleagues from doing justice to the complexities of a given situation. The result can be a measure of confusion, simplistic assertions and a failure properly to consider evidence that does not conform with a priori assumptions. This is partially true of the chapters on Chile. For example, at one point (p. 16) Professor Petras confidently assumes the existence of a high degree of political consciousness and working-class solidarity amongst Chile's copper miners, but subsequently (p. 32) he has to modify the assumption in the light of the miners' behavior during Allende's tenure of office.

The difficulties of Professor Petras's general approach are, however, most clearly revealed in the chapter he contributes, together with Erisman and Mills (pp. 231–271) on the Monroe Doctrine. One can accept some of the chapter's general assumptions concerning the deployment of American power in the Western Hemisphere but is left unconvinced by much of the detailed argument. Responsibility for extending the "Cold War" to Latin America, for example, is attributed solely to North American policy makers who, it is maintained, seized on an issue that would further facilitate United States economic penetration of the region. The possibility that other strategic considerations might have been involved, and the general global context, are not seriously considered. Equally, it is assumed, without proper discussion, that ideological factors have little or no autonomous role to play in shaping policy. Thus the Cuban missile crisis is discussed with only passing reference to the Soviet Union and with no examination of Soviet motives. United States reactions to the crisis are seen solely in terms of its relationship with Latin America and with no reference to possibly relevant global issues. The authors perform a useful task in "demythologizing" certain aspects of the United States' relationships with Latin America but do themselves a disservice by overstating their case. In this instance they demonstrate the limitations of their approach and point to the danger of creating a new academic orthodoxy more limiting than the orthodoxies they attack.

The book's title is also somewhat misleading. It implies a general review of Latin American problems but it very largely concentrates on the cases of Chile, Brazil, and Argentina. These are, of course, most important within the Latin American context and they present the authors with the opportunity to examine facets of some of the region's most significant political developments.

Of particular interest is the juxtaposition of sections devoted to Allende's Chile and contemporary Brazil. These two sections constitute an interesting study in radically different attempts to tackle the problem of economic underdevelopment. On the other hand the book's comparative component might have been enriched by a similar examination of, for example, the Peruvian case. Equally, a wider range of case studies might have underlined the extent to which foreign influence in Latin America can vary in nature and scope from country to country.

Despite such reservations, however, the book's case studies make it a useful contribution to the debate about Latin America's problems. The detailed case studies of Brazil and Argentina, in particular, ought to serve as a stimulus to further and similarly detailed research.

KENNETH MEDHURST
University of Manchester

Uruguay's Tupamaros: The Urban Guerrilla. By Arturo C. Porzecanski. (New York: Praeger, 1973. Pp. xiii, 81. $10.00.)

Unlike Chile, which has attracted the attention of many political scientists over the past decade, Uruguay, South America's "other" long-standing democratic nation, has been ignored. Even the rise of the Tupamaros, certainly Latin America's, if not one of the world's, most distinctive guerrilla movements, failed to receive its warranted attention until the kidnappings of European and American diplomats, and the execution of an AID official, Dan Mitrione. Since then a stream of books has been published by Latin American and North American political scientists and journalists on the Tupamaros and Uruguay's contemporary plight. Professor Porzecanski's slim volume is the best so far, and required reading for anyone concerned with Uruguayan politics or urban insurgency.

The rise of the Tupamaro urban movement in Uruguay coincided with the increasing containment or demise of rural movements elsewhere in Latin America, notably Guatemala, Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia. Porzecanski correctly observes that the special importance of the Uruguayan movement is that it took place in a modern and politically advanced society, and "provided an important case study of the extent to which an urban social movement can be a carrier of a revolutionary ideology and become an agent of societal change (p. xi)." Abraham Guillen, an important theoretician of urban insurgency in Latin America, lived in Uruguay during the peak of Tupamaro activity, and while often critical of the movement, he wrote recently in his *Philosophy of the Urban Guerilla* (New York: William Morrow & Company, Inc., 1973) that they ". . . have served as the best revolutionary academy in the world on the subject of urban guerrilla warefare; they have taught more through actions than all the revolutionary theories abstracted from concrete situations" (p. 276). What Porzecanski has done is to describe as accurately as is now possible who the Tupamaros were, how they operated, and what they tried to achieve.

The movement began in 1961, when impoverished sugar-cane and sugar-beet cutters were joined by peasants on a 350-mile walk to Montevideo to protest their plight. Directed by Raul Sendic, a law student from the national university, the protest eventually led to the formation of the underground movement. Porzecanski provides a useful profile on the Tupamaros, a young and heterogeneous movement. Looking at police arrest records between 1966 and 1972, Porzecanski found students dropped from about 40 to 30 per cent of those arrested, while those identified as "professionals or technicians" rose from 12 to 32 per cent. The mean age slowly increased from 31 to 39, but the mode remained 21 years of age. The author argues that the movement was both national and nationalistic, organized clandestinely around small cells with members known only by their code names, and financed through robberies and thefts. The Tupamaros' rejection of the older generation's incremental solutions to national problems led them to establish what they termed a "parallel government" to demonstrate that they could act more decisively and effectively than the formal one. Abductions began in 1968, the targets being high government officials, wealthy Uruguayans, and diplomats; of those abducted, only Mitrione was killed. His execution, as Guillen argues, reduced their Robin Hood image in the public media to one of assassins, and the ransom demanded for hostages, Guillen further observes, brought them perilously close to resembling a political Mafia. It also prompted the military to assume responsibility from the ineffectual police for their control.

Porzecanski believes the widespread arrests and torture took their toll on the movement. Arrested Tupamaros in large numbers came into contact with one another, breaking down essential secrecy. When many gained their freedom—in one instance 180 escaped in a single, well-planned jailbreak—their return created rivalries and ill feeling within the movement.

What Porzecanski fails to point out are the several ironies in the more than a decade of Tupamaro activity. Today the movement is largely dissipated and its participants dead, exiled, imprisoned, or in hiding; yet one objective—to destroy the traditional Uruguayan political system and its institutions—has been accomplished, with the imposition of a military-dominated regime, the suspension of

traditional liberties, and the discrediting of political and social institutions. Perhaps more ironic, the unwitting instrument for the Tupamaros was their principal opponent, the military, which originally was disinclined to exert political influence on government institutions, yet in the final analysis crushed the very institutions the Tupamaros were trying to destroy. Porzecanski's analysis is a valuable contribution to understanding one of the most important realities in contemporary Latin American politics, the urban guerrilla.

RONALD H. MCDONALD
Syracuse University

The Beliefs of Politicians: Ideology, Conflict, and Democracy in Britain and Italy. By Robert D. Putnam. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973. Pp. xii, 309. $10.95.)

Regret that *The Beliefs of Politicians* reached me for review about two years after its publication date is happily balanced by the pleasure with which I recommend the book to anyone seriously interested in comparative politics or in the importance of ideas in the study of politics in the broadest sense. Although a prompter review would have better served not just the author but our profession, the value of Putnam's work is not seriously diminished by the passage of a few years or even by the longer period since his research of 1967–68. Scholars specializing in leadership interview analysis presumably already know the book and have judged its specialized contributions—favorably, I believe. Lacking their expertise, I address, in any event, a somewhat more general readership. As suggested at the outset, Putnam has a great deal to offer many of us. He has carefully assembled data on the political beliefs that we often discuss in our teaching and scholarly writing, and he brings a sharp, learned, and sophisticated intelligence to the discussion of these beliefs. Moreover, Putnam writes with straightforward clarity and pleasant informality even when analyzing complex statistical tabulations. The primarily historical or philosophical scholar, or perhaps even the journalist, who still associates quantitative data analysis with opaque writing should find reading this book an enjoyable disconfirming experience. Intellectual pleasure, it should be stressed, comes from the breadth as well as the style of Putnam's exploration.

Putnam obtained his original data, forming the core but no means all of the substance of his book, from semistructured, almost entirely tape-recorded interviews, each lasting more than an hour, with 93 members of the British House of Commons and 83 members of the Italian Chamber of Deputies. He makes a good case that he has interviewed a representative sample of at least nonministerial members (as of 1967–68), that members spoke freely, and that the use of two coders for each set of responses to open-ended questions produced reliable tabulations. The properly skeptical reader can check Putnam's procedure in appendices containing a methodological exposition and the codebook itself. In addition to tabulating responses. Putnam often quotes illustratively from the interviews, thereby giving a life and a liveliness to his presentation. In fact, he does this so well, while also citing a wide variety of historical, cultural, and philosophical ideas to explain the politicians' beliefs, that some readers might decide that Putnam thus makes a significant contribution entirely apart from quantitative analysis (or even in spite of such analysis if one has little use for statistics in the first place). I do not go that far. Rather, I believe that the tabulations, the illustrative quotations, and the more general discourse are elegantly complementary.

Summarizing many of Putnam's findings, with their rightly cautious qualifications, is not possible. His most general and recurrent theme, however, ought to be stated. It is the difference between the British and the Italian politicians—a difference all the more impressive because Putnam grants that his intention had been to describe the similarities between these two sets of parliamentarians. Among the differing national characteristics, the Italians were more ideological, more likely to exhibit partisan hostility, more sensitive to conflict (or less impressed by areas of shared interest), more likely to talk about democracy in terms of equality and justice and liberty and responsibility (while British politicians talk about Parliament and elections and party competition), and likely to have as their most common model "classical democracy" rather than the British consensus in favor of polyarchal and liberal interpretations of democracy.

Putnam's Part I, on ideology and politics, may be the most challenging since it uses the interview data to test views of ideological politics derived from Edward Shils (specifically from a review article published by Shils in 1958) and restated in systematic form by the author. Putnam verifies only a few of these views (which, of course, are not exclusively Shils's). He shows that the ideologically motivated politicians are also stylistic ideologues, in the sense of pursuing abstract purposes, and that they are associated with political extremes and with political and social alienation. But Putnam finds that individual ideological politicians are *not* more dogmatic, more hostile (as partisans), or more opposed to pluralist politics than nonideological politicians. So ideological style and partisan hostility, in particular, are distinct phenomena at the individual level (although, at the national level, the Italian group is both more

ideological and more hostile than the British). Putnam's findings here are convincing, and so is the usefulness of the distinctions that he has made. These distinctions seem especially important in light of his showing of a decline in partisan hostility but not in the ideological style of politics. But I must raise a question if only to indicate enough critical objectivity to encourage readers to accept my highly favorable opinion of this study. Would partisan hostility be similarly dissociated from ideological style in a sample of nonparliamentary politicians, particularly of organizational activists who might have little if any experience in holding significant public office?

LEON D. EPSTEIN
University of Wisconsin—Madison

Syria Under the Ba'th, 1963–66: The Army-Party Symbosis. By Itamar Rabinovich. (New York: Halsted Press, 1973. Pp. 276. $15.50.)

Defying expectations, the present Syrian Ba'thi regime has held power since 1963, and over that period it has evidently strengthened its organizational structure and has developed a number of workable political arrangements. The Ba'th party, established in 1947, was a pan-Arabist, secularist, westernizing party supported mainly by elements of the provincial and sectarian intelligentsia. It sought to resolve the issues of defining the Syrian political community and of broadening elite recruitment by means of a vanguard party of militants inspired by doctrine that was at once romanticized in its recounting of history, antimaterialist, and oriented to the economic aspirations of the petite bourgeoisie. The Ba'th gained a measure of political influence by joining the opposition to Adib al-Shishakli in 1953, by supporting the return to parliamentary government in 1954, by leading Syria into the union with Egypt in 1958, by standing aside from the plot to dissolve that union in 1961 despite substantial provocation, and by providing the only coherent (if factionalized) political leadership in Syria after the collapse of the separatist-bourgeois regime of 1961–63. In its post-union phase the Ba'th has gradually become more radical and also far more dominated by those members who are military officers. It has sought to expand its membership but has not become a mass party. Moreover, whatever political success has been achieved, has been realized in the face of the enhancement of the minoritarian and sectarian character of the Ba'th. Hence, the central question of Syrian politics is how to explain the evidently stable position of the Ba'th regime when it is minoritarian, sectarian, militarist, nonunionist, radical-leaning, secularist, and based on an elite party and a noninstrumental ideological doctrine.

Professor Rabinovich set out to explain the multiple anomalies of the Syrian situation, but his efforts have fallen far short of this difficult goal. Rabinovich was armed with a set of "liberated" Ba'th party documents in addition to a surprisingly rich literature of political memoirs and polemic writings. He was also able to use the daily press, and he relied upon a small but not unimpressive secondary literature on Syrian politics. The relatively large amount of documentation available to Rabinovich was to a large extent responsible for his failure here. The author knows what it is he should be explaining, but he apparently believed that a recounting of how one event led to another was a sufficient explanation. That the events recorded in those liberated documents might not be the really important ones does not seem to have occurred to him.

The fundamental difficulty with this analysis is that despite occasional references to sociological and ideological structures, such contextual elements are not used as an explanatory frame of reference. The meaning of the political tempests in the Ba'thi teapot is not to be sought in the disordered and bitter leaves. To show the linkages between conspiratorial stroke and counterstroke is a work neither of scholarship nor of analysis. This journalistic-diplomatic approach has not only prevailed in American and British studies of Middle East politics, but it is virtually dominant in the Shiloah Institute of Tel Aviv University which has published this study.

As might be expected, the best part of this book is its collection and more or less chronological presentation of much political information and many political names and dates. The book suffers not only from hyperfactualism but also from Rabinovich's evident preference for sequence to coherence in interpreting the facts. Numerous explanatory gaps are simply left gaping, and far too many sentences are simply opaque. This opacity is, needless to say, not due to the use of any political science jargon, but due to the tendency to refer to dates rather than events and due to poor editing.

Space limitations do not permit many examples of these defects to be cited, but the reader will get the idea from the following gaps:

on page 118, "The available information is too sketchy to permit a conclusive comparison of the social origins of the rival Ba'thi factions. Yet . . ."
on page 119, "The little that is known of this episode is . . ."
on page 122, ". . . whether this was an outcome of Bitar's new policy is a moot point."
on page 150, "little is known about the sources of internal strife in the Military Organization, but . . ."

Even more confusing is that the chronological account has al-Bitar expelled from the party on page 103, but on page 112 we see him being en-

trusted with the formation of a new cabinet, on page 121 we are told that his position is "tenuous" and on page 155 that "his membership status at that point is vague. . . . "

Much of the author's analysis is obscure because the reader cannot easily follow the meaning of key sentences such as the following:"It was the need to eliminate the impact of these radical elements on the Syrian Ba'th that the Regional Command cited in order to justify its request from the National Command to suspend the party's Internal Regulations for six months" (p. 125), or, "The calculating and withdrawn J'did had built the Military Committee's control of the army and its supporters in the party's civilian sector" (p. 162). On page 138 there is an example of the author's frequent references to dates rather than significant events: "It was the occasion for 'Umran's rivals to settle their accounts with him and to list all his "sins" going back to his conduct during the period between March 28 and April 4, 1962."

In sum, the book reads badly, gives little confidence that the author really has an explanatory hypothesis, and demonstrates once again that the possession of secret documents does little to advance scholarly political analysis.

LEONARD BINDER

University of Chicago

Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. VII/1972. Edited by Erik Rasmussen. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972. Pp. 319. $10.00.)

This is the seventh edition in the continuing series of yearbooks published by the Scandinavian Political Science Associations. Like its predecessors, the yearbook has three parts: a principal section of substantive articles on a wide variety of topics, a review section of significant developments in the domestic politics of the Scandinavian countries, and an extensive bibliography of work published by Scandinavian researchers or foreign studies of the Nordic region. The reader and reviewer alike are therefore faced with a most challenging *smörgåsbord* of topics, interests, and methodologies. This review cannot discuss in detail each of the thirteen substantive articles and five review articles, but by looking selectively it is possible to gain an impression of the strengths and weaknesses of this annual cooperative effort.

The first article by two Finnish political sociologists, E. Allardt and H. Uusitalo, focuses upon "Dimensions of Welfare in a Comparative Study of Scandinavian Societies." This piece is part of the international effort to find indicators of social conditions that are suitable for both qualitative and quantitative analysis. Two competing operationalizations of "welfare" are discussed: the individual's command of resources and the overall living standards of a given population (pp. 10–11). Frequent reference is made to Swedish social indicator studies where attention has been given simultaneously to physical, social, and psychological needs of individuals and groups. Nine components of the "level of living" are identified: health, nutritional habits, residence, living conditions during childhood and family relations, education, degree of employment and work conditions, economic resources, political resources, and leisure (pp. 19–20). Moreover, data from the Scandinavian countries is included for comparison and illustration (pp. 21–24). Three questions arise that are common for such indicator studies: (1) how recent and correct are the data, (2) how significant are the differences, and (3) what are the policy implications of such data.

Two articles consider problems of decision making in large organizations: "The Control Process: Steering and Review in Large Organizations" by L. Lundquist and "Public Policy-Making and Theories of Organizational Choice" by B. P. Olsen. Both of these pieces contribute to general issues in public policy theory with only passing reference to specific regional issues. As such they might reach a more appropriate audience in a specialized journal.

N. Elvander's contribution, "The Politics of Taxation in Sweden 1945–1970: A Study of the Functions of Parties and Organizations," is especially valuable. Summarizing his extensive Swedish study, Elvander focuses on what he rightly identifies as a seriously neglected issue: tax policy decision making and changing attitudes toward taxation by citizens, organizations, and political parties. He distinguishes three conflict dimensions in Swedish tax policy: government finance, distribution policy, and equality and summarizes the complex decision-making process. He concludes that while parties and organizations defer to government judgment in the first area, their concern and influence has been greater in the two remaining dimensions (p. 79). Elvander's piece demonstrates the advantages of policy analysis with specific references; the possibilities and limitations of different methodologies become apparent.

Several pieces apply advanced analytical methodologies to Scandinavian political issues. M. Isberg, A. Wettergren, and B. Wittrock apply content analysis techniques to Swedish political parties, and M. Laakso applies Riker's "Size Principle" to recent roll-call data from the Finnish parliament. P. N. Olsen focuses upon the historical dimension in his discussion of the "Cradle of a Party System: Voting Patterns and Voting Groups in the Danish Constitutional Convention 1848–1849." Olsen discusses the problems involved in treating historical data, but notes that factor analysis and related techniques highlight the

emerging political groupings. One questions only whether this exercise has added significantly to standard historical interpretations.

More recent changes in voting behavior and party strength are revealed in "Local Voting Studies of Total Electorates: The Danish General Election of 1971" by J. Elklit, O. Riis, and D. Tonsgaard. In cooperation with the Danish State TV network, three voting districts were chosen for analysis in depth: a rural district in Jutland, a white-collar, suburban district in Funen, and a working-class district in Copenhagen. The selection provided, therefore, regional, occupational, and party variation. The importance of this survey is not only that it includes an unusual amount of detail but also that the same districts have been followed in subsequent elections providing continuity. Given the "political earthquake" that shook Denmark in December 1973, as well as the hotly contested issue of Common Market membership that was decided by a national referendum in October 1972, this continuing study is likely to grow in value.

Four American social scientists appear in the collection as well. W. M. Lafferty provides an ecological analysis of industrialization and labor radicalism in Norway. This is a useful piece developed from Lafferty's valuable study, *Economic Development and the Response of Labor in Scandinavia* which appeared in 1971. Tested here is what the author calls the Bull-Galenson Hypothesis on the importance of the pace and timing of industrialization on ideological differences among the Scandinavian labor movements (p. 157). The Norwegian data collected by Lafferty elaborates and qualifies the thesis. The second piece, "Measuring Prejudicial Attitudes in a Situational Context," by E. Chaples, W. Sedlacek, and G. Brooks, lies more in the realm of social psychology than political science. An American survey of prejudicial attitudes toward different ethnic groups was applied to several hundred Danish university students. The results of the survey are summarized and compared to responses by American college students. The substantial and consistent pro-black attitude of the Danes is compared with their more qualified acceptance of Mediterranean foreign workers (p. 243). Although the findings confirm other observations of Danish attitudes, one worries about the application of an American survey, despite some Danish modifications, to Danish students who are far more socially select than their American counterparts. The few blacks residing in Denmark are artists, students, scientists, and diplomats, with occasional visits by political activists. To ask a Dane how he would react to being stopped by a black or Mediterranean policeman is not unlike asking an American how he would respond to being pulled over on the New Jersey Turnpike by an East German *Vopo*. The authors are aware of some of these limitations (p. 245).

As mentioned above, the Review section of the yearbook reports recent significant developments in Scandinavian politics. Most typically, local and national elections are reviewed. H. Valen's extensive analysis of the Norwegian local elections of 1971 in the shadow of the pending Common Market membership question is invaluable. Not only students of Norwegian politics but also those concerned with the influence of national and foreign policy issues on local party organizations will want to read this piece. O. Riis provides a review of the parliamentary elections and change in government in Denmark in 1971, and P. Pesonen analyzes the Finnish parliamentary election of 1972. E. Husu's piece provices insight into the political consequences of economic policy in Finland. B. Molin takes a quick look at the first year of Sweden's unicameral Riksdag. H. V. Aareskjold continues to assist researchers of the Scandinavian region with her complete and extensive bibliography. Four hundred seventy-six works are cited, and the authors are indexed.

This edition of the yearbook is valuable to more than just regional specialists. It is a convenient survey of the advanced political research in the Scandinavian countries. Students of Western politics will find both the substantive issues and the methodologies presented in the yearbook of interest and application. Unfortunately few of the essays are easily applied to undergraduate course work. The expensive format of the volume (the price of the eighth volume has soared to nearly $19.00!) suggests that a way be found for sale of individual essays.

ERIC S. EINHORN
University of Massachusetts/Amherst

The Prospects for an Economic Community in North Africa: Managing Economic Integration in the Maghreb States. By Abderrahman Robana. (New York: Praeger, Special Studies, 1973. Pp. 206. $16.50.)

Professor Robana's book deals with a subject of vital importance to the developing third world, namely the possibilities for maximization of development through economic integration in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. In both the foreword, written by Professor I. W. Zartman, and the preface, written by the author, the reader is warned that the book does not pretend to constitute a blueprint for an economic community in North Africa (i.e., the three Maghreb States mentioned above). It is, as Dr. Robana states, "a treatment of the possibilities for eventual economic integration among those three countries" (p. vii). These possi-

bilities are based on the feasibility of joint exploitation of resources and services in the Arab Maghreb, as well as on the present existence of joint institutions working toward an eventual Maghreb economic integration which were created in the course of the past ten years. Although it is a treatise of hope for the ultimate success of these efforts, the author, who is a professor of finance at Alfred University, New York, and a Tunisian national, effectively analyzes the internal and external economic rigidities hampering the three countries' attempts at multinational coordination.

The book contains an introduction and seven chapters dealing with the following problems: the institutional and economic structure for the Maghreb; the theoretical aspects of economic integration in that part of the Arab world; the economic structure of the Maghrebi States; the structure of external and internal trade in that area; the attempts to restructure the Maghreb economies; obstacles facing and potentials for a "Maghreb Union," and Libya as a special case.

Three recurring themes substantiated with a host of tables, charts and appendices are: (1) that the goal of establishing a viable national economy can best be attained through economic policy coordination and integration; (2) that the substantial potential for integration is hampered by constraining national policies, existing rigidities, and vested national interests; and (3) that the author's "reasonable hope" for progress towards Maghrebi integration is based on "a coherent system of joint institutions" established following the first Ministers of Economy conference in 1964.

The author clearly believes that the institutional structure for joint consultations, studies, and coordination constitutes, among other things, the heart of the movement toward integration. This structure consists of a "Maghreb Council of Ministers for Economic Affairs," a "Maghreb Permanent Consultative Committee for the Maghreb" (CPCM); a Secretariat of the CPCM; a "Center for Industrial Studies" (CEIM); various specialized commissions; and a "Maghreb Permanent Consultative Committee on Education" (CPCEM).

"Although integration has not been achieved," Professor Robana optimistically points out, "the objective behind the establishment of the institutions mentioned above is to seek ways and means for closer and expanding cooperation that might lead to an economic community in ten years or so" (p. 6). In that context, his discussion of the question of a Maghreb Integration Bank (MIB) is illuminating. Although the MIB was officially mentioned in the Protocol of Agreement of the Fifth Conference of the Ministers of the Economy (held in November 1967), no action has so far been taken. Robana realistically notes that "the mere existence of national development banks in each of the Maghreb countries may well be an obstacle to the creation of an MIB" (p. 20). Having noted the obstacles, the author simultaneously discusses the potentialities for success, which is a general pattern throughout his presentation. Thus he proceeds to suggest that in its initial stage, MIB's lending activities could be devoted to expanding and modernizing the Maghreb countries intra-economic infrastructure. He also adds that close cooperation would be expected to develop between the MIB and other national or multinational African financial institutions.

The author assesses the results achieved thus far through those institutional structures as meager. The technical and specialized commissions and committees set up by the ministers have resulted, he contends, only in periodic contacts and studies that were never implemented. The political structure of the Maghreb, the author suggests, "may prove an important obstacle since supra-nationality is not easy to accept" (p. 27). In spite of the promise of immediate results in transport, communications, energy, tourism, and negotiation of a special trade relationship with the European Economic Community, the goal of integration is far away and its shape remains unclear. The obstacles include differing national political objectives, currencies, monetary policies, and the existence of strict exchange controls. In this regard, Professor Robana lends support to the pessimistic conclusion reached by Professor Charles F. Gallagher in his book *The United States and North Africa: Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia* (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1963) where he stated that "the road to a supranational entity appears very arduous."

Nevertheless, the author points to the modest steps taken in the 1970s, including an intergovernmental economic integration agreement presented by CPCM to the sixth Conference of Ministers of Economy held in Rabat in July 1970. In this readable and lucid treatise, he bases his hopes for the future, partly on the fact that no one country in the Maghreb has been able to be self-sufficient and none has a large enough national market to guarantee economies of scale enabling competitive production at world prices. Hence his prediction that "the three North African countries will continue to pursue the path toward economic integration of the Maghreb" (p. 132), especially since the concept of a "Grand Maghreb" is enshrined in their respective constitutions.

With regard to Libya (which has withdrawn, since 1970, from the institutions created for an economically-integrated Arab Maghreb in her quest for closer ties with the Arab Machrek), the author expresses the hope that, in the long run, Libya would belong to both the Maghreb and the

Machrek in an economically integrated Arab world. In view of its wealth of data, cogency of analysis, and political realism, the book constitutes a valuable contribution to the understanding of the promise and the challenge of integration and development not only in the Arab Nation, but also in the rest of the Third World.

YASSIN ET-AYOUTY

SUNY, Stony Brook

Racial Bargaining in Independent Kenya: A Study of Minorities and Decolonization. By Donald Rothchild. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973. Pp. 476. $22.50.)

Race relations in East Africa today have attracted worldwide attention and have great intrinsic significance. The decision of General Amin to deport Uganda's Asians (Indians and Pakistanis) forced us all to recognize a major problem that we had tried to forget for a decade. Almost all the scholarly work on race relations in Africa was done during the late colonial period and was focused on Europeans (whites). The publication of Professor Donald Rothchild's book thus fills a major vacuum, for its focus is race relations between Africans and Asians in postindependence Kenya. Those who are unfamiliar with the details of Kenya's racial situation will find *Racial Bargaining in Independent Kenya* a very useful introduction, and several of the book's points and perspectives will be helpful even to those already immersed in East African affairs. Through the use of two opinion surveys, legislative debates, and the local press, Rothchild is able to give a good and balanced picture of the politics of Kenyan race relations.

The outstanding feature of the book is its fairness to all concerned. Rothchild takes great pains to explain why both Africans and Asians in Kenya are dissatisfied with one another and to give them credit for the uneasy political accommodation the groups have made. The study also is thorough in its presentation of viewpoints and issue areas. Almost all aspects of the Asian-African problem are touched upon, and a good deal of historical material is provided, particularly for the postindependence period, but also in a summary manner for the colonial era. Though Rothchild signed his Foreword in 1971, his analysis still is basically applicable to the Kenya of today. Given the volatile character of race relations, this is an accomplishment.

Having said all the foregoing, however, I must also point out some significant weaknesses in *Racial Bargaining*. For those already familiar with the Kenyan situation, the new material in the book comes from two surveys which Rothchild conducted, one of Asian businessmen, the other of "politically mobilized" Africans. Neither of the two survey samples is representative of the entirety of its ethnic group. This presents no problem for the Asian businessmen sample; we can visualize clearly the character and probable opinion biases of the population from which it is drawn and the sample is genuinely random. The sample of "politically mobilized" Africans presents problems, however. Rothchild describes it as a random sample of Africans who have completed at least primary school and are located in small and large towns. Nonetheless, in fact the sample is not random. Given the towns surveyed, students and those fluent in English are greatly overrepresented and civil servants and women are underrepresented. The biases derived from interviewing those who answered the door in sampled houses in the large towns and from doing quota sampling of those in public places and at home in the daytime in small towns. My inquiries suggest that in the small towns the primary education prerequisite was probably first determined visually. Since education is the primary determinant of social status in East Africa, a person's dress and bearing are likely to reflect closely his level of education. The relationship is far from perfect, however, and a selection of educated respondents by visual criteria is particularly likely to underrepresent those who barely have the specified minimum. (Given the reputation of the organization which did the African survey, I checked on their handling of this project. Let me say to Rothchild's credit that it was carefully supervised and apparently very little falsification of interviews occurred.) All of us who have conducted surveys in developing countries have experienced problems in getting a truly random sample, but Rothchild does not alert us to the biases of his sample and does not analyze his data in a way that would minimize the problems it presents. Thus he implies that statements such as the following describe the population of urban, educated Africans. "[When] asked whether European and Asian citizens should have equal chances with Africans at the present time . . . 32 per cent of the respondents replied positively . . ." (p. 196). Yet when a sample has not been drawn randomly, simple inference of population statistics from sample ones is impossible. The tolerant 32 per cent of the respondents could be almost exclusively schoolboys, who are nowhere near that proportion of urban, educated Africans. Only by carefully analyzing the data along the dimensions of the sample's known biases and adjusting the results accordingly, can one begin to make inferences from the sample to the population. Even then relational analysis (such as cross tabulations) is preferable to the use of descriptive statistics, for the former is more resilent to problems of nonrandomness than are the latter. These statistical errors, although serious, do not make the book

valueless; even if one accepts very wide error margins on much of the data, the findings are highly suggestive. But the reader must protect himself from misplaced confidence in the African survey results, for the author does not.

A second problem comes from Rothchild's attempt to deal with the status of both the European and Asian minorities. The differences between the positions of the two groups are so great that it is difficult to treat both adequately in the same book. For the postcolonial period the book actually focuses on the Asian-African relationship, which is most helpful. Unfortunately, though, the discussion of the structures of legal, educational, and economic privileges in the colonial period is largely confined to the Europeans. Thus we miss a part of the background on the Asian community which we need for the rest of the book.

Finally, Rothchild likes to let the facts speak for themselves. This style helps to give his book the fairness which I admire. However it also means that the author does not draw many conclusions for us and leaves us uncertain about the balance of facts on occasion. Similarly, the theoretical framework of direct and tacit bargaining in which the book is set is given very little explicit treatment. The issue here is a stylistic one; I personally prefer a book which makes an argument, but others like the less aggressive tone *Racial Bargaining* uses.

Racial Bargaining in Independent Kenya does have weaknesses, and the reader must treat part of its statistical analysis with careful skepticism. Nonetheless there is also a good deal of value in the book; moreover alternative studies of Asian-African and postcolonial race relations do not exist. Therefore scholars interested in these subjects will find Rothchild's work worth reading.

DAVID K. LEONARD
University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
University of California, Berkeley

Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates: Colonial Past, Present Problems, and Future Prospects. By Muhammad Sadik and William P. Snavely. (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1972. Pp. 208. $12.50.)

Despite the great strategic and economic (oil) importance of the "Arabian Gulf" (the book under review refers to the Gulf as "Arabian" rather than "Persian"), only in the last few years have some American scholars developed a serious research interest in those areas along the southern shores of the Gulf which now make up the small, independent states of Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Consequently, until very recently there has been very little detailed and reliable statistical and other information readily available in the United States about these particular areas and their peoples and problems.

With the help of three research grants and the cooperation of local officials, Professors Muhammad Sadik and William Snavely were able both to visit and study at first-hand these little-known Gulf "city states" and also to gather a great deal of valuable statistical and other data, some of which had never been published before. The book's 97 tables (containing statistical data on population, health, education, employment, trade, and other topics) and eight charts (showing the governmental organizations of Bahrain, Qatar, and the three most important members of the UAE federation) should be of particular interest and value to specialists on the Middle East and the developing world.

After presenting a brief historical background, the authors discuss and analyze in detail the major economic, social, political, and administrative developments and problems of not only the independent countries of Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, but also the seven, relatively autonomous members (Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, UMM al-Qaiwain, Ras al-Khaimah, and Fujairah) of the UAE federation. In the last two chapters the authors stress that, because of their small populations and resources (other than oil), limited markets, insufficient numbers of educated and trained personnel, and other reasons, the Gulf city states would benefit greatly—in the areas of economic and political development, foreign relations, defense, etc.—if they formed a wider and stronger federation.

The authors note that until oil was discovered most inhabitants of the Gulf city states remained poor and backward and depended heavily on the sea for their main means of communication and livelihood. The discovery of oil opened new horizons and opportunities and made it possible for the oil producing states to promote more rapid economic development. Even those areas without oil benefited indirectly, especially by means of the considerable economic and other assistance provided to them by some of their wealthier neighbors. The Gulf city states have shown different levels of economic and social development; and even the wealthier states still face serious economic and social problems. In all areas political development lags well behind economic development.

The Gulf city states, as the authors stress, do have much in common with many developing countries, e.g., a handicapping colonial past; low level of education and productivity; widespread economic and social inequalities; political inexperience; concentration of political power in the hands of a few. Nevertheless, in a number of important ways these city states are not typical of most developing nations. For example, unlike most developing countries, the Gulf States: have

extremely small populations (Qatar has only about 80,000 people and several autonomous UAE states have less than 11,000 people each; depend heavily upon foreign workers (25 per cent of the workers in Bahrain and more than 50 per cent of the workers elsewhere are foreigners); are predominantly urban because a very large percentage of their populations live in cities; and, in most cases, they have adequate financial means for economic development and have unusually high per capita incomes because of the large oil revenues being received.

The authors have provided useful information, critical analyses, and sound recommendations for promoting economic, social, educational, political, and administrative development in the Gulf states. Nevertheless, they have recognized that their study was incomplete and only a beginning to the full understanding of the Gulf city states. They promised to "continue with research in this area and to analyze various problems in greater depth in future studies" (p. xxii). One can, therefore, look forward to further useful studies by the authors. These should enable them not only to provide more analyses in "greater depth" but also to update their statistical and other data in order to record the many significant economic and political changes (such as the new oil discoveries, the tremendous rise in oil revenues because of higher prices, the increased stress on industrialism and tourism, and the internal political changes in Qatar, Bahrain, and Sharjah) which have taken place since the book was completed. It would also be helpful if the next study were to provide more detailed information and analyses in depth about such matters as: the existing leaders and elites; the roles and influence of students, foreign workers and other foreigners, professional organizations, social clubs, etc. (as in Bahrain); and economic planning programs and activities.

The present scholarly study of an increasingly important area is a most useful and welcome contribution.

FRED J. KHOURI

Villanova University

Communism in Korea. By Robert Scalapino and Chong-Sik Lee. Volume I. The Movement, Volume II. The Society. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972. Pp. xxi, 1533. 2 Vols. $55.00.)

This two-volume work, the culmination of nearly a decade of scholarship, provides one of the most thorough and valuable studies made of a modern political system. It deals carefully with the "traditional" aspects of political analysis—leadership, power, ideology, institutions; but, more unusual in a single study, it deals at equal length with the social and economic effects of that system. The research also goes well beyond North Korea, providing extensive comparative analysis of approaches to the same problems by the Soviet Union and China, as well. The authors place their work in the field of comparative Communist studies, which they see still in the pioneering stages. But to categorize it that way alone could be a disservice. For, if there is one problem with this work, it is its lingering ties to the stereotyped approaches to Communist systems that marked the research of the 1950s and 1960s. By its close, however, this work offers a broader and more relevant perspective that could guide future studies of both Communist and non-Communist systems.

The study is presented in two parts: Volume I, *The Movement*, and Volume II, *The Society*. Volume I covers the historical development of the present Communist regime in North Korea, including a rich account of the early history of the Korean Communist movement, from 1900 to 1945. This first volume really breaks into two parts, based not only on the subject matter but also on the availability of research materials. The first part covers the movement from 1900 to World War II. a period of revolutionaries and independence fighters working under nearly impossible conditions of persecution, dislocation, and hardship. They wove in and out of the Soviet politics of the Russian revolution, and the Chinese politics of China's revolution like a singular thread—part of that fabric but also part of a distinctively Korean history. There is a rich, human flavor to the account of this period. Through the notes of one leader's—Yo Un-hyong's—two month trip across the Gobi dessert and thence across Siberia in 30° below zero weather to attend the First Congress of the Toilers of the Far East in Moscow in 1921, one gets a vivid picture of the conditions, the intensity, the hopes, and the frustrations of these early revolutionary leaders.

The coverage of the period after 1945, in the balance of Volume I (and all of Volume II), is of a different character. The authors have been limited to only two sources of data about modern North Korea: official publications of the North Korean government and the reports of defectors (plus some access to unclassified South Korean and American intelligence estimates). Despite enormous efforts by the authors to overcome bias in these sources and to cross-check almost all accounts, this situation limits the analysis. At a minimum, the human flavor diminishes. More seriously, the study is restricted in the degree to which it can probe the leaders' thoughts and reflections beyond the official rhetoric, and their reasoning process in coming to decisions.

For the most part, however, Professors Scalapino and Lee have overcome this limitation. In

Volume I, through painstaking analysis of each published change in the composition and rank of the leadership, of the issues known to be confronting the leadership, and of the documentary record of debates, statements and decisions, the authors trace the establishment of Kim Il-Song's power. Initially under Soviet sponsorship but later more independently, Kim emerges as the head of one of the most thoroughly mobilized, militarized, and authoritarian states in either the Communist or non-Communist world. The primary influence, in style and structure, is the Soviet Union (the presence in Korea of a large contingent of the Chinese army from 1951–58 seems to have left curiously little by way of records or influence). But there is also a strong nationalist character to both the ideology and policies of the regime which has grown with the strains in the international Communist movement.

The total picture is of overwhelming public emphasis on Kim's personal leadership, his concern with absolute loyalty, and the resulting concentration of power among a few men whose roots go back in almost every case to the small guerrilla bands of Korean independence figthers in Manchuria from which Kim emerged. Simultaneously, there has been a militarization of the society reflecting not only the siege mentality of the regime and the continued confrontation with the South, but also the desire to reconstruct the character of Korean citizenry to fit the perceived needs of socialism and modernization.

Volume II, however, looks at North Korean society from a different perspective. Each major facet of the society—the leadership structure; the control system; ideology and the intellectual; the military; agriculture and the peasant; industrialization and the worker—is analyzed in terms of its character in North Korea and in comparison to the chief Communist "models," the USSR and China. The authors find the Soviet model to be dominant in each case in spite of the claims of innovation and departure. China has experimented more. North Korea has followed the model almost strictly, and —because of its smallness of size, homogeneity of population, and greater ease of control—has had even more success than the USSR with Soviet models of collectivization and certain forms of management. In economic development, comparisons are also made with South Korea.

What emerges as a result of this additional material is a broader and more balanced picture of North Korea as a system that has blended communism, emergence, and tradition in a state that is unquestionably authoritarian but that apparently need have no fear of mass disaffection. To the workers in all sectors, in contrast to the lowest third in South Korea and many other emergent states, North Korea is able to provide a guaranteed minimum allocation of food, free health services, and extremely low housing costs. On the other hand, consumer goods—whether simple items such as clothing or more luxurious ones such as watches and radios—are extremely scarce and expensive, in contrast to what they cost even average workers in South Korea. Allocations to the military and heavy industry are thus a major burden on the society. But isolation from the outside world and effective mobilization of the society minimize comparisons and grievances. On the whole, the authors find both rural and urban populations loyal to the regime. If there is little prospect for evolution to a more open system, there is also little prospect of mass discontent or serious internal dissension.

One of the most valuable contributions in this work is the analysis of North Korea's ability to mobilize and control the society so completely with relatively few overt forms of coercion. A number of years ago, Glenn Paige suggested that Korea provided a unique opportunity to measure the independence of the purely political variable, because two very different political systems had been imposed from outside on an essentially homogeneous culture. The authors of this work argue that the political variable is indeed a strong factor in shaping political-cultural development. They also resolve one of the troubling problems of recent scholarship on Korea. Ever since Gregory Henderson's *Korea: Politics of the Vortex* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), authors—both Korean and American—have been obliged to attend to his important analysis, which showed that Korean cultural factors produce an almost incessant tendency to factionalism and instability. Valuable as this analysis has been, it has also become almost an albatross around the neck of subsequent scholars, seeming to make it impossible for them to conceive within the same cultural milieu of a highly structured and integrated system of Korean politics, to understand for example the sudden swift success of Communist mass organization throughout Korea in the first months of independence, or for that matter to understand North Korea at all.

The resolution of this enigma comes in Scalapino's and Lee's analysis of the nature of North Korea control. They conclude that it is precisely the cultural characteristics cited by Henderson—emphasis on small but unstable "kinship" groups, importance of personal loyalties, the pressure for upward mobility—on which the North Korean regime has capitalized. Standing Henderson on his head, so to speak, the authors find that

> It is in organization that the Communist system of North Korea displays its most impressive strengths. . . . These are strengths that owe a considerable amount to pre-Communist political culture and

most particularly to the intensity with which primordial small-group relations operated in traditional Korean society. . . . By a process of trial and error, Party Leaders finally found that the most successful means of aggregating power lay in taking advantage of the "small group," adapting to the familial character of social organization that formed a central part of the traditional culture of their society. (pp. 1301, 1313).

Against the excellent scholarship and insight in this work, the one troubling aspect is the Cold War rhetoric that appears in it, particularly though not exclusively in those sections dealing with foreign policy toward South Korea or the United States. It seems out of place, and it is most disturbing when it influences the analysis and conclusions of the study. Foreign policy, for example, outside of the Communist countries, is one of the aspects of North Korea not examined in detail in this study. There is no content analysis of statements on key issues over the years; no examination of the milieus in which actions were taken or statements made (no real examination for example of various moves and statements by South Korea, of the special environment of the Vietnam War, particularly the bombing, and how it might have affected perceptions); and above all no opportunity to test and plumb the perceptions of North Korean leaders through direct access to them. Yet the authors assert that North Korea is motivated by its desire to "seize the south" (p. 954), and is spending great sums in preparation for an attack. The evidence offered, if suggestive of this, is at least somewhat ambiguous. The defense preparations that are described would appear to be at least as much defensive as offensive, particularly the enormous effort to dig a network of caves and tunnels and an underground communication system. The imminence of possible South Korean-American attack is also cited elsewhere by the authors as being one of the themes that effectively binds the population. In these circumstances, it seems too pat, at least too quick—too much in the vein that Eric Fromm warned us of years ago—to conclude, as the authors do in analyzing the purpose of North Korean defense expenditures, that it is "inconceivable" that Kim Il-Song could really fear an "unprovoked" South Korean or American attack (p. 986). We may perceive it in the West this way, because of how we see ourselves. But the task of scholars in this case is to plumb the realities as they are perceived in North Korea, or at least to measure the unknowns.

The point says something about the character of further comparative Communist studies, for which the authors argue strongly. It is significant, considering the time span in which this work was done, that the troublesome rhetoric drops off increasingly in the course of Volume II and is totally absent from the final chapter on perspectives. The authors conclude that North Korea can only be understood if seen as Communist, *and* emergent *and* traditional; in this light its system and policies can best be understood, and indeed its character evaluated, as the authors provide their own final and extremely useful evaluation. In this direction comparative Communist studies might well be encouraged, not out of the conviction of inevitable confrontation, the theme of an earlier era, but for purposes of understanding both the links between the Communist states and the ones between them and non-Communist states that confront similar tasks and milieus. This is the broad and valuable perspective to which this work brings us at its close and, one hopes, the guide it will provide to future such studies.

PRINCETON LYMAN

Chevy Chase, Maryland

Sovereignty and Society in Colonial Brazil: The High Court of Bahia and Its Judges, 1609–1751. By Stuart B. Schwartz. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973. Pp. 465. $17.50.)

Despite its central role in administering and governing colonial Brazil, the judiciary has remained a virtually unknown and unstudied institution. This fascinating study fills in a large part of the gap in our knowledge about these hitherto faceless bureaucrats sent to Brazil to dispense royal justice. By carefully piecing together and analyzing the backgrounds, careers, and activities of the judges who manned the High Court of Bahia during the 17th and first half of the 18th centuries, Professor Schwartz develops a decidely original perspective on Portuguese governance of Brazil.

This book details an institutional nonsuccess story. The notorious reputation of the Portuguese judiciary for corruption and inefficiency was well deserved. Despite diligent efforts to send honest, well-trained, and well-paid magistrates, justice in colonial Brazil was regularly bartered like any other commodity, though delivered more slowly.

Why did the judiciary so run amuck in Brazil? Schwartz provides us with essentially two answers: (1) the judges were so busy with nonjudicial functions that they had insufficient time to devote to court business, and (2) local Brazilian interests entangled the judges in a snare of commercial and family alliances that perpetually compromised judicial integrity. Both points are convincingly documented.

The number of nonjudicial hats worn by the Brazilian judges during this period is striking. In addition to deciding cases, the judges of the High

Court led military expeditions, investigated and prosecuted official corruption (though not too vigorously), collected taxes, and supervised the treasury.

The crown had hoped that endowing the magistrates with considerable power and prestige and handsome salaries would create a loyal and incorruptible judicial bureaucracy. But these very endowments made the judges highly sought after by the Brazilian elite as husbands for eligible daughters and as business partners. Royal edicts against such matrimonial and commercial ventures were regularly honored in the breach.

But surely some of the blame must lie with inadequacies of Portuguese law. Substantively, the *Ordenações Filipinas* were obsolete even when first enacted, and procedurally they provided myriad opportunities for delay. Determining the law applicable to a particular case was all too frequently a nightmarish task. One had to search through the confused and contradictory mass of statutes, orders, opinions, regulations, letters patent, decrees, and instructions appropriately termed the *legislação extravagante* (literally, extravagant legislation) as well as the *Ordenações*. There was not even an official compilation of colonial legislation, such as the Spanish had, to begin to bring order to this legal labyrinth.

Unfortunately, this book devotes little attention to the nature of the law the High Court was supposed to be applying. Indeed, a basic weakness of the book is its failure to deal with the judges' case-deciding functions. Nowhere is there a discussion of the issues involved in specific cases, or the analysis the court employed to resolve them. Some of these omissions may be attributable to the loss or destruction of records about the High Court's day-to-day activities, particularly from 1609 to 1626. (See p. 141.) But it would be helpful to know to what extent the magistrates imaginatively reinterpreted Portuguese law. To what extent did they consider themselves without discretion to twist legal norms to achieve a "just" result? Aside from the decisions motivated by corruption, did the judges serve the function of adapting Portuguese law to colonial conditions? Did the Portuguese follow the Spanish administrative formula of "I obey but I do not execute" to shelve inconvenient or inexpedient laws?

Despite such omissions, *Sovereignity and Society in Colonial Brazil* is a very fine effort. It is painstakingly researched from manuscript sources in more than twenty-five archives and libraries in Brazil, Portugal, England, and Spain, plus an impressive variety of secondary sources. In addition to appendices with biographical summaries of all the High Court's judges, there are 29 pages of bibliography, with concise research guides to much of the manuscript data. This book should be required reading for anyone interested in the development of Latin American administrative and legal institutions.

KEITH S. ROSENN
Ohio State University

Crime and Compromise: Janos Kadar and the Politics of Hungary Since Revolution. By William Shawcross. (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1974. Pp. 311. $10.00.)

Janos Kadar is a challenging subject for a biographer for at least two reasons. He does not believe in advertising either his ideas or the details of his personal life. The rambling speech made at the celebration of his 60th birthday is about as far as he has allowed himself to go in that respect. Second, he seems a man of great simplicity, even naiveté, yet his career shows an extraordinary touch for political timing, to say the least. William Shawcross, an enterprising journalist who has covered central Europe for the *Sunday Times* of London, is obviously intrigued by the riddle and at the same time not wholly sure of how to explain it, though not afraid to try. Kadar in the eyes of great numbers of his countrymen was a man who betrayed his best friend (Laszlo Rajk) and his country, but then somehow made up for it by 15 years of cautious accommodation to the people's needs and desires. Hence the title of the book.

The difficulty of portraying Kadar himself gives emphasis to the content of the subtitle, the politics of Hungary since the revolution of 1956. Here we get a rather breezy but basically competent narrative which gives the essence of Kadar's compromise with the people, including the changes which come under the name of the New Economic Mechanism, the relaxation of censorship, the easing of travel restrictions, and other developments, drawing largely on the Hungarian press, on Western and emigré sources, and on conversations within Hungary. The book does not dig deeply into the economic reform, as some Western economists have done. It does not analyze institutions and political practice in the way that William Robinson has attempted in his *Pattern of Reform in Hungary* (New York: Praeger, 1973). It has no secrets to reveal on Hungarian-Soviet relations. But the author did not set out to do those things. He has written a general book for the general public, a worthy successor to his earlier study of Dubček and the drama of Czechoslovakia in 1968. He shows a good sense of the tensions in Hungarian society today, the legacy and the lessons of 1956, and the limits within which leaders and people can act in finding ways to live with each other and with the presence of Soviet power.

Shawcross presents this picture mainly through personalities: Rakosi and Rajk; Gerö, Nagy and Münnich; Kadar's relations with all of them, and above all his relationship with his protector, Nikita Khrushchev. Because Communist politics is so much the politics of conspiracy, the unknown areas in the lives of these men are tremendous—especially in the case of Rajk, who left his mark on Hungarian political life long after the time of his trial and execution in 1949, less than two years after the Communists took full power. But the author does well with the material he has, and he is keen in his judgment of the political forces and issues behind the personalities.

Kadar is no heroic figure, but his toughness and resilience—he withstood cruel torture at the hands of Rakosi's police—and even his apparent simplicity and lack of dynamic qualities have brought him to the status of dean of political leaders within the Soviet bloc. And in the eyes of the Hungarian people, who had their hour of heroism in 1956 and have had to find other ways of seeking a more tolerable life, he has become an anchor. With the recent demotion, since the publication of Shawcross's book, of two leaders who have a prominent place in it as representing the new more liberal trend (Rezsö Nyers and György Aczel), all eyes have focused on Kadar. As long as he is there, the people feel an assurance that the clock will not be turned back, at least not very far back. His record of "crime and compromise" which this book describes so well may not justify such a feeling, but it is there none the less. They may not feel confident that he would ever stand up to the Russians or move beyond the narrow confines of the present system of party control, but he is, strangely enough, a symbol of whatever confidence there is in the future.

JOHN C. CAMPBELL
Council on Foreign Relations, New York

Political Decision Making Processes: Studies in National, Comparative and International Politics. Edited by Dusan Sidjanski. (San Francisco, Calif.: Jossey-Bass, Inc., 1973. Pp. 237. $10.75.)

In *Political Decision Making Processes* Dusan Sidjanski has collected seven papers presented at the VIIIth World Congress of the International Political Science Association held in Munich in September, 1970. The volume reflects, unfortunately, its origins, and though several chapters offer significant insights into the decision-making process, the volume as a whole lacks coherence.

Sidjanski's introductory comments provide a framework within which he suggests the following chapters can be understood. Focusing on the participation dimension of decision making, Sidjanski describes two kinds of processes: closed and open. Closed decision-making processes require the participation only of public authorities. Open processes, in contrast, are characterized by the participation of informed elites or other "social forces." Almost as an afterthought, Sidjanski adds a "mixed" category and concedes that most decision processes tend towards openness.

Two of the seven studies cannot be placed on this participation dimension. Charles Roig focuses on conceptual problems within the decision-making approach. He distinguishes Snyder's intrasystemic and Easton's extrasystemic approaches to decision making, and persuasively argues that the approaches are complimentary rather than conflicting. In addition, Roig argues against the historical (chronological) method of decisional analysis and for a systematic (logical sequence) approach. Despite these and other distinctions, Roig refuses to define "decision." His disclaimer—doesn't this suggest how complex the concept really is?—is not persuasive. Moreover, he fails to develop propositions relating components of the decision-making model to policy outputs. The chapter is less persuasive, consequently, because it is written at such a high level of generality.

Alexander J. Groth and L. L. Wade's study of international educational policy outcomes likewise fails to fit into Sidjanski's framework. But here this study's similarity to the Roig chapter ends. Groth and Wade develop measures of educational quantity (enrollment) and quality (student/teacher ratio) for 67 nations representing four political regime types: affluent democracies, poorer democracies, Communist systems, and autocracies. Using type of regime and level of economic development as independent variables, the authors examine their effects on the quantity and quality of educational policy outcomes. The results are surprising indeed. In short, Groth and Wade find political variables much more salient than economic variables in influencing educational policy: "In all but a few isolated cases, relationships between economic development and educational policy are only moderate or less for *all* political system types. National decision-makers appear to have substantial latitude in which to shape policy and are not as tightly confined by resource constraints as sometimes suggested" (p. 138).

The remaining five chapters can be viewed in terms of Sidjanski's open-closed participation dimension. Three studies focus on decision making within specific nations, while two studies focus on decision making in the international organization context. Sanjieva Nayak applies the mandala (concentric circles) theory of Kautilya to decision making in Ghana; the competition between governing and nongoverning elites provides his data. Nayak analyzes influence in the decision-making process in terms of the proximity of elite groups to

the decision-making center represented by Nkrumah and the People's Party. Nayak describes a "mixed" decision-making situation, but unfortunately relies on the vague notion of "hegemonical tension" among elites to explain policy outcomes. Consequently, Nayak's "explanation" fails to materialize, and we are left instead with a description of various Ghanaian interest groups.

Robert Presthus has contributed an insightful empirical study of interest group-legislative interaction in the Canadian system. From interviews with 140 M.P.'s in Ottawa, Presthus develops generalizations concerning the significance of interest group activities to the policy process. Not surprisingly, personal contact between M.P.'s and interest group representatives is high. Policy-makers perceive interest groups as performing two functions: (1) mobilization of public opinion, and (2) provision of information. Most important, "contrary to conventional appreciations, most legislators tend to regard interest groups and their agents as functionally necessary and normatively legitimate elements in the political process" (p. 106). Presthus's study supports an "open" interpretation of the policy process.

A more "closed" model emerges from Paolo Urio's case study of Switzerland's selection of a fighter plane in the early 1960s. In 1962 policy-makers lacked sufficient information and did not study all relevant factors (particularly economic, political, and psychological) in their selection of a fighter plane for development. As a consequence, the Defense Department overspent and precipitated reactions both from Parliament and from the public. Several reforms in the defense decision-making process resulted. A parliamentary information service was created which allowed M.P.'s to question civil servants and establish commissions of inquiry. Within the Defense Department the staff structure was strengthened and the number of subordinates directly responsible to one head was reduced. Most significantly, in terms of Sidjanski's open-closed participation dimension, these reforms led to greater collaboration between policy makers and the scientific and economic communities, and better information circulation both within the department and between the department and others in government, Parliament, and the public.

Decision making within international organizations provides the focus for the Cox and Jacobson study and the Alger study. Cox and Jacobson have studied interactions within eight universal international organizations (ITU, ILO, UNESCO, WHO, IAEA, IMF, GATT, UNCTAD) between 1945 and 1970. They develop a sevenfold decisional typology based on the nature of issues: representational, symbolic, boundary, programmatic, rule-creating, rule-supervising, and operational. While Cox and Jacobson argue the salience of a particular decision type varies with the organization, they go further and suggest salience influences the decision-making process (p. 155). Operational decisions tend to involve executive heads and bureaucracies; representational or symbolic decisions lead to formal government representative participation. Cox and Jacobson's framework incorporates environmental influences as well; their analysis conforms to Sidjanski's open model of participation. The authors develop specific, empirically testable propositions relating actors, process, and environmental influences to policy outputs in international organizations. Their essay represents a significant contribution to the volume.

Chadwick F. Alger, in his quantitative study of decision making in the ILO, WHO, WMO, and UN in 1955, 1960, and 1965, classifies by subject (administration, budget-finance, elections and appointments, procedural, program) and discussion (no discussion, agreement, some disagreement) 5147 decisions made within those organizations. His descriptive findings are highly suggestive. Alger concludes a trend toward consensual decision making exists in all four organizations (p. 227). Furthermore, procedural issues tend to dominate UN activities, while program decisions occupy the attention of delegates in service-oriented organizations. Alger incorporates aspects of negotiation structure and informal interaction patterns as well as public debate into his model of the international organization decision process. The openness of the process to outside influences suggests that Sidjanski's open model applies to decision making in these universal organizations.

Although individual papers (in particular, the Presthus, Cox and Jacobson, and Alger contributions) add to our knowledge of the decision-making process at national and international levels, the volume as a whole suffers from the problems involved in collections of convention papers. Sidjanski has attempted to combine both conceptual and empirical studies in this volume, and the absence of a well-developed integrative framework (despite the introduction of the open-closed participation dimension) makes the book less successful. It can be recommended, however, for the separate insights of several authors.

LINDA P. BRADY

Vanderbilt University

Cultural and Political Aspects of Rural Transformation: A Case Study of Eastern Nigeria. By David R. Smock and Audrey C. Smock. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972. Pp. 408. $19.50.)

In this study David Smock, an anthropologist who was a Ford Foundation adviser to the Eastern

Regional Government before the Biafran war, and his wife, Audrey, who is a political scientist with extensive fieldwork experience in Nigeria and elsewhere, have produced a most interesting work focusing on the cultural and political aspects of rural development in Eastern Nigeria.

Relying in part on their own fieldwork, the authors refer to a variety of data and techniques. They use case study materials of community plantations and resettlement schemes. They refer to the path-breaking work of scholars such as Robert Le Vine and Simon Ottenberg on the problems of motives and values leading to innovation, achievement, and change. In addition they report the findings of their own survey data ($N=480$) stratified by ethnic group and degree of acculturation.

At the cultural level the authors verified once more that the Eastern region of Nigeria has a traditional cultural system that encourages hard work, innovation, and savings and leads to a willingness to use modern methods and techniques to increase production. Their major contribution here is to show that this generalized willingness to innovate and work was not limited to Ibo groups only, but seemed to be a pattern widespread throughout the region. At the political level, however, the authors are less encouraging. They point out that when political effectiveness is measured in terms of motivating and directing change, the Eastern regional government, especially the local councils, was a failure. This pattern of high motivation at the local village level, linked with an incapacity to organize initiatives for the common good at the district, province, and regional level, seems to be the major finding of the Smock study.

The work would have been stronger had it stressed the cultural aspects of political efficacy as heavily as it has those of innovation. It is only toward the end of the study that the authors address themselves to the problem: "the tendency to restrict one's moral frame of reference to a limited group of people, usually those to whom one can trace genealogical relationships, . . ." (p. 338). The cultural problem for Eastern Nigeria in the prewar period was not one wherein "traditional" villagers resisted change—to the contrary it was one where villagers sought change but lacked the cultural and structural facilities to translate this desire into cooperative and effective endeavors.

From a methodological point of view, the Smock study can be faulted for not being concrete enough on the one hand, and not being general enough on the other hand. Thus, the many interesting case study materials they discuss—resettlement schemes, land tenure patterns, propensity to change—do not refer to the same sample of cases. This prevents the authors from deriving insights by connecting one set of variables from one aspect of the case to another set of variables from another aspect of the case—from land settlement patterns to resettlement schemes, for example. Lacking the richness of case study material, the study fails to relate actions and events at the local level of culture and politics to actions and events at a more inclusive level of culture and politics. Though there is an interesting and competent discussion of Eastern Region politics in the pre-civil war period, that discussion tends not to illuminate subsequent case study material. Without cumulating case study data, and without relating that data to the larger framework, this work lacks focus and tends to be episodic. Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind how rare and valuable is the material gathered by the Smocks. In choosing between methodological purity and bringing their findings to light, the Smocks have done the field of African politics and developing area studies an important service by taking the second course.

ROBERT MELSON

Purdue University

The Cultural Ecology of Chinese Civilization: Peasants and Elites in the Last of the Agrarian States. By Leon E. Stover. (New York: Pica Press, 1974. Pp. 305. $10.00.)

In this interesting volume an anthropologist simplifies history for us by schematizing China's development: the increasingly vast mass of peasantry has grown continuously from the prehistoric tribal folk who became settled farmers in the late Neolithic period, and has maintained itself by manpower agriculture producing cereal crops ever since. Sustained at this comparatively low level of energy production, the Chinese people were made an unprivileged peasantry by the growth of the elitist high culture of Chinese civilization with its overlay of privileged landlords, scholars, and officials. Both the peasant society and the high culture are structured internally and related by the extensive family system right up to the imperial dynastic family at the top. The higher culture and its parasitic administration kept the folk culture out of politics and overlay the great variety of China's local parochial cultures.

While this contrast between the privileged elite and the commoners is one mainstay of China studies, Professor Stover applies special metaphoric terms. The ancient folk community is the "Green Circle," and in the course of time overpopulation drives the less able element downward into the "Sink of Death" since "the overall consequences of the man-land relationship make for net downward mobility" (p. 6). To escape this fate the conjugal peasant family creates a "Cult of Poverty" to act out a life of hardship among

families that are in fierce competition and constantly suspicious of one another. "The family stands isolated, as symbolized by worship of *The Kitchen God*, a deity particular to each household" (p. 7). On the other hand, the court lives by the transport of grain on inland waterways or "Rivers to Glory." At the capital so sustained, the emperor struggles to preserve his domination over the elite in a constant battle between "the Mighty Dragon and the Local Snakes," (p. 8). In the agrarian state wealth follows power, and hence landlords' sons can climb the examination system or "Ladder to the Clouds." In the end, of course, the whole high culture has been projected downward, and Mao has converted the ancient folk society into a mass society.

In working out this rather stark but intriguing scheme, Mr. Stover undoubtedly will find he has stepped on the toes of many Marxists and others who are trying to get China out of its special sinological status. But if he seems to echo some of the nineteenth-century literature on the stagnation of Asiatic society and the special character of oriental despotism, he nonetheless does touch a chord that runs through the Western world's observations of China. In the little tradition he finds that "the folk have no means via a middle class to align themselves with the wider civilization at large. They are reduced to and divided by their local cultural traditions. And this is the secret of control over so many by so few" (p. 26). China is thus an "archaic civilization that never felt the full effects of the second agricultural revolution or the Iron Age technology of the West" (p. 27). As compared with the other ancient civilizations, China is unique because it survived.

Mr. Stover gives the reader among other things a thumbnail summary of China's prehistory (was the loess "at first covered with a heavy growth of trees"? [p. 35]), and traces the flowering of the classical philosophers and the imperial unification. Separate chapters deal with ecology, economy, politics, kinship, class religion and the world view. Indeed, this book grew out of the course that he gave to Japanese students in cultural anthropology at Tokyo University, 1963–65. Twenty-two pages of bibliography and notes organized by topics refer to most of the Western literature and some of the Japanese.

Since a great deal has to be integrated in short compass in this kind of exercise, much depends on the author's attitude and the climate of opinion in which he works. The 1960s in Japan saw Japanese sinologists reflecting the new look of the new generation of historians on the Chinese mainland who were chiefly devoted to denigrating the Confucian society of the past. This volume fits perfectly into the debunking of China's great tradition and specifically imperial Confucianism with all its institutions in the black era before Liberation. No doubt there is progress, and our present-day cynicism about the achievements of the Confucian state is justified in retrospect as the record of peasant suffering is exhumed. Nevertheless, in an earlier generation much of the same data here presented might have been cast in a happier mold, stressing the achievements of the Chinese state in preserving so many people in comparative civility over so long a time. The new look of today is far more disillusioned, Confucian civility has no defenders, and Mr. Stover provides chapter and verse for a grand indictment of the agrarian state. For the future he sees much continuity from the past, but "collectivization under conditions of intensive farming must be a substitute for mechanization," and he therefore doubts whether team organization can raise agricultural productivity. No doubt the unhappiness suggested in this picture of the past can be projected by outsiders onto some future Chinese dispensation.

JOHN K. FAIRBANK
Harvard University

Building a New Japan: A Plan for Remodeling the Japanese Archipelago. By Kakuei Tanaka. Translated by Simul International. (Tokyo: Simul Press, Inc.; Portland, Oregon: International Scholarly Book Services, Inc., 1973. Pp. 338. $12.95.)

When Premier Kakuei Tanaka was told that the original Japanese version of this book, *Nippon Retto Kaizo-Ron* (Tokyo: Nikkan Kogyo Shimbun, 1972), had become a best-seller with over one million copies sold, he is reported to have said, "I suppose I ought to read it!" One should not, however, discount the book simply because it was originally a bureaucracy-produced series of studies prepared when the author held the portfolio of the powerful Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). It appeared in June just before Tanaka became Prime Minister in July, 1972. Late that year and early in 1973, when the "Computerized Bulldozer" was at the height of his popularity, the ideas of "remodeling" were being translated into policy and action.

All of that was, of course, before the disastrous "energy shock" of late 1973, the unfamiliar decline in growth rates, and the plunge into balance-of-payments deficits. Subsequently, Premier Tanaka's Liberal-Democratic Party came under assault (as was clearly shown in the LDP's poor showing in the July, 1974 upper house elections). Tanaka's popularity as shown in opinion surveys fell to a point about as low as that of former President Nixon. Nonetheless, the original "remodeling" thesis did shrewdly tap some of the deepest sources of dissatisfaction on the part of the Japanese

public: inflation, intensive urbanization, and environmental disruption (*kōgai*).

Later Premier Tanaka worked on a new plan to improve the "tarnished image" of his widely criticized "remodeling" scheme. Opposition parties had attacked the earlier plan on the grounds that it would not only alter the nation's landscape but would also increase pollution and spread urban blight throughout Japan. Furthermore, landowner supporters of the LDP had promptly made windfall profits from speculation on properties in areas to which industry was to be relocated under the original scheme.

Tanaka's newest grand design was called "A Plan for Making a Happy Japan." It embraced a 10-point program submitted to government advisory councils in June, 1974, to be applied over the ten-year period 1976–1985. It aimed at a "high-degree welfare society," in consideration of growth-limiting factors: population, food supply, and natural resources. On May 27, 1974 the Diet passed the National Land Development Bill with three opposition parties (the Japan Socialists, the Democratic Socialists, and the Komeito) supporting the LDP because the measure de-emphasized development. A compromise included a guarantee of an adequate supply of reasonably priced land for public use.

Fortunately we have also from Premier Tanaka's pen an English-language précis and update of the original plan ("The Road to a New Japan," *1974 Britannica Book of the Year* [Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1974]). Although this piece was prepared in September, 1973 before the energy crisis, it still stands as a definitive statement of his long-range goals.

According to the Premier's book and later article, Japan's economic development has reflected the transition from primary through secondary to tertiary pursuits toward a "post-industrial society—*i.e.*, an information-oriented society." This was accompanied by rapid urbanization. Citing MITI statistics, the Premier demonstrates that in the decade 1960–1970 the population of metropolitan areas on the Pacific coast—Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka—increased by 10,620,000 to reach a total of 45,580,000 (43.9 per cent of the total population). Meanwhile, farming areas lost population and energy vital to further growth. The major goal of "remodeling" remains industrial relocation so that the value of factory shipments from the Pacific coastal belt will decline from the present 73 per cent to 50 per cent of the national total by 1985.

The Prime Minister feels that sophisticated transportation networks are essential both to relocation and increasing emphasis on knowledge-intensive industries in regional centers. The goal is to put every point in Japan within one day's journey from any other point. Tanaka speaks the conversion of the present "horizontal" urb sprawl into "vertical" high-rise cities. In any ca regulation of land use is now recognized as lyi at the core of a solution.

Progressive as Premier Tanaka's schemes m have sounded, the fact remains that he was on head of a fluid coalition of competing party fa tions and was eventually forced to resign. The were still those powerful members of the party wh looked to production and growth as salvatior with affluence trickling down to the new middl class of *sarari man* (salary man) in Japan. Tanaka' scheme and LDP policy revealed, however, poli ticians' recognition that a sizeable urban-base opposition coalition was snapping at the heels o the majority. The immense popularity of Governo Ryokichi Minobe of Tokyo was evidence of th public's concern.

Premier Tanaka would not be a Japanese if he had not concluded by tapping some of the most fundamental national characteristics. Thus he states the familiar ("modern," Western) standard of "the dignity of man," based on "freedom and democracy." He also expresses, however, the traditional (Japanese) norm: "Rights are always accompanied by duties, choices by responsibilities." Japan must strive to reconstruct a nation of "local communities" in which nature, culture, and industry can be blended harmoniously. If Japan can achieve this goal, the Premier predicts, the nation will be in the forefront of those who want to build a new human society for the 21st century.

ARDATH W. BURKS
Rutgers University

Trudeau and Foreign Policy: A Study in Decision-Making. By Bruce Thordarson. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1972. Pp. 231. $2.95, paper.)

Upon assuming office in the spring of 1968, Canadian Prime Minister P. E. Trudeau undertook a comprehensive review of his country's foreign policy. Subsequent to a 25-month process of studies by interdepartmental task forces, public discussions, and meetings with Canadian foreign policy elites, a set of six booklets was issued entitled *Foreign Policy For Canadians* (an introductory booklet and five sector papers on Europe, Latin America, Pacific, United Nations, and International Development). In these booklets the Trudeau Government set forth a conceptual framework encompassing six national themes (e.g., economic growth and social justice) that was to orient Canadian foreign policy in the future. Noteworthy for the absence of references to the Canada-United States interaction, the booklets were grounded in the assumption that foreign

policy is the extension abroad of domestic policy, suggesting an emphasis on economic factors as opposed to Canada's "helpful fixer" role preoccupation of servicing the international community through its mediatory and peacekeeping activities.

The purpose of the Thordarson volume is to "study the evolution of Canada's new foreign and defence policies and to analyze the events that took place between 1968 and 1971," while "above all it is a study in political decision-making that seeks to determine the major . . . inputs in the decisions that were reached by the Canadian Government" (p. 4). The author disaggregates the review into what he regards as three "major decisions"—to conduct the review (Chapter Four); to reduce Canada's NATO force commitment, which catalyzed discussions of the review for the first year (Chapter Five); and the decisions involved in the six foreign policy booklets (Chapter Six). These three chapters constitute the core, and the most useful, part of this volume. However, before actually disaggregating the review, the author invokes a "decision-making model" (Brecher, Steinberg and Stein, "A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behavior," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 13 [March, 1969]) in Chapter Two. Rather than operationalizing the model, he extracts categories to organize his "mass of information." This is followed by an examination (Chapter Three) of Trudeau's "philosophical" and "instrumental" beliefs because "the psychological element must be explored in depth" (p. 7).

This volume was assessed by journalist Anthony Westell in the *Toronto Star* as "one of the finest pieces of Canadian political reporting I have seen in years," an evaluation with which one must entirely agree. From an analytical standpoint, however, this volume is somewhat disappointing. For example, one of the author's difficulties concerns his assessment of the significance of the review. Such an assessment should include some sort of a fairly rigorous definitional criterion of continuity/discontinuity vis-à-vis such explicit questions as, Does the review (both as process and outcome) constitute a departure from the previous Canadian foreign policy experience? The author does not in the final analysis adequately establish such a criterion and develop such questions. Moreover, he tends to prejudge in his introductory Chapter One by stating that his purpose is to study "Canada's *new* foreign and defence policies" (p. 4). His subsequent assessments of just how "new" the review is tend to be clouded—on page 209 he concludes that the Government's conceptual framework has not had "any significant impact on the actual content of Canadian foreign policy"; on the same page he asserts that the framework "indicated a changed emphasis in the foreign policy of Canada"; while on page 214 he observes that "Trudeau's major achievement during the review was not so much to alter the substance of previous policy as it was to change its articulation."

Notwithstanding the variable analytical focus of this volume, however, it is a most useful account not only of the Trudeau review, but also of Canadian external preoccupations during this period, and of how Ottawa's foreign policy process functions.

ROGER FRANK SWANSON
The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies

Comparative Political Violence. By Fred R. von der Mehden. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1973. Pp. 124. $7.25, cloth; $3.95, paper.)

Today comparative political analysts often see their choice as one between frustrating parochialism and immature globalism. Thirty years is a brief span in the evolution of any discipline, but in less than that time political scientists have intellectually outgrown familiar area studies and country case study approaches—outgrown them without having fully exploited them and without possessing the methods or raw data with which to progress to global comparisons. One result of this drive to escape the cramped quarters of area and country studies is the fascination with cross-national categorizations, categorizations lacking sufficient analytical significance.

Professor von der Mehden's succinct overview of political violence relies heavily on categories. Countries are listed according to their levels of political violence, their sorts of justifications for violence, the types of objectives of violence. The reader, however, wishes that these frequently provocative lists were accompanied by more elaborate interpretive analysis. For political scientists should be increasingly pragmatic about their categorizations, demanding that each serve as a practical tool for answering specific analytical questions.

There could have been far more effort to relate categories to one another to explain the political repercussions of political violence. One country might have been selected, its categorical profile detailed, and the significance of that profile explained. For example, in the course of the volume France is listed as high in its level of political violence (p. 88), high in student violence (p. 15), low in electoral violence (p. 15), low in separatist violence (p. 10), low in both revolutionary and counter-revolutionary violence (p. 11), low in coup-related violence (p. 13). What does this tells us about the French political system or about the relationship between types of violence? Is there

another political system with an identical categorical profile and consequently similar political attributes?

The volume's strongest section deals with causal analysis. Professor von der Mehden, a Southeast Asia specialist and experienced utilizer of the country case method, is skeptical of the conventional wisdom that political violence is highly correlated with economic deprivation. Employing intra-regional comparisons of aggregate data, he finds that only in the European region are those countries with low economic indicators the same as those with high incidences of political violence (p. 109). Unfortunately, he does not go on to speculate on this "European exception." In other regions, Professor von der Mehden finds that the colonial experience coupled with ethnic fragmentation provides the most potent stimulators of violence.

This book, like most other serious works on violence, concentrates almost single-mindedly on causality. Although we remain far from a definitive causal explanation for low as well as high incidences of political violence, we should start devoting more attention to the *consequences* of violence for political systems. All too often it appears as if we studied political violence presuming to know its long-range significance and thus curious only about why and when it occurs.

But, in fact, do we have an adequate systematic justification for spending so much time determining its causes? What does it matter whether a military junta came to power via a violent rather than a nonviolent coup? Specifically what difference does it make whether a country's citizens were politically mobilized by violent rather than nonviolent demonstrations? The common presumption is that higher levels of political violence dissipate valuable political resources—government revenues for unproductive defense and coercion, valuable manpower, limited political trust. In this sense, we are concerned about political violence because we presume it to be wasteful, inefficient, both an indicator and cause of political underdevelopment. On the other hand, as Professor von der Mehden notes in his chapter on justifications of violence, there are those who contend that violence is indeed a shortcut in the often tedious process of development. In the future we need to go beyond simply categorizing such implicit or explicit assumptions regarding the effects of violence to test the validity of those assumptions.

CYNTHIA H. ENLOE

Clark University

Area Handbook for the Khmer Republic (Cambodia). By Donald P. Whitaker et al. Foreign Area Studies. The American University. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, D.A. Pam 550-50, 1973. Pp. 387. $4.10 domestic postpaid.)

The goal of this volume is to provide "a compilation of basic facts about the social, economic, political, and military institutions" of the Khmer Republic (p. iii). Fifteen years ago, a similar effort by David J. Steinberg and his associates, *Cambodia: Its People, its Society, its Culture* (New Haven: HRAF Press, 1959), was a standard reference for students of this generally neglected Southeast Asian kingdom. The present volume, however, is not likely to achieve similar status in scholarly circles, partly because materials on the Khmer Republic are now much more broadly available then they were in the late 1950s. A more significant impediment is that the military nature of both the book's sponsorship and its intended readership seems to have constrained and distorted the authors' presentation of materials on politics in the Republic. In addition, the quality of writing and analysis simply does not live up to the standards established in the earlier work under the auspices of the Human Relations Area Files.

Fully a quarter of the book is concerned with the country's political system, with separate chapters being devoted to the historical setting, the governmental system, political dynamics, and foreign relations. Much is made of the transfer to a republican form of government in the post-Sihanouk period. The Constitution of 1972, we are told, places the source of power in the people rather than the king, and in two places (pp. 4 and 198) we are reminded that the Constitution proclaims the "republican" ideals of liberty, equality, fraternity, progress, and happiness. Actual patterns of political competition and decision making that conflict with constitutional norms and ideals, however, receive circumspect treatment.

Discussion of the insurgency movement is marked by similar ambiguity. At several points a dominant Vietnamese role in the movement is asserted (pp. 5, 47, 72, and 189), but in the brief section devoted to the organization of the movement a much more salient role is attributed to its Cambodian leadership and support (pp. 192, 194). On matters such as these one especially misses any system of source referencing.

Norodom Sihanouk receives short shrift from the authors: he was "obsessed by a belief in the advantages of nationalization"; his government was one of "essentially autocratic rule"; the substantial political party and National Congress which he created "acted to retard political institution building" (p. 3); and the masses of the people accepted his "paternal authoritarianism" and "went through the motion of supporting his program and policies" (p. 197). This kind of treatment is insensitive both to the nuances of Cambodian

political culture and to the nature of Sihanouk's leadership.

Though material in this book would be of use to many visitors to Cambodia, its value to most scholars is likely to be very limited. The striking exception to this generalization is the 35 pages of bibliography which represent an extensive, if not exhaustive, compilation of sources on the Khmer Republic as of July 1972.

STANLEY J. HEGINBOTHAM
Columbia University

The Economics of Colonialism: Britain and Kenya, 1870–1930. By Richard D. Wolff. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1974. Pp. 203. $9.75.)

Despite the proliferation of literature on almost all aspects of African studies in the last decade the economic history of the continent has been sorely neglected. This oversight is now being corrected, and readers interested in the colonial history of Kenya will welcome Richard D. Wolff's study of economic change in colonial Kenya from 1870 to 1930. There have of course been a number of excellent studies of modern Kenya. Yet most of the books have concentrated on political history and have relegated economics to a subordinate status. Professor Wolff assembles his data on economic development from a wide variety of sources. Supplementing British and Kenyan government publications with some judicious, though not exhaustive, reading in the Colonial Office files in London, the author narrates a story of the way in which the traditional economies of the Kenya African peoples were transformed through the influx of European settlers and the fostering of an agricultural export economy, based on settler ownership of land and the use of cheap African labor. While some of this history will be familiar to most scholars interested in Kenya, through the works of Rosberg and Nottingham, Mungeam, and Sorrenson, the focus on economics proves worthwhile. The British interest in East Africa, the author contends, was heightened by the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 and was championed by business interests and missionary groups. These elements eventually prodded the British into assuming formal control over the East Africa Protectorate, and then the desire to turn this sparsely inhabited area into a fiscally self-sufficient colony prompted the British authorities to encourage European settlement. Once having made this momentous decision, the British sought to develop an agricultural export economy of value to the mother country—hence their emphasis on the cultivation and sale of coffee, sisal, and tea. They also lent the full weight of their colonial power to wrenching Africans out of their traditional economic activities and compelling them to serve as a cheap labor force on European estates.

Wolff's presentation of these developments is carefully and skillfully done, and for the most part the main outlines of the story are correct. There are two stimulating chapters on the methods by which the British transformed the African population into wage laborers. Wolff shows the great variety of techniques used by the colonial government to force Africans out of their own economies, ranging from outright physical coercion to the alienation of African land and the enactment of high taxes.

Nonetheless, the presentation suffers from sketchiness, and while the main outlines of economic development are usually drawn accurately, the details are sometimes lacking or are not handled well. Two examples will suffice. This sketchiness arises in the very first chapter where Wolff tries to emphasize the importance of economic factors in causing British imperialism in the late nineteenth century. In the process he criticizes some of the prevailing noneconomic theories, specifically the works of Robinson and Gallagher, Fieldhouse, and others. But he fails to present these views as fully as they warrant, and the reader is left with an incomplete understanding of the major contributions and interpretations of these scholars.

A more serious problem arises, however, in Wolff's discussion of labor in Kenya after World War I. The author contends that all the elements of British power were directed toward turning the African population into wage laborers at that time and that the British used physical coercion, rising taxes, and a newly enacted pass law to dominate African lives and force them into the European economy. As proof for this contention Wolff cites the famous Northey labor circular of 1919 and its recasting in 1920, both of which put pressure on African chiefs to supply labor to European farms. Yet he seems to be unaware that these circulars caused such a furor in England that the new Secretary of State for Colonies, Winston Churchill, was compelled to issue a despatch carefully regulating the forcible recruitment of labor. In fact, the 1920s saw a considerable decline in the forcible despatching of African laborers to work on European farms—an important development which the author fails to incorporate into his analysis.

This book on economic change in colonial Kenya is welcomed because it investigates, with success, this important subject. It is to be regretted, however, that it is not as detailed and comprehensive as it might have been.

ROBERT L. TIGNOR
Princeton University

The French Deputy: Incentives and Behavior in the National Assembly. By Oliver Woshinsky. (Lex-

ington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1973. Pp. 256. $14.00.)

This monograph is a revision of a doctoral dissertation completed in 1971. Conclusions are based on in-depth interviews with fifty French deputies during thirteen months of the years 1968 and 1969 and on documentary evidence. Its general purpose is to demonstrate the fruitfulness of "incentive analysis" in attempting to understand French political behavior. More specifically, three questions are raised: "What are French politicians really like? What does motivate men to engage in politics in France? Is there any relationship between these motives and the bitter divisiveness of political struggles in that country?" (p. 1).

One learns that, although seven "incentive types" have been "observed" internationally by James L. Payne and James D. Barber (in Columbia, the U.S.A., the Dominican Republic, and Brazil), only four are found among French deputies: "Mission" (38 per cent), "Program" (28 per cent), "Status" (20 per cent), and "Obligation" (14 per cent). French deputies, then, are not "really" motivated exclusively either by ideological or self-serving ends, as (Woshinsky asserts) specialists in French politics argue. Rather, their behavior, which causes the naughty political instability of France so decried by American and conservative British and French observers of French politics, is the result of this potent combination of four incentives, one of which each of the deputies possesses. Of particular concern to Woshinsky is the lack of numerical dominance of good, clean, healthy, pragmatic Program Deputies. These wonderful gentlemen are so heavily outweighed by their colleagues of different persuasions (particularly the evil Mission Deputies) that French political behavior barely resembles its counterpart in the U.S.A. This is evidently bad. A new Marshall Plan is needed, I should think. America should send a number of its abundant Program Politicians to France in order to solve her problems in a no-nonsense way. While they are there, they might mate with a large number of the non-Program Deputies' women, Voilà! The "bitter divisiveness of political struggles" in France would be ended in the space of a generation or two.

Apart from the normative overtones which cloud this book, Woshinsky presents an interesting analysis of French legislative politics. Six "attitudinal" and seven "behavioral" correlates of the four incentive types are creatively discussed. Moreover, a portrait of each incentive type, based on interview protocols, is included. This is useful not only for analysis but also for acquainting those not familiar with French politicians with the nature of deputies. These sketches are supplemented by an extensive but concise survey of the literature which links the author's incentive types with other empirical classifications of political motivation.

Several methodological problems detract somewhat from Woshinsky's attempt to demonstrate the value of incentive analysis. The problem of reliability, which he and Payne are attempting to solve, is freely admitted by the author (p. 199, footnote 22). I remain to be convinced that reliability can be achieved with the use of interview schedules alone. Too much interpretation and evaluation is left to the individual coder of the protocols, and he, in turn, must depend upon the assiduity of the interviewer. Moreover, Woshinsky reports (p. 189) that the number of questions asked in the course of the interviews varied. Was the question eliciting the date of deputies' entry into politics, one of the behavioral correlates of incentive types reported by the author, occasionally omitted? One does not know. My own experience in interviewing French politicians leads me to conclude that the quality of data obtained from an interview depends greatly on the way the question is asked and, of course, whether it is asked. The careful structuring and pretesting of questions and the systematic presentation of all of them to all respondents are steps prerequisite to one's success in obtaining both reliable and valid data.

The criteria for categorizing respondents' incentives are, moreover, confusing. I would have great difficulty in distinguishing, for example, a "Mission Participant" from an "Obligation Participant." Both have "moral concerns." It may be "clear" to Woshinsky that "he [the Mission Deputy] has moral concerns, but these concerns relate to the welfare of his movement" (p. 69). This is not clear to me, particularly in the case of "Gaullists" classified as "Mission Deputies": eight are members of U.D.R.; but, two are Republican Independents, one is a U.D.R. *apparenté*, and one is a *non-inscrit*!

These comments are not meant to condemn Professor Woshinsky's work. His book is well researched and well written. The interested reader, however, will find it somewhat lacking in methodological sophistication. He will be surprised and disappointed to learn that only fifty of a sample of one hundred deputies were interviewed in the space of thirteen months. He will be irritated by the lack of evidence presented in support of many generalizations. Finally, he may find, as I do, that incentive analysis, although thought provoking, is too simplistic to explain the behavior of French deputies.

WILLIAM H. HUNT
Southwest Minnesota State College

The Organization and Support of Scientific Research and Development in Mainland China. By Yuan-li Wu and Robert B. Sheeks. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970. Pp. 592. $17.50.)

The objective of this study, prepared for the National Science Foundation, was to assemble all available data on the organization and support of scientific R&D in China and to observe the methods by which China has acquired and used new knowledge in the fields of science and technology. In large part the authors have achieved their objective. The volume provides a detailed and useful account of the life sciences, the physical sciences, mathematics, and the engineering sciences. The fields of scientific activity as defined in the study include not only R&D as narrowly defined, but also include testing and standardization, training and information as those terms are understood in the United States. The cutoff date for a good part of the study is unfortunately 1964. An updating of this study would prove even more useful to the student of Chinese science and technology.

In their analysis of Peking's R&D efforts, Yuan-li Wu, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, and Robert Sheeks, former Associate Director of the Pacific Science Board, National Academy of Sciences, note five stages in the economic and political development of China since 1949: (1) economic rehabilitation, 1949–52, involving the regimentation of scientific manpower and the ideological conversion of the intellectuals: (2) orderly development, 1953–57, corresponding to the first Five-Year Plan, with R&D activities geared to the fulfillment of economic goals and centering on the establishment of the Scientific Planning Commission in 1957; (3) the Great Leap Forward, 1958–60, during which period growing differences with the Soviet Union led to emphasis on military R&D; (4) economic retrenchment and recovery, 1960–65, covering the failure of the Great Leap Forward, the cessation of Soviet aid, with R&D emphasis shifted to predominantly economic, in particular agricultural, objectives and the military aim of achieving a nuclear deterrent; (5) the third Five-Year Plan, 1966–70, with emphasis continued on both economic and military R&D.

The volume also contains sections on educational and man-power requirements, R&D decision making, location of R&D institutions, financing R&D activities, and the users of R&D funds. Wu and Sheeks conclude that finance is not a constraint on the continued expansion of the scientific program; that the major restraints lie in the shortage of senior research workers; that the total funds for science appear to be approximately four times as great as the published state budget for science; and that the nuclear program required funds at least as large as the state science budget itself, which was approximately 1.5 billion yuan in 1964 and 1965.

While concluding that neither economic growth nor economic stability, particularly in the agricultural sector, have been enhanced significantly through domestic R&D efforts, the authors recognize that Chinese R&D had by the mid-1960s become sufficiently advanced so that significant results could no longer be ruled out. China's success in her nuclear weapons development demonstrated the degree to which her R&D efforts had progressed.

The authors single out for discussion the nuclear weapons development of China, with emphasis on the Sino-Soviet aspect. I must take exception to the rendition of a sentence in China's August 15, 1963 statement on Soviet assistance. According to Drs. Wu and Sheeks, the Soviet Union would "provide China with a sample of an atomic bomb and technical data concerning its manufacture" (p. 363). Instead, the Chinese Government statement should read that as of June 20, 1959, "the Soviet Government unilaterally tore up the agreement on new technology for national defense concluded between China and the Soviet Union on October 15, 1957, and refused to provide China with a sample of an atomic bomb and technical data concerning its manufacture (*Jen-min Jih-pao*, August 15, 1963). It would thus appear that the Soviet Union may never have committed itself, in response to a Chinese request, to providing China with a sample atomic bomb. Much about the extent of Sino-Soviet collaboration in the development of China's nuclear program remains to be explored. It would also have improved the study if some analysis of China's progress in R&D with reference to conventional weapons had been included.

The volume concludes with a lengthly summary of findings which in large measure repeats earlier discussions but does contain some new material, such as observations on the effect of the Cultural Revolution on R&D. Generally, as noted earlier, the termination date for a good part of the study is around 1964. The usefulness of the study is further limited by the lack of an index. Nevertheless, the study, despite its limitations, should prove helpful to both the specialist and the student of the Chinese economy by providing in one volume an overview of China's scientific research and development and a key to more detailed exploration of specific areas.

ALICE LANGLEY HSIEH

Arlington, Va.

The Coming Crisis in Israel: Private Faith and Public Policy. By Norman L. Zucker. (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1973. Pp. 282. $10.00.)

As this review is being written the leadership of the *Maarakh*, the coalition of labor parties which has dominated the politics of Israel and Jewish

mandatory Palestine, is attempting to form a coalition government.

The National Religious Party, which has been one of Labor's major coalition partners in the past, has been balking and has demanded essentially theocratic control over the question of "Who Is A Jew?," extending to the question of what constitutes legitimate conversion to Judaism. For Israel-watchers, this is but one of a long series of impasses between the secular and religious parties in Israel, ultimately reflecting different understandings of Jewish history and the Jewish future. What Professor Zucker calls "The Coming Crisis in Israel" in fact has been the center of debate within world Jewry since the beginning of emancipation and the re-entrance of the Jews as a nation into secular politics. The Israeli religio-political situation is neither a current nor coming crisis; it is the chronic problem arising out of the peculiar situation of the Jews as a people scattered and reconstituted, whose religion, culture and nationhood are intertwined and inseparable.

Professor Zucker gives those totally unfamiliar with the Israeli scene a useful overview of many of the major day-to-day issues covering what he terms "Theopolitics." The book touches upon the legal system, particularly laws of personal status, the educational system, the army, etc. He cites much of the factual material relevant to these and allied issues. In substance and material, however, the book is essentially journalistic, not scholarly—a series of prologues awaiting a study.

The book displays a lack of theoretical orientation, little understanding of Zionist theory and history, as well as scant acquaintance with the Jewish legal and political literature central to the issues dealt with. The author's "explanation" of the Balfour Declaration (p. 23) is facile and ignores the scholarly literature that has attempted to explicate this crucial document. So, too, the author's characterization of an element of the law of personal status as quixotic (p. 112) reflects unfamiliarity with the biblical and talmudic literature and the legal and jurisprudential theories with which they work.

I suspect that much of the problem of the book stems from the author's good intentions and limited resources. Thus when he deals with one of the most important personal status cases (the Shalit Case, p. 193), Professor Zucker wants to report reactions in the Israeli press. His discussion, however, is based upon a summary of Israeli press reaction as presented in the English language *Jerusalem Post*. Many studies that social scientists might execute do not require thorough knowledge of the language and literature of the society being studied. If, however, one is to deal with questions of meaning so central to the national culture and essence as those dealt with in this book, working through limited translations and digests without context leads necessarily to superficiality.

"The Coming Crisis in Israel" might be used effectively as supplemental reading in an undergraduate course on Israeli Society and Politics or a beginning course in church and state in secularizing societies. It can be read quickly and easily (illustrated) and its anecdotal style is entertaining. Presumably the author intended it to be something more and that it is not.

PAUL RITTERBAND
City College of CUNY

Japanese Diplomacy in a Dilemma. By Nobuya Bamba. (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1972. Pp. 440. $10.50.)

The author, who teaches Japanese and Far Eastern diplomatic history in Montreal and Tokyo, analyzes Japanese diplomacy during the 1924–1929 period with special emphasis on two key political figures, Kijūro Shidehara and Giichi Tanaka. He compares different goals and policies pursued by Tanaka (the traditionalist) and Shidehara (the modernizer), arguing that the contrast in the two types of diplomacy (one is called "positive" or "expansionistic" and the other "negative" or "peaceful") is a virtual reflection of the contrast in the two diplomats' "personality and cultural identity" (p. 7). *Prima facie*, his writing seems convincing, but on a closer observation it contains some serious problems, both substantive and methodological.

In his attempt at contrasting the differences between the policies pursued by the two decision makers the author oversimplifies. He points up the special importance Tanaka attached to Manchuria while Shidehara supposedly advocated the unity of all China. But in fact Tanaka's Manchuria policy had germinated under Shidehara, who had often referred to Japan's "visible and invisible rights and interests" in Manchuria and Mongolia. Bamba argues that Tanaka convened the Eastern Conference upon assumption of his office as Prime Minister cum Foreign Minister, "hoping to set up a China policy different from that of his predecessor" (p. 293). But the conference was actually more a meeting of Japanese officials involved in Chinese affairs to exchange information; it mostly re-endorsed the existing policies toward China, including the policy of assisting Kuomintang moderates. Tanaka did send the expeditions to Shantung and this was hailed by many Japanese as an expression of a "positive policy" toward China.

One should also point out, however, that the Tanaka cabinet essentially followed the policy of sympathy with Chinese nationalism and friendship with the Western powers. His fall from power in

mid-1929 was related as much to the army's dissatisfaction with his "not sufficiently positive" policies as to the strong criticism of his "positive diplomacy" raised by the *Minseito* and the general public.

Bamba's tendency to overemphasize the contrast between "Tanaka Diplomacy" and "Shidehara Diplomacy" seems also related to his methodological inefficiency. At the outset of his study he makes what is claimed to be a new methodological proposition: "to understand a nation's particular policy at a particular time requires the student to investigate all four aspects, the international, the decision-making, the (social and cultural) milieu, and the key diplomats' perception (of the objective world), in the light of their intricate mutual interactions" (p. 20). Having enunciated this proposition, the author does not make any systematic attempt at relating these four (ill-defined) dimensions in his subsequent discussion. He mostly neglects the first two dimensions. The relationship between the milieu and the key diplomat is explained as follows.

The milieu, which apparently is synonymous with "dominant popular sentiments and aspirations in the society," determines the kind of diplomatic leadership. Once chosen, the key diplomat formulates policies in the light of achieving the "ultimate goal," i.e., "that which their nation aspires to most" (p. 9). "So far as the nation maintains a relatively cohesive culture," the author argues, any deviation of the key diplomat's perception of the ultimate goal from that of the general population, if ever, "will eventually be corrected and the nation's diplomacy returns to a 'normality' reflecting her general cultural tradition" (p. 10). However, when the milieu (which also seems identical with "national-cultural identity") is split, the nation's diplomacy may fundamentally alter depending on which side of the division the key diplomat identifies himself with. According to the author, the Japanese milieu during the 1924–1929 period was diametrically split between traditionalists and modernizers and Tanaka identified himself with the former and Shidehara with the latter. Hence their diplomatic policies were "fundamentally" different. In short, Bamba is a (domestic) "milieu determinist."

In the real world of diplomacy, however, impacts of the international system and decision making (which may be better referred to as pulling and hauling among decision makers) may be equally or more relevant. The general population does not always make policy-relevant aspirations, and decision makers themselves often create or guide popular aspirations. In the context of prewar Japan, the role of elite decision makers was particularly overwhelming. On the other hand, no single Prime Minister or Foreign Minister enjoyed a free hand over diplomatic decision making, though Bamba gives the impression that both Tanaka and Shidehara almost always prevailed over other decision makers. The "key diplomat" had his cabinet colleagues, party leaders, and the *jūshin* (elder statesmen) to worry about. Bamba seldom discusses Prime Minister Kato's inputs into Shidehara's policy making, though (unlike Tanaka) Shidehara was only Foreign Minister. Both the Foreign Ministry and the military also exerted powerful influences over foreign policy, and no single leader could effectively override them.

Consequently, even if Tanaka and Shidehara had possessed completely contradictory personal dispositions as described in the book, it would not necessarily follow that their diplomatic policies would also be fundamentally different. Obviously there was some policy change, but there were other intervening variables besides the difference in personality and cultural identity between the two leaders (and the change in popular sentiments). The shift from the Kato to the Tanaka cabinet also meant a shift of partisan leadership (from the *Kenseikai* to the *Seiyukai*) with resultant realignments in the domestic power balance. Tanaka came to power just at a time when the Nationalists achieved the military unification of China and were about to extend control over Manchuria. Regarding the shift in China policy, Akira Iriye makes a pertinent point in *After Imperialism*: "In effect, Tanaka carried on the Shidehara policy, but in circumstances that eventually made it a different policy."

In summary, Bamba's book is an interesting attempt at demonstrating the impact of "personality and cultural identity" on Japanese diplomacy but it falls prey to oversimplifications and faulty inferences.

HIDEO SATO

The Brookings Institution

The United Nations: Past, Present, and Future. Edited by James Barros. (New York: The Free Press, 1972. Pp. 279. $8.95.)

This is a good, concise description of the background, structure, functioning, and principal activities of the United Nations. It consists of an introduction by the editor and six substantive chapters. Each of the substantive chapters treats the domain of one of the UN's six principal organs. The first three of the substantive chapters, by Leland M. Goodrich, Stephen G. Xydis, and Leon Gordenker, deal respectively with the Security Council, the General Assembly, and the Secretary-General. These are followed by a chapter on decolonization by David A. Kay, one on the development of international law by Leo Gross, and one

on economic, social and technical activities by Robert W. Gregg. Although these latter chapters deal with the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice, and the Economic and Social Council, since none of these organs has been the focal point of the UN's activities in its particular sphere, the scope of these essays goes well beyond what the three principal organs have done.

As the title and the framework suggest, the book's orientation is historical and institutional, and despite the multiple authorship, the book has considerable coherence. The editor obviously developed a common outline, to which the six contributors adhered with substantial fidelity. The chapters uniformly treat antecedents of the UN, the structures and processes created by the Charter, and the major developments within the UN from its creation through the early nineteen seventies, and then conclude with brief speculations about the future. The scheme works reasonably well, except for the chapter on the General Assembly. Because the Assembly's competence is broad, Xydis could easily have infringed on material that is covered in detail in other chapters. He avoided this danger, but at the cost of writing a chapter that appears substantively thin in comparison with the other chapters.

Because the chapters follow a common pattern, a number of general themes emerge clearly. All aspects of the UN are portrayed as the logical continuation and extension of pre-World War II institutional developments. Each chapter demonstrates the flexibility of the Charter's provisions and shows how this has contributed to the organization's survival and vitality. All of the chapters make the point that the UN's activities have been deeply affected by the expansion in the organization's membership caused by decolonization. The reader is given a clear picture of the pervasive tension in the organization caused by the fact that while small and poor states from Africa, Asia and South America constitute a voting majority, relatively rich Western states control the resources for action. Especially in the fields of decolonization and development this has led to a pronounced gap between the UN's hortatory posture and its actual performance. Both Kay and Gregg express concern that if this gap persists for a long time, the majority of member states may become deeply disillusioned with the organization. Kay also sees the gap as a factor leading poor states to resist taking action in the UN on problems such as arms control about which the richer states are deeply concerned.

Taken on its own terms, the book has few flaws. There are minor evidences of sloppy analysis and writing. For instance, Xydis asserts (p. 75) that the number of Security Council meetings has decreased annually since 1948. Table 2 in Goodrich' chapter (p. 41), however, shows a fluctuating dc cline in the number of Security Council meeting through 1959, and a fluctuating increase sinc then. Indeed, one of Goodrich's major points i that the expansion in the UN's membership ha led to a revival of the Security Council. It is also superficial view to assert, as Xydis does (p. 88 that beyond demonstrating the existence of sev eral geographic groups in Assembly voting, th research on roll-call behavior "has resulted in nc consensus." Surely there is consensus that the effect of geography on a state's voting behavior, although it is important, is limited. Some issues such as decolonization command majorities that include states from all geographic areas, while others, such as increasing the authority of international institutions, divide all geographic areas. There are also instances in which it is possible to contest the judgment and the balance that is provided in particular chapters. Gregg generalizes that the economic and social activities conducted by the UN system have been redistributive and integrative. It is obvious that some of these activities have been oriented in these directions. On the other hand, it is not at all clear that either the purpose or the effect of the trade liberalization that has been facilitated by such UN agencies as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the International Monetary Fund has been redistributive. While some of the UN's activities might be held to have long-term consequences for global integration, and while several UN agencies—particularly the Economic Commission for Latin America and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development—have strongly supported the notion of regional integration, the thrust toward "country programming" in the UN's technical assistance activities has given substantial support to national integration. Whether on balance the UN has done more to promote national or international integration is difficult to estimate.

How appropriate are the terms in which the book was conceived is a broader question. Is a better understanding of the UN likely to be achieved by eschewing conceptual and methodological apparatus and sticking to a narrative prose analysis? This question is not easily answered on the basis of existing literature in the field. There can be no doubt that this book provides a comprehensive view of the United Nations, and one that since it is based on a quarter of a century of experience is unlikely soon to become dated. Yet a more systematic and rigorous analysis might have provided a sharper picture. Another issue is the balance between treating the UN as a system, or as part of a broader system. It is important to know what has been done within the

framework of the UN, and the book describes this very well, but it is difficult to interpret the significance of these activities without dealing with their broader context. None of the authors exaggerates the importance of the UN, but none of them goes very far in his analysis beyond the confines of the UN; thus readers are left to themselves to place UN events in context. In sum, the book is a good introduction to the United Nations, although one would hope that scholars and also those with only a general interest in world politics would want to go beyond this.

HAROLD K. JACOBSON
The University of Michigan

The Future of the International Economic Order: An Agenda for Research. Edited by C. Fred Bergsten. (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1973. Pp. xv, 357. $15.00.)

This important volume presents the results of a special inquiry commissioned by the Ford Foundation in 1972. Conducted by Fred Bergsten of the Brookings Institution, the study was intended to develop "a program of research that will provide a foundation for meeting the chief international economic problems of the next decade" (p. 1). The principal conclusions of the inquiry are summarized in a core report by Dr. Bergsten, written in association with John A. Mathieson, and distilled from interviews and correspondence with several hundred experts in more than twenty countries as well as from the coauthors' own personal research. The balance of the book consists of eight supporting papers solicited from outside experts (mostly economists) on what were considered to be among the most crucial individual issues affecting the international economic order, including the problems of internal adjustment to external disturbances (one paper each by Assar Lindbeck and Robert Stern), foreign direct investment (Raymond Vernon), world politics (Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, the only political scientists in the group), minerals trade (Samuel Schurr), the developing countries (various staff members of the Overseas Development Council), East-West relations (Franklyn Holzman), and environmental management (Ingo Walter).

The importance of this book stems not only from the salience of its subject but also from the high quality of its contents. Unfortunately, attempting to cope with a menu as substantial and varied as this one could for many readers rapidly cause intellectual indigestion. The contents of the volume are simply too rich to be consumed at a single sitting. They are also far too rich to be digested in the course of a single short review. Since the best a reviewer can hope to do is merely give some flavor of the book, the following comments are necessarily *à la carte*, not *table d'hôte*.

All nine contributions to the volume, following the same organizing principle, address themselves to three sets of interrelated questions: (1) What are likely to be the dominant international economic issues of the next decade? (2) What is the present state of knowledge regarding these issues? (3) What research strategies can best mobilize available resources to seek needed advances in knowledge? Most of the contributors are more successful in suggesting answers to the first two questions than in responding to the third. Not surprisingly, the authors have quite definite ideas about what are likely to be the outstanding issues of the near future. Also not surprisingly (in a book dedicated to future research requirements), the authors stress serious deficiencies in the present stage of knowledge—at both the theoretical and empirical levels. All describe wide arrays of problems deserving increased attention from scholars, lists which are both enlightening and thought-provoking. When, however, it comes to suggesting an ordering of priorities or programs of implementation, most of the authors turn strangely shy. Few even hint at a coherent research "strategy." The result in most instances is less an agenda of research than a tasty potpourri of potentially researchable topics. Doctoral candidates seeking promising dissertation subjects will find this volume invaluable.

The major themes of the book are summarized in the core report by Bergsten and Mathieson. Two themes in particular stand out as being of special interest to political scientists. One is the need to construct a new international economic order incorporating new rules and standards for behavior. A variety of factors—including the steady proliferation of national economic and social policy goals, which in an interdependent world economy have led to increased politicization of international economic issues; the declining intensity of the Cold War; and the emergence of new national and transnational actors in global economics—have contributed to a breakdown of the old institutional framework based on the principles incorporated in the International Monetary Fund and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The need now is to find new principles of political organization of the international economy. Many of the specific research proposals advocated in this volume reflect the contributors' concern with this problem of systemic transformation, a problem regarding which political scientists are at least as well qualified as economists are to offer solutions.

The second theme, obviously related to the first, is the dearth of interdisciplinary approaches to the solution of international economic issues. Most policy-relevant analysis today continues to be confined narrowly to the traditional academic specializations, economists persisting in treating

political influences on policy as "irrational," political scientists remaining ignorant of much economic theory. What is needed is a systematic effort to breach the barriers between economics and political science—in short, as Bergsten and Mathieson emphasize, to revive the once-respectable "discipline" of "political economy." (More accurately, the need is to eliminate the monopoly that Marxist scholars have traditionally enjoyed in this area.) At the moment only a handful of non-Marxist economists or political scientists even dare to engage in such interdisciplinary studies.

Among this handful of scholars are Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, whose paper in this volume is the only contribution that not only talks about but actually uses an interdisciplinary approach. Addressing themselves directly to the connections between politics and economics in the international arena, Keohane and Nye outline a firm conceptual framework for analyzing such connections, based on key distinctions between political and economic goals and means and between the "process-level" and the "structure-level" of analysis. Their framework is then employed to develop a variety of powerful arguments about changes in the nature and role of force, power, interdependence, complexity, and leadership in international relations. It is also used to offer new insights into five specific international problem areas, currently of interest, where politics and economics intersect, including relations among market economies, North-South relations, East-West relations, multinational-enterprise activities, and the issue of possible natural-resources scarcity. Finally, Keohane and Nye conclude with some suggestions for research and training programs that form what is certainly the most coherent and thoughtful research strategy offered in this book. Their essay should be widely read, and indeed is likely to gain recognition quickly as a seminal development in modern political economy. In this menu of gourmet specialities, the Keohane-Nye paper stands out as the *pièce de résistance*.

BENJAMIN J. COHEN
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
Tufts University

The Wasted Nations. Edited by Frank Browning and Dorothy Forman. (New York: Harper and Row, 1972. Pp. 346. $3.95.)

Reading about the manner in which the United States fought the Indochinese War takes one two major crises back, the war having been replaced in the public's eye first by Watergate and then by the faltering state of the U.S. economy. Hence, the "intellectual and moral catharsis" (p. ix) that Gunnar Myrdal in the preface asks the American people to go through over the conduct of the war seems unlikely to happen. Still, this volume is of interest to students of the Indochinese War, particularly those interested in how it was conducted.

The Wasted Nations is an edited version of the Report of the International Commission of Enquiry into United States Crimes in Indochina, June 20–25, 1971, and contains a perceptive introduction by Richard Falk. This was the second session of a commission of concerned private individuals who, in effect, appointed themselves to investigate the U.S. conduct of the war.

Evidence concerning American and South Vietnamese forces is set forth in five sections: a miscellaneous series of articles by journalists and scholars under the overall rubric "A Crime Against Humanity"; a "Task Force" report compiled by five investigators in North Vietnam in May 1971; individual testimony before the commission by Indochinese "Victims" of the war and by low ranking U.S. enlisted veterans who were the "Victimizers"; a series of articles by Indochinese Communist officials; and finally two essays by Hans Goran Frank and Douglas F. Dowd in a section entitled "International Law and American Policy." There follows a concluding statement based on the evidence presented.

The task force report is based upon data gathered in North Vietnam the month before the commission meeting in Oslo. Areas of investigation included U.S. bombing of North Vietnam, Vietnamization, and the effects of "Chemical Warfare" in South Vietnam. The weakness of this section is a major weakness of the entire work—it is very subjective reporting. The task force was unable to visit South Vietnam, hence the "facts" are as related by the North Vietnamese; there is no Soviet Union supplying the means of warfare to North Vietnam; there are no atrocities by North Vietnamese in the South. Such considerations are simply not faced. The U.S. is conducting warfare against the Indochinese people. In short, the problem is not viewed in the international context but rather in a very selected framework.

From an examination of the evidence the commission prepared a concluding statement which it adopted in Oslo on June 24, 1971. The conclusions may be summarized as follows: 1) U.S. policies led to an extension of the war throughout Indochina utilizing highly developed technology, the side effects of which will cause serious difficulties for coming generations in Indochina, 2) the forced movement of peoples has resulted in a breakdown of the social structure of Indochinese society, and 3) the U.S. conduct of the war can be categorized as war crimes and crimes against humanity according to the Nuremberg Principle.

With this report as a basis Richard Falk wrote his introduction to *The Wasted Nations*. In fact, a

reader is advised to read the introduction after the presentation of evidence since Falk's essay ties together the commission report. If Falk overstates his case, he nevertheless makes some perceptive points. For example, he is quite correct that the gap between the battlefield and the policy maker needs to be closed. How, is another question. Not by visits, that is certain, but by asking the hard questions. Visits of high ranking officials to Vietnam from Washington were a charade on which enough has been said.

When he becomes prescriptive, Falk is less certain. When he suggests that the U.S. place up to $75 billion toward reconstruction of Indochina, he is out of touch with reality. When he says the time is ripe to have a set of hearings in the U.S. on the conduct of the war, he raises an interesting point. Why not? However, they should have available the official data. Who would preside? Perhaps someone like Archibald Cox. One thing that is certain is that what happened in Vietnam isn't going to go away.

The Wasted Nations is one-sided, provocative, interesting, and insightful. If one keeps ones perspective, it is a valuable contribution to the literature on the Indochinese War, particularly for use in political science courses examining that war as a case history of what intervention can lead to.

DOUGLAS KINNARD
The University of Vermont

The Politics of Regional Integration: A Study of Uruguay's Decision to Join LAFTA. By Elizabeth A. Finch. (Liverpool, England: Centre for Latin American Studies, University of Liverpool, 1973. Pp. 70. $1.95, paper.)

To one who came to know and love Uruguay more than two decades ago, as I did, the subsequent downward path of that staunch little country has seemed saddening, even tragic. The evidence has been multiform: the balkanization of political parties, the rise of the military as a political force (and underlying it the anomie that seemed to make that rise inevitable), the economic dislocation and failure to modernize, the near-paralysis accompanying the restoration of the *colegiado*, repeated stalemates between executive and legislative branches, the petty bickering and self-seeking within congress. The pyrotechnics of *tupamaro* activity not so long back were simply an ugly icing on the devil's-food cake made of seemingly spoiled flour.

This study of Uruguay and LAFTA, a condensation of a master's thesis written at the University of Liverpool, was based on almost two years of research in Uruguay in the late 1960s. It is a straightforward, well-organized, workmanlike job. And it is a case-study illustration of many of the contributory factors mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

LAFTA, the Latin American Free Trade Association, was an outgrowth of a treaty signed in February, 1960, by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay by which they sought to expand national markets by gradual elimination of trade barriers. Comparisons with the European Economic Community, the Central American Common Market, and other entities are often introduced. The frequently involved relationships with GATT, the UN's ECLA, the IADB, the IMF, and other international agencies are competently treated.

Uruguay did, after various touch-and-go developments, finally complete her approval of LAFTA, but cumbersome congressional procedures, political opposition, and sheer lethargy meant that "Uruguay was first among the signatories to initiate the process of legislative ratification and the last to complete it" (p. 38). Establishment of LAFTA headquarters at Montevideo gave the country a valued status symbol, but otherwise the consequences have not been earth-shaking.

Among her conclusions the author holds that: a restricted elite of government technicians was more responsible than "the politicians" for Uruguayan adherence to LAFTA; Uruguayan respect for ECLA was a major factor in her decision to join the new group; adherence was not a cause for heated party conflict but in some ways "Uruguay was motivated by optimistic fatalism"; and "the decision-making process in Uruguay exhibited numerous deficiencies in respect of decisional inputs, organization, and procedure" (p. 54).

Supplementing the text of the study are a chronology of events from 1948 to 1961; a list of abbreviations, from ALALC (Spanish for LAFTA) to UC (Unión Cívica, a political party); and an extensive list of interviews and of published and unpublished sources used.

RUSSELL H. FITZGIBBON
University of California, Santa Barbara

The Cairo Documents: The Inside Story of Nasser and His Relationship with World Leaders, Rebels, and Statesmen. By Mohamed Heikal. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1973, Pp. 357. $10.00.)

The personality and political actions of Nasser have been the subject of numerous journalistic and scholarly volumes, both before and after the Egyptian leader's sudden death in September 1970. Heikal's *Cairo Documents* is a journalist's account of the Nasser phenomenon as seen by a faithful admirer, collaborator, adviser and friend of the late Egyptian president. It does not contain official documents; nor is it a documentary study of the Nasserite regime. Rather it is a memoir based on

Heikal's recollections and Nasser's personal papers, some of which are included in the book.

Heikal's relationship with Nasser was an unusual one; at times he seemed to be the president's alter ego, and often he served as the regime's unofficial mouthpiece. Yet Heikal also acted as the government's primary critic whose often scathing attacks on the army and the police after the June 1967 War went beyond the authoritarian strictures of "constructive criticism." Of course, Nasser's person was left out of Heikal's wide-ranging criticism; indeed, in view of Nasser's charismatic hold on the Egyptian and Arab masses, no less than the regime's authoritarianism, few dared to reprove the president. In Heikal's book, however, objectively critical analysis of Nasser's leadership was too much to expect so soon after the latter's death. In Weberian terms, Heikal was a leading member of the charismatic Nasser's *gemeinde* (congregation) and as such his spiritual attachment to the leader would substantially preclude a critical attitude.

The book, nevertheless, remains an important contribution to our understanding of Middle Eastern and international politics. It is particularly useful for the area specialist, both in terms of diplomatic history and regional political history. It may be even more useful to political scientists interested in decision making and the role of mutual perceptions of leaders in determining foreign policy. A case in point is the way in which Nasser's impressions of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson influenced Egyptian policy making. Nasser's favorable view of Kennedy had a beneficial impact on US-Egyptian relations. With the accession of LBJ, however, US-Egyptian relations deteriorated rapidly owing largely to Nasser's instinctive dislike of Johnson, whom he regarded as rude, insensitive, and a wheeler-dealer politician. It is particularly enlightening to discover from Heikal's account that LBJ's several overtures to establish close personal ties were rebuffed by Nasser. Heikal goes on to recount how Nasser's negative perception of Johnson, coupled with other outstanding issues (the Yemeni War, arms to Israel, wheat for Egypt, etc.) led inexorably to the June 1967 War and the subsequent disruption of US-Egyptian relations until 1974.

The foregoing concern with the interaction of personality and politics points to another area of interest in modern political science—the psychological study of political leaders. However uncritical, Heikal's account of Nasser's personality provides a wealth of data for the student of psychopolitics. The techniques that have been utilized by Erikson, the Georges, Rustow, Mazlish, Barber, and Wolfenstein can be most fittingly applied to the study of Nasser's personality. In my opinion, the use of psychohistorical methodology could explain a great deal about Nasser's often peculiar behavior in Egypt and on the international scene. In that effort, Heikal's present work, along with others he has promised to publish, will be a most valuable source of data.

Despite their journalistic and subjective nature, books like Heikal's provide a mine of information for students of comparative political leadership. Heikal's pages give intimate portraits of some of the most important leaders of yesteryear—Eden, Dulles, Khrushchev, Hammarskjold. Tito, Nehru, Chou, Erhard, Guevara, Castro, Eisenhower—to name the most important personalities with whom Nasser interacted during his years in power. The behind-the-scenes-relations among leaders is perhaps the most valuable portion of this book.

Finally, Heikal discusses a most dangerous and dysfunctional aspect of US foreign policy, little known to most Americans but frequently and painfully experienced by many Third World states. This concerns the multiplicity of American foreign policies regarding Egypt which emanated simultaneously from the White House, the State Department, the Pentagon, the CIA, and even private organizations such as the oil companies. Not only did these often contradictory policies confuse Nasser's perception of US intentions, but they aborted the effective execution of American policy in Egypt.

When everything is said and done, *The Cairo Documents* is an an eloquent testimony to the transitoriness of power and of the individuals who exercise it. Nasser has already left the scene, and so have all the major leaders he dealt with except Tito. Even Heikal, the Arab world's most powerful journalist, has been dispossessed of his power as editor of *Al-Ahram* for opposing the sharp about-face in Egyptian policy toward the US. In the new milieu dominated by Sadat and Kissinger, Heikal (as the Soviets) became the odd man out. Yet considering the phenomenal instability of interpersonal and international relations in the Middle East and Heikal's gift for survival, one cannot realistically exclude a return to power for one of the shrewdest men in the Arab world.

R. H. DEKMEJIAN

SUNY, Binghamton

The Soviet Union and the Developing Nations. Edited by Roger E. Kanet. (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974. Pp. xii, 302. $12.50.)

The purpose of this collection of essays, in the words of its editor, "is to provide the reader with both a general overview of Soviet policy towards the developing nations and more detail on various aspects of that policy" (p. xii). Because all but one of the essays were written specifically for this

volume, its editor expresses the hope that it comprises an integrated analysis of Soviet policy in the developing world. The first two essays provide the theoretical framework, a historical analysis of the ideological sources of Soviet policy since 1917. There follow five specific area studies, on Africa, Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America. The study concludes with three essays on general topics—Soviet economic policy in the developing world, the role of the United Nations, and the Sino-Soviet conflict.

The total volume is a mixed bag. The five area studies are excellent, within fairly narrow limits. The attempt to "explain" Soviet policy, however, fails at several levels. The basic difficulty is illustrated in the two introductory essays by the editor, Roger Kanet. Soviet policy is defined primarily in "ideological" terms; that is, by taking more or less at face value the official "Marxist-Leninist line" ground out by Soviet Communist Party rhetoricians. Unfortunately, this line fails to tell us much about Soviet policy, as the five area studies unwittingly demonstrate. More accurately, the realities of Soviet policy constantly illustrate the basic contradiction between the objective perception of Soviet interests and the official "ideological" explanation of what these interests should be.

Each of the five area specialists is aware of this discrepancy. Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, whose article on Africa is particularly good, concludes: "The Soviet Union has come to behave more as a great world power seeking influence and strategic economic and military position and less as the center of a revolutionary movement aimed at overthrowing African governments and installing Communist regimes" (p. 61). Unfortunately, neither Klinghoffer nor the other area specialists is willing to pursue the implications of this conclusion, and instead of moving toward a meaningful and objective definition of Soviet policy, Klinghoffer explains the contradictions in Soviet behavior as the result of a conflict between "practical" and "ideological" interests, concluding that "the Soviets viewed Africa more in the practical terms of furthering Soviet strategic interests than in the unrealistic ideological terms of encouraging states to advance towards socialism" (p. 59). The point, however, is not that "ideology" is necessarily and always in conflict with "practice," but that Soviet policy makers continue to be influenced by a "Marxist-Leninist" ideology which, largely through the authoritarian pressures of the Soviet state itself, and its suppression of criticism, has petrified into a meaningless "conventional wisdom." That conventional wisdom defines the Soviet Union as a revolutionary, left-wing, socialist, Marxist state, and prompts Soviet leaders to pursue policies which they quickly discover to be contrary to the objective interests of a Soviet state which is conservative, right-wing, authoritarian, and bureaucratic. Unfortunately, conventional wisdom in this country accepts the Soviet Union's self-image, and reflects the contradictions created by the acceptance of an inadequate ideological model.

Partly because of this inability to pierce the armor of Soviet rhetoric and to challenge conventional wisdom, the book fails at another level to explain Soviet policy. Roger Hamburg, in his essay on Latin America, puts his finger squarely on the problem when he speaks of "a chronic tendency to equate Soviet 'inputs' (trade, military aid programs, and so on) with 'outputs' (influence) without proving that the inputs actually brought about changes in the actual behavior of the target country" (p. 208). The issue is even more basic. What, in fact, *are* Soviet interests in the developing world? What kind of "influence" would serve these interests? Even if "input" can be shown to produce "output," what kind of "output" would serve Soviet interests? Is a "socialist" system an "output" that will serve Soviet interests? The question is extraordinarily difficult, and applies as much to the United States as to the Soviet Union; the bureaucracies of neither superpower have answered it satisfactorily. John Campbell indicates his awareness of its difficulty when he asks, after describing the elaborate pattern of moves by which the Soviet Union sought to increase its "influence" in Iran after World War II: "Was all this a great success for Soviet policy?" (p. 160). The answer, he suggests, is problematical.

Although most of the authors are aware of this difficulty, they tend to fall back on the "conventional wisdom," and evaluate gains and losses for the Soviet Union by applying a left-wing/right-wing test to the developing countries. But as the substance of these essays constantly demonstrates, the objective interests of the Soviet Union are not necessarily related to the kinds of political-economic systems which exist in the developing countries; and short of direct military or economic control, there is no way in which the Soviet Union, or the United States, for that matter, can guarantee that any particular regime in the developing world is "on its side." Van der Kroef comments that the Soviet Union, in North Vietnam, "could not afford to be outflanked by Peking" (p. 88). But in what sense? Was Hanoi more interested in the kind of ideological "image" the Soviet Union, or China projected, or in who was willing to help North Vietnam? Would the Soviet Union then be able to translate its help into "influence?" Neither the experience of North Vietnam, nor that of Egypt, gives a very satisfactory answer. The prickliness of the question is well illustrated in the essay by Richard Mansbach, in which he quotes a United Nations analyst to this effect: "There was over-

whelming agreement among all categories of specialists that Soviet influence increased during the 1955–59 period" (p. 257). What kind of esoteric definition of "influence" requires a body of "specialists" to detect its subtle presence?

Despite the limitations of its conceptual framework and the resulting lack of integration, *The Soviet Union and the Developing Nations* is a valuable collection of essays, even more so for the reader interested in conditions in the developing world than for the reader interested in Soviet policy.

BERNARD P. KIERNAN

Concord College

Energy Under the Oceans: A Technology Assessment of Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Operations. By Don E. Kash and Irvin L. White and others. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1973. Pp. 378. $4.50.)

In his book, *The Future of Political Science*, Harold D. Lasswell concludes that political scientists' responsibilities include "the linking of descriptive and explanatory knowledge and estimates of the future with clarified interpretations of community goals and evaluations of major policy alternatives" (p. 26). These are weighty charges indeed, requiring comprehensive research, interdisciplinary communication, foresight, and a measure of nerve. Political scientists were unlikely to meet these responsibilities during the period of their methodological sophistication. But they have been properly challenged in recent years to judge disciplinary purposes by the criteria of social relevance—a process taken for granted by many of our predecessors.

Energy Under the Oceans fulfills the requirements of Lasswell's assignment and meets the challenges of the so-called "postbehavioral revolution." Don E. Kash and Irvin L. White direct the Science and Public Policy Program at the University of Oklahoma. They collected an interdisciplinary team drawn from engineering, zoology, physics, and law, and made application to the National Science Foundation to conduct a technology assessment of outer continental shelf (OCS) oil and gas operations. The NSF funded the project under its program of Research Applied to National Needs (RANN). At the urging of the NSF, Kash and White formed an oversight committee "to provide a divergent complementary sounding board, wise council, and in some cases access to knowledge and information not otherwise readily available" (p. iii). A one-week seminar was also held to assist the investigators in their understanding of the issues and inform other interested communities of the project. As a result of these procedures, the research team maintained contact and derived criticism from knowledgeable persons in government, industry, foundations, universities, and citizen groups. The project began in September, 1971, and this book was published in the Summer, 1973.

I mention these details to illustrate what is involved in meeting the challenges of contemporary policy research. Political scientists interested in contributing to policy analysis and decision making must accommodate themselves to interdisciplinary team research, review and criticism by those directly involved in and affected by policy making, and a less leisurely time schedule for research than is typical in academic life. Kash and White have demonstrated in this study that political scientists bring unique qualifications to policy analysis—even in highly technical issue areas. For whatever specialized knowledge was necessary in identifying this or that technological problem, the political scientists could make judgments about the use of this knowledge in the public policy process. Further, they above all were trained to identify nontechnical inputs into decision making, assess existing organizational capabilities, and spot jurisdictional complications.

The book itself is organized into four main parts, with a number of specialized papers appended. The first part discusses technology assessment, places OCS development in its broader energy and environmental context, identifies the purpose of the study, and outlines the research strategy. Part two describes the development of OCS oil and gas resources—including the technical processes involved and the characteristics of the developers (the petroleum industry) and the regulators (relevant government agencies). Part three is the heart of the book since it identifies the major policy issues of OCS development: the adequacy of technologies, availability of scientific data (including data on environmental effects of development), preservation and improvement of environmental quality, governmental management, and jurisdictional matters. The last section summarizes OCS impacts, compares OCS with other possible oil sources (imports and the trans-Alaska pipeline), and outlines a plan for OCS development. Overall it is an impressive document which reportedly has received considerable attention and use among policy makers.

What of the recommendations themselves? The team accepts the utility of the rational, comprehensive model of decision making. Such terms as coordination, effective management, integration, centralized responsibility, long-range planning, and optimal development are used throughout the proposed plan for OCS development. Though they do not appear to have relied on the optimal model

of policy making proposed by Yehezkel Dror in *Public Policymaking Reexamined* (San Francisco: Chandler, 1963), their research approach and recommendations would presumably meet Dror's criteria. Thus, for example, the investigators were quite properly sensitive to the diverse effects of OCS development. Accordingly they seek to increase participation in decision making and provide for coordinated evaluation of effects through "expanded use of the . . . environmental impact statement process" (p. 251). There should be a "hierarchy of impact statements that starts with a general programmatic statement" (p. 252). The Department of Interior would be the lead agency for such statements, which would be coordinated with all agencies having any responsibility for OCS.

Not all students of public policy would agree with this tack. Why not seek to facilitate impact analysis from agencies, congressional committees, or groups outside government who might be presumed to represent more directly the adverse effects of OCS development? Can an advocate agency achieve coordination in fact? Possibly coordination merely becomes one more paperwork responsibility unless another agency or group with differing interests and real authority has the obligation to offer counter evaluations of impact. If so, then the current environmental impact statement process is hardly the appropriate model to achieve the desired goals since the advocate agency is responsible for drafting the statement (albeit charged to elicit others' views and consider them in redrafting). Rather one would be led to a process of adversary decision making which facilitates access, criticism, bargaining, and compromise. Should this approach dominate recommendations, one would expect a positive role for Congress—an institution all but ignored in this analysis. I make this point not so much to criticize this study as to illustrate how different values and analytical approaches can lead to quite different recommendations—another major lesson for those turning to policy analysis.

Though directed to an audience of decision makers, this book should also find its way into the classroom—particularly graduate seminars in public policy. Not only is it a fine example of the scope of knowledge required for contemporary policy analysis, but it can also serve as a basis for discussions of the energy issue-area itself, the advantages and disadvantages of government-funded team research, and the various policy approaches to be taken by the political scientist as policy analyst.

CHARLES O. JONES

University of Pittsburgh

The Year Book of World Affairs, 1973. Edited by George W. Keeton and Georg Schwarzenberger. (London: Stevens & Sons, 1973. Pp. vii, 462. £5.50.)

Whoever is asked to review this twenty-seventh volume of the yearbook published under the auspices of the London Institute of World Affairs, should pay serious attention to Patrick McGowan's very critical review of the preceding volume (APSR 68, [March 1974], pp. 352–353). Many of Professor McGowan's comments also hold true for this later volume. It still reads like "a well-edited journal published once a year, bound in hard covers" and it probably still costs more than the average quarterly review. It is also true that the articles are wide-ranging (from the biological factor in international relations, written by a professor of medicine, to the problem of functional incompatibilities before international courts, written by long-time editor Georg Schwarzenberger himself). Most of the articles do reflect chiefly a "classical approach," as defended by Hedley Bull in his classical essay, although contributors such as James Rosenau (International Studies in the United States), R. J. Vincent (The Functions of Functionalism in International Relations), and C. C. Pentland (Neofunctionalism) are of course well aware of everything social science methodology would have to offer by way of hypothesis testing, etc.

Not unexpectedly, the twenty-two contributions are of uneven quality. More and more of the books in the field of international relations seem to take the form of multiauthored compilations, with similar differences in quality and sometimes similar lack of sufficient cohesion. One may call such a book a "nonbook," as McGowan does, and as such it defies reviewing. Yet, a number of observations can be made about the usefulness of this volume.

In the first place one may wonder about the use of having a select bibliography from previous volumes of the Year Book listed in the beginning of this volume under the heading "Trends and Events." The editors would probably agree that there are other, and possibly better articles that have appeared on subjects such as strategic arms limitations, the Middle East, or South East Asia, and the Far East (to cite a few of the subheadings) than those that appeared in the Year Book of World Affairs. Why then list only those and no other publications? Moreover, this list would seem to be of use only to those readers who have all of the earlier volumes on their bookshelves, ready to be consulted. It is also not very clear according to what criteria the bibliography was compiled. Are these the contributions which, according to the

editors, were of the highest quality at the time of publication or are they the ones that have best withstood the passing of time (which may not be quite the same)?

Some of the contributions even in the present volume have been overtaken by events. The article by Harold Blakemore on Chile was written before the overthrow of the Allende government, although he was clearly aware of the fact that something might happen soon, as witnessed by the question with which he ends the article: "At the time of writing, the basic question remains: can Chile secure a middle way between stability based on exploitation and radical change built on hatred?" (p. 61). (At the time of writing this review—August 1974—the unhappy answer would seem to be "no"). Although the article provides some insights into the problems which the Allende regime faced during its last months in office, it illustrates on the whole the dangers of this type of time-bound study.

The authors who write on aspects of the situation in Eastern Europe seem to be on safer grounds, possibly because political changes occur there only very slowly or not at all. Robin Alison Remington's article on the Warsaw Pact is competent and thorough but contains few surprises. Much more interesting is George Ginsburg's article on the constitutional foundations of the "socialist commonwealth," in which he analyzes the principles on which Soviet thinking about international organization is based. He cogently discusses the ever recurring dilemma in the idea of the "socialist commonwealth" between internationalism on the one hand and the avowed respect for national sovereignty on the other. His article, based on a study of Soviet sources, contains a thorough analysis of the twelve international organizations that belong to the "socialist commonwealth," starting with the Council for Mutual Economic Aid and ending with the International Investment Bank. This original piece of research can be considered one of the best contributions in the volume, containing factual analysis of the highest level.

Perhaps the most interesting and stimulating contribution is the one entitled "Labour in the New Global Economy" written by Charles Levinson, who is Secretary General of the International Federation of Chemical and General Workers' Unions. He argues that the labor unions, in order to be more successful, should expand their basically nation-state centered types of organization and set themselves up at the level of the multinational companies—their main adversaries and negotiating partners. He rightly argues that the labor unions should make use of the same advantages that accrue to activities across national borders as the multinational corporations do. Some readers may wonder whether his faith in the effectiveness of workers' participation in boards of directors and in management is not somewhat exaggerated.

Five contributions belong more specifically to what is commonly called the discipline of international relations. I have mentioned the pieces by Vincent and Pentland on functionalism and Rosenau's on international studies in the U.S.A. Robert Boardman writes about the advantages and disadvantages of the comparative method for the study of foreign policy. Geoffrey Goodwin discusses the discipline of international relations, mainly as taught and practiced in Britain. He argues in favor of breaking through the strict limitations of the field and in particular of bridging the gulf between economics and politics in the study of the international economy by setting up interdisciplinary study groups on such topics as the political dimensions of the world monetary, trade, and investment systems, the role of economic sanctions, and the economic factor in foreign policy studies. Readers more familiar with the British scene than I am may be better equipped to judge whether there also should be a new interdisciplinary international studies journal, "ready to publish the work not only of international relations specialists but of specialists from other disciplines with a particular interest in the international dimension of their studies" (p. 400). Experience with the *International Studies Quarterly*, the American journal which was launched on a similar formula, may suggest some caution in this respect. It just seems rather difficult in practice to attain the desired combination of disciplines.

The 1973 Year Book of World Affairs contains many diverse contributions. It should indeed be read as a journal, from which one picks and chooses the contributions according to one's particular interests and liking. The very variety of contributions contained in this volume virtually guarantees that one is not likely to be disappointed.

PETER R. BAEHR
University of Amsterdam

European Monetary Unification and Its Meaning for the United States. Edited by Lawrence B. Krause and Walter S. Salant. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1973. Pp. 322. $8.95.)

This volume of eight essays and participant discussion represents the proceedings of a Brookings Institute conference, convened to address the question of the likelihood of European monetary unification (EMU) and its impact on United States policy.

Arthur I. Bloomfield sketches the historical de-

velopment of the European political community out of which the movement for EMU has arisen, and Joseph Nye summarizes the conclusions of integrationist theorists on European union. Harry Johnson, Lawrence Krause, W. Max Gorden, and Walter Salant deal, respectively, with narrower economic issues of how to reduce ratios between European currencies, private capital flows, the impact of payments adjustment on employment and inflation, and international reserves. These technical discussions lead to the broader issues posed in Richard Cooper's speculative discussion of the implications of EMU for the development of the world economy and Philip Trezise's curiously elliptical and forbidding assertions about the problems that EMU presents for American economic interests. Harry Johnson provides a trenchant summary of the proceedings, and the editors display good sense in adding a short glossary of commonly misused terms in international economics—band, parity, par value, *numéraire*, etc.—that even the experts fail to use consistently or coherently.

Students of American and West European foreign policy, especially those interested in international economics, will find these readings stimulating and informative. From the perspective of monetary reform, the proceedings explore the many subtle transatlantic interests in conflict between the United States and Europe which bear on the larger political question of American policy toward European union. These turn on hard issues of exchange rates, trade, capital investment, employment, and price levels. How these issues are decided has an important bearing on the economic development of these states, the personal income of their peoples, and the political fate of elected officials. The debate over American policy toward a united Europe turns significantly on these issues.

The essays and discussion reflect two contending schools of thought. The first, shaped still by Cold War fears and the hope of greater European cooperation to bury past animosities, remains optimistic about the prospects of EMU as a critical step to European unity and bullish about the effects of EMU on the American economy. The second group, larger in number and in the force and relevance of its arguments, is skeptical about the likelihood of European union and even more bearish about EMU's benefit for the United States. Progress toward monetary integration is seen as a prelude to greater European control over foreign investment and more pervasive protectionist moves.

Both groups agree, however, that the American dollar holds the key to EMU and European union. "Union" is no longer a desirable goal for Europe in the abstract. Its meaning is secreted in the economic benefits enjoyed by member states. The welfare of each European state significantly depends today as much on their several currency relations with the dollar as on their parities with each other. Johnson drives home the arresting point that for most of the postwar period, and even now in good measure, European currencies are more closely tied to the dollar than to each other. The size of the band between the dollar and European currencies has often been narrower than those between European currencies. In a technical sense monetary integration has been more Atlantic than European. The first task facing the Europeans remains the narrowing of exchange rates among EEC currencies without narrowing further the range of European currencies against the dollar. The present acceptance of American pleadings (and market pressures) to float European currencies makes the discussion of narrowing bands through European governmental cooperation temporarily moot, but any serious movement toward EMU will again have to face this problem and the associated questions of which state will determine the average fluctuation for community currencies against the dollar.

These considerations cast further doubt on European integrationist thinking. One can wonder whether there was ever any realistic basis for Jean Monnet's theorizing about the inevitability of European union once the gears of economic cooperation (*engrenage*) produced ever widening and deepening interdependence (spillover) and eventual political union. These essays support the proposition that the United States, more than the European states themselves, will determine the possibilities of European union as long as its influence continues through its military and economic predominance. These essays suggest that integrationist thinkers have never posed the right questions. The largely careful analyses characterizing these papers and discussion present a complex web of transatlantic monetary ties that are not adequately reflected in integrationist literature. It has tended to posit what it was supposed to demonstrate, viz., the inexorable movement of the European states to union.

On the other hand, there is no lease on life in these proceedings for outmoded ideas about creating an Atlantic community built on American and European pillars. If monetary relations are closely examined, neither notions of Atlantic community nor Monnet's European union are viable. For that matter, Gaullist mercantilist visions are of limited utility. What is needed are conceptual tools and models of developmental politics that avoid the obvious simplicity of these competing representations. These essays on monetary relations are helpful in providing a clearer and firmer base on which to proceed in political theorizing.

Some parting shots are in order. The papers

focus too heavely on EMU rather than on whether EMU is likely to come about in the first place. There is little discussion about the likelihood of the introduction of flexible, floating rates. Much needless attention is paid to the Smithsonian accords although they were overtaken by governmental actions and market forces on both sides of the Atlantic even as they solemnly announced. There is also no anticipation of sudden shocks, like the recent oil crisis and its inflationary pressures on Western economies. There is, finally, a failure, striking in the surface characterizations of French policy, to distinguish carefully between announced and operational policies of the Paris government. The French may have appeared to be ideologically committed to fixed exchange rates, but they were more concerned with trade and unemployment than ideology in floating the franc in early 1974 and in re-valuing their gold stocks at current prices a year later.

Despite these shortcomings, these essays are, as one discussant observed, a useful "background to policy formation."

EDWARD A. KOLODZIEJ
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Soviet-Asian Relations. By Charles B. McLane. (London: Central Asian Research Centre and New York: Columbia University Press, 1973. Pp. 150. $15.00.)

This is volume II of a three-volume survey of Soviet-Third World relations. It is a very useful study of Soviet relations with fifteen Asian countries. Professor McLane has successfully presented a clear, well-researched, and compact narrative covering Moscow's intercourse with each of these countries since the 'fifties. Each chapter examines the sequence of events in one of the Asian nations and further clarifies the historic account with a chronological table of political, economic, and cultural highlights.

It is impossible in a brief review to discuss the details collected and brought into focus by the author. Among the well-written narratives the skillfully condensed description of Soviet relations with Pakistan and India are perhaps the best. Primarily, Professor McLane reports but does not analyze, except perhaps by implication. Clearly, his main purpose must have been to present readable sketches of historical and political events. There can be no objection to this approach which offers to scholars, researchers, and students a clear picture of immensely complex, interdependent situations.

I have, however, some "ideological" reservations. Throughout the book, the Soviet Union is treated as a "normal," traditional nation-state even though it has never ceased to oppose all governmental systems and societies that might impede its revolutionary aims. I believe that the author's approach—and that of many of our colleagues—is a serious mistake. The Soviet pragmatic trend toward "détente" has not displaced the fundamentals of the Soviet system. Whatever Moscow does is linked with these fundamentals. Soviet foreign policy is, *au fond*, Communist foreign policy. To disregard this fact is to accept Soviet international maneuvers at face value. Moscow's attitudes and intentions toward the Asian countries is a particularly good example of the Soviet policy of favoring Communist or leftist regimes which are inclined to be partial to Moscow and therefore strengthen Soviet opposition to the free world.

Perhaps inherent in the author's position is his inclination to use the term "Russian" rather than "Soviet," a usage to which I am opposed. We are dealing with the revolutionary Union of Soviet Republics and not with Russia. Using the term Russian instead of Soviet is a bad habit of many statesmen, scholars and journalists, a habit that delays a better understanding of what the Soviet Union stands for. Nevertheless, the vast arsenal of facts harnessed by McLane is an awe inspiring achievement. The book should be on the shelves of all students of international affairs.

KURT L. LONDON
The George Washington University

From Aid to Recolonization: Lessons of a Failure. By Tibor Mende. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1973. Pp. 317. $10.00.)

Tibor Mende, who served as a senior UN official, particularly with UNCTAD, in 1965–71, and who is now on the Sorbonne political science faculty, has written one of the most humane and trenchant critiques of development assistance available. His wide reading and extensive personal encounters have led him to the conclusion that aid has just perpetuated the dependence of the developing countries on the former colonial powers and other donors.

The author lucidly analyzes the operation of the world economic system, with the growing disparities between the industrialized North and the less-developed South and the likelihood for greater accumulations by the rich countries at the expense of the much more numerous poorer countries. After sketching the real differences that exist along states in Asia, Latin America, and Africa, he stresses that each country has to find its own form of development.

The book attacks many facets of the aid relationship, including aid which only increases dependency, the brain drain, the exaggerated sale of arms to the low-income countries and corruption.

Mende tells us that overdependence upon econometric criteria to measure economic growth often leads to neglecting human needs. Aid frequently leads to debt-servicing problems and limits access to alternative sources of manufactured goods. The ones to profit are officials and companies in the industrialized countries, the aid administrators and the Western-oriented elites in the developing countries. Most of the people who were supposed to be helped, however, remain hungry and humiliated.

Mende's critique of the disparities in the aid relationship is not new; it eloquently enlarges those of other concerned observers, such as Barbara Ward and René Dumont. It is also worth comparing his criticism of aid as a political and economic policy instrument from the perspective of the recipient countries with the more usual discussion from the donors' viewpoint by John Montgomery, Hans Morgenthau, Joan Nelson and others.

At first Mende appears to join the liberal supporters of aid, such as the 1969 Pearson Commission, whose report he quotes extensively, in indicating that the industrialized countries, except France, have not contributed even one per cent of their GNP for aid and that development assistance has been decreasing since 1967. He parts ways with them, however, in condemning aid outright and in insisting that the goal of quantifiable economic growth is insufficient: It is necessary to bring about social, cultural and economic restructuring as well.

Mende echoes the self-reliance pronouncements and policies of Chairman Mao, President Nyerere, and radical critics in other developing countries. The special value of this book is the expression of these ideas by a cultured Westerner, who has had practical experience with the approach he criticizes and who supports his beliefs with empirical evidence.

Although Mende indicates that humanitarian motivations are insignificant in practice, he still seems to expect industrialized countries to change their policies out of their desire to encourage dignity. The aid experience so far, however, has indicated that this is an unrealistic expectation.

Ironically, since the original French edition appeared in 1972, France has reduced its aid commitments to the developing countries, especially in Africa, mainly because of internal pressures and competing European and Mediterranean interests. This in turn has led many countries which were almost entirely dependent upon France to look for alternative aid and trade sources. The most dramatic change in the terms of trade, moreover, has been achieved not through the decency of the industrialized countries, but through the bargaining skills of the oil producers. Political realities suggest that well-intentioned authors like Mende can pave the way, but that real structural changes both within individual countries and the global international system can be brought about only through the independent efforts of indigenous leaders from the developing countries themselves, as undoubtedly the author himself would agree.

SUSAN AURELIA GITELSON
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Japan's Foreign Policy, 1868–1941: A Research Guide. Edited by James William Morley. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974. Pp. 618. $25.00.)

This is the type of book that is intended to be an aid to scholarship rather than a contribution to scholarship itself. However, this particular book is both; it includes a 116-page bibliography plus two glossaries of Japanese titles and names given in English, romanized Japanese, and Han characters, as well as eight substantive articles by the top Western and Japanese specialists on Japan's international relations from the Meiji Restoration to the attack on Pearl Harbor. As a research guide it undoubtedly succeeds, in that all future researchers into the problems covered will have to consult it—to see what it contains, how it treats various topics, and what it omits. Moreover, new researchers looking for a subject will find numerous intriguing suggestions for further study. But this raises a problem. Generally speaking, the more one already knows about Japanese international relations, the more he is going to get out of this book, whereas a novice could be seriously misled by it.

Rather like Lieutenant Onoda of the former Imperial Japanese Army, who walked out of the jungles of the Philippines some twenty-nine years after World War II had ended, this book is something of a living fossil. It is based on a conference held in Pennsylvania in January, 1963. The conference was convened to promote research on the history of Japan's international relations by surveying the massive number of official Japanese archives that had become available after the war, including the documents of the Tokyo war crimes trials and Japanese materials published after Japanese independence, which correct many of the sources used in the trials. Until these official archives began to be opened and published, the study of Japan's foreign relations was restricted almost entirely to a few memoirs, newspaper accounts, and polemical materials. The conference was thus a good idea, but the period after 1963 has seen the publication of many more archives. Only one of the eight essays in this book utilizes the eight-volume *Taiheiyō sensō e no michi* (The Road to the Pacific War), published by the Japan In-

ternational Political Science Association, and none of them refers to any of the forty-four volumes of Misuzu Shobō's *Gendaishi shiryō* (Source Materials on Contemporary History) or the more than fifty volumes of the War History Office, Japanese Defense Agency. These are the most important sources, still largely unexplored in English, for many of the topics covered in the volume. The bibliography of the research guide is divided into two parts—standard works published before 1963, and recent works from 1963 to 1971—so the materials that were published after the conference are listed, although not analyzed in the essays. Considerably greater candor by the editor on this matter would have been desirable. The usefulness of the volume is not seriously diminished by the time lapse, but only the knowledgeable are going to be able to make the necessary adjustments.

The critical essays themselves are fascinating, but not all equally so or for the same reasons. There are three essays on functional areas—Japan's military, economic, and cultural foreign policies—and five on regional areas—Japan's policies toward Britain, China, Germany, Russia, and the United States. Korea is omitted, for reasons that are not explained, but its presence suffuses every other essay. Of the three functional essays, the one on cultural policies by Robert Schwantes is outstanding. His section on the East Asian Common Culture Academy in Shanghai should stimulate a Ph.D. dissertation, and his comment concerning Japanese-American immigration issues that, "Charges have even been made that the Japanese government, through its consuls, deliberately manipulated and victimized the Japanese community on the West Coast" (p. 171) points to another area of needed research. In this connection, a new bibliography should be added: Y. Ichioka et al., *A Buried Past* (1973), which is an annotated guide to the Japanese-American collection at UCLA.

Of the other two functional essays, James Crowley's on the military is the longest in the book. Crowley is a well-known authority on the prewar Japanese military, but his lack of analytic focus and his occasionally apologetic tone—Korea is repeatedly referred to as the "Hermit Kingdom"—leave some doubts about his utter reliability. The Anti-Comintern Pact, for instance, which was indubitably a product of Japanese army diplomacy, is not mentioned by him. The military is thoroughly covered from another angle, however, by Frank Iklé in his essay on relations with Germany.

The greatest weakness of the whole volume is in the economic area. Arthur Tiedemann's essay is quite interesting, but it only covers 1868–1893, and the discussion of source materials is very sketchy. No reason is given by the editor (or by Tiedemann) for stopping at 1893 or for not commissioning another essay on the later period Economic policy stands out as the area most need of further research, and Akira Iriye in h essay on relations with the United States repeatedly cites the inadequate appreciation of "Japan economic dependence on the United States" (p 426) as the major shortcoming of our understanding of the 1920s and 1930s. Still, Tiedemann' essay makes a worthy contribution by pointing out that from the day the Meiji government cam to power down to the present time, balance o payments considerations have affected virtually al foreign (and many domestic) activities of the Japanese.

Of the regional essays, Hosoya's on Russia Nish's on Britain, and Iklé's on Germany are al by leaders in their fields and are consistently valuable. Nish's contribution needs only to be supplemented by the addition of Bradford Lee's recent book, *Britain and the Sino-Japanese War, 1937–1939* (1973). Shinkichi Etō took on the toughest job of the whole project by writing about policies toward China. His paper is the only one that presents a framework for research—he sees policy emerging from the interaction of initial popular responses to Chinese actions, the views of responsible officials, the political interests of peripheral agencies of the government, and the inputs of private interest groups—and he indicates which Japanese materials are more important to read than others. Still, he could have used another fifty pages—and should have taken them. Iriye's essay on the United States is largely a restatement of views that he has presented elsewhere, particularly in *After Imperialism: The Search for a New Order in the Far East, 1921–1931* (1965). It is, in any case, an authoritative treatment.

Except for Etō and the editor, all of the authors are historians, which means that many questions of importance to political scientists are unasked or assumed, although the essays and the bibliography will certainly be of use to political scientists. This is a good book, of clear value to the professional, and one with just enough booby traps to make for stimulating reading.

CHALMERS JOHNSON
University of California, Berkeley

Creating the European Community. By R. C. Mowat. (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1973. Pp. 235. $7.00.)

Professor Mowat's cursory review of the consolidation of Western Europe since World War II concentrates on the "motives and ideas" that inspired the founders of the European Community. The underlying thesis is that the roots of the Euro-

pean idea can be traced to Christian convictions and to European cultural values, more generally. This is hardly a novel argument, but Professor Mowat reaches beyond its usual formulation. The Community was indisputably the creature of the Christian Democratic leadership of post-World War II Western Europe. But to what extent did integration draw sustenance from Christian, democratic, and humanist values? This is the question to which Professor Mowat addresses himself but, unhappily, in a superficial fashion.

The device employed for getting at motives and ideas is a series of portraits of those leaders who typify particular periods and projects—Adenauer, de Gaulle, Monnet, Schuman, and a number of lesser figures. This approach has both its attractions and its shortcomings. Professor Mowat has produced a useful and engaging introduction to the European Community. He has not, however, provided very much for the specialist save the glimmer of a promising idea.

First, the good news. The book offers lively glimpses of important European leaders at key moments in the development of the European Community. These portraits are nicely woven into a chronological overview which highlights ethical themes. By beginning with the World War II resistance movements, Professor Mowat is able to present the emergence of integrationist ideas as the logical and humane counterpart to those fascist and nationalist impulses that came so close to destroying European civilization. He is less successful, I would argue, in defending the positive side of his argument, i.e., that the eclectic tangle of Christian and enlightenment values which inspired the founders of the European Community is capable of providing continuing sustenance to so momentous an undertaking as the uniting of Europe.

Part of the problem is that the book promises more than it delivers. Professor Mowat tells us that he is in a position to pursue an "examination in depth" as a result of his access to private archives and to persons involved in the creation of the European Community. What he provides, however, are brief sketches of European leaders in action. Rather than their "motives" and their "ideas," we get their rhetoric, transmitted rather than analyzed. Moreover, very little is done to evoke the spirit of the unique period in which the European idea gathered momentum. (In this respect, the book suffers by contrast to Richard Mayne's sensitive and searching presentation of similar materials in *The Recovery of Europe 1945-1973* [New York: Anchor, 1973, rev. ed.].)

There are additional difficulties that transcend Professor Mowat's methods and perhaps his purposes. He has raised a series of profoundly complex and important issues but has dealt with them in an offhand fashion. The vital cultural themes ("motives and ideas") emerge as ancillary to diplomatic portraiture and would probably remain so even had Professor Mowat dug more deeply into the lives and times of his subjects. The value consensus on which the Community purportedly rests is treated in a bland and static fashion. No effort is made, for example, to probe the underlying tensions between Christian and enlightenment values, nor is the difficulty of integrating the socialist tradition confronted in a serious manner. A consensus that may have been adequate to the desperate but hopeful postwar period is, moreover, accepted largely without question as suitable to ensuing times. What is missing, briefly put, are concepts and analytical techniques that would sustain a more forceful and systematic investigation of the cultural determinants of the European Community. While brought directly to mind by Professor Mowat's book, these largely neglected themes in the study of European integration remain to be adequately investigated by the enterprising social scientist.

STUART A. SCHEINGOLD
University of Washington

Soviet-American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War. By Thomas G. Paterson. (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973. Pp. xi, 287. $12.00.)

The word "imperialism" does not appear in the index, nor does the author anywhere characterize American foreign policy as imperialist, yet the substance of the book adds up to an overwhelming documentation of the imperial mind and mood of American policy at the close of World War II. The policymakers knew what kind of a postwar world they wanted and they employed their economic weapons against friend and foe alike to achieve it. As Paterson, Professor of History at the University of Connecticut, writes in his conclusion: "American diplomacy was not accidental or aimless: rather, it was self-consciously expansionist" (p. 263). The economic arm was employed consciously both to insure the viability of domestic capitalism through the development of foreign trade, investments, and acquisition of raw materials and to apply pressure to secure political arrangements for the expansion of international capitalism in which the US was dominant. The relentless pursuit of such a policy was bound to clash with Soviet interests.

Explicit recognition of the imperial thrust of American policy is, in this reviewer's opinion, an integral factor in an analytical framework for the study of Cold War politics. This imperial or expansionist policy was a basic conditioning factor

antecedent to specific policy issues with the USSR, quite apart from Soviet culpability for one action or another. American policy was not, of course, articulated as an imperial policy nor could it be to the American people, given its historical notion of itself as anti-imperialist, but the containment doctrine as it was implemented into an expansionist policy, as the author contends, translates into nothing other than imperialism. Paterson avoids the characterization of American policy as imperialist, perhaps because of the organic link between capitalism and imperialism in Marxist theory. He prefers to characterize it as "expansionism," motivated by a will to dominate not merely because it was capitalist but, like other great powers through history, because it exploited opportunities. To ascribe the thrust of American policy to the fact that it was capitalist is to explain too much and to deny that it had options, as the author proceeds to spell out in his account of reconstruction politics. The United States used its overwhelming power to mold the world in its own image which, in itself, contributed to the Soviet-American confrontation. Yet, despite its considerable success in the rehabilitation of devastated areas and the revitalization of the world economy, American policy failed, in the author's opinion, to achieve its goal of postwar peace and prosperity. Washington's unilateral exercise of power and its " . . . disdain for diplomacy as a means of solving disputes and avoiding confrontations" contributed to the division of the world into hostile spheres of interest (p. 267).

The framework for Paterson's study is the ideology of "peace and prosperity," with Wilsonian overtones, which enjoyed the support of a wide political spectrum of American opinion from liberal to conservative. As Paterson lays out the underlying premises of the ideology, international peace depended on economic well-being which presumed a healthy world trade based on a growing world commerce that itself would ensure the economic health of the United States. Derived from these premises was the notion that improvement of economic conditions was basic to the promotion of political stability that would guard against unrest, revolution and communism. The US alone possessed the military, political, and economic power to attempt to fashion the world to its liking, and it did so. In focusing on the economic aspects of American policy and the bargaining power derived therefrom, Paterson has contributed a useful corrective to the line of analysis that has attributed the Cold War to atomic diplomacy, or to mutual misperceptions over policy, or to disaffection over particular issues, such as Soviet hegemony in East-Central Europe. As the author sees it, the exercise of economic power was a major underlying factor that was both the cause and consequence of the developing Soviet-American confrontation and, i itself, contributed to the configuration of postwa politics that emerged after 1948. Moreover, th pursuit of its interest brought the US into cor frontation not only with the Soviet Union but als with its allies. The generous loan to Britain i 1945, nevertheless, entailed concessions on im perial trade preferences and bilateralism. Inter national economic programs such as UNRRA, which could not be controlled by the US wer abandoned in favor of organizations such as th World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which it dominates. In treating reconstruc tion politics in *both* the Soviet and "American' spheres, Paterson has provided a special insigh for reevaluation of American policy.

Paterson deals methodically with the economic issues that affected the Soviet sphere: the postwa loan to the USSR, lend-lease, trade, export controls, relief, the Danube controversy, and others. Clearly, economic power was used to exact, or to attempt to exact, political concessions, which is not so much the issue, but rather its effect on Soviet calculations of the motives and intentions of American policy. Thus, while the British received their loan, the negotiations for a proposed American loan to the Soviet Union dragged on for more than a year and a half after Mikoyan and Harriman first discussed it in October 1943, while the US attempted to exact concessions from the Russians, ranging from claims of American nationals to the disposition of the states of Eastern Europe. In Eastern Europe loan policy was aimed at slowing down nationalization and securing adequate compensation for American property. Paterson makes a good case that the failure to provide economic assistance weakened the democratic socialist leadership vis-à-vis the Czech Communists and contributed to the undermining of Czech independence. In short, pressure on Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union with regard to loan and trade policy leading to export controls had the unanticipated effect of tightening control over the economies of Eastern Europe and contributing to Soviet policies of autarchy. (But see Professor Richard H. Heindel's review in *APSR*, 68 [June 1974] 867–868 of George C. Herring, Jr.'s *Aid to Russia, 1941–1946: Strategy, Diplomacy, the Origins of the Cold War* (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1973): Herring " . . . rejects the notion . . . that the United States used its economic power to force the Russians to comply with American postwar designs.")

A summary characterization of *Soviet-American Confrontation* can do no more than reflect the thrust of Professor Paterson's argument. The force of the argument comes through in the extensively researched treatment of the interlocking factors and events which adds up to a critical view,

moderately stated, of American Cold War policy. Formulated within a traditional perspective of American policy, and cautiously advancing its opinions, the study perforce is a substantial contribution to the radical interpretation of American Cold War policy.

BERNARD S. MORRIS
Indiana University

The Advisory Function of the International Court in the League and U.N. Eras. By Michla Pomerance. (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973. Pp. xv, 439. Appendices. Selected bibliography. Index. $17.50.)

The study of the World Court holds for aspiring international legal scholars something of the same attraction that the study of nudes holds for aspiring painters. Since so many of one's future peers have also studied the subject, one may reasonably expect to find not only expert guidance for, but also attentive interest in, one's own work. And for the same reason, the profession itself finds the study useful as a standard by which those with unusual insight and talent may quickly be distinguished from those without. Finally, though the analogy is stretching thin, I admit, it may not be too outrageous to point out how often the Court, like many nude models, finds itself obliged by unworthy circumstances to pose in silence and relative stillness for substantial lengths of time, thereby affording students the luxury and convenience of a nearly immobile, though still classic and arresting, subject.

How much attention the Court receives is suggested by the fact that this book by Dr. Pomerance, of the Hebrew University, is the third to appear in as many years which deals with precisely the same focus of inquiry: namely, the ambiguity of the Court's competence to render advisory opinions. This, essentially, is a comparative survey of the different experiences of the old and new Court: the PCIJ and the ICJ. Dr. Pomerance begins with a brief summary of the drafting history of the PCIJ's advisory jurisdiction provisions, then reviews that body's own development of the still uncertain function, contrasts each with the constitutive and empirical development of the ICJ's advisory competence, and concludes with an analysis of how the advisory opinions of the Court have been reviewed and translated into social action by appropriate political organs.

Some background may be helpful here. The peace-keeping scheme designed at Versailles in 1919 envisioned the Court as one alternative to war in international dispute settlement. So from the outset the Court's objectives were diplomatic as well as judicial. In providing for the Court's competence to settle contentious matters—cases—the draftsmen were able to finesse the ambiguities inherent in these sometimes conflicting objectives by following the procedural pattern already prominent in international affairs through *ad hoc* litigation. But they were only moderately successful in providing the framework of a controversial innovation in international practice which permitted reference to the Court of questions of general applicability submitted to it by the League's Council or Assembly.

The term *advisory* was not introduced until late in the drafting, and while the draftsmen may have had in mind the analogy of advisory opinions in national courts, there was certainly no extended consideration of the term. It is Dr. Pomerance's conclusion that initial drafts intended to divide the Court's advisory competence into two subprocedures—one in which the Court's function was in the nature of a lawyer's advice to a client, the other which stressed the Court's traditional judicial character: that is, its authoritative pronouncement rather than its legal advice.

In fact, the matter was left for the Court to develop in practice. Like many others, Dr. Pomerance concludes that the Court gradually assimilated its advisory and contentious procedures but that the process of assimilation was upset by the changes introduced when the old Court gave way to the new. These, essentially, were threefold. First, the scope of the Court's advisory competence was reduced from that over "any dispute or question" to that over "any *legal* question" (emphasis added). Second, the Court itself was linked organically to the UN as its "principal judicial organ." Finally, the category of political units entitled to request advisory opinions was vastly expanded to include a wide range of UN organs and agencies.

The third of these changes has had little effect in practice. In fact, bodies such as the International Labor Organization, using the League Council as intermediary, figured much more prominently in the work of the PCIJ than they have in that of the ICJ. The other two changes, however, created problems the PCIJ did not have to face, foremost among which is the apparent incompatibility of the ICJ's UN and international judicial responsibilities. When the Court was independent of the League and empowered to render an opinion on any dispute or question submitted to it, it was freer to develop the limits of its competence in light of its experience and its perception of its institutional identity than it has been able to do when limited by treaty to consider only "legal" questions (whatever that means) and asked to act both as adviser to the UN and judge of disputes in which the objectives and interests of the UN are at stake.

Dr. Pomerance's exploration of the jurispru-

dential implications of this dilemma fall somewhat short of the mark. On this score, there is still nothing to surpass Leo Gross's 1967 Hague Academy Lectures ("The International Court of Justice and the United Nations," *Recuil des Cours*, vol. 120(I), pp. 313–435). And she reaches conclusions with respect to the continuing impact of certain landmark cases (e.g., *Eastern Carelia*, *Northern Cameroons*) with which other scholars will find it difficult to agree. But these are marginal drawbacks to a study which so unmistakably establishes Dr. Pomerance as a legal scholar to be reckoned with.

Her style is superb: tight organization; summaries of conclusions at convenient intervals within, as well as at the end of, chapters; a masterful, case-by-case survey of the considerations which actually determined why and when the Court's advisory function has been invoked so far; and, for good measure, a set of appendices and a selected bibliography that are invaluable to other researchers.

Without duplicating Dr. Pomerance's own summaries, it may be noted that she concludes that the ICJ has come to ignore the quasi-contentious aspects of requests for advisory opinions in favor of an emphasis upon its lawyer-client relationship to the rest of the UN organization. She observes, as have others, that the ICJ's advisory opinions tend to involve organizational matters limited in both scope and generality, in sharp contrast to the PCIJ's. Finally, she predicts only modest success for the Court, regardless of attempts to increase its availability, until the world political situation stabilizes.

EDWARD GORDON
Union University Law School, Albany

Economic Blocs and U.S. Foreign Policy. By Ernest H. Preeg. (Washington, D.C.: National Planning Association, 1974. Pp. 204. $7.95, cloth; 13.50, paper.)

Since the spring of 1971 it has been difficult to profess allegiance to the principles of Bretton Woods, even if it had been possible during the preceding twenty five years to overlook the failure to implement the spirit of universal multilateralism enunciated in that conference.

Ernest Preeg, a U.S. Foreign Service officer, faces this situation directly and attempts to assess the present world economic system in terms of multilateral rules versus more limited economic arrangements among particular groups of countries. As the title of his book suggests, his principal concern is with economic policy in a situation of developing economic blocs.

The main theses of the book are that the international economic system is polarizing into three dominant blocs—North America, Western Europe, and Japan; that one of the most urgent needs of the present economic system is an improved balance-of-payments mechanism; and that this need can partly be met through a system of flexible exchange rates between the currencies of the three major blocs. Preeg sees this tripolarization continuing in the future with higher degrees of economic and even political integration occurring within the blocs between the United States and Canada and among the member states of the European Community. Each of the three poles would have a single currency, with a monetary union in Europe and between the United States and Canada, with the yen, the europa, and the dollar providing the basis of a triple key-currency monetary system. There would be a linking of the smaller-country currencies to one of the three key currencies as denomination of assets and regional transactions take place in the key currencies.

Having outlined this evolving world economic structure, Preeg gives a well-balanced and succinct description of economic conditions and relations in North America, Europe and Japan, laying the empirical groundwork for his policy framework. In two separate chapters an outline of economic policies is offered, one among the advanced industrialized countries, and one between the industrialized countries and the rest of the world. The culmination of the policy chapters is found in the proffering of a "multilateral framework of non-multilateralism" (p. 174), in which universal multilateralism is replaced by a "double standard" whereby different rules would apply to different situations. The analysis offered is more elaborate and detailed than the present review can adequately represent; suffice it to say the arguments are interesting and provocative.

Of particular interest is chapter 9, "The Foreign Policy Dimension of Economic Relations," a welcome treatment of the political implications of economic policy, two realms that are rarely explored within the covers of a single book. Preeg points out, "If economic policy makers sometimes appear to be less than fully appreciative of the political consequences of pursuing a given economic interest it must regrettably also be recognized that the political scientist, consciously or unconsciously, often avoids taking account of economic issues" (p. 138). This chapter represents a lucid and generally comprehensive elaboration of the political implications of the economic policies, particularly the trade-off between economic gains from freer trade and the political constraints resulting from greater dependence, especially for small countries. Yet this consideration of political implications does not seem to pervade the entire analysis.

Underlying the development of the three major

poles is the greater integration of each pole. This is politically achieved in the case of Japan, a single country, and it is an avowed goal in the case of the European Community. Within the North American bloc, however, increased Canadian dependence and further integration, both economic and political, with the U.S. represent sensitive political issues in Canada. Indeed, in 1972 a major foreign policy paper by Mitchell Sharp, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, specifically eschewed the option of closer integration with the U.S. And this was from a Liberal government whose position is the most "continentalist" of the three principal political parties. Perhaps this simply reflects the perspective of the book which is one of an American position, which is amply identified in its title.

W. ANDREW AXLINE
University of Ottawa, Ontario

No Clear and Present Danger: A Skeptical View of the U.S. Entry into World War II. By Bruce M. Russett. (New York: Harper and Row, 1972. Pp. 111. $1.95, paper.)

In the 1930s and 1940s, the study of international politics at Yale was dominated by Nicholas Spykman and Arnold Wolfers, whose geopolitical and power analyses of world politics had considerable influence on the future development of more "scientific" approaches to international studies. It is perhaps ironic that a professor teaching international politics at Yale today—Bruce Russett—can publish a book on the earlier period that notices neither Wolfers' *Britain and France Between Two Wars* nor Spykman's *America's Strategy in World Politics* and has as its astounding thesis that the United States should have stayed out of the Second World War because, as its title implies, there was "no clear and present danger" to the republic in the course of events as they were then unfolding in Europe and Asia.

Russett admits at the outset that his book is meant to be provocative, that many of his readers will be offended by its theme, and that he wrote it while still in the process of rethinking its subject matter. One wishes that Russett had kept thinking before writing, because the central proposition of this brief volume is not only repellent but it is also supported with some exceedingly dubious assertions. For example, the fundamental theme of the book is that "American participation in World War II had very little effect on the essential *structure* of international politics thereafter" (p. 19), and this structure, Russett seems to argue, was changed in only one important respect, that Russia replaced Germany as the great threat to European security. But just as World War I resulted in the destruction of three empires, which decisively altered the structure of international politics (defined by Russett as "the basic balance of forces in the world" [p. 20]), so World War II resulted, as most elementary texts in international politics would agree, in the transformation of the world balance from multipolarity to the familiar bipolarity of the postwar decades.

What Russett suggests is that the United States should have stayed out of the war but should have provided all help short of war to the British, as it appeared to be doing in 1940–1941, because by the end of 1941 the European war was actually stalemated, although no one realized it at the time. In fact, however, it was Hitler who declared war on the United States after Pearl Harbor, and Russett, who ascribes this action to "Hitler's psychopathology" (p. 30), thus has no realistic basis for his preferred policy of United States aloofness during what would have been, he admits, a longer and more bloody war than the one that was really fought. In a sentence of exquisite delicacy, Russett acknowledges that "perhaps any idea of 'fighting to the last ally' would have been too 'cynical' to survive public debate" (p. 69), but nevertheless this is the policy that he thinks would have been preferable to American belligerency. He believes this "longer and even more bloody" (p. 30) war would have ended in a long drawn-out stalemate without American entry, and this presumably would have provided a safer, more secure environment for the United States than the cold war that actually did follow World War II; but the accurate perception by the survivors that the United States policy had been to bleed all parties in the war, hoping for a favorable outcome for itself could have led to an even more hostile and dangerous environment for this country.

Russett grants rather grudgingly that war against Nazism on moral grounds is a "perfectly reasonable position" (p. 43), but says that he prefers to argue in the arena of "realists" concerned with the structure of the international system. Perhaps this is why he curiously omits any mention of fascism as a worldwide political and ideological movement during the 1930s; others, however, would insist that a realistic consideration of the stakes of the war would include not merely dominance or subjugation of great powers or alterations in the structure of the international system, but, more profoundly, the survival of basic Western values threatened by transnational totalitarian mass movements.

It is possible to conclude that this slight volume is not really about its ostensible subject, but is merely another critique, somewhat disguised, of United States involvement in Vietnam. Russett indulges in some of the loose generalizations of leftist revisionists: "In the early years of the cold war all American liberals were required to demonstrate their loyalty and freedom from any taint

of pro-Communism" (p. 85). He also seems to believe that American foreign policy after World War II was "to oppose injustice everywhere by military means" (p. 107), a vaulting ambition actually pursued by no president, secretary of state, or any leader of the American military and strategic establishment.

Nevertheless, Russett is clearly not a New Leftist. He is attempting to revive the older revisionist stance of Tansill, the Beards, and other interwar critics of United States foreign policy. His hero seems to be the late Senator Robert Taft rather than Henry Wallace. His prescriptions for the future, such as "there must be an initial presumption against the use of force in international politics" (p. 88), are easily agreed-upon banalities. The problems begin of course after such a presumption has been held for a good while, and events, such as the fall of France, lead one to think what to do next.

MORTON J. TENZER
The University of Connecticut

South West Africa and the United Nations: An International Mandate in Dispute. By Solomon Slonim. (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973. Pp. 409. $13.50.)

This work by Professor Slonim is one of the first to deal comprehensively with the development of the international dispute concerning the South West African mandate from its inceptive years right up to the last advisory opinion of the World Court of June 21, 1971. The author writes succinctly and switches expertly from pure narration to analysis and comment. A review of the historical background of the mandate is followed by accounts of the trusteeship struggle, the attempts to implement the 1950 Advisory Opinion, the efforts to obtain a binding judgment, the revocation of the mandate and its aftermath. Despite the density of argument, the wealth of material presented and the complexity of the problem, the work is, on the whole, most readable. It says a great deal for the author's wide knowledge and grasp of the background and development of the thirty-year-old dispute that he was able to produce a work which deals so directly with the most important aspects of the controversy. In addition, he furnishes a concise account of the complex legalities and tortuous political mazes confronting the United Nations.

The author gives an accurate account of the creation of the mandate system under the League of Nations and of the controversies which ensued, culminating in United Nations efforts to convert South West Africa into a Trust Territory (or at least to compel South Africa to accept international accountability for its administration of the mandate). The refreshingly dispassionate analysis of the protracted court battle between Liberia/Ethiopia and South Africa is particularly instructive. The author quite correctly refutes the assumption that since the court denied Ethiopia and Liberia the right to obtain a decision on the merits, a study of the pleadings would be entirely misplaced: "Nothing, however, could be more misplaced than this assumption itself. For, in fact, it is only by seeing how the case evolved and what was asked of the Court that one can gain proper perspective on the refusal of the court to make any determination on the merits" (p. 213).

Although Dr. Slonim's work is not primarily intended to present a broad picture of the mandate question in an international context, the author does intersperse his treatise with many apt observations on the realities of the dispute. For instance, he comments on the anomaly whereby the United Nations acts in the place of the League of Nations in controlling an instrumentality created by the League: "It was anomalous, because a mandate was something of a fossilized remnant of an earlier colonial age, and the United Nations was not equipped to handle relics. How does a gasoline station service a horse and buggy?" (p. 92).

This book does not supply all the answers—nor does it presume to do so. Nagging questions like the following remain: If South Africa merely wanted to bluff the world and the Court with her inspection and pelebiscite proposals (as was so often alleged), why was this bluff not called and the ploy exposed, by simply accepting the proposals? The Court was afforded the opportunity to undertake a full factual investigation into South West Africa; why was it not used in order to "unmask" South Africa? What were the underlying big-power considerations and political maneuvers which influenced the protracted tug-of-war in the debating halls of the United Nations and the World Court? Finally, the most important question: how can South Africa, the United Nations, the members of the Third World and the superpowers reach an agreement on the South West Africa issue which will satisfy anticolonial sentiments, dissipate South Africa's fears and resistance, salvage the prestige of the United Nations, and, above all, safeguard the interests of all the inhabitants of the Territory?

Though some of the more "progressive" idealists may regard it as somewhat too realistically conservative, Dr. Slonim's factual and precise work is highly recommended to anyone who would dare to answer any of these agonizing questions.

MARINUS WIECHERS
University of South Africa, Pretoria

China's Trade with the West. A Political and Economic Analysis. Edited by Arthur A. Stahnke. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972. Pp. 246. $16.50.)

While this collection of essays (written mainly in 1971, published in 1972 and sent to me in early 1974) has been somewhat outdated by changes in Chinese-American relations during the past four years, it actually serves as a useful benchmark against which to measure political and economic changes in *China's Trade With The West*. This book is at first glance a rather unpretentious one, containing six essays by international specialists with backgrounds in various aspects of China's relations with the West. The reason I suggest that it may seem unpretentious is because neither the editor nor most of the contributors appeared to realize that the volume really has a powerful, even devastating theme: that U.S. policy toward China since 1949—while not entirely setting the pattern for China's trade with the West—in fact very potently influenced that trade whenever it had the opportunity to do so.

Oliver Lee's somewhat simplistic essay focuses mainly on the hostile nature of U.S. trade policy toward the People's Republic of China (PRC; or simply, China) since 1949, but the props are partially knocked out from under him by developments occurring since the essay was first written. The problem however, with both Lee's essay and the book itself is that they do not recognize that U.S. political and economic policy toward China since 1949 thwarted the long overdue reversal of U.S. policy toward the PRC which finally occurred during the first term of the Nixon Administration; nor do they indicate that U.S. policy blocked or threatened the normal conduct of international trade and political relations between China and Canada and China and West Germany; although Professor Allen Whiting concludes to the contrary (p. 5), I believe those constraints had an impact on China's trading potentialities. (Incidentally, it would have added to the vigor of this volume if chapters on trade between China and Japan; China and Australia; and China and a major Latin American country—for example, Brazil—had been included. These would have shown even more graphically how U.S. pressure acted as a deterrent on trade development between given countries and the PRC until the U.S. itself decided to change its posture toward China.)

As a collection of essays, then, these pieces do not explicitly enough drive home the above mentioned major theme. Additionally, they vary in quality and scope, some focusing on specific problems, others (like Whiting's) dealing with overall concerns; another, Victor Li's, has some advice that is good for the China trader but has only marginal relevance to this volume.

While American policy has been a major deterrent in the development of many countries' relations with China, it does not seem to have been so in the case of Chinese trade with Hong Kong. Colina MacDougall Lupton's thorough essay on trade between the P.R.C. and the British Crown Colony is an important summary of that distinguished reporter's writing on the China scene from Hong Kong for a decade; her writing on many aspects of China in the 1960s has never really received the accolades it richly merits. Hence, we should be grateful for this piece. Yet in her summary on P.R.C./Hong Kong trade, she fails to answer several interrelated questions: Why didn't the U.S. *seem* not to interfere in that trade? Or did it interfere, and do we not know about such interference? What were the political pressures at work between the U.S. and the U.K. which discouraged such American activity? Or did the U.S. benefit *sub rosa* from that trade sufficiently so that it chose not to make an issue of it unless American concerns openly flaunted their government's pre-1971 trade policy toward the P.R.C.? The Lupton piece, for all its genuine *feeling* for the nature of P.R.C./Hong Kong trade, seems to have not dealt with this issue area. (The omission, I should think, is more that of the editor than the contributor.)

But this review was not written for an international economics journal, and I am not an economist. Hence, instead of commenting more on each essay—as I would like to do—it is important to iterate a point that this book is supposedly driving at: that from time to time, it is possible to separate political relations from economic ones, that China has been very pragmatic in various cases, that other countries have tended to respond in kind; however, the international political dimension should not be in any way down-played. We need not belabor the Sino-U.S. case further. The books shows in its well-written two major case-studies, however, China's trade with both West Germany and Canada was hampered by political considerations. These were mainly American-inspired, unquestionably, but in both instances to a very limited extent as well as that of Hong Kong during 1967, Chinese political considerations also entered into play. In the case of Hong Kong the Chinese political environment affected trade with Hong Kong indirectly more than directly: that is, when internal transportation facilities were interrupted by Red Guard activities in south China in the summer of 1967, Hong Kong suffered from the impact of internal upheaval. That impact however, was almost certainly not the result of conscious political and/or economic decision making by the Chinese leadership in Peking (or even in Kwangtung province). Indeed,

when the British authorities were cracking down most heavily on Hong Kong Communists, interruptions in trade from China were minimal, at worst.

I will conclude with two observations derived from Professor Whiting's introductory essay. First, I disapprove for political and intellectual reasons of referring to the People's Republic of China (PRC) as "an authoritarian regime" (p. 9). Indeed, the more one reads Whiting, the more one is convinced that Whiting himself does not regard China as "an authoritarian regime." Certainly, for anyone who has actively been involved in political and economic relations with the officialdom of the PRC, that terminology is, to use the vernacular, "inoperative." Second, as this review is being written (July 1974), I recognize that I have all the advantages of 20-20 hindsight in noting that Whiting may have erred in suggesting that the " . . . Cultural Revolution . . . is not a likely prospect in the near future. The disruptions to foreign trade consequent from Red Guard activity are not probable . . . " (p. 27). As the Criticize-Confucius, Criticize-Lin Piao campaign continues apace, albeit at this writing *sans* Red Guards, as the Chinese national and provincial leadership shows continued flux, it may very well be that the foreign trade institutions may be no more insulated from domestic change in the next few years than they were during the Cultural Revolution. Such a result may obtain despite efforts to prevent society-wide political movements from affecting external affairs institutions. It is unlikely, however, that China would ensure that such insulation occur; indeed, as in the Cultural Revolution some Chinese may feel that those institutions *must not* be isolated from the general political environment.

In any event, the posited interrelationship between internal and external politics and economics is not unique to China, as Americans who have witnessed the unfolding of the Watergate affair can well testify.

DANIEL TRETIAK

York University, Toronto

Macropolitics: International Relations in a Global Society. By Richard W. Sterling. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974. Pp. 648. $13.95.)

Richard Sterling offers a textbook with a difference. The difference lies in the thesis which he sustains throughout the book by posing a macropolitical approach to international relations against the more common micropolitical perspective. Professor Sterling believes that micropolitics threatens global disaster by exalting the claims of the nation. Conversely, macropolitics promises global survival by placing the international interest in first place.

By extrapolating from the present in the now common neo-Malthusian fashion, Sterling describes the frightfulness of the future we are making. We must change our ways. If doom is to be avoided, the argument runs, peace must be kept. Peace rests on justice and affluence. Justice and affluence require the reduction of world inequality and the economic development of poor countries. As he puts it; "If development is the path to a peaceful world, then the failure of development is the road to a world at war" (p. 426). He affirms the first conditional statement by claiming without much evidence that domestic violence is associated with poverty (pp. 84–85). Quotations from "Populorum Progressio" show that Pope Paul VI agrees with the proposition that world peace depends on worldwide economic and social development (pp. 398–399). Since by assertion Sterling has abolished any "qualitative difference between international and domestic politics" (p. 330), what holds domestically will obtain internationally. And thus a proposition resting on doubtful evidence, dubious authority, and unfounded assertion becomes the basis for defining global necessities and for prescribing policies throughout the book.

The policies, moreover, are ordinarily to be carried out by no one in particular. Necessities impose themselves; rational policies have their requirements. They take over from personal agents or governmental agencies. Thus, "society" must eliminate social evils (p. 399); "the nation must begin to slough off its parochialism" (p. 202); "states must meet the needs of the political ecosystem" (p. 336). Thus, "rationality impels men in the direction of global equalization" (p. 457).

Because Sterling prescribes policies for abstract actors and relies on disembodied forces for the solution of problems, he omits from the first half of the book any analysis of the foreign-policy input to international politics. Otherwise, Part I is a highly competent, admirably succinct, and pleasingly readable account of international politics written along conventional, or micropolitical, lines. The second half of the book examines the macropolitical world mainly by looking at the economic and demographic problems that threaten world disaster. The large recent literature on those matters is competently summarized, though not considered critically. In Part II, the survival requirements of the global system and the imperatives we must act upon are urgently stated. But still one has trouble figuring out who is supposed to follow the imperatives in order to fulfill the requirements. In the midst of all the whirring about of disembodied forces, the answer nevertheless slips out. The rich nations must help the poor ones, and ultimately, if much good is to be done in the world, the superpowers must do it (pp. 339, 352–356). Sterling realizes that great

tasks can be accomplished only by agents of great capability.

The problems, then, are found at the global level; solutions to the problems continue to depend on national policies. But what are the conditions that make nations more or less willing to obey the injunctions that Sterling lays upon them? How can they resolve the tensions between pursuing their own interests and acting for the sake of the system? Sterling believes that the tensions can be overcome, but he does not say how. If he were to do so, he would all the more clearly reveal that the shift from a micro- to a macroperspective has not brought off the "Copernican revolution" in international politics that he tried for. What went wrong?

Sterling uses the prefix "macro" merely to focus concern on the world as a whole, rather than on the nation. He does not ask whether a macroperspective requires altering one's analytic approach or suggests a new way of developing an international political theory. In economics, the meanings and distinctions of micro- and macrotheories are well understood. A microtheory is a theory of the market built up from assumptions about the behavior of individual entrepreneurs. The theory shows how the actions and interactions of the units form and affect the market and how the market in turn affects them. A macrotheory is a theory about the national economy built on system-wide aggregates. The theory shows how they are interconnected and indicates how changes in one or some of them affect others and the performance of the economy. In economics, both micro- and macrotheories deal with large realms. The important difference between them is found not in the size of the objects of study but in the way the objects of study are approached and the theory to explain them is constructed.

Sterling does not follow the economist's suggestive usage. Instead, he uses "micro" and "macro" as prefixes of fashion in the ever developing jargon of the field. He believes that the shift to a macroperspective is made necessary by the growing interdependence of our imperilled planet. But how does necessity become possibility? Lacking a theory, Sterling cannot answer that question. He can only describe the problems that he thinks must be solved and then assign to nations the duty of adopting the perspectives and values that would lead some of them to act for the sake of humanity. Sterling relies on final causes—the imperatives of world survival—to turn national actors into international agents.

One who wants to change things, as Sterling earnestly does, should look for effective causes and ways of acting upon them. The search for causes is in part a theoretical endeavor. The first strategic requirement, if a Copernican revolution in the study of international relations is to be made, is to ask what a macrotheory of international relations might reveal. Such a theory would show how the international system is moved by system-wide aggregates. The theory would look somewhat like a macroeconomic theory in the style of John Maynard Keynes. It would, however, lack the latter's practical implications. National governments can manipulate system-wide economic variables. No agencies with comparable capabilities exist internationally. Who would act upon the possibilities of adjustment that a macrotheory of international politics might reveal? Even were such a theory available, we would still be stuck with nations as the only agents capable of acting to alleviate global problems. We would still have to revert to a micropolitical approach in order to examine the conditions that make benign and effective action by states separately and collectively more or less likely. Sterling fails to do so. He also fails to develop his macroperspective into a usable approach or a viable theory. He therefore can do no more than describe problems and insist that the world's survival requires their solution.

KENNETH N. WALTZ
University of California, Berkeley

The Arms Trade with the Third World. By SIPRI. (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1971. Pp. xxxi, 910. $15.00.)

Military Aid and Counterrevolution in the Third World. By Miles D. Wolpin. (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1972. Pp. xiii, 327. $12.50.)

As descriptive studies, each of these works is a *tour de force*. While the SIPRI authors have sought to present a comprehensive analysis of the transfer of military goods and services (excluding small arms) from the developed to the Third World, Wolpin has endeavored to lay bare the iniquities of the Military Assistance Program (MAP) of the United States. Without in any way denigrating the high quality of the factual material presented in these works, I believe it is appropriate to comment that each work, considered at the level of an understanding of the raw data, is an exercise in the glaringly obvious. The reader emerges from exposure to these authors considerably better informed factually, but scarcely more enlightened about the political consequences of the transfer of military goods and services. Whether or not the subject matter lends itself to a greater measure of understanding is a moot point.

Underpinning *The Arms Trade with the Third World* is the laudable social scientific belief that understanding is required for control. The 910 pages on the arms trade has served to confirm my prior conviction that the prospects for serious international regulation, let alone cessation, of the

trade in arms are very close to zero. The SPIRI authors confirm what every thinking man already knew: that the motives impelling arms supply and arms receipt are myriad and redundant and that they derive from the anarchic character of organized human life, both international and domestic. By way of contrast with the somewhat ideological *SIPRI Yearbooks*, this volume does not preach at the reader, nor does it offer any very serious prescriptions for what one suspects its authors appreciate to be an insoluble problem-mix. The author of the Foreword was moved to write as follows: "The book makes sobering reading. But it may help to create a better understanding of the complex problems involved and also promote further thinking on measures for stopping *the general arms race*. If so, the book has achieved its aim" (p. 5, emphasis added).

These sentences suggest two questions. First, what is the point in the writing of a book of this kind? And second, how closely have the authors considered the connections between their subject matter and conflict phenomena? In response to the first question, the authors would seem to believe that public opinion might operate to restrict the trade in armaments, if only the facts are presented (p. 123). The trouble with this argument is that it is almost certainly false so long as there are major arms-supplying countries wherein public opinion will be granted no access to the relevant information. Men-in-the-street everywhere will admit to the generic belief that armaments are "bad," but they also prove responsive to the following brands of argument: that the choice lies not between (say) British arms and no arms but rather between British arms and (say) French arms; that moral judgment is appropriate to individuals, not to governments; and that the principal duty of the (say) United States government is to protect the interests of Americans, not to restore or to establish democracy in diverse foreign climes.

As knowledge for its own sake, the detail in *The Arms Trade with the Third World* is invaluable. Underlying the monumental task of data assembly and processing, however, lurks the shadow of the scholarly fallacy—the notion that the truth will set us free. To present the facts of weapon transfer is not to contribute usefully to the control of the arms trade. The participating individuals, in developed as in Third-World countries, know perfectly well why they are trading in armaments—and those reasons are deemed to be sensible. To control the trade in armaments, as the SIPRI authors recognize (p. 1), one must needs step beyond the detail of weapon transfer and address the reasons why states consider it essential to supply and to receive armaments.

That the arms trade is an important subject few would deny. It is when one seeks to proceed beyond the vague appreciation of importance that the difficulties begin. For example, what are we to make of the facts that the GNPs of "all developing countries have grown at an average rate of 5 per cent a year since 1950. Their military expenditures have grown at a yearly rate of 7 per cent, while their major weapon imports have grown at a rate of 9 per cent" (p. 83). One feels that too much is being spent on armaments, but this is a very soft judgment. The varied motivations that impel armaments acquisition in the Third World are not to be deemed frivolous by Olympian observers from the developed countries. Whether or not the major arms-supplying states are analogous to drug pushers, they are able to peddle their wares because local clients are addicted. Eliminate the demand and the supply will cease.

If it be granted, in a very general way, that the arms trade is important, it may yet be difficult to itemize specific charges. It is in this linkage area that *The Arms Trade with the Third World* is particularly weak. Clearly the SIPRI authors are concerned with the impact of the arms trade on local arms races, and with the connection between arms races and wars. Here the authors have stepped apparently unknowingly into a social scientific void. Social scientists are at last recognizing that the dynamics of arms races must be studied seriously, that analysis by dead reckoning or by no less lifeless models, is not good enough. The authors refer to "the general effect of arms races on wars which is the same whether weapons are produced domestically or purchased abroad." This is surely a gross error in judgment. The attractions of trial by combat may be sharply reduced if it is believed likely that the principal arms-supplying power(s) may elect to avow neutrality in the conflict and hence to deny spare parts and ammunition for the systems supplied. The SIPRI authors are prone to refer to "the global arms race" and to "the general arms race" (p. v). Such glib characterization of a multitude of complex processes both testifies to intellectual slackness and aggravates the book's worst fault, namely, the tendency to state conclusions and imply connections at the outset—and then in the remainder of the book, to let the data (the authors hope) speak for themselves.

If local arms races are the transmission belts linking the arms trade with local wars, it is incumbent upon the authors to demonstrate the structure of those competitions. In fact, neither arms races in general, nor any local race in particular are dissected in the course of these 910 pages. Is some arms supply, and indeed even the occasional arms race beneficial to the cause of local stability? Possibly (pp. 77–78), but such balances in arms supplies are "not very stable" (p. 77). This assertion, in common with many of this work's general

statements, is true enough, even obvious, yet is somewhat unhelpful. With more thought given to the meanings of stability, the structure and processes of arms races, and the character of the political systems and subsystems to which the arms trade is relevant, SIPRI could have produced a book that yielded sophisticated understanding as well as the plethora of relevant factual material this volume contains.

The critical tone of these comments has been induced by my strong conviction that a manifestly useful book should have been conceived in such a way as to render it far more useful. The book is organized in four Parts. In order, the reader is presented with a general survey (Part 1), with the perspective of the suppliers (Part 2), the perspective of the recipients (Part 3), and with a critical review of the reference material used (Part 4). Parts 2 and 3 proceed doggedly, country by country. The authors appreciate the complexity of motives on both the supplier and the recipient sides. Supplier policy orientations are usefully, if somewhat obviously, declared to be some mixture of the hegemonic, the industrial and the restrictive (p. 17). The authors stress, appropriately enough, the fact that the superpowers have been the sources of approximately two-thirds of the flow of major weapons to the Third World, while Britain and France have contributed approximately another twenty per cent. Thus, four supplier countries are responsible for between 85 and 90 per cent of the trade in major weapons (p. 9). Also, the SIPRI authors have presented an excellent analysis of the arms supply policy of the superpowers, stressing the role of preemptive supply considerations (pp. 161–164).

As implied above, this book comprises a series of high quality vignettes, all-too-loosely linked with theorems that should have been subject to rigorous empirical testing. Repeatedly, and on *prima facie* grounds, reasonably enough, the connection between superpower competition and local arms races is emphasized (for example, pp. 121–122), yet the linkages are not examined systematically. We are left with bland and obvious general truths. One pertinent question quite ignored by the authors concerns possible connections between the course of the Soviet-American arms race and the pattern of competitive arms-supplying policy.

This book is indispensable for anyone interested in the trade in arms, but in its level of political and social scientific sophistication, it is distinctly inferior to the earlier publication of Amelia Leiss from M.I.T. (*Arms Control and Local Conflict.* Vol. III: *Arms Transfers to Less Developed Countries.* [Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Studies, M.I.T., 1970]). Indeed, it is possible that despite its useful presentation of factual data, *The Arms Trade with the Third World* may contribute to the perpetuation of fallacies concerning the alleged evils of the trade in armaments (see my article "Traffic Control for the Arms Trade?" in *Foreign Policy*, 6 (Spring 1972) 153–169). If Third World countries are not to acquire advanced weaponry, that should be a decision for those countries. A suppliers' convention on the regulation of the arms trade would be inherently inequitable and would deny the validity of local determinations of need. If Western analysts are uncertain that they are able to identify needed military equipment for their own countries, how much less confident are they when it comes to the determination of the legitimate needs of (say) Mali, Saudi Arabia, or Peru? More to the point, there is every reason to believe that the major supplying countries are profoundly and, in many respects, for good reason, hostile to the notion of the international control of the trade in armaments.

In *Military Aid and Counterrevolution in the Third World*, Miles Wolpin reveals the seamy side of the United States' Military Aid Program (MAP). The author seeks to demonstrate that

> the attitudinal modifications and personal friendships structured by one or more MAP training/orientation tours not only intended to but in fact significantly reinforced and diffused conservative tendencies within foreign military establishments. By creating new external reference groups and definitions of national interest, the MAP has transformed dependent officer corps in many nominally independent Third World countries into servants of America's informal empire. (p. 121).

Leaving aside the cruder of the ideological flourishes in the above, the author succeeds despite himself. This book is a damning indictment of an MAP that has been so crass in many of its features that it did not deserve to accomplish its objectives (overt or covert). In his didactic, ethnocentric, and ideological presentation Wolpin betrays a politically reversed mirror-image of his subject matter. It is no exaggeration to comment that Wolpin's material triumphs over the author. In superb and fascinating detail, Wolpin presents the nuts and bolts of the United States' MAP. The perspective of the American MAP officers is presented, as are the appalling details of the crude propaganda material to which foreign military officers are exposed. Usefully, and denying the off-the-cuff judgment of the SIPRI authors (p. 70), Wolpin endeavors to appraise the effectiveness of the MAP in terms of its covert objective of supporting counter-revolutionary forces among friends and potential adversaries (Chapter 7).

There is a certain wide-eyed innocence about this book, as Wolpin labors to demonstrate the obvious. Surely it can hardly be a revelation to discern that the MAP is, to a very significant degree, intended to influence the attitudes of individual

foreign military personnel. Nonetheless, obvious or not, Wolpin does tell a story that should be told.

Wolpin's ideology hinders his scholarship in that, as with the SIPRI volume, the most salient questions are not addressed. While it is difficult to deny Wolpin's thesis that the MAP has served as a vehicle for United States intervention in the domestic affairs of friendly states, it is appropriate to ask, "By what standards should one judge the United States MAP?" A conservative (counter-revolutionary in Wolpin's language) superpower is naturally going to have a conservative MAP. Is it illegitimate to seek to influence the attitudes of foreign military trainees? Surely not. Clearly it is a matter of degree. Does Wolpin believe that the MAP is fundamentally illegitimate, or only that it has been maldirected? We are not told. If one grants that great powers will indulge in MAPs, which is a reasonable assumption, then one must seek to explore what an MAP should and should not endeavor to accomplish and by what methods.

COLIN S. GRAY
Hudson Institute, Croton-on-Hudson, New York

Russia in the Caribbean: A Special Report, Part Two. Special Report Series, No. 13. By James D. Theberge. (Washington, D. C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1973. Pp. 166. $3.95.)

This volume accompanies a separately published and very brief (36 pp.) Part One which consists of the findings and recommendations of a panel of experts. To some extent, Part Two provides an updating of some kinds of information found in an earlier study edited by Theberge, *Soviet Seapower in the Caribbean: Political and Strategic Implications* (New York: Praeger, 1972), but the present report is somewhat broader in scope and more consistent in viewpoint.

Essentially the study is concerned with analysis of certain developments in the Caribbean area since the early years of the Castro regime, particularly the growth of the Soviet Union's political, economic, and military presence. From a limited, primarily political influence this presence has expanded to major multidimensional proportions by the early 1970s.

Defining the Soviet Union's long-term objectives in the Caribbean as expansion of its own power, protection of Cuba, and erosion of United States influence, the study examines the strategic and tactical means being utilized in pursuit of those ends. One chapter summarizes the Soviet government's view of the Caribbean area and Latin America as a whole, the bases of its commitment to a future in the region, and its general approach toward achieving its aims. Other chapters treat individually the chief tactical instruments and activities: greatly expanded conventional diplomatic relations; support of and, where possible, control of communist parties; conduct of and supervision of espionage, propaganda, and subversion; selective support of revolutionary violence; expanded trade and economic aid; expanded fishery and oceanographic endeavors in cooperation with Cuba; an enlarged naval presence, also in cooperation with Cuba; and, an increasing dependency of Cuba upon the USSR. Professor Theberge does not assume the task of formulating an overall Caribbean policy recommendation for the United States, but he does discuss in summary fashion some of the implications of the developments and the present situation in terms of this country's interests.

As we have seen for quite a number of years, some Americans view any amount of Soviet influence in the Caribbean with apprehension and pessimism. Avoiding that extreme as well as its opposite, promoted perhaps by some relaxation of U.S.-U.S.S.R. tensions, Theberge's moderate position might be labeled a "realistic" one. Recognizing that the Soviet posture, actual and potential, is indeed pertinent to this country's interests and needs, he sees it nevertheless as "more a cause of concern than of alarm" (p. 31). He thinks that the military aspects of the great-power rivalry are less significant in the long run than the political and economic dimensions and the United States enjoys certain advantages as the incumbent dominant power and friend. While the Soviet Union has achieved many of its aims, it has been compelled to move with caution, mindful of the risks and uncertainty of its position. Its gains, such as in consolidating control over Cuba's economy and foreign policy, have been at tremendous cost.

Given the brevity of the book and its comprehensiveness, the chapters necessarily are very short. Nevertheless, a good deal is accomplished as a result of succinct text, numerous tables and maps, and several supportive appendices. A lot of information is packed between the covers.

At times one might wish a source had been cited to support a given statement. At other places, certain "well-informed sources" ought to have been identified. Numerous expressions such as "Moscow's involvement" and "Washington's purpose" may annoy some readers. Nevertheless, this is a well-written, very readable book; it appears to present its information reliably, and to suit the needs of both the specialist and the general reader.

CARL C. MOSES
Wake Forest University

American Foreign Policy in the Congo, 1960–1964. By Stephen R. Weissman. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1974. Pp. 325. $13.50.)

Professor Stephen Weissman offers an important contribution to the growing body of revisionist interpretations of American international behavior during the Cold War period. He places himself outside the framework of the classical premises of American policy during this era, to seek out explanatory variables from a critical, left-wing perspective: class origins of policy makers, well-springs of the imperial urge in American-Third World relations, economic bases of policy choice, determinants of the Cold War ideology.

Weissman has been thorough in ferreting out documentary sources for his study. More important is his success in interviewing a large number of the key American actors, supplemented by some of the Zairian participants (the Congo became Zaire in 1971). The author deserves high marks for the quality of his documentation; this permits a sophisticated revisionism, with a rejection of some standard hypotheses, and qualification of others.

Weissman discerns three stages in the unfolding American involvement. The Congo crisis burst upon the international scene at a time when American foreign policy was dominated by a moderately conservative establishment, of patrician Eastern genealogy, interlocked by family ties and personal economic interests with major corporate and banking houses. This policy elite, argues Weissman, was thoroughly Europhile, unsympathetic to African nationalism, and crudely anti-Communist. During this first stage, a number of critical commitments were made: the United Nations intervention, the failure to take action against the Katanga secession, the overthrow of Lumumba.

Phase Two, according to Weissman, was marked by the advent of the new frontiersman, bearing as ideological baggage a sophisticated anti-communism, and consequently a greater sympathy for African nationalism as a potential bulwark against Soviet penetration. This group would have tried to coopt Lumumba, but was forestalled by his assassination just as they came to power. They were able to engineer the installation of the Adoula government, the liquidation of the Katanga secession, and the elimination of the Lumumbist rump regime in Kisangani (formerly Stanleyville).

In the third period, with Johnson at the helm, there was a militarization of policy, as Vietnam came to dominate all preoccupations. In Zaire, this was the epoch of the Tshombe government, the rebellions, and the American-Belgian parachute operation in Kisangani and Isiro (ex-Paulis).

Weissman intends the study as a critique but avoids the tone of a prosecuting attorney. He is in good measure persuasive in his interpretation of the ideological postulates operative and the actual role played by the policy matrix of the State Department, CIA, and Pentagon. He is usually careful in his judgments, and generally eschews undocumented assertions.

A stimulating and provocative book such as this will necessarily generate debate. The argument linking class origin and policy role, even though substantially qualified in comparison with the dissertation version of the present work, remains unsatisfactory. Certainly one can argue that the Brahmin background of Christian Herter and his connections in the corporate establishment made him accessible to pressures arguing the higher priority of European interests and a favorable climate for capitalist enterprise. But the Bowles family, also used as example, shows an evolution in three generations from conservative capitalist to liberal sophisticated anti-communism to radical New Left, without any obvious change in the class determinants of political values. Both the conservative crude anti-communism and liberal sophisticated anti-communism of the Weissman typology found advocates, at the field level, among key actors whose class background could not be compared to Herter or Harriman. Weissman elsewhere concedes that direct economic interests in Zaire are not very powerful in determining the American role; his discussion of this aspect is both informative and convincing.

Weissman seems to me quite unpersuasive, however, on the viability of the Lumumbist alternative. It is possible that Lumumba could have been imposed on Zaire with a substantial international intervention, comparable to that which was exercised on behalf of some of his rivals. Much less certain is whether Lumumba would have triumphed if internal forces had been allowed to sort themselves out. The author fails to distinguish between the strength of urban and rural hostility to the manifold oppressions of the Belgian colonial system, on the one hand, and nationalism as a structured, integrated force on the other. Lumumba had very little support among various absolutely critical sectors: Kinshasa (ex-Leopoldville), and southern Shaba (ex-Katanga) cities, the Luba-Kasai and Kongo, the two groups most strongly represented in the new elite. But Weissman appears to assume that a real nationalist consensus existed.

Elsewhere, the analysis of internal politics is inadequate. The Katanga secession is argued as a Lunda-Yeke phenomenon, based on traditionalism. Yet the paramount ruler of the Lunda, the Mwaat Yav, was deeply suspicious of his son-in-law Moise Tshombe, who represented a competing lineage; the chief lived in mortal fear of a Tshombe assassination attempt. The "Yeke" are an extremely small group, with a miniscule representation in the copperbelt cities; they are visible only because of the folklore surrounding Msiri, the

ruler who created the group, and the prominence of some of his descendants, especially Godefroid Munongo. The argument that Lumumbist nationalism appealed to segmentary systems also fails to cope with the fact that large numbers of such groups did not support his party.

The main contribution of the Weissman study, however, is an examination of the dynamics of American policy in Zaire during the first years of independence. For the questions it raises, for the documentation and candor of its analysis, and for the alternative perspective it offers this book will take its place among the major sources of Zaire political history and American foreign policy studies.

M. CRAWFORD YOUNG
University of Wisconsin/Madison

The Conduct and Misconduct of Foreign Affairs: Reflections on U. S. Foreign Policy Since World War II. By Charles W. Yost. (New York: Random House, 1972. Pp. xvii, 234. $7.95.)

Charles Yost writes about important things with grace and a good measure of wisdom. He is one of this country's most versatile and experienced diplomats, having served finally as Ambassador to the United Nations; his book conveys a sense of personal witness.

Yost undertakes a dual task: to discover and criticize the sources of American foreign policy (the decisional apparatus, domestic influences, the psychology of leaders, the military), and to prescribe an improved world order.

His analysis of the "misconduct" of American diplomacy since World War II leans heavily on the alleged distortions of ideology and militarization. Like most limitationist liberals, Yost commends the policy making of the Truman years: Greek-Turkish aid, the Marshall Plan, NATO, Korea. In his words, "There has probably been no period in American history when the conduct of foreign affairs was both so significant and so successful" (p. 64). But somehow this period was also the foundation of the American stand in Vietnam, which most limitationist liberals have come to disapprove. Therefore they seek an analysis that will preserve their positive evaluation of the diplomacy of 1946–52 and yet explain and condemn consequences such as Vietnam.

Here is Yost's explanation:

> Because it was assumed that public support of limited and necessary objectives could only be assured by stating them in apocalyptic terms, as part of a world-wide struggle between good and evil, a doctrine was put forward, a precedent was set, and a moral commitment was assumed which was far more comprehensive and open-ended than the circumstances required; which helped create an enduring and militant climate of opinion in the United States; and which, two decades later, was to lure three other American Presidents into the morass of Vietnam (p. 36).

But the disembodied spirit of the Truman Doctrine—its ideology, or its license for "militarization"—didn't cause Vietnam. It was the structural categories of mind and system, and the similar morphology of situations that induced American intervention. One must either accept such military interventions or reject the fundamental categories that made them seem necessary. Yost is reluctant to do either.

Yost has some acute reflections on the use of military force and the organization of the Services (e.g., p. 94), though he misses the logical bite of the strategic debate of the 1950s and 1960s (massive retaliation, the discovery of its flaws and ultimate incredibility, and the necessity of either building adequate conventional forces or retreating from certain foreign policy objectives). Occasionally he wanders into trivia such as the size of our military missions (MAAGs) abroad (p. 106), and into "pop" criticism such as his deprecation of "worst case" planning (p. 96) and the "intoxication" with counterinsurgency (p. 106).

Yost proposes sensible and even bold suggestions for the internal reform of the State Department and the Foreign Service, to make them leaner and more responsible at all levels. He is sophisticated about intelligence (p. 161), skeptical about secrecy (p. 174), and constructive about the proliferation of agencies engaged in foreign affairs (p. 164)—he would consolidate their functions, even the economic ones, under the Secretary of State (p. 166). But he remains a partisan of the executive branch. Even after describing the egregious powers of the American president, he recommends only a bit more candor and some consultation "with the appropriate leaders of the Senate and House" (p. 168). This looks like business as usual between the branches.

Yost complains about the National Security Council—the option papers, the vapid State of the World messages, the crisis management. Curiously, he refers to Kissinger only obliquely through invidious code words; "If an outsider without practical experience in foreign affairs, even though he may have vast 'scientific' erudition and outstanding intellectual ability, is suddenly placed in an exalted position in government, such as that of National Security Adviser to the President, he may be tempted to try to carry out dogmatically some of the elegant but theoretical conceptions he has distilled in his ivory tower and elaborated in his books" (p. 171). Yost would employ such "outsiders" "in the middle ranks of the government foreign affairs apparatus" and be wary about promoting them.

The second large message of Yost's book is his blueprint for a more rational and humane international order. Basically, his is a "requisite" approach: Security, even survival, in the face of science, technology, and a shrinking world, *requires* "a single universal political structure" (p. 224). Actually Yost prescribes "four parallel elements." The first is simply more realistic and moral conduct of foreign policy by each powerful nation state. The second is "an association of developed democracies," which he admits might become an "imperial league" and even lead to an Orwellian tri-polar world. A more serious objection is that this element is not compatible with the next two elements in his own scheme. Yost is trying (literally) to have the best of all worlds. But, since the tendencies of several of his elements are contradictory, they should compel *choice*, rather than inspire superimposition.

The third element is "peaceful collaboration among superpowers." Yost does not mean a "concert of two, three, or five great powers, including one or both of the Communists" (p. 204)—only modest *ad hoc* agreements such as limitations of arms. But a "concert" of great powers is the necessary foundation for his fourth (and most important) element: "an eventual world federation," with a "central executive and parliament with overriding powers," and endowed with "sufficient preponderant military power to prevent large-scale violence" (pp. 182, 220, 223–225). But effective implementation of collective security requires, as the very minimum condition, the unimpaired operation of the UN Security Council—that is, the restriction of the veto of the great powers; and this requirement is like Aesop's fable about the mice belling the cat.

Why haven't the great powers put this system of collective security into operation? "All" that is lacking is the "will, determination and conviction" (pp. 217, 219)—which is to say, of course, that there are *reasons* why the great powers don't want that system to work. Inevitably, the case for supranational organization includes the notion of the obsolescence and demise of the nation-state: "the most stupendous of political anachronisms . . . the most archaic of systems of government" (pp. 44, 211). But in their assault on the nation-state, proponents of a federal world typically mistake the phenomenon of community—the conditions of trust, the limits of political delegation, the bases of legitimacy. These relationships are not supranational. If anything, they tend to be subnational; indeed, the nation-state might be their *highest* practicable expression. In situations where power is diffused and real interests are opposed and intractable, the "requisite" approach becomes simply a fond and self-validating wish-list. We might have to "do" with less than we "need." Though the problems and disasters might well be the product of the nation-state system, the solutions might also have to be within the powers of individual nation-states.

Yost's brief on the misconduct of foreign policy, though sweepingly presented, is not sustained; what we find are not incapacity or error or perversity, but deliberation and at least the illusion of necessity; not misconduct, but something closer to the essence of tragedy. And Yost's remedy of universal government, though perhaps "required," is not available, in the sense of being attainable through our efforts; or even if it were, at a cost and with consequences that would be bearable or desirable.

EARL C. RAVENAL

School of Advanced International Studies
The Johns Hopkins University
Washington, D. C.

Two acclaimed books focus on *The American Experience*



GROWING UP IN AMERICA

by Fred M. and Grace Hechinger

best and most readable

"It is the best and most readable single volume on how education and the nation have helped to shape each other."
—CLARK KERR


greatly needed

"This is a greatly needed book. It puts into healthy perspective the confusing and exciting history of education in the past two decades—and places them in the context of our growth and movement as a society. It should put us all back to work with concern and enthusiasm to solve the real problems of our schools and our society."
—JOHN W. GARDNER

must reading

"*Growing Up in America* is an excellent book. It places in perspective the critical role of public education in the move toward the fulfillment of the American dream. The successes and failures are placed in front of us coupled with observations which make it must reading for professional educators." —John Ryor, President National Education Association

$15.00



THE WEALTH OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

A History of American Affluence

by Oscar and Mary F. Handlin

challenging and thoughtful

A Pulitzer Prize-winning historian (author of *The Uprooted*) and his wife "have breathed freshness and clarity into... their explanation of how the widespread hardship and poverty of colonial times was gradually transformed into the comfort and affluence of the modern day... vivid vignettes and illuminating examples... challenging and thoughtful."
—Library Journal

the central economic question

"Closer to home is this historical study of issues that still affect our everyday lives. The Handlins, Oscar and Mary, have tackled the central economic question in *The Wealth of the American People*." —America

skillful

"A large amount of information is compressed into the Handlins' skillful blend of social and economic history that seeks to describe 'the past forms of human behavior involved in gaining and expanding wealth in the United States.'" —Publishers Weekly

$10.00

—At your bookstore or use this coupon—

Rev. 09

McGraw-Hill Book Company
Dept. PL, 25th Floor
1221 Avenue of the Americas
New York, N.Y. 10020

Please send me

_____copy(ies) of *Growing Up in America* @ $15.00

_____copy(ies) of *The Wealth of the American People* @ $10.00

Name_____

Address_____

City_____

State_____ Zip_____

Check or money order enclosed. Please add applicable taxes.

APSR

PATTERNS OF INTERRACIAL POLITICS

Conflict and Cooperation in the City

by PETER K. EISINGER

A Volume in the INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH ON POVERTY MONOGRAPH Series

In the 1960s, largely through the efforts of the War on Poverty, low-income, central-city blacks made substantial progress toward cohesion, a political voice, and their own political leaders or "elites." Thus the politics of large urban areas has become interracial politics.

This book is one of the few to attempt to make explicit the implications for elite behavior of the configurations of attitudes and behaviors of ordinary citizens. Based on survey data collected in Milwaukee in 1970, it details the patterns of political behavior and belief among blacks and whites in Milwaukee, and shows how these patterns help structure the context of costs and opportunities that bear on elites as they forge relations of conflict or cooperation between majority and minority groups. It deals with elites and masses, political integration and goals, and patterns of conventional political participation, and also presents survey data on issues, such as protest and community control, not normally covered in conventional surveys.

1975, 220 pp., $11.00/£5.70

QUANTITATIVE SOCIOLOGY

International Perspectives on Mathematical and Statistical Modeling

edited by H. M. BLALOCK, A. A. AGANBEGIAN, F. M. BORODKIN, RAYMOND BOUDON, and VITTORIO CAPECCHI

A Volume in the QUANTITATIVE STUDIES IN SOCIAL RELATIONS Series

The USA and the USSR, Eastern and Western Europe—sociologists and other social scientists from these countries and areas have contributed to this international review of mathematical and statistical modeling work. The result of a coordinated effort by an international board of editors, the volume falls into three parts. Part One deals with the philosophy of science, the notion of causation and its relation to probabilities and change processes, and alternative ways of developing and stating theories in formal languages capable of handling complex causal processes. Part Two is concerned with problems of design, measurement, and classification, both in terms of general strategies and new specific methodological approaches. The third part applies mathematical modeling to specific problems. The chapters are at various levels of mathematical sophistication, but presuppose a reasonable acquaintance with probability theory, applied multivariate analysis, and mathematical modeling in the social sciences.

1975, 654 pp., $18.50/£9.25

POLITICS AS SYMBOLIC ACTION

Mass Arousal and Quiescence

by MURRAY EDELMAN

A Volume in the INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH ON POVERTY MONOGRAPH Series

The central theme of this book is the shaping of mass political perceptions, beliefs, and wants through governmental acts, in contrast to the conventional assumption that government responds to the people's will but does not create it. The author explores the social psychological dynamics of shifts in people's perceptions of political interests, enemies, allies, threats, and reassurances. The work helps explain the recurring popular support for mass violence and for self-defeating courses of action, and examines the requisites for effective political action. The following changes are analyzed as facets of the same basic process, with systematic ties to each other: changes in political beliefs and perceptions; in attachments to mass movements; in political roles and self-conceptions; in emotions regarding political developments; and in the myths, metaphors, and language forms purporting to describe political events.

1971, 188 pp., $11.00/£5.70 (cloth); $3.95/£1.90 (paper)

N.B.: Postage plus 50¢ handling charge on all orders not accompanied by payment.

Prices subject to change without notice.

ACADEMIC PRESS

A Subsidiary of Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers

111 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10003

24-28 OVAL ROAD, LONDON NW1 7DX

SCHOOLING IN CAPITALIST AMERICA

Educational Reform and the Contradictions of Economic Life

Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis

Two widely respected economists present the first comprehensive radical critique of the American educational system and its role in our society. Offering a challenge to conservative and liberal educators alike, Bowles and Gintis demonstrate that our educational system never has, does not now and never will provide equality of opportunity for human development—unless and until the inherently unequal capitalist economy of which it is an integral part is abandoned. The result of a six-year collaboration drawing on their own extensive statistical and historical research, *Schooling in Capitalist America* points the way to the changes in our economic and social institutions which would finally bring about a truly humane and egalitarian system. "Should have the close attention of all who are concerned with education and especially of all who are concerned with educational change and reform."—**JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH.** "*Schooling in Capitalist America* will strike the educational establishment—and the American consciousness—with unquestioned force. *A book that will last.*"
—**JONATHAN KOZOL.** "A very rare combination of creative radical thinking and scientific rigor. Bowles and Gintis have written a book that no one concerned with the educational system can afford to ignore."
—**ANDRE GORZ.**
Just published $13.95

THE POWER OF NATIONS

Klaus Knorr

Building on the foundations of his seminal *Power and Wealth*, one of the country's most perceptive students of military power provides us with an in depth description and analysis of the various ways in which nations convert political and economic resources into international power and influence.
Just published Cloth: $16.95; Paper: $6.95

U.S. POWER AND THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION


Robert Gilpin

"An original attempt at linking the empirical study of private investment abroad by the leading world economic power to the theory of the international economic order, and a constructive suggestion for an alternative American economic policy."
—STANLEY HOFFMAN,
Harvard University
Just published $10.95

Available at bookstores or order direct from the publisher.

NEW. SIGNIFICANT.
BASIC
BASIC BOOKS INC.
10 EAST 53RD ST, NEW YORK 10022

As the nation reflects on the past 200 years



...with McGraw-Hill texts

INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL SCIENCE, Third Edition
The Late **CARLTON CLYMER RODEE**, **TOTTON J. ANDERSON**, **CARL Q. CHRISTOL**, and **THOMAS H. GREEN**, all of the University of Southern California
Dynamically written, well balanced, and completely updated, the third edition of this distinguished text continues to focus on the relationships between the people and government in modern society. It covers the fundamental concepts and principles of political organization. Studies modern government from not only an empirical but a comparative perspective. And examines the functions, operations, policies and problems of modern government, as well as the forces impinging upon it. Placing greater emphasis on identification of political issues and political tools for problem solving, this new edition has been shortened by 100 pages, thoroughly rewritten, reorganized for greater clarity, and now incorporates a significant amount of student aids. 1976, 528 pages, $12.95, Instructor's Manual available

POLITICS: IDEALS AND REALITIES
GEORGE McKENNA, City College of New York
Talking to its readers, not down to them, this brief introductory text attempts to analyze American political institutions from a human standpoint. It synthesizes the best features of "orthodox" and "point of view" texts by combining a lively, provocative style with sound organization, basic information, and a contemporary awareness of issues. A populist citizen-participation theme runs throughout the text. Although Politics: Ideals and Realities takes the whole of American history for its background, the chief focus is on American politics since the end of World War II. 1976, 416 pages, softcover, $6.95

in Political Science

STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, Fourth Edition
CHARLES R. ADRIAN, University of California, Riverside
Combining a lively, readable style, emphasis on politics and process, and free use of material from other disciplines, this popular text helps students to view state and local governments as political—rather than merely administrative—entities. The fourth edition continues to cover the legal status of states, intergovernmental relations, the politics of elections, and governmental functions. It adds the latest research findings on recent constitution construction, trends in voter participation, and state and local finance—with special attention to revenue sharing. And the text now gives attention to the increasing interest in studying state and local governments on a comparative basis. 1976, 544 pages, $12.95

POLITICS AND POLITICAL SYSTEMS: An Introduction to Political Science
JOHN W. ELLSWORTH and **ARTHUR A. STAHNKE**, Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville
Encouraging critical thought and an understanding of politics as a social process, this beginning text introduces students to the wide variations in political systems and shows how each system deals with problems common to all. The text is organized around a comparative framework that avoids ethnocentric bias. Five contemporary political systems are contrasted with two simple models to point out their similarities and differences. The book is clear, concise, and readable and considers the latest political events and developments in the discipline. 1976, 384 pages, $10.95

FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT
AND POLITICAL SCIENCE SERIES

POLITICS AND VOTERS, Fourth Edition
HUGH A. BONE, University of Washington, and **AUSTIN RANNEY**, University of Wisconsin
A brief, well-illustrated summary of elections, political parties, and American politics, Politics and Voters guides students through the purpose, characteristics, and problems of the American national and local political parties. It analyzes how candidates are nominated, probes the strategies and factors in campaigning for office, and clarifies the role of pressure groups and policy making in the U.S. Added to this edition is coverage of new campaign laws, changes in national convention practices, and public interest groups. 1976, 192 pages, softcover, $3.95

THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM, Fourth Edition
C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, University of California, Santa Barbara
This concise, but comprehensive overview of the constitutional foundations of the American political system imparts an understanding of the structure, function, powers, and limitations of the American constitutional system; the operation of the principal branches of government; and the pattern of constitutional rights guaranteed by the Constitution. Important recent developments are included in this fourth edition, particularly those concerned with the Nixon presidency, impeachment, and resignation. 1976, 160 pages, softcover, $4.95

LIBERTY IN THE BALANCE, Fourth Edition
H. FRANK WAY, University of California, Riverside
Thoroughly updated—with over 80% of the text completely revised—this popular book continues to give in-depth treatment to selected contemporary problems in American civil and political liberties. Recognizing the student's interest in current constitutional issues, the author provides a broader discussion of these issues than is generally possible in a case book. New material has been added on women's rights, school desegregation and busing, social and economic justice and freedom of expression. 1976, 176 pages, softcover $3.95

Prices subject to change

McGraw-Hill Book Company
COLLEGE DIVISION
1221 Avenue of the Americas
New York, N.Y. 10020

Students, professors, and those interested in the study of politics and government are invited to become members of the AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

JOIN APSA

membership includes:

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW—quarterly journal of scholarly articles and book reviews in political science, and

PS—quarterly journal of association news and articles of professional concern.

Opportunity to register in the APSA Personnel Service—currently lists the largest number of political science teaching and research positions.

Attend the APSA Annual Meeting, September 2-5, 1976, Chicago, Illinois.

Name_____

Mailing Address_____

_____ (Zip)_____

This is an application for membership. Upon receipt of this form we will mail you a membership card and begin a year's subscription to the AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW and PS.

Student $12 ☐

Annual

If your annual income is under $12,000 $20 ☐

$12-15,000 $25 ☐

over $15,000 $30 ☐

Please send with remittance to:

Membership Secretary
AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION
1527 New Hampshire Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

Add $2 for foreign postage.

Random House brings you the best texts for your political science courses.

THE MIGHT OF NATIONS
World Politics in Our Time

NEW

Fifth Edition

John G. Stoessinger, Hunter College of the City University of New York

An important work by an author known for excellence in his field, this introductory text continues to be the mainstay of political science courses wherever and however they are taught. Professor Stoessinger clearly delineates the political aspects of the world struggle for *power* and *order* and goes further to integrate the economic, military, and psychological elements that are inseparable from the political picture. The fifth edition has been updated to include the most recent developments in international relations and contains vital new material on: The Middle East since 1972; global economic problems; the U.S. and Southeast Asia; the diplomacy of Henry Kissinger; detente between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. and China; Common Market; and other current topics.

Random House/ October 1975/460 pages paperbound/Order Code: 30402

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT TODAY

Excellent for an introductory course in American Government! Using this text, students learn to *analyze* government and its actions, rather than simply reviewing the facts. Organized so that the material can be used in any sequence, *American Government Today* examines how priorities are established and how public policy decisions are made and executed within the political process. The writing is free from technical jargon and terminology. Some of the particularly valuable chapters include: *Wealth and Its Distribution; Foreign Affairs and National Security; Race and Government;* and *American Ideology*. An extensive graphics program, much of it in full color, provides interest and reinforcement for the text material. *Instructor's Manual* and *Student Study Guide* available.

Random House/CRM/1974/515 pages hardbound/
Order Codes: 30025, 30032 (I.M.), 30031 (S.S.G.)

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT
Democracy and Liberty in Balance

NEW

Ruth C. Silva, Pennsylvania State University, **Edward Keynes,** Pennsylvania State University, **Hugh A. Bone,** University of Washington, **David W. Adamany,** University of Wisconsin

A basic text on American politics that examines Congress, the Presidency, and the Judiciary with a focus on the conflict between individual freedom and majority rule. In the two opening sections, the authors explore the origins and development of liberal democracy and of political participation, providing students with a firm foundation for the examination of contemporary institutions and problems. The text also presents the most recent findings of studies which test the extent to which the American system succeeds or fails in measuring up to the normative standards of the liberal-democratic model — a model which the authors explicitly support. *Instructor's Manual* available.

Alfred A. Knopf/March 1976/544 pages hardbound/
Order Code: 31644, 31176 (I.M.)

For information or to order, write:

Random House/Alfred A. Knopf
Desk 28, 400 Hahn Road, Westminster, Maryland 21157



Congress Investigates 1792-1974

A brand-new, one-volume abridgement of the original five-volume work!

The roster of people, events, investigations and ideologies associated with Congressional investigatory committees reads like a dramatic textbook on the major themes of American history. And beneath the confrontations and disclosures lay the gnawing questions which their activities raise in regard to the Constitution, the Courts, the Presidency, and the people.

The 5-volume *Congress Investigates: A Documented History 1792-1974* was the first comprehensive, scholarly, fully-documented work on this important subject, consisting of in-depth essays by outstanding scholars on 29 historically significant investigations, and hundreds of related documents.

Now the distinguished editors of that set—Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. and Roger Bruns—have selected 16 of the most important essays and reproduced them in their entirety for this one-volume abridged edition.

St. Clair's Defeat, 1792
Indian Rations and Sam Houston's Trial, 1832
The Covode Committee, 1860
The Conduct of the War, 1861
Joint Committee on Reconstruction, 1865
Andrew Johnson's Impeachment, 1867
The Pujo Committee, 1912
Teapot Dome, 1924
The Pecora Wall Street Expose, 1934
The Nye Munitions Committee, 1934
The Dies Committee, 1938
The Truman Committee, 1941
The Kefauver Committee, 1950
The MacArthur Inquiry, 1951
The McCarthy Era, 1954
The Watergate Inquiry, 1973.

Each essay contains a bibliography and a listing of important documents. Professor Schlesinger has contributed an in-depth introductory essay. A comprehensive index rounds out the work.

507 pgs. $15.95.

For the full sweep of the 29 investigations, and the hundreds of documents, get the 5-volume set!

In addition to 13 more probing, analytical essays, *Congress Investigates: A Documented History 1792-1974* presents hundreds of documents, some in their entirety and some excerpted. They were gleaned from private collections, printed speeches and Congressional documents; retrieved from previously unpublished Congressional records, newspapers and contemporary articles.

4,103 pages. $150 the set.

Both books published by **Chelsea House Publishers** in association with **R.R. Bowker.**

Order on 30-day approval from:
R.R. Bowker Order Dept.
P.O. Box 1807
Ann Arbor, Mich. 48106.

Outside Western Hemisphere:
Bowker, Erasmus House, Epping, Essex, England.

All orders plus shipping and handling. Sales tax added where applicable. (Prices subject to change without notice.)

BOWKER
NEW YORK & LONDON

RECENT BOOKS FROM HARPER & ROW

PRESIDENTIAL STYLE
Some Giants and a Pygmy in the White House
By Samuel and Dorothy Rosenman; introduction by James MacGregor Burns. Personal experiences of Samuel Rosenman, a distinguished presidential adviser, are the basis for this lively excursion into the varied styles of Theodore Roosevelt, Wilson, FDR, Truman and Harding. "Interesting and valuable,"—*Library Journal.* $16.95

TODAY AND TOMORROW IN AMERICA
By Martin Mayer. The author of *The Bankers, The Lawyers,* and *Madison Ave., U.S.A.* analyzes the major forces that shape today's world and its crises—and shows how individuals can help plan for the future. $8.95

JAPAN TODAY
People, Places, Power
By William H. Forbis; foreword by Senator Mike Mansfield. An eminent journalist tells why Japan has become and will remain a dynamic force in the world. "A fact-filled, interesting book . . . and surely one of the most valuably up-to-date." —*Publishers Weekly.* $12.95

THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MILITARY HISTORY
Revised Edition
By R. Ernest Dupuy, Col. U.S.A., Ret., and Trevor N. Dupuy, Col., U.S.A., Ret. Now updated through 1973, this mammoth survey includes the "official" end of the Vietnam War and the October War in the Middle East. 1,488 pages, 150 line drawings, 75 photographs, maps, charts. $22.50


UP FROM COMMUNISM
Conservative Odysseys in American Intellectual History
By John P. Diggins. A lively cultural history of the cold war focusing on the lives of four writers who moved on separate paths from Left to Right: Max Eastman, John Dos Passos, Will Herberg, and James Burnham. "Fine, reflective, thoughtful and deeply interesting."—*Irving Howe.* $20.00

At bookstores Harper & Row
10 E. 53rd St., New York 10022
1817

Alfred

The new name in POLITICAL SCIENCE

INTRODUCES...



A TEXT AND READER IN ONE BOOK!

Covers all basic areas and concepts of the American government system

Includes basic introductory material for each chapter plus selected readings representing various views on important issues

Is illustrated with useful diagrams, charts and drawings

Is easy to read

THE ART OF POLITICS

Electoral Strategies and Campaign Management

Brown & Seib

A STEP-BY-STEP GUIDE TO THE PRACTICE OF ELECTORAL POLITICS

Features:

An overview of party politics and American voting behavior

A discussion of aggregate data and survey methods

An update on campaign financing after Watergate



FOR STUDENTS AND PROFESSIONALS CONCERNED WITH INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS . . .

. . . A TEXT WHICH ANALYZES THE IMPACT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY HAS HAD AND IS LIKELY TO HAVE ON ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL RELATIONS IN THE WORLD

COMING . . .

"PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION" *by* Simmons & Dvorin

Alfred PUBLISHERS

ALFRED PUBLISHING CO., INC.
Dept. PS
75 Channel Drive
Port Washington, N.Y. 11050

ORDER YOUR EXAMINATION COPY NOW!

FROM D.C. HEATH

DIALECTICAL ECONOMICS:
AN INTRODUCTION TO MARXIST POLITICAL ECONOMY
Lyn Marcus, National Caucus of Labor Committees
1975 *Cloth* *490 pages*

THE TERMS OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE
William E. Connolly, University of Massachusetts—Amherst
1974 *Paper* *216 pages*

PERSPECTIVES ON THE PRESIDENCY: A COLLECTION
Stanley Bach and George T. Sulzner, both of the University of Massachusetts—Amherst
1974 *Paper* *411 pages*

THE COLD WARRIORS: A POLICY-MAKING ELITE
John C. Donovan, Bowdoin College
1974 *Paper* *294 pages*

THE SOCIAL REALITY OF ETHNIC AMERICA
Rudolph Gomez, The University of Texas—El Paso
Clement Cottingham, Jr., University of Pennsylvania
Russell Endo, The University of Colorado
Kathleen Jackson, The University of Washington—Seattle
1974 *Paper* *412 pages*

AMERICAN POLITICS: POLICIES, POWER, AND CHANGE
SECOND EDITION
Kenneth M. Dolbeare, University of Massachusetts—Amherst
Murray J. Edelman, University of Wisconsin
1974 *Paper* *569 pages*

SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND POLITICAL THEORY
William E. Connolly and Glen Gordon, both of the University of Massachusetts—Amherst
1974 *Paper* *267 pages*

ON THE CITY'S RIM: POLITICS AND POLICY IN SUBURBIA
Frederick M. Wirt, University of Illinois, Urbana
Benjamin Walter, Vanderbilt University
Francine F. Rabinovitz, University of California—Los Angeles
Deborah R. Hensler, Rand Corporation
1972 *Paper* *252 pages*

REPORTERS AND OFFICIALS:
THE ORGANIZATION AND POLITICS OF NEWSMAKING
Leon V. Sigal, Wesleyan University
1973 *Paper* *221 pages*

MODERN COMPETING IDEOLOGIES
L. Earl Shaw, University of Minnesota
1973 *Paper* *428 pages*

A PREFACE TO POLITICS
David F. Schuman, University of Washington
1972 *Paper* *195 pages*

From our Problems in American Civilization Series. . .

Harry S. Truman and the Fair Deal
Alonzo L. Hamby, Ohio University
1974 *Paper* *224 pages*

RACE AND ETHNICITY IN MODERN AMERICA
Richard J. Meister, University of Michigan—Flint
1974 *Paper* *198 pages*

THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR
SECOND EDITION
Thomas G. Paterson, University of Connecticut
1974 *Paper* *274 pages*

HEATH

For details or sample copies, call us **toll free: 800-225-1388**.
In Massachusetts, call collect: **617-862-6650.**

A Raytheon Company

D.C. Heath and Company
Home Office: 125 Spring Street, Lexington, Massachusetts 02173
Sales Offices: Atlanta, Ga. 30318 / St. Louis, Mo. 63132 / San Antonio, Texas 78217 / Novato, Calif. 94947 / Toronto, Ontario M5H 1S9



The first reviews are in on this dynamic analysis of parties and voters

EVERETT CARLL LADD, JR. with CHARLES D. HADLEY

TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEM

Political Coalitions from the New Deal to the 1970s

SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET: "*Transformations of the American Party System* clarifies for layman and professional alike what is happening to the American political system. It combines survey analysis with a sophisticated treatment of underlying trends. It deserves a wide readership."

SAMUEL LUBELL: "Much-needed . . . clears the way for fresh thinking about our political parties."

AUSTIN RANNEY: "Anyone seriously concerned with understanding what is happening to our party system and why should read and ponder this study."

HEINZ EULAU: "Ladd and Hadley demonstrate that dismal statistics can make fascinating reading if treated in context and historical perspective."

SAMUEL H. BEER: "A splendid piece of work. I don't know of a more sophisticated treatment of the New Deal coalition and its fate. I put the book to work immediately in a course on the politics of federalism."

xxv + 371 pages $12.50 cloth $4.95 paper

*Initial report: Over 80 adoptions for this new text on the legislative process in its first 8 months**

RANDALL B. RIPLEY, *The Ohio State University*

CONGRESS

Process and Policy

"Out of his rich personal experience and ripe scholarship, Professor Ripley has written a timely book on Congress. His volume is well-organized, perceptive, and thorough both in its description and in its analysis of congressional organization and operation, congressional relationships to the president and to the bureaucracy, and the role of congressional parties."

—Charles M. Hardin, *University of California, Davis*

352 pages $9.95 cloth

*Write to the publisher for a full adoption list.

Norton

W·W·NORTON & COMPANY·INC·

500 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10036



F.E. PEACOCK Publishers, Inc.

New Titles

ROBERT D. CANTOR's

Introduction to International Politics

This new text is written at a very basic level and intended for the first course. It is both interesting and attractive, placing more emphasis upon the dynamics of international politics as opposed to theory.

The text has a certain timeliness with considerable material taken from speeches, official documents and news articles.

Spring 1976 400 pages c. $6.50 paper

ALEC BARBROOK's

Patterns of Political Behaviour

A survey of the literature which has grown out of the attempt to analyze political behavior in a manner which purports to emphasize description rather than prescription.

Spring 1976 209 pages c. $4.95 paper

ROBERT D. CANTOR's

Voting Behavior & Presidential Elections

Analyzes all the prominent theories of voting behavior and examines their validity in the light of electoral reality.

1975 139 pages $3.75 paper

FELIX A. NIGRO and LLOYD G. NIGRO's

The New Public Personnel Administration

An analysis of public personnel administration as it exists today, with emphasis on basic issues in public personnel policy. Provides a theoretical framework, based on open system theory, for understanding the relationship between personnel administration and organizations.

Spring 1976 320 pages c. $8.95 cloth



F. E. PEACOCK PUBLISHERS, INC.
ITASCA, ILLINOIS 60143

Cornell University Press

Timely new perspectives on the international scene...

The International Politics of Natural Resources

By ZUHAYR MIKDASHI. By tripling oil prices, OPEC has dramatized the conflict between resource-producing countries and giant transnational enterprises. This book takes a close look at the major producers of today's most sought after commodities and deals with the ever-shifting pattern of cooperation and antagonism between transnational enterprises and their host governments. Mr. Mikdashi's shrewd, impartial analysis of international dealings in oil, copper, iron, sulfur, uranium, bauxite, and tin clarifies complex contemporary problems and points the way toward solving them. $12.50 (April)

The New Economics of Growth

A Strategy for India and the Developing World

By JOHN W. MELLOR. A top specialist offers a bold new blueprint for alleviating poverty in the underdeveloped world by increasing the participation of the poor in the growth process. Pointing out the inadequacies of current development practices, Mr. Mellor sets forth a high-employment strategy centered on increased agricultural production. He tests his plan in the context of India—the stronghold of the capital-intensive approach to development, which has so far produced disappointing rates of growth and little or no improvement in the economic condition of lower income groups. His book may well have a vital impact on the future welfare of the developing world. A Twentieth Century Fund Study. $11.50 (April)

The Dynamics of the Nuclear Balance

Revised Edition

By ALBERT LEGAULT and GEORGE LINDSEY. Highly praised when first published in 1974, this clear and forceful summary of the intricacies of the strategic nuclear balance has been revised and updated to include material on negotiations subsequent to SALT I.



The authors have also added information concerning technological changes in ballistic missiles and selective targeting options. "A to Z of the strategic arms race. ...Perhaps the best introductory work now available for the general reader."—*Foreign Affairs* $14.50 (July)

CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS ITHACA AND LONDON

LO SPETTATORE INTERNAZIONALE

A quarterly review of international politics published in English by the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) of Rome. Each issue contains articles by Italian and foreign authors and a regular survey of Italy's position in international politics and commerce.

Among the articles published in the second issue of 1975 were the following:

Udo Steinbach—*The Situation in the Balkan Countries after the Cyprus Crisis*

Stefano Silvestri/Cesare Merlini—*Politico-Military Evolution in the Mediterranean Area and the Southern European Situation*

Mohamed Sid-Ahmed—*Analysis of the Politico-Military Evolution in the Mediterranean*

Hisham Sharabi—*The Middle East Conflict*

In forthcoming issues of 1975 articles on European defense, price management and monetary problems, and Italy's role in international affairs will be featured.

Editor-in-chief: Cesare Merlini

Editorial Offices: Istituto Affari Internazionali
88 Viale Mazzini, 00195—Rome

Subscription Rates for 1975:

Italy	Lit. 5000
Europe	Lit. 6000 or $9.50
Other countries	Lit. 7000 or $11.00

Orders should be sent directly to the publisher:

Società editrice il Mulino
Via S. Stefano 6—P.O. Box 119
40100 Bologna, Italy

Statement of Ownership, Management and Circulation

Required by Act of October 23, 1962:
Section 4369, Title 39, United States Code

1. **Date of Filing:** October 1, 1975

2. **Title of Publication:** American Political Science Review

3. **Frequency of Issue:**
Quarterly in March, June, September and December.

4. **Location of Known Office of Publication:**
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

5. **Location of the Headquarters or General Business Offices of the Publishers:**
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

6. **Names and Addresses of Publisher and Editor:**
Publisher:
American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
Editor:
Nelson W. Polsby, Dept. of Political Science
University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720

7. **Owner:**
American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

8. **Known Bondholders, Mortgagees, etc.:**
None

9. The purpose, function and nonprofit status of this organization and the exempt status for Federal income tax purposes have not changed during the preceding 12 months.

10. **Extent and Nature of Circulation:**

	Average No. Copies Each Issue During Preceding 12 Months	Actual No. Copies Single Issue Nearest to Filing Date
A. Total Number Copies Printed	17,500	17,500
B. Paid Circulation		
1. Sales	None	
2. Mail Subscriptions	15,000	15,000
C. Total Paid Circulation	15,000	15,000
D. Free Distribution by Mail, Carrier or Other Means	0	0
E. Total Distribution (C + D)	15,000	15,000
F. Office Use, Left-Over, Unaccounted, Spoiled after Printing	2,500	2,500
G. Total	17,500	17,500

presses de la fondation nationale des sciences politiques

27 RUE SAINT-GUILLAUME 75341 PARIS CEDEX 07 FRANCE TEL 222 32 30

La politique soviétique au Moyen-Orient, 1955-1975, by Hélène Carrère d'Encausse. From Stalin's death to today, the Middle Eastern policy of the Soviet Union has experienced far reaching changes. To expose its inner logic the author has skilfully joined a description of the thread of events to a perceptive ideological analysis.
328 p. **68,00 F** ISBN 2-7246-0335-4

L'agitation paysanne en Russie, de 1881 *à* 1902, by Sylvain Bensidoun. Peasant revolts in Imperial Russian provinces studied through hitherto unpublished archives and minutely reconstituted here were indeed a prelude to Revolution and tolled the bell for the Romanov dynasty. This book is a major new event for the student of Russian affairs and for the general public: today more than ever before, it rests at the heart of historical analysis.
496 p. **96,00 F** ISBN 2-7246-0332-X

L'Algérie politique : institutions et régime, by Jean Leca and Jean-Claude Vatin. Origin and growth of an independent political system: the Algerian State is perceived as an "administrative State" whose centralized bureaucracy sees the resolution of all political conflicts and claims.
512 p. **120,00 F** ISBN 2-7246-0331-1

Instituteurs algériens, 1883-1939 by Fanny Colonna. How a colonial school system was able, at a decisive historical moment for Algeria, to evolve an intermediary group between the ruling and the ruled.
240 p. **58,00 F** ISBN 2-7246-0333-8

Les paysans face au progrès, by Maryvonne Bodiguel. Strategies and oppositions to agricultural innovation in rural France seen and analyzed as a field study.
180 p. **48,00 F** ISBN 2-7246-0334-6

Histoire de mots : culture et civilisation, by Philippe Bénéton. Through the semantics of *culture* and *civilization* this book introduces us to Western ideological evolution.
168 p. **50,00 F** ISBN 2-7246-0330-3

PLEASE ALSO NOTE THAT
as of January 1, 1976, we shall also be our own distributors for the
Revue française de science politique
and also, for all titles previously published in our series (catalogue available on request)

Financing the New Federalism

Revenue Sharing, Conditional Grants, and Taxation
edited by Wallace E. Oates

This assessment of the effects of recent revenue sharing programs shows how they have modified the structure of intergovernmental fiscal relations. Dealing with the political and fiscal implications, the contributors outline and evaluate incentives in the existing program, uncovering a number of striking anomalies. Their papers help elucidate how state and local governments respond to federal grants of various types. Published for Resources for the Future, Inc. $12.00 hardcover, $3.95 paperback.

new paperbacks

Corporate Power and Social Change

The Politics of the Life Insurance Industry
Karen Orren

"The men who run these companies and the investment decisions they make have an important impact on the way we live, yet Karen Orren . . . is one of the few scholars to have examined them." — *The Nation* $3.45 paperback, $10.00 hardcover.

Dissent in the USSR

Politics, Ideology, and People
edited by Rudolf L. Tökés


"A comprehensive and penetrating analysis of an important new political phenomenon in the Soviet Union. . . ." — *Zbigniew Brzezinski, Director of the Research Institute on Communist Affairs, Columbia University.*

$4.95 paperback, $15.00 hardcover.

The Johns Hopkins University Press
Baltimore, Maryland 21218

Johns Hopkins

New Candidates for the '76 Classroom



American Government: Past, Present, Future

Theodore L. Becker, University of Hawaii

American Government: Past, Present, Future is a refreshing new text with a point of view—it shows students what has gone wrong since 1776 in American law, political processes, and the institutions set forth by the Constitution.

Approaching American politics as a novel blend of political ideology, governmental structure, and constitutional law, Theodore Becker guides the beginning student through the origins of constitutional ideology, the decline of the original and traditional political ideologies, official lawlessness and political corruption, and suggestions for re-evolution. Becker places his topics in the context of elections and the parties, the separation of powers, the Bill of Rights, the Presidency, Congress, the Judiciary and the Bureaucracy.


The text responds to student apathy and cynicism about government by directing students to the problems of involvement in the systems—agreeing that the system has major problems—but asserting that the structure is not doomed. 1976, paperbound, 560 pp.

Parties and Politics in America

Frank B. Feigert, State University of New York at Brockport
M. Margaret Conway, University of Maryland

This new text examines the origins and functions of U.S. political parties, contrasting them with other political entities such as political movements, interest groups, and political factions. Parties are viewed as having three elements—the party in the electorate, the party organization, and the party in the government. Each element is examined in detail, and the interrelationships of the three are considered. The environmental factors which shape the nature of American political parties and their operating characteristics are also discussed.
1975, 6-1/8 x 9-1/4, 432 pages.

Allyn and Bacon, Inc., College Division,
Dept. 893, 470 Atlantic Ave., Boston, MA 02210



Political Behavior of the American Electorate, Third Edition

William H. Flanigan, University of Minnesota and Nancy H. Zingale, Lakewood Community College

Designed for courses in electoral behavior and American Government, this book includes 1972 Presidential data largely taken from the Survey Research Center and the Inter-university Consortium for Political Research, both at the University of Michigan. The authors analyze voting data and behavior over the past century; partisan political forces; and political opinion as linked to psychological and social factors.

1975, 5-1/2 x 8-1/2, paperbound, 208 pages

Patterns of American Foreign Policy

Gene E. Rainey, University of North Carolina at Asheville

Utilizing the latest theories and empirical research, this text presents a highly readable and comprehensive survey of American foreign policy. The author organizes the varied decisions, policies, and programs into "patterns" or identifiable regularities of diplomatic behavior. The book's final sections deal with ecology, energy crisis, Watergate, and suggest patterns to continue or change with innovative politics.

1975, 6-3/8 x 9-1/4, 405 pages

State and Local Government in America, Third Edition

Daniel R. Grant, Ouachita Baptist University and H.C. Nixon

This highly respected text maintains a balanced treatment of behavioral material and institutional studies by incorporating the latest research and developments in political science. The author discusses: ethnic and black politics, the new ecology and consumerism politics, crime control, justice for the poor, and the political impact of the 26th Amendment.

1975, 7-1/2 x 9-1/2, 559 pages

The Craft of Public Administration

George E. Berkley, Northeastern University

Without neglecting theoretical issues, the book focuses on problems public administrators face and their solutions. The text discusses the anatomy and physiology of organization; personnel practices and problems; leadership; communication; budgeting, and the use of consultants. The actual case studies in each chapter illustrate the practitioner-oriented administrative techniques.

1975, 6-3/16 x 9-1/4, 504 pages

★★★

NEW FROM HOOVER

HERBERT HOOVER: President of the United States
Edgar E. Robinson & Vaughn D. Bornet

"a lucid, well-researched and illuminating account of a generally significant period in American history . . . a must for all students of the period."
— Ellis W. Hawley/$12.95

YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL — COMMUNIST AFFAIRS: 1976
Richard F. Staar, editor

". . . an invaluable research tool for study of communist countries or the communist movement anywhere in the world.
— Ellsworth Raymond, *Perspective*/$25.00

RADICALS IN THE UNIVERSITY
Edward E. Ericson, Jr./$11.00

DIPLOMATS AND BUREAUCRATS: The First Institutional Responses to Twentieth-Century Diplomacy in France and Germany
Paul G. Lauren/$11.00

VALUE FOR MONEY: The Hong Kong Budgetary Process
Alvin Rabushka/$9.95


CONSCRIPTION: A Select and Annotated Bibliography
Martin C. Anderson/price not set

AMORAL AMERICA
George C.S. Benson & Thomas S. Engeman/$8.95

THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: A Morphology of the Welfare State
Roger A. Freeman/$8.95 Cloth
$5.95 Paper

THE STRUGGLE FOR CYPRUS
Charles Foley & W.I. Scobie/$7.95

EGYPT'S YOUNG REBELS "Young Egypt": 1933-1952
James P. Jankowski/$7.00



HOOVER INSTITUTION PRESS
Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305

Frantz Fanon

Social and Political Thought

By Emmanuel Hansen. A major study that extracts and synthesizes, from the rich corpus of his writings, the coherent system of social and political thought of the almost legendary revolutionary who died in 1961 at the age of thirty-six. Fanon's mature philosophy is traced in the course of a life whose principal episodes parallel the growth in his vision and influence—from a youth spent under the brutal repression of a military dictatorship in his native Martinique, through the years of his medical career in France, to the final period of revolutionary activity in Algeria, his adopted homeland.

$15.00

Social Movements, Violence, and Change

The May Movement in Curaçao

By William A. Anderson and Russell R. Dynes. The dramatic events of May, 1969, when a massive riot involving thousands of workers, under the leadership of black radicals and labor extremists, was to result in the wanton destruction of millions of dollars' worth of property, are examined as episodes in the larger movement for social change on the formerly placid island in the Netherlands Antilles that has now emerged as an active member of the tumultuous Third World of developing nations. Illus. $12.50

The New Deal

Edited by John Braeman, Robert H. Bremner, and David Brody. Two volumes of original essays—the first devoted to *The National Level,* and the second to *The State and Local Levels*—that address such questions as: How new, in fact, was Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal? What alternatives, if any, were really available to its principal policy makers? How successful, in the last analysis, was the Roosevelt administration in disciplining, liberalizing, and humanizing capitalism? And what, ultimately, has been the enduring effect of Roosevelt's policies and programs in the shaping of modern America. $30.00 the set.

Poland and the Coming of the Second World War


The Diplomatic Papers of A. J. Drexel Biddle, Jr., United States Ambassador to Poland, 1937–1939

Edited by Philip V. Cannistraro, Edward D. Wynot, Jr., and Theodore P. Kovaleff. President Franklin D. Roosevelt's appointment in 1937 of his personal friend and political ally to the chief diplomatic post in Poland signaled a significant increase in official American concern over the impending crisis in Europe. Biddle served in Warsaw until the outbreak of war between Poland and Germany, when he accompanied the government on its flight into exile. His papers from this period, published here for the first time, provide a thoroughly fascinating account of the nature, scope, tactics, and tragic impact of the beginning of Nazi aggression.

$17.50

The Holy War

Edited by Thomas Patrick Murphy. The taking up of arms with bellicose intent of destroying one's enemies, in full confidence that the shedding of blood is sanctified by divine will, or is at least justified by the rectitude of one's humane cause, is subjected to study, in seven original essays, as a recurring phenomenon in the history of man, who continues to find ample sanctions for committing acts of aggressive violence against the alien both outside and within his culture. Illus. $15.00



OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY PRESS

2070 Neil Avenue, Columbus 43210



Supplementary Empirical Teaching Units in Political Science: American Politics

New computer related instructional materials whereby students learn important substantive topics in American politics as they learn methods of analysis.

Seven SETUPS are Available Now for Class Use

Voting Behavior: The 1972 Election by Bruce D. Bowen, C. Anthony Broh, Charles L. Prysby.

Political Socialization Across the Generations by Paul Allen Beck, Jere W. Bruner, L. Douglas Dobson.

Political Participation by F. Christopher Arterton, Harlan Hahn.

The Supreme Court in American Politics: Policy Through Law by John Paul Ryan, C. Neal Tate.

U.S. Energy, Environment and Economic Problems: A Public Policy Simulation by Barry Hughes.

Representation in the United States Congress: 1973 by Ray A. Geigle and Peter J. Hartjens.

The Dynamics of Political Budgeting: A Public Policy Simulation by Marvin K. Hoffman.

Each SETUPS is a module that can be taught in one to two weeks. SETUPS were designed to supplement instruction in introductory courses. But SETUPS have been field tested successfully in upper division courses. SETUPS were developed by faculty in a workshop supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation to the American Political Science Association and hosted by the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research, summer, 1974.

Each SETUPS Module Includes a Monograph and a Data Set

The monograph is a 5½" x 8½" paperback of approximately 100 pages with:

1. A substantive essay on the topic.
2. Analytical exercises.
3. Instructions about how to do the exercises.
4. Suggestions for further readings and exercises.
5. A code book for the data set.

The data set is prepared and distributed by the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research. The SETUPS data can be ordered for use with SPSS, OSIRIS or as card image.

The minimum SETUPS order is 25 copies–in any combination of titles. Each SETUPS will cost $4.00. Lower prices are arranged for bulk orders. An order for 25 or more SETUPS will entitle you to the data sets for *all the SETUPS* at no extra charge.

TO ORDER SETUPS

Fill out the form below and the SETUPS Monographs will be sent to your bookstore. When we confirm the bookstore order, we shall send you a data-specification form.

Please complete and return this form to:

SETUPS: American Politics
American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

Name_____

Department_____

College_____

Address_____

City_____ State_____ Zip_____

I am planning to use the following SETUPS in_____ (course title), Fall, 1975.

No._____ of: *Voting Behavior*

No._____ of: *Political Socialization*

No._____ of: *Political Participation*

No._____ of: *The Supreme Court in American Politics*

No._____ of: *Public Policy: U.S. Energy, Environment and Economic Problems*

No._____ of: *Representation in the United States Congress: 1973*

No._____ of: *The Dynamics of Political Budgeting*

The Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin America

COLE BLASIER

This first comprehensive, comparative study of U.S. responses to revolutions in Latin American countries is based on previously unused sources in German and Russian as well as Spanish and English. The revolutionary process in Latin America has tended to pass through three stages: rebellion, reformism, and revolutionary change. Dr. Blasier describes the extensive and complex relations between Latin American and U.S. leaders in these stages primarily in Mexico, Bolivia, Guatemala, and Cuba. He explains why U.S. leaders sponsored paramilitary units to overthrow revolutionary governments in Guatemala and Cuba and compromised their differences with revolutionary governments in Mexico and Bolivia. Written with sensitivity and authority, the book is invaluable to the scholar and the interested layman and is an ideal classroom source. *$15.95*

Congress Oversees the Bureaucracy: Studies in Legislative Supervision

MORRIS S. OGUL

Congressional supervision of the way the executive implements legislative mandates—"oversight" of the bureaucracy—is one of the most complex and least understood functions of the Congress. In this book, Dr. Ogul clarifies the meaning of oversight and analyzes the elements that contribute to its success or neglect. Conceptual and informational limitations have marked previous analyses of oversight. This book addresses itself to both problems by analyzing legislative oversight in its direct and latent manifestations and by providing new data about it. *$9.95*

From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe

LAWRENCE VAMBE

The continuation of Lawrence Vambe's superb and vivid account of African life in Rhodesia begun in *An Ill-Fated People* (University of Pittsburgh Press, $6.95). *From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe* is an absorbing mixture of autobiographical anecdotes, social observations, and political comments. It is a chronicle of destruction and humiliation and yet rises from indictment to illuminate the forces that seek to create the modern Zimbabwe from the old Rhodesia. *$9.95*

OTHER RECENT BOOKS OF INTEREST

Army Politics in Cuba, 1898-1958	LOUIS A. PÉREZ, JR.	*$9.95*
Interdependent Development	HAROLD BROOKFIELD	*$8.95*
Argentina in the Twentieth Century	DAVID ROCK, Editor	*$14.50*
Clean Air: The Policies and Politics of Pollution Control	CHARLES O. JONES	*$13.95*
The Political Ideas of Marx and Engels. Volume 1: Marxism and Totalitarian Democracy, 1818-1850	RICHARD N. HUNT	*$11.95*

Pittsburgh

University of Pittsburgh Press
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15260

Spring at The Free Press

COMPARATIVE MODERNIZATION: A Reader
Ed., Cyril E. Black $12.95

THE MODERNIZATION OF JAPAN AND RUSSIA
A Comparative Study
Cyril E. Black, Marius B. Jansen, Herbert S. Levine, Marion J. Levy, Jr., Henry Rosovsky, Gilbert Rozman, Henry D. Smith II, and S. Frederick Starr $15.95

GAME THEORY AND POLITICS
Steven J. Brams $6.95 paper

PARADOXES IN POLITICS
Steven J. Brams $6.95 paper

THE SOVIET UNION SINCE THE FALL OF KHRUSHCHEV
Ed., Archie Brown and Michael Kaser $13.95

URBAN TERRORISM: Theory, Practice and Response
Anthony Burton $12.95

VIOLENCE AND REPRESSION IN LATIN AMERICA: A Quantitative and Historical Analysis
Ernest A. Duff and John F. McCamant $15.95

THE LAST CHANCE
William Epstein $12.00

MEN IN REBELLION: Higher Governmental Leaders and the Coming of the American Revolution
James Kirby Martin $2.95 paper

A WORLD FEDERATION OF CULTURES
An African Perspective
Ali A. Mazrui $15.00

WORLD POLITICS: An Introduction
Ed., James N. Rosenau, Kenneth W. Thompson, and Gavin Boyd $12.95

IDEOLOGY AND POLITICS
Martin Seliger $14.95

KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS
Roberto Mangabeira Unger $12.95


LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY
Toward a Criticism of Social Theory
Roberto Mangabeira Unger $12.95

POWER, RACISM, AND PRIVILEGE
Race Relations in Theoretical and Sociohistorical Perspectives
William J. Wilson $4.95 paper


CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Dina A. Zinnes $17.95

The Free Press
A DIVISION OF MACMILLAN PUBLISHING CO., INC., 100D Brown Street, Riverside, New Jersey 08075

INSTRUCTIONAL RESOURCE MONOGRAPHS




Information and evaluation for teachers, librarians, and students on U.S. government publications, general reference books, library facilities, and their utilization.




As a guide to the development of an alternative (to lecture and discussion sections) method of teaching and learning, this monograph is a collection of essays on the objectives, organization and impact of using the personalized system of instruction in political science. Examples are given on topics in American politics.

FORTHCOMING



A selective guide to the development, applicability and impact of simulations and games, with examples for the design of original role playing exercises.



A guide to the theory, design and application of computer-assisted instruction for interactive teaching and learning in political science. Examples from several subfields, including political philosophy.

ORDER FORM

- ☐ *A Guide to Library Sources in Political Science: American Government*, by Clement E. Vose ($4.00 paperback, $6.50 hard cover).
- ☐ *PSI and Political Science: Using the Personalized System of Instruction to Teach American Politics*, edited by Ralph B. Earle, Jr., ($3.50 paperback).
- ☐ *Simple Simulations*, by Charles Walcott with Anne Walcott ($3.50 paperback).
- ☐ *Computer-Assisted Instruction in Political Science*, edited by Jonathan Pool ($4.00 paperback).

Name_____

Address_____

City_____ State_____ Zip_____

Send form prepaid to:

DIVISION OF EDUCATIONAL AFFAIRS
American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

New States in the Modern World

Martin Kilson, Editor

Probably the first book to consider new states in relationship to their effect on world political order, this volume of original essays focuses on the origins and current status of the new African states and one Arab-African state, Egypt. *Center for International Affairs.* $15.00

Harvard University Press
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

Now Available! A Second Printing of **G. M. A. GRUBE'S**

1974 Translation of PLATO'S REPUBLIC

- LARGER TYPE
- WIDER MARGINS
- BETTER PAPER
- NEW INTRODUCTION BY GRUBE
- PREVIOUS ERRORS CORRECTED

"The subtlety and complexity of Plato's writing and argumentation in his most famous dialogue is preserved in this very literal and readable translation. The notes are quite useful, without being excessive. I found the work very appropriate for use in my introductory political theory course."

—RAYMOND A. ROCCO, *Univ. of Calif., Los Angeles*

"...an excellent rendering, with a clean translation...and notes helpful to the undergraduate. It makes up for the grave defects of the Cornford and Lee versions..."

—GEORGE K. PLOCHMANN, *Southern Illinois Univ.*

Complete translation of all ten books **$1.95 paper** ($2.30 after July 1)

Also of interest to Political Scientists: THE ESSENTIAL AUGUSTINE, PHILOSOPHY IN THE MIDDLE AGES, THE ESSENTIAL PLOTINUS

For exam copies, send $1.00 for PLATO, AUGUSTINE, PLOTINUS; $2.00 for PHILOSOPHY IN THE MIDDLE AGES, to:

HACKETT PUBLISHING COMPANY, INC.
P.O. BOX 55573 Indianapolis, Indiana 46205

Facing the realities of power in the '70s.

"I have strong doubts and misgivings regarding the effect of foreign direct investment on the American economy and the long-term viability of a foreign economic policy which relies heavily on foreign investment rather than trade."

U.S. POWER AND THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION

Robert Gilpin

"A consistently stimulating and forcefully argued book." —*Albert O. Hirschman, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton.*
"An original attempt at linking empirical study of private investment abroad . . . to the theory of the international economic order."—*Stanley Hoffmann, Harvard University.*
Illustrated with charts and graphs. $10.95

"To be sure, international prestige may be derived from notable feats of economic growth and technological excellence. But the historical record suggests that great national size and wealth may act as a serious impediment to eliciting noncoercive influence."

THE POWER OF NATIONS

Klaus Knorr

Building on the foundations of his seminal *Power and Wealth,* Prof. Knorr offers an in-depth analysis of the ways in which nations convert political, economic and administrative resources into international power. $16.95; Paperbound, $6.95

NEW SIGNIFICANT
BASIC
BASIC BOOKS INC.
10 EAST 53RD ST. NEW YORK 10022

PRAEGER SPECIAL STUDIES

THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY
Edited by Francis O. Wilcox and Richard A. Frank
ca. 175 pp. Apr., 1976
ISBN 0-275-55860-6 ca. $12.50
PSS Student Edition:
ISBN 0-275-89480-0 ca. $4.95

THE PEOPLE CHOOSE A PRESIDENT
Influences on Voter Decision Making
Harold Mendelsohn and Garrett J. O'Keefe
272 pp. Mar., 1976
ISBN 0-275-56110-0 $18.50

THE POLITICS OF DIVISION, PARTITION, AND UNIFICATION
Edited by Ray Edward Johnston
ca. 275 pp. Apr., 1976
ISBN 0-275-55660-3 ca. $18.50

ALLENDE'S CHILE
Edited by Philip O'Brien
ca. 225 pp. Apr., 1976
ISBN 0-275-55750-2 ca. $16.50

SPAIN IN THE 1970s
Economics, Social Structure, Foreign Policy
Edited by William T. Salisbury and James D. Theberge
ca. 180 pp. Mar., 1976
ISBN 0-275-55800-2 $20.00

POLITICIZING THE POOR
The Legacy of the War on Poverty in a Mexican American Community
Biliana C.S. Ambrecht
240 pp. Feb., 1976
ISBN 0-275-05900-6 $18.50

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
National, Regional, and Global Perspectives
Edited by Yonah Alexander
414 pp. Feb., 1976
ISBN 0-275-09480-4 $22.50

THE MEDIA AND THE LAW
Edited and with an Introduction by Howard Simons and Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
250 pp. Feb., 1976
ISBN 0-275-55820-7 $15.00
PSS Student Edition:
ISBN 0-275-89530-0 $4.95

FREEDOM OF THE PRESS VS. PUBLIC ACCESS
Benno C. Schmidt, Jr.
175 pp. Mar., 1976
ISBN 0-275-01620-X $15.00
PSS Student Edition:
ISBN 0-275-89430-4 $4.95

THE INFLUENCE OF EAST EUROPE AND THE SOVIET WEST ON THE USSR
Edited by Roman Szporluk
272 pp. Jan., 1976
ISBN 0-275-07500-1 $17.50

THE POLITICS OF NATURAL DISASTER
The Case of Sahel Drought
Edited by Michael H. Glantz
368 pp. Jan., 1976
ISBN 0-275-01180-1 $21.50

THE STATUS OF ALIENS IN EAST AFRICA
Asians and Europeans in Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya
Daniel D. C. Don Nanjira
248 pp. Feb., 1976
ISBN 0-275-55570-4 $18.50

QUALITY OF LIFE INDICATORS IN U.S. METROPOLITAN AREAS
A Statistical Analysis
Ben-Chieh Liu
336 pp. Feb., 1976
ISBN 0-275-56360-X $27.50

*THE POWER OF THE PURSE
A Symposium on the Role of European Parliaments in Budgetary Decisions
Edited by David Coombes
394 pp. Jan., 1976
ISBN 0-275-05790-9 $20.00

*For sale in the U.S. and Philippines only.

Please use ISBN number when ordering from:
Praeger Publishers
111 Fourth Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10003



On the state of the art and the Union

POLITICAL RESEARCH METHODS
Foundations and Techniques
Barbara Leigh Smith, University of Nebraska
Karl F. Johnson, University of Missouri
David W. Paulsen, University of Nebraska
Frances Shocket
Just published / 352 pages / $10.95 (tentative)
Providing an introduction to both the foundations and techniques of basic research, this text traces the development of political science research methods, discusses current controversies, and analyzes the scientific method and the various attacks upon the "standard view" of scientific explanations. Also provided is an unusually thorough treatment of techniques not found in most texts — including the semantic differential, direct and indirect methods, and methodological triangulation.

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
Richard J. Stillman, III, California State College — Bakersfield
Just published / 398 pages / paper / $6.50 (tentative)
With Stillman's concept-case approach to the study of public administration, students examine writings of key theorists, then use contemporary cases to test the relevance of these classic writings to modern situations. The cases involve students in decision-making processes, emphasize the complexity and moral implications of the issues, and develop a critical and realistic attitude toward the nature of public administration.

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT
Policy and Process, Second Edition
Robert L. Morlan, University of Redlands
1975 / 464 pages / paper / $8.50
Morlan emphasizes the dynamics of the political system, its strengths and shortcomings, and concentrates on significant issues of public policy, both domestic and international.

CAPITAL, COURTHOUSE, AND CITY HALL
Readings in American State and Local Politics and Government, Fourth Edition
Edited by Robert L. Morlan, University of Redlands
1972 / 329 pages / paper / $8.25
This supplementary reader includes a new section on crucial public policy issues of the contemporary urban crisis.

Also of interest:

VICTIMS OF GROUPTHINK: A Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and Fiascoes
Irving Janis, Yale University
1972 / 277 pages / paper / $6.50

PRACTICING TEXAS POLITICS, Second Edition
Eugene W. Jones, Angelo State University
Joe E. Ericson, Stephen F. Austin State University
Lyle C. Brown, Baylor University
Robert S. Trotter, El Centro College of the Dallas County Junior College District
1974 / 464 pages / paper / $7.25 / Instructor's Manual

THE POLITICS OF VIOLENCE
The New Urban Blacks and the Watts Riot
David O. Sears, University of California — Los Angeles
John B. McConahay, Yale University
1973 / 244 pages / paper / $5.95

SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND FREEDOM
Willis H. Truitt and T. W. Graham Solomons, both of the University of South Florida
1974 / 432 pages / paper / $5.50

For adoption consideration, request examination copies from your regional Houghton Mifflin office.



Houghton Mifflin

Atlanta, GA 30324 • Dallas, TX 75235 • Geneva, IL 60134
Hopewell, NJ 08525 • Palo Alto, CA 94304 • Boston, MA 02107

New

from the publishers of Democracy Under Pressure

Dilemmas of Democracy

READINGS IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

Edited by PETER COLLIER

Dilemmas of Democracy offers 25 thought-provoking essays on major issues in American government today. Based on restrained, well-reasoned arguments, the readings address specific problems and suggest pragmatic measures for reform; taken together, they cover all the important topics treated in American Government courses. Mr. Collier's preface and headnotes help readers to place the selections in context and to apply them to such broad, significant themes as presidential power and its potential for abuse, the structure and functions of political parties, and the relationships of regulatory agencies to the industries they are *supposed* to regulate. Among the writers represented in the text are Richard Hofstadter, Michael Parenti, Jessica Mitford, Studs Terkel, Dave Dellinger, and Richard Goodwin.

Paperbound. 448 pages (probable)
Publication: March, 1976

Personality in Politics

ALAN C. ELMS, University of California at Davis

Under the Series Editorship of
IRVING L. JANIS, Yale University

This timely and authoritative study of the role of personality in politics moves from the political development of the average American citizen to the psychological characteristics of our political leaders. Its focus is largely on political behavior—how the individual's own personality affects his or her political responses—but it does not neglect the interaction of personality and situational differences. Drawing on current research in this exciting academic field, Professor Elms emphasizes not only what we know about political behavior but what problems and ethical considerations confront behavioral scientists working in politics. Numerous concrete examples, drawn from contemporary American political life, serve to illustrate the psychology of political figures and their behavior.

Paperbound. 224 pages (probable)
Publication: May, 1976



HARCOURT BRACE JOVANOVICH, INC.

New York · Chicago · San Francisco · Atlanta

A HARPER TORCHBOOK



LEWIS S. FEUER

Ideology and the Ideologists

"The most important sociological study of ideology to have yet appeared. . . . An ideology, Feuer suggests, is a fusion of myth with the language of philosophy and science. It is the mythical element which is ancient. What seems to belong to modernity, and to be no older than the word 'ideology' itself, is the endeavor to clothe the myth in the trappings of philosophy."—MAURICE CRANSTON, *Lugano Review*

"A scholarly attempt to describe and explain the use and spread of ideologies in modern times. . . . Though he deals with abstract issues, Feuer's style makes this a readable volume. . . . A highly original work of great value to advanced undergraduates in sociology and political science."—*Choice*

TB/1840 $4.75

Harper & Row
Paperback Dept.
10 E. 53d St., New York 10022

A NEW HARPER PAPERBACK

JUNG AND POLITICS

The Political and Social Ideas of C. G. Jung

VOLODYMYR WALTER ODAJNYK

Foreword by Marie-Louise von Franz

This book represents a compilation of those of Jung's ideas that have political and/or social implications, gleaned from his voluminous writings on various subjects, a comparison of those ideas with Freud's, and a consideration of just what Jung's ideas imply for the social and political future of humanity." *—from the Preface*

CONTENTS: The Origin of Culture and Politics • Psychic Inflation • Mass Psyche and Mass Man • The Individual and the State • Politics and the Unconscious • The German Case • The End of Politics • The Future of Man • Jung and Freud • A Word about Democracy

CN/488 $4.95

For a complete list of psychology paperbacks write to

Harper & Row
Paperback Dept.
10 E. 53d St., New York 10022

OXFORD

Party Dynamics
The Democratic Coalition and the Politics of Change
Richard L. Rubin, Columbia University. ☐ A penetrating analysis of the weakening of past relationships within the Democratic party, this book also provides insights into the dynamics of the American party system. Professor Rubin examines the coalition of groups that has traditionally made up the party, the elite groups which have now come into prominence, attempts to reconcile these two divergent socio-political forces, and the changes and instability which have been brought about by their interaction.
June 1976 180 pp. cloth $9.95 paper $4.00

The American Party Systems
Stages of Political Development
Second Edition
Edited by **William Nisbet Chambers**, Washington University, and **Walter Dean Burnham**, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. ☐ "This outstanding historical examination—invaluable for courses in political parties and advanced courses in American government—is greatly enriched by Walter Dean Burnham's survey and interpretation of research and events to 1974."—Charles M. Hardin, University of California, Davis. "This volume remains the best anthology on American political development available."—Howard L. Reiter, University of Connecticut
1975 584 pp. 8 charts cloth $11.95 paper $3.95

The Judicial Process
An Introductory Analysis of the Courts of the United States, England, and France
Third Edition
Henry J. Abraham, University of Virginia. ☐ "This is by far the most useful text on the judicial process that I know of. It is extremely useful in undergraduate and graduate courses."—Ronald M. Labbe, University of Southwestern Louisiana. "Outstanding... an excellent survey of the judicial process with good comparative information."—John A. Clinton, Montgomery College. "This book is well on its way to becoming a classic in its field." —Robert W. Langran, Villanova University
1975 544 pp. cloth $12.95 paper $6.00

From Georges Sorel
Essays on Socialism and Philosophy
Edited by **John Stanley**, University of California, Riverside. Translated by **John** and **Charlotte Stanley**. ☐ This is a representative selection of major writings by one of the foremost thinkers of this century. Included are articles on Marxism, religion, syndicalism, social myths, the philosophy of history and science, and a long and newly translated segment of "Reflections of Violence." In his introduction, Professor Stanley disputes the frequently encountered view of Sorel as a reactionary or extreme rightist, and emphasizes Sorel's attempt to provide Western society with a morality based on labor, struggle, and family life.
1976 406 pp. cloth $15.00 paper $5.00

Prices and publication dates are subject to change.

The City Boss in America
An Interpretive Reader
Edited by **Alexander B. Callow, Jr.**, University of California, Santa Barbara. ☐ This anthology brings together interpretive essays by historians, political scientists, journalists, sociologists, politicians and a novelist that explore the critical features of machine politics: the rise of the boss, running the machine, the boss and the immigrant, corruption, the boss and the reformer, and the modern machine. Preceding each chapter is an interpretive essay supplementing the selections.
1976 350 pp. paper $6.00

Governing Science and Technology
W. Henry Lambright, The Maxwell School, Syracuse University. ☐ "For anyone who asks why a country that can land a man on the moon cannot solve its domestic social problems *Governing Science and Technology* should be prescribed reading. This is a perceptive and stimulating analysis of the major range of problems involved in the relation of politics to big technology—a relation which scholars have often ignored under the delusion that technology and science are the same thing."—Don K. Price, Harvard University. (Public Administration and Democracy Series)
1976 224 pp. cloth $9.00 paper $4.00

Politics, Position, and Power
The Dynamics of Federal Organization
Second Edition
Harold Seidman, University of Connecticut. ☐ Statistics and references have been revised and fresh material added to bring the second edition of this book up to date. In addition, former President Nixon's attempt to achieve a "new American revolution" through executive branch reorganization is fully documented. "A good, readable contemporary study of the realities of federal government organization and its impact on current affairs."—Kenneth L. Knotts, Northwestern State University. "An informed and sophisticated account of the failure of traditional public administration solutions for federal malaise."—Sam Postbrief, University of Maryland
1975 370 pp. paper $4.00

Power, Influence, and Authority
An Essay in Political Linguistics
David V. J. Bell, York University. ☐ In this provocative essay on the concept of power, Professor Bell draws on recent theories of communication and decision-making to present a study of political linguistics. This approach provides a framework for interpreting and evaluating political acts not only in the national and international arena but within the family and marketplace as well. "First class work of conceptualization and synthesis."
—Glynn L. Wood, American University
1975 144 pp. cloth $5.95 paper $2.95



OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
200 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10016

Global politics from Mexico to Peking

THE MEXICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM, Second Edition

L. Vincent Padgett, San Diego State University

Just published / 272 pages/paper/ $5.95 (tentative)

A book about Mexicans and their politics. Padgett examines their past, their present, and their prospects for a viable political system within the context of their culture and history. In this Second Edition, thoroughly rewritten and updated, Padgett interprets the political system in the light of a political culture that combines Hispanic and indigenous elements. Since technical language is kept to a minimum, the text is accessible to college students at all levels.

THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF POLITICS

David F. Roth and Frank L. Wilson, both of Purdue University

Just published / 448 pages/ $10.95 (tentative)

Suitable for both majors and non-majors, Roth and Wilson's text offers a genuinely comparative approach: each chapter discusses a political topic and then presents examples from six countries. Similarities and differences among countries, therefore, become obvious to students. Roth and Wilson define basic terms and concepts clearly, often using familiar examples from the United States. Countries compared are China, Nigeria, Mexico, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union.

POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT: How People Decide Their Fate, Second Edition

Karl W. Deutsch, Harvard University

1974 / 650 pages / $11.50 / Instructor's Manual

Emphasizing real-world politics, Deutsch presents basic concepts for analysis, focusing on six major political systems. For introductory political science.


For adoption consideration, request examination copies from your regional Houghton Mifflin office.




Houghton Mifflin

Atlanta, GA 30324 / Dallas, TX 75235 / Geneva, IL 60134 / Hopewell, NJ 08525 / Palo Alto, CA 94304 / Boston, MA 02107

PUBLICATIONS FROM UNITED NATIONS



DEMOGRAPHIC YEARBOOK 1973
The twenty-fifth issue of the Demographic Yearbook contains 1973 statistics of area, population, natality, mortality, nuptiality and divorce for every country of the world, latest available data on expectation of life and a 7-year trend of international arrivals and departures. Data on the economic characteristics of the population are shown, including labour force participation rates by age and sex, as well as various cross-classifications of population by industry, occupation, status, age and sex.
Order No. E/F.74.XIII.1 Clothbound $38.00




STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 1974
Important compilation of statistics from countries throughout the world covering a wide range of economic and social subjects, including: population, agriculture, manufacturing, construction, transport, trade, balance of payments, national income, education and culture. Improved statistical coverage has enabled the Yearbook to widen the territorial scope of many of its tables and to provide more comprehensive and accurate world and continental aggregates.
Order No. E.76.XVII.1 Clothbound $38.00

United Nations Publications
Room LX-2300, New York, N.Y. 10017 or United Nations Publications Palais des Nations
1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland


AMBIGUOUS LEGACY
The Left in American Politics
by James Weinstein
Traces the history of the socialist left in the United States through an analysis of its three principal movements: the Socialist Party of America, 1900-1920; the Communist Party of America, 1919-1956; and the "New Left" of the 1960s. *192 pp. Paper: $4.95 (05575-2). Cloth: $9.00 (05368-7).*

REAPPRAISALS OF FASCISM
Edited by Henry A. Turner, Jr., Yale Univ.
A compilation of ten of the most important recent re-examinations of fascism as a generic phenomenon, exploring its causes and characteristics. *288 pp. Paper: $5.95 (05579-5). Cloth: $12.50 (05372-5).*



Outstanding new viewpoints on topics of current and continuing interest.

THE INFANCY OF NAZISM
The Memoirs of ex-Gauleiter Albert Krebs 1923-1933
Edited and translated by William Sheridan Allen, State University of New York at Buffalo
A uniquely full and objective picture of the inner workings of the Nazi party in its formative years, by a close, but critical, associate, of Hitler and Goebbels. *448 pp. Paper: $5.95 (05583-3). Cloth: $12.50 (05376-8).*



NEW VIEWPOINTS
A Division of
Franklin Watts
730 Fifth Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10019

For our descriptive catalog of all New Viewpoints publications, please write to our Marketing Services Department.

Presidential Spending Power
LOUIS FISHER

"Louis Fisher knows more about government spending, the secret nooks and crannies where the bureaucrats squirrel away the taxpayer's dollar, and where the bodies are buried than anyone in the country. *Presidential Spending Power* makes public in an interesting way what was heretofore known only to an inside few. If you want to know why the budget is out of control or how the President has usurped the congressional prerogative over spending, read this book."— *Senator William Proxmire* Cloth, $12.50 • Paper, $3.45

The American Economy
Income, Wealth, and Want
STANLEY LEBERGOTT

These original and provocative essays tackle the complexities of income distribution, trends in the standard of living, and the gap between the ideals and realities of capitalism. With a rare combination of historical method, quantitative skill, and philosophical outlook, Stanley Lebergott presents new interpretations and estimates of public policies relating to the U.S. distribution of income and wealth today. $17.50
Part I of this book is available as WEALTH AND WANT. $6.95

Neighborhood Organization and Interest-Group Processes
DAVID J. O'BRIEN

Since the end of the civil rights era, it has become increasingly clear that the social and political conflicts between residents of poor neighborhoods and local interest groups or public authorities cannot be resolved entirely at the national level. This study seeks insight into these problems through an analysis of efforts during the sixties to organize the poor to pursue their interests in local decision-making processes. $13.50

Organized Social Complexity
Challenge to Politics and Policy
Edited by TODD R. LAPORTE

One striking feature of modern political and social development has been the construction of social systems encompassing more and more groups. The increase in social complexity, the authors of this volume contend, has reached a point where accepted concepts fail to describe social and political phenomena adequately. $16.50

The Wall of Separation
The Constitutional Politics of Church and State
FRANK J. SORAUF

This is the story of some of the most anguished constitutional controversies of our time, those involving the issue of separation of church and state. Few questions stimulated debate as intense as that over prayer in public schools and public aid to parochial schools. In contrast to previous studies, which have focused on the substance of the issues, Frank J. Sorauf's book concentrates on the judicial process in its social and political context. $15.00

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS Princeton, New Jersey 08540



William O'Brien and the Course of Irish Politics, 1881-1918

Joseph V. O'Brien

This study focuses on the political career of William O'Brien—journalist, agrarian agitator, member of Parliament and one of the foremost exponents of the constitutional approach to solving the quandary of Ireland's position in the British Imperial system.

228 pages, 10 halftones, $14.50

Modern Japan

Aspects of History, Literature, and Society

Edited by **W. G. Beasley**

These essays deal with fundamental aspects of culture that need much fuller analysis before one can be confident about the nature of change in modern Japan.

296 pages, maps, $17.50

Power and Privilege Influence and Decision-Making in Pakistan

Robert LaPorte, Jr.

This book appraises the declining authority in Pakistan of the civil services, the military, and the major industrial families and the increasing leverage exerted by the middle class on a national decision-making level.

237 pages, $13.75

Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration

Tracy B. Strong

In his examination of Nietzche's philosophical doctrines which have implications for political theory, Strong focuses on Nietzsche's claim that Western culture, in all its aspects, is coming to an *end.*

376 pages, $15.00

The Fascist Ego

A Political Biography of Robert Brasillach

William R. Tucker

One of the most prestigious of the French Fascist intellectuals was Robert Brasillach, a literary critic, novelist, journalist, and poet. Tucker sees in Brasillach's involvement with fascism a form of anarchic individualism or "right-wing anarchism."

341 pages, $21.50

Industrial Imperialism in Italy, 1908-1915

Richard A. Webster

What forces impelled Italy, an impoverished country with few capitalist or imperialist historical traditions, to engage in two world wars and three colonial campaigns during the twentieth century? This work identifies the causes in the "industrial takeoff" of liberal Italy in the late 1890's.

399 pages, $22.75

The Noble Savages

The Primitive Origins of Charisma and its Contemporary Survival

Bryan Wilson

Wilson seeks to show the congeniality of charisma to the social conditions of less-developed peoples, and its growing marginality in modern society. The book is enhanced by studies of charismatic leaders in Native-American and African cultures, who are used to develop refinements of the Weberian idea of charisma.

143 pages, $7.50

University of California Press Berkeley 94720



Politics in the American States

A Comparative Analysis
Third Edition
Herbert Jacob, Editor
Northwestern University
Kenneth N. Vines, Editor
SUNY, Buffalo

The leading text in the state politics field has been completely revised and rewritten for its new Third Edition. POLITICS IN THE AMERICAN STATES examines all 50 states *comparatively;* it is systematically empirical, and it limits itself to *state* politics. The comparison of empirical data yields a text rich in description and explicit in its analysis. Original chapters, written by experts in each field, utilize contemporary political science concepts and techniques. These individual chapters are bound into a unified study by their common frame of reference. The Third Edition features new materials and emphases important in contemporary political science, a chapter on regulation of the environment and a chapter on Federalism that deals with relations between states and the national government.
Cloth approx. 520 pages March 1976
$11.95 tent.

Performance in American Bureaucracy

Robert C. Fried
University of California, Los Angeles

PERFORMANCE IN AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY introduces students to the study of public administration in the United States by taking as its point of departure the problem of evaluating and explaining administrative performance. Administrative behavior is examined at national, state, and local levels of government, with the aim of comparing performances and accounting for gaps between actual and desirable performance. Fried develops and applies performance criteria based on the effectiveness of administrative action, the values of liberalism (due process), and responsiveness to public demand. He has included traditional and recent materials on administrative behavior and the politics of administration to demonstrate why performance gaps occur, when successful performance is achieved, and which contextual and organizational variables are most related to the outcomes of administrative effort.
Cloth approx. 440 pages
February 1976 $10.00 tent.

Leadership in Congress

Stability, Succession, and Change
Robert L. Peabody
The Johns Hopkins University

This is the first book to offer in-depth analysis of succession and change in Congressional power structures. Peabody examines leadership selection processes in the contemporary U. S. Congress: the Senate and the House of Representatives, the Democratic majority and the Republican minority. A comprehensive analytical framework clarifies the importance of four clusters of variables—individual, positional, institutional, and external—which condition or influence party leadership selection processes. Studies are limited, in the main, to leadership change in the period between 1955 and 1974. Eight case studies include key contests involving the current House and Senate party leaders; these cases are based on intensive, focused interviews with the principal candidates and their followers.
Paper approx. 440 pages March 1976
$7.95 tent.

Bureaucracy, Politics, and Public Policy

Second Edition
Francis E. Rourke
The Johns Hopkins University

This book systematically analyzes the role of bureaucratic organizations in modern government policy-making. Professor Rourke focuses both on the roots of bureaucratic power—the sources from which administrative agencies derive their power—and on the distinctive problems that arise when policy-making is carried on within a setting in which executive organizations play a central role. The new Second Edition retains the analytic structure developed for the first edition, but it incorporates the most recent literature on public policy within the scope of its analysis, and up-dates references and illustrative materials to include events and developments since 1969: Watergate, the growing power of public interest groups, the movement for citizen participation in bureaucratic decision-making, and the trauma of Vietnam.
Paper approx. 240 pages March 1976
$4.50 tent.

U.S. Foreign Policy and World Order

James A. Nathan
James K. Oliver
Both at the University of Delaware

This new text examines the development of the political, military, and economic concept of world order that has constituted American foreign policy since World War II, placing it within the context of domestic politics. The authors outline the problem of order in contemporary world politics and the prevailing American conception of this problem. They argue that the American approach to the world in the post-World War II era has come to rely primarily on the threat and use of force, in an effort to build a global order commensurate with "the American way of life." Part I of the text traces the historical development of American foreign policy—with particular emphasis on the period from 1945-1952—and Part II examines the consequences of this policy for domestic institutions and political processes.
Cloth approx. 608 pages
February 1976 $11.95 tent.

The Basics of American Politics

Gary Wasserman
Medgar Evers College, CUNY
with Ed Beard and Marsha Hurst

Politics as a game—an arresting image that unifies this new introductory-level text, focuses attention on a dynamic competition for power and values, and helps beginning students conceptualize American Politics. The authors deal with the most elemental structures and functions of American government descriptively, not analytically. Cartoons, line drawings, maps and charts enhance the textual material; political terms are highlighted and defined within the narrative. There are chapter summaries for easy review, study questions, and boxed inserts containing lively quotes, anecdotes, and discussions of relevant issues. POLITICAL PLAYERS offers synthesis and simplicity. It is a lean volume in which the emphasis is always on *basics:* the history, structure, powers and influence of each "player" in the political game. The text was designed to provide a solid foundation in American government while allowing the instructor great flexibility in using supplementary materials.
Paper approx. 220 pages March 1976
$4.95 tent.

Criminal Justice

Enforcement and Administration
Alan S. Kalmanoff, Lawyer
University of California, Berkeley
(School of Criminology)

This comprehensive text discusses every aspect of the administration of justice—from police through prosecution, trial and defense, sentencing and corrections. The organization of the book parallels that of the criminal justice system: chapters cover the various stages of the system in the same order that a criminal would encounter them. Professor Kalmanoff focuses on the interrelated activities of each segment of the criminal justice system, stressing the dependence of each on the roles and values of the others. He also examines the responsiveness of the system to the norms and values of American society. The text is extraordinarily up-to-date, utilizing the latest FBI statistics (UCR), research findings, and LEAA reports. New approaches to problems of police administration, diversion and pretrial alternatives, bail reform and community corrections are given extensive coverage. Plea-bargaining—a process accounting for 90% of the criminal justice system's cases—is discussed in considerable detail, and current court decisions that will have an impact on the administration of justice for years to come are integrated into the text.
Cloth approx. 448 pages March 1976
$10.95 tent.

Ideology and Myth in American Politics

A Critique of a National Political Mind
H. Mark Roelofs
New York University


Offering a critical interpretation of the American political system, this unique text focuses on the deepseated division within that system between its privatistic, operative ideological elements and its myths of egalitarian humanism, democracy, and heroic national achievement. It represents an indictment of the American political system and the American political mind, but it is more concerned with explaining why and how the system fails than with berating it for its shortcomings. Prof. Roelofs' conceptual analysis explains and amplifies most, if not all, of American history and current political events. He views the problems with American government as congenital—rooted in the fundamental elements of the American political mind—and he concludes that there will be no revolution and no fundamental reform in American politics.
Paper approx. 220 pages March 1976
$5.95 tent.

Political Change in the Metropolis


John J. Harrigan
Hamline University

POLITICAL CHANGE IN THE METROPOLIS integrates coverage of central-city, suburban, and metropolitan-level politics, as well as the politics of Federal involvement in urban affairs. The text is organized around one major analytical theme: the bias of political change. Three broad changes—the growth of socially, geographically, and ethnically based political power; the growth of functionally organized urban political power; and the emergence of the federal government as a major actor in urban political affairs—are identified and analyzed in terms of which groups, individuals, and institutions they benefit or harm. Instead of appending separate chapters on policy questions (as do most competing texts), Prof. Harrigan treats policy issues integrally with political structures and processes. POLITICAL CHANGE is the only text of its kind to end with a "conclusion" and summary of the arguments. It is also the only text to place American urban policies in comparative perspective.
Paper approx. 550 pages
February 1976 $7.95 tent.






TOUCHSTONE



PAPERBACKS

SIMON AND SCHUSTER
630 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10020



For complimentary examination copies, write on your departmental letterhead to School and Library Services, address above. Include details on course in which you are considering using title requested, and advise us where you have seen announcement.



Thayer, George
WHO SHAKES THE MONEY TREE?
American Campaign Financing Practices from 1789 to the Present

Examining the ways in which American political campaigns are financed, Thayer goes beyond the visible shoots of the money tree to trace the roots that reach far down into every aspect of American life. "An enormously entertaining and wise treatise."—Robert Sherrill, *Chicago Tribune*. "The extraordinary number of illustrations makes very interesting reading. . . . The book is well indexed."—*Choice*. "Thayer offers many good perceptive observations . . ."—*Library Journal*
☐ 21913 Index $2.95

Kaufman, Arnold S.
THE RADICAL LIBERAL: The New Politics, Theory and Practice

Explores the underlying causes of the chronic disorders in American society by analyzing the growing gap between the rhetoric of American liberals and everyday reality. "Useful for those trying to find their way between the excesses of the new left and the excesses of the liberal corporatists." —*Choice*. "A thoughtful, brief statement in the classic tradition of democratic rationality." —Michael Harrington.
☐ 20576 Biblio., Index $1.95

Rostow, W. W.
THE UNITED STATES IN THE WORLD ARENA: An Essay in Recent History


The story of our military and foreign policy by the former Special Assistant for National Security Affairs to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. "The book is distinguished by largeness of view, grasp of the broad factors involved, frequent originality of thought, and a good deal of penetration." —Allan Nevins.
☐ 20254 Notes, Appendices, Index $3.95

"Scipio"
EMERGENT AFRICA
☐ 20155 Index $1.95

Peirce, Neal R.
THE PEOPLE'S PRESIDENT: The Electoral College in American History and the Direct Vote Alternative
☐ 20065 Appendices, Biblio., Index $2.95

Walzer, Michael
OBLIGATIONS: Essays on Disobedience, War, and Citizenship
☐ 20930 Index $2.95

Taylor, William
HANGING TOGETHER: Equality in an Urban Nation
☐ 20712 Notes, Biblio., Index $3.95



PEACE SOLDIERS
The Sociology of a United Nations Military Force
Charles C. Moskos, Jr.

"This is the first detailed analysis of the operation of an important UN peacekeeping operation—that in Cyprus—which is informed and guided by broad sociological, political, and international issues. It is in effect a contribution both to the study of international relations and to the sociology of military institutions."
—Morris Janowitz
1976 184 pages Cloth $11.00

STRENGTHENING THE WORLD BANK
Escott Reid
With an Introduction by Maurice F. Strong
Published by the Adlai Stevenson Institute
xviii, 289 pages Cloth $7.50

CHINA
A Resource and Curriculum Guide
Second Edition, Revised
Edited by Arlene Posner and Arne J. de Keijzer

"It is not too much to recommend that everyone concerned with China education have access to, or a personal copy of, this book."—*China Notes*

"An indispensable resource guide—it is a must for every history teacher on either the secondary or college levels."—Samuel Y. Kupper, *The History Teacher*
1976 328 pages Cloth $15.00
Paper $3.95

ESSAYS ON MONEY AND INFLATION
David E. W. Laidler

These essays by the distinguished British economist David E. W. Laidler, provide a new macroeconomic, monetarist approach to inflation that views the problem in terms of the economy as a whole. About a third of the book is concerned with the analysis of inflation in open economies in Europe and North America.
1975 256 pages Cloth $15.00

GOVERNMENT, LABOR, AND INFLATION
Wage Stabilization in the United States
Daniel Quinn Mills

This timely work analyzes how government, labor unions, and management in the United States have dealt with the problem of controlling inflation. It will also serve as a valuable reference for officials who formulate public policies and for representatives of management and labor.
1975 viii, 312 pages Cloth $16.50

The University of Chicago Press
Chicago 60637

PUBLICATIONS OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

The American Political Science Review

Quarterly journal of scholarly articles and book reviews in political science. Included in APSA membership. Back issues: $10.50 per copy; $25.00 per volume.

PS

Quarterly journal of Association news and articles of professional concern. Included in APSA membership. Back issues: $2.00 per copy; $5.00 per volume.

DEA NEWS for Teachers of Political Science

Newspaper on education and the curriculum. Included in APSA membership.

Annual Meeting Program

Final program for APSA Annual Meeting. Included in Annual Meeting Registration. Extra copies: $.50.

APSA Annual Meeting Papers**

Hard copies, $3.00 each.

APSA Annual Meeting Proceedings**

Microfilm reels of all papers, 1901-1912; 1956-present. $22.00 per reel.

Cumulative Index to the American Political Science Review**

1906-1968, $6.50.

Cumulative Index to the Proceedings of the Annual Meetings**

Key word index to all papers included in proceedings of Annual Meetings for 1904-1912; 1956-1970 $18.50.

Women in Political Science: Studies and Reports, 1969-71 of the APSA Committee on the Status of Women in the Profession**

PB 486, $11.00.

Political Science Thesaurus

A major reference tool in political science; this volume represents the terminology control device for computer-based information retrieval service. Individuals: Hardback: $20.00; Paper: $15.00. Institution Hardback: $30.00; Paper: $25.00.

APSA Biographical Directory

Biographical information on over 7,000 Association members, plus names and addresses for approximately 12,500 members. Members: Hardback: $7.50; Paper: $5.00. Non-Members: Hardback: $12.50; Paper $10.00.

APSA Directory of Members: Annual Supplement to the APSA Biographical Directory

Names and current addresses of all APSA members. $3.00 each.

Guide to Publication in Political Science

Co-sponsored by the APSA Committee on the Status of Women and the Women's Caucus for Political Science. $1.00.

Roster of Women in Political Science (3rd ed.)

Biographical information on women political scientists. $2.50 each.

Annual APSA Directory of Department Chairpersons

Names and addresses of Chairpersons of departments offering political science at four-year institutions $20.00 each.

Personnel Service Guidelines for Employers and Applicants

Pamphlet containing information and guidelines for members of the APSA Personnel Service and for employers listing their vacancies in the Personnel Service Newsletter. No charge.

**Order from: Customer Service Department
University Microfilms
313 North First Street
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106

Personnel Service Newsletter

Monthly listing of positions for political scientists. APSA Members: $8.00 subscription.

Careers and the Study of Political Science: A Guide for Undergraduates

A monograph discussing the relationship between political science knowledge and skills and careers in law, government, business, journalism, teaching, etc. $.50 each; bulk rates available.

Guide to Graduate Study in Political Science

Compilation of Ph.D. and Masters programs in political science. The 1976 Guide is revised and expanded to include listings of faculty and fields of specialization: $4.00 each.

Sources of Financial Support for Political Scientists: Research Education, Professional Development Bulletin 1: Support for Professional Development: Fellowships and Traineeships

Information on post-doctoral fellowships, internship programs, special training support and foreign travel grants available to faculty and advanced graduate students. $1.00 each.

Global Dimensions in U.S. Education

A joint publication of the APSA Committee on Pre-Collegiate Education, the Education Commission of the International Studies Association, and the Center for War/Peace Studies of the N.Y. Friends Group, Inc. Four publications: The Elementary School, The Secondary School, The University, The Community. $1.50 each, $5.00 per set.

Comparing Political Experiences

Complete description of an alternative course for high school government instruction. $2.75 each.

SETUPS: American Politics

Supplementary Empirical Teaching Units in Political Science

New computer related instructional materials whereby students learn important substantive topics in American politics as they learn methods of analysis. *Voting Behavior: The 1972 Election* by Bruce D. Bowen, C. Anthony Broh, Charles L. Prysby. *Political Socialization Across the Generations* by Paul Allen Beck, Jere W. Bruner, L. Douglas Dobson. *Political Participation* by F. Christopher Arterton, Harlan Hahn. *Representation in the United States Congress: 1973* by Ray A. Geigle, Peter G. Hartjens. *The Supreme Court in American Politics: Policy Through Law* by John Paul Ryan, C. Neal Tate. *U.S. Energy, Environment and Economic Problems: A Public Policy Simulation* by Barry Hughes. For information and price list write: APSA Division of Educational Affairs.

INSTRUCTIONAL RESOURCE MONOGRAPHS

Guides on materials and methods for teaching and learning in political science. *A Guide to Library Sources in Political Science: American Government* by Clement E. Vose. $6.50 hardback; $4.00 paperback. *PSI and Political Science: Using the Personalized System of Instruction to Teach American Politics*, edited by Ralph B. Earle Jr. $3.50 paperback.

Legislative Service Project Manuals

Individual manuals available for: Connecticut, Kansas, Kentucky, Montana, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island. $2.50 each.

Political Science and State and Local Government

A volume on the current and future state of research and educational programs in the field of state and local government. $3.75 each.

APSA Membership Mailing Lists and Labels

For information and price list, contact Membership Secretary, APSA.

APSA Political Science Department Chairpersons Mailing Labels

For information and price list, contact APSA Departmental Services Program.

ORDER FORM

I am enclosing a check for $_____, for _____

_____ (list publications).

Name _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

Order from: American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

(All orders must be prepaid)

Politics and the Migrant Poor in Mexico City

Wayne A. Cornelius. Nowhere is the world-wide population shift from rural to urban areas more marked than in Latin America, which has surpassed all other Third World regions in urban growth. Based on extensive research of political attitudes and behavior in six low-income communities, this is the first detailed analysis of political learning among migrants in Mexico. It breaks new ground in the study of rapid urbanization, and offers a creative model for future studies of the local community as an arena for social and political action. $12.50

Warlord Politics in China, 1916-1928

Hsi-sheng Ch'i. This first comprehensive treatment of warlordism in 20th-century China approaches regional militarism as a generic phenomenon of Chinese politics in the most complex and chaotic era of recent Chinese history. After a description of the emergence of military factions after the death of Yuan Shih-k'ai, the author analyzes their membership, goals, capabilities, and sources of cohesion, and offers an explanation for the baffling advances, retreats, clashes, and changes of allegiance that have puzzled students of the era. $11.50

Educational Reform with Television

The El Salvador Experience

John K. Mayo, Robert C. Hornik, and Emile G. McAnany. This is a detailed report on the planning, development, and results of a unique experiment in instructional television used as an integral component of national reform. Drawing upon data gathered over a five-year period, it demonstrates how El Salvador achieved positive results where other countries failed, and concludes with an analysis of how the El Salvador experience can be applied to other developing countries. $10.00



Stanford University Press


New from Columbia

NIXON'S GOOD DEED
Welfare Reform
VINCENT J. and VEE BURKE
With a Foreword by Senator Abraham Ribicoff
This probing, behind-the-scenes investigation into the workings of U.S. welfare reform is now available in paperback. "Fast-paced, well-written, and authoritative. . . . Excellent supplementary reading for classes at all levels in political sociology, political science, and social welfare."—*Choice*
$4.50, paper

THE UNITED NATIONS IN A CHANGING WORLD
LELAND M. GOODRICH
Now available in paperback is this thought-provoking review of the first quarter-century of the history of the United Nations by a noted authority on international relations and member of the conference secretariat in San Francisco which created the international organization. "Will serve admirably both as a basic text for students and as a means by which mature readers can gain an overview of the development of the world organization."—*Political Science Quarterly*
Columbia University Studies in International Organization #9
$6.00, paper

CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES
Transnational and Transgovernmental Relations
ANNETTE BAKER FOX, ALFRED O. HERO, JR., AND JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., Editors
Published here in book form is a special issue of *International Organization* on Canadian-American relations. In this volume experts from both countries analyze such critical issues in U.S.–Canadian relations as domestic political and public opinion factors, mutual trade in energy resources, corporate and multinational enterprises, and issues involving defense, labor, and fisheries and pollution.
$22.50, cloth; $6.95, paper

TWENTIETH-CENTURY YUGOSLAVIA
FRED SINGLETON
The most complete and up-to-date survey of modern Yugoslavia to be published in any language, this book concerns the efforts which the Yugoslavs have made since the Second World War under the leadership of the Communist Party to industrialize an economically underdeveloped country and to grapple with the problems of cultural diversity within a multinational federation. cloth, $15.00; paper, $5.95



COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS
Address for orders: 136 South Broadway, Irvington, New York 10533

POLITICS AND THE FUTURE OF INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY

LEON N. LINDBERG. *University of Wisconsin, Madison*

This collection of original essays by Leon N. Lindberg, Todd LaPorte, C. J. Abrams, Ronald Inglehart, Taketsugu Tsurutani, Jeffrey D. Straussman, M. Donald Hancock, and Charles W. Anderson explores the political implications of what is meant by *postindustrial* society, including the transformations that are taking place at the present time and the possible futures of the societies. $6.95, paper

THE NATION-STATE AND THE CRISIS OF WORLD POLITICS

Essays on International Politics in the Twentieth Century

JOHN H. HERZ, *City College, CUNY*

Tracing the development of his ideas on world politics over three decades, Herz urges added concern with an interdependent world's population, resources, and environmental problems. $4.95, paper

THE POLITICS OF POLLUTION IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Ecology and Power in Four Nations

CYNTHIA H. ENLOE, *Clark University*

A study of the factors which shape the ways that power and opinion interact to produce government policies regarding environmental disruption in the *United States, U.S.S.R., Japan,* and *Britain.* $4.95 paper

DIVIDED NATIONS IN A DIVIDED WORLD

GREGORY HENDERSON, *Tufts University;* RICHARD NED LEBOW, *City College, CUNY;* JOHN G. STOESSINGER, *Division of Special Political Affairs, United Nations* $7.95, paper

POLITICS IN EUROPE

Structures and Processes in Some Postindustrial Democracies

MARTIN O. HEISLER, *University of Maryland*

In this book of original essays, the authors identify and illustrate the dominant patterns in Western and Central European politics and provide the theoretical framework for further explorations. $7.95, paper

RACE AND ECONOMICS

THOMAS SOWELL, *University of California, Los Angeles*

"Nobody can talk seriously about ethnicity or race without referring to this book. Sowell is distinguished by the breadth of his interests, the discipline of his analysis, and that rarest of combinations, passion and fairmindedness."—Edward Banfield, *University of Pennsylvania*

$4.95, paper

PRAGMATIC ILLUSIONS
The Presidential Politics of John F. Kennedy
BRUCE MIROFF, *University of Texas, Austin*

In this view from the Left of the Kennedy Presidency, Miroff points out that behind the much-vaunted pragmatism and objectivity of Kennedy and his advisers was a misguided and aggressive approach to foreign affairs and a cautious and corporate-oriented domestic program.
$4.95, paper

EXPLORING CONTRADICTIONS
Political Economy in the Corporate State
PHILIP BRENNER, *Trinity College;* ROBERT BOROSAGE and BETHANY WEIDNER, both of the *Institute for Policy Studies*

This future-oriented book of readings brings together the work of activists and scholars from all the major social sciences. $4.95, paper

EDUCATION IN NATIONAL POLITICS
NORMAN C. THOMAS, *University of Cincinnati*

"Conveniently and expertly summarizes the complicated scene of education and politics. And it goes beyond what is already familiar to provide a richly detailed analysis of the policy concern."
—Robert A. Salisbury, *Washington University, St. Louis* $4.95, paper

NOTES ON THE OLD SYSTEM
To Transform American Politics
MARCUS RASKIN, *Institute for Policy Studies*

"Scratches an itch that no other commentary on Watergate has managed to do.... Read it: if you've forgotten where we were before Watergate came and drowned us, this will refresh your memory."
—*The New York Times* $3.95, paper

THE UNITED STATES
A Study of a Developing Country
IRA SHARKANSKY, *University of Wisconsin, Madison*

"The United States is not just one country but many and its uneven rate of political and economic development has important consequences to politics and public policy. Sharkansky's book is an excellent study of this important phenomenon."
—Aaron Wildavsky, *University of California, Berkeley* $3.95, paper

THE POLITICS OF WOMEN'S LIBERATION
JO FREEMAN, *State University of New York, Purchase*

Winner of the American Political Science Association Prize for the Best Work on Women in Politics. $4.95, paper

DAVID McKAY COMPANY, INC.
750 Third Avenue, New York 10017



Today's History Today

Send for free catalog

CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY INC.

Box 70, 1414 22nd St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037

DON'T MAKE NO WAVES— DON'T BACK NO LOSERS

An Insider's Analysis of the Daley Machine

BY MILTON L. RAKOVE

Rakove brings to this illuminating study an intimate knowledge of Chicago and the Daley machine, a practitioner's understanding of street-level politics, and a scholar's background in political theory. An astute and dispassionate analysis of all aspects of Daley's machine—its organization, its methods, and its future.

312 pages, photos **$10.00**

A PEACE DENIED

The United States, Vietnam, and the Paris Agreement

BY GARETH PORTER

In one of the first postwar considerations of American involvement in Vietnam, Porter traces the history of the conflict, reveals the previously untold story of the climactic Kissinger-Tho talks, and shows why the Paris Agreement failed to bring an end to the war.

374 pages, photos, index **$15.00**

PEOPLE VS. GOVERNMENT

The Responsiveness of American Institutions

EDITED BY LEROY N. RIESELBACH

Contributors examine the performance of key institutions in meeting the needs of the country and the desires of the citizens. They find that the various institutions are responsive—to those with power and influence—and they suggest methods and reforms to enable the public to gain its share of attention and respect.

384 pages, tables, index **paper $3.95 cloth $15.00**

Indiana University Press

TENTH AND MORTON STREETS
BLOOMINGTON, INDIANA 47401

The American Political Science Association Announces

United States Political Science Documents



UNITED STATES POLITICAL SCIENCE DOCUMENTS is an information resource designed to assist students, scholars, and practitioners of politics, government, international affairs, and related fields.

USPSD is the published version of a computer-based file of political science information being developed continually by the United States Political Science Information Service of the University Center for International Studies, University of Pittsburgh, in conjunction with the American Political Science Association.

Derived from the articles of approximately 75 hournals published in the U.S., each item entered into ***USPSD*** provides:

1. author name(s)
2. title
3. contributor name(s)
4. source—journal name, volume number, issue number, date, and pages
5. abstract
6. names of all figures, tables, charts, etc.
7. names of all people cited—primarily authors and public figures.

Each item is also indexed by subject and geographic areas of concern, according to the terminological and geopolitical conventions contained in the ***Political Science Thesaurus***, published by the American Political Science Association. (You can also order a copy of the ***Political Science Thesaurus*** along with your order for the ***United States Political Science Documents.*** See the attached order form for details.)

USPSD will be published annually in TWO PARTS. The abstracts from the journal articles will be contained in Part II, while Part I will include four INDEXES to Part II listed by:

1. authors
2. subjects
3. geographic areas
4. proper names

In addition, a "cited persons" (in computer-printout form) index can be ordered separately. Each entry in each index contains:

1. document number
2. author(s)
3. title
4. source

Two volumes of *United States Political Science Documents* will be published in 1976:

Volume 0:

To be published in January 1976, Volume 0 will cover 1500 articles published in both 1974 and 1975 (in part). Orders are being taken now at 15% PRE-PUBLICATION DISCOUNT PRICES for the two-part set. See the order blank for price details and how to order.

Volume I:

Scheduled for publication in the spring of 1976, Volume I covers all articles published in 1975 (in full). The two-part volume will contain between 2,000 and 2,500 items and is also available with 15% PRE-PUBLICATION DISCOUNT PRICES.

How to Order Your Set of United States Political Science Documents . . .

☐ Enclosed is my check/money order in the amount of $_____ for the items checked below.

☐ Please send an invoice in the amount of $_____ for the items checked below.

	Regular Price	*Pre-Publication 15% Discount*	*Pre-Publication to APSA Members*
Volume 0 (1974/75 documents scheduled for January 1976):			
Index & Documents	$70.00	$59.50 ☐	$42.50 ☐
Index Only	$55.00	$46.75 ☐	$29.75 ☐
Volume I (1975 documents scheduled for March/April 1976):			
Index & Documents	$90.00	$76.50 ☐	$59.50 ☐
Index Only	$75.00	$63.75 ☐	$46.76 ☐

	Individuals	*Institutions*	*Individual APSA Members*	*Institutional APSA Members*
Political Science Thesaurus (available now):				
Hardback Edition	$20.00 ☐	$30.00 ☐	$18.00 ☐	$27.00 ☐
Paperback Edition	$15.00 ☐	$25.00 ☐	$13.50 ☐	$22.50 ☐

Name_____

Address_____

City_____ State_____ Zip_____

Please make all checks payable to: THE UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH.

Send to: University of Pittsburgh, University Center for International Studies, 4200 Fifth Avenue, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15213

4 NEW paperbound texts from DORSEY

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS AND AMERICAN POLITICS: Voters, Candidates, and Campaigns Since 1952 (paperbound)

Herbert B. Asher, The Ohio State University

Presidential elections are analyzed from the dual perspectives of the candidate seeking support in the electorate and the citizen choosing between competing candidates. Elections are viewed as the interplay between citizens and candidates with each imposing constraints upon the behavior of the other.

CONGRESS, THE BUREAUCRACY, AND PUBLIC POLICY (paperbound)

Randall B. Ripley and **Grace A. Franklin,** both of The Ohio State University

This book focuses on the impact of the relationship between Congress and the federal bureaucracy on the content of national public policy. The nature of the relationship varies in broadly predictable ways depending on the kind of policy at stake.

URBAN POLITICS IN THE SUBURBAN ERA (paperbound)

Thomas P. Murphy, University of Maryland, and **John Rehfuss,** Northern Illinois University

The growth of the urban crisis of the 1960s and its spillover to the suburbs in the 1970s is traced in this completely new text. Approached from a suburban viewpoint, it integrates the social, economic, and political effects of central city-suburban relationships in specific metropolitan areas and in the context of the American federal system.

TEXAS GOVERNMENT TODAY: Structures, Functions, Political Processes (paperbound)

Beryl E. Pettus, Sam Houston State University, and **Randall W. Bland,** Southwest Texas State University

Presenting a fresh, lively account of the Texas political system, this compact and easy to read book combines comparative description with explanations of governmental characteristics, behavior, and policy performance.

Examination copies for adoption consideration available on request; please indicate course title and text presently used.

THE DORSEY PRESS

Homewood, Illinois 60430

Write for our complete Catalog

POLITICAL SCIENCE

National University Publications

POLITICAL OPPOSITION AND DISSENT
Edited by Barbara N. McLennan

". . . a valuable collection of individual essays . . . seminal ideas about opposition in particular countries." —*Contemporary Sociology*

(1973) ISBN 0-8046-7049-4 $15.00

THE ADMINISTRATION OF CHANGE IN AFRICA: Essays in the Theory and Practice of Development Administration in Africa
Edited by E. Philip Morgan
Foreword by Dwight Waldo

"There are at least four commendable features of this volume which make the task of the reviewer easy. First, the editor's short introduction ably outlines and usefully classifies the various methodological and substantive perspectives of the 11 major papers in this volume. Second, the volume carries its own review, as it were, in the form of an excellent concluding paper. Two other commendable features are its unity of theme and excellent sectional organization. —*Journal of Developing Areas*

(1974) ISBN 0-8046-7039-7 $15.00

THE POLITICS OF DEFENSE ANALYSIS
Ralph Sanders

"An interesting, informative and balanced account of the first 10 years of centralized systems analysis in the Department of Defense . . . provides a healthy corrective to the prevailing half-truths concerning Congressional effectiveness." —*Military Review*

(1973) ISBN 0-8046-7071-0 $15.00

THE DILEMMA OF CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL THEORY: Toward a Post-Behavioral Science of Politics
Thomas A. Spragens
Foreword by Morton A. Kaplan

"A worthwhile book in political theory has been contributed by Spragens to a field wherein agreement to overcome the fact-value dichotomy is surrounded by disagreements concerning options."
—*Journal of Politics*

(1973) ISBN 0-8046-7059-5 $10.00

EXTERNALITIES: Theoretical Dimensions of Political Economy
Edited by Robert Staaf and Francis Tannian

A series of substantive theoretical works on "spillover effects", "second-order impacts", and "social costs of social benefits." Among the contributors are Paul A. Samuelson, Sherman Krupp, James N. Buchanan, Harold Demsetz, E. J. Mishan, William Felner and Howard Ellis.

(1973) ISBN 0-8046-7063-3 $17.50
ISBN 0-8046-7083-8 Soft Cover $ 6.50

All titles are Dunellen Publishing Company. Distributed only by

KENNIKAT PRESS
90 South Bayles Avenue • Port Washington, New York 11050
SEND FOR COMPLETE CATALOG OF PUBLICATIONS

New Books in Political Science

from St. Martin's Press

P.O. Box 5352
New York, N.Y. 10017

SOVIET POLITICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE

A. H. Brown

This new book offers a unique critical appraisal of the political science literature devoted to the U.S.S.R. and suggests which approaches are the most useful for an increased understanding of Soviet policy. The author focuses on the behavioralist-traditionalist debate and argues in favor of a "discriminative methodological eclecticism."

April 1976 128 pages $10.95, clothbound

TOLERATION

Preston King

The author presents a thorough exploration of the logic, implications, and applications of the concept of toleration. He studies toleration as a form of liberty, subjects it to rigorous philosopical analysis, reviews it within an historical tradition, and assesses its relevance to the pursuit of truth, justice, and equality.

February 1976 230 pages $16.95, clothbound

THE BRITISH GENERAL ELECTION OF OCTOBER 1974

David Butler and Dennis Kavanagh

Marked by the authoritativeness and impartiality which have characterized all of the Nuffield election studies, this volume examines the reactions of the politicians and the electorate to the challenges emerging from the February election. The events of '74 are detailed, including the timing of the government's dissolution, reporting by the media, and the special problems of Scotland.

February 1976 350 pages $18.95, clothbound

THE FUNCTIONAL THEORY OF POLITICS

David Mitrany

David Mitrany's contribution to the theory and practice of international relations is considerable —he formulated the doctrine and theory of functionalism in international organization. This book is the only collection of Mitrany's classic essays currently available.

April 1976 320 pages $18.95, clothbound

FEUDALISM, CAPITALISM AND BEYOND

Eugene Kamenka and R. S. Neale, Editors

In this volume of specially commissioned essays, international scholars focus on the Marxist conception of capitalism as a total social formation. Each contributor examines the idea of capitalism —its highlights, its nodal points or lines of stress, and its faults where the whole structure might crumble.

February 1976 160 pages $12.95, clothbound

New Yale Paperbounds

Coups and Army Rule in Africa

Studies in Military Style

Samuel Decalo

Samuel Decalo presents detailed evidence from Dahomey, Togo, Congo/Brazzaville, and Uganda that African military coups are engineered by coteries of cliques composed of ambitious officers seeking self-advancement. He successfully refutes prevailing theories that military rule has fostered socioeconomic or political development or stability. c. $17.50 p. $4.95

Essential Works of Socialism

Edited by Irving Howe

The authoritative one-volume anthology of major socialist writings, is now once more available. Offering a historical perspective of democratic socialism from Marx to contemporary writers, it is the essential resource for understanding socialist thought. c. $20.00 p. $8.95

Authoritarian Brazil

Origins, Policies, and Future

Edited by Alfred Stepan

"The focus is on: the origins of the authoritarian regime; the political economy of authoritarian Brazil; the political future of authoritarian Brazil. . . . For their insights, understanding, analysis, explanation, and useful interpretation, these essays are essential reading for student and scholar alike."—*Journal of Politics*
c. $11.50 p. $3.95

The Shaping of Southern Politics

Suffrage Restriction and the Establishment of the One-Party South, 1880–1910

J. Morgan Kousser

"A meticulous and heavily documented research production. . . . The chief merit of the Kousser volume is its state by state analysis of the means and devices employed in the South to prevent political control by Negroes and illiterate whites and its refined estimates of the impact of these restrictive measures upon the electorate."—*The Annals* c. $16.50 p. $4.95

Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden

From Relief to Income Maintenance

Hugh Heclo

"This book is an important and significant contribution to our understanding of the politics of income maintenance policies on a cross-national basis, and it provides a fascinating study of the impact of political culture on the policy-making process . . . . A valuable contribution to all students of European politics and to students of comparative public policy."—*Perspective*

Winner of the 1975 Woodrow Wilson Foundation Book Award c. $17.50 p. $4.95

The Politics of Electoral College Reform

Second edition

Lawrence D. Longley and Alan G. Braun


"Provides considerable insight into the legislative process as well as the outside forces which impinge on legislative decision-making."
—*The Annals* c. $11.50 p. $3.45

Selling the People's Cadillac

The Edsel and Corporate Responsibility

Jan G. Deutsch

This extraordinary book shows that corporate social responsibility should be treated as a legal rather than as an economic problem. Reconstructing the history of the Edsel—one of corporate America's greatest debacles—Jan Deutsch places it in its cultural, economic, and psychological setting. c. $20.00 p. $8.95



Yale University Press New Haven and London

New and Recent

BEYOND THE WATER'S EDGE

America's Foreign Policies

Howard Bliss *and* M. Glen Johnson, *Vassar College*

This brief overview traces America's foreign policy from development of the post World War II consensus to the breakdown of that consensus in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The authors deal with such matters as the nature of foreign policy; the major historic themes of U.S. foreign policy; the major characteristics of the post-war international system; the President and his primacy in policy making; the foreign affairs bureaucracy; Congress and foreign policy; and the impact of non-governmental institutions (the media, public opinion, interest groups) on foreign policy.

272 pages/paperbound/1975/**$4.95**

POLITICS AND PUBLIC POLICY IN AMERICA

An Introduction

David A. Caputo, *Purdue University*

A concise introduction to American government that stresses contemporary aspects of American institutions and public policy while providing students with factual and theoretical information required to stimulate critical thought about the complexities and characteristics of the American political system. Appropriate attention is given throughout to important contemporary issues such as race, sex discrimination, international conflict and human rights. Coverage includes national political institutions — congress, the courts, the presidency, the federal bureaucracy; state and urban politics; group politics and political parties; public policy; the future of American politics.

302 pages/paperbound/1974/$3.95

THE PINNACLE

The Contemporary American Presidency

John F. Murphy, *U.S. Coast Guard Academy*

In this fresh analysis of the modern American presidency, the author asserts that President Truman recognized basic transformations in the nation wrought by World War II, and that he moved to create in the presidency an instrument of permanent authority capable of pursuing a national agenda. Truman thus placed the President at the pinnacle of authority and responsibility, and he and his successors must be evaluated in that light. Professor Murphy then examines the thrust of each administration, its success in achieving the national agenda, prospects and possible problems for the presidency.

215 pages/paperbound/1974/$2.95

Lippincott

J.B. Lippincott Company • Division of Higher Education
East Washington Square • Philadelphia, Pa. 19105

W. H. Freeman and Company: Committed to the Best in Political Science.

URBAN AMERICA
The Policy Alternatives
David A. Caputo, Purdue University

For the first course in Urban Politics, this new text combines historical, institutional, and behavioral material with a solid analysis of the policy alternatives facing the citizens and political leaders of America's urban centers. A major theme is how urban politics in the United States both directly affects and is directly affected by national political institutions and policy decisions.
Publication date: Spring 1976

EXPLORATIONS IN CONVENTION DECISION MAKING
The Democratic Party in the 1970's
Denis G. Sullivan, Dartmouth College,
Jeffrey L. Pressman, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and
F. Christopher Arterton, Yale University

A timely supplementary text for undergraduate courses in American politics, political parties, and elections, *Explorations in Convention Decision Making* is based on the authors' research at the 1972 and 1974 Democratic conventions. The book presents models of intra-party conflicts and their resolution, convention decision making, and the process of legitimation, plus a historical survey of American political conventions from their origins to the present. The authors relate their findings to current concerns about party reform and to the more general problem of organizational survival in a changing environment.
Publication date: Summer 1976

SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING
David W. Rohde and Harold J. Spaeth, Michigan State University

This is a systematic explanation of how and why the Justices of the United States Supreme Court make their decisions—an explanation that focuses on what the justices actually do, rather than on any idealized scheme of decision making.

"Destined to become a classic in the field. . . . I look forward to using it in my American Consitutional Law course."
—Sheldon Goldman, University of Massachusetts
1975, 229 pp., 30 illus., hardcover $11.95, softcover $5.95

INTEREST AND IDEOLOGY
The Foreign Policy Beliefs of American Businessmen
Bruce M. Russett and Elizabeth C. Hanson, Yale University

This is the first extensive test of some major economic theories of foreign policy choice. Focusing on recent and contemporary events in U.S. foreign policy, the authors examined stock market prices; performed a content analysis of financial and military periodicals; and analyzed the responses of 1,200 business executives and senior military officers to a special questionnaire. The conclusion is provocative: economic considerations appear to be less important than domestic ideological preconceptions in influencing businessmen's foreign policy choices.
1975, 296 pp., 35 tables, hardcover $10.95, softcover $4.95



W. H. FREEMAN AND COMPANY
660 Market Street, San Francisco, California 94104

GERMANY AND POLAND

From War to Peaceful Relations

W.W. Kulski

The first in-depth analysis in English to fully present the Polish and German points of view regarding their mutual relations, whose breakdown in 1939 led to the Second World War. It traces the stages of West German-Polish relations, affected not only by wartime and postwar events but also by a thousand years of mutual history. The changing relationship is also described against the background of the changing Eastern policies of West Germany toward the Soviet Union and the whole Eastern bloc; without an understanding of this background the attitudes of both West Germany and Poland would be incomprehensible.

Professor Kulski begins the book with an analysis of the historical background from ancient Slavic settlements through the medieval period to Nazi Germany. In subsequent chapters he examines World War II, the origin of the Oder-Neisse frontier, international postwar conferences, the Adenauer era, the "softening" Erhard-Schroeder Eastern approach and the great-coalition's opening of a dialog, Brandt's new Eastern policies, the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties of 1970, the ratification of the treaties, and the aftermath. Professor Kulski offers a fascinating account of the Bundestag debate, skillfully analyzing the forces at work and the reasons for the abstention of the opposition. Germany and Poland places German-Polish relations in the context of the broader issues of European security., West-East detente, and German unification.

ISBN 0-8516-0118-2 (cloth) $22.50
ISBN 0-8156-0122-0 (paper) $9.95

From your local bookseller or prepaid from:

SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY PRESS
Syracuse, New York 13210



Revised this year to put today's politics into perspective

AN INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN GOVERNMENT Second Edition

Kenneth Prewitt ★ Sidney Verba

An instant success upon its publication in 1974, AN INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN GOVERNMENT has been revised after two years to ensure up-to-date coverage of events and to include current analyses based on the soundest recent research. The authors have retained and expanded many of the innovative features introduced in the widely used first edition and have incorporated users' and reviewers' suggestions in revising their text to meet the needs of contemporary courses. The book stresses the recurring patterns, structures, and processes that give meaning to political activity, giving students a clear, analytical understanding of the institutional and behavioral aspects of American government.

Tentative: 640 pages; $11.95. February 1976. *Instructor's Manual* by Richard L. Cole. *Study Guide* by Raymond Tatalovich (tentative: $4.95).

Now in a new SECOND EDITION

THE FEDERAL COURTS AS A POLITICAL SYSTEM

Sheldon Goldman and Thomas P. Jahnige

The Second Edition of this important book incorporates the latest research and events in its examination of how the federal judicial system works within the larger context of American politics. Material is integrated within a framework of Eastonian systems analysis and is balanced between the lower courts and the Supreme Court. The social and political backgrounds of Nixon's judicial appointees are analyzed, and previously unpublished material on the Nixon administration's judicial selection process is included. New judicial behavior is highlighted.

Tentative: 305 pages; $5.95; paper. January 1976.

To request examination copies, write to Lilian Schein, Dept. 197. Please include course title, enrollment, and present text.

10 East 53d Street
New York, N.Y. 10022

1817

Harper & Row

William W. Lammers

PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS: Patterns and Prospects

Reflecting the need for critical reappraisal of the presidency in the aftermath of Watergate, this cohesive text traces the patterns and practices characteristic of presidential politics since 1932 and considers contemporary practices in evaluating proposed reform ideas. The selection process and domestic policy making are discussed. The text identifies key considerations in determining the future of the presidency, presents diverse interpretations, and incorporates empirical findings of political scientists in related fields.

310 pages; $5.95; paper. January 1976.

Ronald J. Stupak

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY:
Assumptions, Processes, and Projections

Blending traditional and revisionist outlooks, this text features a policy-making, decision-making, value-based approach to United States foreign policy since World War II. The author uses case studies, personality analyses, diplomatic philosophical data, and discussions of substantive issues to identify, analyze, and explain the underlying patterns of foreign policy—past, present, and future. The Truman years are viewed as the pivotal period. Detailed consideration is given to the current wave of reevaluation concerning United States involvement in the international system, and future prospects are assessed.

243 pages; $6.95; paper. January 1976.

John C. Bollens and Henry J. Schmandt

THE METROPOLIS: Its People, Politics, and Economic Life, THIRD EDITION

This outstanding text presents a balanced, multidimensional view of the metropolis that emphasizes process and behavior as well as form and structure. The Third Edition includes major developments that have occurred since 1969 and endeavors to assess their significance.

401 pages; $7.95; paper. 1975.

Robert L. Lineberry and Ira Sharkansky

URBAN POLITICS AND PUBLIC POLICY, SECOND EDITION

Featuring a strong public policy focus, this comprehensive text is intended for the first course in urban politics. All traditional topics, including power structure, nonpartisan politics, federalism, city managers, bureaucracies, and taxation and finance, are covered with special attention given to current and controversial issues.

348 pages; $7.95; paper. 1974.

To request examination copies, write to Lilian Schein, Dept. 197. Please include course title, enrollment, and present text.

10 East 53d Street
New York, N.Y. 10022

1817

Harper & Row

Gordon G. Henderson

AN INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL PARTIES

A sophisticated, selective treatment, this book concentrates on currently significant aspects of political parties, thoroughly exploring issues that students are likely to have pondered on their own. Prepublication reviews have been extremely enthusiastic about this book, especially citing it for its currency, readability, and choice of high-interest topics. It is a brief and provocative introduction to American political parties that will stimulate further thought and research.

AN INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL PARTIES offers an up-to-date survey of the best writing and research in the field. Discussions model the research process, cover substantive findings, and indicate directions for future research. Political participation, issue voting, the independent voter, trust and alienation, campaign techniques, characteristics of party actives, and other topics ignored by most texts are explored. Some comparative material on parties in other countries is offered to broaden perspectives. Explanations of essential quantitative measures and statistics are geared to students with no training in those techniques.

Tentative: 317 pages; $10.95. January 1976.

Douglas V. Verney

BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS:
Life Without a Declaration of Independence,
THIRD EDITION

This elementary introduction to British government and politics is ideal for comparative courses. The new edition features updated material on governmental solvency, local reforms, Ireland, nationalism in Scotland and Wales, the Common Market, the emerging Liberal Party and other shifts in party strength, the oil crisis and the North Sea discoveries, minority government, civil service systems, the National Health Service, British policy toward the United States, and changes in Parliament.

Tentative: 224 pages; $5.50; paper. January 1976.

David J. Finlay and Thomas Hovet, Jr.

7304: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ON THE PLANET EARTH

What will the next 20 years—7304 days—bring? This forward-looking introduction to International politics confronts basic questions about the present and the future. How the system, both institutionalized and informal, is organized to deal with current problems and the decision-making process are examined in detail.

374 pages; $10.95. 1975. *Instructor's Manual.*

To request examination copies, write to Lilian Schein, Dept. 197. Please include course title, enrollment, and present text.

10 East 53d Street
New York, N.Y. 10022

1817

Harper & Row

Formerly, Dodd, Mead

Harper & Row takes pride in announcing the acquisition of the following college texts formerly published by Dodd, Mead & Company. It means that Harper & Row can now offer you an even larger selection of outstanding texts for your courses in political science.

Introduction to Political Science

Reo M. Christenson, Alan S. Engel, Dan N. Jacobs, Mostafa Rejai, and Herbert Waltzer
IDEOLOGIES AND MODERN POLITICS
Second Edition
280 pages; $5.95/paper. Spring 1975.

Dell G. Hitchner and William H. Harbold
MODERN GOVERNMENT
Third Edition
522 pages; $8.95/paper. 1972.

American Government

J. Keith Melville
THE AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM
353 pages; $5.95/paper. 1975.
Instructor's Manual.

Norman C. Thomas, Editor
THE PRESIDENCY IN CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT
348 pages; $6.95/paper. Spring 1975.

James P. Young, Editor
CONSENSUS AND CONFLICT
Readings in American Politics
397 pages; $5.95/paper. 1972.
Instructor's Manual.

Public Administration and Public Policy

Alan A. Altshuler
THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY
452 pages; $8.95/paper. 1968.

David F. Paulsen and Robert B. Denhardt, Editors
POLLUTION AND PUBLIC POLICY
A Book of Readings
258 pages; $6.95/paper. 1973.

Harold Wolman
POLITICS OF FEDERAL HOUSING
227 pages; $5.95/paper. 1971.

Political/Voting Behavior

Gerald M. Pomper
ELECTIONS IN AMERICA
Control and Influence in Democratic Politics
297 pages; $6.95/paper. 1968.

Gerald M. Pomper
VOTER'S CHOICE
Varieties of American Electoral Behavior
259 pages; $6.95/paper. Spring 1975.

Public Opinion

Alan D. Monroe
PUBLIC OPINION IN AMERICA
296 pages; $7.95/paper. Spring 1975.

To request examination copies, write to Lillan Schein, Dept. 197. Please include course title, enrollment, and present text.

1817 **HARPER & ROW 10 East 53d Street, New York, N.Y. 10022**

NOW, Harper & Row

Urban Politics

Ernest Patterson
BLACK CITY POLITICS
310 pages; $6.95/paper. 1974.

William O. Winter
THE URBAN POLITY
516 pages; $11.95. 1969.

American Foreign Policy

Howard Bliss and Glen Johnson, Editors
CONSENSUS AT THE CROSSROADS
Dialogues in American Foreign Policy
326 pages; $4.95/paper. 1972.

Eugene J. Rosi, Editor
AMERICAN DEFENSE AND DETENTE
Readings in National Security Policy
532 pages; $6.95. 1973.

Political Theory

A. J. Beitzinger
A HISTORY OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT
628 pages; $13.95. 1972.

Anthony de Crespigny and Kenneth Minogue, Editors
CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHERS
296 pages; $7.95/paper. Spring 1975.

Robert Y. Fluno
THE DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY
Governmental Practices and Purposes
235 pages; $4.95/paper. 1971.

International Political Science

W. Andrew Axline and James A. Stegenga
THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY
A Brief Introduction to International Relations
196 pages; $3.95/paper. 1972.

David Brook, Editor
SEARCH FOR PEACE
Readings in International Relations
423 pages; $6.95/paper. 1970.

Edwin H. Fedder
NATO
The Dynamics of Alliance in the Postwar World
155 pages; $4.95/paper. 1973.

Richard C. Gripp
THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF COMMUNISM
224 pages; $4.95/paper. 1973.

Mark N. Hagopian
THE PHENOMENON OF REVOLUTION
402 pages; $7.50/paper. 1974.

Dell G. Hitchner and Carol Levine
COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS
259 pages; $5.95/paper. 1967.

Donald James Puchala
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS TODAY
379 pages; $7.95/paper. 1971.

John S. Reshetar, Jr.
THE SOVIET POLITY
Government and Politics in the U.S.S.R.
412 pages; $6.95/paper. 1971.

Frank Tachau, Editor
THE DEVELOPING NATIONS
What Path to Modernization?
243 pages; $5.95/paper. 1972.

The Politics of Aid, Trade and Investment

Edited by S. Ralchur and C. Liske.

ISBN 0-470-54117-2 1976
320 pp. $20.00
(A Sage Publications book)

Governmental management of trade is examined in large and small states, ranging from the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to Latin America and the Third World.

The Nature of International Society

By C. A. W. Manning.

ISBN 0-470-56760-0 1962; 1975
220 pp. $19.75

A unique examination of such topics as the quality of communal thought and feeling, the international applications of ethics, the element of make-believe in social arrangements, the role of myth, and the explanation of legal commitment.

The Paralysis of International Institutions and the Remedies:

A Study of Self-Determination, Concord among the Major Powers, and Political Arbitration
By Istran Bibo.

ISBN 0-470-07208-3 April, 1976
220 pp. $17.50
(Not available in Canada from Halsted Press)

Examines the rise of the nation-state in relation to the problems it has created. Criticizes the existing machinery and methods for settling international disputes and makes proposals for their improvement.

HALSTED PRESS

Prices are subject to change without notice. Prices slightly higher in Canada.

International Terrorism and World Security

Edited by D. Carlton and C. Schaerf.

ISBN 0-470-13503-4 1975
332 pp. $19.75
(Not available in Canada from Halsted Press)

Examines the most prevalent types of violence in the world, the national liberation movements and the guerrilla movements of the Third World, and their relationship to the traditional forms of international conflict.

Soviet Propaganda:

A Case Study of the Middle East Conflict
By B. A. Hazan.

ISBN 0-470-15000-9 1976
350 pp. $22.50

Examines the attributes of propaganda and the history, themes, and methods of Soviet propaganda with special emphasis on Zionism and the State of Israel.

Turmoil and Consensus:

The World of Politics
Edited by B. Callaway and A. Stone.


ISBN 0-470-13015-6 1976
275 pp. Cloth $12.95 (tentative)
ISBN 0-470-13016-4 1976
175 pp. Paper $7.95 (tentative)
(A Schenkman publication)

Examines political issues, causes of political change, domination, stability, and the future of politics. Includes selections by Marx, Mao, Nkrumah, J. S. Mill, C. Wright Mills, and Herbert Marcuse.

Examine these books free for 30 days. Write Dept. 49, Halsted Press, 605 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016. In Canada order from John Wiley & Sons Canada, Inc., 22 Worcester Road, Rexdale, Ontario.

The International Scene

IMPORTANT NEW BOOKS FROM HALSTED PRESS, A DIVISION OF JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC.



variety:

THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS
David Blake and Robert Walters, both of the University of Pittsburgh

A systematic and comprehensive analysis of the political aspects of the major forms of international economic transactions such as trade, monetary affairs, and multinational corporations. Juxtaposing liberal and radical views, the book examines the economic issues causing conflict among advanced industrial states and with developing countries. This book can serve as the major text for courses focusing on these topics or it may usefully supplement texts in international relations.
1976 (68471-2) $7.50

MODERN POLITICAL ANALYSIS, 3rd Edition
Robert Dahl, Yale University

Each chapter in this new Third Edition directs its attention to persistent, and important question of contemporary relevance. Some of these questions include: What is the role of power and authority in political systems? What conditions make for stability, change, or revolution in different political systems? What are the distinguishing features of political man? Compact, clear, and succinct, the text quickly enables students to gain a grasp of some of the most profound problems in political analysis. 1976 (59698-1) $3.50

WHO'S RUNNING AMERICA: INSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES
Thomas Dye, Florida State Univ.

This text examines men at the top of the institutional structure of America—who they are, how much power they yield, how they came to power, and what they do with it. Dye systematically identifies 5,000 elites in America who collectively control: over half of the nation's industrial and financial assets, the television networks, news agencies and major newspaper chains, the most prestigeous law firms, the larger private foundations and universities, top command positions in the military, and key positions in various branches of government. 1976 paper (95838-9) $5.95; cloth (95839-7) $8.95

PUBLIC OPINION AND RESPONSIBLE DEMOCRACY
Dennis Ippolito and Thomas Walker, both of Emory Univ., and Kenneth Kolson, Hiram College

Provides the student with a comprehensive overview of the roles and influence of public opinion in American national politics. The book's objective is to analyze public opinion in a political context and, thus to allow the student to understand the relationship between public opinion and government. 1976 (73783-3) $10.95

PRENTICE-HALL

For information, write: Robert Jordan, Dept. J-431, College Division, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ 07632

a dynamic text...

DYNAMICS OF AMERICAN POLITICS
Raymond Wolfinger and Martin Shapiro, University of California at San Diego, and Fred I. Greenstein, University of California at Berkeley.

A basic introduction to American government presenting the most up-to-date findings and interpretations in the field of American politics that is written in an easy-to-understand style. The text places equal emphasis on individual political activities, organized political activity, governmental activity, governmental institutions, the policy making process, and political evaluation.

The authors of *DYNAMICS OF AMERICAN POLITICS* believe "that the students should be told what we know about American politics, not burdened with research methodologies, professional jargon, and conceptual models and techniques."

The text is post-behavioral in the sense that it has moved beyond the controversies over behaviorism vs. traditionalism and the controversies over elitism vs. pluralism. The authors explain to your students what political science can tell us, based on current research; about how American government and politics actually operate.

Exploring current concerns about problems of public policy (race, environment, etc.) and evaluation, separate chapters cover; the policy-making process, the use of unconventional means to achieve rapid system change, and the evaluation of the political process.

Useful supplements to accompany the text include a *Test Item File* with over 1,000 test items and an Instructor's Manual with class discussion topics, suggested chapter outlines, and alternate course sequences. A *Student Workbook* is also available. 1976 (47716-6) $11.95

PRENTICE-HALL

For further information, write: Robert Jordan, Dept. J-431, College Division, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ 07632

stimulating.

BASIC ISSUES OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, Eighth Edition Samuel Hendel, and Hillman Bishop

Contains persuasively reasoned analyses of opposing or variant positions on the fundamental values, conflicts, and persistent issues of American democracy and politics. Its special values, apart from its emphasis on critical and controvesial questions, lie in its sharpening of analytical faculties and contribution to lively and stimulating discussion for your students.

The new Eighth Edition deals with such current topics as the balancing of power after Watergate, preferential treatment in employment and in admission to professional schools (DeFunis v. Odegaard), the fundamental premises and goals of American foreign policy, and the question of how pluralistic and how successful is America. In addition, a significant number of topics have been updated or strengthened including those dealing with the dilemmas of freedom, the role of the Supreme Court, women's liberation, and centralization and noncentralization.

Among the exciting new contributions in this edition are selections from the writings of Alexander Bickel, Gabriel Koko, Howard Zinn, Sidney Hook, Archibald Cox, Daniel J. Elazar, Henry Kissinger, Alex Nove, Frances Fitzgerald, Michael Parenti, and Ben J. Wattenberg.

1976 paper (06252-1) $6.95

PRENTICE-HALL

For further information, write: Robert Jordan, Dept. J-431, College Division, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 07632

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

AN INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN GOVERNMENT
Third Edition

Erwin L. Levine, Skidmore College, and **Elmer Cornwell, Jr.,** Brown University

1975 320 pages paper

NEW

THE PERVERTED PRIORITIES OF AMERICAN POLITICS
Second Edition

Duane Lockard, Princeton University

1976 352 pages (approx.) paper

AMERICAN POLITICS:
Crisis and Challenge

Louis S. Loeb, Luther College, and the late **Daniel M. Berman**

1975 448 pages paper

POLISCIDE

Theodore J. Lowi and **Benjamin Ginsberg,** both, Cornell University

1976 320 pages (approx.) paper

THE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
Second Edition

C. Peter Magrath, University of Minnesota;
Elmer E. Cornwell, Jr., Brown University, and **Jay S. Goodman,** Wheaton College

1973 717 pages paper

NEW

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY

John F. Manley, Stanford University

1976 512 pages (approx.) paper

POLITICS, U.S.A.:
Cases on the American Democratic Process
Fourth Edition

Andrew M. Scott and **Earle Wallace,** both, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

1974 556 pages paper

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

NEW

BUREAUCRACIES, ORGANIZATIONS, AND ADMINISTRATIONS: A Political Primer
David Schuman, University of Massachusetts, Amherst
1976 256 pages (approx.) paper

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS/LAW

THE RELATIONS OF NATIONS
Fourth Edition
Frederick H. Hartmann, Naval War College
1973 715 pages

WORLD IN CRISIS
Fourth Edition
Frederick H. Hartmann, Naval War College
1973 519 pages paper

NEW

THE DYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
Third Edition
Norman J. Padelford, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the late **George A. Lincoln** of the University of Denver, and **Lee D. Olvey,** United States Military Academy
1976 608 pages (approx.)

NEW

LAW AMONG NATIONS:
An Introduction to Public International Law
Third Edition
Gerhard von Glahn, University of Minnesota, Duluth
1976 784 pages (approx.)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Fourth Edition
Martin Shapiro, University of California, San Diego, and the late **Rocco J. Tresolini**
1975 832 pages

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

NEW

CONCEPTS IN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
Richard E. Flathman, The University of Chicago
1973 532 pages

POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES
James A. Gould and **Willis H. Truitt,** both, University of South Florida
1973 495 pages paper

Macmillan

Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc.
100A Brown Street, Riverside, New Jersey 08075

The Origins of Zionism

David Vital. ☐ The most comprehensive history of the beginnings of Zionism yet attempted, this study provides valuable insight into the essentia character and purposes of this important movement. Professor Vital focuse on the crucial formative period from the onset of the great East-West migration of European Jews in 1881 to the first World Congress of Zionists in 1897, which marked the emergence of Zionism as an organized politica force.

1975 416 pp. $22.0

The Procedure of the UN Security Council

Sydney D. Bailey. ☐ This is a comprehensive guide to the constitution and procedure of the United Nations Security Council, set in its political and historical context. The author discusses the difficulties of solving procedural problems, showing how they are complicated by faults in the UN Charter, by specific political problems, and by changes in diplomatic thinking. He includes proposals for changes in the Council's procedure which do not require amendments to the UN Charter.

1975 440 pp.; 27 tables; charts $26.0(

British Government 1966 to 1975

Years of Reform

Frank Stacey. ☐ The pace of change in British Government over the last decade has been unusually rapid. Major reforms have been carried through in the organization of the Civil Service, local government, and the Health Service; and far-reaching reforms are projected in regional government. Professor Stacey assesses all these developments as well as other changes which have been largely, or wholly, unplanned and have resulted from the pressure of events.

1975 256 pp. $17.00

Indonesia Accuses!

Soekarno's Defence Oration in the Political Trial of 1930

Soekarno; edited, translated, annotated and introduced by **Roger K. Paget**; University of Colorado. ☐ The first English translation of the most famous tract of the Indonesian nationalist movement; this indictment of colonialism and forecast of future events in the nationalist movement provides important new material for students of comparative politics. (Oxford in Asia Historical Memoirs)

1975 238 pp. $22.00

The Black Sash of South Africa

A Case Study in Liberalism

Cherry Michelman, Springfield Technical Community College, Massachusetts; with a Foreword by **Sir Robert Birley**. ☐ One of the few remaining active liberal groups in South Africa to protest apartheid, the Black Sash is an organization of white middle-class women. It has grown from limited opposition to the Nationalist Government on issues surrounding the Senate Bill of 1955-56 to a widening political consciousness. Dr. Michelman and a woman of the Black Sash describe the group's efforts to oppose apartheid through protest techniques, propaganda, advice offices, and publications. (Institute of Race Relations)

1975 208 pp. $18.25

Prices are subject to change.

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

200 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10016

Reliable politics from Wiley

PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, 2nd Ed.
Richard A. Watson, *University of Missouri*
This powerful teaching aid combines three purposes of an effective American government text: basic factual material...concepts around which to organize that material...and a critical evaluation of our political system. Includes Watergate, the Carnal Knowledge case, Detroit busing, Nixon's resignation, and the Budget Reform Act of 1974.
1975 616 pp. $8.95 paper

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT:
Minority Rights Versus Majority Rule
Harlan Hahn, *University of Southern California,* & **William Holland,** *University of California at Riverside*
What roles do racial and ethnic minorities have in our political system? Here's the first book to examine this role within all phases of American politics: the constitution, political parties, interest groups, and the three branches of government.
1976 203 pp. $6.95 paper

POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INQUIRY
Dickinson L. McGaw & George Watson, *both of Arizona State University*
A comprehensive overview of research methods in the social sciences. Includes logic and philosophy of science materials in addition to research methods, data collection, and analysis techniques.
1976 approx. 528 pp. $12.95

SUPPLEMENTAL CASES FOR CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING 1975 EDITION
Joel B. Grossman, *University of Wisconsin,* & **Richard S. Wells,** *University of Oklahoma*
This casebook is designed to accompany the Wiley text, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING. It provides topical, current information on the major Supreme Court decisions made between 1971 and July 1974. An addendum is included on the most important decisions of the 1974 term.
1975 406 pp. $4.95 paper

NATIONAL POLICY GAME
John L. Foster, Thomas A. Henderson & Daniel G. Barbee, *all of Georgia State University*
A classroom simulation game that introduces students to the American political process through personal involvement. Students become political actors who must solve some of the major problems faced by congressmen, bureaucrats, White House staff, newspeople, and lobbyists in accomplishing their goals.
1975 108 pp. $4.95 paper

SERVING THE FEW:
Corporate Capitalism and the Bias of Government Policy
Edward S. Greenberg, *University of Colorado*
Focuses sharply and explicitly on distributional issues (wealth, income, taxation, justice, and health), on giant corporations, and how government intervention affects the distribution of costs and benefits among social classes. Discusses reform in a historical perspective, and sees it motivated by the needs of corporate capitalism.
1974 275 pp. $10.95 cloth
$ 4.95 paper

THE PLOT THAT FAILED:
Nixon and the Administrative Presidency
Richard P. Nathan, *University of Virginia*
Explores implications and raises questions without passing judgement on Nixon's attempt in 1972 and 1973 to achieve his major aims in domestic policy by controlling the management of domestic government.
1975 193 pp. $8.95 cloth
$4.95 paper

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS SINCE WORLD WAR II:
A Short History, 2nd Ed.
Charles L. Robertson, *Smith College*
Combines a detailed summary of international events and crises since the war with an overview of broad changes in the political pattern of the world.
1975 465 pp. $12.95 cloth
$ 8.95 paper

To be considered for complimentary examination copies, write to Howard P. Smith, Dept. A5444-PS. Please include course name, enrollment, and title of present text.

JOHN WILEY & SONS, Inc.
605 Third Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10016
In Canada: 22 Worcester Road, Rexdale, Ontario
Prices subject to change without notice.
A5444-PS

FISCAL CENTRALIZATION AND TAX BURDENS

State and Regional Finance of City Services

Roy W. Bahl and Walter Vogt, Syracuse University

Strong evidence that shifting the responsibility for financing city services from the cities to state or regional governments could heighten the regressivity of tax structures.

Available 144 pp $13.50

IMPROVING ACCESS TO ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY — Nonmetropolitan Labor Markets in an Urban Society

Niles M. Hansen, University of Texas

Economic development and manpower problems in nonmetropolitan areas — public policy measures enacted to alleviate these problems and specific suggestions for improving economic opportunities.

Spring, 1976 ca. 156 pp ca. $13.50

NON-NUCLEAR FUTURES:

The Case for an Ethical Energy Strategy

Amory B. Lovins and John Price (co-published with Friends of the Earth International)

A closely focused outline of the main technical, ethical, social, economic and policy issues regarding the use of nuclear power.

(cloth) $11.95 144 pp (paper) $5.95

EVALUATION AND REFORM

The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Title I

Milbrey W. McLaughlin, The Rand Corporation (Rand Educational Policy Series)

An examination of the initiation, implementation, outcome, and impact of major Title I evaluation efforts from 1965 through 1972.

Available 160 pp $12.00

THE IMPACT OF SCHOOL RESOURCES ON THE LEARNING OF INNER CITY CHILDREN

Richard J. Murnane, University of Pennsylvania

New data on the backgrounds and academic progress of students in relation to the school resources they receive.

144 pp $12.00

ECONOMICS AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

Media Structure and the First Amendment

Bruce M. Owen, Stanford University

Professor Owen argues that public policy regulating U.S. media is based on erroneous technical and economic assumptions, conceived in a climate of emotional preconceptions, and detrimental to the realization of free expression. He develops a critical distinction between "editorial-newsgathering" and "production-transmission" functions that serves as the basis for his specific recommendations to reformulate U.S. communications policy.

Available 244 pp $15.00

RESISTANCE TO RACIAL CHANGE IN THE URBAN NORTH

John Michael Ross, Boston University and Massachusetts Institute of Technology

A systematic analysis of public opinion which challenges current popular and sociological theories of anti-racial changes.

Forthcoming ca. 240 pp ca. $13.50

WHEN VALUES CONFLICT

Essays on Environmental Analysis, Discourse, and Decision

Lawrence H. Tribe, Harvard University School of Law; Corinne S. Schelling; and John Voss, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Editors

(Published for the American Academy of Arts and Sciences)

The role of values in analysis and decision-making in the environmental area — the product of five years of intensive discussion and study by eminent scholars from a broad range of disciplines. The application of these theories to a 'live' environmental dispute is described in BOUNDARIES OF ANALYSIS (listed below).

Spring, 1976 ca. 144 pp ca. $12.00

BOUNDARIES OF ANALYSIS

An Inquiry into the Tocks Island Dam Controversy

Harold A. Feiveson; Frank W. Sinden; and Robert H. Socolow, Center for Environmental Studies, Princeton University

(Published for the American Academy of Arts and Sciences)

The problemmatic influence of values in the evolution of decisions that surrounded the Tocks Island Dam proposal. This important study (which illustrates the theories developed in WHEN VALUES CONFLICT) analyzes the political decision-making process throughout the life of this environmental controversy and shows how economic and technological analyses affected the decisions.

Spring, 1976 ca. 288 pp ca. $15.00

GROWTH LIMITATION AND POLITICAL POWER

Bruno Fritsch

An internationally respected scholar argues that the social and political consequences of growth limitation will mobilize very powerful political forces long before exhaustion of the world's physical resources . . . that nuclear blackmail and war are very real threats unless the international system begins to move away from its present dominance oriented structure.

Spring, 1976 ca. 112 pp ca. $12.00

For information on these and related Ballinger titles, please write for our catalog.



Ballinger

PUBLISHING COMPANY

17 Dunster Street, Harvard Square, Cambridge, MA 02138

Coup d'état or who's on top?

COMMUNITY AND REVOLUTION IN MODERN VIETNAM
Alexander Woodside, Harvard University
Just published / 352 pages / $9.95 (tentative)

The first western book to use Vietnamese and Chinese language sources in an analysis of the Vietnamese revolution. Woodside traces the revolution from its origins to the 1970s, and compares Vietnamese, Chinese, and Japanese history. COMMUNITY AND REVOLUTION IN MODERN VIETNAM is an appropriate supplement for advanced undergraduate and graduate courses in East Asian studies.

THE ARMED BUREAUCRATS
Military-Administrative Regimes and Political Development
Edward Feit
University of Massachusetts — Amherst
1973 / 199 pages / paper / $4.95

Focusing on military coups and resulting regimes in Argentina, Burma, Egypt, Pakistan, Greece, and Spain, Feit presents each case in detail, allowing consideration of the relation between theory and case.

CUBA UNDER CASTRO
The Limits of Charisma
Edward Gonzalez
University of California — Los Angeles
1974 / 224 pages / paper / $6.50

In this overview of Cuban politics, Gonzalez summarizes pre-revolutionary and revolutionary developments through the mid-1960s, emphasizes recent internal and external developments which pose new and serious problems, and examines alternative revolutionary models and foreign policy.

For adoption consideration, request examination copies from your regional Houghton Mifflin office.



Houghton Mifflin

Atlanta, GA 30324 / Dallas, TX 75235 / Geneva, IL 60134
Hopewell, NJ 08525 / Palo Alto, CA 94304 / Boston, MA 02107

A Guide to Graduate Study in Political Science 1976

Revised Fifth Edition
including names and fields of specialization of faculty.




Available in December . . .

The 5th edition of the authoritative compilation of Ph.D. and Masters programs in political science is completely revised and now contains the *names and fields of specialization of all faculty in graduate departments.*

$4.00 (prepaid)

Available Direct From:
The American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036



25 MAR 1976

The American Political Science Review

Articles and Essays by Lynn T. White III, John P. Diggins, David K. Hildebrand, James D. Laing and Howard Rosenthal, Geoffrey S. Smith, Jerrold G. Rusk, John H. Whyte


John A. Armstrong
Mobilized and Proletarian Diasporas

Michael J. Robinson
Public Affairs Television and the Growth of Political Malaise

Fred M. Hayward, Joel D. Barkan
A Reassessment of Conventional Wisdom About the Informed Public

Joel D. Aberbach and Bert A. Rockman
Clashing Beliefs Within the Executive Branch

Paul R. Abramson
Generational Change and the Decline of Party Identification in America



Published Quarterly by

The American Political Science Association

Vol. LXX June 1976 No.2

Reo M. Christenson, Alan S. Engel, Dan N. Jacobs, Mostafa Rejai, and Herbert Waltzer
IDEOLOGIES AND MODERN POLITICS
SECOND EDITION

An objective and balanced account of today's *isms* that successfully combines historical background, contemporary description, and scholarly analysis to examine the genesis, evolution, and current status of specific ideologies. 280 pages; $5.95/paper. 1975.

Sheldon Goldman and Thomas P. Jahnige
THE FEDERAL COURTS AS A POLITICAL SYSTEM
SECOND EDITION

The up-to-date Second Edition of this important book incorporates the latest research and events in its examination of how the federal judicial system works within the larger context of American politics. 305 pages; $5.95/paper. January 1976.

William W. Lammers
PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS
PATTERNS AND PROSPECTS

Traces the patterns and practices characteristic of presidential politics since 1932 and considers contemporary practices in evaluating proposed reform ideas. Key issues determining the future scope of presidential power are identified. 310 pages; $5.95/paper. January 1976.

Gerald M. Pomper
VOTERS' CHOICE
VARIETIES OF AMERICAN ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR

A comprehensive analysis of American voting behavior from 1960-1972, with emphasis on presidential elections. The author compiles a portrait of the American voter and presents a simple introduction to quantitative techniques in political science. 259 pages; $6.95/paper. 1975.

Ronald J. Stupak
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
ASSUMPTIONS, PROCESSES, AND PROJECTIONS

Blending traditional and revisionist outlooks, this text features a policy-making, decision-making, value-based approach to United States foreign policy since World War II. The hows, the whys, and the whos of foreign policy-making are explored in depth. 243 pages; $6.95/paper. January 1976.

A Reminder . . .

Have you ordered the *Study Guide* to accompany the new Second Edition of Prewitt and Verba's AN INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN GOVERNMENT?

To request examination copies, write to Lilian Schein, Dept. 305. Please include course title, enrollment, and present text.

10 East 53d Street
New York, N.Y. 10022

1817

Harper & Row

The American Political Science Review

Vol. LXX June 1976 No. 2

CONTENTS

393 Mobilized and Proletarian Diasporas — John A. Armstrong

409 Public Affairs Television and the Growth of Political Malaise: The Case of "The Selling of the Pentagon" — Michael J. Robinson

433 A Reassessment of Conventional Wisdom About the Informed Public: National Political Information in Ghana — Fred M. Hayward

452 Comment: Further Reassessment of the "Conventional Wisdom": Political Knowledge and Voting Behavior in Rural Kenya — Joel D. Barkan

456 Clashing Beliefs Within the Executive Branch: The Nixon Administration Bureaucracy — Joel D. Aberbach and Bert A. Rockman

469 Generational Change and the Decline of Party Identification in America: 1952–1974 — Paul R. Abramson

479 Local Autonomy in China During the Cultural Revolution: The Theoretical Uses of an Atypical Case — Lynn T. White III

492 Four Theories in Search of a Reality: James Burnham, Soviet Communism, and the Cold War — John P. Diggins

509 Prediction Analysis in Political Research — David K. Hildebrand, James D. Laing and Howard Rosenthal

536 Communications

557 Editorial Comment

560 Book Reviews and Essays

560 "Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954. A Review Essay. — Geoffrey S. Smith

583 Political Participation in America: A Review Essay — Jerrold G. Rusk

592 Recent Writing on Northern Ireland — John H. Whyte



Office of publication: Curtis Reed Plaza, Menasha, Wisconsin.
Foreign Agent: P. S. King and Staples, Ltd., Great Smith Street, Westminster, London.
Second class postage paid at Washington, D.C., and at additional mailing offices.
Printed in the United States of America by George Banta Company, Inc., Menasha, Wisconsin.
Copyright, 1976 by the American Political Science Association.

Effective January 1, 1976, all manuscripts submitted for possible publication in the *Review* should go to

Professor Charles O. Jones, Managing Editor Elect
Department of Political Science, Mervis Hall
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15260

Correspondence about all issues up to and including the issue of September 1977 should continue to be addressed to the managing editor in Berkeley.

ARTICLES

393 **Mobilized and Proletarian Diasporas.** Using an exchange model, this article examines two ethnic groups, mobilized and proletarian diasporas, in a broad range of modernizing polities. The salient dimensions of myth, communications networks, and role differentiation permit one to distinguish these groups analytically over a long time period, and to subdivide the mobilized diasporas into archetypal diasporas and situational diasporas. The latter are politically detached elements of a great society, whereas the "homeland" of the archetypal diaspora is symbolically significant as a major component of the diaspora's sacral myth. Because internal resentments and the pressures of the international environment tend to undermine the value of a diaspora to the dominant elite of a slowly and unevenly modernizing multiethnic polity, these polities (Russia and the Ottoman Empire are examined closely) exhibit a succession of mobilized diasporas. Rapidly modernizing polities, on the other hand, tolerate mobilized diasporas, but turn increasingly for their unskilled, transient labor to groups which are more distant culturally and in physical appearance from the dominant ethnic group, and which, therefore, are increasingly disadvantaged and restive.

By JOHN A. ARMSTRONG, Professor of Political Science, University of Wisconsin, Madison.

---

409 **Public Affairs Television and the Growth of Political Malaise: The Case of "The Selling of the Pentagon."** Television journalism can produce significant changes in opinions about basic American institutions and may also foster political malaise. Laboratory investigation revealed that the CBS documentary, "The Selling of the Pentagon," convinced viewers that the military participated more in national politics and misled the public more about Vietnam than these viewers had previously believed. The program also caused a significant decrease in political efficacy among all our groups. This finding led to correlational research to determine if exposure to television news is also associated with lower levels of efficacy.

SRC survey data suggest that reliance upon television news programs is associated with feelings of inefficacy and political self-doubt. These data also indicate that reliance upon television news fosters political cynicism and distrust, political instability, and frustration with civil rights. Holding constant the level of education or income of these respondents does not appreciably alter these relationships.

In short, the two sets of data imply that the networks helped to create Scammon's Social Issue and that video journalism fostered public support for George Wallace.

By MICHAEL J. ROBINSON, Assistant Professor of Politics, The Catholic University of America.

---

433 **A Reassessment of Conventional Wisdom About the Informed Public: National Political Information in Ghana.** This study examines the extent, impact and implications of political information in Ghana using survey data. A major interest is to identify and examine variables which influence level of information and to look at the consequences for the political process of different levels of political information. I examine conventional wisdom concerning the ignorance of the masses about national politics and call into question some common assumptions. Many of the differences usually assumed between developed and underdeveloped nations are found either not to exist or to be smaller than hypothesized. The data suggest that in some areas of national political information the masses in non-modernized societies are more politically aware than their counterparts in modernized societies. It is also suggested that there is no necessary link between education (literacy) and political information and that there are a number of functional equivalents to formal education. In the last section of the study several propositions about the informed citizenry are discussed.

By FRED M. HAYWARD, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Wisconsin, Madison.

452 **Comment.** By JOEL D. BARKAN, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Iowa.

---

456 **Clashing Beliefs Within the Executive Branch: The Nixon Administration Bureaucracy.** This article examines two key political beliefs of high level American federal executives: their views on the role of government in providing social services and their views regarding inequities in political representation. Data were collected in 1970 through open-ended interviews with a sample of 126 political appointees and supergrade career civil servants in the domestic agencies. Both of the beliefs analyzed were pertinent to the efforts of the Nixon administration to reorder national priorities and policies. The evidence in the paper establishes differences in the outlooks of ad-

ministrators depending on agency, job status, and party affiliation. Agency and party affiliation are particularly important variables, and their joint effects on the beliefs examined are substantial. Democratic administrators in the social service agencies were the most liberal and Republicans in the non-social service agencies the most conservative. Our data document a career bureaucracy with very little Republican representation and a social service bureaucracy dominated by administrators ideologically hostile to many of the directions pursued by the Nixon administration in the realm of social policy. The article closes with a discussion of the implications of our findings for future conflicts between the elected executive and the bureaucracy.

By JOEL D. ABERBACH, Associate Professor of Political Science and Associate Research Scientist at the Institute of Public Policy Studies. The University of Michigan, and BERT A. ROCKMAN, Assistant Professor of Political Science, The University of Pittsburgh.

---

469 **Generational Change and the Decline of Party Identification in America: 1952–1974.** A large and growing proportion of Americans claims to be neither Republican nor Democratic, and partisan independence is most widespread among young adults. A time-series cohort analysis of eleven surveys conducted by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan between 1952 and 1974 strongly suggests that the low level of partisan identification among young adults results largely from fundamental differences between their socialization and that of their elders. The overall decline in party identification results largely from generational change. High levels of partisan identification persist among persons who entered the electorate before World War II, but among those who entered the electorate more recently levels of identification are low. The analysis strongly suggests that overall levels of party identification will continue to decline, and permits examination of one process by which party loyalties among mass electorates gradually are transformed.

By PAUL R. ABRAMSON, Associate Professor of Political Science, Michigan State University.

---

479 **Local Autonomy in China During the Cultural Revolution: The Theoretical Uses of an Atypical Case.** This article explores the extent to which Shanghai City, and its subordinate units, have been politically independent of higher authorities in the Chinese government. Evidence from the 'fifties and early 'sixties suggests increasing managerial and cultural independence at the city level. Evidence from the early Cultural Revolution however suggests conceptual problems in the connection of usual notions of "autonomy" with substantive issue areas, and in their connection with local and central patterns of factions. The slow reconstruction of a local Party hierarchy in Shanghai was paralleled by a decentralization of some commercial and industrial decisions. Shanghai's role as a model in Party rebuilding increased the fully national role of the city's top leadership. Analysis of autonomy, power, or dependence in administrative units is affected when strong local leaders acquire national ambitions. Suggestions are made about the characteristics of an organization these words might describe.

By LYNN T. WHITE III, Assistant Professor, Departments of Politics, East Asian Studies and Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University

---

492 **Four Theories in Search of a Reality: James Burnham, Soviet Communism, and the Cold War.** Right-wing and Left-wing attitudes toward the cold war are strikingly similar because in some cases the anti-communist is himself an ex-communist. This is particularly true of James Burnham, a former disciple of Leon Trotsky and presently the diplomatic columnist of William F. Buckley's *National Review*. Burnham's writings have had profound influence in America, especially at the time of the outbreak of the Korean War when officials in Washington saw in his books both an answer to "containment" and the first theoretical formulation of the new policy of "liberation-rollback."

Burnham's own views on the cold war, however, have undergone a number of significant changes and revisions. At different times in his career he has offered four different and often contradictory interpretations of communism: (a) first, the Soviet Union as a "managerial" state that marks the end of Trotsky's dream of "permanent revolution"; (b) next, communism as the latest expression of Machiavellianism that augers the eclipse of liberal democracy and seemingly the inevitability of Stalin; (c) then, during the early cold war period, managerialism and Machiavellianism are dropped and Soviet behavior is now attributed to a Marxist *Weltanschauung* that replaces power politics with ideological determinism; (d) finally, Burnham criticizes Kennan,

The American Political Science Association

1527 New Hampshire Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

President: JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, Williams College; *President-Elect:* SAMUEL H. BEER, Harvard University; *Vice Presidents:* RICHARD F. FENNO, University of Rochester; BARBARA HINCKLEY, University of Wisconsin, Madison; AARON WILDAVSKY, University of California, Berkeley; *Secretary:* FRED I. GREENSTEIN, Princeton University; *Treasurer:* BETTY A. NESVOLD, San Diego State University; *Program Co-Chairpersons:* BENJAMIN R. BARBER, Rutgers University, and FRANCES FOX PIVEN, Boston University; *Executive Director:* EVRON M. KIRKPATRICK, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036; *Managing Editor, APSR:* NELSON W. POLSBY, University of California, Berkeley.

COUNCIL: (Above-named Officers *ex officiis*), 1975–76; HAYWARD R. ALKER, JR., MIT; LEONARD BINDER, University of Chicago; SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, Stanford University; DALE ROGERS MARSHALL, University of California, Davis; SAMUEL C. PATTERSON, University of Iowa; FRANCES FOX PIVEN, Boston University; MULFORD Q. SIBLEY, University of Minnesota; JOHN E. TURNER, University of Minnesota; 1976–77; JAMES DAVID BARBER, Duke University; SUZANNE BERGER, Massachusetts Institute of Technology: JAMES B. CHRISTOPH, Indiana University; DANIEL J. ELAZAR, Temple University; HERBERT JACOB, Northwestern University; M. KENT JENNINGS, University of Michigan; INEZ SMITH REID, Barnard College; JAMES N. ROSENAU, University of Southern California.

FORMER PRESIDENTS: FRANK J. GOODNOW, ALBERT SHAW, FREDERIC N. JUDSON, JAMES BRYCE, A. LAWRENCE LOWELL, WOODROW WILSON, SIMEON E. BALDWIN, ALBERT BUSHNELL HART, W. W. WILLOUGHBY, JOHN BASSETT MOORE, ERNST FREUND, JESSE MACY, MUNROE SMITH, HENRY JONES FORD, PAUL S. REINSCH, LEO S. ROWE, WILLIAM A. DUNNING, HARRY A. GARFIELD, JAMES W. GARNER, CHARLES E. MERRIAM, CHARLES A. BEARD, WILLIAM B. MUNRO, JESSE S. REEVES, JOHN A. FAIRLIE, BENJAMIN F. SHAMBAUGH, EDWARD S. CORWIN, WILLIAM F WILLOUGHBY. ISIDOR LOEB, WALTER J. SHEPARD, FRANCIS W. COKER, ARTHUR N. HOLCOMBE, THOMAS REED POWELL, CLARENCE A. DYKSTRA, CHARLES GROVE HAINES, ROBERT C. BROOKS, FREDERIC, A. OGG, WILLIAM ANDERSON, ROBERT E. CUSHMAN, LEONARD D. WHITE, JOHN M. GAUS, WALTER F. DODD, ARTHUR W. MACMAHON, HENRY R. SPENCER, QUINCY WRIGHT, JAMES K. POLLOCK, PETER H. ODEGARD, LUTHER H. GULICK, PENDLETON HERRING, RALPH J. BUNCHE, CHARLES MCKINLEY, HAROLD D. LASSWELL, E. E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, V. O. KEY, JR., R. TAYLOR COLE, CARL B. SWISHER, EMMETTE S. REDFORD, CHARLES S. HYNEMAN, CARL J. FRIEDRICH, C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, DAVID B. TRUMAN, GABRIEL A. ALMOND, ROBERT A. DAHL, MERLE FAINSOD, DAVID EASTON, KARL W. DEUTSCH, ROBERT E. LANE, HEINZ EULAU, ROBERT E. WARD, AVERY LEISERSON, AUSTIN RANNEY.

The American Political Science Review

Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley 94720

EDITORIAL BOARD: NELSON W. POLSBY, *Managing Editor, University of California Berkeley;* CHARLES O. JONES, *Managing Editor Elect, University of Pittsburgh;* PHILIP SIEGELMAN, *Book Review Editor, San Francisco State University;* SHLOMO AVINERI, *The Hebrew University of Jerusalem;* LUCIUS BARKER, *Washington University;* BRIAN BARRY, *University of British Columbia;* RICHARD A. BRODY, *Stanford University;* SAMUEL D. COOK, *Dillard University;* ELMER E. CORNWELL, *Brown University;* S. RUFUS DAVIS, *Monash University;* ROBERT J. JACKSON, *Carleton University;* ROBERT JERVIS, *University of California, Los Angeles;* DALE ROGERS MARSHALL, *University of California, Davis;* RUSSELL D. MURPHY, *Wesleyan University;* JOAN M. NELSON, *Washington, D.C.;* J. ROLAND PENNOCK, *Swarthmore College;* SAMUEL L. POPKIN, *University of California, San Diego;* ROBERT D. PUTNAM, *University of Michigan;* DOUGLAS W. RAE, *Yale University;* AUSTIN RANNEY, *University of Wisconsin;* GIOVANNI SARTORI, *University of Florence;* MICHAEL J. SHAPIRO, *University of Hawaii;* JAY STARLING, *Southern Methodist University;* STEPHEN V. STEPHENS, *Baltimore, Maryland;* George E. VON DER MUHLL, *University of California, Santa Cruz;* RICHARD A. WATSON, *University of Missouri;* RICHARD WINTERS, *Dartmouth College;* **MANUSCRIPT EDITOR:** ELLEN Y. SIEGELMAN. **EDITORIAL ASSISTANTS:** BETSEY COBB, RITA WILLIAMS. **EDITORIAL INTERNS:** ROBERT ARSENEAU, JONATHAN BENDOR, KENNETTE BENEDICT, BETH CAPELL, DON CHISHOLM, PETER COWHEY, SHAI FELDMAN, STEPHEN GENCO, EVELYN DEBORAH JAY, JOHN Q. JOHNSON, ELAINE KAMARCK, PAUL D. KARPS, JAMES I. LENGLE, IAN LUSTICK, DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DAVID RICHMAN, JENNY RING, STEVEN ROSENSTONE, STUART A. ROSS, SERGE TAYLOR, PHILIP J. WILSON, JOHN ZALLER

About the American Political Science Review

The American Political Science Review, published quarterly during the months of March, June, September, an December, is supplied to all APSA members. Membership dues are charged according to the following schedule

Membership Category	*Dues*
Regular	
Annual income	
Under $12,000	$25
$12,000–14,999	$30
$15,000–19,999	$35
$20,000–24,999	$40
$25,000–29,999	$45
$30,000 and over	$50
Student and Retired	$12
Family	$5
Life	$1000
Institutional (includes *APSR* and *PS*)	$50 domestic $52 foreign

Student memberships are limited to five years per person. Foreign currency at the official exchange rate will be accepted for foreign subscriptions and foreign membership fees. The equivalent of $3 for additional postage should be added for foreign subscriptions.

Current issues are priced at $10.50 per copy; for *back issues prior* to 1970 address Walter J. Johnson, Inc., 355 Chestnut St., Norwood, New Jersey 07648; for issues 1970 and later send request directly to the American Political Science Association.

Applications for membership, orders for the *Review*, and remittances should be addressed to the Executive Director. The American Political Science Association, 1527 New Hampshire Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. *Notices of changes of address* should be received in the Washington office by the 25th day of the months before publication.

INSTRUCTIONS TO CONTRIBUTORS

Address correspondence about contributions to the *Review* concerning issues before the issue of September 1977 to Nelson W. Polsby, Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, California 94720, and issues after September 1977 (including all new manuscripts) starting January 1, 1976, to Charles O. Jones, Department of Political Science, Mervis Hall, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15260. Address all correspondence about pending manuscripts to Charles O. Jones.

Please submit *four* copies of a manuscript to be considered for publication. *Unfortunately, due to increased postage costs, we can no longer return manucripts to the author.* Manuscripts must be typed, mimeographed, or photocopied, with all written material double-spaced (including footnotes and quotations). Footnotes must appear at the end of the manuscript, not at the bottom of the page. Since manuscripts are sent out anonymously for evaluation, the author's name and affiliation should appear only on a separate covering sheet and all footnotes identifying the author should also appear on a separate sheet. An abstract of less than 150 words should accompany the manuscript.

Figures should be drawn on white paper with India ink and the original tracings or drawings retained by the author (for transmission later to the printer). Copies only should accompany the manuscript. Tables should be typed on a separate page. Insert a guide line, e.g., "Table 1 about here," at the appropriate place in the manuscript.

Consult recent issues of the *APSR* on other style matters. A style sheet is available and may be obtained by writing Mrs. Kendall Stanley, Department of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pa. 15260.

Address books intended for review to Paul A. Beck and Robert S. Walters, Book Review Editors, *American Political Science Review*, Department of Political Science, Mervis Hall, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15260. Information, including News and Notes, for the Association's news-journal, *PS*, should be sent to 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036; advertising, reprint and circulation correspondence should be sent to the Executive Director at the Washington office. Domestic claims for non-receipt of issues must be made within six months of the month of publication; overseas claims, one year. Advertising information and rates are available from Nancy Edgerton, Adv. Manager, APSA, 1527 New Hamphsire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

Articles and notes appearing in the *Review* before the June 1953 issues were indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature*. Current issues are indexed by *The International Political Science Abstracts* and the *Social Sciences Index*. Microfilm of the *Review*, beginning with Volume 1, may be obtained from University Microfilms, 313 North First Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106. A *Cumulative Index of the Review*, Volumes 1–62; 1906–1968, may also be obtained from University Microfilms. Articles appearing in the *Review* are listed regularly in *ABC Pol Sci* and *Current Contents: Behavioral, Social & Management Sciences*. Book reviews are indexed in *Book Review Index*.

Mobilized and Proletarian Diasporas

JOHN A. ARMSTRONG
University of Wisconsin, Madison

The recent revival of interest in the historical dimension of social and political development necessarily entails a concern for types of polities which have been outside the mainstream of political science as a discipline. Both the older institutionalism and newer systems approaches have tended to take the nation state and the coincidence of polity and society for granted.[1] Political scientists specifically concerned with areas outside Europe and its overseas descendants have been more sharply aware that multiethnic composition is nearer the norm than the exception for major polities. Historically, however, multiethnicity has been still more clearly the norm, even in European polities. Consequently, an extended longitudinal framework is almost essential for adequate comparative investigation of the multiethnic polity. One of its most significant components, the diaspora, constituting a distinctive collectivity—perhaps even a separate society—can hardly be understood except in historical perspective. Much of the literature on contemporary diasporas appears to consider them to be anomalies, or at least very transitory. Some diasporas are indeed the result of contemporary social and economic forces. A deeper historical perspective suggests, on the other hand, that other types of diasporas, like multiethnic polities themselves, are the norm rather than the exception.

The first purpose of this article is to suggest a typology of the more significant types of diasporas. A typology constitutes, by itself, a limited step toward further theoretical development. In elaborating the kind of typology suggested here, one can hardly avoid examining data and making assumptions which have further, though more tentative, theoretical implications. Second, therefore, I offer a partial explanation of the changing position of the major types of diasporas within multiethnic polities. This explanation is based on close study of a wide range of historical data, a small part of which is cited by way of illustration. The present essay, however, is an exploration, not a verification. Consequently, its propositions, while (I hope) logically interrelated and not in conflict with existing secondary data, are designed primarily as hypotheses for further investigation.[2]

In the sense in which I use the term, "diaspora" applies to any ethnic collectivity which lacks a territorial base within a given polity, i.e., is a relatively small minority throughout all portions of the polity. Obviously this category embraces numerous ethnic collectivities such as widely dispersed hunting or pastoral nomads and certain semitribal groups like Gypsies. Since, however, the concern of this article is the major ways in which diasporas have interacted with the multiethnic polity, it focuses on two types: the *proletarian diaspora*, essentially a disadvantaged product of modernized polities; and the *mobilized diaspora*, an ethnic group which does not have a general status advantage, yet which enjoys many material and cultural advantages compared to other groups in the multiethnic polity. Because the mobilized diaspora has a much longer and more complex history, most of the article will be devoted to it, with the emergence of the proletarian diaspora considered primarily as a contrast to the mobilized diaspora.

Even the preliminary definitions just advanced suggest that my consideration of diasporas rests on two theoretical positions. The first, derived in part from the work of Frederik Barth and his associates, stresses the significance of boundaries among collectivities which cannot be defined by geographical partition.[3] Clearly, a diaspora is something more than, say, a collection of persons distinguished by some secondary characteristic such

[1] Even historical studies of nationalism pay scant attention to diasporas. See for example Carleton J. H. Hayes, *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism* (New York: Smith, 1931); Friedrich Meinecke, *Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1911); Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism* (New York: Macmillan, 1944); and Salo W. Baron, *Modern Nationalism and Religion* (New York: Harper, 1947). Recent social science discussions like R. A. Schermerhorn, *Comparative Ethnic Relations* (New York: Random House, 1970) and Cynthia H. Enloe, *Ethnic Conflict and Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973) deal only in passing with mobilized diasporas.

[2] I am completing a monographic study on the German diaspora in the Russian Empire and the beginnings of its replacement by the Jewish diaspora. This work will employ in a limited context both quantitative and nonquantitative data to test some of the hypotheses advanced here. The study will appear in a book edited by Jeremy Azrael for the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies Collaborative Research Project on Nation-Building and National Integration in the USSR. Since considerable amounts of data on Russia are cited in this and in previous studies I have published, I have documented here only the most important assertions about the Russian multiethnic polity.

[3] *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries*, ed. Frederik Barth (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1969).

as, for example, all persons with Scottish names in Wisconsin. For the mobilized diaspora, which has often constituted for centuries a separate society or quasi-society in a larger polity, the factors making for stable identification require especially close examination.

Consideration of the factors leading to persistence of the mobilized diaspora also rests on assumptions derived from exchange theory. In contrast to many subordinate ethnic groups (including, nearly always, proletarian diasporas), the mobilized diaspora is apt to have an elite which is more sophisticated in calculation of advantages and in symbol manipulation than is the elite of the dominant ethnic group. Because it assumes that both participants in an interaction may improve their positions, although the more powerful (in the present study, the dominant ethnic elite) achieves the better terms, an exchange model appears most appropriate. Only (as happens infrequently) when one participant (the mobilized diaspora) is coerced by the superior physical force controlled by the dominant ethnic elite, must the exchange framework give way to a conflict model.[4]

Utilization of the exchange framework requires two important qualifications. In the first place, rational calculation of the terms of exchange has been limited to elite members. While I do not attempt to examine elite decision making, the historiographical consensus does provide reasonably strong evidence that mobilized diaspora elite members, and members of dominant ethnic group elites, have in fact calculated the costs and benefits involved in their interactions. It is less easy to show that elites have represented the interests of their co-ethnic masses; but, as will appear later, there is evidence that mobilized diaspora masses identify with their elites in terms of perceived life chances. A second qualification relates to the derivation of the exchange model from economics, where values accruing to participants can ordinarily be expressed quantitatively. At this stage of our knowledge about mobilized diasporas, such calculations are completely unfeasible. Consequently, the exchange model used here is only a heuristic device; and the propositions derived with the aid of the model, because they refer to tendencies rather than precise parameters, constitute only weak hypotheses.

Boundary Maintenance in Mobilized Diasporas

Examination of the boundary-maintenance mechanisms which have enabled mobilized diasporas to persist leads one to conclude that the categor contains two subtypes with considerably differer characteristics. Because the Jews are commonl considered the model for all diasporas, I shall refe to the first subcategory, in which they fit, as th *archetypal diaspora.* The second subcategory ma be termed the *situational diaspora.* As these term imply, the superficial difference between the tw subcategories is the completeness and permanenc of the diaspora condition of the first, or archetypal as compared to the partial and temporary condi tion as a diaspora of the situational ethnic group The most important situational mobilized dia sporas have been the Germans, throughout East ern Europe, and the Chinese, dispersed over broac areas of Southeast Asia. In both cases the situational diasporas were fragments of far larger, compact ethnic masses constituting two of the world's great societies. The considerable degree of individual movement between the situational diaspora and its great society homeland suggests that the diaspora condition was perceived as a transitory phenomenon. In contrast, for millennia, Jews (and groups like the Parsees) did not constitute compact majorities anywhere.

At the level of historical "reality," the superficial distinction based on attachments to homelands is harder to maintain. The obvious case of the recent formation of a Jewish homeland immediately comes to mind. More important than this isolated instance is the fact that, by the criterion of possession of a territorial base, a large majority of mobilized diasporas occupy an intermediate position. The case of the Armenians, second only to the Jews in historical importance, is instructive. As late as 1915, two-thirds of the Armenian ethnic group continued to live in Eastern Anatolia and the central Transcaucasus, although Armenians probably constituted the majority in only restricted portions of these regions. Even after the unprecedented Turkish holocaust during World War I, one-third of all Armenians have continued to live in Soviet Transcaucasia. As early as the thirteenth century, however, it was clear to observers like Marco Polo that the dispersed segment of the Armenian ethnic group was behaving like an archetypal diaspora.[5] The basic reason was that the compact settlement area had not only been subjugated for centuries by foreign conquerors, but had suffered an equally long period of economic and cultural eclipse compared to the affluence and vitality of the Armenian diaspora.

The major significance of the different relations of situational and archetypal diasporas to their "homelands," however, lies in the dimension of

[4] See especially R. L. Curry, Jr. and L. L. Wade, *A Theory of Political Exchange* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), pp. ix ff.; and Peter Blau, *Exchange and Power in Social Life* (New York: Wiley, 1964), pp. 151 ff. On the uses of conflict theory in ethnic relations see Schermerhorn, *Comparative Ethnic Relations*, p. 44.

[5] Speros Vryonis, *The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization from the Eleventh Century through the Fifteenth Century* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), p. 235.

Morgenthau, and Lippmann for failing to adopt a "dialectical" viewpoint in order to understand the "dual" nature of the Soviet Union—an ironic reinvocation of Trotsky's earlier message to the Old Left.

The article attempts a critical analysis both of Burnham's shifting perspectives and of the ethical dilemmas in his political thought. It may also be read as a chapter in the intellectual history of the cold war.

By JOHN P. DIGGINS, Professor of History, University of California, Irvine.

J9 **Prediction Analysis in Political Research.** Procedures for empirical tests of political theory should be designed to evaluate the success of the specific prediction being tested. This paper introduces; (1) a formal language, termed "prediction logic," for stating an important class of predictions, including predictions that imply there will be relatively few cases in certain cells of a cross-classification; (2) a population measure, ∇_p ("del"), that indicates the degree of success achieved by a statement in the language; (3) partial measures for the multivariate case; (4) bivariate statistical inference methods when the data arise from a sample rather than a population, both for an *a priori* prediction statement and for a statement selected *post hoc*. A number of well-known measures of "association" are ∇_p measures for specific prediction logic statements. Research applications are indicated through the use of contingency tables appearing in *APSR* articles by Eulau and Eyestone, Goldberg, Muller, Riker and Zavoina, Rosenthal, Sawyer and MacRae, Sickles, Wolfinger and Field, and Wolfinger and Heifetz.

By DAVID K. HILDEBRAND, Associate Professor of Statistics, University of Pennsylvania, JAMES D. LAING, Visiting Associate Professor of Engineering-Economic Systems, Stanford University, and HOWARD ROSENTHAL, Professor of Political Science and Industrial Administration, Carnegie-Mellon University.

---

536 COMMUNICATIONS

From David Adamany, Harvey L. Schantz, Jesse F. Marquette, Karen Remmer, Robert L. Ayres, Hungdah Chiu, Yung Wei, Allen S. Whiting, James W. Hottois, Douglas Dobson and Douglas St. Angelo, Ernest van den Haag

---

557 EDITORIAL COMMENT

BOOK REVIEWS AND ESSAYS

560 **"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954. A Review Essay.** For the past decade historians have debated the major domestic and foreign policy issues of the Truman era. This debate has centered upon the origins of the Cold War, the interplay between politics and diplomacy, and the alleged responsibility of President Harry S. Truman and American liberals for the demise of civil liberties and the onset of McCarthyism. During the course of this debate Truman's reputation diminished significantly. From one of America's greatest chief executives, as pictured by Arthur M. Schlesinger, the man from Missouri emerged in accounts by New Left revisionists as a small man who was incapable of providing progressive leadership at home and whose conservative temperament and anti-Soviet rhetoric needlessly escalated the Cold War and extinguished New Deal reform. To their credit, the revisionists have broadened the parameters of diplomatic history by demonstrating the impact of social and economic institutions upon the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. On the other hand, revisionist history has often been colored by ideological premises, a presentist bias, and a combativeness that diverted attention from the validity of revisionist conclusions to social and psychological explanations of why these accounts were written at all. As a result of careful work by Thomas Paterson, John Gaddis, George Herring, and Alonzo Hamby, the debate on the politics and diplomacy of the postwar years has entered a new phase, in which historians have begun to fashion interpretations based upon combinations and variants of liberal, realist, and radical hypotheses. This development portends a healthy movement toward a fairer, more empathetic rendering of the Truman era, and the complex roles played by the thirty-third President.

By GEOFFREY S. SMITH, Associate Professor of History, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario.

583 **Political Participation in America: A Review Essay.** Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie. *Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality.*

By JERROLD G. RUSK, Professor of Government, University of Arizona.

---

592 **Recent Writing on Northern Ireland.** Denis P. Barritt and Charles F. Carter, *The Northern Ireland Problem* 2nd ed.; Ian Budge and Cornelius O'Leary, *Belfast: Approach to Crisis. A Study of Belfast Politics, 1613–1970*; James Callaghan, *A House Divided: The Dilemma of Northern Ireland;* Liam de Paor, *Divided Ulster;* Garret FitzGerald, *Towards a New Ireland;* Rosemary Harris, *Prejudice and Tolerance in Ulster; A Study of Neighbor. and "Strangers" in a Border Community;* The London Sunday Times Insight Team, *Northern Ireland: A Report on the Conflict;* F. S. L. Lyons, *Ireland Since the Famine;* Eamonn McCann, *War and an Irish Town;* John Magee, *Northern Ireland: Crisis and Conflict;* Conor Cruise O'Brien, *States of Ireland;* Richard Rose, *Governing Without Consensus: An Irish Perspective.*

By JOHN H. WHYTE, Reader in Politics, The Queen's University of Belfast.

---

597 **Political Theory, History of Political Thought and Methodology**

Jose V. Abueva, *Ramon Magsaysay: A Political Biography.* A. B. Villanueva, p. 597
Theodor W. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics.* Gillian Rose, p. 598
Norman Z. Alcock, *The War Disease.* William R. Thompson, p. 599
Hayward R. Alker, Jr., Karl W. Deutsch, and Antonine H. Stoetzel, *Mathematical Approaches to Politics.* Charles Lewis Taylor, p. 600
Schlomo Avineri, *Hegel's Theory of the Modern State.* Patrick Gardiner, p. 602
William O. Aydelotte, Allan G. Bogue and Robert William Fogel, eds., *The Dimensions of Quantitative Research in History.* Joel H. Silbey, p. 603
Bernard Barker, ed., *Ramsay MacDonald's Political Writings.* James G. Kellas, p. 604
Raymond Boudon, *Education, Opportunity, and Social Inequality: Changing Prospects in Western Society.* Robert H. Beck, p. 605
Albert Breton, *The Economic Theory of Representative Government.* William A. Niskanen, p. 605
John Charvet, *The Social Problem in the Philosophy of Rousseau.* Judith N. Shklar, p. 606
Richard L. Clinton, ed., *Population and Politics: New Directions in Political Science Research.* John G. Grumm, p. 608
Harold Eugene Davis, *Latin American Thought: A Historical Introduction.* Thomas W. Walker, p. 610
Georges Duby, *The Early Growth of the European Economy: Warriors and Peasants from the Seventh to the Twelfth Century.* David Herlihy, p. 611
William Eckhardt, *Compassion: Toward A Science of Value.* James Chowning Davies, p. 611
François Hotman, *Francogallia.* Charles E. Butterworth, p. 613
F. William Howton, *Functionaries.* Lloyd A. Rowe, p. 614
Frederic C. Jaher, ed., *The Rich, the Well Born and the Powerful: Elites and Upper Classes in History.* Suzanne Keller, p. 615
Edward E. Jones, David E. Kanouse, Harold H. Kelley, Richard E. Nisbett, Stuart Valins, and Bernard Weiner, eds., *Attribution: Perceiving the Causes of Behavior.* Peter W. Sperlich, p. 617
E. G. Liberman, *Economic Methods and the Effectiveness of Production.* Gregory Grossman, p. 618
Arthur S. Link, *The Higher Realism of Woodrow Wilson and Other Essays.* Richard J. Stillman, 2nd., p. 619

---

619 **American Government and Politics**

Saul D. Alinsky, *Rules for Radicals: A Pragmatic Primer for Realistic Radicals;* Si Kahn, *How People Get Power: Organizing Oppressed Communities for Action;* Ralph Nader and Donald Ross, *Action for a Change. A Student's Manual for Public Interest Organizing;* Dick Simpson, *Winning Elections: A Handbook in Participatory Politics;* and Michael Walzer, *Political Action: A Practical Guide to Movement Politics.* Dale Rogers Marshall, p. 620
William L. Barney, *The Secessionist Impulse: Alabama and Mississippi in 1860.* LaWanda Cox, p. 623

Gerald Benjamin, *Race Relations and the New York City Commission on Human Rights.* Stephen M. David, p. 624
Ian D. Burman, *Lobbying at the Illinois Constitutional Convention.* William L. Day, p. 625
Roger B. Canfield, *Black Ghetto Riots and Campus Disorders: A Subcultural and Philosophical Study of Democratic Legitimacy and American Political Violence, 1964–1970.* Ralph A. Rossum, p. 625
Aage R. Clausen, *How Congressmen Decide: A Policy Focus.* Michael L. Mezey, p. 626
Rubin G. Cohn, *To Judge with Justice: History and Politics of Illinois Judicial Reform.* Byron W. Daynes, p. 628
Congressional Quarterly Service, *Congress and the Nation, Volume III (1969–1972);* and Congressional Quarterly Service, *Guide to the Congress of the United States.* Norman J. Ornstein, p. 628
Joseph Cooper, *The Origins of the Standing Committees and the Development of the Modern House.* Richard E. Damon, p. 631
Martha Derthick, *Between State and Nation: Regional Organizations of the United States.* Thomas R. Dye, p. 632
Ithiel de Sola Pool, ed., *Talking Back: Citizen Feedback and Cable Technology.* Doris A. Graber, p. 633
Joseph Albert Ernst, *Money and Politics in America, 1755–1775: A Study in the Currency Act of 1764 and the Political Economy of Revolution.* Alan Tully, p. 635
Estelle F. Feinstein, *Stamford in the Gilded Age: The Political Life of a Connecticut Town, 1868–1893.* Richard E. Welch, Jr., p. 636
Richard N. Goodwin, *The American Condition.* George Kateb, p. 636
Walter Haller, *Supreme Court und Politik in den USA: Fragen der Justiziabilität in der höchstrichterlichen Rechtsprechung.* Francis H. Heller, p. 637

---

638 Comparative Government and Politics

Remigio E. Agpalo, *The Political Elite and the People: A Study of Politics in Occidental Mindoro.* Aprodico A. Laquian, p. 639
W. A. J. Archbold, *Outlines of Indian Constitutional History (British Period).* Manindra K. Mohapatra, p. 640
Charles Bettelheim, *Cultural Revolution and Industrial Organization In China: Changes in Management and the Division of Labor.* D. Gordon White, p. 641
Henry Bienen, *Kenya, the Politics of Participation and Control.* L. Gray Cowan, p. 642
Hugo Blanco, *Land or Death: The Peasant Struggle in Peru.* Larry L. Pippin, p. 643
Louis Chevalier, *Laboring Classes and Dangerous Classes in Paris during the First Half of the Nineteenth Century.* Louise A. Tilly, p. 644
Paul H. Claeys, *Groupes de pression en Belgique, Les groupes intermédiaires socio-économiques, Contribution à l'analyse comparative.* L. Huyse, p. 645
F. K. Crowley, *Modern Australia in Documents.* Two Volumes. Murray Clark Havens, p. 646
John W. Dardess, *Conquerors and Confucians: Aspects of Political Change in Late Yüan China.* L. Carrington Goodrich, p. 647
Edwin D. Driver, *World Population Policy: An Annotated Bibliography.* Dorothy M. Stetson, p. 648
Peter Duignan and L. H. Gann, *Colonialism in Africa, 1870–1960: A Bibliographical Guide to Colonialism in Sub-Saharan Africa.* Emmet V. Mittlebeeler, p. 648
John K. Emmerson and Leonard A. Humphreys, *Will Japan Re-Arm? A Study in Attitudes.* Richard Storry, p. 649
Sungjoo Han, *The Failure of Democracy in South Korea.* Han-Kyo Kim, p. 649
Harijan: A Journal of Applied Gandhiism; 1933–1955. Volumes I–XIX. Paul F. Power, p. 651
Ann-Katrin Hatje, *Befolkningsfrågan och Välfärden: Debatten om familjepolitik och nativitetsfrågan under 1930- och 1940-talen.* Erik Allardt, p. 653
Dale Roy Herspring, *East German Civil-Military Relations: The Impact of Technology, 1949–72.* James H. Wolfe, p. 654
Mikael Hidén, *The Ombudsman in Finland: The First Fifty Years.* Robert B. Kvavik, p. 655
Stanley Hoffmann, *Decline or Renewal: France since the 1930s.* Dorothy Pickles, p. 655
Christopher Howe, *Wage Patterns and Wage Policy in Modern China 1919–1972.* Alexander Eckstein, p. 657
Brian Irving, ed., *Guyana: A Composite Monograph.* Robert W. Anderson, p. 658
W. A. Douglas Jackson, ed., *Agrarian Policies and Problems in Communist and Non-Communist Countries.* Roy D. Laird, p. 658
Henry Jacoby, *The Bureaucratization of the World.* John H. Hallowell, p. 660
David Loshak, *Pakistan Crisis.* George M. Platt, p. 660
Patrick J. McGowan and Howard B. Shapiro, *The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy: A Survey of Scientific Findings.* Frederic S. Pearson, p. 661
Dieter Mahncke, *Berlin im geteilten Deutschland.* Wolfgang F. Dexheimer, p. 663

Norman Z. Alcock, *The Emperor's New Clothes: and Other Irreverent Essays for the Seventies.* Louis Kriesberg, p. 663

Yonah Alexander, *The Role of Communications in the Middle East Conflict: Ideological and Religious Aspects.* Joel S. Migdal, p. 664

Tai Sung An, *The Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute.* Thomas W. Robinson, p. 665

Alberto Aquarone, *Le Origini Dell' Imperialismo Americano.* A. F. K. Organski, p. 666

James Barber, *South Africa's Foreign Policy, 1945–1970.* Leonard Thompson, p. 667

Charles A. Barker, ed., *Power and Law: American Dilemma in World Affairs.* Adda B. Bozeman, p. 669

Cyril E. Black and Richard A. Falk, eds., *The Future of the International Legal Order. Volume III: Conflict Management. Volume IV: The Structure of the International Environment.* G. Schwarzenberger, p. 670

Frede Castberg. Updated and edited by Torkel Opsahl and Thomas Ouchterlony, *The European Convention on Human Rights;* and Nicole Condorelli Braun, *Commissaires et Juges dans les Communautés Européenne.* Ernst B. Haas, p. 671

Fidel Castro, *Fidel in Chile: A Symbolic Meeting Between Two Historical Processes.* Weston H. Agor, p. 674

Phillip Darby, *British Defence Policy East of Suez, 1947–1968.* Max Beloff, p. 674

Richard J. Erickson, *International Law and the Revolutionary State: A Case Study of the Soviet Union and International Law.* Peter B. Maggs, p. 675

Isaiah Friedman, *The Question of Palestine, 1914–1918: British-Jewish-Arab Relations.* Aaron S. Klieman, p. 676

John H. Gilbert, ed., *The New Era in American Foreign Policy.* Howard H. Lentner, p. 677

Ruth B. Henig, ed., *The League of Nations.* Robert H. Ferrell, p. 678

Robert E. Hunter, ed., *The United States and the Developing World: Agenda for Action.* Raymond C. Miller, p. 679

thnic *myth* rather than external historical real-:y.[6] In both cases the myth of the homeland is rucially important, but the two forms of myth are harply distinguished. In turn, the different forms of ethnic myth crucially influence two other boundary-maintaining mechanisms: *communications specialization* and *role specialization*. This complex of factors is decisive not only for maintaining the stable boundaries of the mobilized liaspora, but for the latter's exchange relationship vith dominant ethnic elites.

The situational diaspora's myth is relatively lose to the familiar "modern" myth of nationalsm. Diasporas such as the Eastern European Germans (prior to 1945) and the Overseas Chinese esembled modern nations in their belief (not utterly unfounded) that they were parts of larger thnic collectivities which had achieved distinctively superior levels of secular civilization.[7] For most, like the Chinese, attachment to a peculiar religion has been very weak. Because of its syncretic nature, the Chinese belief system readily accommodated to Thai and Burmese Buddhism, and considerable numbers of Chinese even converted to Islam in Malay regions.[8] German peasant settlers in Russia and Hungary kept their Protestant religion and rarely intermarried with neighboring Orthodox peasants. In the mobile society of metropolises such as St. Petersburg, however, numerous upper-class Germans intermarried and made the relatively slight denominational transition from Lutheranism to Orthodoxy.[9] Moreover, the situational diaspora myth of cultural superiority was rarely—until a very recent period—associated with the typical nationalist claim for *political* unification of all members, diaspora and homeland, of the ethnic group. The German diaspora in the Russian Empire (perhaps to a lesser extent in Poland-Lithuania and Hungary) was explicitly averse to political attachment to its great society.[10] The very concept of political attachment of the Southeast Asian Chinese to the Chinese Empire was, except for transitory incidents noted below, unrealistic until very recently. As will become apparent, the situational diaspora's rejection of ethnic political unification has not saved it from the suspicions of the dominant elites of their multiethnic polities; these elites have less frequently suspected archetypal diasporas, lacking any realistic connection to a homeland, of disloyalty.

Deprived of a great society to which to attribute cultural superiority, the archetypal diaspora has found a more intense focus of distinctiveness in its peculiar religion. This has been true for intermediate groups like the Armenians or the Greeks of the Ottoman Empire as well as for more obviously archetypal diasporas like the Jews and the Parsees. In each case, moreover, the religious myth, although perhaps predominantly other-worldly, has had a significant territorial focus. The Iranian shrines of the Indian Parsees, the Greek Ecumenical Patriarchate in the Phanar district of Istanbul, and of course the city of Jerusalem, provided territorial foci for the myth of ethnic identity during the long centuries when these religious centers had very restricted practical relation to the life of the diasporas. The manner in which the Gregorian Catholicosate of Echmiadzin has increased in significance as the symbolic center of Armenian life, although transferred in fact from one alien polity to another, is a still better illustration of how the religious myth defines a substitute homeland for the archetypal diaspora. Moreover, precisely because the myth is religious, its ability to maintain the crucial element of endogamy is stronger among archetypal than among situational diasporas.

Communication networks, as Karl Deutsch has shown, constituted a major basis for *modern* ethnic identification.[11] Distinctive communication patterns connected to religious and cultural myths have been significant for mobilized diasporas for centuries. All mobilized diasporas have sought to maintain their peculiar languages for internal use. Situational diasporas, with some access to cultural

[6] "Myth" refers to an integrated set of beliefs emphasizing the historical continuity and peculiar identity of a group. Since the myth has strong affective connotations, group members commonly resist efforts to subject it to critical analysis; none of these features implies, of course, that the myth is either true or false.

[7] See especially Richard J. Coughlin, *Double Identity: The Chinese in Modern Thailand* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1960), pp. 121, 160. Indians in East Africa and Malaya and Lebanese in West Africa also probably should be considered situational mobilized diasporas; Indians in Africa are convinced of their cultural superiority, according to Pierre L. Van den Berghe, *Race and Ethnicity* (New York: Basic Books, 1970), pp. 277, 293–94.

[8] Coughlin, *Double Identity*, pp. 78, 192; Victor Purcell, *The Chinese in Southeast Asia* (London: Oxford University Press, 1951), p. 59; *The New York Times*, September 16, 1974. The Chinese maintain intense family (ancestral) identification; this appears closer to identification with a superior culture than with religion in the usual sense.

[9] Fervent Lutherans did protest, but the extent of their concern and the numerous cases they cite are in themselves evidence of the tendency of the German diaspora to assimilate religiously. It had before it, of course, the frequent example of marriages and conversions to Orthodoxy among Lutheran royal families.

[10] It is precisely this rejection of political ties with the homeland which distinguishes mobilized diasporas, as I conceive them, from minorities like English-speaking Canadians in Quebec, who can be more aptly categorized as outposts of a dominant ethnic group.

[11] Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1953). Deutsch suggested the importance of communications networks for modern ethnic identity in an earlier work, "Medieval Unity and Its Economic Conditions for an International Civilization," *Canadian Journal of Economic and Political Science*, 10 (February, 1944), 18–35.

resources of their great societies, have generally been more successful: thus most Germans in Russia continued to speak German, and most Overseas Chinese speak some form of Chinese.[12] This linguistic distinctiveness is more necessary for maintaining *secular* myths, whereas the archetypal diaspora can rely on sacral resources. However little this diaspora actually uses the linguistic vehicle of its religion, the sacral language constitutes a vital element of the myth. Moreover, while adopting alien languages for the vast majority of communications, the archetypal diaspora usually maintains two important restrictions. First, the written word, with its exceptionally strong sacral implications, remains in the group's original alphabet, which is often very different from those of surrounding ethnic groups.[13] For example, while employing Arabic, Persian, Romance, or Germanic dialects, Jews have continued to write in the Hebrew alphabet; one Armenian script is used for two very different dialects. Moreover, borrowed linguistic elements which offend the central religious elements of the myth are avoided. Thus medieval Spanish Jews were more receptive to Arabic than to Latin, regarded as a specifically ecclesiastical vehicle of a hostile church; and they purged the dialects they did accept (Yiddish and Ladino) of words with specific Christian connotations.[14]

Although some measure of linguistic peculiarity is important for the mobilized diaspora, it cannot avoid accommodating to a considerable extent to the linguistic patterns of its environment if the diaspora is to maintain material and cultural advantages in the multiethnic polity. The tension between maintaining at least symbolic attachment to its own language, and the practical employment of other languages, leads diaspora members to acquire unusually strong linguistic skills. In Southeast Asia the Chinese quickly acquired a minimum command of the colonial powers' languages; even in Thailand the Chinese have been far ahead of the dominant ethnic group in mastering English.[15] In nineteenth-century Russia, Germans constituted a disproportionate element of the Asian consular service skilled in Oriental languages, just as Armenians are very numerous among Soviet Orientalists. For most archetypal diasporas, transmission of the archaic sacral language required some type of formal training in communications skills. It was a short step from the study of the sacral language to the essential study of more utilitarian languages and then, through the broadening circle of cultural contacts, to a structured educational experience.

The combination of linguistic skills and their relation to broader patterns of communications specialization has probably contributed more than the diasporas' myths themselves to their occupational role specialization. In turn, it is just this specialization which has made mobilized diasporas so useful as modernizing or proto-modernizing elements. Apart from purely linguistic skills, the network of personal and family relations (buttressed by the latent threat of diaspora community sanctions) were highly effective premodern devices for facilitating long-distance commerce. Thus Spanish Jews were indispensable for international commerce in the Middle Ages and Armenians controlled the overland trade between Europe and the Orient as late as the nineteenth century. Because of their special skills, dominant ethnic elites have often calculatingly assigned advantageous roles to mobilized diaspora members. Thus, in seventeenth-century Java, the Dutch rulers pragmatically calculated that the Chinese should be allowed to substitute a poll tax for military construction labor because they were more productive "in merchant services, agriculture, lime-burning, tailoring and other ways."[16] Two centuries earlier the Ottomans had exempted Armenian and Jewish diasporas from the "boy tax" (children forcibly recruited for the Janissaries) for very similar reasons.[17] More generally, dominant elites have retained military leadership and formal governing roles, while leaving despised but lucrative commercial roles to the mobilized diasporas. In these role allocations the implicit exchange relationship is often based on the economist's principle of relative advantage. For example, Lebanese Christians began to occupy middleman

[12] Coughlin, *Double Identity*, pp. 140–41, 144, 158; W. L. Cator, *The Economic Position of the Chinese in the Netherlands Indies* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936), pp. 19, 29, 35; Guy Hunter, *South-East Asia—Race, Culture, and Nation* (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), pp. 44 ff.; G. William Skinner, *Chinese Society in Thailand* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957), p. 169.

[13] See especially Matthias Mieses, *Die Gesetze der Schriftgeschichte: Konfession und Schrift im Leben der Völker* (Vienna: Wilhelm Braumüller, 1919), pp. 67 ff.; Istvan Hajnal, "Le Rôle Social de l'Ecriture et l'Evolution Européenne," *Revue de l'Institut de Sociologie* (Brussels), IV (1924), 32 ff.

[14] Max Weinreich, "The Reality of Jewishness versus the Ghetto Myth," in *To Honor Roman Jakobson* (The Hague: Mouton, 1967), III, 2209; *Language in Sociocultural Change: Essays by Joshua A. Fishman*, ed. Anwar S. Dil (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972), pp. 297 ff.; Stephen Sharot, "Minority Situation and Religious Acculturation; A Comparative Analysis of Jewish Communities," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 16 (June, 1974), 340, 347; Yitzhak Baer, *A History of the Jews in Christian Spain*, II (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1966); Abraham A. Neuman, *The Jews in Spain*, I (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1942).

[15] Skinner, *Chinese Society*, p. 169; Coughlin, *Double Identity*, p. 153.

[16] Cator, *Economic Position of the Chinese*, p. 13.

[17] H. A. R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West*, I, Part 2 (London: Oxford University Press, 1950), p. 223.

·oles, which the dominant Ottoman elites des·ised, in eighteenth century Egypt, and more re·ently have acted as a mobilized diaspora in West ·frica. In Lebanon itself, although native Christ·ans are dominant in middleman roles such as ›anking and mercantile activities, the small Ar·enian diaspora community has, through its *rela·ively* greater skills in industrial development, pro·ided 18 per cent of capital investment in large in·ustry, 43 per cent in minor manufacturing.[18] In·eed, the case for referring to these diasporas as "mobilized," thus implying that they have a cer·ain modernizing potential, does not rest on their specialization in middleman roles. Situational diasporas have often been directly involved in ·transmitting innovative economic techniques—·e.g., Saxon miners in Eastern Europe and Chinese exploitation of gold and tin mines in Borneo and Malaya.[19] Perhaps archetypal diasporas are less inclined to provide the heavy manipulative labor in geographically isolated settings which mining entails. But, as a historian of seventeenth-century Istanbul writes: "Only the [Jewish, Armenian, and Greek] minorities, less hampered by religious imperatives [than Moslems], are capable of start·ing an adaptation to new conditions, all the more naturally since it is to them that the foreigners [possessing new techniques] turn."[20]

Dynamics of Interaction Within the Multiethnic Polity

The typology presented in the preceding section required some discussion of the interaction of mobilized diaspora and dominant ethnic elite, but emphasized the internal development of the diaspora itself. Significant aspects of this development very frequently have taken place long before the diaspora's incorporation in a given multiethnic polity. Hence, in a sense, the special qualifications of the diaspora appear to the dominant elite as "given" factors, and this elite may not even be aware of the extent to which (in the long run) these diaspora skills may be strengthened or weakened by the exchange relationship. In the following set of propositions, therefore, one must be careful to distinguish between short-run advantages, usually perceptible to both the diaspora and to the dominant elites, and long-run advantages which may be discernible (if at all) only to the outside observer.

(1) Within the multiethnic polity, the mobilized diaspora is temporarily indispensable for the dominant ethnic elite. Much of the reasoning behind this proposition, particularly the analysis of diaspora skills, has already been presented. But it is important to stress the other side of the exchange relationship: the paucity of skills among the dominant ethnic elite, which often consists almost entirely of warriors, landlords, and perhaps priests of the dominant religion. As a Turkish nationalist, Ziya Gökalp, plaintively expressed it, "the poor Turks inherited from the Ottoman Empire nothing but a broken sword and an old-fashioned plow."[21] As long as they *were dominant*, however, the elites of the major ethnic group could acquire from others the skills they needed. Among diaspora technical skills prized by dominant elites, medicine has always ranked very high. As an early student of the question wrote, Jews (but the generalization could also be applied to Germans, Chinese, or Armenians) acquired medical skill because it was highly transferable: "The study of philosophy did not afford a prospect of earning a living and at that period jurisprudence afforded the least prospect of all (moreover, at first the latter was valid only in one's homeland, since other laws prevailed elsewhere); but the study of medicine was a cosmopolitan one which, *mutatis mutandis*, could be utilized everywhere."[22] In fact, medicine often acted as the entering wedge for Jews and other diasporas to secure access to a broader range of skilled professions.

In addition to their technical role specilization, the diasporas' communications skills have been especially prized by dominant elites who rarely possess either the multilingual ability or the more subtle understanding of diverse communication patterns required to deal effectively with a multiethnic population. Thus the first Arab caliphs found it necessary to employ Christian secretaries for civil administration; as late as the fourteenth century the Egyptian Coptic minority monopolized the secretarial roles.[23] Even where diasporas

[18] Loretta Kh. Ter-Mkrtichian, *Armiane v Stranakh Arabskogo Vostoka* (Moscow: "Nauka," 1965); Eugen Wirth, "Damaskus-Aleppo-Beirut: Ein geographischer Vergleich dreier nahöstlicher Städte im Spiegel ihrer sozial und wirtschaftlich tonangebenden Schichten," *Die Erde*, 97 (1966), 180.

[19] Roger Portal, *L'Oural au XVIIIe Siècle* (Paris: Institut d'Etudes Slaves, 1950), pp. 65, 99; F. Ia. Poliansky, "Promyshlennaia Politika Russkogo Absoliutizma vo Vtoroi Chetverti XVIII v. (1725–1740 gg.)," *Voprosy Istorii Narodnogo Khoziaistva SSSR*, 1957, p. 106; Cator, *Economic Position of the Chinese*, pp. 139 ff.

[20] Robert Mantran, *Istanbul dans la Second Moitié du XVIIe Siècle* (Paris: Maisonneuve, 1962), p. 510.

[21] Quoted by Uriel Heyd, *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism: The Life and Teachings of Ziya Gökalp* (London: Luzac, 1950), p. 74.

[22] G. Wolf, "Zur Geschichte jüdischer Aertze in Oesterreich," *Monatsschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums*, 13 (1864), 196–97; cf. Guido Kisch, *Die Prager Universität und die Juden, 1348–1848* (Mährisch-Ostrau: Julius Kittls Nachfolger, 1935), p. 36.

[23] Dominique and Janine Sourdel, *La Civilisation de l'Islam Classique* (Paris: Arthaud, 1968), p. 370; A. S. Tritton, *The Caliphs and Their Non-Muslim Subjects*, 2nd ed. (London: Cass, 1970), p. 72; cf. H. Montgomery Watt,

have been excluded from formal administrative position, they nearly always occupy (Spain, Ottoman Turkey, Russia, and the colonial empires of Southeast Asia) the quasi-administrative roles of tax farmers. In the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire, it is said, there was an Armenian banker behind every high official, indispensable for providing the surety bond which permitted the official to be entrusted with revenue collection.[24]

(2) Within the multiethnic polity, the mobilized diaspora depends for security on the dominant ethnic elite. Among the upper stratum of mobilized diasporas, at least, there has been considerable awareness of the mutual dependency between diaspora and dominant elite. Faced with the terror of the Inquisition, late fifteenth-century Jews came close to identifying with the Ottoman power. "You do not know who the Turk is. If God will favor us, that is, conversos [unwilling converts to Christianity], the Turk will be in Castile within a year and a half... The Turk is called the Destroyer of Christianity and the Defender of the Jewish Faith," wrote an Istanbul Jew.[25]

Perhaps the most articulate legitimization for adherence to a multiethnic polity was advanced by the Baltic German situational diaspora as a rearguard stand against both Russian and German nationalism. An 1870 editorial, appropriately entitled "About the Situation," idealizes the recent past:

> When we looked to the East, we saw a strong overlord whose arm protected us from disorder and preserved for us the blessings of peace. Further, we saw a broad field in which our sons and younger brothers had always been able to make a way and a position for themselves with slight effort and where a gracious monarch regarded us with great and well-earned trust. We saw a great empire, whose institutions we knew little of, except that none equalled ours in autonomy and enlightenment appropriate to the times.[26]

The note of personal loyalty to the sovereign is frequent in mobilized diaspora commentaries; but allegiance to a dominant elite perceived as embodying a superior ideal of supranationalism is not confined to traditional fealty. For example, Chinese diasporas in Southeast Asia and the Indian middleman minorities of East Africa strongly identified with colonial elites against indigenous nationalist movements, with little regard for the nominal source of these elites' authority.

(3) From the internal standpoint, the delicate balance of forces maintaining a mobilized diaspora's position within the multiethnic polity is most apt to be upset by a sharp overall rise in social mobilization. Such evidence as is available strongly suggests that widespread deprivation in a stagnant, traditional social order does not incite strong anti-diaspora activity *even* among dominant ethnic elements engaged in direct competition with diaspora middlemen. It would be difficult to find a recent independent polity as stagnant as late nineteenth-century Morocco. Yet excellent impartial studies testify to the good relations between Jewish and Moslem traders and artisans in the same occupations. "In sum, each asks only to perpetuate a lazy indifference which time has in some manner sanctified. In this rural life, stupefying for the mind but subjected to the quest for daily bread, economic contacts sufficed, perhaps, to engender a climate of mutual comprehension and collaboration between Moslems and Israelites."[27] In the common situation of specialized occupational roles, stable division of roles between the dominant and the diaspora ethnic groups appears to be readily accepted. Thus the Hungarian gentry, throughout much of the nineteenth century, seems to have been satisfied with the arrangement whereby Magyars owned estates, ruled, and commanded, while Jews occupied the liberal professions as well as middleman roles.[28] A similar mutual satisfaction apparently prevailed between dominant Thais and the Chinese diaspora up to the 1930s.

Hungary and Spain, are, however, classic instances of ouster of Jewish diasporas from favorable positions as the result of *mobilization* of lower strata of the dominant ethnic group. Accompanying a general increase in territorial and occupational mobility was awareness that advantages enjoyed by the diasporas were not "inevitable" but could be altered to the apparent advantage of the dominant ethnic group. While not discounting such influences as the anti-Judaism of the Spanish

---

Islam and the Integration of Society (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1961), p. 121, on the persistence of crypto-Zoroastrians (i.e., what are today known as "Parsees") in the civil service of the caliphs.

[24] Avedis K. Sanjian, *The Armenian Communities in Syria under Ottoman Dominion* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 36. On the ubiquity of Chinese tax farmers, see especially Purcell, *Chinese in Southeast Asia*, p. 664.

[25] Baer, *History of the Jews in Christian Spain*, II, 347.

[26] "Zur Lage," *Baltische Monatsschrift*, 19 (1870), 8; cf. Hans Rothfels, *Reich, Staat und Nation in deutsch-baltischen Denken* (Haale: Niemeyer, 1930), pp. 226 ff.

[27] Pierre Flamand, *Un Mellah en Pays Berbère: Demnate* (Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1952), p. 141. See also Roger LeTourneau, *Fès avant le Protectorat* (Casablanca: Société Marocaine de Librairie et d'Editions, 1949), pp. 186, 448; H. Z. Hirschberg, "The Jewish Quarter in Moslem Cities and Berber Areas," *Judaism*, 17 (Autumn, 1968), 406; J. Goulven, *Les Mellahs de Rabat-Salé* (Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1927) presents a somewhat less favorable picture. Cf. Mantran, *Istanbul*, p. 65.

[28] Robert A. Kann, "Hungarian Jewry during Austria-Hungary's Constitutional Period (1867–1918)," *Jewish Social Studies*, VII (1945), 357–86.

Church, the principal authorities on late medieval Spain stress the importance of lower strata attacks on Jews in a situation of expanding opportunities, while the elite—including bishops and religious-military orders—was eager to protect the Jews because of their economic value.[29] As Américo Castro trenchantly puts it:

> Finally, a day would come when the Catholic Sovereigns had an urgent need for the "common people" to further their militant imperial enterprises, and with it would come at last the annihilation of the two castes [Moslems and Jews] who no longer possessed any possible defenses . . . the lower strata of Christian society began to arise in the ranks and the way became clear for them to govern those who had formerly dominated them as *grandes de Castille* without being Christians.[30]

The passage just quoted implies that the position of the dominant elites themselves, closely identified with the mobilized diasporas through symbiotic activity, conversion, and sometimes intermarriage, was insecure. As larger elements of the dominant ethnic population became politically and economically mobilized, the "impurity" of the upper stratum threatened to become a ground for drastic turnover in elites. In other words, the *terms of exchange* had become distinctly less favorable for the dominant ethnic elite. The diaspora had not effected this change; but it could in a sense "compensate" for it by becoming a sacrifice ("shock absorber" is Blalock's term)[31] to divert populist animosity from the elite. As a result, the latter frequently turned to scapegoating, thus essentially altering its relation with the diaspora from *exchange* to *coercion*. Just as Ferdinand of Aragon sanctioned the Inquisition to quiet populist rumors assailing his Jewish ancestry, Sultan Abdul Hamid preferred to turn violently on the Armenian diaspora rather than to risk being identified with it in rising Turkish public opinion as he was in fact by descent. There are some indications that similar motivations lay behind the anti-Chinese measures taken by the Thai elite (with its considerable Chinese ancestry) after the revolutionary upheavals of the 1930s.[32] In a very similar way, the slow, uneven process of modernization in Russia has made antidiaspora tactics attractive to very different kinds of dominant ethnic elites. No one would deny that Alexander III was sincerely anti-German; but his weak son, Nicholas II, took anti-German measures at the outbreak of World War I partly to divert attention from the notorious German atmosphere of his Court. More recently, Soviet leaders with Jewish in-laws (including Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev) have probably been motivated to some degree by fear of too close identification with the disliked diaspora.[33]

[29] See especially Neuman, *The Jews in Spain*, I, 182; Baer, *A History of the Jews in Christian Spain*, II, 25; Fernand Braudel, *La Méditerranée et le Monde Méditerranéen à l'Epoque de Philippe II*, 2nd ed. (Paris: Colin, 1966), II, 29. Cf. Weinreich in *To Honor Roman Jakobson*, III, 2201, for a description of the similar situation in the medieval Rhineland.

[30] Américo Castro, *The Spaniards* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 502, 570.

[31] Hubert H. Blalock, Jr., *Toward a Theory of Minority-Group Relations* (New York: Wiley, 1967), p. 81. On p. 79 Blalock appears to agree with my point that a mobilized diaspora is relatively secure in a traditional social order.

[32] Coughlin, *Double Identity*, pp. 128, 168; Purcell, *Chinese in Southeast Asia*, p. 169.

Dynamics of the International Context

By definition, multiethnic polities belong to James Rosenau's category of highly penetrated systems in which domestic developments are extraordinarily dependent on extrasystemic conditions.[34] These polities have operated in an international environment geographically or chronologically remote from the modern Western model of impenetrable nation states. Consequently, the numerous treatments which depict mobilized diasporas exclusively as *victims* of intrasystemic forces ignore the crucial effects of international *politics* upon the exchange relation between diaspora and dominant ethnic elite.

(4) In the external relations of the multiethnic polity, the mobilized diaspora is as indispensable (and as transitory) as it is for the internal interests of

[33] John A. Armstrong, "Soviet Foreign Policy and Anti-Semitism," *Soviet Jewry: 1969* (Academic Committee on Soviet Jewry, 1969), pp. 65–69. I do not pretend that the explanation of internal factors presented above is adequate to explain all cases of persecution of mobilized diasporas, especially those involving recent anti-Semitism. Ernst Nolte in *Three Faces of Fascism* (New York: Reinhart, 1966), emphasizes quite rightly the importance of the search for scapegoats after military defeat (in Weimar Germany and late nineteenth-century France; he might have added Turkey after defeats in 1876–78 and 1915–19). Still, it can be argued that *one* significant factor in all three of these countries was the highly uneven pace of modernization, which made it profitable for elites of premodern origin to condone scapegoating by discontented members of their ethnic group. More directly contrary to my interpretation, at least on the surface, is the important study by Bruno Bettelheim and Morris Janowitz, *Dynamics of Prejudice* (New York: Harper, 1950), which attributes increases in anti-Semitic attitudes in both Germany and the United States to *downward* mobility. Of course outbreaks of anti-Semitism occasionally occur in successfully modernized countries, despite what I contend is the generally favorable position of the vestigial mobilized diasporas there. Unfortunately, such an ingrained historical prejudice is hardly likely to disappear merely because of economic and social transformations. It is not surprising that when anti-Semitism does occur in a modernized society the causes are different from those in slowly modernizing multiethnic societies. Apart from the hideous Nazi exception, however, dominant elites in Western modernized societies *have* succeeded in preventing the *attitudes* Bettelheim and Janowitz note from resulting in catastrophic *behavior*.

[34] James N. Rosenau, *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy* (New York: Free Press, 1971).

the dominant ethnic elite. Two basic factors account for the importance of the mobilized diaspora in external relations. In the premodern period, international commerce, although small in terms of the overall economic activity of the large multiethnic states, was indispensable to rulers. Luxury items were needed to nurture dominant elite loyalties and some military items (including the technological innovations mentioned earlier) had to be imported. Consequently, the activity of the mobilized diasporas was vital when the polity was expanding territorially, and retained considerable defensive significance even during stagnation. For example, in the late sixteenth century Sephardic Jews, through their contacts with European traders, contributed significantly to the Saadian dynasty's revival of Moroccan power, just as earlier their long-range commercial contacts had strengthened Moslem and Christian monarchies in Spain. Other refugee Sephardic Jews and Armenians from Kaffa in the Crimea extricated the Ottoman Empire sufficiently from Venetian commercial domination to enable the Empire to reach the pinnacle of its power.[35]

The situations just mentioned are excellent illustrations of the point made earlier, that the dominant elite of a given multiethnic polity customarily takes the skills of its mobilized diaspora as a given, since they were acquired under other regimes. The case of the Armenians shows how complicated this competition for diaspora skills can become. Apparently the Armenians began to be a mobilized diaspora during the early Middle Ages, when they occupied a precarious but profitable position between the Byzantine Empire and Moslem states. A few centuries later, in 1590, Shah Abbas recognized the importance of Armenian skills by forcibly transplanting their major center for transit trade, Julfa, to New Julfa, a suburb of his Persian capital. However, he was not the only ruler to profit from this drastic move. By breaking up the homeland center of Armenian commerce, Abbas set in motion a new dispersion which fructified the Armenian diaspora in the rival Ottoman Empire as well as in Poland and even in the Moghul Empire.[36] Two centuries later, the Tsar harvested many of the long-term benefits of increased Armenian dispersion (and the heightenin of skills which accompanied it) by incorporatin the remaining Armenian centers on the Trans caucasus trade route. The Russian governmen recognized its potential, although wholly unearne advantage, by conceding to the Armenian mercan tile elite exemption from tariffs on the route fron Persia to Leipzig. A few years later Prussian fin ance minister Friedrich von Motz sought a treat with Russia to enable Prussian trade to penetrat Asia with the aid of the Armenian "commercia people" under Russian protection.[37]

The example just cited suggests that the com mercial advantages accruing to multiethnic em pires from their mobilized diasporas could pro vide leverage in international negotiations. Bu mobilized diasporas have often been more directl involved in foreign policy. Perhaps the most strik ing example is the way in which the Phanario Greeks maintained de facto direction of Ottoma foreign policy for one hundred fifty years. The ke move occurred when "in the later seventeenth century the Phanariot Greeks gradually ousted th renegades and Levantines who had hitherto serve as interpreters in dealing with foreign embas sies."[38] The office of Grand Dragoman (created i 1669) soon became equivalent to permanent hea of the Ottoman foreign office. One Grand Drago man even acquired the formal title of Minister o Secrets (ordinarily the Greeks prudently left thes honorific posts to Moslems) and acted as chie Turkish delegate at the Carlowitz peace confer ence.[39] In the neighboring Russian multiethnic empire, German diaspora diplomats were so in fluential that not until the 1880s did a Tsar (Alex ander III) order all diplomatic correspondence t be conducted in Russian. As late as 1914 one in dispensable diplomat of German origin was stil reporting home to St. Petersburg in French, sinc he simply did not know Russian. Just five year later, the new Bolshevik elite found the polyglo Polish Jew, Karl Radek, equally indispensable fo foreign negotiations.

(5) Dominant ethnic elite perceptions of mobilized diaspora disloyalty tend to negate the value of th diaspora for external relations. The very character istics which originally made the diasporas valuabl have tended, over considerable time periods, t

[35] Gaston Deverdun, *Marrakech* (Rabat: Editions Techniques Nordafricaines, 1959), p. 453; Halil Inalcik, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300–1600* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973), p. 129; Moise Franco, *Sur l'Histoire des Israélites de l'Empire Ottoman depuis les Origines Jusqu'à Nos Jours* (Hildesheim: Olms, 1973—reprint of 1897 ed.), p. 57.

[36] Sanjian, *Armenian Communities*, p. 48; V. A. Baiburtian, *Armianskaia Kolonia Novoi Dzhulfy v XVII Veke* (Erevan: Akademiia Nauk Armianskoi SSR, 1969); *Istoricheskie Sviazi i Druzhba Ukrainskogo i Armianskogo Narodov* (Kiev: "Naukova Dumka," 1965), pp. 101 ff., 122 ff.; R. L. Abramian, *Armianskie Istochniki XVIII V. ob Indii* (Erevan: Akademiia Nauk Armianskoi SSR, 1968).

[37] Valentin Wittschewsky, *Russlands Handels-, Zoll und Industrielpolitik von Peter dem Grossen bis auf die Gegenwart* (Berlin: Mittler, 1905), p. 57; Hermann von Petersdorff, *Friedrich von Motz* (Berlin: Hoffing, 1913) II, 323.

[38] Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 87.

[39] *Ibid.*, Steven Runciman, *The Great Church in Captivity* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press 1968), p. 364; Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society*, I, Part 2 p. 236.

rouse the suspicions of the dominant elites. Groups which partially escaped the control of absolute monarchs, groups whose co-ethnics lived under rival sovereigns, groups which carried on constant intercourse across frontiers could hardly avoid arousing distrust. For more xenophobic elites—the fifteenth-century Spanish monarchs and latter-day Soviet elites—simple distrust of "cosmopolitans" has been sufficient to damn the Jewish diasporas. Yet it is remarkable how long and well a more sophisticated elite like the Ottomans trusted their Jewish subjects; most Eastern European elites were equally tolerant of German diaspora contacts.

(6) The most potent source of the dominant ethnic suspicion of the mobilized diaspora is the existence of its "homeland" outside the dominant elite's territorial control. This proposition requires careful qualification. As was discussed in the preceding section, a sharp rise in social mobilization with concomitant populist pressures is *the most* important factor jeopardizing a mobilized diaspora. *That* danger arises, however, only when a dominant elite's interest in utilizing a diaspora has eroded and the alternative of scapegoating affords a short-run advantage. In contrast to this "cynical" calculation, real suspicion that a diaspora has transferred its loyalty to the occupants of its homeland pervades the dominant elite itself.

It is important to distinguish the positions of the *situational* and the *archetypal* diasporas. For the former, much depends on the political activity of its great society. Probably German disunity is the basic reason that Eastern European German minorities were rarely distrusted by dominant elites (although often denounced for their overbearing manner by lesser figures) until the formation of the Second Reich. After that, for understandable reasons, it was all downhill for the diaspora Germans until the expulsions at the end of World War II. The Southeast Asian Chinese, on the other hand, while never suffering as extreme a reversal, have been intermittently distrusted precisely because the polity of the great Chinese society, while *choosing* isolation, at all times possessed considerable potential for imperialist intervention. Thus Spanish suspicion that a haughty mandarin mission was preparing to oust Spain from the Philippines led to the brutal massacre which terminated a local Chinese uprising in 1603. A factor behind the Dutch decision (1854) to suppress the Borneo mining *kongsis* was their sending envoys to the Emperor of China.[40] More recent suspicions, associated with the attraction Sun Yat-Sen exerted in the 1920s and the Chinese Peoples Republic in the 1960s have induced equally harsh reactions from new indigenous elites in countries like Indonesia.

One might suppose that the vastly lower power *potential* of the archetypal diasporas' homelands would correspondingly reduce the dominant elites' suspicions. At times this has indeed been the case. Generally the religious nature of the archetypal diaspora myth, with its transcendental element, has induced diaspora members to accommodate to the curses and revilings of the ethnic groups among which they live. Even when the dominant elite protected the diaspora from serious physical harm, it eventually reinforced the diaspora's ignominious position by formally excluding it from positions of power and by enforcing residential segregation and sumptuary laws. This happened in sixteenth-century Istanbul, despite the Jews' exceptionally favored position. It is not surprising that messianic movements became noticeable among them about that time.[41] Since, however, recovery of the Jewish homeland was not then within the realm of practical politics, these movements aroused little concern among the dominant Ottoman elite which, moreover, had rather less need for diaspora services as the Empire became more homogeneously Moslem in population and more stagnant in economic and military affairs. The sharp decline of the Jews in the Ottoman Empire is, however, one of the few instances of a diaspora's being largely displaced in an *unmodernized* context without extreme coercion by the dominant ethnic elites.

More often, as Karl Deutsch has noted, a minority "with links to the domestic system and some particular links to the international or foreign input" will eventually react to persecution by loosening its ties to the multiethnic polity.[42] In other words, the dominant ethnic elite's suspicions tend to be self-fulfilling. The Phanariot Greeks' loss of their influential position in the Ottoman Empire is a good example of this interaction. Soon after acquiring their extraordinary influence in foreign negotiation, Phanariot elites began to dream of recreating the Byzantine Empire. At first they regarded partnership with the dominant but declining Moslem elites as the only feasible tactic. By the latter part of the eighteenth century, however, revival of an Orthodox Empire sponsored by Russia attracted those Phanariots who were too

[40] Purcell, *Chinese in Southeast Asia*, p. 591; Cator, *Economic Position of the Chinese*, p. 157.

[41] Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society*, I, Part 2, pp. 217, 241; Lewis, *Emergence*, p. 454; Haim Nakoum (former chief rabbi), "Jews," in *Modern Turkey*, ed. Elliot Mears (New York: Macmillan, 1924), p. 87; Uriel Heyd, "The Jewish Communities of Istanbul in the Seventeenth Century," *Oriens*, 6 (No. 2, 1952), 308 ff.

[42] Karl W. Deutsch "External Influences on the Internal Behavior of States," in *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics*, ed. R. Barry Farrell (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), p. 12.

impatient to endure the humiliating terms which the Ottoman elite exacted from its Christian junior partners. Eventually the first wave of modern nationalism induced the Greeks to strike for independence at a time when the Ottoman elite was gravely concerned with Russian and other European Christian encroachments. The result was nearly catastrophic for the Phanariot diaspora: "The Turks were no longer prepared to trust the Orthodox. With the holocaust at the Patriarchate the old dispensation was ended."[43] The long period of Phanariot access to top policy making terminated in 1821 with the execution of two successive Grand Dragomans. "The chief beneficiaries were the Armenians, already well established as money-changers and bankers; better trusted than the Greeks, better educated than the Jews, they moved into many positions previously held by both. . . ."[44]

Incipient independence for the Greek homeland entailed destruction of Greek diaspora ascendancy. The position of the Armenians provides a still sharper illustration of the sensitivity of dominant elites to the attraction exerted on diasporas by their homelands. Although the Armenian diaspora (particularly in India) resented Persia more than the Ottoman Empire during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the location of the sacral center, Echmiadzin, in the Persian domains worried the Ottoman elite. Even earlier, the latter had maneuvered to secure control of the diaspora by inventing the title of "patriarch" for the Gregorian Bishop of Bursa and bringing him to Istanbul. Gradually the cultural center of Armenian life gravitated there. Far into the nineteenth century Ottoman leaders referred to the Armenians as the "loyal *millet*," i.e., the most loyal of the non-Moslem minorities. But continued concern with the religious attraction of Echmiadzin led the Ottomans to make repeated efforts to encourage rival Armenian religious centers in their own territory (Jerusalem and Cilicia). The threat became greater when Echmiadzin and the surrounding Transcaucasian homeland passed from the stagnating Persians (who, in any event, as Moslems could not easily pose as champions of an Armenian ethnic revival) to the dynamic Christian Russian Empire. The Russian government, while encouraging the Gregorian Church, moved quickly to place it under the supervision of St. Petersburg officials. By the 1830s the Armenians had acquired the status of a significant secondary mobilized diaspora within the southern borderlands of the Russian Empire, both commercially (as noted earlier) and in governmental and military posts concerned with its Oriental subjects.[45] A more recent Armenian analysis provides a good indication of the way in which sophisticated diaspora elites have been able to comprehend the delicate balance of exchange relation with the dominant elite:

> The position of the Armenian authorities at the capital was obviously influenced by the Porte's apprehensions of, the hostility to Russia. . . . [since control of all ecclesiastical institutions by the Echmiadzin Catholicos would surely be construed by the Porte as tantamount to placing them under Russian authority. This was a contingency that the Armenian leaders at Constantinople felt must be avoided at all costs if the security of the empire's Armenian *millet* was to be safeguarded.[46]

Unfortunately for the Armenian diaspora, its internal conflicts prevented the solution of replacing Echmiadzin church authority by that of the Cilician center. Still more dangerous was the coincidence between the rise of a Russian-sponsored threat to the Ottoman Anatolian frontier and the birth of modern nationalism in both the Turkish Moslem dominant ethnic group and among the Armenians themselves. All of these developments came to a head in 1876 when the Ottoman and Russian Empires clashed militarily. Massacres of the Armenians during that period were succeeded twenty years later by worse atrocities, and in 1915 (once again under the threat of Russian invasion) by the near-final "solution" of genocide.

Succession of Mobilized Diasporas

(7) **In a multiethnic polity where slow mobilization of the dominant ethnic group results in a persistent need for mobilized diaspora skills, diasporas will tend to succeed one another in advantageous positions.** The preceding discussion of the factors which jeopardize mobilized diasporas has contained many hints that, as one's position declined, another arose in some polities to provide the middleman and communication skills the dominant elite continued to need. Indeed Proposition 7 can be deduced (although not rigorously) from Propositions 1, 3, 4, and 5: if a diaspora is indispensable for both internal and external purposes, yet is incapacitated by factors (increased mobilization among the dominant ethnic group, growing dominant elite suspicion of the diaspora's external connections) largely independent of the elite's continuing need for these skills, it is at least probable that that elite will turn to a more trusted mobilized diaspora if one is available.

A possible alternative, of course, for the dominant elite is to forego the advantages which *any*

[43] Runciman, *Great Church*, p. 406.

[44] *Ibid.*; Lewis, *Emergence*, pp. 87, 455; Bernard Lewis, *Islam in History* (London: Alcove Press, 1973), p. 135.

[45] Louise Nalbandian, *The Armenian Revolutionary Movement* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), pp. 27, 43, 71, 133; Lewis, *Emergence*, p. 350.

[46] Sanjian, *Armenian Communities*, p. 242.

mobilized diaspora could contribute. The sixteenth-century Spanish elite's reaction is often considered the paradigm of this alternative. Having massacred or expelled the Jewish diaspora and the important Moslem communities, the Spanish elite itself resolutely renounced the skills they had supplied. As Américo Castro has written:

> An essential requisite to be a counselor of the emperor was that he be the son or grandson of *labradores*, that is, of peasants, farmers, or people who tilled the soil. . . . In sum, the ideal was that the ancestor of a counselor of His Imperial Majesty, the lord of half the world, should be illiterate, that he should lack even the elementary knowledge or technical experience to be a bricklayer, muleteer, tailor, or itinerant salesman. By no means should he be a physician, pharmacist, or—an hidalgo! Neither the status of the hidalgo nor one's patent of nobility guaranteed beyond the shadow of doubt that the royal counselor was free from Jewish or Moorish ancestry. . . . Since the Jews had a reputation for being the most intelligent and learned men, they [Spaniards] purposely chose to appear ignorant and illiterate on the surface to avoid the risk of being earmarked as Jews.[47]

No doubt there is an element of rhetorical exaggeration in Castro's generalization. Much indirect evidence suggests that there was indeed a continuing need for diaspora skills in Spain, and the downward course of Spanish power during this period is incontestable.[48] Still, one should be on guard against exaggerating the importance of the rejection of diasporas. After all, unusual tolerance for diasporas did not prevent a strikingly parallel decline of the Ottoman Empire. After his magisterial examination Fernand Braudel concluded that basic conditions of economic growth had turned against the large imperial polities by the end of the sixteenth century.[49] On the whole, however, the Spanish course is hardly one which sophisticated dominant ethnic elites will wish to emulate.

While some tendencies toward succession of mobilized diasporas appear in other polities,[50] the experiences of the Russian and the Ottoman Empires are clearest and historically most significant. Consequently, a tabular juxtaposition of these experiences, bringing out the striking similarity of successive but chronologically remote stages in the dynamics of diaspora-dominant elite interaction in the two multiethnic Empires, is suggestive. The comparison is especially significant because the Ottoman Empire made little progress toward economic and social modernization, while the Russian polity eventually did achieve modernization, although in an exceptionally protracted, uneven manner.[51] The comparison does, however, suggest two important differences: (a) the tendency of the interval between successions of mobilized diasporas to decrease in the successfully modernizing polity (Russia); and (b) the diminishing importance of successive mobilized diasporas in such a polity. In the Ottoman case, intervals are uneven in a random way which may reflect the dominance of "extraneous" or chance factors. The Russian case, on the other hand, suggests a chronological telescoping of the dynamic variable (diaspora succession) as modernization proceeds.

A recent monograph reveals that Lenin himself recognized that Jewish mobilized diaspora skills were essential to replace Russian bourgeois defectors—to "sabotage the saboteurs."[52] Some of these defecting specialists were in fact Germans, although the Germans had been declining as a diaspora for several decades prior to the Revolution. For example, German capital pioneered in textile manufacturing in Russian Poland, but during the last decades of Tsarist rule, Jewish capital became increasingly significant there.[53] Jews had operated the highly important grain and timber trades in the western parts of the Russian Empire for a century and were extremely important in central banking by 1914.[54] The very intensity of attacks on Jews (largely perpetrated by lower strata of the dominant Russian ethnic group directed by its elite in a classic example of scapegoating) aroused Jewish eagerness to acquire overtly powerful positions after the Revolution: "There can be little doubt that the thirst for power had been exacerbated by centuries of drought and that Jews were determined to drink deeply of the sweet waters of power."[55] By the 1920s Jewish membership in Soviet policy-making bodies was roughly comparable (one-fourth to one-half of the total) to

[47] Castro, *The Spaniards*, pp. 550–52.

[48] *Ibid.*, p. 591; Fernand Braudel, *Capitalism and Material Life, 1400–1800* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973), p. 24.

[49] Braudel, *La Méditerranée*, II, 46. The Spanish kingdom was obliged to import Flemish and Burgundian administrators from its outlying possessions and (more or less surreptitiously) French merchants and artisans (forty thousand in Madrid alone by 1655) to assume specialized roles Spaniards could not fill.

[50] Notably in nineteenth-century Hungary, where Jews replaced the urban German diaspora in many occupations with the tacit acquiescence of the Magyar elite, which regarded Jews as more assimilable, Kann, "Hungarian Jewry," pp. 371 ff.

[51] I have analyzed the social implications of the pace of Russian modernization in "Communist Political Systems as Vehicles for Modernization," in *Political Development in Changing Societies*, ed. Monte Palmer and Larry Stern (Lexington: Heath, 1971), pp. 135 ff.

[52] Zvi Y. Gitelman, *Jewish Nationality and Soviet Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), p. 23.

[53] Ezra Mendelsohn, *Class Struggle in the Pale* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 17; cf. S. B. Weinryb, *Neueste Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Juden in Russland und Polen* (Breslau: M. and H. Marcus, 1934).

[54] Gitelman, *Jewish Nationality*, p. 76.

[55] *Ibid.*, p. 116.

Comparative Succession of Mobilized Diasporas

Ottoman Polity			Interval Scale (Years)	Russian Polity		
Principal Diaspora	Secondary Diasporas	Dates		Dates	Principal Diaspora	Secondary Diasporas
Catholic Levantines	*Greeks* (few *Jews* and *Armenians*)	1453–	0	1710–	*Germans* (mainly Baltic; slowly declining after 1881)	*Jews* and *Armenians* (by mid-nineteenth century)
Jews (mainly Sephardic; high point in mid-sixteenth century then slow decline due to cultural and economic factors without coercion)	*Greeks* (ten times more numerous than *Armenians* in Istanbul, but latter most important in Syria)	1490–	100			
Greeks (mainly Phanariot; sharp decline after nationalist uprising)	*Jews* (major residual position); *Armenians* (rapidly rising in Istanbul); *Lebanese* (becoming important in Egypt)	1650–	200	1919–	*Jews* (declining after 1942)	*Armenians* (rising after mid-1950s)
				1952–	*Armenians* (limited, slightly declining after 1964)	*Jews* (highly jeopardized residual position)
			300			
Armenians (rapidly declining after 1876)	*Jews* (modest recovery after 1880, as most trusted); *Greeks; Lebanese*	1821–	400			
		1919	500			

German proportions in the Tsarist governing elite of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Probably Jews were even more important in the liberal professions. But the constant insecurity of their position, in contrast to the widely accepted superiority of the Russian German diaspora prior to Alexander III, is indicated by the fact that the small portion of the Jewish group which acquired influential posts was obliged to renounce (and actively attack) the major elements of its diaspora culture.

As I have shown elsewhere,[56] officially sponsored anti-Semitism, like the secret setting of employment quotas, undermined the Soviet Jewish position at least by 1942. This chronology irrefutably demonstrates that the internal dynamics of the Soviet system, particularly the rapid replacement of the cosmopolitan Old Bolshevik elite by lower-strata Russians imbued with popular pre-

[56] John A. Armstrong, *The Politics of Totalitarianism* (New York: Random House, 1961), chapter 11.

udices, was the main factor at the start of the anti-Semitic campaigns. Certainly the dramatic establishment of a Jewish homeland in 1948 could not have been the instigating force. Nevertheless, certain indiscreet (though thoroughly understandable) demonstrations of Jewish attachment to the concept of Israel (e.g., Madame Polina Molotov's declaration to Minister Golda Meir—"I am a Jewish daughter"), like the Armenian or Greek responses to Ottoman humiliations during the preceding century, exacerbated dominant elite suspicions. Although the crescendo of accusations and arrests during 1949–53 was not completely sustained by Stalin's successors, the position of Jews as an influential diaspora in the USSR was ended. In their place, but to a much more restricted degree (mainly in foreign commerce and on the southern borderlands) were installed Armenians—whose homeland, with the religious center of Echmiadzin—lay securely under Soviet control.

(8) In polities (whether or not multiethnic) where social and economic modernization has proceeded rapidly and evenly, mobilized diasporas do not perform indispensable activities and are generally not subject to discrimination. The greatly diminished position of the Armenian diaspora, as compared to its German and Jewish predecessors in the Russian polity, suggests that as modernization proceeds, mobilized diaspora skills become less significant. Even in a slowly, unevenly modernizing polity like the Russian, the dominant ethnic group (and some others) eventually provide the communications and technical role specialists once provided by diasporas. Western polities rapidly accomplished this phase of modernization decades ago. In such societies, vestigial diasporas may continue to be represented somewhat disproportionately in certain middleman roles, but never predominate in a broad range of crucial roles as they have in traditional or slowly modernizing multiethnic polities. Not only does a well-educated portion of the dominant elite possess considerable communication skills, but it is generally strong enough to enforce universal adoption of its language (or occasionally a bilingual compromise) by means of standard educational requirements. Influenced by the universalist values of the dominant elite, members of the dominant ethnic group appear to accept diaspora colleagues (even though they may be perceived as competitors) in much the same way that dominant ethnic occupational competitors did in a stagnant traditional society like nineteenth-century Morocco.

Proletarian Diasporas

The proposition just offered concerning the position of mobilized diaspora members in successfully modernized societies—despite the numerous exceptions which spring to mind[57]—is important for understanding the critical differences between the position of the mobilized and the proletarian diaspora. Before exploring this dichotomy, qualification is necessary. At all times and places, large portions of mobilized diasporas, like members of proletarian diasporas, have occupied disadvantageous roles in the occupational structure. The *luftmenschen* of the Jewish Pale were far from exceptional. A large proportion of even the relatively prosperous Armenian community of Istanbul was occupied in such menial work as porterage. But even the worst-off members of these diasporas had before them the symbol of upward mobility provided by their co-ethnics: "the Jewish journeyman by no means considered himself permanently a wage earner. As he saw it, were he compelled to suffer the insults of his master one day, the next he himself might become an employer, the master of his own shop. For such changes in status were fairly common practice."[58] Lacking such an upwardly mobile reference group, proletarian diasporas have, on the contrary, consisted of a nearly undifferentiated mass of unskilled labor.[59]

Lack of even the prospect of access to advantageous *occupational roles* is accompanied by low *communication skills*. Only 67.9 per cent of one group of Algerians studied recently in France could read or write in the dominant language, which is hardly surprising since 68.3 per cent could not read or write Arabic. Oral communication is almost as difficult; in Switzerland pidgin Italian has become known as the "slave language" because it is the only vehicle for communication among the diverse proletarian diaspora workers as well as between them and their dominant ethnic employers.[60] Here is a typical case of what Joshua Fishman calls "diglossia," i.e., the division of linguistic codes between those perceived (by both the dominant ethnic group and the proletarian diaspora) as appropriate for "high" purposes and those reserved for "low" purposes.[61] Clearly their

[57] See footnote 33 above.

[58] Mendelsohn, *Class Struggle in the Pale*, p. 9.

[59] Stephen Castles and Godula Kosack, *Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe* (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 310; John A. Jackson, *The Irish in Britain* (London: Routledge and Paul, 1963), pp. 79, 81. It is true that at times specific proletarian diasporas have tended to take unskilled jobs in particular economic branches, but these are almost always characterized by greater job turnover and geographical mobility than roles occupied by the dominant ethnic group, and by less status mobility.

[60] Castles and Kosack, *Immigrant Workers*, pp. 182, 191.

[61] Joshua Fishman, *Sociolinguistics* (Rowley: Newbury House, 1970), p. 78.

low communication skills reinforce the low perceived status of the proletarian diaspora members in addition to lowering their performance. Moreover, communication limitations make it difficult for a proletarian diaspora to maintain an identifying *myth*. Even the predominantly Polish and Italian proletarian diasporas in France in the 1940s learned to speak French very imperfectly. Because of this linguistic obstacle, combined with less tangible communications barriers, a high proportion abandoned the practice of their Catholic religion, even though it is the faith of the dominant ethnic group. For Moslem workers in Western Europe, religious tradition apparently serves more as an added barrier to assimilation (especially through intermarriage) than as an identifying myth.

Given the circumstances of the proletarian diasporas, it is difficult to envisage their relations with dominant ethnic elites in terms of exchange theory. One viewpoint is that the appropriate framework of analysis is strict conflict theory (usually Marxist-Leninist), based on the assumption that the dominant ethnic elites are able to manipulate values in such a way that the proletarian diasporas lose absolutely as well as relatively.[62] In purely material terms, this contention has been strongly debated.[63] Neither side of the debate appears to have looked at the crushing *material* circumstances in the areas of, say, Turkey or Morocco where the diasporas originate. The enormous *cultural* and *psychic* impoverishment of the proletarian diasporas can, however, scarcely be questioned. Equally important in any conclusion concerning the undesirability of the process of formation of proletarian diasporas in modernized societies is the matter of relative deprivation. The degraded condition of the diasporas can hardly fail to arouse destructive animosities between them and the dominant ethnic groups when the cultural and physical appearance gap between the groups is also wide.

(9) In polities where economic and social modernization has proceeded rapidly and evenly, proletarian diasporas tend to become progressively more distant culturally and in physical appearance from the dominant ethnic group, and to suffer more discrimination. American readers are familiar with the concept of successive waves of immigrants taking over the least desirable housing and starting at the bottom of the occupational ladder. Unquestionably this process, in the United States, has entailed increasingly greater perceived cultural differences between proletarian diasporas and the dominant ethnic group. What is not so often recognized is that the modernized European polities have experienced a very similar succession of proletarian diasporas. After the first centuries of the Roman imperium, slave diasporas did not constitute a major source of labor in Europe (or for that matter in Islamic and other major civilizations of the medieval and early modern eras). Modernization began, therefore, with local, homogeneous unskilled labor supplies:

> The standard stable partnership is between a poor region with regular emigration and an active town. . . . The origins of the new citizens in a lively town like Metz or Constance for example (the latter from 1367 to 1517) could equally well be marked on a map. In each case it would disclose a wide area associated with the life of the town . . . [that] spoke its dialect . . . . [The town] left the lowly tasks to new arrivals [from this region]. Like our over-pressured economies today, it needed North Africans or Puerto Ricans at its service, a proletariat which it quickly used up and had quickly to renew. The existence of this wretched and lowly proletariat is a feature of any large town.[64]

By 1788 "foreigners," i.e., French-speakers like the Auvergnat water-carriers and Savoyard sawyers, performed the menial tasks of Paris. Most labor was still recruited from northern and eastern regions with *dialects* as well as standard speech similar to Parisian, however. A little later, the less desirable urban roles (and those in migratory agricultural labor) were assumed by Bretons (often Celtic-speaking) and persons from countries adjoining France.[65] As modernization (and prosperity) increased, however, these quasi-native elements resisted the painful dislocation involved in long-distance migration. By the twentieth century, southern Italians and Poles were, consequently, moving into the less desirable roles of the Parisian occupational structure. Together these groups comprised 52 per cent of all foreigners in France by 1936, and 53 per cent a decade later.[66] It was

[62] Castles and Kosack, *Immigrant Workers*, especially p. 476.

[63] Charles P. Kindleberger, *Europe's Postwar Growth: The Role of Labor Supply* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 204 ff.; Pierre Grandjeat, "Les Migrations de Travailleurs en Europe," *Cahiers de l'Institut International d'Etudes Sociales*, I, Cahier 1 (Paris, 1966), pp. 62 ff.; Arnold M. Rose, *Migrants in Europe* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1969), pp. 150 ff.

[64] Braudel, *Capitalism*, pp. 380–81. Braudel's generalization is supported by the ingeniously compiled statistics presented by Roger Mols, *Introduction à la Démographie Historique des Villes d'Europe du XIVe au XVIIIe Siècle* (Louvain: Duculot, 1955), II, 379 ff. Cf. Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1970), p. 10: "The classic heterogeneity of great cities has been limited to the elite part of the population . . . not, as in the United States, the masses."

[65] Braudel, *Capitalism*, pp. 380–81; Louis Chevalier, *La Formation de la Population Parisienne du XIXe Siècle* (Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1949), pp. 21, 165, 210.

[66] Alain Girard and Jean Stoetzel, "Français et Immigrés," *Institut National d'Etudes Démographiques*, Cahier No. 19 (Paris, 1953), p. 19.

not until the 1950s "postindustrial" period that *bidonvilles* for non-European workers became noticeable. Half a million non-Europeans entered France during 1955–62 alone. By the 1970s over a million North Africans were in France, compared to ninety thousand in 1936.[67]

In some respects the British experience was less gradual because reliance on the culturally distinct Irish for mobile, heavy labor began in the early nineteenth century, declined for nearly a century after the first industrial booms were over, then turned sharply upward during World War II. As late as 1966, there were 350,000 Irish workers as compared to 500,000 from the Commonwealth (mostly non-white).[68] Although friction between natives and nonwhite immigrants was evident sooner in Britian, France, contrary to characteristically optimistic forecasts, was not immune. As recently as 1969 one French observer concluded that:

> Sure of our own nationality, which has resisted all kinds of attacks and has so valiantly digested all kinds of bastardization, we have developed as one of our national characteristics a sort of tolerant, individualistic and chauvinistic indifference to foreigners, which will persist in this thoroughly bourgeois era because it is essentially based on self-assurance.[69]

The signs of latent animosity, related to cultural distance, should have been apparent by then. For example, in the late 1940s, a French sample ranked North Africans (who at that time were mostly French citizens) with Germans as "least liked." Moreover, on the operationally critical question of whom respondents would most object to as sons-in-law, 70 per cent (as compared to 45 per cent for Germans) indicated North Africans.[70] With astonishing rapidity this latent hostility became manifest between 1968 and 1975, with North Africans engaging in radical labor activities and French extremists lynching Algerians.[71]

Some writers have stressed the postcolonial aspects of the succession of proletarian diasporas. While it is true that France and Great Britain have drawn on former colonies, a very similar progression has occurred in West Germany, despite German lack of a colonial empire.[72] The first cycle of replacement of local, German workers in unskilled labor (during the late nineteenth century) did draw on culturally—although not legally—alien Poles from eastern Prussia, but Poles from the Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires were also attracted. By 1910 virtually the same proportion (four per cent) of the German labor force was foreign as in West Germany in 1965. Nevertheless, as in France and Britain, a striking change in the ethnic makeup of this four per cent has occurred. By 1973 more than half of the immigrant workers had come from such culturally distant countries as Yugoslavia and Greece, including nearly 30 per cent from Moslem Turkey.[73]

Politics has played an important part in promoting the succession of proletarian diasporas in successfully modernizing polities, just as it has been significant in the succession of mobilized diasporas in the slower or unsuccessful multiethnic polities. Within the international framework, preservation of a stable equilibrium since 1945 has been a crucially necessary condition for the recruitment of labor from progressively more remote regions. From the standpoint of internal politics, the progression has been largely the result of *nondecisions*. Certainly Western European governments have facilitated migration and in a few instances (Franco-Algerian agreements) have actively promoted it. In general, however, it has been undirected market forces which have shaped the nature of labor migration. In spheres where polities have the capacity to initiate policies, failure to act may be just as political as positive action.

The feasibility of controlling the succession of proletarian diasporas—at least up to the present—is demonstrated by the experience of the Soviet-bloc polities. Since the late 1960s the economy of the German Democratic Republic has exerted almost as strong an attraction on foreign unskilled labor as that of the German Federal Republic. Considerable reservoirs of underutilized labor exist in Poland and the Balkan Soviet-bloc countries. Nevertheless, foreign employment in East Germany has been limited to the magnitude of several tens of thousands, ordinarily workers recruited for specific contract projects.[74] The situation within the multiethnic USSR (which may well determine GDR policy on migration as well) is more critical. Rapid industrialization with prodigal use of labor, low productivity in agriculture, and a sharply declining reproduction rate among European ethnic groups is straining the resources of the Soviet dominant ethnic areas. In contrast,

[67] Castles and Kosack, *Immigrant Workers*, pp. 296, 432.

[68] Rose, *Migrants*, p. 24.

[69] *Ibid.*, p. 115.

[70] Girard and Stoelzel, "Français et Immigrés," pp. 37, 41.

[71] Edward R. F. Sheehan, "Europe's Hired Poor," *The New York Times Magazine*, December 9, 1973; cf. *The New York Times*, May 2, 1973, and Jean-Paul Sartre's editorial article in *The New York Times*, March 11, 1973.

[72] The poor excuse for a colonial empire which the Second Reich cherished produced no significant labor export; in a sense, of course, the Ostarbeiter compelled to work in Germany during World War II constituted a temporary proletarian diaspora.

[73] Castles and Kosack, *Immigrant Workers*, p. 19; Kindleberger, *Europe's Postwar Growth*, p. 177; Rose, *Migrants*, p. 24; *The New York Times*, November 24, 1973.

[74] *The New York Times*, July 11, 1972, on increased Polish and Rumanian export of contract labor to *West* Germany, despite *East* German opposition.

Soviet regions most distant geographically and culturally (the Moslem-culture republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus) have very high reproduction rates and underutilized labor forces. Nevertheless, there has been no migration of unskilled labor from these regions to the cities of Russia and the Ukraine, which continue to recruit predominantly from the adjacent Slavic rural regions. Moreover, while the subject is treated with great reticence in Soviet publications, there are some indications that this restraint represents a definite policy decision.[75]

(10) There is a reciprocal relation between modernization and diasporas: (a) In polities where modernization is rapid and even, mobilized diasporas tend to become vestigial and their members are advantaged whereas proletarian diasporas become increasingly important and their members are deprived. (b) In multiethnic polities where modernization is retarded mobilized diasporas are temporarily advantaged as a group, but are successively discarded and their members are deprived; whereas proletarian diasporas are vestigial, and their members are no more deprived than the lower strata of the dominant ethnic group. This lengthy proposition can be derived from Propositions 7, 8, and 9. It also sums up the conclusions of this article. That *both* tempos of modernization lead to severe discrimination against ethnic groups may seem like another of the bitter ironies of history. But the ten propositions I have advanced are not intended to be commandments. The saving note, if there is one, is recognition of the autonomy of politics which *might* be able to create frameworks in which both patterns of discrimination are avoidable.

[75] John A. Armstrong, "The Ethnic Scene in the Soviet Union," in *Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union*, ed. Erich Goldhagen (New York: Praeger, 1968), p. 7.

Public Affairs Television and the Growth of Political Malaise: The Case of "The Selling of the Pentagon"*

MICHAEL J. ROBINSON
The Catholic University of America

New Thoughts on Political Television

In the United States, candidates for national office depend upon television to transform candidacy into incumbency. In 1968, the Democrats spent 61 per cent of their presidential campaign funds on broadcasting; the Republicans spent half.[1] But surprisingly, the public relies more heavily on political television than do the candidates. In 1972 two-thirds of the American people said that television was the best way to follow candidates for national office and more than half got their "clearest understanding of the candidates and issues in national elections" from TV.[2]

Of course, for the national candidate, reliance on electronic media declines once the election has been decided. But the public takes no such holiday. In fact, since 1963, the year that CBS and NBC both extended their evening news from fifteen minutes to half an hour, television has remained the public's preeminent source of political information and news. By 1972, a full 64 per cent of the general public felt that television provided "most of (their) news about what's going on in the world today."[3]

This dependence upon television for political information of all types has triggered some wild speculation about the political implications of television campaigns and television news, especially network news. Every president since Kennedy has written about the impact of public affairs television on the landscape of American politics.[4]

But, until recently, political scientists have not been so willing as presidents to commit to paper their thoughts about the effects of public affairs television, especially television journalism. At base, this reluctance to study noncampaign television was the consequence of an unproved assumption—that both campaign television and public affairs television were incapable of affecting viewers. Relying on the scholarly work of the 1940s and 1950s, political scientists assumed that television journalism, like television campaigning, was just another source of information that could be selectively *attended to*, *perceived*, or *retained*. In short, having established early in the game that television campaigns rarely influence voting turnout or voting choice directly,[5] American political science paid little, if any, attention to more exotic theories about noncampaign television and politics. And, at one point, the profession seemed committed to a general theory of minimal effects. In

* I thank M. Kent Jennings at the University of Michigan for helping in this research when others were cool to the whole endeavor. Richard Hofstetter, at Ohio State, deserves credit for straightening me out from time to time. Philip Burgess, also at Ohio State, was my principal aid in every facet of this study and I owe him a lot.

[1] Herbert Alexander, *Political Financing* (Minneapolis: Burgess Publishing, 1972), p. 10.

[2] The Roper Organization, *What People Think of Television and Other Mass Media: 1959–1972* (New York: Television Information Office, 1973), pp. 7–10.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 2.

[4] John Kennedy, "A Force That Has Changed the Political Scene," *TV Guide*, 1959, cited in Edward Chester's *Radio, Television and American Politics* (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1969), p. 107. Richard Nixon, *Six Crises* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1962), chapter 2. Lyndon Johnson is not quite so explicit in his memoirs but he clearly links the public's "misunderstanding" of Tet to television journalism. He also suggests that television coverage at the Chicago convention in 1968 was a critical event in the political history of the 'sixties. See *Vantage Point* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), p. 384, p. 543.

[5] The literature here is legion. For a discussion of the impact of TV on turnout see Angus Campbell, "Has Television Reshaped Politics?" *The Columbia Journalism Review*, 1 (Fall, 1962), 10–13. Herbert Simon and Frederick Stern, "The Effect of Television upon Voting Turnout in Iowa in the 1952 Presidential Election," *American Political Science Review*, 49 (June, 1955), 470–477, William Glaser, "Television and Voting Turnout," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 29 (Spring, 1965), 71–86. All these studies consistently show little or no effect on turnout when television campaigning is the independent variable. For a look into the question of TV and voter preference see Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, William Miller, "Television and the Election," *Scientific American*, 188 (May, 1953), 46–48; Department of Marketing, Miami University, *The Influence of Television on the Elections of 1952*, (Oxford, Ohio: Miami University, Oxford Research Associates, 1954); Kurt and Gladys Lang, *Politics and Television* (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1968); Sidney Kraus, *The Great Debates* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962); Jay Blumler and David McQuail, *Television in Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969); Harold Mendelsohn and Irving Crespi, *Polls, Television, and the New Politics* (Scranton, Pa.: Chandler, 1970); Paul Dawson and James Zinser, "Broadcast Expenditures and Electoral Outcomes in the 1970 Congressional Elections," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 35 (Fall, 1971), 398–402. All these books and articles, except the Dawson and Zinser piece, reach similar conclusions. Television campaigns do not appreciably alter voting preferences or the outcome of general elections.

1956 one political scientist, Eugene Burdick, had to leave the APSA altogether to find a reputable social scientist who might break with the theory of television and noneffects. Burdick was unable to locate a political scientist who would venture a piece about the possibility of public affairs television affecting elections and voters at some time in the future.[6]

Throughout the early 'sixties, most political scientists clung to the theory of minimal consequences, a theory which relegates television, and all mass media, to a position of relative impotence. The proponents of this theory argued that television campaigns rarely produce any attitudinal or behavioral changes, nor does television journalism.[7] Perhaps V. O. Key summarized best the position of professional political science as it existed in the 'fifties and early 'sixties:

> Neither radio nor television has been able to grow into an independent source of political information or interpretation. In the main, these instruments have been brought into the pattern of older news media; they are by and large transmitters rather than originators of political intelligence. As such, radio and television have not become institutions of political influence in their own right.[8]

The late 'sixties strained this position, as they did many of the widely held positions within the profession. The "TV War" in Vietnam, the portrayals of violence in urban America, the televised student "revolution," all made any extrapolation from television voting studies of the 'fifties and early 'sixties seem out of date, almost naive. Several political scientists began to forge hypothetical links between television journalism, public opinion, and political behavior. Television journalism, not television campaigning, became a new focus. And at the turn of the decade, a spate of articles by political scientists appeared, each expressing anxiety about the discipline's inability to find any political significance in public affairs television. Stressing either the extraordinary size and composition of the TV news audience,[9] the unique format of the television news item,[10] the unusual qualities of video presentation,[11] or the high credibility of the networks,[12] these essays all suggested that television journalism is *sui generis* and that TV news produces effects far beyond those yet measured (or even considered) in television campaign research. These essays did more than stress the uniqueness of television news; they also suggested that television news produces fundamental changes in American public opinion. Wamsley and Pride, for example, argued that TV news may render the society less legitimate by denigrating symbols of authority.[13] Paul Weaver wrote that the television news format fosters "detachment (at best) or cynical rejection (at worst) toward the political institutions of the nation."[14] Perhaps the most dramatic hypothesis drawn by a political scientist was proposed by Byron Shafer, who asserted that television journalism was the principal creator of a new political cleavage, if not of a new political era:

> For a long time there were two basic issues in national politics: foreign policy . . . , and economics. . . . Now there is a third: Law and Order—shorthand for street crime, race, protest tactics, and "revolution." It has been forty years since American politics generated an issue so intense that it could change partisan loyalities for vast numbers of citizens . . . . Where did it come from?
>
> We suggest that the essential midwives in the birth of this issue are Messrs. Cronkite, Brinkley, and their brethren—television newsmen. . . .[15]

These hypothetical links between television journalism and political ethos are not really new. Kurt and Gladys Lang argued as early as 1955 that public affairs television could change the "political climate" and thus, indirectly, influence voters. But these notions were virtually ignored by professional political scientists during the twenty years following the first television campaign, the 1952 contest between Eisenhower and Stevenson.[16]

Now we, as a profession, have seriously begun to reconsider the theories of minimal effects which have passed from one generation of graduate students to the next since World War II. Of course, to reconsider an old theory is human; to confirm a new one is divine. Unfortunately, until now political scientists have had to reconsider without much data. In essence, political scientists have observed increased concern over sociopolitical decay and a

[6] For a description of the exchange between Burdick and the Langs see *Politics and Television*, pp. 17–19.

[7] Kurt and Gladys Lang, *Voting and Non-Voting* (Waltham, Mass.: Blaisdell Publishing, 1968), p. 4.

[8] V. O. Key, *Public Opinion and American Democracy* (New York: Knopf, 1967), p. 372.

[9] Gary Wamsley and Richard Pride, "Television Network News: Rethinking the Iceberg Problem," *Western Political Quarterly*, 25 (September, 1972), 434–450.

[10] Paul Weaver, "Is Television News Biased?" *Public Interest*, 26 (Winter, 1972), 57–74.

[11] Mendelsohn and Crespi, chapter 5.

[12] Wamsley and Pride "Television Network News," pp. 437–438.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 449.

[14] Weaver, "Is Television News Biased?," p. 74.

[15] Byron Shafer and Richard Larson, "Did TV Create the Social Issue?" *Columbia Journalism Review*, 11 (September/October, 1972), 10–17, at p. 10. Also see Richard Scammon and Ben Wattenberg, *The Real Majority* (New York: Coward, McCann, Geoghegan, 1970), p. 162.

[16] The only piece dealing directly with television to appear in the *American Political Science Review* during the years 1952–1972 was published in 1955. Its principal author, Herbert Simon, is a political scientist, but virtually none of the most prominent scholars in television research and, for that matter, media are political scientists.

ecline in political trust and confidence. They have lso observed a concomitant rise in public reliance pon an expanding television journalism. All these henomena are real. Wilson, among others, has ocumented the growing concern with law and rder;[17] Converse and Miller have documented he recent decay in efficacy and political trust;[18] Roper has demonstrated that television continues o outpace all other media as a source of national olitical information.[19] Moreover, our dependncy upon television news is *increasing*.[20] But the eal question involves the assumed linkage beween these phenomena. Do the arrows really xist? Has public affairs television fostered cynicsm, feelings of inefficacy, or Scammon's Social ssue? Does television journalism, even as Robert Dahl suggests, promote a growing American polical malaise?[21] Does public affairs television afect the national political ethos? Has it substantially influenced a national election? The experimental and correlational data which appear below indicate that the answer for all these questions is yes—a somewhat equivocal yes, perhaps, but a yes.

Methodology

Two types of data were used to test for the impact of public affairs television on American public opinion. The first set of data was collected in a series of laboratory investigations conducted during the first week of December, 1971. An additional set of data was borrowed from the five national election studies conducted by the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan between 1952 and 1968. The SRC data, adopted following the experiments, serve to corroborate and expand some of the most important experimentally based findings. The survey data also provide the opportunity to extrapolate the experimental findings to the general public with at least some degree of confidence.

Two Experimental Designs. Separate experiments were orginally designed to test for two types of effects. The first set of experiments was conducted to assess the impact of the CBS documentary, "The Selling of the Pentagon," upon individual opinions about the military, the national administration and the media. The second set of experiments was conducted to assess the impact of "The Selling of the Pentagon" on those same institutions, when presenting "The Selling of the Pentagon" with a set of contradictory remarks. These remarks, which came at the end of the presentation, came to be known as the "coda," of which more will be said later.

In short, there were two sets of experiments here, one set for testing effects of program, the other set for testing effects of coda. The elaborate Solomon-Four Group design was adopted to evaluate program effects.[22] The traditional Thurstone design (pretest–post-test, control group)—a less rigorous but less expensive design—was used to evaluate the impact of the coda.[23]

The Solomon design includes *two* control groups as well as *two* experimental groups. In theory, this design provides unusually great power for controlling virtually all the exogenous factors which can cloud the findings in any experimental research. It was adopted for precisely this reason. Unfortunately, the theoretical advantages were, in this case, ultimately overshadowed by some procedural realities.[24]

The Solomon design required four separate groups of subjects. The Thurstone design called for two groups. All told there were six groups of

[17] James Q. Wilson, "The Urban Unease: Community vs. City," *Public Interest*, 12 (Summer, 1968), 25–39, at p. 26.

[18] Philip Converse, "Change in the American Electorate," University of Michigan, mimeo, 1970; Arthur Miller, "Political Issues and Trust in Government," paper presented to the American Political Science Association, 1972.

[19] Burns Roper, *What People Think of Television and Other Mass Media*, p. 2.

[20] Data cited in *TV Guide*, July 7, 1973. Data compiled for ABC News by Nielsen.

[21] It was Robert Dahl who first linked the words "television" and "malaise," "The City in the Future of Democracy," *American Political Science Review*, 61 (December, 1967), p. 967.

[22] Richard Solomon, "An Extension of Control Group Design," *Psychological Bulletin*, 2 (March, 1949), 137–150.

[23] See Donald Campbell and Julian Stanley, "Experimental Designs and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research in Teaching," in *Handbook of Research in Teaching*, ed. Nathaniel Gage (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963) chapter 5. This chapter explains, lucidly, the differences between the Solomon and Thurstone designs, offering a good description of the advantages and disadvantages of both.

[24] Having adopted the Solomon design, I was obliged to incorporate two groups of subjects who had received no pretesting whatever. (groups B and D in Table 1) The subjects were given only a "post-test" in December, 1971. For Group B, this meant filling out a questionnaire immediately upon seeing the documentary. For Group D, it meant filling out the December questionnaire without having filled out a questionnaire previously and without having seen the documentary. Although these arrangements had been made for Groups B and D, those who were not pretested were far less likely to arrive and participate than were those who had been questioned earlier. It appears that subjects who are recruited *but are not questioned* during the pretest period take the enterprise less seriously (the questionnaire lends credibility to the affair) and are less likely to attend. Whatever the explanation, the differences between those who were pretested and those who were not —differences in background, political beliefs, and likelihood of participation in the experiment—were so consistently large that the four-group analysis, as suggested by Solomon, had to be discarded. I rely here on the Thurstone design.

subjects, four groups that were experimental, two that were controls. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the six groups and each subject was asked to report to an assembly hall on his or her assigned evening. Pretests were administered to some—but not to all—of the participants in November, 1971. (Because of the designs adopted, three groups were not pretested. See note 24.) The actual experiments were conducted during the first two weeks of December. Post-tests were administered to the experimental groups immediately following presentation of "The Selling of the Pentagon." Control groups were tested just prior to exposure.

The pretest questionnaire was nine pages in length and tapped opinions about the behavior and credibility of (1) social and political institutions, (2) public officials (3) private citizens and (4) news organizations. Almost all of the questions were unique to the experiment and were designed specifically for it. But the pretest questionnaire also contained five items which assessed the subject's feelings about his ability to deal with and understand politics. These items were not unique; they were the five items originally used by the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan in building the scale of political efficacy.[25] These five items were also included in the post-test questionnaire. As we proceed it will become clear that this inclusion was an extremely important one in developing the theory of videomalaise.

In all there were three questionnaires. Questionnaires one and two were nearly identical and were administered in November and December of 1971, respectively. The third questionnaire was two pages in length and was distributed by mail in February 1972 to all those who had participated in the experiment. The response rate for the February survey was 85 per cent.

[25] For a discussion of the concept of efficacy see Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley, 1960), pp. 515–519. The scale was used first in Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, Warren Miller, *The Voter Decides* (Evanston, Ill.: Row-Peterson, 1954), p. 18.

Modes of Viewing. Subjects watched "The Selling in three different modes. In the first mode, subjec saw only the documentary, 53 minutes in lengt just as it had appeared on CBS the evening February 23, 1971. Some of the subjects in mode had been pretested; some had not. (Groups A an B in Table 1) In the second mode subjects watche the documentary and then one of two codas, thi coda being a twelve minute videotape in whic F. Edward Hebert, Chairman of the House Arme Services Committee, former Vice President Spir Agnew, and the president of CBS News, Richar Salant, presented their interpretations of the pro gram. (Group E in Table 1) This coda was a edited version of the remarks made by Agnew Hebert, Melvin Laird, and Richard Salant durin the rebroadcast of "The Selling," presented b CBS on March 23, 1971. Another group of subjects (Group F) saw the documentary and a second—artificial—coda, a coda in which three confederates paraphrased the remarks of Hebert Agnew, and Salant. The control groups did not see the documentary until all members had completed a post-test questionnaire (T2); there were, recall, two control groups—one with pretest, one without (groups C and D in Table 1). Table 1 presents a summary of all six groups, including the mode of presentation for each group and the extent to which each group was tested.

Subjects. Subjects were recruited and paid through local civic, religious, and labor organizations. All came from a middle-sized midwestern city. Table 2 presents a demographic profile of the 223 subjects who participated. Note that these subjects differ substantially from those usually found in experiments in communication. But, because predisposition of the audience is so important in determining the effects of any communication, students appeared to be a poor reservoir from which to draw subjects.[26] Therefore subjects were recruited in

[26] When this experiment was pretested with students in August, the students simply grew more negative toward the military and more positive toward CBS. None of the psychological tension that existed for the adults existed for

Table 1. Six Experimental and Control Groups Listed by Mode of Exposure and Extent of Testing

	Pretest (Nov. 1971)	Mode	Post-Test (Dec. 1971)	Follow-up (Feb. 1972)
Group A	Yes	Program only	Yes	Yes
Group B	No	Program only	Yes	Yes
Group C	Yes	Control	Yes	Yes
Group D	No	Control	Yes	Yes
Group E	Yes	Program & Coda (Actual)	Yes	Yes
Group F	Yes	Program & Artificial Coda (Fake)	Yes	Yes

uch a way that predispositions would show more ariation, and less "liberalism" than that expected mong college sophomores. These subjects also epresented a substratum of the population that as similar, demographically, to Scammon's "real

Table 2. Demographic Breakdown of all Participants

Mean Age	44	$N=219$
Mean Family Income	$12,000	$N=214$
Per cent White	98%	$N=221$
Religious Affiliation		
Catholic	37%	
Protestant	62%	
Other	1%	
Per cent Male	40%	$N=221$
Partisan Attachment		$N=150$[a]
Democrat	32%	
Independent	32%	
Republican	36%	

[a] Not ascertained for two groups of subjects.

the students. The student response was theoretically unrewarding.

majority." In fact, all subjects lived within 150 miles of Scammon's sociopolitical capital, Dayton, Ohio. Table 3 offers a political profile of this group, a group that can be loosely defined as middle-American. While it is impossible to state precisely to what degree these subjects were representative of any larger audience, these people did constitute a more compelling collection of subjects than that usually found in experimental work in social science, especially in political science.

Findings

Level of Prior Exposure, A Seminal Concern. Orginally, the experiments were conducted to test several hypotheses about the process of opinion change. Many of these hypotheses are not directly relevant here and a compilation of all hypotheses and all the experimental findings appears elsewhere.[27] Some of the experimental findings, however, are useful at this point for two reasons. First, they speak directly to the basic question of program effects or coda effects. Second, some of the experimental findings led directly to an analysis of the SRC national survey data which, in turn, led to the theory of videomalaise. But, the first finding

[27] Michael J. Robinson, "Public Affairs Television and the Growth of Political Malaise; The Case of The Selling of the Pentagon" (Ann Arbor: Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1972.)

Table 3. Political Profile of all Subjects, November 1971, Selected Variables

	Strongly Agree	Agree	No Opinion	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	*N*
1. The United States is probably the most honest government in the world.	9%	41	18	27	5	(172)
2. The women's liberation movement has gone too far.	14%	41	20	21	4	(170)
3. Spiro Agnew has done a good job as Vice President.	11%	46	21	16	6	(173)

Mean "Reliability Scores," Selected Variables[a]	Score	*N*
The United States Army	59	171
The Department of Defense (Pentagon)	57	171
CBS Television	71	171
NBC Television	72	173
Richard Nixon	71	172
Pravda	26	153
The Comumbus *Dispatch*	62	171
Roger Mudd	71	164
Walter Cronkite	77	172
Melvin Laird	62	163
John Wayne	55	160

[a] Subjects were asked to evaluate the reliability of each of these people or organizations. Scores have a possible range of 1 (least reliable) to 100 (most reliable).

meriting attention is not, per se, experimentally derived or derived from the national survey data. This finding indicates that the pool of subjects was not unrepresentative of the wider audience and implies that these experiments were more than an empty exercise in laboratory technique.

During the experiments, just following exposure, subjects were asked if they had ever seen or heard about "The Selling of the Pentagon." Their responses, which appear in Table 4, demonstrate that the subjects had not been very aware of or sensitive to the documentary and the controversy surrounding it. Only 17 per cent of the entire pool had seen either the first or second showing of "The Selling." Another 12 per cent said they had heard something about the program and indicated in their response some familiarity with the program. But there was a good deal of confusion surrounding the controversy that made prior knowledge hard to assess. And 21 per cent of the subjects gave "information" about the program that was either erroneous or nonsensical. One woman said she knew about "The Selling," having seen it in paperback! Apparently, the controversies surrounding *The Selling of the Pentagon* and The Pentagon Papers case blended into one for some of the subjects.

Table 4. Prior Exposure to "The Selling of the Pentagon," All Subjects

Had Seen Nothing and Heard Nothing	49%
Had Seen Nothing and Heard Something Meaningless	21%
Had Seen Nothing and Heard Something Meaningful	12%
Had Seen Program Beforehand	17%
Had Heard About Program from Another Subject During the Week of Experiment	1%
	100%
N=	(223)

One could have predicted that only a small portion of the subjects would have seen the program beforehand, given the low Nielsen ratings for the original telecast and the retelecast. The *combined* Nielsen for both programs was a meagre 19.8.[28] Assuming some overlap between the first audience and the second, this Nielsen figure is very close to the percentage of our subjects who had actually seen the show on television.)

It was, of course, essential to this experiment that only a small percentage of our subjects had seen the program beforehand. Previous viewers were not only "contaminated" subjects, they wer also very unrepresentative sociologically and pol tically, in comparison with the remainder of th subject pool.[29] These contaminees had to be *re moved* from any of the actual analysis and the were. Fortunately, they represented a small mino ity of the pool.

Program Effects

I had hypothesized that "The Selling" in it original mode would (1) change *beliefs* (cogni tions) about the behavior of the American mili tary, rendering those beliefs less positive and (2 change affections toward the military, makin them less positive as well. In both field experiment and laboratory studies, recent television docu mentaries have been shown to produce such opin ion changes, changes that were generally in keep ing with the theme and intent of the broadcast. Using survey techniques and a quasi-experimenta design, William Alper and Thomas Leidy demonstrated that "The National Citizenship Test," another CBS production, affected the level of information and opinions about the Bill of Rights among American high school students.[30] Stephen Fitzsimmons and Hobart Osburn, using laboratory techniques, also found that network documentaries increased information about and changed opinions concerning automation, birth control, Brazilian politics, farmers, and migrant workers.[31] There was, in short, ample literature to suggest that a serious documentary could shift opinions on some political issues.

Cognitive Opinion. The first hypothesis was confirmed. The program did change opinions about the manifest behavior of the armed services. Having witnessed the telecast in its original mode, Group A subjects perceived the military as: more likely to lie about the War in Vietnam, more likely to get involved in politics and more likely to seek special political advantage than these subjects had

[28] Nielsen data obtained from CBS Research. The Nielsen figure represents the portion of the entire adult population, viewers and nonviewers, watching a designated program.

[29] Those previously exposed were very different in demography and politics from those not previously exposed. In all cases they were more "liberal" and more antimilitary. I assume the differences were not caused by the exposure—that the differences indicate that those who take the time and devote the energy to watch such a documentary were negatively predisposed toward the institution being attacked. In short, those who dislike the military would tend to ferret out an unflattering presentation, especially when these people were given a second opportunity by CBS to watch the attack. The data support this interpretation.

[30] S. William Alper and Thomas Leidy, "The Impact of Information Transmission Through Television," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 33 (Winter 1969–1970), 556–562.

[31] Stephen Fitzsimmons and Hobart Osburn, "The Impact of Social Issues and Public Affairs Television Documentaries," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 32 (Fall, 1968), 379–397.

previously believed.[32] In fact, subjects changed their opinions on all three items used to tap beliefs about military conduct. And opinions changed in the direction that CBS had obviously intended. Mean scores for two of the three cognitive items changed enough to meet the .05 level of significance which had been adopted at the outset. (Table 5) The control group, Group C, showed no significant change on any of these items.

The experimentally induced change may not be dramatic, albeit significant. However, these changes are noteworthy for three reasons. First, they were changes not simply in group levels of information, but changes in beliefs about institutional behavior. In the other research involving network documentaries, change in level of information had been considered the basic test of effect.[33] Second, our changes were in the direction of "disloyalty," i.e., change in beliefs about governmental misconduct. In this case, viewers were supposed to become more suspicious of the behavior of a legitimate American institution, the military. Third, this group was not especially predisposed toward suspicion of the military. Given what we know about the role of predisposition in determining the impact of any communication,[34] these shifts in beliefs about behavior are more than meaningful, they are notable. The program moved some portion of our middle Americans toward holding an image of the American armed service that was more sinister and misbehaving.

[32] This same relationship existed for groups E and F. And, in this case, the post-test only group, Group B, also underwent the predicted changes. In this report, however, for the sake of simplicity, and because coda effects require an entirely separate discussion, I focus on groups A and C. Also see note 24.

[33] William Alper and Thomas Leidy, "The Impact of Information," p. 556; Stephen Fitzsimmons and Hobart Osburn, "The Impact of Social Issues," p. 382.

[34] The literature here is voluminous. For a good summary see Chester Insko's *Theories of Attitude Change* (New York: Appleton-Century Crofts, 1967).

Affective Opinion. Affective opinions were not meaningfully altered by "The Selling," at least not in its original mode of presentation. Subjects were asked to rate several units and persons within the Department of Defense in terms of reliability. There was also a thermometer reading for the "Military" and General George Patton. None of these items moved significantly following exposure. Table 6 shows just how stable these affective ratings remained over time, for experimentals and controls.

Evaluative Opinion. One other item indicates that "The Selling" was not quite so effective as CBS might have preferred. Subjects were asked to what degree they agreed with this statement: "The military-industrial complex has become too powerful in the United States." Responses were scored from one to five, with one signifying strong agreement, five indicating strong disagreement. The mean was 2.9 at T1; the mean was 2.8 at T2. This difference was not statistically significant and was actually less in absolute size than that which occurred within the control group. One interesting sidelight is that the modal response to this question about the military-industrial complex at both T1 and T2 was "no opinion," suggesting that the colorful phrase "military-industrial complex" lacks color, or even meaning, for a good bulk of this audience, and perhaps for the wider audience as well. At any rate, the program in its original mode failed to force these subjects to reconsider their basic feeling for the military establishment.

Coda Effects. One other set of experimental findings bears on our discussion of malaise. I had hypothesized that the original format (no coda) would be the most effective mode of presentation and that the program, when followed by a partially declamatory coda, would lose its punch. This hypothesis, adapted from experimental findings in

Table 5. Mean Scores for Cognitive Variables, For Those Not Previously Exposed

	Group A (Experimentals)			Group C (Controls)			Group E (Actual Coda)			Group F (Fake Coda)			Groups A, E, F (Experimentals)		
	Nov.	(N)	Dec.	Nov.	(N)	Dec.	Nov.	(N)	Dec.	Nov.	(N)	Dec.	Nov.	(N)	Dec.
"In the United States the military has stayed out of politics." (range = 1.5)	3.5	(33)	3.7	3.7	(22)	3.8	3.5	(37)	4.0*	3.6	(25)	4.0*	3.5	(95)	3.0*
"The Army lies about Vietnam whenever lying serves its purpose." (range = 1–9)	4.7	(33)	4.1*	4.8	(24)	4.8	4.9	(37)	4.9	4.3	(25)	4.4	4.7	(95)	4.5
The Defense Department's ranking among six organizations in terms of lobbying activity. (range = 1–6)	3.7	(31)	2.9*	3.3	(22)	3.4	2.8	(35)	2.6	3.7	(25)	3.7	3.3	(91)	3.0*

* Correlated *t*-test significant at .05 level.

Table 6. Mean Score For Affective Variables, For Those Not Previously Exposed

	Group A (Program Only)			Group C (Control)			Group E (Actual Coda)			Group F (Fake Coda)			Groups A, E, E (All Experimentals)		
	Nov.	(N)	Dec.	Nov.	(N)	Dec.	Nov.	(N)	Dec.	Nov.	(N)	Dec.	Nov.	(N)	Dec.
Target															
Reliability:															
Army	60	(32)	61	59	(22)	65	65	(36)	63	59	(24)	64	62	(92)	63
DOD	57	(33)	57	61	(22)	63	64	(36)	56*	54	(24)	60	59	(93)	58
Melvin Laird	66	(29)	61	65	(20)	64	68	(35)	65	58	(22)	66*	65	(86)	64
Thermometer:															
Military	76	(33)	74	70	(23)	66	73	(36)	68*	71	(23)	69	74	(92)	70*
George Patton	72	(32)	72	69	(20)	71	71	(36)	74	73	(22)	80*	72	(90)	75
Source															
Reliability:															
Roger Mudd	62	(31)	68	74	(20)	77	79	(34)	76	68	(24)	65	70	(89)	70
CBS TV	69	(30)	68	70	(22)	76	75	(37)	70	68	(25)	62	70	(92)	67*
Thermometer:															
TV News	76	(33)	74	73	(24)	73	78	(34)	73*	80	(23)	74*	77	(90)	74*
Government Personnel															
Reliability:															
Richard Nixon	76	(33)	77	76	(24)	75	82	(36)	76*	60	(25)	75*			
Spiro Agnew	72	(31)	72	70	(23)	67	73	(36)	68*	63	(25)	70*			
"Military Industrial Complex is too powerful," Mean agreement, range = 1–5	2.9	(33)	2.8	2.7	(23)	2.5	2.7	(36)	2.6	2.6	(24)	2.6			

* Correlated *t*-test significant at .05 level.

social psychology,[35] received qualified support from the present experiments as well.

Findings from the experiments in which codas were employed tended to corroborate the notion of a dissipating effect. The data in Table 5 suggest that both codas blunted the impact of the program, if one looks *only* at the items used to measure changes in cognitive opinions. Focusing upon the three specific items used to assess beliefs about the manifest behavior of the military—the three items which appear in Table 5—one finds that the original program produced significant changes in the predicted direction in two items out of three. But, when accompanied by either coda, the program produced significant shifts in opinion in only one item out of three. Looking from a second perspective one also finds that the aggregate shift in opinion (measured by the difference in means for all three items combined) is larger in the original mode of presentation than in the other two modes combined. All this suggests that the codas did diminish the program's effectiveness and, more generally, that "instant analysis," the ever-recurring nemesis in the minds of Richard Nixon and Spiro Agnew, does tend to limit the effectiveness of a political appeal on television. (Of course, in this case the roles were reversed. The networks spoke and the administration provided the instant analysis.) But there are inconsistencies in these data. In fact, the True Coda seems to magnify the differences between T1 and T2, at least on some affective items.

There are a number of interpretations of the "inconsistencies" in Table 6. One interpretation might be that the actual coda—with a sitting vice-president—was perceived as beyond the acceptable bounds of political debate. The imbroglio, which included an incumbent vice-president, may have triggered an across the board depreciation in opinion about all those involved in the debate. (This interpretation implies that the administration—any administration—would be wise to choose an *unofficial* spokesman when it wishes to challenge the veracity or the conclusion of a network presentation, thereby allowing the Vice-President and President to remain aloof from the dispute.[36]) But, whatever the interpretation one chooses for the variations in Table 6, the crucial point from our current perspective is the total lack of variation among all three modes of presentation when one considers the impact of "The Selling of the Pentagon" upon the subjects' perceptions of their own ability to cope with politics. In this respect, all

[35] Eleanor and Nathan Maccoby, A. K. Romney, J. Stacy Adams, "Social Reinforcement in Attitude Change," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 63 (1961), 109–115.

[36] These intermodal differences can well be interpreted differently. Because these differences are not crucial here, the alternate explanations have been omitted. For a thorough discussion, see Michael Robinson, "Instant Analysis and the Effectiveness of Television Programming: Spiro Agnew vs CBS," forthcoming, *Journal of Communication*, 1976.

hree modes of presentation produced virtually dentical effects.

ffects on Perceived Efficacy. It was originally ypothesized that "The Selling" would frustrate ubjects, forcing them to turn inward and doubt heir own ability to comprehend and cope with olitics. The efficacy scale was included to test this ypothesis. And, in all modes of presentation, The Selling of the Pentagon" did decrease the evel of perceived political efficacy within the experimental groups. Table 7 contains mean efficacy cores for each of the three experimental groups before and after exposure. Note that the control roup, Group C, shows no reduction in efficacy whatever. In fact, the control *increased* its mean fficacy score, though not significantly. And when omparing the experimental groups with the control group at T2, the differences are also significant t the .01 level. Although this experimental effect lid dissipate somewhat over time, no other between-group differences, were as consistent or as obust as these. And if one examines the individual tems constituting the efficacy index, these differences are even more intriguing because most of the change occurred for those items which appear to ap most directly the issue of political self-confidence: "People like me don't have any say about what the government does," and "Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on." In short, the program frustrated viewers, regardless of mode of presentation. And a close reading of the data suggests that subjects, in every mode, were at least as willing to doubt their own capacity to comprehend politics as they were to question the legitimacy of the institutions involved. In fact, it appears as if they were actually more willing to deprecate themselves. This may be a common mechanism for coping with political information that fails to fit the predispositions of the viewer, listener, or reader. On balance, "The Selling" apparently produced a psychological tension within subjects which they chose to reduce by questioning their own ability to cope with or comprehend politics.

Broader Questions. Although Converse demonstrates in "Change and the American Electorate" that the efficacy scale no longer works as a scale,[37] Converse does suggest that the decrease in the efficacy index represents one of the most significant changes within the contemporary electorate. I agree. And in this controlled environment, "The Selling of the Pentagon" produced precisely this same change. Findings from the experimental environment, however, cannot be readily extrapolated to the general public for a host of reasons.[38] Our experimental findings were indicators of potential, not actual effects. But given that the impact of "The Selling" on political efficacy was manifest in all the experimental groups, regardless of mode, the whole issue of public affairs television warranted further consideration.

If "The Selling," with its dogfight among the Defense Department, CBS, and the Administration, could reduce a viewer's level of political self-

[37] Philip Converse, "Change in the American Electorate," University of Michigan, mimeo., 1971, p. 96.

[38] For a thorough discussion of problems involved in extrapolating from the laboratory to the population at large see Elliot Aronson and J. M. Carlsmith, "Experimentation in Social Psychology," in Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson, *Handbook of Social Psychology*, 2nd edition, vol. II (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1968).

Table 7. Political Efficacy Scores For Only Those Not Previously Exposed

		Group A		Group C		Group E		Group F	
		(No Coda)		(Control)		(Actual Coda)		(Fake Coda)	
		Nov.	Dec.	Nov.	Dec.	Nov.	Dec.	Nov.	Dec.
Efficacy Score:									
(Lowest)	0	0%	9%	4%	4%	5%	5%	0%	8%
	1	16	18	13	13	16	22	24	28
	2	32	21	13	13	16	27	24	12
	3	19	27	46	39	30	27	20	36
	4	29	21	17	33	24	14	20	12
(Highest)	5	3	3	8	8	8	5	12	4
	99%*	99%*	99%*	101%	100%	99%*	100%	100%	100%
(*N*)		(31)	(33)	(24)	(24)	(37)	(37)	(25)	(25)
Mean=		2.7	2.4*	2.8	3.0	2.8	2.4*	2.7	2.3*

* Correlated t-test significant at .05 level.

* Totals do not equal 100% due to rounding.

confidence, or increase a viewer's sense of cynicism, one could imagine that public affairs television, especially television news, with its own vivid depictions of conflict between social and political institutions, might produce a similar effect. Consequently, with the experimental findings in hand, I hypothesized that those who had come to depend upon television for their political information would, as consequence, exhibit a greater sense of inefficacy, and for that matter, a greater sense of cynicism and distrust—sentiments which, in combination, might be considered the attitudinal components of contemporary political malaise.

Television and Political Malaise: Survey Evidence. The procedures used to test these hypotheses were straightforward. Based on the SRC election studies for 1960, 1964, and 1968, those respondents who stated that they had relied upon televisic during these campaigns were separated from tho who relied upon some other medium.[39] (The 19(data are divided into three levels of dependenc (a) those relying solely on TV for information, (' those relying principally on TV, (c) those relyir on some other medium.) This "television variable was then cross-tabulated with the respondent efficacy scores, and subsequently, with sever other "political" opinions.

Political Efficacy. Reliance on public affairs tel vision is, in fact, associated with lower scores o the efficacy index. Table 8 indicates that sinc 1960, but not before, there has been a significar

[39] Unfortunately, the SRC data were not collected wit the needs of this study in mind. And perhaps, as an indica tion of the low level of importance assigned to mass medi the SRC election studies never contained a thorough o

Table 8. Relationship Between Reliance on Television News and Respondent's Efficacy Score

		1960		1964		1968[a]		
		Primary Source of Political Information						
		TV	Other Media	TV	Other Media	Only TV	TV	Other Media
Efficacy Score:								
Low (0–1)		31%	18%	43%	30%	60%	42%	34%
High (2–4)		69	82	57	70	40	58	66
		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
		(640)	(392)	(983)	(563)	(116)	(614)	(383)
Education Level:	Efficacy:							
Low	Low	48%	36%	65%	60%	82%	74%	64%
(8th grade or less)	High	52	64	35	40	18	26	36
		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	N	(203)	(92)	(299)	(104)	(38)	(128)	(70)
Moderate	Low	29%	19%	38%	31%	48%	41%	36%
(9th grade–12)	High	71	81	62	69	52	59	64
		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	N	(257)	(148)	(514)	(270)	(56)	(278)	(147)
High	Low	15%	6%	17%	19%	46%	26%	24%
(Some college)	High	85	94	83	81	55	74	76
		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	N	(129)	(98)	(104)	(80)	(11)	(93)	(67)
Very High	Low	12%	4%	22%	7%	25%	18%	14%
(College or beyond)	High	88	96	78	93	75	82	86
		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	N	(50)	(54)	(58)	(100)	(4)	(100)	(86)

[a] The 1968 SRC data were coded so as to permit a refinement in the TV variable. Subjects could be classified as (a totally dependent upon television, (b) primarily dependent upon television and (c) not dependent upon television Note that the findings fit perfectly with the theory—the greater the dependency, the lower the level of efficacy.

lifference in the level of perceived political efficacy between those who rely upon television for politi-al information and those who do not.

The more skeptical reader will already have decided that Table 8 has been misinterpreted. There are, after all, at least two other—and less bizarre—explanations for the association between feelings of efficacy and television reliance: a) that those who rely on television for political information are of lower educational status and that, as a matter of course, those who are of low educational status are less efficacious from the start; or (b) that those who "suffer" from feelings of inefficacy, at any social status, are more likely to move toward television for their political information because television somehow satisfies special psychopolitical needs, whatever they may be. Both of these alternative explanations for Table 8 are reasonable; but neither is overwhelmingly persuasive, when examined closely.

There *is* a moderate and negative relationship between TV dependency and educational attainment. But, if the relationship between TV dependency and efficacy were, in fact, spurious, as the first alternative explanation implies, the relationship would die when respondents with similar levels of education are compared. But holding constant the level of education does not change the negative relationship between TV dependency and perceived efficacy. This relationship held in 1960, 1964, and 1968, despite controls for education, class, or income. And, interestingly enough, by 1968 the relationship had become stronger and less vulnerable to controls than at any other previous time (each of the contingencies in 1968 is statistically significant at the .05 level.) Unfortunately, the 1972 SRC election study did not include the items required to update this finding. Nevertheless, the correlation between dependency and inefficacy is not to be discarded too facilely.

Of course, the mere imposition of one, or several, intervening variables does not speak directly to the second alternative explanation offered above—an explanation which implies that inefficacy causes dependency and that the relationship, as I have stated it, is backward. Admittedly, with the data at our disposal, it would be impossible to test this second interpretation. Even so, there are two things to be said about the theory in which feelings of inefficacy are considered the cause of television reliance. First, two-thirds of our samples relied more upon television for following politics than they relied upon any other medium. To argue that television attracts malcontents or the abnormal is to argue that the majority of the public is extraordinary, a premise which is, in itself, extraordinary. Second, and more important, if, as this interpretation implies, the entire public believes itself to be extraordinarily inefficacious, the public did not feel so inefficacious in 1952, 1956, or 1960. There has been a substantial and undeniable *growth* in felt inefficacy. If television merely attracted the inefficacious, and the relationship were that simple, we would still be obliged to explain the *increase* in inefficacy. Even if one could demonstrate that inefficacy does lead to greater TV dependency, this second explanation might still lose its initial persuasiveness. For, if, in fact, those who do possess some latent predisposition toward political inefficacy or misanthropy or cynicism do come to rely on television, and if in the course of that reliance those predispositions are activated, then we do have a television effect. More accurately, perhaps, we have an *interaction* between the televised message and the individual's predispositions.

Whatever the interpretation, Table 8 contains some surprising information. After all, survey research has traditionally found little correlation between exposure to public affairs television and any particular, public opinion. For example, despite intuitions to the contrary, among those who, in 1968, depended upon television for their political information, 38.2 per cent believed that "we did the right thing" getting into Vietnam. Among those depending upon other sources of information, 38.6 per cent felt the same way—a difference of less than one-half of one per cent. This "finding" is not uncharacteristic of the entire period during which we fought in Vietnam. There simply was no measurable relationship between media reliance and opinions about the war during the 1960s.[40]

But the nonrelationship between TV dependence and substantive, contemporary political issues like American involvement in Vietnam can be misleading. The television variable *does* help when one considers issues that are more fundamental, in this case issues like political self-confidence.

The findings in Table 8 actually fit nicely with our experimental findings. A dose of television journalism in the experimental case produced a decrease in political self-esteem. And within the general public, reliance upon television for political information coincided with lower scores in political efficacy. In short, national survey data tended to corroborate one of the most important of the experimental results, that exposure to public affairs television seemed to have a deleteri-

even credible series of media questions. I was forced to use the following item: "Of all these ways of following the campaign, which one would you say you got the most information from—newspapers, radio, television, magazines?" The item was not precisely what I would have preferred, given the reference to "campaign information." Nevertheless, it was the only available option, poor syntax and all.

[40] Michael J. Robinson, *Public Affairs Television*, p. 148.

ous effect on one's sense of political self-esteem.

But the relationship between television and perceived efficacy may be only a part of a larger theory, one in which television journalism can be linked to other fundamental beliefs about people, society, politics, and government. And, in our case, survey data can be used to expand a theory as well as corroborate a finding.

Television and the American Political Ethos: The Case of 1968

From our perspective, 1968 provided an excellent case study for examining the political implications of the American television news system. Not only was 1968 a year with a number of extraordinary political occurrences, virtually all of which were televised via network television, it was also a year in which the Survey Research Center chose to ask questions that could be used to categorize, more systematically than before, the extent to which members of the public relied upon television for monitoring political developments. And although one might choose to argue that findings from 1968 exaggerate the impact of television journalism, the data from that period suggest that there was not only a relationship between exposure to television dependency and feelings of political malaise but also that there was a relationship between dependency and political behavior.

Misanthropy. The reliance upon television journalism in 1968 was associated with both social and political misanthropy. For example, those who relied upon television were somewhat less trusting of their fellow man than those who did not. Among those who followed politics in 1968 solely through television, 61 per cent believed that one "can't be too careful in dealing with people;" among those relying primarily upon television, 34 per cent adopted this misanthropic position. A similar pattern existed in the 1964 survey. Moreover, controls for education and income do not destroy this relationship, although in both cases the strongest relationships exist among those with moderate levels of income or education.

These findings suggest that television journalism can foster social distrust, especially among those in the lower-middle class. Reliance on television, according to these calculations, promotes images of society which are disproportionately sinister. These findings on misanthropy are *not* unique to our research. George Gerbner and Larry Gross have recently demonstrated and demonstrated again a similar relationship. In their research, Gerbner and Gross find that those who watch great amounts of television—entertainment and news alike—are more distrustful, cynical and misanthropic than those who watch little or no television.[41] Virtually all their findings hold up under controls for level of education, age, income and race.

This generalized cynicism apparently has a political component as well. When our respondents were asked whether they believed that, once elected, congressmen "lose touch with the people pretty quickly," a similar pattern of political skepticism emerged. A full 69 per cent of the white respondents relying solely upon television accepted the statement; 56 per cent of the white respondents relying principally upon television chose that response; only 45 per cent of the remaining respondents felt that way. Again the relationship holds up under controls for income and education level, and again the greatest differences occurred within those strata that can most appropriately be termed middle-American (Table 9).

The Social Issue in 1968. If one regards white attitudes towards blacks and white attitudes toward lawlessness as principal components in Scammon and Wattenberg's Social Issue, it appears that public affairs television and the Social Issue were functionally related during the 1968 campaign. Among white respondents, dependence upon video journalism increases one's propensity to disapprove of the speed of the civil rights movement. As one moves across the continuum, from those totally dependent upon television to those not at all dependent upon television, the rate of disapproval for civil rights activity decreases by 18 per cent (Table 10). Once again, controls do not nullify this monotonic relationship. Even among those respondents with college degrees, attitudes toward the civil rights movement were dependent, in part, upon level of television dependency. And among those respondents who are here defined as moderate in education or income, the relationship is especially vivid. There are, to be sure, other interpretations of Table 9; but I believe that reliance upon public affairs television did, in 1968, foster the belief that the civil rights movement had gotten out of hand.

This same media relationship appeared when considering opinions about the degree of violence existing within the civil rights movement. White respondents dependent upon television were more willing than white respondents dependent on some other medium to regard black political action as "mostly violent." Although the relationship was less compelling than that which exists in Table 10, the same monotonic pattern emerged—the greater

[41] George Gerbner and Larry Gross, "The Social Reality of Television Drama," Annenberg School of Communication, University of Pennsylvania, unpublished mimeo, 1973; *idem*, "Television As Enculturation," Annenberg School of Communications, University of Pennsylvania, unpublished mimeo, 1975.

the affinity for television, the greater the hostility toward civil rights activity. On balance, it appears that white frustration with black activism and black politics did, in 1968, go hand in hand with TV dependency.

Television and the Vote in 1968. In 1956, the Langs asserted that television could, "by creating a political climate, a sense of urgency, an image of parties and candidates, etc., . . . influence votes."[42] Once again, if one uses the 1968 election as a case, their hypothesis, as curious as it may seem, has merit.

Although it would be impossible to make any definitive conclusion about the effect of network journalism on voting behavior in 1968, there are findings which coincide with a conventional wisdom—a wisdom which holds that, in 1968, George Wallace and Richard Nixon enjoyed greater electoral support because of a network-induced videomalaise.

This theory of a TV-vote is relatively unambiguous. Television journalism produced political frustrations and discontents—i.e., television created the Social Issue. George Wallace and Richard Nixon provided images of themselves that were concurrent with majority sentiments about the Social Issue and, consequently, television journalism won votes for Wallace and Nixon.

Using essentially the same procedures as before, we can produce evidence which suggests that the second link in our theory is plausible—that television reliance did influence voting in the 1968 presidential election. More specifically, television journalism produced votes for George Wallace and votes for Richard Nixon.

Among Independents and Democrats, there was a relationship between television dependency and vote: those more reliant on TV generally were more likely to vote for Wallace or Nixon (Table

[42] Lang and Lang, *Politics and Television*, p. 19.

Table 9. Relationship Between Reliance on TV News and the Belief that Congressmen Quickly Lose Touch With People, Whites Only

Congressmen Lose Touch (1968)	Those Relying Solely on Television	Those Relying Primarily on Television	Those Relying on Other Media
Agree	68%	56%	45%
Disagree	32	44	55
	100%	100%	100%
N	(109)	(594)	(366)
Education:			
Low (8th grade or less)			
% Agree	76%	72%	56%
N	(34)	(122)	(66)
Moderate (9th grade–12)			
% Agree	65%	56%	44%
N	(54)	(272)	(140)
High (some college)			
% Agree	60%	48%	52%
N	(10)	(92)	(67)
Very High (college or beyond)			
% Agree	*	42%	31%
N		(52)	(84)
Family Income:			
Low (Less than $6,000)			
% Agree	74%	67%	46%
N	(51)	(208)	(95)
Moderate (Less than $10,000)			
% Agree	60%	54%	48%
N	(30)	(197)	(117)
High (Less than $15,000)			
% Agree	57%	42%	46%
N	(14)	(131)	(81)
Very High ($15,000 and over)			
% Agree	62%	49%	38%
N	(8)	(51)	(68)

* Less than five cases.

Table 10. The Relationship Between Reliance on TV News and the Belief That the Civil Rights Movement is Going Too Fast, 1968, Whites Only.

	Those Relying Solely on Television	Those Relying Primarily on Television	Those Relying on Other Media
% Believing Civil Rights Moving too Fast	81%	70%	63%
N	(110)	(588)	(366)
% Believing Civil Rights Moving too Fast			
Education Level:			
Low (8th grade or less)	78%	74%	66%
N	(37)	(121)	(65)
Moderate (9th grade–12th)	87%	78%	72%
N	(53)	(271)	(138)
High (some college)	80%	63%	61%
N	(10)	(90)	(67)
Very High (college or beyond)	*	50%	48%
N		(93)	(87)
% Believing Civil Rights Moving too fast			
Low (Less than $6,000)	80%	72%	66%
N	(51)	(215)	(94)
Moderate (Less than $10,000)	83%	72%	69%
N	(29)	(197)	(117)
High (Less than $15,000)	87%	70%	59%
N	(15)	(129)	(83)
Very High ($15,000 and over)	50%	60%	51%
N	(7)	(50)	(65)

* Less than five cases.

11). The relationship is not a very strong one. Among Republicans, the relationship is spurious, washing away with controls. But among Democrats, especially Democrats within the lower and middle socioeconomic strata, where one finds two-thirds of the Democratic identifiers, the relationships holds, even with controls for education or income (Table 12).

One might expect a better indication of television's impact among those who were nonpartisan in 1968. For if there were a TV-vote in 1968, it should have shown itself more vividly

Table 11. Relationship Between Television Dependency and Presidential Vote, 1968, Whites Only

Partisan identification	Democrats			Independents			Republicans		
	Primary Source of Political Information								
	NOT TV	TV MOST	TV ONLY	NOT TV	TV MOST	TV ONLY	NOT TV	TV MOST	TV ONLY
Voted for:									
Humphrey	73%	65%	61%	33%	20%	13%	4%	9%	0%
Nixon	16	21	21	55	63	60	89	84	100
Wallace	10	15	18	12	17	27	7	7	0
	99%	101%	100%	100%	100%	100%	99%	100%	100%
(*N*)	(116)	(199)	(28)	(92)	(127)	(15)	(98)	(131)	(22)

among Independents, those who did not possess the psychological anchor of partisan identification. The data in Table 11 also suggest that the Independents were the most vulnerable of all to a TV effect. Among white Independent voters, reliance upon television was associated with greater support for Wallace and greater support for Nixon. Independents relying solely on television gave Wallace 27 per cent of their vote; among those relying principally on television the figure was 17 per cent; among those Independents relying on some other medium for political information, Wallace received only 12 per cent of the vote. This relationship did not disappear when we held constant the level of education or income of the respondent (Table 13). Once again, when cell sizes permit any insights whatever, the greatest variation occurred among respondents of moderate social status.

None of these behavioral findings in Tables 11 through 13 are earth-shaking. Voting preferences are, to be sure, not extraordinarily different across our TV variable. Certainly there are inconsistencies in the data, and, at the very least, one should argue that TV dependency interacts with partisan identification and socioeconomic status in order to affect vote. Nonetheless, despite the caveats and qualifications, these patterns are intriguing and fall well within the bounds of our theory. And, as a final defense of these "voting" data—data which support the notion that television helped produced votes for George Wallace in 1968—one might well look to the relationship between television dependency and attitudinal support for Wallace. Given that the weak correlation between dependency and vote may reflect the unusually discrete characteristic of a presidential vote, and given that attitudes are not so discrete as voting preference (that there is a greater potential variation in attitude than in vote) one would predict from our theory that attitude toward Wallace should correlate—and correlate more strongly—with TV dependency than with vote. This is exactly what we do find! Among Democrats, Republicans and Independents, there is a significant, and vivid correlation between dependency and Wallace's national thermometer ratings.[43]

[43] Michael J. Robinson and Clifford Zukin, "Television and the Wallace Vote in 1968: Are There Lessons For 1976?" abstract, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 38 (Fall, 1974),

Table 12. Relationship Between Television Dependency and Presidential Vote, 1968

		White Democrats Only		
		Those Relying Solely on Television	Those Relying Primarily on Television	Those Relying on Other Media
Family income less than $6,000 per annum	Humphrey	54%	59%	72%
	Nixon	23	22	22
	Wallace	23	19	6
		100%	100%	100%
		(13)	(68)	(32)
Family Income less than $10,000 per annum	Humphrey	80%	61%	74%
	Nixon	10	25	14
	Wallace	10	14	12
		100%	100%	100%
		(10)	(69)	(42)
8th grade education or less	Humphrey	50%	64%	64%
	Nixon	20	12	19
	Wallace	30	24	16
		100%	100%	99%
		(10)	(50)	(31)
12th grade education or less	Humphrey	67%	62%	77%
	Nixon	20	24	15
	Wallace	13	14	8
		100%	100%	100%
		(15)	(100)	(47)

Table 13. Relationship Between Television Dependency and Presidential Vote, 1968

		White Independents		
Income Level:	Vote	Those Relying Solely on Television	Those Relying Primarily on Television	Those Relying on Other Media
Low	% Humphrey	25%	14%	21%
	% Nixon	25	69	50
	% Wallace	50	17	29
		100%	100%	100%
		(4)	(35)	(14)
Moderate	% Humphrey	0	16	28
	% Nixon	67	64	55
	% Wallace	33	20	17
		100%	100%	100%
		(6)	(44)	(29)
High	% Humphrey	*	27%	39%
	% Nixon		58	52
	% Wallace		15	9
			100%	100%
			(33)	(23)
Very High	% Humphrey	*	29	36
	% Nixon		57	64
	% Wallace		14	0
			100%	100%
			(14)	(25)
Education Level:				
Low	% Humphrey	*	27%	0%
	% Nixon		73	56
	% Wallace		0	44
			100%	100%
			(11)	(9)
Moderate	% Humphrey	0%	14%	32%
	% Nixon	57	66	59
	% Wallace	43	20	9
		100%	100%	100%
		(7)	(59)	(34)
High	% Humphrey	*	23%	41%
	% Nixon		55	46
	% Wallace		23	14
			101%	101%
			(31)	(22)
Very High	% Humphrey	*	28%	38%
	% Nixon		60	62
	% Wallace		12	0
			100%	100%
			(25)	(24)

* Less than four cases.

All in all, one might argue that television journalism between 1964 and 1968 did more than alter individual perceptions about American politics: television actually changed some votes, the bulk of those votes going to Wallace or to Nixon. Given the closeness of the outcome, *television journalism, not television campaigning*, may have been a straw that helped to break Hubert Humphrey's back. At minimum, television journalism helped make George Wallace "viable" as a third party candidate.

On Strength of Relationship. The survey data have taken us around a circle. Dependence upon video journalism is associated with (a) social distrust (b) political cynicism (c) political inefficacy (d) partisan disloyalty (e) and third party viability. The relationships are not big or bold. But they do not die with controls; sometimes they grow. On balance, I believe that these relationships are not only meaningful they are also understated. Understatement occurs because the index used to gauge television reliance is a weak one, weak in giving only very gross calibrations of the individual's dependence upon television and telling us next to nothing about the individual's actual exposure to television. But more important, the variable used here is inherently weak. The truth is that almost everyone depends on television news to some degree. We all swim in the same electronic sea. Some of us are wetter than others perhaps. But we are all a little wet. So it is impossible to separate out the effect on part of us because that effect is in all of us. We, as political scientists, frequently see ourselves as spectators, not participants in social phenomena. Sometimes that status is warranted. But the perceptions that we each hold have been peppered by television too. So we should expect the differences between those citizens admittedly relying on TV and those who see only *some* TV to be artificially small and understated. The surprising thing is that the TV variable, shabby as it is, works.

But even if one accepts the fact that there is correlation in these variables, we are still far from producing definitive evidence; correlation is not causality. But the experiments with "The Selling" strongly suggest that causation lives in these data, and that television journalism does cause frustration, cynicism, self-doubt, and malaise. The associations among the survey variables gain credibility because they ride atop the experiments that demonstrated the causality.

On the Meaning of Relationship: Medium or Message

Even if one believes that television journalism causes malaise, there is one other issue to resolve—the McLuhan issue. Nothing demonstrated to this point implies that these "effects" are to be attributed directly to the medium. These effects may merely be attributable to the message—in this case the messages of the 'sixties. Philip Converse, who documented the coming of the new political ethos, argues that *events* produced the change.[44] Presumably this would be the general belief within our profession. But I believe that the events theory needs supplementing—that there is a McLuhanian strain running through these findings. Unfortunately, neither our experimental nor our correlational data can address this directly. The experiments with "The Selling of the Pentagon" are of little value in this dispute. The experiments demonstrated that events—facts and information—could produce effects; but the experiments, as designed, could not have been used to demonstrate those events, when shown on television, were more effective than would have been the case with other media.

The survey data also have limited value here. Although it is true that those who were reliant upon television were most dysphoric, this does not, per se, demonstrate that the medium was the causal factor. But, given the unique qualities of the medium, one could make such a case. In fact it is probably necessary to do so. For the theory which places events, per se, at the center of the changing American ethos seems to be an insufficient explanation of the 1960s and even the 1970s. Instead, I offer a quasi-McLuhanian interpretation of videomalaise—one in which the unique qualities of television journalism, as well as the events of the period, must be considered in any theory of political change. After all, events must be communicated to be events, as trees falling on desert islands may attest. And it is the unique characteristics of any medium which serve to select, interpret, and disseminate these events. Therefore, I suggest that had all the traumatic events of the last dozen years transpired without television journalism (indeed, *would* they all have transpired without television journalism?) there would have been less change within the American electorate than has, in fact, occurred. And going beyond that, I suggest that had the same *amount* of information about those events been conveyed through any medium other than network journalism, the changes would still have been less pronounced.

But mine is not wholly a McLuhanian theory, to be sure. It suggests only that television is part of the message—not all of it—and that, given the uniqueness of its audience, mode, and content, television has been, for more than a decade, at the core of our growing political malaise. Television journalism may be, in short, the missing link in our

445. Also, Michael J. Robinson and Clifford Zukin, "TV and the Wallace Vote," *Journal of Communication*, forthcoming, 1976.

[44] Philip Converse, "Change in the American Electorate," p. 97.

understanding of contemporary political change. But if so, why so?

An Explanation of Videomalaise

I suggest that six major interrelated factors explain the growth of videomalaise: (1) the abnormal size and shape of the television news audience, (2) the public perceptions of the credibility of the networks, (3) the interpretive character of television new coverage, (4) the negativist emphasis of television news reports, (5) the emphasis on conflict and violence in network reportage, (6) and the anti-institutional theme in network news programs.

In a nutshell, the highly credible television news organizations have been compelled to bombard the American television audience with interpretive, sensational, aggressive, and anti-institutional news items. This content reaches and holds a unique audience, larger and more volatile than that attracted by any other medium. Many of the members of this unique audience are inadvertent to it. These inadvertent viewers tend to lack political sophistication; they cannot cope well with the type of news and information that the networks provide. But because the networks are too credible to be dismissed in their messages, these viewers respond to the content by growing more cynical, more frustrated, more despairing; they become increasingly less enamored of their social and political institutions. Then, and somewhat ironically, these more vulnerable members of the audience transfer their estrangement, either through polls or the media, to those who are not, themselves, as politically unsophisticated. Eventually the entire society begins to show the symptoms of a growing political malaise.

The Audience

The Abnormal Size and Shape of the Television News Audience. Roper has documented the imperious development of television journalism as the first source of political information within the public. In the most recent poll (1974), television news was cited by 65 per cent of the population as the primary source of political information.[45] And in 1972, a full 66 per cent of the American public learned "most" about national candidates from television.[46] But size alone is not crucial to us. What is crucial is that television news reaches both those who generally monitor politics *and* those who would have virtually *no* news were it not for television. Television reaches that large stratum of society which will watch the news, but not read it. Television touches those millions who will sit through the news because of what follows or what comes before, but who would rarely expend the energy to read through printed information. Consequently, TV produces two audiences—the advertent (those who watch for the news) and the inadvertent audience (those who fall into the news). As such, the overall television news audience is unique in two respects: (1) It is the only audience for news in which socioeconomic status and degree of exposure are *negatively* correlated. Those who are less wealthy or less well educated, etc. are not only more likely to rely on television news, they are also more likely to watch television news.[47] In fact, those low in socioeconomic status watch more television news, in absolute terms, than do those of higher status. No other medium has ever produced this pattern of exposure. (2) The inadvertent audience within the audience is also less likely to have its information mediated through a cadre of opinion leaders. Therefore, television news has, in all likelihood, short-circuited the two-step flow of communication, at least for this large collectivity of inadvertent viewers.

These unique characteristics of the television news audience are crucial in understanding the effects of television journalism. Because the inadvertent viewers within the general audience are of lower socioeconomic status and educational attainment and because they come to the information without the benefit of mediation through opinion leaders, they are more vulnerable to almost any type of television effect—to any unique attribute of network news content. From the perspective of presidential politics, the inadvertent audience within the television audience might be used to explain the new phenomenon by which wholly incredible presidential candidates have become, after the primaries, credible nominees. More assuredly, the theory of an inadvertent audience can help explain one of the most titillating changes within the electorate to have taken place since the advent of serious television journalism—the obversion of the relationship between information flow and partisan stability. In direct contrast with the pretelevision era.[48] one now finds that voters with the least contact with mass media are the least predictable in their behavior.[49]

[45] Burns Roper, *Trends in Public Attitudes Toward Television and Other Mass Media, 1959–1974*, Television Information Office, New York, 1975, p. 3.

[46] Burns, Roper, *What People Think*, p. 2.

[47] Robert Bower, *Television and the Public* (New York: Holt, 1973), pp. 129–141.

[48] Philip Converse, "Information Flow and the Stability of 'Partisan' Attitudes" in Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller, Donald Stokes, *Elections and the Political Order* (New York: Wiley, 1966), pp. 136–158.

[49] During the 'sixties, survey research revealed that those exposed to the fewest media—those exposed only to television—were politically the *least* stable. Converse's theory was thereby overturned. See Edward Dreyer, "Media Use and Electoral Choices: Some Political Consequences of Information Exposure," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 35 (Winter, 1971–1972), 544–553.

The fact that those receiving only one source of olitical information, a source which is invariably levision, are now least stable politically fits icely with our notions about the inadvertent udience and subsequently, with our theory of ideomalaise. As such, the special characteristics the television news audience and especially the nadvertent audience explain a good deal about ie unique effects which have been attributed to levision in this research.

The High Credibility of the Networks

Besides its ubiquity, and perhaps because of it, levision enjoys remarkably high credibility as an nformation source. Within each of the six experiental groups employed in our experiments Valter Cronkite was considered to be the most eliable source of information from among a list f twenty-five people and organizations "who eport to the public from time to time," and mong our subjects CBS was regarded a more eliable news source than *The New York Times.*

None of this is uncharacteristic of the nation. Quayle finds that Walter Cronkite is America's nost credible human.[50] Harris found that in 1974 he American public felt greater confidence in elevision news than in any other American social institution of any type.[51] In 1974, Roper also found that 51 per cent of the American people believe that television is the most credible of all major sources of information.[52]

Credibility enters the equation because it is so closely and positively linked to persuasiveness.[53] Credibility implies persuasiveness. In social psychology, and among television critics, the relationship is virtually taken for granted. It was, after all, the high credibility of CBS, by far the most credible of the three networks for my subjects, which ignited the unprecedented reaction to "The Selling of the Pentagon" at the highest official levels.[54]

Summarizing factors 1 and 2, I contend: (a) that television journalism extends its informational net enormously, bringing in many who would otherwise be uninformed, (b) that television journalism has actually supplanted—and continues to supplant—other media for a large number of moderately and marginally informed members of society, and (c) that television journalism says it all *credibly*, hence persuasively.

But the special characteristics of the network news audience—its size, composition, and persuasibility—are not, in and of themselves, sufficient conditions for understanding the effects of television journalism. In order to complete the theory one must consider both the source and the content of the communication. And in our case, the source—the network news departments—produces a content that possesses several characteristics that contribute to the growth of a videomalaise. More specifically, by pursuing the economic and organizational needs, and to a lesser degree, the personal or partisan objectives of the membership, the network news departments have come to produce a content which is inferential, dramatic, negativistic, contentious, and disestablishmentarian. These characteristics, when combined with the unique dimensions of the television audience (remember, too, that these characteristics of content, are, to some extent, created to achieve and maintain this unique audience), lead to a clearer understanding of the theory of videomalaise.

The Content

The Interpretive Character of Television News Coverage. It is generally conceded that electronic journalism is qualitatively different from print journalism in its structure because, as Reuven Frank of NBC wrote, "Print exists in space, broadcasting in time."[55] Frank also believed that "the television news program must be put together with the assumption that each item will be of some interest to everyone who watches."[56] This opinion is shared, apparently, by news executives throughout the networks.[57]

These attitudes beget news items which are "interesting" to the audience. But, in pursuit of interest, news departments at the networks emphasize the *interpretive* news report. Dennis Lowry has found that nearly one half (49 per cent) of the network news sentences are "unlabeled inference" and that inferential sentences, labeled or unlabeled, for all networks combined, represent over 50 per cent of the total.[58]

Paul Weaver explicitly maps out a structural explanation for television's propensity for the interpretive. According to Weaver, television

[50] See Marvin Barret, ed., *The Politics of Broadcasting*, 1971–1972 (New York: Thoms Crowell, 1973), p. 49.

[51] Louis Harris, *Confidence and Concern: Citizens View American Government* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 33.

[52] Burns Roper, "Trends in Public Attitudes. . . . ," op. cit., p. 4.

[53] Carl Hovland and Walter Weiss, "The Influence of Source Credibility on Communication Effectiveness," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 15 (Winter, 1951), 635–650. For a good, if dated, summary of the influence of source literature, see Joseph Klapper's *The Effects of Mass Communication* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1960), especially pp. 99–104.

[54] See "CBS and Congress, 'The Selling of the Pentagon'," *Educational Broadcasting Review* (Winter, 1971–1972), pp. 43–107.

[55] Reuven Frank, "An Anatomy of Television News," *Television Quarterly*, 9 (Winter, 1970), 15–28, at p. 18.

[56] *Ibid.*

[57] See Theodore Peterson, Jay Jensen, and William L. Rivers, *The Mass Media and Modern Society* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston Press, 1965).

[58] Dennis Lowry, "Agnew and the Network TV News: Before/After Content Analysis," *Journalism Quarterly*, 48 (Summer, 1971), 205–210.

journalism must be *thematic*.[59] "There is," writes Weaver, "the television news form." He argues that "a television news story cannot assume . . . discursive structure. Its principal need is for a clear, continuous narrative line sustained throughout the story—something with a beginning, a middle, and an end that will create, maintain, and if possible increase the viewer's interest . . . it needs a *theme* which can be sustained throughout the story."[60]

In their landmark works on television and reality, the Langs found that in pursuit of an interpretive theme, television journalists forget or distort reality. In 1951, television journalists, in search of an interesting story, misrepresented public reactions to General McArthur by depicting his parade in Chicago as a wildly successful, heroic tribute. The Langs and their on-the-scene respondents found the parade to be a monumental flop.[61] In a second case, the Langs discovered that in trying to "interpret" the 1952 conventions, the network journalists found conflict where there was none and covered floor fights which had never occurred—all to keep an interesting theme going.[62] Recently, Edward Epstein has drawn dozens of modern cases in which the need for thematic reporting has distorted news coverage. For example, TV journalists frequently cover California, but invariably with a *theme*—that California is bizarre. These thematic reports, according to Epstein, fit with the organization's economic and bureaucratic needs, but not necessarily with reality. Epstein argues persuasively that, as a consequence of its own organizational needs, the television news department gives us a story which reports "news from nowhere."[63] But for us the important point is that the television news story is inherently interpretive because it is inherently thematic. And, given the special and the traditional exigencies of network television, the interpretive TV story is more likely to be negativistic, contentious, or anti-institutional (or some combination of the three) than is the same "story" told in print. It is also more likely to be overdone.

The Negativistic Emphasis in Television Reports

American journalism apparently operates under a principle similar to Gresham's Law—the bad drives out the good, and the negative supersedes the positive. In American television journalism this tendency is even more acute.

Denis Lowry had demonstrated that televisio has a marked propensity for placing the "bad news up front in the telecast, usually with som type of audio-visual aid.[64] Edith Efron's con troversial content analysis also finds a preponder ance of negativism within the television news pro gram.[65] And Efron is not alone. A more recent and far more rigorous, investigation of the net work news program also reveals that among item which can be reliably categorized, the majority are negativistic.[66] Even personal scrutiny suggests a network predilection for the contentious and the negative. Sometimes "nastiness" merely appears as a news item, with little, or no, backgrounding—only the disputation receives coverage. In October 1973, for example, CBS News chose to replay, three times in one news day, a verbal and physical altercation between the UN ambassadors from Chile and Saudi Arabia. In none of these showings was the origin of the disagreement meaningfully discussed; only the incident was televised.

Merrill Panitt notes that the penchant for the journalistic negativism is greater in the United States than in other western countries; he also believes that this is especially true for American television journalism: "Our television news programs . . . are concerned with what is *wrong* with our government structure, our leaders, our prisons, schools, roads, automobiles, race relations, traffic systems, pollution laws, every facet of our society. In Europe, there is much less emphasis on exposing what is wrong, much more satisfaction with the status quo."[67] Whether one compares American television news with other television news systems, or with other American media, one finds an extraordinary emphasis on negativistic reportage.

The Emphasis on Conflict and Violence

Closely related to the electronic media's penchant for negativity is their predilection for violence and conflict. Anthony Greenwald's unpublished data show television to be three times more likely than local newspapers to cover noncriminal violence.[68] Benjamin Singer found the propensity for violence in American television news reporting to be substantially greater than that discovered in Canadian reportage. In com-

[59] Paul Weaver, "Is Television News Biased?" pp. 57–74.

[60] *Ibid.*, pp. 67–69.

[61] Lang and Lang, *Politics and Television*, p. 52.

[62] *Ibid.*, p. 148.

[63] See Edward J. Epstein, *News from Nowhere* (New York: Random House, 1973), especially chap. 5.

[64] Dennis T. Lowry, "Gresham's Law and Network TV News Selection," *Journal of Broadcasting*, 15 (Fall, 1971), 397–408.

[65] Edith Efron, *The News Twisters* (Los Angeles: Nash, 1971), *passim*.

[66] Richard Hofstetter, "Television News Elections Project," Ohio State University mimeo., 1974.

[67] Merrill Panitt, "American Out of Focus," *TV Guide*, January 15, 1972, pp. 6–12. This article was first in a five-part series.

[68] Anthony G. Greenwald, "Do Crime and Violence in the Mass News Media Modify Behavior?" unpublished mimeo., Ohio State University, 1971, p. 22.

paring CBS and CBC news broadcasts during April and May of 1970, Singer discovered that CBS devoted 64 per cent of its news time to "aggressive items" while CBC devoted only 32 per cent of its news time to such stories.[69] Singer also discovered that CBS had employed more than twice as many "aggressive items" as the CBC during this same period, even after making allowances for war news from Vietnam.[70] In short, the predilection for action found within American journalism seems to exist at least as pervasively within television as within the other media, probably more so.

The Anti- institutional Theme in Network News Program

Besides manifesting an affinity for conflict and violence, the networks tend to engage in a type of journalistic "Naderism." This is evident in Efron's work on the network coverage of the 1968 presidential campaign. Having analyzed all three nightly presentations during the seven weeks prior to election day, Efron set forth her theory of network bias—a bias toward the "Democratic-Liberal-Left axis of opinion."[71] Efron's universe of words sampled, her coding categories, her unit of analysis, and her general procedures are suspect and have been widely criticized.[72] Nonetheless, her findings are not unreasonable, especially when reinterpreted. If, for example, one regards the clearly unbalanced network treatment of "the white middle class" (the ratio of negative to positive references for this group was fourteen to one) to be anti-institutional, instead of anti-Republican as Efron suggests, the Efron findings make more sense. Below is a table which lists all ten "issues" discussed in Efron's *The News Twisters*. In the first column appear all the issues treated favorably, in the second column all issues treated unfavorably. These data do not necessarily confirm Efron's theory of favoritism for the Democratic-liberal-left axis. Instead these data seem to reflect a bias that is somewhat anti-institutional and disestablishmentarian. Note that the "Liberals" were treated just as unfavorably as the "Conservatives;" both groups, according to Efron's techniques, take the short end of a 4-to-1 word count. In essence, Efron's data seem to indicate that television journalism likes practically nothing and nobody, certainly nothing and nobody in the establishment. Again, Efron's scholarship is suspect. But, using far more rigorous techniques, Hofstetter found traces of the same anti-institutional themes in the 1972 campaign.[73]

Table 14. The Ten Efron Issues, Listed by Treatment Received on Television

Favorable Treatment	Unfavorable Treatment
"Black Militants"	"US Policy in Vietnam"
"Left"	"US Policy concerning bombing"
"Viet Cong"	"Liberals"
	"Conservatives"
	"White Middle Class"
	"Demonstrators"
	"Violent Radicals"

It seems reasonable to assume that these anti-institutional themes reach the audience with one essential message: none of our national policies work, none of our institutions respond, none of our political organizations succeed.

One other characteristic of content is closely linked to the disestablishmentarian dimension. The networks tend to imply in their content and their style of delivery that things were once better than they are now, that the government and the society and its members performed or behaved better in the good old days. Again, given the special vulnerability of the inadvertent audience, and the credibility of the source, one would well expect that these viewers would grow increasingly more frustrated with themselves as political entities and with their institutions.

But one must not forget that the content of network reportage is not *sui generis* in all respects.

[69] Benjamin Singer, "Violence, Protest, and War in Television News: The U.S. and Canada Compared," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 34 (Winter, 1970–1971), 611–616, at p. 613. Unfortunately, Singer's analysis is confounded by the Cambodian incursion and the Kent State killings, both of which occurred during the weeks he chose to do his study.

[70] *Ibid.*, p. 615.

[71] Edith Efron, *The News Twisters*, p. 47.

[72] The networks and academia have met *TNT*, as Efron's book has been glibly nicknamed, with skepticism. Charles Winick in "Critique of the Methodology of Edith Efron's 'The News Twisters' " CBS Xerox, October, 1971, has criticzed the universe sampled, the unit of analysis, the lack of checks for coding and the lack of contextual interpretation. International Research Associates Incorporated has replicated Efron's work, using only the CBS programs employed in the original analysis. IRA found less "bias" than did Efron. And IRA also pointed out what it regarded as unjustified or unsupported techniques in the Efron study. See International Research Associates, "An Analysis of Thirty-Six Telecasts of 'The CBS Evening News With Walter Cronkite,' Broadcasts from September 16 to November 4, 1968," mimeo., New York, February, 1972. My own feeling is that Efron's work is shoddy but not inaccurate and that criticisms of her method are too broad. Indeed, were Winick's every demand met there would probably be *no* example of a good content analysis. Paul Weaver has investigated Efron's own data and estimated that if one would throw out all questionable coding decisions, the imbalance would remain. This does not, however, convince me about her interpretations of the imbalance.

[73] Richard Hofstetter, "Television News Election Project," chap. 6. Hofstetter found virtually no politically partisan bias in the 1972 campaign coverage.

Television journalism is part of American journalism. The propensities for negativism, contentiousness, anti-institutionalism may be stronger for television journalism than for the print or audial media, but those propensities exist in all our media. In general, bad news is news; good news is no news. Television news is qualitatively different from other types of news, but in some respects, all the media are qualitatively similar. In areas where the media are the same qualitatively, they differ in intensity, with television generally proving to be most intense. And television reaches millions who would ordinarily go without the information and who lack the sophistication to deal with this journalistic content, be it traditional American journalism or its televisual hybrid.[74] Nor can one forget that the effectiveness of the audio-visual mode of presentation, although we have not dealt with this factor in this research, is real and demonstrable and that television news relies most heavily—and increasingly more heavily—upon those very aids which have proved effective in producing behavioral responses.[75]

Television journalism is, at base, everything that American journalism is, and more. Television journalism reaches an audience more susceptible than any other to the images generally associated with our whole system of mass communication. As consequence, public affairs television has touched a segment of the population which once received its political information from a local precinct worker or friend or relative. Under those conditions, this segment of the society was a repository of passivity, a source of political stability and quiescence. With television this segment of society has become an available reservoir of dysphoria and instability. The new dysphoria—the new instability—born within the ranks of the inadvertent viewers works its way through the polls and all forms of media to touch us all.

In summary, television journalism disseminates news and information far more widely than does any other news source, bringing political information to people in the society who might never have bothered to obtain this information before television arrived, and who might still not bother, were it not for TV news. Events get conveyed and given the credibility of the network news program. "events" are believed. But events are frequently conveyed by television news through an inferential structure[76] that often injects a negativistic, contentious, or anti-institutional bias. These biases, frequently dramatized by film portrayals of violence and aggression, evoke images of American politics and social life which are inordinately sinister and despairing. The inadvertent viewer, through television, witnesses these images of the society. regarding them as essentially evil and indicative of sociopolitical decay. Unable or unwilling to reject the network reports, the inadvertent viewer may turn against the group most directly responsible for the conflict, against the social and political institutions involved, or against himself, feeling unable to deal with a political system "like this."

"The Selling of the Pentagon," a concentrated adaptation of the evening news programs, probably produced this type of reaction for those "few" million who fell into either the original audience or the audience for the "rerun." The network involved, CBS, was the most credible of the three. The events depicted were believable and probably believed. The message was substantially negative and disestablishmentarian and immeshed at least two American institutions—CBS and the military—in a full-scale imbroglio. In the real world the result was probably similar to that which existed in the laboratory—immediate decrease in political self-esteem and a perceptible black eye for some of the institutions involved.

The nightly news broadcasts represent a less concentrated dose of television reportage than that found in "The Selling." But the same types of messages appear in both. And the nightlies bombard the inadvertent audience and the advertent audience as well with surprising regularity. On balance, it is not surprising that the evening news programs could produce effects similar to those achieved by "The Selling." Nor is it surprising that public dependency on network news can cause a perceptible shift in political ethos—a shift toward malaise.

Prognosis

These trends are not inexorable. Either television journalism could change its foci and style or the public could acquire the political sophistication required to cope more effectively with video journalism. But the Watergate scandals probably reduce the already limited likelihood of restructuring electronic journalism. The journalistic profession as a whole is probably too pleased with itself at this moment to alter its behavior in the near future. Television management is, itself, unlikely to

[74] Edgar Litt shows that "the people" (i.e., the working class), do not receive adequate civic education to cope with the facts about the basic process of politics in the United States. Only the middle-class schools teach politics as group conflict. The working-class child is taught about politics at a more *idealistic* level. Given that these children become the heaviest users of TV news, this inadequacy could insure political frustration among this stratum. "Civic Education, Community Norms, and Political Indoctrination," *American Sociological Review*, 28 (February, 1963), 69–75.

[75] Alan Booth, "The Recall of News Items," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 34 (Winter, 1970–1971), 605–610.

[76] This phrase belongs to the Langs, *Politics and Television*, p. 134.

demand any structural changes in public affairs television.

Of course, the public continues to increase its aggregate level of education. This implies that the inadvertent audience will grow smaller and its membership will be less sensitive to the images provided by television journalism. But even assuming constancy in television journalism and greater public political "development," what does videomalaise portend? In decreasing order of probability, the three most likely outcomes are: (1) a growing political instability among voters (2) a withering of the two major American parties (3) the flowering of a broad-based, anti-democratic third party. One might well argue that all three scenarios are possible. The most recent SRC data on partisan attachments within the society indicate that phases one and two are already well-established.[77] Even phase three may not be beyond the realm of plausible.

Once again the Langs appear prophetic. In the 'sixties they asserted that public affairs television elicits "defensive reaction against confusion, against reality that is overpowering, against the unfamiliar and the frightening, where 'remote' events and invisible powers seem to determine the destiny of the individual who can do nothing about it."[78] And, according to the Langs, television does so by its "emphasis on crisis and conflict in lieu of clarifying normal decision-making processes."[79] It would appear that the mid-'sixties and the early 'seventies saw just such a set of reactions as the Langs had forecast. Television probably did serve as midwife in these changes. Ironically, the men and women of television news may have unwittingly fostered political malaise when, in 1963, they adopted, in the public interest, the thirty-minute news program (one hour and thirty minutes per night when combined with local news).

At minimum one might use the television news system to understand one of the great opinional discrepancies of our time. Television journalism may help explain why, in 1973, 45 per cent of the American people considered themselves to be doing "very well," but only 3 per cent believed that the country, as a whole, was doing so.[80] Or one might use these data to explain the erosion of the Kennedy-Johnson coalition, a coalition which vanquished its Republican opponents in 1964 but which barely survived the campaign of 1968, let alone 1972. One might argue that Richard Nixon won his original "deviating" election in 1968, not with the aid of Frank Shakespeare, Roger Ailes, and Harry Treleavan, but with that of Frank Reynolds, Roger Mudd, and Harry Reasoner. This conclusion is probably as anathematic to the people in television news as it is ironic to us. The networks believe that, in the shadow of Richard Nixon's resignation, they are now, more than ever, the soul of the republic.[81] The networks also believe that "effects" are not their concern; they must report the news as it happens. Somewhat surprisingly, they even doubt that they have had any effects on our ethos—especially effects that are dysfunctional to the political process.

The networks argue, for example, that the televised Ervin and Rodino hearings, throughout the several phases of the impeachment inquiry, actually increased the level of political efficacy and the level of political trust. One might remember that the findings reported here are, in fact, based upon data that were collected during a time when Watergate was merely an apartment complex in northwest Washington. One might also argue that the late 'sixties and early 'seventies were an aberrational epoch—that videomalaise will occur only under those special circumstances which prevailed between 1963 and 1972—that a theory of videomalaise was "accurate" once but is already "obsolete."[82]

I cannot, at this moment, refute that premise. But, I find this premise of obsolescence less than persuasive; the opposite seems true. It is, in fact, the middle 'seventies and Watergate which are unique. Not only is there some likelihood that politics will return to the issues of the late 'sixties—the social issues—there is, indeed, reason to believe that network journalism, with its unchanged organizational imperatives, will move us in that direction, almost as an inevitability. An economic depression, or a near depression, would certainly define the political issues of the 'seventies in economic terms. But without an economic collapse or a hot war, network television may be potent enough to define as a matter of course the political environment—*to make the issues of our times those issues which best accommodate the medium. Television may, however unintentionally, come to define our politics as a byproduct of its own organizational and idiosyncratic needs.*

[77] According to a recent SRC Survey, 36 per cent of the public now identifies with the Democrats, 21 per cent with the Republicans, and a full 43 per cent with neither. See Warren Miller and Arthur Miller, "Political Realignment in 1972, Party Loyalties and Issue Preferences," University of Michigan, mimeo., 1974, p. 1.

[78] Lang and Lang, *Politics and Television*, p. 307.

[79] *Ibid.*

[80] *Time*, November 19, 1973, p. 25.

[81] I had the opportunity to speak formally and informally with a high-ranking member from each of the four major networks (ABC, CBS, NBC, PBS) immediately following the Nixon resignation. They were vociferous and unanimous in their rejection of the theory about videomalaise. Generally, they regarded it as irrelevant, given the role of American journalism in the policy process. They also regarded the theory as inaccurate, and more so now than at any time within the last decade.

[82] The word was used by NBC news executive, Robert Northshield.

There is a sense of irony in all this. The network personnel probably do not wish to see our political ethos or our political issues defined so as to undermine their own liberal predilections toward public policy. (The most recent study of the people in network journalism reveals a moderate-to-liberal orientation among the producers and the directors, as well as the correspondents.[83]) But the theory of videomalaise is rife with irony. It is, after all, more than a little ironic that, during the 1960s, the most vitriolic attacks ever hurled against the network news organizations came from the very party and political leadership that were, at the time, the unintended beneficiaries of videomalaise. Of course there is an ironic end to their story too. But the theory of videomalaise may offer more than ironies about leadership; it may also offer some insights into the future.

[83] Edward J. Epstein, *News From Nowhere*, chap. 7, "Values."

Ever since 1968—but certainly not before that time—George Corley Wallace has grown noticeably reticent in his opinions about network journalism. Given the protracted struggle between Governor Wallace and the networks during the mid-'sixties, and given the political differences between the governor and the network news organizations, one might, without the benefit of our theory of videopolitics, ask why the diminution in criticism? One might, without our theory, be forced to argue that Wallace has merely decided to avoid an unnecessary conflict or that he wishes to demonstrate his commitment to freedom of the press. But *with* the theory one can conclude that Governor Wallace has not so much changed his opinions about network journalists or even the first amendment. One might better conclude that the governor sits in Montgomery and contemplates the future of a center-seeking Alabamian who understands videomalaise.

A Reassessment of Conventional Wisdom About the Informed Public: National Political Information in Ghana*

FRED M. HAYWARD
University of Wisconsin, Madison

Introduction

In much of the thinking and writing about non-modernized areas of the world, it is assumed (more often implicitly than explicitly) that the masses have little political knowledge and that they are generally ignorant of the political process, the national leadership, political organizations, the national territory and its people.[1] This has led to concern in some quarters that the "information gap" might lead to instability or be utilized by people with different value systems and ideologies to foster unrest and endanger world peace.[2] For others, political ignorance has been seen as a blessing which allows the national governments of recently independent states some breathing space—time to organize, to build institutions, to establish development projects—without pressure from the populace.[3] In the Ivory Coast an official of the Parti Démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI) cites mass political ignorance as a justification for autocracy: "Democracy is a system of government for virtuous people. It seldom works even in very mature countries. Why should we expect it to work here? We must be realistic. Our people are ignorant of the problems we face. They cannot be left to choose the solutions to our overwhelming problems but must approve the alternatives debated by an elite."[4] Some leaders have played on the presumption of ignorance to line their own pockets. Others have seen it as justification for the rule of an "enlightened" elite without reference to the masses.

Writers have also been concerned about the role of political information in creating the "good citizen." It is usually assumed that the good citizen is the informed citizen[5] and presumably that the uninformed individual is a "bad citizen."[6] That was certainly the presumption in Ghana after the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah—that the populace had not understood what was happening and had thus either been taken in by Nkrumah and the

* For their kind assistance and hospitality I am indebted to the University of Ghana, the Institute of African Studies, to the Department of Political Science, its chairman at the time, Professor Victor T. Le Vine and its staff. These individuals and many others in the University, the community and the Government made my work possible. Most importantly, I wish to express my appreciation for the kindness, patience and cooperation of the villagers in the areas in which I worked. Their enthusiasm, aid and wisdom made my work exciting and rewarding. I also wish to acknowledge the generous support of a Fulbright-Hays Faculty Research Grant during 1969–70, research support from the Graduate Schools at the University of Wisconsin, and the tireless aid of my research assistants, Mark Huddleston and Linn Hammergren. I am particularly indebted to Murray Edelman, Edward Friedman, Deané Neubauer, James C. Scott, and M. Crawford Young for their valuable comments and suggestions. None of these individuals or institutions are responsible, of course, for the final product.

[1] Some writers are a little more explicit. Peter Lloyd suggests that the West African masses are apathetic toward government because they have little education and "... scant experience of the world beyond their own small communities. ..." *Africa in Social Change*, 2nd ed. (New York: Praeger, 1968), p. 220. In discussing political interest in the late 1950s and early 1960s, Gershon Collier states: "As a matter of fact, the vast majority of the people were totally oblivious of what was happening. ..." *Sierra Leone: Experiment in Democracy in an African Nation* (New York: New York University Press, 1970), p. 97.

[2] Ithiel de Sola Pool, in his article "The Necessity for Social Scientists Doing Research for Governments," argues that in most developing nations there are two countries, that of the masses and that of the intelligentsia. The problem is to bring them together. He suggests that "the link will be made somehow with or without us. If it is made by ideological political movements it will be made by revolutions and it will be made in turmoil and struggle by people killing each other. There is a better way now of making this link and that is through social science research." *Background*, 10 (August, 1966), 115–116. The implication is that the masses will succumb to either approach and that it would thus be "better" to move quickly with the non-revolutionary approach which is somehow inherent in the social sciences.

[3] An argument put most forcefully by Samuel Huntington in "Political Development and Political Decay," in *Political Modernization*, ed. Claude E. Welch, Jr. (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1967).

[4] This argument was made by the president of the constitutional committee of the Territorial Assembly in 1959, but is in keeping with both the policy and the operation of the PDCI since that time. Quoted in Aristide R. Zolberg, *One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), pp. 253–54.

[5] Lane and Sears noted that in democracies it is assumed that citizens undertake the burden of being informed about political affairs so that they can carry out their civic duties effectively. Similar assumptions are made in other systems. Whether or not the citizen is in fact well informed is an empirical question. See Robert E. Lane and David O. Sears, *Public Opinion* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1964), chapter 6.

[6] Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller, Donald Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley, 1960) chap. 20, discuss assumptions about the informed citizen and electoral behavior.

Convention People's Party or was ill prepared to counter its acts and arguments.[7] This was among the reasons for the creation of a Centre for Civic Education (CCE), which was expected to teach proper citizenship and to explain the rights and the responsibilities of the populace in order to pave the way for the return to civilian rule.[8]

It is often assumed that political information and civic knowledge create a foundation for attachment to the political system.[9] This was another stimulus to the establishment of the CCE in Ghana. The National Liberation Council (NLC) and the leaders of the Centre hoped to build a strong commitment to the new political order they envisioned in the post-Nkrumah era.[10]

The general conceptualization of the masses as politically ignorant is not surprising. Many of the nonmodernized nations of the world have only recently become independent of foreign occupation, and some have territorial boundaries of rather recent origin, particularly in Africa. Furthermore, the ability to communicate political information is often hampered by poor roads, difficult terrain, extreme climates, limited economic resources, and few opportunities for the average person to travel. One would expect these problems to create important constraints on the flow of information.[11]

Educational opportunities are also limited in most of the Third World. Since studies in the United States suggest that education is highly correlated with political information,[12] we could reasonably expect a comparatively low level of political information in countries with lower levels of literacy. In fact, we know that in spite of the relatively high level of education in the United States as well as extensive communications networks and intense public-oriented election campaigns, the level of political knowledge in the United States is surprisingly low.[13] It seems reasonable that in countries with a less educated citizenry, poorer communication, limited modernization, and few government services, the level of ignorance about government would be higher than that in the United States.

On the other hand, the assumption that the masses are politically ignorant may be somewhat off the mark. There are no doubt functional equivalents of formal education—the extensive use of the radio, for example.[14] My own experience in rural Africa in the mid-'sixties suggested that the rural populace was surprisingly well informed—even in remote areas. Although my early observations were subjective, I was struck both by the level of information about national politics and by the degree of understanding of complex political issues.

This paper is an attempt to examine these questions more systematically—to study the extent, impact, and implications of political information using survey data gathered during work on national integration in Ghana (see Appendix for discussion of the sample). I focus on three types of national political information: (1) identification of major political actors and organizations, (2) knowledge of the territory encompassed by the nation, and (3) identification of the people officially categorized as Ghanaians. Another major interest is to identify and examine variables which affect level of information. The relationship between information and a number of variables including education, occupation, income, mobility, and ex-

[7] This argument was made by a number of the leaders of the coup. See for example, A. A. Afrifa, *The Ghana Coup* (London: Frank Cass, 1967).

[8] See Fred M. Hayward, "Ghana's Experiment with Civic Education" *Africa Report*, 16 (May, 1971), 24–27.

[9] Lane and Sears argue that while this is a basic assumption about the effect of civic knowledge, it is wrong. They suggest that attachments come in other ways—from childhood experiences, satisfaction, fear of deviance, and a variety of rewards (*Public Opinion*, p. 61).

[10] At the time of the establishment of the Centre for Civic Education General Ankrah, Chairman of the NLC, suggested that "we are fully convinced that, with the initiation of nationwide civic education as the solid bedrock in our society, we can confidently look forward to a new civilian government in which elections will be held in a clean and free atmosphere without any victimization, violence and personal vindictiveness; in which the government will realize its limitations and in which the rights and privileges of the people shall be guaranteed." Speech at the inauguration of the Centre for Civic Education, June 7, 1967. There were other expectations of the founders of the C.C.E., including the hope that it would prove a useful vehicle for election of a particular kind of politician in the forthcoming election and provide its leader, Dr. Busia, with public exposure prior to elections. See Yaw Opong Saffu, "Politics in a Military Regime: The Case of Ghana" (Ph.D. thesis, Oxford University, 1973) esp. chap. 3.

[11] The relationship of communication to development has been discussed by many writers. Lucian W. Pye, for example, writes about the general tendency of non-western systems to be hampered by communications difficulties in "The NonWestern Political Process," *The Journal of Politics*, 20 (August, 1958), 468–486. In his superb sketch of Balgat, Turkey, Daniel Lerner analyzes the impact of communications on development in a single community and suggests its implications for developing areas as a whole. Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1962).

[12] Donald J. Devine, *The Attentive Public* (Chicago: Rand McNally Co., 1970), pp. 58–59.

[13] Hazel Gaudet Erskine has done us the great service of bringing together data from a wide variety of polls taken in the United States over the years. She shows very clearly how poorly Americans are informed about politics. See her "The Polls: The Informed Public," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 26 (Winter, 1962), 669–677; "The Polls: Textbook Knowledge" *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 27 (Spring, 1963), 133–141; and "The Polls: Exposure to Domestic Information" *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 27 (Fall, 1963), 491–500.

[14] Frantz Fanon discussed the educational aspects of radio in Algeria as a means of mobilizing the masses during the Algerian Revolution. See his *A Dying Colonialism*, trans. Haakon Chevalier (New York: Grove Press, 1965), chap. 2.

posure to the media, will be examined. These variables will be analyzed in both bivariate and multivariate contexts. Finally, I shall examine some of the consequences for the political process of different levels of political information. What effect does political information have on participation, integration, stability, cynicism, and other political attitudes and actions? Does the informed citizen feel more competent to affect politics? Does he or she benefit from the political system to a greater extent than do less informed individuals? Is the informed citizen more compliant than the uninformed by virtue of receiving government cues regarding desired behavior? Is the informed populace more supportive of the national political apparatus? What are the costs of an uninformed public?

In the course of this study I examine conventional wisdom concerning the ignorance of the masses about national politics and call into question some common assumptions. We will see that the differences usually assumed between the level of political knowledge in developed versus underdeveloped societies are not as great as often hypothesized. In fact, my data suggest that in some areas of national political information the masses in nonmodernized societies are more politically aware than their counterparts in modernized societies. Such findings indicate a need to reexamine the assumption that the United States and other Western nations are at the high end of the continuum of public information. The results of this study suggest that we need to pay more attention to the salience of politics in different societies when we do comparative studies. I also show that there is no necessary link between education (literacy) and political information and suggest a number of functional equivalents to formal education. In the last section of this paper I discuss several propositions about the informed citizenry, in particular the notions that: the informed citizen is more likely to be the compliant citizen; the informed public is likely to benefit (or expect to benefit) from government more than the less informed; satisfaction among the informed public is more a function of reception of cues from government and public officials than the result of instrumental rewards.

Information about the Nation and National Politics

Fundamental to knowledge about national politics is some conception of the existence of the national entity. Of the total sample of 376, only two per cent (i.e., 8 respondents) either did not know whether or not they lived in Ghana or asserted that they did not live in Ghana. Since only the urban sample was on a major road and since one of the villages was not on a road at all, this is an amazingly low percentage, especially when one considers that similar responses have been encountered in the United States in the not very distant past.[15] Only .5 per cent of the sample (or two respondents) asserted that the interview was not taking place in Ghana. Both of these respondents were living in the Volta Region which had been totally annexed to Ghana just prior to independence in 1957.[16] One of the two respondents noted that some of the people "in town" said that the area was a part of Ghana, but he doubted it. This view was clearly not shared by the vast majority of his neighbors.

Among the 98 per cent of the populace surveyed who were aware that they lived in Ghana, how much more extensive was their information about the nation? Let us first examine the level of information about national political figures and organizations.

Political Knowledge. Knowledge about major political figures, political organizations, and recent political events is indicative of the impact of national politics on individual citizens. Part of the process of gaining political knowledge involves access to information. Political knowledge at minimum reflects exposure to information about politics. Being informed also implies at least interest in politics—an interest strong enough to permit one to remember the information to which one is exposed. While the informed citizen may have a strong interest in these events, the degree of interest is measured only minimally by the knowledge itself.

Respondents were asked: Who was Prime Minister when Ghana attained Independence? Who is Prime Minister now [i.e., in 1970]? Who ran the government before the last elections [1969]? Ninety per cent of the respondents correctly named Kwame Nkrumah as the first Prime Minister, 87 per cent could name the Prime Minister in 1970, Kofi Busia, who had been in office for about six months at the time of the survey,[17] and 81 per cent

[15] In his study, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," Philip Converse notes that "even in the modern United States, there are scattered pockets of population that are rather vague about national identity. We encounter respondents, for example, who when asked if they were born in the United States, answer 'No. I was born in Georgia,' in what is clearly ignorance rather than a throwback to secession or kittenish state pride." Converse in *Ideology and Discontent*, ed. David Apter (New York: Free Press, 1964), p. 258.

[16] This territory had been part of German Togoland which was occupied by the English and French during World War I. Part of the territory (now the Volta Region) remained under British Mandate until a plebiscite in 1956 which resulted in merger with Ghana just prior to its independence in 1957.

[17] This compares with the following results in the United States in August 1948. Ninety-one per cent of the respondents could name Harry Truman as the Democratic can-

identified the military regime, the National Liberation Council (NLC), or one of its leaders as the former government. In the urban sample all respondents answered these questions correctly.

Respondents were asked several questions about the elections held in mid-1969, including the political party of the Prime Minister (1970). Seventy per cent gave the formal name of the party (Progress Party, or P.P. for short), 3 per cent gave nicknames for the party ("Sure", Party Papa), 4 per cent named the National Alliance of Liberals (N.A.L.) which was the major opposition party, and 23 per cent didn't know. Respondents were also asked to name as many of the political organizations competing in the election as they could. As Table 1 shows, the same percentage of respondents (70 per cent) knew the name of the major opposition party, N.A.L., as knew the name of the party which was then in power. The elections themselves resulted in a major victory for the Progress Party which won 105 of the 140 seats to only 29 seats for N.A.L. The other three parties won five seats, and one independent was elected.[18]

Table 1. Name Other Political Parties in 1969 Elections

	Yes	No
National Alliance of Liberals	70%	30%
People's Action Party	26%	74%
All People's Republican Party	14%	86%
United Nationalist Party	31%	69%
Other Misc.	6%	94%

($N=115$)[a]

[a] The total sample was 376 but some of the information questions were asked of approximately a third of the sample chosen randomly and thus the smaller N for some of the tables like this one.

Respondents were asked if they could name their representative in Parliament. Fifty-four per cent could correctly name their representative, (see Table 2) and an additional 4 per cent identified their representative on the basis of the town or village in which he lived. What is particularly striking in terms of comparative political knowledge is that the Ghanaian responses are slightly higher than the per cent who could name their representative in the United States in 1970 (53 per cent),[19] and much higher than responses to similar questions posed in the U.S. in 1947 and 1966, when only 38 and 46 per cent respectively, could name their representative in Congress.[20]

Table 2. Identify Representative in Parliament (1970)

Knows clearly	54%
Identifies by town or village	4%
Names wrong person	14%
Don't Know	29%
	101%

($N=115$)

There were clearly limits to the extent of knowledge about those in high government offices. Only 28 per cent of the sample could name one or more cabinet ministers (see Table 3). To be sure, these men were in the public limelight much less than the Prime Minister and often had positions which impinged little if at all on the life of the respondents (e.g., foreign affairs).

Table 3. Name Cabinet Ministers

Names five or more	1%
Names 3–4	3%
Names 2	8%
Names 1	16%
None	73%
	101%

($N=115$)

To assess the extent of individual respondents' political knowledge and to simplify later analysis, a political knowledge scale was established using the items discussed in this section.[21] It is striking that fully 18 per cent of the sample gave correct responses to all of the questions, and 26 per cent of the respondents could answer all but one question. At the other end of the scale, only 3 per cent of the sample could not answer any of the questions (see

didate for president. In 1947, 98% said that they had heard of him and had a reasonably correct idea who he was. See Hazel Gaudet Erskine, "The Polls: The Informed Public," p. 670.

[18] Election results are cited in *Birth of the Second Republic*, ed. Moses Danquah (Accra: Editorial & Publishing Services, circa 1969).

[19] Cited in the *Gallup Opinion Index* Report No. 58, April 1970 (Princeton: Gallup International Inc., 1970), p. 20.

[20] Hazel Gaudet Erskine, "The Polls: Textbook Knowledge," p. 138 and *Gallup Opinion Index*, April 1970, p. 20.

[21] The seven items in the scale were: Who was Prime Minister when Ghana attained independence? Who is Prime Minister now? Do you know his political party? Who ran the government before the last election? What parties opposed the Progress Party in the election? Who is your representative in Parliament? Can you name any Ministers in the government? Respondents scored only one point for one or more Ministers. The scale is a summated rating scale coded as (1) for a correct answer and (0) for an incorrect answer. Thus, a score of seven would mean that the respondent correctly identified all of the items, a zero that none had been correctly identified, and so on.

Table 4). This information suggests that Ghanaians have a rather high level of general knowledge about the major organizations and individuals involved in national politics. Furthermore, when one compares selected responses in Ghana with similar or related survey information levels in the United States, Ghanaians demonstrate comparable levels of political knowledge.[22] This is particularly remarkable when one considers the tremendous communications difficulties in Ghana.

Table 4. Level of Political Knowledge

		Number of responses correct	Percentage correct
Levels of Knowledge	Low	0	3%
		1	3%
		2	5%
	Medium	3	13%
		4	14%
		5	18%
	High	6	26%
		7	18%
			100%

($N=115$)

Identification of National Territory. The second political information variable examined was the extent to which respondents were aware of the territory encompassed within the boundaries of Ghana. These responses help us determine whether there is a territorial conception of the state and if so, how accurate it is. Gustav Jahoda, among others, has noted that the understanding of one's environment begins with objects in the immediate vicinity and expands to encompass larger and larger areas.[23] One aspect of the environment is the national political entity and the territory it encompasses. Unlike most of the nations in the West, Ghana (like most of the rest of Africa) has had its geographic boundaries established relatively recently—in the case of the eastern boundary of Ghana as recently as 1956. For some respondents the notion of an entity called Ghana was an abstract one without concrete form beyond the knowledge that they personally resided in Ghana. As noted, 98 per cent of the sample said they were in Ghana. Where respondents have a territorial conception of the state, its parameters become an important question. Is the conception limited to the respondent's own geographic area as in the case of one man in the Volta Region who suggested that he lived in Ghana but that the region on the West side of the Volta River was the Gold Coast (the pre-independence name of Ghana)? Is it more encompassing than that? What are its limits? How accurate is the conception of the state? A number of respondents suggested that the boundaries included Nigeria. While knowledge of the territorial limits of the nation is not important in terms of the daily survival of most individuals, it does reflect their view about the extent of national power and indirectly, about who may benefit from the activity of government.

Respondents were asked: Would you tell me in general terms what are the boundaries of Ghana? (e.g., where does it begin?). What is clear from the responses is that more than fifty per cent of the respondents have no idea about the territorial limits of Ghana. I was not concerned with geographer's definitions of boundaries but rather with some kind of indication that the respondent knew roughly where it was. In some cases answers were not very precise—identification being made in terms of a town, a people, or language group. The responses concerning the Ghana–Upper Volta border are indicative. While 12 per cent of the respondents had a reasonably clear idea of the border, another 7 per cent identified it on the basis of a town on the border—in most cases the town of Paga. An additional one per cent identified Upper Volta on the basis of language—usually the change from English to French; 80 per cent could not identify this border. The data on the other two borders show that 30 per cent of the respondents had at least a minimal conception of the Ghana-Togo border, and 20 per cent the Ivory Coast frontier.

If we look at the extent to which the respondents had correct conceptions of the territorial limits of Ghana, we find (Table 5) that only 12 per cent can correctly name all of the boundaries in a fairly clear fashion. On the other hand, almost 48 per cent had some idea about the territorial limits of the country in at least one area. Fifty-two per cent of the sample were unable to identify correctly any of the boundaries of the country, even in an ambiguous fashion.[24] Clearly the level of ignorance of Ghana-

[22] Ghanaians would not be expected to have comparable knowledge about formal institutions or the constitution, since those aspects of national politics in Ghana have changed rather frequently in the period since independence unlike the case in the United States.

[23] In this study the focus was on learning whether respondents had a correct view of Ghana's territory rather than in looking at stages in the process of learning about the nation. However, the limits on formal education and the isolation of many areas create conditions which put many adults in positions similar to the school children discussed by Gustav Jahoda in "The Development of Children's Ideas about Country and Nationality; Part I: The Conceptual Framework," *British Journal of Educational Psychology*, 33 (Feb., 1963), 47–60, esp. p. 48.

[24] Eleven per cent of the respondents identified places or divisions other than what could be reasonably construed

ians in this area of political information is much greater than it was about national political figures, organizations, and events. This is probably partly explained by lack of education and by the limited need of most citizens to know boundaries in the course of their daily lives.

Table 5. Identification of Ghana's Boundaries (correctly)

Three–four identified clearly	12%
Two clearly	5%
One clearly	13%
Identify one or more by town/people clearly	7%
Identify one more, more ambiguously	11%
None identified	52%
	100%

($N=376$)

Identification of Ghanaian Ethnic/Cultural Groups. The third aspect of political information examined in this study relates to the ability of respondents to identify ethnic-cultural groups which are Ghanaians. This knowledge has implications for the recognition of government authority and the legitimacy of government services, taxation, and other obligations to the state. Conceptions of "citizenship" affect notions about the legitimacy of both office holders and government programs. It is quite clear that if some segments of the nation do not regard at least some Ewes, for example, as Ghanaians, Ewes in leadership positions are likely to have difficulty asserting their authority. Furthermore, if the Dagomba are not regarded as true Ghanaians, there may be opposition to government expenditures on education, roads, and other services in Dagomba areas.

Respondents were asked: "What people are Ghanaians?" Their responses were noted, and the interviewer then asked if any of the people on a predetermined list, but not already mentioned spontaneously, were Ghanaian. The list included Ashanti, Dagomba, Ewe, Fanti, Ga, Hausa, Mossi, Yoruba. The first five ethnic groups are Ghanaians, while the Hausa and Yoruba are Nigerians. The status of the Mossi is somewhat ambiguous since large numbers live in Ghana. They are usually regarded as Upper Voltans in official circles, but even there the level of disagreement is high. The results can be seen in Table 6.

There is strikingly little ambiguity in the responses to this question. The greatest ambiguity is shown in responses about the Mossi: 20 per cent of the respondents did not know whether or not the Mossi were Ghanaians. Of the options presented this is perhaps the most ambiguous case because strong historic ties link most of the Northern Ghanaians and the Mossi.[25] Furthermore, large groups of Mossi live in Ghana or migrate to Ghana especially to work on the cocoa farms. In all of the other cases more than half of the respondents either accept or reject the notion that a particular group is Ghanaian. Approximately eighty per cent or more of the respondents recognized the Ashanti, Ewe, Fanti, and Ga as Ghanaians.[26] More than fifty per cent of the respondents viewed the Hausa, Yoruba, and Mossi as non-Ghanaian, which corresponded to the government view. Just prior to this survey, the government had embarked on a policy of expelling aliens without valid residence permits—an action which affected thousands of Hausa, Yoruba, and Mossi, many of whom had lived in Ghana all of their lives.[27] This action may have fostered or increased the feeling that these

as the official boundaries of the country. About five per cent of the sample identified wrong boundaries within Ghana, another five per cent, boundaries outside of Ghana and one per cent, incorrect boundaries both inside and outside Ghana's present borders.

[25] The Mossi are mostly from Upper Volta, but they are very closely related to a number of Northern Ghanaian ethnic groups including the Dagomba.

[26] In terms of self-identification as Ghanaians, of the ethnic groups represented in the sample in reasonably large numbers, 98 per cent or better identified their own ethnic group as Ghanaian.

[27] Some of the Hausa and Yoruba traders in particular had lived in the North for several generations and had little or no idea about the location of their "home" in Nigeria. Most of the Mossi were migrant laborers who came to Ghana seasonally to work on the cocoa harvest or as laborers in other areas.

Table 6. Identification of Ethnic/Cultural Groups as Ghanaian

	Ashanti	Dagomba	Ewe	Fanti	Ga	Hausa	Yoruba	Mossi
Spontaneously yes	48%	34%	39%	24%	25%	9%	1%	4%
Yes when mentioned	39%	31%	49%	55%	54%	24%	21%	21%
Rejects when mentioned	6%	16%	3%	8%	5%	55%	61%	53%
Don't Know	6%	18%	8%	13%	16%	12%	17%	20%
Inapplicable	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1%
	99%	99%	99%	100%	100%	100%	100%	99%

($N=376$)

ethnic groups were non-Ghanaian. Given the general popularity of the government action, however, and the widespread agreement with the demarcation (except among Ewes who saw it as a threat), the results would probably have been little altered had this survey been carried out six months earlier. Even though some Ewe (who were classified as Togolese) were deported, the Ewe were regarded as Ghanaian by almost ninety per cent of respondents while only three per cent felt they were not Ghanaian. This is particularly poignant in the face of some anti-Ewe sentiment at the time of the survey (based on the contention that there were too many Ewe in political and administrative positions) and the feelings of some Ewe that they were being persecuted.

If we examine the composite scores of respondents in terms of their ability to identify specific ethnic groups as Ghanaian or non-Ghanaian (as generally defined by the government), we find that almost one-fourth of the respondents give correct responses to all seven options and another 28 per cent knew all but one (see Table 7). Of the ethnic groups shown in Table 6, Mossi was omitted from the scale, since the government officials interviewed were quite ambiguous about the status of many Mossi in Ghana. I was usually told that some were Ghanaian and some were not. When asked why this did not apply to the Hausa or Yoruba I was usually told that they had maintained their loyalties to Nigeria—that they had not become integrated into the Ghanaian communities in which they lived. They did not marry Ghanaians, they continued to wear Nigerian dress, and they spoke of Nigeria as their home.

In summary, most of the Ghanaians interviewed had a rather clear conception of the citizenship of people within the state—a conception that reflects the official position. Few Ghanaians have an ethnocentric view of the state since 70 per cent of the respondents correctly identified at least five of the seven ethnic groups noted as Ghanaian or non-Ghanaian, while only two per cent could identify none (see Table 7).

Table 7. Ethnic Identification

		Number of correct responses	Percentage correct
Levels of Knowledge	Low	0	2%
		1	3%
		2	3%
	Medium	3	7%
		4	15%
		5	21%
	High	6	28%
		7	22%
			101%
			(N=376)

Determinants of Political Information

In this section we will examine the relationships between political information and a number of demographic variables—including residence, economic position, mobility, age, and sex—which might affect level of political information. The relationship between level of political information and source of information (radio, newspapers, political leaders, traditional authorities and friends) will then be examined.

Demographic Variables. A number of demographic variables (shown in Table 8) were predicted to have strong associations with political information on the basis both of previous research findings (primarily in the United States) and my own earlier work in Africa.

Table 8. Bivariate Relationships Between Information Variables and Demographic Variables[a]

	Political Knowledge	Identification of Boundaries	Identification of Ethnic Groups
Education	.34***	.56***	.24***
Occupation	.32***	.30***	.19***
Age	−.31***	−.14**	−.22***
Mobility	.23**	.21***	.14**
Size town	.30***	.10*	.26***
Sex (f, m)	−.42***	−.29***	−.22***
Urban	.28**	.04	.29***
Economic position	.13	.18***	.05
Ethnic Group			
Northern	.13	−.27***	.25***
Ewe	−.27**	.12*	−.27***
Southern	.11	.12*	−.01
	(N=115)	(N=376)	(N=376)

* Significant at the .05 level
** Significant at the .01 level
*** Significant at the .001 level
[a] (All correlations are Pearson's r unless otherwise noted.)

When these variables are partialled using multiple regression analysis,[28] the associations with occupation, size of town, economic position, and ethnic groups[29] decreased markedly. Education,

[28] The dependent variables (the three information scales) are interval data. For each respondent, the score is the sum of correct responses to the respective questions about political knowledge, boundaries, and Ghanaian ethnic groups.

[29] Occupation was ranked on the basis of the degree of technical competence required, and size of town was de-

age, mobility, sex, and urban residence[30] have relationships which continue to be statistically significant, but are generally not as strong as had been anticipated. Let us look at these variables in greater detail.

We would expect education to have a strong association with political information. This relationship is suggested in a great deal of the work on information in the United States.[31] It also seems reasonable as a general proposition to assume that educated individuals in any country will have more information about the nation and the political process. This is not necessarily a function of being taught about "civics" in school since many schools in Africa do not include such material. The effect of education is more likely to be a consequence of literacy, which increases access to information. I suspect that it is also due in part, as Hyman and Sheatsley suggest,[32] to the fact that students are encouraged to be aware and critical of the world around them.

In the Ghanaian case, there are relatively strong bivariate correlations (Pearson's r) between education and the three types of information identified in the three scales. The correlation is strongest ($r=.56$) with the identification of boundaries which, of the three scales, is most likely to be a consequence of formal education as opposed to what Lane and Sears called life knowledge.

One striking finding is that when all the other demographic variables are controlled in a multiple regressional analysis, the correlations with education, while still significant, drop markedly, suggesting that other variables serve as functional equivalents of formal education in imparting political information (see Table 9). The data also suggest that too much importance may have been attributed in the literature to the role of formal education in the socialization process. What is usually measured in Western nations is the effects of increasing amounts of education. In the underdeveloped areas of the world we have the opportunity to compare educated individuals with those who do not have formal education but who *are educated* as a result of their life experiences. Our inability to focus on those without formal education in the West, largely because it is almost impossible to get a large sample of individuals without formal education, may lead us to attribute to formal education changes which really result from other experiences. In addition to normal life experiences in Africa (and much of the underdeveloped world), there is also the effect of the oral transmission of history and tradition.

Age has a moderate negative correlation, ($r=-.31$) with political information, indicating that younger individuals tend to be better informed than their elders.[33] We would expect part of this relationship to be accounted for by education, especially since the number of school places per capita were very limited, until relatively recently, even in Ghana which was a pioneer in mass education in Africa.[34] This expectation is borne out when we look at the partial correlations from the regression analysis. The correlations here drop markedly, and only the relationship between political knowledge and age remains significant. Thus, while there is still evidence of greater political information among younger Ghanaians (eighteen years of age and older), the extent of the difference in level by age cohort is not very great.

In his very interesting sketch of Balgat, Turkey, Daniel Lerner[35] stressed the role of mobility in changing the level of national consciousness. "Balgat Revisited" was a very different place from Balgat of the past, in large part because a road had been built through it, bringing it into close contact with national political life. One would expect that experience outside one's home town (in the Ghanaian case measured by whether the respondent had ever lived in another village or town) would broaden horizons if only because of contacts with other people and different life styles. It was thus expected that geographic mobility would have a strong correlation with the information variables in Ghana. Although the bivariate correlations are significant they are much lower than expected (other indices of mobility such as length of residence in town or village, are even lower). When other demographic variables were controlled, only

termined by population. Economic position was estimated by the interviewers on the basis of an established set of criteria. Accurate measures of economic position are difficult to obtain in much of Africa since there is general suspicion that any information volunteered will be used to assess taxes or other levies. Ethnic groups were coded nonnorthern, northern, etc. The largest group in the northern sample was Dagomba. The largest southern ethnic groups in the sample were Akuapem, Shai, Ashanti, and Fanti.

[30] Education was coded on the basis of amount of schooling, ranging from none through college. Age was coded by age cohort. Sex was coded female–male. Urban was coded rural–urban. Mobility was operationalized on the basis of whether or not respondents have lived in other villages or towns for a year or more. A positive response was taken as an indication of mobility.

[31] For example: Lane and Sears, *Public Opinion*, p. 62; Herbert H. Hyman and Paul B. Sheatsley, "The Current Status of American Public Opinion" in *Public Opinion and Propaganda*, ed. Daniel Katz et al., (New York: Dryden Press, 1954), pp. 35–36; Donald Devine, *The Attentive Public*, pp. 58–59.

[32] Hyman and Sheatsley, pp. 35–37.

[33] In *Public Opinion*, p. 612, Lane and Sears report the same pattern in the United States.

[34] In 1965, Ghana ranked sixth in level of literacy in independent Africa south of the Sahara, although in the middle decile range in terms of percentage literate. See Donald G. Morrison et al., eds., *Black Africa; A Comparative Handbook* (New York: Free Press, 1972), p. 70.

[35] Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society*, chap. 1.

the relationship between mobility and identification of Ghana's boundaries remains significant at the .05 level or better, and that correlation is very low indeed ($r=.14$). While this does not falsify the assertion that mobility affects the level of information, it certainly calls for a careful reexamination of this relationship.

Most studies of women and politics have shown that women are less interested in politics than men.[36] The data from Table 8 tends to support this assumption. We also know, however, that in most cases once socioeconomic variables (in particular, education) are partialled out, the difference by sex largely disappears. In the Ghanaian case, controlling for the other demographic variables somewhat reduces the relationship between sex and level of political information. Nonetheless, the correlation is strong enough ($r=.27$) to suggest that women in Ghana are generally less well informed than men even when they are of comparable socioeconomic position.[37]

In most of Africa, urban centers are much more closely tied in with national political life and the outputs of government than are rural areas. They are generally multiethnic, have very mobile populations and are often centers of education. It was anticipated that the correlations between political information and urban residence would be relatively high. There is a moderate bivariate association ($r=.28$ and .29 respectively) between urban residence and both knowledge and identification of ethnic groups (see Table 8). Such information is more likely to be imparted in an urban than a rural context. There is, however, almost no relationship between urban residence and knowledge of the geographic area of the country. When the demographic variables are controlled, the associations between urbanization and information become even weaker (Table 9).

The demographic variables taken together account for 37 per cent of the variance for political knowledge with a multiple correlation coefficient of .60. They "explain" 39 per cent of the variance in the scores for identification of boundaries ($R=.63$). Demographic variables have the weakest collective association with the identification of Ghanaian ethnic groups, accounting for only 22 per cent of the variance with a multiple correlation coefficient of .47.

Table 9. Partial Correlation Coefficients of Demographic Variables and Information Scales

	Political Knowledge	Identification of Boundaries	Identification of Ethnic Groups
Education	.18	.39***	.18***
Occupation	.06	.00	.01
Age	−.21*	−.11*	−.05
Mobility	.13	.14**	.03
Size town	−.09	.01	.04
Sex	−.27**	−.21***	−.14**
Economic position	−.02	.01	.01
Urban	.20*	.01	.10*
Ethnic Group			
Northern	—.06	−.09	−.01
Ewe	−.10	.02	−.11*
Southern	−.03	−.03	−.07
	$R=.60$ $R^2=.37$ Signif. level $=<.0001$ ($N=115$)	$R=.63$ $R^2=.39$ Signif $=<.0001$ ($N=376$)	$R=.47$ $R^2=.22$ Signif $=<.001$ ($N=376$)

* Significant at the .05 level
** Significant at the .01 level
*** Significant at the .001 level.

Sources of Information. In the previous section some of the demographic characteristics of the informed citizen were discussed. Let us now examine the sources of information, asking: Where do people get most of their information? Does it result from personal contacts, the media, government officials, or other sources? What are the dominant sources? Are they national or local in character, personal or impersonal? Of particular importance, what is the relationship between presumed primary sources for the distribution of information about the national political system and the extent to which correct information is imparted?

In terms of the size of the potential audience, we would expect the mass media, in particular the radio, to be one of the major sources of political information. The radio provides, as Frantz Fanon has noted,[38] a means of circumventing the widespread illiteracy which has limited the utility of printed matter. The invention of the transistor coupled with battery power has made the radio both cheap and mobile. Radios are found in almost every village in Ghana. In fact, Ghana has the sixth highest number of radios per 100,000 people in Africa.[39]

[36] See for example, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 388; Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller and Donald Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley, 1960), pp. 272–76; Elihu Katz and Paul L. Lazarsfeld, *Personal Influence: The Part Played by People in the Flow of Mass Communications* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1955), p. 271.

[37] This corresponds with findings of Campbell et al. in *The American Voter*, p. 485, that in the southern United States women tended to be less politically involved than men, as reflected in voter turnout. In general, however, we find that sex differences are mitigated or disappear when socioeconomic factors are controlled.

[39] Morrison et al., *Black Africa*, p. 78.

I expected newspapers to be a very important source of information in Ghana, both because of the relatively high level of literacy (approximately forty per cent) compared with other African states and the common practice of having a literate person read the newspaper to groups of nonliterates. This phenomenon is common throughout Africa, and one source has estimated that the average copy of a newspaper is read by or for seventy different people.[40] While this figure is probably unusually high, it is not unreasonable to assume that each copy is read by or to at least a dozen people. Expectations about the media were borne out by survey results which showed that 30 per cent of the respondents said that they followed political affairs by listening to the radio only, 3 per cent read newspapers only, and 33 per cent used both, making a total of 63 per cent who were exposed to at least one of these media.

In an attempt to identify the range of sources of political information and the relative dependency on each, respondents were asked: "How do you find out about politics in Ghana?" Multiple responses were possible (see Table 10). While we did not, unfortunately, ask respondents for their major source of information, the responses can reasonably be taken as an indication of the relative importance of each source in that those mentioned came to mind when respondents were asked how they learned about politics.

Table 10. Sources of Political Information[a]

Friends	16%
Chief or elders	8%
Political leaders	9%
Travelers	12%
Mass media	43%[b]
Other	8%
None	12%

(N=117)

[a] Total per cent adds up to more than 100 since some respondents listed two sources (either media counted as one).

[b] This total is smaller than that quoted in the text (63%) because respondents listed sources of information generally and may have left out the mass media here while responding yes to a direct question about the media as reported earlier.

The mass media were the most frequently mentioned (43 per cent) source of information. If we add to that total the 9 per cent who depend on political officials (e.g., party leaders, national government officials) we find that more than half of the respondents stated that national figures or individuals working with the nationally owned and controlled media were the source of their information Only 8 per cent listed traditional leaders (such as chiefs or elders) as the source of their information suggesting both the limited role of many traditional leaders in informing the populace about national affairs, and the fact that their sources of regular national political information are often little better than those of the average citizen. On the other hand, traditional chiefs in particular, have had generally good access to the national government in Ghana.

Somewhat surprisingly, twelve per cent of the respondents mentioned travelers as their sources. This response came primarily from the two most isolated villages, suggesting the importance of personal contact with informed individuals—contacts which in isolated areas were provided largely by travelers. It should be noted that the designation traveler does not include individuals in the other categories who might also travel, but refers to "strangers" and traders. In many villages the exchange of information with travelers is highly institutionalized. Travelers who stop in a village are expected to greet the chief (usually in the presence of some elders). This meeting normally includes an exchange of news. An elder or the chiefdom speaker recites what has transpired in the village recently, and the traveler in turn is expected to tell them about what was happening elsewhere.

Respondents were asked if they had been taught about government in school. Seventeen per cent (slightly less than half of those with some education) said that they had had some political education in the schools. The low level of political education indicated by these responses is somewhat surprising given the efforts of various governments to raise the level of political awareness, but is certainly indicative of their lack of success.

Respondents regarded the sources noted above as important and influential contributors to their knowledge of Ghanaian politics. Is there a relationship between individual sources and the extent to which individuals are informed about major political actors and the national government? While it is difficult to know precisely what was imparted from contacts with different types of sources of political information, we can gain some idea by examining the relationship between the sources cited by the respondent and the accuracy of the respondent's political information. The bivariate relationships between sources of information[41] and level of correct information (shown

[40] Reported by one distributor of the *East African Standard* in Kenya as quoted in William Hatchen, *Muffled Drums: The News Media in Africa* (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1971), p. 211.

[41] The sources of information were coded no (0) yes (1). The political information scales were coded from low to high scores.

in Table 11) give us some idea of the accuracy by type of information. It is clear that with the exception of identification of boundaries, there is very little relationship between sources of information and level of information. While information may be imparted by these contacts, either it is not accurate or it is related to subjects other than major political organizations and actors, the nature of the state, or its people.

Table 11. Bivariate Relationships Between Information Variables and Sources of Political Information

	Political Knowledge	Identification of Boundaries	Identification of Ethnic Groups
Radio	.13	.14	.23*
Newspaper	.20	.46***	.21*
School Civics	.28	.47***	.14
Friends	−.20	−.02	−.07
Chief	−.29	.15	−.15
Leaders	.00	.21*	−.06
Others	.14	−.28**	−.10
	(N=27)[a]	(N=116)	(N=116)

[a] Because the political knowledge question and the source of information question were on different schedules asked of only one third of the sample, the number of respondents who answered both schedules was very small.

* Significant at the .05 level.
** Significant at the .01 level.
*** Significant at the .001 level.

Utilizing multiple regression analysis to examine the relationship between various sources and the boundary and ethnic identification scales,[42] (see Table 12) we can see that only 9 per cent (R=.31) of the variance in level of political information is explained by these sources for the identification of ethnic groups and 45 per per cent (R=.67) is explained for the identification of boundaries. In the latter case, the partials suggest that newspaper reading and civics classes in schools are the major contributors to information about boundaries. We would expect this particular type of political information to be most highly affected by formal or "book" learning.

Examination of level of information indicates only a limited association between source of information and accuracy or level of information, with the exception of knowledge of the general geographic outlines of the nation (which is attributed primarily to formal education). The findings suggest that the sources of political information are generally diffuse, highly idiosyncratic (in terms of such things as travel, nature of education, and interest) and not tied to specific types of contacts or single information sources like the radio or traditional leaders.

[42] The N for the political knowledge scale is too small (N=27) to permit confidence in the results of multiple regression analysis running sources against the political knowledge scale.

Table 12. Partial Correlation Coefficients of Information Variables and Sources of Political Information

	Identification of Boundaries	Identification of Ethnic Groups
Radio	−.04	.12
Newspaper	.42***	.09
School Civics	.37***	.07
Friends	−.02	−.10
Chief	.26**	−.11
Leaders	.19*	−.04
Others	−.20*	−.08
	R=.67	R=.31
	R^2=.45	R^2=.09
	Signif= <.0001	Signif=.141
	(N=116)	(N=116)

* Significant at the .05 level
** Significant at the .01 level
*** Significant at the .001 level.

Political Information, Political Attitudes and Political Actions

We have looked at the extent to which Ghanaians are informed about various aspects of politics and the state and have seen that in many areas Ghanaians are quite well informed about political affairs. What, if any, relationship exists between political information and political attitudes and activity? Are informed citizens more active? Do they feel more competent politically than the poorly informed? Are they more supportive of the system? In short, does political information have an effect on the political system, or is it unrelated to political attitudes and acts? In order to get at these questions the three information scales were correlated with a number of variables tapping a variety of political dimensions.

Moderate to strong associations can be seen in Table 13 between political information and a number of variables which suggest support for the political system. There are moderate relationships between the information scales and national political integration[43] and between two of the infor-

[43] The information variables are treated as independent variables in this section. Since most of the dependent variables are not based on interval data, a lower-order correlation, Gamma, is used. The integration scale was based on responses to the following questions: Do you feel that what the national government does is important? When government does something with which you disagree, do you feel responsible? Does the government stand for methods and ideals you value? Given your conception of the ideal poli-

Table 13. Correlations Between Political Information Scales, Selected Attitudinal Variables and Voting

	Information Scales		
	Political Knowledge	ID Bounds	ID Ethnic
Political Integration	.47*	.21**	.44*
No conflict between traditional and national authority	.73**	.05	.37***
Political competence	.18	.29**	.32***
Government helpful	.16	.32**	.21*
Present government better	.36*	.38***	.10
Prefer national control of local government	.38**	.07	.49*
One party state opposed	.54*	.34*	.27*
Opposition useful	.26	−.05	.30***
Politicians look after themselves	.52*	.19	−.05
Voted in last election	.16	.01	−.03
	(N=115)	(N=376)	(N=376)

(Correlations are Gammas)
* Significant at the .05 level
** Significant at the .01 level
*** Significant at the .001 level

mation scales and feelings that national and traditional allegiances are not in conflict.[44] There are significant relationships between two of the information variables, political competence[45] and, the feeling that government has been generally helpful.[46] The political knowledge and identification of boundaries scales also have a moderate association with regime support (as opposed to system)—that is, the current regime (at the time of the survey, Busia's Progress Party Government) was felt to be better than previous governments. The question was: How does the present government differ from previous governments? Finally, there is a clear association between both the political knowledge and ethnic identification scales on the one hand and a desire for national control of local governments on the other. The question was: Should local government be controlled by national government? While a preference for national control of local government is only tangentially related to system support, it does indicate that relative to other political authorities, the national government is preferred as the administrator or agent in local political affairs.[47]

These associations suggest that the informed citizen is more likely to feel politically competent, to identify with the national government, and to believe that the national government makes a positive contribution to his or her life. These findings also suggest that the strategy of the Ghanaian government, which was designed to increase citizen knowledge through civic information dissemination programs in the hope of raising citizen commitment and competence, may well have been efficacious.

Given the significant relationship between level of information and positive attitudes about the national government, is there a corresponding relationship between political information and political activity? The only participation variable on which individual data were gathered was voting. Thus our conclusions regarding information and political activity must be regarded as somewhat incomplete. Nonetheless, since voting is usually the major operational variable for measuring participation in much of political science literature, it is not without precedent to focus on voting as an indicator of political participation.[48] Sixty-seven per cent of the respondents said they had voted.

It was hypothesized that the relationship between voting and political information (especially political knowledge) would be strong, i.e., that those who were informed would be the most likely to register to vote, follow political events, and feel that it was important to express their preferences

tical system, are we getting closer to this ideal government? Each respondent was scored zero through four. For a more detailed discussion of the scale, coding, and methods see Fred Hayward, "Correlates of National Political Integration: The Case of Ghana," *Comparative Political Studies*, 7 (July, 1974), 165–192.

[44] The question asked respondents was: Does loyalty to the nation conflict with your loyalty to your ethnic or traditional group, your chief or local leaders?

[45] The political competence scale is based on the following questions: 1) Suppose a law was being considered by government that you thought unjust or harmful. What do you think you could do? 2) In such a case, is it likely that you would actually try to do something about it? 3) Have you ever done anything like that? This scale (like the other scales used here) is a summated rating scale with respondents scored on the basis of "correct" responses or those indicating the presence or absence of the particular characteristic, in this case responses reflecting a sense of competence. Scores ranged from zero to three.

[46] Respondents were asked: Have you dealt with any of the following agencies, their officials or representatives? (list followed). Have you found them helpful? This item is based on responses to the last question.

[47] The major reason cited for the preference for national control was extensive corruption at the local level. While the national government was certainly not immune to this phenomenon, its record was better than that of most local councils. There was also a feeling among respondents that the national government had more resources which would be made available to local areas by such a shift in control.

[48] Lester Milbrath, in his summary study of participation, notes that participation as measured by voting is the most thoroughly researched of all political behavior, partly because of its frequency and the ease of quantification. As Milbrath notes, however, many other aspects of participation warrant further study. See Lester Milbrath, *Political Participation* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), esp. chap. 1.

by voting. The election which had preceded the survey by a little more than six months had been hotly contested so that issues and preferences were expected to have meaning at the local level. Open-ended interviews in the villages confirmed that they had. Let us look at the voting process in Ghana.

Voting is not mandatory in Ghana, nor is there a law requiring voter registration by all citizens. Furthermore, going to the polls often requires considerable effort. It is not unusual for villagers to have to walk two to five miles to reach the polling places and in many cases they then have to wait hours in long lines (often in the hot sun) before they can vote. These problems were not unique to this election, but a regular feature of voting in Ghana. Among the most frequent reasons given by respondents for nonvoting were lack of knowledge, the distance to the polling station, long lines, or the weather. For these reasons, it was felt that the less-informed citizen would be less likely to go to the trouble of voting than the well-informed person. As can be seen in Table 13 this assumption was not correct, since there is practically no relationship between voting and any of the information variables. While a slight relationship (Gamma=.16) exists between political knowledge and voting it is too small to be meaningful and is not statistically significant. Thus while political information has an effect on attitudes about support for the system, it does not have a corresponding effect on participation as reflected in voting.

Several factors may explain the lack of relationship between voting and political information. The communal nature of much of rural African society may result in strong pressures for individuals to vote, whether they are informed or not, especially when exhortations by party organizers further encourage them to go to the polls. In addition, the holiday atmosphere in many areas on election day makes voting an event not to be missed. The actual process of voting for some people may well be secondary to the chance to relax, socialize, listen to music, dance, and greet friends from neighboring villages who have been brought together by the occasion of an election.

The data also suggest that there are significant relationships between political information and democratic norms as exemplified by opposition to a one-party state and (in the case of the ethnic identification scale) by feelings that a political opposition was useful.[49] This finding suggests that those who were aware of the diversity of ethnic groups in Ghana also felt that it was important that there be mechanisms for expressing opposition to government policies. In some respects, these data could also be interpreted as a further demonstration of system support, since the government in power at the time of the survey was democratic. Furthermore, the Ministry of Information and especially the Centre for Civic Education had been emphasizing the importance of democratic values and contrasting these values with the excesses of the Convention People's Party under the one-party state. This is not to suggest that free speech, fear of repression, and political competition are merely functions of government propaganda. During the work in Ghana, I was continually struck by the frequent and unsolicited statements from respondents about their appreciation of the freedoms which existed at that time, as opposed to the fear engendered during the worst years of repression and detention under Nkrumah. The comments by some workers interviewed in Northern Ghana are a typical example. "In the past we could not meet like this. If you had come before [under the Nkrumah regime] we would have gone into the bush. Now we know we have the right to meet. Before, the government was the work of one man. Now we know our rights."[50]

Finally, these data suggest some potentially serious costs to those in power that arise from having a well-informed public. Where wrongdoing, inefficiency, inequities, and other problems exist, they will come to the attention of informed citizens. If public officials do not live up to public ideals about proper behavior, knowledge of such activities can lead to cynicism, alienation, and conflict. Although Ghanaians generally supported the national political system, they gave evidence of some cynicism which under adverse conditions could increase in scale and import. Respondents were asked whether they agreed, disagreed or had no opinion about the statement: Most politicians are looking out for themselves above all else. Seventy-three per cent of the total sample thought that this was the case, while only twenty-four per cent said no. Respondents who were better informed tended to be more cynical than those who were less informed. The correlation between the political knowledge scale and cynicism about political leaders is .52. There is little association with other information variables. It is likely that these responses represent more than a disposition to mistrust the motives of politicians since the historical precedent for cynicism is certainly evident. Ghanaians have experienced corruption for a very long time. There have been a number of trials for corruption, bribery, misuse of office and public

[49] The questions were: What purposes does an opposition party serve? (coded as indicating "useful," "not useful"). Do you think the country would be run differently if there were a one-party state? (coded as "better," "same," "worse").

[50] Interviewer notes made by the author, northern Ghana, March 1970.

funds. A very high proportion of those charged were found guilty, and although the bringing of charges grew out of the military coup, the charges themselves were usually very well substantiated. Cynicism not only has a basis in fact, it also has important political consequences both in expressing a recognition of the divergence from the ideal and in suggesting that the honest, public-spirited politician may have difficulty being believed or trusted.

Conclusion

Contrary to conventional wisdom which suggests that the masses in Africa (and much of the rest of the underdeveloped world) are politically ignorant, the majority of Ghanaians (to the extent that this sample is typical) are politically aware. These findings suggest that widely held assumptions about the political ignorance of the masses in underdeveloped areas in general should be seriously questioned if not rejected.

The relatively high level of political information in Ghana is particularly striking when we recall that Ghana became a political entity fairly recently as a result of European occupation and division of Africa in the late 1800s. Indeed, its current geographic and ethnic demarcation was completed only in the mid-1950s just prior to independence. As in most of Africa, this geographic entity was delimited with little knowledge of or concern for existing societies and political units. A number of important traditional societies were divided by national boundaries. Furthermore, the spread of information was hampered by poor roads, inefficient systems of communication, limited educational opportunities, foreign control of the political process until 1957, limited political participation prior to that time, and frequent and fundamental changes in the structure of the political process during the last twenty years.[51]

Political Information: Modernized vs. Nonmodernized Societies. An understanding of the implications of the relatively high level of political information in Ghana (and, I suspect, of much of the rest of Africa) warrants a reexamination of some of the assumptions about the characteristics of the informed public. One of these assumptions is the comparative one that since the level of political information is low in the United States and Western Europe.[52] in spite of modern efficient communications systems, high levels of educatio great geographic mobility, and so on, it is on reasonable to assume that relatively nonmoder ized societies will be even less informed. In l menting the low level of political information the United States and Western Europe, Dav Sears makes this point when he notes, "Or possible implication is that, unsatisfactory as it [i.e., the low level of information in the Unite States], this level represents some kind of upp limit of public attentiveness in relatively peaceft mass democracies."[53] One assumes that any dev ation from a relatively peaceful condition or fror democratic norms would only lower the level c information in the United States. Hyman an Sheatsley, writing in the 'fifties, noted: "In almos every instance where the polls have tested publi information, at least twenty per cent of the popu lation have revealed complete ignorance."[54] In th Ghanaian data, where there are comparable fig ures, the level of information in Ghana is simila to, or in one case slightly higher than, that in th United States. In spite of the higher level of education in the United States, sophisticated communications systems, high geographic mobility, and other factors which facillitate the flow of information, the level of information in the United States *does not* appear to represent an upper limit on public attentiveness.

These findings suggest that we need to be less ethnocentric in assessing comparative political phenomena and in defining the high end of continua in terms of Western industrialized nations. They demonstrate the need to pay particular attention to political systems in the *Third World* since their experiences are often very different from our own. The findings also suggest that it would be useful to do more thinking about the implications and meaning of different types of political information. What kind of information is useful for what purposes? Perhaps the findings about knowledge of one's representative in the United States are indicative of the historical evolution and growth of presidential power in the twentieth century coupled with the decline in the power of Congress. It may be that political contacts are not as important in Western nations as they are in the

[51] After a brief period of open party competition at the time of independence, the regime became a virtual one-party state under Nkrumah with harsh political control of the opposition. In 1966, a coup d'état brought in the government of the National Liberation Council. In 1969 government was returned to civilian rule, competitive elections were held and a Progress Party Government formed. There was another coup in 1972 ushering in a period of military rule.

[52] Almond and Verba compared the level of information in the United States with that in the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, and Mexico in terms of respondents' ability to name party leaders and ministers. Respondents in the United States were highest in both categories. *The Civic Culture*, pp. 95–96.

[53] David O. Sears, "Political Behavior," in Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson, eds., *The Handbook of Social Psychology*, 2nd. ed. (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1969), V, 328.

[54] Hyman and Sheatsley, "The Current Status of American Public Opinion," p. 36.

Third World—if only because the margins between subsistence and starvation are much narrower. Or, perhaps there is a greater basis for political community in nations like Ghana than in highly industrialized and technological societies like the United States because the populace in the Third World nations is less atomized, alienated, rootless, and privatized.

Exposure to Information and Level of Information. We know there is greater exposure to political information in modernized than in nonmodernized societies. We know from studies in the United States[55] that low exposure to information usually is reflected in very low levels of political information. If this finding is generalizable outside the the United States, where exposure is comparatively lower levels of information in Ghana, where exposure of the general populace is limited, than in the United States, where exposure is comparatively much greater. Since this does not seem to be the case, further exploration is necessary.

The difference may well be explained by the greater salience of politics for Ghanaians than for respondents in the West. The most important reason for the greater salience of national politics is probably the growing awareness that, for better or worse, the national government is going to play *the* major role in economic development. As such, it is the likely source of, or impediment to, more schools, water systems, hospitals and dispensaries, roads, electricity, improved agriculture, industrial growth, and other important outputs that affect the lives of the populace. Therefore what is done in the name of government often "demands" attention.

Another explanation of the relatively high level of information in spite of limited exposure is that Ghanaians have not become saturated (or supersaturated) with information or dulled by attempts to impart information. In Ghana, unlike the United States, individuals are not massively assaulted by information sources vying for their attention. Not only is less information presented, there are also fewer competing types of information and of entertainment (such as magazines, newspapers, movies, television) which can distract from the political message. For example, when national officials or politicians visit rural constituents the event is much more of an occasion than in the United States. It is not something which can be seen regularly on television, it is not crowded out by a favorite soap opera, country-western program, football game, or movie of the week. I certainly do not mean to suggest that all information imparted in Ghana is received. What I am suggesting is that the event creates a context in which the possibility of reception is increased because one has the attention of the individual. Attention does not guarantee knowledge.[56] It is *the importance* of politics to the individuals' well being that makes reception likely.

Compliance and the Informed Populace. Most governments disseminate information in the belief that the informed citizen will comply with the directives of the government. While in most societies, ignorance is not an excuse for noncompliance, few governments act as if that assertion were a sufficient deterrent to noncompliance. It is usually assumed that if a citizen is informed, his or her response is more likely to be in accord with government directives than if the citizen is uninformed.

The potential difficulties posed by uninformed individuals are indicated by the experience of government officials in one isolated Ghanaian village. The population of this village was basically oblivious of the national government. When a government official arrived on a motorcycle to urge them to expand their agricultural production, they were polite, but mystified. They listened to the official with respect since he was clearly important (he had come on a machine). They agreed that they would follow his advice, poured libations to celebrate the plan to increase their plantings, and once he left continued as before. In this case the cost of noncompliance to the success of the government's plan was small. Had the government decided to force the villagers to increase production it would have been greater. In cases like the control of cocoa diseases, the government of Ghana has been willing to use force. For the most part the threat is sufficient if other methods fail. There is a pool of information about the government in most cocoa areas which allows individuals to interpret and predict government actions. In the isolated village, however, there was no equivalent pool of information, and the cost of threats to use force might have brought tragic and unintended results. While the informed citizen is by no means necessarily the compliant citizen, it seems likely that compliance will be greater among the informed on issues which are perceived as vital to the government (and thus subject to serious sanctions for noncompliance).

Although we usually assume that information is "neutral," that individuals may accept or reject attitudes and messages intended for them, my findings suggest that the informed citizen may well also be inclined to be compliant. As we have

[55] Sears, "Political Behavior," pp. 315–458; David O. Sears and Richard E. Whitney, *Political Persuasion* (Morristown, New Jersey: General Learning Press, 1973), p. 7.

[56] Devine, *The Attentive Public*, p. 35.

seen in the last section, those individuals with high levels of information tended to be more closely tied to government. They were more likely to have high levels of integration, feel competent politically, and have positive attachments to the regime in power than were those with low levels of information. Clearly, along with information about government, some cues were imparted about how one should act and about rewards for such action. While the cognitions and attitudes tapped in the survey are not measures of compliance, it seems reasonable to assume that those who are well informed are more likely to act in accord with government wishes than those with little or no information at all.

The Ignorant Masses—Targets for Subversion. Much of the concern about the "ignorant masses" stems from the fear that the masses of Africa, Asia, and the Americas will be subverted by evil forces out to serve their own ends.[57] As Katz and Lazarsfeld have noted, those who held this view saw "... an atomistic mass of millions of readers, listeners and movie-goers prepared to receive the Message; and secondly, they pictured every Message as a direct and powerful stimulus to action which would elicit immediate response."[58] John Mecklin, writing about his experience with the United States Information Service and about the Vietnamese, suggests that "the knowledge of an illiterate man is limited to what he has himself experienced or heard. His mind is untrained and therefore atrophies like the shriveled leg of a polio victim. . . . His power of reason, the greatest of nature's gifts to mankind, develops only slightly beyond the level of an American six-year old."[59] The masses are thus potentially easy pawns for those who would use them.

The notion of a *tabula rasa* contradicts what we know about much of the world[60] and what has been presented here about Ghana. It is hard to believe that the turmoil in Asia would have made individuals less politically aware or that life experiences would not have expanded their minds. What we do know is that the masses in Ghana are far from ignorant—in fact, in some areas they are better informed than the masses in the West. It is thus not likely to be ignorance that would result in their subversion.

An equally important flaw in the ignorance subversion model is the assumption that messages imparted will be received as a basis for action. Most evidence on the effects of propaganda and information suggests that the public is very resistant to such efforts.[61] It seems much more likely that people become receptive to ideas about changing the existing political system because it has failed. The notion of the gullibility of the ignorant masses assumes that there is no substitute for formal education (i.e., that experience with government officials, corruption, and repression do not count) and that people are unable to make judgments about who has been helping them or what might be of benefit. The masses of the African nations in which I have worked do not live in a vacuum—though they might be without formal schooling. Their attitudes about the national government are much more likely to reflect experience and information than ignorance.

The Informed Citizen as the "Good Citizen." Much of the concern about the level of political information has emanated from the belief that the informed citizen is the "good citizen," and the uninformed citizen, at least by implication, is the bad citizen. As Hyman and Sheatsley put it: "In the absence of information, the public would be expected to have little competence for national decisions and to fall easy prey to emotional symbols, and to a great extent this is true."[62] They suggest that "an ideal public would certainly be familiar with the name and duties of its office holders and would be well informed about their actions."[63] Most of those who examine the level of political information have expressed concern about the amount of political ignorance in both modernized and non-modernized societies. Some have gone as far as to suggest that the uninformed should not be allowed to participate in political affairs[64]—others that the fact that most do not is beneficial.[65]

[57] One can see this theme in John Mecklin, *Mission in Torment* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965), and Ithiel de Sola Pool, "The Necessity for Social Scientists Doing Research for Governments."

[58] Katz and Lazarsfeld, *Personal Influence*, p. 16.

[59] Mecklin, *Mission in Torment*, p. 76. While Mecklin seems to feel that this inability to reason aided the Viet Cong it did not help the USIS, primarily, he suggests, because the Diem government was so corrupt. One wonders why this corruption was clear to an atrophied mind when the Viet Cong horrors he mentions were not.

[60] This sense of mass awareness is beautifully portrayed in John Womack, *Zapata and the Mexican Revolution* (New York: Vintage, 1968) and in Carlo Levi's novel *Christ Stopped at Eboli* (New York: Noonday, 1947). Even in studies like that of Almond and Verba which show that the level of political ignorance in many areas is surprisingly high, it is clear that respondents do have ideas about politics, political values, and goals. Their areas of ignorance are much more likely to reflect lack of interest and the low salience of politics than a need for external stimulation or organization.

[61] See for example, Carl I. Hovland, Irving L. Janis, Harold H. Kelley, *Communication and Persuasion: Psychological Studies of Opinion Change* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953); Katz and Lazarsfeld, *The People's Choice* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954).

[62] Hyman and Sheatsley, "The Current Status of American Public Opinion," p. 37.

[63] *Ibid.*, p. 40.

[64] This is certainly the implication of the PDCI official's statement quoted in the introduction.

[65] Bernard Berelson, Paul Lazarsfeld, and William McPhee suggest in *Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a*

Most of the concern about the level of public information about politics has been focused on representative government and the impact of mass participation and competition on stability and rational decision making. As noted earlier, however, noncompetitive governments are also very concerned with the dispersion of information felt to be important to the citizenry. In both the competitive and noncompetitive state it is assumed that the informed citizen will be the good citizen in the sense that information will be used to reach intelligent rational decisions. Without defining "intelligent" or "rational" decisions, let us look at some possibilities and implications of what it means to be an informed citizen in the Ghanaian context. At the time of the survey, Ghana had a competitive political system. Elections had been held recently, most parliamentary seats were actively contested by a number of political parties, and there was general consensus that (with a few minor exceptions) the election had been fair. A number of agencies were involved in the dissemination of information including the Ministry of Information, the Centre for Civic Education, the public and private media, the parties, a variety of pressure groups, and interested citizens.

The data which have been presented suggest several possible interpretations of the meaning of "informed citizen," as well as some interesting possible implications of an informed citizenry under differing conditions. None of these possibilities is presented as definitive, since a great deal more research is needed on the relationship between political information, attitudes and actions.

A good deal of evidence suggests that the informed citizen in Ghana is inclined to feel both politically competent and generally satisfied with the political system and government policy. We have seen that high levels of information are associated with a sense of political competence, high levels of national integration, opposition to the one-party state, confidence that national government and traditional societies are not fundamentally in conflict, and preference for the incumbent regime over previous ones. Where governments are responsive to the needs of the populace, where there is general feeling that government is doing as much as it can given its resources,[66] where there seems to be an opportunity for various segments of the nation to be fairly represented in government, we would expect the kinds of responses we found in Ghana. It should be added that at the time of the survey the government did meet, or could reasonably be expected to meet these expectations. One also suspects that the general feeling of satisfaction reflected a period of grace extended to the new government by a populace weary of the Nkrumah regime.

Another interpretation of these data might suggest that the general level of satisfaction reflected in the more informed respondents was not a consequence of citizen reaction to government policies, but rather illustrates that the informed benefit (or expect to benefit) more than others because they know how to deal with government and gain the greatest possible benefits from its services. If this model is correct, we would anticipate that informed respondents would be economically better off. As we have seen earlier, there is very little association between level of information and economic position. The economic situation in Ghana does not permit the government to distribute economic benefits in a way that would significantly increase *income* for the informed masses. On the other hand, there are many other benefits, like education for one's children, which would not be reflected in economic position.

Finally, satisfaction among the informed public might be a consequence of reception of government cues that the masses should be satisfied.[67] It may be that the positive orientations toward the government are reflections of the response to authority, rather than the result either of government policy or of feelings that the political system has responded to popular desires and demands as much as possible. Certainly this interpretation would explain the lack of significant associations between income and information and voting and information, as well as the moderate association between information and the feeling that the national government and its agencies was helpful.

My own view is that all three of these factors are operative in Ghana. All of them are compatible with the data. At the time of the survey the great expectations about the prospects for both democratic government and economic development clearly contributed to a feeling or expectation of government responsiveness to the citizenry. Governmental responsiveness was also the message be-

---

Presidential Campaign (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954) that reduced participation of the uninterested benefits the system by aiding stability and also provides maneuvering room for political change—change often possible primarily because of indifference. (See especially pp. 314–15.)

[66] Seventy-one per cent of the respondents agreed with that statement, 23 per cent disagreed, and 6 per cent said that they did not know.

[67] In his superb study of politics and symbolism, Murray Edelman suggests that "... individuals' positions on public issues are mobilizable rather than fixed; that government activities are themselves potent influence upon change and mobilization of public attitudes; and that the significant 'outputs' of political activities are not particular public policies labeled as political goals, but rather the creation of political followings and supports: i.e., the evocation of arousal or quiescence in mass publics." See *Politics as Symbolic Action* (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co. 1971), p. 4.

ing proclaimed by the government and especially the semi-independent Centre for Civic Education.[68] Most respondents clearly felt that they would benefit more under the new regime than under the previous regimes. Those who were politically aware were likely to feel these prospects more keenly. Finally, the message of the government, the parties, most civic leaders, and so on, was that the prospects were good for Ghana in 1970. Thus many who had no tangible evidence that this was the case may nonetheless have felt that it was true.

One other interesting finding warrants further comment: the relationship between information and cynicism about politicians. As noted in the last section, the higher the level of political knowledge, the higher the level of cynicism about politicians in Ghana—despite the generally high level of political satisfaction. It is certainly to be expected that where politicians are self-interested, corrupt, ineffective and unresponsive, the informed will be aware of this and be cynical about them. The level of cynicism in Ghana in 1970 may reflect experiences of this sort in the past, or reservations about the good intentions of politicians in the new government. In either case, the relatively strong association between high levels of information and cynicism even in the context of general satisfaction with the national government indicates several important consequences of an informed public. Where the public is not as satisfied as it was in Ghana we would expect the level of cynicism to be very high or to increase. This in turn could lead to instability, alienation, and noncompliance. Governments might respond by trying to reduce the amount of information reaching the citizen. In the short run such actions could only be ineffective, since the knowledge leading to cynicism had already been imparted. More important, it is unlikely that any such actions in Africa would be very effective either in the short or long run. Greatly reducing the amount of information is likely to raise public suspicion about what is going on. In any case, given the large number of states in Africa, their diverging ideologies, the range of radio transmissions, and the difficulty of controlling information crossing borders, it is unlikely that any African nation could succeed in eliminating the transmission of information contrary to that which it wishes its populace to receive. Furthermore, few nations have the equipment or have made a major effort to control outside sources of information. It is true that almost every African nation has censored or controlled local media at various times. In some states laws have been passed against rumors and lies. Ethiopia has even jammed broadcasts from Somalia. Nonetheless, these efforts hav had little effect in controlling the flow of informa tion.

This suggests that in African nations (lik Ghana) with relatively high levels of information the populace will be aware of the nature and ef fectiveness of their governments. Those govern ments which benefit few of their citizens, whil being able to cue some of the citizenry about th "necessity" and "patriotic duty" of support, wil pay a high cost for an informed citizenry. In spit of the advances in the nature of weaponry in th modern age, it seems unlikely that those whc govern can escape the consequences of an informed and potentially active populace. While the consequences may be minimal in the short run, the long-term results may well be revolutionary.

Appendix: The Sample

This paper is based on material gathered in Ghana by the author during a study of national integration in 1970. Approximately three hundred eighty people were interviewed in a survey conducted in six communities varying in population from several hundred to fifty thousand. Five of the communities were rural, one urban. Two of the samples were in the Northern Region, one in the Volta Region, and three in the Eastern Region. The samples in each village were randomly selected and comprised approximately eight per cent of the adult population. The sample was drawn from randomly selected households after each household in the village/town had been numbered. Two individuals, eighteen years or older, selected by means of a table of random numbers, were interviewed in each of the households in the sample.

The communities studied, it should be emphasized, were not selected randomly. This is a "purposive" sample. Each community was chosen because it had characteristics that I felt reflected a variety of conditions which need to be confronted in studying national integration. On the other hand, care was taken to ensure that these communities also generally represented conditions in Ghana as a whole.[69] The rural villages were all

[68] For further discussion, see Fred M. Hayward, "Ghana's Experiment with Civic Education."

[69] The demographic characteristics of these communities very closely approximated the national distribution as illustrated by the 1960 census. For example, the occupational breakdown for the sample indicates close similarity with the national figures. The distribution for the sample was: agriculture, 56%; artisan, 3%; technical, 6%; industrial, 4%; business and trade, 12%; professional, 6%; student, 3%; housewife, 10%; other, 1%. This corresponds closely to the overall occupational breakdown for the whole of Ghana in 1960, which (when adjusted to the categories used here) was: agriculture, 49%; artisan, 5%; technical, 4%; industrial, 4%; business and trade, 12%; professional, 2%; student 2%; housewife, 19%; other, 3%; *1960 Population Census of Ghana* (Accra: Government of Ghana, 1962), vol. 1.

primarily agricultural, relatively stable communities. The urban sample was an administration, trading, and educational center with some light industry. Each rural community was between 10 and 30 miles from a large city, although none was situated on a major road, and the smallest village sampled (250 population) had no road until a few days before the survey.

The interviews averaged 45 minutes in length. Some took more than an hour and a few as little as 30 minutes. The interviews were structured, although approximately five per cent of the questions were openended. Interviews were carried out in the local language by interviewers trained at the University of Ghana at Legon. All but one of the six interviewers had had previous interviewing experience, and most were familiar with social science interviewing techniques and had previously used quantitative material. Most of the questions used in this paper were asked of all respondents in the sample. Some of the questions, including, those on political knowledge, however, were given to approximately one-third of each sample, which explains the lower N shown for some of the data presented. This was done to limit the length of the interview so that it could be completed in one sitting while at the same time allowing a broad enough scope to explore a wide range of interests.

Comment: Further Reassessment of "Conventional Wisdom:" Political Knowledge and Voting Behavior in Rural Kenya*

JOEL D. BARKAN
University of Iowa

In his article, "A Reassessment of Conventional Wisdom About the Informed Public,"[1] Fred Hayward questions the validity of one of the more pervasive assumptions about political behavior in the new states—that the members of these polities, particularly residents of rural areas, are generally uninformed about the political process, and are consequently incapable of meaningful and rational participation in their countries' political life. Presenting survey data from six Ghanaian communities, Hayward argues that the publics of the new states are much better informed about the political process than heretofore supposed. Indeed, on some dimensions, these publics may be even better informed than the publics of polities regarded as more developed.

Hayward's finding is significant, for it suggests that the members of peasant societies may be far more integrated into the national political systems of their countries than is usually assumed. Peasants residing on the periphery of these societies may in fact be "citizens" of the new nations emerging within their societies' boundaries despite the parochial and traditional settings in which they live. They may be reasonably well linked to central government institutions. They may have well-defined sets of expectations as to how the members of these institutions should behave. And they may participate in the political process in a highly rational manner given their interests as they define them, and the opportunities for such participation which occur in their communities.

Though important and highly suggestive, Hayward's findings, and the argument it supports, need to be buttressed by additional evidence and research, as Hayward himself notes. Hayward's measures of political knowledge are relatively sparse.[2] Most frustrating from the standpoint of this writer is the absence of a more extensive discussion of the relationship between political knowledge and political behavior among his respondents. Hayward explores the relationship in respect to only one aspect of one type of behavior, the frequency of voting in parliamentary elections, and reports that contrary to his expectation, the correlation between political knowledge and whether his respondents voted was very low (.16).

Had Hayward also investigated *how* his respondents had voted, and *why*, he might have discovered that the existence of informed publics on the periphery of the new states is complemented by rational political behavior on the part of these publics, behavior which appears in turn to affect the behavior of those who purport to be political leaders. This possibility can be demonstrated with data obtained from a series of surveys conducted by Professor John J. Okumu and myself in thirteen parliamentary constituencies in rural Kenya in May, 1974[3]—data which confirm Hayward's finding that peasants are highly knowledgeable about some aspects of the political process, and that the "conventional wisdom" needs to be reassessed.

Like Hayward's Ghanaian respondents, a very high proportion of the Kenyan respondents—89 per cent—correctly volunteered the name of their member of parliament when asked who he was.[4] Since our respondents were not queried on the other items through which Hayward measured

* I am indebted to John J. Okumu of the University of Dar es Salaam for his advice and collaboration on the field research on which this note is based. I would also like to acknowledge the helpful comments of three colleagues at the University of Iowa: Michael Lewis-Beck, Douglas Madsen, and Donald McCrone. Data for this discussion are derived from a comparative study on the relationships between legislators and their constituents in Kenya, Korea, and Turkey, sponsored by the Comparative Legislative Research Center of the University of Iowa.

[1] Fred M. Hayward, "A Reassessment of Conventional Wisdom About the Informed Public: National Political Information in Ghana," *American Political Science Review*, 70 (June, 1976), pp. 433–451.

[2] Hayward presents little or no data on how the members of his sample conceived of the most significant issues which dominated Ghanaian political life at the time of his study, nor of their conceptions of national political institutions and the roles played by various actors in these institutions, nor of the activities through which Ghanaians participate in the political process. Given the vagaries of the research climate in which he worked, most of these omissions may be the result of Hayward's prudence rather than oversight.

[3] An additional survey was conducted in an urban constituency, the findings from which are not our main concern. In all, three hundred adult citizens were sampled in each of the constituencies for a total N of 4,128. Sampling procedures consisted of a random selection of thirty sampling plots a quarter mile in diameter in each constituency followed by the selection of ten respondents within each plot according to quota criteria.

[4] The range across the thirteen rural constituencies was 65 to 99 per cent, while the figure for the one urban con-

political knowledge in Ghana, we cannot replicate this summary scale. Given our other findings, we expect the distribution on such a scale would have been similar had this line of questioning been pursued. Equally significant, are the data obtained regarding the role expectations Kenyans hold of their MPs.

When asked which of seven activities they regarded as the most important for their MPs to perform, an overwhelming proportion of the respondents in the thirteen constituencies cited activities which constitute linkages between the publics on the periphery of the political systems of the new states and the central government[5] (see Table 1).

Table 1. Most important activity which Kenyan MPs should perform

Linkage Activities	
Explain government policies to constituents:	7%
Tell government what people in district want:	29
Obtain projects and benefits for the district:	25
Visit district frequently:	11
Non-Linkage Activities	
Take active part in the debates of the National Assembly and pass bills:	5%
Help constituents with their personal problems:	6
Help solve conflicts in the community:	2
TOTAL LINKAGE	71%
TOTAL NON-LINKAGE	13
No answer and don't know	16
N=	(3,828)

The strong belief that MPs should communicate the views of their constituents to the central government and strive to obtain resources for their districts, when coupled with the relatively low incidence of no answers, suggests that the publics of peasant societies not only have a general knowledge of the political process as argued by Hayward, but also a well-defined conception of the roles their political leaders should play.[6] Even more important, these role expectations appear to have been the basis for the respondents' evaluations of their MPs, and their voting decisions when these leaders sought re-election in October, 1974.

The relationship between the respondents' role expectations and their voting decisions is presented in Figure 1 in the form of a causal model explaining the vote received by the eleven MPs of the thirteen representing our sample constituencies who stood for re-election. To construct the model, the percentage of the vote received by these incumbent legislators was regressed on the number of candidates who stood for election in their districts in October, 1974, and on an aggregate evaluation score of the MPs' performance derived from the district surveys. The evaluation scores were computed by taking the rating each respondent accorded his MP for that activity which he had previously said was the most important for his MP to perform. These activities were rated on a three point scale of "Very Active," "Somewhat Active," and "Not Active." The aggregate evaluation score for each district is thus the percentage of respondents in the district who rated their MP as "Very Active" on the activity they regarded as most important.

Upon computing the correlations and path coefficients for the model, we found support for the expectation that the respondents' ability to evaluate MPs according to their role expectations would be related to their voting decisions. As shown by the figure, low evaluations of MP performance result in an increased number of candidates as more and more would-be challengers jump into the race. Virtually all of the challengers are local notables who are in a position to discern voter sentiment accurately, albeit unsystematically. The message to incumbent MPs is clear: either they carry out their duties in conformity with the role expectations of their constituents, or face a stiff challenge at the next election.[7]


The reader will note that the high correlation coefficient for the relationship between the vote received by incumbents and the evaluation scores washes out upon controlling for the number of

stituency was 56 per cent. Given similar results from our Korean and Turkish surveys, we expect that Hayward would have also reported a higher level of political information on the part of his rural respondents, had he presented separate findings for his urban and rural communities.

[5] Similar results were found in all thirteen constituencies. Moreover, the MPs for these districts also reported that these were the activities on which they spent most of their time. For more on the congruence of the role expectations held by Kenyan constituents and their elected representatives, see Joel D. Barkan and John J. Okumu, "Political Linkage in Kenya," in *Political Parties and Linkage*, ed. Kay Lawson (forthcoming, 1976).

[6] Space does not permit a more extensive presentation of data which demonstrate the delegate roles Kenyan constituents expect their MP to play. Suffice to say Table 1 is but one indication of this expectation.

[7] A detailed discussion on how our respondents arrived at their evaluation of their MPs given their role expectations is beyond the scope of this essay. In brief, high evaluation scores were accorded to those MPs who were most successful at organizing self-help development projects in their constituencies (e.g., schools, health clinics, roads), and/or those who obtained central government assistance for these projects.



Multiple correlation	.68
Multiple correlation, adjusted for small n[f]	.64
n =	11
Significance	.09

[a] Beta weights for model appear without parentheses, while correlation coefficients (Pearson r) appear with parentheses.
[b] "Serious" candidates are those who ultimately received at least 5% of the vote.
[c] Significant at .011.
[d] Significant at .001.
[e] Significant at .034.
[f] J. P. Guilford, *Fundamental Statistics of Psychology and Education* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), pp. 400–401.

Figure 1. Regression model explaining vote received by incumbent Kenyan MPs in election of 1974[a]

candidates in the race. This is, of course, what should occur if the respondents' evaluations determined the size of the election fields, which in turn determined the levels of the incumbents' vote. This indirect effect of the aggregate evaluation scores on the incumbents' vote can be seen by computing the coefficient[8] for the path which is .52 $(-.81 \times -.64)$. The finding suggests that residents of the rural areas of developing countries not only evaluate their representatives according to some well-defined criteria of what these representatives should do, but also that their opinions are heard and sometimes heeded!

The foregoing analysis has been made to extend Hayward's argument about the significance of informed publics in the new states by shedding some additional light on the nature of voting behavior in one such society. Given these findings, and Hayward's, citizens living in the rural/traditional sector appear to be more integrated into the national political system, and to be more rational participants in that system than students of political development usually assume. But if these findings are valid, why has such a basic aspect of political life in these countries been so frequently ignored?

The answer lies partly with the paucity of field research on mass political behavior in peasant societies, particularly in Africa, and with the conceptual frameworks students of political development usually bring to bear on their subject. While the first is often a function of research opportunities beyond scholarly control, the second is a function of the questions asked. Given our preoccupation with the development of national political institutions, we usually ask how such institutions, and their personnel might more effectively pene-

[8] For a recent discussion of effect coefficients see Michael Lewis-Beck and Lawrence B. Mohr, "Evaluating Effects of Independent Variables," *Political Methodology* (Winter, 1976).

rate the periphery and assimilate the residents of the periphery into the national political system.[9] Rarely do we ask how those on the periphery are already attempting to penetrate the center; rather we ask how national institutions might be created to accommodate increased participation when it occurs. Because central political institutions in these societies are often fragile, and cannot accommodate such participation, it is assumed that little occurs on the periphery that is conducive to the development of the national system. Put differently, we tend to view political development as a "top down" phenomenon which begins at the center of the new states, and which is initiated by "modern," i.e., Western-educated people. As the questionable assumptions of the "conventional wisdom" should make painfully clear, we have probably neglected an important part of the story. Perhaps it is time to examine political change more systematically from the "bottom up," by taking a careful look at what is happening on the boundaries *vis-à-vis* the center of these polities.[10]

[9] To cite but two notable examples of this perspective which have set the course followed by others: Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), and Leonard Binder et al., *Crises and Sequences in Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971).

[10] The literature on patron-client relationships in the new states is a start in this direction, though virtually none of this literature presents any data on the nature of the individual attitudes and behavior of those who are a party to such relationships. See John Duncan Powell, "Peasant Society and Clientelist Politics," *American Political Science Review*, 64 (June, 1970), 411–25; René Lemarchand and Keith Legg, "Political Clientelism and Ethnicity in Tropical Africa: Competing Solidarities in Nation-Building," *American Political Science Review*, 66 (March, 1972) 68–90; and James C. Scott, "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change," *American Political Science Review*, 66 (March, 1972), 91–113.

Clashing Beliefs Within the Executive Branch: The Nixon Administration Bureaucracy*

JOEL D. ABERBACH
The University of Michigan
BERT A. ROCKMAN
The University of Pittsburgh

Introduction

When presidential administrations change, uncertainty and tension rise within the American federal bureaucracy. New program priorities and emphases and the introduction of new personnel create some inevitable difficulties of adjustment under the best of circumstances. Politically appointed executives with typically short career spans and often limited experience in bureaucratic politics must learn to come to grips rapidly with the complexities of their jobs.[1] With astonishing quickness they must come to know whom they can trust among their career subordinates; who among them will be cooperative and loyal and who will not.

For their part, senior career executives must discover whether changes at the top of their agencies, divisions, and bureaus imply changes in policy direction and alterations in opportunities for exercising discretion. Further, the career executive must ask himself whether he can continue to function effectively if policy directions change sharply or if administrative relationships are altered drastically. If the answer to these questions is no, what solutions will he seek? Should he step down in order to allow his appointed superiors a freer hand in choosing more compatible subordinates?[2] Or will he attempt to employ the political leverage that comes with long years of experience in nurturing affected interest groups and appropriate congressional committees?[3] The ambience of political change is captured by an official in the Agriculture Department who, according to David Stanley, suggested that new political executives and career administrators" . . . go around sniffing each other like dogs."[4] The American system of government with its fragmented centers of authority provides unusual opportunities for administrators to undermine the initiatives of their political directors, though the risks of doing so are obvious.

All of these tensions within the American federal bureaucracy are exacerbated when a change in the White House is accompanied by a change in partisan control. This is especially true when the changeover is from Democratic to Republican control because of Republican suspicions that the career bureaucracy is heavily infiltrated by Democrats. Thus, the Eisenhower administration came into office determined to weed out large numbers of Democratic bureaucrats and to reclassify a number of administrative positions from civil service status to Schedule "C" or policy-appointive status.[5] The Eisenhower administration, in short, suspected the federal bureaucracy of disloyalty to its own policy preferences. If the administration's rhetoric in this regard ultimately outpaced the scope of its actions, nevertheless, President Eisenhower himself remarked after his first six months in office that, "You could see that there was a very, very great, almost revolutionary activity necessary

* This is a revised version of a paper presented at the 1974 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois. We are grateful for financial support from the Ford Foundation and the National Science Foundation. Joel Aberbach also wishes to acknowlege assistance from the Institute of Public Policy Studies at The University of Michigan and Bert Rockman acknowledges assistance from a Faculty of Arts and Sciences Grant from the University of Pittsburgh. We also wish to thank Fred Greenstein for his very helpful comments on an earlier draft of this manuscript.

[1] For a discussion of the turnover rates of politically appointed executives contrasted with career administrators, see Eugene B. McGregor, Jr., "Politics and the Career Mobility of Bureaucrats," *American Political Science Review*, 68 (March, 1974), 24. For a discussion of the adjustments required by newly appointed executives, see Marver H. Bernstein, *The Job of the Federal Executive* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1958), pp. 10–37.

[2] According to Marver Bernstein (p. 60), the select group of career administrators participating in the Round Table he conducted argued "that a political executive ought to have some freedom in changing career executives."

[3] For a general and insightful analysis of the problem of administrative control, see Norton Long, "Power and Administration," *Public Administration Review*, 9 (Autumn, 1949), 257–269.

[4] David T. Stanley, *Changing Administrations* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1965), p. 87.

[5] See Herman Miles Somers, "The Federal Bureaucracy and the Change of Administration," *American Political Science Review*, 48 (March, 1954), 131–151, and Lewis Mainzer, *Political Bureaucracy* (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Co., 1973), p. 107. In the context of the initial days of the Eisenhower administration, Somers adds (p. 136) that " . . . when the agency heads first arrived they brought with them a profound distrust of the inherited bureaucracy. A frequent complaint was 'I don't know whom I can trust.' "

to pick up where others had left off and to begin again because there were opposing policies and ideas coming in after twenty years of another type of philosophy."[6]

The Nixon administration also came to power suspicious of the existing bureaucracy. The tone of the administration's rhetoric stressed the philosophy of decentralization and substantial curtailment of some of the directions undertaken in the previous eight years of Democratic rule. Moreover, the rhetoric in this case was followed by action. The administration wanted to eviscerate, not merely consolidate, a number of programs advanced in the Johnson years including, for example, many of the programs associated with the "war on poverty." Suspicious of the responsiveness and loyalties of administrators, the Nixon administration's litmus test of loyalty often went beyond even the partisan affiliations of the administrators to rather exacting ideological standards of loyalty.[7]

Documents recently released reveal, in sometimes colorful terms, the high level of mistrust within the Nixon administration toward the federal bureaucracy. In a taped conversation of April 19, 1971, Richard Nixon, himself, lectured George Schultz, then Director of OMB, on the need to enforce bureaucratic discipline.

> You've got to get us some discipline, George. You've got to get it, and the only way you get it, is when a bureaucrat thumbs his nose, we're going to get him. . . . They've got to know, that if they do it, something's going to happen to them, where anything can happen. I know the Civil Service pressure. But you can do a lot there. There are many unpleasant places where Civil Service people can be sent. We just don't have any discipline in government. That's our trouble. Now I'm getting a little around the White House, uh, but we got to get it in these departments. . . . So whatever you—well, maybe he is in the regional office. Fine. Demote him or send him to the Guam regional office. There's a way. Get him the hell out.[8]

This suspiciousness, at least in part, was grounded in the belief that the career civil servants were politically hostile to the Nixon administration. In a manual prepared for political appointees by White House personnel and sarcastically dedicated to the United States Civil Service Commission, the administration's appointees were warned that the career service was politically stacked against the administration: "Because of the rape of the career service by the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations . . . this Administration has been left a legacy of finding disloyalty and obstruction at high levels while those incumbents rest comfortably on career civil service status."[9]

Although the thrust of these hostile statements is directed at the career civil servants, the Nixon administration also became increasingly wary of some of its own appointees,[10] and as we will note later, there was some foundation for this attitude.

The conditions making for high levels of tension within the federal bureaucracy, then, were at high tide during the Nixon years. The purpose of this article is to examine clashes of political belief within the federal bureaucracy during the Nixon administration, to investigate the bases of conflicting beliefs, and to discuss the implications of our findings for the future conduct of administrative politics within the executive branch.

The Sample and Data

The data discussed here are drawn from the American segment of a comparative study of bureaucratic and political elites in nine countries.[11] Interviews were conducted in 1970 with 126 administrators from eighteen federal agencies within the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area.[12] The administrators all came from agencies whose primary responsibilities are in the domestic policy areas; administrators in defense and foreign affairs

[6] Eisenhower Press Conference Transcript, *The New York Times*, July 23, 1953, as quoted in Somers, p. 142.

[7] Witness, for example, the firing of liberal Republican Leon Panetta in early 1970 as Director of the Office of Civil Rights in HEW. It is interesting as well to contrast the administration's firing of Secretary of the Interior Walter Hickel and five of his line subordinates with President Eisenhower's genteel handling of his Secretary of the Treasury, George Humphrey, who vociferously opposed the Eisenhower budget in public.

[8] Transcript of April 19, 1971 meeting published in *The New York Times*, July 20, 1974, p. 14.

[9] U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, *Executive Session Hearings*, "Watergate and Related Activities—Use of Incumbency-Responsiveness Program," 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, 1973, Exhibit 35, V. 19, p. 9006. Further, in testimony before the Senate Select Committee, H. R. Haldeman, the White House Chief of Staff, argued that the Nixon administration was faced with ". . . the continuing problem of bureaucracy responsiveness, where decisions are made at the top, and get diverted on a highly political basis at a lower level to a direction other than the policy of the department would have indicated" (v. 18, 8181–8182). For similar views expressed by Harry S. Flemming of the Nixon staff, see "Government Commentary: Nixon vs. the Veteran Bureaucrats," *Business Week*, August 1, 1970, p. 31.

[10] For evidence of this, see, Lewis Beman, "President-Less Government in Washington," *Fortune* (January 1974), pp. 74–76 and 160–162; and John Herbers, "Nixon's Presidency: Centralized Control," *The New York Times*, March 6, 1973, Section I, pp. 1 and 20.

[11] The countries involved, in addition to the United States, are Britain, France, Italy, Morocco, The Netherlands, Sweden, West Germany, and Jamaica. Our colleagues on the larger project are Samuel J. Eldersveld, Thomas J. Anton, Ronald F. Inglehart, Robert D. Putnam, Archibald Singham, and John Waterbury.

[12] The agencies are: Agriculture, Commerce, HEW, HUD, Interior, Justice, Labor, Transportation, Treasury, GSA, OEO, FCC, FPC, FTC, ICC, SEC, SBA, and the VA.

agencies were excluded from the sample frame. Officials were stratified by position, and samples were drawn of those formally designated as "political executives" and of career civil servants under civil service jurisdiction with supergrade status (GS 16–18). The response rate was 87.5 per cent, i.e., we interviewed 126 of the 144 administrators contacted.

Political executives were defined as persons holding "policy" positions at approximately the level of Assistant Secretary who were formally appointed by the President and passed with the advice of the Senate (PAS) or officials on Executive Level Schedule C or those holding NEA (Non-Career Executive Assignment) job designations with GS rankings of 16 or higher. Hierarchically, but depending upon the particular agency, the C and NEA officials ranged from the levels of Deputy Assistant Secretary to Bureau or Division Chief to Program Chief. The career civil servants all held Career Executive Assignment (CEA) status. In order to be considered in the sampling universe each supergrade CEA had to be the *top* career official within a particular administrative subunit. When two or more supergrade career officials held positions of parallel rank within a given subunit hierarchy, all were considered members of the sampling universe. Sixty-one political executives and sixty-five supergrade career civil servants were interviewed, with response rates of 80 and 96 per cent respectively.

To be eligible for the sample, officials had to be full-time in their jobs and occupy positions with administrative responsibility for some program or set of programs. In other words, officials serving in the offices of the Secretary, or Agency Director, or Agency Administrator, and executives serving in internal agency administration (Personnel, Public Information, etc.) were eliminated. Our goal was to interview political appointees and high-level career civil servants whose jobs clearly entailed a responsibility for policy making and implementation.

The interviews were designed to tap the political attitudes, values, and beliefs of the respondents.[13] A standard interview schedule was used in the study, but the questions were open-ended and discussions with the respondents were often wide-ranging. Our goal was to conduct the interview in a style resembling a conversation so as to put the respondent at his ease and elicit thoughtful and, where appropriate, complex answers to our questions. The vast majority of the interviews (121) were tape recorded and then fully transcribed. All interviews were coded by two highly trained coders for both the manifest responses and, in many instances, the latent features (i.e., indirect aspects) of the respondents' answers. This long and difficult process enabled us to capture much of the subtlety and nuance of the responses. Intercoder reliability coefficients (Tb's) were calculated for all ordinal items to measure agreement between the coders. Most divergencies were reconciled in meetings of the coders and study directors.

The Setting: Party Differences in the Federal Bureaucracy

Presidents and their administrative appointees hold power only briefly. Assistant secretaries, deputy assistant secretaries, and others holding politically appointed positions come and go under the watchful eyes of career administrators. Conflicts between those who hold office temporarily and those who do so more permanently may be the exception rather than the rule. But conflicts at times are unavoidable, and the suspicions that help to generate them are particularly likely to heighten under Republican administrations because of the belief that the career bureaucracy is a bastion of Democratic sympathy and, hence, is politically undependable.

The suspicion that the career bureaucracy may be disinclined toward the objectives of Republican administrations has substantial grounding in fact. It is clear from Table 1, for instance, that the representation of Republicans in the senior career positions of the federal bureaucracy is quite low.[14] There is some reason to believe, further, that some of the administrators who identified themselves as Independents did so because of a sensitivity to questions dealing with partisanship, especially in 1970 at the time of the interviewing when many bureaucrats feared for their jobs. As we shall see later, Independents more frequently resemble Democrats than Republicans.

In any event, the belief that a Republican administration does not have natural political allies within the federal bureaucracy seems well-justified. Indeed, the proportion of Democratic "political appointees" in Table 1 is somewhat artifactual. The bulk of Democratic appointees are actually holdovers from the previous Democratic administration rather than appointments of the Nixon administration. Only two of the Democratic appointees in our sample actually were appointed during the Nixon administration. Most of the

[13] We cannot fully describe the interview instrument and methods used in the study in the limited space available to us here. Details about the interviews and coding procedures can be found in Joel D. Aberbach, James D. Chesney, and Bert A. Rockman, "Exploring Elite Political Attitudes: Some Methodological Lessons," *Political Methodology*, 2 (Winter, 1975), 1–27.

[14] Bernard Mennis's study of career foreign service officers notes that only 5 per cent of the FSO's considered themselves to be Republicans. See Bernard Mennis, *American Foreign Policy Officials* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1971), p. 121.

Table 1. Party Affiliation by Job Status

Formal Job Designation[b]	Party Affiliation[a] Republican		Independent		Democrat		Totals (*N*)
High Political Appointee (i.e., PAS designation)	81%	66%	6	10	13	24	100% (16)
Middle Level Appointee (i.e., Schedule C, MEA designation)	59%		12		29		100% (41)
Supergrade Career	17%		36		47		100% (58)
			Gamma = .58				*N* = 115

[a] Party affiliation was measured by asking the administrators whether they normally voted for one party or the other. Those who said that they did not normally vote for one party or the other were coded as Independents. A very small number of administrators (8) refused to answer the question, and one indicated that he typically did not vote and had no party leaning. One administrator indicated that he normally supported a minor party, and we were unable to ask the question of one other administrator. These account for the eleven "missing" responses. Seven of these "missing" responses are located within the career group.

[b] Because of the small number of PAS designated appointees in our sample, hereafter analyses involving the job status variable will distinguish only between appointees and career administrators.

Democratic holdovers, in fact, are experts and professionals in jobs which emphasize a high degree of professional expertise.[15] Indeed, had we split the sample so as to distinguish between administrators with a clear political appointment and those who, while appointed, are largely professionals and experts, the correlation between job status and party affiliation would be slightly higher.[16] Obviously, one possible source of tension derives from this marked relationship between administrative job status and party affiliation. Republican appointees confront an overwhelmingly non-Republican career bureaucracy.

Furthermore, as Table 2 indicates, Democrats and Independents disproportionately inhabit certain key agencies. Of the eighteen domestic agencies from which our sample was drawn, three agencies—HEW, HUD, and OEO—are involved primarily in programs with large expenditures for social services. In the main, the services performed by these agencies are directed toward constituencies that are heavily inclined toward the Democratic party in terms of electoral support. Moreover, the organized interest group clienteles affected by most of the programs of these three "social service" agencies are often professional associations and social cause organizations with informal, but substantial, ties with the Democratic party nationally. A Republican administration bent upon controlling the activities of these agencies faces not only the natural tendency of administrators to see things in terms of agency perspectives, but also the additional barrier of disproportionately low Republican representation within the social service agencies.

[15] Some of the middle appointee positions do not change hands regardless of the party in the White House because a portion of the jobs within this category stress professional expertise and experience. In other instances, the incumbents often have formidable political links with interest-group or congressional constituencies so that it is politically unprofitable for an administration to replace them. See David T. Stanley, *Changing Administrations*, pp. 136–137. On the other hand, the attempts of the Nixon administration to centralize appointment procedures through the White House even for jobs of this sort probably has decreased the proportion of Democrats remaining in formally appointive positions. See, for instance, John Herbers, "Nixon's Presidency: Expansion of Power," *The New York Times*, March 4, 1973, Section I, pp. 1, 47–48.

[16] The gamma coefficient between party affiliation and a slightly revised job status code is .65. This revised job status code distinguishes between appointees who are obviously political and those who are apparently nonpolitical.

Table 2. Party Affiliation by Agency

Agency[a]	Party Affiliation Republican	Independent	Democrat	Totals
Social Service Agencies (i.e., HEW, HUD, OEO)	24%	30	46	100% (33)
Other Agencies	46%	21	33	100% (82)
		Gamma = −.32		

[a] Hereafter, the Agency variable will be dichotomized in this manner.

It would not be surprising, therefore, to see differences in the outlooks of administrators across agency lines, political appointee versus career strata, and party affiliation. As our data will demonstrate, differences in party affiliation also permeate and further reinforce differences based upon agency and appointee-career distinctions.

We now investigate the influences of these variables upon the beliefs of American federal executives.

Clashing Beliefs in the Federal Bureaucracy

The main focus of this article deals with clashes in belief within the upper reaches of the Nixon administration bureaucracy in 1970. Our interviews covered a wide variety of attitudes and beliefs, but we will concentrate here on two of fundamental importance to domestic policy making and implementation.

In coding the study we constructed a summary measure of each respondent's position on a left-right dimension defined in terms of government provision of social services.[17] The coders examined the entire interview, especially questions which asked the interviewee to consider whether the government must play a greater role in the nation's economic affairs than it does now, to describe what kind of society would be desirable for the next generation and what practical changes would be necessary to achieve it, and to distinguish political liberalism from conservatism. The respondents were placed along a five point continuum ranging from support for a much greater government role in the provision of social services, to endorsement of the status quo, to support for much more private enterprise and individual initiative in welfare matters. While reading through the interviews and coding the administrators' responses along this scale was obviously not a simple task, our coders were in perfect agreement almost 50 per cent of the time and disagreed by more than one step along the scale only 12 per cent of the time.[18] The left-right social services dimension represents a fundamental issue in American politics and one which concerned the administration as it struggled to modify and control the social policies of the nation.

The second index we will examine is one which measures administrators' beliefs that there is equity in the representation of interests in the American political process. The discussion of the issue took place in a section of the interview devoted to assessing the pattern of influence over policy decisions in the United States and the necessity, if any, for increasing citizen participation in governmental affairs. Answers to the question "Do you think there are groups in American society whose interests are not sufficiently considered?" were coded initially with a combination code which provided (a) the administrator's direct response to the question, itself, and (b) the accompanying reason the administrator gave for his response. The combination codes were then reduced to an eight point continuum ranging from a response and justification that highly favored the status quo (e.g., a belief that all groups have their interests adequately considered, even though some groups will always consider themselves under-represented) to responses and justifications that strongly favored redistribution (e.g., some groups are under-represented while the highly organized, traditional interests are over-represented). The inter-coder reliability coefficient for this eight-point scale is Tb = .66. In our analysis, the eight-point scale was collapsed into a three-point continuum making for even higher reliability. In the middle of this continuum are respondents who believe that all groups are adequately considered, but who then attach qualifications to this statement by stressing factors such as the difference between equitable consideration and equitable solutions or the belief that while all groups are considered adequately some groups may be excessively considered. To one side of this middle set of respondents are those who believe unreservedly that all groups are considered adequately or that if they are not it is their own fault rather than a system defect which accounts for it. On the other side are those who believe that some groups fail to receive adequate consideration in the political process. Overall, almost two-thirds of the administrators fell into this latter category.

The importance of this variable, which we label "equity of representation," is that it indicates a predisposition on the part of administrators to support changes altering the ordinary ways in which government operates so as to represent groups not considered adequately through the complex maze of legislative and bureaucratic channels. The labyrinth that government often represents for the less organized sectors in society can be altered only if there is a perception that some groups cannot be heard effectively.

[17] Placement on the left-right continuum was predicated on a respondent's support for, or opposition to, programs that allocate public funds for social services. The term social services was given a broad operational definition in this code. A respondent's views on traditional social welfare programs and more recent extensions of these bore heavily on where he was placed on the continuum. The respondent's discussions of proposals for more public goods and services aimed at improving the lot of the socially and economically disadvantaged were also relevant in determining his or her score on the left-right continuum.

[18] The summary coefficient of intercoder reliability for this measure is $T_b = .41$. For procedures used to reconcile coding discrepancies, and for a discussion of T_b as a very conservative measure of intercoder reliability see Aberbach et al., pp. 16–19 and 23.

Though the left-right social services continuum emphasizes substantive policy orientations, and the equity of representation continuum emphasizes procedural equality, the two variables are strongly correlated in the expected direction; gamma = .55. The strong relationship between them suggests that they represent fairly coherent elements of a political belief system. But the two variables are also conceptually and empirically distinct, and, as we shall see, their relationships to other variables differ somewhat.

The Left-Right Social Services Continuum. Table 3 indicates the relationships between the three variables discussed in the previous section—party affiliation, agency, and job status—and the left-right continuum on the role of government in social affairs. Before looking at the relationships themselves, it is worthwhile examining the marginals showing the distribution of the administrators along the left-right continuum. The distribution is skewed to the left, with a heavy emphasis among administrators on much more or at least some additional government involvement in the provision of social services, but the modal category is an endorsement of the present balance between governmental and non-governmental activities. The desire to roll back government involvement is a distinctly minority position. The overwhelming majority of high-level administrators support at least the current level of government effort in the provision of social services, although, of course, they may oppose particular policies or actions.

The general agreement that at least the current level of government provision of social services should be maintained and the disagreement about where to go from here can be seen in Table 3b, which displays the relationship between party affiliation and the left-right continuum, and in Table 3c, where agency is the independent variable. In 3b nearly half of the Democrats are in favor of much more government effort, and 24 per cent lean toward some additional activities. Only 11 per cent favor the present balance, and 5 per cent want to change the system drastically to allow a much greater emphasis on individual enterprise and ini-

Table 3. The Left-Right Social Services Continuum by Party Affiliation, Agency, and Job Status

	Left-Right Social Services Continuum					
	For Much More Government Provision of Social Services (Left)	For Some Additional Government Provision (Left-Center)	For Present Balance (Center)	For Less Government Provision (Right-Center)	For Much Less Government Provision of Social Services (Right)	Totals (*N*)
A. *Marginal Distribution for the Left-Right Social Services Continuum*	26%	18	30	16	10	100% (114)
B. *Party Affiliation*						
Republican	7%	9	43	25	16	100% (44)
Independent	24%	24	28	12	12	100% (25)
Democrat	49%	24	11	11	5	100% (37)
			Gamma = −.53			
C. *Agency*						
Social Service (HEW, HUD, OEO)	53%	18	21	6	3	101%[a] (34)
Other	15%	18	34	20	14	101%[a] (80)
			Gamma = .60			
C. *Job Status*						
Political Appointees (Pooled)	20%	13	35	20	11	99%[a] (54)
Career Supergrades	32%	22	25	12	10	101%[a] (60)
			Gamma = −.24			

[a] Totals do not equal 100% because of rounding.

tiative. The opposite is the case for the Republicans. A mere 7 per cent favor much more government involvement in the nation's provision of social services, and 41 per cent favor some or much *less* government activity in the social area. It should be noted, however, that the modal Republican response endorses the current balance. This endorsement often is stated with regret, and an acknowledgement that the current situation and the history of government involvement in the provision of social services requires that the government at least continue its current efforts. In a sense, there are two separate conflicts over the role of government in the provision of social services which are detailed in the data: one is between the Democrats and the Republicans, with the Democrats strongly supporting a much greater government role; the other is within the Republican party between those who endorse the current balance and those who want to shift to a smaller role for government and a greater emphasis on the individual in providing for his own welfare and security.

The relationship between the agency the administrator serves and his position on the left-right continuum (Table 3c) is, not surprisingly, also very strong. People in the social service agencies almost always endorse a greater government role in the provision of social services, while those in other agencies are more divided on the subject. Support for the current balance is the modal tendency for administrators in non–social service agencies, with responses quite evenly distributed around the center position.

The association between job status and position on the left-right continuum (Table 3d) is clearly the weakest of the three displayed in Table 3. Nevertheless, the modal response for appointees is support for the status quo, while the modal response for career civil servants calls for much more government provision of social services. A sizeable proportion, however, even of the political appointees of the Republican administration (33 per cent) believe that the government should provide either much more in the way of social services or at least some services in addition to those provided now.

Part of the reason for this support for change in the status quo by the political executives is made clear in Table 4, which depicts the relationship between party affiliation and the left-right continuum with job status controlled. While Democratic political appointees are not numerous, they are quite as liberal in their notions about the role of government in the provision of social services as are the Democratic career administrators. As the reader may recall from our earlier discussion, a majority of the Democratic political appointees are holdovers from the Johnson administration, most of them in NEA or C level positions requiring special expertise. A few appointees also are blacks clearly chosen to indicate concern for minority interests. These individuals, plus a few Independents, represent most of the support among political appointees for a more liberal role for government in providing social services to the populace.

A look at the relationship among career bureaucrats also aids in understanding the relatively modest correlation between job status and position on the left-right continuum. The number of Republican career bureaucrats in our sample is small, but they are further to the right on the left-right measure than any group we have looked at. Most of these career Republicans, however, are

Table 4. The Left-Right Social Services Continuum by Party Affiliation Controlling for Job Status

Political Appointees (Pooled)						
Left-Right Social Services Continuum						
Party Affiliation	Left	Left-Center	Center	Right-Center	Right	Totals (*N*)
Republican	6%	9	50	23	12	100% (34)
Independent	50%	—	17	17	17	101%[a] (6)
Democrat	42%	33	—	17	8	100% (12)
			Gamma = −.44			
Career Supergrades						
Left-Right Social Services Continuum						
Party Affiliation	Left	Left-Center	Center	Right-Center	Right	Totals (*N*)
Republican	10%	10	20	30	30	100% (10)
Independent	16%	32	32	10	10	100% (19)
Democrat	52%	20	16	8	4	100% (25)
			Gamma = −.56			

[a] Total does not equal 100% because of rounding.

not in the social service agencies and have little to do directly with the formulation or implementation of policy in the social services area.

Table 5 displays the relationship between party affiliation and the left-right continuum controlling for agency. The gamma coefficients are very high especially for the administrators in the social service agencies. More than 90 per cent of the Democrats in the social service agencies favor much more government involvement in the provision of social services.[19] This contrasts with only 11 per cent of the Republicans in the same agencies. In the non–social service agencies the relationship is substantial (Gamma = −.40), but not so strong as in the social service agencies. Democrats are still much more liberal than Republicans, but the contrasts are not quite so great.

A close examination of the table reveals that the Republicans in the social service agencies are more liberal than those in the non–social service agencies.[20] If one assumes that this contrast carries over when Republicans administering social services are contrasted with Republicans in the Executive Office of the President, then it is likely that Republicans in the social service agencies were engaged in unusually difficult struggles over policy with both the Democrats in their agencies and other forces in the administration. The *N*'s are small enough so that we must be cautious in interpreting these data, but the difficulties which HEW, HUD, and OEO experienced during the Nixon administration bear out this interpretation.

[19] Seventy-nine per cent of the Democrats in the social service agencies are career civil servants, compared to 59 per cent in the non–social service agencies. Remember that most of the Democrats in appointed positions are in the NEA and C classifications.

[20] The gamma coefficient for Republicans between agency and the left-right social services continuum is .42. It is .95 for Democrats, among whom the overwhelming majority of social services administrators are very liberal.

Beliefs About Representational Equity. The belief that the political system works with virtual perfection in assuring that all groups have their needs met is essentially conservative for it assumes that there is no need to reform representational procedures in government. During the 1960s a number of programs were developed in an effort to make government less complicated and more responsive to traditionally under-represented and less participative groups. These groups usually possess little knowledge of the paths of access to government and typically have little leverage they can bring to bear upon conventional processes of representation. Some of the "Great Society" programs of the 1960s—legal services, for example—were designed to grant economically and politically disadvantaged citizens the opportunity to employ the resources of government in order to equalize their standing before the courts. Other programs, such as Model Cities, were designed to grant citizens who normally have little political access the opportunity to participate in the development of community institutions and services that would be more responsive to their needs. Whether these and other programs have worked as intended is a debatable question, but they certainly have been controversial.

The normal constituency of a Republican administration includes few of the ostensibly underrepresented groups in American society. Because of this, Republicans should be less likely to perceive representational inequities in the first place and, thus, less likely to support reforms aimed at equalizing the opportunities of citizens to influence government. Attempting to redress inequities in representation requires that these inequities be

Table 5. The Left-Right Social Services Continuum by Party Affiliation, Controlling for Agency

Social Services Agencies (HEW, HUD, OEO)

Left-Right Social Services Continuum						
Party Affiliation	Left	Left-Center	Center	Right-Center	Right	Totals (*N*)
Republican	11%	22	44	11	11	99%[a] (9)
Independent	33%	22	33	11	—	99%[a] (9)
Democrat	92%	8	—	—	—	100% (13)

Gamma = −.82

Non-Social Service Agencies

Left-Right Social Services Continuum						
Party Affiliation	Left	Left-Center	Center	Right-Center	Right	Totals (*N*)
Republican	6%	6	43	29	17	101%[a] (35)
Independent	19%	25	25	12	19	100% (16)
Democrat	25%	33	17	17	8	100% (24)

Gamma = −.40

[a] Totals do not equal 100% because of rounding.

perceived. The likelihood of a Republican administration being less sensitized to issues of representational inequity was reinforced by the inclination of the Nixon administration to develop a constituency encompassing those who were resentful of the appearance of "special treatment" for the economically and politically disadvantaged sectors of the citizenry.[21] As an interest group spokesman put it, "Nixon has changed the whole context of the argument on national priorities. You don't hear many mayors talking about helping poor minorities."[22]

The data in Table 6 show, as expected, that Republican administrators are less disposed than Democratic or Independent administrators to view some groups as inadequately considered in the political process, although the relationship between party and the equity variable which has a strong procedural component is quite a bit weaker than the relationship with the more substantively oriented social services continuum. Similarly, the career executives more frequently than politically appointed executives believe that some groups fail to receive adequate consideration through the political process. But these relationships are overshadowed by the correlation between agency and beliefs about the equity of representation. The influences of agency are especially strong, with 83 per cent of the administrators in the social service agencies taking the position that some groups are not adequately considered in the political process compared to 59 per cent of the administrators of other agencies.

Several questions are raised by the findings presented in Table 6:

(1) Do party differences in beliefs about equity of representation persist across appointee-career lines?
(2) Do party differences in beliefs about equity of representation persist across agency lines as they have been drawn here?
(3) Are the job status (i.e., appointee-career) and agency variables independently important in accounting for beliefs about equity of representation?

When the relationship between party affiliation and beliefs about equity of representation is controlled for job status (Table 7), the correlation between party and representational equity remains unchanged for political appointees and is diminished, although the form of the relationship is essentially intact, for career executives.[23] Within

[21] See, for instance, Kevin Phillips, *The Emerging Republican Majority* (Garden City: Anchor, 1970).

[22] As quoted in John Herbers, "Nixon's Presidency: A Nation is Changed," *The New York Times*, March 7, 1973, Section I pp. 1, 22.

[23] The correlation for the career executives diminishes principally because of the instability in the distribution of cases between the "all considered" and "all considered, but qualifications" categories.

Table 6. Beliefs About Equity of Representation by Party Affiliation, Job Status, and Agency

	Beliefs About Equity of Representation			
	Small Groups Inadequately Considered	All Considered, but Qualifications	All Considered	Totals (*N*)
A. Marginal Distribution for Beliefs About Equity of Representation	65%	17	18	100% (107)
B. Party Affiliation				
Republican	50%	29	21	100% (38)
Independent	74%	4	22	100% (23)
Democrat	72%	14	14	100% (36)
		Gamma = −.28		
C. Job Status				
Political Appointees (Pooled)	57%	22	22	101%[a] (51)
Career Supergrades	73%	13	14	100% (56)
		Gamma = −.30		
D. Agency				
Social Service (HEW, HUD, OEO)	83%	14	3	100% (29)
Other	59%	18	23	100% (78)
		Gamma = .55		

[a] Total does not equal 100% because of rounding.

Table 7. Beliefs About Equity of Representation by Party Affiliation, Controlling for Job-Status

Political Appointees (Pooled)				
Beliefs About Equity of Representation				
Party Affiliation	Some Groups Inadequately Considered	All Considered, but Qualifications	All Considered	Totals (*N*)
Republican	38%	28	24	100% (29)
Independent	67%	—	33	100% (6)
Democrat	67%	25	8	100% (12)
		Gamma = −.28		
Career Supergrades				
Beliefs About Equity of Representation				
Party Affiliation	Some Groups Inadequately Considered	All Considered, but Qualifications	All Considered	Totals (*N*)
Republican	60%	30	10	100% (10)
Independent	76%	6	18	100% (17)
Democrat	74%	9	17	100% (23)
		Gamma = −.10		

each partisan category, career bureaucrats are more likely than political appointees to perceive that some groups are without adequate representation. However, the party differences within each job status designation are still a bit stronger than those across job strata. Republican administrators, whether career or appointee, are the least likely to believe that some groups' interests are inadequately considered.

Unlike the job status variable, the agency an administrator works for has a sizeable independent impact upon his beliefs about equity of representation. Nevertheless, party affiliation also remains important *within each* agency type. As Table 8 illustrates, the compound effects of agency and party are especially important. About twice as many Democrats and Independents within the social service agencies as Republicans outside

Table 8. Beliefs About Equity of Representation by Party Affiliation, Controlling for Agency

Social Service Agencies (HEW, HUD, OEO)				
Beliefs About Equity of Representation				
Party Affiliation	Some Groups Inadequately Considered	All Considered, but Qualifications	All Considered	Totals (*N*)
Republican	67%	22	11	100% (9)
Independent	88%	12	—	100% (8)
Democrat	89%	11	—	100% (9)
		Gamma = −.49		
Non–Social Service Agencies				
Beliefs About Equity of Representation				
Party Affiliation	Some Groups Inadequately Considered	All Considered, but Qualifications	All Considered	Totals (*N*)
Republican	47%	30	23	100% (30)
Independent	67%	—	33	100% (15)
Democat	65%	15	19	99%[a] (26)
		Gamma = −.20		

[a] Total does not equal 100% because of rounding.

these agencies believe that some groups are not adequately considered in the political process. The party differences within each type of agency are also strong, especially for the social services administrators, despite the clear influence of agency upon administrators of all partisan persuasions. The differences, for example, between Republicans across each type of agency are about the same as the party differences within each agency type.

The beliefs about equity of representation represent predispositions. We do not know for sure precisely what influence they may have had upon the behavior of these administrators. However, they do reflect a receptivity to programs and procedures designed to mobilize or better represent the politically disadvantaged. The Nixon administration obviously confronted a substantial number of administrators without compatible predispositions when it became interested in retrenching or at least reevaluating some of the mobilizing experiments of the 1960s. These data indicate that Democrats and Independents, particularly within the social service agencies, were probably in the forefront of the opposition. But Republican administrators within the social service agencies also are clearly more disposed to the belief that some groups are inadequately considered than are Republican administrators from other agencies. The stronger interparty correlation found within the social service agencies reflects the near unanimity of the Democratic and Independent administrators to the view that some groups are left out, rather than strong acceptance of the view among Republican administrators within these agencies that all groups are considered. Even though there are strong inter-partisan differences within the social service agencies, the findings argue for a powerful agency effect upon all administrators. This, of course, may be due to the kinds of Republicans recruited into the social service agencies. They are, as we have noted above, somewhat less conservative than other Republican administrators in their orientation to the role of government in providing social service.

Organizational incentives and agency culture, however, can play a large role too. Unless they are very strongly predisposed to ignore the claims of their agency constituents or to see events through deeply conservative ideological lenses, Republican administrators are likely to be absorbed by the day-to-day problems with which their agencies deal: Perhaps, then, one of the major incentives for the Nixon administration's attempt to centralize control over the federal bureaucracy—and especially in the social service program areas—stemmed from a belief that while Democratic administrators were ideologically unsalvageable, even the Republicans in the social service agencies were absorbing more fully the ethos of their agencies than the policy goals of the White House.[24]

In short, our data here certainly suggest that there are considerable differences in outlooks about equity of representation *within* the federal bureaucracy. These disagreements are based upon both party and agency lines, and the joint effects of these two variables are especially strong. Despite the importance of partisan differences within the social service agencies, the clashes between the Nixon White House and its putative emissaries within the social service agencies may have been equally significant. While our data do not extend beyond the mid-point of the first term of the Nixon Administration, we suspect that the later replacements for the Republican appointees in the social service agencies began to resemble more closely the Republican administrators in other agencies.

Summary and Conclusions

This analysis examined two key political beliefs of high level American federal executives. We looked at the correlates of their views on the role of government in providing social services and their views regarding inequities in political representation. Both of these matters were relevant to the efforts of the Nixon administration to reorder national priorities and policies.

The findings across each of these issues generally converge. *Agency* and *party affiliation* were particularly important variables in accounting for differences in administrators' views. Democratic administrators in the social service agencies (i.e., HEW, HUD, OEO) were most oriented to a more active government role in the social services sector. Similarly, Democrats (joined by Independents) in the social service agencies most frequently saw inequities in the process of representation, whereas Republicans least believed such inequities existed.

The joint effects of party and agency are especially important in examining both issues. Democratic administrators in the social service agencies were the most liberal on the left-right social services continuum and Republicans in the non–social service agencies the most conservative. A similar, if somewhat weaker, partisan split is present for the equity of representation variable. The left-right continuum strikes closer to the heart of differences in partisan ideology than does equity of representation and, thus, the influence of party is especially powerful in predicting administrators' positions on the social services measure.

Our findings document a career bureaucracy

[24] As John Herbers has written of the Nixon Administration, "... the White House frequently does not trust the departments which have constituencies of their own." See, "Nixon's Presidency: Centralized Control," *The New York Times*, March 6, 1973, p. 20.

with very little Republican representation but even more pointedly portray a social service bureaucracy dominated by administrators ideologically hostile to many of the directions pursued by the Nixon administration in the realm of social policy. Democratic administrators in the social service agencies were the most hostile to these directions, but even Republican administrators in these same agencies, at the time of our interviews, held attitudes that were not wholly sympathetic to the social service retrenchments sought by the Nixon administration. Neither were the Republican administrators in the social service agencies very sympathetic to the administration's attempts to decrease the government's attentiveness to the politically disadvantaged. Our data do not permit us to say whether the Republicans in the social service agencies started out more liberal than other Republicans or were socialized into their more liberal positions by experiences in the bureaucracy and the demands of their roles. Both are probably correct to some degree. But there is no question that the federal bureaucracy was not fertile soil in which to plant the most conservative of the Nixon administration's social policies.

One important aspect of the broad syndrome of administration activities now known as "Watergate" had to do with the crude attempts by the Nixon administration to gain control over the government which it was elected to lead. The flagrant disregard of constitutional limitations in the administration's attempts to consolidate its perceived political mandate must not becloud our perspective on the larger problem of governance faced by an aggressively conservative Republican administration. Uncovering the misdeeds of the Nixon administration should not obscure the difficulties a Republican administration such as Nixon's faced with both a Democratic Congress and a bureaucracy unsympathetic to conservative social policies. Relations between the Nixon administration and the Congress quickly deteriorated because of differing policy perspectives and the rather disdainful attitudes of many White House people toward the legislative branch. While we have no direct data on the behavior of the administrators in our study, we know enough about their policy attitudes and about the tendency of bureaucrats in any administration to protect their programs to infer that the Nixon administration's suspicions about them were not wholly groundless. The setting for the Nixon administration was one which makes the quip that "even paranoids may have real enemies" seem appropriate, although the very aggressive behavior of the administration made a difficult situation much worse than it need have been.

A sharp electoral realignment that produces Republican Congresses along with Republican administrations can cut off the political leverage of the bureaucracy and, indeed, over time may produce a far larger proportion of Republicans in the career bureaucracy itself. For the foreseeable future, however, such a scenario is extremely improbable. There is better reason to suspect that the White House will continue to reflect short term political changes and that the Congress and bureaucracy will be relatively immune to these dynamics. Thus, a forceful conservative Republican president may face even deeper ideological clashes with the bureaucracy in the future. The data summarized in Table 9 show that the strongest opposition to the ideological bent of the Nixon administration came from younger and middle-aged Democrats, rather than from those Democrats whose political chronology dates back to the New Deal era in American politics. Republicans, in general, tend to be relatively stable in the distribution of their attitudes across age categories, but the oldest Democrats are the most conservative. The younger and middle-aged Democrats clearly possess more ideological and reformist vitality than their elders. The evidence indicates that partisan-based ideological distinctiveness is growing rather than lessening.[25]

Table 9. Correlations Between the Left-Right Social Services Continuum and Party Affiliation, and Between Equity of Representation and Party Affiliation, Controlling for Age

	Left-Right Continuum by Party	Equity of Representation by Party
Age	Gamma Coefficients	Gamma Coefficients
30–46	−.71 (40)	−.34 (33)
47–56	−.53 (41)	−.46 (38)
57 and over	−.16 (24)	.05 (26)

Moreover, further expansion of governmental activities in the social service areas will expand the bureaucracies and activities that seem to attract administrators with the most liberal viewpoints. Unless a conservative Republican president does act sharply to curtail the activities of administrators in these agencies or to politicize the agencies through extensive changes in personnel, he can ex-

[25] Our assumption here, of course, is that the data represent a generational rather than a life cycle phenomenon. While longitudinal data would be necessary to establish definitively the validity of this assumption, the stability among the Republicans regardless of age and the differences between the Democrats lead us to a generational interpretation.

pect many of his social policies to be received coldly by administrators there. And yet, a president is limited in the extensiveness of the personnel changes he can make. The tendency of even his own appointees—unless they are persons of deep and forceful conservative convictions (e.g., Howard Phillips, the former Acting Director of OEO) —to be influenced by the ambience of their agencies is very real. As Frederick V. Malek, Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget has observed: "In the agencies you are isolated from the President; you relate to the department and its problems."[26] Under the conditions that we have described, therefore, the incentives for an aggressively conservative Republican administration to centralize control in the White House are obviously very substantial.

The potential problems a Democratic president faces with the bureaucracy, while not so severe as those of a Republican, are still difficult. If he pursues a more centrist course in social policy than the liberal administrators in the social service agencies desire, he may face serious difficulties in controlling their behavior. If, on the other hand, he pursues aggressively liberal social policies, he may have problems holding together his constituencies in Congress and the country. There is no question, though, that a Democratic president's clashes in belief with the bureaucracy will not ordinarily be so severe or potentially disruptive as those of a conservative Republican. A Democratic president, after all, does require the support of some key constituences whose interests are articulated through the social service bureaucracies.

The Watergate turmoil and the crisis of regime that it generated should not cause us to lose sight of continuing issues of governance and the future crises that may be associated with them. The problems of presidential accountability through the electoral process, of a bureaucracy ideologically unresponsive to conservative presidents, of an increasingly Gaullist "presidentialism"—an isolated, highly centralized presidency which reached new levels in the Nixon White House—are closely linked.[27] These problems are particularly acute when the legislative and executive branches are politically divided. Moreover, as Norton Long points out, it is not entirely clear that ". . . election is the *sine qua non* of representation. . . ."[28] The "mandate" view of presidential or even congressional authority must be offset by the possibility that the bureaucracy can speak for constituencies whose claims are largely ignored at the White House and on Capitol Hill. Still, the priorities and constituencies of elected leaders cannot be disregarded casually within the framework of democratic politics.

The problem remains, however, as to which elected leaders are to be followed. The framers of the Constitution designed a government of separate but shared powers. The rise of an immense bureaucracy with its own constituencies, not visualized in the original design, has further complicated a system that was not designed to give any branch of government or major actor a clear mandate to lead.

By seeing himself not as the preeminent contender for power, but as the holder of an exclusive mandate to command, Nixon sought to eliminate these complications. The system, however, makes the President a powerful but limited leader in a sea of departments, agencies, legislative committees, and courts. He can choose to bargain with other institutional actors and accommodate their interests, or he can try to maximize his control over policy and its implementation. The latter course, especially when the President threatens the interests of the other institutions or their constituencies, creates profound conflict within the government. Any aggressive president who wishes to promote political change faces a large array of frustrations, but these must be especially acute for a conservative who believes that the bureaucrats within his "own" branch of government are not loyal to him. In a government in which there are multiple lines of authority, the temptations for presidents to abuse their powers in an effort to gain control and for administrators to safeguard the interests of their particular agencies and to promote their own conceptions of proper public policy are always present. The framers of the Constitution, having given us little guidance here, have left these problems as part of their enduring legacy.

[26] As quoted in Beman, "President-Less Government in Washington," p. 74.

[27] See, for instance, Richard P. Nathan, *The Plot That Failed: Nixon and the Administrative Presidency* (New York: John Wiley, 1975).

[28] Norton Long, *The Polity* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1962), p. 71.

Generational Change and the Decline of Party Identification in America: 1952–1974*

PAUL R. ABRAMSON
Michigan State University

The decline of party loyalties during the past decade is one of the most profound changes in postwar American politics. Political scientists, journalists, and politicians recognize this erosion, and President Ford has voiced concern at the growth of partisan independence. Many believe that the erosion of party loyalties is likely to continue, since an especially large proportion of young adults claims to be neither Republican nor Democratic.

But does the very low level of party loyalty among young Americans provide a basis for predicting a continued decline in American party loyalties? Since the early days of survey research, young adults have been more likely to identify as Independents than their elders, and, according to Angus Campbell and his colleagues, this high level of independence results from their youth. The young, they claim, have not yet learned to support a party; as they age, they are likely to become more partisan.[1]

As I hope to show in this article, these arguments about the relationship of age to strength of party identification cannot be supported by the best available data. The low level of partisan identification among young Americans appears to result from fundamental differences between the formative socialization of persons who entered the electorate during the postwar years and that of their elders. Through a time-series cohort analysis of eleven surveys conducted by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan between 1952 and 1974, I show that the overall decline in party identification results largely from generational change. High levels of partisan identification persist among persons who entered the electorate before World War II, but among persons entering the electorate more recently levels of identification are low. This analysis strongly suggests that the overall proportion of party identifiers will continue to decline, and allows us to examine one process through which party loyalties among mass electorates gradually are transformed.

The Decline of Party Identification During the Postwar Years

As can be seen in Tables 1 through 4, regardless of how we define attachment to a party, since 1964 the proportion of whites[2] who were identifiers has declined markedly.[3] Until 1964, the proportion of strong party identifiers did not fall below 35 per cent (see Table 1). By 1970, only 27 per cent were strong identifiers, and, by 1974, only 24 per cent were. Until 1964, about three out of four whites were identifiers (either strong or weak) (see Table 2), but this proportion dropped in each subsequent survey until by 1974 only 60 per cent identified with one of the major parties. During the same period the percentage of pure Independents rose from 8 per cent to 15 per cent (see Table 3). The mean level of party identification was 2.04 in 1964, but declined in each subsequent survey, and by 1974 had reached 1.67 (see Table 4).

* I wish to thank John Aldrich, Paul Allen Beck, Bruce A. Campbell, T. Daniel Coggin, Charles F. Cnudde, Philip E. Converse, David J. Elkins, Ada W. Finifter, Victor Hanby, Robert W. Jackman, Warren E. Miller, Charles W. Ostrom, Jr., Kathleen Peroff, Frank A. Pinner, David W. Rohde, Joseph A. Schlesinger, W. Phillips Shively, and Brian Silver for their comments on earlier versions of this article. An anonymous referee for the *Review* made extensive and helpful suggestions. The Ford Foundation supported my research, but bears no responsibility for my conclusions. The Department of Political Science and the Computer Institute for Social Science Research, Michigan State University, also provided support. Carol Thompson assisted with the data analysis. I am especially grateful to Arthur H. Miller for providing me with the basic contingency table that enabled me to include the 1974 SRC-CPS data in the final version of this article.

The data for the SRC surveys conducted between 1952 and 1972 were provided by the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research, and the 1974 data are also now available through the Consortium. The Consortium bears no responsibility for my analyses and interpretations.

[1] Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: Wiley, 1960), pp. 161–165.

[2] Blacks have had markedly different political experiences from whites, and the assumptions I make about the development of party loyalties among whites do not apply to blacks. For a discussion of partisan change among blacks, see Paul R. Abramson, *Generational Change in American Politics* (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1975), pp. 65–68.

[3] The measure of party identification used by the SRC classifies respondents as strong Democrats, weak Democrats, Independents who lean toward the Democrats, Independents with no party leanings, Independents who lean toward the Republicans, weak Republicans, and strong Republicans. Tables 1 and 2 follow the procedures used by Campbell et al. by "folding" this scale to combine strong partisans, and to combine strong and weak partisans. The

Table 1. Percentage of Whites Who Were Strong Party Identifiers from 1952 through 1974, by Years of Birth

Age in 1952:	69–76	61–68	53–60	45–52	37–44	29–36	21–28	13–20	5–12	4 or younger	Total
Years of Birth:	1876–1883	1884–1891	1892–1899	1900–1907	1908–1915	1916–1923	1924–1931	1932–1939	1940–1947	1948–1955	white electorate
Year of Survey:											
1952	49%* (97)*	43% (141)	46% (211)	34% (236)	32% (289)	24% (320)	30% (249)				35% (1615)[b]
1956	57% (60)	53% (119)	43% (160)	36% (227)	35% (279)	32% (345)	27% (293)	28% (98)			36% (1610)
1958[c]	53% (73)	47% (118)	47% (167)	40% (219)	34% (304)	35% (318)	32% (275)	31% (155)			38% (1638)
1960[c]	†	48% (125)	42% (170)	35% (249)	40% (291)	28% (342)	34% (307)	34% (192)			36% (1739)
1962	†	50% (70)	37% (103)	55% (159)	36% (188)	30% (200)	30% (194)	21% (183)	†		35% (1168)
1964	†	50% (72)	47% (122)	49% (166)	37% (213)	33% (242)	32% (220)	28% (229)	25% (104)		36% (1394)
1966	†	44% (52)	37% (112)	36% (113)	31% (164)	25% (188)	23% (195)	19% (156)	17% (138)		27% (1131)
1968	†	†	45% (104)	41% (156)	34% (181)	19% (230)	26% (240)	22% (189)	11% (225)		27% (1387)
1970	†	†	36% (95)	32% (139)	35% (184)	31% (188)	23% (199)	19% (186)	21% (236)	18% (124)	27% (1395)
1972	†	†	41% (135)	34% (219)	35% (290)	27% (288)	24% (330)	15% (313)	14% (420)	12% (342)	24% (2397)
1974[c]	†	†	46% (96)	37% (201)	32% (264)	26% (276)	25% (277)	19% (239)	17% (368)	16% (436)	24% (2246)

* Numbers in parentheses are the totals upon which percentages are based.

[b] The *N* for the total white electorate is always somewhat larger than the sum of the *N*s of the cohorts, for the total is based upon all whites, regardless of age, including some for whom no information about age was available.

[c] Weighted *N*s.

† Because of the small *N*s the percentage of strong partisans has not been presented.

Table 2. Percentage of Whites Who Were Strong or Weak Party Identifiers from 1952 through 1974, by Years of Birth

Age in 1952:	69–76	61–68	53–60	45–52	37–44	29–36	21–28	13–20	5–12	4 or younger	Total
Years of Birth:	1876–1883	1884–1891	1892–1899	1900–1907	1908–1915	1916–1923	1924–1931	1932–1939	1940–1947	1948–1955	white electorate
Year of Survey:											
1952	80%*	76%	82%	72%	79%	71%	68%				75%
1956	82%	84%	72%	75%	76%	72%	68%	55%			73%
1958	82%	83%	81%	82%	79%	77%	69%	70%			77%
1960	†	82%	82%	80%	73%	73%	72%	74%			76%
1962	†	83%	83%	84%	76%	76%	67%	65%	†		75%
1964	†	88%	82%	84%	79%	73%	71%	69%	65%		75%
1966	†	79%	82%	70%	79%	70%	67%	67%	59%		71%
1968	†	†	83%	76%	75%	70%	66%	67%	44%		68%
1970	†	†	73%	72%	80%	72%	62%	61%	55%	48%	66%
1972	†	†	82%	73%	76%	71%	65%	56%	49%	45%	62%
1974	†	†	80%	72%	69%	65%	62%	55%	53%	50%	60%

* For the totals upon which these percentages are based, see Table 1.

† Because of the small *N*s, the percentage of strong and weak partisan identifiers has not been presented.

Table 3. Percentage of Whites Who Were Independents with no Party Leanings from 1952 through 1974, by Years of Birth

Age in 1952:	69–76	61–68	53–60	45–52	37–44	29–36	21–28	13–20	5–12	4 or younger	Total
Years of Birth:	1876–1883	1884–1891	1892–1899	1900–1907	1908–1915	1916–1923	1924–1931	1932–1939	1940–1947	1948–1955	white electorate
Year of Survey:											
1952	7%*	7%	6%	7%	4%	7%	6%				6%
1956	7%	7%	10%	10%	9%	9%	9%	13%			9%
1958	4%	6%	4%	7%	9%	6%	9%	12%			8%
1960	†	14%	6%	6%	15%	7%	7%	12%			9%
1962	†	4%	6%	4%	7%	9%	14%	8%	†		8%
1964	†	4%	7%	5%	8%	3%	7%	10%	12%		8%
1966	†	10%	10%	16%	8%	15%	9%	13%	15%		12%
1968	†	†	7%	10%	9%	12%	12%	10%	18%		11%
1970	†	†	11%	12%	10%	12%	13%	14%	14%	22%	13%
1972	†	†	7%	9%	9%	10%	13%	17%	17%	19%	13%
1974	†	†	9%	7%	11%	14%	10%	15%	17%	23%	15%

* For the totals upon which these percentages are based, see Table 1.

† Because of the small *N*s, the percentage of Independents with no party leanings has not been presented.

Table 4. Mean Partisan Strength of Whites from 1952 through 1974, by Years of Birth[a]

Age in 1952: / Years of Birth:	69–76 1876–1883	61–68 1884–1891	53–60 1892–1899	45–52 1900–1907	37–44 1908–1915	29–36 1916–1923	21–28 1924–1931	13–20 1932–1939	5–12 1940–1947	4 or younger 1948–1955	Total white electorate
Year of Survey:											
1952	2.2[b]	2.1	2.2	2.0	2.1	1.9	1.9				2.03
1956	2.3	2.3	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.9	1.8	1.7			1.97
1958	2.3	2.2	2.2	2.1	2.1	2.0	1.9	1.9			2.05
1960	†	2.2	2.2	2.1	2.0	1.9	2.0	1.9			2.03
1962	†	2.3	2.1	2.3	2.0	1.9	1.8	1.8	†		1.99
1964	†	2.3	2.2	2.3	2.1	2.0	2.0	1.9	1.8		2.04
1966	†	2.1	2.1	1.9	2.0	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.6		1.85
1968	†	†	2.2	2.1	2.0	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.3		1.82
1970	†	†	2.0	1.9	2.0	1.9	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.4	1.79
1972	†	†	2.1	2.0	2.0	1.9	1.8	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.72
1974	†	†	2.2	2.0	1.9	1.7	1.8	1.6	1.5	1.4	1.67

[a] Mean partisan strength with strong partisans scored as 3, weak partisans as 2, Independents who lean toward a party as 1, and pure Independents and apoliticals scored as 0.

[b] For the totals upon which these means are based, see Table 1. (Actual totals are slightly smaller, because persons who supported minor parties have been excluded from these calculations.)

† Because of the small *N*s the mean score has not been presented.

Whether or not this trend presages a continued decline in levels of party identification cannot be answered definitively; as Otis Dudley Duncan reminds us, "There is nothing about a trend—supposing it to have been reliably ascertained for some specific period—that guarantees its own continuation."[4] But one can gain greater confidence about the future of a trend by studying age-group differences. "It is the inevitable fact of life," Herbert H. Hyman writes, "that the young will replace the old and will determine the future course of any trend. Thus if the young differ from the old, and were to continue to do so despite their own aging, some prediction can be ventured."[5] Even the most cursory examination of the data reveals replication of a well-established finding: young adults have weaker partisan attachments than their elders.[6] The problem is to explain that relationship, and, since I am using data originally analyzed by Campbell and his colleagues, their discussion will be my point of departure.

Age and Party Identification in the Mid-1950s

The authors of *The American Voter* demonstrated clearly that young adults have weaker party attachments than their elders.[7] Combined data collected in seven surveys between 1952 and 1957 showed that the percentage of strong identifiers increased steadily with age; the percentage of Independents (including those leaning toward either major party[8]) decreased. But Campbell and his colleagues not only presented their findings; they also recognized, and attempted to discriminate between, alternative explanations.

Age differences may result from generational effects, for "age may mark an historical epoch in which the person has matured or undergone some special variety of experience that has left an im-

mean score measure of strength of partisanship follows the same logic, but assumes, for purposes of illustration, that the party identification scale can be treated as interval. My measure is similar to the index of partisan strength used by Philip E. Converse in "Of Time and Partisan Stability," *Comparative Political Studies*, 2 (July, 1969), 139–171, at 149–151, although his index scores ranged from zero through two.

The percentages reported in Tables 1 through 3 are based upon all respondents, except those for whom party identification was not ascertained. Persons who supported minor parties and those classified as apolitical are included in the numbers upon which percentages are based. As these two groups never made up more than three per cent of the total, similar results would be obtained if they were excluded from the analysis. In computing the mean strength of partisan identification for this study, apoliticals were scored as zero, but persons who supported minor parties were excluded from the analysis. The totals upon which the mean scores were calculated are therefore slightly smaller than those upon which the percentages were based.

[4] Otis Dudley Duncan, "Social Stratification and Mobility: Problems in the Measurement of Trend," in *Indicators of Social Change: Concepts and Measurements*, ed. Eleanor Bernert Sheldon and Wilbert E. Moore (New York: Russell Sage, 1968), pp. 675–719, at p. 679.

[5] Herbert H. Hyman, *Secondary Analysis of Sample Surveys: Principles, Procedures, and Potentialities* (New York: Wiley, 1972), p. 243.

[6] Throughout this analysis, respondents were divided into eight-year age cohorts, although I present data about younger cohorts before the full eight-year age group had entered the electorate. Ideally, a cohort analysis should divide respondents into the same age range as the number of years between surveys, allowing comparison of persons of the same age at different points in time by reading diagonally down and across the table. Practical considerations, however, dictate that the Ns for each cohort be substantial, and to divide respondents into two-year age groups would lead to small Ns as well as unreadable tables.

The 1952, 1968, 1970, 1972, and 1974 surveys recorded years of birth. For other surveys year of birth has been calculated from data about the respondent's age. The 1954 SRC survey employed arbitrary age categories, and could not be used in my time-series cohort analysis.

[7] Campbell et al., *The American Voter*, p. 161.

[8] In this analysis, the Michigan authors did not differentiate between Independents who leaned toward a party and those who did not.

print on his attitudes and behaviors."[9] "The historical interpretation of our data," they reasoned, "would suggest that partisan feeling was more intense several decades ago than now. If older persons have more intense party loyalties than younger, it is a reflection of the politics of an earlier American period."[10] On the other hand, age differences may result from the differing position of people in the life cycle, for "age may serve as an index of the length of time that the individual has lived in a specified state or engaged in a specified behavior."[11]

In attempting to discriminate between these explanations, Campbell and his colleagues supported a life-cycle explanation. Because their test used cross-sectional data, however, they could not examine the partisanship of persons as they moved through the life cycle. Among persons who remain attached to the same party throughout their lives, the effects of age, length of attachment to a party, and time of entry into the electorate cannot be distinguished from each other. But for persons who have switched their partisanship, the effects of duration of attachment can be distinguished from those of age and era of maturation. If the life-cycle explanation were valid, Campbell and his colleagues reasoned, the tendency of the old to have stronger partisan loyalties than the young would be eliminated once duration of attachment were controlled. They tested the relationship between age and strength of party loyalties while controlling for the length of time respondents identified with their party; when the length of attachment was held constant, the young had somewhat stronger party attachments than their elders. "This pattern of relationships," they concluded, "fits very well a more general thesis that group identification is a function of the proportion of a person's life he has been associated with the group. The longer a person thinks of himself as belonging to a party, the stronger his sense of loyalty to it will become."[12]

But Campbell's test is not definitive, for few old persons had short-term party attachments, and only the simplest controls were applied.[13] More important, although older persons who had recently acquired their partisanship were likely to have weak party loyalties, the causality of this relationship could have been the opposite of that suggested by the Michigan authors: Weak party loyalties may cause, rather than result from, brief attachment to a party. Indeed, panel data suggest that weak partisans are more likely to convert to another party than are strong, and that once converted they are more likely to remain weak partisans than to support their new party strongly.[14]

Even without panel data, however, one can discriminate between alternative explanations of the relationship of age to strength of partisanship by comparing persons born during the same years but sampled at different times. Campbell and his colleagues did not find this kind of analysis attractive, for they had collected data for only five years. Their practice of combining the results of surveys conducted at different times precluded any tentative efforts to examine the effects of aging upon young adults who, during a five-year period, might have developed stronger party attachments. Now, however, we can conduct a far more extensive cohort analysis by examining age groups during a twenty-two year period.

Age and Party Identification Between 1952 and 1974

Let us begin by examining the relationship between age and strength of party identification in 1952. As can be seen in Table 1, the percentage of strong identifiers was lowest among persons born between 1916 and 1923 (ages 29–36), and next lowest among those born between 1924 and 1931 (ages 21–28). Table 2 indicates that these 21- to 28-year olds also had the lowest percentage of identifiers (both strong and weak). Slightly more than one white in twenty was a pure Independent, and there was no relationship between age and pure Independence (see Table 3). The mean strength of party identification was lower among the 1916–1923 and the 1924–1931 cohorts than among any of the older age groups (see Table 4). As Campbell's discussion suggests, there are two plausible explanations for the weakness of party loyalties among these young adults. A life-cycle explanation suggests that their weak party loyalties result from political inexperience, whereas a generational explanation suggests differences between their formative socialization and that of their elders.

If a life-cycle explanation for the weak party loyalties of the young were valid, their feelings of party identification would grow stronger with age. The cohort born between 1916 and 1923, which had the largest percentage of weak partisans,

[9] Campbell et al., p. 161.
[10] *Ibid.*, p. 161.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 161.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 163. For a similar analysis examining the relationship of age and strength of partisanship in Britain, see David Butler and Donald Stokes, *Political Change in Britain: Forces Shaping Electoral Choice* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969), pp. 55–58.
[13] The basic procedure was comparison of persons 44 years or younger with those 45 years or older. The authors, however, found only 27 persons 45 years old and older who had held their current identifications for less than four years, and only 40 who had held their current identification for between four and seven years.
[14] See Edward C. Dreyer, "Change and Stability in Party Identifications," *Journal of Politics*, 35 (August, 1973), 712–722.

should develop stronger partisan attachment as it aged. So, too, the cohort born between 1924 and 1931 should develop stronger partisanship as persons in that age group gained more experience and more opportunities to grow attached to the party of their choice; this cohort had the largest percentage of Independents who leaned toward one of the major parties, and many of them might become loyal partisans as they aged. Even pure Independents might develop partisan attachments.[15] Thus the percentage of strong and weak party identifiers among the 1924–1931 cohort should increase during the subsequent two decades. We might expect the proportion of pure Independents to decline. And the mean level of party identification among the two youngest cohorts should grow as they aged and had more time to become attached to their political party.

A generational explanation is based upon different assumptions and predicts different relationships. It assumes that there is a formative period during which fairly enduring attitudes are learned; after that, attitudes tend to become relatively stable. While such assumptions are not valid for all political attitudes, there is considerable evidence, much of it presented by Campbell and his colleagues themselves, that they are valid for party loyalties.[16] Even before they enter the electorate, many persons have already learned party loyalties, but these loyalties are likely to be weak.[17] The most important experiences in changing a person's party loyalties probably occur between the time he enters the work force and the first few elections in which he participates. This is frequently a period of social and geographic mobility, often including marriage which further weakens parental ties. Although many persons will have party loyalties even before they vote, they have had few opportunities to reinforce those loyalties through political behavior. If social and political conditions contribute to the formation of strong party loyalties during this period, the relative level of partisan identification among the cohort will continue to be high. But if conditions during this formative period contribute to the development of weak party loyalties, party loyalties are likely to remain weak.

If the generational explanation is correct, most persons in the 1916–1923 cohort experienced formative socialization in the late 1930s and World War II, and by 1952 would be relatively resistant to partisan change; party identification among this cohort might well remain low as its members aged. Persons born between 1924 and 1931 experienced formative socialization during or after World War II, and in 1952 many would still be relatively open to partisan change. A generational explanation would not necessarily predict either a rise or a decline in levels of partisan identification, but, given the political and social conditions following 1952, party loyalties might remain low. During this period, party leadership was weak: Eisenhower provided little leadership for the Republicans, and both Johnson and Nixon developed personal campaign organizations that bypassed formal party structures.[18] The division of party responsibility between the President and Congress for much of this period may have dampened the development of strong party ties. Candidates, especially Republicans, played down their party and ran highly individualized campaigns. By stressing candidates at the expense of parties, television may have further weakened party loyalties. Television made political information cheaper, and the political party may have declined in importance as a means of reducing information costs. And, although there was rapid social change —massive migrations from the farms to the cities, the mass mobilization of blacks, the growth of higher education—neither party seemed able to capitalize upon those changes by offering programs to reinforce party loyalties.[19] Given these conditions, in spite of the predictions generated by the life-cycle explanation, party loyalties might fail to develop among the young as they gained more political experience.

These explanations can be tested by a time-series cohort analysis.[20] In the absence of panel data

[15] On the other hand, Independence might be a form of loyalty in and of itself. Pure Independents might become more committed to Independence as they gained political experience.

[16] See Campbell et al., *The American Voter*, pp. 125–128, and Butler and Stokes, *Political Change in Britain*, pp. 44–64. Also see William N. McPhee and Jack Ferguson, "Political Immunization," in *Public Opinion and Congressional Elections*, ed. William N. McPhee and William Glaser (New York: Free Press, 1962), pp. 155–179.

[17] A three-wave panel study of fourth, sixth, and eighth graders in the San Francisco Bay area conducted between December 1968 and May 1969 showed children to have relatively unstable partisan identifications compared to those of adults. (See Pauline Marie Vaillancourt and Richard G. Niemi, "Children's Party Choices," in *The Politics of Future Citizens*, ed. Richard G. Niemi [San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1974], pp. 126–148.) For a further discussion of the strength of party identification among pre-adults, see David O. Sears, "Political Socialization," in *Handbook of Political Science, Vol. 2: Micropolitical Theory*, ed. Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp. 93–153, at pp. 121–123.

[18] For a discussion of party leadership during the postwar years, see David S. Broder, *The Party's Over: The Failure of Politics in America* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972). For another provocative discussion, see Walter Dean Burnham, "The End of American Party Politics," *Trans-action*, 7 (December, 1969), 12–22.

[19] Gerald Pomper, who also discusses the weak party identifications of young Americans, argues that they result from the political events of the last decade. See *Voters' Choice: Varieties of American Electoral Behavior* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1975), pp. 23–24.

[20] As Karen Oppenheim Mason and her colleagues clearly show, any cohort analysis faces a basic methodo-

covering these twenty-two years, one cannot compare the same respondents sampled at different times; but cohorts sampled in 1952 can be compared with persons born during the same years sampled in subsequent surveys.[21] A life-cycle explanation predicts that levels of party identification will increase among the 1916–1923 and 1924–1931 cohorts as their mean age increases; a generational explanation predicts that levels of identification among these cohorts will remain low. To the extent that the youngest cohorts still have relatively flexible partisan loyalties, their level of party identification might, indeed, decline.

We can discriminate between these explanations by reading down each column of the tables. The data provide virtually no support for a life-cycle explanation. Only the first measure of partisanship shows any strengthening of party loyalties among the 1916–1923 cohort. There was a rise in the percentage of strong partisans between 1952 and 1964, but there was a decline after that, and in 1974 the percentage of strong partisans was only slightly higher than it had been when that cohort was twenty-two years younger. The remaining three measures, however, show lower levels of partisanship in 1974 than in 1952.

The pattern among the 1924–1931 cohort provides an even stronger refutation of the life-cycle explanation, for between 1952 and 1974 partisan strength declined on all four measures. Further compelling evidence against the life-cycle explanation is found in the change among the 1932–1939 cohort, part of which was sampled by the 1956 survey.[22] Although this cohort had aged eighteen years by 1974, partisan strength declined on three of the four measures, and the percentage of identifiers (strong and weak) was unchanged. The 1940–1947 cohort also showed no tendency to develop stronger partisan loyalties in the ten years after 1964; instead, partisan strength dropped markedly. The 1948–1955 cohort, first sampled in 1970 when some of its members had not yet been enfranchised, had weaker party identifications than did their elders on all four measures. While four years is not long enough to discriminate adequately between alternative explanations, it is noteworthy that low levels of identification persisted in both 1972 and 1974.

This analysis strongly suggests that the relatively weak party identifications among the young result from fundamental differences between their socialization and that of their elders. It provides virtually no evidence that this low level of identification is only temporary. Since this analysis is based upon eight independently conducted probability samples, and since the numbers upon which the percentages and means were calculated are fairly substantial, it is highly unlikely that the observed decline in partisanship among the cohorts born after 1923 resulted from sampling error. To reject the life-cycle explanation, however, one would need only to demonstrate that partisanship failed to *increase* among these cohorts. But if this analysis is

logical problem: each of the three independent variables—age, period of survey, and years of birth—is a perfect function of the other two. Mason and her colleagues propose a model, employing Multiple Classification Analysis, that allows the analyst to estimate the effects of age, period, and cohort. (See Karen Oppenheim Mason, William M. Mason, H. H. Winsborough, and W. Kenneth Poole, "Some Methodological Issues in Cohort Analysis of Archival Data," *American Sociological Review*, 38 [April, 1973], 242–258). David Knoke and Michael Hout, using the Michigan SRC data, have applied the Mason et al. technique to the study of party identification. (See "Social and Demographic Factors in American Political Party Affiliations, 1952–1972," *American Sociological Review*, 39 [October, 1974], 700–713.) However, both the applicability of the Mason et al. model to attitudinal data and the use of this model by Knoke and Hout have been questioned in a recent paper by Norval D. Glenn, who argues that the model necessitates unwarrented assumptions. (See "Some Cautions Concerning Statistical Attempts to Separate Age, Period, and Cohort Effects," paper presented at the 71st Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, September, 1975).

While the methodological problems of cohort analysis may be unresolved, the theoretical expectations of the life-cycle explanation are so clear that the failure of partisanship to rise among cohorts as they age provides, at the very least, a basis for seriously questioning *The American Voter* formulation.

[21] All these surveys are based upon national probability samples, and, as the Ns have been reported, the reader can evaluate the probability of differences between age groups in Tables 1 through 3 resulting from sampling error. (As weighted Ns were used for 1958, 1960, and 1974, tests of significance are not valid for those years.) However, the best assurance that differences between cohorts are meaningful is the replication of age-group differences in numerous surveys based upon separately conducted samples. In this respect, too, the 1958, 1960, and 1974 data are less satisfactory. More than half the respondents in 1958 and 1960 originally were sampled as part of a panel study begun in 1956, and more than half of the respondents in 1974 originally were sampled as part of a panel study begun in 1972. Thus, the high consistency in levels of identification among cohorts in 1956, 1958, and 1960, and between cohorts in 1972 and 1974 partly results from sampling procedures.

One can also gain greater confidence that age group differences are meaningful by replicating this analysis with other data sets. To this end, I report upon a study by Norval D. Glenn who used Gallup data to conduct a similar analysis.

[22] Although levels of partisanship are reported for the 1932–1939 cohort in 1956 and 1958, the full eight-year cohort was not sampled until 1960. The full eight-year cohort born between 1940 and 1947 was not sampled until 1968. In 1970, the SRC began to sample eighteen-, nineteen-, and twenty-year olds. Nevertheless, the full eight-year cohort born between 1948 and 1955 was not sampled until 1974. Respondents born in 1956 were not included in this youngest cohort, but since only ten respondents born during that year were included in the electorate sample, their levels of identification have not been reported.

not convincing enough, additional analyses, based upon totally independent data sets, also clearly refute the life-cycle explanation.

One study includes Norval D. Glenn and Ted Hefner's excellent cohort analysis of Gallup data collected from 1945 through 1969, and Glenn's updated analysis of 1971 Gallup surveys.[23] (Since Gallup surveys do not distinguish between strong and weak partisans, or between Independents who lean toward a party and those who do not, these data are roughly comparable to my analysis of the proportion who were strong or weak partisans.[24]) Glenn reports a decline in party identification during the 26-year period, from 78 per cent in 1945 to 70 per cent in 1971, most of the decline occurring after 1965. His analysis provides virtually no evidence that young adults became more partisan as they aged. Glenn and Hefner conclude that "the widely cited finding of Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes that older people have stronger party identification on the average than young adults reflects, largely or entirely, an intercohort rather than a life-stage difference."[25]

A panel study by M. Kent Jennings and Richard G. Niemi further demonstrates that in recent years young adults have not become more partisan as they aged.[26] Beginning in 1965 with a sample of high school seniors and their parents, they conducted a second wave of their study in 1973, collecting data on partisanship from over 1300 youths and 1100 parents in both waves. In 1965, 25 per cent of these youths had been strong party identifiers; by 1973 only 13 per cent were. In 1965, 64 per cent were strong or weak identifiers; by 1973 only 51 per cent were. Even the percentage of pure Independents rose slightly, from 13 per cent in 1965 to 16 per cent in 1973. In 1965 the mean strength of partisanship among these youths, according to my calculations,[27] was 1.76; by 1973 it dropped to 1.48. These changes, Jennings and Niemi concluded, were "startling." Because a life-cycle explanation clearly would lead one to expect the proportion of identifiers to rise among a cohort maturing from its late teens into its mid-twenties, the decline of party identification, they concluded, "provides a compelling argument for a generation effect."[28]

These panel data have also been used by Niemi and Herbert F. Weisberg to compare directly the same individuals over time.[29] Among youths who were Democrats in 1965, only 59 per cent were Democrats eight years later, 7 per cent were Republicans, and 34 per cent were Independents (including Independents who leaned toward a party). Among those who began as Republicans, only 46 per cent remained Republican, 15 per cent were Democrats, and 39 per cent were Independents. But among those who began as Independents, 65 per cent remained Independents eight years later, while 18 per cent were Democrats and 16 per cent were Republicans. This direct panel comparison clearly demonstrates that the overall direction of change in recent years has been toward weakening identifications: young Independents were more likely to retain their Independence than were young partisans to retain their partisan loyalties.

Hidden Life-Cycle Effects?

Given my findings, the Glenn analyses, and the Jennings and Niemi data, can we conclude that the partisan loyalties of young Americans do not increase with age? I believe we can, but W. Phillips Shively makes several interesting counterarguments in a critique of an earlier version of this article.[30] First, as he notes, *The American Voter* data suggest fairly gradual increases in partisanship from year to year. According to data presented by Campbell et al., 24 per cent of the 21- to 24-year-olds were strong party identifiers, 53 per cent of cent of the 70 to 75-year-olds were. Thus, Shively argues, one would expect an increase of .58 per cent per year as cohorts aged. (Following the same

[23] See Norval D. Glenn and Ted Hefner, "Further Evidence on Aging and Party Identification," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 36 (Spring, 1972), 31–47; and Glenn, "Sources of Shift to Political Independence: Some Evidence from a Cohort Analysis," *Social Science Quarterly*, 53 (December, 1972) 494–519.

Since women tend to outlive men, the proportion of females in a cohort will increase as it ages. Glenn introduced a weighting factor to compensate for this tendency. As he reports, sex differences in levels of identification were small, and his weighting procedure had little effect on his results. The present analysis consistently controlled for sex, but since sex differences were small, no weighting factor was used.

[24] Glenn usually reports a slightly higher proportion of identifiers than that reported in Table 2 of this article. Glenn's analysis includes nonwhites, but this difference does not account for his tendency to find a larger proportion of identifiers. When blacks are included in the present study, the overall percentage of identifiers is affected only marginally.

[25] Glenn and Hefner, "Further Evidence," p. 44.

[26] M. Kent Jennings and Richard G. Niemi, "Continuity and Change in Political Orientations: A Longitudinal Study of Two Generations," *American Political Science Review*, 69 (December, 1975), 1316–1335.

[27] These scores are based upon the same procedures used in Table 4, except that apoliticals were not included in these calculations.

[28] Jennings and Niemi, "Continuity and Change," p. 1325.

[29] Richard G. Niemi and Herbert F. Weisberg, "Is Party Identification Stable?", in *Controversies in American Voting Behavior*, ed. Niemi and Weisberg (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1976).

[30] W. Phillips Shively, "The Development of Aggregate Levels of Partisanship," mimeo, University of Minnesota, January, 1975. Shively was discussing a mimeographed version of this article written in May, 1974.

logic, one would expect the combined percentage of strong and weak identifiers to increase .34 per cent per year.) Shively argues that this gradual increase might not be detected during only two decades. But during the course of twenty-two years, one would expect the percentage of strong partisans to rise by nearly 13 per cent, and the percentage of identifiers to rise by more than 7 per cent. Of course, only data collected during future years can determine whether my analysis (as well as Glenn's analysis that examined change over twenty-six years) failed to detect aging effects that have yet to emerge.

Shively's second point is more important: life-cycle effects may be present in the SRC data, but may have been "swamped" by other factors that cancel out the absolute strengthening of partisan loyalties. In the language of cohort analysis, "period effects" might be so strong that life-cycle effects would be difficult to detect. Aging effects, Shively argues, may occur even though the absolute level of partisanship among a cohort declines. Shively then correctly demonstrates that when one compares changes among cohorts over time with changes in partisanship for the electorate as a whole, the relative strength of identification among cohorts often rises as they age. This is apparent from the data I present. For example, the 1924–1931 cohort had lower than the overall level of strong partisanship in 1952, but by 1974 had the same identification level as the electorate as a whole. Even though the absolute level of identification among this cohort decreased, its relative level of partisanship compared with the electorate as a whole increased. But Shively's measurement procedures did not account for the changing composition of the electorate.[31] The overall level of partisanship among the electorate fell, as I will show below, largely because new cohorts with low identification levels entered the electorate, and because of attrition among older cohorts with high identification levels. When one compares each cohort across time with cohorts already in the electorate when the cohort was first sampled, the relative level of partisanship seldom rises. For example, compared with most older cohorts, the 1924–1931 cohort had relatively low identification levels in 1952; in 1974 it still had relatively low identification levels compared with three of the four remaining older cohorts in the table. In any event, the life-cycle explanation, as formulated in *The American Voter*, strongly suggests absolute increases in identification as cohorts age.

Findings Not Accounted for by the Generational Explanation

The data strongly suggest that generational differences account for the low levels of identification among Americans who have entered the electorate since World War II, but a generational explanation cannot account for all of the data I have presented. A generational explanation predicts considerable stability in the partisanship of older cohorts, but after 1964 partisanship began to erode even among older cohorts. Between 1964 and 1966, the percentage of party identifiers dropped in six of the eight cohorts, the percentage of pure Independents rose in seven, and the mean strength of partisanship dropped for all eight age groups. The most pronounced drop, occurring in all age groups, was in the percentage of strong identifiers.[32]

The data in Table 1 show two separate processes at work through 1964. Between 1952 and 1964, among the cohorts born before 1924, and entering the electorate before or during World War II, the proportion of strong identifiers grew. But the proportion of strong identifiers did not grow among cohorts entering the electorate after the War. A life-cycle explanation predicts the growing partisanship of the older cohorts, but it cannot account for the failure of the young to develop stronger party loyalties. The decline in strong partisanship between 1964 and 1966 was of similar magnitude among both the prewar[33] and postwar cohorts. Although a generational explanation might account for the erosion in identifications among the younger age groups, it cannot explain the decline in strong partisanship among the prewar cohorts, the youngest member of which was now over forty. But although there was some fluctuation in levels of strong partisanship during the next eight years, most cohorts had close to the same percentage of

[31] Although Shively does not use this label, his proposed measurement technique can be considered a "correction for trend" procedure. For a more detailed discussion of reasons such "corrections" must consider compositional effects, see Neal E. Cutler, "Toward a Generational Conception of Political Socialization," in *New Directions in Political Socialization*, ed. David C. Schwartz and Sandra Kenyon Schwartz (New York: Free Press, 1975), pp. 254–288, at pp. 272–273.

[32] As several studies have shown, the shift toward partisan independence was most marked in the South. See E. M. Schreiber, " 'Where the Ducks Are': Southern Strategy Versus Fourth Party," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 35 (Summer, 1971), 157–167; Glenn, "Sources of Shift"; and Paul Allen Beck, "Partisan Stability and Change in the American South: 1952–1972," paper presented at the 70th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September, 1974. But the shift away from partisan loyalties was also a nationwide trend. I have also avoided conducting this cohort analysis within regions for a basic methodological reason: cohort analysis assumes that when one traces an age group across time its social composition is unchanged. Migrations between regions in the United States are age-related, and the composition of a cohort within a region may change over time as a result of these migrations.

[33] Persons born before 1924 are labeled the prewar electorate, even though a small proportion entered the electorate during World War II.

strong partisans in 1974 as in 1966. In 1974, each of the prewar cohorts had a level of strong partisanship that was as high or slightly higher than in 1952. But each of the postwar cohorts had a lower level of strong partisanship in 1974 than when it had first entered the electorate.

Clearly there were strong period effects during these years, influences affecting persons of all ages. As Warren Miller has suggested, "The impact on the young is seen in their increasing tendency to eschew partisanship; for the old the impact of the same factors does not lead so much to diminution of partisan attachment as to prevention of any increase."[34]

The Impact of Generational Change on Overall Levels of Partisanship

Considerable evidence has been presented to show that the low levels of partisanship among young Americans do not result from their youth, but appear to result from generational differences. These differences, as we will now see, have a sizable impact on the overall level of partisanship, for the composition of the American electorate has changed considerably during the postwar years. In fact, the overall decline in party identification between 1952 and 1974 results largely from new cohorts entering the electorate after World War II and of older cohorts diminishing through death. Although older cohorts have fluctuated somewhat in their level of party identification, in most cases their identification levels in 1974 differed little from those of some twenty-two years earlier.

Among whites born before 1924, 36 per cent were strongly partisan in 1952, and by 1964, 41 per cent were; after 1964, the percentage dropped, and by 1974, 33 per cent were strongly partisan.[35] The percentage of strong and weak partisans follows a similar pattern. In 1952, 76 per cent of the prewar electorate were party identifiers; the proportion rose to 80 per cent in 1958, and remained at that level in 1964; by 1974 it declined to 70 per cent. The proportion of pure Independents among the electorate was 6 per cent in 1952, and reached 12 per cent in 1966; in 1974 it was 11 per cent. The mean level of party identification for the prewar electorate was 2.05 in 1952, and by 1964, 2.14. By 1974, it dropped to 1.90. With all four measures the decline in partisanship among the prewar electorate between 1952 and 1974 was far smaller than the decline among the electorate as a whole. Moreover, even to the extent that party identification did fall among the prewar electorate, that decline resulted largely from differential death rates, for the older prewar cohorts, which had high identification levels, diminished far more than the younger prewar cohorts.[36] In fact, regardless of which measure of partisanship we use, the overall decline in identification between 1952 and 1974 results largely from the ever-increasing number of persons entering the electorate after World War II and from the diminution through death of the older cohorts.

Glenn's cohort divisions allow us to approximate closely the prewar/postwar dichotomy.[37] Among persons born before 1925, 78 per cent were party identifiers in 1945, and that percentage was unchanged 26 years later. The overall percentage of identifiers among the electorate dropped eight per cent, entirely because of the entrance of persons born after 1924 into the electorate and the continual diminution of the older age groups. Jennings and Niemi do not present data on the overall decline of party identification among the electorate, but their data show considerable stability in the identifications of the parental generation.[38]

To a large extent the overall decline in party identification between 1952 and 1974 results from generational change, a process in which the political predispositions of the older generations tend to persist, although older generations gradually are replaced by new generations with different attitudes from those of their elders. But we must also examine period effects to account for the more rapid erosion of partisanship between 1964 and 1974. Those effects are quite pronounced in the decline of strong party identifiers, for even among the prewar electorate there was an eight per cent drop during those ten years. But, even if the prewar cohorts had retained their 1964 identification levels, the overall proportion of strong identifiers would have declined, since the proportion of strong identifiers dropped among younger cohorts as well. Moreover, the large cohorts born after World War II began entering the electorate, a process accelerated by enfranchising eighteen-, nineteen-, and twenty-year-olds. Persons born before 1924 made up 60 per cent of the white electorate in 1964, and only 39 per cent ten years later.

We may estimate roughly the importance of period effects between 1964 and 1974 by making a

[34] Personal communication, May 30, 1974.

[35] These figures include persons in cohorts older than those presented in the tables.

[36] The cohorts born before 1900, which had very high identification levels, made up 37 per cent of the prewar electorate in 1952, but only 15 per cent in 1974.

[37] Glenn reports the ages of his cohorts during the years they were surveyed. My reports about the years of birth of his cohorts are based upon my approximations. Since all persons sampled in 1945 were born before 1925, the overall identification level for that year is reported; with the 1971 data, the partisanship of persons born between 1885 and 1924 is reported.

[38] Jennings and Niemi, "Continuity, and Change," pp. 1323–1324; Niemi and Weisberg, "Is Party Identification Stable?"

series of simple assumptions. If the prewar cohorts had retained their 1964 identification levels, while the postwar cohorts declined at the rates actually observed, 27 per cent of the electorate would have been strong party identifiers in 1974. The decline in strong identifiers would have been nine per cent, rather than the 12 per cent that actually occurred. If all the cohorts born before 1944 had retained their 1964 identification levels, 29 per cent of the electorate still would have been strong identifiers. There still would have been a seven per cent drop in the proportion of strong identifiers. In other words, the proportion of strong party identifiers would have declined without any erosion in party loyalties among persons who had entered the electorate by 1964, but that decline would have been less marked if period effects had not eroded strong partisanship among all age cohorts.

Conclusions

These findings force us to reject or at least to modify the received proposition that weak party loyalties among young adults result from their youth. That proposition may be true in other societies, but there is no evidence that life-cycle effects account for the weak party loyalties of young Americans. In developing the life-cycle explanation, Campbell and his colleagues did not take politics adequately into account. Partisan loyalties might grow stronger throughout the life-cycle, *if* political conditions reinforce party ties; conditions in postwar America did not.

These findings call into question Philip Converse's more recent arguments about the way party loyalties develop. Developing an elegant and parsimonious model, Converse postulates a gradual increase in partisanship among generations and among the entire electorate.[39] In a mature party system, according to his model, identification levels would stabilize. Using *The Civic Culture* data to test his model, he finds considerable support for it. But the data presented here show partisan decay, not stability. Moreover, Converse's model assumes that partisan loyalties among individuals strengthen as they age, and these data provide no support for that assumption. Perhaps, as Ronald Inglehart and Avram Hochstein conclude, Converse's model may describe the development of party loyalties in periods of partisan stability, but cannot account for periods of rapid partisan change.[40]

We may also question Converse and his colleagues' discussion of the high level of Wallace voting among young Americans in 1968.[41] The young, they claim, voted for Wallace more often than their elders because they had weaker party loyalties; when controls for strength of party loyalties were introduced, the tendency of the young to vote for Wallace was eliminated.[42] Converse et al. assumed that the weak partisanship of young adults resulted from life-cycle differences, and concluded that high levels of Wallace voting among young Americans should not be seen as the beginning of a trend. But if the low level of identification of young Americans results largely from differences between their formative socialization and that of their elders, the potential of the American electorate to support new parties may be greater than Converse and his colleagues reasoned.

The findings in this article have far-reaching implications, especially if Campbell and his colleagues are correct in their arguments about the contribution of party loyalties to political stability. Persons with strong party loyalties, they argue, are more resistant to the appeals of new parties and of leaders outside the traditional party system.[43] While this conclusion has been challenged,[44] it still seems plausible. The very low level of partisan loyalties in America today does not necessarily presage dangers for American democracy, or even a breakdown of the two-party system. But weak party loyalties may set the stage for new party alignments.[45] New parties are more likely to succeed when many voters have weak loyalties to the established parties. And survey research itself may contribute to the further erosion of party ties, for political leaders are well aware of the decline in party identification and may be tempted to continue minimizing party appeals.

[39] Converse, "Of Time and Partisan Stability."

[40] Inglehart and Hochstein, "Alignment and Dealignment of the Electorate in France and the United States," *Comparative Political Studies*, 5 (October, 1972), 343–372. Inglehart and Hochstein focus on the role of issues in eroding American party loyalties.

[41] See Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, Jerrold G. Rusk, and Arthur C. Wolfe, "Continuity and Change in American Politics: Parties and Issues in the 1968 Election," *American Political Science Review*, 63 (December, 1969), 1083–1105, at 1103–1105.

[42] Converse et al., "Continuity and Change," p. 1104.

[43] These arguments are advanced in Campbell et al., *The American Voter*, pp. 120–145, and in several essays in another volume by these same authors, *Elections and the Political Order* (New York: Wiley, 1966). Converse advances similar arguments in, "Of Time and Partisan Stability," and, with his colleagues, in "Continuity and Change."

[44] Most notably by W. Phillips Shively, "Party Identification, Party Choice, and Voting Stability: The Weimar Case," *American Political Science Review*, 66 (December, 1972), 1203–1225.

[45] For a discussion of possible new alignments, see Abramson, *Generational Change*, pp. 71–121.

Local Autonomy in China During the Cultural Revolution: The Theoretical Uses of an Atypical Case*

LYNN T. WHITE III
Princeton University

"Autonomy," like the concepts "power" and "influence" which are closely related to it, has to be defined in terms of intentions as well as behavior. The knottiest problem of political science is probably to define these words; a single article about China is not likely to solve it.[1] But we must begin with this issue anyway, because it makes clear the assumptions that are not available to us. If the Chinese central newspaper *People's Daily* and the Shanghai paper *Wenhui pao* are at any time urging the same line on a policy, there is no way to infer just from that fact that either is dependent on the other. If they are urging different lines, then at least one of them is autonomous; but particularly in some periods, it would be difficult to say which. Since any study of power or autonomy must delve into the murky marsh of speculating about what one actor might have done if another had not expressed himself, we must in practice give any word of this sort a definition that is more loose than would be ideal. We will only talk here about similarities and differences between what happened in Shanghai and what happened in the central government at Peking, because that is all we can document.[2]

A fine example of our problem arises from the fact that this paper studies autonomy "during" the Cultural Revolution. But when did the Cultural Revolution end? One likely date would no doubt be the famous "congress of victory," the Party's Ninth, held in April 1969. In that month, the main communist newspaper in Hong Kong, the *Ta kung pao*, noted that "The world is anxiously waiting to know . . . where China goes from here, with the completion of the Cultural Revolution." But from Chengtu, at the same time, came an assurance that the congress marked "a new stage in the Cultural Revolution," not its "completion" as the Hong Kong paper had said. In that same month another local source in Honan quoted Chairman Mao to the effect that "it must not be thought that peace will come after the second or even the third cultural revolution." A more conservative Fukien report that April saw an imminent end to the movement and predicted confidently that the congress "will certainly lead us forward to seize all-round victory." In Shanghai, the conclusion was cautious and very hypothetical: Only the intensity of unknown future struggles could determine "whether or not the Cultural Revolution can be carried through to the end" at all. And what did Peking say? If "central" policy may be equated with a dictum of Chairman Mao, then in this case it was ambiguous. With his usual circumspection, Mao said, "We hope that the present congress will be one of unity and of victory and that after its conclusion, still greater victories will be won throughout the country."[3]

* The author warmly thanks the Foreign Area Fellowship Program, the Center of International Studies of Princeton University, and the Center for Chinese Studies of the University of California, Berkeley, for support in this project. He is highly grateful for the comments of two anonymous reviewers. All errors and "misstatements" are the author's responsibility solely.

[1] A summary of theoretical debate on this subject can be found in *Power*, John R. Champlin, ed. (New York: Atherton Press, 1971).

[2] Many China specialists have debated the extent of centralization or decentralization in the People's Republic. This is one of the predominant issues of the field, although there is not space here even to list all the important statements on it. A particularly sophisticated debate is in the area of military politics. William W. Whitson, with Huang Chen-hsia, *The Chinese High Command: A History of Military Politics, 1927–71* (New York: Praeger, 1973), argues that the People's Liberation Army is divided into regionally based "loyalty groups." Critiques of this view are by William L. Parish; "Factions in Chinese Military Politics," *China Quarterly*, No. 56 (Oct–Dec., 1973), 667–99, and by David S. G. Goodman, "The Statistical Evidence for Yang Ch'eng-wu's Manipulation of the Military Elite," *China Quarterly*, No. 57 (Jan.–Mar., 1974), 148–55. A noncentralist view of Chinese planning is offered in Audrey Donnithorne, *China's Economic System* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1967). This volume is currently being revised, and Nicholas Lardy has written a dissertation at the University of Michigan that questions some of Donnithorne's conclusions on the basis of budget data. A relatively centralist perspective is found in Victor C. Falkenheim, "County Administration in Fukien," *China Quarterly*, No. 59 (July–Sept., 1974), 518–43. An analytically sophisticated essay that offers five "policy-making arenas" for which this issue can be discussed is Michael C. Oksenberg, "Chinese Politics and the Public Health Issue," in *Medicine and Society in China*, John Z. Bowers and Elizabeth F. Purcell, eds., (New York: Josiah Macy, Jr. Foundation, 1974), pp. 128–61. The main purpose of the present article is not to come down on either side of this centralist-localist debate, but to emphasize that a discussion of politics in this type of situation is unlike an analysis of nesting administrative jurisdictions.

[3] Summarized in the *South China Morning Post*, Hong Kong, April 20, 1969, p. 10.

Precedents for Autonomy

It may be useful to begin with a brief list of past occasions when Shanghai has shown some local autonomy, either in the sense that it served as a distinct "power base" which its leaders might use on the stage of national politics or in the sense that government policies were concocted differently there than in other parts of China. Nominally, Shanghai acquired the status of a "directly ruled city" (*chih hsia shih*) under the Nationalist central government in 1928. But in fact ever since then, this name has only meant that Shanghai is a province-level unit. Beginning in May 1949, the city was governed by the leaders of the communist Third Field Army, whose Commander was Ch'en Yi and whose First Political Commissar was Jao Shu-shih. Ch'en became Mayor, and Jao became First Secretary of the Shanghai Party Committee. During this early period, the top leadership of the city was identical with that of East China generally, and of the field army. The new Central government let field armies rule quite independently in large regions of the country at this time.[4]

Various of the city's bureaucracies were gradually integrated into a national framework before the elimination of the East China Great Administrative Area in 1954. The first Five-Year Plan, which committed relatively little investment to Shanghai, had a more nationally centralizing effect in inland cities than on the coast in general.[5] During this period, Shanghai's performance in the centrally written plan for grain production, for instance, was worse than that of any other province; whereas its overfulfillment of the central plan on cotton was better than any other province's. Cotton was more profitable than grain, when grown in Shanghai's ten rural counties, and the local agricultural departments seem to have been essentially ignoring central directives on this matter.[6] By the end of this Plan in 1957, Shanghai still contained about one-fifth of China's whole industrial economy, because the turnover from capital there was quicker (for economic reasons, involving both the production and marketing processes) than in relatively nondeveloped parts of China. The Great Leap Forward of 1958 further increased local managerial autonomy in Shanghai as elsewhere.[7]

In the aftermath of the Leap, the city's autonomy in cultural policy became an important factor on the national scene. A debate on the Party's cultural line had long raged in Shanghai and elsewhere between radicals and quasi-liberals. It reached a climax in 1962, when the famous novelist Pa Chin made a speech against radical literary critics at the Second Shanghai Congress of Writers and Artists.[8] In the spring of the following year, Mayor K'o Ch'ing-shih fixed local policy in this dispute by appointing a leftist editor named Chang Ch'un-ch'iao to head the city's Party Propaganda Department. This appointment may be considered the first "power seizure" of the Cultural Revolution. It provided a friendly place for Chiang Ch'ing's experiments in revolutionary opera during the mid-1960s. Some of her productions were staged in Peking at that time; but they were received badly there, and local authorities called them tasteless, "like boiled water."[9] K'o, Chang, and critic Yao Wen-yüan in Shanghai were much more receptive. As Mao Tse-tung himself put it, "If there was revisionism in the Center, what would the regions do about it? I felt my view couldn't be accepted in Peking. Why wasn't the criticism of Wu Han started in Peking but in Shanghai? This was because there were no available men in Peking. Now the question of Peking is solved."[10]

Actions like Yao's famous criticism from Shanghai of Wu Han's play, *The Dismissal of Hai Jui*,[11] were certainly based on the local power configuration, and they were certainly directed against a different policy than the one that prevailed in Peking. But a conceptual problem arises here that must shape our analysis and conclusions mightily: Yao's article in the Shanghai *Wenhui pao* was also a national event, instigated by Mao Tse-tung himself, who must surely be considered a "central" leader even in 1965. This event was also based in local politics, and it was at odds with what most factions in Peking wanted. Was it evidence of Shanghai's "autonomy"? The Peking and Shanghai leaderships were traveling in divergent directions by 1965, even though neither regarded itself as essentially local.[12]

[4] Kau Ying-mao, *The People's Liberation Army and China's Nation Building* (White Plains: International Arts and Sciences Press, 1973), p. xxix; and Kau's forthcoming book on *Bureaucracy and Political Development in Communist China.*

[5] Audrey Donnithorne, *China's Economic System*, pp. 144–5. See also Nicholas R. Lardy, "Economic Planning in the People's Republic of China: Central-Provincial Fiscal Relations," in U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *China: A Reassessment of the Economy* (Washington: GPO, 1975), pp. 94–115.

[6] Cf. the table in my "Leadership in Shanghai, 1955–69," *Elites in People's Republic of China*, Robert A. Scalapino, ed. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972), p. 312.

[7] I intend to refine this point in a future book about urban economic institutions in Shanghai, Donnithorne and Lardy, in the works cited above, agree that the city's managerial independence increased in 1958, although they disagree concerning its fiscal autonomy.

[8] White, "Leadership in Shanghai, 1955–69" pp. 334–8.

[9] Union Research Service, Hong Kong, XL, No. 26 (August 13, 1965), 185.

[10] *Mao*, Jerome Ch'en, ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1969), pp. 96–97. Mao's statement was made on October 25, 1966.

[11] *Wenhui pao* (Documentary News), Shanghai (hereafter WHP), November 10, 1965.

[12] There is no suggestion here that this kind of problem

Autonomy is not just a matter of what local authorities *can* do; it is also determined by what they *want* to do. In industrial policy—as contrasted with cultural policy—there was no evident disagreement between most Shanghai and central leaderships at this time. And the city's local institutions allowed a separation between high cadres dealing with economic matters and those who dealt with culture. Shanghai's senior deputy mayor, Ts'ao Ti-ch'iu, dealt with economic affairs until early 1965, when he prepared to succeed Mayor K'o during the latter's last illness. Ts'ao presided as acting mayor at two major conferences on administrative and economic policies in February and March 1965, when he urged Shanghai's compliance with central directives to "organize a climax of industrial production," "increase capital," and develop more foreign trade.[13] Ts'ao was a centralizer in urban economic policy. This position did not at the time put him into any evident conflict with leaders who wanted a more radical cultural policy. Autonomy was no issue, as long as disagreements could be sublimated.

Early Cultural Revolution: Autonomy in Factions at Many Levels

Thus far we have been assessing the degree of political hierarchy between national and local levels of administration. The difficulties with this kind of analysis become evident in Shanghai examples from 1966, when both the city and the central government were split into contending groups. Relations between them certainly did not cease to exist, but they were structured by the divisions within each administrative level. Radicals in Shanghai universities and publishing houses, which felt the earthquakes of the early Cultural Revolution most severely, often took their lead from ideological friends in Peking—if not from the official Party or government there.[14] Many municipal institutions were paralyzed by mid-1966 directives from Peking, and organizations could now form quickly to oppose them both below and above the city level. The Central Committee's August Plenum sent down a list of "Sixteen Points" which confused and neutralized public security cadres at the province and urban district levels in Shanghai. This paralysis of control organs left the local Party open to attacks which in previous years would have been repressed without a chance of developing.[15] This was a sign of local autonomy "in" Shanghai but not at the municipal and district levels, which were being stymied to allow the rise of Red Guard groups.

Any discussion of local autonomy in this period must emphasize the Shanghai Garrison. Its Public Security units were given new, liberalized orders about how they should tolerate dissidents. In addition, the land, naval, and air units were also instructed to convene "talk about application meetings" (*chiang yung hui*) in October and November, to provide more communication between the Army and at least some cadre leaders. For the most part, this movement began in the suburbs of the city, near servicemen's barracks.[16] Army groups had been doing this kind of thing on a smaller scale since 1964, but the critical autumn of 1966 saw an upsurge in the movement which was related to the linking of some civilian hierarchies to military organization as a means of assuring China's unity.

Radical civilians in Shanghai—notably Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, who was a secretary of the city's Party committee since 1965—evinced independence from many local elements in the political kaleidoscope at this time. Chang flew from Peking to Ant'ing East (a railway stop halfway between Shanghai and Soochow) on November 11 to help resolve labor demands that were being pressed upon the Municipal Committee by the Shanghai Workers' Revolutionary Rebel Headquarters. Apparently acting on his own initiative,[17] Chang undercut the Party committee's negotiating position by signing the petition of these workers in his capacity as a member of the central Cultural Revolution Small Group. In this kind of situation—when central and local politics were both split by disputes that crosscut administrative divisions—autonomy and coordination can only be discussed in terms of a very political and nonadministrative definition of the word "level"[18] Chang was representing a central faction from Peking against the Shanghai Party Committee—of which he was also a member. No attempt will be made here to give a blow-by-blow account of the famous January Revolution in the winter of 1966–67. Suffice it to

—which is certainly obvious in Shanghai—cannot apply in principle to other provinces too. A Kao Kang in the Northeast, or later a Huang Yung-sheng from Canton, certainly might have national ideas. The author may sometimes fail to avoid being a Shanghai local chauvinist; but he tries.

[13] *Hsinmin wanpao* (New People's Evening News), Shanghai (hereafter HMWP), February 19 and March 30, 1965.

[14] Cf. White, "Shanghai's Polity in Cultural Revolution," *The City in Communist China*, John W. Lewis, ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971), p. 343.

[15] *Ibid.*, pp. 328–9.

[16] *Shanghai wanpao* (Shanghai Evening News), Shanghai (hereafter SHWP), October 11, 1911, notes a *chiang yung hui* at Ts'aoching Commune, organized by land soldiers. The same newspaper on November 16 describes another, organized by airmen; and on November 20, still another such meeting, convened by "a certain unit of the East Sea Fleet" whose quarters is at Woosung in the Shanghai suburbs.

[17] Cf. White, "Leadership in Shanghai," p. 350.

[18] For such a definition, cf. the attempt in "Shanghai's Polity in Cultural Revolution," pp. 368–9.

say that nearly every group in Shanghai, no matter how it was generated, seemed to have its own autonomous policies then. The January 6 editorial in the "liberated" Shanghai *Wenhui pao* quoted Mao as saying that "rebellion is justified." None of the nice distinctions that arose later between "left" and "right" rebellion were yet suggested. Instead, the cheque was quite blank:

> "This has gone too far" is the view held by those who favor revolution made in comfortable ways. This is revisionist. Violent attack is the only way to destroy all enemies . . . One either actively supports the revolutionary actions of the rebels, or one firmly opposes them. There is no middle road. Only true Marxists hold that "To rebel is justified."

As long as any group could lay claim to "true Marxism," this was a formula for autonomy everywhere.

Restoring Hierarchical Links Between Levels

The demise of Shanghai's Party organization apparently came as a shock even to those who engineered it. Ts'ao Ti-ch'iu, Ch'en P'ei-hsien, and all the deputy mayors, as well as all the municipal Party secretaries (including Chang), were under attack by "big character posters" in Shanghai that January. When power was seized from almost all of them, the Party ceased to function in Shanghai. But as early as January 8, a "radical" newspaper, the *Shanghai Red Guard War Report*, was already urging that the Center be asked to reorganize the Municipal Party Committee. On January 12, at a meeting of 10,000 people to denounce the leaders of the local Communist Youth League, a "rebel" spokesman said that the League itself must be preserved, even if its personnel were overthrown.[19]

Leaders newly at the helm, no less than their followers, clearly had no idea in this period what form the new local government was supposed to take. Many elements in Shanghai had independent ideas on the subject. The quick rise and fall of the Shanghai People's Commune demonstrates this fact graphically. Chang Ch'un-ch'iao was being severely criticized in posters during late January. An organization at Futan University was set up to "examine" him. Probably after some consultation with his friends in Peking, and under point 9 of the Sixteen Points of the previous August Plenum of the Central Committee, Chang on February 6 proclaimed the Shanghai Commune. This institution helped to confirm his own local leadership, and so helped to unify the city for future reintegration with a national government. The Commune was hailed as a "creative application of the thought of Mao Tse-tung." But Chairman Mao himself had second thoughts. In mid-February he invited Chang to Peking, and (according to a wall poster) pointed out that[20] "if the country sets up communes, then the Chinese People's Republic will have to change its name to the Chinese People's Commune. . . . The Chairman suggests that Shanghai should change a little."

The gaping institutional vacuum, which had been caused in Shanghai by the Party's fall, could not be quickly filled by any alternative organization. But the desire for a more hierarchical order in many quarters was such that the *Chiehfang jihpao* (of which Chang had been Managing Editor for a time after May 1964) began to advocate Army intervention to establish a new local rule under his hegemony.

> It is not possible for the People's Liberation Army to refrain from intervening. Some people use "nonintervention" as a pretext to suppress the masses in reality. This is absolutely impermissible. Their so-called "nonintervention" is false. The question is not whether to intervene or not, but which side to stand on. . . . The demand of all genuine proletarian revolutionaries for the Army's assistance must be met.[21]

Any study of central-local relations during most of the Cultural Revolution becomes a study of the People's Liberation Army itself, since in most areas (and less in Shanghai than elsewhere) the PLA was the main surviving hierarchy.[22]

In a televised speech on February 24, Chang dissolved the Shanghai Commune and proclaimed the establishment of the Shanghai Revolutionary Committee. Their leaderships were identical. The most important figures in both had enjoyed careers, more than 15 years before, in the Third Field Army (except Yao Wen-yüan and Wang Hung-wen, the youngest ranking members). Chang Ch'un-ch'iao had long been a political commissar in that Army. Wang Shao-yung, Ma T'ien-shui, and Ch'en Lin-hu had been subordinates of Jao Shu-shih, the head political officer of the Third Army. Liao Cheng-kuo, Kao Chih-jung, Chi Ying-wu, and other soldiers on the Committee still remained commanders from that Army in 1968.[23] Many of the deposed leaders were of course also connected with the Third Army; but on the whole, the original ranks of the people who took over were as high as of those who fell.

This may have been some consolation to remaining authorities at the Center, because dissident organizations in Shanghai during January and

[19] New China News Agency (hereafter NCNA), Shanghai, July 14, 1967.

[20] Cited in "Leadership in Shanghai," pp. 352–3.

[21] NCNA, Peking, January 25, 1967, rephrasing *Chiehfang jihpao* (Liberation Daily), Shanghai (hereafter CFJP), editorial.

[22] Cf. Harvey Nelsen, "Military Forces in the Cultural Revolution," *China Quarterly* No. 51 (July–Sept. 1972), pp. 444–74.

[23] Whitson, *The Chinese High Command* p. 253.

February launched many general attacks against central authority as such. One can easily imagine the reaction of any Peking man—no matter what his political preferences—to local statements like the following:

> Some of our comrades think that everything has been solved now that the Shanghai Municipal Committee has been overthrown, so that the "thoroughness" of the revolution can be called off. They fail to perceive the reality of the reactionary line that was passed into factories through the work of bureaus, ministries, and corporations from the Center. . . . Although our factories are organizationally under the Shanghai Municipal Committee, nevertheless the sections that manifested the reactionary road to capitalism are those which are under the direct control of the ministries, bureaus, and corporations of the Center. Most of the leading cadres of the [Central] First Ministry of Machine Building are Liu Shao-ch'i's men. They carry out stubbornly the line of Liu and Teng. They take advantage of conditions in subordinate organizations all over the country. . . .[24]

Autonomy at this time was not always leftist; sometimes it was also rightist. The "economistic" tendency of local People's Bank branches to authorize high wage payments to workers was the target of specific central criticism on January 22. Also, a Party circular prohibited any change in the status of collectively owned enterprises or cooperatives to become "state-owned".[25] A fixed scale of more generous wages prevailed in state factories than in collectives, and the central prohibition on change to a "higher" form of ownership demonstrates the Center's scant interest in having more "state factories"—which in fact were mostly local-run, and often were just as independent of high authorities as were local collectives.

Central authorities were clearly alarmed at the extent to which mid-level cadres had been dismissed in Shanghai during the crest of the Cultural Revolution. As early as January 16, Premier Chou is reported to have said that "we should not promote the style of workers taking over management as they have done in Shanghai."[26] Some—not all—local forces heeded or agreed with this complaint. By February 21, even the "radical" *Wenhui pao*, still speaking for the Provisional Committee of the Shanghai People's Commune which was about to be dissolved, argued that "the evil wind of 'dragging out every cadre and striking down every power holder' comes from the class enemy." Rather tenderly, the paper suggested that *some* cadres were revolutionary, and they should be supported: "They should not be discriminated against, just because they are cadres."

An anarchist bee had been let loose in January, and the rest of 1967 and most of 1968 were devoted to efforts by the Revolutionary Committee and Peking to subdue it. There was probably more real autonomy in Shanghai at this time than at any other since liberation. For that very reason, the newly installed province-level and central authorities were closer in their basic aims than ever before. They both saw a need to balance the revolution with more order than existed then. The Revolutionary Committee called on "mass organizations"—a term that included all the officially tolerable new groups that had sprung up in Shanghai—to reduce "the number of their working personnel not taking part in production." It was ordered that "all individuals must strictly observe State plans and State systems." Chinese police were traditionally supposed to prevent rebellions, and now in a new vocabulary it was announced that "all rebels on the public security, procuratorial, and judicial fronts should unite together" and "closely coordinate with the Chinese People's Liberation Army units stationed in Shanghai . . . vigorously strengthening the work of maintaining law and order."[27]

The central and provincial authorities of this time adopted two policies to reduce the amount of autonomy at lower levels. In the first place, the Revolutionary Committee declared illegitimate all organizations that were not based on production or exchange processes. In particular, "Red Guard organizations formed by students should stop recruiting workers and poor and lower-middle peasants."[28] Later, as we shall see, the Committee itself set up exactly such organizations for its own purposes; but in early 1967 it wanted them abolished. In the second place, the new regime hoped to coopt as many local leaders as possible. For this purpose it was necessary to nurture cooperation between "leaders of mass organizations" and "revolutionary leading cadres." These latter were in fact often not very revolutionary at all, but they had survived January and had the experience that was needed to reestablish a thorough government. Of these groups, the second was politically as important as the first. At the beginning of April, a conference of "revolutionary leading cadres" from urban districts and corporations was held in Shanghai to urge them to be serious about "understanding the immortal achievements of the revolu-

[24] *Chitien chanpao* (Machinery and Electricity War Report), Shanghai, published by the Shanghai Revolutionary Rebellion Joint Committee of the First Ministry of Machine Building, February 2, 1967; in the Union Research Institute Library.

[25] *Tungfang hung* (The East is Red), Peking, January 22, 1967.

[26] *China News Summary*, Hong Kong, No. 154 (January 19, 1967) p. A8, based on the January 16 dispatch from Peking of an *Asahi shimbun* reporter.

[27] NCNA, Shanghai, February 27, 1967; tr. *Survey of the China Mainland Press*, Hong Kong (hereafter SCMP), No. 3890, p. 6.

[28] *Ibid.*

tionary mass organizations." Although the surviving old cadres were flattered as the "core and mainstay of the revolutionary three-way alliance," they were also supposed "to recognize the important role of the leaders of revolutionary mass organizations."[29]

On the whole, this plan for cooperation worked fairly well. By September, the *People's Daily* was praising Shanghai as a national model of success in creating alliances of both old and new cadres.[30] But later that same month, Premier Chou expressed some concern that big-character posters then going up in Shanghai should be more restrained in their content, despite their basic constructiveness. He urged that these posters should "refrain from spreading gossip, rumors, and state secrets," and he was also eager that they should not purvey obscene news or be written in bad taste.[31] The Premier clearly thought his cautionary words about what should be done in Shanghai would have some effect there.

Center-Shanghai relations were intimate at this time because the two most important civilian leaders in the city, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao and to an even greater extent Yao Wen-yüan, were spending much of their time in Peking dealing with national questions. When a Congress of Red Representatives of Shanghai Vocational Schools was planned in December 1967, Yao from his desk in Peking sent a long telegram of detailed instructions "not to allow the organization of the Red Guards to become lifeless."[32] As we shall see later, Yao also felt able to use his position as a member of the Cultural Revolution Small Group to send off telegraphic memos to almost anyone in the country, including Army commanders.

Although civilians were important for administration in both the central and Shanghai governments, the military hierarchy remained vital for unity. This was the case even when garrisons in different places did not implicitly follow the same policies. The major radical civilian figures at the national level clearly had better relations with military organs in Shanghai than in most parts of the country. These improved relations were in part an outgrowth of Chiang Ch'ing's theatrical work in Shanghai during the early 1960s, which involved her cooperation with East China military figures. This connection may even have influenced the local garrison's policy on "supporting the left" in Shanghai. Numerous soldiers arrived at units like the No. 3 Stevedoring Section of the Shanghai Port, or the Hsinchien Machine Works; but they usually came without guns, to perform a mediating function rather than a strictly military one.[33]

The "people's armed forces departments, about which very little is known, were important in forging links between ordinary civilians and soldiers throughout Shanghai to strengthen the city's new vertical government. Such departments existed at the municipal, urban district, and county levels. They were staffed by both PLA soldiers and civilians, and they presaged many later mixed institutions of this sort. In mid-1967 some radical groups began "bombarding the armed forces departments indiscriminately" in Shanghai, but this action brought a quick reprimand from the *Wenhui pao*.[34] To consolidate these departments and make them more effective, the Shanghai Garrison organized special full-time cadre schools for their personnel in 1967. Leftists were invited to be teachers there, possibly because of an official desire to counteract antiradical sentiments among some factory militia leaders who worked in these departments. Possibly for this reason, at least 1500 cadres had to go through the training more than once. It was reported from factories in Hsühui District that many cadres who took this training became members of enterprise revolutionary committees.[35]

Some high generals in the Nanking Military Region came under verbal fire because of their reluctance to use force in "supporting the left." The most strenuous of these criticisms was directed by Red Guards against airforce units connected with Gen. Yü Li-chin, then stationed in Peking, who had been a leader in the Nanking area's air units through the mid-1960s. According to one report, Yü on August 12, 1967, in the name of the Shanghai air garrison instructed units in Wusih to "attack" a civilian political group. This "plot" never materialized, because Yao Wen-yüan got wind of it and telephoned the local commander to prevent it. But Yü's apparent desire for order in his old home base made him more interventionist than the commander of the Nanking Military Region, Hsü Shih-yu.[36] Hsü himself, along with Tu P'ing, Yu T'ai-chung, and other Nanking generals, were also criticized by disgruntled groups which felt they should come to the aid of the leftists more often than they did. But Chairman Mao, through his representative K'ang Sheng on no less than three occasions, "put in a few words in favor of Hsü Shih-yu" and denied "rumors" that Hsü was in the

[29] NCNA, Shanghai, April 1, 1967.

[30] *Jenmin jihpao* (People's Daily), Peking (hereafter JMJP), editorial, September 18, 1967; tr. SCMP 4031, p. 10.

[31] *Wanshan hungp'ien* (Myriad Hills Turn Red), Peking, No. 1 (September 26, 1967); tr. SCMP 4057, p. 5.

[32] *Hungseh tsaofanche t'unghsün* (Red Rebel Bulletin), Kongmoon (Chiangmen), December 12, 1967; in URI library.

[33] NCNA, Shanghai, September 18, 1967.

[34] Shanghai Radio, June 27, 1967.

[35] NCNA, English, Peking, October 23, 1967.

[36] *Ts'ank' ao tzuliao* (Reference Materials), Canton, No. 1, July 1968; tr. SCMP 4222, pp. 1–3.

wrong.[37] In fact, the restrained, civilian-oriented "support the left" policy of the Nanking Region was quite consistently applied. Its compatibility with civil policies in both Shanghai and Peking made the basis on which a hierarchical Shanghai government could be formed at that time.

In June 1968, the land, air, and naval units of Shanghai held a joint conference to pledge united efforts toward ending autonomous factionalism in the civilian organs where they participated as propaganda and mediation forces. They swore to "defend to the death" not only Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao, but also the central Cultural Revolution Small Group and Chiang Ch'ing.[38] The development of models and cults during late 1968 and 1969 is evident in Shanghai papers. They were publicized largely by soldiers. Often figures in the national hagiology were involved, such as Chiang Ch'ing, Men Ho and Li Wen-chung; but sometimes local Shanghai figures such as Hsü Tse-hua were also prominent.[39]

By 1968, the Shanghai Revolutionary Committee and public security offices within the military had gathered a good deal of evidence against leaders of autonomous dissident groups at low levels, including some Red Guard groups. Chang and his secretariat studied and judged these cases, and the PLA-run public security departments gave stiff sentences to counterrevolutionaries who were accused of "ransacking houses and refusing to make confessions."[40] An April 27 rally at "Cultural Revolution Square" had shades of 1789. This "public judgment meeting" was held "to suppress active counterrevolutionary culprits resolutely." It was attended by ten thousand people and given full television coverage so that everyone in the city could see it on public TV sets. Some of the defendants were committed to prison; others received death sentences which "were carried out immediately" to the accompaniment of shouts of "Long live Chairman Mao!"[41] Authorities from the Central government sometimes showed up to validate and witness decisions of this sort. K'ang Sheng, Mao's own main expert in security affairs, on May 2 attended a "Work Conference on Special Cases" that had been convened by the Shanghai Revolutionary Committee, and he expressed support as well as some caution about the development of this policy in Shanghai when he said, "It doesn't matter when several persons die, but there are some points to note: The political influence of it may be bad . . . and more important cases may be mishandled or postponed." He urged that "attention must be given to the art of struggle as well as to tactics."[42]

Some examples of the dissidence which the Revolutionary Committee and local PLA chose to publicize in this way may have bordered on ordinary criminality. But much of the dissidence was political. At the end of 1968 many separatist groups in "*laotanan*" ('old-big-difficult') schools and factories still had a tendency to snub the workers' propaganda teams that had been sent down from the city government—even after revolutionary committees were formed in those units.[43] The exemplary cases that were dealt with in "public judgment meetings" only somewhat reduced this tendency to ignore higher authorities. Cooperation from autonomous group leaders below the municipal level was slowly restored.

In some units, such as the Shanghai First Tire Factory, soldiers associated with the propaganda teams found that they could at times make good liaison with leaders there who had been demobilized from the Army many years before.[44] In some cases, faction leaders could themselves be recruited to become members of propaganda teams. These teams were fairly free-form institutions, whose local personnel could be changed easily. They supplied forums for substantive agreements between local factions.[45]

Using these methods, the Revolutionary Committee was able to reduce low-level autonomy within the city and to restore some of the lines of communication that are essential to thorough government there. The means to make this change were quite constant after 1968, but the speed of the movement was slow and never very sure. Well into the 1970s, the city government still favored a very gradual withdrawal of worker propoganda administrators from universities. Newspaper articles emphasized that although many universities were by this time back in operation, the teams should not leave them, lest factionalism develop there again. The hierarchy of the city had mostly been reconstructed before this time; but any complete elimination of low-level autonomy would have been impossible—even if the city fathers had wished to go so far.[46]

[37] *Wenko t'unghsün* (Cultural Revolution Bulletin), Canton, No. 13 (March 1968); tr. SCMP 4166, p. 14.

[38] WHP, June 30, 1968.

[39] *Ibid.*, and Radio Shanghai, November 2, 1969. Cf. also WHP, May 29, 1968, for an article entitled "Take Comrade Chiang Ch'ing as a Model in Carrying Out Revolutionary Mass Criticism and Repudiation to the End."

[40] WHP, April 11, 1968. Cf. also *Wenko t'unghsün*, No. 13 (March 1968); tr. SCMP 4167, p. 14.

[41] WHP, April 28, 1968.

[42] *Hung szu t'unghsün* (Red Headquarters Bulletin), Peking, No. 4–5 (July 1968).

[43] *Hsingtao jihpao* (Singtao Daily), Hong Kong, December 23, 1968.

[44] WHP, October 16, 1968.

[45] Cf. an investigation report from Shanghai that was reprinted in *Hungch'i* (Red Flag), Peking, March 13, 1969, and tr. in *Survey of China Mainland Magazines*, Hong Kong, No. 650, p. 32.

[46] WHP, April 4, 1972.

Autonomy in Industrial and Commerical Policy

High authorities could postpone dealing with independence in strictly economic decisions more easily than in the political sphere. They allowed more production decisions to be made by "democratic management" at low levels. The effects of the Cultural Revolution had a potential of permanence in no field more than in urban economic institutions. Not only did the Shanghai offices of various central ministries become targets of criticism; the economic "embassies" in Shanghai from other provinces also fared badly. By late 1967, fully seventy separate offices in the city, which were subordinate to various ministries and provinces elsewhere, had been "investigated" and closed down by Shanghai local groups. A radical source described these permanent delegations from other parts of China as being veritable spy stations, with weapons, radio transmitters, underground workshops and "a good deal of contraband goods and commodities in short supply."[47]

More dispassionate economic reports give clues about what this institutional change may have meant in policy terms. The closing of interprovincial trade offices did not lead to more autarky and "self-reliance" in Shanghai, as might be expected. On the contrary, this change allowed the commercial departments of provinces and lower-level units to negotiate more freely for an expanded trade under less centralized direction. One report from the Shanghai Second Commerce Bureau says that the importation of hogs from outside Shanghai's jurisdiction was sharply increased by August 1968 from its 1966 level.[48] International as well as domestic trade was affected by this trend. In late 1969, it was reported that the Shanghai Foreign Trade Bureau had been able to "make good use of backlog goods in the inventory to boost foreign trade and to meet home demand. . . . Instead of the foreign trade departments being independent [i.e. under nonlocal control] as in the days of Liu Shao-ch'i, these departments are now managed as are other departments."[49] The Cultural Revolution allowed new and somewhat free informal contracts to develop large-scale economic exchanges under relatively little hierarchical control.

In early 1969, the Chinese press began to ruminate sporadically the idea that China was entering a "great leap" or "flying leap" ("*ta yüeh*" or "*fei yüeh*"). The old 1958 slogans certainly seemed apt enough in this new period of managerial decentralization. But at the same time, some *post*-Leap recovery policies and slogans were also in evidence As in 1961, agriculture was to be the "foundation" of the economy, and industry was the "leading factor."[50] There was even a particular shortage (of coal) in 1969, to add some spice of reality to these nostalgic reminiscences. In Shanghai, an "Emulate Peking" campaign was initiated to save coal.[51]

Shanghai purchasing stations announced in February 1969 that they were willing to receive factories' output "at any time." This increased marketing flexibility paralleled the demise of the central organs which might have enforced planned delivery schedules otherwise. It was announced that the total tonnage shipped from Shanghai to other parts of China in the first month of 1969 was double that of the same period one year earlier. "Together with industrial departments" the Shanghai commerce offices sent "joint investigation teams" to advertise, and buy, in other parts of the country.[52] The Spring Festival market of 1969 had a brisk trade on this basis, and the supplies of all foodstuffs were reported up from the previous year.[53] The Cultural Revolution was neither an economic depression in Shanghai nor a movement against capitalist style markets among collectively owned firms.

During this period, it was frankly maintained that plans get fulfilled fastest when they are most ambitious and unspecific. "Only when there is enough leeway allowed in drawing up a plan will it be possible to make the masses constantly maintain enthusiasm in production to a high degree."[54] Emulation proposals appeared to be among the more effective "plans" in heavy industry at this time, even though they were not administratively binding. When the Peking Iron and Steel Company proposed "grasping revolution and promoting production . . . in preparedness against war," the Shanghai No. 3 Steel Plant was encouraged to study the Peking documents, criticize the "complacency affecting some comrades," and organize emulation among its own workshops and shifts.[55] Even more than the previous emulation campaigns, these movements in 1969 seem to have been relatively cooperative and noncompetitive.[56] In such a context of economic enthusiasm and amity, what bureaucrat would dare send down a simple directive?

The most sophisticated formulation of the 1969–70 economic model was the critique by radical economists of the "profit principle" as a control of subordinate economic units by superordinate ones.

[47] *Ch'engchien hung szu* (Urban Construction Red Headquarters), Canton, No. 8, January 1968; cf. SCMP 4127, p. 11. See also *Hung tienhsün* (Red Telegraph Report), No. 2 (March 1968) xx. SCMP 4143, p. 12–13.

[48] *Ts'aimao chanpao* (Finance and Trade War Report), Shanghai, August 14, 1968.

[49] Radio Shanghai, December 20, 1969.

[50] *South China Morning Post*, March 16, 1969, p. 8.

[51] WHP, June 30, 1968.

[52] NCNA, English, Shanghai, February 13, 1969.

[53] *Ibid.*, February 15, 1969.

[54] JMJP, February 28, 1969; an article about Shanghai.

[55] NCNA, English, Peking, September 17, 1969.

[56] Cf., for example, *ibid.*, September 19, 1969.

Most of these attacks were launched against Sun Yeh-fang (who was dubbed "China's Liberman" in parallel with Liu's honorary title as "China's Khrushchev"). The Shanghai No. 1 State Cotton Mill had a field day criticizing Sun, because in 1961 he had personally written an "Investigation Report" on that mill. Sun insisted that a capital-profit ratio should be computed for enterprises even in a socialist economy. He argued that some index of this sort was necessary to sum up the various desiderata of high output, good product quality, and an optimum capital-labor ratio. In some ways, Sun may at first seem to be a decentralizer: He wanted "small power" over production matters to be vested at the enterprise or factory level, and he called for "free transactions in fixed assets" and opposed transfers of capital in the form of grants under the state ownership system. In particular, he insisted that capital depreciation was underestimated unless invisible wear and tear were taken into account, and he apparently felt that pressure to raise labor productivity could be properly applied by the government only if information from this accounting reform were available. Sun's best critics were no amateur economists. They certainly did not come out against accounting as such, or against the need to manage finances. But they accused Sun, in effect, of using market indices to structure the most crucial decisions in writing plans. Sun's critics wanted the state to retain more initiative but less regular control over the economy than his formulae would allow, and they came out in favor of free grants of state capital to economic units for the purpose of implementing public ideas. They felt that profit was not, in any case, an index that could comprehend all the various results of the economic process which they wished to optimize. On the subject of depreciation, they made an interesting and classically Marxist critique of Sun's ideas, saying that invisible wear and tear needs to be accounted only in a capitalist economy, where competition forces a steady reduction of the input of labor relative to capital. They called Sun's depreciation policy a matter of "drinking poison to quench thirst," and they said that it was necessary only in a monopoly market situation.[57] Finally, and most important, they suggested (but did not say) that Sun's emphasis on profit was really a means of central control. Sun was in fact not a very convincing "capitalist." Cultural Revolution resistance to the idea of profitability was based on its use as a summary index that would help higher political levels acquire more power over economic enterprises at lower ones.

At various times in Shanghai's Cultural Revolution, especially after the Ninth Party Congress, this kind of local autonomy was elaborately defended. "Advanced small plants," with 300 to 400 workers each, "more or less poorly equipped," were commended by the Shanghai Revolutionary Committee for their achievements. Such small enterprises were in practice beneath any enforceable plan. They "started with indigenous methods and combined indigenous and modern methods" to develop some rather complicated products. The Hungsheng Magnetic Materials Plant, which had once been a masonry workshop, was converted at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution into an electric parts factory. "When the plant began trial-producing magnet sheets and magnetic core materials for the 'electronic brains' of computers, some people thought they were entitled to ask for equipment from the higher levels." But realism prevailed, and apparently the higher levels did very little to subsidize, control, or make money from such operations.[58]

By mid-1972, 380 "neighborhood factories" and 4000 "neighborhood teams" in Shanghai were officially listed as producers of over 10,000 kinds of small products ranging from screws to radios. At least some of the enterprises in this substantially unplanned economy were probably unregistered. Many of these small plants had been founded or reformed during the Great Leap. By 1972 their total production was valued at 340 per cent of what it had been in 1965. The Cultural Revolution allowed for the growth of small industries of a sort that earlier had been important in the economic growth of other countries such as Japan.[59]

Autonomy in Remaking a Local Party

It was not until March 1968 that a "Party group" (*tang hsiaotsu*) of five members was formed in the Shanghai Revolutionary Committee.[60] According to traditional Leninist doctrine, this kind of delay was never supposed to occur, since each nonparty organization was supposed to be guided by its Party members. The Municipal Revolutionary Committee only slowly saw its interest in restoring

[57] This is a heavily interpreted version of *Kuangming jihpao* (Bright Daily), Peking, January 23, 1970; tr. SCMP 4595, pp. 65–75. This fascinating article, and others like it from the same period, deserve more criticism by professional economists. It should be evident that the most interesting Maoist economic ideas go considerably beyond the mere doctrine of enthusiasm.

[58] NCNA, Shanghai, May 18, 1970; and a similar article, *ibid.*, February 25, 1970.

[59] Cf. NCNA, Shanghai, April 25, 1972; and *ibid.*, April 30, 1972, announced that Shanghai's output in the first quarter of that year had been an all-time high. See also William W. Lockwood, *The Economic Development of Japan: Growth and Structural Change, 1868–1938* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954).

[60] *Wenko fenglei* (Cultural Revolution Storm), Canton, No. 3, March 1968; tr. SCMP 4149, p. 14. The five were Chang, Yao, Ma T'ien-shui, Wang Shao-yung, and Hsü Ching-hsien. Wang Hung-wen was apparently still considered too junior.

a Party hierarchy parallel to its own system of subordinate revolutionary committees. By late 1968, some of the lower revolutionary committees proved to be more recalcitrant—more autonomous—than even the old Party committees had been in forwarding information up to the city government. A directive of that time ordered that

> the revolutionary committees of all districts, counties, bureaus, institutions of higher learning, and revolutionary mass organizations must promptly report their situation to the Municipal Revolutionary Committee, seek advice from it, and report to it. . . . If a unit under our supervision does not seek advice before doing things, or does not make a report afterwards, then it is establishing an independent kingdom.

The Revolutionary Committee also specified that "each report should be limited to one thousand characters. . . . The content must be true, clear, and brief. . . . The style must be refined, vivid, and brisk."[61] These regulations were meant to maximize the ratio of specific information to abstract ideology in reports, on grounds that the Municipal Revolutionary Committee members reading them thought well of Chairman Mao's ideas already. But they did not have such sure control over the careers of functionaries in their subordinate organizations as the old Municipal Party Committee had previously enjoyed. Only a restoration of the Party could give them this important tool for policy coordination.

Shanghai by late 1968 had been designated as a national model both for building the local Party and for helping to write a new Party Constitution. "May 7 cadre schools" were developed from October onward, and the experiences and difficulties of the Nanshih District May 7 Cadre School filled Shanghai newspapers for many weeks.[62] At the same time, campaigns were also pressed for the "cleaning of class ranks" and the establishment of criteria under which some new cadres who were active during the Cultural Revolution became Party members and others were cast out because of their bourgeois or dissident backgrounds. There was a slow but steady decrease in the autonomy of local political groups whose independence had burgeoned during the early Cultural Revolution. This contrasted with the trend toward relatively dispersed power in the economic system.

Party rebuilding was for some people in Shanghai a rather fearsome prospect. "At the beginning, some units, not having given enough thought to the matter, did not make Party rectification a central task. . . . This task could not be squeezed into the schedule." To speed the organizational process, Chang and Yao had 200 investigators sent to 47 "pilot" units to run study classes and hold meetings concerning Party rebuilding in those places.[63] The first principle of Party reconstruction was that nonparty people should participate in it. *Wenhui pao*, as early as October 16, 1968, warned that if rectification were "carried out behind closed doors, some 'good old men' and 'middle of the roaders' may be admitted into the Party, and some bad men and opportunists, whose actions do not agree with their words, may infiltrate the Party." So leaders of mass organizations were invited to the meetings that set up provisional Party branches in various kinds of units, even though many of the participants were later not admitted to the Party itself.

Various possible ways of forming leading Party "nucleus groups" were discussed at this time. Some people in Shanghai reportedly said that these groups should be elected by their production units with all confirmed or previous Party members as candidates; some thought the groups should consist of all the Partymen on the unit's revolutionary committee; and others thought that all nominal Party members should elect the new Party leaders by ordinary ballot. Finally it was decided (after considerable advice on this topic from Yao Wen-yüan) that nucleus groups of the Party in various units should be "produced"—not elected—after open "consultations." In effect, this meant that higher-level officials would sit in at lower unit meetings to help choose the new local leaderships by means of consensus among Party members, with nonparty observers present at the creation, but with no need for any vote.[64] This schema was immediately important in local efforts to restore hierarchy and to reduce subgroup autonomy in Shanghai. It also became important on the national scene, because this abstract formula was adopted as a model for reconstituting the Party all over China.

The Ninth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was held in mid-April, 1969, and "nucleus groups" officially became full-fledged cells in Shanghai shortly after that. The first Party branch under the new constitution in China was established in the Shanghai No. 17 Cotton Mill (the factory where Wang Hung-wen had been a policeman and organizer). The *Liberation Daily* called for emulation of this model by all units establishing their own branches. But even in this exemplary case, the relationship of the new branch to the mill's revolutionary committee was not at all clear:

[61] WHP, editorial of September 25, 1968; cf. tr. SCMP 4288, pp. 12–13.

[62] On May 7 schools in Shanghai: cf. WHP, October 4, 9, and 10, 1968; JMJP, September 8, 1969; and Shanghai Radio, January 14, 1970.

[63] Transcript of a report to the Kwangtung Province Revolutionary Committee on the experience of the Shanghai Revolutionary Committee, in an undated pamphlet; tr. SCMP 4344 (January 23, 1969), p. 1–3.

[64] *Ibid.*

The Party branch exercised an important role behind the revolutionary committee—and it had done so since 1967, before its official inception, acting as a vanguard for purging the Party in the open. . . . It is hoped that the revolutionary committee will function even more satisfactorily and will fulfill its historic task of criticism and repudiation.[65]

This enigmatic statement indicates that the new Party branches certainly did not supersede the revolutionary committees. But it also suggests that the revolutionary committees were not supposed to be regular administrative organs (as in practice many of them had turned out to be). In this model mill committee at Shanghai, a Mao Tse-tung Thought Study Class was set up for all the new branch secretaries and revolutionary committee members, so that they might restore the Party's political role through a gradual process of their own reeducation.[66] This procedure might lead to a purer kind of Party at the local level, but it would not necessarily produce a very forceful or hierarchical one.

Shanghai in National Politics

The vertical structure that emerged in Shanghai during the Cultural Revolution differed in one important respect from the revised governments that were set up in almost all other provinces of China. Shanghai politics were reformed by civilians, but regular soldiers led in most other places. The first six revolutionary committees to be formed at the province level in China (from January to August, 1967) were dominated by men who had been military commissars. They were not professional commanders. Later, when revolutionary committees were formed in other provinces at a time of more emphasis on law and order than on revolution, professional commanders were chosen to head the new groups. No less than four of the six earliest-formed committees saw a later replacement of their original commissar-chairmen by new commander-chairmen. The main exception was Chang Ch'un-ch'iao in Shanghai. (Hsieh Fu-chih also retained his title in Peking, possibly with the help of Chou En-lai who long favored reliance on the political acuity of commissars.)[67]

Civilians were also dominant on the reconstructed Shanghai Party Committee, which was not established until January 1971 after a meeting that lasted six days. This was the first province-level Party committee to be headed by nonmilitary figures. Its standing committee had sixteen members, although only Chang, Yao, Wang Hung-wen, Ma T'ien-shui, Hsü Ching-hsien, Wang Hsiu-chen, and Chou Ch'un-lin were named in the newspapers. Of these, only the last is a commander. The city's atypicality was clear when the new Liaoning Party Committee, formed just three days later in a similar urban and industrial province, was clearly dominated by military men.[68]

To a surprising extent, Shanghai styles were propagated successfully to much of the country under quasi-military rule. For example in mid-1969, a campaign was mounted in Shanghai against the doctrines of Confucius and Mencius. Discussion meetings were held in the city, and to some extent this movement spread to other parts of the country. It was pointed out that "the repudiation of Confucianism meant the repudiation of that rank renegade Liu Shao-ch'i, and of revisionism."[69] In 1970, a "writing group" in Ch'uansha County was busy making polemics against Confucius, apparently in connection with activities of the May 7 cadre schools there.[70] The "new" cultural revolution, mooted during 1973–4, was in part the national continuation of a movement that had been simmering in Shanghai long before Lin Piao's demise. Most of the vocabulary now used for criticizing the Marshal was borrowed directly from Shanghai's continuing campaign against the Sage.

Shanghai has clearly been used as a testing ground by the national leadership on many occasions in recent years. During 1971 when Lin Piao's fall was widely rumored on the informal grapevine of China, but before it was officially announced, Shanghai papers placed emphasis on the Party's "Ninth Congress line." Lin's own prominence at that congress was of course not discussed. But apparently to gather more information about the effect of his purge on middle cadres, the Party committee members of Shanghai County were organized to study documents that emphasized Party unity. It seems clear that national leaders were uneasy and curious about what the local effects of Lin's flight and death would be; so at this time all county officials were urged to "listen humbly to dissenting views" and to "make reports more frequently."[71]

Shanghai was also used as a testing ground for restoration of the Communist Youth League. The first province-level congress of that organization in China after the Cultural Revolution was held at the city as late as February 12, 1973. Almost half the delegates to this congress claimed to be of working-class background, and another fifth were peasants. Three hundred Red Guard representatives also attended, but only as observers without

[65] Radio Shanghai, June 21, 1969.
[66] NCNA, Shanghai, June 13, 1970.
[67] Whitson, *The Chinese High Command*, p. 550.
[68] *China Quarterly*, "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation," No. 46 (April–June 1970), p. 388.
[69] Radio Shanghai, July 4, 1969.
[70] JMJP, May 24, 1970.
[71] NCNA, Shanghai, October 31, 1971.

any direct participation. The earlier Shanghai formula for reconstituting Party branches, under which the old organizations' memberships "produced" new leaderships after consultation under the eyes of nonorganization elements, was now extended to the reestablishment of other kinds of units.

Shanghai's constitution-making function for the country as a whole became obvious at the Tenth Party Congress in August 1973. Wang Hung-wen (then age 35) had been spending almost all his time in Peking, although his task there was not clear. At the Congress, both Wang and Chang were raised to memberships in the Standing Committee of the Politburo; and Wang came third after Mao and Chou on the formal lists of Party pecking order that are of such overwhelming interest to peeking Peking watchers. Except for Chou, Wang read the only report delivered at the Congress. He read it probably for the straightforward reason that the main item on the agenda of the Congress was approval of a new Party Constitution, which he had been busy helping to write. In addition, Wang—like Hsü Ching-hsien and Yao and a few other relatively young members of the Shanghai leadership—has evident intelligence and energy, as well as some claim to proletarian experience. All of this may well have recommended him to Mao Tse-tung and other old leaders. The major emphasis in Wang's speech at the Congress was based on Mao's 1966 dictum: "Great disorder across the land leads to great order. And so once again every seven or eight years, monsters and demons will jump out themselves. Determined by their own class nature, they are bound to jump out." The Party Constitution affirmed that socialist construction would take "a considerably long historical period." The civilian politicians' style of turning over all the rocks to find all the worms was definitely expected to become a necessary practice in China. The men who wrote this Constitution clearly feel that their critical, firm manner should prevade China's development process in the future.

Nearly two years later, in January 1975, the Fourth National People's Congress met in Peking. Only two reports were again delivered—one by Chou on government work, the second by Chang Ch'un-ch'iao on China's new State Constitution. Chang expressed the complex belief of organization radicals quite well when he said that "without ample democracy, it is impossible to have a high degree of centralism, and without a high degree of centralism, it is impossible to build socialism."[72] In a sense, Wang and Chang and their colleagues symbolize Shanghai's situation in China as a whole. In "real power" terms, the city is not strong compared to other places, in any short-run political sense. But it is a fountain of political ideas and administrative techniques that stir interest elsewhere, and it provides a steady flow of effective national politicians.

[72] *Peking Review* 18:4 (January 24, 1975), p. 19.

Conclusions

Shanghai's civilian peculiarity has linked it somewhat with the central government of Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai. What is the meaning of local autonomy in this kind of situation? Shanghai's Cultural Revolution leaders are well aware that they are now performing on a national stage. Their obvious country-wide evangelism, expressed in heroes, models, slogans, and constitutional suggestions, all makes little sense unless a role in national policy formulation is really open to them. In fact, they have long been influencing national policies. A kind of comprehensive patriotic intention typifies them better than the other characteristics by which they are usually described. Chang, Yao, and Wang have been called regionalists—but they spend most of their time in Peking. They have been called leftists—but their origins and past activities make clear that they are censors and policemen just as much; and that is a rather different description. Their main hope is apparently to be central politicians in the service of national purposes.

If we wish to find out about local government in most parts of China, we cannot make many generalizations from the obviously atypical case of Shanghai. That city is now more intertwined in the politics of the capital than are most province units. But a consideration of the "autonomy" of this unusual place leads to conclusions that can be comparative. This limiting case suggests a redefinition of the problem of autonomy, as it might be studied anywhere. Whether or not Shanghai's leaders have been potentially independent of central government power, they have clearly not been independent of their own national ideas. The multilevel, factionalized politics of the Cultural Revolution in Shanghai, ranging over many issue areas, suggest that attributes like "autonomy," "power," or "dependence" cannot be ascribed to any objects just at random. These words can pertain only to some kinds of units. In particular, it is in many cases difficult to determine precisely whether or not they characterize administrative levels of a bureaucracy, or geographic parts of a country. Attributes like power and dependence do not in practice turn out to be behavioral variables unless there is a clear unity of will in the entities they describe, because their use presumes the possibility of knowing what subordinate units would have done if superordinate ones had not acted. That is a speculative and hypothetical business. In the study of real events outside of laboratories, the most obvious official parts of government structures (such as their de-

partments or regions) often have no such clear unity of will at all, either because they are divided into factions, or else because their purposes are not strong enough to allow any reliable estimate of how they would act under conditions that do not exist. The really political units in such situations are often not the evident administrative ones, but are groups of a sort whose definition is beyond the scope of this paper.[73]

In mid-September 1973, Shanghai began publishing a monthly journal called *Study and Criticism*, which seems to be a southern version of—and potentially a rival for—Peking's *Red Flag*. The new theoretical magazine emphasizes classic Marxist ideas about the importance of urban workers in the leadership of any socialist revolution. To call the policy behind this movement a merely "local" matter would be to ignore most of its substance, and all of its ambition. Even its origin "in Shanghai" is somewhat dubious, although Shanghai people certainly have participated importantly in this kind of national campaign during the Cultural Revolution. There have been times when the nationally advertised policies from both Shanghai and Peking were not in fact the policies followed most generally in the country at large. These two cities are not most of China. Their civilian leaderships have often differed in style and policy from the committees of military leaders and groups representatives that hold sway in most parts of the nation.

In the last analysis, what is "national" policy? To find it, should we read the *People's Daily*, the classic source? Should we instead read *Wenhui pao*, which has obviously been a better indicator of this policy on a few occasions? Or should we interview people from Kongmoon, and try to find out what the commanders are really thinking in Chengtu? A broad sense of Chinese national patriotism has clearly increased throughout the country under communist rule. Central initiatives and orders—which are partly generated in localities, as well as adapted for application there—meet with wide compliance in many parts of the country. But the abstract categories "national policy" and "local autonomy" are as difficult to exemplify precisely in China as they would be, say, in America, even though the project in either case is useful as a means to talk about what happens locally and comparatively.

[73] One attempt to define the preliminary traits of an entity that might be described by words like "power" or "dependence" is White, "Shanghai's Polity in Cultural Revolution," esp. pp. 357–69.

Four Theories in Search of a Reality: James Burnham, Soviet Communism, and the Cold War

JOHN F. DIGGINS
University of California, Irvine

All through history, mind limps after reality.
Leon Trotsky

In a perceptive article in a recent issue of the *APSR*,[1] Professor Ole R. Holsti illustrates the many and strikingly similar ways in which the Right and the Left view international politics in relation to the cold war. The logic, structure, and rhetoric of their theories are the same, Holsti points out; only the roles of the villians are reversed—presumably to protect the innocent. At the conclusion of his comprehensive survey the author expresses frustration at being unable to validate the respective theories. Given the axiomatic, circular nature of the reasoning behind such attitudes, we are confronted with self-contained arguments that cannot be rationally analyzed or empirically tested. Of the Right-wing school of thought, Holsti states: "The real problem is that the protracted conflict theory does not appear capable of falsification."

It may be true that what cannot be empirically asserted cannot be refuted. Yet if one approaches the problem through the historical dimension, tracing the development of the conservative cold war argument over a substantial period of time, and through the mind of one of its original and learned strategists, some interesting findings may emerge to indicate that the Right-wing theory is considerably less static and more sophisticated than Holsti describes, and considerably less adequate and more vulnerable than its proponents assume. In an ultimate sense, Holsti is no doubt correct when he maintains that the theories of the conservative Right, like those of the radical Left, are "irrefutable" because they "appear to be essentially nonfalsifiable." I would suggest, however, that the basis for this impasse may lie in the lack of a historical perspective which would enable one to consider the adequacy of ideas both before and after events. In this paper I shall attempt to show that the theory of a major conservative spokesman has been incapable of explaining satisfactorily what it purports to explain—the nature of Soviet Communism, international politics, and the ideology of the cold war—and hence that theory must give way to a number of shifting and conflicting theories, all in search of a presumably constant reality. I shall also suggest that the Right not only resembles the Left in its thoughts on the cold war, as Holsti astutely demonstrates, but that in this instance it resembles the Left because historically its thoughts and assumptions have derived from the Left. In the following study we may find not only "strange bedfellows" but fellow-travelers returning to the same bed. Indeed, one of the ironies of the cold war is finding the conservative theorist in the awkward position of trying to prove the Left wrong by proving Marxist-Leninism right.

A serious shortcoming of Professor Holsti's otherwise insightful study is that it begins too late. In order to understand anti-communism in America, we must first understand ex-communism. For whatever may be the background of the New Left's theories on the cold war, that of the Old Left-New Right antedates the Russo-American confrontation that emerged after World War Two. The intellectual origins of the cold war, as opposed to the diplomatic, can be traced to a simple, though perhaps unanswerable, question: "What is Soviet Communism?" This question permeated the air of radical debate in the 'thirties, and many writers spent the best years of their lives struggling with the problem of definition, some even going to their graves convinced that they had found the answer. Leon Trotsky was sitting at his desk working out a "definitive" interpretation of Stalin's Russia when the assassin struck him fatally from behind. The scene is as prophetic as it is tragic: the brave "old man," the "veritable pharos," as Edmund Wilson once called him,[2] slumped over his blood-stained manuscript, a document of the historically damned, a sad testament to the failure of political theory to catch up with history.

One of Trotsky's leading intellectual disciples in America was James Burnham. For the past twenty-five years this polite, soft-spoken writer has been one of the most aggressive advocates of a cold war "initiative" on the part of the West. Throughout his political life, both as a brilliant "*literary Trotskisant*" of the *New International* in the 'thirties,

[1] Ole R. Holsti, "The Study of International Politics Makes Strange Bedfellows: Theories of the Radical Right and the Radical Left," *American Political Science Review*, 68 (March, 1974), 217–52.

[2] Edmund Wilson, *To The Finland Station* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1940), p. 432.

and as a sagacious diplomatic theorist for William Buckley and the *National Review* since 1955, Burnham has attempted to form a comprehensive image of Russia and the alleged international communist movement. After he broke with Trotsky in 1940, he proceeded to draw upon a variety of social theories in order to illuminate the new realities of history; and as a *National Review* contributing editor he would write a steady column under the heading "The Protracted Conflict," the title of the book that Holsti analyzed in detail in his article, and the phrase used repeatedly in that article to categorize cold war theorists on the Right. Burnham's various theories, however, fell short of the task that he had set for himself—to develop an intellectually sophisticated cold war position and thereby free the modern mind from the fallacies of liberalism and Marxism, the philosophies of "western suicide."[3] Ironically, a quarter of a century later, faced with the liberal "conservative realism" of Walter Lippmann, Hans Morgenthau, and George Kennan, Burnham himself is forced to return to Trotsky's Hegelian-Marxist perspective, circa 1939, in order to reinterpret the "dual nature" of the Soviet Union and to obtain an answer to the growing demand for rapprochement and détente. Burnham's post-Marxist career not only dramatizes the tension between theory and history, it may also suggest to political scientists the curious relationship between intellectual history and the formation of diplomatic strategy.

From Dialectics to Managerialism

A professor of philosophy at New York University in the 'thirties, James Burnham first gained notoriety as the author of *The Managerial Revolution*, published in 1941. The book has since become a minor classic in political sociology, and it has also been subjected to a number of theoretical criticisms. But for our purposes it is important to stress that the work was an attempt to explain, as the subtitle indicated, "What is Going On In The World," and particularly in the Soviet Union. Indeed the book had actually crystallized in Burnham's mind while he was debating Trotsky in the months immediately following the outbreak of World War Two. *The Managerial Revolution* is, among other things, both a refutation of Trotsky's interpretation of Soviet Russia and an attempt to demonstrate why there could not be a mass alternative to Stalinism. Before we proceed to a discussion of the book, Trotsky's philosophical position needs to be explained, for it is in large part essentially the position Burnham himself returns to a quarter of a century later to argue against détente.

Trotsky's views of Russia combined the notion of "Soviet Thermidore" with the notion of "bureaucratic collectivism," ideas he adopted and revised rather than originated. Accordingly, Trotsky held that Stalinism must be seen as a temporary "Bonapartist" political phenomenon, an "episodic relapse" that, like the Thermidorean phase of the French Revolution, would be undermined by its own "social contradictions" and ultimately destroyed by the proletariat as it rose again to resume the second act of the unfinished October Revolution. Neither Stalinism nor classical French Bonapartism represented counter-revolution, for neither phenomenon expressed a tendency to turn back the social revolution and restore former property relations. Yet as a reactionary stage within a continuing historical process, Stalinism signified a tendency on the part of the rising bourgeoisie to regenerate itself through the political means of the new bureaucracy. In the face of this danger of bourgeois restoration, Trotsky was nevertheless convinced that the Soviet Union must be defended: despite its "monstrous bureaucratic degeneration," the Soviet Union remained a genuine "workers' state," which, however "deformed" and "betrayed," had succeeded in preserving the collectivization of property, the historic "conquests" of the Russian Revolution and the "instruments" by which the "toilers" will liberate themselves from the "bureaucratic interval" of Stalinism.[4]

That Soviet communism could be repressive and nationalist on the one hand and still potentially radical and internationalist on the other was an argument that could no longer be accepted by Burnham, Max Eastman, Sidney Hook, and a number of other Old Left intellectuals who became, less than a decade later, militant cold warriors. Positions grew more intense with the nonaggression pact, the Russo-Finnish war, and the Soviet penetration of Poland in 1939–40. The subject of Soviet diplomatic behavior was now as baffling as the purges; but not to Trotsky, who called upon his dwindling followers to continue to resist Stalinism as "reactionary" and at the same time support Stalin's foreign policy in Eastern Europe as "progressive." As I have pointed out elsewhere,[5] this fantastic proposition was not offered solely on the basis of Russia's national security—the rationale used by Stalinists to excuse the nonaggression pact, and, curiously, used two de-

[3] James Burnham, *The Suicide of the West: An Essay on The Meaning and Destiny of Liberalism* (New York: John Day Co., 1964).

[4] Leon Trotsky, "The Soviet Union Today: The Workers State and the Question of Thermidore and Bonapartism," *New International*, 2 (July, 1935), 116–22; *The Revolution Betrayed: What Is the Soviet Union and Where Is It Going*, tr. Max Eastman (Merit Publishers ed.; New York, 1965), pp. 86–114, 231, 273–89, *passim*.

[5] John P. Diggins, "Getting Hegel Out of History: Max Eastman's Quarrel With Marxism," *American Historical Review*, 79 (Feb., 1974), 38–71.

cades later by some New Left historians to excuse Yalta. Rather, Trotsky was convinced that Stalinism could simultaneously be counterrevolutionary in Russia and revolutionary in Poland and the Ukraine, where the liquidation of landed estates demonstrated that Soviet expansion was not "imperialistic." More was at stake here than the Orwellian butchery of political language. For as the controversy developed, Trotsky realized that the entire edifice of his position depended upon the dialectical logic he employed both to affirm that the proletariat would break the "shell" of Stalinism and to deny that Russia's bureaucracy was an autonomous social stratum. He thus made every attempt to draw Burnham into a debate over "The ABC of Materialist Dialectics," to which the latter replied: "I stopped arguing about religion long ago." Undaunted, Trotsky remained convinced that the "dual" nature of Stalinism could only be understood if one maintained a dialectical interpretation of the contradictory forces of history:

> It is not surprising that the theoreticians of the opposition who reject dialectical thought capitulate lamentably before the contradictory nature of the USSR. However the contradiction between the social basis laid down by the revolution, and the character of the caste which arose out of the degeneration of the revolution is not only an irrefutable historical fact but also a motor force. In our struggle for the overthrow of the bureaucracy we base ourselves on this contradiction.[6]

This Trotskyist perspective would remain with Burnham *malgré lui*—in inverted form, to be sure. Years later he would return to it to show how liberals "capitulate lamentably before the contradictory nature of the USSR" in their inability to see that "peaceful coexistence" and "permanent struggle" are one in the same, strategies that negate one another only to better assert the "higher synthesis" of world revolution. The dream that eluded Trotsky is the nightmare that haunts Burnham.

Communism is an idea that is determined to be realized and destined to fail. Burnham's *The Managerial Revolution* tried to demonstrate the validity of the second half of that statement, presumably with the assumption that, once demonstrated, the first half would lose its mythic élan. To Burnham, Trotsky's inexorable alternatives—Russia must either move forward to socialism or revert to some form of capitalism—seemed a species of syllogism born of dialectic logic, and he proceeded to refute it with what might be called a neither-nor paradigm. The new trend of economic organization, which Burnham claimed had been developing in advanced western countries since 1914, demonstrated that capitalism was a moribund reality and socialism a mythical dream. The coming order would be neither the old bourgeois society of capitalism nor the new classless society of socialism. Instead it would be a managerial bureaucracy, a political-economy run by a new ruling elite which was assuming control over the economic sectors and thereby seizing the very power that once belonged to the capitalist class and was destined, in the Marxist view of history, to fall to the working class.[7]

The "Burnhamian Revolution," as Dwight Macdonald called it,[8] provoked considerable controversy in early 1942, and again after World War II, when many of Burnham's fatalistic prophecies about the defeat of democratic England and totalitarian Russia proved historically embarrassing. As a study in futurology, *The Managerial Revolution* is a flawed work. As an interpretation of the Soviet Union, however, it is an important statement. What every contemporary critic overlooked was that Burnham used Marxist social theory to explain the recent history and nature of Soviet communism. Bureaucracy had not been a problem in orthodox Marxist political thought, and technological elites had not been foreseen even by Lenin, who elevated party control to an Archimedean principle of power only to blind himself to the ultimate authoritarian consequences of his own creation. Burnham was not the first writer to discern in the emergence of bureaucracy a refutation of Marx's class analysis, nor was he the first to see the hidden oligarchical tendencies that are potential in all political organizations. But Burnham was the first to carry Marxism to its logical conclusion in order to turn it back upon itself. Unlike the anarchists, Burnham refused to claim that Bolshevism was the "plot" of a new ruling class, the creation of a displaced intelligentsia with a secret lust for power; and unlike the Trotskyists, he was certain that Stalinism represented far more than "The Revolution Betrayed." For managerialism, of which Stalinism was an expression, evolved logically from Marx's assumption that all power and authority derive from possession of the means of production. As a sociological phenomenon, managerial rule, technological authority, and bureaucratic domination could be traced back to the mode of production, the ownership of which Marx had regarded as the sole source of power and freedom. Burnham may have indiscriminately equated ownership with control; he may have narrowly identified economic power with political authority and class domination; and he may have falsely stressed property rather than income as the criterion of class membership. The point is, how-

[6] Leon Trotsky, *In Defense of Marxism (Against the Petty-bourgeois Opposition)* (New York), pp. 6, 53, 72.

[7] James Burnham, *The Managerial Revolution: What is Happening In The World* (New York, 1941).

[8] Dwight Macdonald, "The Burnhamian Revolution," *Partisan Review*, 9 (Jan.–Feb., 1942), 76–84.

ever, that it was perfectly Marxian to make all three assumptions.[9]

The real question is whether Burnham's managerial analysis satisfactorily explained the nature of Soviet communism. Any answer to this difficult question is fraught with irony. For in the Stalinist period, to which his analysis applied, the Russian managerial class, specifically the engineering profession, was the first to fall victim to the purges, as Alexander Solzhenitsyn observed in *The First Circle*. Yet in the post-Stalinist era scientific training appears to be, especially for present-day leaders like Leonid Brezhnev and Alexis Kosygin, "an important criterion on their way to power."[10] The road to power, however, is hardly the same thing as the power to rule. Whether the scientists and technicians constitute a new Soviet ruling class, and whether managerialism supersedes Marxism as the sociological key to Soviet behavior, remains problematic. It is still not clear whether the logic of occupational ascendancy, the role of ideals and ideology, or the personal factor in bureaucratic power struggles accounts for the vagaries of Soviet domestic politics and diplomatic postures. Even more seriously, it is unclear whether the theory of managerialism is itself theoretically coherent. The difficulty in applying Burnham's analysis to Soviet Russia is that it takes as a solution to a problem what is in reality the problem itself. In effect, Burnham substituted for Marx's historical determinism an even narrower version of technological determinism in order to explain the present and predict the future. He tried to go beyond Marx but he never took his eyes off the means of production, the fundamental causal agency in the Marxian analysis of social change, the foundation and the apex of power in the Burnhamian analysis of society and politics. As Marx mistook the decline of the old bourgeoisie as the end of the middle class, so too did Burnham mistake a historical event—the rise of managerialism—for a natural law.

In showing how the means of production had been absorbed by the new means of administration, and hence the new instruments of elitist domination, Burnham could successfully demonstrate that the democratic goals of communism would always be frustrated by the technological imperatives of modernization. This thesis was Burnham's answer to Trotsky's belief in the Fourth International as the reincarnation of the October Revolution. But having refuted Trotsky, Burnham had also to refute Jefferson. Once he questioned the possibility of socialism, it was necessary for him to carry his analysis further and question the possibility of democracy itself.

Intellectual History Used and Abused

The Machiavellians was published in 1943. It would be his last major theoretical work before he dropped his defeatist pose and became caught up in the polemical heat of the cold war. It was also the first thorough study by an American of the sociological writings of Gaetano Mosca, George Sorel, Roberto Michels, and Vilfredo Pareto. There are two curiosities about *The Machiavellians*. Previously American scholars had become interested in European elitist thought when they were trying to unravel the twisted intellectual roots of fascism.[11] Yet Burnham chose to call his Machiavellians "defenders of freedom." Moreover, the book appeared in the midst of the greatest ideological war in modern history, when most Americans fervently believed that the defeat of the fascist powers would be a victory for democracy. Yet Burnham set out to prove that democracy was a myth, an illusion, a fiction, and a lie.

The book's first several chapters are a brilliant *tour de force*. Here Burnham opens with a passage from the 1932 Democratic party platform, and then, turning back six centuries, proceeds to contrast the "formal" and "real" meanings of Dante's *De Monarchia* with Machiavelli's *The Prince*. Dante's treatise represented "politics as wish," pointless metaphysical distinctions and logical deductions drawn from a theology that had no relevance to the actual world of space, time, and events. The "real" purpose of *De Monarchia*, the immediate issue that brought the text into being, was the protracted conflict between the forces of the Papacy and the forces of Empire during the twelfth to fourteenth centuries. Like the designers of the 1932 Democratic Party platform, however, Dante was reluctant to acknowledge the *real* power struggle taking place before his eyes, and thus he failed to demonstrate how his abstract, idealistic goals for saving the Holy Roman Empire could be reached, since "being unreal, they cannot be reached." Machiavelli, in contrast, took as his data phenomena that were truly political, and his whole method of inquiry was nontranscendental, confined solely to the realm of real power relationships among men. Indeed Machiavelli was the first theoretician of *praxis*, the first political philosopher to give man ideas that can be acted upon and translated into social practice.

It was this "science of power" that was carried

[9] See Ralf-Dehrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), pp. 136–44.

[10] Kendal E. Bailes, "The Politics of Technology: Stalin and Technocratic Thinking among Soviet Engineers," *American Historical Review*, 79 (April 1974), 445–69.

[11] John P. Diggins, *Mussolini and Fascism: The View from America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971).

forward into the twentieth century by the neo-Machiavellians. Mosca, Michels, Pareto, and Sorel followed Machiavelli in divorcing ethics from knowledge, taking human nature as it is, rejecting all monistic and metaphysical theories of history, and investigating political behavior in the "antiformal" mode of refusing to accept at face value what men say, think, or write. In their works Burnham found all the intellectual ammunition he needed to wage his two-front war against socialism and democracy. One by one they come forward with their wisdom: Mosca, with his theory of the ruling class as an organized minority, his rejection of representative government as an empty fiction, and his empirical outline of the permanent stratification of society; Michels, with his "iron law of oligarchy," his thesis that direct democracy is impossible for "technical" and "mechanical" reasons; and his demonstration that ultimate sovereignty cannot be dispersed and that the masses psychologically depend upon autocratic leadership; Sorel, with his belief in the emotive and activating power of myth, his recognition of the necessity of violence to challenge institutions based on force, and his savage attack on the squalid fraud of 19th century bourgeois parliaments; and, above all, Pareto, with his principle of the "circulation of elites," his view of politics as primarily the arena of nonlogical conduct, and his theory of "residues" and "derivations"—roughly, the constant habits or impulses of human behavior and the rationalizations or ideologies used to justify them.

That there exists a sharp separation between the rulers and the ruled, that governments operate on force and fraud, and that all political groups and institutions degenerate into hierarchies and elites were theorems Burnham fully endorsed. But his conclusion was far from pessimistic. If democracy, conceived in Lincolnesque terms as popular sovereignty and government *by* the people, was theoretically impossible, nevertheless liberty and freedom, as expressed in and through organized opposition, could still prevail. Mosca's principle of "juridical defense" demonstrated how the individual could be protected from arbitrary personal power, and both Mosca and Machiavelli demonstrated how liberty would emerge out of the continual clash of opposing factions, interest groups, and social forces. New threats to liberty, however, were arising everywhere. The war, Burnham pointed out in the last chapter, was a "stage in a world social revolution." New power alignments would evolve even though the elitist structure of power itself remains intact. The military might now join the technicians and managers as a new "Bonapartist" ruling class based on plebiscitary democracy. This trend could be checked if various elites were to resist the total concentration of power in the state. But—and here is the crux—to do so elites might have to defy a democratic public that can never be induced to think logically and scientifically. How then could elites, whose scientific skepticism alienates them from the masses, preserve liberty and at the same time sustain their own deference and power?

> A dilemma confronts any section of the elite that tries to act scientifically. The political life of the masses and the cohesion of society demand the acceptance of myths. A scientific attitude toward society does not permit the belief in the truth of the myths. But the leaders must profess, indeed foster, belief in the myths or the fabric of society will crack and they will be overthrown. In short, the leaders, if they themselves are scientific, must lie.[12]

In this argument for dishonesty honestly argued, Burnham was at least true to Plato and Machiavelli.[13]

The Machiavellians is doubtless a daring work in American political theory that effectively challenged the moral pieties of liberalism and the classless illusions of Marxism. Yet the perversity of brilliance in the work makes one wonder whether intellectually history is being used or abused. One of the major embarrassments is its shifting criterion of truth. Approaching knowledge as an antiformalist, Burnham denied the autonomy of political theory. He maintained that the "real" meaning of any political doctrine could only be understood against the background of time and place, and, above all, in light of the social forces that had produced it. Although he applied this criterion to Dante, he abandoned it when he moved into the twentieth century and discussed the neo-Machiavellians. Here we learn nothing of the social and political context of their writings, for Burnham treated their theories almost as universal principles, as though he had discovered the timeless "iron laws" of political geometry. The conspicuous feature of modern elitist theory, however, is that it arose out of a particular political culture; indeed, it developed predominantly in Italy, a country where liberal democracy had not been fully developed, a culture in which the moral cynicism of the intellectual class reflected the actual oligarchical power structure of the ruling class.

It is necessary to dwell a bit further on *The Machiavellians* because it came to be regarded as the theoretical and moral foundation of Burnham's later attitudes toward the cold war and of his interpretation of Soviet foreign policy. Ac-

[12] James Burnham, *The Machiavellians: Defenders of Freedom* (Chicago, Gateway edition, 1963), p. 304.

[13] For an interesting response to Burnham's argument, see Benedetto Croce, "Political Truths and Popular Myths," in *My Philosophy and other Essays on the Moral and Political Problems of Our Time* (New York: Collier Books, 1962), pp. 91–95.

cording to Burnham's reading of Machiavelli, a leader or political elite could justify the unlimited use of force, violence, and even political lying in international affairs, not merely as traditional power politics, but on ethical grounds. Burnham was convinced that Machiavelli had not eliminated ethics from politics but instead refuted Dante's otherworldly, transcendental ideals because they were unattainable. He did this, Burnham maintained, "in order to bring politics and ethics more closely into line, and to locate both of them firmly in the real world of space and time and history, which is the only world about which we can know anything."[14] We rub our eyes. For the "real world" is the domain of factual knowledge about which we can have no moral knowledge; indeed, ever since Hume philosophers have seriously questioned whether the slightest glimmer of ethical insight can be derived from a study of the objective world, whether knowledge apart from morality can determine choice. Most men want to feel there is a reasonable correspondence, a just measure of appropriateness, between what they think they know about the world and what they think "ought" to be done in the world. *The Machiavellians* failed to answer this need for ethical knowledge.

The book also failed to answer the need for practical knowledge. Indeed, it is difficult to see how neo-Machiavellian thought helped illuminate the meaning of many contemporary historical events and movements. In *The Machiavellians* there is no attempt to confront the dynamics of historical change or the novel phenomenon of totalitarianism in general and Stalinism in particular; nor is there any effort to analyze the reasons for the hegemony of elites or explain why elites must deteriorate (if Pareto's "circulation of elites" explains the Soviet purges, then Yezhov must be judged "superior" to Bukharin). Similarly, there is no effort to develop a theory of human nature or to explain the persistence of irrationality in politics; nor is there any convincing reason given why elites, and only elites, would think scientifically and rationally. (The Founding Fathers, elitist themselves, did not trust government by elites because even the "best minds" were disposed to "self-delusion"; Mussolini, supposedly an admirer of Sorel, was hardly a model of "logical conduct"; Stalin, an admirer of Stalinism, was perhaps *too* logical.) Even more serious, *The Machiavellians* offers no penetrating causal interpretation of the struggle for power or any analytical perspective for anticipating the future course of history. (It is far more difficult, Mosca observed, to foresee exactly what will happen than merely to foresee what is never going to happen.) About all we can learn from *The Machiavellians* is that power struggles among men and nations will continue forever because man by nature is driven to struggle for power. Burnham did not explain this phenomenon, he assumed it, and in doing so he offered a tautology instead of a theory.

Obviously Burnham was using Machiavellianism as shock therapy for liberals and socialists, the fuzzy-minded intellectuals whose moral sentiments blinded them to power realities. In the neo-Machiavellians he believed he had found a "scientific" body of knowledge that illuminated the flux of events, and he was certain that a proper understanding of Machiavelli would demonstrate why it was necessary to exclude moral considerations from political inquiry. Yet the difficulty with Burnham's argument was not, as his critics would charge, that his own neo-Machiavellianism concealed value commitments that justified a ruthless, militant response to the Soviet Union. What renders Burnham's work questionable is his simple, one-sided interpretation of Machiavelli. "We find," Burnham wrote, "that Machiavelli uses language in a cognitive, scientific manner. That is, except where he is frankly urging his readers to action, he uses words not in order to express his emotions or attitudes, but in such a way that their meaning can be tested, can be understood in terms of the real world. We always know what he is talking about."[15] On the contrary, the author of *The Prince* and *The Discourses* used language in such ambiguous ways that Machiavellianism has many meanings. Some scholars, seeing more satire than science, cannot even take his prose literally, while others, especially political philosophers with ideological commitments, can easily make Machiavelli serve different political purposes. Hence the Marxist Antonio Gramsci hails *The Prince* as a call for the dictatorship of progressive forces against an obsolete feudal aristocracy (Burnham also leaned toward this view); the conservative natural law philosopher Leo Strauss regards Machiavelli as an anti-Christian "teacher of evil"; the existentialist Merleau-Ponty sees him as a modern humanist operating in a universe hushed in moral silence; and the liberal historian Sir Isaiah Berlin maintains that Machiavelli realized the "irreconcilability of equally dogmatic faiths, and the practical improbability of complete victory of one over the other," and thus inadvertently opened the path to "empiricism, pluralism, toleration, compromise."[16]

[14] Burnham, *Machiavellians*, p. 44.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 46.

[16] Antonio Gramsci, *The Modern Prince and Other Writings* (New York: International Publishers edition, 1959); Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "A Note on Machiavelli," in *Signs* (Evanston, Illinois, 1964) pp. 211–223; Leo Strauss, *Thoughts on Machiavelli* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press 1958); Isaiah Berlin, "The Question of Machiavelli," *New York Review of Books*, 17 (Nov. 4, 1971), 20–32.

The variety of these interpretations makes one wonder whether Burnham's politics rested on clear theoretical foundations. In his cold war phase, Burnham would pose as the "romantic Machiavellian" (Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.'s description[17]), the exponent of heroic *realpolitik* who would bring all American power to bear on the liberation of eastern Europe. Yet the cold war became anything but a cool, logical exercise in Machiavellian statecraft, which stresses the limited efficacy of force and aspires to the "pure" use of power, undefiled by motives of personal pride or political humiliation. Indeed, the cold war reintroduced on a grand scale that selfsame emotional ingredient that Machiavelli tried to eliminate from politics—the language of moral passion.

In truth, Burnham's mind and temperament was unsuited to the advice that Machiavelli offered. Although the Renaissance philosopher wanted to use the "new" science of politics to control the imponderables of politics, he also desired to sensitize the political leader to the discontinuities of historical experience and the ironies of political action. "Above all," Sheldon Wolin has written, Machiavelli's "political actor needed a temperament which could endure acting without assurance of certainty."[18] This anguished capacity to perform with "negative capability" (Keats's phrase), to confront the world of power and at the same time realize there are limits to man's knowledge of that world, scarcely describes Burnham's mechanistic approach to cold war politics where, as we shall see, the movement of power is predicted with geometric precision by a strategist who knows the "real world."

This curious discrepancy between Burnham's professed political theory and his actual political behavior, between Machiavelli's sense of skepticism and moderation and Burnham's absolute certainty about the course of history, raises a further question. If Machiavellianism does not supply the theoretical foundation of Burnham's subsequent cold war convictions, what does? Clearly the answer lies elsewhere. Were we to adopt Burnham's own antiformalist method of inquiry and use the categories of Pareto, we might say that Burnham's neo-Machiavellianism was the "derivation" of his anti-Stalinist "residue." Seen in this light, Burnham's new-founded theories may be regarded as expressions of a frustrated ex-Trotskyist, and his impassioned cold war convictions not those of a "scientist" but what Machiavelli himself might suspect as being the politics of *vendetta*.

[17] Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., review of Burnham's *The Struggle for the World*, *Nation*, 64 (April 5, 1947), 398–99.

[18] Sheldon Wolin, *Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1960), p. 217.

Stalin's Advocate or Adversary?

But upon whom did Burnham seek revenge? To what political purpose did he write *The Machiavellians*? Was he warming up for a cold war that had yet to crystallize in 1943? Interpreting Burnham became even more puzzling in 1945, when he published his widely discussed "Lenin's Heir" in the *Partisan Review*. Here Burnham proposed the scandalous thesis that Stalin, far from betraying the revolution, had actually fulfilled it. Trotskyists and American liberals could not see this because they had always dismissed Stalin as an uncultured mediocrity who triumphed more by stealth than by skill. But once the intellectual disabuses himself of literary snobbery, Burnham contended, he may have to admit that Stalin was a "great man," and the source of his greatness lies not only in his role as military leader in the war but in a "creative political imagination" that had produced two profound changes in communist policy: first, "a multi-national Bolshevism" which now allows Russia to avoid the mistakes of the early Comintern and exploit the deeper currents of nationalism and national liberation; second, "a geopolitical vision" that enables him to orchestrate every isolated military move into a unified diplomatic offensive. Burnham cleverly dramatized this total movement in Platonic metaphors:

> Starting from the magnetic core of the Eurasian heartland, the Soviet power, like the reality of the One of Neo-Platonism overflowing in the descending series of emanative progression, flows outward, west into Europe, south into the Near East, east into China, already lapping the shores of the Atlantic, the Yellow and China Seas, the Mediterranean, and the Persian Gulf. As the differentiated One, in its progression, descends through the stages of Mind, Soul and Matter, and then through its final return back to Itself; so does the Soviet power, emanating from the integrally totalitarian center, proceed outward by Absorption (the Baltics, Bessarabia, Bukovina, East Poland), Domination (Finland, the Balkans, Mongolia, North China, and tomorrow Germany), Orienting Influence (Italy, France, Turkey, Iran, central and south China . . .), until it is dissipated in MH ON, the outer material sphere, beyond the Eurasian boundaries, of momentary Appeasement and Infiltration (England, the United States).[19]

Burnham's article exploded like a tempest at Trotsky's wake. Former disciplies Lionel Abel and Dwight Macdonald attacked Burnham for directing his animus against a fallen revolutionist with whose values he agrees while admiring a "successful butcher" whose behavior appalls him, and indeed for eliminating values altogether from historical inquiry by accepting what in fact happens

[19] James Burnham, "Lenin's Heir," *Partisan Review*, 12 (Winter, 1945), 66–67.

rather than what one wants to happen.[20] The most interesting response was George Orwell's essay, "Second Thoughts on James Burnham," a classic in the literature of political criticism and historio-philosophical analysis, Orwell had been following Burnham's writings since *The Managerial Revolution*. With "Lenin's Heir" he now believed he possessed the key to Burnham's lofty indifference to democracy: the American writer is intoxidated by a fascination with power. His eyes are always fixed upward, blinded by the apex of political authority. So captivated, Burnham tries to hypnotize the reader by building up a "picture of terrifying, irresistible power" in which Stalin becomes an epochal hero embodying the march of destiny. This mental disease, moreover, distorts Burnham's understanding of history. "Power-worship blurs political judgment because it leads, almost unavoidably, to the belief that present trends will continue." Not only does he predict the future simply by extending the present forward, Burnham sees history itself as one continual apocalypse. "Nations, governments, classes, and social systems are constantly described as expanding, contracting, decaying, dissolving, toppling, crashing, crumbling, crystallizing and, in general, behaving in an unstable and melodramatic way." It is this cataclysmic vision, together with his Machiavellian power-fetish, that explains Burham's new-found admiration of Stalin. Whether engrossed by Nazi Germany or Soviet Russia, by managerialism or bureaucratic collectivism, "in each case he was obeying the same instinct: the instinct to bow down before the conquerer of the moment, to accept the existing trend as irreversible."[21]

Although he gave a penetrating analysis of Burnham's philosophy of history and power, Orwell was completely wrong about Burnham's political position. So too were Macdonald, who suggested, after pondering three possible interpretations of "Lenin's Heir," that Burnham was recommending "submission to Stalinism," and Abel, who in fact entitled his reply "Stalin's Advocate." Burnham fooled everyone by becoming Stalin's greatest adversary among the American intelligentsia. Years later he admitted in an interview with this author that he had written the article as a "put-on," an effort to challenge intellectuals to think of Stalin neither as Trotsky's "mere cipher" nor as Roosevelt's "genial Uncle Joe"—to think, in a word, the unthinkable. Indeed, six months before the article appeared Burnham was secretly at work on a study of Bolshevik diplomatic goals for the Office of Strategic Service, a study which was to be analyzed in preparation for the Yalta Conference. Parts of this study were incorporated into Burnham's next book, and when it appeared intellectuals would never again have to wonder whether they were reading Burnham correctly.[22]

The Struggle for the World was published in 1947. A marvelous exercise in pamphleteering, it reads like Lenin's *April Thesis* and Tom Paine's *Common Sense*. Typically, the opening sentence expresses Burnham's apocalyptic belief in Armageddon: "The Third World War began in April, 1944." Burnham was referring to a mutiny allegedly of Communist-directed Greek sailors in Alexandria, a clear sign that the Soviet Union now intended to turn the antifascist resistance against the West. It was the opening round of a total war that "may begin at any moment, today, tomorrow; it may even have begun before these sentences are published." The inevitability of war, Burnham insisted, was the consequence of the "transcendent power" now concentrated in atomic weapons, a new technological development that makes possible for the first time in modern history the domination of the world by a single state. The struggle will be fought to the complete triumph of either the United States or the Soviet Union, the only two remaining power centers. As to communism, Burnham defined it as "a world-wide, conspiratorial movement for the conquest of a monopoly power in the era of capitalist decline." He drew on Lenin's writings to embellish the definition, and, with similar knowledge of early Comintern history, he had no trouble demonstrating Soviet policy was identified with a world communist schema. Communism, in short, was a monolith. Moreover, the logic and direction of communism could be grasped through the concepts of geopolitics. Thus Burnham worked out an actual spherical diagram of the world as it existed in August, 1939, placing the Soviet Union at the center and drawing, around a dark inner circle, a series of concentric rings, each demarcating vividly the presence or influence of Soviet power. Lest the diagram imply a static image, Burnham cleverly used the language of physical motion and force to depict Soviet power as an endlessly propulsive tendency to expand itself beyond legitimate boundaries. The Soviet Union is the "inner, magnetic core," the "defensive ring" from which, offen-

[20] Lionel Abel, "Stalin's Advocate," *Politics*, 2 (May 1945), 146–48; Dwight Macdonald, "Beat Me Daddy," *Partisan Review*, 12 (Spring, 1945), 181–87.

[21] George Orwell, "Second Thoughts on James Burnham" (1946), in *The Orwell Reader: Fiction, Essays, and Reportage* (New York: Harcourt, Brace 1956), pp. 335–54.

[22] Interview with Burnham, June 11, 1971. Twenty years later Burnham also revealed in writing that "Part I of *The Struggle for the World* was originally part of a secret study prepared for the Office of Strategic Services in the spring of 1944 and distributed at that time to the relevant Washington desks." Burnham, *The War We Are In: The Last Decade and the Next* (New Rochelle, N.Y.: 1967), p. 10.

sively, "pressure pushes" extend forever outward in a "thrust" of "direct power from the Heartland." The metaphor was awesome, and it served to dramatize Burnham's argument that motion continues through a vacuum until it is resisted, that power must be answered with power.

Would America resist? Burnham was doubtful. Americans were too immature for the world of diplomacy and their leaders too irresolute. Yet the West will inevitably have to face the awful decision somewhere sometime. And to carry out Burnham's policy will be, he admitted, "a long, difficult and perhaps most terrible process." "The most hopeful route out of the crisis will be hard and painful and, most probably, bloody." It will be a struggle, "such that one or the other, or perhaps both, of the contestants must in the end be defeated." Nevertheless, Burnham could—by somehow mixing Toynbee with Machiavelli—conclude that the cold war is the challenge to which America must respond or accept its own decline and fall. Unlike Christian grace, which offers men another chance to repent and choose again, "History offers each of its great challenges only once. After only one failure, or refusal, the offer is withdrawn. Babylon, Athens, Thebes, Alexandria, Madrid, Vienna sink back, and do not rise again."[23]

The Struggle for the World appeared at a momentous turning point in modern American diplomatic history. It was published during the week in which President Truman announced his decision to come to the support of Greece and Turkey. Immediately Burnham's book was linked to what soon was referred to as the "Truman Doctrine." *Time* treated the publication as a news event in its "International" section, *Life* devoted thirteen pages to a condensation of the book's contents, and the liberal *Christian Century* angrily complained that Burnham's "stop Russia" policy was precisely what Congress had approved in supporting Truman's aid bill.[24] *The Struggle for the World*, however, proved a poor guide to both world events and American policy. Within a year after its publication two developments occurred that would eventually shatter the communist monolith: Yugoslavia's break with the Soviet Union and Tito's courageous defiance of Stalin, and the Chinese Communist's successful drive against the nationalists, which culminated in a victory that Stalin neither had foreseen nor tried to bring about. Burnham, however, could take little satisfaction in these developments, for the Truman administration had confirmed the worst of his fears. The Berlin airlift was a "decision not to decide," a timid effort to avoid a confrontation instead of sending an armed convoy through the blockade, a "minute risk" that would have won "enormous gain" by demonstrating to the world that the Communists could be beaten at their own game.[25] Burnham now began to reexamine the Truman policy that he had recently supported, and in *The Coming Defeat of Communism* (1950) he spelled out the defects of its defensive and hence defeatist nature. Instead of accepting the status quo and relying upon the Marshall Plan (which scarcely thwarted communist strength in Italy and France), Burnham advised America to take advantage of the nuclear balance of terror and exploit Soviet weaknesses by embarking upon an "offensive-subversive war" that will defeat the enemy through sustained propaganda, economic pressure on western countries trading with Russia and her satellites, and material and moral support to resistance movements behind the Iron Curtain.[26]

"Burnhamism" now became a phrase of fear and revulsion among the European Left. In England, the socialist R.H.S. Crossman denounced embittered ex-radicals like Burnham and Arthur Koestler, who allegedly accused western intellectuals of "cowardice" for flinching from the consequences of taking the "strategic initiative."[27] In France, the Communist Pierre Courtade, who had been *L'Humanité*'s American Correspondent, equated Burnham's idea of a managerial elite with the racial-imperialist ideas of the Nazi Alfred Rosenberg. Convinced that Burnham was the intellectual architect of American hegemony, Courtade published a novel supposedly based on Burnham's career, *Jimmy*, which was later translated by the Leningrad review, *Zvedza*. Here unsuspecting Frenchmen could read of the anti-communist "police state" apparatus of Governor Thomas Dewey and Judge Harold Medina, who were suppressing the voices of progressive Americans, represented by the black communist Paul Robeson, while allowing anti-Semitism and racism to run rampant in a country succumbing to "*l'hystérie burnhamienne*."[28]

In the United States, Burnham's hardened cold

[23] James Burnham, *The Struggle for the World* (New York: The John Day Co., 1947), p. 248, passim.

[24] "For That or Nothing," *Time*, 49 (March 24, 1947), 26–27; James Burnham, "Struggle For The World," *Life*, 22 (March 31, 1947), 59–68, 73–80; letters to the editor ran "about two to one against Burnham," which led to an entire editorial explaining *Life*'s differences with the author; see editorial, *Life*, 22 (April 21, 1947), 38. "Blueprint for Empire," *Christian Century*, 64 (May 21, 1947), 646–48; see also "The Truman-Burnham Parallel," *Christian Century*, 64 (June 4, 1947), 702–03.

[25] James Burnham, "Our Spineless Foreign Policy," *American Mercury*, 70 (Jan., 1950), 3–13.

[26] James Burnham, *The Coming Defeat of Communism* (New York: John Day Co., 1950).

[27] R. H. S. Crossman, "Reflections on the Cold War," *New Republic*, 124 (Apr. 9, 1951), 10–12.

[28] Pierre Courtade, "James Burnham, Le Nouveau Rosenberg de l'imperialisme Americain," *La Nouvelle Critique* (July–Aug., 1950), pp. 14–28; *Jimmy*, (Paris: Les Editeurs Français Reunis, 1951).

war position and his defense of McCarthy troubled the anti-Communist Left. In 1953 *Partisan Review* asked him to resign from its editorial board, and that same year a bitter dispute erupted within the American Committee for Cultural Freedom when Burnham wrote an introduction to Medford Evans's *The Secret Fight for the A-Bomb*, which charged American scientists with relaying classified data to Soviet agents. Notable ACCF physicists and chemists like Herman J. Muller, Robert Openheimer, Harold Urey, and Eugene Rabinovitch threatened to withdraw from the organization unless Burnham were forced to resign, while sociologists Nathan Glazer, Daniel Bell, and David Riesman worked vigorously to resolve the rift. "These people are not Russia dupes," Bell wrote Sidney Hook, speaking of scientists he had recently met at MIT. "[Jerome] Wiesner is close to Schlesinger and A.D.A., but that is a far cry, of course, from being pro-Russian, unless one wants to apply Burnham's inverted Leninism of looking at the 'objective' consequences of their political positions."[29] Burnham went on to write his own version of scientific espionage in *The Web of Subversion*, published in 1954 and later reissued in 1961 as an "American Opinion" publication of the John Birch Society. Burnham chose to apply the method of "inverted Leninism" not only to scientists but to liberals in general, and as for being "close to Schlesinger," Burnham could extend the doctrine of guilt-by-association to corruption-by-marriage to explain why the historian is not to be trusted. "Schlesinger is married to the sister of John K. Fairbank," Burnham wrote in the *American Mercury*. "It would be a cruel thing to hold a man to blame for his brother-in-law. But Schlesinger has taken explicit political as well as personal responsibility for the *bona fides* of Fairbank—of whom it has been testified under oath that he was a member of the Communist Party, and who has been undeniably proved the active associate of Communists and pro-Communists."[30]

The battle between Burnham and Schlesinger had been building up for some time within the ACCF (from which the historian would resign in 1955, protesting that the organization had lost sight of cultural freedom and had become obsessed with anti-communism long after the threat of internal communism had passed).[31] In 1953 Schlesinger had written a savage review of Burnham's latest book—"a careless and hasty job, filled with confusion, contradiction, ignorance and misrepresentation." Burnham is a man "in permanent apocalypse," Schlesinger exploded, "a catstrophic thinker whose tiresome prophecies of doom can only dazzle once. He is the Bix Beiderbecke of our political journalism, only he has hit that high note once or twice too often."[32] Burnham's next book deserves to be examined closely, not so much for its high notes as its theoretical dissonance.

"Who Will Die for Containment?"

As with his other books, Burnham's *Containment or Liberation?* (1953) was timely, provocative, and deliberately unsettling. It appeared shortly after the 1952 campaign, which saw Democratic candidate Adlai Stevenson and his advisor Schlesinger opposing the Eisenhower-Dulles policy of committing America to freeing peoples under Soviet domination. It also appeared during the exhausting stalemate of the Korean War and the height of McCarthyism, when the public was most susceptible to criticisms of American foreign policy. For once Burnham was in touch with the masses.

Ironically, it was the elite, the only class Burnham had once believed capable of logical thinking and rational behavior, that was responsible for America's disastrous foreign policy, and the architect of that policy was George Kennan. Burnham devoted several chapters to a close analysis of Kennan's famous "Mr. X" article in *Foreign Affairs* in 1947, and to his seminal treatise on realism versus idealism in international relations, *American Diplomacy, 1900–1950*. Burnham's critique was perceptive and, as it turned out, prescient. Looking back, it does appear that Kennan was unduly optimistic about the possibility of containment affecting real changes within the Kremlin. Exactly how containment would bring about a "gradual mellowing" of totalitarian power was never convincingly explained. Burnham also effectively challenged the liberals' assumption that communism is simply a "natural" response to a poor economic environment: there was no clear geographical correlation or historical pattern between communist strength and economic conditions. Communism is a "political apparatus," not a natural development, as Lenin's criticism of "spontaneity" proved again and again throughout the twentieth century. Burnham was at his best exposing the fallacies of containment. Yet, despite his astute and lucid critique, he himself became vague and problematic when he turned to liberation as the solution. He advocated recognizing governments-in-exile, recruiting and training national, paramilitary armies in preparation for an invasion, and developing opposition movements

[29] Daniel Bell to Sidney Hook, Nov. 23, 1953, files, American Committee for Cultural Freedom, Tamiment Library, New York.

[30] James Burnham, "The Case Against Adlai Stevenson," *American Mercury*, 80 (Oct. 1952), 11–19.

[31] Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. to James T. Farrell, Mar. 14, 1955, files, ACCF.

[32] Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "Middle-Aged Man With a Horn," *New Republic*, 128 (Mar. 16, 1953), 16–17.

behind the enemy's lines. The key was resistance—the will to act decisively and struggle bravely. Greece and Finland had the will, and they remained free; Poland and Czechoslovakia did not, and they were swallowed up. The lesson? We can help the captive peoples restore the will to resist by demonstrating to Russia that America is ready to come to their support and is prepared for "whatever military action may be required" to assure the success of their struggle. Burnham never acknowledged that the success of Greece and Finland in remaining out of the Soviet orbit was due to Stalin's acquiescence to geopolitics as much as their own firmness. Nor did he, like Kennan, bother to explain how the Soviet ruling class could abandon a militant posture toward the West without giving up its own claim to power within the Russian bureaucracy. Indeed, why would the Soviet Union tolerate liberation? No ruling class relinquishes power to those who would destroy it. Both Marx and Machiavelli could agree to that truth. Was Burnham now a Wilsonian liberal speaking the language of "national self-determination" (used frequently in the book)? Or was he still an unconscious Trotskyist who continued to harbor illusions about the internal weaknesses of Stalinism and who saw his national liberation armies as the Fourth International redivivus? Whatever the answer, one thing seemed clear: Burnham was no longer the managerialist or the Machiavellian, for he had no consistent theory of power to liberate those from total power.[33]

Nor did Burnham offer a consistent theory of political knowledge with which to interpret historical events. This is no place to plunge into a historiographical discussion of the debate over the orgins of the cold war. But it is obvious that at the heart of that debate is a fierce controversy over the *intent* of Soviet foreign policy. Was Stalin's policy aimed at Russia's national security or at world communist expansion? Burnham, of course, had no doubt it was the latter, but to prove Soviet designs for world conquest he had to abandon his recent neo-Machiavellianism and return once again to Marxism. For Machiavellianism led to a geopolitical perspective that traced the cold war to imperial Russia's limited, strategic ambitions in eastern Europe and the Balkans. This perspective, shared by conservative writers like Walter Lippmann and, to a certain extent, by conservative statesmen like Churchill and de Gaulle, Burnham was forced to reject in order to stress the ideological background of the cold war. In so doing he now attributed to ideas a power he had formerly denied them. Thus the Burnham who had warned readers in *The Machiavellians* against accepting at face value the documents and statements of political leaders—the fallacy of "formalism"—was now citing Lenin's pre–World War I writings as the operational code of Soviet foreign policy and Marx's *Communist Manifesto* of 1848 as the mental blueprint of the Soviet *Weltanschauung*—"You have a world to win." All this was highly dubious. True, ideology plays an important role in communist thinking. Yet it is exceedingly difficult to ascertain whether ideology determines the nature of action or action determines the meaning of ideology. Which text do we use? *What's To Be Done* (1902) revises *Capital* (1868), *State and Revolution* (1917) updates *Two Tactics of Social Democracy* (1905), and October 1917 breaks the whole organic unity of Marxist theory and practice, so that in *Left-Wing Communism* (1920) Lenin can flagrantly derevolutionize Leninism itself. Whatever may be the motivating force of Marxist theory in prerevolutionary situations, the irony is that Burnham attributed Soviet political successes to ideological determinism, while in reality Russia's political experience since 1917 has, as R.V. Daniels observes, "revolved around the most exaggerated voluntarism."[34]

A curious pattern of thought emerges in Burnham's attitudes toward the Soviet Union. In the late 'thirties, as we have seen, he used the categories of Marxian and managerial analysis to explain the failure of the Bolshevik Revolution. A few years later, in "Lenin's Heir," he used neo-Machiavellianism to demonstrate that Stalin "fulfilled" the revolution only by betraying Marxist ideas for power politics. Then a decade later, when it became clear that the *realpolitik* perspective led to a conservative interpretation of the cold war as a traditional clash of nation states struggling for contiguous spheres of influence, he was forced to reinvoke the power of ideology in order to dramatize the menace of communism. Burnham, in short moved back and forth between Machiavelli and Marx, between the idea of power and the power of an idea, changing his epistemology each time he wanted to explain reality.

Burnham also wanted to foretell as well as explain, and as a result *Containment or Liberation?* retained the same flaw that one sees in his earlier works—the instinct to predict the future by projecting the past. "If the communists succeed in consolidating what they have *already* conquered, then their complete world victory is certain. The threat does not come only from what the com-

[33] James Burnham, *Containment or Liberation? An Inquiry Into the Aims of United States Foreign Policy* (New York: John Day Co., 1953), pp. 19–49, *passim.*

[34] Robert V. Daniels, "Fate and Will in the Marxian Philosophy of History," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 21 (Oct.–Dec., 1960), 538–52; see also the same author's "What The Russians Mean," *Commentary*, 34 (Oct., 1962), 314–23; and Bernard P. Kiernan, "Ideology and Foreign Policy: A Reconsideration," *Virginia Quarterly Review*, 50 (Winter, 1974), 22–38.

munists may do, but from what they have done. We do not have to bring in speculation about Soviet "intentions." The simple terrible fact is that if things go on as they now are, if for the time being they merely stabilize, then we have already lost." In Burnham's thoughts about diplomacy one cannot help but see a kind of residual Marxism, a tendency to think that any stable situation is inherently contradictory and contains the seeds of inevitable conflict. Thus the logic of containment led to two diametrically opposed alternatives. "At most, containment can be a temporary expedient, a transition. As the transition is completed, containment must move toward one or the other of the two major poles, toward appeasement or liberation." The United States cannot really contain Russia, Burnham insisted, for the "Soviet imperial state" is by definition "a totalitarian power which seeks world domination." Ultimately America will have to submit to communist expansion or "get rid of Soviet rule." The inexorability of the either-or alternative not only displays Burnham's weakness for melodrama, it also displays how closely his views corresponded with the Communist version of the cold war. Reading Burnham, we are in the same political universe as Lenin in 1917, a world of inevitable conflicts, apocalyptic confrontations, and ultimate moments of truth. Accepting communist rhetoric at face value, Burnham could continue to expound his mechanistic view of diplomacy as a chess board of predictable power moves in a vacuum of nonresistance.[35]

The question of resistance brings us to the weakest link in the chain of Burnham's argument: the ethical link. Burnham's dilemma lay in formulating a theory of politics that could be realistic without being cynical, a political theory that made "power" its central concept and yet somehow allowed for the role of moral ideals in human affairs. He was unaware of the dilemma until the cold war, when it became apparent that Machiavellian geopolitics meant accepting the status quo. Hence the critique of containment had to be ethical as well as political. Burnham now spoke of the need for "honor" in American foreign policy, of being faithful to certain ideals without which liberation would be a mockery and a sham. "Spirit must direct matter toward a goal, and a firm resolution must sustain an unyielding effort through periods of failure, loss and sorrow." Burnham did not say whence this "spirit" would rise, but his political message was clear enough:

> It is perhaps the crucial defect of the policy of containment that it is incapable of meeting this moral and spiritual demand. Who will willingly suffer, sacrifice and die for containment? The very notion is ridiculous. The average man cannot even understand the policy of containment, much less become willing to die for it. Will the captives of the Kremlin risk death for a policy that starts abandoning them to the usurpers of their freedom?"[36]

The question was poignantly posed, but one can find no answer to it in the entire body of Burnham's writings. Who, one might ask, will fight for Michel's "iron law of oligarchy"? Who will storm the barricades for the cause of bureaucracy? Who will die for Pareto? In 1943, when Hitler had all but conquered western Europe, Burnham proceeded to prove that freedom was an illusion. In 1953, when Stalin had absorbed eastern Europe, he suddenly discovered the value of freedom without explaining how it could be realized. Sorel-like, he now asked East Europeans to fight for an ideal he once believed theoretically impossible, and he asked his own people to risk their lives in order to rescue Europe from Soviet domination—the very American people who had passively witnessed the destruction of East European nationhood in 1939.

Conservatives might forgive Burnham for offering his advice ten years too late, against Stalin rather than Hitler. But even conservatives cannot avoid noticing the theoretical incoherence in Burnham's cold war philosophy. In truth, Burnham's idea of liberation embraced two incompatible world views: the geopolitics of power and national interests on the one hand, and the "higher politics" of morality and national commitment on the other. The first view stresses the need for international security and stability, the second stresses the imperative of ethical demands as the test of national morality. The first is soberly conservative, preferring the known to the unknown, Machiavelli's world of power rather than Dante's world of ideals. The second is radically adventuous, fired by romantic notions of glory and honor (and perhaps fear of national humiliation). In *Containment or Liberation?* Burnham tried to accommodate both views, but ultimately the prudence of political realism yields to the pride of Wilsonian idealism, the mind surrenders to the will. The result of this theoretical schizophrenia was a confusion between what was possible and what was "honorable." As Machiavelli might have predicted, and as the East European uprisings of 1956 would demonstrate, the doctrine of liberation gravely implicated America in political tragedy.

Russia Through Trotsky's Eyes

The Hungarian revolt found Burnham helpless as he watched in silence the Soviet tanks rolling toward Budapest. Neither he nor the *National Re-*

[35] Burnham, *Containment or Liberation?* pp. 217–18, 251.

[36] *Ibid.*, pp. 41–42.

view dared suggest a counteroffensive by NATO forces. Even editor Buckley, the cold warrior *par excellence*, felt the soft glove of Schlesinger on his shoulder.[37] Chastened by the Budapest bloodbath, Burnham was nonetheless somewhat encouraged by the democratic aspirations of the Hungarian rebels, goals that he now realized could only be won by abandoning the doctrine of liberation. Accordingly, Burnham called for the withdrawal of Soviet and NATO troops from eastern and western Europe. This new policy for neutralizing Central and Eastern Europe, which Burnham referred to as "the Austrian solution," was similar to a proposal Walter Lippmann made as early as 1947, and one that George Kennan would advocate in 1958 as the strategy of mutual "disengagement." But Burnham could not sell the idea to the *National Review*. Frank S. Meyer and William Schlamm, two more ex-Communists on Buckley's board of consulting editors, maintained that Burnham's policy, based on the premise that atomic war is unthinkable, substituted gradual surrender for "aggressive pressure."[38] Burnham also failed to explain why disengagement would be acceptable to the Soviet Union. He believed his policy would be attractive to the Kremlin, now presumably convinced that it had lost control of the situation in Eastern Europe, and always prepared to take Lenin's tactic of one step backward. The Polish and Hungarian uprisings, however, were in large part responses to Khrushchev's 20th Party Congress speech denouncing Stalin, a dramatic speech that was not published in the USSR but gained widespread attention abroad and helped spark rising hopes in Eastern Europe. Burnham expected the Soviet Union to relax its grip on neighboring states just when that grip was slipping, and he never seemed to consider that Hungary's demands for party structural reform consisted of "western" democratic ideas that would challenge, and thereby threaten, the bureaucratic despotism of the Soviet state. In short, the logic of disengagement ignored the logic of totalitarianism—a strange oversight by the author of *The Managerial Revolution* and *The Machiavellians*.

Disgusted with the Eisenhower-Dulles posture of stalemate, Burnham responded favorably to the Kennedy administration. Initially he was impressed by the strategic sophistication and paramilitary plans of Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, and by the young President's "brave and lofty" words about defending Laos. Tactical reasons, however, dictated that Laos not be the place to embark upon this decisive new turn. Instead Cuba, where the rising "anti-Castro revolt does seem to have Mr. Kennedy's backing," is the beachhead where America could redeem herself. "What is crucial," Burnham told NR *readers* in April 1961, "is that we should *somewhere*, in *some* theatre or on *some* vital issue, make a stand of unconditional firmness: that we should strike a blow against the enemy." Ten days later Burnham's hopes were dashed with the Bay of Pigs fiasco, and he thereupon referred to Cuba as Khrushchev once spoke of Berlin—"a bone in our throat."[39]

In the early 'sixties Burnham toured Indochina and reported to the *NR* the disillusionment of Asians with America's feeble response to Cuba. He also recounted General Bill Donovan's "domino theory," which by the verbal ingenuity of metaphor explained why America's capitulation in Laos convinced the Communists that victory in Vietnam was possible. Burnham was certain that America possessed the power to win in Vietnam but lacked the will and courage. "What if," he asked *NR* readers, "the incredible chemical and biological weapons now available to Americans were turned against the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese? If really massive combined forces were assembled from the U.S., Phillipines, Free China and Australia? If Chinese north-south communications were cut, as they can be without too much difficulty? If operations into the Chinese mainland were launched?" Would not such actions precipitate nuclear war between the two super powers? "Poppycock," scoffed Burnham: Khrushchev would not sacrifice Moscow to save either Saigon or Havana, which is all the more reason why the nuclear test ban treaty must be rejected. Moreover, Kennedy liberals, so squeamish about world opinion and so scrupulous about their own political purity, were blaming President Ngo Dinh Diem for their failures in Vietnam. True, the Diem government was not democratic, Burnham admitted, but "what sort of political cretins can they be who think South Vietnam could be ruled like England or Switzerland?" Curiously, on one issue Burnhamite conservatives and New Left radicals were in agreement: the struggle is against com-

[37] During the crisis the *National Review* lost its vaunted sense of power politics and displayed the curse of liberalism—moral gestures. Buckley advocated issuing an "ultimatum" stating that the use of Soviet troops against "any of the East European peoples would constitute a *causus belli*. We believe that Moscow would have to back down from such an ultimatum." The use of the conditional "would" indicates that the *National Review* was hoping for the best while refusing to admit that the worst had already happened. If the Soviets do not back down? The United States, Buckley insisted, should withdraw its ambassador from Moscow and refuse to compete in the Olympic games! (Buckley, "Platonic Sorrows," *National Review*, 2 [Dec. 22, 1956], 45).

[38] James Burnham, "Sighting the Target," *National Review*, 2 (Dec. 29, 1956), 12; for Frank S. Meyer's criticism of Burnham, see the *National Review* columns gathered in his *The Conservative Mainstream* (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1969), pp. 319–27.

[39] See Burnham's *National Review* columns gathered in *The War We Are In: The Last Decade and the Next* (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1967), pp. 126–31.

munism, not about democracy. In the cold war the Machiavellians and the Marxists found a consensus.[40]

With the Johnson administration America was saved by geography. Only a man from Texas had the guts to spurn the liberal "isolationists" of the eastern establishment and escalate the Vietnam war through systematic aerial bombardment. Burnham delighted in describing what liberals despaired in discovering. "So far as foreign policy goes, Lyndon Johnson expresses the same temperament and policy as Barry Goldwater. The citizens who in 1964 voted for Goldwater are today, in general, the firmest supporters, outside of the professional military men, of Johnson's intervention in Asia." Equally encouraging was the performance of Defense Secretary McNamara, "a perfect exemplar of the top level of the new managerial class," who was attempting to integrate the industrial economy and the war machine through "program definition, cost-efficiency, systems analysis, centralized procurement, computerized inventory control, ultra-speed internal communications, etc." Burnham, the technological elitist, was deeply moved, and in the *NR* he wrote an intelligent defense of McNamara against his military and business critics on the Right and his intellectual and student critics on the Left. Soon, however, Burnham himself became a critic. All along he had doubted whether Johnson, a consummate politician, would be enlightened enough to rise above partisan, domestic issues and devote his energies primarily to foreign affairs. By 1967 it became clear that the Johnson administration would not ignore the antiwar pressures mounting across the country. Burnham now criticized McNamara for failing to step up the bombing by knocking out North Vietnam's seaports and destroying its irrigation systems and food supplies through "biological or chemical means."[41]

Burnham had no qualms in advising America to become aggressive and take the cold war offensive. For he believed that the Hungarian uprising proved that the Soviets could handle their "domestic matters" without fear of outside interference. This was the essence of "peaceful coexistence," a doctrine that preempted western interference only. The Communists, Burnham maintained, operate on the assumption of two zones: the "zone of peace," the land under communist rule, is off-limits, and any effort to disturb the status-quo is considered counter-revolutionary and Right-wing, to be crushed by whatever means necessary. The "zone of war" is the territory still free from communist domination, and within this zone any attempt that seeks to change or overthrow a government is "progressive," to be supported by "all freedom loving peoples." The United States had been duped into regarding Cuba and North Vietnam as "zones of peace," and hence America had naively announced to the world that its foreign policy does not aim to overthrow the governments of Castro and Ho Chi Minh. The Marxists, it seemed, also had their corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.[42]

Any judgment one makes of Burnham's theory of the two zones—which is a faithful restatement of the communist doctrine of coexistence—is bound to be a matter of political sentiment. The point, however, is to match "selective indignation" with objective selection. If the Soviets engaged in two zone diplomacy, clearly the West originated it with the Allied intervention during the Russian Revolution and Civil War in 1918–1920; and if the Soviets perfected it, the United States nontheless practiced it—witness, for example, the State Department's role in the overthrow of Mossadegh in Iran and the CIA's involvement in subverting the Communist-supported Arbentz government in Guatemala. As for penetrating beyond the enemy's borders, the Soviets take the low ground with Communist spy networks, and America takes the high ground with U-2 reconnaissance flights deep into Russia's heartland. Burnham could rightly complain that the Soviets supported and exploited revolutionary uprisings in Greece, Angola, Cuba, and Zanzibar, but he could not prove that they had created them.[43] In giving the Soviets more credit than they deserved, Burnham's thoughts once again reflect the mirror image of the communist mentality. As an anti-Communist cold warrior, Burnham retained his Marxist vision of totality, the tendency to see all political phenom-

[40] James Burnham, "Toujours, La Sale Guerre," National Review, 14 (Jan. 29, 1963), 60; "Who Gives a Whoop?" National Review, 14 (Apr. 7, 1963); "What Chance in Vietnam?" National Review, 15 (Oct. 8, 1963), 305.

[41] Burnham, *The War We Are In*, pp. 104–06; "Why Do They Hate Robert Strange McNamara?" *National Review*, 18 (Nov. 15, 1966), 1152–62; "Does Johnson Have a Foreign Policy?" *National Review*, 16 (Mar. 10, 1964), 190; McNamara's Non-War, *National Review*, 19 (Sept. 19, 1967), 1012–14.

[42] Burnham, *The War We Are In*, pp. 15–23.

[43] In *The Struggle for the World*, Burnham dramatized the Greek revolt of 1944 as a Soviet inspired maneuver and thus the actual beginning of the "Third World War." Regarding a mutiny in the Greek Navy, which he presumed had been instigated by the Moscow-controlled Greek Communist Party, Burnham wrote: "We do not know the details of what happened in the mutiny; but the details, important as they may be for future scholars, are unnecessary. We know enough to discover the political meaning of what happened, and for this details are sometimes an obstacle" (p. 1). A recent thorough and scholarly study of this affair, wherein "details" inform rather than "obstruct," presents a quite different picture of the "political meaning" of a resistance movement that Stalin himself would later allow to be crushed. See John O. Iatrides, *Revolt in Athens: The Greek Communist "Second Round" 1944–1945* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1972).

ena as interrelated and emanating from a single source. Thus it is not surprising that both Burnham and the Communists had difficulty acknowledging indigneous nationalist movements, whatever their political nature, working-class or bourgeois. Burnham detected the long hand of Moscow in Communist activities in Africa, and Communists saw the long hand of Washington in counter-revolutionary movements in South America. Neither the Left nor Right, it seemed, could successfully take action independent of Russia or the United States. Whatever the validity of this world-view—the Indonesians who took it upon themselves to oust Sukarno apparently did not share it—two could play the game while professing clean hands. For on the question of democracy, Burnham himself succumbed to the two zone distinction. He accused liberals of being political "cretins" for refusing to understand that representative government and liberty are impossible in South Vietnam because of the lack of a democratic heritage. Yet the logic of this rationale applies to Russia and much of eastern Europe as well. The old fellow-travelers used to chide liberals that surely the Russians could not claim to have lost under communism what they never possessed under Czarism.[44] Similarly, Burnham's two-zone thinking enabled him to defend the antidemocratic coup of the Greek colonels in 1968, but not the democratically elected Marxist government of Salvatore Allende in Chile in 1972. Determined to see the Soviet Union liberated in the name of democracy, Burnham was willing to allow democracy to be liquidated in the name of the "free world." It was all a matter of "zones." (Orwell, Orwell, where art thou now?)

But moral judgment, as desirable as it is dangerous in the study of international relations, will probably not get us very far in understanding the cold war. Far more essential is a plausible mode of analysis with which to interpret the meaning of historical events. In this respect, what ultimately challenged Burnham's theoretical perspective was the Sino-Soviet split. This development in the early 'sixties seemed to confirm what several writers had suspected—beneath the ideology of communism lay the deeper emotions of nationalism and the deeper impulses of power. Burnham did not deny that the Soviet state comprised a fusion of Russian and Communist elements, even though, as World War Two demonstrated, each element shifted in relative weight from time to time. What he denied was the ultimate historical significance of the Moscow-Peking rivalry. For the rift between European and Asiatic Marxist-Leninism created the impression that there now existed two distinct Communist postures: Russia's "soft" line of peaceful coexistence, and China's "hard" line of permanent revolutionary struggle. And this impression led to the assumption that the United States should support the policy of coexistence to demonstrate that the democratic West also desires peace. Burnham challenged these assumptions one by one.

The nature of the Sino-Soviet dispute is "verbal only," Burnham maintained. Peaceful coexistence versus revolutionary struggle is merely a debate "over how best to bury us." Burnham pointed to Zanzibar, Angola, and Yemen as evidence that Russia as well as China supported Communist revolutionary activity, and to Indonesia, where both Moscow and Peking supported Sukarno's "crush Malaysia" adventure. Moreover, the split is not between China and the Soviet Union but between Chinese and Russian Communists. Burnham acknowledged the ethnic, economic, and cultural differences between the two great powers. Nevertheless, the split is basically a factional quarrel, an organizational struggle for control and direction of the world Communist movement. From a Leninist perspective, the split could be viewed as an "intra-revolutionary dispute" that in many respects resembled the old rivalry between the Bolsheviks and the Social Revolutionaries; and the debate over the "hard" and "soft" lines echoes the disputes that marked the earlier Comintern shift from the Second to the Third period, from the strategy of consolidation based on the apparent stability of capitalism in the 1920s, to the strategy of revolutionary offensive that began on the eve of the depression. "Khrushchev and Mao take their stand foursquare on Lenin," Burnham insisted, and thus "the objective and the method of the struggle are according to the Communist mode."[45]

Those who did not share Burnham's vision of the cold war were not the radicals but the liberals. Burnham reserved his greatest scorn for writers who assumed "the Kennan-de Gaulle-Morgenthau-Lippmann approach" and mistakenly interpreted the Sino-Soviet split and Khrushchev's "de-Stalinization" policy as evidence that communism had run its course. Kremlinologists of this school perceived communism in the traditional categories of national interest and security, substituting for ideological clashes historical counters that arise from concrete geographical settings. These same writers asked Americans to understand that the Soviets' security concerns are similar to those of pre-revolutionary Russian govern-

[44] David Caute, *The Fellow-Travelers: A Postscript to the Enlightenment* (New York: Macmillan, 1973).

[45] James Burnham, "Nikita Khrushchev; Maoist," *National Review*, 16 (July 28, 1964), 644; "Kennedy, Krushchev, and Mao," *National Review*, 15 (July 16, 1963), 17; "Bear-Baiting," *National Review*, 16 (Aug. 25, 1964), 718; *War We Are In*, pp. 53–61.

ments, and, by the same reasoning, that America's national interest and security were not at stake in Vietnam. Such theorists take geopolitics too seriously, complained Burnham, who once believed that *raison d'état* and *Realpolitik* were the only true perspective on the cold war.

> "De Gaulle's theory and practice of international politics are based on the following conceptions: 1) the primary counters of the game are nations with deeply ingrained traits that change very slowly, if at all; 2) as a corollary, 'ideologies' (communism, fascism, Liberalism, etc.) are secondary and superficial; 3) the rules of the game are Machiavellian: significant moves express changing relations of power and interest, not ideological or moralistic abstractions about 'justice,' 'freedom,' 'peace,' or what not.

De Gaulle's error lay in following literally the advice Burnham put forth in *The Machiavellians*: power is everything, ideology nothing.[46]

With Pareto, Burnham had once attacked as fallacious the liberal assumption that people act as they do because of the beliefs they hold. Then with the impact of the cold war, as we have seen, he was compelled to attack liberals for failing to take beliefs and ideologies seriously. In the late 'fifties and sixties, with the shift to the doctrine of peaceful coexistence, and with the development of the Sino-Soviet split and de-Stalinization, Burnham turned the angle of his epistemological prism once again. He now called upon Kremlinologists to concentrate upon deeds rather than doctrine. "Suppose we ask the experts what this dispute is all about. Can you prove it? Yes, they will reply, and they will produce hundreds of Soviet statements proclaiming peaceful coexistence and hundreds of matching Chinese statements denouncing peaceful coexistence and calling for revolutionary struggle." All such statements are "notoriously unreliable," maintained Burnham. "Let's forget for a moment, what they say. What do they do?" he asked and proceeded to use Zanzibar, Yemen, and Indonesia as test cases.[47]

Burnham had little respect for American scholars of the Soviet Union. In the 'fifties he blasted the Russian Institutes at Columbia and Harvard, the "mass production . . . factories" of which "99 per cent of their publications have not the slightest intellectual, scientific, or political interest . . ." A rare exception in contemporary scholarship was Gerhart Niemeyer's *An Inquiry Into Soviet Mentality*. Niemeyer's book demonstrated that Communist behavior is not "rational" because it aspires beyond "the limits of normality in action"; that an "East-West dialogue" could not take place because of the Communist *weltanschauung*; and that "peace . . . is not possible with an adversary who rejects the very right of other societies to exist." Such conclusions were like an ice bath of diplomatic realism from which "nearly all Americans draw blindly back," observed Burnham, who praised Niemeyer for single-handedly "inquiring into the categorical presuppositions of our knowledge of Communist behavior."[48]

With what "categorical presuppositions" did Burnham now propose to explain Communist behavior? As noted earlier, Burnham's own perspectives shifted with each episode in his intellectual career—from managerialism to Machiavellianism to Marxist-Leninism. In the 'sixties many of the most prestigious American writers were articulating the Machiavellian, geopolitical viewpoint that Burnham had advocated in the 'forties. From the perspective of political "realism," Kennan, Morgenthau, and Lippmann interpreted the Sino-Soviet split as a nationalistic rivalry, and de-Stalinization and peaceful coexistence as the triumph of experience over dogma. In response, Burnham moved on to another vision of reality to challenge American scholars: the Sino-Soviet split is essentially a conflict to decide the question that has always been the crux of international communism: Who shall be master of the international revolutionary movement? Thus, the riddles of Soviet behavior—that the Russians, for example, can "simultaneously want and not want coexistence" —must be understood by simple Marxist logic.

> What the Kennans, etc., say is true enough (this is what gives it plausibility), but true only in one historical dimension of a multi-dimensional reality. They fail, a Marxist would say, to comprehend dialectics: fail to realize that simultaneously in our age there is taking place an international competition of national states and empires (new and old), as in the past several centuries, *and also* an unprecedented revolutionary struggle that is world-wide and civilization-deep."

When Lippmann and Morgenthau tell us that American interest and security are not at stake in Vietnam, their "premise is based on a superficial, too mechanical idea of the national interests." And when they view the Sino-Soviet split as real and permanent, they are likewise reasoning mechanically rather than dialectically. To separate the strategy of peaceful coexistence from that of revolutionary struggle is to confine oneself to a one-dimensional perspective, an ahistorical perspective that fails to see the conflict as merely an extension of the "old legal-illegal dispute," reform versus revolution. Rather than a renunciation of communism, the split represents a phase of revisionism that will itself be revised in a revolution-

[46] Burnham, *War We Are In*, pp. 61–63, 195–97.
[47] *Ibid.*, pp. 56–58.
[48] James Burnham, "Their World and Ours," *National Review*, 2.(Nov. 3, 1956), 19–20.

ary direction. "A true dialectician would see it as once more exemplifying the law of the unity of opposites. On a higher plane, the Russian thesis of coexistence and the Chinese antithesis of militancy fuse into a synthesis of true revolutionary struggle."[49]

Not until the end of the 'sixties did Burnham and the *NR* grudgingly admit a genuine rupture between China and Russia.[50] Meanwhile, in order to drive home the significance of the dialectical viewpoint, Burnham purported to convey in his columns the Communist vision of reality through the "eyes of the Kremlin." Striving for authenticity, he organized his columns as secret diplomatic dispatches to the CPUSSR:

To: The Secretariat
From: Intelligence Section
Subject: Weekly Summary, International (excerpts)

The present (or Geneva) period is characterized dialectically in the following manner: a) thesis—unprecedented freedom of maneuver for the camp of socialism; b) antithesis—unprecedented inertness on the part of the enemy . . .[51]

Obviously Burnham was convinced that the best way to understand Soviet communists was to see them as they saw themselves through the mediation of the Marxist-Leninist mind. Perhaps a student of R. G. Collingwood would appreciate Burnham's effort to "think himself into" historical action in order to discern the thought of his antagonist. But one wonders, for example, whether Burnham's Marxist-Leninist perspective could explain many of the cold war's erratic events and surprising turns. What would Lenin say of the sporadic uprisings in Yemen and Zanzibar? And Stalin, who never lifted a finger to help Mao or Tito, what would he say of Khrushchev's attempt to rescue Castro by planting missile sites in Cuba? And Khrushchev, who denounced the "crimes of Stalin," how would he react to the New Left's exoneration of Stalin's role in the cold war?

Burnham's demand that every Kremlinologist become a "true dialectician" is most revealing. He was convinced that the contradictions in Soviet diplomacy could be seen as more apparent than real only when writers overcome a mechanistic, linear view of historical development and appreciate the "unity" that lies behind "opposite" tendencies—the "higher plane" of historical understanding. From this privileged epistemological position, he criticized de Gaulle and Kennan for not understanding "the enemy's dual nature"—Russia's "synthesis" of Soviet nationalism and communist internationalism, of peaceful coexistence and revolutionary struggle.[52] There is an embarrassing irony in this criticism of the dichotomy of national interests and ideology, for it is precisely the indictment Trotsky leveled at Burnham himself a quarter century earlier. Trotsky had also been convinced that Russia was characterized by what he called, in his debates with Burnham and Max Eastman, a "dual nature," and he too believed that the "contradiction" between the Soviet Union's revolutionary ideology and Stalin's counterrevolutionary nationalism would resolve itself on the battlefield in a new fusion of war and liberation. But when Trotsky asked Burnham to accept the principle behind the paradox and support the USSR while opposing Stalinism, and when he called upon his American followers to discard the "banalities" of "common sense" and discipline themselves in the "dialectical training of the mind," Burnham replied, "I stopped arguing about religion long ago."[53] As a cold warrior, Burnham was now, twenty five years later, asking Kennan, Lippmann, and Morgenthau to take up again the "religion" of dialectical reasoning and to see Russia through Trotsky's eyes and thereby grasp the negation of peaceful coexistence ("socialism in one country") by the higher synthesis of "permanent revolution." With this demand, the epistemology of the cold war had come full circle, and we are still limping after reality.[54]

[49] *Ibid.*, p. 19; *War We Are In*, pp. 56–63, 99.

[50] In 1960, Burnham edited and introduced a sympoisum, sponsored by The American-Asia Educational Exchange and published by the *National Review*, on the conservative response to the Sino-Soviet split. Here one may find well-reasoned, though subsequently disproved, arguments, particularly those by Stefan T. Possony and Karl A. Wittfogel, explaining why the split was more apparent than real and why China would be forced to remain subordinate to the Soviet Union. See Burnham, *Bear and Dragon: What Is The Relation Between Moscow and Peking?* (New York, 1960).

[51] Burnham, The *War We Are In*, pp. 29–33.

[52] *Ibid.*, pp. 27–29.

[53] Burnham's debate with Trotsky is discussed in Diggins, "Getting Hegel Out of History," op. cit. pp. 65–71.

[54] For further discussion of the ex-communist intellectuals and the cold war, see this author's *Up From Communism: Conservative Odysseys in American Intellectual History* (New York: Harper & Row, 1975).

Prediction Analysis in Political Research*

DAVID K. HILDEBRAND
University of Pennsylvania

JAMES D. LAING
Stanford University

HOWARD ROSENTHAL
Carnegie-Mellon University

Methods for empirical analysis of political theory should allow precise translation of the particular substantive proposition being investigated into an appropriate procedure for quantitative evaluation. An exact correspondence between substance and method might be established in either of two ways. First, the investigator can work backward from method to substance, constraining the theory to yield only substantive propositions that can be evaluated with the standard menu of special-purpose statistics. By this approach, available methods delimit what theories are considered. Alternatively, the investigator can select or, if necessary, design analytic methods appropriate to the particular substantive theory under investigation. We believe that the second approach places scientific priorities in the correct order: the form of the substantive theory should dictate data analysis.

This paper describes a general approach for (a) stating precisely any of a broad class of predictions relating qualitative (nominal or ordinal) variables and (b) evaluating the extent to which a particular substantive proposition correctly predicts the empirical relation.[1] First, we focus on bivariate propositions, examining language commonly used by political scientists to describe or predict bivariate relations, then developing a "prediction logic" formalization of that language. We then present a measure, ∇_{φ}, for evaluating the extent to which a proposition stated in the prediction logic successfully predicts the dependent variable in a *population*. Since ∇_{φ} yields a distinct measure for each logically distinct prediction logic proposition, it enables the investigator to translate a particular substantive proposition directly into appropriate methods of data analysis. Moreover, many well-known measures of association can be interpreted as special cases of ∇_{φ} for specific prediction logic propositions. We next consider bivariate statistical inference procedures for *sample* data. These procedures apply to bivariate propositions specified *a priori* and also to propositions selected *ex post facto* to describe a relation observed in the data. Finally, we briefly outline the prediction logic and associated methods for evaluating the prediction success attained in a population by a multivariate prediction.[2] Numerous research examples illustrate applications of these methods in political science.

Bivariate Prediction Logic

To identify the basic logical structure underlying an important part of the natural language of prediction and description in political science, we begin by examining some elementary propositions taken from the research literature. We then formalize this structure and illustrate its application with more complex propositions.

Some Elementary Propositions. Verbal discussions of relations among qualitative variables in political science frequently can be expressed in statements postulating that certain conditions tend to be necessary, sufficient, or both necessary and sufficient for the occurrence of specified states of the predicted variable. Often, this form is quite evident. For example, Lipset has stated that

* This research was conducted with support of grants GS-32161 and GS-33754 from the National Science Foundation. An earlier version of this paper appears in the *Proceedings of 1973 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms, 1973). FORTRAN IV programs that perform the analysis discussed in the paper may be obtained from the authors.

[1] For a more technically detailed presentation of our approach to bivariate prediction and analysis, see our papers "Prediction Logic: A Method for Empirical Evaluation of Formal Theory," *Journal of Mathematical Sociology*, 3 (January 1974), 163–185, and "Prediction Logic and Quasi-Independence in Empirical Evaluation of Formal Theory," *Ibid.*, pp. 197–209. See also William Buchanan, "Nominal and Ordinal Bivariate Statistics: The Practitioner's View," *American Journal of Political Science*, 18 (August 1974), 625–646.

[2] For an extensive presentation of these methods, see our forthcoming book *Prediction Analysis of Cross Classifications* (New York: Wiley [Probability and Mathematical Statistics Series: Applied Section]). See also Richard A. Bartlett, " Partition Analysis of Categorical Data," (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1974).

. . . a "high" level of education . . . *comes close* to being a *necessary* [*condition* for democracy].[3]

Rosenthal has used the same form:

Only 2 of the 13 R.P.F. coalitions occurred in districts without Modéré incumbents, suggesting that the presence of such an incumbent *can be regarded* as a *necessary condition* for a R.P.F. alliance.[4]

If, for the moment, we ignore the "tends to" type of hedging qualifications such as "comes close," then these statements have the same logical form:

x is a necessary condition for y.

This proposition can be represented as the formal logic statement,

y implies x (or, symbolically, $y \rightarrow x$)

as can the following equivalent statements:

if y then x.

y only if x.

y is a sufficient condition for x.

These statements are all equivalent in elementary formal logic since they identify the same truth table shown in Table 1a.[5] As the circled entry indicates, the statement "If y then x" (and its logical equivalents) is falsified if and only if the event "y and not x" (written $y\&\bar{x}$) occurs. As illustrated in Table 1b, any truth table can be represented as a contingency table in which each falsifying event is shaded. The statement that x *is* a necessary condition for y is falsified by any observation in the shaded cell, even if only one such event occurs in a thousand observations.

The propositions quoted above, however, also include a hedging qualification. Their basic form is

x *tends to* be a *necessary condition* for y.

For example, Lipset says that a high level of education "comes close" to being a necessary condition for democracy. Were this proposition used to predict the bivariate relation exhibited in a cross classification such as Table 1b, then the statement


[3] Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man* (Garden City, N.J.: Doubleday, 1960), p. 40 (Anchor Edition); our emphasis.

[4] Howard Rosenthal, "The Electoral Politics of Gaullists in the Fourth French Republic: Ideology or Constituency Interest?" *The American Political Science Review*, 63 (June 1969), 476–487, at 484, our emphasis.

[5] For an introduction to elementary formal logic and truth tables, see John G. Kemeny, J. Laurie Snell and Gerald L. Thompson, *Introduction to Finite Mathematics*, 3rd edition (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974) or Patrick Suppes, *Introduction to Logic* (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand, 1957), Part I.

Table 1. Truth Table in Two Equivalent Representations for the Elementary Proposition "x Is Necessary for y"

y	$\rightarrow$	x
T	T	T
T	(F)	F
F	T	T
F	T	F



(a) Truth Table for $y \rightarrow x$ (b) Contingency table representation of truth table for $y \rightarrow x$, where shaded cell is falsifying (error) event.

does not specify that exactly zero cases of the shaded event should occur. Rather it states that relatively few such events occur. That is, given the "tends to" qualification, the shading indicates that the $y\&\bar{x}$ cell represents an error or deviant event that may occur, albeit infrequently, without "falsifying" the proposition. This rationale is highly visible in Rosenthal's statement that the presence of a Modéré incumbent tends to be necessary for R.P.F. alliance formation, since that proposition was suggested by the observation that "only 2" deviant events for this proposition occur in the data shown in Table 2.

The statement "y is a sufficient condition for x" is, in formal logic, equivalent to the statement "x is a necessary condition for y." Similarly the statement "Having Gaullists in coalition tends to be

Table 2. Modéré Incumbency and Gaullist Participation in Electoral Coalitions, French Legislative Elections of 1951[a]

		Modéré Incumbency: Yes	Modéré Incumbency: No	n
Gaullists in Coalition	Yes	11	2	13
	No	35	47	82
	n	46	49	95

[a] The 95 observations represent those legislative districts where the *apparentement* system applied. Shaded cell is error cell.

Source: Rosenthal, "The Electoral Politics of Gaullists. . . ." Table 5, p. 485.

sufficient for Modéré incumbency" identifies the same error event as Rosenthal's statement about Table 2. While temporal ordering suggests that it makes little sense to consider the presence of Gaullists in the current electoral coalition as a "cause" of Modéré incumbency, the two propositions may be regarded (from a prediction viewpoint) as equivalent since they identify the same set of error events. This paper does not attempt to distinguish cause from effect. The methods for evaluating bivariate predictions are designed to produce identical results for logically equivalent propositions.

The biconditional proposition also appears in the political science literature. Rapoport's statement provides a clear example:

> A grand coalition . . . *is likely* to form *if and only if* the game is strictly superadditive.[6]

As before, if we ignore the "tends to" type of qualification, "is likely," then this proposition is stated in the form

$$x \text{ if and only if } y.$$

In formal logic, this and all the following logically equivalent statements identify the same falsifying events that are shaded in Table 3:

$$x \leftrightarrow y$$

$$\bar{x} \leftrightarrow \bar{y}$$

$$\text{If } x \text{ then } y, \text{ and if } y \text{ then } x.$$

$$(x \rightarrow y) \& (\bar{x} \rightarrow \bar{y})$$

$$x \text{ if } y, \text{ and } x \text{ only if } y.$$

$$x \text{ is a necessary and sufficient condition for } y.$$


Now recognizing the "is likely" qualification, Rapoport's statement is expressed directly in the prediction logic form:

$$x \textit{ tends to } \text{be } \textit{necessary and sufficient} \text{ for } y.$$

The shaded cells in Table 3 indicate the set of *error* or *deviant* events for this proposition.

Recall that in formal logic a proposition can be stated unambiguously by identifying its domain and truth table. By direct formal analogy, a prediction logic proposition may be stated precisely by specifying its domain and the set of error events it identifies. For convenience, we will often state prediction logic propositions in symbolic form using the connectives "$\rightsquigarrow$" (read "predicts" or "tends to be sufficient for") as the analogue to formal implication, and "$\leftarrow\!\!\!\rightsquigarrow$" (read "tends to be necessary and sufficient for") as the analogue to the biconditional connective in formal logic. Similarly, we use symbols identical to those of formal logic for negation and conjunction (&), and use "or" for disjunction. Using these symbols, the following prediction logic statements identify the same set of error events shaded in Table 3, and therefore are logically equivalent predictions:

Table 3. Error Events (Shaded) for a Biconditional Proposition



$$x \text{ tends to be necessary and sufficient for } y.$$

$$x \leftarrow\!\!\!\rightsquigarrow y$$

$$\bar{x} \leftarrow\!\!\!\rightsquigarrow \bar{y}$$

$$\text{Predict } y \text{ if and only if } x.$$

$$(x \rightsquigarrow y) \& (\bar{x} \rightsquigarrow \bar{y})$$

$$(y \rightsquigarrow x) \& (\bar{y} \rightsquigarrow \bar{x})$$

The prediction logic form of proposition is quite explicit in the examples quoted above. More commonly, however, the prediction logic form is left implicit in the investigator's language. For example, Francis reports:

> High general influencers tend to be high specific area influencers, and low general influencers low specific area influencers.[7]
>
> [Read: High general influence tends to be necessary and sufficient for high specific area influence.]

> Senators in their first or second session of service tend to be low specific area influencers.[8]
>
> [Read: If first or second session of service, then predict low specific area influence.]

Often, however, the language of description is less precise than that of prediction logic statements. Some investigators might have reported the data shown in Table 2 with a statement such as

[6] Anatol Rapoport, *N-Person Game Theory* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1970), p. 269; first emphasis ours.

[7] Wayne L. Francis, "Influence and Interaction in a State Legislative Body," *The American Political Science Review*, 56 (December 1962), 953–960, at 954.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 955.

"R.P.F. alliances are less frequent when Modéré incumbents are present then when they are not."[9] Descriptively, this statement is correct. Nonetheless, it also is consistent with three distinct prediction logic propositions:

$$\begin{bmatrix}\text{Modéré}\\ \text{incumbency}\end{bmatrix} \text{ tends to be a } \begin{Bmatrix}\text{necessary}\\ \text{sufficient}\\ \text{necessary and}\\ \text{sufficient}\end{Bmatrix} \text{ condition for } \begin{bmatrix}\text{R.P.F.}\\ \text{alliance}\end{bmatrix}.$$

These alternative propositions are not equivalent, nor, as we show later, are they equally successful predictions for the data in Table 2. Wolfinger and Field, displaying sensitivity to such distinctions, were careful to rule out alternative prediction logic interpretations of their remarks concerning the data shown in Table 4a:

> . . . there is a recognizable "public regarding" structura syndrome in American cities. Most of the manager cities have . . . adopted nonpartison ballots and at-large elections. But the opposite is not true; there is no private-regarding syndrome. Instead, cities with mayors have, in fairly equal proportions, every conceivable combination of the other two structural variables.[10]

Although Wolfinger and Field's remark is based on the 6×2 cross-classification given in Table 4a, their proposition can be represented without loss, except for the "fairly equal proportions" phrase, by combining all but the first row of Table 4a to form the 2×2 cross-classification of Table 4b. The propositions defined by the set of error events in these two tables are logically equivalent, since an

[9] This proposition can be operationalized into a specific prediction logic proposition about the relative position of pairs of observations on the two variables. We describe this procedure later in the paper.

[10] Raymond E. Wolfinger and John Osgood Field, "Political Ethos and the Structure of City Government," *The American Political Science Review*, 60 (June 1966), 306–326, at 313–314.

Table 4. Prediction of City Council Election Characteristics from Form of City Executive[a]

(a)

Wolfinger & Field's Original Table

Election Type		Form of Executive: Mayor (x_1)	Manager (x_2)	n
Non-partisan, at-large	(y_1)	22	101	123
Non-partisan, ward	(y_2)	22	13	35
Non-partisan, combination	(y_3)	14	6	20
Partisan, at-large	(y_4)	14	16	30
Partisan, ward	(y_5)	28	4	32
Partisan, combination	(y_6)	21	2	23
n		124	145	269

(b)

Logically Equivalent Table for Predictions of " 'Public Regarding' Syndrome"

Election Type	Form of Executive: Mayor (x_1)	Manager (x_2)	n
Non-partisan, at-large	22	101	123
Other	102	44	146
n	124	145	269

[a] Shading indicates error cells.

Source: Wolfinger and Field, "Political Ethics and the Structure of City Government," Table 3, p. 314.

event is an error in the 2×2 table if and only if it is an error in the 6×2 table.

While the elementary propositions discussed above provide an introduction, a method limited to 2×2 tables would be only modestly useful. In order to consider complex propositions regarding large contingency tables reported in analyses of political behavior,[11] we need to define the prediction logic for the general $R \times C$ table.

A Prediction Logic for Specifying the Form of Bivariate Relation in an $R \times C$ Table. As in formal logic, define the variables to be specified sets of events that are mutually exclusive and exhaustive within the domain of the prediction. More explicitly, let Y and X be two independently measured variates specified as the finite sets of events $\{y_1, y_2, \cdots, y_i, \cdots, y_R\}$ and $\{x_1, x_2, \cdots, x_j, \cdots, x_C\}$, respectively, where R and $C \geq 2$. Suppose that the domain of a prediction logic proposition includes all events (y_i, x_j) in the cross-classification $Y \times X$.[12] Then, treating X as the independent variable, we may state the proposition's prediction for cases having $X = x_j$ in the form

$$\mathscr{P}_{.j} : x_j \rightsquigarrow \mathscr{S}(x_j)$$

where the set of predicted ("success") states, $\mathscr{S}(x_j)$, is a (not necessarily proper) subset of the Y states. This may be read "If $X = x_j$ then predict $\mathscr{S}(x_j)$" or "x_j tends to be sufficient for $\mathscr{S}(x_j)$." The event (y_i, x_j) belongs to the set of error events identified by $\mathscr{P}_{.j}$,

$$\mathscr{E}_{.j} = \{(y_i, x_j) | y_i \notin \mathscr{S}(x_j)\}$$

if and only if that event falsifies the formal logic statement that x_j implies $\mathscr{S}(x_j)$.

The prediction logic is defined through this formal correspondence between the set of error events, $\mathscr{E}_{.j}$, and the set of falsifying events if the proposition were stated, instead, in elementary formal logic. Any question about the logical structure of a proposition in prediction logic should be resolved by reference to the set of error events it identifies. To state propositions in a manner close to that of the natural language of prediction and description in political science, we adopt symbols for the prediction logic that are analogous to the sentential connectives of formal logic. As stated previously, the prediction logic uses "$\rightsquigarrow$" (predicts) as the analogue of "$\rightarrow$" (implies), and employs the same symbols as does formal logic for conjunction ("&"), disjunction ("or"), and negation ($\bar{x}$ or $\sim x$ for "not x"). For example, the prediction logic statement for Table 4a may be written as $x_1 \rightsquigarrow Y$ & $x_2 \rightsquigarrow y_1$, where Y represents y_1 or $y_2 \cdots$ or y_6. Thus, with the exception of the symbol for "predicts," prediction logic symbols are the same as symbols used in formal logic. In prediction logic, however, these symbols have a different meaning. They are a convenient way of specifying error events that should *seldom*, but not necessarily *never*, occur. For this reason, care must be exercised in making deductions from sentences stated in the prediction logic. For example, given $(w \rightarrow x) \& (x \rightarrow y)$, one can infer $w \rightarrow y$. In contrast, even though both the predictions $(w \rightsquigarrow x)$ and $(x \rightsquigarrow y)$ enjoy some success in a given population of data, this does not guarantee that the prediction $w \rightsquigarrow y$ also finds support in the same data.[13] Nonetheless, if appropriate caution in this regard is exercised, then the logical character of the prediction logic can suggest further interesting propositions for analysis.

Given the logical connectives, a proposition in the prediction logic whose domain is the cross-classification $Y \times X$ may be expressed in the form

$$\mathscr{P} = \mathscr{P}_{.1} \,\&\, \mathscr{P}_{.2} \,\&\, \cdots \,\&\, \mathscr{P}_{.j} \cdots \,\&\, \mathscr{P}_{.C}$$

Alternatively, this proposition may be defined solely in terms of the set of error events ("error structure") it identifies:

$$\mathscr{E}_{\mathscr{P}} = \{(y_i, x_j) | x_j \in X, y_i \notin \mathscr{S}(x_j)\} = \cup_j \mathscr{E}_{.j}$$

As in formal logic, it often is convenient to omit from the statement of a proposition $\mathscr{P}$ any component proposition $\mathscr{P}_{.j}$ that identifies no error (i.e., $\mathscr{S}(x_j) = Y$). For example, $(x \rightsquigarrow y)$ is shorthand for $(x \rightsquigarrow y) \& (\bar{x} \rightsquigarrow (y \text{ or } \bar{y}))$. Thus, Wolfinger and

[11] For an extensive application of our methods to analyze propositions more complex than any examples considered in this paper, see James D. Laing and Richard J. Morrison, "Sequential Games of Status," *Behavioral Science*, 19 (May 1974), 177–196. Also, see Kenneth E. Friend, James D. Laing, and Richard J. Morrison, "Game-Theoretic Analyses of Coalition Behavior," a paper presented at the 1974 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Palmer House, Chicago, Illinois, August 29–September 2, 1974. For an application in economics, see Pieter Korteweg, "The Inflation Problem: A Multi-Country Study of Inflation—The Dutch Case 1952–1972" (Rotterdam: Netherlands School of Economics Working Paper 741, 1974), a paper presented at Eastern Economic Association meetings, Albany, New York, October 25–27, 1974.

[12] For a discussion of our methods when certain cells are omitted from the proposition's domain and, hence, should be excluded from the analysis, see Hildebrand, Laing, and Rosenthal, "Prediction Logic and Quasi-Independence . . . . ," p. 203, and Hildebrand, Laing and Rosenthal, *Prediction Analysis of Cross Clasifications*, chap. 4. For an extensive application of these methods, see Laing and Morrison, "Sequential Games of Status,"

[13] See David K. Hildebrand, James D. Laing and Howard Rosenthal, "A Prediction Logic Approach to Causal Models of Qualitative Variates," *Sociological Methodology, 1976*, ed. D. Heise (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1975), pp. 146–175.

Field's proposition can be expressed for the 6×2 cross-classification shown in Table 4a as $x_2 \rightsquigarrow y_1$. This proposition can also be stated without losing any essential information (but perhaps losing intuitive value) solely in terms of the error structure

$$\{(y_2, x_2), (y_3, x_2), (y_4, x_2), (y_5, x_2), (y_6, x_2)\}$$

Any prediction logic propositions are logically equivalent if they specify the same set of error events. For example, Wolfinger and Field's proposition for Table 4a, $x_2 \rightsquigarrow y_1$, is logically equivalent to

$$(Y \neq y_1) \rightsquigarrow x_1$$

There also is a slightly less obvious form of logical equivalence. If by combining or dividing states of variables, as illustrated by Tables 4a and 4b, one error structure can be transformed into another without affecting the counting of prediction successes and errors, then the two propositions identifying these error structures are logically equivalent. Such variable transformations are arbitrary since they have no predictive significance for the proposition under investigation.

Examples of More Complex Prediction Logic Propositions. In this section we illustrate applications of the prediction logic with more complex propositions that have appeared in this *Review*.

The first such example is from Riker and Zavoina:

> In general, learning theory suggests that, for these 140 pairs, if previous experience had led to success (i.e. voting for or against and winning), then the members of these pairs would repeat the previous choice. If previous experience had led to failure (i.e. voting for or against and losing), then *the prediction is not so clear.* However, if on previous experience in a pair, a player voted for and lost, it would seem to be a good indication to vote against on the second match, if only because he knows that voting for is not successful. On the other hand, if a player voted against another and lost on the first meeting, *there is almost no guide to action. . . . In such a case, there is no really good prediction* inasmuch as it is reasonable either to vote for as an experiment or to vote against on the basis of experience.[14]

The relevant data are portrayed in Table 5. The cells are shaded where the theory (actually a null model for its authors) expects few cases. Note that, like "necessary" or "sufficient" predictions in the 2×2 case, this theory is of limited *scope*. That is, it makes a nontautological prediction only for some of the independent variable categories. Specifically, no prediction is made for "voted against and lost." The example demonstrates why conventional measures of association cannot be used to assess prediction logic propositions. The conventional measures are fixed for a contingency table rather than adaptable to the specific prediction being made, and they typically represent the analysis of a prediction of full scope. A prediction with full scope for the data in Table 5 would be the simple persistence proposition: "vote for in current match if and only if vote for in previous match." The error cells for this proposition have heavy borders in Table 5.

In addition to variations in scope, predictions may vary in their *precision*. Consider Muller's prediction:

> I shall hypothesize that (1) APV [Approval of Political Violence] and IEPV [Intention to Engage in Political Violence] will show a strong degree of fit to a monotonic

[14] William H. Riker and William James Zavoina, "Rational Behavior in Politics: Evidence from a Three-Person Game," *The American Political Science Review*, 64 (March 1970), 48–60, at 58; our emphasis.

Table 5. Voting in Experienced Pairs in a Three-Person Coalition Experiment.[a]

Action of Subject in Current Match	Experience of Subject in Just Previous Match Involving Other Player in Pair: Voted For, Won	Voted For, Lost	Voted Against, Won	Voted Against, Lost	*n*
Votes For	63	22	36	27	148
Votes Against	31	26	50	25	132
n	94	48	86	52	280

[a] Shaded cells represent error cells for Riker-Zavoina learning predictions; cells with large black borders represent error cells for persistence predictions.
Source: Riker and Zavonia, "Rational Behavior in Politics . . . ," Table 3, p. 60.

function and (2) cases which deviate from direct monotonicity will show higher rank-order on APV than on IEPV.[15]

Table 6. Intention to Engage in Political Violence and Approval of Political Violence[a]

IEPV (Intention to Engage in Political Violence)	APV (Approval of Political Violence) 0	1	2	3	4	5	*n*
0	97	89	43	9	2	2	242
1	5	75	45	17	4	2	148
2	0	5	39	8	11	2	65
3	0	0	3	13	8	4	28
4	0	0	1	1	3	4	9
5	0	0	0	0	2	5	7
n	102	169	131	48	30	19	499

[a] The triangle indicates the error set for Muller's *a priori* hypothesis.

Source: Muller, "A Test of a Partial Theory of Potential for Political Violence," Table 2, p. 936.

The relevant data are shown in Table 6. For strict monotonicity, all cases not on the main diagonal constitute errors. The error cells for the proposition with the qualifier about "cases which deviate" are depicted by the triangle in the table. The triangle shows that no [nontautological] prediction is made for a "5" APV score (taking APV as the independent variable). For a score of "4" a prediction is made, but it is very imprecise; only a "5" IEPV score constitutes an error. As the APV scores decrease, the precision of the predictions increases until a unique IEPV value is predicted for the lowest score, "0." Another prediction with a triangular error set is provided by Eulau and Eyestone:

> Reversed development is an empirical fact of life . . . Although we assume that in general stages and phases follow each other in "progressive" order, an assumption that the results of Table [7] certainly do not falsify, no rigid assumptions need or should be made about the direction of change.[16]

[15] Edward N. Muller, "A Test of a Partial Theory of Potential for Political Violence," *The American Political Science Review*, 66 (September 1972), 936.

[16] Heinz Eulau and Robert Eyestone, "Policy Maps of City Councils and Policy Outcomes: A Developmental Analysis," *The American Political Science Review*, 62 (March 1968), 124–143, at 129–130.

The lower triangle in the table indicates those cells which would contradict "progressive" change. If we seek a quantitative evaluation of the extent to which "the results of Table 7 certainly do not falsify," we will have to take into account the varying precision of the predictions.

Forms more complex than triangles can also be specified in terms of error cells, and error events can be given different weights to represent different degrees of severity. An example of a precise theory generating a quiltwork pattern of error cells in a large table is furnished by Sawyer and MacRae's game-theoretic model predicting the number of candidates nominated by each of two parties in the Illinois General Assembly elections during the period 1902-1954.[17]

In each election district three legislative seats are to be filled. The problem facing each party is to decide how many candidates to nominate. Sawyer and MacRae assume each party restricts its alternatives to nominating one, two, or three candidates. Consequently, the situation can be represented as a two-person 3×3 game matrix in which the dth row indicates that the Democrats nominate d candidates, the rth column indicates that the Republicans nominate r candidates, and the entry in cell (d, r) is the number of seats won by each of the two parties given that they nominate d and r candidates, respectively. The *nine strategy pairs* generated by the 3×3 game represent the categories of the *dependent variable.*

Now Sawyer and MacRae further assume (1) each party's votes are distributed evenly across its candidates, and (2) each party has a perfect forecast of the two-party vote. Given these assumptions, for each pair of choices by the two parties about how many candidates to nominate, both parties can determine the number of seats won by each party. For example, if each party nominates two candidates and the Democrats win 30 per cent of the vote in a district, then the Democrats win one seat and the Republicans win two. Now as the Democratic percentage of the vote won is increased from zero to 100, just six distinct 3×3 game matrices result, one for each of the intervals shown as column headings in Table 8. This set of intervals is the *independent* variable.

In two-person game theory, two strategies are in equilibrium if neither player is motivated to change his strategy unilaterally. An analysis based solely on game theory would predict that the parties choose strategy pairs that are in equilibrium. This prediction identifies the double-hatched cells in Table 8 as errors.

Note that there is more than one equilibrium

[17] Jack Sawyer and Duncan MacRae, Jr., "Game Theory and Cumulative Voting in Illinois: 1902–1954," *The American Political Science Review*, 56 (December 1962), 936–946.

Table 7. Policy Development of Cities in Developmental Sequence from 1958–61 to 1962–65[a]

Type of Development in 1958–61	Type of Development in 1962–65					
	Retarded	Emergent	Transitional	Maturing	Advanced	n
Retarded	6	9	0	0	1	16
Emergent	4	2	7	3	0	16
Transitional	1	3	14	5	1	24
Maturing	0	0	5	7	4	16
Advanced	0	0	0	0	10	10
n	11	14	26	15	16	82

			A priori			*Ex post*		
	$\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$	U	Std. Value	$p<$	95% Confidence Interval	χ^2	p(16 d.f.)	p(4 d.f.)
$\mathscr{P}^{(1)}$	.527	.335	4.48	3×10^{-6}	$.335\leq\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}\leq.718$	33.17	$.005<p<.01$	$p<.001$
$\mathscr{P}^{(2)}$	.635	.601	7.98	3×10^{-7}	$.496\leq\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}\leq.774$	55.00	$p<.001$	$p<.001$
$\mathscr{P}^{(3)}$	.334	.789	4.67	3×10^{-6}	$.212\leq\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}\leq.457$	36.08	$.001<p<.005$	$p<.001$
$\mathscr{P}^{(4)}$	.834	.441	12.46	3×10^{-7}	$.712\leq\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}\leq.956$	55.83	$p<.001$	$p<.001$

[a] The lower triangle represents the error set for $\mathscr{P}^{(1)}$. The lower triangle and the shaded portion of the upper triangle represents the error set for $\mathscr{P}^{(2)}$. Both triangles represent the error set for $\mathscr{P}^{(3)}$. The shaded portions of both triangles represent the error set for $\mathscr{P}^{(4)}$.

Source: Eulau and Eyestone, "Policy Maps of City Councils . . . ," Table 2, p. 130.

strategy pair identified by game theory in each of the six types of district; that is, there is more than one cell in each column of Table 8 that is identified as a prediction success for the equilibrium strategy proposition. Sawyer and MacRae introduce additional considerations—such as hedging against an error by the opposing party or against being wrong in predicting the vote division— to select just one equilibrium strategy pair in each type of district as being optimal. They predict that the parties will tend to select this single equilibrium pair in each type of district. This proposition identifies as error events all cells that are single *or* double-hatched in Table 8. The Sawyer and MacRae prediction commits exactly twice the number of prediction errors (418 vs. 209) committed by the equilibrium pair prediction. Note, however, that their prediction is more *precise* than the equilibrium pair proposition since they predict a single outcome for each type of district. In comparing the prediction success of the strictly game-theoretic predictions and their more differentiated predictions, allowances should be made for this difference in precision.

These examples suggest that prediction logic is a rather straightforward formalization of part of the natural language used by political scientists. We next indicate ways in which the logic can be used to analyze other types of propositions relating qualitative variables.

Prediction Logic with Differentially Weighted Errors, Actuarial Propositions, and Predictions of Relative Order. The prediction logic approach can be extended to allow for differentially weighted error events, to represent probabilistic predictions, and to operationalize predictions of relative order such as "The greater the X, the greater Y tends to be."

First, since some errors may be regarded as more serious or important than others, the error events can be differentially weighted. More specifically, each cell in the cross-classification may be assigned some finite weight $\omega_{ij}\geq 0$. Nonetheless, the assignment of binary weights, $\omega_{ij}=1$ or 0, is frequently appropriate, especially when all variables in the proposition are nominal and, hence, no natural conception of distance is available.

Second, the propositions we have considered above may be interpreted, to borrow a term from game theory, as *pure* prediction strategies: if $X=x_j$ then *always* predict $\mathscr{S}(x_j)$. The prediction logic also can be used to represent probabilistic or

Table 8. Number of Candidates Nominated by Two Parties in Six Types of Election Districts, Illinois General Assembly Elections, 1902–1954[a]

Candidates: Dem., Rep.	Per Cent Vote in District for Democrats 0–25	25–40	40–50	50–60	60–75	75–100	*n*
1,1							
1,2	53	300	109	17	3	0	482
1,3	21	19	4	0	0	0	44
2,1	0	4	21	80	126	41	272
2,2	3	48	285	198	15	0	549
2,3							
3,1	0	0	0	0	1	4	5
3,2							
3,3							
n	77	371	419	295	145	45	1352

[a] Two error structures are shown in the table. Double hatching indicates error cells for the prediction that the joint strategy by the two parties is a pure strategy equilibrium pair. All hatched cells constitute error cells for the Sawyer and MacRae predictions.

Source: Sawyer and MacRae, "Game Theory and Cumulative Voting . . . ," p. 938. These investigators omitted " . . . 24 elections (many of them involving strong third parties) which display a nomination pattern other than one of . . . " the five rows containing data above. (*Ibid.*, p. 940).

actuarial propositions by admitting *mixed* prediction strategies: if $X = x_j$, then use the pure prediction strategy $\mathscr{P}_{\cdot j}^{(1)}$ with probability $q_{\cdot j}^{(1)}$, $\mathscr{P}_{\cdot j}^{(2)}$ with probability $q_{\cdot j}^{(2)}, \cdots$, and $\mathscr{P}_{\cdot j}^{(T)}$ with probability $q_{\cdot j}^{(T)}$, where

$$\sum_{t=1}^{T} q_{\cdot j}^{(t)} = 1$$

The use of mixed prediction strategies extends the scope of the methods described in this paper to include not only (using Coleman's term[18]) "sometimes-true" propositions stated as pure strategy predictions, but also explicitly probabilistic predictions of the sort found, say, in Mendelian genetics.

Third, the prediction logic can be used to operationalize predictions of relative order such as "The

[18] James S. Coleman, *Introduction to Mathematical Sociology* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), p. 516.

greater the X, the greater Y tends to be" (i.e., "Y tends to increase with X"). This proposition makes an imprecise prediction about the relation in the cross-classification of two ordinal variables. It predicts only that Y tends to increase with X. This proposition is analogous to the prediction for interval variables that the slope of the regression of Y on X is positive, without specifying the values for the intercept and slope.

The proposition "Y tends to increase with X" can be operationalized as a prediction logic statement which predicts, for each *pair* of observations, if one observation has a greater X-value then it also has a greater Y-value. Let $X \times X$ in *extensive form* denote the Cartesian product set that includes all C^2 pairs of the X states:

$$\{(x_1, x_1), (x_1, x_2), \cdots, (x_1, x_C), (x_2, x_1), (x_2, x_2), \cdots, (x_C, x_1), \cdots, (x_C, x_C)\}$$

We shall use the more compact symbol X^{*2} to mean $X \times X$. The typical state $(x_j, x_{j'})$ indicates that, in a randomly drawn pair of observations, the first observation has $X = x_j$ and the second has $X = x_{j'}$. (The apostrophe simply indicates the column index of the second observation. For example, it is not required that $j' \neq j$). Now combine all states of X^{*2} for which the first observation has the greater X-value and denote this by $X_1 > X_2$. Using analogous procedures define the states $X_1 = X_2$ and $X_1 < X_2$. Then the relative order on the variable X within each observation pair can be described by the trichotomous variable $\{(X_1 > X_2), (X_1 = X_2), (X_1 < X_2)\}$ which we define as the *condensed ordinal form of* X^{*2}. Similarly, the condensed ordinal form of $Y \times Y = Y^{*2}$ is the variable $\{Y_1 > Y_2), (Y_1 = Y_2), (Y_1 < Y_2)\}$. Then the proposition for the cross-classification of Y and X that "Y tends to increase with X" can be operationalized as a prediction logic statement for observation pairs in the 3×3 cross-classification of Y^{*2} with X^{*2}, where both variables are in condensed ordinal form: for example,

$$X_1 \{\gtreqless\} X_2 \rightsquigarrow Y_1 \{\gtreqless\} Y_2.$$

This technique based on paired comparisons not only permits operational statements of such ordinal predictions as "Y tends to increase with X," but it also will be used later in this paper to provide common interpretation for various measures of ordinal association, thus permitting a unification of that literature.

Finally, it is useful to note here that the logic as defined above can be used to state *multivariate* propositions in logically equivalent *bivariate* form. In linear models for quantitative data, an algebraic combination of the independent variables is used to predict the dependent variable: for example, $y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 w + \beta_2 x$. Once the values of the parameters β_1 and β_2 are specified, then this proposition may be expressed in equivalent bivariate form as $y = \beta_0 + v$, where v is the value of the composite variable V defined by the linear combination, $\beta_1 w + \beta_2 x$. Analogously, if the variables are qualitative, then logical (rather than algebraic) combinations of the independent or dependent variables can be used to transform multivariate prediction logic propositions into equivalent bivariate form. For example, a multivariate prediction logic proposition that predicts Y from W and X may be transformed into a logically equivalent proposition that uses the composite variable V to predict Y, where $V = W \times X$ is the set of all paired combinations of W states and X states, $\{(w_k, x_j)\}$. This is illustrated by the Riker and Zavoina prediction quoted earlier for Table 5: in applying learning theory, they combine information about voting and winning into a composite independent variable.

The bivariate prediction logic defined in this section has a simple structure. Despite this, theories stated in the logic need not be simplistic. First of all, even if attention is restricted to pure strategy predictions with unweighted errors, there are 2^{RC} logically distinct prediction logic propositions that can be defined for the domain of an $R \times C$ cross-classification. This large variety not only includes propositions that predict just one event of the dependent variable for each independent variable event, analogous to the point predictions of regression models for quantitative variables. It also includes propositions predicting more than one dependent variable event for some values of the independent variable. This latter type of proposition is common, for example, in game-theoretic predictions of political behavior, as illustrated by the earlier discussion of Sawyer and MacRae's analysis of campaign strategy. We also have indicated how analysis based on prediction logic can be extended to permit differentially weighted errors, mixed prediction strategies, and alternative prediction domains such as the ordinal forms of $Y^{*2} \times X^{*2}$. It thus seems clear that prediction logic, while certainly not all-inclusive, nonetheless has a wide variety of scientific applications.

Measuring Bivariate Prediction Success

This section presents a measure of the prediction success of any bivariate prediction logic proposition when the cross-classification contains the entire population or, if the population is infinite, a sufficiently large sample that sampling considerations may be ignored. A later section considers statistical inference from samples. After discussing the most important of the design criteria underlying the bivariate measure, we present the measure and discuss its properties.

Design Criteria. Omitting the tautological proposition that identifies no error event, the method we seek for an $R \times C$ table should yield an easily interpreted, distinct measure for each of the $2^{RC}-1$ logically distinct propositions stated in the logic using pure prediction strategies and unweighted errors and for each of the infinitely many propositions that can be stated with differential weighting of error events or mixed prediction strategies.

In developing bivariate methods, we further require that the model should provide an identical measure for all logically equivalent propositions,[19] and should consider the scope and precision of the proposition under investigation as well as its prediction accuracy.

Previously established measures of bivariate association for qualitative variables do not satisfy these criteria, since each of these measures yields but one value for a given $R \times C$ distribution, at least once it is specified which of the two variables is being predicted. We show later that many of these measures can be interpreted as special cases of our model when it is used to focus on just one of the many prediction logic propositions.

Unlike traditional measures of association, Goodman's methods for analyzing contingency tables for quasi-independence and various multiplicative interactions among the cell frequencies[20] can be adjusted to assess different aspects of a bivariate relation. These methods provide no help, however, in solving the problem addressed in this paper. We have identified fundamental defects in recent attempts by Kang[21] and by Goodman and Kruskal[22] to use these methods, demonstrating that these techniques are inappropriate for the empirical evaluation of prediction logic propositions.[23]

Other approaches to contingency table analysis evaluate the extent to which observed cell frequencies conform to a theory that predicts the *probability* of the various events. Goodness-of-fit tests, maximum likelihood techniques, and various regression-type models[24] seek to evaluate the extent to which observed proportions are consistent with the proportions predicted by a model that, usually, is selected *ex post facto*. Rather than measuring, *ex post*, goodness-of-fit to aggregate proportions or developing a parsimonious way for describing the pattern of cell proportions observed in a contingency table, we seek methods for evaluating a proposition's success in predicting each observation's location on the dependent variable given its description on the independent variable.

Fortunately, a viable strategy for attacking this problem is provided by the general model for defining a proportionate-reduction-in-error (PRE) measure, as explicated by Costner.[25] We next extend this model to develop a distinct PRE measure for each distinct prediction logic proposition relating two qualitative variables, whether the proposition to be evaluated is selected *a priori* or *ex post*.

The Bivariate Measure, ∇_{φ}. The success of a proposition is to be evaluated in a population for which P_{ij} denotes the unconditional probability of the event (y_i, x_j), and $P_{i.}$ and $P_{.j}$, respectively, are the unconditional ("marginal") probabilities of the events y_i and x_j. Note that

$$\sum_{i,j} P_{ij} = \sum_{i} P_{i.} = \sum_{j} P_{.j} = 1$$

To satisfy Costner's criteria for a PRE measure, we must:

(1) Specify decision rules for predicting each observation's location on the dependent variable under two information conditions. In the first condition, *case-K*, each observation's location on the independent variable is *k*nown. In the second condition, *case-U*, it is *u*nknown.
(2) Define prediction error.
(3) Define the measure as

$$1 - \frac{\text{expected prediction error under } \textit{case-K}}{\text{expected prediction error under } \textit{case-U}}$$

---

[19] By this criterion, the measure will be identical for logically equivalent propositions, whether X is used to predict Y, or Y is used to predict X. However, for some research applications it may be useful to treat the variables asymmetrically in accordance with their roles as predictor and predicted. Methods for this are discussed in Hildebrand, Laing, and Rosenthal, *Prediction Analysis of Cross Classifications*, section 4.3.

[20] See, for example, Leo A. Goodman, "The Analysis of Cross-Classified Data; Independence, Quasi-Independence, and Interactions in Contingency Tables With or Without Missing Entries," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 63 (December, 1968), 1091–1131, and Leo A. Goodman, "How to Ransack Social Mobility Tables and Other Kinds of Cross-Classification Tables," *American Journal of Sociology*, 75 (July 1969), 1–40.

[21] Tai S. Kang, "Linking Form of a Hypothesis to Type of Statistics: an Application of Goodman's Z," *American Sociological Review*, 37 (July 1972), 357–365.

[22] Leo A. Goodman and William H. Kruskal, "Empirical Evaluation of Formal Theory," *Journal of Mathematical Sociology*, 3 (January 1974), 187–196.

[23] See David K. Hildebrand, James D. Laing, and Howard Rosenthal, "Prediction Logic and Quasi-Independence in Empirical Evaluation of Formal Theory," and Laing and Rosenthal, "Linking Form of Hypothesis to Type of Statistic: Comment," *American Sociological Review*, 39 (April 1974), 277–280.

[24] For discussions of these three respective techniques, see for example, Paul G. Hoel, Sidney C. Port, and Charles J. Stone, *Introduction to Statistical Theory* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1971), sections 3.5 and 3.4, and Henri Theil, "On the Estimation of Relationships Involving Qualitative Variables," *American Journal of Sociology*, 76 (July 1970), 103–154.

[25] Herbert L. Costner, "Criteria for Measures of Association," *American Sociological Review*, 30 (June, 1965), 341–353.

Assume that the proposition under investigation represents a pure prediction strategy identifying unweighted error events. (The argument extends naturally to allow for differentially weighted errors and mixed prediction strategies.) Defining prediction error as required by the second criterion, we say that a prediction error occurs if and only if an observation's location on the dependent variable does not belong to the predicted set.

The *case-K* rule simply is to apply the proposition $\mathcal{P}$ given the state of the independent variable. The decision rule, "predict $\mathcal{S}(x_j)$," is therefore applied to those observations having $X=x_j$. The conditional probability of a prediction error, given $X=x_j$, is

$$\sum_i \omega_{ij} P_{y_i|x_j} = \sum_i \omega_{ij}[P_{ij}/P_{.j}]$$

Then, summing across the independent variable states, the total prediction error rate under *case-K* equals

$$\sum_j P_{.j} \sum_i \omega_{ij}[P_{ij}/P_{.j}] = \sum_{i,j} \omega_{ij} P_{ij}$$

Under the *case-U* information condition, predictions must be made for each observation in ignorance of its actual location on the independent variable, x_j. Beyond this, Costner does not specify what information may be used. In developing PRE interpretations of various measures, Costner has used decision rules under *case-U* that require *no* information about the distribution on the dependent variable be used in making predictions under the *case-K* and *case-U* information conditions. (Of course, information about the Y probabilities must be used to measure error. The measurement of error is necessarily *ex post*. We only require that Y information not be used in making predictions.) Since information about the distribution on the dependent variable is not to be used in making predictions, we propose that the *case-K* predictions be simulated under *case-U* without information as to an individual observation's X-state.

In our model, under *case-U* the decision maker knows only the proposition $\mathcal{P}$ and the unconditional probabilities of the *independent* variable, $\{P_{.j}\}$. Selecting each observation at random, he predicts with probability $P_{.j}$ that its Y-state lies in the subset of Y-states, $\mathcal{S}(x_j)$. Since observations are drawn randomly, this prediction rule commits prediction error with the unconditional probability

$$\sum_i \omega_{ij} P_{i.}$$

Summing across states of the independent variable, the total expected error rate in applying the proposition $\mathcal{P}$ under *case-U* is

$$\sum_j P_{.j} \sum_i \omega_{ij} P_{i.} = \sum_{i,j} \omega_{ij} P_{i.} P_{.j}$$

Using these error rates, define the PRE measure: Thus, $\nabla_{\mathcal{P}}$ measures the PRE achieved by the prediction logic proposition $\mathcal{P}$ in predicting Y when the investigator uses that proposition knowing each observation's location on the independent variable with certainty rather than knowing only the unconditional probabilities of the various independent variable states.

$$\nabla_{\mathcal{P}} = 1 - \frac{\sum_{i,j} \omega_{ij} P_{ij}}{\sum_{i,j} \omega_{ij} P_{i.} P_{.j}} = 1 - \frac{\text{expected error for } \mathcal{P} \text{ in predicting } Y, \text{ given } X}{\text{expected error for } \mathcal{P} \text{ in predicting } Y, \text{ given random } X} \tag{1}$$

knowledge of the unconditional probabilities of the *dependent* variable "values:" e.g., for R^2, predict the mean value of Y, and for Goodman and Kruskal's λ_b, predict the modal Y class. While this approach is appropriate for measures based on prediction rules derived, *ex post facto*, from inspection of the distribution actually observed in the data, such procedures are inappropriate for evaluating propositions given *a priori*. A prediction rule that can only be applied once the observed distribution on the dependent variable is given is irrevocably *ex post*. If this information were used in defining a prediction rule for *case-U*, the effects of losing information about each observation's actual X-state would be confounded with those resulting from adding probabilistic knowledge of its Y-state.

Since our primary purpose is to develop methods for evaluating propositions specified *a priori*, we amplify Costner's PRE model by requiring that

Differential weighting of error events does not change the argument. Error rates are simply replaced with weighted error rates. Since the measure equals one minus a ratio of weighted errors, the value of $\nabla_{\mathcal{P}}$ is not changed if all error weights are multiplied by any non-zero constant.

We stipulate that a prediction logic proposition is *admissible* for a population if and only if it identifies at least one error event (y_i, x_j) for which neither marginal is zero (i.e., $P_{i.}>0$ *and* $P_{.j}>0$). This ensures that the denominator of expression (1) is nonzero, hence the $\nabla_{\mathcal{P}}$ measure is defined mathematically for every admissible proposition. Predictions based on inadmissible propositions are

autologies for the population, hence there is no error to be reduced. (Analogously R^2 is undefined if the dependent variable has zero variance).

In general, if $\mathscr{P}$ is an admissible proposition, then $-\infty < \nabla_{\mathscr{P}} \leq 1$. If $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ is positive, then it measures the PRE afforded by the proposition in the population. On the other hand, it is quite possible that a proposition selected *a priori* can do worse than the benchmark ("null") prediction under *case-U*. If so, then $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}} < 0$, and the measure's absolute value in this case represents the proportionate increase (negative reduction) in prediction error. Note that if the two variables are statistically independent, then $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}} = 0$. The converse does *not* hold: $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}} = 0$ does *not* imply statistical independence in the entire table *nor* does it imply that $P_{ij} = P_{i.}P_{.j}$ in every error cell. Rather, $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ is zero if and only if the *total* probability observed in the set of error cells as a whole equals the *total* probability in the set of error events under statistical independence.

As demonstrated above, $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ is readily interpreted as the PRE achieved by a specific prediction logic proposition. The general model defined by expression (1) yields a distinct measure for each logically distinct pure strategy prediction with associated error weights, $\{\omega_{ij}\}$. Moreover, it is easy to show that $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ is identical for all logically equivalent propositions. Thus, $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ is an easily interpreted measure that is custom-designed to the particular prediction logic proposition under investigation. We next extend the measure to evaluate propositions that make probabilistic predictions.

$\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ with Actuarial Propositions. "Actuarial" propositions are an important type of mixed strategy proposition. An actuarial proposition $\mathscr{A}$ states that, if $X = x_j$, then $Y = y_i$ with conditional probability q_{ij}, where

$$\sum_i q_{ij} = 1$$

for each $j = 1, C$. The PRE model may be used to evaluate the success of $\mathscr{A}$ applied as a mixed strategy prediction. Under *case-K*, given an observation that is known to have $X = x_j$, then, with conditional probability q_{ij}, select the prediction $Y = y_i$. Under *case-U*, given each randomly drawn observation, first, with probability $P_{.j}$, choose the conditional probability distribution $\mathbf{q}_{.j} = (q_{1j}, q_{2j}, \cdots q_{Rj})$. Then, given this choice, select with probability q_{ij} the prediction that $Y = y_i$. An observation is an error if it does not have the predicted Y-state. Then the PRE measure for the actuarial proposition $\mathscr{A}$ is

$$\nabla_{\mathscr{A}} = 1 - \frac{\sum_{i,j}(1 - q_{ij})P_{ij}}{\sum_{i,j}(1 - q_{ij})P_{i.}P_{.j}} = 1 - \frac{\text{expected errors for } \mathscr{A} \text{ in predicting } Y, \text{ given } X}{\text{expected errors for } \mathscr{A} \text{ in predicting } Y, \text{ given random } X} \qquad (2)$$

Note that the expected error rates under the two information conditions are identical whether we use the actuarial proposition, $\mathscr{A}$, or instead use a pure strategy prediction $\mathscr{P}$ with error weights $\{\omega_{ij} = (1 - q_{ij})\}$; hence $\mathscr{P}$ is the certainty equivalent of $\mathscr{A}$: $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}} = \nabla_{\mathscr{A}}$.

An Operationalization of Prediction Scope and Precision. Undoubtedly the most direct index of a prediction's empirical success is its *case-K* error rate, since that measures the prediction's *accuracy*. It is implicitly assumed in the PRE model, however, that the prediction's accuracy should also be evaluated within a relative framework. Prediction accuracy may have been purchased at the price of prediction *scope* and *precision*. Nearly tautological predictions are seldom wrong.

Consider, first, the prediction's effective scope. Suppose, for example, that a proposition predicts the entire set of Y-states for all but one X-state, say x_1, and predicts a proper (and nonempty) subset of Y-states when $X = x_1$. Suppose, further, that $X = x_1$ for only .001 of the population. Then, given the limited scope of the prediction, the *maximum case-K* error rate possible in that population is .001. Clearly, this very low error rate should not be taken to indicate that the prediction is "successful." Rather, it indicates that the prediction is "nearly tautological."

We operationally define the scope of a proposition $\mathscr{P}$ to be the proportion of the population for which $\mathscr{P}$ makes nontautological predictions. Recall that a prediction logic proposition $\mathscr{P}$ can be expressed in terms of its component propositions $\mathscr{P}_{.j}$ which indicate the prediction when $X = x_j$. Each component proposition contributes to the effective scope of $\mathscr{P}$ only if $\mathscr{P}_{.j}$ identifies at least one error event. Then, by definition,

$$\text{scope of } \mathscr{P}_{.j} = \begin{cases} 0 \text{ if } \mathscr{E}(x_j) = \emptyset \\ P_{.j} \text{ otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Then the overall scope of the proposition $\mathscr{P}$ can be computed by adding together the scope contributions of its component predictions.

By this meaure, both the Sawyer-MacRae and the game-theoretic propositions for Table 8 have maximum scope: 1.0. Despite being equal in scope, these two propositions differ with respect to the *precision* of their prediction. The first proposition predicts just one Y-state, while the second predicts two or more states of the dependent variable. One approach to measuring precision would be to count the number of dependent variable states

that are error events for the proposition. This approach is unsatisfactory, since it is sensitive to arbitrary variable transformations that have no predictive significance for the proposition under investigation. As an alternative operational measure of the *precision* of the component proposition $\mathscr{P}_{.j}$, we use the (unconditional) probability of the set of dependent variable categories that $\mathscr{P}_{.j}$ identifies as errors:

$$\text{precision of } \mathscr{P}_{.j} = \sum_i \omega_{ij} P_{i.}$$

Finally, we measure the overall *precision*, U, of the proposition $\mathscr{P}$ in the population as the sum of the precisions of its component predictions, weighted by their contributions to the proposition's effective scope:

$$\begin{aligned} U &= \text{precision of } \mathscr{P} \\ &= \sum_j (\text{scope of } \mathscr{P}_{.j}) \\ &\quad \cdot (\text{precision of } \mathscr{P}_{.j}) \\ &= \sum_{i,j} \omega_{ij} P_{i.} P_{.j} \end{aligned}$$

Thus, the precision of the proposition $\mathscr{P}$ equals its error rate when it is applied, under *case-U*, to randomly selected observations. Then, by this operationalization, the bivariate measure may be interpreted as evaluating the observed error rate in relation to the prediction's precision.

More than one criterion should be used to evaluate a prediction's "success." Useful information is provided not only by $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$, but also by its components: *case-K* error ("inaccuracy") and *case-U* error ("precision"). Note further that the range of possible values for $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ varies with the extent to which the proposition *is differentiated*, that is, the extent to which it makes different predictions for different states of the independent variable. For example, $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ must be zero if the proposition makes the same nontautological predictions for all states of the independent variable. (Analogously, if a regression model with zero slope fits the data, then the model is totally undifferentiated, and $R^2 = 0$.)

Moreover, a thorough analysis of a prediction's success also should consider the performance of each component prediction, and the success in predicting each state of the dependent variable. We next consider methods for such microanalysis of prediction success.

Decomposition of Prediction Success. The most elementary prediction logic proposition identifies just one cell, say (y_i, x_j), as an error event. The $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ measure for this elementary proposition equals a frequently appearing measure that Quetelet proposed around 1850:[26]

$$\nabla_{ij} = 1 - \frac{\omega_{ij} P_{ij}}{\omega_{ij} P_{i.} P_{.j}} = 1 - \frac{P_{ij}}{P_{i.} P_{.j}}$$

It is easy to show with simple algebra that $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ may be expressed as a weighted average of Quetelet measures for the error cells identified by the proposition $\mathscr{P}$:

$$\nabla_{\mathscr{P}} = \sum_{i,j} \left[\frac{\omega_{ij} P_{i.} P_{.j}}{\sum_{i,j} \omega_{ij} P_{i.} P_{.j}} \right] \nabla_{ij} \qquad (3)$$

This expression may be used to measure the contribution of various theoretical components to the overall success of the prediction. For example, the success of the proposition $\mathscr{P}$ when $X = x_j$ is

$$\nabla_{\mathscr{P}.j} = 1 - \frac{\sum_i \omega_{ij} P_{ij}}{P_{.j} \sum_i \omega_{ij} P_{i.}} = \sum_i \left[\frac{\omega_{ij} P_{i.}}{\sum_i \omega_{ij} P_{i.}} \right] \nabla_{ij}$$

The overall prediction success is a weighted average of the success achieved in the population by the component predictions,

$$\nabla_{\mathscr{P}} = \sum_j \left[\frac{P_{.j} \sum_i \omega_{ij} P_{i.}}{\sum_j P_{.j} \sum_i \omega_{ij} P_{i.}} \right] \nabla_{\mathscr{P}.j} \qquad (4)$$

where the weight of each component prediction is the proportion of overall *case-U* error ("precision") for which it is responsible.

In addition, these decomposition procedures can be useful in comparing two propositions. For example, consider two prediction logic propositions, $\mathscr{P}$ and $\mathscr{P}'$, that identify unweighted error structures, $\{\omega_{ij}\}$ and $\{\omega'_{ij}\}$, for the same table. Let $\mathscr{E}^+$ denote the set of events identified as prediction errors by $\mathscr{P}'$ but not by $\mathscr{P}$. That is, $\mathscr{E}^+$ is the set of additional error events identified by $\mathscr{P}'$. Similarly, let $\mathscr{E}^-$ denote the set of events that are errors for $\mathscr{P}$ but not $\mathscr{P}'$. Then the overall prediction success of the alternative proposition $\mathscr{P}'$ may be expressed as a weighted combination of the PRE achieved in the sets of error cells $\mathscr{E}_{\mathscr{P}}$, $\mathscr{E}^+$ and $\mathscr{E}^-$:

$$\nabla_{\mathscr{P}'} = \frac{1}{U'} [U \nabla_{\mathscr{P}} + U^+ \nabla_{\mathscr{E}^+} - U^- \nabla_{\mathscr{E}^-}] \qquad (5)$$

[26] Leo A. Goodman and William H. Kruskal, "Measures of Association for Cross-Classifications II: Further Discussion and References," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 54 (March 1959), 123–163, at 133.

where

$$U' = \sum_{\mathcal{E}'} P_{i.}P_{.j}$$

$$U^{+} = \sum_{\mathcal{E}^{+}} P_{i.}P_{.j}$$

$$U^{-} = \sum_{\mathcal{E}^{-}} P_{i.}P_{.j}$$

Interpreting Measures of Association as Special Cases of $\nabla_{\mathcal{P}}$. Table 9 identifies the prediction domain, proposition, and error weights for which $\nabla_{\mathcal{P}}$ equals each of various measures of bivariate association for qualitative variables. Given this formal equivalence, the prediction logic and $\nabla_{\mathcal{P}}$ measure provide a unifying perspective that interprets each measure of association shown as being based on a specific prediction logic proposition.

All the measures belonging to the first row of Table 9(A) are based on a proposition that identifies only one error cell in a 2×2 table. Similarly, Yule's Q is limited to relative comparisons of observation pairs on two dichotomous variables, once the investigator eliminates all observation pairs that are tied on either dichotomy. Goodman and Kruskal's τ_b (and τ_a) is defined for the general $R \times C$ table of two nominal variables, and is based on the *ex post facto* actuarial proposition which, given each observation's state on the independent variable, predicts each of the dependent variable states with that state's conditional probability as observed in the data.

Of the measures for ordinal variables given in Table 9(B), all but the quadrant measure are based on predictions about relative comparisons. Unlike Goodman and Kruskal's or Costner's interpretations of gamma, our interpretations are based on *a priori* rather than *ex post* predictions.[27] Since, under any of these interpretations, gamma ignores observation pairs that are tied on at least one variable, it tends to exaggerate the degree of monotonicity in the original $Y \times X$ cross classification. Somer's d_{xy} (and d_{yx}) and Kim's d avoid this problem by focusing on predictions whose domain includes all observation pairs, whether or not they are tied on either variable. Finally, if no observation is tied with another on either variable, then Spearman's rho may be interpreted as a $\nabla_{\mathcal{P}}$ measure defined for a 6×6 table that cross-classifies all ways in which *three* observations can be strongly ordered on Y and X.

Thus interpreted, each of the measures of association given in Table 9 is appropriate in a particular scientific context only if the prediction domain, prediction, and error weights underlying the

[27] In effect, Goodman and Kruskal, and Costner, "Criteria for Measures of Association," look at the sign of γ before choosing a prediction rule. (See Leo A. Goodman and William H. Kruskal, "Measures of Association for Cross Classifications," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 49 [December 1954], 732–764.) If $\gamma > 0$, then they use the prediction given in Table 9. On the other hand, if $\gamma < 0$, they use the prediction rule $X_1 > X_2 \longleftrightsquigarrow Y_1 < Y_2$, interpreting the absolute value of gamma as the PRE afforded by this *ex post* prediction. If, in contrast, one specifies one of the *a priori* predictions in the table, $\gamma < 0$ simply indicates a proportionate *increase* in error resulting from an unsuccessful prediction.

Table 9. Prediction Logic Propositions for which $\nabla_{\mathcal{P}}$ Equals Various Measures of Bivariate Association[a]

Units of Analysis	Measure of Bivariate Association	Prediction Domain	Prediction	Error Events	Error Weights
(A) *NOMINAL VARIABLES:*					
Single Observations	Quetelet's measure and equivalents	$Y \times X$, Y and X dichotomous	$x \rightsquigarrow y$	$(\bar{y}, x)$	1
	Goodman and Kruskal's τ_b	$Y \times X$	Ex post actuarial proposition: If x_j, then predict y_i with probability $q_{ij} = P_{ij}/P_{.j}$ for $i = 1, R$, $j = 1, C$.	$\{(y_i, x_j)\}$, for which $q_{ij} \neq 1$, $i = 1, R$, and $j = 1, C$.	$\{(1 - q_{ij})\} = \{1 - (P_{ij}/P_{.j})\}$
Observation Pairs	Yule's Q	Extensive form of $Y^{*2} \times X^{*2}$, given $X_1 \neq X_2 \,\&\, Y_1 \neq Y_2$ (i.e., omitting ties), where Y and X are dichotomies	$(x, \bar{x}) \longleftrightsquigarrow (y, \bar{y})$	$(\bar{y}, y) \,\&\, (x, \bar{x})$ $(y, \bar{y}) \,\&\, (\bar{x}, x)$	1 1

(B) *ORDINAL VARIABLES:*

Single Observations	Quadrant measure	$Y \times X$, whese there exist median values y^0 and x^0 such that $\Pr(Y > y^0) = \Pr(Y \leq y^0) = \Pr(X > x^0) = \Pr(X \leq x^0) = \frac{1}{2}$	$X > x^0 \longleftrightsquigarrow Y > y^0$	$(Y \leq y^0 \,\&\, X > x^0)$ $(Y > y^0 \,\&\, X \leq x^0)$	1 1
Observation Pairs	Goodman and Kruskal's γ	Condensed ordinal form of $Y^{*2} \times X^{*2}$, given either (a) $X_1 \neq X_2 \,\&\, Y_1 \neq Y_2$ (b) $Y_1 \neq Y_2$ (c) $X_1 \neq X_2$	(a) or (b): $X_1\{\lesseqgtr\}X_2 \rightsquigarrow Y_1\{\lesseqgtr\}Y_2$ (c): $X_1\{\lesseqgtr\}X_2 \rightsquigarrow Y_1\{\overset{<}{\geq}\}Y_2$	$(Y_1 < Y_2 \,\&\, X_1 > X_2)$ $(Y_1 > Y_2 \,\&\, X_1 < X_2)$	1 1
	Somer's d_{xy}	Condensed ordinal form of $Y^{*2} \times X^{*2}$	$X_1 > X_2 \rightsquigarrow Y_1 \geq Y_2$, $X_1 = X_2 \rightsquigarrow Y_1 = Y_2$, $\& X_1 < X_2 \rightsquigarrow Y_1 \leq Y_2$	$(Y_1 < Y_2 \,\&\, X_1 > X_2)$ $(Y_1 \neq Y_2 \,\&\, X_1 = X_2)$ $(Y_1 > Y_2 \,\&\, X_1 < X_2)$	1 $\frac{1}{2}$ 1
	Kim's d	Condensed ordinal form of $Y^{*2} \times X^{*2}$	$X_1 > X_2 \rightsquigarrow Y_1 > Y_2$ $X_1 = X_2 \rightsquigarrow Y_1 = Y_2$ & $X_1 < X_2 \rightsquigarrow Y_1 < Y_2$	$(Y_1 < Y_2 \,\&\, X_1 > X_2)$ $(Y_1 = Y_2 \,\&\, X_1 > X_2)$ $(Y_1 \neq Y_2 \,\&\, X_1 = X_2)$ $(Y_1 = Y_2 \,\&\, X_1 < X_2)$ $(Y_1 > Y_2 \,\&\, X_1 < X_2)$	1 $\frac{1}{4}$ $\frac{1}{4}$ $\frac{1}{4}$ 1
	Kendall's τ_b^2	Condensed ordinal form of $Y^{*2} \times X^{*2}$	Ex post actuarial proposition: given state of X^{*2} predict each state of Y^{*2} with its conditional probability in $Y^{*2} \times X^{*2}$	$Y_1 > Y_2$ $Y_1 = Y_2$ $Y_1 < Y_2$	If prediction is $Y_1\{\lesseqgtr\}Y_2$, then use (>) (=) (<) 0 $\frac{1}{2}$ 1 $\frac{1}{4}$ 0 $\frac{1}{4}$ 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ 0
Observation Triples	Spearman's ρ_s	Condensed ordinal form of $Y^{*3} \times X^{*3}$, given observations are strongly ordered on each variable (no ties)	$X_i > X_j > X_k \rightsquigarrow$ $[(Y_i > Y_j \,\&\, Y_j > Y_k)$ or $(Y_j > Y_i > Y_k)]$, where i, j, k index distinct observations in the triple	$(Y_i < Y_j \,\&\, Y_j)\,\&$ $(X_i > X_j > X_k)$ $(Y_k > Y_i > Y_j)\,\&$ $(X_i > X_j > X_k)$	1 1

* Measure to which reference applies is indicated in brackets.

[Quetelet's measure] Leo A. Goodman and William S. Kruskal, "Measures of Association for Cross-Classification," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 49 (Dec. 1954), 732–764.

Equivalents to Quetelet's measure:

[I] J. Durbin, "Appendix Note on a Statistical Question Raised in the Preceding Paper," *Population Studies*, 9 (July 1955), 101.

[Glass-Rogoff-Carlsson social mobility index] David V. Glass, *Social Mobility in Britain* (London: Routledge and Paul, 1954); Natalie Rogoff, *Recent Trends in Occupational Mobility* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1953); Gosta Carlsson, *Social Mobility and Class Structure* (Lund: C. W. K. Gleerup, 1958).

[Köppen's measure] Wladimir Köppen, "Die Aufeinanderfolge der unperiodischen Witterungserscheinunge nach den Grandasatzen der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung," *Repertorium fur Meterologie* (Petrograd: Akademiia Nauk, 2 (1870–1), 189–238. Cited in Goodman, Leo A. and William H. Kruskal, "Measures of Association for Cross-Classifications, II: Further Discussions and References," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 54 (March, 1959), 123–163.

[Loevinger's coefficient of homogeneity applied to a two-item scale] Jane Loevinger, "A Systematic Approach to the Construction and Evaluation of Tests of Ability," *Psychological Monographs*, 61 (1947), No. 4.

[measure of causal strength—normalized] F. T. Schreier, *Human Motivation: Probability and Meaning* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957), pp. 124f.

[y_{iii}] Saburo Yasuda, "A Methodological Inquiry into Social Mobility," *American Sociological Review*, 29 (Feb., 1964), 16–23.

measure satisfy the theoretical specifications or descriptive objectives of the investigator. The prediction logic and $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ measure not only provide a prediction framework within which these measures of bivariate association may be interpreted, but also apply to other predictions for which the standard measures are inappropriate.

To this point, we have assumed that the cell and marginal probabilities for the entire population were known. We next consider statistical inferences from samples.

Bivariate Statistical Inference

In applying the prediction logic to research using a random sample of a population, the investigator might specify a single proposition *a priori*, or, on the other hand, select the proposition *ex post*, after analyzing the data. Between these extremes, the investigator might have selected a small number of propositions *a priori*, choosing among them *ex post*. In this section, we dichotomize the range of inference problems into two classes: (a) a single, prespecified proposition; (b) *ex post* selection.[28]

Inference for a Single, *A Priori*, Proposition. For propositions stated for $Y \times X$ before the data are analyzed, we investigate here what is probably the usual sampling situation: simple random sampling, with population marginals unknown. Elsewhere we give results for two other sampling situations.[29] Application of the "delta"[30] method to a "natural" estimator of $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ allows us to show that its distribution is asymptotically normal and to calculate the asymptotic variance.

Let f_{ij} denote the observed fraction of the entire sample in cell (y_i, x_j), and denote the respective marginal fractions by $f_{i.}$ and $f_{.j}$. Then the estimator of $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ is

$$\hat{\nabla}_{\mathscr{P}} = 1 - \frac{\sum_{i,j} \omega_{ij} f_{ij}}{\sum_{i,j} \omega_{ij} f_{i.} f_{.j}} \tag{6}$$

The asymptotic variance is

$$\operatorname{Var} \hat{\nabla}_{\mathscr{P}} = \frac{\sum_{i,j} \omega_{ij}^2 P_{ij} - \left[\sum_{i,j} \omega_{ij} P_{ij}\right]^2 + \beta\left[\beta \sum_{i,j} (\pi_{i.} + \pi_{.j})^2 P_{ij} - 2 \sum_{i,j} \omega_{ij} (\pi_{i.} + \pi_{.j}) P_{ij}\right]}{(n-1)U^2} \tag{7}$$

In the variance expression, n denotes the total number of observations in the sample,

$$\beta = 1 - \nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$$

$$\pi_{i.} = \sum_j \omega_{ij} P_{.j}$$

$$\pi_{.j} = \sum_i \omega_{ij} P_{i.}$$

In estimating the variance the unknown true probabilities P_{ij}, $P_{i.}$ and $P_{.j}$ should be replaced by the respective estimates, f_{ij}, $f_{i.}$ and $f_{.j}$.

[28] For further development and technical details of the statistical methods for evaluating *a priori* and *ex post* prediction logic propositions, see Hildebrand, Laing and Rosenthal, *Prediction Analysis of Cross Classifications*, chapter 6 and Stanley Wasserman, "An *Ex Post* Significance Test for a Pattern of Association Based on Prediction Logic" (M.S. thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 1973).

[29] Hildebrand, Laing and Rosenthal, "Prediction Logic: A Method for Empirical Evaluation of Formal Theory," and "Errata," *Journal of Mathematical Sociology* (in press).

[30] Harold Cramér, *Mathematical Methods of Statistics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1946), and S. S. Wilks, *Mathematical Statistics* (New York: Wiley, 1962), p. 260.

[τ_b] Goodman and Kruskal, "Measures of Association for Cross-Classifications," pp. 759f. Interchanging the roles of X and Y in these conditions, τ_a also can be shown to be a $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ measure.

[Q] G. Udny Yule, "On the Methods of Measuring Association Between Two Attributes," *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, 75 (1912), 579–642.

[Quadrant measure] William H. Kruskal, "Ordinal Measures of Association," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 53 (Dec., 1958), 814–861: pp. 818–822.

[γ] Goodman and Kruskal "Measures of Association," p. 749.

[d_{xy}] Robert H. Somers, "A New Asymmetric Measure of Association for Ordinal Variables," *American Sociological Review*, 27 (December 1962), 799–811. Equivalently, by interchanging the roles of X and Y these conditions, d_{xy} also can be interpreted as $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ measure.

[d] Jae-On Kim, "Predictive Measures of Ordinal Association," *American Journal of Sociology*, 76 (January 1971), 891–907.

[τ_b^2] Thomas P. Wilson, "A Proportional-Reduction-in-Error Interpretation for Kendall's *Tau-b*," *Social Forces*, 47 (March 1969), 340–342.

[ρ_s] Kruskal, "Ordinal Measures of Association," pp. 823–827.

Fisher's exact test and extensive Monte Carlo studies indicate that these approximations are excellent when $n=100$ and are generally quite acceptable for small samples ($n=25$). As general rules-of-thumb, the normal approximation is adequate for testing purposes if $nU \geq 5$ and the marginals are not extremely skewed. Note that the criterion $nU \geq 5$ refers to the overall expected error rate in the set of all error cells as a whole; this criterion need *not* be satisfied in each error cell. An important implication of this criterion is that the investigator who has an *a priori* theory involving variables with large numbers of categories gains no statistical premium from collapsing categories.

In testing hypotheses and establishing confidence intervals, the approximation is improved if the *case-K* error rate is corrected for continuity. If the proposition being investigated is logically equivalent to a proposition that identifies exactly two diagonally opposed error cells in a 2×2 table, then the continuity correction factor is $k=1/n$. Otherwise, $k=1/2n$. This correction is used in defining the terms $\hat{\nabla}^+$ and $\hat{\nabla}^-$: If the *case-K* error rate is the maximum (or minimum) possible, given the sample marginals, then set $\hat{\nabla}^+ = \hat{\nabla}_{\mathscr{P}}$ (or $\hat{\nabla}^- = \hat{\nabla}_{\mathscr{P}}$). Otherwise, $\hat{\nabla}^+(\hat{\nabla}^-)$ is computed by adding (subtracting) the correction factor k to (from) the *case-K* error rate in the appropriate expression for $\hat{\nabla}_{\mathscr{P}}$.

The hypothesis that $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}} > c$, where $0 \leq c < 1$, achieves the α level of significance if $Z > Z_\alpha$, where Z_α is the critical value of the standardized normal deviate (one-tailed), and the test statistic, corrected for continuity is

$$Z = \frac{\hat{\nabla}^+ - c}{(\text{Var}\ \hat{\nabla}_{\mathscr{P}})^{1/2}} \tag{8}$$

The $(1-\alpha)$ confidence interval, corrected for continuity, is

$$\hat{\nabla}^+ - Z_{\alpha/2}(\text{Var}\ \hat{\nabla}_{\mathscr{P}})^{1/2} \leq \nabla_{\mathscr{P}} \leq \hat{\nabla}^- + Z_{\alpha/2}(\text{Var}\ \hat{\nabla}_{\mathscr{P}})^{1/2} \tag{9}$$

No corrections for continuity should be made in calculating Var $\hat{\nabla}_{\mathscr{P}}$ or in computing the point estimate, $\hat{\nabla}_{\mathscr{P}}$.

These results provide the basic methods for making statistical inferences about the success of a single prediction logic proposition that is stated *a priori*. We next discuss statistical methods in selecting a proposition, *ex post facto*, on the basis of the distribution observed in a sample.

***Ex Post* Inference.** The *ex post* methods of prediction analysis rest on the result that the ordinary chi-square statistic, χ^2 (appropriate to the sampling situation described in the preceding section), is a weighted combination of all the estimated ∇_{ij} values for a table. (However, chi-square is not a $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ measure since some of the weights are negative.) Consider all possible weighted combinations of ∇_{ij} values, which includes considering the values of $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ for all possible propositions, $\mathscr{P}$, and sets of error weights, $\mathscr{W} = \{\omega_{ij}\}$. For any weighted combination of ∇_{ij} values, we can calculate the sampling variance and, hence, the standardized value under the assumption of statistical independence. This assumption is equivalent to the assumption that all $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ values are zero. We have proved that the largest possible squared standardized value equals $((n-1)/n)\chi^2$. On the basis of this result it follows that *if χ^2 is not significant, then no $\mathscr{P}$ developed from ransacking the table will be significant.* A conservative procedure for testing some $\mathscr{P}$ selected *ex post* is to compute the standardized value of $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ under the null hypothesis of statistical independence and to test this value against the chi-square distribution with $(R-1)(C-1)$ degrees of freedom. (For the 2×2 table, there is a stronger result: a proposition $\mathscr{P}$ selected *ex post* has a significant $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ value if and only if chi-square is significant.)

Now if the proposition $\mathscr{P}$ is selected *ex post* from a restricted set of propositions specified *a priori*, use the following procedure. Given the marginals, there are only $(R-1)(C-1)$ linearly independent $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ values. For example from the values of the ∇_{ij} for $i<R, j<C$, and given the marginals, we can calculate the $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ value for any $\mathscr{P}$ and $\mathscr{W}$. If the set of propositions specified *a priori* in fact contains $(R-1)(C-1)$ linearly independent propositions, then the previous procedure applies. If the number of independent propositions is, say, $M<(R-1)(C-1)$ then a conservative procedure is to test the squared standardized value assuming statistical independence against a chi-square distribution with M degrees of freedom. The procedure becomes more conservative as M increases.

These results permit some counsels to researchers. Those who have been testing *a priori* theory on the basis of a chi-square test have been too conservative. In a 2×2 table they have been using a two-tail test where a one-tail test is appropriate; in larger tables, they also have paid too heavy a price in the $(R-1)(C-1)$ degrees of freedom used in testing. (This consideration far outweighs the differences in the estimated sampling variances under *a priori* and *ex post* conditions.) On the other hand, those who have interpreted a table *ex post* on the basis of a chi-square test are likely to have been insufficiently conservative. Since a specific squared standardized $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ estimate captures only a part (hopefully a large part) of the deviations from independence assessed by chi-square, in general it will meet a lower significance level than ordinary chi-square. The foregoing comparison of *a priori* and *ex post* testing procedures clearly indicates that substantial gain in statistical power accrues to the

investigator who states predictions *a priori* rather than *ex post facto*. To illustrate this point and other aspects of using the prediction logic, we now return to the examples.

Bivariate Examples

Let us begin by considering the simple example shown earlier in Table 2: Modéré incumbency, the independent variable, is used to predict whether the Gaullists joined an electoral coalition. For comparative purposes, Table 10 lists the estimated and standardized values of V_φ and the 95% confidence intervals for the "necessary," "sufficient," and "necessary and sufficient" hypotheses as if each were given *a priori*. Since we are dealing with a fourfold table, if one of these three V_φ values exceeds zero, all do. If the "necessary" interpretation (or one of the other two) is assigned *ex post*, the chi-square statistic gives the appropriate significance level. Use of the "necessary" description of the table clearly rests on the greater "predictive significance" of that statement vis-à-vis the other two, rather than on "statistical significance."

Slightly different *ex post* procedures must be used with the data in Table 4a, which was used to illustrate the " 'public regarding' syndrome of the city manager cities." The estimated value of V_φ is .44 ($U = .24$). If the hypothesis that the manager form is sufficient for nonpartisan, at-large elections was stated *a priori*, then Table 4a is logically equivalent to Table 4b, and we can proceed as with a 2×2 table. On the other hand, if this hypothesis was formed *ex post* from scanning the larger table, the relevant χ^2 value should be tested against the five degrees of freedom in the *un*collapsed table.

The "necessary," "sufficient," and "necessary and sufficient" statements for the collapsed Table 4b and their logical equivalents in 4a are all assigned the same *ex post* χ^2 value (72.58 for these data). The prediction "managers are necessary and sufficient for at-large, nonpartisan elections" appears to be a better description of the data than the "sufficient" prediction, since the former has greater estimated values for both V_φ and U.

It is important to consider both U and V_φ. In a study of the Maryland Court of Appeals, Sickels attempted to show, through an analysis of which judges wrote certain types of opinions, that consensus failed to exist on the court even though decisions were unanimous.[31] Finding that a pair of possibly maverick judges wrote distinct types of opinion, however, would not indicate that the court is not predominantly consensual. For the data in Table 11 and the proposition, "Hammond sustains the local board and Henderson does not," the value of V_φ is a substantial .71, but U is only .12. Indeed, the data do not enable us to reject the statement that "consensus exists on the court except for Hammond and Henderson." Also, although the *a priori* significance level is $p < 3 \times 10^{-6}$, it seems likely that the hypothesis was developed *ex post*. Moreover, while there are only two degrees of freedom in the table used to report the data, this

Table 11. Judge Writing the Opinion and Decisions to Support Local Zoning Board in Maryland Court of Appeals[a]

Judge Writing Opinion	Decision Sustains Local Board	Decision Overturns Local Board	n
Hammond	9	②	11
Henderson	①	9	10
Other	37	31	68
n	47	42	89

[a] Circled numbers represent prediction errors.

Source: Sickels, "The Illusion of Judicial Consensus . . ."

[31] Robert J. Sickels, "The Illusion of Judicial Consensus: Zoning Decisions in the Maryland Court of Appeals," *The American Political Science Review*, 59 (March 1965), 100–104.

Table 10. Success in Prediction of Gaullist Coalition-Joining (See Table 2)

Modéré incumbency is a ____ condition for Gaullist coalition participation.	Prediction Success, V_φ	Prediction Precision, U	*A priori* Std. Value, Z	*A priori* $p <$	*A priori* 95% Confidence Interval	*Ex post* χ^2 (1 d.f.)	*Ex post* p
necessary	.702	.07	3.31[a]	.0005	$.316 \le V_\varphi \le 1.087$[b]	7.90	$.001 < p < .005$
sufficient	.119	.42	2.31[a]	.0104	$.031 \le V_\varphi \le .201$	7.90	$.001 < p < .005$
necessary & sufficient	.203	.49	2.51[a]	.0060	$.063 \le V_\varphi \le .343$	7.90	$.001 < p < .005$

[a] These different values reflect the variability of the asymptotic approximation when the marginals are skewed.

[b] This number, greater than the maximum possible value of V_φ, results from application of the asymptotic theory to a situation where the total number of expected errors is small (6.71) and the estimated value of V_φ is relatively large.

table apparently was formed by collapsing a data set which described the written opinions of all justices. If so, then the proper *ex post* procedure for J justices requires $J-1$ degrees of freedom. For $J>6$, the *ex post* χ^2 of 10.67 is not significant at the .05 level.

The value of U can also be of interest when one assesses possible tradeoffs between prediction accuracy and prediction precision. The Eulau-Eyestone example provides an illustration. It concerns Table 7's cross-tabulation of the type of development in 1958–61 with that in 1962–65. As we suggested earlier, "progressive" development might be represented by the proposition that the distribution tends to lie in the upper right triangle ($\mathscr{P}^{(1)}$). On the other hand, if the process of development is sufficiently slow and "stages and phases follow one another," one's prediction might be that each city council would either stay in its 1958-61 development type or advance to the next more advanced type ($\mathscr{P}^{(2)}$). In contrast, if no changes took place, all cases would fall on the main diagonal ($\mathscr{P}^{(3)}$). Finally, recognizing that "reversed development is an empirical fact of life," one might predict that the development type of each city council did not tend to change more than to the adjacent type ($\mathscr{P}^{(4)}$). For illustrative purposes, assume that the data in Table 7 represent a random sample from some population. Table 7 shows the "estimated" $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ and U values and *a priori* and *ex post* significance levels for each of these propositions. Apparently $\mathscr{P}^{(1)}$ should be excluded from *ex post* consideration; its values for $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$, U, and χ^2 are all lower than the corresponding values for both $\mathscr{P}^{(2)}$ and $\mathscr{P}^{(4)}$. An *ex post* choice among the other three propositions is more difficult; as we move from $\mathscr{P}^{(3)}$ to $\mathscr{P}^{(2)}$ to $\mathscr{P}^{(4)}$ we gain in prediction accuracy but at the cost of reducing prediction precision.[32] It is interesting (and perhaps not intuitively obvious from inspecting the table) that the most accurate prediction is the one that allows for developmental regress as well as advance.

In contrast to the Eulau-Eyestone example, Muller's data concerning two political violence measures shown earlier in Table 6 are less ambiguous. His *a priori* upper-triangular prediction is strongly supported by the data ($\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}=.835$, $U=.21$, std. value$=22.18$, $p<3\times10^{-7}$). Note that the $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ measure shows far stronger support than does either Somer's symmetric d(.53) or R^2 (.47), the two measures reported by Muller. The discrepancy occurs because neither of these measures is designed to indicate agreement with an upper-triangular pattern. Incidentally, by using R^2, Muller opted for a "squared-distance" measure of error. Suppose we develop a set of error weights that places increasing weight on cells the more they deviate from the predicted relation. By one scheme, the first diagonal band of cells immediately below the main diagonal might be regarded as being one unit of "distance," the second band as two units and so on to the lower left cell (at a "distance" of 5). Then, squaring these quite arbitrary units of "distance" and normalizing so that the greatest error weight equals one, yields a matrix of error weights. For this set of error weights, $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}=.945$, $U=.03$, std. value$=63.58$, $p<3\times10^{-7}$, indicating still stronger support for the hypothesis, although prediction precision is substantially less.

Of course, the assignment of scalar error weights is usually quite arbitrary, at least when the variables are qualitative. The investigator who is unwilling to make the strong assumptions necessary to justify such an assignment of error weights may, nonetheless, be willing to order the seriousness of various error events.

The methods can be used when the error weights are specified only as a complete weak order. Suppose, for example, that we were to specify that all events on or above the main diagonal of Muller's table are prediction successes: i.e., $\omega_{ij}=0$ if $j\geq i$. Further, suppose we identify five diagonal bands of cells, assigning equal weights to all error cells in the same band [$\omega_{ij}=\omega_u$ for all (i, j) below the main diagonal such that $u=i-j$, where $u=1, 5$] and order the bands according to their seriousness of error: $\omega_5\geq\omega_4\geq\omega_3\geq\omega_2\geq\omega_1>0$. Let ∇_u denote the unweighted $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ measure for the proposition identifying as errors only the set of all events in the band of cells u. Then from (3) it follows directly that if $\nabla_u\geq\nabla_{u'}$ for all $u\geq u'$, then the unweighted $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ must be less than or equal to the value of $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ for all sets of error weights consistent with the above constraints. Since, for Muller's data, $\nabla_5=\nabla_4=\nabla_3=1.00>\nabla_2=.96>\nabla_1=.73$, the weighted PRE is not less than $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}=.835$ for any weights consistent with the ordinal constraints given above. This result demonstrates that the decomposition of prediction success made possible by (3) can provide useful information even when the error weights are incompletely specified.

With both the Muller and Eulau-Eyestone examples, all propositions considered have error sets that consist of one or two triangles of error cells. Given this regularity, the relative accuracy and precision of the various propositions could to some degree be detected through inspection by an experienced researcher. In contrast, measures are indispensable where the pattern of error cells renders visual inspection impractical. This is the case for the Sawyer-MacRae example shown in Table 8.

[32] The fact that it should be difficult to decide which proposition is "best" should not be surprising. For somewhat different reasons, for example, it may not be clear whether the "best" functional relation between two interval variables is linear, quadratic, logarithmic, etc.

The Sawyer-MacRae predictions commit 418 *case-K* errors. These errors may be partitioned as 209 errors in the cells identified as errors only by game theory and 209 in the *additional* error cells identified by Sawyer and MacRae's *ad hoc* considerations. The ∇_φ values for these error sets are .69 and .03, respectively. Consequently, the *ad hoc* considerations add little prediction success to that achieved by game theory. It would be difficult to arrive at this conclusion with conventional measures.

For the game-theoretic prediction, $U = .50$, while for the *ad hoc* predictions, $U = .15$. Since the two error sets are disjoint, we can use (3) to express the value of ∇_φ for Sawyer and MacRae's overall prediction as a weighted average of the values for the game-theoretic prediction and that based solely on *ad hoc* considerations:

$$\nabla_\varphi = \frac{.50}{.50 + .15}.69 + \frac{.15}{.50 + .15}.03 = .54$$

The comparison of the ∇_φ values for the overall and game-theoretic predictions is not nearly so dramatic as the 2:1 ratio of the raw errors, since ∇_φ compensates for the greater precision of the overall prediction. The very low ∇_φ value for the *ad hoc* component suggests that in this case the greater precision is not worth the loss in prediction accuracy.

This and the previous two examples demonstrate that, unlike many conventional (particularly multiplicative) measures, ∇_φ is not excessively sensitive to zero marginals or cell entries. The Sawyer-MacRae data show no cases in four of the dependent variable categories and nine empty cells elsewhere in the table; nine of thirty-six cells are empty in the Muller example; eight of twenty-five cells are empty in the Eulau and Eyestone table. These zeros do not prevent us from assessing the various theories. Moreover, adding a few data cases in one of the zero cells would make only a minuscule change in ∇_φ. Similarly, ∇_φ is not sensitive to small amounts of missing data. If we were to include 24 cases that Sawyer and MacRae excluded from the analysis, this would produce only a slight change in the values given above, since those results are based on 1352 cases.

Until now, we have focused on using the prediction logic and ∇_φ to measure the agreement between the data and one or a few well specified propositions. Prediction analysis methods can also be useful for selecting a precise proposition *ex post* when only a much weaker prediction is possible *a priori*. Such a case arises in Goldberg's study of party identification.[33] He analyzes cross-tabulations between ordinal variables with 11 categories and a dichotomous dependent variable. The dependent variable indicates defection from or loyalty to parental party identification.[34] Goldberg's theory predicts that the proportion defecting will increase with the ordinal categories, but his theory is not strong enough to permit more specific predictions.

Throughout his analysis, Goldberg uses Goodman and Kruskal's τ_b measure. Because Goldberg found very low values for τ_b in his data (on the order of .05), his article is, in part, an apologia for the low explanatory power of his theory of rational voting.

Since τ_b is based on a prediction that has no relation to Goldberg's theory, it is irrelevant in this

[33] Arthur S. Goldberg, "Social Determinism and Rationality as Bases of Partly Identification," *The American Political Science Review*, 63 (March 1969), 5–25.

[34] Although Goldberg's variables are ratio scales, he presents the data collapsed into ordinal categories. Also, Goldberg's independent and dependent variables are not measured independently as is required for application of ∇_φ. However, the confounding introduced by the latter aspect of his techniques should be minor.

Table 12. Defection from Father's Party Identification Vs. Intergenerational Strain[a]

	Score on Strain											
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	*n*
Defection	4	1	22	51	67	46	51	17	2	0	1	262
Loyalty	7	11	109	234	135	73	55	25	2	0	2	653
n	11	12	131	285	202	119	106	42	4	0	3	915

[a] Shading denotes error cells for *ex post* prediction discussed in text.

Respondents restricted to those who are either Republican or Democrat identifiers and who report their fathers as either Republican or Democrat identifiers.

Source: Goldberg, "Social Determinism and Rationality as Bases of Party Identification," Table 1, p. 9.

context. As shown earlier in Table 9a, this measure equals ∇_{φ} for the mixed prediction strategy "if x_j, then predict y_i with probability $f_{ij}/f_{\cdot j}\cdots$" the conditional frequency of y_i given x_j *observed in the data*. This mixed prediction strategy is chosen *ex post*, and is determined solely by the observed distribution, not by Goldberg's theory.[35]

For illustrative purposes we now take an alternative approach using a pure prediction strategy with unweighted errors. Letting j index the ordinal category of the independent variable, the following prediction is consistent with Goldberg's theory:

$$(j \leq a) \rightsquigarrow \text{(loyalty)},$$
$$(a < j < b) \rightsquigarrow \text{(loyalty or defection), and}$$
$$(b \leq j) \rightsquigarrow \text{(defection), where}$$
$$-1 \leq a < b \leq 12.$$

Generally, then, we will have a pattern beginning with error cells for defection, then (for $a<j<b$) no error cells, and finally error cells for loyalty. If, however, $a=b-1$, then the no-error-cell situation is eliminated; if $a=-1$, loyalty alone is never predicted; and if $b=11$, defection alone is never predicted. The parameters a and b are introduced to reflect not only that Goldberg's theory cannot indicate in advance the ordinal category for which one would shift from a loyalty prediction to a defection prediction but also that the ordinal variables may have little predictive value for a range ($a<j<b$) of categories.

Analyzing the data from the perspective of this set of predictions, we could select a significance level, then compute the standardized values for the error sets given by each of the 78 possible choices of values for a and b, and finally select, on substantive or subjective grounds, one of the propositions, if any, that is acceptable as "significant." Generally, however, inspection of the table will suggest a viable *ex post* proposition. For the data in Table 12, for example, if we set $a=3$ and $b=7$, we obtain $\nabla_{\varphi}=.33$, significant at the .001 level. For the same table, $\tau_b=.055$. The difference is impressive and could easily change the weight placed on the findings. This difference results largely from recognizing that relatively accurate predictions occur only for the extreme categories of the independent variable. What we have found for this table applies to the entire Goldberg article. Our Table 13 gives ∇_{φ}, a, and b for certain tables in Goldberg's article. These results do not confirm Goldberg's contention that his deviance variable shows a "somewhat stronger" relationship than his strain variable.[36] His claim holds if one accepts the predictions implicit in the use of τ_b. It does not hold for our *ex post* predictions. On the other hand, our results do confirm Goldberg on the point that deviance predicts better for "high" education than for "low."[37]

The preceding examples have illustrated how the prediction logic can be applied to bivariate data analysis. The fact that tables are bivariate is not always an indication of a simple descriptive hypothesis, as is most apparent in the Sawyer-MacRae case. Furthermore, the variables involved were often categorizations that needed considerable prior elaboration by the investigators. For example, Goldberg's independent variables were residuals from multiple regressions. Consequently, it appears that bivariate techniques will continue to be useful in data analysis. Nonetheless, the theoretical structures of political science are increasingly multivariate. To handle multivariate

[35] Moreover, the τ_b measure is designed for nominal data and could show high values when data contradict Goldberg's theory. We suspect Goldberg used it because τ_b measures an (*ex post*) prediction of single observations whereas conventional ordinal measures such as γ are restricted to the prediction of observation pairs.

[36] Goldberg, pp. 12–13. A note of caution. The type of *ex post* analysis we conducted with Goldberg's data can lead to an overestimate of the ∇_{φ} value with small samples. The overestimation is negligible with samples as large as Goldberg's. See Bartlett, "Partition Analysis of Categorical Data."

[37] *Ibid.*, p. 13.

Table 13. *Ex Post* Analysis of Goldberg's Ordinal Tables

Table	Independent Variable	n	a	b	∇_{φ}	U	τ_b	U for τ_b
I.	Strain	915	3	7	.330	.18	.055	.41
V.	Deviance	915	3	5	.230	.38	.064	.41
VIa.	Deviance (control on high education)	520	3	6	.303	.36	.113	.40
VIb.	Deviance (control on low education)	395	2	7	.180	.19	.034	.42

Source: Goldberg, "Social Determinism and Rationality as Bases of Party Identification," pp. 9, 12, 14.

problems, we first need to extend the analytical framework.

Multivariate Prediction Logic

To avoid complicated notation, we shall focus on trivariate predictions. The general multivariate method is an immediate extension of the trivariate procedures.

Let $W=\{w_1, w_2, \cdots, w_k, \cdots, w_S\}$ be the third variable with S ("strata") states. The Cartesian product set $V=X\times W$ is the composite independent variable. Then, by direct extension of bivariate prediction, a multivariate prediction can be stated as:

$$\mathscr{P}_{.jk}: (x_j, w_k) \rightsquigarrow \mathscr{S}(x_j, w_k) \subseteq Y$$

Then $\{\mathscr{P}_{.jk}\}=\mathscr{P}_{YV}=\mathscr{P}_{YXW}=\mathscr{P}_{YWX}$ denotes the overall trivariate prediction concerning the dependent variable Y. Similarly the symbols $\mathscr{P}_{XW}$, $\mathscr{P}_{YX}$, $\mathscr{P}_{YW}$, respectively, denote bivariate propositions in which X is predicted by W, Y is predicted by X, and Y by W.

In defining the error structure for multivariate predictions, we continue the correspondence to formal logic:

An event belongs to the error structure for a multivariate proposition if and only if that event would falsify the proposition were it expressed as a compound statement in formal logic.

The multivariate proposition $\mathscr{P}_{YV}$ might be stated in the form of a logically connected set of bivariate statements. As an example, consider the proposition


$$\mathscr{P}_{YXW}: \mathscr{P}_{YW} \text{ or } [\mathscr{P}_{XW} \,\&\, \mathscr{P}_{YX}]$$

What is the relation between the error structure for the multivariate proposition and that of the component bivariate statements? This question is important if the investigator wishes to evaluate the contribution of each component to the prediction success achieved by the multivariate model. As Table 14 illustrates, a multivariate theory can be formed in a number of ways by logically connecting simpler propositions, and its error structure is defined in exact correspondence to the truth table for the compound statement were the multivariate proposition expressed in formal logic.[38] We next present methods for empirical evaluation of such multivariate theories.

[38] In this paper we do not consider how non-binary error weights for bivariate propositions should be treated when these propositions are logically connected to yield a multivariate prediction. For example, if an error event for the multivariate prediction is also an error event for two distinct bivariate components, and the event is weighted differently for these components, then what weight should be used in analyzing the multivariate prediction?

In this paper we assume either that unweighted errors are used or that the error weights are given directly for the multivariate prediction.

Table 14. Some Multivariate Error Structures



Measuring Success and Prediction Shift of Multivariate Propositions

Now consider the empirical evaluation of a multivariate proposition in an entire population or in a sample that is sufficiently large so that sampling considerations may be ignored. For ease of exposition, we continue to limit attention to pure strategy predictions relating just three qualitative variables. The extension of these methods for more than three variables is direct. For the trivariate case, we employ standard notation to indicate unconditional probabilities by P_{ijk}, $P_{ij.}$, $P_{i..}$, etc., and conditional probabilities indicated by expressions such as $P_{y_i w_k|x_j}$.

Given that the trivariate proposition may be expressed in equivalent bivariate form as $\mathscr{P}_{YV}$, it is clear that the trivariate del (∇) measure can be defined by direct extension of the bivariate measure:

$$\nabla_{\mathscr{P}_{YXW}} = 1 - \frac{\sum_{i,J,k} \omega_{ijk} P_{ijk}}{\sum_{i,J,k} \omega_{ijk} P_{i..} P_{.jk}} = 1 - \frac{\text{expected error for } \mathscr{P}_{YXW} \text{ in predicting } Y, \text{ given } V(X \text{ and } W)}{\text{expected error for } \mathscr{P}_{YXW} \text{ in predicting } Y, \text{ given random } V} \quad (10)$$

The second expression in (10) indicates that this overall measure has a direct proportionate reduction in error (PRE) interpretation.

To measure the *partial* success of $\mathscr{P}_{YXW}$ in predicting Y, *controlling for* X, we again use the PRE model. Under the *case-K* information condition, one applies the trivariate proposition knowing each observation's values on X *and* W. Then the expected *case-K* error rate is

$$\sum_{i,J,k} P_{.J.} \omega_{ijk} P_{y_i w_k|x_j} = \sum_{i,J,k} \omega_{ijk} P_{ijk}$$

Under *case-U*, one applies $\mathscr{P}_{YXW}$ to each observation, knowing that it is drawn randomly from the $X = x_j$ subpopulation, thus predicting $\mathscr{S}(x_j, \omega_k)$ for this observation with probability $P_{w_k|x_j}$. Since $P_{.j.}$ of the observations have $X = x_j$, the probability of *case-U* error in the population as a whole is

$$\sum_j P_{.j.} \sum_{i,k} \omega_{ijk} P_{y_i|x_j} P_{w_k|x_j} = \sum_{i,J,k} \omega_{ijk} P_{y_i|x_j} P_{.jk}$$

Then define partial del, *controlling for* X, as the PRE measure

$$\nabla_{\mathscr{P}_{YXW|X}} = 1 - \frac{\sum_{i,J,k} \omega_{ijk} P_{ijk}}{\sum_{i,J,k} \omega_{ijk} P_{y_i|x_j} P_{.jk}} = 1 - \frac{\mathscr{P}_{YXW} \text{ error in predicting } Y, \text{ given } X \text{ and } W}{\mathscr{P}_{YXW} \text{ error in predicting } Y, \text{ given } X \text{ and random } W} \quad (11)$$

Notice that the partial differs from multiple del as given by (10) only by substituting conditional probabilities of y_i, given x_j, for unconditional probabilities in the denominator. It is this substitution of conditional probabilities that partials out the information value of X to the proposition $\mathscr{P}_{YXW}$ in predicting Y for the population. Omitting degenerate cases for which the denominator is zero, $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}_{YXW|X}}$ measures the PRE accomplished by the trivariate proposition that can be attributed to W, controlling for X. The multiple and partial dels are analogous to the bivariate measure in interpretation and behavior. Similarly, partial del can also be expressed as a weighted average of the partials for each error cell analogous to expression (3), thus permitting a decomposition of prediction success of $\mathscr{P}_{YXW}$ attributable to W and controlling for X.

In regression analysis, the partial coefficient of determination is related to the simple and multiple coefficients by the following partitioning equation:

$$(1 - R^2_{YXW}) = (1 - R^2_{YX})(1 - R^2_{YW.X}) \quad (12)$$

In contrast to this simple relation in linear models, evaluating the marginal contribution of W in prediction logic propositions is more difficult. In adding W to the model, thus moving from $\mathscr{P}_{YX}$ to $\mathscr{P}_{YXW}$, two changes occur. First, the information conditions change. Adding W makes the joint probability distribution of Y, X, and W relevant rather than just the joint distribution of Y and X. The ordinary partial coefficient of determination in fact assesses this change in information by measuring the relative gain in linear predictability about Y when information about W is added to that associated with X. If the simple model is

$$y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x$$

and the trivariate model is

$$y = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 x + \gamma_2 w \quad (13)$$

then the simplicity of the partitioning equation (12) provides a straightforward way of measuring the marginal contribution of W. But if the trivariate model is

$$y = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1[\max(x, w)] \quad (13')$$

the model is no longer linear in X and W, although

the regression is linear in the variable enclosed in brackets. In this case, conventional partial techniques fail. Yet (13′) appears to be a perfectly reasonable trivariate model. Prediction logic problems are generally similar to (13′). In addition to changing the information by adding W, the *form* of the prediction is altered. Consequently, in addition to a partial measure accounting for information effects, we need to account for the "shift" in the *nature* of the predicted relation.

Unless special conditions obtain, an expression analogous to (12) relating multiple, bivariate and partial dels will not balance. In order to guarantee that the accounting equation does balance, we need to multiply the right side by the measure of *prediction shift:*

$$\Psi_{\mathscr{P}_{YXW}/\mathscr{P}_{YX}} = \frac{[\mathscr{P}_{YXW} \text{ error}/\mathscr{P}_{YX} \text{ error}], \text{ given } X \text{ and random } W}{[\mathscr{P}_{YXW} \text{ error}/\mathscr{P}_{YX} \text{ error}], \text{ given random } V(X \times W)} \tag{14}$$

The numerator and the denominator of the shift both control for information conditions in comparing $\mathscr{P}_{YXW}$ and $\mathscr{P}_{YX}$. In the numerator only X (and not W) is known, while in the denominator the states of both independent variables are unknown. Thus, the shift does not reflect information effects which have been accounted for by the partial. The numerator compares the prediction accuracy of $\mathscr{P}_{YXW}$ to that of $\mathscr{P}_{YX}$, eliminating the effect of W information on prediction accuracy. The denominator normalizes the numerator for differences in the form of relations specified by the bivariate and trivariate propositions.

Given the measure of prediction shift, the prediction logic analogue to (12) is the equation

$$(1 - \nabla_{\mathscr{P}_{YXW}}) = (1 - \nabla_{\mathscr{P}_{YX}})\Psi_{\mathscr{P}_{YXW}/\mathscr{P}_{YX}}(1 - \nabla_{\mathscr{P}_{YXW|X}}) \tag{15}$$

The measures in this expression provide the basis for trivariate analysis. We next illustrate application of these multivariate methods with examples taken from the political science literature.

Trivariate Examples

The descriptive lore of American politics indicates the dominant position of rural, southern Democrats in the House of Representatives. Wolfinger and Heifetz[39] present data on this point for the House as of January, 1964. We examine the data on subcommittee chairmanships as if they had been collected to test the *a priori* statement that in this population of Democratic congressmen, "southern, rural" $\rightsquigarrow$ "subcommittee chairmanship." The error event for this statement is the double-hatched cell in Table 15 (compare Table 14(c)). The error set is the intersection of the error sets for the bivariate statements "southern $\rightsquigarrow$ subcommittee chairmanship" and "rural $\rightsquigarrow$ subcommittee chairmanship." The bivariate $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ values of .31 and .22 for these predictions, respectively, indicate that chairmanships are better predicted for representatives of southern rather than rural districts. The multiple $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}}$ value is .48, indicating that the substantial decrease in precision inherent in the more restrictive multivariate prediction is offset by a marked increase in prediction accuracy over that available from either bivariate statement. When, as in this example, one shifts from the bivariate prediction $x \rightsquigarrow y$ to the multivariate proposition $w\&x \rightsquigarrow y$, the prediction shift measure always equals 1.0, leaving us with a direct analogy to the partitioning equation in linear regression. The partial del, controlling for the urban-rural variable, equals .32; it is .24 when North-South is controlled. This is consistent with the comment above that "southern" has greater predictive power than "rural."

Next consider a somewhat more complex example where the prediction shift does not equal 1.0. In Rosenthal's analysis of electoral coalitions in the Fourth French Republic,[40] the dependent variable is whether or not a "centrist strategy" coalition forms: $Y = \{cs, \overline{cs}\}$. The two independent variables are whether the degree of "Communist danger" present (X) is *h*igh, *m*edium or *l*ow, $X = \{h, m, l\}$, and (W) whether a "rightist alternative" is available, $W = \{ra, \overline{ra}\}$. The investigator's initial proposition may be stated

$$\mathscr{P}_{YX}: h \rightsquigarrow cs, m \rightsquigarrow (cs \text{ or } \overline{cs}), \& \; l \rightsquigarrow \overline{cs}$$

This proposition makes differentiated predictions only for the extreme categories of the "Communist danger" variable, identifying as errors those cells that are *double*-hatched in Table 16.

To differentiate the prediction when $X = m$, Rosenthal offered the trivariate proposition

$$\mathscr{P}_{YXW}: h \rightsquigarrow cs, m \rightsquigarrow (ra \longleftrightsquigarrow \overline{cs}), \& \; l \rightsquigarrow \overline{cs}$$

[39] Raymond E. Wolfinger and Joan Heifetz, "Safe Seats, Seniority, and Power in Congress," *The American Political Science Review*, 59 (June 1965), 337–349, at 339.

[40] Howard Rosenthal, "Voting and Coalition Models in Election Simulations," *Simulation and the Study of Politics*, ed. William Coplin, (Chicago: Markham, 1968), pp. 237–287, at pp. 279–280.

Table 15. Subcommittee Chairmanship, Democrats, House of Representatives by Region and Urban-Rural, 1964[a]

Congressman Is . . .	Constituency Type				*n*
	North		South		
	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	
Subcommittee Chairman	32	19	7	51	109
Not Subcommittee Chairman	75	34	16	22	147
n	107	53	23	73	256

[a] Since the table was originally published in percentage form, there may be some slight errors in the number of cases shown in each cell. Shading indicates error cell.

Source: Wolfinger and Heifetz, "Safe Seats, Seniority, and Power in Congress," Table 1, p. 343.

This trivariate proposition identifies as errors all cells that are single- or double-hatched in Table 16. Note that whether a rightist alternative is available has predictive significance under $\mathscr{P}_{YXW}$ only when $X=m$; thus this variable may be ignored when $X\neq m$ without affecting the value of $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}_{YXW}}$.

For the bivariate prediction, $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}_{YX}}=.781$, but the denominator in this measure, the measure of prediction precision, is only $U=.24$. Thus, only a 24 per cent error rate for $\mathscr{P}_{YX}$ is expected under statistical independence. Although the multivariate proposition make predictions with twice the precision ($U=.48$), its prediction success is nearly as high: $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}_{YXW}}=.758$. By simple algebra, the sign of the partial, $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}_{YXW|X}}$, can be shown to depend solely on the probabilities in the "m" cells. The rightist alternative variable achieves substantial prediction success within the "m" cells, as reflected in the .591 value for the partial.

In the ordinary linear model, a positive partial implies that the trivariate coefficient of determination must be greater than the bivariate coefficient. Contrast this with the result for Rosenthal's data that $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}_{YXW}}=.76<\nabla_{\mathscr{P}_{YX}}=.78$. Thus, by (15), the shift measure in this case must be greater than one

Table 16. Centrist Strategies as Predicted by Communist Danger and Rightist Alternative (1951 French Legislative Elections)[a]

(*W*) Rightist Alternative?	(*X*) Communist Danger				*n*
	High (*h*)	Medium (*m*)		Low (*l*)	
		($\overline{ra}$)	(ra)		
Centrist Strategy (*cs*)	35	17	4	1	57
Not Centrist Strategy ($\overline{cs}$)	4	2	21	11	38
n	39	19	25	12	95

[a] The abbreviation ra=rightist alternative; $\overline{ra}$=no rightist alternative. The cross-tabulation involving rightist alternative was not available for the *h* and *l* categories on Communist danger. Since the rightist alternative variable has no predictive significance for these categories, the available data suffices for all relevant computations.

Source: Rosenthal, "Voting and Coalition Models in Election Simulations,"

($\Psi = 2.70$). The error structure for the multivariate prediction is formed from $\mathscr{E}_{\mathscr{P}_{YX}}$ by adding $\mathscr{E}^+ = \{(cs, ra, m), (\bar{c}s, \bar{r}a, m)\}$. Since $\nabla_{\mathscr{E}^+}$ for this set of two additional error cells is only .735, we know from the weighted-average expression (5) that $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}_{YXW}}$ must be less than $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}_{YX}}$. The overall trivariate prediction is less successful than $\mathscr{P}_{YX}$ (albeit more precise), even though the partial del indicates that the rightist alternative variable succeeds in predicting centrist strategies in districts having medium "Communist danger."

The final example is based on the predictions by Riker and Zavoina cited earlier for the data shown in Table 5. The first of two trivariate propositions to be examined uses learning theory to predict that an action is repeated if reinforced, but makes no prediction if the action is not reinforced. Letting f and f' denote voting "for" on the preceding and current ($'$) match, respectively, and using w to denote that the subject won on the last match, the simple learning prediction may be stated as

$$\mathscr{P}_{YXW}: (f \,\&\, w) \rightsquigarrow f',\ (\bar{f} \,\&\, w) \rightsquigarrow \bar{f}',\ \&\ \bar{w} \rightsquigarrow (f' \text{ or } \bar{f}')$$

Riker and Zavoina modify this proposition by predicting that a losing vote "for" will be switched to a vote "against";

$$\mathscr{P}'_{YXW}: (f \,\&\, w) \rightsquigarrow f',\ [(f \,\&\, \bar{w}) \text{ or } (\bar{f} \,\&\, w)] \rightsquigarrow \bar{f}', \&\ (\bar{f} \,\&\, \bar{w}) \rightsquigarrow (f' \text{ or } \bar{f}')$$

These two propositions can be contrasted with the simple (bivariate) persistence model, $\mathscr{P}_{YX}: f' \leftrightsquigarrow f$. For this simple model, $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}_{YX}} = .142$. The model $\mathscr{P}_{YXW}$, which makes predictions only for reinforced subjects, attains $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}_{YXW}} = .254$. The complete Riker-Zavoina prediction is slightly less successful: $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}'_{YXW}} = .227$. This occurs because $\mathscr{E}_{\mathscr{P}'_{YXW}}$ is formed by adding $(f'\bar{w}f')$ to $\mathscr{E}_{\mathscr{P}_{YXW}}$, and $\nabla_{f'\bar{w}f} = .133$, which not only is less than $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}_{YXW}}$ but also is less than the corresponding value for the simple persistence model. The lack of success in predicting for the $\bar{w}f$ subjects was anticipated by Riker and Zavoina when they stated that for unreinforced players, "the prediction is not so clear."

The value of the partial del controlling for X, $\nabla_{\mathscr{P}'_{YXW|X}} = .158$, indicates that the variable, W, describing whether or not the subject won on the previous trial, contributes to the success of Riker and Zavoina's multivariate prediction, $\mathscr{P}'_{YXW}$ but $X = \{f, \bar{f}\}$ contributes slightly more ($\nabla_{\mathscr{P}'_{YXW|W}} = .197$). The shift factor for these data equals $\Psi_{\mathscr{P}'_{YXW}/\mathscr{P}_{YX}} = 1.07$. By expression (15), the proportion of *case-U* error that is *not* reduced by the multivariate proposition, $1 - \nabla_{\mathscr{P}'_{YXW}} = .773$, can be accounted for by the product

$$(1 - \nabla_{\mathscr{P}_{YX}})\Psi_{\mathscr{P}'_{YXW}/\mathscr{P}_{YX}}(1 - \nabla_{\mathscr{P}'_{YXW|X}}) = (1 - .142)1.07(1 - .158) = .773$$

This concludes our analysis of examples taken from the research literature. Our purpose in presenting these examples is future-oriented. We think that the prediction logic approach provides a convenient and robust model for theory construction and data analysis in political science.

COMMUNICATIONS

Cross-over Voting and the Democratic Party's Reform Rules

TO THE EDITOR:

This communication presents sample survey data tending to confirm the factual assumptions about cross-over voting in presidential primaries that led the Democratic party to restrict participation in delegate selection processes to declared Democratic voters.

On December 7, 1974, the Democratic party adopted a formal Charter which, among other things, specifies that its National Convention "shall be composed of delegates who are chosen through processes which . . . restrict participation to Democrats only."[1] The Democratic National Committee subsequently adopted resolutions providing that an "adequate provision" for carrying out this mandate "includes laws which restrict participation to Democratic voters who have been registered as such at least 14 days in advance . . . through a system of state or federal voter registration which includes party registration, or where appropriate, a system of party enrollment approved by the National Democratic Party."[2]

A subsequent staff paper points out that this is not the only means by which a state could conform to the delegate selection rules, but that there is "a first preference for this type of system."[3] Where necessary, state Democratic parties have "an obligation to make all feasible efforts to repeal, amend, or otherwise modify [state] laws to accomplish these objectives."[4]

At the onset of the 1976 campaign, primaries were scheduled in 30 states represented by 2299 (76.5 per cent) of the 3007 Democratic convention delegates.[5] In 22 states, 1914 (63.7 per cent) of the delegates will be named in primaries. Fifteen of these states, selecting 1325 delegates, have advance party registration of voters. Several state selection systems, approved by the Democrats' Compliance Review Commission, appear plainly inconsistent with the Charter's "first preference" for advance party registration and with the underlying rationale of the reform rules. Wisconsin's open primary, selecting 68 delegates and testing voter preferences for presidential candidates, is the plainest instance. The requirement in six other states, selecting 521 delegates, that a voter need only declare his party affiliation at the polls also defeats the rules' purpose.[6]

The rationale for these rules is found in the work of the McGovern-Fraser Commission which insisted that Democratic party affairs be opened to all who wanted to become members, but that "a full opportunity for all Democrats to participate is diluted if members of other political parties are allowed to participate in the selection of delegates to the Democratic National Convention."[7] In a somewhat stronger statement, the Executive Director of the Democratic National Committee replied to newspaper criticism of a closed presidential primary with the assertion that "cross-over primaries have become the mechanism of the most flagrant manipulation of democratic decision-making . . ."[8]

Two factual assumptions underlie this rationale. First, in the absence of advance party registration of voters, there will be substantial crossing over by independents and Republicans into Democratic presidential primaries. Second, cross-over voting dilutes the participation of Democratic voters because the cross-overs cast ballots in a way significantly different from the Democrats.

The Data

This analysis relies primarily on statewide sample surveys of Wisconsin voters taken by the Survey Research Laboratory at the University of Wisconsin-Madison.[9] The most reliable of these was taken soon after the 1968 presidential pri-

* I am grateful to Dennis Affholter for preparing the analysis decks and making the computer runs. Professor Jack Dennis graciously made available his 1972 survey of the Wisconsin electorate. The University of Wisconsin Survey Research Laboratory and its director, Professor Harry P. Sharp, were very helpful in supplying the 1964 and 1968 survey data.

[1] *Charter of the Democratic Party of the United States*, Article II, section 4.

[2] "Call to the Democratic National Convention" (mimeo, 1975), Resolution II: Qualifications of State Delegations, section (c).

[3] Democratic National Committee, "Research Project on Section 9 of our Mandate and Guidelines A-3 and C-3" (mimeo, 1975), p. 3.

[4] "Call to the Democratic National Convention," Resolution II, section (c).

[5] Wisconsin Legislative Reference Bureau, "*The Wisconsin Presidential Primary: Open or Closed?*", Research Bulletin 75-RB-1, August, 1975, p. 11.

[6] Arkansas, with 26 delegate votes, and Idaho, with 16 delegate votes, hold presidential preference primaries which bind delegates but do not select them. In both states voters declare a party preference at the polls. These regulations also violate the purpose of the Democratic selection rules.

[7] Report of the Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection, *Mandate for Reform* (Washington, 1970), p. 47.

[8] Mark A. Siegel, "Democratic Leader Responds to Open Primary Editorial," *Madison Capital Times*, July 21, 1975, Editorial Page.

[9] These statewide samples were 702 in 1964, 573 in 1958, and 839 in 1972.

mary.[10] In 1964 and 1972 surveys were taken after the November election, requiring voters to recall their participation in the April presidential primary. Although this long time-lag apparently contributed to some distortion in voter recall, the survey data fall within accepted tolerances between poll data and actual voting patterns.

Reported participation in all three presidential primaries was reasonably close to the percentage of the voting age population that actually cast ballots.[11] In 1968, survey respondents overreported participating by 5.3 per cent.[12] In 1964 and 1972, they underreported voting by 8.2 and 8.7 per cent respectively. While underreported voting is unusual, the eight month delay between primary day and polling may have blurred respondents' memories.[13]

Respondents' recall of whether they had voted in the Democratic or Republican primary was also quite accurate for 1964 and 1968.[14] In 1972, however, the Democratic primary attracted 79.8 per cent of the voters, but only 62.3 per cent of the survey remembered participating. Richard Nixon's November landslide may have caused voters to forget or misreport their vote in April's Democratic primary.

Finally, voter recall of which Democratic candidates they voted for was accurate within 2.3 per cent in 1968. In 1964, however, the survey reported a 12 per cent smaller vote for George Wallace than he actually received; and in 1972, George McGovern's survey strength was 15 per cent higher than he actually received. The "halo" effect of both the primary and general elections may account for these disparities. In any case, the survey reports of candidate voting must be treated cautiously in the subsequent analysis.

How Much Cross-Over Voting?

Studies of the Washington blanket primary, which permits voters to select which party's primary they will vote in for each office on the ballot, suggested little cross-over voting. Aggregate voting data showed that in only 13 of 71 primaries for statewide and national office had the vote for the combined candidates of one party for one office been more than 5 per cent above or below the mean vote cast for their political party for all other offices.[15]

Similar conclusions were reached for two Wisconsin gubernatorial primaries in studies based on more reliable survey data. In 1964, only 6.2 per cent of voters reported casting ballots in the primary of the opposite party.[16] In 1966, when the Democrats had a bitterly contested four-way gubernatorial primary and the Republican contender faced no nomination challenge, the cross-over vote was only 7.5 per cent.[17]

There is, however, persuasive evidence that cross-over voting occurs far more frequently than these figures indicate. The aggregate data used in the Washington study may well conceal large numbers of party affiliators crossing over into the opposition party's nomination contests. That voting in most primary contests did not exceed the party's mean primary vote by more than 5 per cent may simply reflect the netting out of a much larger cross-over vote by each party's identifiers into the other party's nomination contests. Survey data tend to confirm this suspicion: in a statewide survey 78 per cent of Washington voters reported voting for candidates of more than one party; and 37 per cent declared an intention to vote in contested opposition party primaries where they favored their own party's nominees, but they had no primary opposition.[18]

Cross-over voting in Wisconsin presidential primaries appears to be much higher than was re-

[10] Some of these data have been previously reported in Austin Ranney, "Turnout and Representation in Presidential Primary Elections," *American Political Science Review*, 66 (March, 1972), 24–26, 34–36.

[11] Actual vote figures were obtained from the *Wisconsin Blue Book* for 1966, 1969, and 1973. Total voting age population is reported in United States Department of Commerce, *Statistical Abstract of the United States* (Washington, 1974), Table 614.

[12] Studies showing overreported voting ranging from 2 to 27 per cent are collected in David Adamany and Philip Dubois, "The 'Forgetful' Voter and an Underreported Vote," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 34 (Summer, 1975), 227 note 1. Many factors produce voting overreport; but actual voter misrepresentation is usually set at 2 to 8 per cent, much lower than total overreport. Angus Campbell et al., *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960), pp. 94–95; Aage R. Clausen, "Response Validity: Vote Report," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 32 (Winter, 1968), 594–602; Helen Dinerman, "1948 Votes in the Making—A Preview," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 12 (Winter, 1948), 585–598.

[13] The only published analysis of underreported voting is apparently that of Adamany and Dubois.

[14] In 1964, 72.5 per cent of voters participated in the Democratic primary; 72.3 per cent of the survey sample reported casting Democratic ballots. In 1968, the actual and sample survey Democratic vote was respectively 59.9 per cent and 64.7 per cent.

[15] Daniel M. Ogden, Jr. and Hugh A. Bone, *Washington Politics* (New York: New York University Press and Citizenship Clearing House, 1960), pp. 38–40. An earlier study of a smaller number of primaries reached the same conclusion. See Daniel M. Ogden, Jr., "The Blanket Primary and Party Regularity in Washington," *Pacific Northwest Quarterly*, 39 (January, 1948), 33–38.

[16] Austin Ranney and Leon D. Epstein, "The Two Electorates: Voters and Non-Voters in a Wisconsin Primary," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 28 (August, 1966), p. 609, n. 17.

[17] Austin Ranney, "The Representativeness of Primary Electorates," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 12 (May, 1968), 227–228.

[18] Daniel M. Ogden, Jr., "Washington's Popular Primary," *Research Studies of the State College of Washington*, Vol. 19 (September, 1951), 146–147.

ported for the 1966 and 1968 gubernatorial contests. One reason might be that gubernatorial primaries coincide with party nomination contests for Congress, lesser statewide constitutional officers, state legislators, and county officials. A partisan is constrained from voting in the opposition gubernatorial primary by his interest in numerous other nomination contests on his own party's ballot.[19] No such constraint exists in presidential primaries, which are held in April when no other partisan races are on the ballot.

Defining cross-over voters as those who do not identify with the party in whose primary they cast ballots, all independents are cross-over voters as are all Democrats voting in the Republican primary and all Republicans voting in the Democratic primary.[20] In 1964, cross-over voters composed 24.6 per cent of the total primary electorate. In 1968, they were 23.2 per cent, and in 1972, 27.1 per cent.

In all three years there were vigorous Democratic presidential nomination contests, but no races or only nominal competition on the Republican side. Hence the tendency was for Republicans and independents to cross over into the Democratic primary, while Democrats remained in their own party column. Cross-over voters were therefore a greater percentage of the Democratic electorate than of the total. Table 1 shows the composition of both parties' primary electorates in 1964, 1968, and 1972. Cross-over voters accounted for a minimum of one-quarter of the Democratic electorate in 1964 and a maximum of one-third in 1972.[21]

The Consequences of Cross-Over Voting

The strongest objection to open primaries is that they permit one party's adherents to "raid" the opposition party primary. This was the apparent meaning of Mr. Seigel's heated insistence that they lead to "flagrant manipulation of democratic decision making . . ." But there is a difference between cross-over voting and raiding. The former "is a drifting across party lines in search of the excitement of a pitched primary battle. Raiding is an organized attempt on the part of one party to send its partisans into the primary of the other in order to foist the least attractive candidates on it.[22]

Although there is substantial crossing over, there is precious little evidence of raiding. In his analysis of cross-over voting in the 1968 Wisconsin presidential primary, Austin Ranney tabulated the reasons for crossing over given by the small sample ($N=38$) of voters who had done so. He concluded that "most of the crossovers temporarily deserted their party to register their special approval of a candidate, or a policy associated with a candidate, available only in the other party."[23] Similar reasons were given by the 37

[19] In one-party situations, the weaker party may have very few primary contests and its partisans may therefore cross over into the dominant party's primary without forgoing choices within their own party. This may explain the apparently high cross-over vote in earlier Wisconsin gubernatorial primaries. See Leon D. Epstein, *Politics in Wisconsin* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1958), pp. 35–40, 95–96. Also Frank J. Sorauf, *Party Politics in America*, 2nd ed. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1972), p. 214.

[20] Survey respondents were divided by the standard seven-point scale. Independent Republicans and independent Democrats were classified as party affiliators, because it is probable that under the mildest form of party registration, in which the partisan declares his affiliation at the polls, they would be willing to volunteer a party identification in order to vote. Participating in the opposition party primary would, therefore, be cross-over voting for them.

[21] A survey of 382 voters as they left the polling places in 1972 set the composition of the Democratic primary at 73.3 per cent Democrats, 19.3 per cent Republicans, and 7.3 per cent independents. The poll, commissioned by *The New York Times* and conducted by Yankelovich, Skelly, and White, Inc., was made available by the Wisconsin Legislative Reference Library. We attribute the difference between the one-third in our survey who reported crossing over and the one-quarter in the Yankelovich survey to the less reliable sampling technique used by the latter.

[22] Sorauf, p. 214.

[23] Ranney, "Turnout and Representation in Presidential Primary Elections," p. 35.

Table 1. The Partisan Composition of Wisconsin Presidential Primary Electorates in 1964, 1968 and 1972

	Party Primary											
	1964				1968				1972			
Voters' Party Identification	Dem.		Rep.		Dem.		Rep.		Dem.		Rep.	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Democrat	137	74.1	10	14.1	142	71.7	4	3.7	136	66.3	9	7.3
Independent	18	9.7	5	7.0	22	11.1	11	10.2	23	11.2	11	8.9
Republican	30	16.2	56	78.9	34	17.2	93	86.1	46	22.4	104	83.9
	185	100.0	71	100.0	198	100.0	108	100.0	205	99.9	124	100.1

Table 2. Party Identification of Voters Casting Ballots for Leading Candidates in the 1964 and 1968 Wisconsin Democratic Presidential Primaries

Voters' Party Identification	1964						1968							
	Wallace		Reynolds		Total		McCarthy		Johnson		Others[a]		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Democrat	10	6.8	127	93.2	137	100.0	68	47.9	56	39.4	18	12.7	142	100.0
Cross-Overs	30	62.5	18	37.5	48	100.0	39	69.6	8	14.3	9	16.1	56	100.0
Independent	4	22.2	14	77.8	18	100.0	12	54.5	5	22.7	5	22.7	22	99.9
Republican	26	86.7	4	13.3	30	100.0	27	79.4	3	8.8	4	11.8	34	100.0

[a] Write-in votes for Hubert Humphrey, Robert Kennedy, and George Wallace.

per cent of respondents in the Washington survey who said they would cross over into the opposition primary when their own party's candidate, whom they intended to vote for in the general election, was unopposed. Thirty-four per cent indicated they would "vote for the best man in the other party to have two good men running in the general election." Only three per cent wanted to nominate the opposition's weakest contender in order to enhance their own party's prospects.[24]

The absence of raiding does not, of course, dispose of the McGovern-Fraser Commission's contention that cross-over voting might "dilute" the participation of Democrats in selecting delegates and ultimately presidential nominees. Only if cross-over voters favor competing candidates in the same proportions as Democratic participants can the Commission's position be dismissed. It is plain from the Wisconsin survey data that this is not the case.

Tables 2 and 3 show that the candidate preferences of cross-over voters are quite different from those of Democratic voters. Because of small numbers of respondents in some cells, independents and Republicans are reported together as well as separately in these tables. In 1964, Democrats gave 93.2 per cent of their ballots to Governor John Reynolds, President Johnson's stand-in. Cross-over voters, by contrast, preferred George Wallace by a margin of 62.5 per cent to 37.5 per cent. In 1968, Democratic voters gave Senator Eugene McCarthy a 47.9 per cent to 39.4 per cent edge over President Johnson. Cross-voters were far more emphatic in their preference for McCarthy, preferring him by a margin of 69.6 per cent to 14.3 per cent.[25]

In 1972, George Wallace was the main beneficiary of cross-over voting. He captured only 7.4 per cent of the Democratic ballots, but received 29 per cent of the cross-over vote. George McGovern, on the other hand, was disadvantaged by cross-over voting; he was supported by 51.5 per cent of Democrats, but only 33.3 per cent of cross-overs. Hubert Humphrey and Edmund Muskie polled about the same percentage among cross-over voters as among Democrats.[26]

[24] Ogden, "Washington's Popular Primary," p. 147.

[25] Taking the unreliably small number of independents and Republicans separately in 1964 and 1968 shows that both groups voted differently from the Democrats. In 1964, independents gave a smaller majority to Reynolds than did Democrats, and Republicans supported Wallace. In 1968, both groups supported McCarthy more strongly than did Democrats, but again Republicans tended to be more dissimilar from the Democrats than were the independents.

[26] Taking the unreliably small number of indepedents and Republicans separately in 1972 shows that the similarity between the cross-over vote for Humphrey and Muskie and the Democratic vote for them was caused by aggregating their higher support among independents and lower support among Republicans.

Table 3. Party Identification of Voters Casting Ballots for Leading Candidates in the 1972 Wisconsin Presidential Primary

Voters' Identification	McGovern		Humphrey		Muskie		Wallace		Others[a]		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Democrat	70	51.5	22	16.2	14	10.3	10	7.4	20	14.7	136	100.1
Cross-Overs	23	33.3	11	15.9	7	10.1	20	29.0	8	11.6	69	99.9
Independent	5	21.7	7	30.4	4	17.4	5	21.7	2	8.7	23	99.9
Republican	18	39.1	4	8.7	3	6.5	15	32.6	6	13.0	46	99.9

[a] Votes cast for Shirley Chisholm, Edward Kennedy, Henry Jackson, John Lindsay, and scattered write-in candidates.

Table 4. General Election Voting by Cross-Over Voters in 1964 and 1972

Voters	1964						1972							
	Goldwater		Johnson		Total		Nixon		McGovern		Schmitz		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Cross-Over Voters[a]	29	61.7	18	38.3	47	100.0	39	60.9	17	26.6	8	12.5	64	100.0
Independent	3	17.6	14	82.4	17	100.0	8	40.0	9	45.0	3	15.0	20	100.0
Republican	26	86.7	4	13.3	30	100.0	31	70.5	8	18.2	5	11.4	44	100.1
All Republican and Independent Voters	153	64.8	83	35.2	236	100.0	291	84.8	39	11.4	13	3.8	343	100.0
Independent	9	18.0	41	82.0	50	100.0	38	59.4	22	34.4	4	6.3	64	100.1
Republican	144	77.4	42	22.6	186	100.0	253	90.7	17	6.1	9	3.2	279	100.0

[a] Republicans and Independents who voted in the Democratic presidential primary. Does not include occasional Democratic cross-overs into the Republican presidential primaries.

In none of these three primaries did the participation of cross-over voters alter the statewide outcome. The candidates preferred by Democratic voters—Reynolds, McCarthy, and McGovern—won statewide majorities, despite the cross-over vote. This does not imply, however, that cross-over voting did not "dilute" the participation of Democratic voters. First, Wisconsin law requires that at least two-thirds of delegates must be chosen by congressional districts. Statewide survey data cannot tell whether the results in specific congressional districts, especially those with predominantly Republican electorates, might have been altered if only Democrats had participated.

The prospect that delegate outcomes will be altered by cross-over voting is further heightened by the new Democratic party rules requiring that "delegates . . . be chosen in a manner that fairly reflects the division of preferences expressed by those who participate in the presidential nominating process."[27] Tables 2 and 3 plainly demonstrate that the proportional preferences of Democratic and cross-over voters are sharply different, and the participation of cross-over voters will therefore alter the composition of national convention delegations. There always remains, of course, the possibility that in a close primary contest, the cross-over voters would tip the statewide vote against a candidate favored by the majority of Democratic voters.

Second, the primaries have effects quite distinct from allocating delegates. They affect the national standing of candidates. "A triumph in one state primary contest is apt to lead to a higher standing in public opinion polls. The winner of a primary is also likely to be given more attention in the mass media, by the party organizations and by the general electorate. In seeking commitments from other delegates, a candidate can use his primary victory to demonstrate his political appeal."[28] A strong primary showing is also helpful in wooing campaign workers and financial support. Because cross-over voters do not cast ballots in the same manner as Democratic voters, they distort the impression of candidates' relative strengths.[29] And they may therefore alter the decisions of Democratic voters, workers, contributors, and delegates in other states about which candidates to support.

Cross-Over Voters in the General Election

Proponents of the open primary sometimes argue that the participation of cross-over voters in the nomination process may encourage them to vote for the party's general election nominee.[30] The open primary is here seen as a recruitment process which expands the party's general election vote. Although the number of cross-over voters in the 1964 and 1972 survey samples was too small for definitive analysis, those data, presented in Table

[27] Democratic National Committee, *Delegate Selection Rules for the 1976 Democratic National Convention* (Washington, 1975), Rule 11, p. 6.

[28] Gerald Pomper, *Nominating the President* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1966), p. 109. Also Nelson W. Polsby and Aaron B. Wildavsky, *Presidential Elections*, 3rd ed. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971), pp. 131–133. Morris Udall put the point pungently when responding to a reporter's question whether he would enter the Wisconsin primary if the state's delegates would not be seated because the primary did not conform to Democratic party rules. "The whole early primary game is momentum and psychology . . . Even if it's not binding, even if it's a beauty contest, the Wisconsin primary is still important." *Wisconsin State Journal*, September 21, 1975, section 1, page 4.

[29] Crossing over may especially exaggerate the strength of incumbents or other well-known figures. Ogden and Bone, *Washington Politics*, p. 39. This may, of course, give these primary candidates a substantial psychological advantage as they enter the general election.

[30] "Open Primary A Must," *Madison Capital Times*, June 12, 1975, Editorial Page.

4, supply at best only mixed evidence to support this thesis.[31]

In 1964, cross-over voters supported President Johnson in the general election in only the same proportion as did all Republicans and independents casting November ballots. By contrast, cross-over voters were measurably more likely to support George McGovern in 1972 than were Republican and independent voters generally. Among that very small subset of cross-over respondents ($N=20$) who had supported McGovern in the primary, his general election support was, however, only slightly higher (30 per cent) than among all cross-over voters (26.6 per cent).

Conclusion

The evidence presented in this communication tends to confirm the factual assumptions underlying the Democratic party's rules preferring advance party registration of voters participating in delegate selection primaries. First, Wisconsin's open primary has permitted a heavy cross-over vote, ranging from a quarter to a third of the total Democratic electorate. Second, the candidate preferences of cross-over voters are markedly different from those of Democratic voters. This may alter the composition of the state's national convention delegation, especially under new rules emphasizing proportionality between primary voting for candidates and their share of state delegations. And, it may affect the perceived standing of candidates as their delegate search moves from Wisconsin to other states. In both ways the role of Democratic voters in the selection process may indeed be "diluted" by the open primary.

The counterproposition, advanced by opponents of the new rules, that cross-over primary voters are likely to support the party's general election nominee cannot be confirmed from the mixed evidence available for 1964 and 1972.

DAVID ADAMANY
University of Wisconsin, Madison

[31] This analysis cannot be replicated for 1968. Because that year's survey was taken shortly after the primary, the general election choices of primary voters cannot be ascertained.

Julius Turner Revisited: Primary Elections as the Alternative to Party Competition in "Safe" Districts

TO THE EDITOR:

Basic to our American democracy is the notion of competitive elections: government by and for the people demands that voters be offered realistic alternatives at the polls.[1] Yet as students of elections know, the outcome of most contests for the United States House of Representatives is a foregone conclusion even before the polling booths have been opened on the Tuesday following the first Monday of November. It just might be, however, that voters were offered a true choice between candidates, and the representatives-elect were confronted by strong challengers, in primaries conducted in districts lacking keen party competition. If so, then perhaps there is an alternative method—primary competition— by which the people, in districts that are safely in the fold of one political party, can regularly take their representative to task.

The preceding thesis is, in baldest terms, the basis of Julius Turner's widely cited article, "Primary Elections as the Alternative to Party Competition in 'Safe' Districts," which was first published in 1953. "The purpose of this paper," Turner wrote, "is to examine the primary election in one-party areas (both within and outside the South) to discover whether it does provide for a competitive politics similar to that found in two-party areas."[2] Turner's conclusion that primary elections did not present "realistic alternatives in over three-quarters of the safe Congressional districts of the country . . . " as well as his pessimistic assertion that "we have not yet found a successful substitute for two-party competition"[3] have become staples of American electoral analysis.

Do Turner's findings for the 1944–1950 period *still* obtain? The present piece reports the principal findings of a replication and extension of Turner's seminal study. Data for the last decade—1964 through 1974—are presented and compared with Turner's findings for 1944–1950.[4]

---

[1] "Democracy" is a term that has been assigned many different, but not necessarily mutually exclusive, meanings. In this paper, the notion of a competitive struggle of elites for the electorate's vote is stressed. A statement of this view of democracy is Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947), pp. 269–273.

[2] Julius Turner, "Primary Elections as the Alternative to Party Competition in 'Safe' Districts," *Journal of Politics*, 15 (May, 1953), 197–210, at 198.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 210.

[4] All data for 1944–1950, except where specified, are from the tables and text of Turner's article. In some instances Turner's data have been manipulated. All election results for 1964 through 1972 are from Richard M. Scammon, ed., *America Votes*, vols. 6–10 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Governmental Affairs Institute, 1965–1974). The 1974 primary election results are from the appropriate number of *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. CQ Weekly Report*, 5 April 1975, pp. 716–723, is the source of 1974 general election returns.

Sections of the United States are defined as follows: *South*: Ala., Ark., Fla., Ga., La., Miss., N.C., S.C., Tenn., Texas, Va.; *Northeast*: Conn., Del., Me., Mass., N.H., N.J., N.Y., Penn., R.I., Vt.; *Border*: Ky., Md., Mo., Okla., W.VA.; *Central*: Ill., Ind., Iowa, Ks., Mich., Minn., Neb., N.D., Ohio, S.D., Wisc.; *West*: Alaska, Ariz., Calif., Colo., Hawaii, Idaho, Mont., Nev., N.M., Ore., Utah, Wash., Wyo.

"Safe" Districts[5]

"The major conclusion to be drawn from analysis of Congressional general elections," Turner declared in 1953, "is that the one-party area is a problem for every section of the country, both metropolitan and rural, and is not limited to the South and a few states in the North. . . "[6] For the most part, this conclusion also summarizes the 1964–1974 data. There are important differences, however, between the two periods.

Outside the South, for every five elections won with 60 per cent or more of the total vote between 1944 and 1950, more than seven elections were likely to be this one-sided from 1964 through 1974. In the South, the frequency of party competition (as defined in note 5) was more than four times higher in the later period. This increase is, of course, a manifestation of the cracking of the "Solid Democratic South" by Republican House candidates.

Turner found that competitive elections occurred more often in metropolitan than in rural districts. In the last decade, elections in urban districts were the ones least likely to give rise to party competition.

Across the United States, the percentage of House elections in which the winner received at least 60 per cent of the votes cast, rose from 55.6 during 1944–1950 to 64.8 from 1964 through 1974.[7] This increase in the frequency of noncompetitive elections has been traced to greater incumbent strength at the polls.[8]

David Mayhew has argued that the decrease in the number of marginal House seats—those in which a disproportionately high number of partisan turnovers occur—has allowed the House to "become insulated from presidential and partisan electoral currents."[9] Yet the 1964 and 1974 general elections and the subsequent role of the Democratic freshmen who had just replaced Republican incumbents are illustration enough

[5] Adopting Turner's usage, the term "safe district" is merely a shorthand for "a district in which the winner of the House election received 60 per cent or more of the total vote." An election in which the winner receives less than 60 per cent of the total vote is defined in this analysis as an election with party competition.

[6] Turner, p. 201.

[7] At least since 1896 most House election winners have received 60 per cent or more of the two-party vote. See Cortez A. M. Ewing, "Primaries as Real Elections," *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*, 29 (March, 1949), 293–298, and David R. Mayhew, "Congressional Elections: The Case of the Vanishing Marginals," *Polity*, 6 (Spring, 1974), 295–317.

[9] David R. Mayhew, "Congressional Representation: Theory and Practice in Drawing the Districts," in *Reapportionment in the 1970s*, ed. Nelson W. Polsby (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 249–285, at 268.

Table 1. Number of House Elections Won with 60 Per Cent or More of Total Vote, Ten General Elections, 1944–1950, and 1964–1974 Compared, by Sections

		1944–1950							
Section	House Seats	1944	1946	1948	1950			Total	Per Cent
South	105	99	99	99	98			395	94.0
Northeast	121	56	65	46	57			224	46.3
Border	42	11	10	20	21			62	36.9
Central	118	50	63	36	58			207	43.9
West	49	19	22	21	17			79	40.3
All Sections	435	235	259	222	251			967	55.6
		1964–1974							
Section	House Seats[a]	1964	1966	1968	1970	1972	1974	Total	Per Cent
South	106	75	82	74	93	82	78	484	75.6
Northeast	109	63	62	70	67	71	64	397	61.5
Border	36	29	24	19	29	30	26	157	73.4
Central	115	42	68	76	73	75	54	388	56.9
West	69	35	45	46	50	50	39	265	61.9
All Sections	435	244	281	285	312	308	261	1691	64.8

Source: 1944–1950—Turner, p. 199, Table I except for Delaware (1944–1950), Connecticut (1944–1950), and Rhode Island (1944–1946) which are taken from the relevant volumes of the *Congressional Directory* and added to the Northeast. 1964–1974 see note 4.

[a] For 1972 and 1974, the number of House seats for each section was South–108, Northeast–105, Border–35, Central–111, and West–76.

hat the House is not, at least presently, impervious o all shifts in public sentiment.

The final opportunity for electoral competition or House seats is the general election. But it is not he first: "much of our politics is intraparty, not nterparty politics."[10]

Close Primaries in "Safe" Districts

The nomination process is of most importance n districts lacking animated party competition. These are are the districts in which, as the saying goes, the primary is the real election. Have House primaries really offered the electorate realistic political alternatives in one-party districts? A preliminary answer to this inquiry can be arrived at by examining the nomination process of the party winning the November election in the safe districts identified above.

In order for a primary to be considered an alternative to party competition its outcome must be *uncertain* to the candidates and their backers. For our purposes, primaries in which the winner defeated his nearest challenger by "less than 2 to 1 are considered close contests, comparable to the contests in general elections in two-party areas."[11] Although arbitrary, this is a widely used cut-off point and one that pleases notions of what is electoral uncertainty in primary elections.

Twenty-two years ago, Julius Turner concluded that "the primary is not a successful alternative to two-party competition in most parts of the United States."[12] Once more his conclusion also holds for the last decade. Again, however, there are important differences between the two periods.

A drop-off in the proportion of safe districts with a close primary occurred in all sections of the nation, in all types of districts, and in districts both with and without entered incumbents. Southern states, Border states, nonurban districts, and districts with an entered incumbent showed the largest declines.

Republican North Dakota and Republican Vermont were the states in which the primary was the most effective substitute to party competition from 1944 through 1950. During 1964–1974, the primary was most effective in the Democratic cities of New York and Baltimore.

Across the nation, from 1944 through 1950, primaries supplied real competition in 22.2 per cent of the safe districts. In the last decade, only 9.1 per cent of those elected to the U.S. House from a safe district had to survive a close primary.

Increased tenure in office is an obvious result of the decline in the frequency of competitive elections and of close primaries in safe districts. Longer average continuous service by House members is bound up with a heavy reliance on the criterion of committee seniority as a mechanism for distributing committee and subcommittee chairmanships, an increased stability of House leadership, the growth of the "congressional career," and, more generally, a rigidification of organizational patterns.

Incumbents were quite successful in gaining renomination in safe districts during both periods. In the minority of those quests for renomination in which they were forced into a contested primary, incumbents won consistently and usually by better than 2 to 1 over their nearest challenger. High success rates for incumbents and an increase in the

Table 2. Safe House Districts with Close Winning Party Primary, Ten Election Years, 1944–1950, and 1964–1974 Compared, by Sections

Section	Number of Safe Districts	Number of Safe Districts with Close Primaries[a]	Per Cent
	1944–1950		
South	395	118	29.9
Northeast[b]	222	29	13.1
Border	62	20	32.3
Central	207	36	17.4
West	79	11	13.9
All Sections	965	214	22.2
	1964–1974		
South	484	58	12.0
Northeast[c]	397	39	9.8
Border	157	14	8.9
Central	388	22	5.7
West	265	21	7.9
All Sections	1691	154	9.1

Source: 1944–1950 is equivalent to Turner, p. 204, Table III. For 1964–1974 see note 4.

[a] As previously defined, a close primary is one in which the winner failed to double the vote of his nearest rival. For districts in which both a regular and run-off primary were held, the closer of the two was used in the calculations.

[b] Delaware (one representative) and Connecticut (six) had no provision for House primaries during the 1944–1950 period. Rhode Island (two) had no provisions for House primaries for the 1944 and 1946 elections. Thus the two districts (out of 32) in which a House candidate received 60 per cent or more of the November election vote are excluded from further analysis in Tables 2, 3, and 4.

[c] Though Delaware had no provision for a House primary until 1970, its one representative did not receive 60 per cent or more of the vote in 1964, 1966, or 1968. There is thus no effect upon the number of safe districts analyzed.

[10] V. O. Key, Jr., *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups*, 5th ed. (New York: Crowell, 1964), p. 435.

[11] Turner, "Primary Elections as the Alternative," p. 203.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 210.

Table 3. Primary Results in Safe Districts with Entered Incumbent, Ten Election Years, 1944–1950, and 1964–1974 Compared, by Sections

Section	Number of Safe Districts	Incumbent Lost		Incumbent Won		
		Close	Futile	Close	Futile	No Contest
			1944–1950			
South	371	21	2	78	103	167
Northeast	206	3	0	20	34	149
Border	57	3	0	13	23	18
Central	198	5	0	26	56	111
West	76	1	0	7	41	27
All Sections	908	33	2	144	257	472
			1964–1974[a]			
South	449	4	0	31	105	309
Northeast	374	6	0	21	84	263
Border	150	2	0	7	75	66
Central	366	1	1	11	71	282
West	253	2	0	14	68	169
All Sections	1592	15	1	84	403	1089

Source: 1944–1950—Turner, p. 208, Table V. For 1964–1974 see note 4. Incumbency status verified in *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 1964, 1966, 1968, 1970, 1972, and 1974, relevant numbers.

[a] Not included are 12 safe districts in which pairs of incumbents competed in the primary. Their distribution was South 2, Northeast 5, Border 1, Central 4, and West 0. All contest results were close except for the one in the Border section.

Table 4. Primary Results in Safe Districts without Entered Incumbent, Ten Election Years, 1944–1950, and 1964–1974 Compared, by Sections

Section	Number of Safe Districts	Close	Futile	No Contest
		1944–1950		
South	24	19	4	1
Northeast	16	6	3	7
Border	5	4	0	1
Central	9	5	3	1
West	3	3	0	0
All Sections	57	37	10	10
		1964–1974		
South	33	21	8	4
Northeast	18	7	6	5
Border	6	5	1	0
Central	18	6	6	6
West	12	5	4	3
All Sections	87	44	25	18

Source: 1944–1950—Turner, p. 209, Table VI. For 1964–1974 see note 4.

proportion of incumbents enjoying a comfortable margin of victory characterize House elections and primaries in safe districts over the last three decades.

Electoral Competition for the U.S. House

Voters may be offered realistic alternatives in the primary or the general election. Likewise, a House candidate may be defeated in either. Now considered are the proportion of House races with party and/or primary competition[13] and the ratio of competitive elections to close primaries in safe districts—a valid indicator of the relative importance of interparty and intraparty politics.

In all sections of the United States the proportion of races for U.S. House seats with either party or primary competition was lower from 1964 to 1974 than during the 1944–1950 period. This decline was substantial in all regions of the nation except the South. In the South, however, the focus of electoral competition switched from the Democratic primary to the November general election—the ratio of competitive elections to close primaries in safe districts was 1 to 4.7 from 1944 to 1950 but was 2.7 to 1 from 1964 through 1974. This reshuffling of the focus of electoral competition, which bought the South into line

[13] A House race consists of a nomination and an election. In this analysis, a nomination decided in a primary in which the winner defeated the next strongest candidate by less than 2 to 1 is considered a nomination with primary competition. As defined in note 5, an election in which the winner receives less than 60 per cent of the total vote is an election with party competition. A House race with either party or primary competition is termed a competitive race.

Table 5. Electoral Competition in House Races, Ten Election Years, 1944–1950, and 1964–1974 Compared, by Sections

Section	Years	House Races[a]	Elections Won with Less than 60 Per Cent of Total Vote	Safe Districts with a Close Primary	Percentage of Races Competitive[b]
South	1944–1950	420	25	118	34.0
	1964–1974	640	156	58	33.4
Northeast	1944–1950	484	260	29	59.7
	1964–1974	646	249	39	44.6
Border	1944–1950	168	106	20	75.0
	1964–1974	214	57	14	33.2
Central	1944–1950	472	265	36	63.8
	1964–1974	682	294	22	46.3
West	1944–1950	196	117	11	65.3
	1964–1974	428	163	21	43.0
All Sections	1944–1950	1740	773	214	56.7
	1964–1974	2610	919	154	41.1

Source: Tables 1 and 2.

[a] The number of races is the product of seats and general elections.

[b] See note 14.

with the pattern characteristic of all the other sections during both 1944–1950 and 1964–1974, is but another indicator of the "erosion of sectionalism."[14]

Across the nation, metropolitan races were more likely to be competitive than rural ones from 1944 to 1950. In the last decade, urban races were the ones least likely to be competitive.

From 1944 through 1950, 56.7 per cent of those elected to the United States House of Representatives were confronted with party and/or primary competition in their quest for House membership. In the last six election years, only 41.1 per cent ran similar risks.

The low proportion of House races in which voters are offered true political alternatives is a departure from a basic norm of our American democracy: competitive elections. Between the unattainable ideal of full competition and "the cases in which all competition with the established leader is prevented by force," Joseph Schumpeter has reminded us, "there is a continuous range of variation within which the democratic method of government shades off into the autocratic one by imperceptible steps."[15]

HARVEY L. SCHANTZ
The Johns Hopkins University

[14] As in V. O. Key, Jr., "The Erosion of Sectionalism," *Virginia Quarterly Review*, 31 (Spring, 1955), 161–179.

[15] Schumpeter, p. 271. The comments of Milton C. Cummings, Jr., Alan J. Eade, Robert L. Peabody, Stephen V. Stephens, and two anonymous *Review* referees are gratefully acknowledged.

Social Change and Political Mobilization in the United States: A Methodological Note

TO THE EDITOR:

In a recent issue of the *Review*, I advanced and tested a causal model of the process of political mobilization in the United States.[1] Since that time, I have come to realize that a more appropriate perspective on that data is available, and that a new method of generating the base correlations yields markedly improved results. This note describes that alternative method, and indicates that the model is appropriate as originally identified, but with an increase in explained variance of over 30 per cent when compared with the prior method. In addition, the data for the decade 1960–1970, are incorporated to update the model.

The previous paper treated each decennial census period as a sample. The magnitude of each variable for each state was treated as an observation. Averaged correlation matrices for several census periods were developed for analysis.

While this method does introduce an element of longitudinal analysis into the research, it is definitely not the nicest available procedure. An alternative is to treat each state as a sample. The magnitude of each variable at successive decennial periods is observed, and a correlation matrix is generated for each state. The process relationship

[1] Jesse F. Marquette, "Social Change and Political Mobilization in the United States: 1870–1960" *American Political Science Review*, 68 (September, 1974), 1058–1074.

between each of the variables is captured by this procedure, since we are conducting a truly longitudinal analysis. The next step is to average these matrices across states, which yields one averaged matrix with a reliability equivalent to the number of original observations less the degrees of freedom lost in averaging.


Two problems arise when using this method, or in fact when conducting any longitudinal analysis. First it is necessary to identify the most appropriate functional form of the relationship between the variables, since they will not all be linear, and second, we must consider the problem of serial correlation. In Tables 1 and 2, the actual functional forms are given for each of the three link equations in the model. Since 48 states were included in the analysis, and there are three nontrivial regressions in the model, the possibility of auto-correlation existed for 144 separate relations. Of those 144 relations, only 14, or 9.7%, indicated a possibility of auto-correlation when subjected to the Durbin-Watson test.[2] This result is slightly misleading since the available bounds for the Durbin-Watson test are calculated only to $N=14$. The probability is that an exact test would indicate no auto correlation.

The correlations which are reported in this re-

[2] J. Durbin and G. S. Watson, "Testing for Serial Correlation in Least Squares Regression II," *Biometrika*, 38 (June, 1951), 159–178.

Table 1. Analysis for the Averaged Matrices 1870–1960

Model and Link Correlations



Partials

Relation	Original r	r	Partial r	r^2	Proportional Reduction
IE.M	.9403	88.4%	.3168	10.0%	88.7%
MP.*E*	.8780	77.1%	.0711	.5%	99.4%
IP.ME	.8275	68.5%	.2161	4.7%	93.1%

Regression Analysis

$$I \xrightarrow{+.75\%} M \xrightarrow{+.09\%} E \xrightarrow{81.49\%} P$$


Relation	R	R^2	Direct Additional Variance
P.E	.9027	81.49%	81.49%
P.EM	.9032	81.58%	.09%
P.EMI	.9073	82.33%	.75%
E.M	.9635	92.83%	92.83%
E.MI	.9672	93.55%	.72%

Functional Forms

Relation	Equation
M on I	$M = a + b \log I + e$
E on M	$E = a + bM + e$
P on E	$P = a + b \log E + e$

Table 2. Analysis for the Averaged Matrices 1870–1970

Model and Link Correlations



Partials

Relation	Original	r^2	Partial r	r^2	Proportional Reduction in r^2
IE.M	.9553	91.3%	.3136	9.8%	89.3%
MP.E	.8670	75.2%	.1847	3.4%	95.5%
IP.ME	.8348	69.7%	.0906	.8%	98.9%

Regression Analysis

$$I \xrightarrow{+.07\%} M \xrightarrow{+.84\%} E \xrightarrow{75.46\%} P$$

Relation	R	R^2	Direct Additional Variance
P.E	.8687	75.46%	75.46%
P.EM	.8734	76.30%	.84%
P.EMI	.8738	76.37%	.07%
E.M	.9743	94.92%	94.92%
E.MI	.9768	95.42%	.50%

Functional Forms

Relation	Equation
M on I	$M = a + b \log I + e$
E on M	$E = a + bM + e$
P on E	$P = a + b \log E + e$

search are extremely high for social science data. It is necessary, therefore, to consider whether or not the correlations are spurious. If two variables grow in magnitude through time, then it is likely that these variables will show a high degree of covariation. It is possible that the observed covariation is spurious, resulting simply from mutual growth. High correlations are not, therefore, *prima facie* evidence of a reliable causal relationship.

If, for good theoretical reasons, we expect high correlations between variables, and in addition expect a particular pattern of relations between variables, then we may use both expectations in conjunction as a source of mutual validation. If the expected *pattern* of correlations holds, that is if the expected model is identifiable, then the existence of the pattern may be used to justify the nonspuriousness of the high *magnitude* of the observed correlations. Further confirmation of the validity of these results is provided by the initial successful identification of the model using cross-sectional procedures.

Table 1 presents the model and analysis for the period 1870 to 1960 to allow comparison with the earlier results.

Table 2 presents the updated version, 1870 to 1970, and also confirms the identified model.

Figures 1 a–c present a plot of the three link relations for the state of California from 1870 to




Figure 1. Plot of three link relations for the State of California: 1870–1970

1970, to illustrate that the high correlations are not due to outliers.

This analysis reconfirms the results presented in the earlier paper, but with very significant improvement in the level of explained variance. The success of this methodology suggests that it would be most appropriate for many other forms of comparative research that are currently relying on cross-sectional analysis.

JESSE F. MARQUETTE

University of Akron

Development and Strategy in Latin America

TO THE EDITOR:

In the June 1975 issue of this *Review* Robert L. Ayres raises a number of very important questions about the benefits of the development strategy which has been pursued in Latin America in the postwar period. He argues that this strategy has not only failed to produce high growth rates; it has exacerbated and even created serious problems such as inequality, unemployment, and structural dependence. The solution, in his view, is a radi-

cally different approach to development: an approach "emphasizing distribution over growth and concentrating on policy measures designed to produce 'livable' rather than wealthy societies" (p. 507). At a time when the benefits of affluence or "growth for growth's sake" are being questioned by the North American public, it is likely that his views will be received sympathetically. However, certain difficulties should not pass unnoticed.

Perhaps the central weakness of Ayres's argument is logical. He convincingly argues that existing development policies have been unsuccessful for political reasons, yet he proceeds to propose a set of alternative policies without seriously considering the problem of implementation. While readers of the *APSR* may find a touch of utopian thinking refreshing, the utility of any specific policy prescription is obviously related to the question of feasibility. Ayres recognizes this when he evaluates the high-growth, high-investment strategy and rejects it on the grounds that "it is hard to see the political factors that account for the historically low rates of savings and investment in Latin America changing over the long run" (p. 516). I find it equally hard to see the political factors which have rendered existing redistribution policies ineffective (e.g., progressive income taxation and land reform) changing over the long run. To suggest that the emergence of "effective, developed polities" is a necessary condition for the policies of "livability" (p. 524) is merely to evade the central issue. Insofar as political realities render existing policies ineffective, they will have the same effect on Ayres's proposals.

Ayres's case for rejecting growth strategies in favor of distribution is also weak. To the extent that the issue is genuinely one of alternatives, one doubts that an emphasis on redistribution would create "livable" societies in impoverished countries such as Haiti or El Salvador. Even in relatively prosperous countries, an emphasis on redistribution at the expense of investment and growth produces rather dismal social and political consequences, as the case of Uruguay demonstrates all too clearly.

But more fundamentally, the relationship between distribution and growth depends on a variety of factors such as the distribution of power and wealth in a society, the organization of production, the level of economic development, the pattern of social mobility and the dispersal of income by factor shares, socioeconomic groups, occupations, geographical regions, and sectors of the economy. Ayres does a disservice by minimizing these complexities in order to present a dramatic choice between "livability" and wealth. It should be remembered that the Latin American nation which has had the most effective redistribution, namely Cuba, also has one of the highest rates of savings and national investment in economic growth. It is clear that the Cubans do not view redistribution as an alternative to growth, but as a political necessity for achieving higher growth.

Furthermore, import-substitution policies have not proved nearly as disastrous for redistribution as Ayres suggests. In Argentina import-substitution development has proceeded further than elsewhere in Latin America. On the basis of Ayres's analysis, one would thus expect the most unequal distribution of income in Latin America. In fact, however, the distribution of income in Argentina is not only one of the most egalitarian in the region; it is considerably more equal than in France, Canada, Ireland, Finland and Norway (C. L. Taylor and M. C. Hudson, eds., *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*, 2nd ed. [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972], pp. 263–64).

The difficulty in assessing distribution patterns is that everything depends on where one is looking. Economic growth can be associated with growing equality in one range of income distribution and growing inequality in another. Cross-national comparisons indicate that concentration of income tends to decrease with the level of economic development, because of the increase in income shares received by the middle range of the distribution (Nancy Baster, *Distribution of Income and Economic Growth: Concepts and Issues* [Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1970], pp. 19–33). The fragmentary evidence on longitudinal changes in Latin American income distribution suggests that the relative position of the top 5 per cent of the population has improved in countries with low growth rates and worsened in those with high growth rates (ECLA, *Income Distribution in Latin America* [New York: United Nations, 1971] pp. 51, 59, 68–69, 87–88). Since concentration of income in the top 5 per cent is the chief source of inequality in Latin America, this evidence indicates that if one looks at upper-class groups, there is a positive trade-off between growth and distribution. On the other hand, there is also evidence of a reduction in income shares received by the poorest 50 per cent of income units in Latin American countries with high growth rates (*ibid.*). This pattern is similar to that found in the U.S. where the share of income received by the poorest and wealthiest groups has tended to decline over time (Robert Girling, "Dependency and Persistent Income Inequality," in *The Structures of Dependency*, ed. Frank Bonilla and Robert Girling [Stanford, California: n.p. 1973], p. 96). Thus perhaps the issue is not so much the failure of existing policies in Latin America as it is the general framework of growth in a capitalist system.

In the last analysis it seems inappropriate to suggest from the pages of a prestigious North American journal that Latin Americans abandon growth as a basic goal and reconcile themselves to the status of permanent economic underdevelopment. As Latin Americans have become increasingly sensitive to the issue of *dependencia*, they will surely wonder whether this suggestion will meet their needs or those of U.S. corporations. Ayres asks, "Does Latin America need social scientists capable of analyzing the demographic correlates of municipal budgets using the IBM 360?" (p. 522). This type of capability is precisely what Latin Americans require to generate their own development policies designed to confront basic social and political problems and avoid the imposition of oversimplified models offered by North Americans.

KAREN L. REMMER
University of New Mexico

TO THE EDITOR:

Questions concerning the politics of poverty-oriented development strategies raise difficult and complex issues. Prof. Remmer seems to identify the central issue as "the general framework of growth in a capitalist system," and this is certainly in line with an increasingly prevalent view among Latin Americanists in the United States. Indeed, one might summarize reams of recent "theorizing" about Latin American politics in a few sentences. Thus: Latin American countries, Cuba excepted, are "dependent capitalist" states. They lack a growth-promoting "national bourgeoisie" because the most powerful political actors are closely tied to foreign capital and interests. They are thus structurally inhibited from pursuing poverty-oriented strategies because these would transform the status quo from which the elites derive benefit. In such political systems, policies designed to combat poverty would be mere palliatives at best and probably counterproductive. The only real solution lies in the revolutionary uprooting of the dependent capitalist system and its wholesale replacement by some variant of socialism.

This is obviously not the place to debate such controversial points. Briefly, I believe that so great an emphasis upon "the general framework of growth in a capitalist system" structures the analysis in a way which does not do justice to the complexities of politics in Latin American countries. Of course, much depends on what one means by "politics." I happen to be interested in mechanisms and strategies for producing change in "reformist" regimes, in populistic regimes, and even in corporatist-authoritarian ones. I am interested in these questions because of my general belief that the likelihood of additional revolutionary regimes in the proximate future of Latin America is nil and my further belief that not everything has to change before anything can change. If there is anything "impractical" at the moment, it would appear to be waiting for the revolution. In the present stage of my intellectual development. I agree with Robert A. Packenham that "the world is simply too complex and variegated to be satisfactorily ordered in terms of any of the extant total pictures"—including, I might add, the total picture of "the general framework of growth in a capitalist system." (Robert A. Packenham, *Liberal America and the Third World* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973], p. 356.)

Having said this, I hasten to add that in my article I explicitly noted (p. 524) that "an equity-emphasizing Third World socialism may be the most fruitful in terms of compatibility" (with livability emphases). This may or may not be the case. But, failing the socialist alternative, it will not do to dismiss my policy prescriptions as merely "utopian." Among other things, this would place countries like South Korea and Taiwan in the category of utopias—hardly an apt classification. These and other countries have adopted many of the sorts of policies I recommend and have achieved greater equity (though not utopia) in so doing. Similarly, the poverty-oriented lending of the World Bank is perhaps inaccurately characterized if labeled utopian. I see nothing utopian, for example, in the Bank's recent $110 million loan for an integrated rural development project in Mexico. (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *World Bank Annual Report 1975* [Washington, D.C., 1975], p. 55.) It is no doubt true that there are formidable problems of implementation and that many of these problems are "political," but I do not think we can label the policies utopian on this ground alone. This sort of cavalier dismissal results in the neglect of many of the important events occurring in the field of contemporary international development. As I stated in my article (p. 524): "It will also be necessary to explore the politics of income redistribution, technological adaptation, or rural development from a comparative perspective." I am currently devoting a year's research leave to this and allied tasks, and my tentative conclusion is that their study suggests numerous fascinating and unlikely outcomes. Of course "the utility of any specific policy prescriptions is obviously related to the question of feasibility." Prof. Remmer apparently feels that I have exaggerated the feasibility of many policies. I feel that her orientation precludes even looking at things which I consider important.

Prof. Remmer further argues that "the relationship between distribution and growth depends on a variety of factors such as the distribution of

power and wealth in a society, the organization of production, the level of economic development, the pattern of social mobility and the dispersal of income by factor shares, socioeconomic groups, occupations, geographical regions, and sectors of the economy."[2] I think it is clear that writing on this potpourri of factors would have necessitated two or three books instead of one article. She maintains that "everything depends on where one is looking." I was looking at the relationship between distribution and growth, and this is by no means a misplaced emphasis. In the period since I wrote the article (mid-1972), much has been written on this topic. A popular conclusion is that "income inequality first increases and then decreases with development. . . . (T)he objectives of growth and equity may not be in conflict." (Hollis Chenery et al., *Redistribution With Growth* [London: Oxford University Press], p. 17.) This "have our cake and eat it too" answer may be accurate; I hope it is. Nevertheless, I remain somewhat skeptical. For the fact is that Cuba, to which Prof. Remmer refers in this connection, showed piddling growth rates from 1960 to 1970 in comparison with five other developing countries in a recent well-documented study. (*Ibid.*, p. 253.) Indeed, curiously enough, one of the principal conclusions of the study was that "*except for Cuba*, redistribution has been accompanied by significant growth. . . . " (*Ibid.*, p. 255. My italics.) I am not trying to minimize complexities at all; maybe the Cubans are.

Prof. Remmer's reference to Argentina is rather amusing since she commits precisely the error of which she accuses me. She omits, that is, any reference to *political* phenomena. One would not expect, on the basis of my analysis, Argentine income distribution to be the most unequal in Latin America unless one knew nothing of Peronism as a political movement and the economic policy emphases thereof. I spent much of 1974 conducting field research in Argentina, and I can assure Prof. Remmer that questions concerning possible tradeoffs between growth and distribution, the fate of small- and medium-scale industry, the future role of agriculture, the development of intermediate technology, and the export-inhibiting effects of import substitution are live issues of political and economic debate.

Finally, I should comment briefly on the last paragraph of Prof. Remmer's letter. In the first place, I did not recommend that Latin Americans *abandon* growth. I talked about a possible lowering of the *rate* of growth and about how high aggregate growth rates with reliance upon "trickle-down" distributive effects seemed increasingly ill-advised. It is a gross oversimplification of my arguments to suggest that I was only talking about the equal distribution of the current stock of bananas in Central America. Second, I am dismayed (but not at all surprised) by the questioning of the "appropriateness" of my article for publication in "a prestigious North American journal." In a liberal society, judgments concerning "appropriateness" are inordinately complex and generally resolved, for better or worse, in the market place of ideas. In other kinds of societies, including most in Latin America, such judgments are generally far easier to render. This is yet another unfortunate feature of their underdevelopment.

ROBERT L. AYRES
Guest Scholar
The Brookings Institution
Washington, D.C.

China and the Taiwan Question

TO THE EDITOR:

In his review of my book, *China and the Question of Taiwan: Documents and Analysis*, (*American Political Science Review*, Vol. 69 [March, 1975], 363–364), Allen S. Whiting makes a number of unfair and ill-founded statements that deserve a rebuke. For example, Whiting castigated me for omitting Lung-chu Chen and Harold D. Lasswell's *Formosa, China and the United Nations* (1967) in the "Selected Bibliography." This is most unfair since Whiting himself acknowledged that the book is a "presently irrelevant tome"; if that is so, what is wrong with omitting it in a bibliography which is supposed to be selective? Also, Whiting failed, and apparently purposely, to acknowledge that I did include Lung-chu Chen and W. M. Reisman's "Who Owns Taiwan: A Search for International Title?" (*Yale Law Journal*, 81 [March 1972]) in the selected bibliography. The article is more current and relevant to the Taiwan question since it represents the latest view of an advocate of the Taiwanese independence movement, while the earlier book is, as correctly pointed out by Whiting, now "irrelevant."

Whiting's simplistic interpretation of the impact of the February 1972 Sino-American communique on the legal status of Taiwan also needs clarification. According to Whiting, the issue of the legal status of Taiwan has been "overtaken" by the communique. However, senior U.S. foreign service officials denied that the communique represented any change in the position held by the U.S. since 1950, i.e., that the status of Taiwan is as yet undetermined (see the then Assistant Secretary of State Marshall Green's view reported in *Mainichi Daily News*, March 29, 1972, p. 2). Furthermore, the U.S. commitment in the communique is: It does not challenge the position taken by "all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait . . . [that] there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of

China." The communique does not legally prohibit the U.S. from changing its position if in the future the Chinese on one side of the Taiwan Strait change their mind on the status of Taiwan.

Finally, it must be pointed out that, except for an American contributor, Whiting made unfair statements on all Chinese contributors to my book and almost one half of the review was devoted to attacking Professor Wei, though he never spelled Wei's name correctly in the entire review, for which Professor Wei will respond in a separate letter.

HUNGDAH CHIU
University of Maryland Law School

TO THE EDITOR:

Professor Allen Whiting's review of my chapter in Hungdah Chiu's book on *China and the Question of Taiwan* (*APSR*, March, 1975) is a typical example of a "non-review" in which the reviewer avoids a frontal attack on the approach, method, and data base of a work but indulges in skirmishes on the irrelevant. He offers two "comments," and only two, on my contribution. First, he asserts that I have "professional and personal ties" on Taiwan, therefore my writing on the island automatically "suffers." Second, he made the observation that my identification was "curiously omitted" from the biographical summaries in the back of the book, as if there is some unmentionable secrets.

The fact is: the biographical information on the contributors to Chiu's book was arranged alphabetically. My biographical data happened to be on the last page which, owing to an oversight of the publisher, was left out in the final binding process. Both the publisher and the editor wrote letters to me, expressing their regrets. As for the first "critique," if one accepts Whiting's argument that one's professional and personal ties with a country unavoidably weakens his writings about it, then few of the American scholars would be qualified to examine the problems relating to the United States and most of the immigré scholars would be disqualified to study the countries of their origin. And there would not be many left to examine the world's problems. How would Professor Whiting feel if one questions the quality of his writing on American foreign policy toward China or other areas merely because he has been in the U.S. foreign service and has had other governmental connections?

Finally, if Professor Whiting is seriously interested in reviewing my work, he should at least know how to spell my name correctly. He mentioned my name twice in the review—the first time, Yang Wei and the second time, Yan Wei—both times incorrectly. For readers who would like to see a more serious review of my writings, I would recommend the reviews on my work in *China Quarterly*, *American Journal of International Law* and in the book review section of *The Asian Students*.

YUNG WEI
Stanford University

TO THE EDITOR:

I am grateful to Professors Hungdah Chiu and Yung Wei for calling my attention to errors in my review of the book, *China and the Question of Taiwan: Documents and Analysis*. I was remiss in not checking the galley proof more closely and I apologize for the misspelling of Professor Wei's first name. I appreciate learning that the omission of his identification was the fault of the publisher. Finally my interpretation of the Sino-American communique of February 1972 was more political than legal as Professor Chiu properly points out. The wording and nature of that document does not resolve the legal status of Taiwan once and for all.

I reject, however, the implications as well as the specific allegations in Professor Chiu's final paragraph. Professor Ting-yee Kuo's assertion that "Taiwan suffered the most" of all China under the Japanese is flatly and correctly contradicted by Professor Ramon Myer's essay which I quoted. If this is "unfair," so be it. Only two sentences and not "almost one half" of the review criticized Professor Wei's contribution. After living on Taiwan for ten months in 1974–75 I retain my original judgment concerning the constraints on native scholars in sensitive areas of political development there. But regardless of my review and whatever reactions it may have unintentionally aroused, my respect for Professor Wei remains high both on the basis of personal participation with him in academic conferences and his consistent dedication to the application of social science concepts and methods in the analysis of Taiwanese society.

Last and least, surely I have not "castigated" Professor Chiu by simple reference to the "curious omission" of a book from his bibliography.

ALLEN S. WHITING
University of Michigan

Stability of Partisan Attachments

TO THE EDITOR:

Douglas Dobson and Douglas St. Angelo's article in the *APSR*, June, 1975, proposes to test three hypotheses. Hypothesis One deals with stability of partisan attachments. The authors conclude that there are "rather clear patterns of variation in party attachments over time." This conclusion supports the conclusions of other scholars. However, even given that replication may be im-

portant, the article is misleading at this point.

The authors present a novel conceptualization of partisan stability which is then employed in testing a later hypothesis. Yet, the discussion of Hypothesis One ignores the operationalization used in the later section of the article. The data in this first part of the paper are presented so that an interested reader finds it impossible to construct anything like the "Change of Party Identification" variable which is employed later. If validation of the "Change of Party Identification" variable is a hidden purpose of this section, that purpose is never achieved.

The second hypothesis deals with the relationship between political information and vote switching. The "floating-voter hypothesis" posits an inverse relationship between media attention and vote switching. Dobson and St. Angelo conclude: "a reconsideration of the floating-voter hypothesis suggests that voters with low media involvement do not seem to be disproportionately represented among floaters. Rather, voters who switched their vote between elections modally tended to be in the higher involvement categories" (p. 489).

This could be an important finding. Yet, it is so flawed as to render questionable the rest of the research presented in the article. The question as stated by these authors and by their predecessors carries with it implications for democratic theory. The floating-voter hypothesis may be restated to say that those who are least involved have the most to do with electoral outcomes. Dobson and St. Angelo argue that this is not true. I wish that this conclusion had validity.

Dobson and St. Angelo base their conclusion on the observation that the modal percentage of floating voters is found toward the higher end of media involvement. Use of the mode as an indicator masks the fact that voters with stable voting patterns were more likely to be highly involved than were floaters. Using the authors' data, definitions, and approach, the following simple table (with $\chi^2 = 36.76$, $df = 1$, $p < .001$) can be constructed to show the relationship between vote stability and media involvement.

Level of Involvement	*Stable Voters*	*Floaters*
Low (0–2)	34%	52%
High (3–4)	66	48
N	653	349

Dobson and St. Angelo have seriously misled their readers by seeking to prove a hypothesis and no amount of obfuscation such as one finds in the following passage can correct the error.

> It must be noted that these results do not, however, deny the central thrust of both Converse's and Dreyer's analysis of the interelection hypothesis—i.e., that voting stability tends to increase with levels of involvement. Rather, it is simply being argued that increasing vote/vote stability as a function of level of involvement does not imply decreasing rates of floating as a function of involvement (p. 487).

Both voting stability and floating are functions of involvement and the point can be demonstrated rather easily. The first step is to look at how and why the question is asked. The Dobson and St. Angelo article is concerned with explaining the behavior of floating voters and shifting partisans. What if one were to change the question, and ask what the ramifications of media involvement are (as Dobson and St. Angelo did anyway in the disclaimer quoted above)? As the figure below indicates, there is a linear decrease in the probability of floating votes as media involvement increases among voters.

Finally, the reader comes to the meat of the article in Hypothesis Three: "the highly involved voter, who is likely to be more constrained in his partisan attitudes than are voters of low involvement, is more likely to alter his party attachment so that it is consonant with his current vote intention than are voters of low involvement" (p. 488). The authors find a linear relationship between change in party identification and vote switching for voters in the high media involvement category only.


The measure of change of party identification employed in testing Hypothesis Three may be highly misleading. Clearly, voters at the extremes cannot vary toward their party; they can only vary away from it. Independents (in any of the three categories) may vary toward or away from either of the parties to the extremities of the scale. How many of the changers in Figures 1 and 2 were 1956 independents and thus relatively unconstrained at the outset? The answer is not made available in the discussion of Hypothesis One where the 1956 and 1960 surveys are never directly compared.

Dobson and St. Angelo appear to have provided some basis for rejecting the hypothesis that voting and party identification are unaffected by current events (or at least their representation in the media). Voters who were highly involved with the media and who switched their vote between 1956 and 1960 behaved differently from uninvolved vote switchers. Yet the control variable, media attentiveness, has been shown to be a predictor of the dependent variable. Are Dobson and St. Angelo presenting a spurious relationship resulting from collinearity?

The authors' conclusion that "a completely random model of change of party attachment does not seem appropriate for the entire electorate" may be worthy of further investigation. Their hypothesis certainly could bring Converse's notion of "mass"

Figure 1

Increase in Media Attentativeness and Probability of Floating Votes (Voters only, $N = 1002$)



Regression Slope = −.09

	df	Chi-square
Total	4	38.06
Due to Regression	1	37.58
Due to Non-Linearity	3	.48

Key
———— Observed
– – – – – – Predicted Regression Line

(Data source: Dobson and St. Angelo, Table 6, page 488)

into question. But, putting questions about evidence and inference aside, neither this article nor its predecessors come to grips with Converse's hypothesis directly. Converse equates "mass" of stored information with partisan stability. No data are brought forward in the Dobson and St. Angelo article to suggest that this is incorrect. The article replicates Converse's assumption that "number of media attended" at time t is somehow an indicator of media attended at some previous time, $t-n$. Yet, Converse also observed that floating voters "show a high susceptibility to short-term change in partisan attitudes *provided that any new information reaches them at all.*" (*Elections and the Political Order*, p. 144, emphasis in original.) Dobson and St. Angelo could have tested this hypothesis. But all that we know about their "high information group" is that these voters were attentive to three or four media *in 1960*. This becomes more important when one takes account of the possibility that the party changers may disproportionately include voters from the independent categories—the voters who Converse hypothesized to be *least* constrained in their partisan attitudes.

A proper test would require that media attention be compared temporally in much the same manner as change in party identification is operationalized by Dobson and St. Angelo. Had this been done, the authors would have been able to differentiate between those who were regularly involved and those who somehow became involved in 1960. As is stands, the test and discussion of Hypothesis Three adds extremely little to the literature.

James W. Hottois
University of San Diego

To the Editor:

With an air of assured assertiveness, Professor Hottois takes our paper in the *APSR*, June, 1975, to task. He attacks our findings and methods and wishes that our findings had validity in order that he might have faith in liberal democracy. Hottois' opening attack is that our findings on partisan instability merely replicate the work of other scholars. We assume that our critic read the early sections of the paper, but we have been wrong before. To refresh his memory, we did indicate that Converse has touched on the question of partisan stability. Moreover, we noted that Dreyer examined partisan turnover in the 1956–60 SRC panel data, although he came to quite different conclusions than did Dobson and Meeter. Although we did not cite them, we are also aware that some popular writers and commercial survey organizations have drawn attention to shifting patterns in the marginal distributions of party attachment for the past five to seven years. We are not aware, however, that any of these commentaries or reports are based on panel data. If our findings are merely a restatement of established scholarly conclusions, Hottois could have done us all a favor by providing documentation for that point. In all fairness, we may on this point have misled some of our readers who are not familiar with the voting literature by saying on page 489 that our findings are in "agreement with other research." It would have been more accurate to have said that our findings are in agreement with some parts of some other more recent research.

We are next taken to task for our measure of partisan stability and change. Hottois complains that he cannot see the relationship between the conceptions of stability, interparty change and intraparty change utilized in the early part of the paper and the simple subtractive measure utilized to obtain a *numeraire* in the final portions of the paper. We can only assume that either Professor Hottois did not read the paper carefully or, alternatively,

that he sat down at his typewriter without thinking about the problem. To spell it out for him, a reading of footnote 26 will suggest, for example, that 1956 Strong Democrats who were *stable* would have received a score of zero if their 1960 party identification was subtracted from their 1956 party identification. Strong Democrats who made an *intraparty* move would have been scored 1 or 2, while those who made an *interparty* move would have been scored 3 or more (but collapsed to 2 in the final analysis because of N problems). The process is similar for other categories of identifiers. Perhaps Hottois is objecting to the fact that the full 7 by 7 tables are not presented in the paper. If that is the problem, we apologize. The full tables were in the original draft, but many readers of the draft felt that they were too cumbersome and difficult to follow. We will be happy to provide Professor Hottois with the original tables.

Next, Hottois objects to our patently true conclusion that "In a modal sense, . . . floating voters exhibit relatively high levels of political involvement." It is true that stable voters are slightly more likely to be highly involved than unstable voters. But Professor Hottois chooses cutting points for high and low media attention in order to dramatize the point. If he had chosen 1 as the cutting point, for example, he would have found about 90% of the stable voters and about 80% of the floating voters to be highly involved. Clearly there is a negative relationship in this table. Stable voters tend to be the most highly involved and consistent nonvoters tend to be the least involved. It must be noted, however, that the differences between involvement levels among stable voters and switchers is rather small. Indeed, stable voters followed an average of 2.81 media while switchers followed an average of 2.51 media. One-time voters followed an average of 2.25 media while consistent nonvoters followed an average of 1.87 media. The interpretation that makes sense to us is the one which we articulated in the original paper, i.e., that vote stability increases with media involvement, that vote switching is not related to media attention, and that nonvoting tends to decrease with increased media attention. Although we would not press the point without further analysis, we would suggest that these relatively involved vote switchers might offer some comfort to Professor Hottois's rather shaky belief in liberal democracy.

In his next point, Professor Hottois again chooses to ignore the relationship between nonvoting and media involvement. He redefines the sample to include voters only and looks at the linear trend between media involvement and floating. Not surprisingly—since vote stability increases with media attention and that the proportions must sum to one—he finds a decreasing probability of floating as media involvement increases. If Hottois had examined all of the relationships in the table, he would have found that stability increases with involvement (slope $=.14$, significant at .05); that there is almost no relationship between switching and involvement (slope $=-.003$, not significant); that one-time nonvoting tends to decrease slightly with involvement (slope $=-.04$, significant at .05) and that consistent nonvoting decreases rapidly (albeit nonlinearly) with involvement (slope $=-.09$, regression is significant at .05, as are departures from nonlinearity).

Next, Hottois objects to the fact that the standard measure of party identification is finite. Presumably, he would have liked to see categories such as "very strong Democrat" or "very extra strong Democrat." There is, of course, something of an infinite regression problem here. But how is it that the boundedness of the partisanship measure affects the analysis? All Hottois says is that independents were relatively unconstrained in terms of the direction of their moves relative, that is, to strong partisans of both parties. That is a fairly obvious point, but what is the implication? If we could figure out what question Hottois was raising, we would try to answer it. Then his problem shifts to his difficulties in deducing how many of the "changers" were 1956 independents. Presumably he is talking about change in partisan identification and is again objecting to table formats, i.e., the fact that Table 4 is not a 7 by 7 by 7 table that would permit calculation of the 1956–turnover table. For the record, we note that about 36 per cent of the 1956 Independents remained so in 1960. About 35 per cent moved toward the Democratic party and about 28 per cent moved toward the Republican party. Relative stability

Level of Involvement	Stable Voters	Vote Switchers	Nonvoters in One Election	Consistent Nonvoters
0	1.2	2.1	5.4	13.4
1	8.4	14.2	16.9	24.1
2	23.8	29.0	36.7	32.6
3	41.0	39.3	28.9	21.3
4	25.5	15.3	12.0	8.4
	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

and change rates were about the same in the 1956–60 period as in either of the other two-year periods. About 51 per cent of the sample made some kind of change between 1956 and 1960 (ignoring changes made in 1958). Of those who changed, about 13 per cent were independents. Overall, independents composed about 9 per cent of the total 1956 sample. That is not nearly as disproportionate as Hottois suggested.

Finally, we are criticized for not attempting to treat the dynamics of media attention. We agree with Professor Hottois that media attention should be treated as a dynamic variable, as should most of the other variables examined in voting studies. In fact, we have recently made some preliminary efforts along these lines. We have made at least enough effort to know that the test-retest correlation between media attention in 1956 and 1960 is an unimpressive .38 (tau-B); that there are some wording differences between the questions in 1956 and 1960; that the 1958 study contained no questions regarding media attention, and that the percentage of homes with televisions increased from 73 per cent in 1956 to 89.4 per cent in 1960. We also know that when one tries to treat vote change, change of party identication and change in level of media attention simultaneously, frequencies on the order of zero show up with disturbing regularity. Handling these and other problems relating to dynamic formulations of the electoral process creates a difficult design problem. We have not solved that problem, nor has Hottois, but apart from this we remain convinced that our findings and procedures are sound.

DOUGLAS DOBSON

Northern Illinois University

DOUGLAS ST. ANGELO

Florida State University

More on Political Violence

TO THE EDITOR:

I have no wish to prolong the exchange with Jeffrie Murphy on my *Political Violence & Civil Disobedience* (*APSR*, June, 1975). However, Murphy's attribution of words to me which I never wrote strikes me as unethical and demands correction.

Murphy writes, referring to my views, "it simply will not do to haul out some nineteenth-century clichés (e.g., Bentham's famous claim that talk of natural rights is 'nonsense on stilts')". Murphy clearly suggests that I quoted Bentham or other "nineteenth-century cliches." I did neither. Further: "On p. 15 van den Haag asserts that Hobbes rules out 'any qualification' on [sic] the obligation to obey the law"; and since "Hobbes allows self-preservation to function as a qualification," my "claim is clearly false." But I did not write on p. 15 of *Political Violence & Civil Disobedience* or anywhere else what Murphy "quotes." There is a footnote which does not refer to self-preservation, but, unequivocally, to "any qualification" of "the general moral obligation to obey laws" which, I point out, Hobbes rejects. If Murphy is as "aware that self-preservation is different from civil disobedience" as he claims to be, how can he believe self-preservation qualifies the general moral obligation to obey laws as only a contrary moral obligation could? (Civil disobedience rests on such contrary moral obligations, while draft dodging rests on self-preservation.)

I asserted nothing about Herman Melville's views, although Murphy says I did. To prove as much, Murphy now offers a dictionary definition of "affirm" (a synonym for "assert"), and concludes that one is "justified in attributing to a man a view he has asserted to be true." Since I wrote Melville "affirmed in the novel," I attributed the asserted view to Melville, according to Murphy. But I wrote—and Murphy (wisely perhaps, but not accurately) now omits—"in the novel." One is not justified in attributing to an author a view affirmed or asserted to be true *in a novel*, and I did not. Murphy goes on to describe the dilemma Melville deals with, suggesting that I did not realize that he dealt with one. Since my whole essay is concerned with this dilemma, described as such, there is no basis for Murphy's claim.

I could go on. But I think I have said enough to support my original contention that Murphy's review was "captious"; I must now add that his rejoinder is deceptive.

ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG

New York University
New School of Social Research

Editorial Comment

In Transition. Owing to the sizeable backlog of accepted, but unpublished articles, there is a transition period in which the affairs of the *Review*, while not exactly in limbo, are conducted in two locations. Charles O. Jones, Manging Editor Elect, since January 1 of this year has been responsible for the evaluation of all new manuscripts, and for the contents of all issues starting with the issue of December, 1977. The orderly publication of all issues until then remains the responsibility of the current Managing Editor. Both new and old managing editors attend meetings of the Council of the Association, but only the current incumbent votes. Persons having business with the *Review* can address either editor, and he will pass the buck or pocket it, or refund it, as circumstances appear to dictate. New management and old alike guarantee a square deal all around, the customer always right our usual 12.5 per cent of the time.

A New Broom (continued). Starting with the issue of December, 1977, at the same time Charles O. Jones becomes Managing Editor, the Book Review section of the *Review* will change management as well. Paul Allen Beck and Robert S. Walters, both Associate Professors of Political Science at the University of Pittsburgh, will become Book Review Editors, succeeding Philip Siegelman. Effective immediately, all books for review should be sent to Professors Beck and Walters at the Department of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15260.

Professor Beck has written articles on partisan realignment and political socialization, and Professor Walters, with David Blake, has just completed a book entitled *The Politics of International Economic Relations*. They intend to create an Advisory Panel which will be asked to assist them in selecting books for review and identifying subjects for review essays.

Articles Accepted for Future Publication

Joel D. Aberbach, University of Michigan, "Power Consciousness: A Comparative Analysis"

C. Arnold Anderson, University of Chicago, "Conceptual Framework for Political Socialization in Developing Societies"

John M. Bacheller, Kirkland College, "Lobbyists and the Legislative Process: The Impact of Environmental Constraints"

Richard M. Bank, University of California, Santa Barbara and Steven R. McCarl, University of Denver, " 'Virtue, Obligation and Politics' Revisited"

Paul Allen Beck, University of Pittsburgh, "Partisan Dealignment in the Post-War South"
Robert A. Bernstein, Texas A&M University, "Divisive Primaries Do Hurt: U.S. Senate Races, 1956–1972"

Paul R. Brass, University of Washington, "Party Systems and Government Stability in the Indian States"

Steven R. Brown, Kent State University, "Toward An Experimental Analysis of Political Literature"

Charles D. Cary, University of Iowa, "A Technique of Computer Content Analysis of Transliterated Russian Language Textual Materials: A Research Note"

Clarke E. Cochran, Texas Tech University, "Authority and Community: The Contributions of Carl Friedrich, Yves Simon, and Michael Polanyi"

Neal E. Culter, University of Southern California, "Demographic, Social Psychological, and Political Factors in the Politics of Age: A Call for Research in Political Gerontology"

Barbara Deckard, University of California, Riverside, "Party Realignment and the Transformation of the Political Agenda—The House of Representatives, 1925–1938"

Shaheen F. Dil, Princeton University, "The Cabal in Kabul: Great Power Interaction in Aghanistan

Lowell Dittmer, State University of New York, Buffalo, "Thought Reform and the Cultural Revolution: An Analysis of the Symbolism of Chinese Polemics"

Robert Eyestone, University of Minnesota, "Confusion, Diffusion and Innovation"

Norman I. Fainstein, Columbia University and Susan S. Fainstein, Rutgers University, "The Future of Community Control"

Richard F. Fenno, Jr., University of Rochester, "Congressmen in Their Constituencies: An Exploration"

John A. Ferejohn. California Institute of Technology. "On the Decline of Competition in Congressional Elections"

Norman Frohlich, Joe A. Oppenheimer, Jeffrey Smith and Oran R. Young, University of Texas at Austin, "A Test of Downsian Voter Rationality: 1964 Presidential Voting"

Dante Germino, University of Virginia, "Eric Voegelin's Framework for Political Evaluation in His Recently Published Work"

John V. Gillespie, Diana A. Zinnes, Philip A. Schrodt, G. S. Tahim and Richard Rubinson,

Indiana University, "An Optimal Control Model of Arms Races"

R. Kenneth Godwin and W. Bruce Shepard, Oregon State University, "Political Processes and Public Expenditures: A Re-examination Based on Theories of Representative Government"

Robert T. Golembiewski, University of Georgia, "A Critique of 'Democratic Administration' and Its Supporting Ideation"

George D. Greenberg, Jeffrey A. Miller, Lawrence B. Mohr and Bruce C. Vladeck, University of Michigan, "Developing Public Policy Theory: Perspectives from Empirical Research"

Robert W. Jackman, Michigan State University, "Politicians in Uniform: Military Governments and Social Change in the Third World"

Bryan D. Jones, Saadia Greenberg, Joseph Drew, and Clifford Kaufman, Wayne State University, "Bureaucratic Response to Citizen-Initiated Contacts: Environmental Enforcement in Detroit"

Russell Hardin, University of Pennsylvania, "Hollow Victory: The Minimum Winning Coalition"

Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, "Industrial Conflict in Advanced Industrial Societies"

Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, "Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy"

M. Kent Jennings and Gregory B. Markus, University of Michigan, "The Effect of Military Service on Political Attitudes: A Panel Study"

Sam Kernell, University of Minnesota, "Presidential Popularity and Negative Voting: An Alternative Explanation of the Mid-Term Congressional Decline of the President's Party"

Arthur J. Lerman, St. John's University, "National Elite and Local Politician in Taiwan"

Michael S. Lewis-Beck, University of Iowa, "The Relative Importance of Socioeconomic and Political Variables for Public Policy"

Michael Margolis, University of Pittsburgh, "From Confusion to Confusion—Issues and the American Voter (1956–1972)"

Richard D. McKelvey. Carnegie Mellon University and John H. Aldrich, Michigan State University, "A Method of Scaling, With Applications to the 1968 and 1972 Presidential Elections"

Richard D. McKelvey and Peter C. Ordeshook, Carnegie-Mellon University, "Symmetric Spatial Games Without Majority Rule Equilibria"

R. D. McKinlay and A. S. Cohan, University of Lancaster. "The Political, Military, and Economic Performance of Military and Nonmilitary Regime Systems: A Cross-National Aggregate Study"

J. Miller McPherson, Susan Welch, University of Nebraska, and Cal Clark, New Mexico State University, "The Stability and Reliability of Political Efficacy: Using Path Analysis to Test Alternative Models"

Paul E. Meehl, University of Minnesota, "The Selfish Voter Paradox and the Thrown-Away Vote Argument"

Abraham H. Miller, Louis H. Bolce and Mark Halligan, University of Cincinnati, "The J-Curve Theory and the Black Urban Riots: An Empirical Test of Progressive Relative Deprivation Theory Using Both Objective and Perceptual Indicators"

Arthur H. Miller, Warren E. Miller, Alden S. Raine, and Thad A. Brown, University of Michigan, "A Majority Party in Disarray: Policy Polarization in the 1972 Election"

Edward N. Muller, State University of New York at Stony Brook, "Behavioral Correlates of Political Support"

Edward N. Muller and Thomas O. Jukam, State University of New York at Stony Brook, "On the Meaning of Political Support"

Garrison Nelson, University of Vermont, "Partisan Patterns of House Leadership Change, 1789–1976"

Helmut Norpoth, University of Cologne, "Explaining Party Cohesion in Congress: The Case of Shared Policy Attitudes"

Thomas C. Nowak, Waynesburg College and Kay A. Snyder, Michigan State University, "Politics and Administration: The Philippines Before Martial Law"

Karen Orren, University of California, Los Angeles, "Standing to Sue: Interest Group Conflict in the Federal Courts"

Benjamin I. Page, University of Chicago, "The Theory of Political Ambiguity"

Thomas L. Pangle, Yale University, "The Political Psychology of Religion in Plato's *Laws*"

James L. Perry, University of California, Irvine and Charles H. Levine, Syracuse University, "An Interorganizational Analysis of Power, Conflict, and Settlements in Public Sector Collective Bargaining"

James H. Qualls, The Johns Hopkins University, "Barber's Typological Analysis of Political Leaders"

David Resnick, Cornell University, "Crude Communism and Revolution"

Neil R. Richardson, University of Texas at Austin, "Political Compliance and U. S. Trade Dominance"

Howard Rosenthal, Carnegie-Mellon University, and Subrata K. Sen, University of Rochester, "Spatial Voting Models for the French Fifth Republic"

Barry S. Rundquist, University of Illinois, Urbana,

Gerald S. Strom, University of Illinois at Chicago Circle, and John G. Peters, University of Nebraska, "Corrupt Politicians and their Electoral Support: Some Theoretical and Experimental Observations"

Lester M. Salamon, Duke University, and John J. Siegfried, Vanderbilt University, "Economic Power and Political Influence: The Impact of Industry Structure on Public Policy"

Lars Schoultz, Miami University, "The Socioeconomic Determinants of Popular-Authoritarian Electoral Behavior: The Case of Peronism"

Thomas Schwartz, Carnegie-Mellon University, "Collective Choice, Separation of Issues and Vote Trading"

Donald D. Searing, University of North Carolina, "Measuring Politicians' Values: Administration and Assessment of a Ranking Technique in the British House of Commons"

Gerald S. Strom, University of Illinois at Chicago Circle, and Barry S. Rundquist, University of Illinois, Urbana, "A Revised Theory of Winning in House-Senate Conferences"

Peter J. Steinberger, University of California, Riverside, "Hegel as a Social Scientist"

J. Weinberger, Michigan State University, "Science and Rule in Bacon's Utopia: An Introduction to the Reading of *The New Atlantis*"

Fred H. Willhoite, Jr., Coe College, "Primates and Political Authority: A Biobehavioral Perspective"

Gerald C. Wright, Jr., Florida Atlantic University, "Contextual Models of Electoral Behavior The Southern Wallace Vote"

Marvin Zetterbaum, University of California, Davis, "Equality and Human Need"

"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954

A Review Essay*

GEOFFREY S. SMITH
Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario

Thirty years have passed since Harry S. Truman succeeded Franklin Roosevelt as President. Although the Missourian's place in history is impossible to pinpoint at this juncture, one thing is certain: The Truman who appears in the pages of recent books by revisionist historians would not be recognizable to those persons who knew him well. Their response, after reading New Left assessments of his foreign and domestic policies, might well be, "Harry, we hardly know you."[1]

During the 1950s, liberal historians depicted Truman in glowing terms. A compromise vice-president who assumed the presidency with little preparation, the "man from Missouri" overcame

---

* *The Price of Vision: The Diary of Henry A. Wallace, 1942–1946*. Edited and with an Introduction by John Morton Blum. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973. Pp. 707. $15.00.)

The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism: Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and Internal Security, 1946–1948. By Richard M. Freeland (New York: Knopf, 1972. Pp. 419. $10.00.)

The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1947. By John Lewis Gaddis. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972. Pp. 361. $12.50. $3.95.)

The Politics of Fear: Joseph R. McCarthy and the Senate. By Robert Griffith. (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1970. Pp. 362. $8.50.)

The Specter: Original Essays on the Cold War and the Origins of McCarthyism. Edited and with an Introduction by Robert Griffith and Athan Theoharis. (New York: New Viewpoints, 1974. Pp. 368. $4.65.)

Beyond the New Deal: Harry S. Truman and American Liberalism. By Alonzo L. Hamby. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973. Pp. 635. $12.95.)

The Politics of Loyalty: The White House and the Communist Issue, 1946–1952. By Alan D. Harper. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Publishing Corp., 1969. Pp. 318. $13.00.)

Truman and the 80th Congress. By Susan M. Hartmann. (Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press, 1971. Pp. 241. $9.00.)

Aid to Russia, 1941–1946: Strategy, Diplomacy, the Origins of the Cold War. By George C. Herring, Jr. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973, Pp. 365. $15.00.)

The Truman Period as a Research Field: A Reappraisal, 1972. Edited and with an Introduction by Richard S. Kirkendall. (Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press, 1974. Pp. 246. $10.00.)

The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War. By Robert J. Maddox. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973. Pp. 169. $7.95.)

The Rise and Fall of the People's Century: Henry A. Wallace and American Liberalism, 1941–1948. By Norman D. Markowitz. (New York: Free Press, 1973. Pp. 361. $8.95.)

The Anti-Communist Impulse. By Michael Parenti. (New York: Random House, 1969, Pp. 333. $7.95.)

Soviet-American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War. By Thomas G. Paterson. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 1973. Pp. 287. $12.00.)

Mr. Republican: A Biography of Robert A. Taft. By James T. Patterson. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972. Pp. 749. $12.50.)

After Yalta: America and the Origins of the Cold War. By Lisle A. Rose. (New York: Scribner's, 1973. Pp. 216. $7.95.)

Prophet in Politics: Henry A. Wallace and the War Years, 1940–1965. By Edward L. and Frederick H. Schapsmeier. (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1970. Pp. 268. $8.95.)

New Left Diplomatic Histories and Historians: The American Revisionists. By Joseph M. Siracusa. (Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1973. Pp. 138. $6.95.)

Seeds of Repression: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of McCarthyism. By Athan Theoharis. (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1971. Pp. 238. $6.95.)

The Yalta Myths: An Issue in U.S. Politics, 1945–1955. By Athan Theoharis. (Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press, 1970. Pp. 263. $10.00.)

Democrats and Progressives: The 1948 Presidential Election as a Test of Postwar Liberalism. By Allen Yarnell. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974. Pp. 155, $8.95.)

[1] With apologies, of course, to Kenneth P. O'Donnell and David F. Powers with Joe McCarthy, "*Johnny, We Hardly Knew Ye*": *Memories of John Fitzgerald Kennedy* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1972).

his inexperience, forcefully countered Soviet aggression, and extended Rooseveltian liberalism under the aegis of the Fair Deal. In 1948 he achieved an unexpected victory over Thomas E. Dewey of New York, only to fall victim to the Korean War and McCarthyism. Truman's foreign policy successes dominate this favorable interpretation. The doctrine that bears his name, the Marshall Plan, Point IV, and the establishment of NATO all contributed to his ranking as "near great" in Professor Arthur M. Schlesinger's 1962 poll, and as one of America's eleven greatest Presidents.[2] Similar notes of approval flavored Cabell Phillips's account of *The Truman Presidency*, Eric Goldman's narrative of *The Crucial Decade*, and, more recently, Merle Miller's *Plain Speaking*, William S. White's *The Responsibles*, and Alonzo Hamby's *Beyond the New Deal*.[3] All of these works emphasize Truman's achievements in meeting challenges posed by postwar transformations in American society and by the new, bipolar system of international relations.

But Truman's favorable reputation did not withstand the tremors of the 1960s. The easing of Soviet-American tension, the apparent bankruptcy of liberal solutions to a host of domestic problems, and the nation's involvement in Vietnam contributed to a climate of disillusionment similar to that which generated historical revisionism during the 1920s and 1930s and the early Cold War era itself.[4] Historians began to analyze postwar developments in less favorable terms. Rather than the champion of liberalism and defender of the "free world," as he earlier appeared, Truman struck revisionists as ill-qualified for office and incapable of providing aggressive, progressive leadership.[5] According to Barton Bernstein, the liberal premises upon which Truman constructed his Fair Deal actually strengthened the fetters of the past and prevented the Chief Executive from enacting a humane program of national and international reform. Even had the Korean War never occurred, and even had Truman achieved his Fair Deal goals, the administration would not have been able to solve basic problems facing American society.[6]

Athan Theoharis, another revisionist, concurs. Allowing that Truman's intentions were noble, Theoharis laments the narrowness of his vision, arguing that in the absence of effective presidential leadership a reactionary Congress regained the initiative, thereby precluding the resolution of basic problems and the consideration of other options. Theoharis finds that Truman's foreign policy and internal security decisions "helped to legitimate conservatism and undermine reform." In a very real sense Truman "became a victim of his rhetoric, elitism, and partisanship and not simply of war-created hysteria or a frustrated public seeking scapegoats."[7]

The Cold War Debate: Toward A New Synthesis

The domestic revisionism of the past decade is inextricably tied to similar developments in the historiography of postwar American foreign relations, more specifically to the emergence of a serious challenge to orthodox interpretations of the origins and development of the Cold War.[8]

[2] Arthur M. Schlesinger, "Our Presidents: A Rating by 75 Historians," *New York Times Magazine*, July 29, 1962, pp. 10–14; Richard S. Kirkendall, "Harry Truman," in *America's Eleven Greatest Presidents*, ed. Morton Borden (Chicago: Rand NcNally, 1971), pp. 255–88. The "rating game" is challenged in Thomas A. Bailey, *Presidential Greatness: The Image and the Man from George Washington to the Present* (New York: Appleton-Century Crofts, 1966).

[3] Cabell Phillips, *The Truman Presidency: The History of a Triumphant Succession* (New York: Macmillan, 1966); Eric F. Goldman, *The Crucial Decade and After: America, 1945–1960* (New York: Knopf, 1960); Merle Miller, *Plain Speaking: An Oral Biography of Harry S. Truman* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1973); William S. White, *The Responsibles* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972); Alonzo L. Hamby, *Beyond the New Deal: Harry S. Truman and American Liberalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973). See also Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership* (New York: John Wiley, 1960), pp. 171–78; Irwin Ross, *The Loneliest Campaign: The Truman Victory of 1948* (New York: New American Library, 1968); and Margaret Truman, *Harry S. Truman* (New York: Morrow, 1973).

[4] On earlier revisionism, see Warren I. Cohen, *The American Revisionists: The Lessons of Intervention in World War I* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967); Robert E. Osgood, *Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations: The Great Transformation of the Twentieth Century* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 309–32; and Justus D. Doenecke, *The Literature of Isolationism: A Guide to Non-Interventionist Scholarship, 1930–1972* (Colorado Springs: Ralph Myles, 1972).

[5] Lloyd C. Gardner, *Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941–1949* (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1970), pp. 55–83; Barton J. Bernstein, ed., *Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration* (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1970); Thomas G. Paterson, ed., *Cold War Critics: Alternatives to American Foreign Policy in the Truman Years* (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1971); Bert Cochran, *Harry Truman and the Crisis Presidency* (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1973); Howard Zinn, *Postwar America, 1945–1971* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1973); Jerome M. Milieur, ed., *The Liberal Tradition in Crisis: American Politics in the Sixties* (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1974).

[6] Barton J. Bernstein, "America in War and Peace: The Test of Liberalism," in *Towards a New Past: Dissenting Essays in American History*, ed. B. J. Bernstein (New York: Pantheon, 1968), pp. 289–321. See also Bernstein, "The Presidency Under Truman," *Yale Political Review*, 4 (Fall, 1964), 8f.

[7] Athan Theoharis, "The Truman Presidency: Trial and Error," *Wisconsin Magazine of History*, 55 (Autumn, 1971), 49–58 at p. 58.

[8] "Orthodox" accounts include Dexter Perkins, *The American Approach to Foreign Policy*, rev. ed. (New York: Atheneum, 1972); John W. Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 4th rev. ed. (New York: Praeger, 1971); Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "The Russian

Early critiques questioning whether the Soviet Union deserved full blame for the conflict came from "realists" like Walter Lippmann and Hans Morgenthau, who contended that Soviet challenges to American interests manifested peculiarly *Russian*, not *Communist* ambitions. Lippmann and Morgenthau warned that the United States would in fact risk escalating the Cold War by insisting upon opposing communism in areas not vital to national security.[9]

A more radically revisionist position emerged in the writings of William Appleman Williams. In *The Contours of American History*, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, and *The Roots of the Modern American Empire*, Williams argued that since the 1880s American diplomacy functioned to meet the requirements of America's capitalist socioeconomic system. According to this interpretation, the nation's policy makers have been rational and calculating in seeking to establish an international environment (an "open door") that would promote commercial penetration and business expansion. In the 1960s revisionist historians applied this thesis to the Cold War era, which they deemed the most recent and most ambitious period of American imperialism. Such writers as Bernstein, David Horowitz, Lloyd Gardner, Gar Alperovitz, and Gabriel Kolko contended that the origins of the Cold War lay not with the expansive thrust of Soviet communism, but with the requirements of the American domestic order. These writers depicted Josef Stalin as a cautious nationalist, concerned not with initiating global revolution but with protecting Russia's historic interests. Stalin's desire to establish Soviet power in Eastern Europe impressed most revisionists as a natural extension of historic Russian policy. The area had always been unstable, and it possessed as strategic an importance as a gateway to Russia as Gibraltar did to the Mediterranean.[10]

Yet while revisionists agree that the Truman Administration initiated the Cold War by confronting Soviet power in Eastern Europe, they differ markedly in defining responsibility for Washington's offensive policies. Moderate revisionists echo the complaints of Progressives like Henry Wallace and Rexford Guy Tugwell by stressing Truman's alleged departure from the statesmanlike policies designed by Roosevelt to secure postwar harmony.[11] The more radical historians, meanwhile, reject entirely the notion of individual responsibility for the onset and development of the Cold War. In *The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945–1954*, Joyce and Gabriel Kolko argue that the foreign policies of both FDR and Truman inevitably served the structural requirements of American capitalism. Institutional dynamics during and after World War II resulted in the rational objective of restructuring the world "so that American business could trade, operate, and profit without restrictions everywhere."[12] Truman's failure lay in his inability to comprehend the political necessities of such a goal. Throughout his administration he not only battled for power with the Soviets, but more important, sought consciously to crush the world-wide forces of "the Left" by manipulating great economic and social transformations occurring throughout the Third World. Despite their rigid ideological framework, turgid and repetitive prose, and failure to define precisely some important terms, the Kolkos impressed many colleagues with the depth of their research, thorough analysis of important topics, and provocative discussion of the background of the Truman Doctrine and of shortcomings in American policy before and during the Korean War.[13]

But the revisionism of the late 1960s and early 1970s did not go unchallenged. The accusation that Washington policy makers utilized their economic power ruthlessly and unceasingly after 1945 injected new life and new stridency into the debate. The premises, the conclusions, and in some instances, the scholarship of revisionist writers drew criticism from many quarters. Rejoinders

---

Revolution—Fifty Years After: Origins of the Cold War," *Foreign Affairs*, 46 (October, 1967), 25–52.

[9] Walter Lippmann, *The Cold War: A Study in U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper, 1947); Hans J. Morgenthau, *In Defense of the National Interest: A Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Knopf, 1952).

[10] For overviews, see Thomas A. Bryson, "The Concept of Empire in American Diplomatic History," Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations *Newsletter*, 4 (December, 1973), 7–19; and Thomas J. Noer, "The Changing Concept of Containment," Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations *Newsletter*, 5 (September, 1974), 4–14. Representative titles include David Horowitz, *The Free World Colossus: A Critique of American Foreign Policy in the Cold War* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1965); Gar Alperovitz, *Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam, The Use of the Atomic Bomb and the American Confrontation with Soviet Power* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965); Gabriel Kolko, *The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943–1945* (New York: Random House, 1968); Gabriel Kolko, *The Roots of American Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Power and Purpose* (Boston: Beacon, 1969).

[11] See Rexford G. Tugwell, *Off Course: From Truman to Nixon* (New York: Praeger, 1971); Henry A. Wallace, *Towards World Peace* (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1948).

[12] Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, *The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945–1954* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 2.

[13] See, for example, Gaddis Smith's review of *The Limits of Power* in *The New York Times Book Review*, February 27, 1972, p. 31, and Warren F. Kimball's insightful review essay, "The Cold War Warmed Over," *American Historical Review*, 79 (October, 1974), 1119–36.

dwelled upon the sources of revisionist historiography, suggesting, for example, its theoretical similarity to right-wing attitudes on foreign policy, the extent to which the New Left's commitment to restructuring society necessitated the development of a "usable past," and the importance of external events in shaping intellectual attitudes.[14] But through many of these assessments there coursed a combativeness that appeared to divert the attention of historians from the validity of revisionist conclusions to social and psychological explanations of why revisionist accounts were written at all.

Robert J. Maddox's *The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War* belongs in this latter category. Maddox argues that "an examination of the *manner* in which new interpretations are reached ought to precede dialogues over the interpretations themselves."[15] But this good idea is vitiated by an intemperateness reminiscent of Robert E. Brown's condemnation of Charles A. Beard's *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States*.[16] Maddox checks footnotes and impugns the scholarship of seven writers who offer revisionist interpretations of important wartime and postwar Soviet-American disputes.[17] These issues include the Polish boundary and provisional government, the occupation zones of Germany and reparations, and the relationship between America's possession of the atomic bomb and Russia's decision to enter the campaign against Japan. Maddox also explores revisionist assessments of Washington's decision to terminate Lend-lease, the possibility of a Soviet loan, and the significance of Truman's stormy meeting on April 23, 1945, with Soviet Foreign Minister, V. M. Molotov. And Maddox discovers that the revisionists have based some of their conclusions on incomplete or distorted evidence, that some writers have taken quotations out of context, and that revisionist works are marred by many factual errors.

Despite Maddox's claim to objectivity, his book fails to clarify the complex factors that generated and escalated the Cold War. What he has done is to inject gratuitously ideology and *ad hominem* arguments into his analysis. Although he distinguishes between "hard" and "soft" revisionists, he does not apply this yardstick in any systematic way. Consequently readers are left with the impression that there are no differences between Horowitz, D. F. Fleming, and Kolko, and that Williams's *Tragedy* and Alperovitz's *Atomic Diplomacy* still occupy the vanguard of revisionist scholarship. Nor has Maddox noted differences of opinion within New Left circles on several key issues.[18] His book also fails to recognize that some students of postwar foreign and domestic policy have utilized both traditional and revisionist hypotheses to fashion eclectic interpretations.[19]

[14] The review literature is voluminous and often testy. The most helpful analyses include Ole R. Holsti, "The Study of International Politics Makes Strange Bedfellows: Theories of the Radical Right and the Radical Left," *American Political Science Review*, 68 (March, 1974), 217–42; Charles S. Maier, "Revisionism and the Interpretation of Cold War Origins," *Perspectives in American History*, 4 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), 313–47; Henry Pachter, "Revisionist Historians and the Cold War," *Dissent*, 15 (November–December, 1968), 505–18; Walter Lacquer, "Rewriting History," *Commentary*, 55 (March, 1973), 53–69; J. L. Richardson, "Cold-War Revisionism: A Critique," *World Politics*, 24 (July, 1972), 579–612; Daniel M. Smith. "The New Left and the Cold War," *Denver Quarterly*, 4 (Winter, 1970), 77–88; William W. MacDonald, "The Revisionist Cold War Historians," *Midwest Quarterly*, 11 (1969), 37–49; Norman A. Graebner, "Cold War Origins and the Continuing Debate," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 13 (March, 1969), 123–32; Irwin Unger, "The 'New Left' and American History: Some Recent Trends in United States Historiography," *American Historical Review*, 77 (July, 1967), 1237–63; J. A. Thompson, "William Appleman Williams and the 'American Empire'," *Journal of American Studies*, 7 (1973), 91–104; Robert W. Tucker, *The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971); Robert D. Schulzinger, "Moderation in Pursuit of Truth is No Virtue; Extremism in Defense of Moderation is a Vice," *American Quarterly*, 27 (May, 1975), 222–36. See also comments by Robert Ferrell, Richard W. Leopold, and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., in *Interpreting American History: Conversations with Historians*, ed. John A. Garraty, 2 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1970), II, 220–21, 244–45, 268–69, 276–77. For some effects of the debate upon the historical profession, see B. W. Cook, A. K. Harris, and R. Radosh (eds.), *Past Imperfect: Alternative Essays in American History*, 2 vols. (New York: 1973), II, 320–52.

[15] Robert James Maddox, *The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), dust-jacket blurb.

[16] Robert E. Brown, *Charles Beard and the Constitution: A Critical Analysis of "An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution"* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956).

[17] Volumes under review include William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, rev. ed. (New York: Dell, 1962); D. F. Fleming, *The Cold War and its Origins, 1917–1960*, 2 vols. (New York: Doubleday, 1961); Alperovitz, *Atomic Diplomacy*; Horowitz, *Free World Colossus*; Kolko, *Politics of War*; Diane Shaver Clemens, *Yalta* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970); and Gardner, *Architects*.

[18] See, for example, William Appleman Williams's criticism of Lloyd Gardner's emphasis upon external developments in shaping postwar American foreign policy in *From Colony to Empire: Essays in the History of American Foreign Relations*, ed. W. A. Williams (New York: John Wiley, 1972), p. 6. See also Lloyd C. Gardner, "Truman Era Foreign Policy: Recent Historical Trends," in *The Truman Period as a Research Field: A Reappraisal, 1972*, ed. Richard S. Kirkendall (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1974), pp. 68–69.

[19] Examples of eclectic scholarship include Thomas M. Campbell, *Masquerade Peace: America's UN Policy, 1944–1945* (Tallahassee: Florida State University Press, 1973); Herbert Feis, *From Trust to Terror: The Onset of the Cold War, 1945–1950* (New York: Norton, 1970); and the books under review by Gaddis and Herring.

That Maddox's volume polarized attitudes among American historians is not surprising. By attacking revisionists for prostituting their intellectual standards for fame and academic advancement, publishers for ignoring historical accuracy to push salable commodities, and reviewers for "endorsing these . . . works as responsible pieces of historical research," the author in effect "impugned the ethics of seven people by name and many others by implication."[20] Maddox's book thus stands as a warning, both of the pitfalls of ideology and subjectivity in writing recent history, and of the need for scholars to avoid sarcasm and name-calling. Criticism for the sake of criticism will only beget more criticism.

Joseph M. Siracusa's assessment of revisionism, meanwhile, is as bland as Maddox's is angry. Siracusa's study, *New Left Diplomatic Histories and Historians: The American Revisionists*, also criticizes this group of writers, emphasizing their presentism and narrow theoretical bases. But the book remains for the most part descriptive, adding little that is new in analysis. The volume's major contribution consists of views concerning the New Left, communicated to the author by such realist and traditionalist historians as Norman A. Graebner, Robert A. Divine, and Herbert Feis. The views of these correspondents are generally disparaging, although several agree with the author that despite its shortcomings, New Left scholarship provides historians with alternative hypotheses to explore—hence the new history's therapeutic value.

More satisfactory than either Maddox's or Siracusa's volume is Richard S. Kirkendall, ed., *The Truman Period as a Research Field: A Reappraisal, 1972*, which now ranks as the point of departure for students of the postwar era. Volumes such as this, which supplements a similar study in 1967, do much to counter recent criticism of presidential libraries for favoring "an elite group of insiders" and fostering "a kind of cozy, closed, official history."[21] In this collection of essays and commentary, Robert H. Ferrell and Alonzo Hamby analyze historiographical trends from traditional-liberal positions, while Lloyd Gardner and Harvard Sitkoff do so from revisionist perspectives. Comments are provided by David S. McLellan, Barton J. Bernstein, Richard O. Davies, William C. Berman, and Elmer E. Cornwell, Jr. Bernstein's assessment is the ablest, and indicates how complex and open-ended the debate on postwar politics and diplomacy has become. He argues convincingly that despite its unifying animus against Truman and American liberalism, revisionism is by no means monolithic. Revisionist historiography is in fact characterized by disagreement and conflict between (and among) neo-Marxists, left-liberals, right-liberals, and other groups. Old labels and categories, therefore, retain little utility in classifying interpretations, and more than ever historians need to assess new books in individual terms.

The contributors agree that scholars ought to widen their horizons, both by utilizing archival material now being opened for research, and by shifting their attention from "the White House and presidential synthesis" to themes allowing for more meaningful analyses.[22] Such topics would include reassessments of the nature and impact of social and economic determinants of foreign policy; viewing the Truman administration's postwar policies within a context of the changes wrought by World War II; and inquiring not only into the ways in which domestic constraints limited the President's foreign policy options, but also the extent to which his large role in global affairs contributed to his domestic difficulties.

John Lewis Gaddis confronts these problems in *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1947*. Winner of the prestigious Bancroft and Stuart L. Bernath prizes, Gaddis's book represents less "a successful response to the current revisionist fad" (to quote John W. Spanier), than an attempt to move "beyond revisionism" and incorporate the best of all recent scholarship.[23] Gaddis contends that recent historians have debated the causes of the Cold War without much success. He counters an important revisionist argument that Soviet-American conflict resulted primarily, if not entirely, from dynamics within this nation's political economy. He discovers that far from being an expansive force, the domestic political culture circumscribed sharply the alternatives of Washington policy makers. Writing that "the Cold War is too complicated an event to be discussed in terms of either national guilt or the determinism of inevitability," he suggests that revisionists too often ignore the complexity and unpredictability of human behavior.[24] Individual frailty remains a crucial part of the decision-making process, according to Gaddis, who con-

[20] Maddox, pp. 10, 159–61; Kimball, "Cold War Warmed Over," 1126. See the stridently favorable review by Francis Lowenheim, together with rejoinders by revisionist authors, in *The New York Times Book Review*, June 17, 1973, pp. 6f. Also see Maddox, "*Atomic Diplomacy*: A Study in Creative Writing," *Journal of American History*, 59 (March, 1973), 925–34, and Alperovitz's reply, 1062–67.

[21] Alexander DeConde, "What's Wrong with American Diplomatic History," Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations *Newsletter*, 1 (May, 1970), 1–16 at p. 4.

[22] The quote is Harvard Sitkoff's, after Thomas Corcoran.

[23] John W. Spanier, review of Gaddis in *Journal of American History*, 59 (December, 1972), 768.

[24] Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War*, p. 360.

tends that the actions of statesmen are not predestined by ideology but are subject to such noncontrollable variables as political pressure, chance occurrence, ignorance and error, and irrationality.

Gaddis seeks to explain why American leaders defined their policy alternatives as narrowly as they did. Analyzing several basic policies that revisionist writers interpret as unnecessarily generating Soviet hostility, he rejects the idea that the survival of capitalism required continuing global expansion of American economic influence during and after the war. Economic motives did play an important part in shaping policies, but the domestic political system exerted an even stronger impact.[25] Gaddis finds that "the delay in opening the second front, nonrecognition of Moscow's sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, the denial of economic aid to Russia, and the decision to retain control of the atomic bomb can all be explained far more plausibly by citing the administration's need to maintain popular support for its policies rather than dwelling upon requirements of the economic order."[26]

In fact, for numerous reasons Soviet-American amity had all but dissolved by autumn 1944, and there existed little possibility of renewing the friendship.[27] Truman's preoccupation with "lessons" of the past (particularly the Europe of the 1930s) reflected his desire to prevent a renewal of warfare, but instead seriously clouded the American vision of the postwar world.[28] Although the Missourian hoped to continue his predecessor's policies, Truman's abrasive personality—and his desire to appear decisive and efficient—suggested to Soviet leaders that he had reversed FDR's conciliatory approach. This problem was manifest in April 1945, when the new President "gave it to [Molotov] straight 'one-two to the jaw'" to emphasize his displeasure with Moscow's failure to implement the Yalta accords on Poland.[29] What Molotov and Stalin could not see was that this "no nonsense" rhetoric was as much tailored for domestic as for their own consumption. Attempting to educate public opinion, which still contained a strong component of isolationism, Truman had undertaken to convince Congress and the populace of the validity of his effort to utilize economic power for political purposes in Europe.[30]

Similarly, although tipping the postwar balance of power in favor of the United States, nuclear power did not become a diplomatic weapon against the Soviet Union. In fact, the ultimate weapon signified for Washington the "impotence of omnipotence," since there existed within administration circles no agreement on "a clear strategy for employing the weapon's potential power as a bargaining instrument on specific issues." In addition, by the end of the war Congress had begun "to reassert its authority over the conduct of foreign affairs, severely restricting the administration's freedom of action, not only in the field of international control but also in more conventional areas of military and economic policy."[31] In Gaddis's view, therefore, domestic constraints such as these serve as a reminder that "policy makers operate within a certain range of acceptable options, but they, not historians, define degrees of acceptability. It is surely uncharitable, if not unjust, to condemn officials for rejecting courses of action which, to them, seemed intolerable."[32]

A deeper antipathy toward revisionism distinguishes Lisle Rose's *After Yalta: America and the Origins of the Cold War*. Like Gaddis, Rose denies that Truman "pursued an aggressive policy aimed at world economic hegemony" and "cynically manipulated a good-natured but gullible public into accepting the thesis of an internal and external Communist threat of terrifying propor-

[25] Indeed, in a statement that would have labeled him a radical a decade ago, Gaddis contends that "Washington chose to withold the one instrument which might have influenced Soviet economic behavior—a postwar reconstruction loan—in hopes of extracting political concessions." But Gaddis emphasizes that such a loan would not have been an end in itself, only a means to an end: "Establishing a new world economic order without first resolving the deep political differences which divided the United States and the Soviet Union was naive in the extreme, for, in the long run, politics turned out to be more important than economics for the leaders of both nations." Gaddis, p. 23.

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 358.

[27] Gaddis contends that even had American policy makers possessed the freedom to seek accommodation with Moscow, they would have been unsuccessful. Soviet xenophobia, security fears, bureaucratic suspicion, and Stalin's paranoia all contributed to the absence of a conciliatory attitude within the Kremlin. Stalin, furthermore, must assume greater responsibility for the Cold War than either FDR or Truman. This conclusion rests on the premise that Stalin possessed "more chances to surmount the internal restraints on his policy than were available to his democratic counterparts in the West." *Ibid.*, p. 361. An important essay that stresses the need to avoid moral judgments in analyzing Soviet-American friction is Ernest R. May, "The Cold War," in *The Comparative Approach to American History*, ed. C. Vann Woodward (New York: Basic Books, 1968), pp. 328–45.

[28] Gaddis, pp. 354–55. See also John Lewis Gaddis, "Harry S. Truman and the Origins of Containment," in *Makers of American Diplomacy: From Benjamin Franklin to Henry Kissinger*, ed. Frank J. Merli and Theodore A. Wilson (New York: Scribner's, 1974), pp. 493–522. On Truman's reading of history, an important study is Ernest R. May, *"Lessons of the Past": The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973). Also see George E. Mowry, "The Uses of History by Recent Presidents," *Journal of American History*, 53 (June, 1966), 5–18.

[29] Quoted in Gaddis, *Origins of Cold War*,, p. 205.

[30] *Ibid.*, pp. 224, 341–42.

[31] *Ibid.*, pp. 246, 254, 261–63.

[32] *Ibid.*, p. 357.

tion."[33] To comprehend Truman's failure to forge a constructive relationship with Moscow, one must study as a unit the diplomatic and domestic histories of the early Cold War Era. For within America's political culture lay an important source of Soviet-American conflict. In an interpretation that bears similarity to the "psychic crisis" concept utilized by Richard Hofstadter, Rose reemphasizes the importance of emotionalism and idealism in the formulation of foreign policy.[34] He explains that policy makers emerged from World War II buffeted by "the successive shocks of depression, world war, reform, bureaucratization, and, above all, the responsibilities of world power." This atmosphere of extended crisis and anxiety, characterized by a "frantic quest for an ever more elusive security and status," insured that Truman's policies were not at "all a matter of design," but a product of "paralysis and drift, deferral and delay." After Yalta, paradoxically, "the outward thrust of American power was in large measure the product of an ongoing domestic crisis of self-confidence."[35]

Like Hofstadter, however, Rose encounters problems in establishing how such domestic tensions affected the key decisions of specific policy makers. This failure detracts from his criticism of several revisionist hypotheses. In addition, Rose seems not to recognize the diversity within revisionist ranks. Some, but not all writers argue that Washington decision makers consciously sought economic hegemony, while other interpretations either deny that free will played any part in American Cold War policies, or skirt the issue entirely.

Rose denies Alperovitz's "atomic diplomacy" thesis, but argues nonetheless that America's nuclear monopoly escalated Soviet-American conflict by creating in Russian eyes "the potential for a more effective and frightening capitalist encirclement than ever before." Rather than "a possible benefit to the United States in any quest to remake the world," the bomb became "at once a national burden and a fertile soil for foreign jealousy." Atomic power may have provided Washington with "a wide range of aggressive new political options," but Rose correctly emphasizes that options do not necessarily become policies. Although Soviet leaders had reason to mistrust the United States for not sharing its atomic secret, they could not see that numerous factors prevented Truman—even had he so desired—from formulating "an explicit program of atomic diplomacy directed against the Soviet Union after Hiroshima."[36]

Although more plausible than Alperovitz's argument, Rose's emphasis upon Soviet-American nuclear friction diverts attention from other important issues. Rose finds no evidence to locate the origins of the Cold War in Russian-American conflict over Germany and Eastern Europe, or in "solely or even largely . . . economic factors."[37] But other writers, including Gaddis, have established that these and other problems became contentious before atomic power. The author also ascribes to Moscow "an equal if not greater measure of responsibility" for the Cold War, explaining that although "gross insensitivity to the understandable fears of an erstwhile ally rather than any coherent thrust or pretense to omnipotence" characterized American policy, Stalin did seem ready to expand Russian power into areas "often considered critical to western security."[38] Once again, Rose suggests, domestic distractions prevented American leaders from appreciating that for the moment, war casualties had established practical limits to Soviet aspirations. This argument is also reasonable, but it too must be demonstrated in practical terms.[39]

Two studies of economic diplomacy during and after World War II also deal with domestic America, and illustrate further the extent to which recent scholars have fashioned interpretations based upon combinations and variants of orthodox, realist, and radical hypotheses. George C. Herring, Jr., *Aid to Russia, 1941–1946: Strategy, Diplomacy, the Origins of the Cold War*, and Thomas G. Paterson, *Soviet-American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War*, also suggest that at this juncture the major contribution of revisionism lies less in its controversial conclusions than in forcing historians to integrate social and economic factors in foreign policy with more traditional emphases upon power, politics, personalities, and public opinion. Both monographs, furthermore, reflect solid research, are gracefully written, and display

[33] Lisle A. Rose, *After Yalta: America and the Origins of the Cold War* (New York: Scribner's, 1973), pp. 31–33.

[34] Richard Hofstadter, "Manifest Destiny and the Philippines," in *America in Crisis: Fourteen Crucial Episodes in American History*, ed. Daniel Aaron (New York: Knopf, 1952), pp. 173–200.

[35] Rose, pp. 112, 177, 183.

[36] *Ibid.*, pp. 32–33, 176–78. An important recent study of atomic diplomacy, published after this essay was completed, is Martin J. Sherwin, *A World Destroyed: The Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance* (New York: Knopf, 1975).

[37] Rose, p. 175.

[38] *Ibid.*, p. 179.

[39] Rose has written another book, *Dubious Victory: The United States and the End of World War II* (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1973). This volume avoids moral judgments and the use of hindsight as it assays Big Five diplomacy between Yalta and Potsdam. A related book, tentatively titled *The Ordeal of Peace*, will deal extensively with the domestic context of postwar diplomacy.

similarities to arguments advanced by Louis J. Halle and Walter LaFeber.[40]

Herring adamantly rejects the views of early revisionists on Lend-lease, while accepting or modifying more recent hypotheses. He contends that the diplomacy of global war was "an infinitely complicated process involving many different forces which were rarely in harmony and often in conflict."[41] He repudiates both the idea that Washington attempted naively to purchase Soviet friendship through Lend-lease, and the contention that the United States utilized its economic power to force Moscow to accede to American postwar designs. Lend-lease, he asserts, reflected FDR's emphasis upon military expediency and political realism. The measure strengthened Russian military power, provided glue to hold together uneasy allies, and played a significant role in the defeat of the Axis. But economic assistance did not promote the broader objectives of postwar unity. The author argues persuasively that the large gap in postwar objectives, combined with American pressure for retrenchment, limited severely the capacity of foreign aid to promote unity. Paradoxically, economic assistance heightened East-West tensions.

Like Gaddis and Herbert Feis, Herring accepts the revisionist argument that the Truman Administration's decision to end Lend-lease on May 11, 1945, signified a basic change in policy. But he rejects as oversimplified the position advanced by Kolko, Bernstein, and Alperovitz that the act denoted a political and economic move against Moscow. Herring shows that the administration was in fact fulfilling the requirements of congressional legislation, which prohibited "the use of Lend-lease for anything but essential military purposes."[42] That Truman's policies reflected a growing suspicion of the USSR did not mean that "the administration employed Lend-lease systematically to achieve its foreign policy objectives."[43] As Truman himself pointed out, aid to Britain was also stopped, and the British suffered most heavily from the termination. To Herring, then, the cessation of aid was less an economic weapon directed against Moscow than an indication of the need to build up supplies for the coming showdown against Japan. Yet Herring agrees with revisionists who contend that the abrupt cutback of Lend-lease exacerbated Russian suspicion of American motives. Moreover, his analysis of the administration's management of the postwar loan issue converges with Paterson's, as both historians concur that State Department attempts in the spring of 1946 to secure major political concessions for a loan further augmented Russian hostility. This episode probably cost Truman and his advisers whatever chance they had to utilize economic assistance to secure even minimal concessions, or to contribute to postwar amity.[44]

Unlike Paterson, however, Herring finds no evidence to suggest that a postwar loan would have mitigated Soviet antipathy, although he speculates that relations might have improved had Washington combined a loan with acceptance of a Russian sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. Herring concludes that while "the wisdom of such a course has much to commend it in retrospect . . . history and experience had not prepared American leaders to act in this fashion."[45] Not only would Truman have undertaken a mammoth political risk by disavowing Congress's mandate to limit aid to the military requirements of the Allies; the Chief Executive faced many other domestic pressures that also restricted his freedom of action. These included his own inexperience and extreme sensitivity to congressional attitudes, his ostensibly formidable difficulties in securing legislative approval of FDR's postwar diplomatic designs, and difficulties produced by bureaucratic confusion and administrative bungling.

Conversely, Paterson maintains that Washington's "will to dominate" the postwar world was neither restricted by domestic political pressures, nor, as Kolko would have it, shaped solely by the requirements of capitalism. Paterson argues that the administration based its reconstruction policies upon its own conception of national interest. Reflecting an ideology devoted to the attainment of "peace and prosperity," policy makers assumed that their objectives depended upon a healthy global economy, political stability, unrestricted world trade, and the development of markets for business and commercial interests. Paterson also feels that the Cold War was not inevitable: American leaders possessed options to defuse postwar tension, but unfortunately these were blocked by policies that divided the world "into hostile spheres and emasculated the goal of peace and prosperity that . . . Americans hoped to fullfill."[46]

[40] Louis J. Halle, *The Cold War as History* (New York: Harper and Row, 1967); Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945–1971* (New York: John Wiley, 1972).

[41] Herring, *Aid to Russia, 1941–1946*, p. xix. See also George C. Herring, Jr., "Lend-Lease to Russia and the Origins of the Cold War," *Journal of American History*, 56 (June, 1969), 93–114.

[42] Herring, *Aid to Russia*, p. 288.

[43] *Ibid.*

[44] *Ibid.*, p. 292; Thomas G. Paterson, *Soviet-American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1973), pp. 33–42. A thoughtful critic of revisionism agrees with this point. See Maier, "Revisionism and the Interpretation of Cold War Origins," pp. 340–41.

[45] Herring, *Aid to Russia*, p. 293.

[46] Paterson, pp. 263, 267. See also Thomas G. Paterson, "The Abortive American Loan to Russia and the

Soviet-American Confrontation thus reflects the influence of Williams and Kolko, but Paterson warns that in addition to economics "other diplomatic variables were also active" in shaping policy.[47] The author avoids the one-dimensional quality of much leftist historiography by emphasizing in his analysis the importance of distorted American perceptions of the Soviet Union, the influence of the regular political process, public opinion, bureaucratic lethargy and conflict, and the impact of personalities. Establishing himself as one of the most circumspect of the younger writers on the left, he carefully assesses the background of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, the role of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, American economic relations with Europe, the recovery of West Germany, Russian penetration of Eastern Europe, and the abortive Soviet loan.

According to Paterson, the parochial nationalism and universalist expectations characterizing United States reconstruction policies reflected the style and personality of administration leaders—and their reading of history—more than the external problems posed by Soviet military and diplomatic initiatives. "When the postwar period brought tension rather than peace," the author explains, "an explanation was drawn from history: Soviet Russia was replacing Nazi Germany as the major disrupter of a stable, pacific international order. Therefore, the United States must isolate the evil and avert the cyclical recurrence of war."[48] As illustrated by the abrasive rhetoric utilized by Truman, Averell Harriman, James F. Byrnes, and Dean Acheson, the administration had concluded, in Acheson's words, that "only the United States had the power to grab hold of history and make it conform."[49]

Taking Acheson and other policy makers at their word, Paterson argues that overwhelming economic strength endowed Washington with the ability to coerce international compliance with American reconstruction policies. But in asserting that "few restraints inhibited the exercise of American power," the author seemingly neglects evidence provided by Gaddis and Herring, who emphasize the importance of Truman's difficulties in the face of Congress's desire to retrench and to reassert its prerogative over foreign policy after four years of executive direction.[50] Disagreeing with this view, Paterson contends that the "foreign policy public"—composed of professionals, businessmen, and organized pressure groups—endorsed Truman's major proposals without much opposition, while congressional influence on foreign policy was declining, and the diplomatic debate was being curtailed by bipartisanship. Here, however, Paterson seems to be defining public opinion too narrowly, as well as underestimating Truman's sensitivity to congressional attitudes. Herring and Gaddis indicate that senators and representatives were in fact more closely attuned to the attitudes of their constituents than to the elite groups Paterson emphasizes.

Postwar Politics

Our understanding of the restrictions, peculiarities, and importance of domestic influences upon foreign policy during the postwar years is expanded further in the eclectic scholarship of Susan M. Hartmann and Allen Yarnell. In *Truman and the 80th Congress*, Hartmann describes the manner in which the President utilized the Republican-dominated legislature to lay the basis for the 1948 campaign. Yarnell, meanwhile, in *Democrats and Progressives: The 1948 Presidential Election as Test of Postwar Liberalism*, dissects Democratic campaign strategy, clarifying the interrelationship between foreign policy issues and liberal anti-communism, which supplied the framework for the administration's attack upon Henry Wallace and the Progressive Party.

Hartmann considers the era of the 80th Congress significant for providing insights into "patterns in foreign and domestic politics that would affect events in the United States for the next twenty years."[51] She shows how Truman's inept leadership in 1946 contributed to Republican victories in that off-year election, endowing the GOP with firm control in Congress for the first time since Hoover's presidency. Attempting as a matter of necessity to keep foreign policy out of domestic politics, Truman first tried to cooperate with his adversaries—except, of course, in matters concerning important New Deal legislation. In part because his administration "fabricated a crisis atmosphere and made its proposals in terms of U.S. security from communist expansion," the President was able to secure opposition support

Origins of the Cold War, 1943–1946," *Journal of American History*, 56 (June, 1969), 76–92.

[47] Paterson, *Soviet-American Confrontation*, p. ix.

[48] *Ibid.*, p. 262. See also Thomas G. Paterson and Les K. Adler, " 'Red Fascism': The Merger of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia in the American Image of Totalitarianism, 1930's–1950's," *American Historical Review*, 75 (April, 1970), 1046–64. For the ensuing controversy, see *American Historical Review*, 75 (December, 1970), 2155–64; 76 (April, 1971), 575–80. A similar study of the origins of anti-Soviet sentiment is Elliott West, "The Roots of Conflict: Soviet Images in the American Press, 1941–1947," in *Essays on American Foreign Policy*, ed. M. F. Morris and S. L. Myres (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1974), pp. 83–116.

[49] Gaddis Smith, *Dean Acheson* (New York: Cooper Square, 1972), p. 416.

[50] Paterson, *Soviet-American Confrontation*, p. 264.

[51] Susan M. Hartmann, *Truman and the 80th Congress* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1971), p. 1.

for his major foreign policy initiatives, especially the Truman Doctrine.[52]

Speaking loudly, but brandishing a small stick, Truman approached politics in a manner that some writers have termed self-defeating.[53] But while Hartmann agrees that the Missourian's vigorous rhetoric was not usually matched by commensurate deeds, she explains that the distance between the President's words and the realities of policy making did not necessarily constitute failure. On the contrary, apparent legislative defeats for the administration tended to cloak calculated, strategic victories. Truman's emphatic veto of the Taft-Hartley Bill, for example, blunted but did not halt the Republican attack upon federal labor policy. Yet his liberal rhetoric served "the crucial purpose of returning labor securely and energetically to the Democratic fold and denied a big domestic issue to a possible third party movement."[54]

Truman's ability to emphasize his sharp differences with the 80th Congress enabled him to step forward as a defender of the public interest and a champion of the New Deal. He followed a political strategy that was skillfully directed by Clark Clifford, who counseled that the President's tactics and recommendations during the campaign "must be tailored for the voters, not the Congressmen; they must display a label which reads 'no compromise'."[55] Casting himself as "the Galahad of reform pluckily fighting the dragon of privilege," Truman himself emerged as a first-rate strategist. In 1948 he retreated from his earlier commitment to civil rights when it appeared that too radical a stand would jeopardize party unity prior to the Philadelphia convention. Similarly, his emphasis upon bipartisan foreign policy, to prevent diplomatic issues from entering the arena of domestic politics, did not prevent his own use of the Soviet menace for partisan purposes. Hartmann explains that the President's "get tough" speeches of March 17, in which he indicted Moscow for complete responsibility for the global crisis and denounced "Henry Wallace and his Communists," signified a form of crisis management that undercut the latter's political appeal by attacking his patriotism.[56]

If the desire to avoid contention over Cold War policies formed an integral facet of Truman's political strategy, the Republican party itself aided the President in utilizing domestic political conflict to advantage. After the nomination of Governors Dewey and Earl Warren, and the adoption by the convention of a moderate platform, Truman— in a masterstroke—summoned the 80th Congress into special session and challenged it to approve the major planks in the Republican platform. This Congress failed to do, and the incumbent executive, who spoke to the issues with characteristic directness, maintained his paramount campaign issue—the association of Congress's negative record with the Republican party.

According to Hartmann, the significance of Truman's victory lay in its assurance that American liberals would place priority upon anti-communism rather than domestic reform. Yet nowhere does the author depict the President as a slave of capitalist ideology. She admits that government and business were on good terms during the period, and that domestic reform tended to support the strategic requirements of corporate capitalism. But she correctly stresses the need to assess Truman's conduct during the campaign—and his liberalism generally—within the matrix of politics. In this context one may appreciate Truman's substantial contributions to domestic reform—contributions that were consistent both with his conservative termperament, and with the conservative American political system. Perhaps the major virtue of this well written study is its reminder that chief executives are neither deities nor dupes. Better than other postwar presidents, one feels, Truman discovered early in his tenure that harsh political realities both determined the limits of his foreign policy goals and limited the administration's movement toward substantial reform.

Yarnell's study of the Democratic party's response to Wallace's candidacy follows closely Hartmann's account, and counters the assertion of several scholars that the Progressives pushed Truman to the left on domestic issues during the campaign.[57] Utilizing the recently opened Wallace papers, numerous manuscripts, and interviews with key figures, Yarnell argues that Wallace's presence in the campaign contributed prominently to Truman's hard line on foreign policy—a crucial ingredient in his victory. Wallace, of course, had hoped to redirect America's diplomatic course—and while this proved impossible, many observers claimed, in the words of Karl Schmitt, that "for the first time in American

[52] *Ibid.*, p. 64.

[53] This theme is emphasized in Samuel Lubell, *The Future of American Politics*, 3rd rev. ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), pp. 26–42.

[54] Hartmann, p. 90.

[55] *Ibid.*, p. 129.

[56] *Ibid.*, pp. 72–101, 128–31, 147, 168–69.

[57] Rexford Guy Tugwell, "Progressives and the Presidency," *The Progressive*, 13 (April, 1949), 5; David A. Shannon, *The Decline of American Communism* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1959), p. 179. See also, for similar interpretations, Curtis D. MacDougall, *Gideon's Army* (3 vols., New York: Marzani and Munsell, 1965); and Richard S. Kirkendall, "Election of 1948," in *History of American Presidential Elections, 1789–1968*, ed. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., 4 vols. (New York: Chelsea House, 1971), IV, 3099–3145.

history, the thunder of a party of discontent had been stolen, neither four nor forty years later, but in the very midst of the campaign."[58] This assertion, according to Yarnell, does not withstand scrutiny. Nor does the author find evidence to sustain Walter LaFeber's conclusion that "the Berlin Blockade and Truman's shift to the left on domestic issues killed off any hopes that Progressives nursed of determining the election."[59]

Much irony, in fact, existed in Wallace's attempt to provide a forum from which Americans might force the Democrats to adopt a more conciliatory foreign policy. Not only did Wallace fail in this task; his presence in the campaign actually facilitated Truman's projection of a liberal image, despite the lack of new programs to substantiate it. Refuting the notion that the Democrats shifted to a more liberal stance during the campaign, Yarnell demonstrates that party strategy remained consistent after November 1947, when Clifford prepared his memorandum on the coming election. The document analyzed the problems posed by a potential Wallace candidacy, but predicted that the third party would play only a minor role in influencing the President's course. Clifford argued that the Republicans would remain the prime foe, and that Truman should campaign against Dewey rather than Wallace. Yet at the same time Clifford cautioned that "every effort should be made *now*, jointly and at one and the same time, to dissuade Wallace and also to identify him in the public mind with the communists."[60] The latter task was carried out not by Truman, who remained personally aloof during most of the campaign, but by practical liberals like Hubert Humphrey, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., and Leon Henderson, who, in historian Robert Griffith's words, "took to baiting Wallace and his followers in an effort to strengthen their own position as sober, industrious, and 100% American reformers."[61]

Yarnell maintains that Wallace's position in the campaign was consistent with his own postwar beliefs and that he was not being duped by Communists. The indisputable presence of Communists among his supporters did not mean that they controlled the party, but charges by Americans for Democratic Action emphasized this point and had the effect of undermining Wallace's criticism of American foreign policy. Although admitting that it is impossible to test the effect of this theme from available voting statistics, Yarnell concludes that as leaders of the attack ADA members saw clearly that the issue of communism provided a means to secure control within the liberal community, and thus profited most from Wallace's failure.[62]

Wallace and Taft Revisited

Both Hartmann and Yarnell conclude that Truman succeeded in achieving his major objectives during the campaign. But both accounts also question whether his goals were constructive, and whether his leadership was good for the country. Two of the President's contemporaries—Wallace and Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio—exhibited similar doubts, and it is not surprising that a generation later their careers have been reinterpreted in more positive terms. John Morton Blum, Frederick and Edward Schapsmeier, and Norman Markowitz join Yarnell in depicting Wallace as a far more complex man than the mystical, political ignoramus of liberal historiography, or the crypto-"open door imperialist" as portrayed by New Left writers Ronald Radosh and Leonard Liggio.[63]

Blum and the Schapsmeiers grant that Wallace's critique of administration diplomacy was naive and misguided, but at the same time present a

[58] Karl M. Schmitt, *Henry A. Wallace: Quixotic Crusade, 1948* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1960), p. 91.

[59] LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War*, p. 73.

[60] Allen Yarnell, *Democrats and Progressives: The 1948 Presidential Election as a Test of Postwar Liberalism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), pp. 32–33.

[61] Robert Griffith, *The Politics of Fear: Joseph R. McCarthy and the Senate* (Lexington, Ky.: University of Kentucky Press, 1970), p. 46.

[62] Yarnell, pp. 106–07. See also Alonzo L. Hamby, "Henry A. Wallace, the Liberals, and Soviet-American Relations," *Review of Politics*, 30 (April, 1968), 153–69. Although Yarnell occupies solid ground in contending that the politics of anti-communism figured prominently in Truman's victory, the author fails to sustain the assertion that "by hurling charges of communism at the third party," the President "fully legitimized the issue for use in American politics" (p. 85). This argument ignores the long history of guilt-by-association in politics. See Geoffrey S. Smith, *To Save a Nation: American Countersubversives, the New Deal, and the Coming of World War II* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), for an assessment of the Roosevelt administration's utilization of this theme in the battle against isolationism. See also Wayne S. Cole, *Charles A. Lindbergh and the Battle Against American Intervention in World War II* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1974). Yarnell's assertion that the Truman administration gave the nation "a real taste of what was to come in later years over the issue of anti-communism" (p. 114) also lacks convincing proof. Yarnell has not demonstrated the links between Truman's anti-communism (which he defines as synonymous with the ADA's version) and the anti-communism of the McCarthyites. To do this he would have to carry his story at least into 1950, demonstrating the political impact of the fall of China, the spy cases, and the Korean War.

[63] John Morton Blum, ed., *The Price of Vision: The Diary of Henry A. Wallace, 1942–1946* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973); Edward L. and Frederick H. Schapsmeier, *Prophet in Politics: Henry A. Wallace and the War Years, 1940–1965* (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1970); Norman D. Markowitz, *The Rise and Fall of the People's Century: Henry A. Wallace and American Liberalism, 1941–1948* (New York: Free Press, 1973); Ronald Radosh and Leonard P. Liggio, "Henry Wallace and the Open Door," in *Cold War Critics*, ed. T. G. Paterson, pp. 76–113.

sympathetic portrayal of a man whose search for social justice led him on a tortuous odyssey, from FDR's third-term Vice-President to political Waterloo. These two books indicate that Wallace's idealistic, progressive philosophy remained consistent as he moved from scientific farming to journalism, and finally to politics, where he became "a man driven by conscience and conviction, so much so that his concern for political realities was often obscured by the cause itself."[64]

While Blum's skillful editing provides important insights into Wallace's character, into the personal and bureaucratic conflict of the Roosevelt and early Truman administrations, and into the Iowa native's growing disdain for political compromise, both volumes emphasize the importance of the Second World War as the nemesis of Wallace's liberalism. His diary entries during the conflict reveal the hope that peace would herald the emergence of a "century of the common man." But his unyielding commitment to continuing the anti-fascist alliance after 1945 led him astray. Failing to grasp Sir Harold Nicolson's dictum that foreign policy cannot be based on enthusiasm or sentiment, Wallace counseled a policy of moderation toward Moscow, despite Stalin's dubious actions in Eastern Europe. Eschewing power politics, Wallace warned that the United States was on a collision course with her former ally, and that Truman was responsible for this dilemma. By 1948 Wallace's *Weltanschauung* had become Manichaen: The administration faced a choice between one world and nuclear holocaust. Increasingly his statements became self-righteous, arrogant, and parochial. He completed his ill-fated campaign for the presidency believing that opponents of his mission were either malicious or ignorant. And he in turn earned the appellation of an appeaser.

While these two books are not likely to stir much controversy—except perhaps for overcorrecting the harsh accounts of earlier writers—Norman D. Markowitz's monograph is at once more ambitious and more problematic. Markowitz utilizes Wallace's career to attack interest-group politics and post-New-Deal liberalism. The author shows how as wartime Vice-President, Wallace joined other "social liberals" to create a new order—a global New Deal. This noble goal eluded him, however, partly because he lacked political skill, but also because of forces beyond his control. Decrying social injustice at the same time that he defended capitalism, Wallace failed to grasp the contradiction within his concept of "progressive capitalism" and proved no match for advocates of "corporate social liberalism." Ultimately his politics exhibited "the poverty and . . . emptiness of social liberalism—its failure to deal realistically with the American political economy and thus to make a difference in the real world."[65]

According to Markowitz, Wallace represented the humanitarian wing of social liberalism. A man who championed the democratic process and social welfare, he could not prevail against "corporate social liberals"—reformers "interested primarily in adjusting people to an efficient business culture."[66] Even before Roosevelt's death, these conservative spokesmen had begun to reassert themselves. Powerless in the face of corporate interests, unable to master the intricacies of pressure-group politics, and unsuccessful in defusing the Truman administration's hostility toward the Soviet Union, social liberalism quickly disintegrated. The President's conservative politics, anti-Communist rhetoric, and domestic loyalty program forced many former associates of Wallace to jettison their idealism. Many of these individuals embraced the image of "Red-Fascism" and joined the ranks of "Cold War liberalism," opposed to any accommodation with the Soviets. After the Progressive campaign of 1948, which in the author's view posed "the real questions confronting postwar America," the way lay open for Dean Acheson and John Foster Dulles, for Korea, and for the junior senator from Wisconsin. In the end, Wallace himself suffered a failure of nerve, giving up his quest for a people's century, supporting Truman in Korea, even popularizing the old canard of the "Yellow Peril."

Markowitz's accounts of Truman's vice-presidential nomination (the "second Missouri compromise") and of the inception of the Progressive party are first-rate. Moreover, his conclusions indicate once again that left-wing revisionism is not monolithic. Although proposing a general revisionist interpretation of the origins of the Cold War, for example, he challenges other radical historians in several instances.[67] Yet despite insights provided into the liberal movement, the author's neo-Marxian perspective caricatures the administration and transforms Wallace, Truman, and other actors into captives of economic, intellectual, and social forces. Markowitz's view of Wallace assumes that capitalism and humanitarianism are mutually exclusive categories, when in fact specific sections of the book suggest that they overlap. The author also appears to over-simplify differences between Wallace's vision of a people's century, and the imperialistic drive toward what Henry Luce of *Time* termed an "American Century," a vision shared, incidentally, by Wallace's "corporate-liberal" opponents, including ADA,

[64] Schapsmeier and Schapsmeier, pp. 163–64.

[65] Markowitz, pp. 3, 8–9.

[66] *Ibid.*, pp. 7, 324–28.

[67] *Ibid.*, pp. 53, 195, 227–28.

the business establishment, and the administration itself.[68]

Markowitz's analytical framework also minimizes the importance of bargaining and compromise in the day-to-day operation of politics. Wallace and his supporters may have envisioned a good society modeled upon an ideal cooperative commonwealth, but their labors occurred within the parameters of the political system, not within the realm of speculative philosophy. From his days as Secretary of Agriculture, Wallace sought to humanize and democratize capitalism, not to supplant it with another system.[69] Wallace thus occupied ground between the worlds of competition and cooperation, and if this made him at times an insightful and prophetic thinker, it also influenced his quixotic politics. But if Wallace appeared to lack abilities usually connected with political achievement, he nonetheless managed to survive in politics for thirteen years, a point that bears emphasizing.

While recent historians have found new meaning in Wallace's dissent against Truman's domestic and foreign policies, current revisionism has altered in a positive way the reputation of Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio. After World War II liberals depicted the most influential Republican in Congress as a stiff and negative political troglodyte and an ultranationalistic opponent of globalism. According to Henry W. Berger and James T. Patterson, however, this picture is erroneous.[70] Berger's view of Taft suggests in fact an intriguing similarity between the origin of many of the Ohioan's attitudes toward domestic and foreign affairs, and the sources of disillusionment felt by many radicals and liberals in the late 1960s.[71] Like many New Left historians, Taft viewed domestic and foreign affairs as inseparable, and believed that political and economic liberty would survive in the United States only if government controls were kept to a minimum and if the nation avoided war.

Taft exhibited concern that another conflict would destroy private enterprise and Republican government, and he thus rejected bipartisanship in foreign policy. He warned repeatedly after 1948 that increased global commitments threatened the national interest by restricting the freedom of the United States to act unilaterally in the event of crisis. Skeptical of the military threat posed by the Soviet Union in the late 1940s, he opposed overcommitting the military in Europe, and scored Truman for ignoring the implications of large economic investments in underdeveloped nations. After the President failed to consult either Congress or the United Nations before ordering American troops to Korea, Taft charged him with usurping Congress's authority to declare war. In terms very similar to those employed by recent revisionists, Taft argued that Washington policy makers could not expect to impose democracy and capitalism upon other nations. American had to exert international influence through example.

Although in Berger's words Taft never indicated "the exact point at which government activity intruded upon liberty," the senator decried corporate monopoly and remained a lifelong adversary of the New and Fair Deals.[72] Domestic reform under FDR and Truman centralized power in the executive branch of government and fostered public monopolies, while such policies as deficit spending and wage and price controls threatened personal freedom. Here Berger emphasizes Taft's social conscience, explaining that the Ohioan believed that society did possess responsibility to battle depressions, prevent poverty, and secure equal economic opportunity for all citizens.

In claiming Taft as a precursor of the contemporary left's opposition to globalism, however, Berger neglects the Republican leader's virulent anti-communism and its effect upon domestic politics and the development of the Cold War. These issues receive close attention in Patterson's model biography, *Mr. Republican*. Patterson is no radical, but his analysis has been influenced by recent revisionism. Like Berger, he rejects as simplistic the orthodox picture of Taft as a reactionary spokesman for business interests. The senator emerges here as a man of urbanity and warmth, who possessed the ability to change his mind on important national issues. Patterson finds much to praise in Taft's career—his principled opposition to American involvement in

[68] See Henry Luce, *The American Century* (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1941).

[69] Markowitz's interpretation has much in common with Norman Pollack's assessment of Populism. See Norman Pollack, *The Populist Response to Industrial America: Midwestern Populist Thought* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962).

[70] James T. Patterson, *Mr. Republican: A Biography of Robert A. Taft* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972); Henry W. Berger, "Senator Robert A. Taft Dissents from Military Escalation," in *Cold War Critics*, ed. T. G. Paterson, pp. 167–204; Henry M. Berger, "A Conservative Critique of Containment: Senator Taft on the Early Cold War Program," in *Containment and Revolution*, ed. David Horowitz (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), pp. 125–39.

[71] Murray N. Rothbard, "The Transformation of the American Right," *Continuum*, 2 (Summer, 1964), 221. A spirited New Left defense of Taft's views on foreign policy, together with those of Charles Beard, Oswald Garrison Villard, John T. Flynn, and Lawrence Dennis is presented in Ronald Radosh, *Prophets on the Right: Profiles of Conservative Critics of American Globalism* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1975). See also the attempt of "new conservatives" to claim Taft as one of their own in Russell Kirk and James McClellan, *The Political Principles of Robert A. Taft* (New York: Fleet Press, 1967). Taft's own views are contained in *A Foreign Policy for Americans* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1951).

[72] Berger, "Taft Dissents," 171.

World War II, his criticism of the "victor's justice" at Nuremberg, his advocacy (after earlier opposition) of public housing and federal aid to education, and his support for a Jewish homeland in Palestine.

But Patterson admits that Taft's libertarian views were sometimes distorted by partisan and fiscal considerations, and by the issue of communism. The Ohioan was not above demagoguery: He appreciated the political capital inherent in anti-Communist rhetoric. As early as 1945 he expressed astonishment at "how many professors and other so-called intellectuals have been converted to a sympathy with the Russian system."[73] In 1946 he charged that Truman "coveted the support of . . . the communists in the November election," at the same time as he sought a Congress "dominated by a policy of appeasing the Russians abroad and of fostering Communism at home."[74] By 1950, for partisan reaons, Taft joined other conservative Republicans in warning against Communist infiltration of the State Department. Patterson concedes that Taft's charges "not only lacked solid proof, but also cast the debate over China policy into an unproductive search for scapegoats."[75] The Ohio politician had long been a foe of communism, but with the advent of Senator Joseph McCarthy, Taft moved to a more aggressive position. Privately he expressed dismay over McCarthy's lack of civility, his ignorance of Senate tradition, and his failure to verify his accusations. Indeed, in calmer times Taft's strong record on civil liberties might have led him to denounce or disassociate himself from McCarthy's crusade.

Taft did not do so. Instead he counseled that the Wisconsin senator should "keep talking and if one case doesn't work out, he should proceed with another one."[76] In explaining the complex motives behind the Ohioan's failure to break with his "crude and undisciplined colleague," Patterson stresses Taft's own "instinctive hatred of Bolshevism."[77] He believed that the great struggle of his era was ideological and not military in nature, and he advised that unless the government was cleansed of subversives "it could never hope to serve as an example of capitalist virtue to the rest of the uncommitted world."[78]

Taft's defense of McCarthy also reflected "his party loyalty and aggressive partisanship in an election year."[79] Not only had his consistent criticism of Democratic foreign policy lent plausibility to the charge of Communist sympathizers within government, but concurrent developments in international and domestic politics made 1950 a poor time to contradict McCarthy's accusations. In addition, Taft himself faced strong opposition from Catholic bishops, the AF of L, and NAACP. According to the author, therefore, "the temptations of politics, more than anything else, had turned Taft toward irresponsibility."[80]

Patterson's biography emphasizes the centrality of partisan politics in domestic and foreign policy making, and suggests once more that the genius of the democratic system—along with its defects—lies not in the realm of ideology but in the trenches of day-to-day compromise. During the postwar era conservatives hoped to undo the Roosevelt-Truman welfare state, and to place the nation once more upon the path toward responsible government. Taft's nomination in 1952 would have overthrown the eastern, liberal wing of the Republican Party. Yet although he possessed many political skills—as epitomized by his role in constructing a strong alliance between conservative Republicans and southern Democrats—that honor eluded him. And here, perhaps, one may quarrel with Patterson's emphasis upon external factors to explain Taft's failure. The liberal press did caricature him as an intractable ideologue, thus helping to destroy his presidential ambitions, but the author might have accorded more attention to Taft's political and administrative qualifications for the White House, along with the implications of his criticism of United States Cold War policies.

Truman, McCarthy, and Civil Liberties

Next to the origins of conflict with the Soviet Union, the most controversial issue of Truman-era historiography concerns the relationship between the Cold War, the administration's position on civil liberties, and the rise of McCarthyism. Where earlier observers portrayed the embattled Chief Executive as a stalwart champion of civil liberties, recent revisionists have found in his own anti-Communist position—in his exaggerated rhetoric, partisan strategies, and foreign policies—the basis of the witch hunt that began in 1950.

During the 1950s liberal historians explained McCarthyism primarily in personal, sociological, and psychological terms. These writers indicated that McCarthy's appeal was strongest not among traditional conservative sectors of society, but among laborers, rural folk, and certain ethnic groups located within the American reform tradition. Richard Hofstadter, Seymour Martin Lipset,

[73] Patterson, p. 446. See also James T. Patterson, "Alternatives to Globalism: Robert A. Taft and American Foreign Policy, 1939–1945," *Historian*, 36 (August, 1974), 670–88.
[74] Patterson, *Mr. Republican*, p. 313.
[75] *Ibid.*, p. 443.
[76] *Ibid.*, p. 446.
[77] *Ibid.*, pp. 447–49.
[78] *Ibid.*, p. 449.
[79] *Ibid.*
[80] *Ibid.*, pp. 448–49.

and Daniel Bell analyzed McCarthyism as a facet of "mass" and "status" politics, identifying the phenomenon with Populism, and depicting both movements as irrational responses to the industrial secular state.[81]

This approach, which reflected a distrust of mass democracy, dominated McCarthy scholarship until 1967, when Michael Rogin challenged attempts "to explain the hysteria with which McCarthy infected the country by the hysterical preoccupations of masses of people."[82] Centering his attention upon Wisconsin and the Dakotas, Rogin utilized Gallup Polls to demonstrate that in emphasizing the irrational component of rural radicalism, "pluralists" like Hofstadter ignored the specific goals and issues of popular protest; that unlike earlier agrarian protest movements, McCarthyism was not a mass movement; and that historic agrarian radicalism contributed not to McCarthy's strength but to the constituencies of liberal Democrats. Discarding an elitist model of America's sociopolitical structure, Rogin concluded that McCarthy lacked a "cohesive, organized popular following," and that "the attack was made by one section of the political elite against another and was nurtured by the very elites under attack."[83] McCarthyism thus developed within the context of the nation's conservative tradition, and the Wisconsin senator capitalized mainly upon the political frustrations of the traditional, midwestern conservative wing of the Republican Party.

Rogin's assessment transcended the particular significance of McCarthyism with its warning to scholars who utilized social science theory and a pluralistic model of American politics. By separating such issues as McCarthy's ideology, his political backing, and his popular support, Rogin pointed out that psychological insights (which dominated consensus interpretations of radical dissent) are also pertinent to analyses of mainstream politics. He also suggested that pluralism can explain neither elite support for emotional, antidemocratic movements like McCarthyism, nor, for that matter, democratic and creative mass movements.

Agreeing that the values of interest-group liberalism provide a poor yardstick to comprehend McCarthyism, Athan Theoharis moves several steps beyond Rogin. Theoharis argues that in initiating the Cold War and pursuing an inconsistent course on civil liberties, the administration contributed directly to the red scare of the 1950s. In *The Yalta Myths* he probes the emergence of the Yalta Conference as a problem in politics. In 1945, he finds, most citizens shared the Roosevelt administration's view that relations with Moscow required a policy of trust and conciliation. Only "extremist" politicians denounced Yalta, and they did so to discredit the New Deal. Yet by 1950 the conference had become a political weapon for the GOP, as a result of the fall of China, the Hiss case —and the Republicans's unexpected and galling defeat in 1948. Ironically, Theoharis suggests, the Republican party was aided by Truman's earlier reorientation of foreign policy. Containment, together with the President's tough rhetoric, created a crisis atmosphere in which Truman ultimately proved unable to defend his policies—except in partisan terms. When the administration "reversed its views on the reasonableness and desirability of trusting the Soviet Union," the author writes, "Yalta became a conference that it had never been."[84]

In *Seeds of Repression* Theoharis continues his indictment. While searching frantically for issues to secure popular and congressional support, the President and his advisers emphasized American righteousness and Soviet depravity and in effect created a new political environment—an environment that ossified foreign policy and limited the parameters of public debate. An even more important factor in laying the basis for McCarthyism, according to the author, was Truman's loyalty programs, which set impossibly high standards, stressed the dubious concept of guilt by associ-

[81] See Daniel Bell, ed., *The New American Right* (New York: Criterion Books, 1955), and its revised edition, Bell, ed., *The Radical Right: The New American Right Expanded and Updated* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1964). See also Richard Hofstadter, *The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays* (New York: Knopf, 1965). A criticism of "consensus" historians is offered in Marian J. Morton, *The Terrors of Ideological Politics: Liberal Historians in a Conservative Mood* (Cleveland: Case Western Reserve University Press, 1972). Another book assessing liberal historiography in the 1950s is Bernard Sternsher, *Consensus, Conflict, and American Historians* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974).

[82] Michael Paul Rogin, *The Intellectuals and McCarthy: The Radical Specter* (Cambridge: M.I.T. University Press, 1967), p. 217.

[83] *Ibid.*, pp. 216–60. Other recent critiques of pluralism include R. Alan Lawson, *The Failure of Independent Liberalism, 1931–1941* (New York: Putnam, 1971); Theodore J. Lowi, *The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy, and the Crisis of Public Authority* (New York: Norton, 1969); and Theodore J. Lowi, *The Politics of Disorder* (New York: Basic Books, 1971).

[84] Athan Theoharis, *The Yalta Myths: An Issue in U.S. Politics, 1945–1955* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1970), p. 219. In addition to the books under review, Theoharis's publications include "The Threat to Civil Liberties," in *Cold War Critics*, ed. T. G. Paterson, pp. 266–98: "The Rhetoric of Politics: Foreign Policy, Internal Security, and Domestic Politics in the Truman Era, 1945–1950," and "The Escalation of the Loyalty Program," in *Politics and Policies*, ed. B. J. Bernstein, pp. 146–268; and "The Politics of Scholarship," in *The Specter: Original Essays on the Cold War and the Origins of McCarthyism*, ed. Robert Griffith and Athan Theoharis (New York: New Viewpoints, 1974), pp. 262–81.

ation, and encompassed all government employees with suspected "subversive tendencies." Paradoxically, this program provided the criteria upon which the administration was subsequently judged. With numerous decision makers calling for a battle to the death with communism at home and abroad, Theoharis finds it not surprising that Truman was eventually devoured by the monster he created. When the President's adversaries condemned him for "losing" China and for his "no win" policy in Korea, they were merely criticizing him for failing to keep his word.

Theoharis's views are bold and original. His analysis has the advantage of removing McCarthy from the limelight—a fortuitous development, it would appear—since the Wisconsin Republican's bombast and primitive style mesmerized liberal historians as they did liberal politicians during the early 1950's. Unfortunately, however, the validity of Theoharis's conclusions is undercut by the narrowness of his own frame of reference, and by the one-dimensionality of his studies. Both *The Yalta Myths* and *Seeds of Repression* overstate their case when they label Truman as the midwife of McCarthyism.

Like Charles Beard and Charles C. Tansill, who constructed a "devil theory of Franklin D. Roosevelt" to explain American entrance into World War II, Theoharis offers a similar interpretation of Truman's mendacity in matters pertaining to foreign policy and civil liberties. In fact, *Seeds of Repression* reveals its author's Nader-like opinion of American political elites (a tendency that may become more pronounced in the aftermath of Watergate). Not only are Truman and his associates unlikable, misguided, narrowminded, and self-interested, but readers must also conclude that they are omnipotent as well. Laboring under the illusion of American omnipotence (moreso, one feels, than his protagonists ever did), Theoharis denies that public servants might in fact be motivated by idealism and altruism. He also neglects the possibility that their policy options may be limited by the complexities of domestic and international politics. In any event, while it is probably true that conspiracy theories of history reveal more about the plight of their purveyors than about history itself, the burden of proof lies with the theorist.

And Theoharis does not offer a convincing case. Even if one grants that Truman's civil liberties record was inconsistent, and that he achieved more success in correcting inequities outside than within the administration, many problems remain. The author does not accord sufficient weight to the existence of indisputable Soviet espionage activities during the immediate postwar era; he does not consider the degree to which conservatives affected the political context in which the President operated; he misses the perseverance of prewar anti-communism, which gave structure to the debate between Truman and his adversaries; and he vastly overrates the Chief Executive's influence over the postwar political environment. Like most revisionists, Theoharis places undue emphasis upon *American* motives, images, actors, and developments. He neither probes nor speculates upon the possible effect of developments within the Soviet Union. Nowhere does the reader encounter any estimate of the reality behind Russian statements and actions. Nor is there any consideration of such important topics as Soviet national interests, Russian strategy, or Stalin's ideology.

Theoharis's case rests on the premise that Truman's rhetoric controlled public opinion. But the author does not explain why the President lost control of the Communist issue after 1948. This point is pertinent because, contrary to Theoharis's assertion, Truman did not adopt a consistently harsh, anti-Communist line until 1948 and 1949. Consequently the universalistic rhetoric of the Truman Doctrine of March 12, 1947, may in fact have represented a realistic appraisal of what was required for the Chief Executive to achieve his goal. As Alonzo Hamby pointed out, the political system may well "require a crisis atmosphere for the passage of important foreign policy measures; at the least we should be aware that the administration was not itching to establish one."[85]

Truman did resort to hyperbole to "scare hell out of the country" (to quote Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg), as the President sought to justify the assumption of Britain's role in protecting Greece against communism. But this is not the same thing as saying, as Theoharis does, that the Missourian's words signaled a revolution in foreign policy and suddenly alerted the populace to the menace of international and domestic communism. As John Lewis Gaddis writes, "Gaps between rhetoric and reality in U.S. foreign policy have often been large; indeed, such gaps might be said to constitute a defining characteristic of this country's diplomacy." While Theoharis views the Truman Doctrine as a misguided departure from FDR's "more sophisticated" approach to Soviet-American relations, Gaddis interprets the Doctrine as consistent with "previously established precedents for dealing with shifts in the European balance of power." Despite Truman's noisy rhetoric between 1947 and 1950, the administration "had neither the intention or the capability of policing the world," says Gaddis, adding that the "real commitment to contain communism everywhere originated in the events surrounding

[85] Alonzo L. Hamby, "The Clash of Perspectives and the Need for a New Synthesis," in *Truman Period: Reappraisal*, ed. R. Kirkendall, p. 132.

the Korean War, not the crisis in Greece and Turkey."[86]

In addition, to ascribe responsibility for McCarthyism to Truman's ability "to infect the population with his own fantasies" constitutes an amazingly facile generalization.[87] It assumes that the President's belief in the devil theory of international communism remained consistent between 1946 and 1952. And the assertion also ignores the point that while Truman's anti-Soviet rhetoric waxed militant between April and December, 1947, public opinion polls at the end of the year actually showed that a larger percentage of Americans believed that Communists were loyal citizens and deserved commensurate rights. This leads to the conclusion that Truman's rhetoric had less effect upon popular fears than Theoharis claims. As Murray Kempton observed, "historians can make the mistake, once they have proved that a speech was made, of going on to the assumption that people paid it much attention."[88]

Another revisionist account, which rejects Theoharis's left-liberal explanation, is Richard M. Freeland's *The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism*. Freeland argues that in order to safeguard economic and strategic interests on the European continent, the administration perceived the necessity of sending massive economic aid to war-ravaged countries. In securing popular and congressional support for such controversial measures as the Marshall Plan, the President and his advisers initiated an anti-Communist propaganda campaign that nudged the United States into the McCarthy era, and continued with sufficient strength through America's commitment in Vietnam. Freeland explains that this approach did not reflect expedient decisions, shortsighted policies, and mistakes. On the contrary, "the emotional and political forces and the patterns of belief . . . that were to provide the essential energies of postwar anti-communism . . . were aroused and these patterns of behavior developed . . . as a result of a deliberate and highly organized effort by the Truman administration in 1947 and 1948 to mobilize support for the Marshall Plan."[89] The President and his advisers thus emerge as progenitors of "a conscious, purposeful strategy deriving from the dynamics of a politics and ideology of multilateralism and economic internationalism."[90]

Because the administration's foreign policy was determined by a quest for markets to consume expected postwar surpluses, and because it was necessary to create those markets with foreign aid, the government faced a major stumbling block—a conservative Congress unwilling to expend large amounts of capital to rebuild Europe. Unable to persuade Congress of the advisability of foreign aid—a proposed loan to Britain was itself in difficulty in 1946—Truman then placed the issue within the context of deteriorating Soviet-American relations. The tactic proved successful and the President learned an important lesson.

According to Freeland, "no central decision was ever taken by the President or cabinet to use such techniques to support the campaign for Cold War policy."[91] Such a decision was unnecessary, for Truman's top advisers shared his sense of urgency, which was heightened by the reluctance of the 80th Congress and the American people to support foreign aid. The author marshals much evidence to show that the administration moved forcefully to silence its critics, and that its initiatives subsequently generated the fires of McCarthyism. Centering upon the period 1946 to 1948, with an epilogue carrying the story through 1950, Freeland assays well such matters as the Federal Employee Loyalty Program, Attorney General Tom Clark's controversial list of suspected communists, administration attempts to deport "subversive" aliens, high-level support offered the House Un-American Activities Committee, and Truman's strategic release of diplomatic documents revealing apparent Soviet hostility.

Yet despite impressive scholarship, Freeland fails to prove his case. His assertion that the administration did not need to make a central decision to create "a coherent pattern of official behavior" does not jibe with his claim that Truman and his advisers undertook "a deliberate and highly organized effort" to silence their detractors. In addition, the author's assessment of the government leaves the impression of a monolithic structure more rigid than the Kremlin. In arguing that Truman's official circle possessed one mind and a singular set of motives. Freeland is forced to employ circumstantial evidence. The author's contention that Attorney General Clark and J. Edgar Hoover were motivated in their critical attitude toward dissent by the commercial benefits that would accrue from approval of the Marshall Plan is at the least problematic. Even more debatable is

[86] John Lewis Gaddis, "Was the Truman Doctrine a Real Turning Point?" *Foreign Affairs*, 51 (January, 1974), 386–402 at p. 386. The significance of Korea in politics is stressed in Ronald J. Caridi, *The Korean War and American Politics: The Republican Party as a Case Study* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1968).

[87] The phrase is Murray Kempton's. See "Truman and the Beast," *New York Review of Books*, March 11, 1971, p. 6.

[88] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

[89] Richard M. Freeland, *The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism: Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics and Internal Security, 1946–1948* (New York: Knopf, 1972), pp. 3, 5.

[90] Athan Theoharis, review of Richard M. Freeland, *The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism*, in *Journal of American History*, 59 (June, 1972), 218–19.

[91] Freeland, pp. 225–26.

Freeland's suggestion that the administration "manufactured" the war scare of 1948 to engender that ambience of urgency required to secure congressional approval of ERP. A more plausible hypothesis might be that the European situation warranted Truman's concern, while his harsh rhetoric aimed both to alert apathetic citizens and to facilitate his chances in the coming election. There is no doubt that the Czech coup of 1948 and the Soviet move against Berlin "came to Truman's rescue when his political fortunes were at their lowest."[92] But there exists no evidence to demonstrate that the President and his advisers created these incidents; hence Freeland appears to confuse fortuitous occurrences with deliberate conspiracy.

If Freeland minimizes the importance of events that for good reason might have made Americans fear Communist aggression and subversion, he also exaggerates the political utility of anti-communism prior to Dewey's defeat. As Earl Latham indicated in *The Communist Controversy in Washington: From the New Deal to McCarthy*, the issue of Communist infiltration in government did not become an important political rallying point until *after* Truman's victory.[93] Only then did conservative Republicans, joined by Southern Democrats, popularize the issue in political terms. One should remember that Truman himself inadvertently placed control of the Communist issue in the hands of Congress when he summoned that body into special session in July 1948. And it would not be until Eisenhower's election four years later that the Communist issue was stripped of its political utility.

Congress's role in the drive for internal security legislation, and Truman's sincere, albeit unsuccessful attempts to defend civil liberties against his conservative adversaries form two basic themes of Alan D. Harper's *The Politics of Loyalty: The White House and the Communist Issue, 1946–1952*. Harper's positive view of Truman's leadership contrasts sharply with the revisionist contention that the administration's "garrison-state" ideology produced McCarthyism. Admitting that federal review boards often confused loyalty with security and thus acted on suspicions rather than facts, the author nonetheless finds that Truman himself championed the principle of civil liberties, as illustrated by his veto of the McCarran Internal Security Act of 1950 and the Walter-McCarran Act of 1952. Harper argues from liberal premises, asserting that Stalin's policies initiated the Cold War, that Communist subversion posed a real danger to national security, and that Henry Wallace was duped in 1948 by the CPUSA. Hence it is not surprising that Harper's image of Truman differs markedly from the *diabolus ex machina* encountered in Theoharis's and Freeland's volumes. *The Politics of Loyalty* gives the Chief Executive high marks, both for recognizing that the right's demand for internal security would menace individual liberties, and for attempting to balance arguments from these anti-subversive forces with those by defenders of civil liberties.

That Truman failed in his quest, therefore, should not make one doubt his sense of fairness. Harper notes that the President realized the threat of Communist subversion was exploitable, but as internal problems and external events converged to exacerbate popular anxiety and cast doubt on the administration's Commission on Internal Security and Individual Rights, he proved unable to keep the issue from being politicized. The author points to several circumstances beyond Truman's control, which perverted his concern with how the loyalty program functioned and led to the administration's failure to appease hard-line conservatives in Congress. The need to formulate a loyalty-security program within a short period of time, the combination of Soviet gains in Europe and partisan pressures, and the appointment of individuals sympathetic to a broad definition of security resulted in "too much stress on protection against subversion and rather too little on protection of traditional rights."[94] The President's efforts to influence executive departments and agencies administering the program also foundered because of the failure of Democratic leaders in the Senate to maintain discipline within party ranks. This dearth of leadership, together with Truman's dependency upon cabinet officers to formulate and execute policy, ultimately hindered him from dealing effectively with the inconsistencies and wide latitude demonstrated by agencies administering the program.

In contrast to Theoharis and Freeland, who consider Truman uniquely responsible for McCarthyism, and in contrast to Harper, who pictures the President as its victim, Robert Griffith offers a more detached view in *The Politics of Fear:*

[92] Robert A. Divine, "The Cold War and the Election of 1948," *Journal of American History*, 59 (June, 1972), 90–110 at p. 95.

[93] Earl Latham, *The Communist Controversy in Washington: From the New Deal to McCarthy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), pp. 394–99, 422–23. Other important assessments of McCarthyism include Dennis Wrong, "Theories of McCarthyism: A Survey," *Dissent*, 1 (Autumn, 1954), 385–97; David A. Shannon, "Was McCarthy a Political Heir of LaFollette?" *Wisconsin Magazine of History*, 45 (Autumn, 1961), 3–9; Nelson W. Polsby, "Towards an Explanation of McCarthyism," *Political Studies*, 8 (October, 1960), 250–71; Philip C. Chapman, "The New Conservatism: Cultural Criticism *vs.* Political Philosophy," *Political Science Quarterly*, 75 (March, 1960), 17–34.

[94] Alan D. Harper, *The Politics of Loyalty: The White House and the Communist Issue, 1946–1952* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Publishing Corp., 1969), p. 232.

Joseph R. McCarthy and the Senate. Contending that McCarthyism was neither an aberration in American politics, nor the result of an emotional, conspiratorial, mass political binge, Griffith presents a convincing case that the phenomenon represented the continuation of earlier antiradical politics, stimulated by the irresolution and fear of important senators, and facilitated by the decentralized political system. McCarthy's success, Griffith submits, stemmed less from the ethos of the Cold War than from "a political dynamic created during the 1940s by a band of Republican partisans as they scrapped and clawed their way to power."[95]

The Wisconsin Senator's ability to take advantage of the routine features of politics speeded his rise to power. Republicans who valued party loyalty and Senate decorum did not attack him for fear of splitting the GOP. Southern Democrats, who disliked the Fair Deal and northern urban liberalism, joined their colleagues in a conspiracy of silence. Liberal and conservative politicians alike thus made possible both McCarthy's impact and his duration as an anti-Communist leader. Griffith thus indicates that the dynamics of McCarthy's career lay in the irresolution and failures of political elites. His analysis is convincing, and his book is probably the best we shall have for some time. Nonetheless, one regrets the author's failure to assess further the respective roles and priorities of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations in this affair. For Truman battled over the best method to oppose communism, first with conservative Republicans and then with McCarthy, and lost both rounds. Eisenhower survived McCarthyism, but in retrospect it seems safe to conclude that the Senator's demise in 1954 did not change the essentials of either the government's or the public's image of the Communist threat. Anticommunism remained an important theme in sustaining popular approval of U.S. foreign policy.

In accounting for liberal complicity in McCarthy's methods and tactics, Griffith might have clarified further the battle between McCarthyites and anti-McCarthyites by emphasizing its concern with anti-Communist means rather than ends. From the outset of his national career, the Wisconsin politician remained an outsider who never secured entrance into the exclusive "club," and whose civil liberties were themselves substantially compromised by the surveillance of all first-class mail sent his residence between October 24 and November 16, 1952. McCarthy's opponents, then, utilized tactics similar to his, just as anti-McCarthyite forces argued from similar assumptions about communism. Murray Kempton has noted that Senator Ralph Flanders of Vermont, who in March 1954 launched the first Republican attack upon his raucous colleague, also feared "a monstrous and diabolic conspiracy against world peace," while the members of the Watkins Committee, the group that censured McCarthy, expressed criticism of Truman's foreign policy and analyzed communism in monolithic and moralistic terms.[96]

The problem of drawing a line of principle between McCarthy and his critics is underlined in a recent collection of original essays, edited by Griffith and Theoharis, which is heavily though not exclusively influenced by revisionist premises and assumptions.[97] Defining McCarthyism as a facet of conventional politics, rooted in the actions and inactions of conservative and liberal elites, the editors note that although the Wisconsin senator did not initiate the postwar Republican battle against executive privilege and secrecy, he came to personify the assault after 1950. Paradoxically, Eisenhower's victory in 1952 did not herald a new era of candor in policy making. On the contrary, the Republicans "abandoned their earlier condemnations of executive secrecy to support executive privilege on national security grounds."[98] According to the editors, the insulation of executive decision making from public scrutiny after McCarthy's fall both produced a more conservative and elitist politics than before, and also "reinforced anti-democratic political procedures."[99] *The Specter: Original Essays on the Cold War and the Origins of McCarthyism* seeks to explain the sources of "this profound shift in American politics in the post-McCarthy years." Several of the

[95] Griffith, *Politics of Fear*, p. ix. See also two essays by Griffith, "The Political Context of McCarthyism," *Review of Politics*, 33 (January, 1971), 24–35; and "The Politics of Anti-Communism: A Review Article," *Wisconsin Magazine of History*, 54 (Summer, 1971), 299–308.

[96] Kempton, "Truman and Beast," p. 12.

[97] Griffith and Theoharis, eds., *The Specter*. The complex relationship between the liberals and McCarthyism is dealt with from three different perspectives in Irving Kristol, " 'Civil Liberties,' 1952—A Study in Confusion," *Commentary*, 13 (March, 1952), 228–36; John Steinke and James Weinstein, "McCarthy and the Liberals," *Studies on the Left*, 2 (1962), 43–50; and Thomas C. Reeves, *Freedom and the Foundation: The Fund for the Republic in the Era of McCarthyism* (New York: Knopf, 1969). See also Mary Sperling McAuliffe, "The Red Scare and the Crisis in American Liberalism, 1947–1954," unpublished dissertation, University of Maryland, 1972; Leslie K. Adler, "The Red Image: American Attitudes Toward Communism in the Cold War Era" (dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1970); Peter H. Irons, "America's Cold War Crusade: Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy, 1942–1948" (dissertation, Boston University, 1972).

[98] Griffith and Theoharis, eds., p. xii. Other readers on McCarthyism include Thomas C. Reeves, ed., *McCarthyism* (Hinsdale, Ill.: Dryden Press, 1973); Allen J. Matusow, ed., *Joseph R. McCarthy* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970); and Earl Latham, ed., *The Meaning of McCarthyism*, 2nd ed. (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1973).

[99] Griffith and Theoharis (eds.), p. xiii.

essays deal with groups usually identified with McCarthyism—conservatives, Catholics, and businessmen—while other writers assess the problem of liberal complicity in the repressive politics of the era by analyzing parts played by Americans for Democratic Action, the CIO, and the American Civil Liberties Union. This volume concludes with considerations of several broader themes—the origins of internal-security legislation, the 1950 congressional elections, and McCarthy's utilization of the anti-Communist theme before 1950.

In contrast, Michael Parenti discerns no shift to a more elitist politics in the post-McCarthy era. His book, *The Anti-Communist Impulse*, defines anti-communism as nothing less than a national purpose and national ideology. Parenti condemns this "impulse," alleging that since 1947 it has led policy makers to ignore diversity and competition within Communist systems, and to interpret all of them as a threat to the American way of life. Furthermore, he asserts that anti-Communist leaders have wrongfully stressed the innocence and beneficence of American motives and actions, at the same time that they have undermined the nation's commitment to freedom, prevented the resolution of severe domestic problems, and contributed to a disastrous foreign policy of global counter-revolution.

A revisionist diatribe, *The Anti-Communist Impulse* demonstrates how "selective historical evidence, in addition to the trappings of scholarship, can attempt to create a new [historical] orthodoxy that is even more self-righteous and mentally restricting than the old one."[100] Because his research centers upon a narrow range of revisionist studies, Parenti does not add to our understanding of the historical origins of American anti-communism nor of the variety of forms it assumed in postwar American politics. Like Theoharis and Freeland, he tends to confuse all variations of anti-communism with McCarthyism, leaving little room for appreciating the political and diplomatic dilemmas facing Truman and American liberals during the first decade of the Cold War.

Beyond the New Deal

It is to these dilemmas that Alonzo L. Hamby turns in his important study of the Truman presidency. *Beyond the New Deal: Harry S. Truman and American Liberalism* provides an impressive defense of postwar liberalism and ranks with Gaddis's volume in its judicious use of sources, multidimensional framework, and temperate conclusions. No Cold Warrior, Hamby emerges as a qualified champion of postwar, "Vital Center" liberalism, a philosophical amalgam of ethics and expediency that rejected totalitarianism of the left and right and helped preserve New Deal values and aspirations in adverse times.[101]

Although admitting that some liberal politicians and intellectuals compromised their integrity when threatened by popular preoccupation with communism, Hamby finds no evidence to indicate that the liberal community either created McCarthyism or encouraged it. On the contrary, most liberals "refrained from character assassination and defended fundamental liberties."[102] Right-wing anti-communism was well established before the emergence of the non-Communist Vital Center, and would have "achieved its McCarthy-era strength earlier had the Popular Front continued to dominate the liberal movement."[103] Stressing the reluctance with which most liberals embraced the Cold War, Hamby demonstrates that the Vital Center's success in isolating Popular Frontism during the campaign of 1948 actually helped Truman to wage and win an election based on a platform of liberal reform. Not until 1950, when the Korean War refired an anti-Communist extremism that might otherwise have sputtered out, did the Vital Center—and the administration's social welfare program—become politically vulnerable.

Beyond the New Deal also questions the assumption—made by revisionists and nonrevisionists alike—that the administration's Cold War policies sabotaged domestic reform. Hamby contends that this hypothesis has yet to be proved in practical terms. Nor does the argument take into account how tremendous the barriers to reform would have been had the Cold War not occurred. By 1938 the conservative coalition in Congress had blunted the legislative thrust of the New Deal, while the war-induced economic boom served paradoxically to strengthen popular desires to secure and protect gains made during the mid-1930s.[104] In arguing that the Cold War stifled reform impulses, revi-

[100] Robert K. Murray, review of Michael Parenti, *The Anti-Communist Impulse*, in *American Historical Review*, 76 (June, 1971), 844.

[101] See Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Vital Center: The Politics of Freedom* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1949).

[102] Hamby, *Beyond New Deal*, pp. 400–01, 507.

[103] *Ibid.*, pp. 507, 509–10.

[104] An indispensable analysis of the development of domestic political constraints during the prewar era is James T. Patterson, *Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal: The Growth of the Conservative Coalition in Congress, 1933–1939* (Lexington, Ky.: University of Kentucky Press, 1967). The effects of World War II are discussed in Richard Polenberg, *War and Society: The United States, 1941–1945* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1972); Richard Polenberg, ed., *America at War: The Home Front, 1941–1945* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968); and Donald R. McCoy, "Republican Opposition During Wartime, 1941–1945," *Mid-America*, 49 (July 1967), 174–89. A first-rate bibliographical survey is Jim F. Heath, "Domestic America During World War II: Research Opportunities for Historians," *Journal of American History*, 58 (September, 1971), 384–414.

sionists have wrongly assumed that "ongoing reform was the normal condition of politics," thus missing the effect of earlier developments upon the fate of Truman's programs. [105]

Although administration preoccupation with foreign affairs did divert attention from the Fair Deal, Hamby explains that "international hostilities, hot or cold, are not necessarily inimical to reform causes."[106] The civil rights movement, for example, received a stimulus when the Korean War transformed into reality the President's earlier order desegregating the U.S. Army. In a broader sense the Cold War made it imperative that the administration move forcefully in the area of civil rights legislation. Here, Hamby concurs with recent studies by Donald R. McCoy and Richard T. Ruetten, and by Richard M. Dalfiume, who take pains not to read the "Black Power" demands of the late 1960s into the history of the late 1940s.[107] Hamby points out that Truman's vacillation on integration must not be interpreted as the personal failure of a man of narrow vision, but rather as the President's recognition of the need to de-emphasize a volatile political issue. Truman's record actually reveals great personal growth and major contributions to the cause of equal justice.

Hamby recaptures a perspective on the postwar era that has been submerged in recent years. Contrary to revisionist accounts, he argues that in the main Truman and Vital Center liberals reaffirmed strongly the nation's progressive tradition. The President not only defended the New Deal in a hostile environment; he also presided over its integration within the national consensus. To adjust the depression-generated New Deal tradition to a climate of postwar affluence was a difficult task, made more troublesome by Truman's inability to achieve a relationship of trust with leading liberals. The latter accepted his direction grudgingly, and had difficulty seeing beyond his gaudy sportshirts, past association with the Pendergast Machine, and undeleted expletives.

In comparison to Roosevelt, Truman fared poorly with the postwar liberal community. But Hamby considers such a comparison "loaded." Truman may not have been among the best and the brightest, but neither was he, as David Lilienthal averred at FDR's death, a "Throttlebottom."[108] Truman recognized his personal limitations, and he soon understood the numerous internal constraints upon his power as Chief Executive. A realist, according to Hamby, the President fashioned a legislative program that—like his own career—"reflected the course of the mainstream of the Democratic Party in the twentieth century."[109] As he sought to identify with issues that would appeal to the most important segments of his party, his sense of fair play and empathy helped nudge him toward more liberal policies. And if he never achieved the liberal support accorded FDR, he did function, especially after 1948, "with varying degrees of acceptance as a liberal leader."[110] With the exception of the Brannan Plan, Truman recognized that his was a mandate not for change, but for the continuation and consolidation of Roosevelt's policies. And although revisionist writers have emphasized the barrenness of his legislative record—failure to strengthen FEPC, to repeal Taft-Hartley, to augment federal aid to education, and to secure a national health insurance program—achievements in the field of public power and social security nonetheless made the 81st Congress the most liberal in a decade.

Hamby's book marks a suitable point at which to conclude this survey of the most contentious battleground in current American historiography. With three decades' perspective and a burgeoning literature from which to draw, historians have begun to formulate issues upon which future writers will no doubt center their research and their disputes. The New Left revisionists have played an important role in this process, and will continue to do so. To their credit, the revisionists have focused much-needed attention upon the domestic context of foreign policy. They have challenged the prevailing model of diplomatic historians, which treats domestic sources of external policy as "exogenous variables, alien influences leading to irrational and hence potentially

[105] Hamby, *Beyond New Deal*, p. 510.

[106] *Ibid.*, pp. 510–11.

[107] See Donald R. McCoy and Richard T. Ruetten, *Quest and Response: Minority Rights and the Truman Administration* (Lawrence, Kans.: University Press of Kans.: University Press of Kansas, 1973); Richard M. Dalfiume, *Desegregation of the Armed Forces: Fighting on Two Fronts, 1939–1953* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1969). More critical interpretations are offered in William C. Berman, *The Politics of Civil Rights in the Truman Administration* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1970): Barton J. Bernstein, "The Ambiguous Legacy: The Truman Administration and Civil Rights," in *Politics and Policies*, ed. B. J. Bernstein, pp. 269–314; and Harvard Sitkoff, "Harry Truman and the Election of 1948: The Coming of Age of Civil Rights in American Politics," *Journal of Southern History*, 37 (November, 1971), 597–616.

[108] *The Journals of David E. Lilienthal: The TVA Years, 1939–1945* (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), p. 690. On Truman's relationship with the liberal community, see also Alonzo L. Hamby, "The Liberals, Truman, and FDR as Symbol and Myth," *Journal of American History*, 56 (March, 1970), 859–67.

[109] Hamby, *Beyond New Deal*, p. 508.

[110] *Ibid.*, p. 509. Agreeing with Hamby, J. Joseph Huthmacher contends that the "liberals' 'holding action' during the Truman years proved successful, but in addition . . . the frontiers of social responsibility were enlarged." See Huthmacher's superb biography, *Senator Robert F. Wagner and the Rise of Urban Liberalism* (New York: Atheneum, 1968), pp. 342–43.

dangerous courses of action."[111] The revisionists have sought to demonstrate that foreign policy does not always reflect decisions made by men in rational pursuit of the national interest. New Left writers have suggested, in fact, that the criteria both for developing and assessing policy derive from this nation's leading institutions. And to varying degrees, these historians have illuminated the dynamics of society—especially the effects of social status and career experience upon policy makers; the links between the country's basic needs and its recent economic, political, and military policies; and the growth in importance of the presidency, federal bureaucracy, and an elite cadre of national security managers.[112]

Yet if the revisionists have expanded the horizons of diplomatic historians by suggesting how society helped contribute to foreign policy making during the postwar era, many revisionist premises and conclusions remain debatable. Most writers on the left have adopted almost an exclusively American point of view in their analyses. This manifestation of what D. W. Brogan termed "the illusion of American omnipotence" accords the U.S. too much responsibility for the globe's myriad ills, while underestimating or discounting the ability of other nations to initiate developments affecting the international balance of power. In addition, in their emphasis upon institutional dynamics, the more radical revisionists overlook the extent to which elements of personality affected events. Although issues of domestic and foreign policy—and the forces that precipitated them—often transcended the purposes and preoccupations of Truman and his advisers, those issues invariably found expression in the unpredictable and often chaotic realm of personal motivation and choices made by fallible men. Thus we are reminded that historians must not forget that policies are made by men, not abstractions, and are the product of unique beliefs, principles, ambitions, and patterns of behavior. This "personal equation" seems especially important in Truman's case, for the Missourian is the only president since 1929 who entered the White House without inherited wealth or social position, who possessed no personal fortune, and who did not ally himself—personally or professionally—with the upper crust of society.

If revisionists have not delighted in remembering Harry Truman (as Clinton Rossiter predicted historians would), neither have they accepted the thirty-third President on his own terms. Their accounts have criticized him, in fact, for failing to accomplish results that would have exceeded the abilities of any President, party, or social movement in recent history. Rather than depending upon their own criteria for assessing change, therefore, historians must empathize with their protagonists, judging their policies in terms of the alternatives and options they faced at the time. Hindsight, after all, is not foresight, although much revisionist historiography seems to ignore this historical canon.

At this time, the literature on the Truman years supports J. Joseph Huthmacher's observation that "whatever verdict history may in the end pronounce on the state of the American system, it is clear that Harry Truman will not bear the sole responsibility for it."[113] One may argue to the contrary, of course, pointing out that Truman reversed FDR's policy of accommodation with the Soviet Union and slammed shut the door of negotiation and compromise. One may also fault the administration for not moving significantly beyound the achievements of the New Deal. It is true that interest politics remained supreme during the Truman presidency, and that the groups which achieved success did so through organizing, lobbying, and demanding political recognition. It is also true that the forgotten men and women of the Depression—the urban poor, "unmeltable" ethnic minorities, rural sharecroppers, and residents of Appalachia—remained two decades later denizens of what Michael Harrington designated "the other America."[114]

Many historians would agree that as Chief Executive Truman sought to minimize conflict and to evade divisive issues, assuming (with much historical precedent) that time would adjudicate major difficulties in America's favor. But to an extent not appreciated by his detractors, Truman entered the White House a captive of his predecessor's policies, of his own perceptions of the requirements of a bipolar international order, and and of a formidable set of domestic constraints. An inheritor more than a creator of the issues he faced during his years in office, Truman defined politics as the art of the possible—which was not surprising considering his own conservative tem-

[111] Thomas A. Krueger, "The Social Origins of Recent American Foreign Policy," *Journal of Social History*, 7 (Fall, 1973), 93–101 at p. 93.

[112] See, for example, David Halberstam, *The Best and the Brightest* (New York: Random House, 1972); Richard J. Barnet, *Roots of War* (New York: Atheneum, 1972); Richard J. Barnet, *Intervention and Revolution: The United States in the Third World* (New York: World, 1968), pp. 3–46; G. William Domhoff, *The Higher Circle: The Governing Class in America* (New York: Random House, 1970); Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Imperial Presidency* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973).

[113] J. Joseph Huthmacher, ed., *The Truman Years: The Reconstruction of Postwar America* (Hinsdale, Ill.: Dryden, 1972), p. 11. An important source for the postwar era is Barton J. Bernstein and Allen J. Matusow, eds., *The Truman Administration: A Documentary History* (New York: Harper and Row, 1966).

[114] Michael Harrington, *The Other America: Poverty in the United States* (New York: Macmillan, 1962).

Political Participation in America: A Review Essay*

JERROLD G. RUSK
University of Arizona

Political participation is an important subject in any democratic state. Who participates, in what ways, why, and with what effect are all topics of concern to the theorist and politician and, hopefully, to the everyday citizen. Many of our ideas on participation, so prominently displayed in the literature, were not empirically tested until survey methodology was developed in the post-World War II period. The pioneering work of the Columbia and Michigan election studies, in particular, cast doubt on the theorist's assumption of an enlightened and involved citizenry. Other research studies contributed further data and fact, continuing to reduce our uncertainty about what political participation meant to the individual. In 1972, what was heralded as the all-embracing study on participation was published: Sidney Verba and Norman Nie's *Participation in America*. Based on survey material collected from a national sample of the electorate in 1967, this study attempted to examine the entire Eastonian model as applied to participation—the ways people participate in politics (the system or process), and the causes (inputs) and consequences (outputs) of this participation. The following is a summary of Verba and Nie's major substantive and empirical findings with a later review of them in light of the conceptual and analytic techniques they employ, the past literature in the field, and the recent developments in our political system.

An Overview

Verba and Nie believe there are four fundamental ways that people can participate in politics to influence the government: voting, campaigning, communal activity, and particularized contacting. Voting and campaigning are self-explanatory; communal activity is group participation aimed at contributing to the community or public good; and particularized contacting is individual interaction with a public official to achieve some personal or self-interest goal. Each of these "modes" of participation is considered to be substantively and empirically distinct from the others. In addition to the differences implicit in the acts themselves, each act also has a different combination of values on the following criteria: the scope of the outcome expected from the participatory act, the initiative required for the act, and the amount of conflict associated with it (p. 73). As a result, people with different political orientations and goals tend to engage in different kinds of participatory acts (pp. 118–119). The different acts, whether viewed separately or combined into an overall index of political activity, reveal higher levels of participation than previous research studies have demonstrated.

Several factors cause individuals to participate in politics at different rates. First and foremost in the Verba-Nie analysis is social class: upper-class people participate more in politics than lower-class people. Variables widening the participatory gap between upper- and lower-class individuals include political beliefs (especially conservative beliefs among upper-class Republicans), political party affiliation, and affiliation with voluntary associations. The one variable narrowing the status gap in participation is race: "group consciousness" among blacks motivates them to participate more than would have been predicted from their class backgrounds. Community size and relative isolation also have independent effects on participation rates, the smaller, relatively isolated communities having a norm structure and physical environment which encourages higher political activity.

The social class analysis has implications for the consequences of participation. The obvious inference is that the views of the upper class will tend to be overrepresented because they are politically more active. Since they favor different issues and solutions to problems than members of the lower class do, their increased activity could lead to an upper-class bias in elite decision making. Supplemental interview materials collected from political leaders of small communities show that elites tend to perceive the same issue and problem priorities as upper-class participators, although the representational link varies with the rate of participation and the consensual/nonconsensual nature of the community. Upper-class individuals have greater representational advantages in low and moderately active communities which are nonconsensual, and they lose some of these advantages as communities achieve higher participation rates and become more harmonious in their opinions.

* *Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality*. Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie. (New York: Harper and Row, 1972. Pp. 428. $10.00.)

Many of the Verba-Nie findings, on the surface, do not appear particularly novel. All of the four modes of participation have been mentioned before by past researchers. Class, party, issue, voluntary association, and racial determinants of participation have been empirically explored elsewhere. Upper-class bias in elite decision making has been a prevalent theme in the literature since at least the time of Matthews's book, *The Social Background of Political Decision-Makers*.[1] The novelty in the Verba-Nie study seems to reside in the following important areas. First, the authors are unique in viewing the four modes of participation as theoretically distinct behaviors, engaging different people with different political orientations and goals. Second, their data analysis is a painstakingly detailed and sophisticated multivariate treatment. Whereas other studies have dealt with similar variables, the analysis techniques previously used have rarely progressed beyond simple bivariate or "control table" explanations of the data. Third, the Verba-Nie project is one of the few studying the consequences of behavior which has collected data from both the mass and the elite. Fourth, and most important, the Verba-Nie study explores participation from all its angles—its nature, frequency, causes, and effects. Most previous research on participation was done in bits and pieces, necessitating the cataloging and synthesizing work of such people as Lane[2] and Milbrath.[3] The Verba-Nie break in this trend shows the analytic potential of studying the modes, causes, and consequences of participation in the same research project. The question of how Verba and Nie conceptually and empirically treat each of these aspects of participation, and with what success, must now be examined.

Modes of Participation

Verba and Nie view participation, for the purposes of this book, as instrumental activity aimed at influencing the government. They believe theoretically, and they assert they prove empirically, that four distinct ways of participating exist in this "instrumental" context. The implicit inference is that these four modes represent the only types of participation which have meaning to substantial numbers of people. While these types or modes represent a useful distinction, the fact that Verba and Nie discover these particular four and no others in their data analysis is hardly surprising, given their analytic techniques. When one asks some fifteen questions on participation dealing with only the substantive areas of voting, campaigning, communal activity, and particularized contacting and then factor analyzes their intercorrelations, one would assume that the factor analysis would uncover some, if not all, of these dimensions of activity. The factor analysis might uncover fewer than four dimensions if the distinctions between modes were not as important as Verba and Nie thought, or it might uncover more than four dimensions if what Verba and Nie viewed as one mode actually broke up into two, but the crucial point is that the authors would not get additional modes which were substantively different from voting, campaigning, communal activity, and particularized contacting because they did not ask questions about them. Dimensional results, it is well-known, are dependent on the number and kinds of questions asked. If one were to include questions on other substantive areas of activity (some of which will be suggested below), further dimensions could conceivably have resulted. In general, while the authors have in a strict sense tested a legitimate hypothesis, it seems difficult to see how it could fail. All of this leads to the conclusion that, while Verba and Nie have uncovered four dimensions of activity which are important, they are by no means the only four —or even necessarily the most important set of four—activities which have meaning to the electorate.

Two types of participation which seem to have been left out of the Verba-Nie scheme are "interest-group activity" and "protest behavior." These are serious omissions because each has had profound effects on influencing the government—interest-group activity since the origin of organized politics in America, and protest behavior in the last decade or so with the civil rights, Vietnam, and draft demonstrations. Neither of these activities fits either of the group-oriented modes of participation—communal or campaign activity—as Verba and Nie have defined them. In fact, what is conspicuously lacking from the Verba-Nie typology are group participation modes which are characterized by either economic motivation or mass demonstration methods. Economics alone has motivated much participation aimed at influencing the government. Individuals participate in such interest groups as trade unions, farm organizations, and veterans' groups with an underlying economic motivation in mind, but, ironically, the only time Verba and Nie mention such groups as these is in the context of communal activity aimed at contributing to the public good. While Verba and Nie do not discuss it, individuals in these groups can and often do help in political campaigns, but the important point, of course, is that they participate through their groups in many

[1] Donald R. Matthews, *The Social Background of Political Decision-Makers* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1954).

[2] Robert E. Lane, *Political Life* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1959).

[3] Lester W. Milbrath, *Political Participation* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965).

ways, other than just campaigning, to influence the economic policies of government. While economics is a prime motivator for some people to participate, major issues and events attract still others. In recent years, several issues and events have prompted new forms of mass participation, but protest activities and demonstrations are not mentioned at all in the Verba-Nie book. To be fair, Verba and Nie state that their focus is limited to activities "within the system" (p. 3), but much of what is called "protest behavior" has been perceived in just this way. A study by Milbrath has documented the view that much protest behavior is oriented toward within-system participation and change. Milbrath has also found that people engaging in protest behavior participate in what would be called "conventional" ways as well.[4] Not including protest behavior as a mode of participation is unfortunate since, during the last fifteen years, it has represented one of the main developments in the political system and also one of the prime shapers of elite decision making. The neglect also of interest-group activity is puzzling since it has long been considered to be a legitimate form of participation which has had effects on the system. All in all, the addition of questions to the Verba-Nie study in the "protest" and "interest-group" areas might well have uncovered two further dimensions of activity with important consequences for elite decision making. Failure to add questions in these and other possibly relevant areas means that the Verba-Nie book on "participation in America" deals with only certain aspects of this complex subject.

What Verba and Nie do cover in their book is, however, an important part of the participation phenomenon. The four modes of participation are meaningful activities to people. Verba and Nie maintain that they are distinct behaviors as defined by the criteria mentioned earlier and that they attract different kinds of people. The definitions they use in the beginning of the book, however, do not always fit the discussion and data analysis that follow. For example, sometimes one has the feeling that those participating in communal activities (the "communalists") are more motivated by self-interest than by altruistic concerns. Perhaps this group-oriented mode, in reality, encompasses a more eclectic set of orientations and motivations than Verba and Nie's definition presumes. Also, at times, the "communalists" and "campaigners" seem to resemble each other in their beliefs and orientations, although Verba and Nie maintain that communalists are basically involved in nonconflictual activities aimed at contributing to the public good while campaigners are enmeshed in conflictual behavior aimed at gaining a partisan advantage. Most central, however, is whether people basically engage in one of these modes of activity to the virtual exclusion of the others. While the authors allow some flexibility in their system (e.g., almost all types of participators can vote), their definitions are sufficiently distinct to provide a clear test of this hypothesis. Intuitively one would expect considerable overlap of activity among people, especially since Verba and Nie's own data analysis in chapter 2 shows people engaging in more participatory acts than past researchers had thought. Despite this finding, Verba and Nie demonstrate that their main hypothesis has considerable validity. About 60 per cent of their sample could be unambiguously classified into one of six "participator categories" based on the four modes of participation (the six "participator categories" being the "voting specialists," "campaigners," "communalists," "parochial participants," as well as the "inactives" and "complete activists"). Another 21 per cent were borderline cases but, with some reservations, could be classified as well. These results, while not covering everyone satisfactorily, tend to indicate that people basically limit their political participation to just one kind of activity.[5] The corollary argument of Verba and Nie that different activities are engaged in by different kinds of people also has some merit, although the extent to which communalists and campaigners have distinctive characters is questionable at certain places in the book. While these ideas are interesting and partially proven, analysis tests using political issues as data will be needed in future studies to completely confirm the hypotheses of the Verba-Nie study.[6] But for the moment, the summary pic-

[4] Personal communication from Lester W. Milbrath (October 15, 1974). Also see Lester W. Milbrath, "Individuals and the Polity: Patterns of Linkages," in Kurt Back, ed., *Social Psychology* (New York: John Wiley, forthcoming).

[5] By "one kind of activity" is meant a single mode which is participated in with considerable frequency. In their classification scheme, Verba and Nie allow "communalists" and "campaigners" to vote as well. "Voting specialists" only vote, and "parochial participants" only engage in particularized contacting. "Inactives" engage in none of the four modes of activity, and "complete activists" engage in all activities but particularized contacting. The latter come closest to the "gladiator" concept and the idea of cumulative participation, but they make up only 9 per cent of the sample (p. 396). Percentages of people in each "participator category" are taken from Appendix F, pages 394–397, of the Verba-Nie book. See Table 4–8 on page 78 of the Verba-Nie book for a summary of the activity profiles of these six "participator categories."

[6] Analysis tests using political issues would tell which kinds of issues attract such people as "communalists" and "campaigners." Verba and Nie assume that nonconflictual community or public good issues attract communalists while conflictual, partisan, and ideological issues attract campaigners, but this assumption is never empirically tested. If the data do not show such patterns, much of what Verba and Nie say about the distinct characters of communalists and campaigners would have to be retracted.

ture appears to be one of definable and fairly isolated behaviors of given groups of people, discounting some of the previous notions about "gladiators" and the cumulative nature of political participation.

The levels of participation in these modes are considered by Verba and Nie to be higher than past studies have shown. If these levels are accurate estimates of activity, then the picture of the participating citizenry that Verba and Nie present would be an improvement over the more pessimistic assessments of the past. What should make us cautious about this finding is the way the participation questions are asked. Most of these questions employ a longer time frame which allows many occasionally active citizens to qualify as "participants" in contrast to the more time-specific questions of earlier studies which were oriented toward activity in a given election campaign. "Have you ever done this?" or "In the last 3 or 4 years have you done this?" are the types of questions which are most likely to elicit participatory responses.[7] There are areas, however, in which the Verba-Nie figures may have face validity—those involving participation in the local community. The Verba-Nie study places great emphasis on local modes of activity—communal involvement and particularized contacting—and these may be the areas in which people participate more readily than one might normally expect. Unfortunately, the questions on local participation employ the most liberal of Verba and Nie's time referents, making it impossible to separate out the effects of question wording from those of a more involved citizenry at the local level. If we adjust the participation figures downward for the various modes, it seems that, contrary to the Verba-Nie study, the scenario of the past still holds: that people mainly vote and do little else. Perhaps people participate in a few other activities over a long span of time, but probably politics is much more peripheral to people than Verba and Nie believe.[8] Problems arising out of the local community may motivate a person to participate from time to time, simply because problems seem more manageable and easier to influence at that level. But for the most part our society has evolved a complex division of labor which leaves politics mainly to elected and appointed officials and the day-to-day concerns of life to the rest of us. This division of labor allows most people to regard politics as only a remote activity, to be entrusted to public officials as their duty. Only when times are bad does the ordinary citizen allow politics to intrude into his life-space as a central concern.

Causes and Consequences

Regardless of the actual level of participation in the United States, different people do participate at different rates. What causes people to take varying postures toward participation has long fascinated political scientists. Verba and Nie study several such causes, but the dominant theme of their analysis is social class. The treatment of social class as a determinant of participation often raises more questions than it answers. This "social variable" stands for a variety of different life experiences which are the real causal factors of note. But which of these experiences? The answer to this question is crucial. Only a detailed probing of socialization processes and psychological perceptions associated with these experiences can provide us with an adequate understanding of this variable and its relation to political participation. Depicting the statistical relationship between class and participation (with or without the intervening variable of civic attitudes) is not enough—it merely represents the starting point in any analysis. Another point of some concern is the way in which the authors perform their multivariate analysis of the determinants of participation. They use class as a baseline model against which to measure the effects of other variables on participation (these other effects seen as deviations from the effects of the class model). To use class as a baseline model assumes substantial relationships between it and participation, but Verba and Nie show that social class explains only between 5 and 14 per cent of the variance in participation (pp. 131–132). Correlating successive variables (such as race, party affiliation, etc.) against participation scores corrected for class effects may be a useful technique to show, in steps, how these various factors deviate in their effects from a class model. Nevertheless, one also wishes that the authors had put all causal factors (including class) into one multiple regression equation in order to get a precise state-

There is another aspect of this problem which is also interesting to explore. Some of these nonconflictual issues aimed at contributing to the public good may change over time into more conflictual and partisan issues in which sides are taken. If this happens, do the communalists withdraw from what now appears to be a conflictual situation or do they continue to cling to the issue as it is newly formed and hence fight for its support in an arena joined by campaigners? Empirical tests on this score would show to what extent communalists and campaigners withdraw from or join an issue as it changes its political character. Since many issues change from public support to conflictual bases over time, this example is probably not as isolated or trivial as it might first appear.

[7] The wording of the participation questions is found on pages 351–355 of the Verba-Nie book. The marginals for these questions are also listed there as well as on page 31.

[8] "Interest-group" and "protest" behavior are probably also peripheral activities to most Americans. Even though protests often take the form of mass demonstrations, probably very few people, in percentage terms, ever engage in such behavior.

ment of their explanatory weights relative to one another as well as an overall summary of the percentage of variance explained by all these factors combined. The latter statistic would give us a good idea of just how much of the "causal waterfront" Verba and Nie have covered and what yet remains to be done.

In general, Verba and Nie study sociological causes of participation more than psychological ones. Probably this orientation represents a conviction that social variables are better able to explain participation conceptually and more likely to account for the variance in such behavior statistically, although earlier remarks in this essay point to weak elements in this position. Class, race, party, community, and organization variables are undoubtedly important choices for analysis, but one's psychological response to politics is at least as crucial. While Verba and Nie do look at "civic attitudes" and the "group consciousness" of blacks, they do little else in the psychological area. Probably a major reason for this neglect—other than the conviction expressed above—is that the authors wished to study the causes of participation in a neutral setting, a setting removed from the short-term stimuli of an election year and people's psychological reactions to these stimuli. Studying participation in an election year, however, would have considerably enriched our theory of causes, since the nature and extent of participation in America is shaped both by the social characteristics forming long-term dispositions toward politics and by the character of short-term forces acting on these dispositions.[9] The first set of variables—the causal determinants of people's basic dispositions toward politics—is represented by some of the social-structural factors that Verba and Nie study; the second set of variables is associated with the Michigan studies of people's psychological reactions to the candidates and issues of the moment, as well as to the "state of the times."[10] The Michigan-based variables can play an important part in the participation process—either interacting with the social variables in inducing people to participate or else causing such behavior independently, thereby increasing the participation levels already produced by these social factors and long-term dispositions. The Michigan scholars have studied these variables only in an electoral context, but one imagines that psychological reactions to these stimuli could lead as well to other forms of participation such as protest demonstrations, interest-group activity, and communal behavior. When combined, the two sets of variables dictate the basic dispositions and orientations that the individual brings to the political situation as well as the short-term stimuli to participate that the situation provides.

Although neglecting short-term psychological variables, Verba and Nie's study of long-term factors yields certain benefits. Measuring the impact of long-term factors from a baseline class model—despite the limitations noted above—can enrich our understanding of how sociological characteristics and basic dispositions relate to one another in causing people to participate, and this knowledge can help to amend and refine past research findings. For example, while it has long been known that blacks participate less because of their socioeconomic backgrounds, Verba and Nie show that feelings of group consciousness and organizational activity help to counteract the dampening effects of low status. The potential of this finding is enormous. As the authors note, if blacks can further develop these two attributes, which are themselves interrelated, they can continue to increase significantly their participation levels and hence better aid their cause in the future. On the other hand, Verba and Nie find that organizational affiliation and especially the factors associated with it—activity and political discussion in the organization—increase the status disparity in participation among whites. Upper-class whites not only participate with greater frequency than lower-class whites because of their class backgrounds, but they also join organizations more which influence them to participate at still higher rates. While the effects of class and organizations have been noted before,

[9] Of course, psychological variables should also be studied in a non-electoral context, such as the Verba-Nie study provides. One imagines that feelings of political trust, attitudes toward the issues and the "state of the times," and group loyalties, for example, play a part in influencing political participation in non-election settings. The important point made here is that psychological variables probably have a greater explanatory role when studied in election settings. The salience of politics among people is simply higher with an approaching election, and people are usually more aware of their political attitudes and feelings at this time and more likely to be affected by them.

[10] The reader may recall that Verba and Nie study the political beliefs of people. What they mean by "political beliefs" seems quite different from the Michigan concept of "election issues." Political beliefs seem to be more general and long-term postures toward politics, such as ideologies or attitude structures, while the Michigan concept refers to short-term stimuli unique to a given election. Verba and Nie include in their study of political beliefs general questions on social welfare, economic inequality, and civil rights (p. 225), which have not, in general, been the specific issues of importance to people in the elections of the last decade. The Michigan studies, on the other hand, let the people define what the important issues are in any campaign, the issues which can motivate people to participate who might not otherwise do so. These issues can and do change from election to election, as do candidates and their personality appeal and feelings about the "state of the times." When these factors emerge and gain salience, people respond by participating in elections, protest demonstrations, interest-group organizations, and communal activities.

Verba and Nie have revealed how organizational effects relate to the effects of the baseline class model. What still is puzzling, though, is the political nature of these organizations. For instance, how can one justifiably view all voluntary associations—which run the gamut from sports and hobby clubs to school and political groups—as influencing participation?[11] It seems that some of these groups have little manifest or latent relationship to anything "political" and would rarely promote discussion or activity of a political nature. And second, why do Verba and Nie believe that all these organizations basically engage in the same kind of political activity? Some organizations may engage in only communal activity, but surely some also engage in activities which are more conflictual, self-oriented, and partisan in character. Of course, some groups are probably not political at all, engaging in none of the activities Verba and Nie or I believe to be political. While not resolving the exact nature of these organizations or the influences they have, Verba and Nie find another variable—political beliefs—which also increases the participation of upper-class whites. Upper-class whites, especially Republicans, tend to have conservative views on politics, and these beliefs motivate them to higher participation rates than their class backgrounds alone would indicate. Since these political beliefs, in Verba and Nie's formulation, represent basic dispositions rather than short-term issue positions, they would exert a highly stable effect over time on participation rates. This finding, however, does not explain why upper-class Democrats—many of whom are liberal—are not motivated by their particular political beliefs. It would seem that liberal views, if as intensely held as conservative views, should have some effect on participation rates. Quite possibly, by not studying protest behavior, Verba and Nie miss one area in which liberal views have an important influence on participation rates.

A last causal variable that Verba and Nie study is the type of community in which political participation takes place. They report that smaller communities—especially if they are relatively distinct and autonomous units—have an important influence on participation rates. Verba and Nie refer to these communities as "bounded" because physically they have clear boundaries separating them from other communities and demographically they encompass most of the economic, social, and political life of their residents. Included in this classification are many of the communities which Verba and Nie feel are becoming rarer and rarer in American society—the rural community, village, and isolated town or city.[12] While representing only a small part of the American population, these communities distinguish themselves by having fairly high rates of political activity. They engage in voting and campaigning at respectable rates, and they particularly emphasize communal activity and other forms of local participation. This discovery by Verba and Nie of the influence small communities have on participation seems to run counter to some of the notions regarding the "nationalization of politics."[13] Theories on the nationalization of politics contend that the distinctive character and influence of the local community has largely been eroded in the last 50 to 100 years. The development of the mass media, in particular, has led people to increasingly focus their attention on national politics and the modes of activity associated with it, voting and campaigning. The media have also provided the national stimuli and influences which are supposed to shape most people's political behavior today. Part of this theory has been empirically tested by Stokes using vote turnout data from congressional districts.[14] While congressional districts are not the same unit of analysis as Verba and Nie's small communities, in some ways they can be considered to resemble one another. Stokes finds a progressive nationalization of influences bearing on the vote and, by inference, the campaign associated with it over the last century. In the face of this evidence, Verba and Nie seem to have evidence of their own which shows that voting and campaign participation are influenced by the local community as well. More importantly, Verba and Nie also show the marked influence small communities have on communal participation, a finding seemingly at odds with the picture of an era preoccupied more with national than with local politics.[15] Perhaps the influence of the local community is not as weakened by these

[11] For a list of these organizations, see pages 178–179 in the Verba-Nie book.

[12] The community characteristics "boundedness" and "isolation" are related, although a community which is "bounded" does not have to be "isolated," but the converse most usually is true.

[13] Verba and Nie also realize this problem in their book (see chapter 13), but they phrase the question somewhat differently from the treatment here.

[14] Donald E. Stokes, "Parties and the Nationalization of Electoral Forces," in *The American Party Systems*, ed. William Nisbet Chambers and Walter Dean Burnham (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 182–202.

[15] At times this reviewer has trouble viewing communal activity as political participation. Political participation, as Verba and Nie define it, is activity aimed at influencing the government (p. 2). Certainly some people view communal activity in this way, but others contribute to the community good without ever thinking to (or having to) influence governmental officials in the process. Residents of small communities, in particular, would often seem to be preoccupied with "friends-and-neighbors" communal activities which are not associated in any way with politics. Feelings of "duty to community" and "community spirit" may motivate many to participate in communal affairs who never engage in any political activity to influence the government.

nationalizing trends as originally thought, or else the small community stands as the last element of resistance to such trends. While all the answers are not known, the differences between the Verba-Nie and Stokes analyses highlight the fundamental question of what forces motivate political participation in any particular community. Obviously, further study of both nationalizing trends and local political influences is needed to clear up some basic questions about causality and the relative explanatory power of these two forces.

While the study of causes is important, the most crucial aspect of participation is its consequences. Individual participation must be shown to influence politicians and the government in order for the study of participation to move beyond the purely descriptive level of accumulating "knowledge for knowledge's sake." If individual participation does not influence government, what is the justification for studying this subject beyond merely describing people's behavior? Recognizing this as their central concern, Verba and Nie define participation for their study as instrumental activity to influence the government. But *does* participation influence governmental officials? In some ways, the data Verba and Nie use to test this proposition are limited in what they can tell us. They are, first of all, limited to interviews of political elites in small communities (under 50,000 in population), and they focus only on local issues and problems. Second, they are confined to elite perceptions of the salience and priority of issues, not including actual elite decisions which would have been a better data source for testing the notion of "successful" mass influence on the government. Given scarce resources and the pioneering effort required to move into the "consequences" area with both elite and mass data collections, perhaps this is all that could be asked of any study at this stage in the research game.

Verba and Nie use the data they have to report one major research finding: that upper-class participators and political elites tend to mention the same issues and problems as being important to the community. Such a finding suggests support for Matthews's earlier views but does not completely indicate whether participation influences politicians. For instance, one wonders if this congruency in the mentioning of issues is determined by the higher participation of the upper class or some other variable such as the similar social backgrounds of the upper class and the political leaders of the community. Verba and Nie recognize this problem and proceed to show empirically that the greater participation of the upper class and not other variables is most responsible for this congruency in issue perceptions. It seems that the upper class, by virtue of their participating more in the system, have a greater influence on what elites perceive to be the important issues in the community. Significant questions, however, remain unanswered. The most crucial question is whether this congruency in issue perceptions would still exist if actual elite decisions were the dependent variable. Actual decisions of elites could be quite different from a mere listing of elite attitudes on the important issues in the community. Further, the listing of attitudes is done in the Verba-Nie study with no hint as to the policy direction of the problems and issues being raised, making it impossible to compare the mass and elite on actual issue stands. For these reasons, a test using elite decisions seems crucial to document the hypothesis that political participation by the masses, particularly the upper-class element, influences elites. Assuming for the moment that the hypothesis would be confirmed by this separate test, another question looms large: whether or not this situation of representation would seriously change if Verba and Nie focused on national rather than local problems and used larger communities in their sample base. The more liberal policies advocated by demonstration and protest participators could cut into the conservative influence of upper-class participators at the national level, obviously a proposition for future study. Overall, however, even if all the above is confirmed, one must ask whether Americans—even upper-class Americans—are active enough to have much influence on elites when compared to interest groups, agencies, and other organized forces. Since Verba and Nie do not study the impact of other forces, the question of what relative weight to assign mass participation in the "consequences" process is unresolved, and, yet, in the end, this question has to be answered to justify the importance of the Verba-Nie enterprise. Assessments by political scientists of the relative influence of mass participation are generally not very optimistic. Voting is still the main and typically the only political activity that Americans engage in with any real frequency; and voting, as Verba and Nie themselves admit, is not the best mode for conveying issue preferences to the elite. If issue preferences are conveyed, they would seem to be conveyed best at the local level, the level Verba and Nie emphasize the most. Such preferences, it is generally agreed, are conveyed even less clearly at the national level. In general, issue preferences cannot be easily conveyed to elites or have much influence on them, especially through the voting mode, the form of activity most people use for this purpose.[16] Of course, there are important excep-

[16] This statement should not be confused with the earlier discussion of issues as causes of participation. Issues can be causes without necessarily having consequences. In other words, issues can cause people to participate, but these issue preferences may not be communicated clearly

tions to this statement, but, for the most part, people probably do not often participate in or influence those decisions that most affect their lives.

While influence levels may be low, whatever influence occurs from mass participation is obviously skewed in the direction of those who participate the most. Upper-class people do have an advantage in representation, although Verba and Nie contend that the extent of this advantage depends on local community characteristics, such as the participatory level and amount of consensus in the community. Verba and Nie argue that the upper class exerts its greatest influence on elites in low and moderately active communities with low consensus levels and that it loses some of this advantage as communities become more active and consensual. Since Verba and Nie select only communities with less than 50,000 inhabitants for their mass-elite comparisons, one wonders if there is enough variation in the activity and consensus levels among these communities to be able to test the notion of community effects on representation.[17] Verba and Nie's earlier causal analysis provides some partial answers to this question. The authors find that a large number of the communities in the less than 50,000 population range represent the small, bounded locale. In this setting, participation rates follow a similar pattern from community to community, being relatively high in most modes and particularly in communal activity and other forms of local participation (pp. 236, 238–239, 241). Instead of a wide dispersion in political activity, therefore, these communities show fairly uniform levels of participation[18] which are generally higher than the rates of the more populated communities which were left out of the elite part of the study.[19] Other research also indicates that small communities are fairly homogeneous in their partisan and issue orientations.[20] These communities, especially if bounded, often are predominantly Republican or Democratic in orientation with political views to match. All such communities—whether mainly Republican or Democratic, conservative or liberal—would probably qualify as "consensual" in the Verba-Nie terminology. While there is obviously some variation between communities on these characteristics and perhaps enough to validate Verba and Nie's notion of "community effects," it would be useful if this hypothesis could be tested on communities with a wider range in population size and boundedness and, hence, political opinions and participatory rates. For the present, the Verba-Nie results are highly suggestive of the role that community characteristics can play in increasing or decreasing the representational advantages of upper-class participators. If a wider range in these characteristics were available, further tests could ascertain just how much credence should be placed in the belief that the upper-class edge in representation varies inversely with the participation and consensus levels of communities.[21]

Conclusions

In summary, the Verba-Nie book has both virtues and limitations, not unexpected for a complex work which attempts to cover the modes, causes, and consequences of participation all in one study. While Verba and Nie fail to cover completely the subject matter of "political participation in America," they have studied this topic in greater depth and on a far vaster scope than any-

to elites or, if so, may not influence their decision making (in essence, a two-step hurdle in the influence process). Of course, issues with widespread salience and intensity—such as the Vietnam War—can and will have effects on elite decision making.

[17] For the most part, Verba and Nie do not answer this question directly. What has been attempted here is to use those pieces of information which seem relevant in the Verba-Nie book to reach a tentative answer. Quite possibly, a few computer runs on the Verba-Nie data file would be the best way to clear up at least part of this problem.

[18] In one place, the authors also give partial data on the activity levels of all communities under 50,000 in population when they classify them for their analysis of consequences (footnote 1, pp. 312–313). The percentage range between the "very low" and "very high" participating communities is between 12 and 13 per cent for all activities except voting, with the two types of moderately active communities falling somewhere within this range. These figures do not appear to depict widely contrasting participatory situations among communities. These communities do vary somewhat in their demographic characteristics although it is assumed that most of these communities are rural areas, villages, and isolated towns or cities. A few small suburbs would also fall within this group and a much fewer number of larger suburbs. (See page 234 of the Verba-Nie book for a list of the types of communities which have less than and more than 50,000 inhabitants.)

[19] These comparisons between communities are done using both "corrected" and "uncorrected" participation rates. Actually, Verba and Nie most emphasize the "corrected" rates which control for the socioeconomic backgrounds of people living in the community. The reason for this emphasis, when studying consequences, is to see if the political characteristics of the community have effects on elites above and beyond the socioeconomic backgrounds of its citizens.

[20] One is particularly reminded of the early Columbia University studies of voting behavior. See Paul Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, *The People's Choice*, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948) and Bernard Berelson, Paul Lazarsfeld, and William McPhee, *Voting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954). For another study on this interesting phenomenon of local political homogeneity, see Warren E. Miller, "One-Party Politics and the Voter," *American Political Science Review*, 50 (September 1956), 707–725.

[21] These relationships are described here using linear concepts. Actually, both relationships are somewhat curvilinear, although they approximate linear relationships quite well.

one previously. They have succeeded in validating and refining many past findings (especially in the area of "causes"), in providing supporting evidence for earlier expectations and theories (especially with regard to "consequences"), and in delineating modes of participation which are relatively distinct, theoretically and empirically, from one another. In short, what they have done, they have done well, and while much still remains, the comments in this essay are aimed at guiding future research efforts which attempt to build from and improve on the Verba-Nie study. For those so motivated, new conceptualizations, models, techniques, and data bases will be needed. As an example, future researchers could profitably use a combined model of long-term and short-term forces—sociological and psychological variables—to explain why people participate at different rates, being careful to specify the relative explanatory weights of each variable. In addition, the social class variable should be more carefully operationalized and studied as a cause of participation in future research designs. In another area, the dimensional analysis of political activity could be expanded to include other possible types of political activity—in the belief that political participation is a much broader subject than the four modes of activity that Verba and Nie have defined. Further checks and probes could also help to ascertain whether the Verba-Nie modes, as defined, fit the motivations and orientations of the people who engage in them. Finally, one would want to enlarge Verba and Nie's question and data base to get firmer evidence for any conclusions that people participate more than previously thought or that they have substantial effects on elite decision making, whether mediated by community variables or not. The picture that still emerges from the Verba-Nie analysis is that the electorate, while possibly improved on these matters, has not made major changes in its political activity either quantitatively or qualitatively. The only exception to this might be the recent phenomenon of protest behavior which was not covered in the Verba-Nie book.

None of these remarks about shortcomings or disagreements with the Verba-Nie book are intended to downplay the contribution Verba and Nie have made. If this review has seemed too critical at times, it is only because important works like the Verba-Nie book should be judged by the strictest and highest standards. Using such standards, Philip Converse calls this study a "classic,"[22] and, if he means by this a "basic work" which will influence research in the area of participation for years to come, his remark is indeed appropriate. While much yet needs to be discovered and validated, Verba and Nie have given us a good start on the road to surer knowledge in this area.

[22] See Philip Converse's remarks on the inside jacket cover of the Verba-Nie book.

Recent Writing on Northern Ireland*

JOHN H. WHYTE
The Queen's University of Belfast

In the last five years, more has been published about Northern Ireland than about any area of comparable size in Europe. This cannot be attributed purely to the turmoil which the area has known since 1968. Even before that date, social scientists were beginning to turn their attention to Northern Ireland, and the fieldwork for the most substantial pieces of research reviewed here (those by Harris, Rose, and Budge and O'Leary) was complete before the troubles began. But disorder has enormously increased the amount of interest taken in the region: it has added work by politicians (e.g., Callaghan, FitzGerald, O'Brien—among the authors being reviewed here) and journalists (e.g., the *Sunday Times* Insight Team) to the work being done by academics, and has transformed an acceleration of publication on the area into an explosion. There are now so many books available on Northern Ireland that a newcomer can only feel bewilderment. The purpose of this review article is to provide a guide to the most important of them.

Such a newcomer will probably wish to start with an historical account: he will need to know what has happened in Northern Ireland before he starts seeking for explanations of why it has happened. An outline history has been provided by a Pelican book, *Divided Ulster*, written by a Dublin academic, Liam de Paor (pronounced 'de Pwair'). De Paor's book is short, readable, and inexpensive. In ninety pages it traces the history of the region from mediaeval times to the establishment of Northern Ireland as a separate unit in 1921; in a further hundred and thirty pages it covers the salient developments between then and 1971. De Paor is hostile to the Protestant majority in Northern Ireland, and his interpretation of a number of events is controversial. But no other book covers so much ground so succinctly; and, provided the reader remembers to look at something else as well, he will find de Paor a useful introduction.

For a fuller account of the more recent period, a first-class history is at last available. F. S. L. Lyons's *Ireland since the Famine*, a massive general history of Ireland from the 1840's to the present, was first published in 1971 and at once established itself as the standard work on its subject. It has all the qualities one could hope to find in such a work: it is reliable, comprehensive, lucid, fair-minded. Lyons seems to have read everything ever published on his period, and has synthesised it all into a coherent narrative. His prejudices, if any, are kept well in check, and he expounds sympathetically the outlook of each main group in Irish history. The eighty pages which he devotes to Northern Ireland since 1921 form the best short history of the region that has yet been written; but what he has to say about the rest of Ireland since that date, and about undivided Ireland under British rule before 1921, is also important and relevant for a student of Northern Irish affairs.

From an outline of history, the reader may wish

* *The Northern Ireland Problem.* By Denis P. Barritt and Charles F. Carter. (London and New York: Oxford University Press, second edition with a new preface and postscript, 1972. Pp. xxviii, 176. $2.95 paper).

Belfast: Approach to Crisis. A Study of Belfast Politics, 1613–1970. By Ian Budge and Cornelius O'Leary. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973. Pp. xxi, 396. $10.95).

A House Divided: The Dilemma of Northern Ireland. By James Callaghan. (London: Collins, 1973. Pp. 207. £2.50).

Divided Ulster. By Liam de Paor. (New York: Penguin Books, 1971. Pp. xx, 250. $1.25).

Towards a New Ireland. By Garret FitzGerald. (London: Charles Knight, 1972. Pp. viii, 190. £2.50).

Prejudice and Tolerance in Ulster; A Study of Neighbors and "Strangers" in a Border Community. By Rosemary Harris. (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1972. Pp. xvi, 234. $10.00).

Northern Ireland: A Report on the Conflict. By The London *Sunday Times* Insight Team. (New York: Random House, 1972. Pp. 316. $7.95 cloth; $1.95 paper).

Ireland since the Famine. By F. S. L. Lyons. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971. Pp. xiii, 852. $17.50).

War and an Irish Town. By Eamonn McCann. (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1974. Pp. 256. £0.40).

Northern Ireland: Crisis and Conflict. By John Magee. (London and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974. World Studies Series. $10.95 cloth; $5.50 paper).

States of Ireland. By Conor Cruise O'Brien. (New York: Random House, Pantheon Books, 1972. Pp. 336. $7.95).

Governing without Consensus: an Irish Perspective. By Richard Rose. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971. Pp. 567. $12.50).

to turn to a more detailed study of recent events. A good starting-point is provided by Barritt and Carter's *The Northern Ireland Problem*. This book, first published in 1962, was reissued ten years later with an introduction and epilogue briefly surveying events since the first edition. It appeared at a time when academic study of Northern Ireland had barely begun, and when almost the only material available was propaganda, on one side or the other. Its authors—one a social worker, the other an academic economist—aimed to provide for the first time a dispassionate survey of contentious issues in Northern Ireland. Relying largely on interviews for evidence, they covered the main areas of controversy: attitudes to Irish unity, religious tensions, education, discrimination, civil rights, and so on. With hindsight we can see that they were too tender to the deficiencies of the regime. But their carefully researched survey remains the best available study of Northern Ireland before the pot boiled over, and makes a useful introduction to a study of the period of turmoil.

For the period of turmoil itself, two books may be recommended. James Callaghan's *A House Divided* covers the period from 1967 to 1972. It is particularly authoritative for the first half of this period, down to June 1970, when the author, as Home Secretary in the Labour government, was the minister in London with oversight over Northern Ireland affairs. Callaghan does not minimize his own talents as a statesman and a diplomat; but his account seems generally balanced and fair-minded and, as a participant, he is able to reveal facts that had not been previously known. *Northern Ireland: A Report on the Conflict*, by the London *Sunday Times* Insight Team, covers much the same period. The London *Sunday Times* prides itself on its Insight column, in which a group of able and lavishly-financed reporters turn their attention to various problems of the day. In the late 'sixties and early 'seventies they devoted much of their energies to Northern Ireland, and the book summarizes their findings. It is based heavily on unattributable interviews, which makes it impossible to evaluate the reliability of the information. In one instance, in which I can identify the informant because he told the same story to me, I would place less trust in his accuracy than the Insight reporters do. From internal evidence one can guess that their sources were best where one might least expect: among the two fighting forces —the I.R.A. and the British army. They were less good among the politicians, and especially Ulster Protestant politicians. This has affected the emphasis in their book, which shows least sympathy towards those from whom the authors received least information. But the book is racily written, and worth consulting provided the reader retains his critical faculty.

One limitation of both Callaghan's book and the *Sunday Times* report is that they do not carry the story past 1972. The gap will be filled by other books now in the pipeline, but in the meantime the inquirer can find an outline of events up to the spring of 1974 in John Magee's *Northern Ireland: Crisis and Conflict*. Magee's book is a reader: it contains documents illustrating different aspects of the Northern Ireland problem, accompanied by a commentary. Magee is a moderate Catholic; his outlook is fair-minded, and his commentary and selection of texts, if not exciting, are judicious. His book is designed for undergraduate use, and anyone teaching a course including Northern Ireland might find it worth adopting as a text.[1]

From narrative, the reader may wish to turn to interpretation. What is the cause of the Northern Ireland problem? Why is it that Catholic and Protestant get on so badly in this corner of the world? The question is certainly puzzling. Even in the nineteenth century—the era of the Kulturkampf in Germany and of the Know-Nothings in the United States—when Catholic-Protestant tensions were far more widespread than they are today, Belfast already headed the world league for sectarian rioting. And in the later twentieth century, when ill-feeling between Catholic and Protestant has died away almost everywhere else, it appears to be still strong in Northern Ireland. What is the reason for this deviant behavior?

One explanation is that the conflict is not really religious at all: that it is a class conflict masquerading as a religious one. The best and most up-to-date exposition of this view is provided by Eamonn McCann in his Penguin book, *War and an Irish Town*. McCann is a Marxist who has played an important part in the politics of his native Derry, the second largest town in Northern Ireland. His book is vividly written, and contains detail on life and politics in Derry which will entertain those most opposed to his thesis. The core of the book, however, is a presentation of that thesis, a Marxist interpretation of the Northern Ireland conflict.

McCann believes that conflict has recurred in Northern Ireland because the ruling class, in pursuit of its own interests, has artificially fomented the division between Catholic and Protestant among the working class. He cites evidence of this from the 1880s, the first decade of the twentieth century, the period after the First World War, and the 1930s. On each of these occasions, Protestant workers showed signs of making common cause with their Catholic fellows, but on each occasion

[1] Another useful teaching text, succinct and well-balanced, is David E. Schmitt's *Violence in Northern Ireland: Ethnic Conflict and Radicalization in an International Setting* (Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Press, 1974. University Programs Modular Studies. Pp. 35).

the bosses (who were mainly Protestant) were able to restore control by beating the sectarian drum: by threatening Protestant workers that, if they did not submerge their interests in an all-class Protestant alliance, they might plunge Northern Ireland into an all-Ireland state, in which Roman Catholics would be a majority and their liberties at risk. In this task, McCann concedes, the bosses were helped by the fact that the independent state which developed in the rest of Ireland after 1921 did indeed show many of the signs of a Catholic theocracy.

McCann's thesis has force. There is no doubt that the pan-Protestant alliance in Northern Ireland has been sustained by unscrupulous propaganda. But to suggest that this has been the main cause of the acceptance by Protestant workers of leadership from Protestant bosses is to postulate a degree of gullibility among the former which is hard to credit. It is at least possible that they were better judges of their own interests than McCann accepts, and that there were more substantial reasons for their stand than manipulation by their bosses. McCann's difficulty arises only because he feels that class politics ought to prevail in Northern Ireland; he has then to find reasons why they do not. But if we abandon the assumption that all conflict must be reduced to class terms, and accept that religious or ethnic or national tensions may have an independent basis, then the Northern Ireland conflict becomes easier to explain. This is the position taken by some other interpreters of the problem.

The most forceful opponent of an economic interpretation of the Northern Ireland conflict is Richard Rose. Rose, an American political scientist who has lived for many years in Britain, is the author of the longest of the recent crop of works on Northern Ireland. The amount of sheer information which his book, *Governing without Consensus*, contains is enough to make it one of the most important ever written on the area. He provides a summary history of Northern Ireland, a detailed analysis of its institutions, and comparative material on divided societies elsewhere. The core of his book, however, is his report of an opinion survey which he conducted in Northern Ireland during the spring and summer of 1968. His sample consisted of 1,291 people—757 Protestants and 534 Catholics. His questionnaire comprised 63 items on a wide range of topics, and the median interview took 75 minutes to complete. The survey was by far the most comprehensive ever carried out in Northern Ireland, and the report on it, which takes up nine of Rose's sixteen chapters, is presented in sufficient detail for readers with interests different from Rose's to draw their own conclusions from it. It constitutes a uniquely important source of information on attitudes in the province.

Rose found that economic circumstances had but slight effects on political attitudes:

> In so far as class differences are more important than religious differences, then Ulster people of the same class should have more similar regime outlooks than people of different classes but the same religion. The data from the . . . survey clearly reject this hypothesis. The difference between middle-class and working-class Protestants in support for the Constitution is four per cent, and three per cent in endorsement of an Ultra position. Similarly, among Catholics, there is only only a two per cent difference across classes in support for the Constitution, and a five per cent difference in readiness to demonstrate against the regime. The differences between religions are much larger. Within the middle class, Protestants and Catholics differ by 36 percentage points in their readiness to support the Constitution, and manual workers differ by 30 percentage points. . . . It is particularly noteworthy that there is no consistent tendency for middle-class Ulster people to be readiest to endorse the Constitution and refrain from extra-constitutional politics, notwithstanding their relative advantage in terms of status (pp. 280–1).

Having rejected an economic explanation of political differences, Rose also rejects several others. One theory sometimes propounded in Northern Ireland is that tensions are so bad because Catholics and Protestants are usually educated apart, and thus are prevented from getting to know each other at the age most crucial for attitude formation. But Rose picked up in his sample sufficient people who had experienced mixed education to be able to check this theory: he found that those with such education did not have noticeably more dove-like attitudes than other people. Indeed, again and again Rose found that factors which might have been expected to induce moderation had this effect only slightly, or not at all. For instance, one might guess that the most educated would be the most tolerant but though this proved true to some extent on the Protestant side, among Catholics the educated were even more likely to be critical of the regime than the uneducated. Trade unionists are members of a professedly nonsectarian movement, but Rose found that they were almost as likely to hold extreme views as the rest of the population. So were those who had traveled abroad, those who lived in religiously mixed areas, those who had no personal memories of previous bouts of violence. Catholic public employees had attitudes similar to those of other Catholics.

To Rose, the trouble stems from non-bargainable conflicts of religion and nationality. There is no way of effecting a compromise. As he starkly puts it: 'In the foreseeable future, no solution is immediately practicable' (p. 21). Developments in the area since he published his book in 1971 have only served to support this view. But his survey data do not, and in the nature of such material

could not, throw light on a further problem: how did these conflicts come about?

For this, we must turn to works with a larger historical element. One such book is Garret FitzGerald's *Towards a New Ireland.* FitzGerald was, at the time he wrote this book, an economist who had lately turned politician; he has since become Minister for Foreign Affairs in the government of the Republic of Ireland. A man with his interests might have been expected to stress economic factors; but, while he offers some well-informed economic commentary, he concedes primacy to the religious factor. 'The Irish problem,' he says, 'is quite simply the fruit of Northern Protestant reluctance to become part of what they regard as an authoritarian Southern Catholic state' (p. 88). FitzGerald finds that this reluctance is not unreasonable. The Republic of Ireland, as it has developed since 1921, has in his opinion developed features which legitimately arouse Protestant distrust. Its legislation on divorce, contraception, censorship, education, and indeed its constitution, derive from Catholic principles which are then imposed on the whole population, Catholic and non-Catholic alike. FitzGerald proposes the abolition of the apparatus of Catholic ascendancy in the Republic. If this were done, he believes that northern Protestants, who possess a latent Irish patriotism, would begin to look more favourably on a united Ireland.

The weakness of this analysis is that it attributes too much importance to relatively recent developments. To be fair to FitzGerald, he does not claim that northern Protestant antipathy to the Catholic south dates only from 1921; but he devotes most of his book to discussing developments in the last fifty years. Any satisfactory treatment of the Northern Ireland problem must delve deeper into history for its roots.

A book which attempts this is Conor Cruise O'Brien's *States of Ireland.* O'Brien, journalist, academic, former professor at New York University, has, like FitzGerald, entered politics, and is now a minister in the government of the Republic. His book is at once a commentary on contemporary events, an interpretation of Irish history since about 1890, and a work of personal and family reminiscence. It might have been more cogent if he had not tried to do so many things simultaneously, but he has a good line in ironic wit, and as it stands his book is one of the most readable of the recent crop of books on the Northern Ireland issue. Like FitzGerald, O'Brien believes that the conflict is basically a religious one, but he defines 'religious' in such a way as to bring in the collective memories of the peoples concerned:

> It would not . . . be exact to say that it is a conflict between Catholics and Protestants. It is a conflict *between IRISH Catholics and ULSTER Protestants.* . . .
>
> The actual *religions*—the systems of beliefs and of feelings about those beliefs—cherished by Ulster Protestants and by Irish Catholics are distinct, in reality though not formally, from the religions of the same name as practised elsewhere.
>
> In both cases the actual, as distinct from the formal, religion is an amalgam of the strictly ecclesiastical body of doctrines and practices, and of other doctrines and practices derived from the past history of Irish Catholics and Ulster Protestants. A cult of the ancestors enters into both, and is acted out in the annual commemorative rites at Bodenstown, Finaghy and elsewhere. (pp. 307–8)[2]

The conclusion which O'Brien draws from his analysis is that Irishmen in the Republic should face reality, should accept that they do not really consider Ulster Protestants as belonging to the same people as themselves, and should put into cold storage their hopes for a united Ireland.

This thesis is more satisfactory than FitzGerald's. It accepts that religious tensions in the north are too deep-rooted to be much affected by institutional changes in the south. But O'Brien does not push his analysis back far enough to examine the origins of these tensions in any detail. For such an examination, we shall have to turn to other works.

One important contribution to the historical examination of Northern Ireland's troubles is Budge and O'Leary's *Belfast: Approach to Crisis.* Belfast is only one city in Northern Ireland; but it is so much the largest, and has witnessed such a disproportionate amount of the disorder, that any explanation of its tensions will go a long way toward explaining those of the region as a whole. Budge and O'Leary's approach is not purely historical: they also report on a survey which they conducted among Belfast electors and city councillors in 1966. The survey, however, was a small-scale exercise, from which only the most general conclusions could be drawn. It is the historical chapters which give the book its value.

Budge and O'Leary discount economic explanations of Belfast's troubles. They demonstrate that there is no close fit between economic depression and sectarian disorder: on the contrary, some political event can be shown to be the cause of almost every outbreak. They prefer to stress religious factors: the growth of the Orange Order,

[2] Bodenstown, the burial-place of the eighteenth-century founder of Irish republicanism, Theobald Wolfe Tone, is the scene of annual commemorations by present-day Irish republicans; Finaghy was until very recently the site of the principal annual demonstration by the Orange Order, in commemoration of the victory over Catholic forces at the Battle of the Boyne (1690).

a militantly Protestant organization, during the nineteenth century, and the inflammatory preaching of particular Protestant clerics. This, they believe, created a pattern of hostility which proved self-perpetuating, so that when, in the nineteen-sixties, some of the Protestant majority at last decided that it was time to build bridges to the Catholics, they had no experience of how such a task might be accomplished, and were unduly timid about arousing opposition within their own community. Their thesis is not entirely satisfactory because it leaves unresolved the problem of why the Orange Order should have found Belfast such congenial soil. But they have contributed more than any other author under review here to exposing the historical roots of Northern Ireland's troubles.

The most careful attempt to assess the relative weight of economic and religious factors can be found in Rosemary Harris's *Prejudice and Tolerance in Ulster*. Harris is an anthropologist, and her fieldwork was carried out more than twenty years ago in a small rural community which she calls Ballybeg. Her conclusions should not be applied unmodified to other areas of Northern Ireland, or to other periods in its history. But anyone who knows Northern Ireland will agree that much of Harris's analysis can be extended to the region as a whole. Her book is beautifully written, sensitive, never patronising, occasionally lit up by shafts of slightly melancholy wit. It is the best book yet published on Northern Ireland, and as such deserves extended comment.

Harris chose for her study an area which was doubly divided: religiously, between Catholic and Protestant, and economically, between prosperous farmers in a valley and poorer farmers in the hills. Though Catholics were strongest in the hills and Protestants in the valley, there were enough rich Catholic and poor Protestant families in the area for her to be able to distinguish the effects of religion and economy. Thus she was able to build up an analysis at three levels: the common culture; the significance of economic divisions; and the significance of religious divisions.

Her account makes clear the pervasiveness of the common culture. Whether Protestant or Catholic, rich or poor, the families which she studied revealed many common traits in their family relationships, their attitudes to kin and non-kin, and their values. Modesty was the quality they most appreciated. Social pretentiousness was what they most disliked. They all shared a suspicion of officialdom, of Belfast, of England. Economic differences, however, were also significant. Hill farmers, who depended heavily on cooperation between neighbors, were more gregarious, while valley farmers were more self-sufficient, and busier. Hill farmers were more likely to be intolerant in their religious and political attitudes.

Yet despite these features, the religious cleavage emerges from Harris's account as fundamental. Although the two communities interacted at work, in most other spheres they were rigidly compartmentalized. They went, obviously, to different churches. Their children went, on the whole, to different schools (though the Protestant hill children went to a Catholic school—without much effect in improving community relations). They played different games, went to different dances, patronized different shops, found employment with different masters. Nearly all Protestant men belonged to the Orange Order, from which Catholics were excluded. Most important of all, there was hardly any exogamy. This was crucial in a society where kinship ties largely dictated whom one could visit informally: it meant that members of one community were cut off from the principal means of getting thoroughly acquainted with people in the other community. Harris stresses that most people sought to promote friendly ties across the division. But she adds that this was achieved by the device of never mentioning politics, religion, or any subject that could conceivably be connected with either, in religiously mixed company. As a result, one community retained grotesquely inaccurate ideas about the beliefs of the other, and outward harmony could co-exist with deep-rooted mistrust.

The weight of scholarly opinion so far, then, is that religious factors cannot be reduced to economic ones in the Northern Ireland situation but have an independent explanatory force. There is considerable disagreement, however, among the authors who accept this view, on what aspect of the religious factor should be stressed. FitzGerald emphasizes mistakes made by the Republic in comparatively recent times. Budge and O'Leary direct attention to the nineteenth-century roots of current attitudes. O'Brien defines religion loosely so as to include the folk-memories, not strictly religious, of both communities. Harris emphasizes the importance of institutional separation and of endogamy. Perhaps the truth is that no one explanation fits all the people of Northern Ireland. Catholic and Protestant are not just two uniform groups; there are important divergences within each of them, as most of the authors we have discussed, notably Rose and Harris, bring out. Different segments of each community are likely to be swayed by different influences. This may be the next area of advance for Northern Ireland studies: instead of of talking just about Protestants and Catholics, researchers should ask themselves more often; *which* Protestants, and *which* Catholics.

BOOK REVIEWS

Ramon Magsaysay: A Political Biography. By Jose V. Abueva. (Manila: La Solidaridad Publishing House, 1971. Pp. 497. $10.25. Distributed in the United States by Cellar Bookshop, 18090 Wyoming Street, Detroit, Michigan.)

This biography about the fourth President of the Philippine Republic, Ramon Magsaysay, is more than a drama of the life and times of a Filipino chief executive. It is also a study of a developing nation: its civic culture, its presidential character, and its executive-legislative relations.

The author, a former Executive Secretary of the 1971 Philippine Constitutional Convention, does his job well in pointing out four aspects of Filipino civic culture which Magsaysay exploited in the art of governance. The first is *utang na loob* (personal debt of gratitude), which Magsaysay used to defend his appointment of persons to high government positions from the erstwhile Democratic Party which helped the Nacionalista Party and Magsaysay capture the presidency from Elpidio Quirino in 1953. The second is the game of *pakikisama* (camaraderie) which Magsaysay played as a superstar. The third is the notion that "politics is addition, not subtraction" —popularized by the late Senate President "Amang" Rodriguez in justifying the admission of defecting Liberals into the fold of the Nacionalista Party. The fourth is the *compadre* system (agreeing or even volunteering to be a godfather to children of political and civic leaders). In Philippine politics, a *compadre* (godfather) becomes *ipso facto* a political follower, ally, or *lider.* The more *compadres* one has, the greater the political dividends, since the system is a form of an investment in "mutual fund" politics—Filipino style!

Like James D. Barber, the author gives us a glimpse of Magsaysay's character. "The man was a paradox of humility and ambition," he wrote, "eager to serve yet wanting to command. . . . He would berate erring officials in public to dramatize his integrity and honesty before a secretly applauding . . . audience who would surely spread the story" (p. 443). After the incident is over, Magsaysay wastes no time in telling the embarrassed official to forget the whole thing because it was only a *palabas* (show)!

Magsaysay had little or no problems in his relationships with local officials, but he had some difficulties in getting along with the legislature. His relationship with senators and representatives was less than cooperative and friendly. The author attributes this to several factors. The first is the nature of the Philippine political parties; the author claims that Filipino Liberals and Nacionalistas are like Tweedle-dee and Tweedle-dum. In some respects, this characterization of Philippine parties is correct and partly explains why Magsaysay's administration must be judged as fairly successful. There are other features of the Filipino party system, however, that contributed to Magsaysay's disillusionment and his secret plan to form a third party after the 1957 presidential election had it not been for the plane crash that took his life. Among these features which the author overlooks are: (1) the lack of discipline among the two major parties; (2) the absence of a highly centralized national party organization; and (3) the irresponsible nature of Filipino parties.

The second factor is the social and economic composition of the Philippine Senate. "Except for a few, all [Senators] were seasoned politicians and skilled speakers and parliamentarians. . . . [Thus] the more popular, prominent, and affluent among them, who were also pillars of the party, could be much more independent and critical of the President than most other colleagues" (p. 379). While this may partly account for Magsaysay's troubles with the Senate, it does not explain his problems with the House of Representatives. The author forgot that the different systems in which the President and representatives are elected could produce contrasting outlooks toward political and socio-economic issues.

Mr. Abueva is correct in asserting that "congress resented for years its subordination to the President . . ." (p. 379). Why is this so? Is it because of the influence of the landed gentry upon the legislative branch which is more susceptible to pressure than the executive branch? Is it because of the nature of the two bodies themselves: legislative bodies are generally conservative in outlook, whereas executive bodies tend to be more liberal? Or is it due to one of the fundamental doctrines upon which the Filipino system of government rests: the theory of separation of powers under which the legislative branch is merely asserting its constitutional prerogative as an independent, co-equal, coordinate and separate branch of the government when it refuses to say "amen" to everything Magsaysay says?

Despite my criticisms, I feel that the author has produced a fully documented and well-written piece of research.

A. B. VILLANUEVA

Western Illinois University, Macomb

Negative Dialectics. By Theodor W. Adorno. Translated by E. B. Ashton. (New York: The Seabury Press, 1973. Pp. xv, 416. $17.50.)

Negative Dialectics, originally published in West Germany in 1966, was Adorno's major and most ambitious statement of his program. It is the equivalent among his works to Heidegger's *Being and Time* or to Sartre's *Being and Nothingness.* It does not stand alone. The *Jargon of Authenticity* (New York, 1973; Frankfurt, 1964) and the article "Fortschritt" in *Stichworte* (Frankfurt, 1969) were written initially as parts of *Negative Dialectics* but were published separately. 'Dialektische Epilegomena' in *Stichworte* (Frankfurt, 1969) were also written as responses to political and philosophical issues aroused by *Negtive Dialectics.* These texts are inseparable from the rest of Adorno's work in a further sense. They amount to an experimental attempt to state a method apart from its practice when the special nature of that method is that it is inseparable from its practice. Thus they complement Adorno's many writings on music, literature, philosophy, and sociology. It might be said that the very decision to write *Negative Dialectics* was an admission of failure. If it is a failure, it is a magnificent and important one.

The large and varied corpus of writings by the many philosopher-sociologists belonging to the Frankfurt School have revolved since the 'thirties around the question which Marx posed in the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844:* "How do we now stand in relation to the Hegelian *dialectic?*" They asked this question for the era and generation after Lukács'. The experiences of that generation included the triumph of Fascism, the lack of any proletarian revolution, the establishment of doctrinaire Marxism in Eastern Europe, and the flourishing of nondialectical philosophies and sociologies in Western Europe and America. Adorno began the first page of *Negative Dialectics* with a proposition which has become infamous: "Philosophy, which once seemed obsolete, lives on because the moment to realize it was missed" (p. 3).

In the book Adorno decodes the history of thought. He claims that the history of philosophy has been the history of what he calls "identity thinking" and he demonstrates that another mode of thinking, which he calls "nonidentity thinking," or negative dialectic, is possible and necessary for the valid cognition of social reality. To perceive the nonidentity in the concepts and theories of nondialectical philosophies and sociologies is to perceive how their central concepts are not "fulfilled by their objects." Unlike other writers in the Marxist tradition, Adorno is not denying the laws of identity or noncontradiction. Nor does he propose an alternative set of theoretical concepts. Nondialectical philosophies and sociologies are not located in a social structure which is known independently of them. That structure is derived from the antinomies found in those bodies of thought. This is called the "immanent method."

The text is riddled with paradox and polemic. Paradox arises because Adorno is in the inherently paradoxical position of presenting a critique of a universally prevailing mode of thought without relying exclusively on that mode of thinking himself. His style is thus designed to induce his reader to think in that different way which he believes is desirable and possible. It is an indirect exhortative method. There is polemic because although Adorno concedes that the works of Husserl, Heidegger, and Lukács reveal the "ontological need" to grant "priority to the object," to break out of epistemological subjectivism, he demonstrates that they have failed and have relapsed into subjectivism. As he dramatically puts it, they have "broken out into the mirror" ([sic], p. 84). There is no scholarship in these chapters: no sympathetic and detailed discussion of what is characteristic or original about another man's ideas. Precisely because he is concerned to sublate this tradition, he takes certain liberties in his construal of it.

Negative Dialectics is a very uneven book. The Introduction and Part Two, "Negative Dialectics: Concept and Categories," are among the most original and sustained pieces that Adorno ever wrote. The exemplars or "models," as he called them, which form the second half of the book, are poor. The reader would do better to look elsewhere in Adorno's *oeuvre* where there are finer ones.

E. B. Ashton, in his Translator's Note, sets the text in its political and philosophical context. He offers several sensitive hints for understanding Adorno's presentation. It is therefore astounding when Ashton suggests that Adorno *thinks in English* (p. xv). One of Adorno's reasons for returning to Germany from America after the Second World War was that the English translations of his work distorted his ideas so much. He believed he could only say what he had to say in German (cf. his essay *"Auf die Frage:* was ist deutsch" in *Stichworte,* pp. 110-2). Furthermore, Adorno deliberately uses his own language so that it is syntactically and semantically difficult even for the German-speaking reader to read. He is a latter-day Nietzsche, too, whose most lucid expression may contain all manner of equivocation. Ashton's opinion has influenced his translation, as has his commitment "to put Adorno's thought into English" (p. xiv) in addition to his task of translating Adorno's text. This robs the

ideas of their *raison d'être* by assimilating them to the very idiom they are designed to resist. Adorno discusses "thought" and "spirit," their identity and nonidentity modes, using impersonal constructions. Thought and spirit are not attributed to "us" but are frequently personified, sometimes by dramatic metaphor. This is a strategy crucial in presenting a dialectic from the point of view of the object, for an attempt "to see beyond the subject" (p. 376), even though that dialectic only admits people in their concrete social relationships. Ashton has turned all the passive constructions into personal ones. This results in a completely different text. Equally bad, Ashton has frequently retranslated terms from the tradition with which Adorno is debating. Adorno relies on his reader's engagement in that tradition, and on the reader's automatic recognition of a word or expression as Marx's or Hegel's. Ashton has made the text familiar where it should be unfamiliar and unfamiliar where it should be familiar. There are many other mistakes and omissions on his part. An index would improve the edition.

Adorno explains one of his motives for writing *Negative Dialectics* as the desire "to transcend the official separation of pure philosophy and the substantive or formally scientific realm" (p. xx). Yet even those social scientists versed in the traditions of German social thought and sympathetic to the search for alternatives to philosophical and sociological positivisms may be disappointed to find that Adorno is a man with a message and that the message is deeply pessimistic. It is that society and consciousness are almost completely reified. The concept and theories of reification are notoriously elusive. Adorno seems to mean that critical consciousness, including his own, is almost impossible. History, in some sense, has come to a halt. *Negative Dialectics* is an attempt to break out of this unbreakable paradox and to invite others to do so too. But Adorno's message and his guilt at having survived Auschwitz make him write like the man whom he says that he became in his dreams—"the emanation of the insane wish of a man killed twenty years earlier" (p. 363), as if his thinking was crippled from then on. This is not to say that his message is wrong. Anyone who is involved in the possibility of Marxism as a mode of cognition *sui generis,* at a time when critical consciousness can no longer be even "imputed" to an ideal-typical class as Lukács could do in 1923 in *History and Class Consciousness,* must read Adorno's book.

GILLIAN ROSE
University of Sussex, England

The War Disease. By Norman Z. Alcock. (Oakville, Ontario: CPRI Press, 1972. Pp. 238. $6.00, cloth; $3.00, paper.)

This work is an interim attempt to formulate a precise definition of the causes of war. To accomplish this task, the author seeks to provide a catalog of the findings of peace research in order to synthesize the results into a theory of war.

The book is subdivided into thirteen chapters. The introductory chapter establishes the tone of the work. Chapter two very briefly mentions and seemingly dismisses (although many are to reappear in later pages) a host of popular single-factor approaches to explaining war. The next nine chapters are dubiously segregated by the alleged disciplinary source of the empirical evidence to be considered: biology, anthropology, history, "mathematical modeling," sociology, psychology, economics, political science, and the "laboratory." The evidence presented is nowhere near as representative of the "essential streams of contemporary science" as the author claims. While a number of topics are mentioned, most are handled superficially. For example, the biology and anthropology chapters rely quite heavily on Sigmund Freud, Konrad Lorenz, and Robert Ardrey. The history chapter consists of a brief overview of a portion of L. F. Richardson's *Statistics of Deadly Quarrels.* The sociology chapter discusses beliefs, attitudes, and public opinion but only as illustrated by a few CPRI surveys. The economics chapter is restricted inexplicably to a few studies of the early 1960s which investigated the possible economic impact of disarmament. Other chapters have similar problems; but a major shortcoming of the book is that the chapters fail to catalog adequately the findings of peace research.

The last two chapters deliver a disappointing synthesis and a supposedly related "dynamic two-phase theory of war" which can be summarized in five statements: (1) Territorial disagreements, reinforced by ideological differences, lead to tensions. (2) Tension causes leaders to become aggressive and to escalate their arms expenditures; to increase their power still further they simultaneously form alliances with compatible allies. (3) Under the strain of increasing armament expenditures, domestic conflict increases, which slows down military spending. (4) Although the rate of increases in armament steadily diminishes, the absolute arms level continues to grow. At this point the "military mind" considers going to war for two reasons: (a) the country is as strong as it will be for several years, and (b) a war

will tend to arrest the anticipated downward swing of military spending. Most wars therefore start just when the arms race is about to crank down. (5) As the level of arms spending steadily increases, such an "intolerable level of spending" is reached that a massive war breaks out.

The reader is told that this "theory" accounts for seventy-five per cent of the variance in international and larger civil wars betwen 1946 and 1971, in spite of the fact that only two of the "theory's" variables have been operationalized: arms expenditure rate of increase, and the presence or absence of war. Alcock may have stumbled upon something—namely that the rate of increase in global arms expenditures is a good predictor of global conflict, a finding which is most interesting from a geocentric (as opposed to a nation-state centric) perspective of world politics—but he has hardly tested his "theory." In any event, Alcock's abstract statements do not even begin to approximate the more rigorous specifications and procedures conventionally associated with contemporary theory construction. And since his approach is unfortunately predicated on the devil concept of the "military mind," it is debatable whether his assertions, as presently constituted, are worth testing.

The author does state that he is writing for two audiences: the concerned public (potential supporters of peace research) and the scientific community (potential peace researchers). The former group may find the book of some interest. For instance, some of the arms-race modeling research is described in easy-to-read fashion. But the book will probably not appeal to most of the scientific community. At best, more informed readers will only be irritated by the glaring lack of references to pertinent findings when a topic is discussed (e.g., the discussion of domestic/foreign conflict linkages mentions only early Rummel and Tanter), the inconsistencies in methodological terminology and the nature of evidence required for casual assertions (e.g., compare pages 139-140, 142, and 152-153), an over-reliance on secondary sources, a lack of respect for levels of analysis problems, a currently outdated "doomsday approaching" mood, and, of course, the basic failure of the book to attain its specified objectives. Nevertheless, the rationale for the book is commendable. It is hoped that the faults of this work will encourage others to produce better and much-needed literature surveys, syntheses, and theories of the causes of war.

WILLIAM R. THOMPSON
Florida State University

Mathematical Approaches to Politics. By Hayward R. Alker, Jr., Karl W. Deutsch, and Antoine H. Stoetzel. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Inc., Publishers, 1973. Pp. 475. $15.00.)

One of the more important cleavages in political science is defined by the use or nonuse of sophisticated mathematical models. In fact, with appropriate apologies to Lord Snow, we might refer to this cleavage as one of two cultures. One culture is not only quantitative but also mathematical: manipulating symbols, numbers, and sometimes data in an effort to attain a particular kind of logical rigor in its statements. The other culture, more dependent upon words and data guided by speculative and/or simple statistical thinking, finds it difficult to understand the complex mathematical models of the first culture.

This notion of the two cultures perhaps puts a bit of a twist on the usual divisions of methodists and theorists, behavioralists and others, scientists and philosophers. These differences are surely real enough, but the communications barriers accompanying them seem a great deal less than those between the political mathematicians and the rest of us. The latter barriers have moved some in the last few years as generations of new graduate students have sat through scope and methods courses and as older members of the profession have gone to summer institutes. Nevertheless, the work of the new mathematical political scientists is closed to all but those with a fairly solid education in mathematics or those who are willing to work hard to get their mathematics piecemeal.

Mathematical Approaches to Politics is recommended for nonmathematical political scientists who want an introduction to what is happening in the other culture, but warning must be given that this is no easy book to read. Its very high level of abstraction and its frequent use of mathematical symbols and logic make it something more than the direct sequel of the introductory statistics text. Its pieces are not written as introductions but are reports on ongoing research in the field. Background information, therefore, is sometimes lacking.

The book is a collection of papers originally given by scholars from Europe and North and South America in sessions of the Mathematical Approaches to Politics Research Group at the Eighth World Congress of Political Science in Munich, September 1-5, 1970. It is divided into four major sections each having to do with a major kind of mathematical approach to politics: (1) statistical models and data analysis, (2)

rational choice theories, (3) structural theories, and (4) simulation models.

The approach most familiar to political scientists in the nonmathematical culture is that of statistical models and data analysis. They have been around the longest. Examples included in this volume are Richard Chadwick's work on transactional systems for measuring power and integration, Jeffrey Milstein's time-serial regression analysis of choices facing United States policy makers between 1968 and 1970 in Vietnam, and Simon Schwartzman's study of voting in Brazil between 1945 and 1964. Schwartzman works primarily with data tables, and Milstein uses a form of regression analysis not much beyond that learned in basic statistics (although he does it in a most interesting way). Chadwick, on the other hand, with his matrices, employs much more complicated algebra. All three papers, however, use conventional descriptive or inferential statistics at some point.

Perhaps the second most familiar approach demonstrated in the book is that of simulation. At least the graduates of Northwestern University learn about it. Hayward Alker attacks the problem of measuring power, integration, and development through the use of the Simon-Homans causal modeling approach and the rational modeling tradition in simulation. His genius, here as elsewhere, is to take the work of others (e.g., Harsanyi, Brunner, Lipset), to discuss and to mathematicize it further, and to make of it much more than the original authors have done. Raymond Hopkins explores the conceptual problems arising in the quantitative analysis of mobilization and assimilation processes and develops two simulation models in dealing with these. His paper includes the use of data from Belgium, Malaysia, and Quebec. Paul Smoker writes a useful review of the major simulations of politics developed between 1959 and 1970 and relates them to each other.

Less familiar to many political scientists are the structural and rational choice theories. Harrison White develops a structural analogy between telecommunications systems and human networks. This paper is the least obviously mathematical of all in the book, but its underlying mathematical logic is provocative. The other paper on structural analysis written by František Charvát, Jaroslav Kučera, and Miroslav Soukup demonstrates that structures of dependency can be interpreted in terms of some of the classical elements of information theory. Both of these papers leave to the readers' imaginations their relevance to politics.

Three examples of rational-choice research are included in the book. Anatol Rapoport, Melvin Guyer and David Gordon compare the performance of Danish and American students in a game designed as a threat situation. The "underdog" is shown to be better off if he acts in a seemingly irrational way; by accepting immediate loss to himself, he can inflict significant loss on his adversary and make it rational for the latter to change his tactics and allow a more equitable division of rewards. Peter Aranson, Melvin Hinich, and Peter Ordeshook are concerned with "the partial explanation and preciction of variations in public policy with variations of election rules." They are particularly concerned with the effect a candidate's objectives have on his choice among election strategies. Michael Taylor developes a model of collective decision making for voting bodies choosing on more than one attribute and with multidimensional alternatives. Basic to his model is the assumption that individuals making choices have a salience ranking of the policy dimensions and these rankings may not be the same for each individual.

These four sections are preceded by an introduction in which Karl Deutsch discusses some past trends and future prospects of quantitative approaches to political analysis. This discussion is particularly helpful to the political scientist of the nonmathematical culture in placing the research reported in the rest of the book into an historical context. Similarly, the brief introductions to each of the four sections are more than the usual summaries of the contents of the papers to follow. Each is a little, well-written essay on the particular approach. These should be thought stimulating for scholars of either culture.

What is likely to be the reaction of the nonmathematician to the political substance of the book? He will probably be tempted to wonder at all of the marvelous equipment brought out to move a molehill. In all honesty, it seems to me that most of the political accomplishments of very sophisticated mathematical political science are still for the future. Alker himself says on page 370 that a lot has been attempted and little accomplished thus far. It might be difficult to maintain that Aranson, Hinich, and Ordeshook have broken much ground not already dug into by Duverger, or that Taylor says much that any local politician worth his salt does not already know. It appears that the more sophisticated the mathematics, the less impressive the politics. There may be a reason for this. It takes some time for an approach to develop and, in the early stages, so much energy is placed on the technique that little is left for the substance. Perhaps, therefore, judgment needs to be withheld for some time longer to see just what the new culture can say about politics.

CHARLES LEWIS TAYOR
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University

Hegel's Theory of the Modern State. By Shlomo Avineri. (New York and London: Cambridge University Press, 1973. Pp. xi, 252. $11.95.)

It is both common and natural to regard the *Philosophy of Right* as one of the more intellectually accessible of Hegel's major writings. It is largely free from the tortuous obscurities of style and presentation, the enigmatic allusions, which make the *Phenomenology* so dark and opaque a work; nor does it—unlike some of Hegel's excursions into logical theory and the philosophy of nature—raise speculative issues whose apparent remoteness from contemporary preoccupations is liable to set up a communicative barrier between the author and the modern reader. If scarcely always pellucid, it is rarely intractable: moreover, the matters with which it is chiefly concerned are relatively familiar, being connected with problems that continue, in one form or another, to remain close to the center of much present-day controversy and debate. The nature and rationale of law, the role of government, the function of the state and its relations to other social institutions, the scope and limits of individual liberty—these are among the topics discussed in a book which frequently impresses by its attention to practical detail and by its characteristically hard-headed concern with the empirical realities of political life. Even so, it is notorious that in this sphere, no less than in other departments of his thought, Hegel's intentions and claims have occasioned extreme and passionate disagreements. Not only have his doctrines given rise to a host of widely conflicting interpretations, but he himself has been extolled, or alternatively denounced, as contributing to the advance of different and often fundamentally opposed ideologies. Some have treated him as anticipating liberal or progressive ideals, while others have condemned him as a reactionary. To some his significance essentially lies in his connection with the development of Marxism, while to others he has appeared as an extreme nationalist and as an apologist of Prussian militarism. He has even been viewed as a precursor of twentieth-century fascism and racism.

Professor Avineri believes that Hegel has been a victim of persistent misunderstanding, many of the positions attributed to him bearing little or no resemblance to those which he in fact held. Philosophy, according to Hegel, "is its own time apprehended in thoughts," and Avineri makes this observation the epigraph of his book. In his view, Hegel's critics have typically been led astray by a failure to identify the questions that chiefly occupied him and by an accompanying tendency to ignore the historical context within which they arose. What Hegel wrote, he maintains, cannot be adequately appreciated in abstraction from the background of changing conditions against which his ideas evolved; in particular, it is mistaken to treat the doctrines propounded in the *Philosophy of Right* as if they represented no more than an attempt, pleasing to the Prussian establishment, to justify the Restoration of 1815. Rather, they should be seen for what they were—the product of a sustained effort, extending over a considerable period, to come to terms with a social reality that had been radically and irrevocably transformed under the impact of the French Revolution and the reforms introduced by Napoleon.

It is a merit of Avineri's study that it presents a clear and well-documented account of the development of this prodigious undertaking. Thus he shows how, even in his early "theological writings," Hegel was already profoundly concerned with the problem of defining the relation of the individual to social institutions and norms: the comparisons he drew at that time between Judaic and Hellenic attitudes to religion and law prefigured, if only in embryo, themes that were insistently to recur in his subsequent work. It was, however, in the unpublished manuscripts and lectures of the Jena period—in the *Verfassung Deutschlands*, the *System der Sittlichkeit*, and (above all) the *Realphilosophie*—that his political and social preoccupations first achieved determinate expression. Avineri draws heavily upon the last of these writings, tracing its connections with Hegel's later analysis of civil society and the state and at the same time stressing its intrinsic importance as embodying original insights into the nature of emergent industrialism. In doing so, he convincingly demonstrates that Hegel was conscious of the tensions inherent from the start in the modern industrial system and that his description of its workings often exhibited an astonishing prescience. Here, as elsewhere, the German thinker was acutely sensitive to factors that made the paradigms of classical political theory no longer seem appropriate.

The Hegel who finally emerges from Avineri's pages was neither an incipient totalitarian nor a reactionary traditionalist. Accusations of aggressive German nationalism are likewise out of place; during the Napoleonic wars he supported the French, and if he afterwards displayed qualified approval of Prussia it was of a nation that had been altered out of all recognition by vom Stein's and Hardenberg's reforms. Essentially, he stood for the rational reorganization of government and legislation and for the modernization of political institutions; the *Philosophy of Right* portrays a differentiated and pluralistic state, sufficiently strong to keep the potentially

destructive forces of civil society in check while simultaneously safeguarding fundamental liberties and guaranteeing the representation of separate interests. In this sense Hegel may be said to have tried, in Avineri's words, "to strike a balance—perhaps an unattainable one—between *homo economicus* and *zoon politikon*" (p. 240).

As Avineri himself emphasizes, his concern is with only one fact of Hegelian thought; thus the connections that indubitably exist between Hegel's social theory and other aspects of his philosophical system tend to drop into the background. The discussion of certain topics sometimes suffers as a result, including that dealing with the notorious assimilation of the actual to the rational. Avineri argues (no doubt correctly) that Hegel has been badly misrepresented on this score, but his own positive account of what the disputed dictum amounts to is too abbreviated to be useful and is hardly likely to satisfy its critics. In general, however, and within his self-imposed limits, he offers a timely and illuminating re-appraisal of a philosopher whose powerful contributions to the understanding of society have been recurrently obscured by passion or prejudice. Avineri may not persuade all his readers that Hegel's political ideas were as reasonable and moderate as he presents them as being. But his scholarly and eminently readable book should at least help to ensure that they receive a more objective and fair minded hearing in future.

PATRICK GARDINER
Magdalen College, Oxford

The Dimensions of Quantitative Research in History. Edited by William O. Aydelotte, Allan G. Bogue and Robert William Fogel. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972. Pp. ix, 435. $13.50.)

It is a truism that historians are largely a different breed these days from what they have traditionally been. Not only do they routinely use quantitative data and increasingly sophisticated statistical methodology, but some also think in terms of model building and the ways they can contribute to improving scientifically rooted descriptions of human behavior. Still, indifference and resistance to quantitative-behavioral approaches remain strong in the profession. Most historians do not ordinarily employ statistical methods, even when appropriate. The History Advisory Committee of the Mathematical Social Sciences Board, therefore, has sought to promote wider knowledge of, in the words of the editors of this volume, "the advantages and limitations of these methods for historical purposes . . . through concrete applications to specific problems" (p. 3). In particular, the committee has funded a number of conferences, one on general historical themes, others focused on a number of specific matters: the economics of slavery, popular voting behavior, social structure, legislative behavior and urban history, among others. The papers from the first of these, held at the University of Chicago in 1969, and subsequently much revised, are the core of this volume.

The essays lay stress on "the scope of the quantitative methods that are today being applied in history and on the variety of issues to which these methods are germane" (p. vii). They vary greatly in subject matter, time focus, and geographic concerns. Some are progress reports of ongoing work, others are finished case studies. Some test old and elusive questions of historical interpretation by adding some hard data. Others break significant new ground in scope, approach, and findings. In all they give the reader a substantial taste of what quantitative historians have been up to and what the promise of quantification is throughout the diffuse historical discipline. The editors contribute a long introduction that strongly argues the case for historical quantification and places each essay in its historiographic and methodological context.

Most of the authors have had long experience in the historical-quantitative enterprise. Stephen Thernstrom continues his study of the relationship between ethnicity and occupational mobility in ninetheenth-century Boston. Lawrence and Jeanne Stone ingeniously reconstruct the patterns of house building and home ownership over three centuries in Hertfordshire in order to create a methodological and data base for a larger examination of social mobility into the English political elite. Robert Fogel and Jack Ruttmer apply the well-developed tools of the cliometricians to test the efficiency of federal land policy in nineteenth-century America. The new urban history is represented by Rogers and Ellen Jane Hollingsworth's recreation of the expenditures of American cities at the turn of the twentieth century as part of a study of public policy outputs at the urban level.

Only three of the papers concern institutional political activity. Allan Bogue and William Aydelotte investigate legislative behavior; Bogue shrewdly tests a number of models of personal power within Congress in the Civil War era; Aydelotte uses scalogram annalysis of roll calls in the House of Commons to determine to what extent ideological factors affected the split within the Tory party in the 1840s. Gerald Kramer and Susan Lepper develop a regression model of popular voting behavior to demonstrate the strong influence which changing economic con-

ditions had on the outcome of American congressional elections since the 1890s. There are also two papers whose trust is basically political. Charles Tilly investigates the relationship between outbreaks of violence and the stage of economic and political development in nineteenth-century France. Gilbert Shapiro and James Dawson consider the relevance of different theories of status tensions to revolutionary commitment in the France of 1789.

This is both varied and valuable fare. Many of its findings will become welcome additions to our data files. But its importance, particularly to students of history, goes beyond the substantive findings presented. Everything about the way historians have engaged or should engage in this enterprise is here. Historians, for example, have some real problems with their data. Not blessed with the series of survey results routinely worked over in other social science disciplines, they must rely on frequently fragile and incomplete aggregate data. Often their work depends on the recovery of elusive data or finding ways of constructing useful numerical indices from disparate material. Some of the work here illustrates such efforts. The Stones' essay, for example, is primarily an attempt to construct a data base for a larger problem of measurement and analysis. Similarly much of the interest of the Tilly and the Shapiro and Dawson pieces lies in their imaginative reconstruction of data banks. At the same time, where the data do exist, the historians included here have characteristically borrowed a wide variety of methods and approaches available in other disciplines to manipulate and analyze their data. As is usual in quantitative-historical work, the methods employed vary from simple summary statistics to the application of complex models of human behavior. The scaffolding of historical quantification is therefore nicely revealed for all to see. Concerned but inexperienced historians can learn much to guide them in their own quantitative probes. Nonhistorians will also find much of value here. Although I doubt that history can ever shed its methodological soft side completely, or even in most cases, the sophistication exhibited here should suggest to students of the political and social process that some historians are ready to contribute precise data and well-formulated insight to the process of understanding human behavior.

JOEL H. SILBEY
Cornell University

Ramsay MacDonald's Political Writings. Edited by Bernard Barker. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1972. Pp. 258. $10.95.)

This book is of particular interest to political theorists and students of the British Labour movement. It deals with the ideas of Britain's first Labour Prime Minister, as expressed in his eleven major theoretical works between 1905 and 1921. Extracts from five of these are represented here, and the editor has provided a fifty-page introduction, which traces the intricate pattern of influences on them, and their place in Labour Party history.

MacDonald was the leader of the Labour Party from 1911 to 1914 and from 1922 to 1931. When he formed the coalition National Government in 1931, he was expelled from the Party. Since then his name has been associated with that "great betrayal." Whether his political ideas were leading him in the direction of forsaking his party must be a relevant question, and they are clearly not those of a "hard-liner." MacDonald rejected revolution, Marxism, class war and industrial strife. In this he was the typical British Labour leader, dedicated to evolutionary reforms, and when in power, inclined to placate the capitalists at the expense of the trade unions and the working class.

He adds a Scottish touch: socialism will come largely through education, moral fervor and willpower. The tone is reminiscent of sermons which he must have heard in his youth at Lossiemouth. "The man through whom socialism is to come is not the economic man, the class-conscious man, the man toiling with the muck. He is to be the man of ideals, of the historical spirit, the man in whose intelligence religion and sense of what is of good report will have a dominating influence" (p. 48). The Calvinist doctrine of the elect seems as relevant here as the continental socialism of Saint-Simon and Comte, discussed by Mr. Barker.

MacDonald was aware of the continental philosophers, and deals with them in *Socialism* (1907). But he was more concerned to produce a British version of socialist philosophy. For this he turned to Darwin, and J. A. Hobson, the economist. The result is a kind of "Social Darwinism," without a critique of capitalism. Socialism comes about through the evolution of technology in industry, and not as a result of the "contradictions" in capitalism, leading to its overthrow.

There are echoes of that in the Labour Party in Britain today, and it is perhaps time to rehabilitate MacDonald as a representative Labour theorist. But the doubt remains: does his philosophy not lead eventually to a sellout of the "man toiling with the muck"?

This book is particularly valuable for the editor's introduction, which bridges political theory and political history. It is a distinctive contribution to the literature on socialism and the development of the Labour Party.

JAMES G. KELLAS
University of Glasgow, Scotland

Education, Opportunity, and Social Inequality: Changing Prospects in Western Society. By Raymond Boudon. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973. Pp. v, 220. $12.50.)

Boudon is a sociologist, professor of social sciences at the University of Paris, who wrote this volume while a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford. Many of the data Boudon reviews were collected while he was a consultant with the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). A necessary limitation of those data is that they are not uniform in quality and were not collected by Boudon on the basis of a design he articulated. But there can be no doubt that Boudon is at home with methodology appropriate for display and interpretation of data focused on a response to the rhetorical question, "Why has the tremendous surge in the development of education, common to most Western countries since World War II, had so little impact in furthering the cause of social equality and economic opportunity?"

In suggesting that the extension of educational opportunity in the lower classes has won little economic or social advantage for the youth of those groups, Boudon's monograph complements *Inequality: A Reassessment of the Effect of Family and Schooling in America* by Christopher Jencks et al. (New York: Basic Books, 1972). The Jencks study argues that the number of years of schooling, and even the quality of academic achievement, have little effect on later income. Boudon undertakes to explain the apparent lack of relation between reducing the inequality of educational opportunity (IEO) and inequality of social (or socio-occupational) opportunity (ISO). The analysis is skillful and persuasive. It could have been proposed a bit more modestly and without a modish claim to being an example of systems analysis. At one moment structuralism is *the* approach, then the analysis of systems has center stage. Actually an understanding of formal education as a system calls for the interaction of all behavioral studies, including a social-psychological probing of attitudes. It was the French study of the latter, which as Jean Floud reminds us, gave rise to the illuminating phrase, *la famille éducogène*—that is, the family that highly prizes education—wishes a maximum amount of education for its children and cooperates with schools in spurring students to high levels of achievement. (Jean Floud, together with A. H. Halsey pioneered the study of social-class influences on education, using British populations for studies initiated just after World War II.) This type of family has exerted social and intellectual pressures reinforcing those of the schools. Surely humanistic reflection on the reformist visions, to which Boudon gives hardly more than a nod, is not out of order. One recalls that it was Boudon's predecessors who, shortly after World War I, joined in *Les Compagnons de l'université Nouvelle.* These proponents of a new education may have seemed romantic optimists, but their desire was not primarily for social and economic advantage. Rather it was the humanistic goal of achieving less snobbishness and monopolization of privilege.

Given these caveats, Boudon's reader will be sobered by his demonstration that there is a low correlation between education (grade completed) and mobility (p. 6). If one wishes to increase mobility, the conclusion of Boudon and Jencks (together with many styled "revisionists" among contemporary historians of American education), is that the character of the economic-social order must be reconstructed to greatly reduce the distance between high and low income and hence between upper and lower class. It is not enough to revise the structure of education by advancing the cause of comprehensive education, mixing youth without regard for social class, or increasing the years of compulsory and fee-free education. It is not enough, Boudon argues, to increase the number of lower- and lower-middle-class families who qualify as *les familles éducogenès.* The manner in which Boudon uses a number of analyses to buttress his contention disarms his opposition. But we are left without direction. Perhaps that is too much to ask of the behavioral sciences, the moreso if they are not in tandem with conventional literary-moral humanism. Nonetheless, for those who wish to understand what Boudon refers to as the data of school bookkeeping, his methodological explorations truly will advance comparative studies in education. Those of us concerned with those studies are very much in Boudon's debt.

ROBERT H. BECK
University of Minnesota

The Economic Theory of Representative Government. By Albert Breton. (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1974. Pp. 228. $8.50.)

Albert Breton has put it all together—an economic theory of public goods, of democracy, of representative government, and of bureaucracy. And somehow, the whole seems less than the sum of the parts. Maybe, as I suspect, some parts are not yet sufficiently sound to build a substantial structure.

This book has many merits: Most important, it is the only book I know that attempts to synthesize an economic theory of government. It should prove valuable for advanced courses in the theory of public choice, and I plan to use it for this purpose. It is careful, concise, coherent

and creative—but not conclusive. All of us should aspire to this standard.

Professor Breton builds on now conventional economic assumptions: Citizens maximize a utility function defined in terms of the level of private and government services. Elected officials maximize a utility function defined in terms of the probability of reelection and other variables. Bureaucrats maximize a utility function defined in terms of the size of the bureau. And, of course, resources are limited. The calculus of constrained maximization is then used to develop hypotheses about the individual demands for government services, the aggregative demand facing a specific government, and the supply of government services. This approach is used to evaluate the consequences of specific "constitutional" characteristics of government—e.g., the voting rule, the election period, the range of authorized functions, the political rights of individuals, the role of the bureaucracy, etc.—although Breton does not develop an explicit calculus for deciding these constitutional issues.

The strongest sections of the book, from my perspective, focus on the behavior of individuals to minimize the coercion of any specific set of government policies and on the behavior of the governing party for any specific set of constitutional characteristics. Breton demonstrates how political participation and individual economic response is related to the level and character of coercion and how the amount of coercion is related to the constitutional characteristics. This material represents his major unique contributions.

Other sections of the book are less satisfactory. Breton distinguishes between government policies and government instruments—the probability of being subject to a crime, for example, rather than the units of police activity. He contends that individuals express their demands and officials base their decisions on these policy outcomes rather than on the instruments. I do not find this formulation to be valuable. Individuals can usually affect the policy outcomes by a variety of personal actions, and it is the government instruments, not the outcomes, which are necessarily common to the affected polity.

Second, I expect that the concept of public goods will become recognized as not very valuable in explaining government behavior. Many public goods are adequately supplied by private organizations in cases where property rights and marketing technology permit efficient exclusion of nonpaying demands. And the developing empirical evidence suggests that very few government activities manifest much "publicness."

And last, a number of minor quibbles: Breton contends that political participation is a positive function of the degree of coercion from a specific set of government actions, but some polar cases are not considered. Political action would not go to zero even in a noncoercive "Lindahl equilibrium" because everyone still has an incentive to reduce his personal tax share. Political action may nearly disappear in the face of considerable coercion if the expected payoff is small. He also contends that a reduction in the cost of political participation will increase the discretionary power of elected officials, but this seems to be based on the simple error of assuming that the voting rule is based on some absolute number of votes rather than on some proportion of those who vote. And finally, he develops the rationale for logrolling as a device to minimize coercion within the governing coalition, but he overlooks the important role of logrolling to protect intense minorities.

In summary, economists (and other social scientists) have yet to develop a satisfactory theory of the most important social phenomenon of our times—the relative growth of government. The construction of a satisfactory paradigm of government, however, will probably build on the foundation Breton has so carefully established.

WILLIAM A. NISKANEN
Ford Motor Company

The Social Problem in the Philosophy of Rousseau. By John Charvet. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974. Pp. 148. $8.95.)

Most books written to denounce Rousseau are dreadful. Until recently selected passages from his works were used to flog authors' pet hates, be they romanticism, pragmatism, democracy, fascism or communism. At present the vocabulary of psychoanalysis is deployed to reveal Rousseau's insanity and so the sickness of his ideas. In either case we learn a lot about the writers of these books but little about Rousseau. John Charvet, Lecturer at the London School of Economics, has written a work that is therefore uniquely welcome. For though he criticizes Rousseau relentlessly, he has written a penetrating, closely reasoned and very lucid essay. He never takes his eyes off his subject, which is a single theme in Rousseau's mature work (the *Second Discourse*, the *Social Contract* and especially *Emile*) and wisely cites no other books. That allows one to concentrate on the matter at hand, which is Rousseau's claim that when men in the dawn of history leave their natural isolation they lose their healthy egoism (*amour de soi*) and acquire a destructive vanity (*amour propre*). Instead of simply pursuing their natural needs they come to see themselves only in relation to, and through the eyes of, others.

This is the source of competition, inequality and every other known vice. Charvet calls this the "social problem" and he believes that Rousseau's conception of and solution for it are "misconceived and radically incoherent" (p. 3). His arguments are always supported by textual references and are cogent, but they are not flawless.

Charvet's first complaint is that in the *Second Discourse* Rousseau has made man too completely an animal to be able to account for his social fate. Indeed that "stupid and limited animal" is no different from any other in the state of nature. His peculiarity is only potential, in what Rousseau calls his freedom. By that he means only that man can alter in response to experience as animals cannot. Man is capable of unlimited self-transformation (perfectibility), and this makes him a moral being whom one can praise and blame for his choice. One does not tell a hog he ought to behave differently, after all. Mr. Charvet professes not to understand what Rousseau means by free will (p. 10) and that is unfortunate, because freedom explains why man can and does leave the animal order. No more is needed. Even natural man's pity is like that of any animal. All feel disturbed by the sight of suffering. That is, of course, quite unlike the pity a social person feels; this distinction is not confusing, though Charvet finds it so (p. 18). Finally, precisely because man is just an animal, he first develops his ability to estimate and compare in relation to other beasts with whom he must cope. This ability is pre-social, not suddenly aroused by primitive society. This social state is, in fact, a late one, preceded by the domestication women impose upon their mates. This together with the natural capacity for measuring is quite enough to lead to competition and awareness of opinion—for these only express a new kind of measurement, inevitable once men see that they are alike: equal and unequal. These stairs to vanity, to "being for others," have no gaps, and only Charvet's own omissions create them. By the time vanity is born men have long since given up their merely casual mating and hunting relations in favor of the settled conditions that undo them. It is not sudden as Charvet claims (pp. 30-31). That does not, however, mean that Rousseau is right.

When he turns to *Emile*, Charvet is on more solid ground. This is the best part of his book. Given that his education is to make a man who can live in society without being corrupted, Emile must become an unshakable egoist. He is accordingly preserved until adolescence from any human relationship. Only contact with things is permitted. Even tutor and pupil treat each other like things for mutual use, not as people (p. 65). Emile thus submits only to natural necessities, among which his tutor is one, and nothing else can influence him. As in the *Second Discourse*, sexuality interferes with this natural state of oneness. To prepare him for society the tutor teaches Emile pity, to identify with the victims who suffer, for his own sake, to be sure, not theirs. This natural emotion is generalized so that Emile comes to feel compassion for mankind, without having to deal with specific people. Vanity however is not absent now. Pity among social men includes the pleasant awareness of not being a victim. This to Charvet seems a corruption of pity and so nothing but vanity (93). The cure for vanity, however, cannot be natural; vanity must somehow supply its own antidote and that is what Rousseau offers. It is, perhaps, a low, but not an incoherent, protection for Emile as he enters society. Having revealed the dark side of pity, Charvet goes on to argue that since Emile now feels generalized as well as egoistic pity he is torn between morality and nature and that this is reflected in the mind-body dualism of the "Confession of the Savoyard Vicar" (pp. 108-109). That may be, but it is not clear why it should be so. The Vicar is a pure case of what Hegel called "the unhappy consciousness" with his divided ego, half soul and half thing. The egoism of Stoics and Christians bent upon personal salvation is proverbial, and their self-division is endemic in our culture and hardly Rousseau's invention. The Vicar is not just Emile.

Because Rousseau was far more obsessed with inequality and its opposite than Charvet seems to recognize, the *Social Contract* is here treated as an extention of these aspects of *Emile*. In a too brief chapter Charvet tries to show what is meant by an association that leaves its members as free as they were before entering it. No conflicts of rights and so no full personal relationships or lesser associations are to be allowed. If there were to be conflict one party would dominate others. Each citizen generalizes his own interests, as Emile generalizes pity, and this is the general will. That will is identical for all because of its limited scope and its impersonal abstract form. Charvet thinks that Rousseau has here confused universalization (Kant?), generality, and equality (p. 134). Universality, however, has no place in this patriotic republic, and equality must in any case be general. The trouble is rather Rousseau's demand that equality should amount to complete identity. That is indeed why, as Charvet says, citizens relate to each other as objects not as people. That is what is wrong with all Rousseau's solutions to "the social problem," and Charvet has brought that out with great clarity and intelligence in his interesting book.

JUDITH N. SHKLAR

Harvard University

Population and Politics: New Directions in Political Science Research. Edited by Richard L. Clinton. (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1973. Pp. 320. $14.00.)

This is the third volume published in the last three years by Heath on the relation between population and politics. Each has remarked on the lack of interest by political scientists in the field of population research. Let us hope that if a fourth should come along soon, it will take note of what has actually been going on, i.e., that there is indeed considerable interest by political scientists in this policy area.

This upsurge of interest can be traced in part to the recognition that population problems are largely political problems. A theme that runs through this volume, as well as other recent works on the subject, is that family planning (contraceptives plus educational and informational services) is by itself an ineffective means of confining the population explosion in the Third World. At AID, where family planning has long been a keystone in the foreign aid program, some officials have recently been turning to political scientists to see if they have any answers to the political problems of population control. Among a new generation of political scientists they have found many who have wanted to become more "relevant" and have seen in the study of rapid population growth the means of doing so. Many of the contributors to this volume exude an enthusiasm and dedication about their work that has become typical among those whom we might refer to now as "postbehavioralists."

It seems inevitable that symposia of this type will be subject to two basic criticisms: that they lack focus or contain much material not germane to the main topic, and that the quality of the contributions is uneven. The present volume cannot be excepted from these criticisms, although they apply with some qualifications. In the first half of this work, one can perceive a certain degree of focus, at least, which apparently was achieved by the manner in which the papers for the volume were produced. They came out of a political science/population workshop sponsored by AID at the Carolina Population Center in January 1972. Instead of inviting people to give papers at the workshop, the conference planners organized roundtable discussions of a few central themes. Afterward, when presumably the themes and issues involved were sharpened and clarified, the participants were asked to go back and write their papers. For each of the four major topics covered, one person was assigned to do a "wrap-up" chapter which would attempt to tie each of the other chapters in his section together.

Following the organization of the workshops, the volume is divided into four sections: (1) "Normative Concerns"; (2) "Methodological Issues"; (3) "The Less Advantaged Countries and Their Relations with the Advantaged Countries"; and (4) "The Advantaged Countries, with Special Emphasis on the United States."

The first section on normative concerns really involves two fundamental issues. The first two chapters deal with the ethics of governmental control of population. The other issue is whether political scientists, as such, ought to get into the population policy question; the authors of the next four chapters all argue that they should. Their reasons are varied, however, and here we are introduced to the major underlying conflict among the political scientists writing for this volume. The chief spokesman for one point of view is Terry McCoy who, in his chapter, "Political Science in Population Studies: A Disciplinary Perspective," demonstrates the value of population policy analysis for the discipline of political science. He sparks the controversy by emphasizing the professional obligation of political scientists to advance their discipline, stating that we "often overlook this responsibility in our eagerness to prove the social utility of our chosen profession," and that "in the final analysis, our value as problem solvers is only as strong as the discipline on which it is based" (p. 16). The opposing point of view is represented by the symposium editor, Richard L. Clinton, in his concluding chapter of this section. A. E. Keir Nash's chapter in this section lies somewhere in between these two. Nash suggests that political scientists could benefit by specifically investing some time in population research. He sees this as helping to make political science a "harder science," and points to the "impetus which political science might receive along behavioral paths from increased attention to demographic studies" (p. 31).

Clinton's chapter strikes out at McCoy and those who would put the interests of the discipline before the pressing problems of population. In order to establish the priority of the latter, he finds it necessary to denigrate the trends and present status of the former. Initially, this is simply a "postbehavioralist" attack against behavioralism for its positivistic implications and alleged conservative bias. But, then he goes on to deplore the conditions of *all* the social sciences, which he sees as having been plagued by three ills: "overspecialization, the emphasis on quantitative analysis, and the premium on the construction of general theories analogous to the laws of the physical sciences" (p. 62).

This sort of critique seems to be particularly

ill conceived and misplaced. Certainly there may be overspecialized political scientists from one point of view, but the behavioral revolution's effect on the discipline was to broaden its scope substantially and to increase its interdisciplinary relationships. Furthermore, it is curious that one would call for de-emphasizing quantitative analysis when approaching population research. Keir Nash in his chapter saw that a splendid opportunity was provided for political scientists to sharpen their quantitative tools in analyzing the wealth of available demographic data. Finally, the desire to de-emphasize theory seems simply wrongheaded. What sort of atheoretical research would be superior to theory-guided research is not made clear. Actually, Clinton wants to mount a frontal attack on the problem of population and does not want anything to get in his way—neither theory, nor the requirements of quantification and varification, nor present limitations of the discipline. It is difficult, however, to see how the product of such a quixotic venture would be even relevant or useful, let alone be of any value to the discipline.

The behavioralist/anti-behavioralist controversy emerges again in somewhat disguised form in the second section on methodology. The major contention here is about the value of the case-study method as against comparative analysis. Steven Sinding, a political scientist with the Office of Population of AID, feels that "rigorous and systematic" case studies would be quite useful to his agency in that they could provide "country-specific" information and data that would help inform the actions of the agency. He finds cross-national aggregate analysis less useful because the sort of information it provides "is not likely to be either firm enough or specific enough to imply action" (p. 127). He is incapable of seeing how political scientists can be useful to him except as data gatherers.

A diametrically opposed view to Sinding's is taken by Mair deVoursney who extolls the virtues of comparative aggregate data analysis over the case-study approach. In addition to the obvious theoretical advantages, she points to a number of practical ones such as the fact that it involves unobtrusive measures in a policy area very sensitive to intrusion. The most comprehensive article in the section is by Nazli Choucri. She sets forth the requirements for systematic inquiry and provides an extensive inventory of research alternatives for the population policy field. Each of the alternatives is analyzed from a cost-benefit standpoint, and here the case-study approach makes a poor showing. The wind-up chapter for this section makes a valiant attempt to reconcile some of the differences among the authors, but they seemed to be too fundamental to make this attempt successful.

The last half of the book is almost totally without focus. The only common thread in Part 3 is that the authors draw on their experience in Third World countries for their comments. Most of the material in this section is personal and subjective. These authors tend to be critical of AID policy, generally from a radical perspective. The concluding chapter in the section gets in another jibe at the behavioralists for their "insensitivity to issues"!

There are two excellent chapters, however, in the book's final section. In one, Elsa Chaney discusses the need for research and action on provision of alternative roles for women as a major means of affecting population growth. She is persuasive in showing that altering the status and role of women in society and providing other roles than motherhood for them can reduce the desire for large families. If this perspective has been largely neglected, it has probably been, as she points out, because population research and policy making have been dominated by men. The other chapter is by Dorothy Stetson and is concerned with the development of a framework for the comparative analysis of population policy. She focuses on "levels of capability performance" and surveys policy options and categories of variables hypothetically related to governmental capability. Her aim, she says, "is to make the study of population policy compatible with the pursuits of political scientists."

The final chapter by Michael Kraft re-echoes the postbehavioralists' points. It is, of course, critical of Stetson for being more concerned about the discipline than about the problems of population policy. In this context he asks, "Why do we continually need to justify the study of 'policy relevant' research by appeals to the significance of such work to the discipline?" I suppose the answer is that if you want to enlist our professional competence in something in which you are interested, then I should think you would have to appeal to our professional interests.

In this volume of 20 essays, then, seven or eight are quite worthwhile. A higher score certainly could have been achieved if the book had not got mired down in the controversy over behavioralism. It may have been useful to point to the defects in present-day political science, but the reiteration of this criticism unaccompanied by any specific remedies for these defects greatly dilutes the value of this volume.

JOHN G. GRUMM
Wesleyan University

Latin American Thought: A Historical Introduction. By Harold Eugene Davis. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1972. Pp. 269. $10.00.)

Latin American thought is very difficult to categorize, systematize, or synthesize. Few "Latin Americanists" agree on what the term "Latin American" means in a social or cultural sense. "Thought," of course, is an equally vague word. What is more, even if the subject were definable, its kaleidoscopic nature would frustrate all but the most determined. Nevertheless, these difficulties have not deterred some scholars, Latins and North Americans alike, from tackling this subject in a systematic way. In English alone, several significant attempts have appeared, including W. Rex Crawford's *A Century of Latin American Thought* (New York: Praeger, 1961), Harold Eugene Davis' *Latin American Social Thought* (Washington: The University Press of Washington, D.C., 1963), and Miguel Jorrín and John Martz's *Latin American Political Thought and Ideology* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1970). Of these, the Jorrín and Martz book is the most successful. It achieves a reasonably balanced and manageable synthesis of the material, whereas Davis (1963) is massive and undigested and Crawford is brief and, now, somewhat outdated.

Against this background Professor Davis has again sallied forth to joust with his favorite windmill. The product of his latest effort, *Latin American Thought: A Historical Introduction*, digests and partially updates the material found in *Latin American Social Thought*. While his previous volume contained extensive excerpts from the work of each of the thinkers discussed, this latest study is straight description and analysis. In a mere 239 pages, the author examines what he feels to be the major currents of Latin American thought from before the arrival of the Spaniards to the present. Starting with the pre-Conquest and colonial antecedents, he proceeds to the Age of Reason and the Independence Movements; revolutionary liberalism, utilitarianism, and traditionalism; positivism and evolutionary thought; end-of-the-century traditionalism; revolutionary and traditional twentieth-century thought; twentieth-century Marxist thought; existentialist idealism and spiritualism; and finally neo-Christian thought.

Although this book purports to be a history of the entirety of Latin American thought, its treatment of the various schools is uneven. Davis clearly is most at home in the period from the Enlightenment through the early twentieth century. His insightful discussions of the different elements of thought which emerged during this long time span are obviously based on extensive and meticulous research. His coverage of schools which preceded or followed this period is less impressive. One would have hoped, considering the tremendous impact of Iberic-Catholic thought on the Latin American mind, to have found an extensive examination of the transplantation of Tomistic-corporative thinking into the New World in the period immediately following the Conquest. This important subject is virtually ignored. More regrettable is Davis' neglect of the major trends of Latin American thought in recent decades. His coverage of the "Democratic Left," the Catholic Left, and the Marxist guerrillas is extremely sparse. The Democratic Left, for instance, is not mentioned as a category, and its two leading spokesmen, Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre and Rómulo Betancourt are discussed only as twentieth-century "Marxists." Christian Democracy is virtually ignored except in a brief section on its Chilean spokesman, Eduardo Frei Montalva. The Christian radicals, who have published prolifically in the last decade, are given a mere two paragraphs of summary attention. Finally, among the Marxist guerrilla writers, Ché Guevara is the only individual to receive any mention.

Another problem with this book centers around its thesis that "Latin American thought since independence has been revolutionary and nationalist . . ." (p. 232). Superficially this statement appears accurate; many of the most prominent thinkers of the last century-and-a-half have been revolutionaries. This thesis, however, ignores the fact that Latin American social, economic and political institutions (which must have been molded by somebody's thinking) are generally traditional and conservative in the extreme. Therefore, although the revolutionaries may have been the most vocal, they have not been the most influential. (This more complex truth is examined most skillfully in a recent article by Howard J. Wiarda, "Toward a Framework for the Study of Political Change in the Iberic-Latin Tradition: The Corporative Model" [*World Politics*, January, 1973, 206-235].) By emphasizing the more visible revolutionary thinkers and by failing to dig more deeply into Latin America's conservative, corporative roots, Davis has distorted reality.

In conclusion, this study is not recommended as a basic text for courses on Latin American thought. Not only does it ignore or underemphasize certain important bodies of material, but also it is too abbreviated and, at the same time, often too sophisticated in its use of terms to be of much value to the beginning student. It will, however, be of interest to more advanced

scholars, especially those concerned with the period from the Enlightenment to the early twentieth century.

THOMAS W. WALKER
Ohio University

The Early Growth of the European Economy: Warriors and Peasants from the Seventh to the Twelfth Century. By Georges Duby. (New York: Cornell University Press, 1974. Pp. 292. $10.00.)

Georges Duby, professor at the Collège de France, is one of the most prolific medievalists active in the world today. In this volume, rendered into excellent English from the French edition of 1973, he explores in brief but masterly fashion the "early growth of the European economy," essentially the economic history of Europe from the seventh century to approximately 1180.

Since the time of Henri Pirenne, there has been no clear and firm synthesis of the economic experiences of early medieval Europe, and much time and effort have been expended, in these past fifty years, in scholarly haggling over Pirenne's imaginative but untenable thesis. Pirenne gets short shrift in this present work (he is cited twice); Duby rather advances his own, totally independent thesis concerning the economic development of early medieval Europe.

Although neither the footnotes nor the bibliography acknowledge it, the book is deeply indebted to the researches of anthropologists into the economic behavior of primitive societies. The work reads in parts like a practical demonstration of principles expounded in Marshall Sahlins' *Stone Age Economics* (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1972). Although Duby could not have seen this last work, he surely caught wind of the ideas it proposes, in the writings of French anthropologists, especially Marcel Mauss.

"At the end of the sixth century, Europe was a profoundly uncivilized place." This, the first sentence of the book, conveys in the word "uncivilized" the essence of the thesis to follow. At least through the ninth century, Europe lived by "an economy of pillage, gift and largesse" (p. 57). What then changed this "gift economy" into the "profit-making economy" of the later Middle Ages? The architects of the new economic order were primarily the magnates, the great warrior princes and, in lesser measure, the prelates of the Church. Until the ninth century, these chiefs lived from booty, tribute and gifts. But when wars of conquest ceased after the reign of Charlemagne, they had to develop new sources of economic support. "To preserve their way of life," Duby explains, "the diminishing return from booty and tribute led magnates to stir up enthusiasm on the part of farm managers: manors had to be made to yield more." The magnates, or their farm managers, thus encouraged technological innovations and the settlement of virgin land. The peasants cooperated—there is even a chapter entitled "Peasant Conquests"—but the chief impetus to growth came from on high. "Power was the motive force behind increasing expenditure and commercial vitality."

Duby thus locates the principal stimulus for economic advance in the actions of the aristocracy. And he does not doubt that there was advance. His last chapter is entitled "take-off," by which he means the triumph of the profit-making economy, characteristic especially of the growing towns, over the primitive forms of economic behavior of the early medieval world.

Duby's work, saturated with anthropological concepts, brings us close to the society of the early Middle Ages—probably closer than any previous synthesis. Still, doubts persist about the appropriateness of the model Duby implicitly proposes. Did the magnates of the early Middle Ages become rational economic men and promoters of a productive economy when they rationally discerned that their earlier reliance on pillage was irrational? Somehow, the directions, allegedly given by the magnates to their "farm managers" to increase manorial yields, has a distinctly unprimitive ring. The manorial surveys of the early Middle Ages punctiliously list charges and services due from dependents; does this emphasis on regular rents, regularly paid, represent "an economy of pillage and largesse"? How primitive was European society in the early Middle Ages? This is the fulcrum upon which Duby's thesis tips or balances. Something surely persisted of the Roman legacy, which stressed clarity, precision, and rationality. Duby's orientation is clearly northern, rooted in Europe's newer lands, where this theory of dominant primitivism is perhaps more acceptable than it is when applied to the Mediterranean regions. Still, to his credit, he has written a book which is likely to remain for years to come a source of lively and fruitful debate.

DAVID HERLIHY
Harvard University

Compassion: Toward a Science of Value. By William Eckhardt. (Oakville, Ontario, Canada: CPRI Press, 1972. Pp. 311. $8.00, cloth; $4.00, paper.)

Every so often there is evidence of progress toward the new investigation and new statement of basic social theory. Most new theorizing deals

with institutions; some of it with humans as passive inhabitants of institutions; some of it with humans as nonpassive interactors with institutions and values, as humans and civilization develop together. Eckhardt's *Compassion* is new evidence of progress in theorizing of the third sort.

The book deals with compassion (or empathy or nonsexual love), both as an innate characteristic of our species and as a social value derived from the nature of humans. Eckhardt contrasts compassion with compulsion. pairing them with (p. 6) altruism ("loving others as well as oneself") and egoism ("satisfying oneself at the expense of others"). All this could be mere logical exercise in moral categorization, but the author does more. He brings to his analysis the research that he and others have done on the correlates between compassion as an expressed value and its manifestations in human interactions. He includes those that take place in both proximal (direct, person-to-person) and distal (attachments to people far from oneself that are mediated by those near to oneself) contexts. In addition he compares the sequence from compulsive to conformist and finally compassionate interactions to the stages of moral development that the psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg—building on Jean Piaget's foundations—has posited and researched.

Eckhardt argues that in their early stages of moral development humans are more likely to be compulsive, then conformist to external power and authority, and in their later stages compassionate. This change is a product of the interaction between the nature of humans and the social (including institutional) conditions prevailing at a particular stage of development. The interaction is not one in which humans are passive, merely conditioned responders to the environment: rather they select between alternative responses whenever the conditions are such as to permit choice.

As Eckhardt acknowledges, his case is not demonstrated by his data, and he argues that research in values will no more change those that are innate in origin than research in nuclear physics changes the nature of elementary particles. On the other hand, he also argues that people's beliefs about each other do affect their interaction. And this all raises that issue which can be disguised in supposedly neutral and scientific language but seems to pop up any way: are humans good by nature or by benefit of values acquired in society and its institutions?

The author does not very clearly deal with human good and evil. He implies what Rousseau stated: that humans are naturally good and are corrupted by society. And he asserts that, since it is human beings who have created the conditions that make them behave badly toward others, they can also recreate the conditions. These implied and asserted statements help trace the question of virtue back a step toward its origins, but they leave unresolved the issue of humans' innate or acquired goodness.

Unless a writer specifies the natural and the social (including institutional) circumstances in which people are at a particular stage of development of people-in-their-culture, I would argue that implications or assertions about human good and evil are meaningless. Humans may die if they behave with total altruism in a totally egoistic society and such a death would be neither moral nor meaningful. In such a hypothetical society, the only value and the only virtue is asocial: it is individual survival—and survival is not to be depreciated when only it is possible. An individual hospitalized with a mortal disease or injury who loses the will to live because the only real virtue is compassion, may lose his own life and therefore the later opportunity to love others.

If indeed it is natural for man, when circumstances allow him to choose, to behave *less* compulsively and egoistically and *more* compassionately and altruistically, then it may more clearly be said that it is human nature to choose to become good, or more compassionate, or more human. This is to say that the innate potential of human beings requires favorable circumstances to emerge: that other-orientation is natural but can be realized only when individual survival is assured. Eckhardt is not very clear on the organism-environment interaction, but he seems to imply that circumstances must be favorable for compassion to emerge.

On an intuitive basis, Marx—more exactly, the 28-year old Ur-Marx of the 1846 *German Ideology*—said such things. Two decades later, in the 1867 *Capital*, Marx had freed mankind from choice: the environment determined all. In our century after Marx, there has developed a boldness about research and theory on the human organism as one of the two major determinants (with the environment) of behavior. This new development is much more promising than research and theory that, following the later Marx, has accepted rather than tested the assumption that the environment—and so, tautologically, institutions—are totally determinant of human behavior.

This book on compassion is a major step toward new, surer, qualified, and quantified assertions of the sort that the Buddha, Confucius, Socrates, Aristotle, Christ, Mahomet, and Marx made intuitively about the nature of humans. In our politically critical time, it is too late to rely on intuition about human nature. We are free to continue to rely on rote ignorance and free therefore to perish with categorical and vague

imperatives. We are also a little free not to do these things.

JAMES CHOWNING DAVIES
University of Oregon

Francogallia. By François Hotman. Latin text by Ralph E. Giesey. Translated by J.H.M. Salmon. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972. Pp. xii, 581. $37.50.)

Francois Hotman was born a few years before the death of Machiavelli and died shortly after the birth of Hobbes. Although he never acquired the fame of either one, his capacities and accomplishments are noteworthy. A professor of law and one-time teacher of classical literature, Hotman, like his more celebrated near contemporaries, was very learned in ancient history and philosophy. His earliest works included a French translation of Plato's *Apology of Socrates* and a commentary on Cicero's speeches. What is more, he had a thorough grasp of the Justinian Code, of its different compilations and interpretations, and of the numerous ancient and modern commentaries on it. Prolific in his writing, Hotman devoted most of his energy to short works on Roman law and history or to disputes about political questions of the day.

All of these interests and capacities are evident in his major work, the *Francogallia*. Its basic argument derives from Hotman's interpretation of what the old French and German historians reveal about the way Francogallia was originally constituted. Convinced that it flourished so long as those original institutions were preserved, he tried to show what those institutions were and to identify the erroneous changes that had arisen over time. That task involved him in the tangles of historical interpretation and led him to burden the work with disputes about correct sources or the proper way to understand different events. Nonetheless, his basic contentions stand forth clearly: from earliest times there is abundant evidence to prove it was never intended that the kings of Francogallia should have unlimited powers; only tyrants have unlimited powers; kings, appointed by the people, should always be responsible to the people and strive to provide for the well-being of the people.

Hotman's book may be divided into three major parts. If the chapter division of the 1573 edition is followed (see "Editors' Preface," p. xi and "Editors' Introduction," sections 7-11), the first part includes chapters 1-5. In these chapters, Hotman gave a brief history of Gaul before its subjugation by the Romans, destroyed the fables which portrayed the Franks as descendants of Trojan warriors by showing why they must have originated in "that swampy region along the coast between the mouths of the Elbe and the Rhine," and explained that they were dubbed "Franks" because their contemporaries considered them to be free men. The second part explains the original institutions and fundamental laws of Francogallia (chapters 6-11) and accounts for the changes which occurred to these institutions and laws under the Carolingians (chapters 12-15) and the Capetians (chapters 16-18). Referring to chronicles and philosophers, Hotman argued passionately that originally there was no hereditary monarchy, that the people elected and deposed kings, and that the regime was basically a mixed polity in which the king shared powers and duties with councils of commoners and nobles. The last two chapters identify two evil practices which gave rise to what Hotman considered great injustices in his own time. As a remedy, he argued that women should be excluded from royal office and that the legal chicanery practiced in the swollen parliamentary courts should be stifled by turning away from superstitious allegiance to the edicts of the court of Rome and by consulting Scripture with one's own natural reason as a guide.

The basic simplicity of the argument is obscured only by Hotman's constant reliance on citations. No aspect of written knowledge seems to have escaped his notice. References to ancient historians—Herodotus, Polybius, Caesar, Livy, Josephus, Plutarch, and Tacitus—abound, as do passages from Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle, St. Augustine, and Marsilius. In addition, Hotman frequently buttressed a point by citing poets and orators such as Homer, Ovid, Isocrates, and Quintilian. And he seems to have been equally familiar with more recondite sources: he drew heavily on jurists and historians of the middle ages or of his own time, as well as on humanists and legal compilations, in order to make his arguments. There is scarcely a page of his book which is not laden with learned references.

While such erudition inspires a certain kind of respect, it is not without its problems. The numerous references sometimes obscure the basic argument and frequently prompt the reader to become careless. Because they are so numerous and apparently repetitious, it is easy to overlook comparing them with one another or with the original text. Similarly, the reader may neglect to think about the relationship between the reference and the principal argument. Above all, the sheer quantity of the references induces the reader to consider them all as equal. When these tendencies are checked, the vague outlines of a greater depth to Hotman's book may be discerned.

For example, in the dedication to this book published in Geneva, the Frenchman, François Hotman, sought to persuade Frederick III,

elector palatine of the Roman Empire, that love for one's fatherland was good and praiseworthy. After acknowledging that the reflections of philosophy and the bitter truths of practical experience argued against patriotism, Hotman rested his case on the feelings stirred by poetic verse. France, suffering from evils of tyranny which had to be quenched like flames, was to be succored by Hotman's portrayal of the way Francogallia was originally constituted. Frederick and other readers, already softened by poetic persuasion, were expected to identify the ancient order of things with the natural order and to recognize that the ancient and natural were unquestionably good.

The presence of equally rhetorical arguments throughout the book, in the form of distorted quotations or erroneous narrations of events, suggests that Hotman's argument is not as simplistic as it first appears. Two questions then become urgent: first, why did Hotman try to base his argument on an identification of the ancient as the good rather than argue against unlimited monarchy on other grounds; and secondly, what is the basis for Hotman's devotion to popular sovereignty and his opposition to absolute monarchy? To arrive at a correct appreciation of the book's merit, one would have to examine these questions.

With the publication of this volume by Professors Giesey and Salmon, such an undertaking is now feasible. The different editions of the work have been carefully collated, and the changes noted. All of Hotman's references are identified and some of his distortions indicated. Except for a habit of speaking of "constitution" when Hotman speaks of "institutions" or of "state" (as in "state of being," i.e., *status*) and a tendency to be somewhat more reserved than the original, Salmon's translation is excellent. A thorough essay on Hotman and the *Francogallia* precedes the text. Unfortunately, the essay is directed almost exclusively to the specialist schooled in the history of the period and thus fails to address itself to a critical assessment of Hotman's contribution. Nonetheless, if Hotman's standing in the republic of letters is ever to be reconsidered, this praiseworthy volume will be an invaluable document.

CHARLES E. BUTTERWORTH
University of Maryland

Functionaries. By F. William Howton. (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, Inc., 1969. Pp. 268. $2.95, paper.)

Professor F. William Howton, a sociologist, has written a book which focuses on the processes of functionalization within contemporary organizations and a new social type, i.e., the functionary, which these processes have created. By functionalization, Howton means "the process by which the division of labor within an organization becomes progressively rationalized" (p. 9). The functionary is a new kind of man who is found in the middle and upper ranks of public, private, and voluntary organizations. In his role as a functionary, the individual knows no bounds. "The only limits he knows come from the rationality applied to the choice and use of means in relation to a given end . . ." (p. 5). He is not concerned with the content or the ends of his work. His ethic is the Functional Ethic, and this ethic may dehumanize him. Large organizations and modern technology, however, have made the functionary a necessary social type that is pervasive in contemporary society.

In his attempts to characterize the functionary and to develop a theory of functionalization, Howton describes the functionary abstractly as being (1) an organization man, (2) ubiquitous, (3) prototypic, and (4) new elitist. The functionary is an organization man because he is "the organization's creature and at the same time part of its apparatus . . ." (p. 23). He is part of both the conscience and the brain of the organization. The functionary is ubiquitous because the organization of work in modern society tends to accept large-scale efficiency as the overriding value. The large production organization where tasks and duties are differentiated functionally is the dominant type, and the functionary operates within it everywhere. The functionary is prototypic because "his occupational type has become a pattern and a mold for all other occupations . . ." (p. 26). In an earlier period, the entrepreneur was the model; today, virtually every occupation looks to the functionary as the model. Functionaries have become new elitist because of their prestigious place in society. Those in large organizations also become leaders outside of the organization because of the influence of the organization.

Howton develops his theory by identifying functionaries and analyzing the processes of functionalization in the military, government, business, and voluntary associations. Howton suggests that functionalization is becoming the dominant force in all of these categories of organizations. The military man, for example, is close to the ideal functionary because his organizational acts have nothing to do with his individual goals and he is relatively unhampered by cultural norms and values. Howton contends that in government, functionalization is also becoming more prevalent and is the result of a

cultural invasion carried on by people entering government who are already imbued with its logic and who are ready to install its substance. In business, functionalization is the prevailing logic in modern industry, and commerce, which once lagged behind industry in organizational development, is now becoming more and more functionalized—particularly with the development of large chain department stores and supermarkets. In the services industry where the self-employed craftsman is still utilized, a burgeoning technology and the need for greater capital investment means that functionalization will ultimately take place. In voluntary associations, functionalization has also taken place as leaders gradually relinquish or share their maintenance, action, intelligence and command functions with evolving functionaries.

Howton includes an excellent case study of a prison which focuses on the struggle of corrections officers to maintain their positions in the face of pressures from rehabilitationists, i.e., professional staff personnel, and inmates. The corrections officers use a variety of techniques—e.g., uniforms, bureaucratization in communication, and bargaining—to maintain themselves in their functional roles. Overall, the corrections officer is conservative and tends to resist change. Howton concludes that the corrections officer may actually be classified as a subfunctionary because he is subjected to peer as well as official discipline and because of the absence of a clear reason for being for the prison, i.e., the unresolved conflict between the custodial and rehabilitation approaches. He reaches up, however, to influence the true functionary above him and this influence is likely to be conservative.

Howton saves for his final chapter his description of the functionary in total institutions and in extreme situations. By total institutions, Howton means institutions which operate on the basis of functional rationality and treat substantive rationality as a remote factor when considering any kind of action. By extreme situations, he means a situation in which an individual is under surveillance and under pressure to accept a role which he or she considers degrading. In their classic form, extreme situations also involve the de-legalization and de-moralization of functionary-inmate relationships. Howton argues that society is gradually creating more extreme situations, and empirical examples include concentration camps, mental hospitals, ineffective states, i.e., where individuals are subjected to guerrillas and vigilantes, totalitarian states, genocide and the threat of thermo-nuclear war.

Howton is not optimistic. He concludes that "total institutions occur in nontotalitarian social structures, and that extreme situations are not confined to total institutions" (p. 244). Moreover, he states that it is not aberrant groups, institutional breakdowns, or criminal functionaries that produce extreme situations, but rather the very success of our functional institutions. The functionary is merely following the logic of the scientific technique, the norm of efficiency and a concept of duty. Howton asserts that there is no real answer to the paradox of being threatened by the success of functional rationality. But he does suggest that total institutions and extreme situations are bound up in a cult of technology which we mistakenly call science.

What is to be done? Howton suggests that man must continue to struggle for a better world and "catch a vision of a larger goal" (p. 249). One way to do this perhaps is to continue to study the behavior of formal organizations. A better understanding of professionalization, the structure and climate of organizational innovation, relationships between organizations and their environments and internal organizational conflict may enable scholars and organizational designers gradually to develop organizations in which managers and decision makers are subjected to a variety of nonfunctional as well as functional influences. With a more diverse set of influences, managers at all levels may be able to catch the vision of larger goals, e.g., those of society and of the role of the organization within society. Professor Howton's description of the pervasive dangers of functionalization leaves us with no choice except to try.

LLOYD A. ROWE
Indiana University, Northwest

The Rich, the Well Born and the Powerful: Elites and Upper Classes in History. Edited by Frederic C. Jaher. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1973. Pp. 377. $15.00.)

This book is a collection of twelve papers on elites. The discussion ranges from classical Athens and the aristocrats of Rome to Renaissance Florence and Elizabethan London. We learn intriguing facts about eighteenth century Rumania, Tsarist Russia, Victorian aristocracy, and the Chilean upper class of the early twentieth century. Papers specifically devoted to the United States focus on New York high society at the turn of the century, on Metropolitan elites of the Midwest, and on the New Deal intellectual elite of the 'thirties—of particular current interest for its efforts to come to terms with problems of growth and equality.

Clearly there is something here for everyone interested in this seemingly timeless topic, as

fascinating as it is elusive. Given such a wide range of topics, however, it is not surprising that the book is uneven, alternately too narrow and too ambitious.

In the preface, the editor states the goal of the volume to be the "analysis of the structure and strategy, tactics and thought, of groups in the upper orders of society" (p. 1) and a documentation of "the religious, familial, military, social, and economic aspects of hegemonic groups" (p. 4). A further aim is to trace the course of the rise and decline of particular elites. Admittedly the editor does not claim that the volume achieves these diverse goals and frankly concedes that the "varied categories that integrate these essays do not coalesce into a general conception of the upper strata" (p. 5). Nonetheless he considers them to constitute a potential basis for building theories in the future.

My own feeling is that the difference between description and generalization is not so easily bridged and is not ultimately one of fact but of attitude. Had the authors been urged to look for general principles to help construct a general comparative framework, these essays could have been most helpful. As they stand, however, they are independent of one another and any generalization depends on the reader's own skill. Not having been asked either to raise or to answer the same sorts of questions about the elite or the upper class they sought to portray, each author proceeded to select whatever problem appealed to him. The result is a profusion of ideas and conclusions with little affinity between them.

Part of the problem lies in the absence of consensus even on elementary definitions. Many terms either are not defined or are defined inconsistently, and the proposed distinction between elites and upper classes on the basis of specialized function and range of impact is not very satisfactory. In my view, each of these terms designates a different form of social supremacy in a different historic era.

Substantively, these essays are extremely instructive, showing that our modern dilemmas are very old indeed. The ancient Greeks, for example, well knew the contradiction between the principle of equality before the law and actual economic and political inequalities, struggling with it no more successfully than we are doing, but their proposed remedies are worth pondering (Robin Seager's essay, pp. 7-26).

Given the history of elites in the past two thousand years, there seem to be only two possible stands for societies to take. One stresses the desirability or at least the necessity of elites and institutionalizes attitudes of privilege, deference, work, and responsibility accordingly. The other stresses elites as unpleasant and unwelcome facts of life needing to be circumvented and opposed. Each ideology seems plausible to its adherents and the prevalence of the one or the other must be sought in the characteristics of the social system defending it.

These essays illustrate the two ideological postures clearly. There is Greece, for example, trying, like our own society, to reconcile its democratic ethos with its pervasive inequalities. Rome, on the other hand, exemplifies a less tortuous appreciation of social superiority. This is evident in its acknowledgment of an aristocrat as "a man of superior character, one of the best men in society, deserving of preferential treatment (Richard E. Mitchell, p. 50).

Another familiar theme emerging in these essays concerns the exclusiveness of elites, their social composition and accessibility, depending on the degree of societal complexity. Elites will generally be more open to talent, merit, and previously excluded social groups when their activities and responsibilities are growing in number and diversity. Stability and continuity, on the other hand, make for more restricted patterns of recruitment. Patterns of recruitment, no matter what the rhetoric, are thus tied to pervasive social forces.

One of the most interesting essays in the book concerns the example of an elite in Renaissance Florence which laid claim to public charity because of the discrepancy between its living standards and its actual resources. Here is a perfect illustration of relative deprivation being used to justify public handouts, poverty having been defined not by objective need but by personal appetite (Richard C. Trexler, pp. 64-109).

Three of the essays, two of them dealing with Russia, hold a special interest for those concerned with social leadership in developing or modernizing societies. One (David L. Ransel, pp. 154-178) concerns the civil service nobility of eighteenth-century Russia and its struggle to come to terms with the new ideals of legality and rational order while continuing to be organized along traditional lines of personal relations and patronage. The other (John P. McKay, pp. 179-202) describes the rivalry between foreign and Russian business elites over important aspects of economic development in the nineteenth century. This case study challenges a number of favorite assumptions about the inevitable dominance of economic elites or the emergence of a super-elite to coordinate others. The third essay (Paul W. Drake, pp. 304-337) focuses on the flexibility and accommodations made by the Chilean upper class to its country's efforts at modernization and provides an important background to the recent history of that country.

Elites are not only select but also tenacious

minorities. The British aristocracy, for example, continued to exert power and influence far into the industrial era with which its ideals and mode of operation would have seemed to be at odds. In a splendid essay, judiciously blending facts and theory, Walter L. Arnstein (pp. 203-257) dissects this process in Britain.

Finally, for those reworking the Woman Question, female domination in high society deserves mention as a generally neglected aspect of female power (Frederic Cople Jaher, p. 284).

In short, most of the essays are intrinsically interesting as separate pieces. Despite their diversity, however, some themes emerge as common to a number of elites, and these would have lent themselves to provisional attempts at synthesis, Such a synthesis, perhaps the key lack in the field of elite studies, would seem to be an important next step for an understanding of leadership and control in human societies.

SUZANNE KELLER
Princeton University

Attribution: Perceiving the Causes of Behavior. Edited by Edward E. Jones, David E. Kanouse, Harold H. Kelley, Richard E. Nisbett, Stuart Valins, and Bernard Weiner. (Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Press, 1972. Pp. 186. $8.95.)

Edward E. Jones and his co-editors have brought together in this book nine original contributions to the field of attribution studies. Attribution studies are a fairly recent addition to the general area of cognitive and social psychology. While some of the key concepts can be traced back to very early writings, most of the theoretical and empirical work dates from the last two decades. Attribution studies and attribution theory are now sufficiently developed so that they can stimulate and can contribute substantively to the investigations in other disciplines. The present volume is a well-written introduction to the field and can be warmly recommended to political scientists. Students of political behavior, in particular, will find attribution theory of considerable interest.

Attribution studies investigate the cognitive processes intervening between information and attribution. "Attribution," of course, is a fairly ambiguous term. Most often the reference is to *causal* attribution: To whom or to what do we attribute the causality of some event? But attribution studies also consider other matters: "Attribution theory is usually described as the process [sic] by which people form causal interpretations of the events around them. The theory applies more generally, however, to the process whereby people attribute characteristics, intentions, feelings, and traits to objects in their social world (p. 47).

Most broadly stated, attribution theory deals with the question of "how the person arrives at his answer to the question 'Why?' " (p. 1). Just how widely attribution analysis ranges can be seen by this list of concerns:

> How do individuals integrate conflicting evidence in forming impressions of others? How do we account for our own successes and failures? How do verbal habits help to mediate generalizations from specific behavioral instances? How does the setting influence the subjective meaning of emotional experience? How do group members impute to one another motives of friendly cooperation rather than, . . . aggressive competition? How do we allocate responsibility for an action between the actor and his environment? What are some of the consequences of believing that a person is or is not responsible for a particular event? (p. ix)

Clearly, the interests of attribution analysis range as far as most of cognitive and social psychology. Attribution theory is not defined by a unique subject matter, but by a particular approach.

One of the best supported propositions of attribution theory is the *covariation principle*: when there are several plausible alternative causes, the effect will be attributed to the one with which it most strongly and most regularly covaries over time (p. 3). This may seem obvious, but it is obvious only insofar as everything seems obvious once it has been discovered. The covariation principle receives modification and specification via a number of auxiliary propositions, for example, the principle of the optimal time interval (p. 7), and the discounting principle (". . . the role of a given cause in producing a given effect is discounted if other plausible causes are also present") (p. 8).

An example will help to move the discussion from the abstract to the concrete. An experiment done by Thibaut and Riecken investigated the attribution of an effect to *internal* or *external* causes. Experimental subjects had to persuade two other persons (confederates of the experimenters) to aid them in a task. One of these persons was identified as having higher status, the other as having lower status than the subject. After compliance had been obtained, the subjects were asked "whether each person complied because he wanted to (internal cause) or because he had been forced or pressured to (external cause). The results were quite clear. A large majority of the subjects attributed the high-status person's compliance to an internal cause and the low-status person's compliance to an external cause" (p. 8). In the case of the high-status person, the subject's power over the other person was rejected as cause, given that another plausible cause was available. Not surprisingly,

the compliant high-status person also was liked better than the compliant low-status person.

The available space does not permit a systematic review of the numerous principles of attribution theory and of the experiments and observations from which these principles have been derived. A few matters of particular interest to political scientists can be singled out, however.

Persons often have to form single, overall evaluations of complex and diverse entities. In addition, such evaluations may have to be ranked comparatively. Candidates for political office are a case in point. How do people assess information about the diverse aspects of a candidate in order to form an overall evaluation of him? A relevant attribution proposition is the *principle of negativity*, which asserts that people weight the negative aspects of a subject more heavily than the positive aspects (p. 47). Without going into the technical details of this principle and its modifiers, it can be seen that here is a possible theoretical framework for the systematic investigation of an important political "folk wisdom": that voters do not generally reward office holders for their good deeds, but punish them for their bad ones.

One (unnamed) principle of attribution theory has interesting implications for the relationship between office holders and their constituents. The principle holds that ". . . there is a pervasive tendency for actors to attribute their actions to situational requirements, whereas observers tend to attribute the same actions to stable personal dispositions" (p. 80). As Jones and Nisbet note, leaders are more likely to attribute their actions to the requirements of the situation, to role limitations, to conflicting pressures brought to bear on them, etc.; followers, by contrast, a more likely to attribute these actions to the character and ability of leaders (pp. 79-80). Leaders situationalize; the public personalizes. No wonder the explanations of the leader and the accusations of the public appear to be rationalizations or misjudgments to the other party!

Among the limitations of this approach, two issues stand out: First, to this date, the larger part of attribution work has consisted of reinterpretations of experiments done for other purposes and under the guidance of different theories. Reinterpretation is cheaper and less time-consuming, and it cannot be faulted in principle. Heavy reliance upon reinterpretation, and, sometimes, simple renaming, weakens the evidentiary standing of attribution theory. It would be helpful if more specifically designed studies could be undertaken.

Second, in encountering the covariation principle (above), the reader will have been quick to remind himself that "correlation is not causality." It is true that attribution theory does not deal with causality as such, but only with perceptions of causality, the empirical truth of which is not of primary significance. Nevertheless, attribution theorists would seem well advised to give some attention to general epistemological discussions of causality. An examination of such volumes as Daniel Lerner's *Cause and Effect* and Mario Bunge's *Causality* is likely to produce solid benefits for the analysis of perceptions and attributions of causality.

PETER W. SPERLICH
University of California, Berkeley

Economic Methods and the Effectiveness of Production. By E. G. Liberman. (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1973. Pp. 240. $1.95.)

For the student of political systems, this little book by the most publicized (in the West) of contemporary Soviet economists carries a forceful message, albeit mostly between the lines, despite its apparent concern only with narrowly economic problems and theorizing. Published in the original Russian version exactly five years after the announcement of the Soviet economic reform of late 1965, Liberman's book is a product of the particular moment of its appearance and of its author's place in the pre-history of the Reform. It will be recalled that in September 1962, Liberman published in *Pravda* his now famous article calling for substantial loosening of the rigid Soviet economic mechanism. The Reform followed his prescription, but mostly in principle; in its specifics it deviated a good deal from his (rather vague) proposals, usually in a "conservative" direction. In its execution, the Reform proved to be even more conservative, while subsequent measures have all but returned Soviet economic institutions to the *status quo ante*. To my mind, this trend is not surprising; the 1965 Reform set up an institutional halfway (eighth-way?) house that had little chance of economic viability. Political realities dictated reversion to the traditional command economy rather than resolution of the impasse by a far-reaching "marketization" (as in Hungary in 1958).

In the present book, Liberman hails the 1965 Reform as a step in the right direction, but argues at length that it is too small to solve many of the pressing economic problems. He calls for considerably greater devolution of power from the center to the individual firm, a more flexible price system, and an end to an economy of widespread shortages (i.e., balancing "aggre-

gate demand" and "aggregate supply," in Western terminology). The proposals are not presented with the degree of precision and rigor that would allow an outside observer to appraise them properly, but one has the impression that they are not fully internally consistent and partake of the quality of partial measures. Hence, their viability, too, is in serious doubt. (It is difficult to know to what extent censorship is to blame for the weaknesses in the model.)

In any case, by 1970, time was already marching backward, as noted. Liberman's proposals stood little chance of adoption, fundamentally because they strike at two of the three political pillars on which the Soviet economic system rests (apart from state ownership of the means of production). One is the excess of aggregate demand over aggregate supply (a *political* premise because it derives at once from the goals of the regime and the realities of the intra-leadership struggle). The second is the monopoly of rule by the Party's *apparat*, whose powers and day-to-day functions would be undermined by the alleviation of the very problems Liberman seeks to solve. Not unexpectedly, the Party is hardly mentioned in the book. Only in the case of the third pillar—reliance on pecuniary incentives to elicit the individual's compliance and performance—is Liberman's position in tune with the official line. Yet he would couple his force with a more efficient mechanism than is politically acceptable at this juncture.

The book is supplied with a helpful translator's foreword, an "ideologically correct" author's special preface to the American edition, a glossary, and no index. Alas, translating Soviet social science (especially economics) is a horrid undertaking. My sympathy is very much with the translator. Many Soviet economic terms cannot be easily rendered into English. But one should try harder than has been done in this instance. While the glossary is most welcome, it should be several times as long. What is worse, the English is quite awkward throughout. One fears than an American economist (let alone, noneconomist) will find it difficult to follow this translation. For instance, while in Marxist usage the word "commodity" (not in the glossary) has a specific meaning, what could be "commodity acts" (p. 55)? In fact, translation problems begin with the very title. Liberman's title in its Russian version (a more accurate English translation would be "Raising the Efficiency of the Soviet Economy by Increasing the Firm's Autonomy") asserts clearly and forcefully the book's message: *viz.*, that economic methods (incentives, prices, etc.), rather than administrative directives, should be used to raise the *efficiency* (not "effectiveness"!) of the Soviet economy. Would the English language reader have grasped this from the translated title?

GREGORY GROSSMAN
University of California, Berkeley

The Higher Realism of Woodrow Wilson and Other Essays. By Arthur S. Link. (Nashville, Tenn.: Vanderbilt University Press, 1971. Pp. 425. $12.95.)

Woodrow Wilson holds a special place in the minds of political scientists; he was after all one of us—a teacher of politics who went on to shape the politics of the nation. The story is, of course, well known about Wilson, the political scientist who authored a dozen books on national politics, helped to found APSA, served as the academic reformer while President of Princeton University and innovator in the fields of economic regulation and international cooperation after reaching the summit of his career, the Presidency of the United States.

Professor Arthur S. Link has spent a lifetime writing about Wilson's career and its impact on American politics and history, and is currently directing the monumental task of compiling the complete documentary history of Wilson's life in a projected forty-volume series, *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, the first nine of which have been published by Princeton University Press. Dr. Link's latest book, *The Higher Realism of Woodrow Wilson*, consists of an important collection of 24 essays that previously have appeared in scholarly journals over the last 30 years.

The essays are useful chiefly to students of early twentieth-century American political history since most explore various fascinating and controversial aspects of Wilson's intellectual development and political career. For instance, the first essay, "Woodrow Wilson and His Presbyterian Inheritance," treats the profound impact of his early religious training on his later political orientation. Another, "Woodrow Wilson and the Democratic Party," demonstrates how, once elected President, Wilson gained legislative support for his New Freedom programs by strengthening local conservative party factions through the vigorous use of presidential patronage. "Woodrow Wilson: The American Southerner" is an interesting account of Wilson's intellectual evolution from an ardent American nationalist to his later discovery of his own southern roots and regional identification.

Nearly a quarter of the essays explore aspects of the 1912 presidential campaign, especially from the perspective of how the winning candidate's strategies forged together the progressive Democratic coalitions in various southern states.

"The Negro as a Factor in the Campaign of 1912" provides useful insight into the role of blacks in that election. Link's thesis is that blacks distrusted both lily-white movement of Roosevelt's progressive Republican faction and Wilson's progressive southern coalition, and, on balance, they voted with traditional Taft Republicans.

Several essays in this collection were written as responses in historiographic debates. "The Case for Woodrow Wilson" challenges the methods, evidence, and conclusions of Sigmund Freud's and William Bullitt's controversial psychological study, *Thomas Woodrow Wilson* (1967). In the end, Link contends, their book says more about its authors than their subject. Also, Professor Link's classic essay, "What Happened to the Progressive Movement in the 1920's?" is included in this collection. Contrary to many older historians, Link finds that progressive vitality survived in various subtle ways in America throughout the 1920s. "Wilson and the Ordeal of Neutrality" and "Woodrow Wilson and Peace Moves" challenges the conventional wisdom about Wilsonian moralism in diplomacy by providing a valuable assessment of Wilson's techniques, successes, and failures in dealing with international problems.

In the best sense, this book of essays is a personal statement by a great professional American historian reflecting a lifetime effort at grappling with a number of central themes and problems in early twentieth-century American history. Granted, there are blanks in the total coverage of Link's essays about Wilson's life. For example, little attention is devoted to analyzing Wilson's academic writing, or his domestic programs of the first term, or his classic rivalry with Senator Lodge. Nevertheless, one notes with pleasure Link's clear prose style, his creative process of analysis, and his careful study of the factual data. Also one can observe the subtle transition of Link's own views about Wilson between his early essays written in the mid-1940s and later ones published by Link in the late 1960s.

If there is a major weakness in the book, it is in the central essay that serves as the theme of the book, "The Higher Realism of Woodrow Wilson." "The Higher Realism" sets forth the argument that Wilson was a "a supreme realist" throughout his public career. While provocative and inventive in his arguments, Dr. Link somehow works too hard at trying to convince us that white is black and that we should really stretch our definition of the term "realist" in order to fit the facts of Wilson's life. These arguments just don't "wash" and leave at least this reader puzzled—why all the effort expended in this direction? In our post-Watergate environment, should not Americans, like Diogenes, delight in finding a few models of integrity, honesty, and idealism in the political past? It seems odd indeed that Dr. Link's years of careful scholarship has found amoralism one of Wilson's more appealing and enduring qualities.

RICHARD J. STILLMAN II
California State College, Bakersfield

Rules for Radicals: A Pragmatic Primer for Realistic Radicals. By Saul D. Alinsky. (New York: Random House, 1971. Pp. 196. $6.95.)

How People Get Power: Organizing Oppressed Communities for Action. By Si Kahn. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1970. Pp. 128. $2.45.)

Action for a Change: A Student's Manual for Public Interest Organizing. By Ralph Nader and Donald Ross. (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1971. Pp. 118. $1.35.)

Winning Elections: A Handbook in Participatory Politics. By Dick Simpson. (Chicago: The Swallow Press, Inc., 1972. Pp. 194. $6.00.)

Political Action: A Practical Guide to Movement Politics. By Michael Walzer. (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971. Pp. 125. $1.95.)

"New politics," with its surge of populist sentiment, has spawned a myriad of new left guides to political organizing. The five guides reviewed here are illustrative of this genre. They address slightly different audiences and problems of organization, but have some common themes and shortcomings.

Saul Alinsky's *Rules for Radicals* is the most important of the five guides. Alinsky's thoughts on social change have influenced several generations of organizers. The book is written for people who want to follow in Alinsky's footsteps and become full-time community organizers. Alinsky addresses himself to the problem of creating mass multiple issue organizations which can seize community power. Alinsky is often portrayed as Machiavelli for the masses, writing primers not for princes but for paupers, telling them how to take power away from the Haves. But Alinsky is not writing for the Have-Nots, he is writing for their organizers, telling them how to stimulate the Have-Nots to do the job. Rather than being a primer for the powerless, the book is a primer for their consultants.

The book has many similarities to Alinsky's earlier *Reveille for Radicals.* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946). In both books organizers are urged to promote conflict as a way of building powerful organizations which can then create an open society with a more equitable distribution of resources. Attention is given to problems of leadership, communication, programs, and tactics. Alinsky once again shows his

skill in formulating aphorisms such as "The means-and-end moralists or non-doers always wind up on their ends without any means" (p. 25). Both books are conversations, not treatises. They reveal Alinsky the activist who can philosophize about his actions and the advocate who chooses to concentrate not on logical clarity but on generating commitment.

The current book, however, has a new tone which is signaled in the subtitle. The earlier book directed its attack at liberals and unions who were squeamish about action and the use of power. In the current book Alinsky challenges young revolutionaries' romantic illusions about how to change the system. Alinsky asserts that it is necessary to work within the system, choose flexible tactics, compromise, and avoid rigid dogma. He stresses the need for continuity in organizing efforts and warns against visions of instant revolution with the accompanying dramatics of infantile rejection and rhetoric. More attention is given to defending the values of equality, justice, and freedom, and our system of democracy as the best means of achieving these ends. This less radical Alinsky drops earlier references to people's owning the means of production and urges us not to forget that "in our system with all its oppressions we can still speak out and denounce the administration, attack its policies, work to build an opposition political base" and this cannot be done in Moscow, Peking, or Havana (p. xxi).

An active organizer since the 1930s and a key influence on the "new politics," Alinsky was an anathema both to Marxist revolutionaries who saw him as accommodationist and to many democrats who saw him as a threat to the system. Nevertheless, this current book shows his intellectual breadth. He raises philosophical issues about the nature of social change and ideology and the relation of ends and means, and links his experiences and ideas with others in different countries and historical periods.

Michael Walzer's book, *Political Action,* like Alinsky's may be of general interest to students of social change. The book is written to tell amateur activists, not Alinsky's organizers, how to create political movements by dramatizing single issues via pressure or electoral politics. Walzer traces the process chronologically beginning with crises which stimulate action, then choices of strategies, defining issues, building support, and designing organizational structures.

Many of the substantive suggestions are similar to Alinsky's: build a constituency by starting where the people are and staying within their experience; choose tactics pragmatically. And Walzer, like Alinsky, is committed to change within the democratic system, rejecting sectarian militants with their fantasies of instant revolution. But Walzer is basically writing for upper-middle-class activists about organizing their peers. For Walzer the search for a constituency basically means appealing to one's own group and then moving outward to form coalitions. The model is the civil-rights and peace movements. Walzer leaves out specific illustrations from his own experience on the grounds that they are "of little interest except to fellow participants" (p. 9). But the generalizations would be more useful if the reader knew the contexts which generated them and thus could better judge their applicability to other contexts.

The book is best understood as the confessions of a converted political theorist, an analyst lured into action. It is spare, clear, and insightful. The author makes interesting observations on the personalities, personal relations, psychological rewards, and conduct of meetings in movement politics. For example, he explores the special role that women have played in citizen politics and notes that the failure of women to assume leadership positions often leaves the movement "rootless, the ideological tool and sometimes the plaything of marginal men" (p. 67). Similarly interesting is his strong critique of the arrogance of organizers who bypass existing leaders of the working-class community because the organizers mistakenly assume "they have some message to deliver that has never yet been thought of" (p. 31).

Walzer provides a cautious, modest defense of movement politics as a feasible and important counterbalance in a society dominated by professionals. He is a relatively realistic advocate of amateur activism and the value of capitalizing on people's periodic sense of outrage to nudge the system toward reform. Questions about the results of movement politics are not addressed, and little attempt is made to place ideas in historical perspective or to link them with other approaches to social change.

The other guides reviewed here are less philosophical than Alinsky's and Walzer's. Si Kahn's book, *How People Get Power,* is written for professional organizers and describes the application of Alinsky-like techniques in activating broadly based poor-people's organizations in the rural South to participate in politics. Kahn stresses the use of a wide range of tactics and the increasing importance of economic, political, and violent tactics for gaining power. He urges organizers to vary their tactics depending on the nature of the problems they are attacking. For example, if the problem is redistributing resources which exist in the area, then power tactics can work. If on the other hand, the problem is the absence of resources in the area, then self-help tactics are the ones to use. Kahn does not claim that his kind of organizing will

bring about reform in the national political system. But he is less explicit than the other authors about the kind of reform he wants. He sees the process of organizing for action as an end in itself, one which "brings hope to the people" (p. 124). The book does not get beyond fairly simplistic rhetoric and leaves out questions such as who pays the organizers, but it is a thought provoking compilation of the conventional wisdom of community organizers and some interesting examples of rural organizing.

Ralph Nader and Donald Ross's book, *Action for Change*, is written for student amateur activists. The authors argue that students should organize to hire professional staffs to do public interest research as a prelude to pressure politics. They think that current problems cannot be solved simply by more dramatization and direct citizen action. Solutions are necessarily complex and thus research and expertise are also needed. Amateurs must be supplemented by professionals. Walzer assumes that amateurs will obtain money to hire supporting staff, but Nader and Ross observe that this does not occur automatically. They suggest a vehicle by which the necessary funds and staff can be provided. This vehicle is a Public Interest Research Group (PIRG) which is funded by student contributions. The authors suggest ways of organizing PIRGs, their structures, support, and operation. They describe public interest projects which might be undertaken such as studies of property taxes, occupational safety and health, employment discrimination, and environmental and consumer issues. The narrow topic of the book allows the authors to provide many specific examples which will be helpful to those interested in PIRGs such as the evidence from PIRGs in Oregon and Minnesota. But the book does not provide any perspective on how this type of organizing fits into recurrent reform efforts, though readers will hopefully note the middle-class good government orientation so typical of earlier reform movements, and thus raise questions about who benefits and who loses from such efforts.

Dick Simpson's book, *Winning Elections* tells amateur activists how to succeed in electoral politics. What makes this book fit into the category of "new politics" is that Simpson is talking about independent campaigns which are not linked with existing political parties. The handbook is based on his experiences in organizing the Independent Precinct Organization on the north side of Chicago and becoming a successful candidate himself. It is crammed full of examples and useful samples of election material including flyers and guidelines for workers such as "What Every Great Coffee Chairman Has to Know." The book is also a ready-made course in practical politics with exercises at the end of each chapter, cross-references to audio-visual material, and an excellent annotated bibliography. Simpson argues that new participatory politics differs from old politics because it focuses on issues, on candidates free of control by bosses, and on volunteer workers, rather than patronage workers or expensive public relations campaigns. This distinction may be clear in Chicago but it is less clear in other settings. Independent campaigns may not be nearly as different from party campaigns as Simpson would like to have us believe. In states with a strong nonpartisan tradition like California the distinction is hard to maintain and campaigns may stress, for example, both strong volunteer precinct organizations and expensive public relations campaigns. But Simpson believes that "new politics" at the local level will mobilize new constituencies of conscience and elect new leaders who will eventually reform the national political system. His assertion that outstanding political leaders must be outstanding people is an example of the faith pervading this guide—a faith that may strike some readers as naive.

A review of these five guides reveals some common themes. They all stress the process of organizing and assume that the purpose is clear. Insofar as they discuss purpose, they all share the nebulous goal of giving "power to the people" to create a better society characterized by more equitable distribution of resources, more justice, less oppression, more open decision making, and more representative institutions. The implication is that we know what is needed, and the problem is organizing to achieve that goal. One marvels at the authors' certainty about the content of the public interest.

The guides also share a uniformly optimistic view of human nature. The authors believe that the majority of people in the United States, the Have-Nots and the Have-A-Littles, have a common interest in redistribution and are capable of perceiving and acting upon that interest when properly organized. Thus the authors give little attention to the possibility that their tactics will be used by Have-Nots and Have-A-Littles who do not share that goal. Only Alinsky's book seems to be seriously concerned with the problem of backlash—the possibility that police, hard hats, and firefighter groups will organize to oppose redistribution. Alinsky describes his efforts to organize lower-middle-class groups. He, like Karl Lamb and others, sees them as potentially a liberal force. In spite of the optimism about human nature, all the authors acknowledge at least implicitly, that it is

necessary to organize in order to educate people to their true interests (and all of them would probably deny that organization involves manipulation).

How useful are the five books for activists or teachers of activists? As guides go, they are useful, but guides are inherently limited. They generalize from specifics to increase applicability, but the resulting generalizations often seem like mere common sense and are only useful if the reader exercises initiative and judgment in applying them to specific situations. The awful truth is that "how-to-do-it" guides to organizing cannot tell the reader how to organize. But if one has modest expectations, these guides can give the reader encouragement by showing organizers' thoughts about what they have done; they can increase the reader's confidence by showing that organizing involves large measures of common sense. These authors all achieve what they set out to do: Alinsky provides realism for radicals, Walzer offers encouragement for amateurs, and Kahn, Nader and Ross, and Simpson provide details for rural organizers, students, and new politicos.

The five books are also useful for posing questions about the purposes, cycles, and results of reform efforts. They all raise issues about the relation of organization to change. The books suggest the tension between inspiration and institutionalization and the problem of what to do with old Young Turks. And even though the books (except Alinsky's) lack a sense of history, they provide useful raw material for the intellectual history of our era. They illustrate the burst of populist optimism in the 1960s. They disagree on the size of the needed changes and the most promising tactics, but they agree that new organizations are necessary in the quest for a better society.

DALE ROGERS MARSHALL
University of California, Davis

The Secessionist Impulse: Alabama and Mississippi in 1860. By William L. Barney. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974. Pp. 371. $14.50.)

The importance of this fresh study of the road to civil war lies in its analysis of local political activists in Alabama and Mississippi during the presidential campaign of 1860. It finds that the Breckenridge Democrats held a significantly greater attraction than did its Bell-Whig and Douglas-Democratic opposition for the relatively young, native slaveholder-on-the-make. The strongest though not the sole magnet, according to the author, was the party's aggressive support of slavery expansion against the Republican threat to contain the institution within established boundaries. During the 1850s the ambition of these young men had run headlong into the rising costs of slaves and land, with the result that even those who attained wealth and status as large-scale planters lacked the security of older wealth. Their future surety lay in a rapid expansion of cotton production, a development that appeared jeopardized by political victory for any party other than their own.

Professor Barney concludes that the Whiggish minority supporting the Bell candidacy relied for its local leadership more largely upon older established planters, large and small. He points out that their greater security, although not necessarily accompanied by greater wealth, made these men more defensive than aggressive, more open to moderation and compromise to preserve the bonds of union with the North. With less need for widening opportunities, they were hesitant to risk the good life of the present in order to insure the future of slavery and cotton production. Business and commercial interests in the towns, but not the aspiring young lawyers, were their natural allies and participated in the leadership of the Bell forces. Yet the political role of this activist town middle class, largely slaveholders, was minimal; they constituted a minority within a minority, powerless to shape policy. Except within a few areas of strong Douglas support, the nonslaveholding yeomanry held an even smaller share of political leadership and power despite the size of their constituency. Decision making in all parties rested firmly in the hands of the wealthy slaveholding elite. Democrats found it politically expedient to invoke the Jacksonian ideology of equality and to stigmatize the opposition as one of class and wealth, yet in those Alabama slaveholding counties where their party predominated Breckenridge leaders held more wealth and as many slaves as their Bell counterparts. These are interesting and significant findings.

William Barney has confirmed the political dominance of the cotton aristocracy in the deep South, and its unity in defense of the peculiar institution; at the same time he has discovered a political fissure that reflected something other than the degree of wealth or the pull of past party loyalties, a fissure that abetted the movement for southern independence. His findings also point to the conclusion, not explicitly stated, that the political controversy over slavery in the territories which convulsed the nation was not, as historians have often argued, a false issue or one primarily symbolic of conflicting moral values. Rather Barney's perspective makes the territorial expansion of slavery a "real" issue involving economic interests, social status, and

white racial fears of black population growth unrelieved by expanded geographic dispersion.

In methodology, the study is a model both of diligence and of the effective fusion of traditional historical research with quantitative data analysis. That analysis sustains the generalizations about age and class of active party members and gives some support to the emphasis on expansion by relating growth factors to county voting patterns. The Princeton University Press has made a reasonable, even generous, allotment of space to maps and tables, but the critical reader will have questions unanswerable by the published data. The least excusable omission is the lack of a statement, and statistical breakdown, of the total number of individuals pursued through the tedious examination of original census returns. From a cursory inspection of text and tables they appear to have numbered well over two thousand. Involving fewer census records but some sixty local newspapers as well, their identification and location rival the monumental search of Ralph A. Wooster for members of the secession conventions.

Without the confirmation of quantitative evidence, traditional sources and methodology have been the source of a secondary but noteworthy contribution to secession historiography. The author has presented a devastating picture of the politics of fear and mob hysteria that led to disunion. Pressure for conformity, which historians have recognized in the South's pre-war defence of slavery and in the aftermath of its decision for secession, also operated during and immediately following the presidential election of 1860. It intimidated potential dissenters from disunion and created an illusion of unity that exceeded reality.

In short, William Barney has presented a study which no serious student of secession and civil war can afford to ignore.

LaWanda Cox

Hunter College, CUNY

Race Relations and the New York City Commission on Human Rights. By Gerald Benjamin. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974. Pp. 274. $12.50.)

Professor Benjamin's book is a political history of New York City's Commission on Human Rights. The book covers the Commission from its establishment by Mayor La Guardia in 1943 through Mayor Lindsay's first term ending in 1969. It focuses upon both internal and external political processes related to the Commission's development. Professor Benjamin examines areas such as the Commission's personnel (both board members and staff) budget, programs, and relationships to the mayor, to other city agencies, and to nongovernmental groups.

The Commission's story is one of significant change in its approach to the problems of race relations. During its earlier years, the Commission generally reflected the demands of liberal, predominantly white, civil rights organizations. These groups believed that the strategies of communication, education, and low-visibility negotiation could best advance minority interests. With the advent of the 'sixties, the Commission's approach began to change. During this decade, the Commission increasingly became a spokesman for minority group interests who rejected this gradual approach to the race issue.

Professor Benjamin is most successful in describing and explaining the political context which brought about this change in the Commission's approach. His implicit theoretical frame of reference is the bureaucratic bargaining model. He applies this model with deftness and skill and is particularly successful in describing the constraints upon the Commission which arose from the conflicting demands of the mayor's office and its nongovernmental constituency. His best chapters are perhaps those covering the Commission's approach during the twelve years that Robert Wagner was mayor. Professor Benjamin describes and analyzes the attempt by the Commission to formulate programs in the areas of housing, education, and employment while confronted with the demands of City Hall for a conciliatory and low-visibility approach and those of minority groups who increasingly wanted vigorous advocacy of their interests.

The limitations of *Race Relations and the New York City Commission on Human Rights* are those inherent in the bureaucratic bargaining model. The model does not explain many of the facets of organizational behavior. While Professor Benjamin avoids the pitfall of attempting to explain all of the Commission's activities by this one conceptual frame of reference, his failure to utilize other models leaves many aspects of the Commission's story unexplained. This difficulty is particularly highlighted when the author is covering events internal to the Commission. At such times, the content rarely rises above the level of mere description.

In all fairness to the author, his primary concern is with the public policy implications of his data rather than the development of public administration theory. The central issue of the book is whether local human rights commissions serve a useful function and should continue to exist. Professor Benjamin's position is that their utility "for furthering the interests of minorities in the city is inversely related to the centrality of

racial issues" (p. 240). The author believes that such commissions were useful when minority groups had limited access to local political arenas and surrogate civil rights groups had a role to play in representing their interests. With recent developments, however, minority groups no longer need these commissions to represent their interests and mayors no longer need be embarrassed by the "militant" positions of these commissions.

On the other hand, a common characteristic of our urban political systems has been the insulation of certain policy arenas and particular local agencies for specific groups. One example among many is the city planning commissions and their usage by urban planners to advocate their interests. It would seem that local human rights commissions could play a similar role for minority groups. The problem would appear to be that mayors can afford the political risks involved in providing planners with a sanctuary, but the situation changes with respect to minorities. This raises the issue of why only certain groups or interests are able to achieve this type of representation in a political system. Why are minority groups unable to develop the necessary political resources? This, unfortunately, is a question which is not adequately addressed by a static model such as the bureaucratic bargaining one. Before Professor Benjamin can reach a definitive judgment on local human rights commissions, he needs to escape the limitation of relying upon this one model for comprehending the totality of political experience.

STEPHEN M. DAVID
Fordham University

Lobbying at the Illinois Constitutional Convention. By Ian D. Burman. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1973. Pp. 119. $3.45.)

This monograph is one of a series analyzing various aspects of the constitutional convention held in Springfield, Illinois, December 1969-September 1970. Voters ratified the new constitution (which replaced one adopted 100 years earlier) at a special election December 15, 1970.

The lobbyist is a familiar and sometimes sinister figure in descriptions of the legislative process at the state and national level, and we think we know what to expect of him or her. But a constitutional convention—a rare event in most states—does not legislate but merely proposes to the people. We know little of how a lobbyist might be expected to operate in the special environment of such an assembly.

Professor Burman has helped to fill that void. An assistant professor of political science at Principia College, Elsah, Illinois, at the time of the convention, he is now a member of the faculty at MacMurray College, Jacksonville, Illinois. In this study, he deals with the significance of interest groups as potential opponents or sources of support for a charter subject to popular acceptance or rejection (chapter I). He describes the organizations that assigned lobbyists to the Illinois convention (chapters II and IV), the reactions and responses of convention delegates to efforts to influence them (chapter III), and the techniques that the lobbyists used (chapter V).

A final chapter (VI) presents his findings, which can be summed up approximately as follows: Most of the groups that lobbied the Illinois legislature did not lobby the convention, either because they did not perceive that their interests were involved in a revision of the basic law or because they did not expect that the delegates would be receptive to them. Actually, the delegates were "susceptible to the inclusion of provisions embodying causes currently popular with reform-oriented people" and "were also willing to grant concessions to interest groups in return for support for ratification of the proposed constitution" (p. 113) so that the few who did lobby benefited.

This study could be helpful to one who has the unlikely responsibility of lobbying at a state constitutional convention. In addition, the information it provides should be useful to the rather limited group of persons who seek to promote the modernization (for lack of a better word) of state governments through constitutional revision. Finally, it sheds additional light on the operation of interest groups; Burman's findings suggest that they are less perspicacious in identifying their own interests than many have been led to believe.

WILLIAM L. DAY
ILLINOIS ISSUES
Sangamon State University
Springfield, Illinois

Black Ghetto Riots and Campus Disorders: A Subcultural and Philosophical Study of Democratic Legitimacy and American Political Violence, 1964-1970. By Roger B. Canfield. (San Francisco, Calif.: R. E. Research Associates, 1973. Pp. 265. $12.00.)

The decade of the 1960s was a period of considerable ghetto and campus violence in America. From June 1963 to May 1968, there were 239 disturbances in black urban centers, involving approximately 200,000 participants and resulting in 50,000 arrests and more than 8,000 casualties. During that same period, there were 91 student protests, demonstrations, or riots,

involving over 100,000 participants. These disturbances resulted in nearly 2,000 arrests and 122 casualties. In this book Professor Canfield attempts to "explain and understand" the motivation behind, and the purposes for, this political violence (p. 5).

Social scientists have advanced a number of theories to explain violence. Thus, social psychologists emphasize the "frustration-aggression" and the "relative deprivation" hypotheses; economists promote the "calculus of revolt" and bargaining theories; and sociologists focus on "strain," "stress," and "cramp" theories. Canfield, however, is reluctant to offer nonpolitical explanations for political violence. He focuses instead on the political causes of violence. For this, he is to be credited. He reminds the reader of Aristotle's theory of revolution and attempts to pattern his work along its lines. Aristotle argued that the chief cause of revolution is the existence of differing understandings of equality as a principle of justice. Consistent with this view, Canfield suggests that "values, such as common notions of justice, are independent variables capable of generating political violence on their own" (p. 82). Thus, he argues that the key to any understanding of the recent political violence in America's inner city ghettos and college campuses lies in an appreciation of the great variety and changing character of American opinion on political justice, especially as it relates to the concepts of equality and liberty.

Canfield focuses on the troubling concept of equality. He contends that as the American regime's responsibility in the area of equality has increased, so has the tendency of citizens to believe that the regime itself is the major source of injustice in the society and that, as a consequence, it is illegitimate and no longer worthy of the citizens' obedience. Canfield hypothesizes that the black ghetto and student subcultures have views of equality and, hence, governmental legitimacy, which conflict generally with those of the larger political community and that this conflict leads to political violence.

With this hypothesis before the reader, Canfield sifts through hundreds of public opinion surveys conducted by Harris, Gallup, Roper, and others to ascertain to what extent the views on equality and governmental legitimacy of the black and student subcultures differ from those of the dominant political community. Canfield's contribution in this respect is considerable. From the extensive data available on these issues, he presents a useful compendium of pertinent findings on the questions of equality and governmental legitimacy and on the willingness of the public to engage in, or support the use of, political violence.

These findings generally confirm Canfield's hypothesis, but they are not enough to overcome a major obstacle in this book. Thus, although Canfield identifies different understandings of the concept of equality as the leading source of political violence, he never really critically examines these various understandings. This lack of critical perspective ultimately prevents him from completing his task: i.e., offering a political explanation of political violence.

Canfield treats all definitions—all views—of equality equally. As a result, he is prevented from exploring a different and perhaps more productive line of argument: viz., that political violence may be the result not only of different understandings of equality and hence, political justice, but also of wrong or fundamentally flawed views of equality, even if they are shared by all. Canfield touches upon this argument when he turns in his conclusion to Lowi's criticism of interest group liberalism and how its view of equality tends to "delegitimize" the government and reduce it to nothing more than another interest group. However, his uncritical stance on equality prevents him from pursuing it. Implicit in Lowi's argument is the thought that the only way to preserve governmental legitimacy is by insuring that a proper definition of equality is maintained (i.e., a definition in which only equal things are treated equally and, hence, in which government is treated differently from private interest groups), not by infusing the whole society, its dominant political community and its various minority subcultures alike, with the same definition. Unfortunately, Canfield concludes his work without exploring this provocative theme. As he informs the reader, politics is characterized by both "power and morality," by what *is* as well as what *ought to be*. As a consequence, one would expect his explanation of the political causes of violence to reflect a concern for both of these themes. Canfield, however, skirts the morality dimension; and, as a result, his explanation of political violence is limited. By his own definition of politics, he has only taken up half the question.

RALPH A. ROSSUM
Memphis State University

How Congressmen Decide: A Policy Focus. By Aage R. Clausen. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973. Pp. 243. $9.95, cloth; $4.50, paper.)

The question of how congressmen decide the issues before them has been frequently addressed, but seldom answered in any conclusive manner. Models built around cue-taking, coalition behavior, and the relative influence of

constituency, party, and president have been posited, but the results of these analyses have shown that each model explains a small part of the variance and that the potency of any particular explanatory variable depends in large measure on the issue and the action that one is talking about.

In *How Congressmen Decide,* Professor Aage Clausen finds regularities to legislative behavior and discernible patterns of influence that bear upon congressional decisions. He begins by proposing a "policy dimension theory of congressional decision-making" which asserts that "congressmen develop categories which subsume specific legislative motions so that a common response can be made to all items of legislation included in a more general category" (p. 8). Thus a congressman begins his decision-making process by determining the policy content of a particular piece of legislation; then he determines the level of support for the general policy embodied in the legislation and compares that with his own degree of support for the concept. That degree of support is an amalgam of the legislator's own personal views, and the views of his constituency, of his party, and of the various interest groups to which he is responsive.

Within this framework, Professor Clausen identifies five major policy dimensions: government management, social welfare, international involvement, civil liberties, and agricultural assistance. Based on his voting record, each member of Congress serving between 1953 and 1964 is given a score on each of these dimensions for each Congress in which he served. Clausen demonstrates that these five dimensions are both continuous and stable over the 1953-1964 period. In a chapter on ideology, he makes the important point that labels such as liberal and conservative make more sense to congressmen than they seem to make to political scientists; about one-half of his population are classified as one or the other on the basis of their policy positions. In an excellent chapter, Clausen artfully disentangles the effects of constituency and party and concludes that party influence is minimal on international involvement, a bit stronger in civil liberties, stronger still in agricultural assistance, and strongest in social welfare and government management. In his analyses of the "roots of policy orientations" Clausen finds that party and state of residence account for most of the variance in policy positions, and that variation among members of the same state delegation on the four domestic policy dimensions tends to be minimal. Finally, he suggests that the international involvement dimension is presidentially oriented; a legislator tends to increase his support for international involvement when the presidency is assumed by a member of his own party.

Professor Clausen has conducted a skillful and highly imaginative analysis. He has produced a strong volume that is vulnerable to criticism only at a few points where the author wanders from the cautious and careful scholarship that marks the bulk of the volume.

One criticism involves truth-in-packaging. Chapters 1 and 2, as well as the book title, promise a test of the policy dimension theory—a theory that purports to tell us how congressmen make up their minds. Testing the theory and explaining voting decisions requires an assessment of the connection between policy dimensions and actual votes. By the end of the book, the theory is still untested and, as Professor Clausen admits (p. 236), we still don't know how congressmen make up their minds. Clausen's five policy dimensions are only rough indicators of any one vote in a policy domain. As he says, the dimensions "indicate in very brief terms the points of commonality characterizing the different policy proposals" (p. 23). Thus, explaining a good part of the variance in policy dimension positions—a commendable performance in itself—helps us to explain only a small part of the variance in the roll-call votes that make up the dimension. (Incidentally, it would have been useful if the author had presented the method by which these general policy dimensions were constructed rather than simply referring the reader to the several *APSR* articles that preceded this volume.)

Second, Professor Clausen advocates the merits of roll-call data in tones so strident and extreme that he invites dissent. For example, he asserts that the policy positions indicated by roll-call votes accurately describe the legislator's position at all stages of the decision-making process. According to Clausen, those who argue the contrary are saying, in effect, that when congressmen vote differently from the way they act in committees, they do so to deceive their constituents, and this argument in his view constitutes "a facile deduction from an unsubstantiated theory of conspiratorial politics which explains much but understands little" (p. 19).

The deception argument is, of course, a straw man that Professor Clausen easily knocks down. Knocking it down, however, does not mean that roll-call votes tell us all we need to know about a legislator's policy position. They do not tell us how strongly for or against a proposal a legislator was. They do not tell us what his position in debate was, or how he acted on unrecorded voice votes. It is an easy, but—to borrow Professor Clausen's word—an unsubstantiated assertion that roll-call votes indicate all of this. When roll-call votes vary from other behavior, the reason

may be attributable to the ambivalence of the legislator, or to a change of mind—interpretations not without some support in the literature. Committee votes may be dictated by loyalty to or bargains with senior committee personnel—arrangements which may not hold on the floor. As Professor Clausen admits, the legislator seeking to score points with party leaders may vote against his conscience and against his constituency at less visible stages of the decision-making process (p. 125).

The point, of course, is that roll-call votes are both useful and convenient data but those who use them are done a disservice when extravagant claims are made on behalf of their efficacy.

How Congressmen Decide promises more than it delivers, but what it delivers makes it must reading for specialists in American legislative behavior and good and worthwhile reading for serious students of American politics.

MICHAEL L. MEZEY
University of Hawaii

To Judge with Justice: History and Politics of Illinois Judicial Reform. By Rubin G. Cohn. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1973. Pp. 164. $3.45, paper.)

Written in very lively, but often overdramatic language, this case study tells of the intrigues and crises faced by a coalition advocating judicial reform, as they first propose and eventually pass a revised judicial article to the Illinois Constitution during the 1970 Illinois Constitutional Convention. Revealing his prejudices about the political process, Professor Cohn evinces his absolute reverence for anything and anyone associated with judicial reform, as well as his general disdain for opponents of reform and his particular contempt for the Chicago Cook County Democratic Organization. For example, actions taken by such judicial reformers as delegate Wayne Whalen of Hanover, Ill., are described as "bold" (p. 130), "brilliant" (p. 76), and "remarkable" (p. 79), while those of delegate Dwight Friedrich of Centralia, Ill., a chief opponent of reform, are referred to as "hardened," "shrewd," and "crude" (p. 33). When Cohn can find no "obvious" weaknesses of character in the delegates opposed to judicial reform, he even makes unsupported allegations relying on "gossip" to cast aspersions, as in the statement that delegate Harold Nudelman of Chicago allegedly was to receive a judgeship because of his friendship with the Chicago Democratic Organization (p. 39). All of his characterizations throughout the book are similarly drawn in starkly absolute terms.

These biases also impregnate Cohn's descriptions of the political process on the convention floor. He finds the political tactics used by the Chicago Democrats to oppose judicial reform totally distasteful, since they are "ruthless" (p. 98), show signs of "organization" support (p. 96) and provide voting unity against judicial reform. Yet the author fails to see that the delegates of the coalition supporting reform also rely on those same "distasteful" tactics to defeat the Chicago Democrats and other opponents of reform on numerous critical votes. But when the coalition wields political power, Cohn commends them for their powers of "advocacy and persuasion" (p. 78).

This devotion to the reformist cause blinds him to balanced assessments and prevents him from deeply probing serious arguments for and against judicial reform. Because of this narrow perspective, he fails completely to recognize the legitimacy of the opposition's arguments, and offers little support and justification for his own. His major charge against the pre-1970 judicial system is that it was diverse, inharmonious, and unpatterned (pp. 3, 8, 12). Cohn's reform model corrects these weaknesses, providing an orderly, structured, and administratively efficient system but one which concentrates control in the hands of the state supreme court and the legal profession (p. 12). A major strength of the new model, Cohn explains, is that it will allow for the appointment rather than election of judges, guaranteeing total isolation of the judiciary from elective politics. Never once does he suggest what impact such a scheme, unchecked by the election process, might have on the quality of justice and on democratic government in general. Indeed the book never concerns itself with the concept of justice except for mentioning the word in its title.

Rubin Cohn is a professor of law who has spent many years crusading for judicial reform in Illinois. Throughout the book Cohn is too much the advocate of reform, and too little the objective analyst of reform, to offer an insightful study on judicial politics.

BYRON W. DAYNES
DePauw University

Congress and the Nation, Volume III (1969-1972). (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Service, 1973. Pp. xxx, 1019; 137 App. $35.00.)

Guide to the Congress of the United States. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Service, 1971. Pp. xxxi, 639; 323 App. $35.00.)

Anybody who has tried to do research on Congress in recent years, whether it be research on internal legislative structures or on Congress's

role in domestic or foreign policy processes, can attest to the information gap filled by Congressional Quarterly. Perhaps no single resource is as important to the congressional scholar as the CQ *Weekly Reports*, which provide a full day-to-day description of what is happening in the House and the Senate, along with a goldmine of additional data. They do become unwieldy after a while, though—I have not yet found any easy way of storing or maintaining back years of CQ, without either renting a storeroom or finding a much larger apartment (neither a reasonable alternative in Washington on an academic salary).

In part to cope with the manageability problem (and also no doubt to raise additional revenues), CQ has in recent years begun to organize, rewrite and encapsulate the massive data in the Weekly Reports in a variety of ways. Yearly summary *Almanacs* have been supplemented with policy-oriented histories of the post World War II Congress, called *Congress and the Nation* (Volume I covered 1945-1964; Volume II, 1965-1968; Volume III, the latest in the series, covers 1969-1972). The most recent addition to the CQ reference library is their *Guide to the Congress of the United States.* This review will deal with the *Guide to Congress* as well as Volume III of the *Congress and the Nation* series.

Congressional Quarterly's *Guide to the Congress of the United States* has 639 pages of text and 323 pages of Appendix. Its eight chapters and 32 subchapters contain a historical summary of Congress (including capsule histories of the House and the Senate); a chronological background of internal congressional institutions (rules, leadership, committees); and discussions of congressional powers; housing, staff and support facilities; and Congressional ethics. The *Guide* has a good deal of information which was not originally presented in the Weekly Reports, mostly glossed from historical texts and political science journal articles. The historical background material is excellently researched and presented. The bulk of the contents—most of the tables and charts, sections on the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, campaign financing, lobbying, for example—came directly from previous CQ publications.

There are excellent subchapters on such diverse topics as the Library of Congress, the General Accounting Office, and the seniority system. The largest section, eleven subchapters on "The Powers of Congress," gives concise accounts of the Constitutional background, precedents, and exercise of the broad range of congressional powers. For example, a reader, ignorant about the commerce clause and the Congressional role in regulating interstate commerce can turn to an eight-page subchapter outlining the basics (though, of course, *only* the basics) and describing the federal regulatory agencies.

Although there are only eight pages on Congress and interstate commerce, there are twenty-four pages on the subject of private bills in Congress—an interesting topic, but hardly worthy of three times the coverage. The anomaly is no doubt the result of a previous detailed CQ Special Report on private bills, which could be readily drawn upon.

The chapters are all basically narratives; though some data are presented, in chart and table form, they appear rather randomly throughout the text. The narrative format has both advantages and disadvantages. In some instances —particularly in the 100-page first chapter, "The Origins and Development of Congress"—an individual with little basic knowledge of the subject matter can find a readable and concise historical summary which is unavailable in any other single source. But for the scholar pursuing research on some aspect of Congress, the information provided in the *Guide to Congress* is for the most part rather shallow, and somewhat difficult to extract readily; reading or at least skimming whole sections is necessary. The first problem is probably inherent in putting together a single all-encompassing volume on 180 years of Congress; the second is intensified by the format. The chapters are most useful, it seems to me, to students who need background in a particular subarea, or to professors who want to prepare basic lectures on various aspects of the legislative process.

This is not to say that the *Guide to Congress* is of no use at all as a research reference. There are useful data in the text, including such tables as a record of discharge petitions filed in the House, by Congress, from 1909 to 1971; the number of roll calls by year from 1947 through 1970; presidential nominations rejected since 1929; cloture votes taken in the Senate since 1919; and growth of the congressional workload over time. But there is no real systematic presentation of historical congressional data. A good deal of what *is* presented has little apparent rationale beyond the fact that it was compiled for and included in the *Weekly Reports*. Large gaps exist—for example, there are no tables giving the number and names of House and Senate committees (and /or chairmen) prior to 1947, or of past congressional leaders. These items may simply reflect my own research interests, but the basic point is that one does not know, without searching, just what one may or may not find in the text of the *Guide*. This greatly limits its usefulness as a research tool.

The Appendix contains several things which enhance this volume's worth. Foremost is a 176-page section containing brief biographical information (basically years of service) on every member of Congress since 1789. For those who don't have a Biographical Directory of Congress at hand, this is a nice and reliable reference, one to which I have turned several times. The Appendix also contains the rules of the House and the Senate.

Congress and the Nation, Volume III (1969-1972) is by contrast, an invaluable resource for the congressional scholar, or for that matter, anybody interested in American national public policy for the Nixon years. *Congress and the Nation* is written much more as a reference tool, undominated by bulky narratives. Although it is basically a reorganization of material which had appeared in the *Weekly Reports,* the organization and streamlining of four years of Reports provides a genuine service.

Congress and the Nation, Volume III has sixteen chapters, with 1019 pages of text and 137 pages of appendix. The chapters are organized by policy area. Chapter one deals with politics and national issues, and includes electoral events in 1969, 1970, 1971, and 1972. Capsule descriptions of Senate, House, gubernatorial and presidential elections are given, along with about twenty-five pages of charts and tables. The data here are rather spotty; for example, there is no systematic breakdown or analysis of turnover in the House and the Senate for the elections covered. On the other hand, there is much that one wouldn't expect, such as a breakdown of presidential convention votes from 1948-1972, and a list of state governors from 1944-1972. Once again one suspects that they are included because the charts had been previously compiled. (I might note at this point that many of the charts and tables present in the *Guide to Congress* are duplicated in *Congress and the Nation;* some do not really appear to fit in either volume, and were obviously included because they were already in the CQ files.)

Much of *Congress and the Nation* is a recounting of important legislation passed in nearly every broad policy area, ranging from economic policy, through civil liberties and rights, to veteran's legislation, and to foreign policy. Each of the policy chapters recounts in a year-by-year fashion the bills brought up in Congress in the particular policy area, and, for those enacted into law, the provisions of the legislation. For example, a reader concerned with what happened in the 1969–72 era in the area of agricultural policy, can consult chapter six which discusses, for each of the four years, the appropriations bills, food stamp and school lunch legislation, subsidy legislation, as well as the provisions and legislative history of the Agriculture Act of 1970, the Sugar Act of 1971, and the Rural Development Act of 1972. All other agriculture bills passed in the four years are briefly described.

Every major bill enacted in every policy area in the four-year period is outlined in the volume, and can be found easily. Some, such as the 1970 Voting Rights Act, or the establishment of the Environmental Protection Agency are not described in enough detail, but still basic summaries are provided. Such important but unsuccessful efforts as the Family Assistance Plan and the Consumer Protection Agency are also covered; there is even a box giving detailed comparisons of the Nixon and Kennedy-Griffiths national health bills in the 92nd Congress. One could readily pinpoint a given bill through the index or in the relevant chapter. Obviously the volume only supplements the *Weekly Reports* and yearly *Almanacs* which contain more detailed information on each piece of legislation. But one can quickly discover the basics (while leaving the old Reports in the back of a closet).

The volume contains other useful information as well. The chapter on the Federal Judiciary includes all 1966–1972 legislation on the courts, as well as all major Supreme Court decisions of 1969–72, by subject area. The chapter on Congress and Government includes the CQ special Report on the 1970 Legislative Reorganization Act (a well-written summary) as well as some interesting extraneous information—for example, a table showing all discharge petitions with their disposition, from 1909-1972 (repeated as I noted earlier, in the *Guide to Congress*), and a box describing Wayne Hays's new role as "Housekeeper of the House."

There is a short but informative section on busing in the Civil Liberties and Civil Rights chapter, and one on no-fault insurance in the section on consumer legislation. Unsystematically throughout the book, tables appear which are sometimes quite handy and sometimes largely worthless. As an example of the former, the section on education includes a fascinating table showing the gap between appropriations and authorizations under ESEA for 1969–72—a very nice demonstration of the differences between the Education and Labor and Labor and Public Welfare Committees on the one hand and the Appropriations Committee on the other. The latter problem is typified by a table covering 2/3 of a page in the section on consumer legislation which gives estimated repair costs for slow-speed car crashes for a variety of car models, and which is largely a waste of space.

The chapter on the presidency includes

biographical data on Nixon cabinet members and White House staff, as well as a section on Watergate through the spring of 1973.

The Appendix contains, for each of the four years, roughly a dozen key votes for each body, with brief descriptions; these key votes are referred to in heavy type throughout the text. Also included are lists of party leaders (though unfortunately only the *top* leaders) and committee chairmen from 1947-1972; a biographical index of post–World War II members of Congress; presidential vetoes in the 1969–1972 period; and the texts of various presidential messages—a very useful compilation of data.

In summary, the third volume of the *Congress and the Nation* series is a worthwhile and recommended addition to the reference library of any scholar concerned with American politics. The *Guide to Congress* is not nearly so important a resource though it contains some useful information. All in all, CQ's publications continue to fill gaps in information on Congress, for which political scientists should be grateful.

NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN
The Catholic University of America

The Origins of the Standing Committees and the Development of the Modern House. By Joseph Cooper. (Houston: William Marsh Rice University, 1970. Pp. 167. $3.50.)

Within the increasing literature on Congress, a significant number of books and articles continue to swim against the tide of quantitative analysis (see Editorial Comment, June, 1974 *APSR*) and even employ historical methods to explain the development of modern structures. Such works as Nelson Polsby's articles on institutionalization and seniority and Randall Ripley's studies of party leadership in the House of Representatives illustrate the fertility of nonquantitative, essentially historical, analysis. Joseph Cooper's monograph is a valuable addition to this literature. *The Origins of the Standing Committees and the Development of the Modern House* seeks to explain the emergence of congressional committees as a product of Jeffersonian thought and congressional experience. The book provides an interesting new perspective on the rise of committees, with an appreciation of Jeffersonian political philosophy as a bonus.

Professor Cooper argues that the theory and practice of Jeffersonian Republicanism first hindered and then permitted development of the standing committee system. Simply put, some of the leading beliefs of the Jeffersonians about the means of democratic decision making had to be modified, little by little, in the face of practical exigencies. Some aspects of the Republican philosophy were revealed to contain the seeds of their own destruction; thus the emphasis on legislative autonomy, which led to the refusal to request advice from the executive branch in the 1790s, necessitated the creation of standing committees, which violated the preference for deliberation by the whole legislature without organizational restraints. Other modifications of theory occurred on a more pragmatic basis, as when Jefferson's accession to the presidency weakened the insistence on freedom from executive management.

Central to Jeffersonian philosophy were the principles "that all legislators should be equal" and "that the legislature as a whole should direct itself" (p. 14). This view led to reliance on the Committee of the Whole House as the body to which initial reference of legislation was made. The Committee of the Whole was well suited for rational deliberation and imposed no "structural infringement" on the equal participation of members in debate. Thus the "sense of the majority" could more easily emerge. Yet by the end of the Jeffersonian era (1829), "insistence on radical egalitarianism disappeared and a new set of values and norms, focused on specialization and deference, crystallized" (p. 105). For reasons which, unfortunately, are not altogether clear, House members retreated from the belief that decisions should be reached through equal deliberation of all members in Committee of the Whole, and accepted a more "modern," post-division-of-labor belief in deference to decisions made by specialized, smaller committees, to which first reference of legislation was made, which had the right to report by bill, and which increasingly became involved in relations with executive agencies. Thus the triumph of practice over theory was attained.

In addition to the rise of the committee system, Cooper notes several important developments of the period 1789–1829. Foremost among these are the appearance of party affiliation as the primary criterion of appointment to committees; expanded importance of the committee chairman's role; and the rise of committee involvement with administration, as the House relaxed its controls on investigations, committee members and administrators regularly exchanged views on legislation, and Congressmen intervened more frequently with the departments on behalf of constituents and local problems. In these many ways, the House was beginning to acquire some of its modern characteristics.

While denying that the House of 1829 is the modern House, Cooper closes his study by applying the themes of the Jeffersonian period to the later history of the House. Here, painting with broad brush strokes, the author describes

the rise and fall of party government and the emergence of the modern decentralized House of shifting coalitions in terms of the Jeffersonian conflict between democracy and structure. While suggestive, this portion of the monograph seems to overgeneralize the earlier findings. Where Professor Cooper states that "Jeffersonian orientations toward egalitarianism, individualism, and even rationalism have had a heavy impact on the minds of House members throughout our history" (p. 115), it is apparent that he has fallen into the common error of overestimating the importance of his topic. Surely members can revolt against heavy-handed party discipline without giving evidence of Jeffersonian thought. The tension between organizational needs and members' desires for autonomy merits more careful treatment. The process of institutionalization is much too complex to be subsumed by an analysis of the decline of Jeffersonian theory.

Another factor which detracts from the overall value of the monograph is the rather casual methodology. Jeffersonian theory and practice are both inferred from the texts of speeches delivered by members identified as "Republicans" or "strong Republicans" and recorded in the *Annals of Congress*. While in many respects this is an admirable and hallowed procedure, at times one has the feeling that Cooper is drawing even more from the speeches than is really there, and that remarks made in debate for the sake of persuasion may not be altogether accurate indicators of prevailing thought or procedure.

Nonetheless, in spite of some shortcomings in his book, Professor Cooper has explored an area which has too long been terra incognita, brought some new insight into the development of House structures, and even managed to bridge an academic chasm between political thought and political practice. This reviewer hopes that the near future will bring more such works to supplement our knowledge of congressional institutions.

RICHARD E. DAMON
College of William and Mary

Between State and Nation: Regional Organizations of the United States. By Martha Derthick. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974. Pp. 242. $7.95, cloth; $2.95, paper.)

Between State and Nation is a well-written, clear-headed, and critical examination of regional governmental organizations in the American federal system. The author, Martha Derthick, a senior fellow at Brookings, undertakes a realistic and penetrating evaluation of some of the favorite nostrums of reformers—regional authorities, interstate compacts, federal-state regional development commissions, river basin commissions, and federal regional coordinating councils. Her conclusions reflect tough-minded political realism:

> To win the fight for existence and a significant share of public functions, [regional organizations] must have extraordinary constituency support or extraordinary means of self-support. These conditions can be met, if at all, only in very special circumstances, when there is a fortuitous coming together of opportunity, leadership, and political backing, so that it becomes possible to go against the institutional grain and create a genuinely new form (p. 226).

Professor Derthick's cautious appraisal of the utility of regional organizations is based on a series of selected case studies. From an almost limitless universe of transitory and ill-defined federal, federal-state, and interstate organizations, commissions, councils, and coordinating committees, Professor Derthick selects seven specific organizational types for analysis and evaluation:

Tennessee Valley Authority
Delaware River Basin Commission
Appalachian Regional Commission
Water Resource Planning Act of 1965, Title II federal-state river basin planning commissions
Economic Development Act of 1965, Title V federal-state regional economic development commissions
Federal Regional Councils

The origin of each of these organizational types is described in separate chapters, together with their legal structures and political bases, principal activities, strengths and weaknesses, and probably future directions.

It is in the final four chapters of the book that Professor Derthick brings her comparative and critical faculties to bear on her central question: Are regional organizations desirable, and if so, what form should they take?

Regional organizations have been created for different purposes—some for operating, management, and regulatory functions, and others for planning and coordinating only. Some have been created merely to coordinate federal programs, others to decentralize federal bureaucracies and open them to state and local influence, and still others to achieve federal-state "jointness." But whatever their differences in purposes and structure, "regional organizations have a common handicap of being unusual cases, deviant new growths in a governmental landscape whose enduring and predominant features are fifty state governments and a number of federal departments and bureaus with national jurisdic-

tions" (p. 190). In order to survive in a crowded competitive universe of governments, weak regional organizations must make costly adaptations in order to fit the purposes and structures of state governments and federal agencies. In the process of adaptation, regional organizations either narrow the spheres of their activities (as when TVA abandoned the idea of comprehensive social and economic planning in favor of specializing in the generation and sale of electrical power), or they retreat into low profile "coordinating" activities which accomplish very little. Often the price that new regional organizations must pay just to get established is to agree not to diminish the authority or functions of established organizations. "In short, while the particular adaptations to the organizational environment vary widely from one type of regional organization to another, the common result is either specialization of activity or a low level of activity. Regional action proceeds within a narrow sphere or at a slow pace" (pp. 191-192).

The general objectives of regional organization include interstate and federal-state coordination, decentralization of federal authority, and federal interagency coordination. Professor Derthick described how various structures and practices both advance and inhibit these separate objectives. She also proposes some "guiding principles" for regional organizations: "powerful inducements" supplied by the federal government; planning organizations lodged near the operating agencies which must carry out the plans; denial of opportunities for planning agencies to find alternative functions to displace planning; and the delineation of a "region" which has a clear and compelling rationale.

But the long-term outlook for regionalism is uninspiring. "It is no accident that the leading cases of regional organizations are accidents" (p. 226). The states "continue to be powerful claimants on federal resources, to be objects of federal deference, and to perform a wide range of governmental functions" (p. 222). Federal members of federal-state regional organizations seldom have the power to influence the federal departments and agencies they represent, let alone induce state agencies to seek regional goals at their own expense. Even federal interagency councils have generally failed as resolvers of interagency conflict; they have complicated rather than simplified interagency grant administration; and they have even blundered in coordinating federal disaster relief. Only the Appalachian Regional Commission, with a large program budget, competent staff, and high morale, offers a reasonably successful example of regional organization. Yet to cover the nation with comparable commissions is not a realistic possibility; the relative success of the Appalachian Commission was a product of genuine, distinctive regional need.

Professor Derthick's comparisons are necessarily rough, owing to the diverse nature of regional organizations. And criteria for judging successful coordination and decentralization are necessarily imprecise. But this volume sets a high standard in the realistic appraisal of the effectiveness of structural reform in the American federal system.

THOMAS R. DYE
The Florida State University

Talking Back: Citizen Feedback and Cable Technology. Edited by Ithiel de Sola Pool. (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1973. Pp. xiii, 325. $9.95.)

The emergence of novel communications technologies, particularly cable television, is forcing decision makers and the American public to choose new communication policies. The essays assembled in this book attempt to ease this task. They provide a firm information base for policy makers by setting forth a variety of social and economic value criteria which should be weighed. In each case, the authors delimit the costs and benefits of particular policy choices in the light of present conditions and in the light of prognostications for the future. A major value premise which pervades most of the discussions is the idea that communications output should be responsive to consumer needs and desires. Most of the authors whose works are represented in this volume apparently believe that the present system is too unresponsive and alienating. They believe that it needs to be opened up to greater public control through more diversified ownership and multiplication of broadcast facilities. They would like to create a system which provides ready access to mass communication facilities for all proponents of diverse interests and contrasting points of view who want to broadcast their ideas.

The book is divided into three major parts, following an introduction which outlines the dimensions of the policy problems. Part One details current social needs which, in the authors' views, are inadequately met by present public communications systems. New technologies provide hitherto unavailable remedies through multiplication of television channels and through opportunities for audience feedback.

The prospect for increased television exposure for the performing arts is one of several social needs discussed in the volume. Martin Mayer, a free-lance writer, points out that the minuscule

size of interested audiences, high costs of professional productions, and disdain for amateur fare seem to doom the prospects for expanded offerings. Harold Mendelsohn, Professor of Mass Communications at the University of Denver, underlines Mayer's argument by scuttling the frequently voiced claims of media critics that television needs to become more educational and intellectual. In a well-documented essay which describes the concerns and television-viewing habits of average working-class Americans, Mendelsohn contends that average viewers are pleased with present exciting entertainment fare, but are puzzled by much of the news and public service broadcasting which presents unrelated snippets of information. They are unwilling to expose themselves to more intellectual fare merely for the sake of learning. This explains why they hardly ever watch educational channels and programs which are geared to the tastes of intellectual elites. Mendelsohn calls working-class Americans "the neglected majority" and argues for cable television facilities operated by and for the needs and tastes of working people.

Charles Tate of the Urban Institute and William T. Knox of the Department of Commerce make much the same argument. Tate urges that inner-city cable facilities, which serve a preponderantly black audience, should be owned and controlled by blacks. Urban CATV systems should produce programs geared to the interests of black audiences. Knox talks more generally about the needs of the poor and of minorities in urban communities, and the types of communication services which could improve the quality of their lives. Gilbert Cranberg, a journalist, explores the uses of cable television surveillance and warning systems for urban crime detection and control.

One social need which has been the subject of much comment is the adequacy of political information presented by television, including the availability of citizen feedback to public officials. Ithiel de Sola Pool, Professor of Political Science at MIT, and Herbert Alexander, director of the Citizens' Research Foundation, speculate about various ways in which cable television, with its potential for two-way communication, could be organized and used to provide more relevant political information exchange. Potential dangers to national unity, to sound policy making, and to the quality of public service broadcasting are assessed, along with the optimistic predictions about the benefits of giving electronic voices to the multiplicity of local political leaders and small interest groups. Pool and Alexander also discuss the pros and cons of various franchising policies and the implications for such current concerns as fairness of presentation, equal time for contending views, and responsibility for obscenity and slander.

Part Two of the book deals with the technology, engineering feasibility, and costs of sophisticated cable systems. Although it is replete with explanatory tables and diagrams and uses relatively nontechnical language, most political scientists will probably skip this part. Even if they do so initially, these chapters are valuable as brief basic reference sources to which social scientists can turn whenever they become involved in technical aspects of cable technology during policy discussions. Subjects discussed include problems of interference in multichannel systems, the merits and costs of alternative ways for providing two-way transmissions, pay television, uses of cable television for business purposes, and various experimental systems which are now in operation.

Part Three is a mixture of technical data about two-way telecommunications systems and speculations about the effects of two-way facilities on social interactions and politics. Political scientists will be most interested in an essay by Thomas B. Sheridan, Professor of Mechanical Engineering at MIT, who describes a feedback technology which would permit audiences at meetings or lectures to interact with the speaker and other audience members and to register their selection of policy alternatives picked from a moderately complete array of choices. Sheridan's essay should be read in conjunction with a philosophical discussion by Ithiel de Sola Pool about the benefits of citizen feedback to the citizen and to the community. Part Three also presents information about the prospects for making data banks, including a vast variety of political data, accessible to the public on demand through the cable television system.

It should be obvious from the description of the book's content that it constitutes a smorgasbord of offerings on policy-relevant matters in the field of cable television. As in any smorgasbord, different readers will prefer different tidbits and will have different ideas about what else might have been included to round out the selections, or what should have been omitted. But no one who is interested in cable technology, particularly its potential for two-way communication, should leave this table of fare unsatisfied. There is a great deal of important information in this volume, presented by knowledgeable scholars in a manner which makes even the more technical aspects easy to comprehend.

DORIS A. GRABER

University of Illinois at Chicago Circle

Money and Politics in America, 1755–1775: A Study in the Currency Act of 1764 and the Political Economy of Revolution. By Joseph Albert Ernst. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1973. Pp. 403. $14.95.)

In his *Money and Politics in America* Professor Ernst has written a book that has some value but certainly does not fulfill the expectations aroused by his earlier writings on that subject. The major accomplishments of the book are twofold. First, Professor Ernst has constructed, with painstaking care, the intricacies of British-colonial dealings over pre-Revolutionary colonial paper currency legislation and parliamentary regulation thereof. If anyone should want information about such events and policies this, obviously, is now the best book to look at. Second, by means of his assertions about the importance of such factors as the terms of British credit, British military expenditures in the colonies, and seasonal and short-run fluctuations in local markets in determining economic conditions in the colonies, Professor Ernst has convincingly pointed out the shortcomings of earlier writers who have assumed that the exchange rates between colonial currency and English sterling and, hence, the terms of trade between colonies and metropolis, depended directly on the quantities of colonial money in circulation. Although interested economists and economic historians will undoubtedly have their own rather technical criticisms of Professor Ernst's handling of the structure of economic relationships in the Empire his arguments, it seems, do demonstrate that these relationships were very complex and that the policies of British creditors did have a significant impact on them.

Despite the importance of these two major contributions to historical knowledge, this book is seriously flawed. *Money and Politics in America* is, by the author's profession, not only a study of the Currency Act of 1764 but also of the political economy of revolution. If this is so, then a major question must be, what is the relationship of the currency problem to the American Revolution? By centering his study on the Currency Act of 1764 and on the subsequent dealings between Britain and the southern and middle colonies over questions of colonial currency emissions, Professor Ernst has implied that these were central to the growing estrangement between England and the colonies. Yet, in fact, colonial efforts to repeal the 1764 Currency Act came in a poor third, after attempts to repeal the Stamp Act and the Revenue Act of 1764. Moreover, in the late 1760s and early '70s Britain and the colonies were able to work out acceptable compromises which allowed several colonies to circulate paper currency despite the general prohibition embodied in the 1764 Act. One is left without a clear sense of what the currency issue meant in the context of the revolutionary crisis, and with the possibility still open that it may have had only marginal significance. This seems to have been one issue on which Britain and the colonies were able to work out acceptable compromises during the pre-Revolutionary years.

An alternative way of looking at the evidence in the book—and it is the way Professor Ernst prefers it to be viewed even though his preference is not reflected in the structure of the book—is the following. It was, according to the author, a series of economic crises, occasioned largely by foreclosures and sharp retractions of British credit after periods of liberal credit extension, which brought colonies and mother country into a confrontation over paper currency. The colonists felt they needed paper currency to facilitate economic activity during the recessions; the British were determined to protect the sterling debts the colonists owed them. The least important developments—even though Professor Ernst spends so much time elaborating them—were the compromises the British and colonials worked out on the question of paper currency emissions. Despite these compromises, so the argument goes, the colonists were so profoundly unsettled by their lack of control over economic affairs in the Empire that political and eventually revolutionary action resulted.

One is left, then, with a statement that economic interests were crucial determinants of the conflict between Britain and the colonies and of the intracolonial conflicts that accompanied the Revolutionary crisis. But it is only that—a statement. Professor Ernst admits that ". . . the precise dimensions and the causes of these crises are open to debate . . ." (p. 361); he does not deal with the question of how the colonists' perceptions of their economic disadvantages affected the Revolutionary movement; and he assumes (". . . once it is accepted that much of the important political activity in the Revolution represented an attempt to deal with economic crises and conditions . . ." [p. 360]) what the bulk of his book does not clearly show. Although, historiographically, this book is of some importance in indicating an increased interest among a number of colonial historians in applying a "conflict model" to Revolutionary events, it is very much an assertion of the applicability of such a model, not a major explication of the political economy of the Revolution. In 362

pages of text one would have hoped for something more.

ALAN TULLY
University of British Columbia

Stamford in the Gilded Age: The Political Life of a Connecticut Town, 1868-1893. By Estelle F. Feinstein. (Stamford, Conn.: The Stamford Historical Society, Inc., 1973. Pp. 319. $6.95.)

Despite the apparent narrowness of its subject matter, this is a model study in several ways and a valuable addition to the urban history of the Gilded Age.

Feinstein's subject is the impact of the social-economic evolution of Stamford in the years 1868 1893 upon its political institutions. She describes how population growth, occupational shifts, the expansion of the Yale & Towne manufacture, and the coming-of-age of the Irish minority made the traditional town-meeting system increasingly unsatisfactory. Though the community managed with difficulty to effect certain changes in the areas of public education and sanitation, it failed to resolve pressing problems of protection, pollution, and poverty. Social dysfunction and the proven inadequacies of the old system of public decision making created a demand for a new political structure. The "solution" was a new city structure superimposed upon the anachronistic but familiar town-meeting.

So summarized, Feinstein's study appears of modest importance. It stands, however, as a model not only of the grass-roots approach to urban history but of the use of political science methodology in historical research and the utility of the case method in testing stereotypic judgments respecting the political history of the Gilded Age. Studies such as this offer needed support for those who would look below the surface stupidities of the Gilded Age and recognize that these years saw the emergence of urban problems relevant to the concerns of today's metro-Americans. In Stamford as on the national scene there was political lag and a failure of synchronization between changing economic realities and the evolution of political institutions, but it is one of the strengths of Feinstein's study that she is aware of the novelty and number of challenges that beset the old political structures and is concerned to understand rather than condemn the failures of institutional response.

There are other strengths characteristic of this carefully written and well documented study. Feinstein's analysis is marked by maturity as well as moderation. While analyzing patterns of geographic, class, and ethnic division, she avoids a simplistic or monocausal explanation for the deadlocks that frequently marked the Stamford political scene. Feinstein uses statistical data to illustrate and not avoid evaluation, and she makes a determined effort to compare developments in Stamford with those of other cities. My major quarrel with Feinstein arises over a matter of emphasis. Stamford's faltering response to community social responsibilities was possibly less the result of the town-meeting system than the amateur tradition of politics, the private philanthropic ethic, and the penny-pinching suspicions of the shrinking agricultural component of the population. Feinstein does not ignore these inhibiting factors, but her emphasis is upon the weaknesses of institutional structure.

Whatever one's opinion about the relative importance of social values and institutional constraints, few readers will fail to acknowledge the importance of Feinstein's work not only as a case study of Stamford but also as a supplement to studies that have recently been written on other New England cities. When juxtaposed, such case studies have a cumulative value for the student of Gilded Age politics. They serve as a necessary corrective to the spleen of Matthew Josephson or the well-worn generalizations of James Bryce.

RICHARD E. WELCH, JR.
Lafayette College

The American Condition. By Richard N. Goodwin. (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1974. Pp. 407. $10.00.)

The surprising thing about this book is its pessimism. It is surely not common for a rather young American fresh from the pleasures of intimate involvement in two presidencies to find "the American condition" so hard. Not even the murder of the two men he loved the best and loved working for the most (John and Robert Kennedy) need have had such a disheartening effect. Missing from this book is not only the remembrance of earlier exhilaration but also the aim of inciting others to action. There is no sense of resuming a mission. It is not that Goodwin disowns the substance of his past. Rather, Goodwin now believes that any serious effort to change society by political means must fail. "Many of us who worked in the White House during the early sixties may have been victims of the anxiety for place and recognition; but ambition also extended to the desire to 'make a difference,' to use this force—whose existence was an article of faith—in order to enhance human well-being" (pp. 338-9). The reforms came to little. What Goodwin has only lately seen is that "the inability to exercise authority is almost infallible proof that it does not exist" (p. 339). Goodwin refers here and there to his new life in Maine;

indeed *The American Condition* sometimes seems like an antipolitical pastoral.

What is the trouble? What is the American condition? The larger answer that Goodwin gives is that the source of our woe is found in the devotion of our culture to a private and self-absorbed individualism with a corresponding loss of the sense of community. Much of the first part of the book deals with the growth of individualism since the Renaissance. Goodwin makes some unconvincing references to the rootedness of medieval life, and thus shows, as others show, how the hunger for community can lead to unhistorical and reactionary sentiments. The analysis also suffers from an excess of eloquence: too many artful phrases for too little freshness of perception concerning modern man. One begins to suspect the writer who moves easily from century to century, from idea to idea. The easy movement turns out to be that of someone who dare not stay long with any one consideration if he is to avoid the disclosure of his philosophical infirmity. In writing these pages Goodwin was simply not hard enough on himself: he is presumptuous. If the whole book were what the first third of half is, it would be a disaster.

Which is not to say that what follows is as patiently worked out as the theme requires. Still there is some power, some suggestiveness, and also some poignancy. The smaller answer, that is, the less self-dizzying answer that Goodwin gives to the question of the source of our woe, is that our economic system imprisons us in unhappiness and closes us off from happiness. The system is not only injurious despite the affluence it provides, it also obstructs the emergence of a humane way of life. The material conditions exist for an unalienated community of free persons, but the present system kills the opportunity. The horror of American life lies as much in failing to be what it might be, as in being what it is.

Goodwin's indictment resembles Marcuse's. But there is also divergence. At least some of the time Marcuse blames the few. Goodwin does not: he blames the system. What does it mean to blame the system? It is tough to extract a satisfactory answer from Goodwin's book. It would seem that the system is everybody; it would also seem that the system is nobody, an impersonal force or tendency that exerts itself apart from human volition, perhaps even from human agency. Goodwin speaks as he does of "system" because he wrongly thinks that the unconscious, the semiconscious, the habitual, the inculcated, the unexamined, the dutiful, and the role-governed are not psychological phenomena; that action proceeding from them is not human action. Goodwin could have made much of the persistence of forms of human conduct without indulging people in the undeserved feeling that they lack choice, or that what they do just happens.

Goodwin puts it plainly at one point in a key sentence. He says, "To a large extent the traditional profit motive has been replaced by the craving for expansion. This is the logically inescapable goal of the corporation as end in itself. It is a shared and linking element in the interests of managers, workers, capital and the organization" (p. 285). A widespread *acceptance* of the organizational code thus marks our society. Security, comfort, psychic gratification, and the approval of others reinforce that code with barely a break. There is nothing impersonal, and something only partly mysterious, in our condition.

If we want a metaphor, we can say that we are under a spell, and that only some deep shock or catastrophe, or some wondrous invention or discovery, or some wild movement of enthusiasm, or some other matter not now nameable, can break the spell, can break the hold of a bad life, but a bad life sufficiently pleasurable, and, what is more, a life kept going by a daily renewal of consent.

The quarrel with Goodwin's metaphysic aside, much in the second part of the book is to be commended for its cumulative force. He contributes to a mode of analysis which Galbraith has publicized. He leaves us with an intensified loathing of our universal complicity in bureaucratization. And then, instead of trying to charm us into hope, he produces his pages on the futility of reformist politics. Against the massed strength of our acceptance, adversary action is almost frivolous. He says, "If some find this work cheerless it is only because analysis unveils the unprecedented magnitude of the coercive power which confronts assertions of the awareness of human possibilities which, although suppressed, are fixed attributes of human existence. Cheerlessness, therefore, is not a conclusion but a preparation. To be cheerful is to accept, and one who accepts is forever without hope" (p. 396). At the last, his eloquence is not too much.

GEORGE KATEB

Amherst College

Supreme Court und Politik in den USA: Fragen der Justiziabilität in der höchstrichterlichen Rechtsprechung. By Walter Haller. (Bern: Verlag Stämpfli & Cie., 1972. Pp. xxvi, 384. DM 65.)

Dr. Walter Haller, now a member of the faculty of law and political science at the University of Zürich, Switzerland, spent the year 1969 in Ann

Arbor, Michigan, where he enjoyed the guidance of that eminent constitutional law scholar, the late Professor Paul G. Kauper. The result of that year's sojourn at the University of Michigan law school is an excellent study of the problem of justiciability as it has been handled by the Supreme Court of the United States.

Of the book's five chapters, the first two are essentially introductory, outlining the constitutional system and setting forth the origins and uses of judicial review. The third chapter—almost half of the book—begins with a discussion of such matters as the "case or controversy" requirement, advisory opinions, declaratory judgment, standing, and judicial self-restraint, and then explores at length and in considerable detail the doctrine of "political questions." Of the final two chapters, the fourth takes up the reviewability of administrative acts, while the fifth seeks to set the preceding discussion in a broader context. Here the author leans, not surprisingly, on Kauper's numerous publications and, with Kauper, assumes a rather detached point of view.

Like most continental jurists, Dr. Haller is concerned with the concept of the *Rechtsstaat* and how it is translated into reality. When viewed in this perspective, judicial review represents the ultimate in a people's commitment to government by laws. "The separation of powers, which is to be deduced from the Constitution, is not an end in itself. One has to go back to the basic values underlying the concept [of separation of powers], foremost among which is the limitation of all political power by the law. This precisely is the purpose which judicial review serves" (p. 322).

The debates which periodically rage around the Court involve not so much the questions of *whether* judicial review should be exercised but rather of *how* it should be exercised. Haller has drawn on virtually all recent discussions of this question. Alexander Bickel, Charles Black, Learned Hand, Robert McCloskey, Herbert Wechsler, and numerous others are not only cited and quoted but their arguments are dissected and skillfully criticized. (In fact, Haller's bibliography of more than 250 titles on judicial review and related questions is as good as any I have seen in recent years.) His own reasoning takes Haller to a conclusion that is founded on Cardozo's description of *The Nature of the Judicial Process:*

> In particular, it is the judge who appreciates the subjective elements in judicial decision-making and who does not surrender to the illusion of perfect neutrality who is most likely to keep his likes and dislikes in check. The same judge is also best able to make responsible use of the freedom he enjoys when he interprets legal propositions and balances competing interests, and he will not seek refuge behind seemingly objective formulae (p. 339).

Thus, if judicial review is to serve its purpose, what is needed are justices cast in Cardozo's mold.

But is not the "political question" one of these "seemingly objective formulae"? Haller reviews the cases from *Luther* v. *Borden* to *Powell* v. *McCormack* and concludes with Corwin that "the doctrine of political questions signalizes an early concession by the Court itself at the expense of the strict logic of judicial review" (quoted on p. 369). That institution—judicial review—represents a withdrawal from an absolutist concept of democracy. The Court's practice with respect to "political questions," by contrast, represents a pulling back from the absolutes of the concept of judicial review. Because the Court's effectiveness depends on the respect it enjoys, it strengthens its own position by a deliberate denial of its own omnicompetence.

Two reflections come to mind. One is the obvious contrast between this book and Philippa Strum's recent *The Supreme Court and Political Questions.* The latter is an avowedly political analysis though Ms. Strum uses her legal materials with the skill of the expert. Haller has written a legal study but much of his discussion acknowledges that policy values are ever-present. Regrettably, our Swiss colleague's work is not likely to be translated into English: scholars concerned with the role of the Court in our society would profit if they could read it in conjunction with Dr. Strum's.

The other thought triggered by the reading of Dr. Haller's book is that it represents a fine testimonial to the benefits of scholarly travel which we have seen intensify over the last two decades. I do not know that anyone has counted the doctoral dissertations and *Habilitationsschriften* (Haller's is one of the latter) submitted to universities abroad and based on research done in this country. More often than not, the academic bookkeeping systems of our universities take little cognizance of the effort contributed by the American professor as he or she guides the foreign scholar through the vicissitudes of our academic folkways. Hence it is pleasing to see Dr. Haller acknowledge his debt to Paul Kauper—a great scholar and fine gentleman whose passing in the fall of 1974 is mourned by students of American constitutional law, be they in Ann Arbor or in Zürich.

FRANCIS H. HELLER
University of Kansas

The Political Elite and the People: A Study of Politics in Occidental Mindoro. By Remigio E. Agpalo. (Manila: College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, 1972. Pp. 414. No price indicated.)

The reader expecting a neat case study of elite politics in a Philippine province will be pleasantly surprised at the rich variety of ideas and data in this book. In the years since the early 1960s when Professor Agpalo started writing this book, a number of approaches have become fashionable in interpreting Philippine politics. These have been incorporated in the text, sometimes with vexing kaleidoscopic effects. In his methodological notes, Agpalo admits that the book gradually evolved and that "no rigorous outline was used to develop it in its present form. . . . it just grew out of a dialectical process and serendipitous development. . . ." (p. 394). This lack of deliberate method shows in the book's organization.

Agpalo's classical political science roots are seen in his tendency to quote authors and authorities with almost scriptural voracity. The chapter on the "conceptual framework" in the study of community power and politics, for example, starts with Aristotle's *Athenian Constitution,* and, by the third footnote, has already cited 17 authors and 12 works on communities from Dahl's New Haven to Warner's Yankee City. Nor is Agpalo's scholarship confined to political science. He quotes as avidly Tennyson's *Ulysses* ("to follow knowledge like a sinking star") and Shelley's harangue to the people of England ("rise like Lions after slumber"). The myriad thoughts and ideas incorporated by Agpalo in his work serve as hypotheses, testimonials, confirmations, and denials. Aside from revealing the expanse of Agpalo's readings, they also document the rather eclectic influences on his own view of politics and development. The wonder of this is that the book's parts do hang together. He may preface a description of the province's ruling political family with "variations on a theme by Thrasymachus" from Plato's *Republic,* or start a simple case study of a barrio leader's changing political party affiliations with a full verse from the *Trojan Women* by Euripides, but, somehow, through some curious creative process, he drives home his points.

One complaint that may be aired about this scholarship by citation is, that while it clarifies Agpalo's intellectual heritage, it is sometimes hard to tell where the cited ideas end and where Agpalo's true insights and ideas begin. Another minor complaint is that practically all the citations are for foreign works. Agpalo does make a quick review of community power structure studies in the Philippines, in the mandatory "review of the literature" section, but he never picks up these studies later, to compare or contrast their findings with his own.

The other characteristic of Agpalo's book is that it interprets elite-mass politics in terms of traditional attitudes, belief patterns, and behavior attributed to lowland Filipinos by social anthropologists. The approach, introduced and popularized by Frank Lynch, Mary Hollnsteiner, George Guthrie, and others, attempts to interpret political behavior through such concepts as *hiya* (shame), *bahala na* (come what may), *pakikisama* (smooth interpersonal relations), and other beliefs and attitude patterns allegedly held by Filipinos. While this approach has added insight into what lies behind Philippine political behavior, it has not been very successful in operationalizing how the belief patterns are translated into Philippine political events.

Pursuing this social-anthropological approach, Agpalo likens Philippine politics to the traditional *pandanggo sa ilaw,* a folk dance where performers delicately balance lighted oil lamps on their hands and head. The analogy is apt, but it adds little to true understanding of Philippine politics. Agpalo contends that provincial politics in the Philippines is "based primarily on manipulation and maneuvering, with patronage serving as a principal means of leverage" (p. 164). He likens the *pandanggo* dancers to the political elite and counterelite. The people are the dance audience. The oil lamps are the power and status of the political elite. The imagery is colorful, but when Agpalo tries to describe how elite politicians actually get and retain power, the analogy to the *pandanggo* becomes strained and is soon quietly abandoned.

The other emphasis discernible in this work owes much to public administration and management studies, especially the use of the case method. It is not by chance that Agpalo's book was published by the College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, which has pioneered these approaches in the country. In presenting his case studies, Agpalo has shown close attention to details. His description of how specific political and administrative decisions were carried out in Occidental Mindoro provides a wealth of data and vivid examples. But admirable as Agpalo's efforts have been, he still has to face the difficult problem of trying to generalize from a number of individual case studies to the larger understanding of how politics is played in the Philippines.

To sum up, this book provides many facts and insights on elite/mass politics in a specific province in the Philippines. It is less successful in its efforts, and claims, to provide a broader understanding of Philippine political behavior

and, by extension, of politics in developing countries. Many of the generalizations made in the book provide an excellent starting point for further research. One of the merits of Agpalo's book is that there is such a richness and variety of suggested approaches that it may be possible to pursue further research on this topic despite the fact, that since September, 1972, when martial law was declared in the Philippines, no elections have been held in the country and hence a new ingredient has been added to Philippine politics.

APRODICO A. LAQUIAN
International Development Research Centre
Ottawa, Canada

Outlines of Indian Constitutional History (British Period). By W. A. J. Archbold. (New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 1973. Pp. 367. $13.00.)

This book was first published forty-eight years ago (in 1926), and its new impression in 1973 ostensibly incorporates no changes. Its publishers believe that this work provides "basic materials for study and further research" about the constitutional framework "upon which the modern states of India and Pakistan now largely rest." The late Professor Archbold, a Cambridge University scholar, had spent several years in India. He had served as the Principal of Aligarh, Dacca, and Muir Central Colleges and was a fellow of the University Senates of Calcutta, Benares, and Allahabad. At the time of writing this book, Professor Archbold was back in Cambridge as Whewell University scholar.

This work covers a period between the advent of the East India Company to the port towns of India (1600 A.D.) until the passage of the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms (1919) by the British Parliament, devoting much attention to the Reform Act of 1919 and its advocacy. The most fascinating phase of Indian constitutional history (1919 to 1947) is obviously beyond the scope of this treatise, and someone looking for a comprehensive history of the development of the Indian Constitution should look at the other standard works in this field, like Arthur B. Keith's *A Constitutional History of India* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1969; Sir Maurice Gwyer and A. Appadorai's *Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution, Vol. I and Vol. II* (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1966); C. H. Alexandrowicz's *Constitutional Development of India* (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1957); Granville Austin's *Indian Constitution—Cornerstone of a Nation* (London: Oxford University Press, 1966); and Gurmukh N. Singh's *Landmarks in Indian Constitutional Development* (Delhi: Atma Ram and Sons, 1959).

Nevertheless, the period covered by this work included significant happenings in the political history of South Asia. The Mutiny of 1857, rise of Indian National Congress, communal representation in the Indian Councils and the entry of Mahatma Gandhi into domestic politics in India were some of the landmarks of this period. The manner in which Professor Archbold deals with these developments may be one way of analyzing his forty-eight-year-old scholarship. His analysis of the Mutiny of 1857 will be disappointing to most Indian historians (who have glorified it as the First War of Indian Independence). The Sepoy Mutiny is dismissed cursorily by Archbold:

> The Mutiny which, whatever else may be said or thought about it, can in no sense be considered to represent any constitutional aspirations. In that the mutineers desired to get rid of English control, it may be said to have a slight connection with later political movements; but it would be truer to say that the latter are more Western than Eastern in origin, and owe their existence very largely to the ideas introduced after the Mutiny, and introduced not by Indians but by Englishmen (p. 113).

On the question of communal representation in the Indian legislatures, introduced by the Indian Councils Act of 1909, the author seems to have no comments. He does not fail, however, to cite the viewpoint of the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms in this respect, which he probably shared. This report says, "Any system of Communal electorate is a very serious hindrance to the development of the self-governing principles. It is opposed to the teaching of history, it perpetuates class division and it stereotypes existing relations. But that Communal electorate should be maintained for Mohammedans in provinces where they are in minority. The same system may be extended to the Sikhs of Punjab. For other minorities the method of nomination may suffice" (p. 177).

This book was obviously written during a turbulent period of Indian constitutional history. Gandhi had just put into practice his doctrine of *satyagraha* in opposition to the provisions of the Government of India Act 1919 (Montagu-Chelmsford Reform). The British civilians were trying political offenders without juries under the provisions of the Rowlett Act. But Professor Archbold makes only a passing reference to these happenings in his preface, saying, "As a lover of India I can only express the hope that the clouds will pass and we shall live to see India in the enjoyment of a government which will satisfy her aspirations whilst it recognizes her connection with, and obligation to, that greater whole [Pax Britannica? M.M.] of which she forms and must form a part" (p. 6).

Students of Indian constitutional history can guess what has gone wrong with Archbold's attempt to sketch an objective analysis of the constitutional development of India. I believe that Professor Archbold was unwilling to deal with the political realities associated with constitutional forms, at least in the case of India. He was trying to write a descriptive but formal history of Indian constitutional documents and not a politico-legal analysis of the evolution of Indian polity.

Finally, Archbold's prognosis about the future of government and politics in India may seem most interesting to the contemporary students of Indian political behavior. Writing in 1926 Professor Archbold said,

> Those who read India's long and troubled history will, however, be prepared for the statement that it is not probable that Western ideas of representative government and the party system will be what India will finally adopt, and that it is much more probable that a bureaucracy, largely Indian in composition, will be, for many years at least, the form that India will find most suited to her needs and traditions (p. 344-45).

MANINDRA K. MOHAPATRA
Old Dominion University

Cultural Revolution and Industrial Organization in China: Changes in Management and the Division of Labor. By Charles Bettelheim. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974. Pp. 128. $6.95.)

This slim volume by the noted French radical economist sets out to gauge the impact of the Cultural Revolution on the nature of management and the social division of labor in Chinese industry. Relying mainly on materials gathered during a trip to the People's Republic in August and September 1971, Professor Bettelheim argues that the Cultural Revolution at its deepest level was an attempt to transform perennial patterns of inequality and hierarchy by eradicating the differences between performance tasks and administrative tasks, between mental and manual work, and between town and countryside.

The book falls into four general sections. In the first chapter, Bettelheim recounts his conversations with members of the revolutionary committee of the General Knitwear Factory in Peking in 1971. The second chapter provides a short introduction to the main principles of Chinese planning. Chapters 3 and 4 ascend to a higher theoretical plane in a discussion of the major ideological goals of the Cultural Revolution and the ways in which it has contributed to the revolutionizing of social relationships in the Chinese economy. A postscript, mainly devoted to the baleful influence of the "ultra-leftists," is added to correct what Bettelheim sees as certain overly deterministic and mechanistic impressions which the reader may have derived from the main body of the book.

It would be easy, but inappropriate, to mount an academic high horse and criticize this book for lacking dispassionate objectivity. The book should be judged on its own terms as an ardent exposition and defence of Maoist views of the meaning of the Cultural Revolution and its impact on the Chinese economy. The criteria for evaluation used here are thus twofold: does Bettelheim provide an accurate picture of the ways in which the Chinese perceive the meaning of their own revolution in the early 1970s and, second, does he present this picture in ways which are cogent and comprehensible to his readers?

On the first count, the book succeeds insofar as it is largely reportage based on Bettelheim's travel notes. For social scientists interested in Chinese views on industrial management and "ultra-leftism" in 1971, this book is a useful source. But the coherence of the analysis is plagued by the ever-changing political realities of China. The tribulations of maintaining a stable Maoist perspective outside China are evident in Bettelheim's work. Since the definition of "correct" lines or policies is constantly changing in the complex ebb and flow of Chinese politics, the China which Bettelheim described approvingly in his book with Charriere and Marchisio, *La Construction du Socialisme en Chine*, published in 1965, is now described as having been distorted by Liu Shao-chi's "bourgeois political line"; the mass participation and Red Guard activity of late 1966 and 1967 are now clouded by imputations of ultra-leftist or Lin Piao manipulation. Even Bettelheim's description of the Peking Knitwear Factory is problematic insofar as it was based on events before the fall of Lin Piao. In fact, one cadre interviewed cites Lin with approbation. In his postscript, however, Bettelheim is clearly trying to "catch up" with more recent changes in Party leadership by appending criticisms of Lin Piao which contradict the words of the factory cadre in 1971. Bettelheim would have strengthened his book if he had disengaged himself to a greater extent from the ideological emphasis of the hour and taken a broader and more critical perspective—one that deals with the ambiguity and fluidity inherent in terms like the "proletarian revolutionary line"—instead of reifying such terms as absolute entities of unambiguous content.

On the analytical side, the book has serious limitations. First, its language and style would be

opaque to most American readers, social scientists or non-specialists, who are not accustomed to the distinctive terminology of Chinese politics. For example, it is clear to politically literate Chinese that, by virtue of the idea of "left in form but right in essence," political behavior which appears extremely "left" may merely be a disguised form of the "bourgeois line." For Americans, however, such dialectical inversions are difficult to fathom. Bettelheim would have strengthened his argument by paying more attention to the interpretation of this often confusing and obscure terminology.

Second, the account suffers from a lack of cross-fertilization with other contemporary work in the field of Chinese industrial management and economic division of labor. Bettelheim does not mention Andors's excellent work on the subject (for example, in the latter's contribution to E. Friedman and M. Selden (eds.), *America's Asia* [New York: Pantheon, 1971]), nor Rensselaer Lee's work on the relation between politics and technology (for example, in his contribution to Chalmers Johnson (ed.), *Ideology and Politics in Contemporary China* [Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1973]). Though his theoretical chapters are provocative and focus on key intellectual and political problems, they are often too abstract to be cogent and fall short of Wheelwright and MacFarlane's more comprehensive and systematic treatment of the same topic in *The Chinese Road to Socialism* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970).

In fact, the lack of references and the generally loose structure of the book show signs of a "quickie." It is to be hoped that Bettelheim will follow up this initial effort to analyze the Chinese economy after the Cultural Revolution with a more concrete, critical and well-thought-out account which will treat the subject with the complexity it deserves.

D. Gordon White
Australian National Univesity

Kenya, the Politics of Participation and Control. By Henry Bienen. (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1974. Pp. viii, 215. $10.00.)

In this comparatively short volume Professor Bienen deals with two of the most important themes of contemporary African politics, popular participation in the structure of decision making, and, as a counterpart theme, the exercise of control by government to bring about specific political and economic ends. His thesis, as he succinctly puts it, is ". . . that Kenya is a participant society in important respects, despite a curtailing of political competition and a fall off in voting turnout." He continues, "I also argue that Kenya's leaders are sensitive to rural demands despite the real limits on participation that exist" (p. 21).

The key to the question of participation lies, of course, in the definitional context within which the term is used. Much scholarly ink has been consumed in the attempt to prove the case for or against the existence of genuine popular participation in the African single-party systems that have come and gone in the nearly two decades since independence swept the colonies out of existence. One of the major difficulties in answering the question of the reality of participation in a specific country has frequently been that the content of the word has been supplied by non-African observers from the framework of their own experience. Obviously, the easiest way to observe participation is in the electoral process, but this in itself can lead to endless debate about whether the voters are, in fact, being offered meaningful choices or, indeed, whether they understand the process at all.

Professor Bienen puts his finger on the heart of the matter when he observes that "people may get what they want with relatively low levels of participation" (p. 11), or, it might even be added, with little or no evident participation at all. For large numbers of rural Africans, in Kenya or elsewhere, participation in the decisions made by their new governments was not a primary demand at independence, nor has it been since. On the contrary, the peasant farmer frequently wanted to have as little to do with government as possible, except when there was a real expectation that a specific need could be met by applying to the nearest authority. Government, for many farmers, tended to be seen largely as the taxing agent, and one was well advised to have as little contact with it as possible for fear that some new, and usually undesirable, levy might be imposed. Government, in other words, was seen more as a harassing and obstructing force than as an agent of constructive advance; hence one of the farmer's objectives was to keep government off his back so he could get on with his work.

Barazas (village public meetings) from time to time were acceptable, and were seen as socially enjoyable and occasionally informative gatherings, but forced involvement in discussion of issues which were seen as irrelevant was regarded as a waste of valuable time. As Bienen points out, in Kenya many of the critical decisions which ultimately affected the rural population were, in any case, made by groups outside the country over which any degree of popular participation in decision making would have had little or no influence.

The author points up in substantial detail the peculiarly important role played by the Civil

Service in Kenya as a vehicle of participation. Any visitor to rural Kenya cannot have helped observing that for most rural Kenyans any direct contact with government was with the provincial administration, not with local party headquarters, since the administration was able to produce results whereas the party could not.

Professor Bienen's chapter on party politics stresses that Kenyatta ruled not through the party but through the Civil Service. It would be difficult to quarrel with his observation that Kenyatta's preeminent role has been maintained only by eschewing KANU as a directing mechanism. Unlike the case in other African countries, in Kenya the single-party was never regarded by the leadership as a vehicle for control, in part because of the inability of the party to overcome continuing ethnic divisions. Even within the major ethnic group, factional divisions within the Kikuyu, combined with personal gain for a few members of the elite, have frustrated the government's plans to build a class of farmers with small holdings.

As a generalization, the author's conclusion that the government "has been responsive to the necessity of a farming existence for the great majority of Kenyans" (p. 189) cannot be faulted. Perhaps no other African country has devoted so much of its own resources and of outside aid to rural development, and the results, in terms of popular satisfaction with government and of political stability have been evident, despite the decline in the outward signs of participation.

This is a valuable study, both for its analysis and for its documentation. For the reader familiar with Kenya over the past decade, it does not adduce a startlingly new thesis nor substantially new documentation. But it points up and brings together aspects of Kenyan political and economic development which are indispensable to a full understanding of the Kenyan political process. For this, as well as for the cogent argument of his analysis, social scientists concerned with Kenya, and indeed with many other African states, are in Professor Bienen's debt.

L. GRAY COWAN
State University of New York at Albany

Land or Death: The Peasant Struggle in Peru. By Hugo Blanco. Translated by N. Allen. (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1972. Pp. 178. $6.95, cloth; $2.45, paper.)

In *Land or Death,* Hugo Blanco, the greatest revolutionary to operate in the valleys of southern Peru, chronicles the oftentimes coincident campaign for unionizing La Convención and Lares peasants and for fomenting a Trotskyist revolution in Peru. The book is divided into two parts. The first contains a cursory statement on the "peasant campaign" (1958–63), an explanation for the absence of a revolutionary party, a sketch of the confrontation between Stalinism and Trotskyism in the peasant movement, an exposition on the "dual power" concept, an account of the armed struggle, and a report on the trial of Blanco, along with other revolutionaries, after their cause failed. Part II of *Land or Death* consists of other prison writings, useful in obtaining a pardon for Blanco. They kept alive the Trotskyist organization in Lima and, perhaps, succored the peasant cause in La Convención that refused to wither.

A Quechua-speaking mestizo from a middle-class family of Cuzco, Blanco became a Trotskyist while studying agronomy in Argentina. Upon returning to Peru, he became active in the Revolutionary Workers Party—POR. An early assignment for the fledgling was to go to his native Cuzco to organize urban workers. Once there, the new organizer found more militancy among the peasants of La Convención-Lares, who had begun to protest their misery through syndicates. Joining the peasant union of Chaupimayo, Blanco radicalized it so thoroughly that it became the vanguard organization and also the focus of Trotskyist action in La Convención-Lares. Many more unions were organized, schools and health centers built, lands "invaded" for distribution among peasants who worked them, and militias formed for protecting such seizures. Subsequently, government decrees recognized land seizures in the La Convención area. The new owners were expected to pay for their properties at officially established prices. Obligatory work on the remaining estates was abolished.

For much of what went wrong with the Peruvian revolution that he envisioned, Blanco blamed an "underestimation of the Leninist principle of constructing a Bolshevik-type party" (p. 75). In explaining the lack of emphasis on building the party, he cites a negative influence of the Castro Cuban revolution and his own "serious syndicalist deviation" (pp. 36-7). The major obstacle that Blanco found in applying the Trotskyist Transitional Program to the needs of poor peasants in Cuzco Department was the confrontation between that plan and a "minimum program" espoused by the reformist Moscow-liners. After defending his controversial employment of "dual power," Blanco proceeds to explain his resort to guerrilla warfare in La Convención, even though he had a decided preference for mobilizing the masses to carry out the inevitable armed struggle for power (p. 63). Following his capture, a worldwide amnesty campaign saved Blanco from the firing squad; he was pardoned in

1970 after nearly eight years in prison.

Land or Death is an insightful and self-critical account of why the Trotskyist Blanco failed to lead his political movement to power in Peru although he coincidentally assisted a radicalized peasant union movement in La Convención and Lares to gain major changes in the oppressive land tenure system of that area. Of the revolutionary groups active in Peru in the 1960s, only Blanco and the Left Revolutionary Front—FIR—worked closely with the peasantry. While the efforts of Blanco in La Convención served as a catalyst for the radicalization of the unionizing drive in other parts of the Department of Cuzco, the case was too isolated for it to have the desired impact elsewhere. The volume by Blanco provides neither a detailed account of the peasant movement in La Convención-Lares nor a blueprint for revolutionary action by a political party in a peasant environment. This autobiographical work, however, is an important addition to the already ample bibliography on revolution, reform, and reaction in the La Convención and Lares valleys of southern Peru.

LARRY L. PIPPIN

Elbert Covell College
University of the Pacific

Laboring Classes and Dangerous Classes in Paris during the First Half of the Nineteenth Century. By Louis Chevalier. (New York: Howard Fertig, Inc., 1973. Pp. 505. $15.00.)

Professor Chevalier, in his classic work, first published in 1958, insists on the centrality of demographic (he often substitutes the adjective "biological") variables as the powerful explanatory variables for social and political events of the Restoration and July monarchy in Paris. Although he makes no systematic comparisons of this historical situation with other times and places, contextual statements make clear that Chevalier believes his thesis is applicable whenever similar conditions exist. This is true particularly, he suggests, in contemporary United States cities.

Chevalier marshals a large and complex mass of data. One part is contemporary opinion, as written by novelists, social reformers, newspapers. The other part is statistical data (also contemporary) collected by government agencies and private individuals. The urban history Chevalier writes is rich and detailed: the idea of confronting impressionistic evidence and demographic fact is an exciting one. Chevalier argues that nineteenth-century Paris was smothered by an enormous, unprecedented rural-urban migration from which grew urban pathology (miserable poverty, sickness, illegitimacy, suicide, crime, political violence). This version of an "uprooting" explanation, stated repeatedly, is that the demographic changes directly caused the urban problems, and that in both migration and consequences, there was a dramatic break with the past. The exceptionally rich sources of aroused literary opinion and social statistics were themselves consequences of the conditions.

How does Chevalier use these sources and what do they show? His presentation of literary comment—he discusses Hugo, Balzac, and Sue at length—is a synthesis of great artistry. These bourgeois authors' works are full of horror stories. They were certain that conditions had worsened in Paris in the first half of the nineteenth century. Yet similar comment, and similar judgments, can be found in sources back over the centuries. The *volume* of distressed comment increased, but did increased *comment* accurately reflect increased problems? Increased comment could simply reflect increased sensitivity on the part of the observers, higher standards of what was tolerable. It could represent better reporting procedures and more intensive policing. Increased popular circulation of newspapers and books should also be taken into account. This is not to suggest that crime and misery were not real and pervasive in Paris, but simply that Chevalier presses his point that opinion relfects reality with little consideration of alternatives.

Statistics should settle these questions. But the way Chevalier uses statistics is not very illuminating. He presents mainly aggregate statistics of population growth and various indicators of social pathology, such as crime and illegitimacy. Sometimes he gives age-specific rates. But he seldom makes systematic comparisons between the incidence of pathology and the incidence of poverty or migration, neighborhood by neighborhood, social group by social group. The quantitative measures he gives simply do not prove that crime and social pathology were a consequence of biological determinants or that these problems were increasing within affected populations as a result of increased migration into the city, as Chevalier argues.

Although he is a demographer and insists on the importance of demography, Chevalier shows little appreciation of the dynamics of population growth in this book. The simple fact that migrants became the parents of native-born Parisians belies his claim that natives and migrants were two separate and distinct populations. His claim that until the nineteenth century Paris was growing by natural increase rather than migration, and at a very slow rate, is dubious. The age pyramids of native-born and migrant populations in a period of heavy in-migration would show that migrants are young adults, natives primarily,

the very young. The urban problems Chevalier describes, illegitimacy, for example, would be concentrated among young adults. In the eighteenth century, illegitimacy was almost exclusively a problem of domestic servants. In the early nineteenth, Chevalier shows, there was a substantial migration of young women who became domestic servants. (Chevalier demonstrates the numerical importance of female migrants in domestic service, but he does not try to quantify this category of women in calculating sex ratios. This is typical of his limited use of statistics.) Higher illegitimacy rates did not necessarily mean a decline in standards of behavior but simply an increase in the number of persons of whom that behavior was characteristic—domestic servants, a vulnerable and exploited group. Unless we have comparisons by composition of the population, we cannot accept Chevalier's analysis.

The final link in Chevalier's argument—that between migration, misery, criminality, and political violence—is left unexplored. In his conclusion, Chevalier admits that those who were arrested in the nineteenth-century revolutions were largely Parisian artisans, and allows that in-migration did not change the complexion of the militant working class or its leaders. This comes almost as an afterthought. The bulk of the preceding pages is in quite another vein—insisting that migration deformed the laboring classes of Paris, made them as one with the dangerous classes, that these classes were dangerous not only in a criminal sense but also in a political sense. Despite his brilliant evocation of the period, Chevalier cannot and does not prove this tendentious theme.

LOUISE A. TILLY

University of Michigan

Groupes de pression en Belgique, Les groupes intermédiaires socio-économiques, Contribution à l'analyse comparative. By Paul H. Claeys. (Brussels: Editions de l'Universite de Bruxelles, Editions du CRISP, 1973. Pp. 414. BFr. 580.)

In a preliminary section of his book Paul Claeys (who is the chief editor of "Les Editions del l'Université de Bruxelles") maps out what he considers to be the most appropriate strategy for the study of interest groups. What is needed first, he says, is a detailed description of such groups in a given country, i.e., their formal anatomy, their relationship with political parties and the administration, their position and role in decision-making processes. In his view such a description should proceed along the lines set out in 1957 by Gabriel Almond and the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council. A second proposal is that even simple monographs should rest on a conceptual framework that makes them easily available for comparative analysis. One way to achieve this goal, the author says, is to use a structural-functional approach in studying interest groups.

It clearly was Claeys's intention to build his own analysis of socioeconomic interest groups in Belgium around this particular research strategy. Let me suggest that the failures in his work largely overshadow the moments of success.

The middle five chapters deal with labor unions, employers' associations, independent workers' unions, farmers' leagues and consumer associations. The data, collected mainly through close reading of annual reports and other periodicals, and through interviews with leaders, cover a wide range of associational characteristics and activities, such as membership, structure, financial resources, representation in legislative bodies, formal contacts with government agencies. This part of the book contains a great many facts which will doubtless be very useful to any foreign scholar of Belgian politics who keeps in mind that although the book was published late in 1973, nearly all the data relate to the year 1967.

The weakest sections in *Groupes de pression en Belgique* are those in which the author discusses theory and comes to an interpretation of his empirical findings. It is quite clear what has gone wrong. On several occasions Claeys preaches the structural-functional gospel, but when it comes to a precise description of the political functions socioeconomic interest groups may have, he only refers to "their role as intermediaries in channeling political demands and participation" (p. 50). A look at the bibliography can help us to understand this paradox. There is one reference to Gabriel Almond, namely his 1958 article in the *American Political Science Review* (Vol. 52, 270-282). Claeys apparently did not profit from Almond's famous elaboration of the functional approach in Almond and Coleman (1960), Almond and Verba (1963), *World Politics* (17 [1965] 183-214) and Almond and Powell (1966), to name but four of his later publications. There is something strange in this omission in a book that on its cover promises the reader the story of a study "inspired by the research program proposed in 1957 by G. A. Almond."

Such doubts are reinforced by a number of additional omissions. In his final chapter Claeys concludes that both leaders and members of the interest groups he studied rarely consider articulation of demands and participation as the main functions of such associations. He adds to this a

second conclusion: socioeconomic interest groups in fact do play a great variety of other roles. They are, in other words, multifunctional (p. 334). One may say that Claeys implicitly describes a well-known characteristic of "consociational democracies," namely their poor internal boundary maintenance and weak functional specialization (see A. Lijphart, *The Politics of Accommodation,* Berkeley, 1968). Belgium has been depicted as a strong case for the consociational democracy type (see H. Daalder, *World Politics,* 26 [1974], 604-621). But, again, a look at the bibliography of *Groupes de pression en Belgique* reveals that the author has missed here an important development in the study of political systems. At first, I thought that the omission was due to the obsoleteness of Claeys's reading list (out of 120 publications cited, only eight were published after 1968). But on closer view a clearer picture emerges. Of all the authors known for work on the consociational democracy theme only V. R. Lorwin is cited. What is so remarkable about this citation is that it refers to an article that was published in French.

This brings us to a major criticism: Claeys's book is crippled by parochialism. His structural-functional theory and his interpretation of Belgian politics are overwhelmingly based on the works of his colleagues at the Université Libre de Bruxelles or on publications written in French. Not only did Claeys thus fail to profit from the works of his fellow political scientists at the Flemish universities in Belgium, he also skipped a major development in the comparative analysis of small European democracies, such as Austria, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Belgium: namely, their description as systems of segmented pluralism which reach political stability through inter-elite accommodation, neutralization of majority rule and extensive autonomy of all subcultural segments and interest groups. Such shortcomings are hardly tolerable in a book that, according to its subtitle, aims to be a contribution to comparative politics.

L. HUYSE

University of Leuven, Belgium
and
Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study

Modern Australia in Documents (Two Volumes). By F. K. Crowley. (North Pomfret, Vt.: David & Charles, 1973. Pp. 625, 620. $17.50 each.)

Australia has attracted less attention from American political scientists than might be expected. A handful of American scholars have investigated various features of the Australian political system. There is some awareness in this country of the excellent work being done by a limited number of Australian researchers. And in both countries the efforts of political scientists have been supplemented by rather more extensive research by sociologists. But most American scholars remain largely ignorant of Australia and its politics. This ignorance is regrettable, for Australian politics is of intrinsic interest and might also shed valuable light on certain questions of comparative analysis. There are sufficient similarities with the United States to permit the impact of different political institutions to be examined with some confidence. And Australia offers intriguing opportunities to investigate the transfer of political institutions. The Australian versions of British (and in some cases American) institutions can be surprising to those familiar only with the original models.

An extensive collection of Australian documents might well be useful to American scholars interested in that country. Professor Crowley, an historian presently at the University of New South Wales, has certainly gathered a large assortment. These two volumes, totaling well over 1,200 pages, bring together materials on several hundred topics. These illuminate much that is of interest in Australia. Yet in some respects the book is a disappointment.

Crowley's emphasis is on social, economic, and cultural change more than on political developments. His book's great merit may be its valuable insight into cultural change as seen through Australian eyes at various points in the twentieth century. The political side, however, is dealt with rather less effectively. In contrast with most documentary histories, this one gives little attention to formal governmental materials. There are some excerpts from parliamentary debates but almost none from statutes, administrative regulations, constitutional amendments, treaties, and judicial decisions (the last often as important in Australian politics as in the United States). All of these tend to be ignored or to be dealt with at second hand via newspaper commentary, memoirs, etc. The original sources would often be much more useful.

Indeed, a high proportion of the entire collection consists of items from the press. Too many of these are trivial and of little interest to most readers, either in Australia or elsewhere. Too much space is devoted to events that attracted great attention at the time but that have little lasting significance or impact—natural disasters, spectacular crimes, impressive achievements by aviators and athletes, and appearances by celebrated entertainers. Perhaps it is important for the student to know what was exciting to his parents and grandparents (or at least to the newspaper editors of their time), but there is too much

here that was of ephemeral importance or none at all.

On the positive side, Crowley deserves credit for thoughtful headnotes that are quite helpful in placing the items in context and sometimes in giving the unsophisticated reader a critical perspective on them. In fact these notes are sometimes more informative than the selections themselves. The specifically political issues are covered through a balanced pattern of readings. Both extremes are represented, often including the Communist press, with which many Australians have been unfamiliar. To expose Australian students to views on left and right of which they might otherwise be unaware is surely to the good, though in the process the middle ground is sometimes lost sight of.

The worth of Crowley's volumes must be judged in terms of the various audiences they might reach. They are clearly not intended for the specialized researcher, who needs more extensive materials more narrowly concentrated. Their primary use will probably be as supplementary reading for Australian undergraduate history students, and they should be of considerable benefit for that purpose. They may also be helpful to American scholars largely ignorant of Australia who need to acquire some basic familiarity with its historical development since Federation. Crowley's work would certainly add flavor to any of the standard historical treatments of the subject. But the political scientist should be aware that this collection will help him more in gaining an understanding of the social and cultural context of Australian politics than in exploring the latter directly.

MURRAY CLARK HAVENS
Texas Tech University

Conquerors and Confucians: Aspects of Political Change in Late Yüan China. By John W. Dardess. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973. Pp. 245. $12.50.)

This is a welcome addition to the literature on the period known after 1271 as the Yüan. The author concentrates on the years from 1328 to 1355 (although he continues to the year of the dynasty's collapse in 1368), and tells in considerable detail the story of its course, beginning with its break with the empire founded by Chinggis and ending with its diminished power over China proper. These are the years when Confucians made themselves felt at court. They were not just the Chinese subjects, newly rising to posts of influence; they numbered also Mongols and central Asians who had lived two or three generations in China, and included both reform and conservative elements. One feature of Chinese government which Qubilai (reigned 1260-94) chose not to institute was the examination system, a device which required superior knowledge of Confucian literature. Inaugurated in 1315, by thirteen years later it had already begun to have an appreciable effect on the bureaucracy, for out of the thousands of candidates who studied the basic books only a handful were selected to be *chü-jen* (masters) and *chin-shih* (doctors). (In 1315 the quota was 300 for the first degree and 100 for the second.) When, in 1328, the emperor who had reigned for five years passed away at the summer capital, Shang-tu, the Confucian elements at the capital, Ta-tu, managed a *coup d'état*. In the next four years, in spite of a great deal of in-fighting, the Confucian gains were considerable, and led to even greater ones by 1340. A number of significant steps forward were taken: the restoration of the examination system, cancelled in 1335; relaxation of certain prohibitions; cancellation of back taxes; and the writing of the histories of the preceding dynasties of Liao, Chin, and Sung. In 1344 the Yellow River burst its banks and took a northerly course, causing widespread distress. After much disputation at court it was finally determined (1351) to cut a new bed south of the Shantung peninsula, diverting the River into it. Our author calls this "one of the greatest hydraulic projects ever undertaken in China in pre-modern times."

Fine as it was, according to Professor Dardess, the action was too late to save China for the Mongol overlords. Beginning in May 1351 (actually 1348 on the southeastern littoral) a popular rebellion began in the Huai valley, to be followed by a stream of other outbreaks. The Yüan were still militarily superior, but other forces sapped their ability to fight. Political enemies at the court impeached the reformist chancellor (who was also commanding the army in the field), forcing his dismissal. Shipments of food and other supplies up the coast from the lower Yangtze valley fell off drastically. Coinage became debased. Famine and plague in the 1340s, especially after the Yellow River break, swept over the northern provinces of Shantung and Honan, resulting as always in bandit conditions. (The author makes no mention of the fact, but the great cities in the Yangtze delta also were devastated by pestilence. The *Yüan-shih* 38.6b relates that 572,00 families suffered in 1334 alone, and other disasters followed.) Regional governments sprang up in the central and southern provinces. They fought not only the Yüan but also each other until one (the Ming) gained over all, and extinguished the dynasty.

Professor Dardess has handled his subject

expertly, helping the uninitiate with useful data on the dramatis personnae, with a table of Yüan emperors, notes, index, and a bibliography of works in six languages. I am happy to commend it.

L. CARRINGTON GOODRICH
Columbia University

World Population Policy: an Annotated Bibliography. By Edwin D. Driver. (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath & Co., 1972. Pp. 1280. $30.00.)

This bibliography presents information about a variety of materials published between 1940 and 1969 relating to population policies. The editor offers a broad definition of population policy: those actions by government and other social institutions which directly or indirectly affect the size, distribution, or composition of the population. This volume refers to works on general population and fertility policies; a second volume is planned to offer a list of materials on policies affecting distribution and composition.

Most of the entires are annotated. They are assembled according to continent, region, and country, and then according to type of policy. General population policy sections include literature about policies affecting population size. Fertility and family policy sections refer to specific policies indirectly affecting population size: abortion, contraception, sterilization, income maintenance, marriage, divorce, maternity, and social services. Appendices include a list of journals cited, an author index and a subject index. The subject index, however, is not sufficiently refined to assist the reader in easily locating a specific policy area or political variable.

Most of the studies covered are in English; therefore the materials are more complete for English-speaking countries. There are few entries for many Latin American, Asian, and African states, while there are extensive listings on United Kingdom, United States and Europe including political party literature, law commission studies, and legal studies, in addition to social science references.

The bibliography will be most useful to students of population policy. Not only does it serve as a guide to research materials, but also suggests the trends in government action over the past 35 years in population and fertility concerns, internally and crossculturally. The reference work will also assist comparative policy analysts in their efforts at conceptual development and crosscultural theory by encouraging a comparative perspective on a substantive policy area. World bibliographies on other substantive policy areas would be most welcome.

DOROTHY M. STETSON
Florida Atlantic University

Colonialism in Africa, 1870-1960: A Bibliographical Guide to Colonialism in Sub-Saharan Africa. By Peter Duignan and L. H. Gann. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973. Pp. xii, 552. $27.50.)

Two senior fellows at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, have produced a monumental "bibliographic overview" (their expression), rather than a definitive bibliography, on the ninety-year period which saw both the culmination and the disintegration of colonial systems in Africa. The authors admit that in this vast field they have had to be selective, and they venture the prediction that this volume "will probably be the last of its kind to cover colonialism in sub-Saharan Africa" (p. xi).

The *Guide* is the fifth of a series of five volumes on European colonialism in Africa, the other four being textual material (Volume 4, on colonial economics, has not yet been published). It could easily have been expanded but the authors have wisely chosen not to be comprehensive, and a reader versed in a particular discipline can readily detect omissions.

The *Guide* is divided into three sections: a Guide to Reference Materials, embracing institutions like libraries and archives; a Subject Guide for Africa in General, arranged by disciplines—although the authors acknowledge that modern African studies cannot be imprisoned by conventional disciplinary boundaries; and an Area Guide arranged geographically. Because the coverage ends with 1960, considerable space is given German and Italian sources, though German and Italian colonialism ended decades earlier.

The principal value of this painstaking work may lie in the survey of research by colonial powers and the institutions where research can be carried on. Related to this are shorter descriptions of metropolitan ministries and departments where records are housed in capitals like Brussels and Lisbon.

Recognizing that the listings are selective, one should perhaps not be critical, but possibly greater use could have been made of cross-references and doctoral dissertations. One might also question the inclusion of a novel, *Les paysans noirs*, by Robert Delavignette (p.290), although an influential one.

Despite these qualifications this *Guide* makes

a distinct contribution to African studies.

EMMET V. MITTLEBEELER
The American University

Will Japan Rearm? A Study in Attitudes. By John K. Emmerson and Leonard A. Humphreys. (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1973. Pp. 165. $3.00, paper.)

At first sight the title of this book seems to pose a question that was answered some time ago. For, as the authors acknowledge in their opening paragraph, Japan has already "rearmed." Twenty years have passed since the Japanese government, by the terms of the 1954 Mutual Defence Assistance Treaty, formally confirmed its intention "to fulfill the military obligations" of the Security Treaty with the United States. By that time Japan's postwar forces, although still very much in their infancy, had become a reality.

What John Emmerson and Leonard Humphreys are really discussing is *full* rearmament, including the acquisition of nuclear weapons. In their study of this question, or more precisely of Japanese attitudes towards it, they rightly attach importance to the findings of public opinion polls. These indicate on the whole that pacifism remains a factor of considerable significance. The polls also suggest that there is widespread support in Japan for the idea that the world's third greatest industrial state can be a great nation without possessing commensurate military power. For example, an *Asahi* public opinion survey carried out in 1972 shows only 3 per cent of respondents in favor of Japan's attaining the status of a militarily big power; 53 per cent hoped to see their country as a "welfare nation"; 20 per cent gave, as the desired aims for Japan, "aid to developing nations and peaceful coexistence." The authors of *Will Japan Rearm?* point out that opinions regarding the expansion of military power have remained remarkably consistent over the years.

This can be regarded as good news by the rest of the world, including the United States. For it has ceased to be orthodox doctrine in Washington that the Japanese must be wheedled and cajoled into enlarging their defense forces. The climate, or fashion, of opinion has altered beyond recognition since Vice-President Nixon's speech in Tokyo, when he apologized for S.C.A.P.'s insistence on writing Article 9, the pacifist clause, into the Japanese Constitution. Back in the 'fifties and early 'sixties Japanese rearmament was all the rage in the Pentagon, if not in the Department of State. The general complaint was that the Japanese were dragging their feet, spending far too small a proportion of their growing national income on their own defense. Today things seem different. Great military power for Japan, to match her mammoth economic strength, is no longer considered a particularly heartening prospect for what can still be described, without excessive irony, as The Free World.

The conclusions reached by the authors are that there will be some further development of armaments in the 'seventies, and that Japan and the United States will continue to maintain their mutual security pact for the next few years. But it is argued that "it is unlikely that Japan will decide in the foreseeable future to produce nuclear weapons" (p.111).

With this note of sober optimism, based on an admirably judicious and careful study, there can be little disagreement; particularly as one of the authors (John Emmerson) has an intimate knowledge of Japan surpassed by few, if any, Western scholars. One warning, however, has to be uttered, since the authors themselves draw attention to it. On the nuclear question they rightly dwell on the matter of prestige, pointing out that if India or Israel were to go nuclear "the prestige argument would become more persuasive even though neither country would pose a military threat to Japan" (p. 86). Since this book was written India has exploded a nuclear device. It is difficult to believe now that the prestige argument will not become rather more persuasive. It was shrewd, possibly prophetic, of Emmerson and Humphreys to have identified that possibility.

RICHARD STORRY
St Antony's College, Oxford

The Failure of Democracy in South Korea. By Sungjoo Han. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974. Pp. 251. $10.00.)

In April 1960 the capital city of South Korea witnessed waves of student demonstrators battling the police in bloodstained streets. The students won, and the dictatorial regime headed by Syngman Rhee was overthrown. Thirteen months later, armed soldiers led by a small group of young officers marched into Seoul and ousted the ineffectual civilian government of Chang Myŏn (John M. Chang). The two events mark the beginning and the end of an endeavor to establish and maintain a democratic government in Korea. The shortlived experiment began with considerable reasons for optimism: new leaders, greater political freedoms, and the promise of reform and innovation. But it failed. Why? Professor Han's study addresses itself to this basic question.

Previously published studies on South Korea

(by John K.C. Oh, Gregory Henderson, Han-Been Lee, Se-jin Kim, among others) include fairly substantial discussions on the events and personalities in the so-called "Second Republic" (1960-1961) of South Korea. But Professor Han's book is the first full-length treatise exclusively devoted to the politics of this eventful and important period.

The author's postmortem on the Chang regime is meant to be an examination of the feasibility and the viability of liberal democracy in Korea (p. xi). He avoids the simple explanation proffered by some, including Chang himself, that tends to exonerate the government leadership and blame only the military rebels for the demise of the "Second Republic." Nor does the author go to the other extreme and engage in discourses in political sociology and political culture to explain the failure of democracy in Korea. Instead, he offers a "sector analysis" as a way of "explaining short-term and middle-range political changes" (p. 6).

The author sets out to examine the behavior of, and the interrelationship between, several politically significant "sectors" of the Korean society: (1) politicians and political parties, (2) the military, (3) police, (4) bureaucracy, (5) student activitists, (6) trade unionists, and (7) business leaders. Relying largely on Korean language sources, including a few interviews, Professor Han gives a well-researched, clearly written, and eloquently presented account of intricate events and conflicting personal and group interests. He is not the first writer to discuss the development of conservative parties in South Korea, but he is highly effective in diagnosing and tracing the divisions within the Liberal party (Rhee's party) and the Democratic party (the ruling party in the "Second Republic"). Of particular interest is his description of the complex maneuvers of the Old Faction and the New Faction, both of the Democratic party, for supremacy in the new government to be created in the summer of 1960 (chapter VI). The author also presents what I believe is the best account in English of the leftist radical movements in South Korea: the Progressive party in the mid-1950s and the Socialist Mass party and others in 1960 (chapters V and VIII). There are interesting and useful discussions on other topics, such as the political role of the police (in chapters II and VII), and the dissension within the military which led to the military coup in 1961 (in chapter VII), that deserve special recognition. Throughout the study, the author displays a sharp insight and sensitivity to the conditions of life in South Korea in the first dozen years of its independence. (Professor Han was a participant in the April 1960 uprising.)

Professor Han's evaluative judgment is forthright and thought-provoking. For example, he considers that the Korean situation in 1960 was "revolutionary" (pp. 31-32); that the caretaker government headed by Foreign Minister Hŏ Chŏng in April-August, 1960 tried unsuccessfully to achieve "revolutionary goals" through "non-revolutionary" means (p. 64); that the leaders of the Old Faction of the Democratic party, Yun Po-sŏn and Kim To-yŏn, were "more often objects of manipulation by individuals of lesser stature than the prime movers of their own faction or party" (p. 115); that Chang Myŏn was timid and indecisive in situations that called for strong will and fast action (p. 117); that the Chang regime "systematically alienated various political sectors" (p. 176); and that the appointment of General Chang To-yŏng (no relation of Premier Chang) as the chief of staff of the army "proved to be the undoing of the Chang government" (p. 175). These and other statements of similar nature may be disputed on points of semantics or fact, although I, for one, find myself in general agreement with most of them. Professor Han's contribution to scholarship, however, lies primarily in his having articulated the context within which one may arrive at his own evaluation.

The most important question the author raises and attempts to answer in the book is, "Why did liberal democracy fail in Korea in 1960-1961?" The "sector analysis" that he employs throughout the study leads him to identify "the ideological and social cleavages between various opposing groups and sectors" as the key factor (p. 207). More specifically, the author argues that the loose coalition of intellectuals, students, and party politicians that had ousted Syngman Rhee and helped bring Chang into power became disenchanted when the Chang government would not punish the former pro-Rhee officials except through due process of law. Similarly, the government's inability to suppress radical leftists who became much more openly active in this period led to alienation of anti-Communist groups and, more importantly, most of the professional military; when the coup came, they merely stood by and watched the government fall. In short, the Chang government was doomed when its adherence to democratic norms at a time of extreme political polarization antagonized those who could have been its defenders. There is considerable truth in these observations. But I also feel that the author overemphasizes, in his final chapter, the political dilemma faced by the Chang government without paying due attention to the shortcomings of those in power—their ineptitude, indecisiveness, internal division. Should we not place some, if not most, of the

blame for the failure of democracy at the doorstep of the ruling group?

Professor Han's study is the first solid landmark for the systematic analysis of the "democratic interlude" in South Korea. Students of political development, as well as those interested in Korean affairs, will find its a valuable source of information and insight. Should a second edition be prepared, as I hope it will be, an additional "sector" may be suggested for Professor Han's analysis: the press. Mass media, especially the daily newspapers in Seoul, have played an extremely important role in the recent political history of South Korea. They merit special attention as we study a period when the freedom of the press prevailed to a degree higher than the preceding and the succeeding years.

HAN-KYO KIM

University of Cincinnati

Harijan: A Journal of Applied Gandhiism, 1933-1955. Vols. I-XIX. (New York and London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1973. Pp. 7885. $19.50 per volume; $370.00, set.)

For the greater part of Gandhi's public life he employed newspapers as vehicles to disseminate his teachings, to comment on ethical, political and social issues, and to respond to a wide variety of questioners, opponents, and seekers. The last of Gandhi's three newspapers was *Harijan*, which he founded in 1933 after failing to achieve nationalist goals through civil protest and after participating as the spokesman for the Indian National Congress in the London Round Table Conference. As part of a series of peace classics, Garland Publishing has reprinted the English-language edition of the newspaper that appeared with some interruptions throughout the last fifteen years of Gandhi's life and continued for another eight years. During Gandhi's lifetime, his associates, notably Mahadev Desai, edited the newspaper and reported on the leader's messages and activities. Congress party documents and official British communications found their way into *Harijan's* pages, although not so frequently as to make it a newspaper of record. Selections from *Harijan* were published some years ago by the Navajivan Publishing House, and Gandhi's writings in the newspaper will be contained in *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi*, a project of the Indian government which has thus far produced 52 volumes, covering materials up to early 1933. Thus the Garland reprint offers a complete source of *Harijan* which is not available in book form.

Among the leading subjects considered in *Harijan* are untouchability, Hindu-Muslim relations, civil disobedience, Gandhi's directives for free India, the Congress and the anti-colonial struggle, village industry and peasant uplift, self-realization, and educational and language policies. There are rudimentary indexes for these and other subjects. Gandhi treated them with a blend of modesty and authority. By 1933 he had experienced disappointments which had convinced hm that there were limits to his capacity to shape events according to his norms and goals. Yet by then he had also acquired a considerable certainty about his values and objectives. Because a review of this kind can not do justice to all of these subjects, attention is focused on the first four.

Calling the casteless "harijans" (God's people), Gandhi established the newspaper to serve the depressed millions. Although he had long been a critic of untouchability, he began to concentrate on the problem during a time of political shortfalls and frustrations. Extending the work of other Hindu reformers, Gandhi attempted with some success to persuade caste Hindus to humanize their interpretations of scripture used to justify exclusion and servitude and to incorporate *harijans* into Hindu society. Gandhi believe in an egalitarian form of *varnashramadharma*, the idealized, fourfold division of society, a construct grounded in metaphysics and socially expressed in adherence to hereditary occupations, subject to noncompetitive mobility over time (I, February 18, 1933; V, March 6, 1937).

Gandhi's views were challenged by B. R. Ambedkhar, the untouchable leader who became the chief draftsman of the Indian Constitution, and finally a Buddhist out of despair with caste Hinduism. In a classic exchange, Gandhi focused on the abuses of caste, while Ambedkhar held that caste itself was at fault (I, February 11, 1933). The difficulty of distinguishing caste and *varnashramadharma* helped Gandhi's education of caste Hindus but injured his debate with Ambedkhar. The two men also differed on remedies: Gandhi stressed appeals to sentiment and voluntarism; his affirmative action opponent looked also to political remedies and mandatory changes. Although the *varna* approach to untouchability and caste has persisted among social reformers in India after independence and although the Congress party has capitalized on Gandhi's *harijan* work, much of Ambedkhar's strategy has overtaken the Gandhian way. Together they have produced some progress without ending the disabilities of one in seven Indians.

Relations with the Muslim minority provided Gandhi with more vexing political difficulties than did the *harijan* issue. From Gandhi's post-

1919 rejection of the British connection onward he worked for attitudes and behavior supportive of a common loyalty to a national authority that would inspire trust and deal justly with the citizens of a highly pluralistic society. His understanding of nation building required a distinct improvement in Hindu-Muslim relations so that individually and collectively there would emerge a common loyalty to one nation, superior to and inclusive of subordinate fidelities and identities with their own integrity.

No secularist, Gandhi sought to create the common loyalty by teaching the ultimate unity of all religious systems, their complementarity at lower, partial levels, and intercommunal harmony and respect. Although he tried assiduously before and after 1933 to include Muslim Indians in a single anticolonial struggle, he did not secure many recruits. Gandhi's frequent claim that he was an orthodox Hindu, his use of cow symbolism and Hindu mythological referents, and his evangelical vegetarianism strengthened—against his wishes—militants in the two communities and indirectly contributed to Hindu-Muslim tensions. The transformation of Hindu-Muslim tensions into Muslim nationalism should not, however, be attributed to Gandhi in any important respect. The Muslim League's announcement in 1940 of its goal of Pakistan provoked Gandhi to respond, "I can never be a partner to vivesection" (VIII, April 13, 1940). These volumes do not add to or amend what is already known about the crucial political decisions of the 1940s leading to the subcontinent's partition. When the *Collected Works* and Nehru's papers, now being published, reach 1940-47 there may be new insights.

Although Gandhi did not urge Indians to oppose partition by resorting to his version of civil disobedience, he considered that such disobedience was an essential and legitimate expression of political participation. Controversies in 1940 and 1942 about whether India should be granted wartime independence revealed Gandhi's criteria for licit rule-breaking. They were essentially the requirements which he had developed in South Africa—the need for preliminary bargaining, adherence to comprehensive nonviolence, advance notice of intent to disobey, nonexploitation of an opponent's vulnerability derived from other sources, willingness to submit to repression, and abstention from score-settling after the event. The *Harijan* accounts of the 1942 "Quit India" campaign suggest that Gandhi did not carefully estimate the likely, unintended results of massive, nonviolent resistance—namely, sabotage and assaults. Also, by launching the campaign he violated one of his own norms because the war had made the British Empire vulnerable (e.g., IX, May 17, 1942). Renewed consideration should be given to the evidence that Gandhi's nationalism occasionally overcame his optimal ethics. Another issue deserving attention is whether there is any ethical or functional benefit to be derived from evidence in *Harijan* and elsewhere that Gandhi was a monopolist on the questions of who is qualified to initiate and to terminate group civil disobedience. His monarchical stand contrasts with much recent theory in which everyone is entitled to be a political saint.

Gandhi's journal is replete with his policy directives for free India. They conflict with the regime's adoption of central planning and birth control programs, high priority for industrialization, and the development of a nuclear explosive device. The Congress party did not follow the advice he gave in his last political writing to disband and render social service (XII, February 15, 1948). Instead the Congress became one of the world's most durable political parties, securing central power and retaining it by competitive means until recently when monopolist, emergency rule emerged. The pre-emergency record of the Congress also included dubious patronage and fund raising methods. Such practices, indeed, the entire issue of corruption in Indian politics which domestic opponents of Indira Gandhi stressed in 1974-75 until they were arrested has been left generally uncriticized by specialists on Indian affairs. Presumably there is an explanation of why Gandhian probity did not become a significant part of India's political culture, but none has been put forward.

A partial explanation lies in the course of the Gandhian movement after the Mahatma's assassination in early 1948. The last eight volumes of *Harijan* provide evidence of difficulties which divided and made the Gandhian movement less than effective in political affairs. Following Gandhi's advice, many Gandhians of whom Jayaprakash Narayan and Vinoba Bhave are the best known rejected competitive, party politics and turned to social uplift in the villages. Other Gandhians became youth workers, educationists, social theorists and guardians of Gandhi's historical reputation, notably Pyarelal. Some Gandhians rose high in the Congress party, but the more independent of the politically involved Gandhians attacked the Congress leadership from outside, as in the case of J.B. Kripalani who censured Nehru's Marxist bent and failure to condemn Communist violations of human rights abroad. In sum, the Gandhian movement diffused its energies and talents and thus was unable to focus critically on the uneven, ethical quality of the political system of

which the Congress was the main actor.

After Gandhi's passing, the Congress regime endorsed and perpetuated his imprecise ideology of social justice, illusory economic nationalism and rejection of communalism. In 1969 India held elaborate Gandhi centennial events without facing such issues as the salience of Gandhi's metapolitics. *Satyagraha*, often abused, persisted to the increasing concern of the regime which was weak in relation to social forces. The opposition's threat of mass protest and civil disobedience in June 1975 to pressure Mrs. Gandhi to resign in the midst of court appeals from her conviction on minor electoral law violations was used by the Prime Minister to justify the introduction of emergency rule, including press censorship which *Harijan* had fought under British imperialism, and the detention of thousands of critics. Yet the Indian government did not lose touch with multi-faceted Gandhism as shown in its campaign against economic crimes and stress on austerity, work and discipline. That Gandhi valued only self-imposed discipline should not be overlooked.

The written record which great men leave behind them may cause disappointment because it is incomplete, meager, self-serving, or unavailable to the scholar. *Harijan* has none of these defects. As Joan V. Bondurant says in her introduction to the set, it is a valuable resource for Indian studies and comparative analysis. The latter includes especially the areas of civil rights, religion and politics, political ethics, anticolonial movements and nation building. The sheer bulk of the record should not deter inquirers.

PAUL F. POWER

University of Cincinnati

Befolkningsfrågan och Välfärden: Debatten om familjepolitik och nativitetsfrågan under 1930- och 1940-talen. With an English Summary. By Ann-Katrin Hatje. (Stockholm: Allmanna forlaget, 1974. Pp. 284. No price indicated)

Dr. Ann-Katrin Hatje's study describes the development of family welfare policies in Sweden during the 1930s and 1940s. She shows how the welfare policy was related to the population question and the concern for Sweden's exceptionally low fertility. The study is one of the monographs in a very ambitious series dealing with Sweden during the Second World War and organized by the Department of History at the University of Stockholm. Other volumes in the series have dealt with Sweden's relationships with and reactions to Germany, the functioning of democracy during a time with a heavy focus on national defence, the Swedish Communist party, and other topics. Hatje's theme, the relationship between the population question and family welfare, has of course today a great actuality. The main importance of the study for political science and the study of public policy, however, is that it traces one of the roots of the Swedish welfare state. Of considerable political interest is also the analysis of the different policy alternatives adopted by the Swedish Social Democrats in relationship to the policy options favored by the bourgeois parties.

As Dr. Hatje points out, the Swedish population debate started with Alva and Gunnar Myrdal's book, *Kris i befolkningsfrågan* (*Crisis in the Population Question*) published in 1934. The originality of the Myrdals' book lay in the authors' bringing together two demands which had been considered incompatible at the time. On the one hand, they stressed the importance of a rise in fertility, and on the other hand they suggested a number of radical reforms in the realms of family and sexual policy. Among other things they advocated an increase in the dissemination of contraceptive methods under the assumption that no unwanted children should have to be born and that population policy should emphasize not only quantity but also quality. This combination of national and social concern caught many others by surprise and aroused especially the Conservatives, who hitherto had considered population policy as their own issue. Among their own party friends, the Social Democrats, the first reactions to the Myrdals' book was divided. It was met with some suspicion in workers' circles where neo-Malthusian views were popular but it was enthusiastically received by young academic Social Democrats who saw new opportunities for comprehensive social change.

The Myrdals' book was the most important and spectacular element in the debate which preceded the creation of government commissions on population, debates and dealings in the Riksdag, new important legislation, and changes in public attitudes towards family planning and childbirth. Meanwhile the world situation—first the expectation of a crisis, and then the external threat felt during the Second World War—had an important impact on the options chosen by different political groups. Hatje documents and describes these complex political processes clearly and consistently, separating the more important themes from the less important ones. First, in its references to the Myrdals' book, it illustrates how a new political innovation stirs up the feelings and get things moving. Second, it describes how a crucial national issue is handled in the Swedish political system, through parties, pressure groups, and formal political bodies.

Third, it shows the influence of the world crisis on the methods, tactics, and political rhetoric of population control. Fourth, it gives factual information about how some important practical solutions in the field of family welfare policy such as legislation concerning abortion were born. Last but not least, it shows how national feelings can be used as a motivation force for social reform. Thus, the book may give a clue to an understanding of the political successes of the Swedish welfare state and its dominant political party, the Social Democrats.

In the book's occasional comparative references a more systematic treatment would have been very fruitful. It is, for instance, striking how racial-biological ideas and an urge to preserve "Swedishness" formed important arguments both in the Swedish population and the welfare debate. In the 1930s such ideas were common all over Europe—not only in Nazi Germany as often thought. There certainly were important differences in public attitudes concerning hereditary defectives, racial purity, and "motherhood" in different European nations, but the differences become blurred unless a systematic comparative treatment is carried out. In any case, Hatje's book is an important source for all who strive for an understanding of the Swedish form of the welfare state.

ERIK ALLARDT
University of Helsinki (Finland)

East German Civil-Military Relations: The Impact of Technology, 1949-72. By Dale Roy Herspring. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973. Pp. 216. $17.50.)

The degree of political reliability of the military elites of the Warsaw Pact states has never failed to stimulate speculation among students of comparative Communist systems, and Dale Roy Herspring has made a valuable contribution to the subject through his pioneering study of the National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic (DDR). Relying largely on a survey of professional East German military publications, the author has assembled a wealth of statistical data grouped into the two basic categories of "technology" and "political control." Each classification encompasses a wide variety of indicators, such as the educational level of officers or the amount of horsepower per military unit under the rubric of technology. The purpose of collecting and manipulating these data was to test empirically the frequently advanced proposition that in a European Communist state the military establishment is composed of indispensable technicians who constitute a group apart in the political order. While this condition may obtain in the Soviet Union, Mr. Herspring's research offers convincing proof that the Socialist Unity Party (SED) has succeeded in creating a military "dual executive" who is both technologically proficient and ideologically dependable.

Although the dearth of literature on the GDR enhances the importance of this research, the thrust of the study does suggest several problems worthy of further investigation. For example, the central concept of "political control" does not allow a differentiation between mere passive acceptance of a regime and a genuinely positive affective relationship between the party and the military services. Indeed, some of the data presented indicate that the prospect of advanced technical training, rather than political commitment, is a major incentive in the recruitment of air force officers. Despite efforts to develop a sense of identity betwen miltary personnel and the state, the DDR remains without a convincing national tradition. Perhaps for this reason alone the government has historically been unwilling to tolerate a superficially indoctrinated army with a strong sense of group interest. Political mobilization within the framework of the SED invariably takes precedence over the requirements of purely tactical or technical training. It is notable, however, that the author did not take into account an early effort to provide the military with a political base outside the SED. In 1948, the National Democratic Party of Germany (NDPD) was founded in what was then the Soviet Zone for the purpose of forging a link between the goals of nationalism and Marxism-Leninism. The NDPD recruited heavily among former *Wehrmacht* officers and attempted to become an alternative to direct control through the SED. With the passage of time this experiment with a minor party lost significance.

The author has examined the available literature, yet the bibliography would have profited from the addition of a commentary on the accuracy and intended readership of the periodicals consulted. Although these periodicals are described in terms of content and frequency of publication, the reader is left to guess whether a given citation is to a journal of military science or to a pictorial information bulletin designed for general distribution to the troops. Nevertheless, the substantive sections are impressive, and the contribution to the theory of the "dual executive" makes Mr. Herspring's study significant reading for the student of civil-military relations in a comparative perspective.

JAMES H. WOLFE
University of Southern Mississippi

The Ombudsman in Finland: The First Fifty Years. By Mikael Hidén. (Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California, 1973. Pp. 198. $8.00.)

Mikael Hidén, Associate Professor in Public Law at the University of Turku, Finland, presents a revised and substantially shortened English version of his work on the Finnish ombudsman, *Eduskunnan oikeusasiamies*, first published in 1970. The revision is a concise, straightforward description of the office as it is institutionalized today. In a brief introduction and second chapter, Hidén places the office of ombudsman within the constitutional structure of the Finnish government. From legal documents, the author in chapter 3 outlines the salient formal features of the office—term of office, tenure, requisite qualifications, functions, staff, finances, etc. Chapter 4 focuses on the ombudsman's jurisdiction, emphasizing the extreme breadth of the Finnish office. In addition to the actions of public administrative and court officials, the Finnish ombudsman can respond to the decisions of private institutional officials performing public functions, e.g., he can reprimand the governing board of a private university for refusing to give the students access to minutes of its meetings. Hiden argues that the concept of the ombudsman as serving to check one branch of government in behalf of another is only partially correct; in practice the ombudsman protects the entire citizenry from errors committed by all officials performing public duties. Also of interest in this chapter is the functional juxtaposition of the ombudsman to the chancellor of justice.

Chapter 5 describes procedures for obtaining and processing information pertinent to cases; chapter 6 evaluates the types of actions the ombudsman can and must take in response to public complaints. In chapter 7, Hidén discusses the "low-key" public profile of the ombudsman. Unlike his counterpart in Sweden, the Finnish ombudsman seeks and receives very little media coverage. The concluding chapter 8 makes the case for a more active and effective ombudsman. Hidén argues that precedents make possible a broader jurisdiction and encourage greater activity; the willingness of the incumbent ombudsman to initiate action and to make greater use of the media are critical factors affecting the possibility of a more creative and constructive role.

Hidén intends to give a fifty-year perspective of the office in Finland. This is perhaps best gleaned from a lengthy and potentially useful appendix covering annual case load since the office's inception in 1919, types and sources of cases, background data on all of the ombudsmen, etc. Inclusion and interpretation of these data in the text would have made for a substantially more effective study. Hidén's work is a case study; no attempt is made to compare the Finnish ombudsman with his counterpart in other nations. Some comparative data would have strengthened the presentation of distinguishing features of the Finnish institution and its operation and effectiveness. The work is in essence a useful source of information on the Finnish ombudsman as it discusses laws that define the office and as it presents the effects of landmark cases on the modern institution. There is a brief bibliography citing the major literature relevant to the study of the Finnish ombudsman.

ROBERT B. KVAVIK
University of Minnesota

Decline or Renewal: France Since the 1930s. By Stanley Hoffmann (New York: The Viking Press, 1974. Pp. 529. $15.00)

Most readers of Stanley Hoffmann's latest book will derive maximum benefit from it if they ignore the claim made in his preface to have succeeded in transforming into "a coherent volume" (p. vii) its 14 essays dealing with different aspects of French political life and thought between 1956 and 1972. The coherence, he says, lies in the fact that he has grouped the essays so as to constitute four main themes, the treatment of which is intended to provide the answer to one underlying question: "What has been happening in the French political community since the 1930s?" (p. vii). The four main themes are: the meaning and impact of the war years and the Vichy regime; the postwar internal transformation of French society; the reaction of France to her postwar situation in relation to Europe and the two superpowers; and lastly, the impact on France of "the vision of one man: Charles de Gaulle" (p. ix).

In reality, the book is both less and more than is implied in this claim. It is less, because owing to some overlapping and a number of gaps, "coherence" is sought within a perhaps arbitrarily narrow scope. The themes of nationalism and of de Gaulle, for instance, are omnipresent, while others—the economic and social evolution of postwar France, political attitudes and party politics, constitutional issues—are either absent or do not emerge with any clarity. There is, for instance, no consideration of the performance of de Gaulle's successor, though M. Pompidou was elected President in 1969 and so had already held office for three years in 1972, when the two most recent of the essays were published. The book is more than its four main themes, however, in that it combines political analysis with historical, biographical, philosophical, and sociological com-

ment and reflection in a way that provides fascinating material for political scientists in general, as well as for those whose special interest is in France.

The fact that these 14 essays were written at different dates is, indeed, part of their attraction. They give much of the book the kind of immediacy that is often lost in chronological summary. And the author's selectivity—his preoccupation with topics rather than with events and with analysis rather than with description—enables him to concentrate his attention, which is never superficial, on a certain number of issues on which he has a great deal to say. For instance, the long essay on *de Gaulle as Political Artist: The Will to Grandeur*, written in conjunction with his wife, really loses nothing from the omission of the last sad year of the de Gaulle presidency, with the inevitable speculations that that period has aroused in the minds of all students of French politics. The essay gains enormously, however, from the intellectual elbowroom that the authors accord themselves in their treatment of the early years of de Gaulle.

In general, Stanley Hoffman uses these essays to do what he does best, which is to provide for his fellow-students in the field of French politics both analysis in depth and a host of reflections and suggestions that help to illuminate French attitudes and policies. Most of those who will read the book with pleasure and profit do not need any thematic unity, artificial or real. They can supply their own. But they will welcome the many examples of his gift for stimulating thought by providing neat and sometimes lapidary summaries of highly complicated periods or episodes in French history, such as, for instance, his five-line summary of the valuable "spin-off" of Gaullist decolonization (p. 294) and his phrase describing France's German policy as "the pursuit of reconciliation without equality" (p. 297). They will welcome, too, the subtlety of his analysis of General de Gaulle's skill in exploiting France's inadequate defense assets (pp. 290-307) and especially his demonstration of Gaullist use of what he calls "the elevator", that is, essentially, of the use of (or attempt to use) other nations in order to serve the interests of France—a process he describes as "drawing a check on other people's bank accounts" (p. 314).

Essays four, five, and six, first published respectively in 1967, 1962 and 1968, concentrate attention on certain aspects of internal Gaullist policies. Mr. Hoffmann is not, however, directly concerned with what could be termed the French 'economic miracle' (or, as the General liked to call it, *les grandes mutations*), that is, with the abrupt transformation into a modern, industrial, export-minded community of what Herbert Lüthy had called in the 1950s "the France of the small town, the small workshop, the small plot of land," which, he said, had "slowly spun itself into a cocoon of established rights and privileges for everything that is small, old, traditional, and stationary." Nor is he concerned with the principal political controversies of the period—the Algerian struggle, the battle over the 1962 referendum, the trials of rebel generals and of OAS conspirators, the vicissitudes of general and presidential election campaigns. His concern is with the basic relations of political society in general, and of French political society in particular. It is with the relations between leader and led (especially in the fields of administration and education), with the clash between heroic leadership and the sometimes far from heroic manifestations of resistance to it.

Throughout this section, the influence of the sociologist, Michel Crozier, is pervasive, and it is hard at times to resist the conclusion that Stanley Hoffmann has succumbed to what he admits to be the temptation to regard the Crozier theory as "so powerful that it sometimes seems to explain everything" (p. viii). Some political scientists, and perhaps especially in Great Britain, will find this temptation easier to resist. They may, indeed, tend to regard this section, in spite of some thought-provoking suggestions (as for instance the reasons advanced for the failure of the idea of "participation" in France) as belonging rightly to a different book.

The book's final speculations on the future of France and Western Europe, with their "sad and simple" conclusion that France and Western Europe "have not been able to stop time and fragment space" (p. 364), are in sharp contrast with the narrower focus of the opening essays on the Vichy years. Intelligent and perceptive as these first essays are, they appear to one reader, whose daily job was at that time to follow the events as recorded in the French daily press, as recollections in tranquillity that inevitably lose something of the claustrophobia and despair that determined the reactions of so many ordinary French people during the occupation. It is nevertheless true, as Stanley Hoffman reminds us, that a gulf separated Vichy conservatism from fascism and that, however inevitable or respectable *"attentisme"* might have appeared to many, it was bound to be a fundamental delusion. Although, in some ways, he does less than justice to the achievement of Marcel Ophuls in his impossible task of trying to re-create the atmosphere of those years, it is no less true that, as he says, *The Sorrow and the Pity* does not, and could not, reveal the *whole* truth of that complex and saddening period of French history.

Altogether, this is a book that all students of

France will want to return to again and again.

DOROTHY PICKLES
Surrey, England

Wage Patterns and Wage Policy in Modern China, 1919-1972. By Christopher Howe. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1973. Pp. 171. $11.95.)

This is a pioneering study of a most important problem heretofore neglected by students of the Chinese economy. The "book is an attempt to provide a statistical analysis of changes in the level and structure of Chinese wages from the 1920s to the early 1970s. It also seeks to elucidate both the mechanisms responsible for these changes and their economic significance" (p. xl).

The author succeeds admirably in the first two of his objectives but falls somewhat short in the third. That is, the book does provide a rich and meaty statistical analysis of wage patterns in China before 1949 and between 1949 and 1957. The material thins out considerably after the end of the First Five-Year Plan Period (1953-57), with only scattered references to 1963 and 1971-1972 as benchmark years after 1957. To a predominant extent this is inherent in the character of the material Professor Howe had to work with. Nevertheless one cannot help but wonder whether one could not have done better by the 1960s.

The book also maintains a high standard in describing and assessing the mechanisms responsible for changing wage patterns and policies. It is less strong, however, in coming to grips with the economic meaning of the material presented.

The book starts with a brief analysis of wage structures in less developed countries on the one hand and in the Soviet command system on the other. In the course of this analysis it also explores some of the relationships between changing wage structures and the process of industrialization. It then investigates China's industrial wage structure first in the 1920s and 1930s and then in the period since 1949. The real wages of all employed nonfarm workers and salaried employees are shown to have risen very rapidly (6 per cent a year) between 1952 and 1957, declined at a 2 per cent a year rate between 1957 and 1963, and then risen slowly (at slightly less than 2 per cent a year) between 1963 and 1972. As a result, for the two decades as a whole (1952-72) the real wage rose at an average annual rate of just below 2 per cent. This statistic is based on official price indices which give preponderant weight to goods subject to price control and rationing. Moreover, since no such indices were published for 1972, Howe assumes that retail prices remained stable between 1963 and 1972. While there is no evidence of a price inflation in China, it is far from certain that this assumption is valid. For all of these reasons combined, real wages may have increased more slowly than Howe's data show.

The author then goes on to analyze wage policy and the process of wage determination in the People's Republic on the basis of the wage trends and structure presented earlier. He shows that policymakers assigned highest priority to the macroeconomic objectives of price stability and inflation control. Therefore the dominant goal of wage policy was close control of the average wage and the total nonagricultural wage bill.

It is much less clear from Howe's analysis precisely what role did wages play as allocators of labor, or to put it differently what role did market versus command mechanisms play in occupational choice and labor assignment. The problem is not ignored but is not confronted systematically, and as a result the author's own judgments on these critical issues do not come through clearly.

If I understand Howe correctly, wages played a more important role up to 1956 or 1957 than thereafter. Even then, however, their role was supporting with labor being largely allocated administratively. This was certainly the case in the 1960s. The commitment to a more or less stable average wage severely limited the reliance one could place on the wage structure as an allocative instrument, since this would have required lowering some wages which would have evoked enormous resistance.

The lack of clarity on these issues, however, is apparent. Thus, on p. 115 Howe indicates that although policies towards average wage control and interindustrial wage structure were implemented with fair success, the occupational, intersectoral, and interregional wage structure proved difficult to manipulate. But on p. 143 he states that wage systems performed some allocative functions, particularly in regard to movement of labor between industries and occupations and, in varying degrees, between sectors and regions.

This book also presents a great deal of very valuable information which illuminates Chinese distributional policies. It is clear that wage and salary spans within enterprises are more egalitarian than in the Soviet Union as evidenced for instance by the treatment of managerial bonuses. Again one would wish that the author had analyzed more directly and explicitly the relationships between wage patterns and income distribution in China.

Since the job of a reviewer is to cast himself in the role of a critic, it would be misleading to conclude from my comments that Howe's is not a

first rate piece of work, highly sophisticated and thoroughly researched. It is indispensable for anyone interested in wage policies and trends or in problems of income distribution in developing countries on the one hand and in socialist countries on the other.

ALEXANDER ECKSTEIN
University of Michigan

Guyana: A composite Monograph. Edited by Brian Irving. (Hato Rey, Puerto Rico: Inter American University Press, 1972. Pp. 87. $5.00, paper.)

This slender little volume is a collection of seven brief essays held together by nothing more than the thin thread of common concern for Guyana. As to the "composite monograph" which the title promises, one looks in vain for a recognizable principle of composition. Alas! there is none. And more's the pity, since Guyana offers an imposing array of problems and examples for the social scientist interested in the dilemmas facing the "new" nations of the Third World.

The possibilities are many and challenging, but this book as a whole fails to address any of them. The editor does claim in his introduction that "the central problem" arising from the study of Guyana is that of "creating unity in a land of diversity" (p. 1), but as a conceptual tool for ordering meaningful analyses of Guyana's problems this formulation seldom rises in this volume above the level of cliché. It is really not a central focus in any of the articles, save a four-page excursis by anthropologist Della Walker, and that deals not with the major problem of integration of the East Indian and Black populations into a viable national culture, but with the interesting but far less crucial one of the relatively small Amerindian population.

The essays that discuss recent political events and economic problems allude to such things as the tendency under Forbes Burnham to one partyism, the accusations of corruption and venality in the government bureaucracy (though both these matters are treated very circumspectly), the appeals of the "black-power" ideology in Guyana, and the continuation of economic dependence. Although they are competent and accurate enough as far as they go (Harold Lutchman's on "Recent Political Developments" is the most lucid and informative of the lot), they leave an overall impression of inadequacy and conceptual incoherence, again because of an apparent lack of a common theoretical frame of reference beyond a vague concern for Guyana's well-being. Thus, for example, in the article entitled "Black Power?" the interesting description which Yereth Knowles offers of the populist appeals to certain Guyanese groups of this particular brand of contemporary anti-imperialist ideology stands in no meaningful analytic relationship to the political currents described in the previous articles. And the tendency toward a one-party system is asserted, with virtually no analytic clues about what it would mean ideologically or structurally, or how it might be brought about in the face of the profound political and cultural cleavages which characterize the country.

Other important policy areas relevant to contemporary Guyana are skimmed over much too lightly, even for such a brief work as this. Prime Minister Burnham's "Cooperative Republic" was declared in early 1970. Although these essays were brought together presumably over a year later, this move is merely mentioned, with no attempt to evaluate its meaning or to speculate as to its significance in the light of what is said about economic problems, Burnham's political style, or the structure of the political system. The problem of Guyana's role in the Caribbean region is also dealt with in an oblique and summary manner. Participation in the Caribbean Free Trade Area (CARIFTA) is treated most gingerly and not at all systematically. The controversial and problematic nature of the whole CARIFTA enterprise is alluded to ever so cautiously be a couple of the contributors, but no stand is taken, either analytic or polemic.

The contents of this monograph are much too bland and innocuous to do justice to the contentious and vigorous potential of its topic.

The final article, on "Wildlife and Pollution," is written by a zoologist and includes interesting descriptions of the fauna of the country and some general policy recommendations for the control of water and air pollution before things get as bad as they are in the more industrialized countries. The strictures implied in this review should not really be held as applicable to this essay, whose subject matter is not comparable to that of the other chapters. Its inclusion illustrates the book's lack of editorial cohesion.

ROBERT W. ANDERSON
University of Puerto Rico, Rio Piedras

Agrarian Policies and Problems in Communist and Non-Communist Countries. Edited by W. A. Douglas Jackson. (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1971. Pp. viii, 488. $15.00.)

If this volume and the two other works that preceded it had been required reading for the delegates to the November, 1974, World Food

Conference in Rome, the speeches made at that meeting might have had a very different focus. Rather than damning the U. S. for its asserted "imperialistic" food export policies of the past, the major stress could have been on the enormous losses in food output the world has suffered because of production shortcomings in the collectivized Communist systems.

This collection is the third in a series of volumes that started with the 1962 conference at The University of Kansas, and was followed by conferences at the University of California, Santa Barbara, and the University of Washington. While the two previous volumes focused almost exclusively on Soviet and Eastern European agriculture, this work, resulting from a conference at the University of Washington, adds studies of Asian Communist systems, plus comparisons with other noncollectivized systems. The comparative approach adds a vital new measure to understanding the successes and failures of collectivized agriculture.

Predictably, the papers and commentaries of the twenty-nine European, Asian, and American scholars are of uneven quality. For example, although Professor Lau employs an impressive array of econometric measures of agriculture in studying mainland China, a less fancy approach to the problems he addresses might have borne more fruit. In an otherwise brilliant (and devastating) review of the Soviet decision to force collectivization on the countryside, Professor Nove totally ignores the vital importance that the invention of the Machine Tractor Stations must have had on Stalin's decision to impose his "revolution from above." My major criticism, however, is that in their otherwise admirable attempts to be fair and judicious in criticizing the collectivized systems, too many of the scholars ignore in their conclusions the overwhelmingly damaging case their research makes against "socialized" agriculture.

That Stalin's man-made famine resulting from forced collectivization is one of the major human tragedies of the present century is well known (at least in the West). How many know, however, that the Chinese leaders themselves admitted (while trying to shift the blame to bad weather) that the imposition of the rural communes was followed by an agricultural disaster worse than any other China had "suffered during the last hundred years" (p. 48)? When the full story is known, how many millions of lives will be shown to have been lost as a result? One often hears that the Chinese have solved their food problem; after all, there has been no major famine in recent years. Part of the answer, however, is that China has become a major importer of grain. Certainly the Chinese Communist leaders can be credited with spreading malnutrition more evenly. *Have* the Chinese solved their food problem? Werner Klatt calculates that as of the mid-1960's available calories per capita per day were some "5% less than was available at the time of the Japanese invasion of China in 1931" (p. 473).

Grain and potatoes still make up the bulk of the Soviet protein-short diet. The Soviet Union, too, has become increasingly dependent upon grain imports. Whether the comparison is of North Korea with South Korea, West Germany with East Germany, Taiwan with Mainland China, the U.S. with the U.S.S.R. or the non-collectivized sectors of Yugoslavia and Poland with their collectivized farms, when all of the necessary qualifications and adjustments are made, if the prime measure is maximizing food output, collectivized agriculture is demonstrated to be seriously wanting. If, however, the prime measure is maximization of central controls over the countryside, collectivized agriculture is an unqualified success.

Karl A. Wittfogel's comparative piece alone is worth the price of the volume. As he documents, the roots of Communist agricultural failures can be traced to the agricultural illiteracy of Marx, Lenin, and their present day successors. The problem is the failure to tap the initiative of collectivized peasants, partially stemming from the unwieldy hugeness of collectivized farms, and very much rooted in their bureaucratic form of management.

Japan's and Taiwan's farms undoubtedly are too small for maximum production efficiency (averaging only some 2.5 acres/farm). Yet, however much economic sense the large, extensive, U.S. farms (nearing an average of 400 acres/farm) may make, the tiny, labor-intensive Taiwan farms produce six times the U.S. output per unit of land (p. 383).

Everywhere, successful farming must be tailored to the prevailing physical and human environment. However, if the climate will support crops, the most vital of all determinants of success is the human element. As Wittfogel underscores, it is necessary for farmers everywhere "to employ their tools effectively and perform their tasks carefully, industriously and with initiative. It is exactly here that the Communist agrarian system flounders" (p. 24).

Marx spoke the truth when he observed that the wage system of nineteenth-century capitalism involved an enormous tendency to dehumanize labor. As Wittfogel underlines, since wage labor is only a miniscule portion of agricultural labor input in the West, by Marx's key measure, agriculture, even in U.S. grain production, "would not be capitalist" (p. 30). Most ironically, now that the Soviet *kolkhozy* have gone over to a

guaranteed minimum wage (where the sovkhozy long have been), Soviet agriculture is the major example of capitalist agriculture in the world—again, if exploitation of wage labor is the key to the definition. As Marx stressed, one of the worst attributes of such a system is the dehumanization of the worker at his tasks. Ask, as we have, on Soviet farms, what choices, what initiative, the peasant workers have in their tasks. The answer is "none."

In Marx's terms, the great bulk of collectivized peasants are wage slaves, for all intents and purposes "chained" to the animals and implements they serve at the pleasure of the Party managers who, semantics aside, are the owners of the means of production.

ROY D. LAIRD

The University of Kansas

The Bureaucratization of the World. By Henry Jacoby. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973. Pp. 241. $12.95.)

This is an English translation of a book originally published in German in 1969. While it is a good introduction to the vast literature on the problem of bureaucracy it will be of little use to the professional political scientist. The first part of the book (fifty-seven pages) is devoted to a superficial account of "the bird of modern government." The second part deals with the development of capitalism, and the third part is concerned with bureaucratic government in Russia. The fourth and concluding part summarizes Max Weber's writings on bureaucracy, discusses the emergence of bureaucracies in the Third World, and concludes with a discussion of the problem of reconciling the need for bureaucracy with the ideals of democracy.

The author quotes extensively from the writings of both German and American social scientists but without any underlying philosophical or, for that matter, conceptual framework of his own. The result is a hodgepodge of undigested quotations which are simply regurgitated. One previous reviewer of the volume says that "Jacoby has managed to consult a wide variety of sources and goes far beyond the kinds of materials ordinarily considered by sociologists . . . not hampered by disciplinary restraints" (Lewis A. Coser quoted on the flyleaf). Jacoby is not only unhampered by disciplinary restraints but submits to no discipline whatsoever. The author concludes that "the future of democracy is . . . dependent on the restoration of a politically aware public" (p. 222). But nowhere in the book does he attempt to define either politics or the public.

JOHN H. HALLOWELL

Duke University

Pakistan Crisis. By David Loshak. (New York; McGraw Hill Book Company, 1971. Pp. xxv, 152. $6.95.)

In 1971 the world's fifth largest nation, Pakistan, was finally sectioned by civil war. For twenty-five years that union had strained its common bonds, and what many observers had considered the inevitable finally occurred: East Bengal achieved not only autonomy but independence. This phenomenon is particularly important to political scientists, representing a largely untapped source for studies of racial discrimination, minority oppression, "controlled" democracy, military elites, the politics of poverty, the value of foreign aid, and the more general scope of the politics of South and Southeast Asia.

Although a spate of books about the 1971 war has resulted, the quality is generally poor. David Loshak has produced one of the better in his *Pakistan Crisis*, and this book is recommended for students exploring the causes of the 1971 war, the events that took place prior to the Indian invasion, and the general political situation involving Pakistan and Bangladesh. Unfortunately, nonjournalistic data concerning the Bengali struggle for independence are limited, and it will probably be a long time, if ever, before an objective evaluation of the situation is available.

Loshak, a staff correspondent for the London *Daily Telegraph* and *Sunday Telegraph* in India and Pakistan from 1969 to 1971, has produced a brief but balanced account of the events leading up to the war beginning in the late 1960s. It is not an academic analysis and does not pretend to be, and it includes only a short summary of Pakistani politics from Partition in 1947 to the resignation of Ayub Khan in 1969. Those who need a more extensive background are encouraged to do some additional reading. Yet the author exhibits a perceptive knowledge of the politics of the subcontinent, and the basic conflicts between Islamabad and Dacca are identified—55 per cent of the population earning two-thirds of the foreign exchange and receiving one-third of the imports; significant exclusion of Bengalis from the civil, military, and foreign services; the perennial floods and cyclones, ignored by the central government; industrial expansion in the West with the rention of the East as a captive market for second-class goods. On top of this, of course, he identifies the more basic problems of poverty and population. Pakistan, Loshak suggests, was "doomed from the start" and a "fallacious concept." The civil war, he concludes, was a direct result of "chronic neglect and cynical exploitation since Partition by Pakistan's predominantly West wing leadership" (p. 22).

Loshak recounts the importance of the 1970

cyclone and the inept governmental response as perhaps the final blow to any possible détente, and he describes the characteristics and qualities of the key figures—Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Yahya Khan, and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. He correctly portrays the limitations that forced the hands of the generals, without excusing them, and the eventual ruthless attempt during 1971 to suppress the revolt by a systematic extermination of Bengali leadership and intelligentsia. But he tempers his judgement of the individuals by recounting the force of events that seems to have led inextricably to this tragic period. "What really went wrong went wrong years before" (p. 95). If anything, he is to be criticized for his projections: "It is hard to see that a West Pakistan standing alone would have much future. The prospects for an independent Bangla Desh look a little better—though, given its vast problems, not much" (p. 141). In this respect, Loshak is ignoring, or perhaps not aware of, the possibility that by 1971 the West had milked most of the profits from the East and was willing to let it go.

It is important to note that this book was written prior to the Indian invasion in December and that only a postscript, added in December, 1971, hints at the final outcome of the war. But the book does not suffer from this limitation because the author's analysis is consequently not clouded by attempts to arrange the events from 1969 to 1971 to fit the results. He is critical of the U. S. position in support of Yahya Khan and suggests, I believe without much evidence, that the Indian position was comparable to that of France during the American Revolution. Actually, the roles of India, the United States and the Soviet Union are not really explored. While this book is only of limited value for the experienced student of politics of the subcontinent, it is a useful reference for those general readers who are searching for an account of the events leading to independence for Bangladesh.

GEORGE M. PLATT
Wichita State University

The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy: A Survey of Scientific Findings. By Patrick J. McGowan and Howard B. Shapiro. (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1973. Pp. 256. $11.00, cloth; $7.00, paper.)

In a relatively short time, the *Survey* has become a highly influential summary-evaluation of the work in a rapidly growing field. (See references to the book in Andriole, Wilkenfeld, and Hopple, 1974; Kirk, 1974; and Chittick and Jenkins, 1974.) Like the field, however, it suffers from a major confusion: what is "foreign policy," and what is most important about it?

The authors have three basic aims: (1) to help build cumulative knowledge by drawing together much of the work in comparative foreign policy; (2) to pinpoint the areas of research which remain unexamined; (3) to assist in the construction of "pre-theories" or hypotheses about the causes of foreign policy behavior (pp. 13-14). Much of the recent literature on frameworks for foreign policy analysis reflects the third objective. (See James N. Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in R. B. Farrell, ed., *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics* [Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966], pp. 27-92; Stephen J. Andriole, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, and Gerald W. Hopple, "A Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policy Behavior," *International Studies Quarterly* [forthcoming, 1975], pp. 1-4; Elizabeth Kirk, "Foreign Policy Research and Policy Influence: Different Levels, Different Targets" [Purdue University; mimeo, 1974], pp. 1-2; William O. Chittick and Jerry B. Jenkins, "A Reconceptualization of the Sources of Foreign Policy Behavior: Questioning the Internal vs. External Dichotomy," [Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Washington, D.C., 1975], p. 1.) Proceeding from assertions about the importance of careful specification and control of independent and dependent variables in theory building (chapter 1) and from presentation of an input-output framework for organizing these variables (chapter 2), Professors McGowan and Shapiro review, evaluate, and attempt to interrelate general propositions from roughly 200 published "empirical" (though not necessarily quantitative) studies (chapters 3–15). Propositions are classified and chapters constructed according to the factors in the framework which are thought to influence foreign policy behavior; thus, chapters cover such independent variables as individual decision-maker characteristics, elite group characteristics, political or governmental characteristics, world system characteristics, linkages between foreign and domestic policies or events, etc. Chapters are not arranged according to types of foreign policy being predicted or explained.

Cumulative theory requires frameworks specifying important variables and relations among variables. While McGowan and Shapiro present a potentially useful framework, they sometimes lose sight of what foreign policy theory is designed to explain. Their dependent variable, foreign policy behavior, encompasses "identifiable acts undertaken by the official representatives of national societies . . . in order to control the behavior of their counterparts in ways desired by the actors" (p. 40). The reader is left wondering which acts are important to explain and why.

Certain types of variables might be more important in explaining certain behaviors than others; certain behaviors might result more often from certain policies or decision rules than from others. Important actions can be directed at colleagues in government, rather than at foreign governments. Attempts to build foreign policy theory should identify and focus on particular policies; evaluation and explanation of foreign policy is impossible unless classes of behavior and events are related to decisions, decision-rules, and doctrines.

McGowan and Shapiro do not specifically categorize behavior; one proposition included is designed to explain "activity in the international system" (p. 108). Generally the only fairly specific types of foreign policy behavior covered in the *Survey* are conflictual and economic. Even "conflict," however, is very general, and we have no idea whether economic, verbal, military, or political conflict is being predicted.

McGowan and Shapiro include propositions from impressionistic or unsystematic studies (e.g., Brzezinski and Huntington, [1973], and Hilsman, [1967], with little effort to define or evaluate notions like policy "success" contained in such studies (p. 71). Thus, the reader cannot tell whether the criteria for policy success or failure make sense logically or ethically, although McGowan and Shapiro see that "while the goods created by a successful foreign policy (such as 'security' or 'peace') are in many respects less tangible than goods delivered by domestic health, education, and housing programs, in other cases, such as trade negotiations or foreign aid agreements, they provide concrete public rewards to the concerned sectors of society" (p. 74). The authors suggest that establishment elites which influence foreign policy may be the primary beneficiaries of such "goods." Also, occasionally McGowan and Shapiro evaluate methodology, operationalization, and comprehensiveness (e.g., p. 57) in accounting for differences in findings. But criticism cannot go very deep in short summaries of many studies.

If criticism had been more thorough, we might have been led to question the importance of findings such as the following: "A nation which imports a great deal is more prone to enter into economic/cultural agreements" (p. 115). Such findings supposedly support the general proposition that "the greater a nation's trade, the more ties of other kinds it will have with other nations." Political and economic contexts are missing from such isolated propositions, and McGowan and Shapiro give few clues about how propositions might fit into larger theories about important problems—especially problems arising from policy decisions.

Underspecification of dependent variables is not peculiar to the McGowan-Shapiro study; it has been typical in comparative foreign policy works. Since the publication of the innovative and provocative Rosenau (1966) "pre-theory," researchers have been busy trying to determine whether governmental, as opposed to idiosyncratic, societal, or systemic variables best predict foreign policy decisions and acts. Few have bothered to wonder whether the same framework can be used to predict economic, military, political, crisis, routine, international, transnational acts, decisions, relations, statements, perceptions. The field is engaged in a stampeding search for general theories of foreign policy; yet foreign policy is extremely complex and hardly a single phenomenon.

Furthermore, comparative foreign policy propositions have generally been evaluated through analysis of aggregate and event data; measures of decision-making processes and perceptions in bureaucracies and governments, and of interest group pressure in a wide variety of countries have been neglected. McGowan and Shapiro note some of these deficiencies and call for fewer case studies and more general cross-country comparisons (pp. 217-221); but the specificity of variables in case studies must be carried into cross-country comparisons. Variables such as "open" or "closed" polity are hardly specific enough for clear explanation.

It could be argued that McGowan and Shapiro merely reflect the deficiencies of the foreign policy literature in failing to present clearer propositions, better specification of dependent variables, and sets of propositions clearly related to the same types of behavior. The *Survey* is not comprehensive, however, and the criteria for inclusion are somewhat vague. Therefore, we cannot tell whether certain areas of research have indeed been neglected and whether more refined propositions are available. For example, regarding the effects of stress on foreign policymakers, Kelman (1965) has published extensive reviews of studies on perceptions. McGowan and Shapiro might have included some of these findings to make the following rather watered down proposition a bit more informative: "As stress increases in a crisis situation, the decision-maker's perceptions of the factors involved in the decision-making process changes also" (p. 58).

While their goal of helping produce cumulative theory seems a bit ambitious in view of the quality of findings they present, McGowan and Shapiro raise the reader's interest in finding better and more complete categories and explana-

tions of foreign policy decisions and behavior. They have provided a coherent framework for analysis, which if turned around to stress types of dependent variables, would facilitate reconciliation of many studies and specification of the types of variables most likely to account for variations in policy, decisions, behavior, and outcomes. Along with Jones and Singer's collection of data-based research abstracts, (*Beyond Conjecture in International Politics,* [Itasca, Illinois: Peacock, 1972]) and Rosenau's anthology of recent research (*Comparing Foreign Policies,* [New York: Sage-Halsted, 1974]), the McGowan-Shapiro volume is an important bibliographic source for advanced students.

FREDERIC S. PEARSON
University of Missouri, St. Louis

Berlin im geteilten Deutschland. By Dieter Mahncke. Schriften des Forschungsinstituts der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, Vol. 34 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1973. Pp. 325. DM 42.00.)

Having been a focal point of East-West relations for almost three decades, the divided city of Berlin has attracted considerable scholarly attention. In response to Soviet and East German attacks on the status of Berlin, most Western analysts in the past have sought to challenge Communist claims be concentrating on the legal context of the Berlin controversy. Comparatively speaking, little attention has been devoted to other elements such as the changing political position of Berlin in the "era of negotiations" and the city's future economic viability. The same is true for the study of the psychological effects which geographical isolation and continued division have on the city's population.

Dieter Mahncke's composite analysis of Berlin's role of international relations does take these long-neglected topics into consideration. It therefore comes as a most welcome addition to the literature on this city. The author, professor of International Politics at the *Hochschule der Bundeswehr* in Hamburg, has approached his topic with a historical orientation; his analyses cover the entire postwar period. However, he focusses on the current situation of Berlin, i.e., following the Quadripartite and supplementtary Inter-German Agreements of 1971.

Mahncke has demonstrated great organizational skill in dealing with the many facets of his subject. He begins by examining the position of Berlin in the late 1960s and early 1970s, a time of changing East-West relations. Then follows an account of the course and outcome of the four-power negotiations and the agreements subsequently reached between the German governments in East and West. Having reviewed the political and legal developments in Berlin between 1944 and 1972, the author analyzes the respective political interests of the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic on the one hand and those of the United States, Great Britain, France and the Federal Republic of Germany on the other. He then discusses various issues related to Berlin's security, its economic development, and special problems such as access to Berlin and traffic between the two parts of the divided community. He closes his study with an interpretation of the psychological condition of the Berliners and with a speculative assessment of the city's future development. An appendix containing the most important documents in connection with the 1971 Berlin negotiations facilitates cross-reference.

Central to this study is a close analysis of the consequences which the Quadripartite and Inter-German Agreements have for the present status and future development of Berlin. The decisive question is whether the city, as a result of these agreements, will cease to be one of the major crisis centers in East-West relations. Mahncke's answer to this question is cautiously optimistic. To him the agreements represent an acceptable compromise. The Western allies and the FRG made concessions regarding the political status of Berlin vis-à-vis the Federal Republic. In return the Soviet Union and the GDR facilitated Western travel to and from Berlin and permitted more contacts between the city's two halves. In exchange for certain restrictions upon the symbolic as well as upon the substantive political presence of the West German government in Berlin, the Soviet Union formally accepted the Western Allies' rights in that city.

Mahncke holds that a continued application of the agreements remains essentially dependent upon the course of East-West relations, particularly those between the U.S. and the USSR. Lucidly written and carefully argued, this monograph is recommended as an exemplary work of scholarship.

WOLFGANG F. DEXHEIMER
Universität Bonn, Germany

The Emperor's New Clothes: and Other Irreverent Essays for the Seventies. By Norman Z. Alcock. (Oakville, Ontario, Canada: CPRI Press, 1971. Pp. 177. $4.00.)

Norman Alcock, Director of the Canadian Peace Research Institute, hopes with this book to stimulate political action against war and also against overpopulation and poverty. He tries to do so by analyzing some aspects of contemp-

orary reality, demystifying some prevalent ideas, proposing some specific alternatives, and then suggesting a course of action.

The two aspects of the current reality he chooses to emphasize are the military-industrial personality and the bureaucracy. The military-industrial personality, characterized by zero-sum thinking, authoritarianism and dogmatism, is formed in early life at home and in school. The contemporary bureaucratic organizations and their adversary character sustain the military-industrial personality. Alcock argues that democratic organizations produce more socially conscious, responsible and mature people; that the social structure can determine how a person will act despite his basic personality (p. 28). These statements are supported by references to several studies. Alcock goes on to argue that certain myths sustain the bureaucrats and military-industrial personalities he has described. The myths relate to the beliefs that military defense provides national security, the sovereign nation is sacred, economic growth is a virtue, and developing countries benefit from foreign aid.

Given these myths and the characterizations of reality, Alcock proposes a number of specific alternatives. First, he urges disarmament, giving priority to limiting the major powers' exports of arms to other nations. A second and related proposal is the establishment of a guaranteed national income, financed by a sales tax and a tax on nonrenewable resources. He then goes on to discuss a guaranteed annual income on a world scale through the United Nations; this would entail a weighted voting, based upon a national social development index and equalization payments from richer countries to the poorer in terms of that index. Finally, Alcock proposes that the U.N. Charter be revised so that voting in the Security Council be based on the social development index and without a veto.

Alcock concludes by suggesting the following actions which individuals and groups can undertake to help realize the objectives he urges: becoming more knowledgeable, choosing particular problems and working with others to bring about change, undertaking a new life style, and working through the political system. This discussion, like much of the book, is written within the context of Canadian society.

Alcock seems to be arguing that if we would only stop thinking in the competitive, zero-sum way we do, we could come up with non-zero-sum solutions to our terrible problems. He offers some intriguing examples of such solutions. But I fear his book will not attain his objectives. First by stressing the way people think as being the underlying reality to be altered, he underestimates the global differences in experiences, power, development, and values, and therefore the structurally grounded resistance to his solutions. I think his book would be more effective in provoking action for change if he could give evidence that what he proposes is already under way. The book's effectiveness might also be enhanced if the solutions were less precise or given in the form of multiple possibilities. His prescriptions would then be less vulnerable to criticism and rejection, the occasional tone of self-righteousness would be lessened, and more fundamentally, people would be urged to do what they must do anyway: formulate their collective goals as they seek to attain them. Finally, the recommendations and solutions are too consistent with one of the myths he would destroy—the sanctity of the sovereign nation. Transcending the national governments in efforts and objectives would seem more appropriate given his analysis.

Despite my disagreements with the book, it does offer in a brief and readable form a number of provocative possible solutions to ominous world problems. It does this within the context of an overarching conception of interrelated problems and therefore the solutions themselves are usefully interrelated.

LOUIS KRIESBERG
Syracuse University

The Role of Communications in the Middle East Conflict: Ideological and Religious Aspects. By Yonah Alexander. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973. Pp. 287. $17.50.)

Professor Yonah Alexander raises an exceedingly important question in this book, one to which political science has paid very little attention. In an era when religious wars are considered an artifact of the past—one's thoughts turn back to seventeenth-century England, for example—how does one explain the use of religion as a tool in the Arab-Israeli conflict? The question can even be taken one step farther than Alexander does, for the Middle East is proving not to be a deviation: how does one explain the rising number of internal and international conflicts having strong religious overtones, such as those in Ireland or Cyprus, in the age of secular nationalism? It has been assumed most frequently that the rise of the modern nation-state entailed a process in which nationalism gradually displaced religion as a prime basis for self-identity and for political action.

Such an assumption derives, I believe, from an implicit model many scholars hold which views the Western European experience as a basis for understanding more recent changes in other parts of the world. Yet, the relationship between nationalism and religion in a number

of the states which industrialized earliest in Europe was very specific to the region: nationalism grew in a period in which there was a break from the universality of Catholicism and a movement toward state churches. The latter posed much less of a challenge to rulers eager to integrate the people into a unified, centralized political system. In other parts of Europe, such as Ireland, and in vast areas outside Europe, religion and nationalism have existed in much more complex (and poorly understood) relationships.

Alexander does not overemphasize the role of religion in the Arab-Israeli conflict by elevating it to a sole or primary cause. On the contrary, in his first two chapters he demonstrates that the core problem in the Middle East is the clash between two rival nationalist movements, that of Arab nationalism and that of Zionism. His survey gives a good account of the background factors which crystallized during the British Mandate and which put the Jews and Arabs on a collision course. Particular attention is given to the complex phenomenon of Arab nationalism, with its paradox of separatism among the various states and the unity ". . .of a common historical legacy, cultural heritage, and unfulfilled aspirations" (p. 3). As a result of this duality, the Arab-Israeli problem exists on two planes, that of the conflict between the Jews and the Palestinian Arabs and that of inter-state conflict.

Religion, Alexander claims, has become interwoven in this clash of nationalist ideologies as both sides have sought to use religious symbols to further their political aims. Both governments and private groups in the Middle East have used Islam, Christianty, and Judaism to justify their actions internally and to further internationalize the conflict by recruiting support from governments and groups outside the Middle East. The bulk of the book consists of a truly impressive array of quotes which demonstrate the use of religion as a tool of vilification, self-justification, viciousness, and hate. Well researched (with a good bibliography) and well organized, *The Role of Communications in the Middle East Conflict* presents an element of the Arab-Israeli conflict which is usually limited to internal consumption in the hostile states themselves or to specific groups outside the Middle East. Unfortunately, it is almost impossible for other scholars to use readily the great quantity of data collected by Alexander since the book lacks an index.

What we need analytically is to begin unraveling the complex, interwoven relationship between religion and nationalism and their effects on interstate conflict. To this end, Alexander contributes very little. He does not use his mass of data to address the theoretical questions raised. Certainly, he is right when he states that one cannot measure the impact of the barrage of religious statements which are made. But vague assumptions—that religion *does* play an important role and that the populations' images of the antagonists are important to peace—are left as unexamined assumptions.

The indiscriminate use of the data themselves is a contributory factor to this lack of solid analysis. Little attempt is made to give a sense of proportion to the quotations: questions of saliency and relevancy tend to be almost totally ignored. No distinctions are made among the countries—from highly theological Saudi Arabia to more secular Lebanon—in order to gauge when and where religion has an impact and of what order of magnitude. Perspective about the effect of religion is inevitably lost by giving equal weight, for example, to quotations on the very sensitive issue of Jerusalem, on the one hand, and to the following deathbed statement by General Riad, Egyptian chief of staff, on the other hand: "Not only will you clash with the enemy tomorrow—with Allah's help, you will cross the water and trample the enemy underfoot" (p. 44).

Both the Israeli and Arab states have spent huge sums of money on mammoth radio transmitters and other propaganda activities and obviously give a rather high priority to these efforts. Alexander, however, does not utilize his data to analyze the role of propaganda on either the local populations or outside groups. Rather he chooses merely to overlay his presentation of data with terms that do not substantially add to our understanding of the problem. Thus people who make statements are called "communicators" and groups that issue statements are called "communication bodies."

Alexander wrote *The Role of Communications in the Middle East Conflict* prior to the October War and correctly predicted that no alternative route had been found to avoid the "fourth futile confrontation on the battlefield." The tragedy of the Arab-Israeli conflict continues to exist against the backdrop of a collision of nationalistic and religious aspirations. Alexander's book notwithstanding, how these two factors combine to mold images and how these images affect the course of political events are questions still left unexplored by political scientists.

JOEL S. MIGDAL
Harvard University and Tel-Aviv University

The Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute. By Tai Sung An. (Philadelphia, Pa.: The Westminister Press, 1973. Pp. 254. $8.95.)

There has long been a need for a comprehensive survey of territorial relations between Russia and China, together with a translation into English of the various treaties and other relevant

documents. That gap has now been filled by this book by Tai Sung An, Professor of Political Science and International Studies, Washington College, Chestertown, Maryland.

The volume possesses several virtues. It is based on a survey of almost all the relevant sources, in several languages. It covers the topic from the beginning of Russian-Chinese border contacts in the seventeenth century to the recent border clashes and unproductive negotiations. It combines an overall historical summary with an analysis and evaluation of the main items of difference between the two powers and, importantly, relates them to the internal orderings of the two states. The author manages the very difficult task of maintaining overall objectivity despite his slight pro-Chinese bias. Finally, he does not shirk from providing a forecast of future Sino-Soviet border relations.

After a comprehensive survey of border relations from earliest times to the Communist accession to power in 1949, An sketches the background to and the outbreak of the border clashes of the 1960s, which culminated in the Ussuri incidents of March 1969. He then forecasts development of this aspect of Sino-Soviet relations into the 1970s, detailing possible levels of conflict, phases, and outcomes. An concludes that, although actual war is unlikely, some form of continuation of conflict is probable, even though he himself gives many reasons—Mao's death, military opposition to Sino-Soviet conflict, and artificiality of the border question itself—why this conflict is capable of being settled soon.

The author does not introduce new data and, wisely, avoids extreme interpretations. Because this is a survey volume, dependent for the most part upon secondary sources, it does not provide detailed analysis of given border incidents, of particular negotiations or treaties, or of Russian/Soviet or Manchu/Chinese documents claiming specific stretches of territory. An does provide the reader with enough references, however, to allow him quickly to move to whatever level of detail he pleases and he himself occasionally penetrates to finer levels when the narrative demands. The result is a model of its kind.

One could, of course, wish for a somewhat more sophisticated framework of analysis possibly encompassing recent propositions concerning the behavior of two large nations with a long common border who maintain contact during vastly different domestic and international circumstances. Subsequent authors addressing territorial disputes as a whole from this point of view will find Professor An's volume a rich reference source. In a few instances the author's account is at variance with the facts: border incidents, for example, continued after the beginning of Sino-Soviet negotiations after October 1969, although reduced in frequency and scale. There are also places where readers may differ with the author's judgment. There has been, for instance, almost no likelihood of a Soviet "surgical" strike at Chinese nuclear installations, as the author avers, merely because the size and dispersion of Chinese nuclear facilities and air fields make the necessary scale of such an attack prohibitively large.

Overall, however, the author has illuminated all the corners of this aspect of Sino-Soviet relations and has produced a volume whose historical sections are of enduring worth and whose comprehensiveness and documentary translations make it useful for both general reader and specialist.

THOMAS W. ROBINSON
University of Washington, Seattle

Le Origini Dell' Imperialismo Americano (The Origins of American Imperialism). By Alberto Aquarone. (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1973. Pp. 591. £8,000.)

This new book by Professor Aquarone is an excellent scholarly analysis of the initial and critical years of America's long rise to the international pre-eminence she now holds. This history brings together the most varied and rich materials dealing with American policy and decision making, elite coalitions and belief systems, the making of alliances and the transfer of power across international frontiers. It should be considered above all a work of synthesis, and it is admirably successful.

One word of caution. The promise in the title, that the work is concerned with the "origins" of American imperialism, will be found misleading by the knowledgeable reader. This treatise does not examine the formation of those economic, psychosocial, and political mechanisms embedded in "the American way of life" that have led American elites to solve "internal contradictions" by outward expansion in preference to internal adjustments. The formation of such mechanisms occurred as much as one hundred and twenty-five years before the period covered by the book. Only endings and consequences are treated here. By "origins" Professor Aquarone really means the beginnings of a visible and sustained move by the United States toward expansion.

The beginnings cover a critical period: roughly the first twelve of the seventy-five years it took the United States to emerge as the undisputed leader of the international system with the advent of World War II. The author picks up his story with the Spanish American War, when the

United States, already a great power, begins her climb to pre-eminence; he concludes the book with an analysis of the conduct of American foreign affairs by President Taft and Secretary Knox. One can have little doubt that events in this period imprinted the conduct of American foreign dealings and give it shape and direction from that day to ours. "Critical," then, is used advisedly. Although not all "the initial critical years" are examined in this book, in the slice of time covered one begins to see: (a) *who* will guide and *who* will oppose American moves toward expansion (the "best and the brightest" have remained startlingly unchanged over the decades); (b) *which* elite beliefs would be selected to fashion a consensus that would guide American expansion; (c) *where, when* and *how* American resources would be used in the exercise of power; and (d) *what kind of relations* would make up the international system America was to head.

There is too much interesting material in this book to describe in detail. The author begins with a discussion of the consequences of the increase in American productivity, so critical in rendering American society capable of generating resources essential for imperial power. The widespread acceptance by the elite of the need to service the massive economic machine was an important ingredient in motivating it to look for dominions beyond American frontiers. Also important is the discussion of the development of an ideology of expansion. Here one finds a familiar story; what was profitable was soon considered necessary, then became inevitable, then was accepted as just. Expectedly, much attention is given to the Spanish-American conflict. The easy victory of American arms added to mounting elite and mass support for expansion; the spoils of that war—the Philippines and Cuba—served as bases for further expansion of American influence. This same embarrassing war booty also precipitated elite division and debate over the possibility and nature of an American empire.

At least three more topics must be mentioned. A major portion of this volume explores American behavior and policies in the Far East, with particular attention to American behavior in the Philippines and the development of ties with China. Surprisingly, in Professor Aquarone's skilled hands even the exhausted subject of the Open Door Policy gains a measure of interest and freshness. A parallel investigation explores the extension of American influence in Latin America and the Caribbean. Finally there is a noteworthy review of behavior and attitudes in foreign affairs during the stewardship of President Taft and Secretary Knox, including a fascinating section on the beginnings of what has been dubbed "dollar diplomacy"—the famous, or infamous, alleged guide of American elites for their behavior in international affairs.

This abbreviated sketch suggests the wide range of rich material in this book meriting attention, but lack of space permits only two more comments here: one on the complex evolution of a coalition and consensus backing expansion; the other on the nature of America's relations with her dependents.

Professor Aquarone notes that two types of issues caused profound divisions among American elites. One was the wisdom of United States expansion; the other was the level and nature of her involvement beyond her own frontiers. The *mano a mano* over the direction of American foreign affairs was fought in a number of different arenas; some of the principal battlegrounds were the presidency, some executive departments, the military establishments, the Congress, some institutions of higher learning, the foreign ministries and governments of European powers, major economic institutions, and some rebel forces in the areas in which the US was extending its influence. The principal actors in the debate were people occupying positions of power in these institutions. i.e., presidents, generals, legislators, bankers, intellectuals, etc. These lists are by no means exhaustive.

Debates over expansion were long and bitter. Professor Aquarone tells us opponents repeatedly questioned expansionist policies; but of course the expansionists won the first battle and the ultimate victory for control. These confrontations, however, in the initial period shaped the nature of expansion. Because at the turn of the century major sectors of the elite would not consent—it was too contrary to their culture, too many convictions would need to be changed to sustain their support for an American empire—America moved away from political colonialism. Consensus for expansion could be obtained, however, and was found to be rooted in the widespread elite concern to service the needs of the American economy by investing in foreign areas and securing markets and sources of raw materials; if America were to have dependencies, they were to be economic and not political.

The difference proved immense. That American elites should have turned their backs on political empires at the time of that model's greatest success—when half of the real estate and one-third of the population of the world were in colonial possession—is amazing. Equally amazing, perhaps, is the grasp by American elites that England was a rapidly declining power, needing help; and this again at a time when England had an empire that included half

of all that was colonial. Only the decisions that led to the War Between the States and to sever colonial ties with Britain are comparable in importance. And it makes for fascinating reading.

This brings us to the second point. It is clear from Aquarone's treatise that the American international system worked better and was cheaper to maintain than the political empires which preceded it. The tending of ties between the colonizer and the dependencies was not the responsibility of political and governmental elites but rather of those in the economy. Because ties were economic, such arrangements went light in their demands on political and public economic resources. Governmental elites were there only to help. Force was in the background. With economic dependence there was no need to import the alien colonizing elite; the indigenous elite performed their task. In short, in the American system controls on dependencies were less visible, narrower, less vulnerable, more flexible, cheaper, safer, and possibly longer lasting than those of political empires. For the system to work smoothly, however, levels of mobilization of populations in both the metropole and the colony had to be kept down.

All this material sheds light on current problems. And Professor Aquarone's work will be extremely useful for other scholars in advancing their own research in this area. This is the highest praise one can give a scholar and nothing more need be added. Yet in this case one should also point out the fact that Professor Aquarone is an Italian—not an American—historian, and it adds to the wonder of his knowledge of American materials and to the praise this book deserves.

A. F. K. ORGANSKI
The University of Michigan

South Africa's Foreign Policy, 1945-1970. By James Barber. (London: Oxford University Press. 1973. Pp. 330. $14.50.)

The main thesis of Dr. Barber's book is that the foreign policy of South Africa since the Second World War has been determined by her internal political and social structure, to a greater extent than the foreign policy of any other non-Communist country. To this effect on page 137 he cites the late prime minister, Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd: "Our motto is to maintain white supremacy for all time to come over our own people and our own country, by force if necessary."

The book is divided chronologically into four sections. "The Aftermath of War (1945-1948)" explains how in his final years as prime minister Jan Christian Smuts, one of the drafters of the Charter of the United Nations, clung to his ideal of a western-dominated international order when it was already becoming irreconcilable with reality, with the result that he was not able to check the growth of foreign criticism of South Africa's control over South West Africa and its treatment of its Indian population. Second, "The Early Years of National Party Rule (1948-1959)" shows how the damaging effects of the Nationalist government's internal policy of apartheid and external policy of removing the last vestiges of British imperial authority were partially compensated by its extreme anticommunism, without, however, bringing South Africa into a military alliance with any Western power. Third, in "The Years of Crisis and Doubt (1960-1966)," we are shown how Verwoerd's administration weathered the stresses created by the Sharpeville incident, the decolonization of British Africa, and the foundation of the Organization of African Unity and its Liberation Committee, by adopting ruthless measures against internal dissidents, embarking on a massive armament program, and attracting large-scale Western participation in the burgeoning South African economy. Finally, "Years of Confidence (1966-1970)" explains how the dangers receded both at home and abroad: South Africa consolidated its position of dominance over a Southern African bloc including Portuguese Angola and Mozambique, settler-ruled Rhodesia, and the former British dependencies Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland which, though ruled by Africans, were constrained by their economic dependence on the Republic.

As an empirical record, rich in detail, objective in tone, and sound in judgment, this is greatly superior to other works on the subject. The only errors I have noted are cases where the footnote references have been muddled, as on page 126 where Dr. Barber confuses two books by this reviewer.

This meticulous account by Dr. Barber, who is a Reader in the Department of Government in the British Open University, stresses the skill of the National Party leadership in accommodating to internal and external challenges to White supremacy. For example, Verwoerd launched the Bantustan program in the early 1960s both as a response to external pressures for "decolonization" and as a technique for diverting internal African political activities from the center to the periphery and splintering them into "tribal" segments.

One wonders how Dr. Barber would assess the period since 1970. By 1975 the peculiar institutions of South Africa had entered another period of crisis. White supremacy was being threatened in at least four respects. The Black industrial

workers, on whom White South African prosperity depends, were beginning to flex their muscles. The Bantustan leaders were not limiting themselves to the subservient roles envisaged by Verwoerd. The movement toward detente between the capitalist and the Communist powers was reducing the value of South Africa's claim to legitimacy in the eyes of the West as a bastion of anti-communism. And Portuguese decolonization was depriving South Africa of its buffer zone to the north.

Dr. Barber's admirable book is a splendidly researched and well-organized history, and it provides essential background for an understanding of the contemporary situation in a potentially explosive region.

LEONARD THOMPSON

Yale University

Power and Law: American Dilemma in World Affairs. Edited by Charles A. Barker. (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971. Pp. 205. $8.50.)

This volume, which consists of papers presented at a meeting in September 1968 by Charles A. Barker, Charles E. Rosenberg, Walter LaFeber, William L. Neumann, Cameron Nish, William J. Bruce, Nam-Yearl Chai, Gerald A. Sumida, Arthur I. Waskow, and Berenice A. Carroll, is the third publication sponsored by the Conference on Peace Research in History. As stated in the preface, the collaborators aimed ". . . to take long views in the history of the peace policy and war policy in our country, rather than to analyze current events" (p. vii). Furthermore, they agreed to do so by associating political science with history in what is described as a bidisciplinary approach. The design does not come off convincingly for a variety of reasons.

On the plane of methodology it appears that history is not congenial to most of the contributors, who evidently share the view expressed by Saul Mendlovitz at the original colloquium that "history is too passive a kind of scholarship to serve world order" (p. x). Although the editor had hoped that the finished papers would correct this estimate, we find him expressing impatience with history, LaFeber chastising Americans for believing themselves immune to history, and Carroll arguing in the course of her excellent concluding review that "historians have been regrettably prone to neglect peace both as a subject and as a value premise in their professional work" (p. 197). The fact that historians may not make up for the deficiencies in the real records at their disposal by surmise and supposition is entirely overlooked. The answer to Carroll's question: "Why There Is No Peace History" may thus well be that world peace cannot be extrapolated convincingly from the records of Africa, Asia, Europe, and America either as an idea or a norm; or that the variegated regional records of the past are not reducible to the same time scale; or that peace, being merely one of numerous themes in world affairs, is analyzed best in the context of general histories of international relations. These possibilities are not explored. Indeed, a reading of the essays suggests that the entire work was conceived and executed in the service rather of hopes, despairs, and other emotions than of scholarly concerns with history.

This mood is communicated on the first page of the book, where attention is drawn to the "shocking" events of 1970, namely the American military intervention in Cambodia and the killing of students in the context of antiwar protests, as well as to such unsettling events in 1968 as the election defeat of Senator McCarthy and the assassination of Senator Robert Kennedy. And it is explicitly endorsed by Rosenberg when he states that issues of war and peace are governed by emotions universally felt—surely a sweeping proposition, yet one for which absolutely no historical or sociological evidence is adduced. The book, then, is disconcerting also on the conceptual side. It purports to discuss American dilemmas in *world* affairs (and to judge by the essays, the dilemmas are legion); yet most of the chapters studiously avoid coming to terms with the world environment in which this nation's government and citizenry are supposed to perceive "the dilemma of power and law." The cause of world peace—which is the symposium's primary concern—is thus discussed exclusively as a function of what the authors consider "good" (very little) or "bad" (a lot) about America.

The formula or paradigm for this concerted approach is borrowed from Gunnar Myrdal's treatment of the American dilemma in *domestic* race relations. Now this "dilemma" could indeed be analyzed in the framework of American constitutional norms and moral values. But it is, after all, axiomatic that domestic affairs are not foreign affairs. If the authors were unaware of this elementary fact, they might have done well to study Myrdal's *Asian Drama* in which the differences between oriental and occidental value systems are set out with admirable clarity. And here they might have learned that issues relating to war and peace in world affairs are not reducible to American thought patterns. What is disturbing about the present volume, then, is the self-righteous assumption first, that non-American forces have nothing to do either with the actualities of international relations or with American reactions to troublesome situations in

this field; and second, that all American policy responses in foreign affairs which do not conform to the authors' values can be safely adjudged loathsome and immoral. For example, Neumann is shocked that President Truman could think that Americans value freedom more than peace (p. 57).

The corollaries of this frankly biased approach consist in seeing every "iffy" question in foreign affairs as a nationally crucial moral dilemma, and in casting the latter in such unreasonably polarized terms as: Power vs. Law; War vs. Peace; Peace men vs. National Will men; Imperialism vs. Anti-Imperialism; Peace and Multilateralism vs. Militarism and Unilateralism; Assertion of Power by Military Force vs. Commitment to Peace and Order. Nothing in international history or foreign relations can be seriously scrutinized in this way, and therefore it is not surprising that the authors evade the challenge by simply flaying the U.S. for being "the bad guy" all the way through. Barker thus refers to "our country's practice of unilateral violence against other peoples" (p. 4); Neumann notes "the American reluctance to accept peace on other than bargain terms" (p. 59); and LaFeber complains that American foreign policy as conducted by presidents in the last 150 years has become ever more aggressive, and that it is the nation's traditional aggressiveness which initiated the American-Soviet rivalry in 1917-18 and triggered the Cold War after 1941. The lists of American misdeeds are endless; they are also repetitious because the authors proceed from identical ideological premises.

Law receives merely passing treatment from the American contributors. For Bruce ("The United States and the Law of Mankind") it appears to stand mainly for UN resolutions, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and certain other present trends and practices which all of the authors feel ought to become part of the law of mankind, but which the U.S., to their regret, has not yet recognized as law. Conventional international law is scarcely mentioned by the North American writers and is written off entirely by the two Asian scholars. Sumida thus argues in an interesting article on "The Right of Revolution: Implications for International Law and World Order" that while rebellions and revolutions in the Third World may have been tactically aided by the existence of the doctrine of state sovereignty, the utilitarian value of the norm is likely to be limited in time. For not only have the new states shown themselves to be less reluctant than those of the West to use force even when it might "technically" violate Art. 2, par. 4 of the Charter (p. 160), but they are also likely to be engaged in internal wars for years to come. The Koreans, meanwhile, we learn from Chai in "Law as a Barrier to Change: A Korean Experience", have had to wage "an incessant war against the law" (p. 112) so as to keep their independence. Therefore they also had to demonstrate hostility toward such a proposal as "world peace through the rule of law," for it reminded all Asians of "the colonialist-tailored legal norms of the bygone days" (p. 113). Furthermore, and most important for the purposes of the book under review, this Asian spokesman assures us that even precolonial (i.e., pre-Japanese) Koreans "had never really developed any fondness for law. They had preferred government by a virtuous ruler . . ." (p. 127-28). In short, then, the reminder is in order that dilemmas between peace and war, or law and power, are not readily perceived beyond our shores.

ADDA B. BOZEMAN
Sarah Lawrence College

The Future of the International Legal Order. Volume III: Conflict Management. Edited by Cyril E. Black and Richard A. Falk. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971. Pp. 413. $12.50.); **Volume IV: The Structure of the International Environment.** Edited by Cyril E. Black and Richard A. Falk. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972. Pp. 637. $17.50.)

Owing to what may be described as acts of God in the Western Hemisphere, the writing of this review has been delayed. Yet, if the sufferers are futurologists, they should probably not complain. Lapse of time enables the reviewer to deal with past futures rather than future pasts.

The two volumes under review, to be followed by a final volume in quest of an international consensus on diagnoses made and remedies proposed in the earlier volumes, are concerned with conflict management (Volume III) and the structure of the international environment (Volume IV).

The general scheme of Volume III is as simple as it is ingenious: framework, central world-order concerns, and the moderation of conflict. In choosing the contributors, the editors have found a neat balance between the lasting and the ephemeral. Perhaps they might have made more decisive use of their blue pencils and been less permissive about linguistic horrors such as "interface" (p. ix), "specificity" (p. 33), "integrality" (p. 276), and "autopunitive" (p. 96).

While any choice is invidious, pride of place should probably be given to Tom J. Farer's incisive paper on "Law and War." Similarly, the application to civil strife of Rosalyn Higgin's technique of grouping conflicting claims helps one to view in perspective strenuous attempts

made to change the law as it stands. The list of "new" countries with religiously defended "old" —that is, colonial—frontiers in Daniel Wilkes's unassuming paper on "Territorial Stability and Conflict" alone is worth more than many a lengthy disquisition. Finally, the steadily accelerating proliferation of nuclear weapons receives justifiably concerned treatment from Arnold Kramish.

Turning to Volume IV, one notes that Part One extends well beyond the limits set in the title of the Volume: *The Structure of the International Environment.* At least potentially, it covers the whole of "Man and his Environment," a worthy subject for an encyclopedia. Even so, one would not wish Harold D. Lasswell's scintillating essay on "Future Systems of Identity in the World Community" to be curtailed. But Mary Ellen Caldwell's impressive analysis of the movements in population trends would have gained by transfer to a missing Part (on which more will have to be said later).

Denis Livingstone's strictures on the inadequate attention paid by the majority of international lawyers to the impact of scientific and technological changes on their own field have some justification. Yet it might have been advisable to add the names of J. E. S. Fawcett and the late M. W. Mouton to the list of honorable exceptions. Also, L. Gordenker's attempt to rouse interest in the potentialities of international social law, an unduly neglected branch of international law, deserves support.

In Part II, more directly concerned with structures of the international environment, the emphasis is on international law (G. Gottlieb) and institutions (J. S. Nye, D. McNemar, and J. P. Sewell).

Gottlieb's conclusion is representative of the spirit of informed but constructive skepticism permeating both volumes: "Short of a cataclysmic conflict and short of ecological collapse no major changes are likely to transform the international system itself" (p. 380).

This conclusion makes apparent the limitations of the structural approach chosen in Volume IV. To balance the essentially static character of structuralism, it might have helped to pay greater attention than has been done in any of the four volumes to the actual forces determining the dynamics of the international system. It is even arguable that room should have been found in Volume IV—if necessary by ruthless pruning elsewhere—for an additional section on forces shaping the international environment.

Moreover, if the specific character of this international system had been more concretely identified and if the difference between law and order in general, and international law and order in particular, had been more clearly perceived, the insights gained might have changed the whole emphasis in the two volumes under review. It might have emerged that the assumption of the possibility of avoiding indefinitely another cataclysmic conflict—we have already had two in living memory—runs counter to everything we know about international systems of open power politics and power politics in disguise. Moreover, the disruptive trends inherent in the contemporary variant of world politics in disguise are intensified by other powerful forces tending in the same direction: population growth; famine; inflation; the ungovernable character of large areas by other than oppressive methods; the evanescence of stabilizing values in the majority of the world's centers of civilization; and widespread resignation to the emergence of neobarbarism in various shapes.

Be this as it may, due tribute must be paid to Myres McDougal, the spiritual progenitor of these volumes. In the 1973 Proceedings of the American Society of International Law, he confesses that Volume IV of *The Future of the International Legal Order* would not have been his personal choice for the Society's Certificate of Merit for the best book on international law published in 1972. He, however, added that he was not wholly displeased with the Committee's decision; for "most of the four volumes were written by my associates and former students" (p. 94). To have inspired four teams as dedicated and versatile as those responsible for *The Future of International Legal Order* is an achievement unequaled by any international lawyer of McDougal's or any other generation.

G. SCHWARZENBERGER
University College, London

The European Convention on Human Rights. By Frede Castberg. Updated and edited by Torkel Opsahl and Thomas Ouchterlony. (Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff and Dobbs Ferry, N. Y.: Oceana Publications, 1974. Pp. 198. $16.50.)

Commissaires et Juges Dans Les Communautés Européennes. By Nicole Condorelli Braun. (Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, R. Pichon et R. Durand-Auzias, 1972. Pp. 232. No price indicated.)

European scholars, sometimes from envy and occasionally with admiration, have long noted that the more interesting works on the integration of Western Europe were not written by Europeans. The voluminous European scholarly literature on the institutions and practices of integration tended to be rigorously formal or painstakingly descriptive. It is a pleasure to report that these grounds for envy no longer

exist: the books here reviewed cannot be faulted on either score. They are competent, interesting, and useful even by the standards of American political science.

The Castberg book on the regional system for protecting human rights is unique among the very large number of works treating the same subject. As a former member of the Commission on Human Rights, the author, instead of merely commenting on the provisions of the Convention and summarizing the ten decisions rendered by the Court or staking out an ideological position, skillfully summarizes the case law of all three institutions. He emphasizes the 6400 cases handled by the Commission, including many which were eventually found inadmissible, and thus recapitulates the evolution of jurisprudence over a twenty-year span. He goes so far as to record split votes and to report on the implementation by national authorities of some key decisions. While the central legal doctrines and issues involved are always brought out, they do not dominate the discussion to the extent of making a political evaluation impossible. Unfortunately, Castberg's conclusions are very brief so that I must make the effort to assess the meaning of this material.

Given the current emotive appeal of the protection of human rights by international legal and political means, the nature of the European system must be clearly established, if only to warn enthusiasts of its very limited applicability to extra-European situations. International regimes dealing with human rights may take several forms. They may *prohibit* the state from certain acts against individuals, i.e., protect the individual from the state. They may also order the state to act in creating new rights or programs, (i.e., the state *shall act for* groups and collectivities). The European system illustrates the first and the United Nations system the second of these approaches. Finally, such regimes can also seek to define what the state *may* do in seeking to protect the collectivity against individuals. The tension between the first and the last of these approaches provides the focus for analyzing the European experience. But first recall another caveat for those who would compare Europe with the UN system: the European Convention is designed to provide minimum protection against national administrative and judicial practices in a setting in which the member states are *already committed* to the maintenance of the rule of law and the rights of the individual; nobody expected them to require persuasion.

Individuals have been so protected primarily in the area of criminal procedure (Austria, Belgium) and administrative practices relating to immigration (Britain). The exercise of the right of individual petition has been successfully safeguarded. But in almost all other areas covered by the Convention, the discretionary power of the democratic state has been upheld. The prohibition against discrimination has *not* been interpreted to mean that compulsory linguistic segregation in education (in Belgium) is illegal or that speakers of minority languages are entitled to special rights in court proceedings (Austria). Small religious sects do not enjoy the same rights as established churches (Sweden, Germany). National emergencies and the threat to human rights *can* be invoked to suspend rights guaranteed by the convention if a democratic regime seeks to protect itself (Ireland, Germany), but not if an authoritarian regime makes such claims (Greece). The right to property does not protect the individual against nationalization (Britain), nor does the right to education entitle one to a school or a curriculum of one's choice (Belgium, Denmark, Sweden). And the prohibition against forced labor cannot be invoked against compulsory civilian service laws (Norway, Germany).

How effective, then, is the system? Only 130 of 6400 complaints have actually been found admissible, and of these perhaps a dozen resulted in decisions favoring the plaintiffs! Castberg makes no claim that this record has resulted in any appreciable harmonization or standardization of European law. In fact, he agrees that the doctrine of the "margin of appreciation" in favor of state discretion militates against such a trend. The Commission, the Court, and the Committee of Ministers expressly reject the role of a final European appeals tribunal. Effects then must be measured in a different way. Castberg shows that the "ombudsman role" of the Commission has been more important than its judicial rulings because of the number of cases in which respondent governments agreed to a friendly settlement, to a change of administrative procedure, or to amended legislation without any rulings having to be made (Norway, Belgium, Britain, Sweden, Austria). He also notes that even in cases found not to be admissible, practices may have been at stake which were subsequently discontinued, particularly in the area of prison administration.

And yet the question remains: how effective is the system in dealing with a government that does not share the presumed consensus in favor of individual rights? The key case is the complaint of the three Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands against the Papadopoulos regime—and it fails to answer the question. Commission and Committee of Ministers ruled against Greece in sweeping terms, and for the

first time in such a manner as to condemn not merely a single law or administrative procedure, but an entire "legal" order, including the failure to hold elections. Yet hours before the Committee of Ministers was to "pronounce sentence," Greece denounced the Convention and withdrew from the Council of Europe. The restoration of democratic government much later can hardly be credited to the procedures in Strasbourg. Castberg and his editors deserve enormous credit for not making inflated claims for the system and for permitting the reader to draw these inferences with the help of admirably arranged materials.

The unique value of the volume by Nicole Braun lies in its marshaling of biographical information on 71 individuals who have served between 1952 and 1970 as members of the European Community Court, the High Authority, and the Commissions of Euratom and the EEC, also including the unified Commission. The information is neatly arranged and tabulated. It includes items on the professional activities and affiliations of the individuals before going to Brussels or Luxembourg or both, their political beliefs and ties, their roles in the European integration movement, their links with national and regional groups and clienteles, and their personal political "styles." Most of the information deals with the way each individual played his supranational role after being appointed. While the discussion is focused on individuals, these individuals are grouped in "typical" career pattern categories which follow the major political events and crises of the Communities. The discussion of roles is thus presented in a setting of political conflict and process. Braun contrasts the behavioral roles defined by the relevant treaties (independent judgment, freedom from instructions and pressure from the governments, collegial decision making, technical and specialized competence) with the *actual conduct* of most of the individuals included in relation to member state behavior. The author's intent is to show the extent of conformity between legally defined and actual behavior, for the judges and commissioners as well as for their home governments. In short: when, where, and why did these European officials abandon independent judgment and resistance to governmental pressure; when and why did they behave like politicians rather than technical specialists? When and how were they punished or rewarded for their behavior?

While certain facts regarding the careers of the better-known Eurocrats are common knowledge (e.g., Mansholt, Hallstein, Monnet, Hirsch), the bulk of the findings are quite new. States tended to appoint individuals who were prominent in the drafting of the key treaties or in the national parliaments. Appointments tended to be balanced according to sensitive national representation issues: major political parties must be given satisfaction as well as an occasional crucial minor party coalition partner. In Holland the religious groups must be satisfied; in Belgium, the linguistic groups. De Gaulle, of course, disregarded all these niceties in his appointments, the Italian government tends to reward deserving Christian-Democrats by sending them to Brussels, and Adenauer took care to send his political supporters. Governments tend to accept each other's appointments without questioning them; the practice of choosing the President of the High Authority by cooptation among the members of the college was abandoned in favor of straight national nomination. Even at the European level, appointments are nicely balanced—through unwritten rules—in terms of nationality, party and interest group ties.

How do these officials behave after being appointed? Most stay within the specialist roles in which they were formally cast; some do not. Those who seek to play a larger role prosper as long as the political milieu is favorable and the Community fares well financially and economically; they suffer attack and opprobrium when these conditions no longer hold. Moreover, as crises develop, the presidencies of the colleges are likely to be taken over by specialists unwilling to take political risks. France tends to punish officials who have disappointed her in Brussels after they leave European service by depriving them of prestigious positions at home. In the Hirsch case de Gaulle actually forced a resignation. Italy simply refuses to support the renomination of her nationals who have been found wanting. Benelux nationals, on the other hand, seem to be quite free to act out the roles they choose for themselves. Does the recruitment pattern follow the rules laid down by the treaties in terms of formal roles? Braun finds that it does not, but she also concludes that this is preferable for Europe because it makes possible a closer rapport between the officials and the political trends at home which constrain their actions in any case. Do the institutions examined behave strictly in terms of the independent and supraordinate (if not supranational) powers conferred upon them? Clearly they do not, for reasons too well understood to require further comment. What happens to the careers of European officials after they leave Brussels? Some prosper by returning to national government service, some go into private business and consulting work, most of them fade into obscurity. Working for Europe turns out to be a mixed blessing.

If these findings and conclusions are far from startling, the reason lies less in the data than in the use made of it. Braun's emphasis is on role

conformity with respect to the progress of the European unification movement. Conformity of informal with formal behavioral roles is thought to advance unification. Lack of conformity—as observed in practice—is equated with stagnation. A more illuminating perspective could have been adopted if the author had asked a different set of questions of her excellent data; what is it about the character of the professional and political roles of these individuals which explains the *maintenance* of the unique European pattern of mixed regional/national decision making in the realm of economics? How did it come to be, admitting that practice did not always follow the rules of the treaties? How do we account for the cycles of growth and stagnation in Community influence, given the attributes of the key individuals and their interaction with national political systems?

This set of questions could have been answered with the data at hand. Braun was in a position to explain how individual commissioners respond to and influence the key domestic groups with whom they had been (or were) affiliated. In some cases this would mean political parties, in others, industrial and agricultural interest groups. in still others, trade unions. She could have taken advantage of the fact that almost half of all commissioners were formerly ministers. Do they have special access to or ties with their old colleagues in the national cabinets—especially if their European "portfolios" corresponded with their former national ones? The same question could have been raised about ex-ministers whose national clientele was easily identified in terms of economic interest. A very large number of commissioners and judges are former national bureaucrats. Does this give them a special line of access to their old shops at home and to their successors? Does their behavior support the thesis that temporary seconding to European service is a more effective socialization mechanism than permanent service in Brussels? Does it make a difference for system maintenance if appointments are made on the basis of protecting national interests (France) or of rewarding faithful service (Italy)? Does the principle of judicial independence survive a close scrutiny about whether the decisions of the Court conform to key national and interest group preferences? The French and Italian officials tend to spend less time in European service than their Dutch and Belgian colleagues. Does that pattern affect the character of the decisions made? It is time that we had answers to these questions, but Braun's work is a useful first step.

ERNST B. HAAS
University of California, Berkeley

Fidel in Chile: A Symbolic Meeting Between Two Historical Processes. By Fidel Castro. (New York: International Publishers, 1972. Pp. 234. $7.50.)

This book is a compilation of speeches, dialogues, and interviews of Fidel Castro during his three-week visit to Chile in 1971. It is not a rigorous piece of scholarly work, but rather consists of long-winded discourses between Castro and his audiences which are biased in nature and repetitive in content.

The book is perhaps most useful as a blueprint for what not to do if you seek to conduct a successful revolution. For example, take Castro's advice to Chile (pp. 11-12) concerning arranging trade arrangements between the two countries for the exchange of Chilean saltpeter and potassium nitrate for Cuba's sugar. According to Castro, it would be in Cuba's interest to import Chile's saltpeter instead of buying European nitrogen for agricultural purposes. For anyone familiar with the characteristics of Chile's saltpeter vs. European nitrogen, this is not the most practical way to increase agricultural production. What is interesting is Castro's reflections on his own revolutionary experience ("There are the problems of the revolutionaries themselves; their lack of know-how and experience," p. 39).

The book is most interesting when Castro discusses his perceptions of the differences between Chile and Cuba and the style of revolution that would be appropriate in each case; and when he discusses the U.S. Bay-of-Pigs attempt to overthrow his regime. This is particularly true in view of recent revelations regarding U.S. activities through the CIA between 1971–3 to "destabilize" the Allende regime.

We now have two authoritarian regimes—one from the left in Cuba and one from the right in Chile. One can not help but speculate as to whether both countries would not now be more truly democratic if we had simply left the nations to choose their own paths. The U.S.'s vital interests in Latin America might have also been more secure than they apparently are now if we had done so.

WESTON H. AGOR
Special Assistant to Governor of Michigan

British Defence Policy East of Suez, 1947-1968. By Phillip Darby. (London and New York: Oxford University Press for Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1973. Pp. 366. £6.50; $21.00.)

Britain's lingering presence in the Indian Ocean and Far East, the result of her tenure of

Empire in India has now been reduced to such tiny proportions that it is not unreasonable to regard it as a suitable subject for historical enquiry. It may be that the time to pronounce judgment has not yet arrived, not only because all the material is not yet available—the thirty-years rule bars the official archives—but also because our own perspectives are changing. Only now with the oil crisis in the forefront of political concern is it beginning to be noted that Britain's presence in the Gulf, for instance, was not unimportant in making for an uninterrupted supply.

Mr. Darby, a very able young Australian student of international affairs has, however, looked at the matter in a rather different light, as a case study in the interrelations of defense and foreign policy. He is concerned to show the inadequacy of the commonly repeated claim that "defence policy is the servant of foreign policy" by showing that this notion suggests an "assumption of the rationality of the decision-making process" which itself is open to challenge. It was not so much alterations in foreign policy that changed Britain's defense posture in the postwar period—indeed, there were no great changes in foreign policy—but pressures for economy on the defense establishment, which in making the necessary cuts rendered certain objectives of foreign policy unattainable. Changes in proclaimed policy were thus largely the result of decisions taken for quite different reasons.

The other important aspect of the matter well brought out by Mr. Darby is the difficulty that faced defense planners in their inability to estimate clearly the impact of the advent of nuclear weapons upon traditional thinking. The idea that the "deterrent" would render minor wars less likely and so permit cuts in conventional forces was to be shown to be a complete misreading of the new situation. Furthermore, the new conditions of warfare arising from other technical developments were also only slowly assimilated by defense chiefs and even more slowly by politicians. After so much bombast about the moral iniquities of the "Suez" affair, it is useful to be reminded of the inadequacy of its planning and the effect of the hesitations of the political leadership. A more rapidly conducted operation might have pre-empted the political opposition it aroused.

It was also true that the whole process of imperial disengagement was difficult for the military to bring into their calculations. They thought of positions in territories over which sovereignty could be taken for granted; the colonial office meanwhile went on with its own program of granting independence to them. Mr. Darby notes, without being able to document, the charge that before 1956 the Ministry of Defence and the Colonial Office were pursuing inconsistent policies in Singapore. In the case of Kenya the evidence is public and striking—large sums being spent in creating facilities that would never be used.

In Britain the alternation of parties in power can also have its effect on defense policy. After being the great protagonist of imperial retreat, the Labour Party in 1963 discovered a new role for Britain in the new Asia and came into power in 1964 with the idea of staying "East of Suez" to provide a factor for stability, only to be defeated in that object by the cost-factor. And the inconsistency was heightened by the fact that in political terms, the priority was then being given to "entry into Europe." The distant chronicler might see between Attlee and Wilson a measure of ideological continuity—one giving independence to India, the other carrying the process forward to the peripheries of the old Empire. But looked at more closely the similarity disappears. The Wilson government did not intend to leave the "East of Suez" area: it found itself with no option for basically financial reasons. In the end the commitment to Europe was given preference, but the choice was reluctantly arrived at and not defended in principle.

From the point of view of democratic theory Mr. Darby's conclusions are even less palatable. At no time was the whole question the subject of serious public debate. Britain accepted a continuing role East of Suez and then abandoned it without ever reckoning the cost of either decision. Labour's innate pacifism found a ready echo among a people wedded to an easy materialism. It is all very far from the textbook distinction between ends and means. Mr. Darby has done a useful service in a cool and scholarly way.

MAX BELOFF
University College at Buckingham

International Law and the Revolutionary State: A Case Study of the Soviet Union and International Law. By Richard J. Erickson. (New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1972. Pp. 254. $15.00.)

This study is an analysis of how the Soviet Union, as the archetypal revolutionary state, has interacted with customary international law. While the thesis that the Soviet Union is an archetypal revolutionary state is obviously debatable, the subject matter of the book is clearly of great intrinsic interest. Unfortunately, the book was quite out of date by the time it was printed and is marred by the apparent attempt of the author to work with Russian materials despite an inadequate knowledge of the Russian

language. The most recent source cited was published in 1966, and some portions of the book appear not to have been revised since 1964. The introduction contains references to two French and six Russian publications. Only one of the French and one of the Russian references are spelled correctly. The author's batting average improves somewhat in the later chapters, but never reaches an acceptable level.

The work covers the development of Soviet theory of customary international law from Stuchka to Tunkin, and then examines the current application of this theory to various major areas of international law. The book also contains appendices devoted to Soviet representation in international organizations, Soviet scholars of international law and an extensive bibliography. All of these are useful, though dated and full of minor technical errors.

The reader who does not know Russian will find a good deal of information about Soviet views in this book. He or she could get most of it, however, in much more up to date and reliable form in the works of such specialists in Soviet international law as Butler, Ginsburgs, Grzybowski, Osakwe, Slusser, and Triska. The reader might also wish to consult Dr. William Butler's recent translation of Professor Grigorii Tunkin's treatise, and for the early period, Timothy A. Taracouzio's classic 1935 study, *The Soviet Union and International Law.*

PETER B. MAGGS

University of Illinois
Urbana-Champaign

The Question of Palestine, 1914-1918: British-Jewish-Arab Relations. By Isaiah Friedman. (New York: Schocken Books, 1973. Pp. 450. $12.00.)

Few documents of modern diplomacy compare with the Balfour Declaration for the amount of governmental scrutiny it received prior to publication in 1917 or for the public controversy and detailed analysis it has been subjected to ever since. Was the Declaration a sinister plot consistent with imperial behavior, an act of farsighted and principled statesmanship, or possibly some of both? Was it blatantly contradictory to other, parallel British pledges to the Arabs and to France regarding future disposition of the Middle East in general and of Palestine specifically, or was it actually compatible with them?

Exchanges between apologists for the Declaration and its critics, often acrimonious and extending over more than half a century, have done little to resolve these central questions of British motivation and intent. If anything, the debate becomes more desultory, less conclusive, and further removed from contemporary political realities of the Arab-Israel struggle. Similarly, research efforts have contributed little that is original—certainly not since the late Leonard Stein's classic study of the Balfour Declaration in 1961—and thus serve neither to sharpen the debate nor to terminate it.

This latest study ought to be the last word on the subject, for it is an impressive summation of virtually all the interpretations, explanations and arguments put forth previously. In its amassing of detail and primary sources, the book is unlikely to be rivaled by any future historical treatment. Moreover, the author, a professor of history at Dropsie College, has been careful to place the Declaration in its proper context: not solely limited to the bilateral Anglo-Zionist relationship, but viewed in the broader yet infinitely more complex regional and international perspective. And while emphasizing the salience of political interests, Friedman alerts his reader to the important role played by various individuals whose perceptions and convictions greatly affected the policy outcome. The dynamism of Sir Mark Sykes; the forceful opposition to any such pro-Zionist public statement by the two leading Anglo-Jewish figures, Edwin Montague and Lucien Wolf, effectively countered by the discreet penetration of Britain's political circles by Chaim Weizmann and, hitherto unappreciated, by the wartime contribution of Aaron Aaronsohn in Palestine; the idiosyncracies of a Balfour or of a Lloyd George —these receive their just due in Friedman's long and involved narrative.

Meticulous research, careful documentation, and a high standard of scholarship in handling a subject notable for partisanship rather than detachment or objectivity are the book's obvious strengths. Another stems from Friedman's comprehensiveness, which sets this book apart from so many earlier essays viewing the Balfour Declaration in terms of single-factor analysis, i.e., that the British pledge was awarded to Weizmann for his wartime scientific contribution.

But the price paid for such thoroughness may be too high. The sheer size of the book, compounded by the writing style of its author in which copious quotes and countless memoranda are unrelieved by a clear outline or by occasional summaries of key points, will deter most people from reading it through. Although admirable historiography, it is too bulky and unstructured a tool for foreign policy analysts. It lacks sharpness, since the author does not explicate and fails to nail down central points. As a result, much of the natural drama of an intense political struggle

between men and nations is lost in the overwhelming mass of detail. Letting the documents speak for themselves is not always the wisest form of scholarly argumentation.

As suggested by his material, rather than by the author himself, the Balfour Declaration, far from being a case of willful British deception, was the product of several factors, including miscalculation and misunderstanding. What links the Husayn-MacMahon correspondence and the Sykes-Picot treaty with the Declaration is not so much the image of a "perfidious Albion" as of a Great Power inflicted with bureaucratic rivalries and deficiencies in interdepartmental coordination in the face of demands and pressures posed by wartime diplomacy.

Incompetence, not duplicity, is the weightiest charge that Great Britain must bear for her contribution in that initial, formative phase of the Palestine problem during 1914-1918. That Zionist aspirations played directly into British hands is well known. It is less appreciated that, conversely, British anxieties and images served Zionist interests equally well. Witness the compelling need felt by those in London to pre-empt a comparable initiative by the Central Powers; or Britain's hope that by means of an expression of sympathy towards Zionism, the Jewish intelligentsia, "whose ranks contain so many of the journalists, teachers, political wire-pullers, etc. of the world" (p. 297), in the words of War Office's William Ormsby-Gore, might be won over to the Allied cause.

Now that Friedman has said virtually everything that can be said about the Balfour Declaration, its background and motives, surely the time is appropriate for proceeding beyond the events and discussions leading up to its becoming official British policy. Balfour's short letter to Lord Rothschild was, after all, merely an informal statement of intent on the part of His Majesty's Government to countenance the Zionist enterprise—"view with favour" was the actual, diluted phraseology adopted by the Cabinet. As such, it was neither self-implementing nor a commitment of substantive support for the building of a Jewish national home in Palestine.

Friedman only refers in passing to "a darker and less controllable phase" which followed release of the Declaration. Yet it is this later period which is decisive. What matters, in political terms, is not why Great Britain issued the Balfour Declaration, but why successive British governments acknowledged its enduring validity. It is necessary for current research to move on and to come to grips with how the several participants to the Palestine contest exploited the Balfour Declaration or maneuvered around it. Friedman's book now provides an excellent foundation for pushing on with these challenging questions.

AARON S. KLIEMAN
Tel-Aviv University, Israel

The New Era in American Foreign Policy. Edited by John H. Gilbert. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973. Pp. 216. $8.95, cloth; $3.95, paper.)

This book of essays is based, with one exception, on papers prepared for a symposium at North Carolina State University in 1972. The authors are all distinguished scholars who were asked to adopt the perspective of the next decade in considering the important issues of American foreign policy.

The essays are of varying quality and scope, but each is an intelligent discussion within the boundaries the author sets for himself. Several interesting issues are dealt with, although very little attention is given to the problems and issues of American foreign policy in the next decade. Indeed, most of the essays do not stand up well in the first biennium of the decade.

Stanley Hoffmann's 1972 *Foreign Affairs* article, reprinted here, is the outstanding essay. It is a brilliant and sophisticated critique of the Nixon-Kissinger view of a pentagonal world system, which not only persuasively argues the inapplicability and undesirability of the balance-of-power model for maintaining strategic stability but also questions its relevance for playing nonstrategic games like trade and ecology.

The felicitous and graceful writing of Inis L. Claude, Jr., is a pleasure to read. His essay offers the advice that the United States should use the United Nations maturely in the next decade.

In one of the more interesting essays, Ernest R. May attempts to identify which factors will be influential in the next decade and then goes on, despite his own advice to the contrary, to make predictions which may or may not hold up for a decade but which look pretty good in 1974.

Hans J. Morgenthau argues again that the Vietnam war was a mistake, and William Van Alstyne argues that only Congress has the power to declare war and that American hostilities were illegal after the repeal of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. James C. Thomson, Jr., has a nice essay on what to expect of American relations with China.

The "fights, games, and debates" distinctions of Anatol Rapoport are applied by him in an analysis of detente. He sees the system as fundamentally structured by insane elites who keep it going for their own purposes, both in the Cold War and in detente.

George W. Rathjens gives a perceptive anal-

ysis of the beliefs underlying the maintenance of nuclear weapons—basically, the view that they are not different in kind from conventional weapons—and concludes that there will be "for the years immediately ahead continuing, and possibly increasing, emphasis on nuclear strength" (p. 173).

In his essay on disarmament, J. David Singer outlines an analysis of the political process involved in armaments/disarmament and then proposes a scheme so far-fetched that one is tempted to characterize his essay as merely symbolic ("Look at me, guys—I'm for peace.").

These essays were prepared while the Vietnam war was still going on but after President Nixon had made clear his view of the world in his Guam speech and his State of the World messages. Two of the essays—Morgenthau's and Van Alstyne's—deal essentially with the war and might be thought to provide examples of the alienation of the intellectuals from American foreign policy. Two others—Rapoport's and Singer's—are pretty much irrelevant to policy making, at least in the short run (which includes the decade to which these essays are ostensibly addressed).

The others, however, are clearly addressing policy-relevant problems. In point of fact, a number of these essays use the Nixon-Kissinger definition of the issues as their focus, or at least their point of departure. To that extent, these authors are members of the establishment. Moreover, despite Vietnam, there are remnants of consensus. They all believe that the United States should remain involved in the world and not become isolationist. (What, after all, do foreign policy analysts do, if the nation turns inward and loses interest in the rest of the world—drive taxis?) Beyond that elementary consensus, however, even these establishment scholars do not agree on very much.

Perhaps they could agree on their task, but that agreement seems to be missing. The authors were asked to deal in futures, a task which presumes that social scientists have sufficiently explanatory theories to predict, which they don't. They could have posed important questions, but, on the whole, the authors of these essays accept the questions posed by policy makers.

Could these authors have done otherwise? The editor posed to them what appears, at a very superficial level, an important question. In reality, however, it is not an important question at all. The editor's question was so vague and provided so much scope that the authors were limited only by their own time, inclination, ambition, and imagination.

Some issues of American foreign policy are intelligently discussed in this volume, but it has no coherence and no structure. It will very probably be useful as a focus of discussion for introductory courses in American foreign policy or for adult discussion groups. But it is time-bound and, as a whole, unimaginative. It does not deal with the Middle East, oil, the environment, population, international economic structures and processes, and other continuing problems of American foreign policy. Neither does it focus systematically on underlying forces that can be expected to persist for the next decade.

HOWARD H. LENTNER
Baruch College, CUNY

The League of Nations. Edited by Ruth B. Henig. (New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1973. Pp. 203. $11.50, cloth; $5.75, paper.)

Publication of documents books as required or supplementary reading for college and university courses has been mostly an American enterprise, so one might have thought, but it is clear that the expansion of higher education in England is leading to similar enterprises. The present volume is part of a series originally published in England, and in many ways it is an attractive book. The editor has placed her documents in six chapters to show the rise, progress, and decline of the League. She covers the League's creation, early problems, the disarmament conference at Geneva in 1932–1934, and the Manchurian and Ethiopian crises, and she includes a chapter on the League's social and humanitarian interests. There is a briskly written introduction, and a concluding essay subtitled "The League is dead, long live the United Nations!" Documents are mostly from standard printed series such as the British foreign office records now being published in a long row of large black volumes, and from Hansard, and the League's official journal; in presenting the attitude of the Soviet Union toward the League, the editor has used appropriate newspaper editorials. She has searched into the manuscript records of the British foreign office and printed such items as Lord Robert Cecil's memorandum on "Proposals for Diminishing the Occasion of Future Wars," written in the autumn of 1916 and given to the cabinet. The bibliography contains a modestly annotated list of titles.

For American students this compilation may not prove as useful as it would for British readers or for Commonwealth or other English-speaking peoples who do not have easy access to libraries. Documents do not usually make interesting reading and most of the documents here do not disprove the rule. The editor remarks that not much has appeared about the League of Nations

other than monographs, since the publication more than two decades ago of Walters's two-volume work. How much better would it have been if the editor, who is a good writer, had done a little book on the League like J. L. Brierly's classic volume on international law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1928). Such a book would have to generalize about the large forces that made one World War lead to another. No group of documents about disarmament or Manchuria or Ethiopia can relate the breakdown of international organization during those two decades. The League came out of the Somme and Passchendaele and Versailles and died in the Great Depression and the Rhineland and Czechoslovak crises. It expired because it could not deal with a national leader like Hitler who was disrupting the peace of Europe, rather than because of failures outside the Continent. Despite all the ingenuity of the editor of the present volume, a document book is the wrong approach to the complex era of the League of Nations—an era that needs reassessing.

ROBERT H. FERRELL
Indiana University

The United States and the Developing World: Agenda for Action. Edited by Robert E. Hunter. (Washington, D.C.: Overseas Development Council, 1973. Pp. 164. $2.50, paper.)

As stated in the foreword by James P. Grant, President of the Overseas Development Council (ODC), this publication is the ODC's first attempt at providing "a comprehensive, periodic, non-partisan survey of the important and difficult problems involving the United States and the poor countries." The second book in the series appeared in 1974, and another is due in 1975.

The book consists of twelve short articles and a 40-page statistical appendix. Clearly aimed at the general, college-educated audience, the *Agenda* as a whole makes the case for increased assistance to the less developed countries by the United States. The statistical annexes simply and graphically remind the reader that the development gap is widening and U.S. official assistance is diminishing, while the dependence of the U.S. on imported raw materials from the less developed countries is growing both greater and more crucial. One bar graph portrays the relationship between expenditures on official development assistance and spending by American consumers on selected product categories (e.g., on toilet articles and preparations, consumers spend three times as much; on tobacco products, five times as much). Evidently, the categories are selected to make the reader question the value priorities of American spending habits.

The articles on different facets of the relationship between the U.S. and poor nations—aid, trade, finance, security, energy, environment, and population—are replete with recommendations for what U.S. policy "should" be. The Overseas Development Council with its moderate liberal establishment Board does not hedge its position: a substantial portion of the world's population is unacceptably poor and the U.S. has the responsibility and the means to do something about it.

The authors of the *Agenda*, most of whom are associated with the ODC, write within the policy framework outlined by Hunter and Grant. In essence the argument proceeds as follows:

(1) The cold war as characterized by political and military uncertainty between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. is over.

(2) The focus in international relations has shifted from political to economic matters.

(3) The role of the less-developed countries has become more important in the world.

(4) Paradoxically, the economic conditions of most of the world's population continues to deteriorate while the economic importance (especially raw material exports) of the less developed countries to the developed continues to increase.

Therefore, it is in the interests of the United States to improve its relations with the poor countries by:

(1) Separating military from economic assistance,

(2) Appropriating long-term untied economic assistance (mostly bilateral as it is most effective) in greatly increased amounts (at least double present levels) in order to come closer to the GNP percentage goal of the Second Development Decade,

(3) Removing trade barriers to exports from LDC's, especially on processed products, and preparing for the internal displacements by adequate adjustment assistance,

(4) Providing debt relief for the most heavily burdened LDC's,

(5) Substantially increasing the amounts of SDR's (Special Drawing Rights) issued by the International Monetary Fund to the LDC's,

(6) Facilitating the establishment of cooperative arrangements for mutually beneficial private investment flows, and

(7) Involving more fully the LDC's in international trade and monetary institutions and decision making.

Buttressed by appropriately selected statistics, the *Agenda for Action* makes an effective moral appeal. And as a political case the book does a

reasonably good job. It makes excellent reading material for foreign policy study groups and introductory college courses. Radicals may regard it as another "liberal cop-out," for except for a few lines in Robert Hunter's introduction devoted to a dismissal of the "liberation" school of thought, no mention is made of any revolutionary change in the world order. Enlightened self-interest is expected to lead the United States into adopting the recommended policies. The *Agenda* makes no attempt to suggest a strategy for getting these policies implemented.

Because the *Agenda* is a general reader, assertions are made without any specific references to theoretical discussions or well-documented justifications for the positions taken. For example, several of the authors utilize a simplistic free-trade, comparative advantage argument to rationalize their policy proposals. Recent developments, both pratical and theoretical, raise considerable questions about the soundness of this argument.

Finally, a book of this kind necessarily suffers from its dated orientation. Even so, it has weathered well, though the authors did not foresee the quadrupling of oil prices nor (by their standards) the disappointing results of the later international conferences on population, the oceans, and food, with which we are by now familiar. Possibly the major over-simplification was the emphasized distinction between political and economic relations. Who, except for diehard adherents to conventional specialized models, can deny the reality of a world political economy which needs to be studied as one phenomenon rather than as separate political and economic entities?

RAYMOND C. MILLER
San Francisco State University

Southern Governors and Civil Rights

Racial Segregation as a Campaign Issue in the Second Reconstruction

Earl Black

"A beautiful example of scholarship. It addresses a problem of national importance."
—James W. Prothro

This book offers a systematic, comprehensive analysis of the rise and partial decline of racial segregation as an issue in Southern electoral politics through the entire South over the past quarter century. In this first comparative analysis of a white political elite, Mr. Black shows that, largely because of Federal pressures, segregationist orientations have increasingly been replaced by nonsegregationist perspectives. His conclusion that "stateways" *can* alter "folkways" is well-reasoned and persuasive. $16.50

Civil-Military Relations in Sierra Leone

A Case Study of African Soldiers in Politics

Thomas S. Cox

The most striking political reality in sub-Saharan Africa within the last decade has been the substitution of military officers for civilians as rulers of many countries. Focusing on the West African state of Sierra Leone, Mr. Cox tests theories of civil-military relations against descriptions and analyses of events, and examines the notion of the military as an effective contributor to the process of political modernization in developing nations. In this carefully researched study he has used such primary source materials as treason-trial transcripts, minutes of civilian advisory board meetings, and interviews with key participants in civil-military relations, to explain how the changes occurred, how the military regimes have functioned, and how army officials have interacted with civilian elites. $14.00

A Theory of Public Bureaucracy

Politics, Personality, and Organization in the State Department

Donald P. Warwick
In collaboration with Marvin Meade and Theodore Reed

This is one of the first books to explore the roots of bureaucracy in an agency's own environment. Based mainly on State Department materials, the study addresses generic problems of bureaucratization and organizational politics. Two case studies furnish vivid illustrations of the powerful forces that work to produce and maintain hierarchy and rules. The book is a fresh, intelligent, and lively account of bureaucratic behavior—behavior that cannot be explained away by facile references to the bureaucratic personality, Parkinson's Law, or other simplistic interpretations. $12.00

The Splintered Party

National Liberalism in Hessen and the Reich, 1867–1918

Dan S. White

A study of the greatest middle-class party of Imperial Germany, *The Splintered Party* is an inquiry into the weakness of liberalism in the Empire of Bismarck and Wilhelm II. In pursuing his theme, Mr. White illuminates the changing political and social scene in Imperial Germany—the division of the National Liberals; the local power of the liberal "notables"; Bismarck's skill as a political manager; the character of agrarian discontent and rural anti-Semitism; and the steady advance of socialism. $14.00

Harvard University Press

79 Garden Street, Cambridge, MA 02138

OXFORD PAPERBACKS

The Politics of Communication
A Study in the Political Sociology of
Language, Socialization, and Legitimation
Claus Mueller, Hunter College of the City University of New York. ☐ The author demonstrates that when a political system is held together by promises, material benefits, and coercion, the system must control information and communication. Watergate is a symptom of this phenomenon. "Professor Mueller's book is superbly interesting. It is so much a book for this time."—Daniel Patrick Moynihan
1973 238 pp. A Galaxy Book (1975) paper $3.50

The United Nations as a Political Institution
Fifth Edition
H. G. Nicholas. ☐ "A lively, authentic, and up-to-date account of how the Charter has worked in practice and how the institutions created by it have responded to the demands upon them....Warmly recommended as an exceptionally well-informed and readable introduction to the political work of the United Nations."
—*International Affairs.*
1959 272 pp. A Galaxy Book (1975) paper $3.95

"Lessons" of the Past
The Use and Misuse of History
in American Foreign Policy
Ernest R. May, Harvard University. ☐ "Concise and stimulating...executed with May's well-known professional skill...*'Lessons' of the Past* is a valiant and valuable introduction to what ought to become a significant discussion."—Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., in *The Journal of American History*
1973 240 pp. A Galaxy Book (1975) paper $2.95

School for Soldiers
West Point and the Profession of Arms
Joseph Ellis, Mount Holyoke College; and **Robert Moore**, University of Maryland. ☐ "Thorough, scrupulously objective and quite readable, this study of the military academy by two former faculty members is critical but understanding in its approach to an institution caught between rigid traditions and a rapidly changing situation."—*Washington Post Book World*
1974 304 pp. A Galaxy Book (1976) paper $3.95

Keywords
A Vocabulary of Culture and Society
Raymond Williams. ☐ The author investigates the English words whose different shades of meaning reverberate throughout our culture and society. Drawing upon cultural history, historical semantics, the history of ideas, social criticism, literary history, and sociology, Williams "defines" and refines the meanings of such words as *aesthetic, alienation, reactionary, romantic*, and *culture*.
1976 288 pp. A Galaxy Book paper $3.50

Prices are subject to change.

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
200 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10016

THEORY and SOCIETY

RENEWAL AND CRITIQUE IN SOCIAL THEORY

THEORY and SOCIETY is a forum for an emerging worldwide community of social theorists. It is of interest to, and a voice for, all those concerned with the philosophical, intellectual and theoretical foundations of the social sciences and sociological inquiry. Committed to preventing their mutual isolation, THEORY and SOCIETY will foster clear discourse and pointed dialogue among them.

Some articles from Volume 2:

Notes on Neo-Capitalism – S. MICHAEL MILLER
Toward a Political Economy of Crime – WILLIAM CHAMBLISS
Reading the Grundrisse: Beyond 'Orthodox' Marxism – PAUL PICCONE
Towards a Reconstruction of Historical Materialism – JÜRGEN HABERMAS
Theodor W. Adorno: Theoretician through Negations – DEVRA L. DAVIS
The Importance of the Romantic Myth for the New Left – RICHARD FLACKS

Volume 3,2 will be a special issue on 'Language', and will contain, among others, Some Basic Distinctions in Universal Pragmatics – a Preliminary Statement, by Jürgen Habermas.

Editors: ALVIN GOULDNER, St. Louis
ERVING GOFFMAN, Philadelphia
DEREK PHILLIPS, Amsterdam
PAUL WALTON, Glasgow

Special Advisory Editor: ROBERT MERTON, New York

Volume 3, four issues – 1976

Personal subscriptions:	1 year	35 Dutch guilders, US$ 13.50.
	2 years	67 guilders, US$ 26.00.
	3 years	97.50 guilders, US$ 37.50.
Regular subscriptions:	1 year	76 Dutch guilders, US$ 29.25.
	2 years	140 guilders, US$ 54.00.
	3 years	193.50 guilders, US$ 74.50.

Send your order with payment to:
THEORY and SOCIETY, Elsevier, P.O. Box 330, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
or to
THEORY and SOCIETY, Elsevier, 52 Vanderbilt Ave., New York, N.Y. 10017 U.S.A.

ORDER FORM
☐ Please enter a [PERSONAL | REGULAR]* subscription for [1 | 2 | 3]* years starting with Volume 3.
☐ Please send me a specimen copy.
I enclose cheque for the correct amount.
Name _____
Address _____
* check appropriate box Postal Code _____

5094 E

Listing and Order Form for Publications of the AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

Quarterly journal of scholarly articles and book reviews in political science. Included in APSA membership. Back issues: $10.50 per copy; $42.00 per volume.

PS

Quarterly journal of Association news and articles of professional concern. Included in APSA membership. Back issues: $2.00 per copy; $5.00 per volume.

DEA NEWS FOR TEACHERS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Newspaper on education and the curriculum. Included in APSA membership.

ANNUAL MEETING PROGRAM

Final program for APSA Annual Meeting. Included in Annual Meeting Registration. Extra copies: $.50.

APSA ANNUAL MEETING PAPERS**

Hard copies, $3.00 each.

APSA ANNUAL MEETING PROCEEDINGS**

Microfilm reels of all papers, 1901-1912; 1956-present. $22.00 per reel. (approx. 7 reels per meeting.)

CUMULATIVE INDEX TO THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW**

1906-1968, $6.50.

CUMULATIVE INDEX TO THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL MEETINGS**

Key word index to all papers included in proceedings of Annual Meetings for 1904-1912; 1956-1970: $18.50.

WOMEN IN POLITICAL SCIENCE: STUDIES AND REPORTS, 1969-71 OF THE APSA COMMITTEE ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION**

PB 486, $11.00.

POLITICAL SCIENCE THESAURUS

A major reference tool in political science; this volume represents the terminology control device for a computer-based information retrieval service. Individuals: Hardback: $20.00; Paper: $15.00. Institutions: Hardback: $30.00; Paper: $25.00.

APSA BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY (Sixth Edition, 1973)

Biographical information on over 7,000 Association members, plus names and addresses for approximately 12,500 members. Members: Hardback: $7.50; Paper: $5.00. Non-Members: Hardback: $12.50; Paper: $10.00.

APSA DIRECTORY OF MEMBERS: ANNUAL SUPPLEMENT TO THE APSA BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY

Names and current addresses of all APSA members. $3.00 each.

GUIDE TO PUBLICATION IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

Co-sponsored by the APSA Committee on the Status of Women and the Women's Caucus for Political Science. $1.00.

ROSTER OF WOMEN IN POLITICAL SCIENCE (4th edition)

Biographical information on women political scientists. $3.00 each.

ANNUAL APSA DIRECTORY OF DEPARTMENT CHAIRPERSONS

Names and addresses of Chairpersons of departments offering political science at four-year institutions. $20.00 each.

PERSONNEL SERVICE GUIDELINES FOR EMPLOYERS AND APPLICANTS

Pamphlet containing information and guidelines for members of the APSA Personnel Service and for employers listing their vacancies in the Personnel Service Newsletter. No charge.

PERSONNEL SERVICE NEWSLETTER

Monthly listing of positions for political scientists. APSA Members: $8.00 subscription.

**Order from: Customer Service Department, University Microfilms, 313 North First Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106.

CAREERS AND THE STUDY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE: A GUIDE FOR UNDERGRADUATES

A monograph discussing the relationship between political science knowledge and skills and careers in law, government, business, journalism, teaching, etc. $.50 each; bulk rates available.

GUIDE TO GRADUATE STUDY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

Compilation of Ph.D. and Masters programs in political science. The 1976 Guide is revised and expanded to include listings of faculty and fields of specialization. $4.00 each.

SOURCES OF FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR POLITICAL SCIENTISTS: RESEARCH EDUCATION, PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT BULLETIN 1: SUPPORT FOR PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT: FELLOWSHIPS AND TRAINEESHIPS

Information on post-doctoral fellowships, internship programs, special training support and foreign travel grants available to faculty and advanced graduate students. $1.00 each.

GLOBAL DIMENSIONS IN U.S. EDUCATION

A joint publication of the APSA Committee on Pre-Collegiate Education, the Education Commission of the International Studies Association, and the Center for War/Peace Studies of the N.Y. Friends Group, Inc. Four publications: The Elementary School, The Secondary School, The University, The Community. $1.50 each, $5.00 per set.

COMPARING POLITICAL EXPERIENCES

Complete description of an alternative course for high school government instruction. $2.75 each.

SETUPS: AMERICAN POLITICS

Supplementary Empirical Teaching Units in Political Science

New computer related instructional materials whereby students learn important substantive topics in American politics as they learn methods of analysis. *Voting Behavior: The 1972 Election* by Bruce D. Bowen, C. Anthony Broh, Charles L. Prysby. *Political Socialization Across the Generations* by Paul Allen Beck, Jere W. Bruner, L. Douglas Dobson. *Political Participation* by F. Christopher Arterton, Harlan Hahn. *Representation in the United States Congress: 1973* by Ray A. Geigle, Peter G. Hartjens. *The Supreme Court in American Politics: Policy Through Law* by John Paul Ryan, C. Neal Tate. *U.S. Energy, Environment and Economic Problems: A Public Policy Simulation* by Barry Hughes. *The Dynamics of Political Budgeting: A Public Policy Simulation* by Marvin K. Hoffman. For information and price list write: APSA Division of Educational Affairs.

INSTRUCTIONAL RESOURCE MONOGRAPHS

Guides on materials and methods for teaching and learning in political science. *A Guide to Library Sources in Political Science: American Government* by Clement E. Vose. $6.50 hardback; $4.00 paperback. *PSI and Political Science: Using the Personalized System of Instruction to Teach American Politics*, edited by Ralph B. Earle Jr. $3.50 paperback. *Simple Simulations*, by Charles Walcott with Anne Walcott. $3.50 paperback. *Computer-Assisted Instruction in Political Science*, edited by Jonathan Pool. $4.00 paperback.

LEGISLATIVE SERVICE PROJECT MANUALS

Individual manuals available for: Kansas, Kentucky, Montana, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island. $2.50 each.

POLITICAL SCIENCE AND STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

A volume on the current and future state of research and educational programs in the field of state and local government. $3.75 each.

APSA MEMBERSHIP MAILING LISTS AND LABELS

For information and price list, contact Membership Secretary, APSA.

APSA POLITICAL SCIENCE DEPARTMENT CHAIRPERSONS MAILING LABELS

For information and price list, contact APSA Departmental Services Program.

Order Form

I am enclosing a check for $_____, for _____

_____

_____ (list publications).

Name _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

Order from: American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

(All orders must be prepaid)

DISINTEGRATION AND POLITICAL ACTION

The Changing Functions of City Governments in America

by ROLAND J. LIEBERT

A Volume in the QUANTITATIVE STUDIES IN SOCIAL RELATIONS Series

This groundbreaking study assesses the historical bases for service functions performed by American city governments and analyzes the effects of functional scope on urban political structure and behavior. Professor Liebert examines the societal causes and political consequences of the historical trend away from comprehensive community government and toward functionally specialized, and relatively impotent, city governments in the United States. He demonstrates that the substantial variation in the number and scope of major city service functions is rooted in powers granted cities at their founding; in the tendency toward the organization of political life at higher levels of government; and in the emergence of newer cities of limited political liability. Extensive empirical analysis assesses the consequences of differing functional scope for city leadership styles, reformism, voter participation, and program outputs.

1976, 232 pp., $12.00/£6.60 ISBN: 0-12-449650-4

THE DISSENT OF THE GOVERNED

Alienation and Democracy in America

by JAMES D. WRIGHT

A Volume in the QUANTITATIVE STUDIES IN SOCIAL RELATIONS Series

The Dissent of the Governed shows that: about half the adult population of the United States (and several other Western democracies) is highly alienated from their political institutions; the amount of alienation has increased sharply in the past 15 years; this alienation arises not from the dislocations of modern mass society, but rather, for the most part, from specific policy choices made by the political elite; the only proven behavioral effect of this alienation is less political participation by the alienated.

These points contradict the accepted theory of political alienation in modern democracies. This important book subjects the accepted theory to examination on the basis of empirical data, drawing on the nationally-representative election surveys conducted by the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan. On the basis of the empirical evidence, the author demonstrates that the accepted theory understates the amount of alienation present in the system, misrepresents its nature and causes, and exaggerates its political effects.

1976, 318 pp., $16.50/£9.10 ISBN: 0-12-765050-4

NETWORKS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION

A Perspective on Community Influence Systems

by EDWARD O. LAUMANN and FRANZ U. PAPPI

A Volume in the QUANTITATIVE STUDIES IN SOCIAL RELATIONS Series

This highly innovative study investigates the structure of community influence and decision-making in a West German town (Altneustadt), utilizing sophisticated techniques and quantitative measurements. The principal concern of this work is to develop and apply new theoretical and methodological approaches in network analysis and the theory of community differentiation and integration. Using the case study of Altneustadt to illustrate their argument, the authors propose a theoretical and methodological strategy for studying the differentiation and integration of large-scale, complex social systems.

1976, 348 pp., $18.00/£10.45
ISBN: 0-12-437850-1

SOCIAL PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

edited by WALTER WILLIAMS and RICHARD F. ELMORE

This unique collection brings together articles forming a comprehensive study of social program implementation.

Implementation—best described as the stage between policy decisions and operations—presents the often extremely difficult problem of translating general statements of policy into concrete actions consistent with original intent. The articles are of two types. First are case studies of the implementation of federal programs and projects in the fields of education, community development, and income transfers. The second group of articles treats implementation as a conceptual problem for policy analysts and administrators. They discuss both the means of carrying out implementation analysis and assessment and the implications of implementation studies for the execution of social policy analysis and research including evaluative research.

1976, 304 pp., In preparation
ISBN: 0-12-756850-6

N.B.: Postage plus 50¢ handling charge on all orders not accompanied by payment.

Prices are subject to change without notice.

ACADEMIC PRESS, INC.

A Subsidiary of Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers

111 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK, N. Y. 10003
24-28 OVAL ROAD, LONDON NW1 7DX

Announcing Congressional Quarterly's

Politics and Public Policy Series

Supplementary Textbooks in Political Science written by leading scholars and published by Congressional Quarterly Press

Advisory Editor
Robert L. Peabody, Johns Hopkins University

Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process

by Walter J. Oleszek

A study of the legislative process in Congress. The organization, rules, procedures and folkways of the House of Representatives and Senate are examined from the perspective of how ideas are transformed into public laws. Intended to provide a clear understanding of how and why the contemporary Congress functions as it does, the study discusses the political and institutional environment of senators and representatives, the formulation of legislation, processing of legislation by committees, scheduling of bills and floor consideration, resolution of differences between the houses, and Congress' oversight role. Special emphasis is placed on the influence the organization and procedures of Congress have on strategies for enacting or blocking legislation, bargaining between members and, ultimately, the shape of public policy. In response to a number of factors, Congress' organization and processes have changed significantly in recent years. Both chambers have instituted procedures to open legislative proceedings to more public view; to strengthen oversight capabilities; to improve the budgetmaking process; to modify the seniority system and to enhance the role of party caucuses. These and other new developments are carefully assessed.

October 1976. Approx. 225 pages. $4.50

Financing Politics: Money, Elections and Political Reform

by Herbert E. Alexander

A thorough analysis of an issue that goes to the basic fibers of our democratic system—the financing of electoral politics. The book discusses how money is raised, handled, spent and regulated in American elections. The history of the increasing costs of political campaigns is documented. The author considers the perennial question of whether big spending is the way to political success, showing where and how money has been a deciding factor and where—surprisingly—it has not. Campaign finance reform is examined as a case study of political reform—with analyses of the effects of major election reform legislation in 1971, 1974 and 1976. The record of campaign finance in the 1972 and 1976 presidential elections, including the campaign abuses associated with the Watergate affair and the successes and failures of the Federal Election Commission, provide a backdrop for an overview of money in politics and election reform.

October 1976. Approx. 225 pages. $4.50

Review Copies

Congressional Quarterly Press
1414 22nd St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037

Please mail information on review copies of:

☐ **Financing Politics**
☐ **Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process**

Name _____

Address _____

_____ Zip _____

The Peruvian Experiment

Continuity and Change under Military Rule

Edited by Abraham F. Lowenthal

This book is the first systematic and comprehensive attempt to appraise Peru's self-proclaimed "revolution"—surprisingly extensive reforms initiated by the military government—in both national and regional perspective. "An extremely important and provocative analysis of one of the most interesting experiments in the Third World." —*Alfred Stepan, Yale University* *Written under the auspices of the Center for Inter-American Relations.* Cloth, $22.50 • Limited Paperback Edition, $6.95

Coalitions in Parliamentary Government

Lawrence C. Dodd

Challenging the widely held belief that durable cabinets require majority party government, Dodd offers in its place a revisionist interpretation based on contemporary game theory. He argues for a fundamental alteration in existing conceptions of the relationship between party systems and parliamentary government. $9.00

UNESCO and World Politics

Engaging in International Relations

James P. Sewell

"Seeking to 'see the world in a grain of sand' through a study of UNESCO, Sewell's well-written and significant contribution to the literature analyzes why and how governments engage in intergovernmental organization and the effects of such participation on the international system."—*Foreign Affairs* *Written under the auspices of the Center of International Studies, Princeton University* $18.50

Mission for Hammarskjold

The Congo Crisis

Rajeshwar Dayal

Hammarskjold's Special Representative during 1960-61 vividly recounts the efforts of the U.N. to restore order and prevent tribal warfare or international conflict. Dayal's narrative supplies new material on disputed points such as involvement of the U.N. in the Kasavubu and Mobutu coups, the arrest of Lumumba, Operation Morthor in Katanga, and Hammarskjold's death. $16.00

Successful Negotiation: Trieste 1954

An Appraisal by the Five Participants

Edited by John C. Campbell

The 1954 settlement of the territorial dispute over Trieste is still remarkable after twenty years for the light it sheds on the principles of successful negotiation. This book offers the recollections and evaluations of the five experienced, skillful men who conducted the negotiations, and suggests methods for resolving future disputes. $11.50

Order from your bookstore or direct from

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

Princeton, New Jersey 08540

The Electronic Battlefield

BY PAUL DICKSON

Dickson examines the frightening handiwork of the ultrasecret group which developed, at a cost of billions and without public debate, the new sensing devices and related technology which have turned the business of killing into a science. 256 pages, photos $10.00

The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The First Twenty-five Years

BY LAWRENCE J. KORB

Drawing primarily on official documents and interviews with former members, this book presents the first complete study of one of the least understood political structures in America, the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 224 pages, appendix, tables $10.95

Citizens and the Environment

Case Studies in Popular Action

BY LYNTON K. CALDWELL, LYNTON R. HAYES, AND ISABEL M. MacWHIRTER

Sixty-eight illuminating case studies of situations where friends of the environment have come into conflict with government, industry, and other power blocs. Describes the problems and the policy processes leading to their solutions. 448 pages, bibl. $17.50

A National Policy for the Environment

NEPA and Its Aftermath

BY RICHARD A. LIROFF

A searching examination of the roles Congress, administrative agencies, and the federal courts have played in the enactment, implementation, and interpretation of the controversial National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. 288 pages $10.00

Struggle in the Countryside

Politics and Rural Labor in Chile, 1919-1973

BY BRIAN LOVEMAN

This study focuses on the political forces that transformed the traditional system of property in rural land in Chile from 1919 to 1973 and evaluates the new meaning of property in rural land which has emerged in the last decade. *(International Development Research Center, Studies in Development Number 10)* 448 pages, tables $15.00

Indiana University Press


TENTH AND MORTON STREETS
BLOOMINGTON, INDIANA 47401



Rebels and Bureaucrats

China's December 9ers

John Israel and Donald W. Klein



"Dr. Klein and Dr. Israel are to be congratulated. *Rebels and Bureaucrats* is a clean, original and exciting work of scholarship. It delivers a new concept in China's recent history, and the profile of a generation of Chinese hitherto obscure but of immense significance in current politics."—*Theodore H. White*

319 pages, Illustrations, $15.00

Disjoined Partners

Austria and Germany Since 1815

Peter J. Katzenstein

Is there a natural tendency toward the political integration of states that are united in culture but divided in politics? In six chronologically arranged case studies, Katzenstein finds the answer is largely negative.

280 pages, 5 tables, $13.50

Law and Development in Latin America

Kenneth L. Karst and Keith S. Rosenn

This is a pathbreaking study combining legal, historical, and institutional perspectives to examine real life problems such as land reform, inflation, and the role of the judiciary in twentieth-century Latin America.

450 pages, Illustrations, $15.75



The Myth of Marginality

Urban Poverty and Politics in Rio de Janeiro

Janice E. Perlman

The "myth of marginality" analyzed here is a set of stereotypes about the urban poor of the world, and particularly of jerry-built communities in Latin America. Many new insights into third-world poverty are presented.

368 pages, Illustrations, $14.95

Policy Analysts in the Bureaucracy

Arnold J. Meltsner

This book introduces the reader to the new profession of policy analyst which emerged in Washington in the late 1960s. By drawing on interviews with many analysts and on his own experience as a government consultant, Meltsner examines the various roles the new policy analysts assume, the ways in which their priorities and methods are affected by the people they advise, and the bureaucratic environment.

320 pages, $10.00

Forces of Order

Police Behavior in Japan and the United States


David H. Bayley

"An outstanding book that should have a broad appeal to all who are concerned about whether we get the crime rates and police service we deserve."
—*Chalmers Johnson*

224 pages, $10.95

All of these books are available at bookstores

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS
BERKELEY 94720



ADVICE AND DISSENT
Scientists in the Political Arena
Joel Primack and Frank von Hippel
Case-by-case reports on how scientists are joining with citizens to challenge the Federal government on technical issues such as the SST, uncontrolled use of pesticides, and the addition of chemicals to our food.
A Meridian Paperback
F443/$3.95

A PSYCHOHISTORY OF ZIONISM
Jay Y. Gonen
The techniques of modern psychoanalysis combine with a rich knowledge of Jewish history to spark this brilliant exploration of the roots of Zionism and its contemporary expression in the state of Israel. "Rich and convincing."
—Publishers Weekly.
A Meridian Paperback
F441/$3.95

HOW CONGRESS WORKS
From the Constitution to the Impeachment Hearings
Don Radler
A timely review of Congressional powers, procedures, and reforms—from the founding days to the present—plus a guide to how people can be heard in the halls of Congress.
A Signet Original Paperback
Y6972/$1.25

GOVERNMENT BY GUNPLAY
Assassination Conspiracy Theories from Dallas to Today
H. Yazijian, S. Blumenthal and the Assassination Information Bureau, Editors
Tough-minded, hard-hitting analyses of the facts that forge a chain of conspiracy from the assassination of JFK, the murder of Dr. King, and the killing of RFK to the shooting of George Wallace. "Well documented....You sit up and take note."*—Publishers Weekly.*
A Signet Original Paperback
W6935/$1.50

THE FIRES OF JUBILEE
Nat Turner's Fierce Rebellion
Stephen B. Oates
Dramatically recreates the bloody slave rebellion that forever shattered the myth of contented slave and benign master and helped to plunge America into the Civil War. "A vivid and excellent narrative account."
—The New York Times.
A Mentor Paperback
MW1467/$1.50

NEW AMERICAN LIBRARY
EDUCATION
120 Woodbine Street
Bergenfield, New Jersey 07621



THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION AND THE

UNIVERSITY CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

ANNOUNCE

A New Annual Reference Publication

UNITED STATES POLITICAL SCIENCE DOCUMENTS

United States Political Science Documents (USPSD) is the published version of a computer-based file of political science information being developed continually by the University Center for International Studies, University of Pittsburgh, in conjunction with the American Political Science Association.

Over the past ten years the political, social, and policy sciences have been inundated with an increasing flow of journal information. Not until now has a convenient sorting, filing, and evaluation process been developed to enable the academic community to keep up with the masses of information in a timely manner. This is why *USPSD* was created.

Volume I of *USPSD* will include between 2,000 and 2,500 documents published during 1975. The set will be available from UCIS Publications during the summer of 1976. For further information or to place your order, write to UCIS Publications at the address below.

USPSD will enable you conveniently to keep abreast of all the major journals in the field of political, social, and policy science, such as:

American Political Science Review
Comparative Political Studies
Comparative Politics
Economic Development and Cultural Change
Foreign Affairs
Foreign Policy
International and Intercultural Communication Annual
International Development Review
International Education and Cultural Change
International Interaction
International Organization
International Relations
International Studies Quarterly
Journal of Conflict Resolution
Journal of International Affairs
Policy Analysis
Policy Studies Journal
Studies in Comparative Communism
Studies in Comparative International Development
World Affairs
World Politics

USPSD will be an annual reference publication which examines and analyzes every article in over 120 major political, social and policy science journals.

Each entry in *USPSD* provides:

1. Author;
2. Title;
3. Journal Source and pagination;
4. An Abstract that describes the scope, purpose, methods employed, and results obtained in each article;
5. A listing of Special Features that include titles of all tables, graphs, figures, and maps used in each article;
6. A listing of Authors Cited in footnotes or references;
7. A listing of Key Subject Descriptors attributed to each article;
8. A listing of the major Geographic Areas referred to in each article;
9. A listing of Proper Names of organizations, political institutions, laws, etc. mentioned in each article.

USPSD will be published annually in TWO PARTS. The abstracts of the journal articles will comprise PART II and include those items listed above. PART I consists of five indexes to all the articles abstracted in Part II; they are divided according to:

1. Author(s) of each article;
2. Descriptor Subjects that are attributed to each article (The descriptions are taken from over 3,000 terms listed in the Political Science Thesaurus);
3. Geographic Areas referred to in each article;
4. Proper Names of organizations, political institutions, laws, etc. mentioned in each article;
5. Journal in which each article is published.

USPSD can be purchased as a two volume set—PARTS I & II—or PART I, the indexes, can be purchased separately. Prices for both are as follows:

	Regular price	APSA-member price
PARTS I & II (Index & documents)	$90.00	$75.00
PART I (Index only)	$75.00	$60.00

University Center for International Studies
Publications Section
University of Pittsburgh
G-6 Mervis Hall
Pittsburgh, PA 15260
USA

DORSEY



PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS AND AMERICAN POLITICS: Voters, Candidates, and Campaigns Since 1952 *(paperbound)*

Herbert B. Asher, *The Ohio State University*

Presidential elections are analyzed from the perspectives of the candidate seeking support in the electorate and the citizen choosing between competing candidates.

Just Published

CONGRESS, THE BUREAUCRACY, AND PUBLIC POLICY *(paperbound)*

Randall B. Ripley and Grace A. Franklin, *both of the Ohio State University*

Focuses on the impact of the relationship between Congress and the federal bureaucracy on the content of national public policy. *Just Published*

URBAN POLITICS IN THE SUBURBAN ERA *(paperbound)*

Thomas P. Murphy, *University of Maryland*, and
John Rehfuss, *Northern Illinois University*

The growth of the urban crisis of the 1960's and its spillover to the suburbs in the 1970's is traced in this completely new text. *Just Published*

TEXAS GOVERNMENT TODAY: Structures, Functions, Political Processes *(paperbound)*


Beryl E. Pettus, *Sam Houston State University*, and
Randall W. Bland, *Southwest Texas State University*

Presenting a fresh, lively account of the Texas political system, this text combines comparative description with explanations of governmental characteristics, behavior, and policy performance. *Just Published*

Examination copies for adoption consideration available on request. Please indicate course title and text presently used.

THE DORSEY PRESS **Homewood, Illinois 60430**

Write for our complete catalog!



For complimentary examination copies, write on your departmental letterhead to School and Library Services, address above. Include details on course in which you are considering using title requested, and advise us where you have seen announcement.

Commager, Henry Steele
THE DEFEAT OF AMERICA:
Presidential Power and the National Character
America's preeminent historian focuses here on the two major crises that have recently faced all Americans: the war in Vietnam and the misuse of presidential power. No other historian so skillfully makes us aware of how much America's past influences America's present. In doing so, Professor Commager, as always, challenges us to build a better future.
☐ 21777 $2.95

Chang, Hsin-hai
AMERICA AND CHINA: An Introduction to Asia (Revised)
Foreword by Edgar Snow
In his foreword Edgar Snow writes, "*America and China* should be mandatory reading for all alert citizens on both sides of the Pacific. Much of it will be as unpalatable to the Chinese Communists as to some American congressmen, but none could fail to benefit from its highly civilized —and profoundly pro-China but not pro-Marxist—point of view." And John Stoessinger, Director, Political Affairs Division of the United Nations, says, "Professor Chang Hsin-hai's book combines profound empathy for his subject with an extraordinary degree of objectivity. The result is a work of wisdom and power."
☐ 21190 Index $2.95

Steinfels, Margaret O'Brien
WHO'S MINDING THE CHILDREN?
The History and Politics of Day Care in America
Day care is an idea whose time has come. In this broad-based and meticulously researched book, the author recounts the history of day care and describes the range of present policies and practices, offering criteria for determining whether or not a given center is working for the good of the children in its care. "... the book is authoritative and broad in scope, and offers both thorough academic research and Steinfel's own field observations.... an original and distinguished contribution to the field."—*Library Journal.*
☐ 21914 Biblio., Index $2.95

Thayer, George
THE FARTHER SHORES OF POLITICS: The American Political Fringe Today, Revised Edition
Examines minor political parties and pressure groups in America today—from the American Nazi Party, Minutemen, and KKK to the New Leftists, old-guard Communists, Harlem Mau Mau, and Catholic Anarchists—and evaluates their influence and relationship to the main currents of American political life. "Commands respect for the thoroughness of its research, the skill with which the author has assembled its material, and the courage with which he tells the truth." —Allan Nevins.
☐ 20068 Index $2.95

Hansberry, Lorraine
THE MOVEMENT: Documentary of a Struggle for Equality
☐ 49411 Photos, Book size 8½" x 11" $2.95

Skolnick, Jerome H.
THE POLITICS OF PROTEST: A Task Force Report Submitted to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence
☐ 20416 Appendix, Notes, Biblio., Index $2.95

Social Dynamics



KROPOTKIN
Martin A. Miller

Martin A. Miller's engrossing account is the first critical biography of Kropotkin in English to make use of both Soviet and Western archival sources. The author challenges the conventional image of Kropotkin as an almost saint-like figure and shows that he was a militant revolutionary throughout his career.
368 pages Cloth $15.00

THE POLITICS OF CHANGE IN A ZAMBIAN COMMUNITY
George C. Bond

Professor Bond's book is one of the few social-anthropological analyses undertaken at the exact moment when a former colony achieved self-government. His overview of this exciting period is supported by case studies, portraits of key individuals, and ethnographic data.
190 pages Cloth $13.50

SOCIAL THOUGHT IN TSARIST RUSSIA
The Quest for a General Science of Society, 1861-1917
Alexander Vucinich

In this work Alexander Vucinich examines the leading theories of social structure and social dynamics advanced by Russian intellectuals from the period of the Great Reforms of the 1860s to the October Revolution of 1917.
304 pages Cloth $15.50

THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW, 1975
Edited by Philip B. Kurland

This edition analyzes the significant decision of the Supreme Court during the 1974–75 term.
448 pages Cloth $25.00


Now in Paper:

RADICALS IN URBAN POLITICS
The Alinsky Approach
Robert Bailey, Jr.
xii, 188 pages illus. Paper $3.25

THE DECISION TO GO TO THE MOON
Project Apollo and the National Interest
John M. Logsdon
xii, 188 pages Paper $3.95

The University of Chicago Press
Chicago 60637

Some indexes to the journal literature cover some of the social sciences disciplines... A few concentrate on one discipline, but



Only SSCI™ covers all the major disciplines in the social sciences.

The *Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI)* provides the kind of coverage you need for doing in-depth searches of the journal literature. It covers every editorial item in over 1,400 leading social sciences journals in fields ranging from anthropology to urban planning. Plus it selectively Indexes over 1,200 more journals from the natural, physical and biomedical sciences for articles relevant to the social sciences.

Because it is multidisciplinary, the *SSCI* does the work of several discipline-oriented indexes. A single lookup in the *SSCI* gives you access to the literature of over 50 major specialties. In all, nearly 85,000 items are indexed each year.

Easy to use, the *SSCI* offers several indexing approaches so you can quickly find pertinent information. All you need to start a search is an earlier paper on your topic, the name of a key author in the field, or simply a single term related to your subject. There are no specialized vocabularies to learn. No complex classification systems to master.

Fact is, with the *SSCI* in your library's reference section, you'll be able to locate articles reported in the journal literature of all the major disciplines of the social sciences more quickly and easily than ever before.

For detailed information on the *Social Sciences Citation Index*, complete the coupon below and mail it today.

Please send me more information on your *Social Sciences Citation Index*™.

Name _____

Position _____

Organization _____ Tel. _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____ ZIP _____

144-(2)448a

ISI® **Institute for Scientific Information®**

325 Chestnut St., Phila., Pa. 19106, U.S.A., Tel: (215) 923-3300, Cable: SCINFO, Telex: 84-5305

©1979 ISI

From Winthrop—
An Important and Timely New Book on American Politics

POLICY LEADERSHIP AND PARTISAN CHANGE

—The New Politics and the American Electorate

By Warren E. Miller, Teresa E. Levitin, both from
The Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan
August 1976, 256 pps.

Paperbound $ 6.00
Clothbound $10.00

This book provides a new perspective from which to judge recent political events. The authors' central argument is that over the past two decades national electoral behavior has been increasingly influenced by the positions leaders have taken on policy issues.

Two major themes are analyzed: ● The immediate impact of the new politics. ● The questions arising from the more endearing roles of party identification, issue voting and leadership.

Foreseeing a change in American politics, the authors aim for a better understanding of the implications of such policy leadership and the effect the failure of that leadership will have on the American political scene. That change includes the possible realignment of the political parties along with change that has already taken place in issue voting, certain to become a dominant factor in the coming decades.

Recent 1976 Publications

1) AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: REFORM IN THE POST WATERGATE ERA by David C. Saffell
2) BLACK AMERICANS AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM by Lucius J. Barker and Jesse J. McCorry, Jr.
3) STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS by Murray S. Stedman, Jr.
4) CONTEMPORARY POLITICS: EUROPE by Alexander J. Groth, Robert J. Lieber, and Nancy L. Lieber

For examination copies, please write to: Richard Marran
Winthrop Publishers, Inc.
17 Dunster Street
Cambridge, Mass. 02138



Winthrop Publishers

From GREENWOOD PRESS

GROWTH IN AMERICA

Edited by CHESTER L. COOPER

Prepared under the auspices of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

(Contributions in American Studies, No. 21).
LC 75-35359. ISBN 0-8371-8596-3. Approx. 320 pages. $15.00

The dawn of America's third century has coincided with a debate over the deeply held American belief in growth and where we are going. This book of essays is drawn from meetings held by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

Drawn from views on the humanities, social sciences, and science and technology, the essays transcend the problem of *economic* growth and deal with growth as a generic value and process.

Among those who contributed essays are Daniel Aaron, Sydney E. Ahlstrom, Samuel P. Hays, Walt W. Rostow, Congressman George E. Brown, Jr., Robert H. Walker, and Henry C. Wallich.

OTHER NEW TITLES OF INTEREST:

MASS ADVERTISING AS SOCIAL FORECAST

by JIB FOWLES

LC 75-35344. ISBN 0-8371-8595-5.
Approx. 160 pages. $10.95

THE MODERN CORPORATE STATE

Private Governments and the American Constitution

by ARTHUR SELWYN MILLER
with an introduction by DANIEL FUSFELD

(Contributions in American Studies, No. 23).
LC 75-35350. ISBN 0-8371-8589-0.
xvi, 271 pages. $15.00

WHITE WEALTH AND BLACK POVERTY

American Investments in Southern Africa

by BARBARA ROGERS

Prepared under the auspices of the Center on International Race Relations

(Studies in Human Rights, No. 2).
LC 75-35353. ISBN 0-8371-8277-8.
Approx. 288 pages. $13.95

ROOTS OF TRAGEDY

The United States and the Struggle for Asia, 1945-1953

by LISLE A. ROSE

(Contributions in American History, No. 48).
LC 75-35354. ISBN 0-8371-8592-0.
Approx. 352 pages. $15.95

WRITE FOR OUR SPRING CATALOG

GREENWOOD PRESS 51 Riverside Avenue, Westport, CT 06880

Viking Penguin on politics and politicians

RESIGNATION IN PROTEST
Political and Ethical Choices between Loyalty to Team and Loyalty to Conscience in American Public Life

Edward Weisband and Thomas M. Franck

"Fascinating, important and alarming. The failure of American officials to resign and speak out against policies they consider not only wrong but tragic... shows a failure of conscience, of the political system, or more likely of both."

—*The New York Times Book Review*

"The understanding of the issues of integrity that confront a public official, which Mr. Weisband and Mr. Franck have so illuminatingly provided, can in itself make a significant contribution."

—ELLIOT L. RICHARDSON

PENGUIN 252 pages $3.50

NIGHTMARE
The Underside of the Nixon Years

J. Anthony Lukas

The Pulitzer Prize-winning correspondent's in-depth history of Watergate from beginnings to the day of final resignation.

"In gathering the mass of facts on Watergate and related outrages, and in reducing them to an intelligible, eminently readable narrative, J. Anthony Lukas has performed an indispensable service ....That the facts about Watergate are now as straight as they are, in spite of all official attempts to conceal them, is a tribute to Lukas's skill as a reporter."

—*The New York Times Book Review*

384 pages $15.00

THE CIA FILE

Edited by Robert Borosage and John D. Monks

In *The CIA File* the foremost authorities on the Agency provide a thoughtful examination of the role of the CIA, its significance and its implications. The most comprehensive and authoritative book yet published on this subject, *The CIA File* offers, in addition to the expert commentaries of scholars, journalists, and former CIA and State Department officials, a rebuttal by ex-Director of Central Intelligence William Colby.

GROSSMAN PUBLISHERS 288 pages $10.00

THE SEVEN SISTERS
The Great Oil Companies and the World They Shaped

Anthony Sampson

The oil giants: their history, power, and effect on the world.

"He has entered an area of baffling complexity and made sense of it.... He has given us a book that will help us understand the most profound economic change of our time."

—*The New York Times Book Review*

320 pages $10.00

THE HARD YEARS
A Look at Contemporary America and American Institutions

Eugene J. McCarthy

Introduction by Tom Wicker

"Elegant, short essays on what is wrong and sometimes right with American 'institutions, operations, principles,' and leaders." —*Foreign Affairs*

"These casual essays reveal what the candidate-poet has recently observed on the American scene. Institutions, policies, ethics, and personalities are subjected to the caustic consideration demanded by a stringent philosophy and poetic sensibility."

—ALA *Booklist*

256 pages $8.95



625 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022



Israel Divided

Ideological Politics in the Jewish State
Rael Jean Isaac
Foreseeing a resurgence of ideological politics that will have profound consequences for Israel's quest for survival, political sociologist Rael Isaac provides the first assessment of Israeli extremist movements — in particular the Land of Israel Movement and the Peace Movement. $10.95

Arms for the Arabs

The Soviet Union and War in the Middle East
Jon Glassman
Treating as a continuum the 1956, 1967, and 1973 wars in the Middle East, Glassman charts the Soviet Union's participation in the political and military developments, examining not only its ideological motivations but also the strategy behind arms shipments and political support. $12.50



The Making of a Missile Crisis: October 1962

Herbert S. Dinerstein
From newspaper accounts and other sources, Dinerstein explores the formation and influence of the assumptions and perceptions held by American, Cuban, and Soviet leaders during the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962. He studies the interaction of all three parties, thus correcting the American bias of earlier appraisals. $14.95

Squatters and Oligarchs

Authoritarian Rule and Policy change in Peru
David Collier
"One of the very best studies in Peruvian politics." — *Alfred Stepan, Yale University.* "A major contribution to the understanding of changing patterns of authoritarian rule in Latin America." — *Guillermo O'Donnell, Centro de Estudios de Estado y Sociedad (Buenos Aires)* $10.95

Johns Hopkins

The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, Maryland 21218


New from

MEN AGAINST McCARTHY
RICHARD M. FRIED
This is an intensive look at the political situation surrounding Senator Joseph R. McCarthy in the early 1950s. It is an in-depth explanation not only of McCarthy himself but also of the forces—national politics and international events—which merged in mid-twentieth-century America to foster his meteoric rise to prominence and notoriety. *Contemporary American History Series, William E. Leuchtenburg, General Editor*
$14.95

STRATEGIES FOR FREEDOM
The Changing Pattern of Black Protest
BAYARD RUSTIN
A longtime leader of the civil rights movement provides an appraisal of the people and organizations involved in black protest. The book offers a firsthand narrative of not only the movement's history and strategy but also of the author's personal involvement in it.
The Radner Lecture Series $5.95

THE "TAR BABY" OPTION
American Policy Toward Southern Rhodesia
ANTHONY LAKE
Feeling that "no area of the world has been viewed by Americans with greater moral disapproval and yet less attention than southern Africa," author Anthony Lake offers this detailed account of America's Southern Rhodesia policy since the Smith government's unilateral declaration of independence from Great Britain in 1965. The book provides information essential to an understanding of the current crisis in the region.
cloth, $17.50; paper, $5.95

CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES
Transnational and Transgovernmental Relations
ANNETTE BAKER FOX, ALFRED O. HERO, JR., AND JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., Editors
Published here in book form is a special issue of *International Organization* on Canadian-American relations. In this volume experts from both countries analyze such critical issues in U.S.-Canadian relations as domestic political and public opinion factors, mutual trade in energy resources, corporate and multinational enterprises, and issues involving defense, labor, and fisheries and pollution. cloth, $22.50; paper, $6.95



COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS
Address for orders: 136 South Broadway, Irvington, New York 10533

Columbia

PUBLIC EMPLOYEE PENSION FUNDS
A Twentieth Century Fund Report
ROBERT TILOVE
This exhaustive, objective study of public employee pension systems covers topics ranging from investment policies to member benefits. As well as a complete description of the major types and variations of the public employee pension funds, the author provides comparisons to private pension plans. "The book is a scholarly call—comprehensive, timely, factually well based—for reform on a subject too long neglected."—Robert Ball, Former Commissioner of Social Security
$20.00

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
I. W. ABEL
In his new book United Steelworkers of America President I. W. Abel looks at the future relationship of labor and management, the development of the industry, and the protection of job opportunities. In addition there is a timely discussion calling for government to cooperate with labor and management in concluding the recession so that full employment may prevail. $6.95

INTERMEDIATE POLITOMETRICS
GORDON HILTON
This new work introduces to political scientists and other social scientists some of the more sophisticated measuring techniques successfully employed in economics. The book contains a special chapter on matrix algebra and requires only a basic understanding of mathematics and statistics. $15.00

Japan's Road to the Pacific War Series:
DETERRENT DIPLOMACY
Japan, Germany, and the U.S.S.R., 1935-1940
JAMES WILLIAM MORLEY, Editor
Originally published in Japan, this is the first volume of a projected series dealing with the events leading up to Japan's entrance into the Second World War. The essays in the present volume discuss the Japanese-German Anti-Comintern Pact, Japanese-Soviet relations, and the controversial Tripartite Pact of Japan, Germany, and Italy. *Studies of the East Asian Institute* $17.50



COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS
Address for orders: 136 South Broadway, Irvington, New York 10533

THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH-1976

Nathan Glazer and Irving Kristol

"The authors of this remarkable survey of our history—Robert Nisbet, Martin Diamond, Nathan Glazer, Irving Kristol, Samuel Huntington, Seymour Lipset, James Q. Wilson, Aaron Wildavsky, and Daniel Bell—are not crying for a world that is gone, but are trying to define where we are 200 years after the Declaration, and where we're going. Thoughtful, provocative, and troubling."—JAMES RESTON, *The New York Times.* "The vitality of their analysis suggests that cures for at least part of the distemper of the times may be on the way."—*Time.*

Just published Cloth, $10.00 Paper: $4.95

AFFIRMATIVE DISCRIMINATION

Ethnic Inequality and Public Policy

Nathan Glazer

"A tempered, factually argued, vigorous polemic against the predominant drift of public policy on racial issues over the past decade. . . . A book worth reading. Public issues only infrequently receive serious sustained arguments of this high order."—*The New York Times Book Review. Recommended by ALA Booklist.*

Just published $10.95

ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA

Robert Nozick

"Must be read . . . Nozick proposes the conflict between liberal socialism and freedom more cogently and more relevantly than any writer I know."—ALAN DERSHOWITZ, *Harvard Law School.* "A fabulous book, a major contribution to political theory and moral philosophy. There is nothing else like it."—GILBERT H. HARMAN, *Princeton University.* "A major event in contemporary political philosophy."—PETER SINGER, *The New York Review of Books.* "A book that simply must be read, perhaps more than any other non-fiction work that has been published in the past few years."—CHRISTOPHER LEHMAN-HAUPT, *The New York Times. Winner, 1975 National Book Award in Religion and Philosophy.*

Published $12.95

READING RAWLS

Critical Studies of *A Theory of Justice*

Norman Daniels, Editor

"A topically oriented collection of studies on *A Theory of Justice,* designed as a guide to reading Rawls. It brings together 14 academic philosophers whose contributions Daniels has organized around Rawls' 'original position,' his method, principles of justice, and some of the relationships between the theory and the social sciences. . . . These essays are of high quality."—THE ALTERNATIVE

Just published Cloth: $15.00 Paper: $5.95

THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO

Translated with Notes and an Interpretative Essay by Allan Bloom

A classic text currently used in leading colleges and universities.

Published Cloth: $15.00 Paper: $5.95


Available at bookstores or order direct from the publisher

BASIC

BASIC BOOKS INC.

10 EAST 53RD ST, NEW YORK 10022

"A real contribution to the literature of political science and public affairs....Highly recommended for academic and public libraries."*



The Ralph Nader Congress Project

Presenting the most ambitious Nader undertaking to date, and certainly the most comprehensive survey of the national legislature in our time: A timely and provocative analysis of Congressional committees directly and crucially involved in domestic legislation. Three years in the making, the books feature interviews with members of the 92nd and 93rd Congresses, with hundreds of Congressional staff members, lobbyists, and top-ranking federal officials. Here's all the information your readers need to determine who runs Congress, what the relationships are between lobbyists, special-interest groups, and our Senators and Representatives, and many more of the facts.

**Library Journal*, in a review of *The Judiciary Committees*

RULING CONGRESS
A study of how the House and Senate rules govern the legislative process
Ted Stiff, Director

THE ENVIRONMENT COMMITTEES
A study of the House and Senate Interior, Agriculture, and Science Committees

THE MONEY COMMITTEES
A study of the House Banking and Currency Committee and the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee
Lester M. Salamon, Director

THE COMMERCE COMMITTEES
A study of the House and Senate Commerce Committees
David E. Price, Director

THE JUDICIARY COMMITTEES
A study of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees
Peter H. Schuck, Director

THE REVENUE COMMITTEES
A study of the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees and the House and Senate Appropriations Committees
Richard Spohn and Charles McCollum, Directors

$16.50 per volume • $90.00 for the full set of six volumes

GROSSMAN PUBLISHERS · A Division of THE VIKING PRESS
625 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022 • Nothing in this advertisement prevents anyone from quoting or charging any price for Viking books.

The Tides of Power

Conversations on the American Constitution

Bob Eckhardt, Member of Congress from Texas, Charles L. Black, Jr., Sterling Professor of Law, Yale University

In a series of candid dialogues, Bob Eckhardt and Charles Black analyze many aspects of the interactions among the three branches of government—as they were formulated in the Constitution and as they have developed over the past two centuries. Working within the framework of the Constitution, they devise a series of proposals that would help recover the proper balance of power in our government. $10.95



The Social Function of Social Science

Duncan MacRae, Jr.

In an ambitious attempt to confront the question of introducing valuation into the social sciences, which for many years have consciously sought to eliminate all argument about values as "unscientific," Duncan MacRae, Jr., argues that scientific propositions and ethical assertions, while clearly distinguishable, may be fruitfully combined by including both in disciplines concerned with the study of man and society. $15.00

The Legitimation of a Revolution

The Yugoslav Case

Bogdan Denis Denitch

This case study of the legitimation of a revolutionary elite in power stresses both the means of achieving, consolidating, and legitimating power and the impact of the new political order on policy, economy, and society. $15.00

V. D. Nabokov and the Russian Provisional Government, 1917

Edited by Virgil D. Medlin and Steven L. Parsons

Introduction by Robert P. Browder

This edited translation of the memoirs of V. D. Nabokov, Head of Chancellery and member of several important councils of the short-lived Russian Provisional Government, is a basic document in modern Russian history. $12.50



Also available

The Growth and Structure of the Chilean Economy

From Independence to Allende

Markos J. Mamalakis

A Publication of the Economic Growth Center, Yale University $20.00

Yale

Yale University Press
New Haven and London

Economic Growth and Neighborhood Discontent

SYSTEM BIAS IN THE URBAN RENEWAL PROGRAM OF ATLANTA

by Clarence N. Stone

The revitalization of Atlanta's central business district, from 1950 to 1970, involved considerable disruption of low-income neighborhoods and the neglect of residential areas.


Clarence Stone shows how Atlanta politicians favored the business community and how neighborhood and low income groups—though active and vocal—could not overcome this bias in the system.

Stone suggests that politicians are not neutral mediators of group conflict. Rather, political power is itself a source of system bias. Power begets power and equally affected groups are not equally accommodated.

0-8078-1262-5 *xv, 256 pp. $13.95*

The University of North Carolina Press

Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27514



National Journal

THE WEEKLY ON POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT

"National Journal analyzes the policy-making process with objectivity, fairness, depth, and consistent accuracy."

—James T. Lynn, Director, Office of Management and Budget

"One of the most highly regarded, objective and responsible publications dealing with matters of public affairs."

—Sen. Edward M. Kennedy

NEW REPRINT SERIES FOR CLASSROOM USE

Used at more than 150 schools the first semester it was available, the *National Journal* reprint series provides a low-cost, timely and invaluable collection of classroom reading material. The leading political scientists listed below have selected the reprinted articles and have written introductory essays. Each reprint contains four to eight articles and costs only $1.95.

Politics, Parties and 1976, Nelson W. Polsby, advisory editor, $1.95.

Our best selling title (to be updated for Fall Semester) on parties, campaign financing, delegate selection and the fall election.

Bureaucracy, Francis E. Rourke, advisory editor, $1.95.

Eight articles on the growth of bureaucracy and efforts to reform it, public employee unions, and federal regulation of selected industries.

Federalism, Daniel J. Elazar, advisory editor, $1.95.

Case studies of federal-state-local relationships, regional planning, fiscal policy, bureaucracy and environmental policy.

Budget, Aaron B. Wildavsky, advisory editor, $1.95.

A close examination of the first year under the new congressional budget process and a look at such continuing problems as uncontrollable spending and the political use of budget figures.

Congress, Richard F. Fenno Jr., advisory editor, $1.95.

Articles on reforms in the 94th Congress, the growth of congressional staffs, jurisdictional conflicts, and White House lobbying efforts on the Hill.

Ford Presidency, Thomas E. Cronin, advisory editor, $1.95.

The state of the presidency after Watergate—the Cabinet, Domestic Council, press office, vice presidency and the search for a domestic program.

Interest Groups, Robert H. Salisbury, advisory editor, $1.95.

Collection of articles on the NAM, labor, public employee unions, environmental groups, the AMA and others.


Procurement Reform, Randall B. Ripley, advisory editor, $1.95.

A case study of the C-5A controversy from the inception of an idea for changing procedures, intragovernmental squabbling, legislation, implementation and oversight.

Examination copies available. Listed with National Association of College Stores.

1730 M Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 Telephone (202) 833-8000

"A beautiful work of sophisticated scholarship." —*Seymour Martin Lipset*



Within the span of a single generation, the voting patterns of Americans have changed fundamentally. The response of people toward candidates, the dominance of issues in campaigns, and realignments within the composition of parties have all led to the creation of new voting publics.

Throughout this landmark work, the first truly comprehensive review of how Americans voted from 1956 through 1973, the authors revise in substantial ways the classic portrait of the voting American, whereby people cast their ballots more on the basis of party and personality than issues.

The Changing American Voter is the new bible of voting behavior. Order the paperback for classroom use; the cloth, for your library.

Cloth, $15.00; paper, $5.95.

The Changing American Voter
A Twentieth Century Fund Study
Norman H. Nie, Sidney Verba, & John R. Petrocik
Harvard University Press
Cambridge, Mass. 02138



Supplementary Empirical Teaching Units in Political Science: American Politics

New computer related instructional materials whereby students learn important substantive topics in American politics as they learn methods of analysis.

Seven SETUPS are Available Now for Class Use

Voting Behavior: The 1972 Election by Bruce D. Bowen, C. Anthony Broh, Charles L. Prysby.

Political Socialization Across the Generations by Paul Allen Beck, Jere W. Bruner, L. Douglas Dobson.

Political Participation by F. Christopher Arterton, Harlan Hahn.

The Supreme Court in American Politics: Policy Through Law by John Paul Ryan, C. Neal Tate.

U.S. Energy, Environment and Economic Problems: A Public Policy Simulation by Barry Hughes.

Representation in the United States Congress: 1973 by Ray A. Geigle and Peter J. Hartjens.

The Dynamics of Political Budgeting: A Public Policy Simulation by Marvin K. Hoffman.

Each SETUPS is a module that can be taught in one to two weeks. SETUPS were designed to supplement instruction in introductory courses. But SETUPS have been field tested successfully in upper division courses. SETUPS were developed by faculty in a workshop supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation to the American Political Science Association and hosted by the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research, summer, 1974.

Each SETUPS Module Includes a Monograph and a Data Set

The monograph is a 5½" x 8½" paperback of approximately 100 pages with:

1. A substantive essay on the topic.
2. Analytical exercises.
3. Instructions about how to do the exercises.
4. Suggestions for further readings and exercises.
5. A code book for the data set.

The data set is prepared and distributed by the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research. The SETUPS data can be ordered for use with SPSS, OSIRIS or as card image.

The minimum SETUPS order is 25 copies–in any combination of titles. Each SETUPS will cost $4.00. Lower prices are arranged for bulk orders. An order for 25 or more SETUPS will entitle you to the data sets for *all the SETUPS* at no extra charge.

TO ORDER SETUPS

Fill out the form below and the SETUPS Monographs will be sent to your bookstore. When we confirm the bookstore order, we shall send you a data-specification form.

Please complete and return this form to:

SETUPS: American Politics
American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

Name_____

Department_____

College_____

Address_____

City_____ State_____ Zip_____

I am planning to use the following SETUPS in_____ (course title), Fall, 1976.

No._____ of: *Voting Behavior*

No._____ of: *Political Socialization*

No._____ of: *Political Participation*

No._____ of: *The Supreme Court in American Politics*

No._____ of: *Public Policy: U.S. Energy, Environment and Economic Problems*

No._____ of: *Representation in the United States Congress: 1973*

No._____ of: *The Dynamics of Political Budgeting*

PRAEGER SPECIAL STUDIES

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE
Volume 1: Reforms, Technology and Income Distribution
Edited by ZBIGNIEW M. FALLENBUCHL
372 pp. Dec., 1975 ISBN 0-275-56150-X $25.00

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE
Volume 2: Sectoral Analysis
Edited by ZBIGNIEW M. FALLENBUCHL
432 pp. Mar., 1976 ISBN 0-275-56160-7 $27.50

ENVIRONMENTAL MISUSE IN THE SOVIET UNION
Edited by FRED SINGLETON
122 pp. June, 1976 ISBN 0-275-56210-7 $13.50

FROM THE COLD WAR TO DETENTE
Edited by PETER J. POTICHNYJ and JANE P. SHAPIRO
288 pp. May, 1976 ISBN 0-275-56200-X $20.00

SOVIET ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH THE DEVELOPING WORLD
Edited by ROGER E. KANET and DONNA BAHRY
254 pp. Dec., 1975 ISBN 0-275-01350-2 $17.50

CHANGE AND ADAPTATION IN SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN POLITICS
Edited by JANE P. SHAPIRO and PETER J. POTICHNYJ
252 pp. June, 1976 ISBN 0-275-56190-9 $18.50

EDUCATION AND THE MASS MEDIA IN THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE
Edited by BOHDAN HARASYMIW
152 pp. Mar., 1976 ISBN 0-275-56170-4 $16.50

DEMOGRAPHIC DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE
Edited by LESZEK KOSINSKI
ca. 300 pp. Fall, 1976 ISBN 0-275-56180-1 ca. $15.50

THE KUWAIT FUND AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ARAB REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT
SOLIMAN DEMIR
160 pp. Apr., 1976 ISBN 0-275-22980-7 $16.50

THE U.S. AND WORLD DEVELOPMENT
Agenda for Action, 1976
ROGER D. HANSEN and the STAFF of the OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL
238 pp. Apr., 1976 ISBN 0-275-56510-6 $15.00
PSS Student Edition: ISBN 0-275-85670-4 $4.25

COLONIAL EMANCIPATION IN THE PACIFIC AND THE CARIBBEAN
A Legal and Political Analysis
ARNOLD H. LEIBOWITZ
240 pp. May, 1976 ISBN 0-275-56000-7 $18.50

POLITICS IN THE SUDAN
Parliamentary and Military Rule in an Emerging African Nation
PETER K. BECHTOLD
384 pp. June, 1976 ISBN 0-275-22730-8 $23.50

QUANTITATIVE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
An Appraisal
Edited by FRANCIS W. HOOLE and DINA A. ZINNES
542 pp. June, 1976 ISBN 0-275-55650-6 $35.00

INDIA'S NUCLEAR OPTION
Atomic Diplomacy and Decision Making
ASHOK KAPUR
320 pp. June, 1976 ISBN 0-275-56100-3 $20.00

Please use ISBN number when ordering from: **Praeger Publishers** 111 Fourth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10003

Policy Sciences

an international journal devoted to the improvement of policymaking

Editor: **GARRY D. BREWER,** Yale University, New Haven
Associate Editor: **TERRY SAARIO,** The Ford Foundation, New York
Chairman, International Advisory Board: **HAROLD D. LASSWELL,** New York

The policy sciences share with the management and decision sciences an interest in problem solving, with the social sciences an interest in social systems and processes, with engineering and planning an interest in design. They also share with people throughout the ages a concern for the needs of mankind. Viewed in this light, the policy sciences could become one of the primary vehicles for the mounting concern for organizing knowledge towards humane purposes.

Active design of institutional and cultural change is a central theme of POLICY SCIENCES whether reflected in empirical studies of particular policy problems, the analysis and design of policymaking mechanisms or the development of methodologies, models and theories. "Knowledge for what" and knowledge for whom" are among the most important questions considered, with particular emphasis on the way the applied sciences and advisory professions participate in the policy sciences.


Subscription price 1976 - Volume 7 in four issues (postage included) for institutes and libraries: US $42.00/Dfl. 105.00, for personal use by individuals: US $20.00/Dfl. 50.00.



Elsevier
P.O. Box 211, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017, U.S.A.

The Dutch guilder price is definitive. US $ prices are subject to exchange rate fluctuations.

5217 E




The 5th edition of the authoritative compilation of Ph.D. and Masters programs in political science is completely revised and now contains the *names and fields of specialization of all faculty in graduate departments.*

$4.00 (prepaid)

Available Direct From:
The American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

27 MAY 1977

The American Political Science Review



Articles and Essays by Richard M. Bank and Steven R. McEarl, Norman I. Fainstein and Susan S. Fainstein, Ralph Ross, Jerry Nardin

---

Karen Orren
Standing to Sue

Benjamin I. Page
The Theory of Political Ambiguity

Arthur H. Miller, Warren E. Miller, Alden S. Raine, Thad A. Brown, Samuel Popkin, John W. Gorman, Charles Phillips, Jeffrey A. Smith, David RePass, Frederick T. Steeper, Robert M. Teeter
The Presidential Election of 1972

R. D. McKinlay and A. S. Cohan
Performance and Instability in Military and Nonmilitary Regime Systems

J. Weinberger
Science and Rule in Bacon's Utopia

Published Quarterly by

The American Political Science Association

Vol. LXX September 1976 No. 3

Presenting a Lively
"Behind the Scenes" Perspective

IN THE ARENA

The Care and Feeding of American Politics
VERNON F. ANDERSON and ROGER A. VAN WINKLE

Facts, analysis, insight, and commentary are candidly revealed to your students by political participants and seasoned observers in this text-reader on running for public office. The authors smoothly integrate the insights and perspectives of politicians, journalists, and political and social scientists.

IN THE ARENA discusses political morality and responsibility in America, political behavior, who votes and why, party politics, campaign management and strategy, technology and politics, and image builders. The book includes a class-tested campaign simulation which offers students a realistic exercise in applied politics. Tentative: 448 pages; $6.95/paper. August 1976. ISBN 0-06-046811-4.

Announcing the FIFTH EDITION
of This Provocative Text

CHALLENGE AND DECISION

Political Issues of Our Time
REO M. CHRISTENSON

The Fifth Edition of CHALLENGE AND DECISION concisely analyzes crucial and controversial aspects of today's major domestic political issues. Presenting a well-rounded range of viewpoints to stimulate classroom discussion, the author examines why certain problems arose, how they have been dealt with, our successes and failures to date, the choices ahead, the values at stake, the political realities, and the pros and cons at issue.

New to this edition are chapters on energy, the economy, the budget, the feminist movement, and pornography. Other chapters are substantially revised with over 50% of the book constituting new material. Tentative: 224 pages; $4.95/paper. August 1976. ISBN 0-06-041267-4.

Just Published

The New Seventh Edition of

PUBLIC PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION

by O. GLENN STAHL

Tentative: 576 pages; $14.95. August 1976. ISBN 0-06-046387-2.

To request examination copies, write to Lilian Schein, Dept. 313. Please include course title, enrollment, and present text.



10 East 53d Street
New York, N.Y. 10022

1817

Harper & Row

The American Political Science Review

Vol. LXX September 1976 No. 3

CONTENTS

723 Standing to Sue: Interest Group Conflict in the Federal Courts — Karen Orren

742 The Theory of Political Ambiguity — Benjamin I. Page

753 A Majority Party in Disarray: Policy Polarization in the 1972 Election — Arthur H. Miller, Warren E. Miller, Alden S. Raine, Thad A. Brown

779 Comment — Samuel Popkin, John W. Gorman, Charles Phillips, Jeffrey A. Smith

806 Comment — Frederick T. Steeper and Robert M. Teeter

814 Comment — David E. RePass

832 Rejoinder — Arthur H. Miller and Warren E. Miller

850 Performance and Instability in Military and Nonmilitary Regime Systems — R. D. McKinlay and A. S. Cohan

865 Science and Rule in Bacon's Utopia: An Introduction to the Reading of the *New Atlantis* — J. Weinberger

886 "Virtue, Obligation and Politics" Revisited — Richard M. Bank and Steven R. McCarl

905 The Future of Community Control — Norman I. Fainstein and Susan S. Fainstein


924 Communications

937 Editorial Comment

939 Book Reviews and Essays

939 On the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* — Ralph Ross

952 Philosophy and International Violence — Terry Nardin



Office of publication: Curtis Reed Plaza, Menasha, Wisconsin.
Foreign Agent: P. S. King and Staples, Ltd., Great Smith Street, Westminster, London.
Second class postage paid at Washington, D.C., and at additional mailing offices.
Printed in the United States of America by George Banta Company, Inc., Menasha, Wisconsin.

Copyright, 1976 by the American Political Science Association.

New Instructions to Contributors

Address correspondence about contributions to the *Review* concerning issues before the issue of September 1977 to Nelson W. Polsby, Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, California 94720; and issues after September 1977 (including all new manuscripts) starting January 1, 1976, to Charles O. Jones, *American Political Science Review*, Department of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15260. Address all correspondence about pending manuscripts to Charles O. Jones.

Please submit *four* copies of a manuscript to be considered for publication. *Unfortunately, due to increased postage costs, we can no longer return manuscripts to the author.* Manuscripts must be typed and mimeographed or photocopied, with all written material double-spaced (including quotations). Please do not send the original typescript. Since manuscripts are sent out anonymously for evaluation, the author's name and affiliation should appear only on a separate covering sheet and all footnotes identifying the author should also appear on a separate sheet. An abstract of less than 150 words should accompany the manuscript.

The footnote form is that used by most scientific journals. Explanatory notes only will be permitted for most manuscripts (see below); references will be listed alphabetically at the end of the manuscript; and in-text references will be made by inserting author or title, year, and page number, if appropriate. For illustration see Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975). Note: authors of manuscripts on the history of political thought may, if they prefer, use the traditional footnote form when referring to the individual theorist's work: the reference form should be used when referring to secondary works.

All manuscripts will be examined carefully for length. Referees will be asked to recommend where cuts might be made, without affecting the principal contribution. Manuscripts over 30 pages will be reviewed with particular care to determine if such length is warranted. Except in extraordinary circumstances, manuscripts over 50 pages will be returned to the author. Resubmission may follow compliance with the page limit. Manuscripts must be prepared as noted above, double-spaced throughout, with standard margins. Tables, charts, and references will be included in the page count.

Communications must follow the form of regular manuscripts (including reference listings where appropriate). They must be brief and to the point.

Figures should be drawn on white paper with India ink and the original tracings or drawings retained by the author (for transmission later to the printer). Copies only should accompany the manuscript. Tables should be typed on a separate page. Insert a guide line, e.g., "Table 1 about here," at the appropriate place in the manuscript.

ARTICLES

723 **Standing to Sue: Interest Group Conflict in the Federal Courts.** The law of standing—rules by which judges find whether a party may bring suit—has been liberalized in the federal courts to permit interest group disputes not ordinarily possible. Following an historical pattern of conflict containment within judicial-style processes, consumer and environmental groups contest corporate business decisions by challenging the legality of their regulatory or legislative authorization. The vagueness and *substantive* emphasis of the new rules give groups more influence in determining when courts will intervene in the affairs of the other branches; and the doctrine's recognition of noneconomic injuries logically forces judges to consider whether they may find standing for some "public interest" beyond a specific plaintiff. Changes in standing equalize social power; but the entanglement of courts in the puzzles of interest representation may restrict protections for strictly private litigants, and may further remove the political system from the Rule of Law.

By KAREN ORREN, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles.

742 **The Theory of Political Ambiguity.** The ambiguity of politicians' words and actions is sometimes attributed to rational seeking of support or votes. Such an explanation must clearly specify the preferences and decision processes among constituents and the calculations by politicians which make ambiguity seem attractive.

The leading effort of this sort is Shepsle's *lottery theory*, in which politicians take probabilistic stands on issues in order to appeal to risk acceptant, expected-utility-maximizing voters. But the lottery theory suffers from several difficulties. Its predictions are not strong; it can at best account for only certain kinds of observed ambiguous behavior; its main condition for the prediction of ambiguity—risk acceptance among constituents—may not be met; and the expected utility model of risky decision making is not well supported by available evidence.

An *emphasis allocation theory* is suggested as an alternative. According to it, ambiguity involves an effort to reduce the salience of conflictual matters (such as specific policy alternatives) in the evaluation of politicians, so that attention will be paid to consensual appeals (peace, prosperity, honesty in government).

By BENJAMIN I. PAGE, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago.

753 **A Majority Party in Disarray: Policy Polarization in the 1972 Election.** The Center for Political Studies' 1972 presidential election survey was used to investigate the role that issue voting, ideology, candidate assessments, and partisan defections played in the Republican landslide of that year. An analysis of issue attitudes revealed a deep policy schism among the Democrats: McGovern supporters preferred liberal policy alternatives while Nixon Democrats favored distinctly conservative issue positions. Interitem correlations among various issues and a liberal-conservative scale showed the voters to have substantial attitude consistency. A normal-vote analysis of these issues demonstrated that the Vietnam war and social issue domains contributed more significantly to the explanation of the vote than did cultural or economic issues. The candidates were clearly perceived as having taken opposing issue positions, with Nixon's position the more preferred by a majority of the population. A proximity measure, computed as the discrepancy between perceived candidate issue position and the voter's policy preference, proved to be a better predictor of the vote decision than the voter's own issue position taken alone. Analyses of candidate assessments showed that McGovern was not a personally appealing candidate—a factor that allowed issue differences to gain maximal importance. The sharp intraparty polarization of Democrats over policy alternatives, a change in the educational composition of the electorate, a decrease in partisan identification, and a growth in partisan defection combined to suppress the impact of party identification as a determinant of the vote decision. It was concluded that the 1972 presidential race could be labeled "ideological" by comparison with past elections.

By ARTHUR H. MILLER, Study Director, The University of Michigan, Center for Political Studies, WARREN E. MILLER, Director, Center for Political Studies and Professor of Political Science, The University of Michigan, ALDEN S. RAINE, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Rutgers University, and THAD A. BROWN, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles.

779 **Comment.** By SAMUEL POPKIN, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of California, San Diego and Cambridge Survey Research: JOHN W. GORMAN, Vice President, Cambridge Survey Research: CHARLES PHILLIPS, Ph.D. Candidate in Government, University of Texas at Austin; and JEFFREY SMITH, Ph.D. Candidate in Government, University of Texas at Austin.

806 **Comment.** By FREDERICK T. STEEPER, Senior Analyst, Political Division, Market Opinion Research, and ROBERT M. TEETER, Executive Vice President, Market Opinion Research.

814 **Comment.** By DAVID E. REPASS, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Connecticut.

832 **Rejoinder.** By ARTHUR H. MILLER and WARREN E. MILLER.

850 **Performance and Instability in Military and Nonmilitary Regime Systems.** The analysis of military regimes, as opposed to military coups, has attracted comparatively little attention. This paper examines whether the political, military, and economic performance of systems which have experienced a military regime differs from the performance of systems which have not. The comparison between the performance of these two types of system is then used to examine the validity of the occurrence of a military regime as an indicator of instability. The population consists of all independent countries of the world. The time span examined is 1961–70. The comparison is made across a number of political, military, and economic variables. The basic comparison is elaborated by introducing controls for GNP, area, number of coups, and duration of the military regime. While the controls show a number of variations, the main summary finding is that it is easy to differentiate military and nonmilitary regime systems in political terms, but not in military and economic terms. This finding seriously questions the utility of the occurrence of a military regime as an indicator of instability.

By R. D. McKinlay, Lecturer in Politics, University of Lancaster, and A. S. Cohan, Lecturer in Politics, University of Lancaster.

---

865 **Science and Rule in Bacon's Utopia: An Introduction to the Reading of the *New Atlantis*.** Bacon's *New Atlantis* presents a picture of human life governed by the new science to be produced by his reformation of the arts and sciences. Unlike his successor Hobbes, who forged a link between modern science and a certain, demonstrable doctrine of political rule, Bacon made no claim to found or present a political science. The reason for this is shown by an analysis of the political teaching of the *New Atlantis*. Bacon's political teaching is indirect, but it is the core of his comprehensive account of science and man. According to Bacon, the end of science is fully disclosed by political wisdom, and that wisdom shows the perfection of science to reverse the moral superiority of moderation over excess. The full meaning of Bacon's scientific utopia consists in a new stance toward the traditional problems of political philosophy.

By J. Weinberger, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Michigan State University.

---

886 **"Virtue, Obligation and Politics" Revisited.** Stephen Salkever in this *Review* ("Virtue, Obligation and Politics," *APSR* 68 [March, 1974]) discusses two paradigms of politics: one based on the concept of virtue (ancient political philosophy), the other resting on obligation (modern political thought). We analyze the meaning and significance of these two paradigms in terms of the cognitive-developmental moral psychology common to Lawrence Kohlberg, John Dewey, and Jean Piaget. We first present the cognitive-developmental theory and its empirical findings. We then demonstrate that the politics of obligation falls within the virtue paradigm as a necessary stage in the development of virtue, which involves placing Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Rawls within our developmental scheme. Finally, we explore the nature of understanding moral principles from within the cognitive-developmental perspective. In all this, we agree with Salkever's basic assumption that any account of political good (public as opposed to private) must be based on moral psychology, i.e., it must deal with the question of "What is good for the most inclusive of all publics, the human species?" We go two steps beyond Salkever, however, by showing the significance of the question, and by providing an answer to it (both of which bear upon the understanding of morality). An underlying purpose of our research is to present and to promote the political relevance and significance of moral psychology in general and cognitive development in particular.

By Richard M. Bank, Graduate Fellow, University of California, Santa Barbara, and Steven R. McCarl, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Denver.

---

905 **The Future of Community Control.** The nature of community control ideology, its relation to more general political consciousness, and its social correlates are explored. The primary data are drawn from two main sources: a survey of the attitudes of 362 civic and political leaders in seven districts of New York City conducted in 1972 using a combination of structural and reputational indicators to identify the sample; and intensive participant observation in three of these districts during 1973–74, along with 175 semi-structured, in-depth interviews with individuals in district-level voluntary organizations, interest groups, political parties, poverty boards and agencies, and "street-level" bureaucratic roles.

Both quantitative and qualitative analyses suggest that the great majority of leaders subscribes to a democratic rather than a race-conflict rationale for community control, but that there is a strong independent relationship between minority group status and operational support for community control. Possible explanations for this finding include the present interests of minority groups in American cities, the functional inadequacies of the political party structure, and the developmental history of the civil rights movement and its ideology. The relationship between race and community control may fade, however, if community control ceases to be a useful vehicle for advancing the interests of minority groups. One crucial determinant will be the identifications and beliefs of minority group members who are recruited into urban bureaucracies. Another is whether experience with decentralized city agencies indicates that movement toward increased community involvement in govern-

ment leads, in fact, to enhanced power and patronage for minorities. The data point to a continuing attachment to the community control ideology but also a recasting of it in a more qualified and complex form.

By NORMAN I. FAINSTEIN, Associate Professor, Dept. of Urban Affairs and Policy Analysis, Center for New York City Affairs, The New School for Social Research, and SUSAN S. FAINSTEIN, Associate Professor of Urban Planning, Livingston College, Rutgers University.

924 COMMUNICATIONS

From Gordon Tullock, Richard A. Brody, Douglas D. Rose, Dennis D. Riley, Fred W. Grupp, Jr. and Alan R. Richards, Paul Allen Beck, Richard Funston, Fred H. Lawson, Patrick J. McGowan and Robert M. Rood

937 EDITORIAL COMMENT

BOOK REVIEWS AND ESSAYS

939 **On the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.*** David I. Sills, editor, *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.*

By RALPH ROSS, Professor of Philosophy, Scripps College, The Claremont Colleges.

952 **Philosophy and International Violence.** Contemporary analytical philosophy has produced a body of work of considerable interest concerning the legal and moral aspects of warfare. Originally stimulated by public controversy over American involvement in the Vietnam War, the attention of philosophers was soon drawn to a number of more general moral and conceptual problems raised by the conduct of war. Those explored in the resulting literature include the nature and justification of the laws of war, the moral evaluation of military conduct, the dilemmas confronted by attempts to allocate blame for acts of military violence, and the implications of different ways of describing such acts for legal and moral judgment. Because investigation of these problems requires both substantive knowledge of international politics and philosophical interests and skills, it should be continued by political scientists as well as by philosophers.

By TERRY NARDIN, Associate Professor of Political Science, State University of New York at Buffalo.

962 **Political Theory, History of Political Thought and Methodology**

Thomas L. Pangle, *Montesquieu's Philosophy of Liberalism: A Commentary on "The Spirit of the laws".* Anne M. Cohler, p. 962

Bhiku Parekh, ed., *Bentham's Political Thought.* Wilfrid Harrison, p. 963

Anton Pelinka, *Dynamische Demokratie: Zur konkreten Utopie gesellschaftlicher Gleichheit.* George Schwab, p. 964

Milton Rokeach, *The Nature of Human Values.* Robert E. Lane, p. 965

Abraham Rothberg, ed., *The Heirs of Stalin: Dissidence and the Soviet Regime, 1953-1970.* D. Pospielovsky, p. 966

Jean-Jacques Salomon, *Science and Politics.* Yaron Ezrahi, p. 967

C. G. Schoenfeld, *Psychoanalysis and the Law.* Stanley Rothman, p. 969

Constance Smith and Ann Freedman, *Voluntary Associations: Perspectives on the Literature.* G. David Garson, p. 970

Ronald Grigor Suny, *The Baku Commune, 1917-1918: Class and Nationality in the Russian Revolution.* Stanislav Kirschbaum, p. 971

Annelise Thimme, *Flucht in den Mythos: Die Deutschnationale Volkspartie und die Niederlage von 1918.* Lewis Hertzman, p. 972

Franco Venturi, *Utopia and Reform in the Enlightenment*; and Robert C. Elliott, *The Shape of Utopia: Studies in a Literary Genre.* Rodney W. Kilcup, p. 973

Sidney R. Waldman, *Foundations of Political Action: An Exchange Theory of Politics.* Robert J. Sickels, p. 975

John J. Weltman, *Systems Theory in International Relations: A Study in Metaphoric Hypertrophy.* Jeffrey A. Hart, p. 975

Anthony Wilden, *System and Structure: Essays in Communication and Exchange.* Harold D. Lasswell, p. 976

977 **American Government and Politics**

John W. Kingdon, *Congressmen's Voting Decisions.* Stanley Bach, p. 977

R. Alton Lee, *A History of Regulatory Taxation*. Clara Penniman, p. 978
Sar H. Levitan, *Programs in Aid of the Poor for the 1970s*. Harold M. Hochman, p. 979
Samuel T. McSeveney, *The Politics of Depression: Political Behavior in the Northeast, 1893-1896*. Richard Jensen, p. 980
Ernest R. May, *"Lessons" of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy*. Donald E. Nuechterlein, p. 981
Stephen E. Patterson, *Political Parties in Revolutionary Massachusetts*. Ronald P. Formisano, p. 981
Elmo Richardson, *Dams, Parks and Politics: Resource Development and Preservation in the Truman-Eisenhower Era*. Jeanne Nienaber, p. 983
Alexander Saxton, *The Indispensable Enemy: Labor and the Anti-Chinese Movement in California*. Wen H. Kuo, p. 984
David Sears and John B. McConahay, *The Politics of Violence: The New Urban Blacks and the Watts Riot*. Peter K. Eisinger, p. 985
Richard Sennett, *The Uses of Disorder: Personal Identity and City Life*. David Nexon, p. 986
Frederick Wirt and Michael W. Kirst, *The Political Web of American Schools*. Harmon Zeigler, p. 987

---

987 Comparative Government and Politics

Marcio Moreira Alves, *A Grain of Mustard Seed: The Awakening of the Brazilian Revolution*. Peter McDonough, p. 987
B. C. Muthayya and I. Gnanakannan, *Developmental Personnel, A Psycho-Social Study Across Three States in India*. Dan Fritz, p. 988
Paul Neuburg, *The Hero's Children: The Post-War Generation of Eastern Europe*. Paul Hollander, p. 989
Laurie Oakes and David Solomon, *The Making of an Australian Prime Minister*. H. V. Emy, p. 991
Guillermo A. O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics*. Thomas C. Bruneau, p. 992
Kenneth W. Post and George D. Jenkins, *The Price of Liberty: Personality and Politics in Colonial Nigeria*. Robert Melson, p. 993
Alexander and Janet Rabinowitch, eds., with Ladis K. D. Kristof, *Revolution and Politics in Russia: Essays in Memory of B. I. Nicolaevsky*. Leonard Schapiro, p. 993
Stein Rokkan, ed., *Scandinavian Political Studies, Volume 8/1973*. Barbara G. Haskel, p. 995
Alfred Stepan, ed., *Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future*. Ronald M. Schneider, p. 997
Carl Stone, *Class, Race and Political Behaviour in Urban Jamaica*. Colin G. Clarke, p. 998
Walter Struve, *Elites against Democracy: Leadership Ideals in Bourgeois Political Thought in Germany, 1890-1933*. Wayne C. Thompson, p. 1000
Adolf Sturmthal and James G. Scoville, eds., *The International Labor Movement in Transition: Essays on Africa, Asia, Europe and South America*. E. M. Kassalow, p. 1001
Peter F. Sugar, ed., *Native Fascism in the Successor States, 1918-1945*. Alex Pravada, p. 1002
J. M. van der Kroef, *Indonesia After Sukarno*. Michael Leifer, p. 1003
Robin Winks, *The Blacks in Canada: A History*. Mildred A. Schwartz, p. 1004

1005 International Politics, Law and Organization

David Kimche, *The Afro-Asian Movement: Ideology and Foreign Policy of the Third World*. Frank H. H. King, p. 1005
Kiroshi Kitamura, *Psychological Dimensions of U. S.-Japanese Relations*. Ichiro Miyake, p. 1006
Gordon K. Lewis, *The Virgin Islands: A Caribbean Lilliput*. Charles D. Ameringer, p. 1007
Frank D. McCann, Jr., *The Brazilian-American Alliance, 1937-1945*. Thomas E. Skidmore, p. 1007
Kenneth R. Maxwell, *Conflicts and Conspiracies: Brazil and Portugal, 1750-1808*. Donna Guy, p. 1008
Roland Mousnier, *Social Hierarchies: 1450 to the Present*. Translated from the French by Peter Evans. Edited by Margaret Clarke. Joan Huber, p. 1009
Farag Moussa. *Manuel de Pratique Diplomatique: L'Ambassade*. Francis O. Wilcox, p. 1010
John M. Paxman and George T. Boggs, eds., *The United Nations: A Reassessment—Sanctions, Peacekeeping, and Humanitarian Assistance*. Lynn H. Miller, p. 1011
George H. Quester, *The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation*. Alastair Buchan, p. 1012
Lillian L. Randolph, *Third-Party Settlement of Disputes in Theory and Practice*. Carl Q. Christol, p. 1013
Volker Rittberger, *Evolution and International Organization: Toward a New Level of Sociopolitical Integration*. Werner J. Feld, p. 1014
Sidney E. Rolfe and James Burtle, *The Great Wheel: The World Monetary System, a Reinterpretation*. Susan Strange, p. 1015
James N. Rosenau, *International Studies and the Social Sciences: Problems, Priorities, and Prospects in the United States*. Kenneth W. Thompson, p. 1016
Antony C. Sutton, *Western Technology and Soviety Economic Development, 1930 to 1945*. Carl B. Turner, p. 1017

The American Political Science Association

1527 New Hampshire Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

President: JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, Williams College; *President-Elect:* SAMUEL H. BEER, Harvard University; *Vice Presidents:* RICHARD F. FENNO, University of Rochester; BARBARA HINCKLEY, University of Wisconsin, Madison; AARON WILDAVSKY, University of California, Berkeley; *Secretary:* FRED I. GREENSTEIN, Princeton University; *Treasurer:* BETTY A. NESVOLD, San Diego State University; *Program Co-Chairpersons:* BENJAMIN R. BARBER, Rutgers University, and FRANCES FOX PIVEN, Boston University; *Executive Director:* EVRON M. KIRKPATRICK, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036; *Managing Editor, APSR:* NELSON W. POLSBY, University of California, Berkeley.

COUNCIL: (Above-named Officers *ex officiis*), 1975–76; HAYWARD R. ALKER, JR., MIT; LEONARD BINDER, University of Chicago; SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, Stanford University; DALE ROGERS MARSHALL, University of California, Davis; SAMUEL C. PATTERSON, University of Iowa; FRANCES FOX PIVEN, Boston University; MULFORD Q. SIBLEY, University of Minnesota; JOHN E. TURNER, University of Minnesota; 1976–77; JAMES DAVID BARBER, Duke University; SUZANNE BERGER, Massachusetts Institute of Technology: JAMES B. CHRISTOPH, Indiana University; DANIEL J. ELAZAR, Temple University; HERBERT JACOB, Northwestern University; M. KENT JENNINGS, University of Michigan; INEZ SMITH REID, Barnard College; JAMES N. ROSENAU, University of Southern California.

FORMER PRESIDENTS: FRANK J. GOODNOW, ALBERT SHAW, FREDERIC N. JUDSON, JAMES BRYCE, A. LAWRENCE LOWELL, WOODROW WILSON, SIMEON E. BALDWIN, ALBERT BUSHNELL HART, W. W. WILLOUGHBY, JOHN BASSETT MOORE, ERNST FREUND, JESSE MACY, MUNROE SMITH, HENRY JONES FORD, PAUL S. REINSCH, LEO S. ROWE, WILLIAM A. DUNNING, HARRY A. GARFIELD, JAMES W. GARNER, CHARLES E. MERRIAM, CHARLES A. BEARD, WILLIAM B. MUNRO, JESSE S. REEVES, JOHN A. FAIRLIE, BENJAMIN F. SHAMBAUGH, EDWARD S. CORWIN, WILLIAM F. WILLOUGHBY. ISIDOR LOEB, WALTER J. SHEPARD, FRANCIS W. COKER, ARTHUR N. HOLCOMBE, THOMAS REED POWELL, CLARENCE A. DYKSTRA, CHARLES GROVE HAINES, ROBERT C. BROOKS, FREDERIC, A. OGG, WILLIAM ANDERSON, ROBERT E. CUSHMAN, LEONARD D. WHITE, JOHN M. GAUS, WALTER F. DODD, ARTHUR W. MACMAHON, HENRY R. SPENCER, QUINCY WRIGHT, JAMES K. POLLOCK, PETER H. ODEGARD, LUTHER H. GULICK, PENDLETON HERRING, RALPH J. BUNCHE, CHARLES MCKINLEY, HAROLD D. LASSWELL, E. E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, V. O. KEY, JR., R. TAYLOR COLE, CARL B. SWISHER, EMMETTE S. REDFORD, CHARLES S. HYNEMAN, CARL J. FRIEDRICH, C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, DAVID B. TRUMAN, GABRIEL A. ALMOND, ROBERT A. DAHL, MERLE FAINSOD, DAVID EASTON, KARL W. DEUTSCH, ROBERT E. LANE, HEINZ EULAU, ROBERT E. WARD, AVERY LEISERSON, AUSTIN RANNEY.

The American Political Science Review

Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley 94720

EDITORIAL BOARD: NELSON W. POLSBY, *Managing Editor, University of California Berkeley;* CHARLES O. JONES, *Managing Editor Elect, University of Pittsburgh;* PHILIP SIEGELMAN, *Book Review Editor, San Francisco State University;* SHLOMO AVINERI, *The Hebrew University of Jerusalem;* LUCIUS BARKER, *Washington University;* BRIAN BARRY, *University of British Columbia;* RICHARD A. BRODY, *Stanford University;* SAMUEL D. COOK, *Dillard University;* ELMER E. CORNWELL, *Brown University;* S. RUFUS DAVIS, *Monash University;* ROBERT J. JACKSON, *Carleton University;* ROBERT JERVIS, *University of California, Los Angeles;* DALE ROGERS MARSHALL, *University of California, Davis;* RUSSELL D. MURPHY, *Wesleyan University;* JOAN M. NELSON, *Washington, D.C.;* J. ROLAND PENNOCK, *Swarthmore College;* SAMUEL L. POPKIN, *University of California, San Diego;* ROBERT D. PUTNAM, *University of Michigan;* DOUGLAS W. RAE, *Yale University;* AUSTIN RANNEY, *American Enterprise Institute;* GIOVANNI SARTORI, *University of Florence;* MICHAEL J. SHAPIRO, *University of Hawaii;* JAY STARLING, *Southern Methodist University;* STEPHEN V. STEPHENS, *Baltimore, Maryland;* GEORGE E. VON DER MUHLL, *University of California, Santa Cruz;* RICHARD A. WATSON, *University of Missouri;* RICHARD WINTERS, *Dartmouth College;* MANUSCRIPT EDITOR: ELLEN Y. SIEGELMAN. EDITORIAL ASSISTANTS: BETSEY COBB, RITA WILLIAMS. EDITORIAL INTERNS: ROBERT ARSENEAU, JONATHAN BENDOR, KENNETTE BENEDICT, BETH CAPELL, DON CHISHOLM, SHAI FELDMAN, STEPHEN GENCO, EVELYN DEBORAH JAY, JOHN Q. JOHNSON, ELAINE KAMARCK, PAUL D. KARPS, JAMES J. LENGLE, DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DAVID RICHMAN, JENNY RING, STEVEN ROSENSTONE, STUART A. ROSS, SERGE TAYLOR, PHILIP J. WILSON, JOHN ZALLER

About the American Political Science Review

The American Political Science Review, published quarterly during the months of March, June, September, and December, is supplied to all APSA members. Membership dues are charged according to the following schedule:

Membership Category	*Dues*
Regular	
Annual income	
Under $12,000	$25
$12,000–14,999	$30
$15,000–19,999	$35
$20,000–24,999	$40
$25,000–29,999	$45
$30,000 and over	$50
Student and Retired	$12
Family	$5
Life	$1000
Institutional (includes *APSR* and *PS*)	$50 domestic $52 foreign

Student memberships are limited to five years per person. Foreign currency at the official exchange rate will be accepted for foreign subscriptions and foreign membership fees. The equivalent of $3 for additional postage should be added for foreign subscriptions.

Current issues are priced at $10.50 per copy; for *back issues prior* to 1970 address Walter J. Johnson, Inc., 355 Chestnut St., Norwood, New Jersey 07648; for issues 1970 and later send request directly to the American Political Science Association.

Applications for membership, orders for the *Review*, and remittances should be addressed to the Executive Director. The American Political Science Association, 1527 New Hampshire Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. *Notices of changes of address* should be received in the Washington office by the 25th day of the months before publication.

NEW INSTRUCTIONS TO CONTRIBUTORS

Address correspondence about contributions to the *Review* concerning issues before the issue of September 1977 to Nelson W. Polsby, Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, California 94720, and issues after September 1977 (including all new manuscripts) starting January 1, 1976, to Charles O. Jones, Department of Political Science, Mervis Hall, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15260. Address all correspondence about pending manuscripts to Charles O. Jones.

Please submit *four* copies of a manuscript to be considered for publication. *Unfortunately, due to increased postage costs, we can no longer return manuscripts to the author.* Manuscripts must be typed and mimeographed or photocopied, with all written material double-spaced (including quotations). Please do not send the original typescript. Since manuscripts are sent out anonymously for evaluation, the author's name and affiliation should appear only on a separate covering sheet and all footnotes identifying the author should also appear on a separate sheet. An abstract of less than 150 words should accompany the manuscript.

The footnote form is that used by most scientific journals. Explanatory notes only will be permitted for most manuscripts (see below); references will be listed alphabetically at the end of the manuscript; and in-text references will be made by inserting author or title, year, and page number, if appropriate. For illustration see Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975). Note: authors of manuscripts on the history of political thought may, if they prefer, use the traditional footnote form when referring to the individual theorist's work; the reference form should be used when referring to secondary works.

All manuscripts will be examined carefully for length. Referees will be asked to recommend where cuts might be made, without affecting the principal contribution. Manuscripts over 30 pages will be reviewed with particular care to determine if such length is warranted. Except in extraordinary circumstances, manuscripts over 50 pages will be returned to the author. Resubmission may follow compliance with the page limit. Manuscripts must be prepared as noted above, double-spaced throughout, with standard margins. Tables, charts, and references will be included in the page count.

Communications must follow the form of regular manuscripts (including reference listings where appropriate). They must be brief and to the point.

Address books intended for review to Paul A. Beck, Book Review Editor, *American Political Science Review*, Department of Political Science, Mervis Hall, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15260. Information, including News and Notes, for the Association's news-journal, *PS*, should be sent to 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington D.C. 20036; advertising, reprint and circulation correspondence should be sent to the Executive Director at the Washington Office. Domestic claims for non-receipt of issues must be made within six months of the month of publication; overseas claims, one year. Advertising information and rates are available from Nancy Edgerton, Adv. Manager, APSA, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

Articles and notes appearing in the *Review* before the June 1953 issues were indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature*. Current issues are indexed by *The International Political Science Abstracts* and the *Social Sciences Index*. Microfilm of the *Review*, beginning with Volume 1, may be obtained from University Microfilms, 313 North First Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106. A *Cumulative Index of the Review*, Volumes 1–62; 1906–1968, may also be obtained from University Microfilms. Articles appearing in the *Review* are listed regularly in *ABC Pol Sci* and *Current Contents: Behavioral, Social & Management Sciences*. Book reviews are indexed in *Book Review Index*.

Standing to Sue: Interest Group Conflict in the Federal Courts*

KAREN ORREN

University of California, Los Angeles

When he penned his famous remarks on the American judiciary, De Tocqueville worried about the destabilizing effects of private lawsuits entered directly against official actions; he advocated instead the guise of judicial settlement of disputes between two private parties as being less damaging to the moral force of law and to popularly held principles of majority will as embodied in legislatures. He could not foresee the subject of this essay—the circumstances in which direct challenges to official actions would in fact be thinly concealed disputes between private parties—if for no other reason than that he did not anticipate the domination of American government by administration and the subsequent subdivision of policy among corresponding private groups. And if contemporary students of politics have likewise failed to pay scholarly attention to this phenomenon, it may be because they are so accustomed by training and experience to take for granted private group interest behind every public act that they have seen little need for comment.

The parties themselves of course are well aware of the interests at issue in a challenge to the legality of the official action in question, and in recent years an increasing number of suits have attempted to obstruct a wide variety of private projects and activities which, without government endorsement, would be perfectly legal. The increase, moreover, is due not only to the initiative of interest groups, but to radical changes in judicial doctrine which permits such suits.

The rules governing who may bring suit, with respect to which official actions, are known as the law of standing.[1] Along with other aspects of judiciability like ripeness, mootness and political question, they have been liberalized considerably as the courts have assumed a more activist role in the federal system. But the doctrine of standing in particular constituted a barrier to parties who would protest actions—frequently private actions with an official stamp—but who had not been designated by Congress or otherwise legally recognized as "parties aggrieved" entitled to initiate judicial review.

The following essay analyzes the changes in the federal doctrine of standing as they have come to permit the juxtaposition in court of private interests. Such a juxtaposition might have been impossible in normal social and political life for a variety of reasons: the disparity in resources between the parties; the lack of an available arena in which the conflict might be joined; the influence of the defendant interest in relevant legislative and administrative bodies; and others. In the essay, attention is directed to the effect that changes in standing have already had on the relationship of corporate business to its public; but corporate business is

* I would like to thank Professors Sylvia Snowiss of California State University, Northridge and Robert Gerstein and Douglas S. Hobbs of the University of California, Los Angeles, who were kind enough to read and comment on an earlier draft of this essay.

[1] It is customary in writing on standing to warn the reader that Professor Paul Freund has said the concept of standing "is among the most amorphous in the entire domain of public law." *Hearings* before the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., (1966), pt. 2, p. 498. Justice Frankfurter called it a "complicated speciality of federal jurisdiction. . . ." U.S. *ex rel.* Chapman, 345 US 153 (1953), 156. Justice Douglas remarked that "generalizations about standing to sue are largely worthless as such." Association of Data Processing Service Orgs. *v.* Camp, 397 US 150 (1970), 151.

The student interested in standing primarily for its political implications will find nothing in the political science literature. This is a result not only of the relative newness of the standing changes, but of the general recent neglect of the role of judicial doctrine in the political system. Many entirely comprehensible articles on the subject of standing have been written by legal scholars, however. These concern a different range of questions from those of immediate interest here, but they are indispensable for an understanding of the doctrine and for references to additional cases, as well as for information bearing on political matters. The specific interpretation of standing in terms of the courts' definition of *interest*, however, is original to this essay and has been prompted by the problem of group conflict.

See Lee Albert, "Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate Surrogate for Claim for Relief," *Yale Law Journal* 83 (January, 1974), 425–97; Kenneth C. Davis, *Administrative Law Text*, 3d ed. (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1972), Ch. 22; Louis L. Jaffe, *Judicial Control of Administrative Action* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965), Chs. 12, 13; Jaffe, "Standing Again," *Harvard Law Review*, 84, (January, 1971), 633–38; Jaffe, "The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Holfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff," *University of Pennsylvania Law Review*, 116 (April, 1968), 1033–47; Kenneth E. Scott, "Standing in the Supreme Court—A Functional Analysis," *Harvard Law Review*, 86 (February, 1973), 645–92; and Robert A. Sedler, "Standing Judiciability and All That: A Behavioral Analysis," *Vanderbilt Law Review*, 25 (April, 1972), 479–512. See also Alexander M. Bickel, *The Least Dangerous Branch* (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1962), pp. 120ff.

only one among a number of powerful institutions —educational, scientific, industrial, and others— which may eventually be challenged in court under the new provisions. The argument advanced— that the specific character of the new doctrine has bestowed on private groups an enlarged measure of discretion in determining public policy—is intended to be understood in general terms; and the implications of the judiciary's aggressive involvement in group conflict for the effectiveness of its more traditional functions within the political system obviously have importance beyond the particular interests being arbitrated.

It might be noted that although changes in standing have taken place in the courts proper, the containment of interest conflict within diverse forums of adjudication is an observable pattern of American politics. In fact, during this century, those interest conflicts of each generation which most strained the balance of private social forces have been managed in precisely this way. In the first decades, business's demands for relief from the hazardous competition promoted by political reformers was accommodated by the network of quasi-judicial regulatory agencies. Organized labor of the 1930's was given recognition and the rights to bargain collectively under the auspices of the National Labor Relations Board. In neither case did these interests grow to broader political dimensions in the sense of seeking control of the central machinery of government.

The black movement, of course, relied heavily on the courts, largely by default and with somewhat less definitive results. Elsewhere I have discussed the lack of organizational structure within the black population as an obstacle to effective confrontation with opposing groups.[2] Here it may be noted in passing that the old law of standing restricted the questions which could be raised in court to the socially amorphous ones of civil rights, to the actions of a limited number of public institutions, and to private actions specified by statute. With the liberalization of standing, it is possible that black and other minority racial groups may follow the lead of environmentalists and consumers and press the interests of their constituencies along a much wider front of actions bearing the official stamp.[3]

The environmental and consumer movements (they are often linked organizationally), which are likely contenders for the characteristic interests of the present decade, follow this pattern. Frustrated in Congress, these groups have made an end run to the courts, where they have skillfully exploited and magnified limited legislative gains, especially the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.[4] Their cases, made possible only through recent changes in the law of standing, have been important in fundamentally transforming the relationship to the public of private interests, in particular corporate business, causing the environmental and consumer damages complained of—a transformation through adjudication analogous to the changed relationship between business and labor brought about by Section 7 of the Wagner Act.[5]

Before proceeding, I must dispense with the objection that standing is merely a preliminary finding, less important than the actual outcome on the merits of the case. For apart from a favorable ultimate verdict for which the right to sue is an obvious precondition, achieving standing is itself a significant victory in several ways. First—and here I depart from what will be my general practice of avoiding largely technical points of law—some legal scholars have argued that the nature of the "zone of interests" test is such that a decision on standing may prejudge a finding on the merits, since frequently the claim of illegality which the court must later determine rests precisely on the fact that the public administrator failed to take into account a legally protected interest;[6] this

[2] Karen Orren, "Corporate Power and the Slums: Is Big Business a Paper Tiger?" in *Theoretical Perspectives on Urban Politics*, ed. Willis Hawley and Michael Lipsky (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976).

[3] For some years before the general liberalization of standing by the Supreme Court in 1970 judges gave a liberal interpretation in cases concerning charges of racial discrimination. A summary is found in Sedler, pp. 499ff. Also see Thomas J. Barnes, "U.S. Government's Standing to Sue—A New Approach to Legal Assistance for Ghetto Residents or an Invitation to Executive Lawmaking?" *Wayne Law Review*, 17 (Sept.–Oct., 1971), 1287–1304. On the other hand, minorities have been notably unsuccessful in obtaining the right to challenge alleged racial exclusion through local zoning, zoning being a subject resistant generally to the broadening of standing. See, for example, Warth *v.* Seldin, 495 F. 2d, 1187 (2d Cir. 1974).

[4] The NEPA requires, among other things, that all administrative agencies establish procedures to consider "environmental amenities and values in their decision making and to include an environmental impact statement with every recommendation." It does not provide for judicial review but does state Congress's intention to preserve the natural environment for present and future generations. An excellent treatment of group strategy is Joseph L. Sax, *Defending the Environment* (New York: Knopf, 1971).

[5] It may be the specific nature of these recent interests, particularly of the environmentalists, that has caused the recurrence in the doctrine of standing of conceptual formulations which, when put in practice in other policy-making contexts, are viewed skeptically by the courts. In particular, the coincidence of concrete circumstances—the scarcity of physical resources—with the growing recognition of human and natural interdependency and the mobilization of groups to speak on these issues, has provided new impetus to the prospect of giving representation to wholistic "public interests." Also, these circumstances may have had a more subtle influence on standing, for example, the emphasis on *effects* of legislative policy rather than on the intentions of legislators.

[6] See for example Charles Allen Wright, *Handbook of the Law of Federal Courts*, 2nd ed. (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1970), pp. 43ff.

problem of prejudgment would seem to be evidenced most clearly in those cases where the claim of the plaintiff is that he has been unfairly excluded from an administrative hearing.

Second, the mere prolongation of litigation may, through delay, costs, and bad public relations, hinder the completion of the defendant's intended project, regardless of the final outcome; may allow further time for the plaintiff to maneuver in Congress and gain public support; and may serve as a deterrent to the undertaking of similar projects by others—as, for example, the electrical power industry claims it has been deterred. Third, despite a decentralized federal court system, decisions in one circuit influence those in others, and of course the Supreme Court binds them all; thus, reasons for granting standing in one case may reverberate for plaintiffs in analogous situations to challenge additional and assorted offending actions.

Finally, the wider opening of the courts to groups for doing battle with their opponents is an important element of strategy and therefore of the strength of plaintiff interests. To clarify, changes in standing might be compared to the class action, which is perhaps more familiar. The class action is a technique that allows groups by consolidating small claims to exploit tactically judicial resources that already exist. Standing, however, shifts the parameters within which groups may operate: what may now be asked of the court in the way of judgments, injunctions, and so on; and the range of social enterprises open to challenge. The class action is usually remedial, providing for the collection of damages which may or may not significantly modify future private behavior without further litigation; the confrontation through standing may bring results in the form of rescinding a required authorization or reversing an administrative decision and constitutes direct participation in piecemeal policy making.

Corporate Business, the Public, and the Law of Standing

The liberalized law of standing permits the litigation of disputes between private interests that cannot be effectively juxtaposed in ordinary social life. There is irony in the fact that essential conditions of this development are identical to those that have enabled entrenchment in government by defendant groups.

Consider as an example a recent district court case, *Consumers Union* v. *Rogers*, in which a consumers' organization protested the agreements entered into by several foreign steel companies to reduce the amount of steel they would import into the United States for domestic sale. Under ordinary social conditions it is difficult to imagine how the consumer group might have confronted the companies: boycott would have been unfeasible, given the nature of the product and the fact that the companies accounted for more than 85 per cent of steel imports; protest—picketing and so on—was likewise unfeasible, since there are over a dozen companies and they are headquartered abroad; nor could the companies be considered tortfeasors and sued in the regular courts. The opening wedge, however, is provided by the circumstance that the steel agreements had come about as a result of negotiations initiated by the U.S. Secretary of State. Under the new law of standing the consumers could complain not directly about the actions of the steel companies, but about Secretary Roger's allegedly unconstitutional stimulation and implementation of these actions.[7] Notice that the dispute between the consumers and Secretary Rogers is artificial; the real parties are the consumers and the companies.

As well as indicating the general format of interest group conflict under the law of standing, the example suggests the specific primary social effect of the new rules, which has been to fundamentally alter business's relationship with the public.[8] To speak of the primary social effect is emphatically not to de-emphasize the importance to society of plaintiffs whose disputes are actually with the government and the laws and have nothing to do with business or any other private interest. Pregnant women seeking abortions, citizens opposed to the expenditure of public funds to support religious schools, white parents challenging school segregation, welfare recipients, residents displaced by urban renewal, antiwar organizations—the new rules have allowed these and others to turn to the courts for redress of grievances.[9] But while such suits may have enhanced the influence of certain interests and indicate the more active role of the courts in the arrangement of powers, they do not amount to a fundamental change in the relationship of the government and its citizenry: this is, however, the case with business and its public.

To explain, a brief discussion of some of the characteristics of corporate business is in order (keep in mind, however, that a different but parallel analysis might apply to, say, labor unions, educational institutions, and others wielding sig-

[7] Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. *v.* Rogers, 352 F. Supp. 1319 (D.D.C. 1973).

[8] By corporate business is meant industry, finance, and "agribusiness." For a recent standing case concerning corporate farming, see Bowker *v.* Morton (N.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 1973), *Environmental Law Reporter*, 4, 20255.

[9] Doe *v.* Bolton, 410 US 179 (1973); Flast *v.* Cohen, 392 US 83 (1968); Whitley *v.* Wilson City Board of Education, 427 F.2d 179 (4th Cir. 1970); Norwalk CORE *v.* Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968); Reservists Committee to Stop the War *v.* Laird, 323 F. Supp. 833 (D.C. Cir. 1971).

nificant social power).[10] Political scientists with a taste for "political economy" have in recent years united business and government conceptually, as alternative allocative systems—an exercise which, if it has no other benefit, serves to throw light on a crucial distinction between the two. Perhaps nothing so characterizes contemporary government as its active and intense intercourse with private interest groups: candidates are selected, policies framed, and allocations allocated with an eye to group needs, demands, and power. Corporate business, on the other hand—enmeshed as it is in a variety of contracts with creditors, stockholders, suppliers, dealerships, and employees—is related to the public to whom it allocates its investments and products only in a manner which is general, diffuse, and legally insulated.

Business's relationship with the public is general in the sense that its legitimacy rests on a broad mandate of effective performance, free of particularized group interests and demands; this generality has been continually and successfully defended against municipalities, states, occupational groups such as farmers, and others who have occasionally entertained the idea of imposing special obligations or impeding the progress of certain enterprises. The relationship is diffuse in the sense that while business decisions viewed collectively have vast and differential effects on social groups, these are the result of decisions made discretely, seriatim, for profit, by hundreds of individuals and companies; for this reason among others, when individual dissatisfactions congeal into group claims, they are usually addressed not to business but to government.[11]

At the level of the individual company, business enjoys considerable insulation through the principles of tort law, which may deny relief even when business actions cause injury and are unlawful. If the court finds that the defendant company owes no duty to the plaintiff, or that the conduct is not the legal cause of the plaintiff's injury, or that the plaintiff's interest is not one which the law intended to protect, then it will usually deny relief. To be sure, definitions of duty and legal cause have been modified considerably in recent years—the imposing of strict liability for defective products being one of the most important changes and one which has figured in a number of class action suits; but the concepts of "proximate cause," "ambit of risk," and caveat emptor in consumer contracts provide a substantial margin of protection from the public.[12]

An essential preliminary to the juxtaposition of business and private interest groups drawn from the diffuse public has been the growth of the administrative apparatus, and in particular the agencies regulating business "in the public interest." For while neither the rhetoric nor behavior of these agencies significantly infringed on the generality of business legitimacy, the aggregation of companies and industries within functionally defined departments and agencies introduces a clear structure, and thereby the potential for organized contacts with other interests. As recent studies have amply demonstrated, opportunities for concerted action were quickly and skillfully seized by producer groups—business and agriculture; while until very recently, reformers and consumers were poorly organized, inhibited by a public ideology of scientific decision making and dollars-and-cents rationality, excluded from hearings by restrictive rulings on administrative intervention, and, as will be explained below, without standing in court.[13]

Nonetheless, the *conditions* set by this system of cabinet bureaus, agencies, and independent regulatory commissions may in the long run turn out to be as politically important as their long captivity. Students of the administrative process are fond of quoting a letter written by Attorney General Olney, in which he consoles a railroad company president by predicting that the newly established Interstate Commerce Commission would become a protection for the industry, "a sort of barrier between the railroad corporations and the people."[14] As a contrast, it is interesting to cite a dissenting opinion in one of the earliest standing cases, also concerning the ICC, which signaled the newly vulnerable status of industry. Several railroads had sued to recover losses they had suffered when the ICC, acting under the charge of the Transportation Act of 1920, had authorized a previously independent terminal line to be acquired by their powerful competition, the New York Central. Under ordinary commercial law, the railroads could not recover damages from the lawful pursuit of business by a competitor. Justice Sutherland for three dissenting judges argued against the majority decision which found that the railroads had standing to sue:

[10] For a suggestive discussion of collective bargaining see Harry H. Wellington and Ralph K. Winter, Jr., *The Unions and the Cities* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1971), pp. 150ff.

[11] For a fuller discussion of these points see Orren, "Corporate Power and the Slums."

[12] See Robert E. Keeton, *Venturing to do Justice* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969), Chaps. 1 and 7.

[13] See Grant McConnell, *Private Power and American Democracy* (New York: Knopf, 1966). Chap. 6 and *passim*; also Theodore J. Lowi, *The End of Liberalism* (New York: Norton, 1970), Chaps. 4, 5.

[14] Quoted in Jaffe, *Judicial Control*, p. 12 and McConnell, p. 284.

> Before Transportation Act, 1920, the New York Central would have been free to acquire these terminals without the consent of the commission. . . . It is claimed, however, that Transportation Act, 1920, so alters the rule as to give a right of action to complainants where none existed before. I am unable to perceive any sound basis for the conclusion. . . . A private injury, for which the law provides no remedy, cannot be converted into a remediable injury merely because it results from an act of which the public might complain.[15]

As it turned out, the dissent proved to be a very distant early warning; for four decades the law of standing would be an effective barrier against such new rights.

Before turning to the actual changes in legal doctrine, I shall disassociate this analysis from any perspective that would attribute these changes to a shift from a "pro-business" to an "anti-business" outlook, either on the part of individual judges or the court as a whole. It is true that the more limited role of judicial review was a fixture of the nineteenth century, with judicial concern for "vested rights" an important aspect of that period's preoccupation with property.[16] And it is also true that the court's more liberal perspective on standing appears to derive, in part at least, from a disenchantment with the business-dominated administrative process, and, in some cases, from the specialized concerns of certain judges—for example, that of Justice Douglas about the spoliation of the natural environment. But the social effects of standing ultimately have little to do with special advantages that business may have previously had in the courts or, for that matter, in the agencies. They have to do with the functions which corporate business performs in society.

Corporate business is not simply an interest group, any more than are labor unions, universities, or other large concentrations of social power. Businessmen do not only lobby and take cases to court along with other interest groups. They are the employers, technological innovators, price-setters, land developers, mineral extractors—in other words the generators (albeit with official imprimatur) of the injuries which individuals and groups go into court to protest. Given these circumstances, the most scrupulously neutral administration of the liberalized rules—often, as it happens, benefiting businessmen, just as the old rules sometimes disadvantaged businessmen—is an infringement on business autonomy. One need not minimize the promotional services of the legal system for business enterprise to observe that it is those members of the public on the receiving end of investment and production decisions (or of decisions made by other socially powerful institutions) who are most in political need of official recognition of their interests and the opportunity to pursue them aggressively in the courts.

The "Legal Wrong" Test

The change in the law of standing may be seen in terms of a drift in the court's own conception of the *interest* of groups and individuals who seek litigation of their grievances. From a view that was highly *legalistic*—recognizing interest only as it arose from specific constitutional or statutory boundaries which the plaintiff claimed had been overstepped in causing him injury—the court has moved to seeing interest in a *substantive* light, as being composed of the plaintiff's values, activities, or characteristics independent of the official action that he claims caused the injury. These conceptions of interest, moreover, are inextricably tied to a changing attitude on the part of the court toward the function of judicial review: from a reticence about interfering with the actions of the other branches of government, except when necessary to protect identifiable and concrete personal rights, to today's forthright acceptance of the commission to give authoritative interpretation of the laws.[17] For the juxtaposition of groups through standing is exactly contrary to the dominant practice of legislative and administrative politics, which is interest segregation.

To illustrate the distinction between the legalistic and substantive conceptions of interest and provide a preview of the doctrinal changes described below, we might reconsider the case of the consumers and the foreign steel companies. Consumers Union complains in court that the steel companies have damaged consumers' "interest"; they must now pay more for finished products they purchase. Under the legalistic view, the court might answer: yes, you have perhaps suffered an unfortunate disadvantage; but as far as the law is concerned you have no real or legal interest, since Congress has nowhere explicitly said that the injury you complain of is to be afforded protection by Secretary Rogers or other officials administering foreign trade. Under the new, substantively based rules, the court reasons: yes, as consumers of steel your interest has indeed suffered through what the companies have arranged; now let us see

[15] The Chicago Junction Case, 264 US 258 (1924), 271–73.

[16] An interesting discussion of nineteenth-century law as it pertained to business can be found in James W. Hurst, *Law and the Conditions of Freedom* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1956), Chap. I.

[17] For a consideration of standing within the context of a change in the court's philosophy of judicial review see Henry P. Monaghan, "Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When," *Yale Law Journal*, 82 (June, 1973), 1363–97, and Fritz W. Scharpf, "Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis," *Yale Law Journal*, 75 (March, 1966), 517–97.

whether your interest may be considered one of those that is afforded protection by the relevant statutes or by the Constitution.

An emphasis on the plaintiff's substantive claim instead of the administrator's violation obviously takes the court closer to a more explicitly political mode, for interest is now subjectively asserted as it is in, say, an electoral or legislative context, rather than regarded as emergent from the confines of already existing law. The problem is not entirely removed from law, of course, because the question of statutory intent becomes central. But as long as the court was reluctant to interfere (unless explicitly directed otherwise by Congress) with the activities of the other branches except when necessary to protect identifiable and concrete personal rights similar to those protected by courts of common law, then it could not provide leeway for the pursuit of interests any greater than that provided by existing political arrangements. In other words, without a more expansive attitude toward judicial review, it would permit no social intrusions on the functionally defined, clientele-minded, and strictly independent systems of congressional committees, regulatory agencies, and Cabinet bureaus which compose the policy-making apparatus and which have worked to keep interests segregated from one another.

In general, although Congress has sometimes legislated expressly narrow provisions for review, the courts have long been given statutory authorization to intervene at the behest of "any party at interest" or "persons aggrieved," and are left with considerable room for construction.[18] Likewise, agency rules are vague regarding intervention in their proceedings (as for "good cause") or nonexistent, and the court is left to decide such problems as whether a prospective intervenor's interest had been inadequately protected by the existing parties. However, recent resistance in Congress to explicitly granting standing to previously excluded groups, as well as the tug-of-war between agencies and judges which has followed liberalization in the courts, are indicators of the extent to which entrenched parties have expected courts to ratify the pattern of interest segregation by restricting judicial construction to a limited range of common law injuries.[19]

The change in the court's conception of interest, then, must be seen in two aspects: the method used by the court to establish congressional intent, and the type of injury considered sufficient for standing. Whereas today many of the most intriguing problems concern the type of injury involved, in the early cases, the injuries complained of were generally concrete, economic, and thus judicially familiar, and the major hindrance to review was the court's test of "legal wrong." A legal wrong is one against which the party is afforded protection by either common law or statute; if no such protection is found, then no matter how offensive the injury suffered may be to abstract notions of justice or legality, standing is denied. This idea remains an element in determining standing today, but it has been relaxed to an "arguable" legal wrong. In the early cases, complaining parties faced a rigorous, even meticulous, determination before the court would proceed with the suit.

In order to re-emphasize that the law of standing is not a veiled expression for ideological preferences on economic matters, it is useful to begin our discussion of cases with two in which the more restrictive, legalistic doctrine worked to deny adjudication to important segments of private industry. Consider *Tennessee Electric Power Company* v. *TVA*, in which the plaintiffs were eighteen electric power plants who asked the Court to prevent TVA from selling its power directly to industrial users and to end a system of public grants for the construction of municipal power plants, on the grounds that such government subsidy of their competition was unconstitutional. The Court looked to the statutes authorizing the offending actions to see whether Congress had created a right of review for competitors such as these; finding no provisions for review, the Court sought guidance in common law, where no protection exists against business losses suffered through the lawful pursuit of competition. An injury inflicted by governmental action, Justice Frankfurter wrote in denying standing, could not be challenged "unless the right invaded is a legal right—one of property, one arising out of contract, one protected against tortious invasion, or one founded on a statute which confers a privilege."[20]

In *Perkins* v. *Lukens Steel Co.* seven steel companies attempted to challenge the method of administering a provision in their government contracts which required that they pay their employees a minimum wage, to be determined by the Secretary of Labor according to the "locality" of the plant. Secretary Frances Perkins had divided the

[18] Examples of narrow provisions include the Federal Trade Commission Act's provision for review by "any person . . . required by an order of the Commission to cease and desist," and the Federal Power Act confining review to parties who participated in Commission proceedings. Examples of broad provisions include "any party at interest" in the Interstate Commerce Act; "persons aggrieved" in the Federal Communications Act; "any person disclosing a substantial interest in such order" in the Federal Aviation Act; and see also the National Labor Relations Act and the Securities Act of 1933.

[19] Intervention upon "good cause" is provided by the organic act of the Federal Trade Commission. See Ernest Gellhorn, "Public Participation in Administrative Proceedings," *Yale Law Journal*, 81 (January, 1972), 359–404.

[20] 306 US 118 (1939), 137.

nation into six localities, and the companies, seeking a more refined breakdown, complained that her action was a violation of the Public Contracts Act. But the Court held that before the alleged violation could be considered, the companies must demonstrate "an injury or threat to a particular right of their own, as distinguished from the public's interest in the administration of the law." The Public Contracts Act, said the Court, created no such right; it had not been enacted for the benefit of the companies (nor, for that matter, of employees); it did not represent a regulation of the industry by Congress. The Government enjoys the same rights as private individuals to "unrestricted power" to make purchases, etc.[21] The companies were denied standing.

Since the legalistic approach acknowledges that an interest would be sufficient if it was founded on a privilege conferred by statute, the legislative background in these two cases is worth noting. In both of the relevant acts, the legislative history actually did show numerous concessions to persons in the same situation as these plaintiffs. The "locality" phrase in *Perkins* was just such a concession; and the Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933 contained several provisions designed to protect and reassure the TVA's private competitors in the power business.[22] But the Court declined to confirm these political compromises by finding privileges to invoke review for particular categories of plaintiffs; instead it sought explicit statutory provisions or common-law protections that the public administrator may have violated, making his behavior illegal.

Two other cases rest their claim to adjudication on specific provisions for judicial review in the statutes under which the offending administrative acts had been taken. In the *Chicago Junction Case* six rival trunklines complained they had lost $10,000,000 in business because the ICC had illegally authorized the New York Central to acquire a previously independent terminal railroad. The action, said the six, was illegal because the ICC had no evidence that it was "in the public interest," the agency's mandate in all such decisions. The Transportation Act of 1920, which had assigned the authority to the ICC, had provided for judicial review of "any party at interest." The Court, however, in an opinion written by Justice Brandeis, denied that the six railroads were "parties at interest" as a result of business lost to their competitor. Standing nonetheless was found to rest on the grounds that in creating a monopoly the ICC had denied them *equal treatment* to which their businesses were entitled in the form of full, reasoned consideration by the Commission. In their right to equal treatment the railroads were found to have a "special interest" in the proceedings and could initiate a suit under the provisions of the Commerce Court Act that provide that any party to a proceeding may become party to "any suit wherein is involved the validity of such order."[23]

In *Alexander Sprunt* v. *United States*, however, where equal treatment was not at issue, plaintiffs were denied standing. Here the ICC had ordered a railroad to stop exacting certain charges which had benefited cotton-compressing companies that were located right on the wharves. Alexander Sprunt and Son and several other waterfront companies claimed they were entitled to standing to test the validity of the Commission's orders under the same provisions of the Commerce Court Act relied upon in *Chicago Junction*. But the Court ruled they had suffered no legal wrong, since by its order the ICC had precisely accorded equal treatment to all companies.[24] Note that the interest found in the competitors under the Commerce Court Act in *Chicago Junction* does not extend to the competitors in *Sprunt* who claimed standing under the same act. The interest is not substantively defined: it does not derive from anything the plaintiffs are, or do, or value, or even how they are affected by the Commission's orders. Brandeis punctiliously hinges his recognition of interest on whether the administrator followed procedures appropriate to the effects that the actions would have on the relevant parties.

For a final case under (if unsteadily so) the older rules, *FCC* v. *Sanders Brothers Radio Station* shows the vehemence of the Court against basing standing on a substantive definition of interest, even while actually according the right of suit to a plaintiff because of the values he seeks to defend. The facts of the case were as follows: the FCC granted a license for a radio station to the *Times-Herald*, a newspaper in Dubuque, Iowa, to operate a radio station there. This was done over the protests of Sanders, who for years had operated a station just across the Mississippi River, and who claimed that there was not enough advertising or talent to support two competing stations and that his was already providing the community with adequate service. Sanders appealed under Section 402(b) of the Communications Act which authorizes judicial review to "persons aggrieved or whose interests are adversely affected by any decision of the Commission granting or refusing . . . [an] application." After reviewing the Communications Act, the Court did recognize Sanders's standing on

[21] 310 US 113 (1940), 125, 127.

[22] See Albert, pp. 445–47.

[23] 264 US 258 (1924), 267.

[24] 281 US 249 (1930). For the view that the decision may have overlooked Sprunt's common law rights see Jaffe, *Judicial Control*, pp. 511–12.

the basis that Congress "must have had some purpose" in enacting the section and may perhaps have thought that only someone who had suffered a financial injury would have the incentive to bring illegal actions of the FCC to court.

Sanders had suffered such a financial injury, but the Court also insisted that no substantive interest of Sanders was at issue: "resulting economic injury to a rival station is not, in and of itself, and apart from considerations of public convenience and necessity, an element the [FCC] must weigh, and as to which it must make findings. . . . The Act contains no express command that in passing upon an application the Commission must consider the effect of competition with an existing station." Sanders was not legally a person "aggrieved" according to the statute and could not have been granted standing on that ground.[25] The implications of the disclaimer were underlined in a dissent by Justice Douglas in a follow-up case, *Scripps-Howard* v. *FCC*, where standing was found according to similar reasoning: Douglas argued that he did not see how a statute could allow a person to sue if Congress did not create "an individual substantive right to be free of competition."[26]

From the perspective of our broader concerns, then, it may be seen that the old rules of standing permitted the juxtaposition of conflicting interests only under the most stinting conditions. Unaided by the courts, the smaller railroads had no recourse against the New York Central; the dockside cotton compressors had none against the railroads; Sanders had none against the *Times-Herald* (except, of course, by way of the marketplace, which theoretically is a recourse for all social groups). And in failing to find a "legal wrong" in competition, courts refused to recognize an interest that could be asserted in litigation. The question is moot whether, had judges been faced with the kind of groups that present themselves for standing today, the doctrine itself might have been different. What is apparent is that given an analogous set of agency actions and statutes, environmentalists, consumers, and others could not have confronted railroads and foreign steel companies and corporate farmers without considerable doctrinal modification.[27]

The "Zone of Interests"

Had the new doctrine of standing merely recognized a longer list of "legal wrongs" through, say, an expanded view of common law rights, it would have changed the frequency but not the nature of the court's participation in group conflict. But in resting standing on a judicially inferred protected zone, one which is forthrightly arguable and vague in its contours, present rules have loosened the interest asserted from any statutory or constitutional moorings. While it is quite true, as students of the court have argued, that these changes have considerably increased judicial discretion, a no less important effect is allowance for an exercise of group discretion not possible under previous rulings.

The decisive break in the legalistic reasoning discussed above came with two decisions in 1970, *Association of Data Processing Service Organizations* v. *Camp* and *Barlow* v. *Collins*.[28] The emphasis on "legal wrong" had persisted straight through the lower court opinions in the cases in which it was to be overthrown. *Data Processing* concerned a dispute between a group of sellers of data processing services and some national banks. The banks had been authorized by the Comptroller of the Currency, Camp, to provide data services also. The legal issue presented was whether the data processors could, as competitors, challenge this authorization. The district court had said no, citing the long line of cases which held that plaintiffs whose only injury was loss from competition had no standing. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, reciting Frankfurter's litany of legal rights in *Tennessee Electric*.

The Supreme Court, however, disagreed. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, makes the starting point Article III of the Constitution, quoting an earlier opinion that "standing is related only to whether the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution." He then sets out a two-pronged test: whether the plaintiff alleges "injury in fact, economic or otherwise"; and whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question."[29] If an interest is arguably within the zone, then Section 10(a) of the Administrative Procedures Act, which grants standing to a person "aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute," provides for review.[30]

[25] 309 US 470 (1940)) 473, 477.

[26] 316 US 4 (1942), 20.

[27] For an example of a case decided shortly before the liberalization of standing, where plaintiffs were found not to "have any real interests" in the litigation under way, see South Hill Neighborhood Association, Inc. *v.* Romney, 421 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1969).

[28] 397 US 150 (1970) and 397 US 159 (1970).

[29] 397 US 150, 151, 152.

[30] Section 10(a) of the Administrative Procedures Act provides: "Except to the extent that (1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law . . . a person suffering legal wrong because of agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." Section 10(c) provides: "Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review."

Douglas proceeds to demonstrate that the data processors have suffered an injury, and that such a competitive interest is arguably within the required zone. He finds this by citing an opinion by the circuit court in *another* case, one concerning travel agents, that Section 4 of the Bank Service Corporation Act of 1962—*not* the Act under which the Comptroller had acted and which concerned yet a different kind of potential bank competition—"had a broader purpose . . . it was also a response to the fears expressed by a few senators that without such a prohibition, the bill would have enabled 'banks to engage in a nonbanking activity'."[31] The Court left the precise applicability of Section 4, the test of "legal interest," for the merits, but regarded this history to satisfy the test of "arguably." The plaintiff was found to have standing.

The *Barlow* case, decided on the same day, arose from conflict between tenant farmers and their landlords. Prior to an amended regulation issued by the Secretary of Agriculture, tenant farmers had been permitted to assign their payments as security to obtain financing for all their needs in making a crop except the rent for their farm land. The new regulation broadened their freedom, allowing them to assign their payments for rent. The tenant farmers sued to hold the amended regulation invalid and sought an injunction prohibiting federal officials to permit such assignments. Barlow and the others claimed they suffered injury in the following way: each landlord now required that his tenants assign to him all payments in advance as a condition for the lease to work the land. With their one source of collateral now gone, the tenant farmers were forced to obtain financing for their groceries, tools, clothes, and so on from their landlords at excessively high prices and interest rates. They had become "captive consumers." The question remained, however, whether the Court would find this injury as damaging to a *protected* interest, particularly since the provision's ostensible intention was to broaden the tenants' financial options rather than to restrict them.

The Supreme Court did find them within the "zone" as set forth in *Data Processing*. Since the legislative history of Congress's provisions for "making a crop" was too sparse to base a protected right, various remarks by legislators indicating "congressional concern for the farmers' welfare" were added to other expressions of protections for the "interests of tenant farmers" in the Food and Agricultural Act of 1965 and the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act of 1935. The farmers were aggrieved parties under the Administrative Procedures Act. Nothing was found to preclude judicial review, and standing was granted.

These two cases illustrate the turn away from a legalistic view to one recognizing the plaintiff's substantive interests independent of specific administrative illegality. First, the invocation in *Data Processing* of the case or controversy clause of Article III is an indication of new functions which standing is expected to provide the court. This is a development of the opinion in *Baker* v. *Carr* where the Court said that the "gist of standing" hinges on whether "the appellants alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for the illumination of difficult constitutional questions."[32] This function, of course, rests for its performance on the plaintiff and his alleged injuries, and not on the limits of the administrator's authority.

Second, the very notion of a protected zone strongly suggests that there is a range of *a priori* interests which fall into this privileged area, and there exist complementary categories of prospective plaintiffs. The Court's opinion in *Data Processing*, when discussing not the basis for standing but whether review had been precluded, indirectly pointed to the presumption of this range in an expression most suggestive of the substantive view of interest: "The Acts do not in terms protect a specified group. But their general policy is apparent; and those whose interests are directly affected by a broad or narrow interpretation of the Acts are easily identifiable."[33] This is a definite shift from placing the burden of proof on a plaintiff to show a "legal wrong." The elusiveness of the boundaries of this zone prompted Justice Brennan, joined by Justice White, to argue concurring in *Barlow* that "injury in fact" should be the only test.[34]

Third, the blurry idea of a zone is accompanied by an equally vague indication of the contours of the interests protected, and thus of the categories of plaintiffs. In cases concerning competitors, there is no practical distinction to be made between the competitors as "persons aggrieved" and the business losses they had suffered; the concept of "competitor" is relatively indicative of the plaintiff's activities, of the nature of his injury, and of the relationship between the parties; as opposed to, say, the category of "businessman." In *Barlow*, however, the Court finds legislative concern for "the interests of farmers" and "the tenants wel-

[31] 397 US 150 (1970), 156. The case Douglas cited was Arnold Tours Inc. *v.* Camp, 400 US 45 (1970).

[32] 369 US 186 (1962), 204.

[33] 397 US 150 (1970), 157.

[34] 397 US 159 (1970), 177. For the view that the "zone of interests" test is meaningless in practice, see Sedler, pp. 486 and 511.

fare," and says nothing of the *particular* activities or values injured which the plaintiff seeks to protect—a long way from the hair-splitting in the ICC cases, whether the competitor was one who had previously been advantaged and was now on an even footing, or one who was previously even and now disadvantaged.

The rather cavalier use of legislative materials to establish Congress's protective intention is quite the opposite from the demand of the reluctant court seeking some explicit authorization or constitutional duty before passing on actions of the other branches. It might be argued that under the earlier doctrine courts did not search hard enough; in the recent cases they have exerted themselves far in the opposite direction to accommodate the values of plaintiffs. This freewheeling approach has continued in subsequent cases; the bounds of "arguably" are nowhere specified.[35] Moreover, the reliance on the Administrative Procedures Act has lifted the burden of finding explicit provisions for judicial review among the snippets of legislators' remarks, judges' opinions, and provisions from other, related-in-varied-degree statutes which arguably add up to legislative intent.[36]

While there can be no question of the judicial activism involved, the court's behavior shows considerable political realism. For if the search for explicitness endorsed the practice of interest segregation, the new generous approach draws on another congressional tendency—that of legislators to raise a rhetorical umbrella above as many beneficiaries as possible. The course of virtually any bill through Congress will elicit on various sides remarks about who will benefit, questions of concern about whether this or that interest will be hurt, assurances that there is no such intention and in fact the contrary is the case, and so on. Similarly, while statutes may be vague and perfunctory on the topic of who shall have standing, they are noticeably silent about those specifically *not* authorized.

The same may be said about the elusive zone and its crudely suggested categories of plaintiffs. Quite apart from the difficulties in cataloguing injuries of the type courts are now willing to recognize, about which I will say more below, and the fact that Congress itself speaks in shorthand, the flexible approach to legislative purpose accords with certain realities of how laws are made. Professor Kenneth Davis, discussing the opinion in *Barlow*, has written that finding protection for "the welfare of tenant farmers" was "a verbal infelicity of no consequence"; the Court, he says, should have referred to the particular interests the farmers had asserted.[37] While Davis's argument may be valid in terms of a coherent doctrine of standing, the Court's own phrasing is probably closer to reality. Undoubtedly many lawmakers acted with nothing more specific than a diffuse concern about tenant farmers and the hope that their long status of quasi-serfdom be improved or at least not made worse. In general, when legislation is drafted, compromised, adjusted at the behest or on behalf of groups—the Sierra Club, social security recipients, chambers of commerce or whoever—it is with an eye to their members as constituents and contributors rather than to the exact "injuries" the bill may be warding off.

Similarly, judges today have a more realistic understanding of the limits of unchecked administrative processes than judges of only a generation ago. In fact, a pronounced disenchantment with the federal agencies runs the extent of the Supreme Court's ideological spectrum. Thus Justice Douglas has written that "they are notoriously under the control of powerful interests who manipulate them through advisory committees, or friendly working relations, or who have that natural affinity with the agency which in time develops between the regulator and the regulated."[38] And, shortly before going to the Court, Justice Burger, typically more circumspect, wrote of an administrative hearing that he himself had ordered while still a U.S. Appeals Judge, chiding the agency in question for "a curious neutrality-in-favor-of-the-licensee. . . . To borrow a phrase from the Examiner, his response manifests a 'glaring weakness' in his grasp of the functions and purpose of the hearing and the public duties of the Commission. . . ."[39] In this sense, the liberalized rules of standing might be considered to reassert Congress's purposes as embodied in the agencies' organic acts.[40]

Realism notwithstanding, however, the effect of the willingness to infer a protected zone of indis-

[35] In Investment Company Institute *v.* Camp, 401 US 617 (1971), the Court found that the mutual funds suffered an injury "indistinguishable" from that of bank service companies in *Data Processing* without any study or discussion of the specific legislation whatever.

[36] Professor Davis has long advocated the view that the APA refers to any persons "adversely affected" by agency action and not merely those "aggrieved" within the meaning of a relevant statute providing review. See Davis, pp. 436–37. For the view that the court has effectively obliterated the distinction between statutory and non-statutory review see Albert, p. 451.

[37] Davis, p. 425.

[38] Dissent in Sierra Club *v.* Morton, 405 US 727 (1972), 745.

[39] Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ *v.* F.C.C., 425 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1969) 547–48.

[40] For a recent example see the remarks of Judge Skelly Wright: "Our duty, in short, is to see that important legislative purposes, heralded in the halls of Congress, are not lost or misdirected in the vast hallways of the federal bureaucracy." Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. *v.* Atomic Energy Commission, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).

tinct dimensions—dimensions not only shifting from case to case but purposely uncertain—is to pass the job of defining the interest largely into the plaintiff's hands. Thus in *Barlow*, as has been seen, the Court finds protection for the asserted "interests of farmers," who claim they must now pay more to finance their planting. Data processors seeking to bar competition are found to be within a zone conjured to embrace competitive interests of (among others) banks, travel agents, mutual funds, and public accountants, deriving its protective force from acts other than the one whose administration was being contested.

Such a doctrine obviously does more than provide plaintiffs with a vigorous role in framing the issues, a role already sanctioned by the case and controversy limitation on federal litigation. More importantly, in its present form at least, the notion of the protected zone vastly extends the possibilities of the lawsuit as an interest group strategy. This means a resort to the courts not only to protect ingeniously construed common law and constitutional rights, but as a sustained and even preferable alternative to legislation in circumstances where legislation may be politically or technically unfeasible, or both. Official actions taken and sanctions given under the authority of laws which, in their historical timing and immediate purpose, could never have contemplated the existence, yet alone the protection, of interests that come before the bar as injured parties might now be challenged as a means of disputing an endless variety of private projects carried out under public aegis. Although pending congressional intervention, it is still the courts who have ultimate discretion in the matter of standing, the present options available to interest groups would seem to be limited only by the imaginative and financial resources of the groups themselves.

Further, while the general question of judicial policy making is beyond the concerns of this essay, whatever problems it does in fact pose for a democratic society are compounded by the dependence of intervention on group interests who would use the courts in a discretionary manner. If the case and controversy provision already relies heavily on private initiative to determine the circumstances and subject matter of judicial intervention, and environmentalists and consumerists are merely imitating civil rights groups in their legal strategies, then the changes in standing rules have grossly exaggerated these features and opened to their operation a vastly widened scope of administrative decisions and nongovernmental projects behind them.

New Injuries and Their Representation

An important element in the discretion permitted the challenging party is the courts' relaxation of what kind of injury is sufficient to satisfy the test of "injury in fact." This change, moreover, corresponds to the prominence of the organizational plaintiff, not merely in a historical sense, but as a function of a representational logic in the new rules for standing.

The consumers' challenge of the steel companies provided no new problems with respect to injury, nor did the data processors or tenant farmers, since all are of an economic nature which, like damages to health, safety, and other concretely experienced injuries, have long been acknowledged by common law and in statutes. But since 1966, a series of opinions has recognized injuries other than economic or direct physical damage as sufficient grounds for standing, thereby, of course, permitting the legal juxtaposition of a far wider variety of private conflicts. In *Office of Communications of the United Church of Christ* v. *FCC*, it was held that listeners who had suffered abuse through being denied a fair and balanced presentation of controversial issues had standing to challenge the renewal of a television license.[41] Prior to this decision, only electrical interference and, in the special case of *Sanders*, economic loss had been acceptable in granting standing under the Federal Communications Act. In *Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference* v. *FPC*, with the assist of the Federal Power Act's expressed concern for "other beneficial uses, including recreational purposes," the court recognized injuries to the aesthetic and conservationist values of the plaintiffs.[42]

An environmental injury was the basis of a claim for standing for the first time in a Supreme Court case in *Sierra Club* v. *Morton*. The Sierra Club attempted to stop Walt Disney Enterprises from building a ski and recreation development in the Mineral King Valley of the Sierra Nevada Mountains. The legal presentation of the matter was the Sierra Club's attempt to enjoin the U.S. Forest Service and the Department of Interior from granting the necessary approval and permits, which the Sierra Club charged would be in violation of several statutes. The Club claimed that it was a party aggrieved, about to endure injuries to its environmental, recreational, and aesthetic values. Although it was to deny standing on other grounds, the Court affirmed that these types of harms "may amount to an 'injury in fact' sufficient to lay the basis for standing. . . ."[43]

The recognition during the last decade of environmental and aesthetic values, as well as the acceptance of the *principle* of noneconomic values, new varieties of which may be expected to confront the courts, implies an investing of rights

[41] 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
[42] 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965).
[43] 405 US 727 (1972), 734.

in certain categories of plaintiffs, rather than a delineation of specific "wrongs" which will be accorded status as injuries for standing. This is the case because these injuries often occur to the intangible values of the plaintiff, rather than to anything which may be observed and measured by others. For standing to be found in such circumstances the plaintiff must solidly establish that he does suffer an injury in fact; "arguably" is applicable only to the zone of interests test. To establish that he does or does not suffer from the claimed aesthetic or emotional stress entails inquiry into the plaintiff himself, his other values, his activities prior to and perhaps surrounding the specific complaint. The court must establish that he is a genuine environmentalist or historical buff, or whatever; and that he falls into or outside of some class of persons who may legally claim the injury.

This is by no means always a straightforward task. For example, Ralph Nader was allowed to challenge an extension of time given an auto manufacturer to comply with safety standards in the National Traffic and Motor Safety Act; the court reasoned that the presence of unsafe autos on the road would injure Nader in his capacity as a crusader for auto safety and as a member of the Safety Advisory Council.[44] Nor is it always a benevolent one. In *Zlotnick* v. *Redevelopment Land Agency*, the district court denied standing to property owners seeking to enjoin condemnation of their land, an act they claimed was illegal because the environmental impact statement required by the National Environmental Policy Act had been inadequately prepared. The court, however, inquiring into their motives, found that their concern for the environment was "at best remote, highly speculative, and ephemeral. They have nothing but their own financial interest to protect, as their continuing efforts to achieve financial settlements emphasize. . . . The Act was not designed to assist individual property owners seeking to enhance payments from the Government when taking by eminent domain threatens."[45] Here, the court considers two substantive interests of the plaintiffs: it finds the financial interest to fall outside of the zone; and the financial interest is then used by the court to demonstrate that the environmental interest, which would fall within the zone, is at best ephemeral and insufficient for injury in fact.

It is at this juncture that organizational plaintiffs perform a valuable judicial function. If judges must distinguish genuine concern, say, for the preservation of a building of historical importance, from a bad faith or spurious suit, membership in a recognized organization is one indicator. Also, organizations with specialized purposes and experience in a given and frequently unfamiliar subject area would seem to meet the need for the sharp presentation of issues which the Court has said is the "gist" of standing.

More fundamental, however, is the role of organizations in litigation by virtue of a representational logic in the present doctrine of standing. I have argued above that the concept of a zone of protected interests implies the existence of classes of plaintiffs to defend them. Seeing a plaintiff as a member of a larger class, of course, is a standard practice in jurisprudence, with the aim being equal treatment and not representation. But when the court infers protection for such abstract and intellectual values as listeners' sensibilities with respect to broadcasting or aesthetic and recreational taste, or the more concrete values such as the desire for air line service in a community and protection from atomic plants,[46] it is obviously looking to the interests of a sector of the citizenry of which the isolated plaintiff must be a representative. In the areas of environment and historical preservation, the plaintiff's injuries are once-removed from injuries to the inanimate object, which perforce places him, in part at least, in the position of protector.[47]

Judges active in the liberalization of standing have said as much, and have gone a step further in suggesting the desirability of plaintiffs to represent protected interests. Justice Stewart for the majority in *Sierra Club*, for example, acknowledges that aesthetic and environmental well-being are "important ingredients of the quality of life in our society . . . and [are] deserving of legal protection through the judicial process"; Justice Douglas eloquently extols the wonders of nature and seeks "legitimate spokesmen for it"; Justice Blackmun reminds the Court that "no man is an Island, intire of itselfe," and seeks plaintiffs to defend the environment with "provable, sincere, dedicated, and established status."[48] In an earlier court of appeals decision Justice Burger has written of "responsible and representative groups . . . found in every community" to contest broadcasting licenses.[49]

Moreover, it may be in the nature of certain noneconomic injuries, and those in which the indi-

[44] Nader *v.* Volpe, 320 F. Supp. 266 (D.C. Cir. 1970).

[45] (D.C. Cir. March 3, 1972) *Environmental Law Reporter*, 2, 20235–36.

[46] See Palisades Citizens Assn. *v.* CAB, 420 F.2d 188 (D.C. Cir. 1969); and Crowther *v.* Seaborg, 312 F. Supp. 1205 (D. Colo. 1970).

[47] On the inadequacy, therefore, of present standing doctrine to fully protect the environment see Christopher D. Stone, "Should Trees Have Standing—Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects," *Southern California Law Review*, 45 (Spring, 1972), 450–501.

[48] 405 US 727 (1972), 757–58, 734, 745, 760.

[49] Office of Communications of the United Church of Christ *v.* F.C.C., 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966), 1005.

vidual economic injury is trivial, that the incentive for any one individual plaintiff to bear the costs of litigation is quite low, and organizational support is essential for the interest to have a hearing. This is especially true if it be considered desirable that the protected interest be defended on a non-sporadic basis, not dependent on the time or wealth of prospective plaintiffs. Also, it may even be the case that injuries to the environment, consumer interests, or others are not felt or clearly understood without the pooling of experience offered by organizations.

Obviously, the organizational plaintiff is not unique to changes in the law of standing. Under the old rules, the federal courts had occasionally allowed organizations to sue on behalf of members who suffered judicially familiar injuries, such as economic harms or racial discrimination;[50] usually, however, unions and trade associations merely joined along in litigation with individual members; and more common in the civil rights area was the so-called test case. But under the new rules, the organization is the *typical* plaintiff. In the course of a spring tide of group activity in society generally, the liberalized approach has enabled numerous environmental, consumer, historical-preservational, and other associations, as well as a wide variety of ad hoc local citizens' groups, to come before the court to do battle with such diverse parties as land developers, lumber companies, and passenger railroads.[51] The bid of these organizations for standing is a continuation of energetic efforts in Congress, the administrative agencies, and the judicial process itself. (It is interesting to note, for example, that the Sierra Club filed an *amicus curiae* brief in *Data Processing*.)

Nor is the court unfamiliar with the problem of representativeness. The degree to which an opinion will affect a number of persons similarly situated is a consideration, for example, in the Supreme Court's decision to hear a case; the question of ripeness implies that there are more or less propitious times for settlement of an issue which is of broader concern than just to the particular plaintiff at hand. In contemporary standing cases, however, the plaintiff is not merely representative in the passive sense, but is an advocate of a substantive interest for which the court has inferred a zone of arguable protection—an advocate, as I have argued, invested by the new standing rules with wide discretion.

The questions presented to the court which surround the matter of representation are familiar to students of group politics as they occur in other contexts. Here we may briefly mention versions that have arisen in standing cases. There is first of all the question of who is an appropriate spokesman for a public interest. Consider for example the case of *National Helium Corporation* v. *Morton*,[52] where an appeals court granted to a business corporation whose contract to deliver helium to the government had been cancelled, standing to assert the contracting official's violation of the National Environmental Policy Act. The court ruled that the fact that the company was seeking to protect its financial stake did not make it ineligible to represent the public's protected interest in the environment. Similarly, a plaintiff granted standing to dispute federal provisions for the labeling of vitamin content on oleomargarine packages was the manufacturer of a competing fish oil product.[53] In these cases, as in others, the court has avoided the issue of appropriateness of representation by describing the protected interest as a "public" one in which the entire public shares, a formulation about which more will be said presently.

Second, granted that an organization or individual has an established reputation for concern and expertise in a given field, there is the question of whether he may legitimately represent the interested parties considered as a class. In the area of environmental protection, for example, the Sierra Club takes different positions from other environmental groups—Friends of the Earth, the Audubon Society, the Wildlife Federation, and others—on various issues ranging from wildlife protection to energy policy. Or consider a recent case in which the National Welfare Rights Organization was granted standing to contest administrative hearings held under the Social Security Act.[54] The court argued that "the National Organization and the relevant state organization could be expected to serve the common good of all welfare recipients involved," although students of public policy have

[50] Cf. Amalgamated Meat Cutters *v.* Rogers, 186 F. Supp. 114 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Associated Industries, Inc. *v.* Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1943); NAACP *v.* Button, 371 US 415 (1963).

[51] In addition to cases cited elsewhere above, see, for example, West Augusta Historical and Genealogical Society *v.* Urban Renewal Authority (4th Cir., Jan. 22, 1974) *Environmental Law Reporter*, 4, 20229; West Virginia Izaak Walton League *v.* Butz, (N.D. W.Va. Jan 25, 1974), *ibid.*; West Va. Highlands Conservancy *v.* Island Creek Coal Co., 441 F.2d 232 (4th Cir., 1971); and Upper Pecos Assn. *v.* Stans, 328 F. Supp. 332 (D.N. Mex. 1971).

[52] National Helium Corp. *v.* Morton, 455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971).

[53] Reade *v.* Ewing, 205 F.2d 630 (2d Cir. 1953). More recently, see Duke City Lumber Co. *v.* Butz, in which twelve large lumber companies were permitted under provision of the NEPA to defend the "continuation of free competition," an interest protected by the Small Business Act, against the S.B.A.'s small business timber set-aside program. (D.D.C. August 28, 1974) *Environmental Law Reporter*, 5, 20080-86.

[54] 429 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1970).

found a diversity in interest among welfare recipients and in particular the inadequacy of the N.W.R.O. in representing this diversity.[55]

Again, while these problems of representation are by no means unique to the judicial process, their importance is perhaps heightened when they occur in a forum that supersedes all foregoing legislative and administrative processes. Furthermore, entirely unlike representative suits to protect specific constitutional rights, in standing cases potentially dubious representatives are allowed to litigate disputes on behalf of interests which are protected often only by "arguable" judicial inference and in the definition of which these representatives have played the primary role.

Organizations and the "Public Action"

The strength of representational logic in the present doctrine of standing shows itself nowhere more forcefully than in the Supreme Court's recent attempt to scotch it.

Insofar as organizations have continued their functions and activities on behalf of their members —in which case they perform analogously to class actions in ordinary damage suits—the court has avoided facing the difficulties of representation head on. The moment of truth, as it were, has occurred when, following a line of reasoning leading from the recognition of protection for substantive interests to the desirability that these interests be protected, organizations have claimed standing for themselves, without asserting any injury whatever to its members. In itself, this is not an entirely novel situation. Even under the old rules, the Supreme Court has acknowledged such independent standing when the social reputation and economic status of an organization qua organization is threatened; or when the right at issue—anonymity—would be undermined if members were required to participate; and even under the new rules when the question of standing is simply not raised.[56] The recent plea has been that organizations be allowed to vindicate the violation of some public interest within the protected zone as representatives of the public at large. For example, imagine that Consumers Union made no allegation that its members would be injured by higher domestic prices caused by the steel companies, but based its claim to standing on the argument that the damage was to the principles of free trade, embodied in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, to which the organization had a long-standing public commitment.

Private organizations have received encouragement for this position in courts' greater receptiveness in recent years to the so-called *pro bono* suit or "public action."[57] In a public action the plaintiff sues to protest an illegal or unconstitutional act which affects him no differently from any other person. The alleged shared injury may be trifling, for the interest at issue is that of the public in legal government. Althouth most states have long permitted such suits, the federal courts until a few years ago turned them aside as being outside the constitutional requirement of case or controversy, according to which courts will intervene only to protect rights of private persons and not to pass on the validity of the behavior of the other branches.

The leading case until 1968 was *Frothingham* v. *Mellon*, in which the class of those affected was drawn slightly narrower than the whole public, at the taxpayers. The Court denied Mrs. Frothingham's protest against the expenditure of federal funds to support maternity hospitals on the ground that her interest was "comparatively minute and indeterminate." To have standing the plaintiff must prove "that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally."[58] In other words if the expenditure burdens all taxpayers in the same amount, then no one of them may contest its legality.

This decision was overthrown in *Flast* v. *Cohen*, in which seven taxpayers sued to have the court declare certain federal expenditures to assist instruction in religious schools as being both unconstitutional and unauthorized by statute. Ignoring the matter of the statute altogether and thus the question of who was authorized to initiate review under its provisions, the Court ruled that Flast and the others could challenge the expenditures because it violated specific limitations in the First Amendment on the spending powers of Congress. Significantly, the Court did not indicate what the injury incurred had been—religious, economic, or both—referring instead to the plaintiff's personal "stake" in the outcome; it emphasized only that there must be a "logical nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought to be ad-

[55] See Daniel P. Moynihan, *The Politics of a Guaranteed Income* (New York: Random House, 1973), pp. 329 ff.

[56] Cf. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee *v.* McGrath, 341 US 123 (1951); NAACP *v.* Alabama, 357 US 449 (1958); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park *v.* Volpe, 401 US 402 (1971).

[57] See Jaffe, "The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions." Jaffe has been the leading scholarly proponent of the public action, and his views are often cited in court opinions. Professor Davis has been the leading and apparently victorious opponent, arguing for injury as a basic element in standing. See Davis, *Administrative Law Text*, pp. 437–39. A student may follow the dialogue between these two through their respective journal articles over the last decade and thereby get an excellent view of the legal issues under debate inside the courts.

[58] 262 US 447 (1923), 487.

judicated."[59] Here the Flast opinion dovetails with changes in standing rules in private actions by focusing on the *substantive* base of the plaintiff's attack. Identifying a violation of the constiutional limitation on the taxing and spending power as the "claim," the "logical" challenger is the taxpayer. Thus, for example, in two recent cases, the Court found that plaintiffs' standing as taxpayers does not logically entitle them to question Congress's failures with respect to the CIA or the Reserve status of Congressmen[60]—though it must be presumed that some other status might.

The doctrine that an interest protected by a statute may best or at least reasonably be asserted by private plaintiffs who nevertheless act not for themselves but for the public is present in the *Sanders* case discussed earlier. Firm in its denial that as a broadcaster Sanders suffered no legal injury through the licensing of his competitor, the Court nonetheless found Sanders to have standing as a "person aggrieved," arguing that otherwise Congress's provisions for judicial review would have no substantial effect.[61] A few years later in another broadcast licensing case, *Scripps-Howard*, the Court, citing *Sanders*, likewise recognized standing saying: "The Communications Act of 1934 did not create new private rights. The purpose of the Act was to protect the public interest in communications. . . . These private litigants have standing only as representatives of the public interest."[62] And in *Associated Industries* v. *Ickes* Judge Frank throught he was following this lead when he found standing for coal companies as part of the consuming public at large, characterizing such a plaintiff as a "private Attorney General."[63] But the impact of *Sanders* and *Scripps-Howard* was limited, perhaps because in these cases the courts had been less anxious to enfranchise the listening public than about giving any tinge of property rights to the holders of radio licenses.[64]

The explicit severance here, as it later would be in *Flast*, of the injury-in-fact test from the substantive interest to be protected, served as precedents in group conflicts in lower courts prior to the *Sierra Club* decision. For example, in *Scenic Hudson*, an association of several nonprofit conservation organizations sought to prevent the construction by Consolidated Edison of a hydroelectric power plant authorized by the Federal Power Commission. The court rejected an argument that since the plaintiffs made no claim to any personal economic injury resulting from the Commission's action they therefore lacked standing. Pointing to the statute which specified that the Commission must look to "other beneficial uses, including recreational purposes, in the licensing," it held that "[i]n order to insure that the Federal Power Commission will adequately protect the public interest in the aesthetic, conservational and recreational aspects of power development, those who by their activities and conduct have exhibited a special interest in such areas, must be held to be included in the class of 'aggrieved' parties. . . ."[65] Similarly, in *Office of Communications of the United Church of Christ* the court allowed a local church, a church communications office and two individuals to challenge a television license as "responsible representatives" of the listening public.[66] And in *Environmental Defense Fund* v. *Hardin*, a number of organizations, including the National Audubon Society, the Sierra Club, the Izaak Walton League and others, were seen to have standing according to the reasoning that a "demonstrated interest in protecting the environment from pesticide pollution was sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact test."[67]

When, however, the question of organizational standing independent of injuries to specific members came to a head in *Sierra Club* v. *Morton*, the Supreme Court balked. The error in the plantiff's argument, it said, was the theory that the "public action" constituted a separate doctrine of standing. In the Court's interpretation, injury in fact had been a requirement in the lower court cases: "most, if not all," had at least one party to the proceeding who claimed an individualized injury. But the Sierra Club indicated a "mere 'interest in the problem'," asking the court "to authorize judicial review at the behest of organizations or individuals who seek to do no more than indicate their own value preferences through the judicial process."[68]

The Court had a point in noticing an economic injury to Mr. Sanders and, for example, to plain-

[59] 392 US 83 (1968), 99, 102.

[60] U.S. *v.* Richardson, 94 US 2940 (1974); and Schlesinger *v.* Reservists Committee, 94 US 2925 (1974).

[61] See above, p. 8.

[62] 316 US 4, 14.

[63] 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1943), 704.

[64] But see International Union of Electrical Workers *v.* U.S., 280 F.2d 645 (D.C. Cir. 1960), where a group of labor unions were granted standing as aggrieved parties to appeal a decision of the Atomic Energy Commission to construct a nuclear reactor on the grounds that it endangered the safety of an area where union members as well as others lived, and thus the economic interests of both unions and members.

See also Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. *v.* Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970) to the effect that doubts of standing for bidders for government contracts should be resolved in favor of standing; bidders, while they lack a protected private interest, may litigate the public interest in contracting procedures.

[65] 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), 614, 616.

[66] 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).

[67] 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970), 1097.

[68] 405 US 727 (1972), 739, 740.

tiffs residing along the Hudson River; but the argument that standing was based on that injury and only in such circumstances might the person argue the public interest seems contrary to the thrust of those earlier opinions, which, decided under the "legal wrong" theory, were firm precisely in the attitude that the plaintiffs suffered no judicially cognizable injury. At any rate, the opinion in *Sierra Club* refrained from reaching the second prong of the *Data Processing* test, the zone of interests. In so refraining it deemphasized the *substantive* basis for the organization's appeal, the existence of arguable legislative intent that the environment be protected; thus it avoided the crux of the matter—why this legislative intent cannot be accomplished by willing and able groups sufficiently concerned to represent the public in bringing an offending action to litigation. Instead the court offered as a reason for its insistence on injury that otherwise it would have no basis for disallowing any other group, no matter how small or short lived, or any individual citizen with "the same bona fide special interest" to press his values in a lawsuit.[69] This of course is not an argument against representation, but merely a device for making representation manageable.

The artificiality of the Court's approach is evident in a remarkable case, *U.S.* v. *Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures* (*SCRAP*). SCRAP, an unincorporated organization of five members, along with several other environmental organizations, asked that railroads be restrained from collecting a surcharge which, according to SCRAP, the ICC had authorized without the detailed environmental impact statement required by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. It claimed to be a party aggrieved in the meaning of Section 10 of the APA by virtue of the fact that members, as campers, hikers, fishers and sightseers, used the forests, rivers, mountains and other natural resources in the Washington, D.C. area; and they were injured by the surcharge, which would make recyclable materials more expensive to transport, thus causing further consumption of trees and other resources, resulting in more depletion and pollution of the environment, some of this possibly in the Washington, D.C. area. The Court found that SCRAP had standing, considering that its members "alleged a specific and perceptible harm that distinguished them from other citizens who had not used the natural resources that were claimed to be protected," and therein finding the necessary "injury in fact."[70]

It might be argued that the emphasis, however awkward, on the importance of "injury in fact" has reaffirmed a conception of judicial intervention primarily to protect individual rights, as opposed to acceding to individuals or organizations who, as the Court has put it, "seek to do more than vindicate their own value preferences through the judicial process."[71] But the limited intervention model has been traditionally associated with the protection of minority rights against legislative implementation of majority will; in the cases at hand, however, the plaintiff, as a representative of interests which the Court itself acknowledges to be "important ingredients of the quality of life" deserving of judicial protection, seeks to restrain administrative endorsement of minority—in particular corporate business—privileges. In other words, by explicitly rejecting the concept of a "legal wrong," and resting standing on a generous understanding of protected substantive interest, the Court has not substantially changed the direction or checked the momentum of its course.

SCRAP indicates the sophistry of the effort to designate interests of the kind that appear here in terms of private injury. As for injury "in fact," it is difficult not to agree with the dissent of Justice White when he deemed it "remote, speculative and insubstantial."[72] Moreover, the formulation of personal injury forces a misrepresentation of the plaintiff's actual experience of the offending action: the injury is intolerable to him not only or even mainly because it infringes on his camping and sightseeing, but because it may deprive present and, perhaps even more important, future members of the public from enjoying these natural resources.

Sierra Club might have proved to be a setback of sorts, as in a case decided shortly afterwards where a lower court refused to allow an organization to challenge the construction of an industrial park because its members preferred open space to industry.[73] But the subsequent trivialization of the injury test in *SCRAP* suggests that the real challenge now is to ingenuity in legal drafting, by which, for the time being, organizations must continue to play the standing game according to the artificial rules. Thus, in a brief for a suit brought to prevent farmers from bringing ethylene-gassed tomatoes to market, Consumers Union denies the allegation by the Department of Agriculture that they represent only "the public at large": its members are purchasers and eaters of tomatoes who have been injured by eating tomatoes of high

[69] 405 US 727 (1972), 741.
[70] 412 US 669 (1973), 689.
[71] 405 US 727 (1972), 740. And see Justice Brennan's dissent in *Barlow*, especially 176–78.
[72] 412 US 669 (1973), 723.
[73] Coalition for the Environment *v.* Linclay Development Corp. 347 F. Supp. 634 (E.D.Mo. 1972). The Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed and reversed, acknowledging the "aesthetic and psychological benefit" of viewing the open space as one among other valid allegations for standing (8th Cir. July 31, 1974) *Environmental Law Reporter*, 4, 20717.

price, low quality, and of lesser nutritional value.[74]

The strain in such an argument is apparent, a strain not only to the pleadings but to the integrity of the courts' own purposes in the standing test. If there is a legitimate reason to limit judicial intervention to private wrongs, then these cases stretch the point to vacuity. If the aim is to protect substantive interests affected by the administrative action in question, then the insistence on personal injury, as opposed to groups who may adequately sharpen the controversy, has so far served only to cloud the real issues of discretion and representativeness that remain.

Nor does other evidence indicate that the spirit of the public action has been exorcized from the federal bench. On the contrary, since *Sierra Club* courts have put forth what might be referred to as the "vitality" theory. In *Trafficante* v. *Metropolitan Life Insurance Company* white tenants were allowed to sue their landlord for violations of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 on their own behalf and "also as private attorney general" because "[w]e can give vitality to [the section of the Act granting administrative review to injured parties] only by a generous construction which gives standing to sue to all in the same housing unit who are injured by racial discrimination in . . . facilities under the auspices of H.U.D."[75] In *Potomac Passengers' Association* v. *Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad*, the relevant statute, the Amtrak Act, provides standing only for the Attorney General and employees and their representatives. But the court of appeals allowed passengers to challenge the discontinuation of certain trains, on the grounds that allowing additional parties standing "is not only fully consistent with but is also necessary to achieve [Congress'] objective."[76] These recent decisions are not inconsistent with the requirement of injury in fact, but they demonstrate judges' continuing flexibility in installing injured parties as representatives of the general public.

Standing and the Rule of Law

The changes in the law of standing have dealt a serious blow to the theory that the Supreme Court might bring contemporary public policy under the Rule of Law.[77] While there have been some arguably advantageous political effects, the diminution of excessive delegations of legislative power and the formulation of clear and fixed rules are not among them.

The positive results of the new rules of standing, and some limitations, may be examined in light of a concrete example. *Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee* v. *A.E.C.* concerned a dispute between an environmental group, Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee, and the Baltimore Gas and Electric Company, over the latter's construction of a nuclear power plant on Chesapeake Bay in Maryland. Granting the plaintiff standing, the court found that in authorizing the plant the A.E.C. had violated the provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act in a number of ways, particularly by the reliance on other federal agencies' standards of water quality in evaluating pollution that might be caused by the facility, and by refusing to halt construction pending completion of environmental impact studies (non-binding on the final decision) required for operations. The court ordered the A.E.C. to itself balance environmental factors, the public's power requirements, and the costs and technology of supply; and to suspend construction so that alterations in the design of the plant could be made if desirable to implement findings of the environmental impact study.[78]

From the straightforward viewpoint of social power, the effect of standing is obvious. Quite apart from the actual outcome on the merits, the ability of an environmental group to assert its interest against the disposition of the company represents an important redistribution of discretion between the parties. No claims need be made for the internal procedures of organizational life or the equality of access to resources needed for litigation to note the essentially democratic direction of these changes. In this sense also, the general looseness in the doctrine and the failure of the court to establish criteria of representation contribute to the adaptability and openness of the adjudicatory forum and may be regarded as beneficial.

Similarly, from the perspective of public policy, the court, by means of its own juxtaposition of interests, then proceeds directly to countermand the agency rule of segregation, ordering that the A.E.C. itself consider competing interests against one another, and thereby filling a vagueness in the NEPA in this regard. Here, as in recent standing

[74] "Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss," Consumers Union, Inc. *v.* Butz, Civil Action No. 2142–72, mimeo, pp. 8–9. Also see Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. *v.* Environmental Protection Agency (9th Cir. November 11, 1974), *Environmental Law Reporter*, 5, 20032–37, where the right to challenge an Arizona air quality statute was found in an individual plaintiff, there being "no doubt, that [he] as a resident of Arizona will suffer injury if compelled to breathe air less pure than that mandated by the Clean Air Act," while, in the same decision, standing was denied under *Sierra Club* to the National Resources Defense Council and the Arizona Nurses' Association, even though both have members residing, and presumably breathing, in Arizona.

[75] 409 US 205 (1972), 368.

[76] 475 F.2d 325 (D.C. Cir. 1973), 337.

[77] A recent proponent has been Professor Lowi. See his *The End of Liberalism*, Chap. 10, and *The Politics of Disorder* (New York: Basic Books, 1971), pp. 58–61 and 180–85.

[78] 449 F.2d 1109 (1971).

decisions generally, the court has harnessed the rhetoric of the "public interest"—in this case the public's power requirements—to a challenge rather than a defense of entrenched private privilege. And of course, the court's willingness to review the A.E.C.'s permit to Baltimore Gas and Electric is itself a desirable check against arbitrary use of administrative authority.

The final action in this sequence of events, however, occurred when Congress, in direct response to the court's decision, explicitly authorized the A.E.C. to issue temporary permits to allow power plants to proceed in their construction and operation while the more elaborate court-ordered (still nonbinding) impact studies were underway. This was done in consideration of, among other things, a national power shortage thought to be of crisis proportions. While one may disagree with the result on value grounds, it was at least achieved by a conscious choice among competing interests, one open to public scrutiny and reversible by normal political means, and one preferable to the A.E.C.'s independent decision which would have prevailed without litigation.

What was not finally accomplished, however, was a retraction of the authority delegated by Congress to the A.E.C. Just the opposite is the case: Congress decided to restore the discretion entrusted to the agency to the level prior to the court's decision. Moreover, had the court's decision stood, it might justly have been accused (or credited, depending on one's attitude) of legislating in Congress's stead. Such decisions—and in recent cases they have ranged from finding legislative protection for far-flung interests at the standing stage to arcane determinations on the merits like, for example, whether a given discontinued railway run is actually a "commuter" or an "intercity" service[79]—are useful and necessary to the administrative process, but are something quite other than the finding that a given delegation of authority by Congress, abhorrent in its vagueness to the Rule of Law, is unconstitutional.

Moreover, there is diminishing likelihood that the Supreme Court will be asked to declare agency authority unconstitutional, at least not at the behest of the new groups for whom it has found standing, for the good reason that it is only the pseudo-public status accorded private decision making which permits the challenger to put forth his own interest in opposition. If there remains an incentive for anyone to seek new and clarified legislation—assuming for purposes of discussion the dubious proposition that it is possible to lay down fixed and clear rules for the multitude of enterprises that modern government brings within its purview—it may finally come from producer interests against an administrative system that has outlived its usefulness.

Enough has been said earlier about the lack of criteria in courts' treatment of legislative intent and injury in fact—sacrifices to the worthy judicial aim of providing a hearing for parties claiming to be adversely affected by government-endorsed actions, but not on that account any indication of an attachment to fixed rules, especially from the point of view of the defendant corporate interests. Perhaps a more fruitful question than whether the Supreme Court will restore the administrative process to the Rule of Law, is what effect its involvement in group conflicts through changes in standing may have on the viability of the courts to perform certain indispensable social functions, in particular as guardians of certain legal principles not considered to be subject to the push and pull of competing groups. Put somewhat differently, what difference does it make that deference to private initiative and the puzzles of authenticity in voices claiming to speak for diverse highly sanctified purposes which are so familiar in other policy-making contexts now occur with regularity in the judicial branch?

Perhaps the initial observation to be made is that the process is infused with false pretenses. I have already discussed misrepresentation of the plaintiff's grievance. But an even more fundamental false pretense is the idea that a dispute between, say, the Disney Corporation and the Sierra Club is a legal dispute in any basic sense. There is no question that such conflicts can be readily twisted into a lawsuit and that statutes like the National Environmental Policy Act and a similarly conceived bill for consumers not yet enacted are, if not an outright sanction, then at least a legislative preparation for this twisting.[80] But the distortion means that the outcome of the case, and thereby fragments of public policy, will also depend on a kind of trick: whether an administrator followed to the courts' satisfaction procedures for drawing up a nonbinding report on environmental impact; or, as in the SCRAP case, whether legislation authorizing a particular agency allows courts to issue the type of injunction necessary to remedy the administrator's acknowledged misstep. The issue is not whether judges must employ precision in the enforcement of laws, but whether such precision may take on an aspect of pettifoggery in especially inappropriate contexts.

[79] Potomac Passengers Association *v.* Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad Co., 363 F. Supp. 39 (D.C. Cir., 1973).

[80] Certain groups in the environmental movement have proposed that blanket legislation be passed to establish standing for litigants seeking to protect the environment. See Sax, p. 247 ff. Such a law in Michigan was declared an unconstitutional delegation by the legislature of power to make the law. Roberts *v.* Michigan, *Environmental Law Reporter*, 2, 1612 (1971).

Another fundamental and false pretense lies in the idea that the "public interest" in a given area may be effectively protected in a form of arbitration between two parties. Consider the Consumers Union against the foreign steel companies. Obviously a question such as the level of foreign imports of a basic commodity involves a great number of interests other than those of the plaintiff-consumers and the companies—interests that may not be assumed to acquiesce in the outcome through their nonparticipation in the suit.[81] It might be objected that this is true of virtually all significant questions on which decisions are rendered. But in the recent decisions permitted by the new law of standing, the courts are not passing on plaintiff's constitutional rights which are expected to take priority over all other interests; rather, they must make judgments on a variegated array of far-reaching matters at the initiative of parties whose protected interests or "rights" are based largely on judicial inference.

Perhaps the most troubling issue arises from the question of the appropriateness of representation, a question provoked by the definition of interest in substantive rather than legalistic terms. One example is the attitude shown in some instances for the standing of private property owners. I have already cited the lower court ruling in the *Zlotnick* case, to the effect that a suit motivated by private financial interest disqualified a plaintiff from challenging provisions intended to protect the environment; a similar verdict was rendered, for example, in *Higgenbottam* v. *Barrett* where it was found that the elimination of water pollution near private residences of plaintiffs who objected to the building of an adjacent apartment house was not arguably within the zone of interests protected by the Water Pollution Control Act.[82] In view of the court's ordinary generosity as to legislative purpose, and its expressed endorsement of the idea that persons who suffer a recognizable injury from a government action may "then represent the public interest," these decisions stand out in relief. While no argument need be made that these are the most appropriate plaintiffs (to adopt, for the moment, the logic of representation in standing), it is not clear why individual property owners are any less qualified to defend the "public interest" than are broadcasters, sports-fishermen, and government contractors.[83]

Thirty years ago Friedrich Hayek argued that equality before the law was incompatible with government economic planning.[84] Certainly the piecemeal, ad hoc, privately initiated and privately defined policy which emerges at the end of the adjudicatory process described above is not what Hayek had in mind. On the other hand, the finding of a "public interest" in this or that substantive interest does constitute a sort of negative planning; and it may be predicted that the difficult social choices implied cannot be postponed indefinitely. The decision that private ownership of property does not confer status appropriate to contest offensive actions in court may be a small move in such a direction. Congress has for decades avoided openly facing the question of social priorities and their corresponding group interests, aware of the potential political consequences. It would be ironic if these choices were to be made by the judiciary, whose legitimacy rests uniquely and in large part on its blindness to social distinctions.

Finally, evidence from other countries suggests that the legal recognition of a myriad of "public interests" has led to a contraction of the rights of strictly private litigants.[85] It is difficult to know how seriously to take the Court's rhetoric in this regard; and, for the time being at least, the new doctrine of standing has certainly given rights to private plaintiffs, even if in categorical form, where none would have existed prior to 1970. Moreover, in addition to their involvement in interest conflicts over government-endorsed decisions, the courts have many other functions where they may and do show solicitude for private rights. But in an era of "Spaceship Earth," when Supreme Court Justices themselves warn that "no man is an Island" and advocate standing for natural objects, the protection of certain individual rights may be a particularly urgent task, and one for which the courts may require as full a measure of public support as ever in their history. I think it is this task against which the courts' active involvement in group conflict must eventually be measured.

[81] On the question of allowing participation of additional parties in suits see David L. Shapiro, "Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts, Agencies, and Arbitrators," *Harvard Law Review*, 81 (February, 1968), 721–72. On limited rights for "third party" interests, see Robert A. Sedler, "Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii in the Supreme Court," *Yale Law Journal*, 71 (March, 1962), 599–660, and Albert, p. 465.

[82] 473 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1973). But see Lathan *v.* Volpe, 455 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1971), allowing local residents to contest federal highway funding. For a decision denying a corporation's right on the basis of pecuniary interest to enjoin the construction of a competing facility along a nearby aircraft flight path and thus in alleged violation of the NEPA and the Noise Control Act, see Clinton Community Hospital Corporation *v.* Southern Maryland Medical Center, 374 F. Supp. 450 (D. Md. 1974).

[83] For an indication that "cures" to the discomforts of interest representation could be worse than the disease, and no less familiar to students of American politics, see the suggestions advanced by Scott (who, in any case, thinks that the issue "may be exaggerated"), pp. 680–81.

[84] Friedrich A. von Hayek, *The Road to Serfdom* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944), Ch. VI.

[85] See S. M. Thio, *Locus Standi and Judicial Review* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1971), pp. 9 ff.

The Theory of Political Ambiguity*

BENJAMIN I. PAGE
University of Chicago

Politicians are notoriously reluctant to take clear stands on the issues of the day. In the United States, congressmen often avoid roll-call votes, and bury bills in committee; presidents conceal their positions on legislation with hazy statements and quiet lobbying; candidates make vague appeals to the voters.[1] In other times and places the behavior of politicians seems much the same.

Efforts to account for political ambiguity sometimes assert that politicians are ambiguous because it is in their rational self-interest to be so. By shunning clear stands they avoid offending constituents who hold contrary opinions; ambiguity maximizes support.[2] This notion provides the starting point for a theory of political ambiguity, but only the starting point. A satisfactory account must specify what preferences and decision processes among constituents, and what calculations by politicians, make ambiguity seem an attractive strategy.

Such specification is easiest in the context of election campaigns, where politicans directly seek votes. Similar reasoning, however, would apply to elective officials who must face voters in the future; to bureaucrats; perhaps even to kings and dictators. All must worry about support from the general public or some other constituency.

Lotteries, Expected Utility, and Risk Acceptance

Kenneth Shepsle has developed a theory of campaign ambiguity based on an expected utility model of risky decision making; the possibility that the electorate may be risk acceptant; and the assumption that candidates can take "lottery" stands on the issues.[3]

A *lottery* (sometimes called a "lottery ticket," a "risk," or a "gamble") is a chance that particular outcomes will occur with known probabilities. "One-half chance of winning $100, and one-half chance of winning nothing," for example, is a lottery.

The expected utility model specifies one way in which people might make choices involving lotteries. It stands in contrast to the older expected value (EV) model, which asserts that people treat a lottery just the same as its mathematically expected value: the sum of the objective value of each outcome times its probability of occurring. Thus an EV decision maker would be just as happy to have half a chance of $100 and half a chance of nothing as he would be to get exactly $50.

In the eighteenth century Daniel Bernoulli rejected the EV model as not descriptive of human behavior. He proposed an *expected utility* (EU) model, in which people react to the mathematically expected *utility* of a lottery: the sum of the utility (or subjective value) to them of each possible outcome times its probability of occurring.[4] Utility need not depend linearly on objective value. One might want $100 either more or less than twice as much as he wanted $50. Thus an EU decision maker might judge half a chance of getting $100 to be either more or less desirable than the certainty of getting $50.

An individual is called *risk acceptant* over a range of outcomes if he would always prefer to have a lottery over that range, rather than getting the lottery's expected value with certainty. A risk acceptant individual, for example, would rather have half a chance of $100 and half a chance of nothing, than he would the certainty of $50. He will take chances; he is willing to gamble.

A *risk averse* individual, on the other hand, would rather have the expected value with certainty. He will not take a fair bet. A *risk neutral* person is indifferent between a lottery and its expected value; he acts like an EV decision maker.

Under the EU model, but not necessarily otherwise, risk acceptance is equivalent to increasing marginal utility—that is, to a concave[5] (upward curving) utility function, one in which each additional dollar brings a greater increment of pleasure,

* Much of the research for this article was done under a Social Science Research Council post-doctoral fellowship in economics, at M.I.T. and Harvard. I am grateful to Michael Spence and John Ferejohn for a number of suggestions, and to S.S.R.C. for its support.

[1] See, for example, Stanley Kelley, Jr., *Political Campaigning: Problems in Creating an Informed Electorate* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1960).

[2] Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), pp. 132–39.

[3] Kenneth A. Shepsle, "The Strategy of Ambiguity: Uncertainty and Electoral Competition," *American Political Science Review*, 66 (June, 1972), 555–68.

[4] Daniel Bernoulli, "Specimen Theoriae Novae de Mensura Sortis," 1738, trans. Louise Sommer, *Econometrica*, 22 (Jan., 1954), 23–36.

[5] Shepsle (p. 561) and most economists reverse this usage of convexity and concavity; their reference point is the horizontal axis rather than the top of the graph.

as the total number of dollars increases. Under EU assumptions, risk aversion is equivalent to declining marginal utility: a convex (downward curving) utility function. Risk neutrality is equivalent to a linear utility function. These relations are illustrated in Figure 1.


Shepsle applied this theoretical apparatus to campaign ambiguity by postulating a single issue dimension of the Hotelling-Downs sort.[6] He assumed that all citizens have opinions, expressible as cardinal utility functions over the dimension, which are jointly-single-peaked (i.e., as each individual considers alternatives along the dimension further from his most preferred point, in either direction, his regard for them declines monotonically), and quasi-symmetric (utility declines at the same rate in both directions.) Two candidates take stands on the issue dimension so as to win or maximize votes. All citizens perceive these stands clearly and uniformly and vote on an EU basis for the candidate whose issue stand they prefer.[7]

Shepsle's chief innovation lay in not insisting that candidates take a single stand at one point on the dimension, but in allowing for the possibility that they can take lottery stands.[8] That is, instead of announcing that he favors military spending of $100 billion per year, a candidate might let the voters know that there was half a chance he would spend $150 billion, and half a chance that he would spend only $50 billion.

Shepsle further assumed (p. 560) that the incumbent is restricted to single stands, and the challenger to nondegenerate (non-single stand) lotteries. He then recalled Duncan Black's theorem that the median most preferred point on the issue dimension would win a majority of votes against any other single stand (p. 562). Shepsle showed that if all voters are risk averse over the entire issue dimension, the median point could defeat *any* other stand, single position or lottery (p. 563). Moreover, if a simple majority of voters is risk averse, the challenger has no winning strategy—that is, for any lottery there exists some single stand that can defeat it. (This does not imply that the incumbent always wins. Some new lottery may defeat that single stand, and a new single stand defeat that lottery, and so on; there may be no equilibrium [p. 564].)

Shepsle's key result is his Theorem 3: if a majority of voters is *risk acceptant* in some interval containing the median, *any* lottery over that interval with expectation at the median defeats a single-point stand at the median (pp. 564–5). In simple terms, when most voters want to take a chance on getting exactly what they want, rather than settle for a middling compromise, candidates apparently have an incentive to take lottery stands.

a. Decreasing marginal utility and (*EU*) risk aversion.



b. Increasing marginal utility and (*EU*) risk acceptance.




Figure 1: Utility functions for money.
$L_1 = \frac{1}{2}$ chance of $100, $\frac{1}{2}$ chance of $0. $E(L_1) = \$50$.

If we are willing to equate lottery stands with ambiguity, therefore; if we accept the assumptions of the theory; and if a majority of voters is risk acceptant on many issues, we seem to have an explanation for widespread candidate ambiguity. But there is reason to doubt (1) how strong the prediction of ambiguity is; (2) whether observed ambiguity can be characterized in terms of lottery stands; (3) whether the condition of risk acceptance is in fact met; and (4) whether the underlying model of voter decision making is correct.

Difficulties with the Lottery Theory

(1) *How strong is the prediction?* Shepsle's analysis applies only to *unidimensional* electoral competition, in which voters with jointly-single-peaked preferences decide on the basis of a single issue. We know, however, that preferences are

[6] Harold Hotelling, "Stability in Competition," *Economic Journal*, 39 (March, 1929), 41–57; Downs, pp. 114–41.

[7] Shepsle, pp. 557–58.

[8] Shepsle, p. 559. Zeckhauser earlier introduced political lotteries in the social choice context. Richard Zeckhauser, "Majority Rule with Lotteries on Alternatives," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 83 (Nov., 1969), 696–703.

rarely organized in a simple unidimensional fashion.[9] The predictions do not generally hold in the more realistic multidimensional case.[10]

Even for single-dimensional competition, the lottery theory reaches a definite prediction only by sleight of hand. The supposed attractiveness of a lottery strategy (given risk acceptant voters) rests on its ability to defeat the "best" single position, the median. Only if one candidate is forced to stand at the median, however, does it follow that the other has an incentive to take a lottery stand. Shepsle insures such a result by assuming that the incumbent is constrained to take a single position, and by also assuming—implicitly—that the incumbent must take his stand first and stick with it.

Both assumptions are arbitrary and contrary to observation. To be sure, an incumbent is generally better known than a challenger, and some information about his future actions can presumably be extrapolated from his past performance; but future policies are not uniquely determined by the past. Indeed an incumbent is often able to be *more* ambiguous about future policy than a challenger is, and to delay longer before taking any stand. He can strike an Olympian pose, too busy with affairs of state to descend to the campaign stump; and he can exalt his past record without committing himself on the future.

If the incumbent is not so constrained, the prediction dissolves. Rather than take an early stand at the median, the incumbent would bide his time. If the challenger took a lottery stand, the incumbent might well find a (non-median) single stand that would defeat it. Realizing this, why should the challenger take a lottery stand in the first place?

The fundamental difficulty is that no equilibrium or dominant strategy may exist, and that if a winning strategy does exist it may not—even with risk acceptant voters—be a lottery. Shepsle found that even for the continuous alternatives of his unidimensional issue space, a dominant strategy may or may not exist depending upon the particular electoral profile.[11] Zeckhauser has shown that, for a finite (not necessarily unidimensional) set of alternatives, if any lotteries are able to defeat the median, there *always* exists some single position which can defeat the lotteries; more generally, Fishburn showed (under weak assumptions about individual preferences) that *any* majority winner must be a single position, not a lottery![12]

Under the most plausible circumstances, therefore—even if all voters are risk acceptant—the theory offers no guarantee that any particular lottery strategy is superior to all single positions, and no prediction that vote-seeking candidates will take lottery stands.

(2) *Do candidates take lottery stands?* Without doubt candidates are often ambiguous, but whether their ambiguity is properly characterized in terms of lottery stands is another question.

Of course candidates do not explicitly announce that there is a chance that they will do X, with a probability (say) of .63, but also a chance that they will do Y, with a probability of .37. (Even New York mayoral candidate Norman Mailer seems to have overlooked this strategy. Some bold experimenter may wish to carry on where he left off.)

There are some less outlandish ways in which such information might be conveyed. A candidate might, for example, make statements at different times and places that contradicted each other. He might say 63 per cent of the time that he intended to do X, and 37 per cent of the time that he favored Y, allowing voters to infer the probabilities from relative frequencies.

The available evidence indicates, however, that candidates rarely take contradictory stands. Outright inconsistency is avoided. To the extent that candidates say anything specific about an issue, they tend to say one thing and stick with it, sometimes repeating a verbal formula word for word.[13]

A better case can be made that candidates drop a number of vaguely conflicting hints about what they stand for. From different indications given to different audiences at different times, the average citizen might infer probabilities and form a lottery-like impression of a candidate's stand. This interpretation is supported by candidates' frequent proclamations of what they *don't* stand for—neither coddling criminals nor shooting thieves; neither unlimited pollution nor massive expenditures to stop it; neither unilateral disarmament nor a runaway arms race—as if they were putting boundaries on their ambiguity, within a range of risk acceptance.

At the same time, the lottery characterization misses a central feature of political ambiguity.

[9] Donald E. Stokes, "Spatial Models of Party Competition," *American Political Science Review*, 57 (June, 1963), 368–77; Philip E. Converse, "The Problem of Party Distances in Models of Voting Change," in *The Electoral Process*, ed. M. Kent Jennings and L. Harmon Zeigler (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), pp. 175–207.

[10] Zeckhauser, "Majority Rule"; Peter C. Fishburn, "Lotteries and Social Choice," *Journal of Economic Theory*, 5 (Oct., 1972), 189–207.

[11] Shepsle, pp. 566–67. Richard McKelvey and Jeff Richelson, "Cycles of Risk," *Public Choice*, 18 (Summer, 1974), 41–66, offers some "tracking" theorems for the unidimensional case, which hold regardless of disequilibrium.

[12] Zeckhauser, "Majority Rule"; Fishburn, "Lotteries and Social Choice." Equilibrium is not to be expected among single stands, either; see Charles R. Plott, "A Notion of Equilibrium and its Possibility Under Majority Rule," *American Economic Review*, 57 (Sept., 1967), 787–806.

[13] Benjamin I. Page, "Constancy and Change," in *Choices and Echoes in Presidential Elections*, forthcoming. There are some exceptions, as in the cases of McGovern and Goldwater.

Often candidates do not give *any* emphatic impression of their stands, whether certain or probabilistic; their chief endeavor seems to be to come as close as possible to taking *no* stand. Except when pressed (in televised interviews or press conference question periods) they generally avoid specific issues altogether, and talk about such matters as the need for new leadership, the desirability of peace and prosperity, and the incompetence or wickedness of their opponents. The most specific stands are taken in obscure forums, where special audiences demand them but where they are easily missed by the general public.[14]

The lottery theory does not predict the low emphasis that is put on issue stands. In fact it cannot deal with variations in emphasis at all, since it postulates a single dimension: a single criterion for voting decisions, on which all citizens perceive candidates' stands clearly. At best it can account for only part of ambiguous behavior.[15]

(3) *Are voters risk acceptant?* This simple question leads us into a brief tour of decision theory.[16] The answer seems to be (a) probably not, over the full range of utility functions for most goods; (b) possibly so, with respect to some gambles involving small amounts of money or other goods; (c) probably not, with respect to public policy alternatives. In the course of reaching these conclusions grave doubt is thrown on the EU model of decision making.

Much of economic theory has long assumed declining marginal utility (or its ordinal equivalent for money and other goods: that is, a man is happier to get an additional dollar when he is poor in income than when he is rich. There is little direct evidence on the validity of this assumption, but it is highly plausible. The sixth serving of caviar, or the fourth Lincoln Continental, simply does not give so much pleasure as the first. Moreover, if the contrary were true economic behavior would look rather different than it does, and general equilibrium might not exist.

Most economists who are concerned with risky choice have also accepted the expected utility theory of decision making. For them, the (presumed) existence of declining marginal utility implies that people are risk averse. Even without this reasoning, however, the conclusion is sensible. Many people buy insurance: they are willing to pay a premium to avoid risk of loss, even though (in order that insurance companies can pay operating costs and make a profit) premiums are higher than the expected value of losses. Granting that some insurance is compulsory, those who freely choose to insure reveal themselves to be risk averse.

A second phenomenon, however, casts doubt on the universality of risk aversion. Not only do many people buy insurance; many also gamble. Gambling (absent cheating) seems to be a clear sign of risk acceptance. Players at roulette tables, horse races, and slot machines regularly pay more than the expected value of their winnings, for a chance at a big payoff.

Gambling creates difficulties for declining marginal utility and/or EU theory. Friedman and Savage made an ingenious attempt to account for it, within the expected utility framework, by postulating that most individuals have *both* declining and increasing marginal utilities over different ranges of income: there are two inflection points in utility functions. The very poor, greatly valuing an additional dollar (at a decreasing rate) have declining marginal utility for money, as do the rich—who are more eager to keep the money they have than to get more. In between, however, there is an area of increasing marginal utility, within which people are willing to take a chance in order to get into a higher income group and life style.[17]

Another possible reconciliation of insurance and gambling is that some individuals have increasing marginal utilities and some have decreasing. Or, going beyond EU theory, perhaps people decide on the basis of subjective rather than objective probabilities; maybe gamblers overestimate their chances of winning, and don't realize they are paying more than expected value. Or perhaps risk itself—or playing a game—has utility; maybe people enjoy pulling levers or watching the spinning wheel even if they tend to lose. Perhaps people's reactions to risk reflect personality characteristics. Compulsive gamblers can't resist a last fling, to recoup losses or to punish themselves; the cautious hedge against any risk of loss.

Some experimental evidence, dealing with small

[14] Page, "The Art of Ambiguity," in *Choices and Echoes*.

[15] The leading multidimensional models of electoral competition, too, rule out variations in emphasis, or candidate manipulations of issue salience, since they postulate clear perceptions of stands and salience that is fixed with respect to candidate behavior. Otto A. Davis, Melvin J. Hinich and Peter C. Ordeshook, "An Expository Development of a Mathematical Model of the Electoral Process," *American Political Science Review*, 64 (June, 1970), 426–48.

[16] For an introduction, see Ward Edwards, "Decision Making—Psychological Aspects," in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, ed. David L. Sills (New York: Macmillan, 1968), IV, 34–42; and Edward C. Devereux, "Gambling," *I.E.S.S.*, VI, 53–62. Extensive literature reviews by Edwards and Luce, as well as several important articles, are reprinted in *Decision Making: Selected Readings*, ed. Ward Edwards and Amos Tversky (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1967). Some of the major articles from an economic perspective are available in *Utility Theory: A Book of Readings*, ed. Alfred N. Page (New York: Wiley, 1968).

[17] Milton Friedman and L. J. Savage, "The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk," *Journal of Political Economy*, 56 (August, 1948), 279–304.

money gambles, throws light on whether people are risk acceptant, and why or why not. The leading experiment was performed by Mosteller and Nogee. Working with the cardinality and expected utility axioms of Von Neumann and Morgenstern,[18] they had ten Harvard undergraduates and five National Guardsmen play "poker dice," with a table of true probabilities before them. The students proved to be "conservative," or risk averse; they refused even rather attractive gambles. The guardsmen, however, tended to be "extravagant," or risk acceptant: they took bets even at poor odds.[19]

Although Mosteller and Nogee assumed an EU decision model in order to measure utility functions, and concluded that the model was "not unreasonable," their work threw considerable doubt on it. They noted that the guardsmen made more conservative bets in "investment" decisions where an agent did the gambling, which suggested that participation itself had utility for them. Further, the results could be interpreted in terms of subjective probabilities, with the guardsmen—despite their probability tables—overestimating their chances. Finally, none of the subjects consistently accepted or rejected the same bets, as the EU model requires; responses were probabilistic.

Preston and Baratta had earlier found risk acceptant behavior in an auction game: their subjects tended to pay more than expected value for a small chance to win a large amount of money. This the researchers interpreted as caused by overestimation of low probabilities and underestimation of high,[20] with a crossover at about .20.

Similarly, Griffith found that racetrack bettors put more money on long-shot horses than objective performance justified, and less on horses with short odds: they seemed to overestimate small probabilities.[21] McGlothlin later confirmed this finding, and showed that the overestimation increased with each new race on a given day—a phenomenon difficult to reconcile with most standard decision models.[22]

During the 1950s and early 1960s, Edwards, Coombs and others carried out a series of experiments which revealed curious mixtures of risk averse and risk acceptant behavior, and cast further doubt on the EU model. They seemed to find subjective probabilities; probability preferences (e.g., a tendency to favor a probability of $\frac{1}{2}$ more than it deserved, and to dislike a $\frac{1}{4}$ chance); and "variance preferences"—attitudes toward risk itself.[23]

In 1959, Davidson, Suppes, and Siegel, using a method suggested by Ramsey,[24] attempted to put back together the pieces of decision theory. They formalized and tested a subjectively expected utility (SEU) model, postulating that individuals maximize the sum of the utility of each outcome, weighted by the *subjective* probability of its occurrence. Subjective probabilities could vary from the objective, but were assumed to conform to an axiom system in which, for example, probabilities of complementary events had to sum to 1. The researchers first established a benchmark, nonsense-syllable dice with observed subjective probabilities of $\frac{1}{2}$ for each syllable, and then calculated bounds on utility functions for money by having 19 Stanford students choose bets from a series of pairs. Nearly all were conservative (risk averse) with respect to big losses, but extravagant (risk acceptant) with respect to big gains. No one had consistently increasing or consistently decreasing marginal utility.[25]

Davidson and associates decisively rejected the EU model by using these utility functions to measure subjective probabilities in reactions to new nonsense dice. Most subjects gave underestimates where the objective probability was .25. Even the SEU model, however, had serious problems. When subjects won or lost several times in a row they learned optimism or pessimism; there were recency effects from seeing syllables come up; there were some indications of a utility of gambling; some subjects' responses were inconsistent with any single utility function, and for others it was impossible to estimate subjective probabilities.

[18] John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1944).

[19] Frederick Mosteller and Philip Nogee, "An Experimental Measurement of Utility," *Journal of Political Economy*, 59 (October, 1951), 371–404.

[20] Malcolm G. Preston and Philip Baratta, "An Experimental Study of the Auction Value of an Uncertain Outcome," *American Journal of Psychology*, 61 (April, 1948), 183–93.

[21] R. M. Griffith, "Odds Adjustments by American Horse-race Bettors," *American Journal of Psychology*, 62 (April, 1949), 290–94. Like Preston and Baratta, Griffith found that objective and subjective probabilities coincided around .16–.20.

[22] W. H. McGlothlin, "Stability of Choices Among Uncertain Alternatives," *American Journal of Psychology*, 69 (December, 1956), 604–15.

[23] See Ward Edwards, "Probability Preferences in Gambling," *American Journal of Psychology*, 66 (July, 1953), 349–64; Edwards, "Variance Preferences in Gambling," *American Journal of Psychology*, 67 (Sept. 1954), 441–52; C. H. Coombs and D. G. Pruitt, "Components of Risk in Decision Making: Probability and Variance Preferences," *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 60 (November, 1960), 265–77. These experiments, like the others reviewed above, were plagued by inability to distinguish among the different possible components of reactions to risk.

[24] Frank P. Ramsey, "Truth and Probability" (1926), in his *The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1931).

[25] Donald Davidson, Patrick Suppes, and Sidney Siegel, *Decision Making: An Experimental Approach* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1957), chap. 2.

Royden, Suppes, and Walsh tried to measure the utility of gambling itself, assuming that people base risky choices on a simple function of expected value and the range of risk involved. Their 8 naval airmen and 8 Stanford students responded to a variety of 50-50 bets in a way that generated complex "utility surfaces," mixing both risk acceptant and risk averse behavior for nearly all subjects. The model was not impressive, predicting choices even less well than a simple EU model, though about as well as the old EV model.[26]

Tversky used a new approach of simultaneous conjoint measurement of subjective probabilities and utilities, within variants of the SEU model. Eleven Michigan prisoners, making bets for cigarettes and candy, nearly all proved to be risk acceptant. In many cases they took grossly unfavorable bets. This was apparently not caused by increasing marginal utility as the EU model specifies; it resulted partly from overestimation of probabilities, especially low ones (as SEU models permit), but also partly from a positive utility of gambling (either participation or risk) not allowed for in SEU models. The extreme risk acceptance, of course, may be unique to criminals or bored prisoners.[27]

The experimental findings, then, seem moderately supportive of the lottery theory, in that they suggest that risk acceptance may be sufficiently widespread in small ranges to motivate the taking of lottery stands. It does not seem *prima facie* unreasonable to generalize from results concerning private goods like money, candy, and cigarettes, to public goods of the sort that governments commonly provide.

There are, however, two reasons to doubt this interpretation. First, in the experiments an important component of risk acceptance may have been the pleasure of participating, of playing a gambling game. Voting for ambiguous candidates may be a less appealing pastime.

Second, the experimental results apply to *unconstrained* utility functions, for consumption of a single good taking everything else as constant. In such cases more is always better. So long as disposal is assumed to be free, utility rises indefinitely —or at least never falls—as quantity increases. In the issue space of the lottery theory, however, preferences are subject to an implicit budget constraint. People do not generally advocate an unlimited number of parks, roads, or rockets; they balance off their desires for various public goods against each other and against private consumption in terms of a government budget. The most preferred points do not all fall at one extreme of an issue dimension, but are scattered along it.

For this reason the question of risk acceptance over an interval of issue space is quite complicated, even if we accept the EU model and focus solely on the shape of utility functions, disregarding subjective probabilities and variance preferences. An individual can have increasing marginal utility as he approaches his most preferred point from either direction; yet he is not risk acceptant in an interval containing his bliss point. He obviously will not prefer any lottery to certainty of the bliss point itself. (See, Figure 2; contrast Shepsle p. 561, 563.)




Figure 2. A political utility function; increasing marginal utility without (*EU*) risk acceptance.

$L_2 = \frac{1}{2}$ chance of $50 billion, $\frac{1}{2}$ chance of $150 billion.

The number of risk acceptant voters in an interval of issue space, therefore, depends partly on the number of most preferred points within that interval; it cannot be inferred from general reactions to risk or the shape of utility functions alone. Whether the condition of majority risk acceptance is met generally, or for any particular issue, is not easy to ascertain; but the likelihood does not appear great for distributions with preferred points clustered near the center.

Rather little is known about the shape of political utility functions, distributions of most preferred points, or reactions to political risk. These matters deserve study not only in connection with candidate ambiguity, but also for their implications concerning voting decisions, coalition formation, elite decision making, and social choice.

(4) *Is the underlying EU model of decision making correct?* The experimental evidence reviewed above strongly contradicts the EU model.

[26] Halsey L. Royden, Patrick Suppes, and Karol Walsh, "A Model for the Experimental Measurement of the Utility of Gambling," *Behavioral Science*, 4 (January, 1959), 11–18, at 15–17.

[27] Amos Tversky, "Additivity, Utility and Subjective Probability," *Journal of Mathematical Psychology*, 4 (June, 1967), 175–202.

At the least, subjective probabilities must be taken into account, and it is doubtful that they follow any simple set of SEU axioms. Very likely some sort of utility for risk, or variance preferences, also plays a part in reactions to risk, as do feelings about participation and game playing. Allais's early critique of the EU model appears to have been well founded.[28]

Mathematical psychologists are still trying to bring theoretical order to the complexity. Approaches include stochastic decision making;[29] information-processing models;[30] an axiomatic treatment of risk resulting in a measure linearly combining expected values and variances;[31] and a constrained optimization model based on "tolerable regrets."[32] Other psychologists have explored variations in reactions to risk due to individual and group characteristics,[33] need for achievement,[34] and the psychopathology of compulsive gambling.[35]

Many economists, perhaps appalled by the chaos, have acted as if nothing happened to the EU theory.[36] It is possible, of course, that in certain theoretical applications—conceivably including ambiguity and lotteries—an expected utility model comes close enough to the truth to yield good predictions and a satisfactory theory *à la* Friedman.[37] This is a matter for empirical test. But if the lottery theory fails to predict well, one reason may be its reliance on the EU model.

The experimental evidence indicates that increasing marginal utility is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for risk acceptance. In the electoral setting, for example, voters with declining marginal utility might overestimate probabilities of favorable outcomes, or enjoy taking a chance, and favor a lottery candidate over one taking a clear stand at its expected value. Conversely, voters with increasing marginal utility over an interval might dislike risk itself, or estimate probabilities conservatively, and prefer the single-stand candidate.

The weaknesses of the lottery theory are at least serious enough so that alternatives should be considered.

The Emphasis Allocation Theory

One alternative to the lottery theory of ambiguity can be outlined as follows. Political information is imperfect; there are limits on the number of messages that candidates can transmit or that the average voter can or will receive. Candidates must allocate their emphasis (in time, energy, and money) among policy stands and other sorts of campaign appeals. Specific policy proposals turn out to be relatively ineffective in winning votes. Candidates therefore devote most of their efforts to projecting a favorable personal image and making other productive appeals; policy stands are left ambiguous, with very low emphasis.

For a fuller specification, consider electoral competition in a multidimensional issue space, in which citizens' preferences can be arrayed in a jointly-single-peaked fashion along a finite number of issue dimensions. Assume that citizens have cardinal utility functions over each dimension; they perceive candidates' stands without bias[38] and evaluate a candidate by summing the utility to them of his stand on each issue, weighted by a salience (or relevance) factor that responds to the

[28] M. Allais, "Les Comportement de l'Homme Rationnel devant le Risque: Critique des Postulats et Axiomes de l'Ecole Americaine," *Econometrica*, 21 (Oct., 1953), 503–46. The editors kindly provided a three-page English summary and a Voltaire-like defense of his right to express these misguided views.

[29] G. M. Becker, M. H. DeGroot, and J. Marshak, "Stochastic Models of Choice Behavior," *Behavioral Science*, 8 (January, 1963), 41–55.

[30] P. Slovic and S. Lichtenstein, "Relative Importance of Probabilities and Payoffs in Risk Taking," *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 78 (November, 1968, Part 2), 1–18.

[31] Alexander Pollatsek and Amos Tversky, "A Theory of Risk," *Journal of Mathematical Psychology*, 7 (October, 1970), 540–53.

[32] F. Hutton Barron and Kenneth D. Mackenzie, "A Constrained Optimization Model of Risky Decisions," *Journal of Mathematical Psychology*, 10 (Feb., 1973), 60–72.

[33] Nathan Kogan and Michael A. Wallach, *Risk Taking: a Study in Cognition and Personality* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964); Kogan and Wallach, "Risk Taking as a Function of Situation, Person, and the Group," in *New Directions in Psychology* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967), III, 111–278.

[34] John W. Atkinson, "Motivational Determinants of Risk-taking Behavior," in *Motives in Fantasy, Action, and Society: A Method of Assessment and Study* (Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1958), pp. 322–39.

[35] Edmund Bergler, *The Psychology of Gambling* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1957); Jay Livingston, "Compulsive Gamblers—A Society of Losers," *Psychology Today* (March, 1974), 51–58. See also the interesting hypotheses outlined in Devereux, "Gambling."

[36] John W. Pratt, "Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large," *Econometrica*, 32 (January–April, 1964), 122–36; Kenneth Arrow, *Essays on the Theory of Risk Bearing* (Chicago: Markham, 1971). Others, like Raiffa, sidestep the empirical questions by treating SEU as a normative model that rational men ought to use in making practical decisions. Howard Raiffa, *Decision Analysis: Introductory Lectures on Choices Under Uncertainty* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1968).

[37] Milton Friedman, "The Methodology of Positive Economics," in *Essays in Positive Economics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 3–43.

[38] A different theoretical approach might recognize that perceptions vary, and seek incentives for ambiguity in the fact that it permits citizens to project or selectively perceive that candidates stand for whatever they want them to. It is not obvious, however, why projection would gain a candidate any votes that he wouldn't get through low emphasis. Projection probably uses up some amount of evaluation rather than adding to it. If positive projection does add to positive evaluations, it is not clear why it would not be counterbalanced by negative projection adding to negative evaluations.

emphasis the candidate puts on that dimension. Citizens vote for the candidate they evaluate most highly. Two candidates choose stands on each issue dimension so as to maximize votes; they allocate emphasis among issues with the same aim.

This model departs from those of the Carnegie group[39] in two main respects. First, candidates do not merely take stands; they also allocate their speaking time, their press releases, and their media budgets so as to vary the emphasis on different appeals. Second, the salience of a given issue is not entirely independent of candidates' behavior; by varying the emphasis he puts on an issue, a candidate can manipulate the extent to which that issue is taken into account in evaluating him. Both points follow from the fact of imperfect information.

Under these assumptions, as a candidate decides how to allocate emphasis among different appeals it is clear that he must consider how citizens' preferences are distributed, how strong they are, and how steeply utility functions drop off with increasing distance from the most preferred points. If, for example, all citizens prefer precisely the same thing, and feel very intensely about it,[40] a candidate can safely take that stand and emphasize his position strongly, winning good will and votes from everyone. If, on the other hand, preferences are intense but widely dispersed—e.g., bimodally distributed—any stand the candidate takes will offend someone. If he agrees with the left-hand mode, he will outrage voters on the right; if he switches and takes a stand on the right-hand mode, he will alienate people on the left; and if he moves to the middle, everyone is disgruntled. Obviously the candidate's best strategy is to avoid issues of a divisive sort, and place (as nearly as possible) *no* emphasis on them, but devote all his time, money, and energy to matters of consensus.

We know empirically that on most matters of specific policy, opinions differ. Americans have disagreed vociferously on whether busing should be used to accomplish school desegregation; how much (if any) income maintenance should be given to the poor; how much money should be spent on military troops and weapons. But practically everyone agrees on certain goals, so long as they are put in general terms: racial harmony; abolition of poverty; world peace. Similarly, nearly everyone wants such qualities as honesty, intelligence, prudence, and energy in government leaders.

The issue space, for full generality, must encompass preferences and stands on these consensual goals and personal qualities, as well as on divisive policy questions. When candidates allocate emphasis, therefore, they most heavily emphasize shared goals, and avoid specific policy stands. They proclaim their devotion to progress, prosperity, and peace (while trying to associate their opponents with stagnation, depression, and war); they say little or nothing about research budgets, interest rates, or weapons systems.[41] (See the Appendix for a simple illustration of the workings of both the emphasis theory and the lottery theory.)

The emphasis theory as stated so far raises several questions. First, why does low emphasis on policy also imply vagueness? Why don't candidates quietly release a detailed, specific statement on each policy area, and then move on to other matters? The answer is that candidates can only partly control the emphasis they put on a stand; their opponents and the media play a part too. A detailed statement on anything important would be picked up and publicized by reporters hungry for news; the opponent would make charges and criticisms; the candidate would find himself devoting time and energy to defenses and denials that would have been better spent making positive appeals.

But if this is so, why do candidates put *any* emphasis on policy at all? Why don't they allocate all their effort elsewhere and say nothing at all, not even a hint, about policy? Here, too, part of the answer is that candidates are not in complete control of emphasis. In some settings, like press conferences and televised interviews, they are asked highly specific questions. Considerable skill goes into the perfection of evasive answers, but sometimes they are cornered (at the risk of loss on such personal dimensions as courtesy and candor) into making a specific response. Behind this process may lie a public norm favoring at least minimal specificity on policy, which is reinforced by media

[39] Davis, Hinich and Ordeshook, "An Expository Development."

[40] Here intensity is conceived of in terms of the height and steepness of utility functions—that is, the amount of utility loss between favored and disfavored policies. Shepsle, p. 565, more narrowly identifies intensity with increasing marginal utility.

[41] This analysis, cast in terms of rational economic man, could alternatively be expressed in terms of candidates' appeals to social-psychological man, who is prey to manipulation by symbols with high value content. (See, for example, the attitudinal consistency theories of Heider, Osgood, Abelson and Rosenberg, Festinger, Fishbein, and others.) Thus candidates attempt to link themselves to strongly positive concepts like peace and prosperity, so that attitudes toward themselves will change in a positive direction; they try to link their opponents to negative concepts; and they avoid elements—like specific policy stands—with mixed or ambivalent value loadings.

The economic analysis offered here, however, would seem to have at least equal explanatory power and to be susceptible of greater precision. Whether there are any genuine conflicts between the theoretical traditions is an interesting question.

condemnations of vagueness.[42] A candidate who said nothing at all about policy would likely be punished at the polls. Thus Richard Nixon in 1968, much accused of ambiguity, proudly claimed that he had taken stands on 227 specific issues, and put together a book of quotations to prove the point.[43]

Granting some necessary mention of policy, why don't candidates concentrate all their non-policy emphasis on the one most productive appeal, on which votes are most efficiently won? Why promise both wealth and brotherhood, if wealth alone will do it? Such a strategy would work if all voters felt most intensely about the same issue, as well as all taking the same stand on it, and if a candidate's emphasis on an issue completely controlled its salience in evaluations of him. But salience is also affected by voters' intensity on an issue: even if a candidate says little about a particular issue, the intense voter will take account of it. Moreover, intensity varies among voters; if a candidate were to devote all his attention to world peace, for example, he might lose the votes of those most concerned with prosperity, or honesty in government. The optimum allocation of emphasis would ordinarily involve a spreading of attention over several goals and valence issues as well as a nod to specific policy.

One advantage of the emphasis theory is that it accounts for both major aspects of ambiguity—vagueness and low emphasis—rather than just one. Another is that it can handle certain non-equilibrium situations which may be quite common. When cyclical majorities involve both single and lottery stands on policies, the lottery theory can make no prediction about candidate behavior, but the emphasis theory predicts that candidates reduce their emphasis on those issues as much as possible and concentrate on productive appeals. The emphasis theory also requires no assumptions about reactions to risk.

The reasoning of the emphasis theory is easily extended from the context of campaign rhetoric to the words and actions of office holders. It helps explain why congressmen avoid or conceal votes on controversial issues but are quick to let their constituents know about government projects, contracts, and installations in the district; why they emphasize favors done for constituents, their experience in office, their power and seniority.[44] It explains why presidents make much fanfare about landing a man on the moon, or journeying to Russia and China, but stay quiet about details of the space budget or wheat deals; why they accentuate personal style and the majesty of the office, rather than the need for particular legislation.

Conclusion

Political ambiguity is generally taken to be harmful from the point of view of public enlightenment and democratic social choice. Where ambiguity is widespread, we can hardly hope that political leaders will educate their citizens about the workings of government or the merits of contending policy proposals. A "responsible party" model of democratic control cannot work properly: the parties fail in their task of education and persuasion; voters are at a loss to make an intelligent choice since they cannot tell what the parties stand for. Nor does an electoral competition, or anticipated reactions, model function correctly: since government actions are concealed from the citizens, there is no need to do what the people want. (To be sure, a respectable social choice argument could be made in favor of lottery stands, if they were majority winners, if they were taken precisely and emphatically, and if policies were subsequently chosen in accord with them; but we have seen that neither the first nor the second condition generally holds. The third seems problematic.)

The emphasis-allocation theory (and for that matter the lottery theory as well) accounts for ambiguity in terms of politicians' incentives. It concludes that under certain presumably common circumstances, the self-interest of politicians dictates that they avoid specific stands and limit themselves to vague actions and utterances.

If our analysis is correct, therefore, we are faced with the discouraging conclusion that ambiguity will be difficult to prevent. Certainly mere exhortations to politicians are not likely to have much effect. Remedies lie instead in the direction of changing incentives, either by persuading the public to react more negatively to ambiguity (increasing the salience of the specificity dimension, and the intensity of preferences on it); or by structural changes such as legal requirements of legislative question periods, face-to-face debates, or written answers to specific questions.[45]

Appendix

For a simple illustration of the workings of the lottery and the emphasis theories, we can consider a small political world in which there are two issue

[42] Specificity could be seen as an evaluative (issue) dimension, with the special property that a stand on it is partly determined by the specificity and emphasis put on policy dimensions; or it might be conceived of in terms of risk aversion.

[43] *Nixon on the Issues* (New York: Nixon-Agnew Campaign Committee, 1968).

[44] These phenomena are noted, but not fully explained, in David R. Mayhew, *Congress: The Electoral Connection* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974).

[45] For some reflections on this problem, see Kelley, *Political Campaigning*, chap. 4.

dimensions (A and B) with three alternative policies (1, 2, and 3) possible on each; five voters (*V*, *W*, *X*, *Y*, and *Z*); and two candidates.

Let us further suppose that issue A is one of consensus: all five voters prefer policy 1. Issue B, however, is one of conflict, with a bimodal distribution: *V* and *W* prefer 1 over the other alternatives; *X* prefers 2; *Y* and *Z* prefer 3. Preferences are jointly single peaked: as any voter moves away from his most preferred point, he likes each succeeding alternative less.

(1) In the usual model of electoral competition, where candidates must take a single clear stand on each issue, there is a dominant strategy at the median: 1 on issue A and 2 on issue B. Clearly nothing can beat 1 on issue A, since all voters prefer it; it defeats either 2 or 3 by a vote of 5–0. On issue B, 2 beats 3 by a vote of 3–2 (*V*, *W*, and *X vs.* *Y* and *Z*) since by the single peakedness assumption the backers of 1 prefer 2 over 3; similarly 2 beats 1 by a 3–2 vote. Both candidates therefore take stands at 1 on A and 2 on B.

(2) For the lottery theory we need further information. Let us assume that on each issue the alternatives are measured in real units and are equally spaced, 1 unit apart; that the voters' feelings about each alternative can be measured in terms of cardinal utility; and—to illustrate the lottery theory—that voters follow an expected utility (EU) model of risky decision making. Now candidates are allowed to take lottery stands, consisting of probability distributions over the alternatives.

Suppose first that all the voters have declining marginal utility as they approach their most preferred points (this, by the EU assumption, is equivalent to risk aversion), and that the utility to each voter of each alternative is as given in Table 1.

If candidates were constrained to take single stands, the result we gave above would still hold. On issue A policy 1 beats any other, since it has utility of 100 rather than 80 or 0 for all voters; on issue B policy 2, the median, beats any other, since *X* combines with *V* and *W* to defeat 3, and with *Y* and *Z* to defeat 1.

Table 1. The utility of alternative policies to voters with declining marginal utility

Issue A	Policy		
Voter	1	2	3
V, *W*, *X*, *Y*, and *Z*	100	80	0
Issue B	**Policy**		
Voter	1	2	3
V, *W*	100	80	0
X	50	100	50
Y, *Z*	0	80	100

Even when lottery stands are permitted, clearly 1 defeats any lottery on issue A; and it can also be shown easily that 2 defeats any lottery on issue B.[1] Candidates still take single stands at the median.

Suppose now, however, that the voters have increasing marginal utility (that is, by the EU assumption, they are risk acceptant) as in Table 2.

Table 2. The utility of alternative policies to voters with increasing marginal utility

	Policy		
Voter	1	2	3
V, *W*, *X*, *Y*, and *Z*	100	20	0
Issue B	**Policy**		
Voter	1	2	3
V, *W*	100	20	0
X	50	100	50
Y, *Z*	0	20	100

On issue A, a single stand at 1 still defeats any other stand, single or lottery. But consider the lottery, on issue B, of $\frac{1}{2}$ chance of 1 and $\frac{1}{2}$ chance of 3. The utility of that lottery to *V* and *W* (under an EU model) is $\frac{1}{2}(100)+\frac{1}{2}(0)=50$ utiles; *V* and *W* prefer the lottery to the single position 2, with its 20 utiles. Similarly, for *Y* and *Z* the lottery has $\frac{1}{2}(0)+\frac{1}{2}(100)=50$ utiles; they too prefer it to the 20 utiles of alternative 2. Only voter *X* prefers alternative 2, with 100 utiles, to the $\frac{1}{2}(50)+\frac{1}{2}(50)=50$ utiles of the lottery. The lottery, therefore, defeats the median position, 2, by a vote of 4–1. Under the lottery theory, with these risk-acceptant voters there may be an incentive for candidates to be ambiguous, at least in challenging a median-clinging incumbent. (But note the lack of equilibrium; a single stand at either 1 or 3 ties the lottery. If the utility to *X* of 1 or 3 were slightly

[1] The general form of a lottery over policies 1, 2, and 3 is (a,b,1-a-b), where each of the three elements represents a probability associated with one policy. (Each must lie between 0 and 1, inclusive.) When the utility to each voter of this general lottery is calculated, using Table 1 and the EU algorithm, it becomes apparent that *V* and *W* prefer it to certainty of 2 if and only if $a > .8(1-b)$; *Y* and *Z* prefer the lottery if and only if $a < .2(1-b)$; and *X* never prefers the lottery, but is indifferent if $b = 1$: that is, if the lottery degenerates to certainty of 2. Given these conditions it is impossible to find permissible values for a and b such that a majority prefers the lottery.

increased there would be a cyclical majority, with that single stand defeating the lottery, the lottery defeating the median, and the median defeating that other single stand.)

(3) For the emphasis allocation theory we need information on the pre-existing salience of issues A and B, and on the extent to which candidates can control emphasis and manipulate salience. Let us suppose that the issues are equally weighted at the outset, each with salience of $\frac{1}{2}$. We assume for simplicity that candidates can entirely control emphasis (putting a weight between 0 and 1 on each issue, with the weights summing to 1) and that their emphasis completely determines salience. Voters evaluate a candidate by multiplying the utility of each policy he stands for by its salience weight, and summing.

Now consider the voters of Table 1. If a candidate emphasizes the two issues equally, and takes the optimal stands (1 on A and 2 on B), V and W evaluate him at $\frac{1}{2}(100)+\frac{1}{2}(80)=90$ utiles. For X, the evaluation is higher, $\frac{1}{2}(100)+\frac{1}{2}(100)=100$ utiles.

Note, however, that if the candidate devotes all his emphasis to issue A, on which there is consensus, everyone evaluates him at 1(100) or 100 utiles. Four voters, V, W, Y, and Z, prefer this strategy of total emphasis on A, while X is indifferent, at 100 utiles either way. This skewed emphasis strategy would defeat a strategy of equal emphasis on A and B, or for that matter any strategy involving *any* nonzero emphasis on B. This is true where the median stand is taken on B but also, by extension, to any single or lottery stand on B. Even with risk averse voters, the emphasis theory predicts candidate ambiguity (in the sense of low emphasis) on a divisive issue.

The same conclusion applies to the risk acceptant voters of Table 2. Similar reasoning shows that a strategy of total emphasis on A (with a stand at 1) defeats one of equal or indeed any nonzero emphasis on issue B, taking a stand at the median 2 or any other single stand. But the A emphasis strategy also defeats any strategy which puts some emphasis on B and takes a lottery stand. Consider the $(\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2})$ lottery. An equal emphasis strategy has utility to V and W of $\frac{1}{2}(100)+\frac{1}{2}(\frac{1}{2}(100)+\frac{1}{2}(0))=75$ utiles; to Y and Z of $\frac{1}{2}(100)+\frac{1}{2}(\frac{1}{2}(0)+\frac{1}{2}(100))=75$ utiles; and to X of $\frac{1}{2}(100)+\frac{1}{2}(\frac{1}{2}(50)+\frac{1}{2}(50))=75$ utiles. But a strategy of total emphasis on A gives each voter 1(100) or 100 utiles; it would be preferred by all five voters.[2]

Thus whether voters are risk averse or risk acceptant, the emphasis theory predicts that candidates place all their emphasis on consensus issues, and say nothing about issues of conflict.[3]

[2] The superiority of a skewed emphasis strategy to one giving nonzero emphasis to a lottery on B holds under EU evaluations of lotteries, but not necessarily under other models of risky decision making. The superiority of total emphasis on A to any strategy putting nonzero emphasis on a single stand on B holds regardless of reactions to risk.

[3] This conclusion holds if candidates completely control emphasis and salience, but as we suggest in the text they generally do not, and must put some minimal emphasis on conflictual issues.

A Majority Party in Disarray: Policy Polarization in the 1972 Election*

ARTHUR H. MILLER and WARREN E. MILLER
University of Michigan
ALDEN S. RAINE
Rutgers University
THAD A. BROWN
University of California, Los Angeles

The 1972 election marked the third time running that one of the major parties failed to cope with the polarization of policy demands among its supporters in the contest for the presidency. McGovern's defeat was the most notable of the three, but Humphrey and Goldwater before him also lost numerically significant and ideologically distinct segments of their parties' supporters to opponents whose policy positions were sufficiently more attractive to outweigh normal considerations of party loyalty and candidate preference at the polls. Indeed, even in the face of the Nixon landslide there are indications that the Republican party in 1972 confronted the same dilemma that faced a Democratic party whose internal disagreements had remained unresolved since the rebirth of the party under Franklin Roosevelt's leadership. This is the more significant precisely because policy disagreements strong enough to cause massive defections among rank and file party supporters had not been characteristic of post-war American national politics. Apparently it took twelve years of national leadership focused on national problems and policy alternatives to begin to reshape the American electorate and overlay the traditional politics of the 1950s—rooted in the Great Depression and the social cleavages made deep by economic distress—with a new issue politics. And it was the 1972 election that exposed the pervasive consequences that follow from dislodging party loyalty and candidate appeal from positions of dominance in mass electoral politics and complementing them with a widespread concern over policies intended to resolve very real national problems.

Contemporary electoral research came into being at the end of the era of Roosevelt and the New Deal and following a war that had been a total national preoccupation for five years or more. The seven years of the Truman presidency during post-war relocation served largely to revive the issues and alignments of the Roosevelt era. The "issueless '50s" were so for a variety of reasons. The Cold War threatened to engage the electorate in a new and dire concern with foreign policy, but the Eisenhower presidency ended that threat, or opportunity. In the election of 1952, party lines were as sharply drawn on the broad dimensions of internationalism/nationalism or interventionism/withdrawal in foreign affairs as they were on controversies over the policies of the New Deal and the Fair Deal. But Eisenhower's leadership moved enough Republicans into the internationalist interventionist camp to obliterate foreign policy as an arena for national partisan dispute for a decade or more.

During the eight years of the Eisenhower presidency, the de facto national Democratic leadership of Johnson and Rayburn thwarted the attempts of such organizations as the Democratic Policy Council to define new domestic policy goals for the Democratic party and to engage the president in open confrontation over national policy directions. The nation was led by a popular, largely non-partisan president and a government only dimly perceived to be divided. "Mr. Republican," Senator Robert Taft, died before the end of Eisenhower's first term, and the rerun of the Eisenhower-Stevenson competition in 1956 produced a second election in which the only real contest was between persistent Democratic loyalties and the popular folk hero, General Ike. Whatever the "real problems" of the nation, the national leadership of both parties deprived their followers of any great sense of urgency to define the problems and argue over alternative solutions.

John F. Kennedy's call to get the nation moving again in an assault on the New Frontiers marked the beginning of a change in the posture of national party leadership toward questions of public policy. Although Quemoy and Matsu, the Great Debates, and Kennedy's Catholicism were prominent features of the Kennedy-Nixon contest, it was the subsequent Kennedy presidential legislative program

* This is an abridged version of a paper presented under the same title at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association in New Orleans in September, 1973. The original paper and this article use data from the Center for Political Studies' 1972 election study which was made possible by grants from the National Science Foundation (GS-33956, GI-29904, GS-3322) and the National Institute for Mental Health (MH19516-03).

that defined the enduring themes of national presidential politics for the next eight years. In 1964 the Republicans and Senator Goldwater did their part to sustain the decision to make American politics issue politics. Whatever the short-run costs to his candidacy and his party, the Goldwater decision to offer "a choice not an echo" reaffirmed the primacy of issues in presidential politics. And as President Johnson was applying his insider's skills to the achievement of national public purpose, the very real problems of the society were being publicized by word and deed through the dramatic medium of national television. In 1968, Governor Wallace, with virtually nothing in the way of personal appeal as a candidate and little more in the way of major party support, was an important national candidate solely because he articulated policy alternatives favored by one out of every seven or eight voters. Political scientists' longstanding pleas for the elevation of issue politics and the creation of conditions that would permit or force responsible party government into existence were being answered.

At the same time that national leaders were injecting a large element of policy-based controversy in American politics, a widening stream of research was documenting a spectacular change in the quality of mass attitudes toward questions of public policy. Both within and across broad policy domains, the structuring of popular attitudes in ways that make sense to the politician and to the student of mass ideology was replacing the ideological formlessness noted in comparable evidence from the 1950s. The universe of policy questions came to be reasonably well ordered by the electorate, with apparently sophisticated structuring. The change in level of interitem and interdomain constraint was so great, in contrast to the earlier period, that an intense search was launched to locate the cause of what appeared to be a basic discontinuity in the partisan concerns of the electorate.

Unhappily, research on mass behavior has seldom seriously grappled with—indeed has seldom even recognized—the problem of incorporating the conditioning and causing events of the real world in the design of the research. In the electoral realm we have been too prone to try to assemble disembodied data to map the "natural history of an issue" with little regard for the likely fact that leadership decisions to promote, to modify, to resist, or to surrender in a policy fight are major factors in determining that "natural" history. Systematic electoral research has largely ignored a major source of the observed change in the quality of mass attitudes on questions of public policy: leadership behavior that brings the substance of issue politics into the public domain.

The 1972 election provided a unique opportunity to investigate the consequence of change in leadership focus on policy and the responses of an electorate mobilized by policy considerations. A detailed inspection of the electoral outcome illuminates some of the systemic problems which flow not only from the changes in the quality of electoral response to the contests for the presidency, but also from the increased impact of policy preference on partisan defection, the increased importance of issues as predictors of the vote decision, and the transformed nature of contemporary public involvement in policy issues. Each of these facets of the 1972 election make it very different from the presidential elections of the 'fifties. This contrast is most clearly revealed by analyses which compare the relative importance of policy voting with alternative and complementary explanations for the particular outcome of the 1972 presidential contest. Ideology and issue voting in that election provide a means for better explaining the unique elements of the contest than do the voters' social characteristics, the nature of candidates, the events of the campaign, political alienation, cultural orientations, or partisan identification. A consideration of the relative balance of these factors on the forces under the particular social and political conditions of 1972 helps us to recognize the problems facing political parties and political leaders whose constituents have been aroused to a high concern over questions of governmental policy. The mass recognition of the enduring existence of salient social problems uncovered by the analyses of the 1972 election suggests that subsequent electoral contests may be fought along lines of deepening policy cleavages.

The Political Setting

During the period just prior to the 1972 presidential primaries, numerous factors suggested a Democratic victory in the upcoming elections. Foremost among these was the war in Southeast Asia. Despite Richard Nixon's 1968 campaign pledge of a rapid end to U.S. involvement, the war continued, and it came to be seen as Nixon's war. American bombings of Vietnam and Cambodia continued even as the 1972 election approached. Although Nixon had run on a "law and order" platform in 1968, with promises of a reduction in the crime rate, violent crimes were still on the increase in 1972. The Administration itself was beset by a series of scandals involving possible criminal activity by well-placed members of the Administration. Moreover, the economic situation appeared bleak: unemployment was higher throughout the Nixon Administration than it had been under Lyndon Johnson; inflation increased substantially; government deficits grew, and the imbalance in foreign trade increased. All of these factors combined created a situation that seemed certain to benefit the Democrats. By early 1972 the Gallup poll reported a significant shift from 1968, with the Democratic party once more popularly

perceived to be the party best able to cope with the important problems facing the nation. And the Democratic lead in basic partisan loyalties showed little or no decline over 1970, a year in which the long string of Democratic national victories at the polls was continued with the re-election of a Democratic congress.

While the advantages and strengths of the Democrats prior to the campaign were substantial, some factors could be expected to benefit the minority party candidate, particularly the fact that Richard Nixon was an incumbent president in a position to exploit the ample political advantages of the highest office in the nation. Moreover, Nixon had achieved impressive gains in foreign affairs, including an historic Peking summit meeting and a growing détente with Moscow. By establishing price controls, he had reduced criticism on the economic front. He could, further, rebut criticism relating to the war in Southeast Asia by reference to the peace negotiations then in progress which eventually led to the pre-election pronouncement that "peace was at hand."

Throughout the campaign and almost up to the time of the election, more than half of the population expected to vote for Richard Nixon. The ultimate margin of victory (approximately 61 per cent voting Republican)[1] was, nevertheless, somewhat unexpected since among the eligible electorate, self-proclaimed Democrats[2] continued by almost 2 to 1 to outnumber Republicans.[3] The degree of ticket splitting which reinstated a heavily Democratic Congress was likewise not widely forecast. Most surprising, however (and perhaps equally alarming), was the lack of citizen concern about the outcome of the election. The percentage of the electorate expressing a personal concern about the outcome was lower than it had been for any previous presidential election during the past 20 years.[4] On election day, only 55 per cent of the eligible electorate participated in the presidential election —the lowest turnout since 1948.

Policy Preference and the Vote

Following the election, politicians and political observers offered many explanations for the outcome, for the substantial defection among Democrats, for the high degree of ticket-splitting, and for the low turnout. Most often, these accounts speculated on the effects of various political incidents of the previous months, including such early events as the California Democratic primary debates, the selection of Democratic convention delegates on the basis of quotas rather than meritorious party service, the acerbity of the Illinois and California seating fights at the Democratic Convention, and the inability of McGovern campaign workers to cooperate with Democratic party regulars. The role of Nixon-McGovern disagreements over national policy, on the other hand, was frequently minimized by assertions that no real policy differences existed among the voters, or that McGovern wavered so much on the issues that he did not project a consistent, tenable policy position and hence was not perceived in terms of basic issues. Lipset and Raab, for example, argued the unimportance of issues. They concluded that "there was no real gap on political issues separating the body of McGovern voters and the body of Nixon voters. The voters, in fact, were on the same side of *all* political issues. . ."[5] The same report went on to contend, moreover, that with respect to the issues the voters perceived little difference between the candidates. More generally, however, the treatment of issues in postelection analyses varied from the view that the issues were relatively unimportant to assertions that they entirely explained the 1972 presidential election outcome. Some analyses emphasized the importance of only a few issues, such as the "cultural" or the "racial" issues. Kirkpatrick, for instance, declared that "at every campaign stop he [McGovern] was hounded by questions about the 'three A's': am-

[1] Data for this report are primarily from the Center for Political Studies' 1972 national election survey, the twelfth in a series, which was based on a standard University of Michigan Survey Research Center national stratified probability sample of 2705 cases. The data are derived from personal interviews with eligible voters (citizens 18 years and older) taken before the election (September 1 to November 6) and reinterviews with the same respondents taken immediately after the election. The data and relevant codebooks for the 1972 study are available to any interested scholars upon request through the Inter-university Consortium for Political Research, The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106.

[2] Party identification is based on the standard measure which asks the respondent: "Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what? Would you call yourself a strong Republican/Democrat or a not very strong Republican/Democrat?" If Independent—"Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or the Democratic party?" The question gives rise to a measure with seven categories that range from strong Democrat to strong Republican. For the purpose of this paper whenever Democrats, Independents and Republicans are referred to, the leaning Independents have been collapsed with the Independent-Independents.

[3] The most extensive analysis of the concept of party identification is provided in Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1960). See especially p. 124 for the distribution of party identification in the 1950's.

[4] In response to the question, "Generally speaking, would you say that *you personally* care a good deal which party wins the presidential election this fall, or that you don't care very much which party wins?", the percentage personally caring about the outcome of the election in 1952 was 68%; in 1956, 65%; 1960, 67%; 1964, 69%; 1968, 64%; 1972, 62%.

[5] Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab, "The Election and the National Mood," *Commentary*, 55 (January, 1973), 43. Emphasis in the original.

nesty, acid, and abortion . . .,"[6] and Rosenthal alleged that the election outcome was determined by the "hidden issue" of race.[7] At the other extreme, some claimed that McGovern supporters constituted an ideological or issue elite who shaped the election outcome by taking an extremely liberal position on all the important issues of the day.[8]

It is understandable that many interpretations of the election placed little emphasis on the issues. Nixon had undertaken to neutralize the war in Vietnam, one of the most potent issues of the 1968 election, and the October announcement that "peace was at hand" seemed to guarantee peace with honor. At home, the college campuses were peaceful, and with the anticipated end to the military draft, they could be expected to remain so. The racial situation had quieted, and "crime in the streets" no longer captured headlines. Indeed, the only heated issues before the election appeared to be issues that had only recently become salient in the McGovern campaign: abortion, amnesty, busing, and the legalization of marijuana. On all these issues Nixon had taken a public stand which reflected the position of a large popular majority.

Nevertheless, there was reason to believe that issues had been important in the election, and that there had been sharp issue differences between the supporters of the two candidates. At the time of the election, the Vietnam war was still a position issue with the debate revolving around immediate American withdrawal from Vietnam versus a protracted military engagement while a peace settlement was negotiated. Despite the growing support for peace, even through unilateral American withdrawal, Nixon's supporters favored an escalation of the war and a renewed national commitment to achieve a military victory. Furthermore, McGovern's position on immediate withdrawal from Vietnam, his pro-amnesty sentiments, and his supposed special appeal to youth were intended to mobilize support along lines reflecting alternative ways of dealing with the nation's continuing social problems. While the racial situation had quieted, widespread social discrimination still existed in America, and there was little reason to expect much change in attitudes toward government assistance aimed at improving the social and economic condition of minority groups. Nixon's praise of the work ethic and his denigration of welfare were clearly at odds with McGovern's statements on welfare, including his early promise of a minimum $1,000 personal income for every person in the nation.

In analyzing the role of policy preferences in the 1972 election, one must first ask whether the composition of McGovern's support changed during the campaign. Since much of McGovern's eventual success in attaining his party's nomination was based on his primary victories, it is useful to determine how different the policy preferences of his early and later supporters were. If they were different, this would illustrate the process by which a candidate is chosen as the presidential nominee of a party and then must broaden his base to include a national electorate as well as the fellow partisans who opposed his nomination.

The intraparty divisions within the Democratic ranks were already evident at the time of the primaries. On each of several issues, and especially with respect to Vietnam, amnesty, and government aid to minorities, McGovern's primary supporters were far more "liberal" than were those who voted for the other candidates in the Democratic primaries. As Table 1 reveals,[9] McGovern captured most of the primary vote of the liberal Democrats while the conservative faction went to the several other contenders. Yet it should also be noted that the *total* set of Democratic primary voters was biased in a direction that might benefit a candidate espousing McGovern's policies. Even those who voted for some Democrat other than McGovern in the primaries were generally slightly more liberal than Democrats who were later to vote for Nixon in the general election.

The depth of the split within the Democratic ranks was fully exposed in the general election. There were only minor differences between McGovern's primary supporters and the much larger set of Democrats who voted for him in November. The differences that do appear, such as the slightly more liberal complexion of the primary supporters with regard to Vietnam and marijuana, largely reflect age differences between the two groups of

[6] Jeane Kirkpatrick, "The Revolt of the Masses," *Commentary*, 55 (February, 1973), 60.

[7] Jack Rosenthal, "The Secret Key Issue: Study of Polls Shows Racial Attitudes to be Critical with Nixon Gainer," *The New York Times* (November 7, 1972).

[8] Kevin Philips, "How Nixon Will Win," *The New York Times Magazine* (August 6, 1972), pp. 8, 34, 35–37.

[9] The issue scales used in Table 1 ranged from 1 to 7, with the extremes indicating designated policy alternatives. The respondents were asked to place themselves on the issue scale. The scales were trichotomized for ease of tabular presentation: categories 1 to 3 were combined into the "left" category, number 4 formed the "center," and categories 5 to 7 were designated as "right." On all the issue scales the left position identifies the liberal position. This is most clearly identified on the last scale in the table which ranged from "liberal" to "conservative" without any specific issue content.

The five-issue policy orientation index is different in that it combined responses to five of the specific issue scales. To form this index an average score was obtained from self-placement on the issues of the Vietnam War, urban unrest, campus demonstrations, protecting the rights of the accused and government aid to minorities. Scores ranging from 1–3 were considered as pro-social change while scores of 5–7 were designated as pro-social control. Placement at 4 on the scale was labeled "center." The distribution for this trichotomized index is 41% pro-social change, 29% at center, and 30% pro-social control. For a more complete discussion of this concept, see Arthur H. Miller, "Political Issues and Trust in Government," *The American Political Science Review*, 68 (September, 1974), 951–972.

voters. However, a deep policy schism among the Democrats is sharply defined when Democrats voting for McGovern in the general election are compared with the Democrats who voted for Nixon. The defecting Democrats were much less in favor of immediate withdrawal from Vietnam; they were much more likely to support the use of police force as the means of ending campus demonstrations; and they strongly opposed an active role for government in maintaining or improving the quality of life experienced by minority groups. On each of the specific issues, as well as on a more general policy orientation index and a liberal-conservative scale, Democrats as a whole were a very heterogeneous collection of citizens. This lack of cohesion reflected long-standing regional differences between southern and non-southern Democrats, but, even within regional subgroups, a substantial degree of intraparty polarization was exposed by the general election.

The Republicans, on the other hand, exhibited a substantial degree of consensus on each issue except Vietnam, where the intraparty division found 31 per cent preferring immediate withdrawal, 30 per cent favoring a complete military victory and 30 per cent in the center. The Republican positions on the liberal-conservative scale also revealed substantial differences of ideological position within

Table 1. Issue Composition of the Candidates' Support

		McGovern Primary Voters	Other Primary Voters	Democrats Voting for McGovern	Democrats Voting for Nixon	All Democrats	McGovern Voters	Nixon Voters
	(*N*)	(78)	(104)	(377)	(271)	(1092)	(566)	(1021)
VIETNAM:	Left	79%	34%	69%	30%	52%	69%	29%
	Center	17	26	19	31	24	19	29
	Right	5	40	12	39	24	12	42
AMNESTY:[a]	Left	52%	17%	49%	18%	34%	54%	15%
	Right	48	83	51	82	66	46	85
MARIJUANA:	Left	41%	19%	30%	10%	20%	37%	17%
	Center	19	6	11	7	8	11	11
	Right	41	75	59	83	72	52	72
CAMPUS UNREST:	Left	[b]	[b]	40%	12%	31%	43%	11%
	Center	[b]	[b]	18	24	22	20	23
	Right	[b]	[b]	42	64	47	37	66
MINORITIES:	Left	49%	18%	50%	25%	39%	52%	25%
	Center	25	35	24	24	22	23	27
	Right	26	47	26	51	39	25	48
STANDARD OF LIVING:								
	Left	53%	28%	53%	21%	39%	50%	18%
	Center	16	22	23	24	23	24	25
	Right	31	50	24	55	38	26	57
BUSING:	Left	19%	4%	23%	2%	14%	22%	3%
	Center	10	2	8	2	5	8	4
	Right	70	94	69	96	81	70	93
FIVE ISSUES:	Left	51%	18%	45%	15%	34%	50%	16%
	Center	30	42	30	33	31	29	34
	Right	18	40	25	52	35	21	50
LIBERAL-CONSERVATIVE								
	Left	48%	24%	50%	14%	33%	54%	13%
	Center	38	33	36	44	41	32	37
	Right	14	43	14	42	26	14	50

[a] The format for the amnesty question was suitable for collapsing into two categories only.

[b] Data unavailable because primary voting and campus unrest questions were on opposite half-samples in the study design.

the party: 41 per cent saw themselves as "conservative" but 28 per cent labeled themselves as "liberal." On other more specific issues, the dominant Republican position was, more often than not, an overwhelming majority supporting a conservative preference against the minority made up of liberals and neutrals combined.

The stark issue differences that separated the total group of McGovern voters from the Nixon voters are also revealed by the data of Table 1. McGovern supporters were consistently more liberal than Nixon supporters. Even on the highly one sided issues—busing, amnesty and the legalization of marijuana where 86, 72, and 68 per cent of the total sample, respectively, expressed a very conservative policy preference—McGovern voters were more liberal than Nixon voters.[10] On the question of Vietnam, which specifically referred to immediate withdrawal versus a complete military victory, 40 per cent more McGovern voters than Nixon voters preferred an immediate end to the fighting. Even with "peace at hand," a military victory in Vietnam was the Nixon supporters' preferred way to end the war. Using a trichotomized five-issue policy orientation index (see Table 1), we find that half of McGovern's voters exhibited a social-change policy orientation, whereas an equal fraction of Nixon voters displayed a diametrically opposed social-control orientation. Similarly, on the liberal-to-conservative scale a full 54 per cent of McGovern's voters identified themselves as clearly "liberal," while half of Nixon's voters saw themselves as strongly "conservative." These are large differences between the candidates' support groups since the total population was divided almost equally among three categories including a "middle-of-the-road" option in both the policy orientation index and the liberal-conservative scale. These differences are even greater than those between the Democratic factions because of the distinctive appeal of the two candidates to different groups of Independents. McGovern clearly captured the votes of the more liberal Independents, and therefore his total vote support group was generally more liberal than were the Democrats who voted for him. The more conservative Independents, on the other hand, voted for Nixon, joining conservative Republicans in a group slightly more conservative than the subset of Democrats voting for Nixon.

In general, McGovern supporters were sharply distinct from Nixon voters in their policy preferences, but they were also a distinct subset among Democrats. Since McGovern's supporters formed 58 per cent of all Democrats, however, it cannot be argued that they were just a splinter faction within the party; it can more reasonably be argued that they were the vanguard of a liberalizing trend occurring in the population as a whole and centered in the ranks of the Democrats. If so, McGovern's principal error in adopting his policy positions for the campaign may have been in overestimating the speed and the magnitude of the national liberal trend on questions of public policy.

The argument can be assessed with respect to shifts in attitudes that occurred between 1968 and 1972 toward contemporary social issues such as the Vietnam war and urban unrest. In 1968 the total eligible electorate took a policy position which was, on the average,[11] slightly closer to the hawkish alternative on Vietnam (see Figure 1). By 1972 a steady drift toward an antiwar opinion resulted in a population more inclined to prefer immediate withdrawal from Vietnam. A similar trend can also be observed with respect to the question of how to handle urban unrest. Voters as a whole were already predisposed in 1968 toward solving the urban problems of poverty and unemployment as a means of ending urban unrest (average value of 3.7 on the scale); by 1972 the population had moved even further to the left (3.1). A similar mild shift toward the left occurred on all the other issues monitored during this time interval.


This movement toward the left was not, however, equally sharp for the three partisan subgroups of Democrats, Independents, and Republicans. Between 1968 and 1972 the Democrats had become substantially more dovish. The Independents also moved toward withdrawal, but the Republicans on the whole still maintained their 1968 position. The four-year change on urban unrest was greatest among Independents. Both Democrats and Republicans moved in the same liberal direction, but the change was less than that noted

[10] It should be noted, though, that of these three issues only on the question of amnesty did a majority of McGovern voters take a liberal position; 70 per cent were against busing and 52 per cent favored increasing the penalties for the use of marijuana.

[11] Attitudes toward contemporary social issues were measured with 7-point scales in 1968, and again in 1970, as well as in 1972. In each of these studies the respondents not only placed themselves on these scales, but they also indicated where they perceived several political objects to be located relative to the policy alternatives represented by the scale extremities. Among the political objects placed on the scales were the presidential candidates and, after 1968, the parties, thus providing data for determining not only how the population has shifted on the issues but also how the perceived locations of various candidates and the parties compare over time.

It should be noted that the average values placed in Figure 1 de-emphasize the high degree of polarization existing in the attitudes toward these issues. While many of the values fall at the center of these scales, the data should not be interpreted to imply that the majority of the population prefers a centrist approach to these social problems. Only a brief glance back at the group distributions on these two issues in Table 1 is necessary to confirm this.

Figure 1: Mean Locations of Voters and Political Objects on the Vietnam Scale, 1968–72



Key to Symbols

V = Voters
H = Humphrey
N = Nixon
Mc = McGovern
D = Democratic Party
R = Republican Party

for Independents. This relatively large shift toward the left exhibited by Independents on these two issues was also noted for the several other issues.

A more complete picture of changes in policy preferences is revealed when the Democrats of both years are divided into subsets comparable to the candidate support groups depicted in Table 1. If Humphrey Democrats in 1968 are labeled loyal Democrats, and Wallace Democrats are treated as defectors, their policy preferences may be compared with the McGovern Democrats and Nixon Democrats in 1972. A comparison of these support groups demonstrates that the massive shift toward a policy of immediate withdrawal from Vietnam occurred among both the right and the left wing of the Democratic ranks. On the average, the 1968 Humphrey Democrats preferred a middle-of-the-road policy on Vietnam, whereas McGovern's Democratic supporters were staunchly in favor of immediate withdrawal. Wallace Democrats in 1968 were substantially more hawkish than Republicans, but by 1972 the Vietnam policy preference of defecting Democrats had converged with that of the Republicans. The shift in policy preference associated with "defecting" Democrats, however, was less than that observed for loyal Democrats. Thus, the 1972 discrepancy between the preferred policy position of defecting and loyal Democrats was greater than in 1968.

At the same time, between 1968 and 1972 defecting Democrats displayed a somewhat larger shift to the *left* in their choice of alternative policies for dealing with urban unrest than did loyal Democrats. Humphrey supporters in 1968 were already expressing fairly strong preferences for the eradication of root causes of urban problems as the best way of dealing with unrest in the cities, and in 1972 McGovern Democrats were only slightly more liberal. Wallace Democrats, on the contrary, were clearly to the right of center on the issue of urban unrest in 1968, but in 1972 defecting Democrats were ever so slightly to the left of center. And yet, despite this marked shift away from the use of force as the preferred way to deal with urban unrest, the defecting Democrats of 1972 remained significantly to the right of the Republicans on this issue and substantially separated from the loyal members of their party.

A still better understanding of the dynamics of attitudinal change can be gained when shifts both in attitudes and in popular perceptions of the policy alternatives offered by the candidates are examined together. For example, while the population was shifting to the left on the issues between 1968 and 1972, Nixon was, in general, being perceived as having remained relatively stable in his policies.

Although Nixon was generally perceived to have changed little on the issues, a substantial degree of change was perceived in the Democratic candidates' positions, especially on Vietnam. There was a striking difference between the Vietnam policy position attributed to Humphrey in 1968 and that assigned to McGovern in 1972. McGovern's perceived issue location was consistently to the left of where Humphrey had been placed in 1968, a position also substantially left both of where the Democratic party was placed and of where Democrats placed themselves.

Indeed, McGovern was perceived as so far left on the issues that Nixon was generally closer to the electorate's average issue position. For example, when the average location of where respondents placed Nixon and McGovern on the 7-point issue scales were compared with where the respondents, on the average, placed themselves on these scales, it was found that Nixon's mean location was closer to the mean location of the electorate on 11 out of 14 separate issues. Those 3 issues on which McGovern's mean location was closer to the population mean than was Nixon's were urban unrest, inflation, and ecological pollution. It should be noted, however, that of the eight issues measured in a comparable study in 1970, Muskie was also placed closer than Nixon to the population mean on *only* these same three issues. Using the difference between the mean location of voters and the average location of the candidate to indicate distance, we find that McGovern was placed, on the average, a distance of 1.29 units from the mean issue position of the electorate, while the average Nixon distance was only .51 units. Among Democrats, McGovern and Nixon were almost equidistant from the group mean (distances of .92 and .89) but in opposite directions with McGovern to the left of the group and Nixon to the right of the group mean. Nixon's policy position was, however, far more similar to the issue preference of the Independents and Republicans than was McGovern's.

Investigating the perceptions of the various candidate support groups for 1968 and 1972 is also instructive. Both Humphrey and McGovern were much closer to the preferred policy alternative of loyal Democrats on the issues of Vietnam and urban unrest than were either Wallace or Nixon. Alternatively, defecting Democrats were distant from both Humphrey and McGovern but close to Wallace and Nixon. For example, on the more salient issue—Vietnam—the 1968 distance between the position taken by Wallace Democrats and the policies they associated with Humphrey was 0.9; the comparable distance to Nixon was 0.7 while Wallace was placed only 0.4 units away. In 1972 the defecting Democrats were, on the average, 2.4 units from McGovern and only 0.3 units from Nixon and Wallace. Since Nixon was not seen as having changed his Vietnam policy between 1968

and 1972, the convergence of the positions of the defecting Democrats and their perceptions of Wallace and Nixon can only be attributed to the leftward shift of the defecting Democrats noted earlier and to a substantial change in Wallace's perceived policy position. Given that right-wing Democrats had exhibited a marked shift toward a preference of withdrawal from Vietnam preceding the 1972 campaigns, the very large distance yet remaining between McGovern and the defecting Democrats is particularly notable.

Furthermore, this disagreement on the Vietnam issue was only partially the result of defecting Democrats perceiving McGovern as more liberal than did other Democrats. That is, the policy disagreement was not simply a matter of negative reaction to McGovern; it was instead a patent indication of the profound issue discordance existing within the Democratic ranks. These data clearly suggest that the configuration of positions attributed to candidates and taken by the public of 1972 had already been developing four years earlier. The main difference between the two elections, however, apart from the absence of a rightist Democratic candidate, was the greater issue distance perceived to separate the leading candidates.[12] Such sharp differentiation between the candidates clearly facilitates the translation of issue demands into a vote decision.

Although the data demonstrate a mild population shift toward more liberal issue positions, this change should not be overestimated. Within the Democratic ranks this trend was most evident with respect to Vietnam war policy. McGovern may have sensed this change and been able to tap it in the primaries, but he was less able to capitalize on it in the general election. Despite the general population shift to the left, McGovern was seen as quite distant from the population's policy preferences, Nixon being relatively much closer to the issue positions preferred by Americans on the average. The general population shift leftward, therefore, did little to increase the popularity of McGovern's proposed policy alternatives. In terms of candidate strategies, it appears that McGovern sensed but misgauged the changes occurring in popular attitudes and policy demands. The salient issues of the campaign, and those predominant in the rhetoric of both candidates, proved to be the issues that were most divisive among the Democrats.

[12] The very large difference between the two candidates on the issue of Vietnam is highlighted by the finding that 39 per cent of the population perceived McGovern as left of center on this issue whereas only 22 per cent saw Nixon as favorably disposed to a policy of immediate withdrawal. Large differences were also perceived between the candidates on the issue of government assistance to minorities: 32 per cent thought Nixon liberal on this issue, compared to 73 per cent for McGovern. Minor differences were perceived between the candidates on only the issues of inflation and pollution.

A Normal-Vote Analysis of Issues

The impact of public policy questions on partisan defection in the 1972 election can be assessed by a normal-vote analysis[13] of several issues salient in that election. The concept of a normal vote originates in the earlier work of the Center which argues that both long-term and short-term partisan influences shape political behavior.[14] It is the dynamic interaction of the long- and short-term forces which makes these concepts so useful in analyzing elections. For, as Converse argues, in order to establish and compare the relative magnitude of electoral shifts for various groups, one must state explicitly the baseline from which any shift is measured. The concept of the normal vote provides a theoretically meaningful and empirically reasonable method to establish the baseline for assessing vote defection from a theoretically "normal" expectation. The empirically derived baseline indicates the degree of support each party's presidential candidate could expect to receive from each subgroup in the electorate, if the short-term factors were causing an equal defection rate among Republicans and Democrats. The relative degree to which certain short-term forces operate in any election can then be ascertained with respect to this long-term factor. The mathematical difference between the percentage of the Democratic vote normally expected for any population grouping

[13] A complete statement of the normal vote concept and computational methods can be found in Philip E. Converse, "The Concept of a Normal Vote" in Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *Elections and the Political Order* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966), pp. 9–39.

The normal vote parameters used here are not those originally calculated by Converse. The empirical observations employed by Converse to determine the partisanship values and expected turnout parameters used in the normal vote computations were from the national elections of 1952 through and including 1960. Since the recent decade has witnessed several electoral anomalies, including a massive victory for each of the major parties and a third party insurgency, the normal vote parameters (both turnout and partisanship) were recomputed on the basis of the six national elections during the period 1962 to 1972. The baseline used here is therefore more representative of the contemporary partisan situation than one computed from Converse's original estimates of the normal vote parameters would have been. A complete report of the new normal vote parameters is now in preparation.

Applying the normal vote computations to the 1972 total sample provides an expected Democratic vote of 54 per cent. When this value is compared to the 36 per cent of the two-party vote that McGovern actually received (after excluding the few per cent voting for minor party candidates), a deviation of 18 percentage points below the expected Democratic proportion of the vote for the total sample is observed.

[14] See in particular Angus Campbell et al., *The American Voter*, pp. 120–167.

and the observed Democratic vote for that group provides an empirical statement of the degree of partisan defection exhibited by the group.


A normal vote analysis of attitudes on several salient public policy issues is presented in Figures 2a–h. Each figure contains two summary indices that indicate the relative importance of the long-term (traditional partisan differences) and short-term forces operating in the 1972 election. The first, an index of long-term partisan effects (labeled L in the figures), summarizes the differences in traditional partisan cleavages among the categories of the independent variable. The second index summarizes the short-term forces, that is, the deviations from the expected vote for each category of the independent variable (labeled S in the figures).[15]

[15] These normal vote indices were developed by Richard W. Boyd, "Popular Control of Public Policy: A Normal Vote Analysis of the 1968 Election," *The American Political Science Review*, 66 (June, 1972), 429–449.


In general, positions on the issues presented in Figure 2 were correlated with long-term partisan

A long-term index value (L) of zero indicates the lack of any relationship between traditional partisan divisions and an independent variable. Non-zero values indicate the average absolute deviation of the expected vote for each category of the independent variable from the expected vote for the total population. For example, the relationship between campus unrest and partisan difference indicates an average absolute deviation of 4.54 percentage points from the expected Democratic vote for the total population, a relationship that is slightly stronger than that for government help to minorities ($L = 4.24$). For the short-term forces index (S), if there is no deviation from the baseline or if the deviation is in the same direction and equal for all categories of the independent variable, the variable would have no relationship to the defections from party and the short-term index value would be zero. Government help to minorities, for instance, has some relevance to the short-term forces in 1972 ($S = 8.63$). But compared to Vietnam ($S = 11.80$), its short-term index is relatively moderate. The short-term index value for Vietnam indicates an average deviation of 11.80 percentage points from the baseline vote normally expected for each policy group (i.e., each category of the issue variable).

Figures 2a–2h; Normal Vote Analysis of Self-Locations on Political Issue Scales, 1972 Only



(Figures 2a-2h continues)



Note: a) The Republican vote is always 100% minus the Democratic vote; b) the category N's below each figure are for the Expected Vote (top row) and the Observed Vote (bottom row) respectively.

differences. As indicated by the moderately large long-term index values and differences in the expected vote, those preferring policy alternatives on the liberal side could be expected to vote more Democratic, whereas those endorsing issue positions on the right end of the scales would be expected to vote Republican more often. Examination of the several issues also reveals the very substantial degree of short-term deviation of the observed vote from the baseline expected vote. Those who preferred liberal policy alternatives were typically self-identified Democrats, but they actually voted slightly more heavily for McGovern than expected. Those endorsing conservative policy alternatives voted Republican dramatically more often than predicted by the normal vote baseline. Short-term deviations from long-term expectations were strongly associated with issue preferences.

The most potent of the issues presented in Figure 2 are clearly the Vietnam war and amnesty (Figures 2a and 2b). Both the long- and short-term components of the Vietnam issue were larger in 1972 than they had been in 1968 when the indices were $L=2.70$ and $S=6.12$ respectively.[16] Apparently, by the end of Nixon's first term in office the Vietnam war had very much become Mr. Nixon's war, at least in the minds of the Democrats who were more predisposed toward immediate withdrawal. But even on the question of national policy in Vietnam, the issue most clearly associated with his candidacy, McGovern was capable of securing only slightly more than his expected proportion of the two-party vote from the minor part of the population that most intensely favored immediate withdrawal from Vietnam. The remaining 70 per cent, favoring a different solution, displayed extremely high "defection" rates, ranging from 20 to 35 per cent below the expected Democratic vote. Similarly, views on the legalization of marijuana and on campus demonstrations were also strongly related to the vote. The two issues differed, how-

[16] Boyd, "Popular Control of Public Policy," p. 448.

ever, in that positions on the marijuana issue, a relatively new issue, had little relationship to enduring partisan differences. Campus demonstrations, on the other hand, had been a salient issue for a longer period of time and had produced moderate partisan differences between those sympathizing with protesting students and faculty and those who favored the use of force to quell campus unrest. Those who sympathized with the students were definitely more Democratic than those who preferred the use of force; they were also younger and relatively better educated. Despite the relative calm on the campuses prior to the election, the campus unrest issue had a substantial short-term component. Apparently the law-and-order attitudes and cultural cleavages underlying reactions to campus demonstrations had persisted in the absence of student riots, and the campus unrest scale is evidently an exceptionally good measure of these attitudes.

Attitudes related to race were also well developed and based on beliefs that might be expected to correlate with the vote and partisan defection. It is, therefore, interesting to note that the questions both on aid to minorities and racial desegregation have relatively lower short-term index values than the issues of Vietnam amnesty, marijuana, and campus unrest. Another question, not presented in Figure 2, dealing with assessments of the civil rights movement, showed even less relationship to the 1972 vote ($S=7.19$) than did the general desegregation question. This fits the pattern of diminution in the salience and potency of racial issues during the period from 1968 to 1972.[17] This trend also coincides with an increase in positive white attitudes toward the civil rights movement, as well as an increased perception of the black movement as peaceful rather than violent. Over the four years of the first Nixon administration, among whites attitudes favorable towards desegregation increased throughout the United States. Yet despite this overall shift in opinion, racial issues continued to have a greater short-term impact in the South. When the data of Figure 2f are recomputed for South and non-South, a 48 per cent deviation from expected vote was observed for segregationists in the South, as compared to a 27 per cent deviation in the non-South. The summarizing short-term index value for the non-South was only 6.76; in the South it was 9.44. Yet, even this somewhat larger short-term index value in the South falls shy of what might have been expected of the most heated and controversial issue in the region.

The general pattern observed for all the specific issues of Figure 2 is one in which McGovern did slightly better, or at least as well as "normally" expected, among the minority of the voters who intensely preferred the liberal policy alternative offered by each policy question. A great deal of "defection," however, occurred among the relatively large majorities favoring other alternatives. This pattern is vividly summarized by the liberal-conservative scale and the five-issue policy orientation index displayed in Figure 2. Respondents indicating a liberal political philosophy or a social change policy orientation voted more Democratic than normally expected. Pro-Nixon deviation from the normal vote among middle-of-the-road respondents was about 25 percentage points, and respondents with a conservative or social control policy orientation voted anywhere from 28 to 34 per cent above the Republican proportion of the vote expected for each group. These marked deviations from the traditional partisan baseline bear witness to the importance of the issues as short-term factors in the 1972 election.

Perceptions of Candidate Policy Positions

The data of Figure 2 display an impressive array of relationships between issues and the vote. However, those data reveal but one aspect of the issue-to-vote relationship since they deal only with the respondent's issue preference. They do not incorporate another important ingredient in issue voting, namely an assessment of which candidate is closer to the voter's policy preference on salient issues. Such an assessment is needed if we expect that voters will evaluate the policy positions of the candidates with respect to salient issues on which they themselves take a stand and then vote for the candidate who is closer to them on those issues. Evidence on this point has been used recently to argue that voting is a rational act.[18] The discussion here will not be concerned with the concept of rationality; rather, it will focus on the conditions under which policy voting will occur.

If voting is to be viewed as policy voting, issues influencing the vote must be salient, the candidates must be perceived to take different issue positions, and the voters must have real issue preferences that

[17] The issue of government aid to minority groups does not, however, elicit only racial attitudes. The primary component of this item is the degree to which the individual, rather than society, is to be blamed for the social and economic misfortunes of certain segments of society. It also refers to the extent of social change necessary to alleviate the adverse socioeconomic conditions of blacks and other minorities. While one aspect of this social attitude is definitely racial in nature, it is not as clearly racial in content as is the desegregation item of Figure 2f.


The Gallup Opinion Index shows that mention of racial problems as the most important issue facing the country today had dropped from 40 per cent in mid-October, 1967 to 5 per cent in early 1972. See *Gallup Opinion Index*, Report No. 78, December, 1971.

[18] The rationality of the voter has been debated heatedly in the literature of late, and while we believe that the data presented here deal directly with this controversy, it is not the purpose of this report to review it.

are established prior to their vote and that are not easily manipulable by political leaders. Under these criteria the policy voter is the individual who casts his ballot for the candidate most proximate to him on those issues about which he holds an attitude before the election. The ranks of the policy voter do not include individuals who are either persuaded by the candidate to take a particular issue position or those who rationalize their vote by projecting their own policy preference onto their preferred candidate, thus presenting a perfect correspondence between their own policy preference and the issue position of their preferred candidate.[19] Unfortunately, without data measuring individual-level issue attitude change over time we cannot distinguish rationalization and persuasion effects from policy voting. What we can do with a single cross section, however, is determine if the proximity measure provides additional predictive power beyond that obtained with the individual's own issue position.

The analysis reveals that an assessment of the relative proximities of the voter to the candidate does indeed provide a far better explanation of the vote than does a measure of the respondent's policy preference alone. This is strikingly demonstrated by Figure 3, which presents a normal vote analysis of the Vietnam and liberal-conservative "proximity indices."[20] These two items had displayed exceptionally strong short-term index values in Figure 2 which used the respondent's stated issue position rather than the proximity measure. The measures of proximity presented in Figure 3, however, show even larger short-term components than those found earlier. The short-term index for Vietnam increased from 11.80 to 16.52, while the value for the liberal-conservative item rose from 11.95 to 16.45. McGovern received 75 per cent of the vote from those who perceived him as the closer of the two candidates on the Vietnam issue; he obtained only 44 per cent of the vote from those who placed him and Nixon equidistant from themselves; and he was supported by only 13 per cent of those who perceived Nixon as closer. Similar results from an analysis of the liberal-conservative measure indicate a stronger covariation between "issue proximity" and vote than between stated policy preference and vote.[21]

Figures 3a–3b: Normal Vote Analysis of Vietnam and Liberal/Conservative Issue Proximity Indices



Notes—a) The Republican vote is always 100% minus the Democratic vote; b) the category N's below each figure are for the Expected Vote (top row) and the Observed Vote (bottom row), respectively.

[19] These criteria are dealt with in Richard A. Brody and B. I. Page, "Comment: The Assessment of Policy Voting," *The American Political Science Review*, 66 (June 1972), 450–458.

[20] Two features of the 7-point issue scales allow us to operationalize this linkage. First, all issues are screened for salience to the individual respondent. The survey questions utilizing the 7-point scales have a self-contained saliency screen which asks, "Or haven't you thought much about this?" This helps in meeting the saliency requirement of the proximity model of issue voting. Secondly, the respondent is asked to locate each candidate on each scale. Thus, for every issue a trichotomous proximity index parsimoniously reveals which candidate is seen as closer to the voter or if the two alternatives are equidistant.

The proximity measures are computed by simply comparing the absolute differences between the individual's self-location and the candidate position on the 7-point issue scale and assigning to the individual respondent a score of −1 if closer to McGovern, +1 if closer to Nixon, and zero if equidistant from both candidates.

[21] It may be suggested, however, that the stronger relationship between the proximity measure and vote is simply a spurious relationship arising because individuals locating themselves on the left systematically placed McGovern closer to themselves and Nixon farther away, while those on the right did just the opposite when responding to the survey instrument. Relationships such as those between the Vietnam proximity and vote (presented in Figure 3a) persist even after controlling for left and right self-placement on the issue. This is clearly revealed by the partial correlations between vote and the proximity measures for each of 14 separate public policy issues. The partial correlations remain virtually identical to the zero-order corre-

With more than a dozen specific issue items available for analysis, a simplification of the data pertaining to issues is obviously desirable. The search for a parsimonious assessment of policy voting led to a factor analysis of the numerous issue questions included in the study. This analysis disclosed four general issue dimensions defined by policies concerning the *war*, and *economic*, *social*, and *cultural* issues.[22] The war domain included the issues of Vietnam withdrawal, amnesty for draft dodgers, and reducing military spending. The issues of government health insurance and a government guaranteed standard of living were the best representatives of the economic dimension. Attitudes toward urban unrest, campus unrest, protecting the rights of those accused of crime, and government aid to minorities formed the social issue domain. Finally, the issues of equal rights for women, abortion and the legalization of marijuana composed the cultural issue dimension. A normal vote analysis of the proximity measures for these four issue domains is presented in Figure 4 and reveals an exceptionally strong short-term component for each issue domain. The data of Figure 4 show that by aggregating issues into general domains and employing the proximity format, the objectives of analytic parsimony and predictive power are maximized.

Ideological Politics in 1972

The normal-vote analysis of the four issue domains documents a substantial relationship between issues and the vote.[23] The implications of the factor analysis four-factor solution, however, go well beyond the simple relationship of the four issue domains to the vote. In addition to the structuring of attitudes implied by the solution, the voter's self-location on the liberal-conservative scale was clearly relevant to all four factors. This suggests a degree of consistency in issue attitudes that has traditionally been associated with an ideological interpretation of politics.[24] Indeed, a multivariate analysis of the role of issues in determining vote preference with the liberal-conservative proximity measure included as an "issue" demonstrates that the liberal-conservative measure is as strong a predictor of the vote as the most potent issue proximity measure based on any one of the four issue domains. This relative importance of the liberal-conservative measure implies that a broad segment of the population in 1972 was reacting to politics in a fairly ideological manner.

---

lation after controlling for the respondent's stated policy preference on each issue. However, when the proximity measure is used as the statistical control in computing the partial correlations, the resulting partial between vote and policy preference is always either very close to zero or at least much smaller than the zero-order relation between self-location and vote. These findings demonstrate that it is almost entirely the proximity model that explains the relationship between an individual's own policy preference and his vote decision. Regardless of an individual's own position on the issues, he is considerably more likely to vote for the candidate he believes to be closer to him on the salient issues than for the candidate he perceives as relatively further from his own policy preference.

Other data, however, suggest that rationalization and/or candidate persuasion may have inflated the correlation between the proximity measures and the vote. For instance, the *long-term* index values for the Vietnam and liberal-conservative proximity indices of Figure 3 were larger than those for the comparable self-location items of Figure 2. This indicates that party identification may have been inducing congruence between the vote and candidate proximity. That is, Democrats who were not entirely aware of McGovern's position on the issues may have been placing McGovern closer to themselves on the issues simply because he was a Democrat and they eventually voted for him because of that, not because of the issues.


Other analysis also suggested that there was some tendency for positive candidate affect to result in closer proximity to a candidate despite the respondent's own issue position. Thus, positive attitudes toward a candidate or his party may have caused respondents with unclear perception of the candidate's policy position to place their preferred candidate closer to themselves on the issues. This in turn would have increased, spuriously, the relationship between the proximity measures and vote. A similar result would have occurred if the respondent had not formulated an attitude on the issue but had simply placed himself at the issue position he believed to coincide with his preferred candidate or party. The rationalization and persuasion effects may have inflated the correlation between proximity measures and the vote, leading to an overestimate of the rational policy voting that did indeed occur. This problem is, however, greatly reduced when conducting multiple equation analyses that include measures of the factors presumed to cause the rationalization or persuasion effects. That is, if these effects are the result of affect toward the candidate or party loyalty, then their spurious relationship to the vote will be removed from the direct relationship between the issue proximity and the vote by including the assessment of candidate affect and party identification in the same explanatory equation containing the issue measures. This is exactly the strategy that was pursued when assessing the relative importance of the several factors affecting the election outcome.

[22] A factor analysis of some twenty issues was employed to ascertain the dimensional structure of the issue space. The loadings of the items on their respective common factors were all above .6.

[23] The results of a multivariate analysis with the two-party vote as the dependent variable and the several individual issue proximities excluding the liberal-conservative scale but including party identification revealed the seven most important single issues. These were, in order of importance as determined by a step-wise regression: Vietnam, a government guarantee of a job and good standard of living, dealing with campus unrest, protecting the rights of individuals accused of crimes, legalization of marijuana, the use of busing to achieve racial integration of schools, and urban unrest. These seven issue proximities explained roughly 60 per cent of the variance in the vote. The last four mentioned issues, however, each added only 1 per cent of explained variance and only 2 per cent more explained variance is achieved after adding eight other issues to the regression analysis.

[24] Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," Chap. 6 in *Ideology and Discontent*, ed. David Apter (New York: Free Press, 1964).

Figures 4a–d: Normal Vote Analysis of Issue Proximity Measures for Major Issue Domains



Notes a) The Republican vote is always 100% minus the Democratic vote; b) the category N's below each figure are for Expected Vote (top row) and the Observed Vote (bottom row), respectively.

As Converse points out,

> . . . The use of such basic dimensions of judgment as the liberal-conservative continuum betokens a contextual grasp of politics that permits a wide range of more specific idea-elements to be organized into more tightly constrained wholes. . . . There are many crucial consequences of such organization: With it, for example, new political events have more meaning, retention of political information from the past is far more adequate, and political behavior increasingly approximates that of sophisticated "rational" models, which assume relatively full information.[25]

The relationship between the liberal-conservative proximity measure and the vote in 1972 is, of course, only inferential evidence of the tightly constrained attitude sets that Converse has equated with ideology. What must be added to authenticate a role for "ideology" in the 1972 election is a direct investigation of the interrelatedness of preferences on public policy questions and of the consistency between the respondents' self-location on specific issue questions and the respondents' self-location on the liberal-conservative continuum.

Table 2 provides data on such interrelatedness of attitudes. The interrelatedness of attitudes on issues can be inspected in terms of correlations both within the clusters of issues that constitute the four issue domains and between the several items forming the separate clusters.

The entries in Table 2 show within-domain and between-domain correlations that are quite high for mass public survey data. These data are consistent with findings reported in previous studies[26] that show relatively higher levels of attitude constraint than were found prior to 1964. This temporal change in the level of ideology has paralleled,

[25] Converse, "Nature of Belief Systems," p. 227.

[26] Norman H. Nie and Kristi Andersen, "Mass Belief Systems Revisited: Political Change and Attitude Structure," *The Journal of Politics*, 36 (August, 1974), 540–591; Gerald M. Pomper, "From Confusion to Clarity: Issues and American Voters, 1956–1968," *The American Political Science Review*, 66 (June, 1972), 415–428.

Table 2: Ideological Constraint: Inter-Item Correlations for Issues and Liberal/Conservative

		Vietnam	Amnesty	Military	St of Living	Insurance	Urban	Campus	Accused	Minorities	Women	Abortion	Marijuana	Busing	Lib/Con
WAR	Vietnam														
	Ammesty	.42													
	Military	.38	.30												
ECONOMIC	St of Living	.22	.27	.15											
	Insurance	.22	.23	.14	.33										
SOCIAL	Urban	.14	a	a	.25	a									
	Campus	.22	a	a	.25	a	.39								
	Accused	.20	.28	.16	.18	.12	.37	.41							
	Minorities	.23	.30	.22	.38	.23	.39	.42	.35						
CULTURAL	Women	.12	.08	.09	.04	.08	.08	.17	.17	.18					
	Abortion	.09	.17	.18	.02	.06	.10	.16	.11	.10	.24				
	Marijuana	.22	.27	.24	.06	.16	.19	.40	.29	.25	.28	.37			
BUSING	Busing	.26	.30	.23	.30	.16	.25	.34	.25	.35	.13	.10	.25		
IDEOLOGY	Lib/Con	.31	.42	.31	.32	.31	.27	.41	.32	.38	.19	.12	.32	.37	

Average Correlations

Within-domain:	.36
Between-domains:	.18
With Lib/Con:	.31
Total Matrix:	.24

[a] Note—Correlations between Insurance, Amnesty, and Military Spending on the one hand, and Urban and Campus Unrest on the other, are unattainable, since these sets of questions were on opposite half-samples on the study design.

[b] The within-domain interitem correlations are contained within the triangles circumscribed by the solid lines. The between-domain interitem correlations as well as the correlations of individual items with the liberal-conservative scale, are circumscribed by the broken lines.

if not produced, the change in issue polarization in the population. Furthermore, the change in indicators of ideological structuring of political attitudes coincides with the upgrading in the quality of political rhetoric and debate that has occurred since the 1960 presidential campaign. It doubtless reflects the fact that the past 12 years have witnessed an increased articulation of the ideological differences between the parties, as well as political interpretations of the pervasive social and cultural turbulence that has been so widely transmitted by the mass media. In short, the increase in the ideological nature of public opinion can be understood to be the consequence of spokesmen, and movements, utilizing public—and often out-of-the-ordinary—channels for airing their grievances.

The increased clarity of both policy disagreements and ideological constraint is particularly well documented by the apparently consistent meanings associated with the liberal-conservative scale. Studies investigating the meaning of liberal-conservative differences in mass populations have often found contradictory, confused, and unclear images associated with those two terms. The rather substantial correlations in the bottom line of Table 2 suggest that there is much less confusion today in translating certain political issues and events into a liberal-conservative framework.

The Impact of Issues and Party

Richard Nixon won a truly impressive electoral victory on November 7, 1972. Not only did he obtain 94 per cent of the vote among self-proclaimed Republicans and 66 per cent among Independents, but he also captured 42 per cent of the vote among self-identified Democrats. This feat seems even more impressive when it is recalled that in 1952 Dwight Eisenhower, perhaps the most popular and personally appealing candidate since Franklin

D. Roosevelt, attracted only 28 per cent of the votes cast by Democrats.

By the simplest of logic, party identification, which has traditionally been seen as the most important determinant of American voting behavior, must have been seriously challenged by other causal factors in 1972. For several years, voting researchers have argued that issue concerns have escaped the low levels of saliency in which they languished during the "issueless" fifties. The evidence we have just reviewed supports that argument. But how does one measure the relative weight of issue concerns and partisan predispositions in deciding an election? Even the most naive test must compare the direct effects of the various explanatory factors in a single multivariate analysis.

The results of one such multivariate analysis demonstrate that the liberal-conservative and war indices were by far the most important of the "issue proximity" measures, while the economic and cultural issues showed relatively weaker independent effects. Most crucially, however, the proximity measures, when taken together as reflecting ideology and policy voting, were substantially more important as direct explanations of the vote than was party identification. At the same time it must be noted that party identification has been theoretically interpreted as a perceptual screen or predisposing attitude that is much further removed, in a causal sense, from the actual vote decision than are either candidate assessments or attitudes on issues as measured with proximity indices.[27] For many respondents, this implies that party identification has a predisposing effect that forces images of candidates and attitudes or issues to be consistent with party attitudes which, in turn, are the factors that directly affect the vote decision. Therefore, since party identification is not coordinate in a causal sense with candidate assessments and issue attitudes, its total effect on the vote cannot be ascertained from a simple regression analysis based on one point in time. Following this argument, however, the total effects of partisan attachment may be better estimated and compared with those of the proximity measures through stagewise regression analysis or from a limited causal modeling analysis using path coefficients.

In a stagewise regression[28] analysis, party identification was the first entered predictor of vote. Other variables were allowed to operate only on the remaining unexplained variance. This procedure maintains the theoretical notion that party attitudes are long-term central attitudes that heavily influence reactions to specific issues and candidates. This analysis revealed that 31 per cent of the variance in the vote was explained by party identification as the first variable in the equation. After party identification, the issue proximity measures were entered into the equation and they explained an *additional* 31 per cent of the variance in the vote. The beta coefficient for party identification in the equation that included the proximity measures was .19, whereas the largest single beta among the policy indices was .21—for the social index. Thus, the proximity measures of issue attitudes were exceptionally potent predictors of the vote even after controlling for party identification.


This conclusion was further strengthened with the computations of a path analysis.[29] Using a simple three-variable model with the vote, party

[27] It might be suggested that if self-placement on the issues were used in place of the proximities, party identification might appear to be relatively more potent because these measures are more coordinate in the causal sense in which they are treated by Angus Campbell et al., *The American Voter*, p. 128. A multiple regression was therefore performed using the 1972 self-placement issue measures instead of proximities. The calculations show that some of the issues were still as important as party identification in predicting the vote. But as Kessel has pointed out, comparisons of the relative magnitude of relations using different types of question formats are fraught with methodological difficulties. The relationship between these different types of issue questions and party identification along with possible shifts in the relationship over time is quite difficult to discern. See John H. Kessel, "Comment: The Issues in Issue Voting," *The American Political Science Review*, 66 (June 1972), 460–461.

[28] The stage-wise regression employed here operated on a "case deletion" procedure, that is, a case was excluded from the analysis if missing data was encountered for any single variable used. The order of the variables entered and the beta coefficients for each variable in the final equation was as follows: party identification (.13), the liberal-conservative proximity (.11), war (.08), social (.16), economic (.03), and radical indices (.01), a measure of reaction to McGovern's campaign performance (.06), McGovern (−.26), and Nixon (.25) thermometer ratings. The multiple R was .82 and R^2 equaled .68.

[29] For a concise statement of path analysis see Donald E. Stokes, "Compound Paths in Political Analysis," in *Mathematical Applications in Political Science V*, ed. James F. Herndon and Joseph L. Bernd (Charlottesville, Virginia: University Press of Virginia, 1971), pp. 70–92.

A four-variable, multiple equation, path analysis including party identification, a single composite issue proximity measure, a composite candidate thermometer and the vote confirms the results of the stage-wise regression and the limited causal analysis presented in the text. The path coefficients and total effects summed from the several equations for the three independent variables are presented below.



It should be noted that the total effects are only for the

identification, and a single composite proximity measure based on 15 specific issues (but excluding the liberal-conservative item), we found the total effect of party identification to be .51, whereas the issue effect was .55. *As an explanation of the vote in 1972, issues were at least equally as important as party identification.*[30] Of course, since party identification is a preconditioning factor influencing political behavior over a long period of time, it is still somewhat inappropriate to gauge its total effect on national electoral behavior with a single cross-sectional survey. This problem simply cannot be circumvented with the present data. Nevertheless, the comparison of the party identification and issue effects clearly demonstrates the significance of policy-related evaluations as an explanation of the 1972 election outcome.

This finding is consonant with the issue polarization so clearly found, particularly among Democrats. During a period of issue consensus or strong alignment between issue orientation and traditional partisan divisions, party ties can be expected to have a significant impact, both directly and as a predisposing agent, on the vote decision. However, during periods when questions of policy attain new levels of public salience and divide the population in a fashion that is orthogonal to traditional partisan differences, other political stimuli, such as new candidates and especially candidates associated with the new issues, may become relatively more important in explaining voting behavior. If a series of new issues endures and develops a profundity and centrality that competes with the predisposing potential of party identification, a good deal of inconsistency between traditional partisan attitudes and behavior will be observed. This inconsistency may simply endure until (1) either the attitudinal differences are resolved through the disappearance of the new issues, (2) or the new issue attitudes gain ascendancy and erode the previously central partisan attitude so that it may be changed to coincide with the new issue orientation, or (3) party leaders reorient the parties and resolve the conflict. Under any circumstance other than the last, partisan realignment may occur at an ideological or cultural attitudinal level, rather than as change originating in the sociological bases of party support. Of course, the degree to which realignment could possibly occur at only the attitudinal level depends on the strength of association between new issue alignments and sociological cleavages. Furthermore, such a realignment would occur only to the extent that new partisan cues emanating from leaders and policies correspond with the new issue cleavages. A systematic investigation of the realignment question will not be entertained in this paper, but the point to be made here is that the 1972 data indicate that the direct results of the inertial, or predisposing, effects of party identification are for the first time in at least 20 years slightly less potent in determining voting behavior than are issue attitudes.

Without exploring the topic of sociocultural cleavages, it should be noted that the relative importance of party identification in the 1972 vote varied among different demographic subgroups. Comparisons across education levels are particularly interesting, for they help to explain the predominance of ideology and issues in this election. As the focus of analysis moves across educational levels from grade school to college, the bulk of the explanatory power shifts from candidate image to issues and ideology. Voters with a college education are better informed politically, generally more cognizant of policy differences between the candidates and, therefore, more likely to make a vote decision on the basis of policy preferences than are less well educated individuals. It is apparently far easier for college-educated individuals to translate issue attitudes into a vote decision than for the relatively less well educated who use the candidate as an intervening focus for their ideology. The relatively greater importance of issues as an explanation of the 1972 election may, therefore, be partially a delayed reflection of the changing composition of the electorate. This hypothesis is supported by the finding that since 1964 turnout rates among the relatively less well educated have been declining, while turnout for the college educated group has remained rather stable and, indeed, actually *increased* between 1968 and 1972.[31]

The net result of these turnout trends was a voting population (that is, those who reported actually

model presented. This model assumes that issue attitudes are not determined by candidate ratings; thus it corresponds to the requirements for policy voting as stated in the text.

[30] A preliminary attempt to determine the effects of issues on the vote was made by D. M. Kovenock, P. L. Beardsley and J. W. Prothro, "Status, Party, Ideology Issues, and Candidate Choice: A Preliminary Theory-Relevant Analysis of the 1968 American Presidential Election," paper delivered at Specialist Meeting *B*: *XI* ("New Approaches to the Study of Social Structure and Voting Behavior"), Eighth World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Munich, Germany, August 31–September 5, 1970. It should be pointed out that contrary to what we treat as issues Kovenock et al., included reactions to individuals such as the vice-presidential candidates as an issue.

[31] Turnout in presidential elections from 1964 to 1972 was as follows:

Turnout by Education, 1964–1972

	1964	*1968*	*1972*
Grade School	68%	60%	58%
High School	78	77	70
College	89	84	87

These data are from the CPS national election surveys for the indicated years.

voting) in which 37 per cent had at least some college education in 1972, compared to only 26 per cent in 1964. Given their generally higher level of formal education, the population of actual voters in 1972 was better prepared to respond to the candidates in terms of policy preferences than were the voters in 1964.

An additional explanation for the decreased predictive power of party identification is that partisan attachment itself had declined significantly in the population by 1972 as evidenced by an increase in the percentage of self-identified Independents between 1964 and 1972. In 1964, some 23 per cent of the eligible electroate described themselves as Independents; by 1968 that figure had risen to 30 per cent; and in 1972 it was 35 per cent.[32] Given this increase in Independents, party identification was a meaningful predisposing factor for a much smaller proportion of the electorate in 1972 than it had been in earlier elections. With the shrinking of partisan attachment, party loyalty could, in turn, be expected to account somewhat less powerfully for the vote decision.

If these trends in turnout and partisan identification continue, issues can be expected to play an increasingly significant role in future elections. This circumstance would obviously have a long-lasting, major influence on political behavior, particularly at the level of presidential elections.

Candidate Preferences

At the outset it was suggested that the growth of issue polarization in the electorate, and the increased importance of issues as determinants of the vote decision have been, at least in part, a response to a new policy-oriented style of elite leadership. One test of this contention can be derived from the variation in candidate preferences that characterize voters with different policy orientations.

Before the election, the respondents in the national survey were asked to give a global, affective reaction to a number of political leaders. They were asked to locate the presidential and vice-presidential candidates, as well as a number of other national political figures, on a "feeling thermometer."[33]

Table 3. Average Ratings of Major 1972 Political Figures
(In "Degrees" on "Feeling Thermometer")

		Policy Orientation		
	Total	Left	Center	Right
Richard Nixon	65.5	54.4	67.8	72.8
Edward "Ted" Kennedy	55.3	67.1	54.3	44.6
Spiro Agnew	54.3	41.6	56.0	62.9
Thomas Eagleton	53.9	57.2	54.8	51.5
Hubert Humphrey	53.1	58.5	54.0	48.0
R. Sargent Shriver	50.0	59.1	49.9	42.5
Edmund Muskie	49.9	55.6	49.9	45.5
George Wallace	49.4	33.4	49.7	60.7
George McGovern	48.9	61.9	46.7	39.4
Henry "Scoop" Jackson	48.5	46.6	50.7	48.1
John Lindsay	47.9	54.9	46.9	43.1
Shirley Chisholm	45.6	57.8	43.0	37.2
(Range of *N*'s)	(1306–2633)	(332–706)	(389–735)	(456–912)

Although there were predictable partisan biases and racial differences in the ratings given to the candidates, the largest variations were found with respect to the general left-right policy preference typology.[34] Mean thermometer ratings, based on the five-issue policy orientation index defined earlier have been entered in Table 3 for advocates of the left, center and right. These comparisons reveal marked differences in attitudes toward the candidates. McGovern, obviously the preferred candidate among individuals in favor of changing the social order, received little positive support from the right. Nixon, on the other hand, received his highest mean ratings from the law-and-order, social control advocates; the centrists were slightly less supportive of the President, and those on the left even less so. Vice President Spiro Agnew's popularity followed essentially the same pattern as that found for the President but was approximately

[32] It should be noted that the Independents Category includes those individuals who lean toward one of the parties as well as those who have no tendency to identify with a party. When "leaning" Independents are excluded, the per cent of Independents increased from 8 per cent in 1964 to 13 per cent in 1972. Most of this increase in Independents appeared, in the aggregate, to be at the expense of the Democrats since their proportion of the electorate declined from 52 per cent in 1964 to 41 per cent in 1972. At the same time the proportion of Republicans remained quite stable at about 25 per cent.

[33] The feeling thermometer is a measure that allows the respondent to indicate his feelings or affect toward the candidates. The measure runs from zero degrees as most unfavorable to 100 degrees as most favorable; 50 degrees is the neutral response.


[34] There were sharp racial differences underlying the overall candidate ratings. When whites are examined separately, Nixon's rating goes up while McGovern's drops to where only Chisholm's mean rating is lower—and Wallace replaces Kennedy as the most popular Democratic political figure. This latter reversal basically reflects partisan differences in the assessment of Kennedy and the highly positive attitude of Republicans toward George Wallace. Among white Democrats, Wallace rated sixth, behind Kennedy, Humphrey, Shriver, McGovern, and Muskie, in that order. While Wallace's popularity increased dramatically among whites between 1968 and 1972, blacks remained steadfastly and strongly negative toward him, no doubt in reaction to the segregationist and strict law-and-order image popularly associated with Wallace. Black ratings of Kennedy, on the other hand, were exceedingly high. McGovern also rated relatively much higher among blacks, surpassing even civil rights champion Hubert Humphrey.

10 degrees lower. Wallace emerged as the only Democrat preferred on the right, falling only slightly below Agnew. The total population means of Table 3 reveal a substantially higher rating for Nixon than for any other political leader included in the list. The second highest ranking political leader, Ted Kennedy, was rated a full 10 degrees lower than Nixon. McGovern was rated exceptionally low, even in comparison to other Democratic leaders. McGovern's mean rating was not only 16 degrees below Nixon's, but it was also slightly higher than that of only three political leaders: Jackson, Lindsay, and Chisholm.[35] Nixon's mean thermometer rating in 1972 was virtually unchanged from what it was in 1968,[36] but in light of the data from Table 3, the notion that he was only a moderately popular candidate in 1972 becomes largely myth. The data strongly suggest that Nixon would have been a formidable opponent for even the most popular of Democratic political leaders.

Most instructive of all comparisons is the discovery that Nixon alone was rated positively (above 50 degrees) by all three groups on the policy preference spectrum. The ratings of the policy preference groups also suggest why a candidate such as McGovern who may represent only one segment of the national policy preference spectrum may capture control of a political party that shares his policy preferences but can not go on to win an electoral victory under contemporary conditions of polarization.

In many respects the 1968 Wallace candidacy, and the strongly conservative issue orientation of the Democrats defecting to vote for him, may have foreshadowed the 1972 presidential contest. If so, however, the strongest argument is not necessarily based on the presumption that past voting behavior is a more important determinant of a current vote decision than is a vestigial psychological identification with a particular party.[37] A previous vote that was contrary to an individual's party identification may itself lead to further defection. But the argument of the present era rests on the persistence of policy preferences that were not well matched by the stands of official party candidates either in 1968 or 1972. The Wallace vote in 1968 constituted a halfway point for individuals on their way out of the Democratic ranks and into the Republican party, and the 1972 vote of former Democrats may have represented solidification of this realignment. The 1972 normal vote expectation for Wallace supporters of 1968 was still strongly Democratic, however, and the 1972 outcome was seemingly set by voters who still called themselves Democrats, despite a two-election pattern of voting against both Humphrey and McGovern. The common element seems to have been the policy preferences of the Democratic defectors. As Figure 5a demonstrates, almost 8 out of 10 individuals who said they voted for Wallace in 1968 cast their ballot for Nixon in 1972; a full 40 per cent below their expected Democratic proportion of the two-party vote. Yet McGovern secured the vote of almost as many of the 1968 Humphrey voters as he normally could have expected, only a 3 per cent deviation below the expected 77 per cent.

Figures 5a–b: Normal Vote Analysis of Wallace Support Indices



Note: a) The Republican vote is always 100% minus the Democratic Vote; (b) the category N's below each figure are for the Expected Vote (top row) and the Observed Vote (bottom row) respectively.

[35] The Eagleton ratings appear to be aberrantly high and were apparently inflated by a sympathy factor; they tend to vary only slightly across otherwise analytically useful population subgroups and were therefore ignored in the various comparisons discussed.

[36] Converse et al., "Continuity and Change in American Politics," Table 2 on p. 1088.

[37] Walter DeVries and V. L. Tarrance, *The Ticket-Splitter: A New Force in American Politics* (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1972) places primary importance on past voting behavior as an explanation of the individual electoral decision.

The overwhelming defection rate of the 1968 Wallace supporters does not necessarily substantiate the claim that the 1968 voting act was the cause of the 1972 defection. Many Democrats who voted for Wallace in 1968 probably did not perceive that vote as contrary to their Democratic party identification and were not, therefore, consciously beginning a move to Republican voting. Furthermore, self-identified Democrats in general who rated Wallace higher than McGovern or any other Democrat, *regardless of previous voting behavior*, also defected heavily from their partisan identification. Figure 5b reveals that McGovern received only 16 per cent of the vote from the Democrats who rated Wallace higher than any other Democratic leader, an amazing 65 per cent less of the two-party vote than he could, on the basis of the normal-vote, have expected from that group. McGovern obviously was exceptionally unpopular among these Wallace supporters who represented more than one out of every four Democrats. Nixon on the other hand, was very warmly regarded. It appears that the absence of a preferred Democratic candidate in 1972 may be the more parsimonious explanation of the massive defection by 1968 Wallace supporters. That is, these conservative individuals, in the absence of Wallace and the presence of McGovern, chose their next most preferred candidate—Nixon. Policy orientations and *candidate* coalitions thus began to emerge.

The 1968 data have already illustrated that the polarization among Democrats existed at least four years prior to 1972, and that the availability of two Democratic candidates in 1968 gave these cleavages an electoral embodiment that did not have to involve massive defection to the Republican candidate. In many respects, then, the two presidential contests seem to have been defined by quite similar confrontations between left- and right-oriented Democrats. A deliberately oversimplied view of 1972 as a rerun of 1968, minus the right-wing Democratic alternative provided earlier by Wallace, is of no small use in understanding what happened. Two factors plainly depressed McGovern's electoral performance relative to Humphrey's. First, McGovern was not a personally appealing candidate—a very important factor under conditions of issue polarization, for it allowed issue differences to gain maximal importance. And second, his emergence to the left of Humphrey evoked somewhat more policy disagreement from the conservative segment of his own party than Humphrey could have expected.[38]

Nevertheless, the coalition structure of the Democratic party suggests that a more centrist nominee would still have found himself more distant from his conservative co-partisans than was Nixon. This enduring schism within the Democratic ranks signals future difficulties in partisan strategies that the Democrats will have to overcome. It raises the possibility that both the attitudinal and demographic basis of the Democratic party have been eroded by the short-term forces operating in the 1968 and 1972 elections and thus suggests, in turn, the continuing possibilities of partisan realignment.

The Democratic Coalition

Much of the popular debate over the election outcome and the obvious disarray among the Democrats has focused on McGovern as the cause of both these phenomena. He was, after all, personally unpopular and, more important, on vital policy questions his stance was perceived as far to the left of his party's mainstream. Electorally Mc-

[38] The 1972 study did not have respondents place Humphrey on the issues; thus we cannot directly assess the difference between him and McGovern. Differences perceived between candidates can, however, be determined from analysis of the candidate thermometers. The general methodology of multidimensional scaling that provides this information, as well as a similar analysis of the 1968 presidential candidates, can be found in Herbert F. Weisberg and Jerrold Rusk, "Dimensions of Candidate Evaluation," *The American Political Science Review*, 64 (December, 1970), 1167–1185.

Weisberg and Rusk found that a two-dimensional space provided a "good" solution with a stress of .05 using Kruskal's formula one for stress. In 1972 the two-dimensional solution has a stress of .05 with formula two which gives larger stress values than does formula one for the same solution. The two-dimensional solution places the political figures at the following locations:

	Dimension:	
Political Leader	*One*	*Two*
George McGovern	.030	.864
Edward Kennedy	.089	.807
R. Sargent Shriver	−.018	.733
Shirley Chisholm	−.254	.681
Hubert Humphrey	.297	.634
Edmund Muskie	−.034	.582
John Lindsay	−.389	.538
Henry Jackson	−.142	−.263
Spiro Agnew	.072	−1.501
George Wallace	.417	−1.525
Richard Nixon	−.068	−1.551

The solution indicates a clear differentiation between the Democratic cluster of leaders and the Republicans plus Wallace on the second dimension and very little difference between any of the political leaders on dimension one. This suggests what the stress value of .08 for a one-dimensional solution confirms, namely, that a one-dimensional solution fits the data nearly as well as a two-dimensional solution. This finding strongly supports the argument that the public was reacting to these political leaders in a highly ideological fashion. Furthermore, the solution demonstrates that while voters perceived a definite difference between McGovern and Humphrey, that difference is not strikingly great. Indeed, the only middle-of-the-road politician according to this solution was Henry ("Scoop") Jackson. Finally, the configuration vividly displays the convergence between Wallace and Nixon that was discussed earlier with respect to the issues.

Govern did very poorly among traditional Democratic voting groups—less well, in general, than Hubert Humphrey had four years earlier. McGovern received only 41 per cent of the working-class vote, 40 per cent of the Catholic vote, 43 per cent of the union-household vote, and 40 per cent of the votes from those with grade-school educations. He did not attain even half of the Northeastern vote or the urban vote. He did relatively well among blacks and young people, but among whites, the middle-aged, and older people, his vote was exceptionally meager.


A normal vote analysis, however, puts McGovern's losses in a somewhat different perspective. In Figure 6, we see that although the long-term associations of sociological variables with party identification run in the traditional directions, they are not exceedingly high in the first place; the highest Long-Term Index (L) value is 4.79, for Religion. In the short run, we find that voting in 1972 accentuated the traditional relationship between partisan differences and place of residence, religion, and race; maintained the relationship with occupational class and union affiliation; and deviated only slightly from the traditional relationship with education and region. McGovern's failure was thus more a case of shortfall among all major white demographic groups than of disproportionate losses among traditionally Democratic groups.[39]

Throughout the 1972 campaign and after the election the McGovern coalition was referred to as an "elite"—both in the sense of holding unrepresentative views and in the even more pejorative sense of being socially distinct and seeking unfair influence in party decision making. The implication of this argument is that the 1972 Democratic vote contingent was not only very different from

[39] McGovern, in fact, did better among some traditionally Democratic groups than was predicted prior to the election. Jews, for example, voted 3 per cent more Democratic than normally expected, a rather interesting finding since prior to the election there was much journalistic discussion of the Israeli urging that American Jews vote for Nixon because of his foreign policy.

For a more extensive discussion of how the voting in 1972 for various demographic groups compared to the expected and observed voting patterns of these groups since 1952 see Arthur H. Miller and Warren E. Miller, "Issues, Candidates and Partisan Divisions in the 1972 U.S. Election," *The British Journal of Political Science*, (September, 1975).

Figures 6a–h: Normal Vote Analysis of Demographic Groups




(Figures 6a-h continues)

that which voted for Humphrey in 1968, but that it was also quite distinct demographically from the traditional Democratic coalition. It has already been demonstrated that on a wide array of divisive issues McGovern supporters were, indeed, so liberal as to be unrepresentative of aggregate Democratic attitudes. Yet it cannot be forgotten that a majority of Democrats (58 per cent) still voted for McGovern, albeit a smaller majority than that secured by Humphrey in 1968. When the 1972 Democratic electorate is divided according to recalled 1968 vote, and these support groups are examined for issue positions, a coalition structure emerges that is highly similar to that associated with the 1972 candidate choice.

The social component of the "McGovern elite" myth is even more thoroughly contradicted by the data. The 1972 support-group structure is displayed in Table 4. While blacks were removed from the analysis of Table 4 so that any observed differences would not be confused with racial effects, it should be noted that McGovern's support group had a substantially larger proportion of blacks than did his nonsupport groups. For instance, of the Democrats voting for McGovern, 26 per cent were black, compared to only 3 per cent of the Democrats voting for Nixon. Among the total population, Nixon received slightly less than 2 per cent of his vote from blacks, while 20 per cent of the McGovern voters were black.

Among whites, McGovern's early support was quite similar to his final Democratic vote contingent. McGovern primary voters were, however, somewhat more likely to fall in the 30–59 age range and less likely to be 60 or older than Democrats voting for McGovern in the general election. They also tended to be slightly better educated, to come from middle income families, and to live outside the South more often than did the Democrats who cast their ballots for McGovern on November 7. Thus, while his primary supporters may be labeled as unrepresentative in terms of some sociological characteristics, on the whole McGovern appears to have been able to broaden his constituency during the campaign. It should be noted, however, that an unrepresentative set of partisans can be expected to vote in primaries, and that, with the exception of age,[40] their characteristics generally correspond to those cited above.

[40] Austin Ranney, "Turnout and Representation in Presidential Primary Elections," *The American Political Science Review*, 66 (March, 1972), 27. Ranney's findings



Note: 1) The Republican vote is always 100% minus the Democratic vote; 2) the category N's below each figure are for the Expected Vote (top row) and the Observed Vote (bottom row) respectively.

McGovern's early supporters were, however, quite distinct in some characteristics from those who voted for other Democratic primary contenders. McGovern primary voters were indeed more likely to be young, to be college educated, and to have a relatively high family income compared to those voting for some other Democrat in the primaries. But they were also more likely to have an urban background, to live in the Northeast, to be Catholic, and to come from a union household. Thus, while there were demographic differences between McGovern's supporters and nonsupporters in the primaries, these differences by no means always conform to the popular descriptions of McGovern's early coalition. When McGovern primary voters are compared to all self-identified Democrats, we find that although the same differences remain evident, they are generally not as large, revealing that McGovern's early supporters were not exceptionally distinct from the traditional Democratic coalition.

In short, the data of Table 4 provide only erratic confirmation of the hypothesis that McGovern's support, in either the primaries or the general election, was composed of a *social* minority sharply distinct from most Democrats. His supporters were, of course, disproportionately more black than his nonsupporters. And although the whites were to varying degrees relatively younger, better-off financially, better educated, and more nonsouthern, his support was not disproportionately composed of women or suburbanites as some political analysts were predicting prior to the election. On the contrary, some of the differences found tend to give the McGovern forces a demographic complexion that is fairly representative of the traditional Democratic coalition—namely, more Northeastern, urban, blue-collar, union-affiliated, and Catholic and Jewish. Whatever the composition of McGovern's visible backers, the data do not show that his rank-and-file supporters constituted a social elite.

A comparative look at the 1968 recall data reveals similar differences between the Humphrey and Wallace support group as were found between McGovern supporters and nonsupporters, except on the age variable. The age pattern fails to emerge because the youngest McGovern supporters were not in the 1968 electorate and because Wallace attracted a disproportionate share of the young vote in 1968. Otherwise, in addition to the fact that blacks fell almost entirely in the Humphrey group, we find that white Humphrey loyalists were better educated, less rural, and better off financially than Wallace Democrats. But, they were also more Northeastern, urban, Catholic, and Jewish. It need not be argued that this demographic similarity between the coalition structures of the two elections extends to the micro level, although it perhaps does. The aggregate parallelisms are enough to dismiss the notion that the McGovern candidacy of 1972 was supported by an elite radically unrepresentative of the groups that supported Hubert Humphrey four years before. Furthermore, although the data imply that a slightly more centrist Democratic candidate might have narrowed the margin of victory, there is little evidence to suggest that such a candidate would have done significantly better in absolute vote-winning terms than Humphrey did in 1968 with 43 per cent of the total vote.

In summary, there remain abiding and predictable partisan differences between the sociological groupings defined along economic, racial, religious and residential class lines. Generally, the groups popularly associated with the Democratic and Republican parties tended to cast their vote in proportions consistent with their long-standing attachment to either of the two parties. The short-term influences in the 1972 election had relatively little differential impact by economic class; they cut across traditional socioeconomic and demographic differences. After the affective ratings of the candidates, the next most important short-term factor accounting for the voter's decision was a liberal-conservative ideology, that is, response to the candidates in terms of a single left-right dimension. This continuum provided a simple policy yardstick by which the presidential candidates were evaluated with respect to the voters' own policy orientation. For others who were less consistently liberal or conservative in their policy orientation, particular issues proved more important in explaining the vote than did the liberal-conservative summary measure.[41] The war issue—including Vietnam policy, amnesty, and cutbacks in military spending—and the social issue—incorporating policy alternatives for dealing with urban problems and unrest, government aid to minorities, protection of individual civil liberties in criminal cases, and alternative modes

indicate that those who typically vote in state primaries are usually older and have a higher status in terms of income and occupation categories than the rest of the voting population. They are also more likely to participate in civic, religious and political organizations.

[41] That the liberal-conservative scale is a summary policy measure is evident from its relation to the issues in Table 2. Further evidence is derived from the finding that as more and more issues are added to a composite proximity measure, the correlation between the composite index and the liberal-conservative measure increases up to a value of about .7.

One reason why certain specific issues had an important impact on the vote in addition to the liberal-conservative effect is that about a quarter of the voters could not place themselves on that continuum. The bulk of these respondents could, however, place themselves as well as the candidates on the more specific issue questions.

Table 4. Demographic Composition of the Candidates' Support Among Whites

	McGovern Primary Voters	Other Primary Voters	Democrats Voting for McGovern	Democrats Voting for Nixon	All Democrats	McGovern Voters	Nixon Voters
(*N*)	(67)	(98)	(279)	(262)	(807)	(445)	(1000)
AGE:							
18–24	19%	5%	19%	7%	13%	19%	10%
25–29	10	8	10	8	9	14	11
30–59	55	62	47	58	51	48	54
60+	16	25	24	27	27	19	25
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
EDUCATION:							
Grade School	13%	18%	21%	21%	25%	16%	14%
High School	45	50	45	55	51	44	49
College	42	31	34	24	24	40	37
INCOME:							
Less than $4,000	12%	17%	17%	16%	19%	15%	12%
$4,000–$7,999	22	21	24	21	25	21	19
$8,000–$14,999	45	42	37	43	38	39	41
$15,000 or more	21	20	22	20	18	25	28
SEX:							
Male	40%	38%	43%	42%	42%	41%	47%
Female	60	62	57	58	58	59	53
RESIDENCE:							
Urban	33%	16%	29%	21%	25%	29%	21%
Suburban	36	41	33	37	35	37	43
Rural	31	43	38	42	40	34	36
REGION:							
Northeast	33%	11%	25%	17%	20%	29%	22%
Midwest	30	29	31	23	27	32	32
South	13	41	23	46	37	20	29
West	24	19	21	14	16	19	17
RELIGION:							
Protestant	50%	73%	53%	61%	61%	57%	74%
Catholic	41	23	41	38	35	37	25
Jew	9	4	6	1	4	6	1
OCCUPATION:							
White Collar	55%	55%	49%	54%	47%	54%	59%
Blue Collar	45	45	51	46	53	46	41
SOCIAL CLASS[a]							
Working Class	51%	59%	49%	58%	58%	46%	48%
Middle Class	49	40	51	42	42	54	52
UNION HOUSEHOLD:							
Yes	38%	28%	35%	28%	30%	33%	23%
No	62	72	65	72	70	67	77

[a] Respondent's self-perceived social class.

for dealing with student demonstrations—were the issue domains that contributes significantly to the explanation of the vote. The economic issues and the cultural issues (abortion, equality for women, and the legalization of marijuana) proved relatively less potent. The most important revelation of the foregoing analysis was the substantial impact of the polarizing effects of specific issues relevant to the election. Indeed, when the relative contributions of the three general factors explaining the vote, namely, the candidates, parties and issues, are compared to previous elections, it becomes clear that not only was this an issue election but that it may more appropriately be labeled an ideological election. Above all else, the outcome of the election was the result of the ideological polarization within the Democratic ranks that pitted the left-wing Democrats against those on the right.

Comment: What Have You Done for Me Lately? Toward An Investment Theory of Voting*

SAMUEL POPKIN
Cambridge Survey Research and University of California, San Diego

JOHN W. GORMAN
Cambridge Survey Research

CHARLES PHILLIPS
University of Texas at Austin

JEFFREY A. SMITH
University of Texas at Austin

A resuscitation of the assumptions buried under the gravestones 'hence,' 'therefore,' 'because' and the like will often reveal that the explanation offered is poorly bounded or downright unacceptable.

—Karl Popper—

"A Majority Party in Disarray: Policy Polarization in the 1972 Election," by Arthur H. Miller, Warren E. Miller, Alden S. Raine and Thad A. Brown, the latest Survey Research Center/Center for Political Studies quadrennial election study offers a portrait of the American electorate which is in stark contrast with that which emerges from the *American Voter*, the classic product of the SRC's researches into voting behavior.[1] In effect, the authors of the latest version now declare the original account to be—in one of the more memorable phrases of recent political discourse—inoperative.

We agree strongly that the portrait presented in the *American Voter* is gravely flawed, but not because, as is now argued, the behavior of American voters in 1972 differed fundamentally from that of voters in past elections. We contend that the portrait is inaccurate because the model of political behavior used to construct it is flawed and inadequate. In this paper, we will outline an alternate framework, drawing on the economic approach to the study of politics pioneered by Anthony Downs.[2] In our view this framework makes it possible to account for electoral behavior over two decades in a more consistent and persuasive way than is achieved either by the original SRC approach or by this revision.

The *American Voter* described the elections of 1952 and 1956 as contests centered on candidate personality; it concluded that "the major role played by candidate appeal suggests the absence of overriding public concern to judge the policies of the candidates and their parties against the standards received from well-elaborated political ideologies."[3]

After the 1960 election, it was still believed that the voters were personality centered and not concerned with ideology: "The electorate seems quite capable of expressing its intolerance of circumstances it finds exasperating and it sometimes responds strongly to the personal qualities of an attractive candidate, but it is not well enough informed to follow a deliberate program of choice between conservative and liberal alternatives in government policies."[4]

* We particularly want to thank Robert P. Abelson, Hayward Alker, Pauline Bisky, Roy D'Andrade, William A. Galston, Robert Jervis, Ithiel De Sola Pool, Howard Rosenthal, Susan Shirk, Leon Sigal, and Aaron Wildavsky for their advice and help. We are deeply in debt to Norman Frohlich and Joe A. Oppenheimer for guiding us through some of the more intricate problems of this paper.

[1] Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960). In citing this and other works from the SRC corpus, we are attempting to outline the *central verbal model* underlying the work. We are fully aware that alternative quotations that qualify and sometimes even contradict can be found. For a similar effort, see Walter Dean Burnham, "Contributions of the SRC to the Development of Voting Theory" (paper presented at the Fall 1975 APSA convention.) As Burnham notes, ". . . it is fair to say that there is no single place in any of this immense (SRC) corpus of work where a comprehensive set of theoretical propositions concerning voting behavior is laid down, with each propostion linked with the next in a closed analytical framework. The problem therefore arises that any effort by an outside scholar to provide an approximation to such a summary is likely to be challenged as misleading or incomplete" (Burnham ms. pp. 4–5).

[2] Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1957). Other examples of the rational-economic approach are: William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook, "A Theory of the Calculus of Voting" *American Political Science Review* 63 (March 1968) 25–43; Arthur S. Goldberg, "Social Determinism and Rationality as Basis of Party Identification," *American Political Science Review* 62 (1969), 5–25; and Norman Frohlich, Joe A. Oppenheimer, Jeffrey A. Smith and Oran R. Young, "A Test of Downsian Voter Rationality: 1964 Presidential Voting," *American Political Science Review* (forthcoming).

[3] Campbell et al., *The American Voter*, p. 550.

[4] Angus Campbell, "Voters and Elections: Past and Present," *Journal of Politics*, 26 (November 1964), 756.

After the Johnson-Goldwater clash of 1964, the conclusion was, "The public may become aroused by current circumstances such as the Korean War in 1952 or by some attribute of the candidate such as Kennedy's religion, but is typically unconcerned about the inter-party debates over specific positions which agitate the party leadership and command copious space in the newspaper."[5] And, in 1968, the SRC found that " . . . pushing beyond the expression of narrow and superficial attitudes in the mass public to the cognitive texture which underlies the attitudes is a rather disillusioning experience."[6]

The findings of "Majority Party" are in stark contrast to previous SRC/CPS findings. They state that, for the first time in 20 years, issues were more potent than party as a determinant of the vote (p. 770), that a "spectacular change in the quality of mass attitudes towards questions of public policy" (p. 754) has occurred and that voters are now becoming ideological. (p. 766) Repeatedly, in numerous passages of their paper the authors of "Majority Party" describe changes in the nature of the electorate or the nature of voting a change from party and candidate to ideology and issues, and claim an increased ideological content to the act of voting. The basis for these claims of change lies in comparisons with the findings of past Survey Research Center studies, but these past studies employed different *models*, *methods*, and *standards*. Since, when we compare the old and new models, the changed model produces massively different results for 1972 than does the older model for 1972, can anyone suppose it would produce the same results for 1964 or 1952?. To arrive at these new findings, the authors of "Majority Party" have introduced a model of voting that differs distinctly from the traditional model of voting that Survey Research Center analysts have used since the early 'fifties. This new model—and its associated methods and standards—generates conclusions about the 1972 election radically different from those produced for 1972 by the old "American Voter" model. The "American Voter" model and the school of voting research based on it have their roots in group theory. But now, in order to account for findings which the "American Voter" model cannot explain, the authors of "Majority Party" have incorporated ideas into their model from what is often described as the economic-rational school of voting research, exemplified by the work of Anthony Downs. Yet in trying to repair the older model the authors have adopted those parts of Downs's work primarily concerned with the nature of policy voting and the aggregation of individual preferences into one-dimensional "ideological space." Some of these concepts are ill-suited to the study of actual voting because they fail to take into account the context of American politics; in other cases, they are simply incorrect as originally formulated. A different aspect of Downs' work which we will emphasize here is the analysis of the costs of information with its implications for the role of informational shortcuts and the origins and nature of issue concerns.

The first section of this paper presents in brief form the six-factor model that was used in earlier SRC/CPS election studies and employs it to test claims of change made both directly and obliquely in "Majority Party." The second section begins to develop a theory of voting based on the idea of the voter as an investor and of each vote as *an investment in one or more collective goods under conditions of uncertainty with costly and imperfect information*. Particular attention is directed to four areas where the investor-voter model highlights problems of the central verbal models which underlie "Majority Party" and previous SRC work: the cost of information, the role of parties, the role of candidates in a system like ours, and the role of ideology.

Section three provides some evidence from the 1972 McGovern election studies suggesting that the size of McGovern's defeat was not the foregone conclusion it is now assumed to have been, that the campaign made a difference, that voters did differentiate between various aspects of the candidates and that McGovern's perceived incompetence was extremely costly to him. Finally, in our conclusion we point out the directions that voting research ought to follow in future years to answer the questions raised by the investor-voter approach.

The 1972 Election in Historical Context

The 1972 election, according to "Majority Party," was "very different from the presidential elections of the fifties" because of the "increased importance of issues as predictors of the vote decision" and the "increased impact of policy preferences on partisan defection." (p. 754) In addition to these explicitly comparative statements we are also told that in 1972 there was "relatively greater importance of issues" (p. 770) and that proximity measures of issue attitudes were "exceptionally potent predictors." (p. 769) These assertions are made without supporting data from elections before 1968. In this section we make the historical comparisons and show that there is

[5] Angus Campbell, "Interpreting the Presidential Victory," in *The National Election of 1964*, ed. Milton C. Cummings, Jr. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1966), p. 269.

[6] Philip Converse, Warren Miller, Jerrold Rusk, and Arthur Wolfe, "Continuity and Change in American Politics: Parties and Issues in the 1968 Election," *American Political Science Review* 63 (December 1969), 1096.

little or no support for comparative claims of "Majority Party."

Two major problems emerge in testing the claims that issues in 1972 were of greater importance than were issues in past elections and that issues were more important in 1972 than were candidates or parties in 1972. The first problem is to clarify what is meant by "importance" and to use valid, defensible criteria. When "Majority Party" says that proximity measures were exceptionally potent predictors of the vote (p. 769) and when it lists the most important issues (p. 766, fn. 23) the criterion of importance employed is "effect on R^2," in the former case within a stage-wise regression procedure and in the latter within a step-wise regression procedure. There is never any justification for using stage-wise regression procedures, and even within standard multiple regression procedures, "effect on R^2" is not an appropriate criterion of importance.[7] In making our assessments of the importance of individual factors such as issues or candidates within a multiple regression model, therefore, we substitute three different and defensible criteria of importance: the weight of individual factors in the voters' decision calculus, the net impact of a factor on the outcome of an election, and the partisan or vote-related polarization arising from differing positions on a factor within the population.

While it is a straightforward matter to substitute different criteria of importance for those used in "Majority Party," there is a second and more difficult problem involved in testing the historical claims made about the 1972 election. Their new multivariate model requires respondents' self-placements on multi-position issue scales and the respondents' perceptions of candidate placements on similar 'left-right' scales for each issue in order to derive the issue-specific proximity measures used in this new model. Previous SRC/CPS surveys have not included the measures needed to use this new proximity model and, therefore, no straightforward historical assessment of the claims of "Majority Party" is possible. Instead, an indirect technique is needed.

The indirect technique by which the claims of Majority Party can be tested relies on the SRC/CPS archive of election surveys, surely the finest in the world, and the SRC six-factor model, which has been used so extensively in the past. The six-factor model can be used for every presidential race since 1952 and thus can be used to test assertions about historical trends. In addition, the older six-factor model can be compared directly with the proximity model in 1972. If the six-factor model shows the asserted trends and if the six-factor model for 1972 agrees with the new proximity model for 1972, then we can be assured that the new findings are not due to the use of new instruments. In fact, the older model does not show the trends asserted to hold in "Majority Party," and the two models do not agree for 1972.

The six-factor model for evaluating presidential elections was developed by Campbell, Stokes and Miller.[8] The basis for this model is a series of eight broad, open-ended questions covering likes and dislikes about the Democratic and Republican presidential candidates and likes and dislikes about the two parties. The responses to the eight questions are regrouped into six separate scales constituting the dimensions of partisan attitudes:

(1) Attitudes toward the Democratic candidate, incorporating all references to "experience, abilities, personal qualities of relation to his party."[9]
(2) Identical attitudes for the Republican candidate.
(3) Attitudes related to groups, incorporating all comments on specific groups in the population.

[7] Glen G. Cain and Harold W. Watts, "Problems in Making Policy Inferences from the Coleman Report," *American Sociological Review*, 35 (April, 1970), 228–242, deal most elegantly with the fallacies and pitfalls of "effect on R^2" type measures; see especially their Table 1.

[8] Donald Stokes, Angus Campbell, and Warren E. Miller, "Components of Electoral Decision," *American Political Science Review* 52 (June 1958), 367–387; Angus Campbell and Donald E. Stokes, "Partisan Attitudes and the Presidential Vote," in *American Voting Behavior*, ed. Eugene Burdick and Arthur J. Brodbeck (Glencoe, Ill: Free Press, 1959) pp. 353–371; Donald Stokes, "Some Dynamic Elements of Contests for the Presidency," *American Political Science Review* 60 (March 1966), 19–28; and Campbell et al., *The American Voter*, pp. 524–531.

[9] This short description of the scales is from Stokes et al., "Components of Electoral Decision," p. 380. Although the exact coding methods used by the SRC in their works have never been published, the assignment of responses in most cases is indicated by their code book. Using our best judgments on appropriate grouping procedures we were able to replicate all published results accurately enough to ensure that the original coding scheme would not produce any non-trivial changes in our results. There was, however, a change in format in the 1972 survey which limited respondents to three rather than five evaluative comments for and against each party and candidate. Therefore, in these tables we have employed only the first three responses for each question in our estimation of the six-factor models for past elections. This means that these tables do not correspond directly with tables using all five responses. Michael R. Kagay and Greg A. Caldeira, ("I Like the Looks of his Face: Elements of Electoral Choice, 1952–1972," paper delivered at the 1975 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, California, Sept. 2–5, 1975) have performed a remarkably similar analysis with slightly different coding schemata (based on three different coding schemata supplied them by the SRC) and using all five responses for the earlier years. Although their results do not accord exactly with those reported here, this is largely due to our use of three responses in earlier years. Neither paper's coding schema, and neither five- nor three-answer procedures supports the assertions of "Majority Party." We wish to acknowledge collegial assistance of the highest order from Kagay and Caldeira.

(4) Domestic issues, including all references to domestic policy.
(5) Foreign issues, including all references to foreign policy.
(6) Party management, including all references to corruption, leadership and the capacity of a party to govern.

Given these six scales, with the score for each respondent equal simply to the number of pro-Republican responses minus the number of pro-Democratic responses, a linear model is estimated for all voters using least squares techniques, with a dichotomous dependent variable scored 1 for a Republican vote and 0 for a Democratic vote. The dependent variable thus estimated is interpreted as the probability of a Republican vote (R) for each voter:[10]

$$P(R) = B_0 + \sum_{i=1}^{6} BiXi$$

Once this model has been estimated for all voters in the 1952, 1956, 1960, 1964 and 1972 presidential elections,[11] three types of comparisons corresponding to three criteria of importance are possible within and between elections:

(1) Comparisons of the raw, unstandardized regression coefficients, which show the weight applied to a factor by voters;
(2) Comparisons of the products of the weights and the population means of the variables, which indicate the net impact of a factor on the overall outcome of an election; and
(3) Comparisons of the products of the weights and the standard deviations of the factors which indicate partisan, vote related polarization in the electorate due to differences among the population on the factor.

Trends In Weights. The unstandardized regression coefficient (B) is a measure of the unit "clout" or weight associated with a given factor. An unstandardized B of .05, for example, means that a one-unit change in the score of a given factor is associated with a five per cent change in the probability of a Republican vote.

The authors of "Majority Party" imply that over time there has been a decline in the value of the weights associated with candidates, reflecting the decline in their importance, and a rise in the value of weights associated with issues, reflecting their increasing role in voters' decisions.[12] Yet, Table 1, which displays the five relevant equations, shows that this model, the only model for which there are data spanning two decades, does not support the assertions of "Majority Party" and, in many cases, actually contradicts them. Never before in the period under review have two candidates been so dominant in the voting equation, and domestic issues are by no means at a high in 1972.[13]

The most notable contradiction to the pattern described by "Majority Party" is the general increase over the years in the weight of candidate evaluation scores. The weights for candidate-centered considerations are higher for the 1972 election than for either of the two Eisenhower elections which are often painted as paradigms of the popularity contest type election. When the coefficients are compared with those of later years, it would appear that the weight given domestic issues, group concerns and general party management were about as high in 1952 as in any subsequent election. The election of 1972 shows a low weight for domestic issues, while the weight of foreign issues in 1972 differs only trivially from 1952, when there was also a major war. A definite decline in 1972 in the weight accorded to considerations of the parties as managers of government lends definite support to the "decline of the parties" thesis, but the weights show the 1972 election to be no more issue-oriented than 1952 and more candidate-oriented than the 1952 race.

Furthermore, "Majority Party" implies that we should expect a decline in the weight attached to the group concerns factor, since group-oriented responses have traditionally been considered less articulate and less "ideological" than references to the domestic policy variable.[14] The analysis of

[10] While the truncated nature of the dependent variable means that probit analysis is preferable to regression analysis, we have adhered to the original SRC method. Kagay and Caldeira (Ibid.) have used probit analysis as a check and found no serious changes from the regression results.

[11] The SRC's 1968 election survey provides a rich set of data which has been underutilized by political scientists because of the very element which makes it unique: the presence of a viable third-party candidate. The SRC's six-factor model is explicitly based on two-way comparisons, because three-way elections raise the issue of strategic voting so we have concentrated on the two-way elections.

[12] "The 1972 election . . . exposed the pervasive consequences that follow from dislodging party loyalty and candidate appeal from positions of dominance in the mass electoral process and complementing them with a widespread concern over policies intended to resolve very real national problems" (p. 753).

[13] The large candidate weights for 1972 might be explained away by arguing that respondents were actually reacting to the candidate solely in terms of his issue positions, so that the candidate is merely a surrogate for issues. The correlations between the issue factors and the candidate factors, however, are less than .2 and are among the lowest in the correlation matrix.

[14] In describing group-oriented concerns as a second level, lesser articulation of interests, Campbell et al. argue that ". . . there is little comprehension of long-range plans for social betterment, or of basic philosophies rooted in postures toward change or abstract conception of social

Table 1. Regression equations for Campbell, Miller, Stokes, six-factor model

(Maximum three responses)
Based on voters

		Democratic candidate	Republican candidate	General management	Groups	Foreign issues	Domestic issues		
	Bo	*B*	*B*	*B*	*B*	*B*	*B*	*N*	R/R^2
		(*t*)	(*t*)	(*t*)	(*t*)	(*t*)	(*t*)		
1952	.52268	.04206 (5.16)	.05845 (7.36)	.07877 (12.29)	.07601 (9.05)	.07901 (8.08)	.06655 (9.43)	1181	.75123/ .56434
1956	.54811	.05947 (8.05)	.08311 (10.75)	.05460 (7.80)	.07500 (10.46)	.06502 (6.80)	.05842 (7.30)	1266	.72337/ .52327
1960	.48692	.07148 (11.42)	.09338 (12.15)	.05402 (8.42)	.06300 (8.56)	.06770 (7.68)	.04546 (6.50)	1406	.77083/ .59418
1964	.45691	.07223 (10.02)	.08733 (11.28)	.06238 (9.53)	.04815 (6.42)	.05684 (5.57)	.05940 (10.05)	1111	.75572/ .57112
1972	.54808	.09625 (8.55)	.10680 (9.74)	.02495 (2.63)	.06689 (7.73)	.07901 (8.43)	.03449 (4.15)	827	.69622/ .48473

the coefficients in Table 1, however, does not bear out this expectation, showing rather that group concerns have relatively consistent importance over time. Nor has the increased education of today's electorate produced more sophisticated articulation of these group concerns. On the contrary, in 1972 nearly 60 per cent of such references were coded as allusions to the "common man" (33.3 per cent) and to big business (26.2 per cent)—traditional concerns since the New Deal. Other significant concerns mentioned were the "poor" (10.9 per cent), age groups (8.4 per cent) and "labor" (4.6 per cent).

Since the higher level of education is invoked by the authors of "Majority Party" to explain much of the claimed shift in the basis of the voting decision from party and candidates to ideology and issues, we must give this possibility full attention. The authors of "Majority Party" argue that voters with a college education are better informed politically, generally more cognizant of policy differences between the candidates and, therefore, more likely to make a vote decision on the basis of policy preferences than are less well educated individuals. It is apparently far easier for college educated individuals to translate issue attitudes into a vote decision than for the relatively less well educated who use the candidate as an intervening force for their ideology. The relatively greater importance of issues as an explanation of the 1972 election, may, therefore, be partially a delayed reflection of the changing composition of the electorate . . . Given their generally higher level of formal education, the population of actual voters in 1972 was better prepared to respond to the candidates in terms of policy preferences than were the voters in 1964 (pp. 770–771).

The electorate of 1972 was significantly better educated than that of 20 years before. Over that period, the proportion of individuals in the SRC sample with at least some college education increased from 14.6 per cent to 29.2 per cent, while the proportion who had not progressed beyond the eighth grade declined from 41.3 per cent to 19.9 per cent. It has already been shown, however, that the shift discovered by the authors of "Majority Party" did not occur in the aggregate population. Furthermore, even when we estimated the model separately for different educational levels, candidate weights for the grade school, high school

and economic structure of causation. The party or candidate is simply endorsed as being 'for' a group with which the subject is identified or as being above the selfish demands of groups within the population. Exactly *how* the candidate or party might see fit to implement or avoid group interests is a moot point, left unrelated to broader ideological concerns. But the party or candidate is 'located' in some affective relationship toward a group or groups, and the individual metes out trust on this basis." Campbell et al., *The American Voter*, pp. 234–235. In addition, see the discussion of mass political concepts, pp. 218–225.

Table 2. Net Importance as measured by $B_i\bar{X}_i$

(Maximum Three Responses)

	Democratic Candidate		Republican Candidate		General Management		Groups		Foreign Issues		Domestic Issues	
	$\bar{X}$	$B\bar{X}$	$\bar{X}$	$B\bar{X}$	$\bar{X}$	$B\bar{X}$	$\bar{X}$	$B\bar{X}$	$\bar{X}$	$B\bar{X}$	$\bar{X}$	$B\bar{X}$
1952	−.3124	−.0131	.6384	.0373	.9331	.0735	−.6765	−.0514	.4242	.03352	−.3116	−.0207
1956	.0348	.0021	.8223	.0683	.4700	.0257	−.8389	−.0629	.4573	.0297	−.2504	−.0146
1960	−.3101	−.0222	.6216	.0581	.3428	.0185	−.6650	−.0419	.2568	.0174	−.2134	−.0097
1964	−.5968	−.0431	−.3492	−.0305	.0801	.0050	−.6994	−.0037	−.0522	−.0030	−.4500	−.0267
1972	.5490	.0528	.4087	.0436	.3930	.0098	−.7146	−.0478	.4510	.0356	−.0036	−.0001

Note: + means pro-Republican
− means pro-Democratic

and college-level respondents were higher in 1972 than in 1952.[15]

Trends in Net Impact. In addition to comparing the factor weights, we can also use them to calculate the net impact of each factor for each election. Given the regression equation

$$Y = B_0 + \sum_{i=1}^{6} B_i X_i$$

then each product $B_i\bar{X}_i$ can be interpreted as the net contribution of a factor to the overall outcome of the election. A product for a particular $B_i\bar{X}_i$ of +0.05, for example, means a given factor has in the aggregate benefited the Republican candidate in that election by five percentage points. A product of −0.05 would mean that the factor has benefited the Democratic candidate by five percentage points. The $B_i\bar{X}_i$ product combines a measure of the overall mean of attitudes in a particular area ($\bar{X}_i$) with the unstandardized coefficient (B_i), which is the weight given to the factor in voter decision making processes. As such, $B_i\bar{X}_i$ is a measure of the "importance" of an issue not at the level of the individual voter but at a macro- or systemic level.[16]

The data in Table 2 show that, in terms of net impact on the election, it is still the candidate factors that dominate the outcome. Again, we see the combined candidate factors more important in 1972 than in any other year, and we see domestic issues with a low net impact. The net impact of foreign issues, namely the war in Vietnam, was only slightly greater than the Korean war in the "issueless" 'fifties.

Trends in vote-related polarization. The authors of "Majority Party" lay great stress on the "stark issue differences that separated the total group of

[15] Two recently published studies using the same data sets in somewhat different contexts have produced similar conclusions. Declercq et al. report a four-factor model including party identification, issue orientation, candidate image and party image predicting vote for five presidential elections (1956–72). Candidate image produces the largest unstandardized regression coefficient for 1972, with issue-orientation second. Both of these variables have increased in this measure of importance over the five elections while the two party variables have decreased. Eugene Declercq, Thomas L. Hurley, and Norman R. Luttbeg, "Voting in American Presidential Elections, 1956–1972," *American Politics Quarterly* Vol. 3 (July, 1975), 222-246. Kirkpatrick et al., employ total candidate and party attitude scores in a regression on vote for 1952–72. Only the standardized regression coefficients are recorded, with the weight of candidate attitudes monotonically increasing over this period, and party monotonically decreasing. A three-factor model, including party identification, shows similar results, with candidate declining only for 1968. Samuel A. Kirkpatrick, William Lyons, Michael R. Fitzgerald, "Candidates, Parties and Issues in the American Electorate: Two Decades of Change," *American Politics Quarterly*, 3, (July, 1975), 247–283.

[16] The combined term, however, has often been confused in presentation with the meaning more properly associated with the unstandardized coefficient itself. This distinction can be clarified by consideration of a pair of polar cases. If a particular factor had, for a given election, a very large regression coefficient—indicating that it was an important highly salient factor in voters' decisions—but had a mean of zero—indicating widespread disagreement on the issue within the electorate—the BX for the factor would be zero, indicating that its net effect on the election was nil. On the other hand, widespread agreement in a particular area would produce a very large mean, and consequently a large BX, *ceteris paribus*. This accounts in large part for the great deal of importance attached to the electorate's candidate evaluations during the fifties, when there were few negative comments recorded about Eisenhower, especially in 1956. In fact, though, the candidate weights (B) themselves were not nearly as dominant in the fifties as the focus on their net effect (BX) suggested at the time.

McGovern voters from the Nixon voters" (p. 758) and subtitle their paper "Policy Polarization in the 1972 Election," Polarization was, in their view, a reflection of "a deep policy schism among the Democrats" (p. 757). This implies that the extent of disagreement within the electorate as a whole, and particularly within the Democratic party, was extraordinary in 1972.[17] The basis for this conclusion, however, is not operationally specific; an unjustified, possibly *ad hoc*, set of issues is examined for 1972 with no historical comparisons. Because there are differences in the aggregate positions of various subgroups on these issues, the inference is made that an extraordinary level of "polarization" exists between these groups.

This approach presents two problems. First, there is no measure of the salience of each issue or the intensity of the position taken on that issue. The implicit assumption, apparently from a model of the ideal democratic citizen, underlying this procedure is that every issue is of equal importance to every respondent. A second difficulty is the absence of any precise measure of the extent of disagreement in a particular area.

The six-factor model, however, does provide a way to measure the partisan polarization of any group of voters arising from a given factor. Just as $B_i\bar{X}_i$ measures the net aggregate impact of a given factor in a given election, $B_i\sigma_i$ is a measure of the difference in the probability of a Republican vote for any two members of a group because of differences between them on a specific factor.[18]

$B_i\sigma_i$ provides a meaningful operationalization of polarization since it combines a measure of the extent of disagreement over a particular factor with a measure of the weight attached to that factor by the voters.

Again, an analysis based on the six-factor model provides data that are not consistent with the account of electoral change presented by the authors of "Majority Party!" Table 3 presents the $B_i\sigma_i$'s for each of the factors and each of the elections under discussion.

The table indicates that the value of $B_i\sigma_i$ for domestic issues is lower for 1972 than for any previous election. Only foreign policy attitudes—i.e., on Vietnam—show greater vote-related polarization in 1972 than in any other election; every other factor of the model has experienced greater polarization in at least one previous election than in 1972. There is no generally greater level of vote-centered, partisan polarization in 1972 than in other elections.

Table 4 shows this measure of polarization calculated only for Democratic respondents and, again, 1972 does not appear strikingly different. The major bone of contention among Democrats

[17] In *The American Voter* widely disbursed issue positions within the parties were described as lack of congruence or lack of consensus and were used as inferential evidence that issues were not important. Now widely disbursed issue positions within the party are described as "poliarization." See Campbell et al., *The American Voter*, pp. 185–187.

[18] If Δ^i_{jk} is the difference on factor i between two individuals (j, k) (i.e., $X_{ij} - X_{ik}$) the difference between them in the probability of a Republican vote due to their difference on factor i will be: $B_i\Delta^i_{jk}$. Over the entire population (for all j, k) the average value of this measure $B_i\Delta^i_{jk}$ will always be zero. Therefore a mean square measure is employed so that over the population we have

$$B_i\sqrt{\overline{(\Delta^i_{jk})^2}}$$

for j, k or

$$B_i\sqrt{\overline{(X_{ij} - X_{ik})^2}}$$

which is equal to

$$B_i\sigma_i\sqrt{2}$$

For convenience $\sqrt{2}$ has been dropped, Kagay and Caldera, *op. cit* also investigated several other ingenious and noteworthy measures of partisan polarization.

Table 3. Polarization

(Maximum Three Responses)

	Democratic Candidate		Republican Candidate		General Management		Groups		Foreign Issues		Domestic Issues	
	σ_x	$B\sigma_x$	σ_x	$B\sigma_x$	σ_x	$B\sigma_x$	σ_x	$B\sigma_x$	σ_x	$B\sigma_x$	σ_x	$B\sigma_x$
1952	1.4797	.0622	1.4708	.0860	1.8203	.1434	1.2421	.0944	1.0095	.0798	1.5164	.1009
1956	1.4964	.0890	1.5346	.1275	1.5918	.0869	1.4854	.1114	1.0270	.0668	1.2704	.0742
1960	1.6773	.1199	1.4899	.1391	1.6181	.0874	1.3343	.0841	1.0223	.0692	1.3227	.0601
1964	1.5554	.1123	1.3990	.1222	1.6931	.1056	1.3054	.0629	.9382	.0533	1.6704	.0992
1972	1.1997	.1155	1.2698	.1356	1.3880	.0346	1.4608	.0977	1.3622	.1076	1.5463	.0533

Table 4. Polarization among Respondents with Democratic Party Identification Only.

(Maximum Three Responses)

	Democratic Candidate		Republican Candidate		General Management		Groups		Foreign Issues		Domestic Issues		
	σ_x	$B\sigma_x$	σ_x	$B\sigma_x$	σ_x	$B\sigma_x$	σ_x	$B\sigma_x$	σ_x	$B\sigma_x$	σ_x	$B\sigma_x$	n
1952	1.3641	.0759	1.3956	.0536	1.5653	.1326	1.3565	.0680	.8871	.0477	1.4565	.0848	532
1956	1.3787	.0821	1.4545	.0773	1.2763	.0653	1.5585	.0907	.8199	0443	1.3310	.0782	554
1960	1.4768	.1473	1.3442	.0552	1.2658	.0422	1.4458	.0683	.9264	.0334	1.3113	.0532	640
1964	1.2593	.0849	1.1211	.0617	1.3261	.0451	1.4264	.0447	.8096	.0106	1.7210	.0721	581
1972	1.1816	.1543	1.1698	.1141	1.1946	.0322	1.5151	.0849	1.2867	.0975	1.7008	.0583	343

in 1972, by this measure, was the candidate, George McGovern. In the two areas that can be construed to relate to domestic affairs—domestic issues and group concerns—there was more vote-related polarization among Democrats in 1956 than in 1972.

Finally, the data in Table 5 also show comparative figures for Democrats in 1972 and Republicans in 1964. These indicate that there was greater vote-related domestic issue polarization among Republicans in 1964 than among Democrats in 1972.

Thus, while the lack of comparable questions makes it impossible to look back on previous elections with the new SRC/CPS "issue proximity" model, we can compare the new and the old models for 1972. These two models seem to provide divergent conclusions about 1972, and the six-factor model shows historical patterns that do not support the assertions in "Majority Party."

The war in Vietnam was important and divisive —though it divided the electorate as a whole more than it divided Democrats. Other issues, however, do not appear to have been particularly high by the criteria of weight, net importance and partisan polarization. The American electorate may be far more educated today than 20 years ago, but this growth of education has been paralleled by an increasing emphasis in the decision calculus on individual candidates, not by a shift from candidates to issues.

The Investor-Voter

The massive differences between the findings of "Majority Party" and the findings of earlier SRC studies are not only due to changes in the American electorate; they reflect changes in the models, methods and standards by which voters are assessed. Such differences call for a careful re-examination of past studies for a comparison of the two approaches. We contend that both approaches are flawed, that neither can provide a consistent explanation of American voting, and that a new approach to the study of voting is needed, an approach which takes a different view of the voter and a different view of politics.

To that end, we will propose a view of voting that sees the voter as an investor and characterizes each vote as *an investment in one or more collective goods made under conditions of uncertainty with costly and imperfect information.*

Elections are by their nature collective enterprises; both the outcome of the election and the subsequent performance of the government are collective goods for the entire electorate. Given the

Table 5. Comparative Party Polarization among Democrats in 1972 and Republicans in 1964

	Democratic Candidate		Republican Candidate		General Management		Groups		Foreign Issues		Domestic Issues		
	σ_x	$B\sigma_x$	σ_x	$B\sigma_x$	σ_x	$B\sigma_x$	σ_x	$B\sigma_x$	σ_x	$B\sigma_x$	σ_x	$B\sigma_x$	n
REP 1964	1.0975	.1396	1.2022	.0723	1.2189	.0723	1.4347	.1171	1.1911	.0644	1.6449	.0856	127
DEM 1972	1.1816	.1543	1.1698	.1141	1.1946	.0322	1.5151	.0849	1.2867	.0975	1.7008	.0583	343

size of the electorate and the privacy of the voting act, there are great incentives for the individual to abdicate the responsibility for the outcome to others, certainly to a greater extent than would be the case if his vote were decisive. The collective aspect of elections reduces the value of the vote in so far as it affects the provision of collective goods, and consequently makes the expected returns from investment in voting decisions small relative to the opportunity costs of such investment.

An instrumental voter applies information relevant to the choice between alternatives, i.e., information which bears upon the expected returns to the voter of the election of particular candidates. The accumulation of information always involves the expenditure of resources by individuals. These costs are directly affected by the quality of the information available; the problem of assessing the credibility of information; the difficulty of distinguishing between campaign rhetoric and actual position statements; the question of interpretation of vague positions; the difficulty of assigning responsibility for collective outputs; and simple gaps in the available information. Under such conditions, we would expect voters to employ information cost-saving devices, such as party and ideological labels and demographic characteristics of the candidates, and to be satisfied with incomplete information.

If the voter is viewed as an investor, an account of the 'fifties, 'sixties, and 'seventies is possible within the framework of a single model. The roots of such an approach, which is developed in the remainder of this paper, lie in the work of Anthony Downs.

We will elaborate the implications of this approach by examining four critical aspects of voting and illustrating the problems of both the old SRC theory and the newer theories of "Majority Party." In so doing we will begin to develop the notion of an instrumental investor-voter, drawing upon Downs but modifying his ideas for the American context and correcting him in those places where he is wrong. The four aspects of voting are the cost of information, the role of parties, the role of candidates and the role of ideology.

Information Costs. The accumulation of information involves the expenditure of resources, if only the time required for its procurement, analysis and evaluation. Since information is costly, voters will obtain only limited amounts. There are, of course, individuals who find politics so fascinating that they will inform themselves even when they have no personal interest in or cannot affect the outcome of a political event. In general, however, the investor-voter will be informed when he:

(1) Is able to apply "free" information, i.e., information gathered for other purposes which is also applicable to the vote decision.
(2) Is immediately and personally affected by a particular issue, e.g., a student estimating the draft as part of his career plans.

An investor-voter model which incorporates the understanding that information is costly leads to expectations about the voter which differ from those of the SRC, or citizen-voter, model. Whereas citizen-voters are expected to have well-developed opinions about a wide range of issues, a focus on information costs leads to the expectation that only some voters—those who must gather the information in the course of their daily lives or who have a particularly direct stake in the issue—will develop a detailed understanding of any issues. Most voters will only learn enough to form a very generalized notion of the position of a particular candidate or party on some issues, and many voters will be ignorant about most issues. The investor-voter will use partisan and ideological labels as practical solutions to the problem of costly information.

Whereas the citizen-voter model gives interest in politics causal priority over issue concern, consideration of information costs reverses the direction of causality; political involvement becomes a product of the perception of the individual stakes and costs involved.

Thus, while the citizen-voter model assumes that the individual's level of political involvement is invariant during adult life and is internal to the individual, i.e., unaffected by changes in the political context[19], the investor-voter model predicts that involvement will vary as the voter's life situation changes and as he responds to new opportunities and political events.

How well informed should we expect the voter to be? Previous SRC studies of voting have graded the voter against an exacting standard. The (ideal) voter-citizen was expected to hold informed opinions on all the crucial issues of the day and to exhibit a high level of interest in politics. When the voters of the 'fifties were found not to meet these standards, it was assumed that the problem lay with the voter. Specifically, a low level of political information, narrow range of expressed issue concerns, lack of perceived party differences, and lack of interest were traced to a lack of education.

When voters were shown to be issueless in the 'fifties, the standard used in order to ascertain whether or not a voter was issue-oriented was very different from the one used today: "If a person goes on record in favor of leaving electric power

[19] Campbell, "Voters and Elections: Past and Present," p. 746. See also Philip E. Converse, "The Concept of the Normal Vote," in *Elections and the Political Order*, ed. Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes (New York: Wiley, 1966), pp. 9–39.

production to private industry, but has no idea what the Administration is doing about the question, we may deduce that his opinion is not based on substantial familiarity with the subject. He has an opinion but knows so little about the topic as to deprive the opinion of significance for his subsequent political behavior." The application of this standard led to rather pessimistic conclusions about voters: "An example of public indifference to an issue that was given heavy emphasis by political leaders is provided by the role of the Taft-Hartley Act in the 1948 election. . . . Almost seven out of every ten adult Americans saw the curtain fall on the Presidential election of 1948 without knowing whether Taft-Hartley was the name of a hero or a villain."[20]

"Majority Party" bases its findings of heightened issue orientation upon very different standards. As noted above, in the 1972 questionnaire format, voters were allowed to express general preferences rather than precise policy choices on particular items of legislation. It was just such generalized preferences or concerns that were so strongly disparaged in past writings. In the 'fifties, when Campbell reported that "there were no great questions of policy which *the public* saw as dividing the two parties," he meant that instead of being concerned about well-defined issues and items of legislation, people cared about the "mess in Washington and the stalemate in Korea."[21] By changing standards, "Majority Party" leaves unresolved how many of our "new" voters, by the more stringent standards of the past, knew whether Cooper-Church was a fast-food chain or a rock group.

Few voters can be expected to have issue opinions which are sufficiently detailed to satisfy the stringent standards of earlier SRC studies. Because gathering and digesting such details about the fate of specific bills and particular administration programs is a costly process, we expect the only voters to bear the cost will be those who need the details for other than voting purposes: e.g., a farmer who needs to know about trade legislation in order to determine what proportions of his land should be planted in what crops.

Voters do, however, acquire much political information in the course of their daily lives. Such information then helps voters to form political opinions and make vote decisions. It is not surprising that voters make use of such "free" information and feel most comfortable dealing with political choices in terms of these "mundane" life experiences, and there is no need to ignore such "gut" voting as a subject of serious analysis.

Philip Converse, in discussing his interviewing experience, provides some support for this aspect of the voter-investor model. He notes that many respondents show clear discomfort when asked certain survey questions and that there seems to be a pattern to this discomfort: "I should make very clear that such events were rare to nonexistent when questions dealt with the immediate terms of the respondent's life, such as whether the respondent was satisfied with his housing or how he would feel about blacks moving in next door. But they began to mount significantly in questions concerning politics, and hit something of a maximum on the national issue items of the structured kind . . ."[22]

Usable political information is acquired in the process of making individual economic decisions; housewives learn about inflation of retail prices, homebuyers find out the trends in mortgage loan interest rates, and owners of stocks follow the Dow-Jones averages. On the basis of this information, voters can gauge the economy, and apply this data when they vote. In the past, SRC analyses discarded such economic views as insignificant. And even in 1972, when the SRC transformed its measure of issue concern to a more realistic "gut-level" general issue preference, they still failed to ask voters their impressions of and prognosis for the national economy, asked no questions about taxes, inflation and unemployment, and thus failed to tap significant levels of voter concern and information about economic issues.

The citizen-voter model assumes that a well-educated electorate will be a well-informed electorate: "The educated citizen is attentive, knowledgeable and participatory and the uneducated citizen is not."[23] However, as "Majority Party" points out, while there has been an enormous increase in the educational level over the past two decades, the proportion of people caring who wins the election has not increased and there is no reason to believe that knowledge about specific legislation has increased either. The investor-voter model suggests that it is the amount of "free" daily life information and individual need to know—motivation rather than just education level—which explains how informed about issues voters will be.

Given the cost of gathering information solely for the purpose of the vote decision, we should not expect issue consensus within parties. Where candidates are engaged in assembling a coalition of output-oriented voters, it is to be expected that

[20] Campbell et al., *The American Voter*, p. 172–173.
[21] Campbell, "Voters and Elections. . . ." p. 752.
[22] Philip E. Converse, "Comment: The Status of Nonattitudes," *American Political Science Review* 68 (June 1974), 650.
[23] Philip E. Converse, "Change in the American Electorate," in *The Human Meaning of Social Change*, ed. Angus Campbell and Philip Converse (New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 1972), p. 324.

people in every coalition will be ignorant of the candidate's stand in many areas not central to their primary concerns. Without sorting the voters into "issue publics" on the basis of the salience of various issues to them, one cannot expect to find high levels of interest or of information. Similarly, within every coalition there will be people who disagree with the candidate or party stand in some area and still support the candidate or party. It is not essential that in 1964 a black Democratic voter whose primary concern is civil rights support or even be familiar with Lyndon Johnson's Vietnam policy in order to qualify as an issue-oriented voter.[24] We ought not to be surprised if we find that the most vocal advocates or opponents of busing or of the Vietnam war are totally ignorant about farm price support policy or revenue-sharing distribution criteria.

This emphasis on the conditions under which voters will inform themselves about issues brings the notion of issue publics to the forefront of public opinion and voting research. As Converse has noted: "We have come a step closer to reality when we recognize the fragmentation of the mass public into a plethora of issue publics."[25]

The investor-voter model assumes that voters have issue interests but expects those interests to be generalized because of the cost of information. Where such issue interests are related to vote decisions, they need not be relegated to insignificance simply because they are lacking in detail. An individual facing a choice situation like voting, where the number of alternatives is limited, need only gather enough information to determine which alternative is preferable. Any expenditure of resources for additional information which does not have a high probability of changing his preference is superfluous. Thus, a generalized notion of the position of a particular candidate or party will usually prove sufficient for the vote decision. This suggests that a proper criterion for evaluating issue-orientation is the existence of relationships between issue position and vote decision, not a judgment about the "richness" of the voter's expression of his issue interest.[26]

Because information is costly, most voters will save time and energy by using informational shortcuts to the vote decision. In this way we can explain the widespread reliance on party identification and ideological labels. So long as the actions of candidates appear consistent with the generalized notion the voter attaches to a particular label, the voter is able to save considerable costs associated with keeping track of all the various activities of government. By employing such a cost-saving strategy, the voter does not sacrifice his basic issue-orientations; he simply deals with them in a more economical way.

The citizen-voter and investor-voter perspectives have strikingly different implications for evaluating the voters' level of participation and involvement. According to the citizen-voter model, voter apathy and general levels of interest, involvement, and participation depend solely on education and internal motivation. The SRC precluded the possibility that voter behavior was a realistic response to the actual political context rather than an expression of internal psychological states.

For example, Converse equated voter involvement with comprehension: "We tend to use involvement as a surrogate for comprehension because it is a fair assumption that there is a high correlation between involvement (motivation to attend to information about matters political) and breadth of comprehension about what is going on in politics."[27] Furthermore, involvement is defined operationally as concern over the outcome of the election and interest in the campaign.[28] The implicit assumption of this linkage is that there are always meaningful differences between the parties or candidates for all to see. Given these assumptions, if a person does not care who wins, he obviously does not comprehend politics.

In the investor-voter model, interest, involvement, and participation depend on the voter's calculation of the individual stakes and costs involved

[24] This possibility was recognized but not pursued in 1968: "Indeed, this irony is compounded when the role of the Vietnam issue is jointly taken into account. We have indicated above that the public was deeply impatient with the Johnson Administration, in part, because of the handling of the war. Blacks stood out as the major demographic grouping most exercised about the entanglement in Vietnam. They were more likely than whites to opine that the government should never have undertaken the military commitment there. They also were more likely to feel that American troops should be brought home immediately, a position not generally associated with the Johnson Administration. None the less. . . . Negro enthusiasm not only for Hubert Humphrey, but for Lyndon Johnson as well, remained high to the very end. It seems quite evident that when black citizens were making decisions about their vote Vietnam attitudes paled into relative insignificance by contrast with attitudes toward progress on civil rights within the country . . . " Philip E. Converse et al., "Continuity and Change in American Politics" (p. 1085).

[25] Philip Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in *Ideology and Discontent*, ed. David Apter (Glencoe, Ill: Free Press, 1964), p. 245; note also that when Converse screened for "self-starting" issue concern, turnover correlations approached the level of stability shown for party identification!

[26] Michael Shapiro, "Rational Political Man: A Synthesis of Economic and Social-Psychological Perspectives" *American Political Science Review*, 63 (December 1969), 1106–1119.

[27] Philip E. Converse, "Information Flow and the Stability of Partisan Attitudes," in *Elections and the Political Order*, ed. Campbell et al., pp. 138–139.

[28] Campbell et al., *The American Voter*, pp. 102–103.

in the election; included in this calculation are the voter's issue concerns and his estimates of his opportunities for participation. As a result, much of the stigma of "apathy" is transferred from the voter to the electoral system.

The SRC also assumed that the major barriers to participation were internal to the individual. In 1960 they stated, "The greater impact of restrictive electoral laws on Negroes is, in part at least, a function of the relatively low motivational levels among Negroes."[29] The increase of participation among black voters in the 1960's is, of course, a clear example of a situation where political participation as well as political interest and involvement, rather than being fixed expressions of individual motivation, responded instead to an increase in investment opportunities and a legal decision by Congress to reduce the cost (or more aptly, to provide subsidies to aid blacks in paying the costs) of voting.

Political Parties. The difference between the investor-voter approach and the SRC approach is sharply illustrated when views of political parties and party identification are compared. For the SRC, party identification was attachment to a group:

> In characterizing the relation of the individual to party as a psychological identification we invoke a concept that has played an important if somewhat varied role in psychological theories of the relation of individual to individual or of individual to group. We use the concept here to characterize the individual's *affective* orientation to an important group-object in his environment. Both reference group theory and small group studies of influence have converged upon the attracting or repelling quality of the group as the generalized dimension most critical in defining the individual-group relationship and it is this dimension that we will call identification.[30]

This concept of party as affective group identification devoid of political policy content is different from that presented by Downs, for whom parties constitute "ideal teams" that attempt to gain elective positions through an appeal to the voters which is based on a platform that is composed of issue positions.[31] This perspective emphasizes an instrumental rather than an affective relationship between voter and party. The most useful way to conceptualize party for this purpose is as a coalition of voters coordinating their efforts to pursue a set of collective goods. While the coalition may exhibit a great deal of stability over time, the basis of the attachment of each individual to the party is instrumental, which is to say that affective attachment depends on rewards received.

The view one holds of the relationship between individual and party has a significant impact on how one sees the voting act. The person who sees an affective relationship interprets the casting of a vote as primarily an act of group loyalty. On the other hand, the person who sees an instrumental relationship finds that the vote is cast as a contribution to a set of collective goods. It follows from the instrumental view that when a voter uses party label as a principal determinant of his vote preference, the label is used as an informational shortcut.

It is important to note the coalitional structure of parties. While there may at times be widespread agreement within a party on general goals, there is no reason to assume that all voters have the same priorities and saliences. Viewing political parties as coalitions of minorities has two important implications for voting research. First of all as noted earlier, the multiplicity of group and individual interests suggests that one should not expect consensus of attitudes across a number of issues within the party. There also is no logical inconsistency in the attitudes of a black Democrat who is pro-civil rights and anti-labor or even any logical reason to suppose such an individual experiences any significant crosspressure when casting a vote for a Democrat. Furthermore, seeing the parties as coalitions of minorities makes it illogical to assume that any significant number of voters should be able to locate the party on some hypothetical "continuum" that summarizes party positions for all issues.[32]

The authors of "Majority Party" summarize the role of parties as it developed in the work of the SRC during the 'fifties when they state, " . . . Party identification has a predisposing effect that forces images of candidates and attitudes on issues to be consistent with party attitudes which in turn are the factors that directly affect the vote decision." (p. 769) In this view of party, there is no instrumental component to membership, no feedback from party performance to party support, and no serious consideration of autonomous interests or values by which voters might judge—even roughly—the performance of their party and occasionally reconsider their support.

A review of the literature shows that many assumptions about party loyalty and the absence of instrumental relationships that are commonly supposed to rest on empirical SRC "findings" are without foundation. They were read into the data

[29] Campbell et al., *The American Voter*, p. 279.

[30] Campbell, et al., *The American Voter*, p. 121, emphasis added.

[31] Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, p. 26. It must be noted that Downs is speaking of an "ideal-team" party system, which speaks clearly with *one well-defined voice*, a point which obviously has crucial implications for any attempt to apply his theory to the U.S.

[32] These conclusions are elaborated later in this paper. See also the excellent discussion by Donald Stokes, "Spatial Models of Party Competition," in *Elections and the Political Order*, pp. 161–179.

or were assumed at the time of the earlier studies on the basis of group theory. One assumption that illustrates this problem is clearly stated in *The Voter Decides*: " . . . Our concept of party identification leads us to *assume* that a person who associates himself strongly with a party will conform to what he sees to be party standards and support party goals."[33] This notion of party identification as a psychological force on the individual to conform to standards and support party goals found expression in the cold-war view of the Communist party and what might be called the "loyalist" model of the party member as party follower, following every twist and turn of the party line. Obviously, issue agreement or support for a party's positions was simply the result of following the party line; belonging to a party exerted considerable influence on an individual "to conform to what he sees as party standards."[34]

Yet the original empirical evidence for "willingness to conform" to party positions is not very strong. In 1952, for example, less than 40 per cent of self-identified "strong" Democrats and "strong" Republicans felt that they would vote for their party's candidate even if they didn't like him or agree with him; less than 60 per cent of the "strong" identifiers even felt that a person should vote for the same party for President and for Congress.[35]

A more important assumption was that party identification was actually a psychological hindrance to issue voting. In *The American Voter*, an analysis of farmers revealed "spectacular links between simple economic pressures and partisan choice."[36] An investor-voter explanation of these "spectacular links" would follow these general lines: The collective nature of the vote means that there is low incentive for an individual to collect information solely to cast one of many millions of votes. Farmers, however, gather the information on their own businesses in great detail—not because they are better citizens than urban laborers, for example, but because they are independent managers and the information necessary for management is directly related to government policy in many cases. Laborers, not being economic managers and thus not collecting the information for their daily use, would be more likely to rely on past performance, using party label as an informational shortcut.

How does *The American Voter* explain the "spectacular links" its authors observed? The spectacular links exist because farmers have weaker partisan identification than laborers, and thus are "psychologically free to march to the polls and vote the rascals out . . . "[37]

Two arguments buttressed the contention of *The American Voter* that there was no causal relationship between party identification and the instrumental goals of the voters:[38]

(1) The lack of congruence within parties on the central issues of the day.
(2) The belief that allegiances had formed early and endured over time.

Yet a lack of congruence within parties is hardly proof that there is no issue-based switching from party to party. There is no reason to expect congruence on every issue unless one assumes that all voters have exactly the same issue preferences and saliences and the same information. A voter without concerns in a particular area would seldom gather information on that area.

Moreover, party allegiances over time are not as stable as had previously been assumed. Between 1956 and 1960, certainly not regarded as a period of dynamic or unprecedented change, one out of every four persons in an SRC panel survey shifted his or her allegiance on a Democrat-Independent-Republican scale.[39] In addition, one out of three people who stated his identification as "strong" Democrat or "strong" Republican, no longer so identified himself four years later, and one out of twelve voters changed parties.

Furthermore, it is an empirical fact that the "weight" attached to party performance varies from election to election; even if there were no switching from party to party, the weight the voters accord to party in the complex of factors in the decision calculus varies according to party performance and according to variations in information possessed by the voters.

The large amount of movement found on panel surveys between partisan strength categories means *it no longer follows that* "responsiveness of the vote decision to short-term partisan forces varies inversely with the mean strength of party identification."[40] Instead, Democrats become strong Democrats when they strongly intend to vote Democratic or agree strongly with the Democratic position on an issue. In other words, there

[33] Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren Miller, *The Voter Decides* (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1954). p. 107. Emphasis added.

[34] See for example Angus Campbell and H. C. Cooper, *Group Differences in Attitudes and Votes: A Study of the 1954 Congressional Election* (SRC, 1956), p. 95, as cited in Peter B. Natchez, "Images of Voting: The Social Psychologists," *Public Policy* 17 (Summer 1970) 564. This paper was aided by Natchez's stimulating analysis.

[35] Campbell et al., *The Voter Decides*, pp. 95–96.

[36] Campbell et al., *The American Voter*, p. 430.

[37] Ibid., p. 430.

[38] Ibid., pp. 185–186.

[39] SRC 1956-58-60 panel reported by John C. Pierce and Douglas D. Rose, "Non-attitudes and American Public Opinion: The Examination of a Thesis," *APSR* 68 (June 1974), 626–650, esp. p. 632.

[40] Converse, "The Concept of a Normal Vote," p. 21.

is feedback from issues and performance to partisan identification. Strength of partisanship is a running tally of current party assessment.

The existence of feedback and shifting changes in the strength of partisan identification, contradicts a fundamental assumption behind the Normal Vote, namely that the vote can be separated into long term and short term forces where the short term forces are the "response to transient election circumstances which do not materially affect the abiding division of party loyalties."[41]

In fact, the analysis of the 'fifties provides considerable evidence of "feedback" from performance affecting party image in voting. The traditional associations between the Republican party and the Depression and between the Democratic party and war have been the subject of much comment in voting research. Even these associations, however, do not appear to have been immutable in the minds of the voters. Stokes et al. in analyzing the 1956 election note that " . . . four years of Republican prosperity destroyed the major part of a fourteen-to-one margin the Democrats had had in the partisanship of these responses. After haunting the Republicans in every election since 1932, memories of the 'Hoover Depression' had receded at least temporarily as a direct force in American politics."[42]

On the other hand, the experience of the first four years of the Eisenhower Administration amplified and reinforced another set of associations. It was found that " . . . references to war and peace in 1952 were pro-Republican or anti-Democratic by a ratio of greater than seven to one. By 1956, the virtual disappearance of comments favorable to the Democrats or hostile to the Republicans had increased the ratio five times."[43]

By 1968, the election that seems to have provoked a re-examination of past theory, an important caveat appeared in discussions of party in the SRC election study: " . . . in the moment of truth in the polling booth, party allegiance seems the most relevant cue for many voters *if conditions permit it to be used.*"[44] The authors of "Majority Party" offer yet another statement of the role of the party:

> During a period of issue consensus or strong alignment between issue orientation and traditional partisan division, party ties can be expected to have a significant impact, both directly and as a predisposing agent, on the vote decision. However, during periods when questions of policy attain new levels of public salience and divide the population in a fashion that is orthogonal to traditional partisan differences, other political stimuli, such as new candidates and especially candidates associated with the new issues, may become relatively more important in explaining of voting vehavior . . . (p. 770).

In other words, sometimes party and issues will be correlated and sometimes they will not. Apparently, what the authors of "Majority Party" wish us to believe is that when issues correlate with party, people are following the party line—as in the "loyalist" model—and issues do not matter. But now that issues do not correlate, they do matter.

A much stronger and clearer statement is needed. If partisan attachment were "affective" and "psychologically predisposing," as the SRC theory of voting originally postulated, orthogonality would not have developed. If orthogonality has developed, the theory is wrong. Indeed, it is notable that while the party has been discussed as a "group" and party identification as "willingness to conform," when the authors of "Majority Party" introduce "liberal-conservative" measures, they are beginning to employ significantly different terminology. To be a liberal, a moderate, or a conservative is to have a " . . . simple policy yardstick by which the Presidential candidates were evaluated with respect to the voters' own policy orientation." (p. 776)

If the liberal/moderate/conservative labels are now to be treated as yardsticks, then why not also treat party as a yardstick and reject the notion of party as a psychologically given group identification with no instrumental content?

Candidates. The structural context in which voters are operating is as crucial to their actual behavior as is the costliness of information and the attendant use of informational shortcuts. There are crucial differences between the American political system and the idealized world which Anthony Downs was modeling. These differences affect both how well the system can be expected to respond to voters' preferences, *ceteris paribus*, and where the voters themselves will focus their attention.

Downs explicitly assumes an "ideal team"

[41] Converse, "Religion and Politics: 1960" p. 101 in *Elections and the Political Order*. Turnout as a separate variable was ignored in the conception of the normal vote on the grounds that the "frequency of 'dynamic' nonvoting is negligible in high turnout presidential elections . . ." (Converse, "The Concept of a Normal Vote," p. 24, fn. 18.) Further, the actual relations between turnout and closeness to the normal vote estimate have been the opposite of those which were predicted. By SRC reckoning, the smaller the turnout, the closer to the normal vote. (Campbell, "Voters and Elections," p. 748, Converse, "Stability and Change in 1960" in *Elections and the Political Order*. p. 91.) See also Richard A. Brody, "Change and Stability in Partisan Identification: a Note of Caution" (unpublished ms.).

[42] Stokes et al., "Components of Electoral Decision," p. 373.

[43] Ibid., p. 375.

[44] Converse et al., "Continuity and Change in American Politics. . . ." p. 1099 (emphasis added).

party that behaves as if it is a single, unified point. Furthermore, he implicitly assumes that the parties have equal ability to carry out the programs they advocate. American parties do not even approximate these assumptions. The American federal system is characterized by widely dispersed patronage centers, local primaries, local fund raising and national party organizations which have few resources at their disposal.[45] In this context voters will rely less on party and party platforms and more on candidate assessments. In addition, voters will use different criteria for evaluating challengers and incumbents.

The American Political system is a system that vests power in a single individual who has no formal ties to his party. The unity of the executive branch, the separation of the executive and legislative branches, and the weakness of the American party system combine to give the American president a degree of power and independence unknown in a parliamentary system, and certainly not envisioned in a Downsian "ideal-team" system. This causes the investor-voter to focus on the presidential candidate rather than just the party, since the party is an unreliable cue for predicting the performance of individual candidates.

In the American system, party labels are poor predictors of actual output because:

(1) The independence of the party member from the party means that a party candidate is free to adhere or not to the party platform, and further, that a candidate might conceivably adhere to the platform for purposes of election but follow a different course in office.

(2) With a multiplicity of offices and levels of government, assessing individual credit or blame for the total party output becomes important, but very difficult.

(3) Finally, where parties are coalitions of minorities, it is to be expected that the relative strength of different groups within the party will vary over time, with consequent effects on the party output.

While social scientists have worried for years about operationalizing their indices, few have recognized that voters are faced with similar problems of operationalization. Being instrumental in the American system places much greater burdens on the voter than it would in an "ideal-team" system: there is much higher variance associated with measures of one man than with the performance of a "single-point" party over time. Indeed, there is empirical evidence that in the American system there is substantial difference between asking voters which party can do the better job on an issue and which candidate can do the better job. A Cambridge Survey Research election study conducted in September of 1972, asked voters which issue, if any, they personally considered most important in the election; then asked which party can do the better job on the issue; and finally asked them which candidate, Nixon or McGovern, could do a better job on the issue. On no issue did more than 65 per cent of the voters pick the same party and party candidate.[46]

It is important to stress that there is a very significant difference between asking "who can do the best job?" in a particular policy area and the approach of "Majority Party," which asks respondents to place themselves and the candidates on scales of abstract preferred positions. This latter approach, while more appropriate in the Downsian "ideal-team" world (if there is single-peakedness) precludes the possibility that the voter cares less about which candidate is the closest to his ideal position on issues for which he has information and preferences, but cares more about which candidate can *deliver* the most. This raises a particular dimension of candidate evaluation—competence.[47]

[45] An extremely stimulating account of the influence on Congress can be found in R. Mayhew, *Congress: The Electoral Connection* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974).

[46] While Cambridge Survey Research (CSR) conducted numerous statewide studies for McGovern for President Incorporated, this reference and all of the analysis presented in the third section of this paper are based on the two principal election studies. The first of these, CSR 159-147, was an 11,000 interview national survey which provided stratified statewide readings of 11 states. An underlying national sample of about 1,300 interviews was obtained, through the use of weighting. This survey was conducted in person the last week of June 1972. Sampling, interviewing, and data processing were all conducted using the professional standards commonly employed, although these standards are necessarily less rigorous than those employed by the Survey Research Center.

In the third week of September 1972, a panel of 1,000 respondents from the June survey were recontacted by telephone (labeled by CSR as survey 159-180). This panel survey constitutes the basis for most of the analysis presented in section three of this paper. The data collected by CSR for McGovern for President Incorporated remains through contractual arrangements and other agreements the joint property of the company and the client. The authors regret that because of the expressed wishes of the client, no copies of the data set can be distributed for the time being. Luckily the Survey Research Center data are available to test all the assertions made in this paper.

[47] The context of public opinion within which the election is held must play a role in the instrumental investor's evaluation of the candidates as well. For example, when a voter's position on key issues could be described as utopian (e.g., absolute equalization of income or nuclear war with Russia) he might very well not support a candidate with similar positions, but instead choose a candidate more likely to be able to deliver at least some of his important desired outputs. Of course, an instrumental voter in this situation who regarded the expected output of the alternative candidates to be trivial or negative, or who believed that he could affect the output of the political system in the long run by casting a protest vote in a particular election,

Competence is a relevant dimension of candidate evaluation for three reasons:

(1) The candidate's competence directly affects the probability of his being able to deliver output from the system once he is elected.[48]
(2) Much of what both the President and Congress do involves the general management of the country. Since the voter has only limited information he may vote for a candidate who seems capable of managing the country even if that candidate is not the "closest" to his specific issue preferences.
(3) Finally, numerous problems will emerge during a candidate's term of office that he will have to solve but that neither he nor the voters can anticipate on election day. Competence in unfamiliar areas may be inferred from the perceived competence of the candidate in other areas.[49]

The relevance of the competence factor to the 1972 election seems to have been entirely overlooked by the authors of "Majority Party," who merely state that "... McGovern was not a personally appealing candidate—a factor that allowed issue differences to gain maximal importance" (abstract). Whatever "not appealing" means, it seems to imply that voters will care more about what a candidate says on the issues when they don't like him. As is indicated below, this "lack of appeal" was in great part a perception of McGovern incompetence, a perception that led to loss of votes not only among voters in general but even among voters who agreed with him on the issues.

When the voter has to obtain an estimate of competence, the process can produce an asymmetry between candidates—e.g., if one is an incumbent or someone who has spent a long period of time in a prominent position,[50] the voters can make judgments based on actual observation of behavior.[51] An incumbent president deals with "real" events; the challenger can be judged only by those he "manufactures." Thus, for the newcomer—or newcomer to the larger stage of presidential politics—public estimates of competence must be based on less substantial criteria, such as how he talks, how he looks, and how he campaigns. And these criteria are susceptible to more varied interpretation than the actual job performance of an incumbent.[52]

When this uncertainty and information costs are taken into account, the investor-voter might well focus on the candidates' demographic characteristics, including localism. Demographic characteristics (e.g., race, ethnicity, age) are important cues because the voter observes the relationship between these traits and behavior as part of his daily experience. Where demographic characteristics are closely aligned to the interests of the voter, or provide cues to the general competence of the candidate, they provide reliable, accessible and economical estimates of candidate behavior. Furthermore, the demographic characteristics of a candidate's supporters may also be taken into account. McGovern, for example, may have been hurt by voters' perceptions of the people standing by him: too many young people, too many blacks, too many welfare mothers.

While social scientists recognize many demographic traits as good predictors of certain sorts of behavior, much of the literature disparages voters

would be behaving consistently with our model by voting for the utopian candidate. A similar calculation would be appropriate where the agreement occurred on less utopian issue positions.

[48] We are indebted to Professor Joe Oppenheimer for pointing out a paper that lends weight to the idea that the instrumental investor uses competence measures rather than simply proximity measures. Jerome S. Bruner and Sheldon J. Korchin argued in "The Boss and the Vote: A Case Study in City Politics," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 10 (Spring 1964), 1–23, that many Boston voters chose to vote for James Michael Curley despite the fact that they felt closer to other candidates on the issues, because they believed that he could deliver more to them than the other candidates.

[49] Trust, a generalized sense that a candidate has your interests at heart and is concerned about people like you, clearly is a second major dimension of candidate evaluation and consideration. The simultaneous relations between trust and competence will be explored in future work. See also, Benjamin I. Page, *Choices and Echoes in Presidential Elections* (forthcoming).

[50] Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, p. 107.

[51] The authors of *The Voter Decides* recognized this about the 1952 election: "Eisenhower, because of his background and experience seems to have been perceived as a person peculiarly able to cope with the nation's international problems." Campbell et al., *The Voter Decides*, p. 58.

[52] The transcripts show that the Nixon campaign recognized this explicitly:

Haldeman: . . . So little is known about McGovern, you'll have a better chance of changing people's mind about him . . .

Haldeman: . . . to start with, you got 40 per cent of the people who will vote for you no matter what happens . . .

President: . . . I agree.

Haldeman: . . . and you got 40 per cent of the people who will vote against you no matter what happens, so you have got 20 per cent of the people left in the middle who may vote for you or may not and that 20 per cent is what you've gotta work on. His argument is that you're so well known, your pluses are clear, clear as well as your minuses; that getting one of those 20 who is an undecided type to vote for you on the basis of your positive points is much less likely than getting them to vote against McGovern by scaring them to death about McGovern; and that, that's the area that we ought to be playing.

Published transcript of a recording of a meeting between the President and H. R. Haldeman on June 23, 1972 from 2:20 to 2:45 PM.

who use these traits as predictors. Yet, demographic traits have a distinct advantage in that not only do they predict, but they are also highly verifiable—hard for an individual to fake or hide.[53]

Stokes and Miller have argued that localism is not only a hindrance to strong responsible parties, but that the "friends and neighbors" vote is strong evidence of a noninstrumental political orientation unconcerned with legislative outputs: ". . . the irrelevance of local appeal to legislative issues is probably as great (for Congress) as it is in the wide-open, one-party primary."[54]

Once again, at least some of the onus can be shifted from the voters to the system: Instead of arguing that irresponsible voters lead to irresponsible parties, we argue that a fragmented system with weak parties leads to information problems for the individual voter which make the best possible decision-making strategies less than ideal. Particularly on distributive issues—which neighborhood to tear up for a highway, where to put the post office, where to disburse patronage—localism may be a very effective operating procedure for the voter to use. At least a voter has some chance of knowing whether or not a neighbor is a blatant crook or an obvious fool. Given the problems of expensive, scarce, and unreliable information about the candidates, the voter is more likely to have confidence in a neighbor with local reputation for competence than in an unknown.[55]

One objection that might be raised to our discussion of "competence" would be that "competence" is nothing more than issue agreement or disagreement, Thus, we find "competent" those with whom we agree and "incompetent" those with whom we disagree. While there is certainly some substance to this idea, it is subject to empirical verification, and one of the questions this paper addresses is how to develop measures that separate disagreement over positions from personal judgments of the candidate. McGovern campaign survey data clearly indicate that voters can react differently to different aspects of a candidate image. The task of separating those aspects from each other and from hard positions on issues is on the agenda for future voting research.

Ideology.* Anthony Downs said that under conditions of costly information and uncertainty, voters would apply an ideology—or yardstick—to the problem in order to reduce their costs. At one point, the authors of "Majority Party" adopted the "yardstick" metaphor for their liberal/moderate/conservative measure, a metaphor with which we agree. The authors, however, have then elaborated on the idea to produce the conclusion that " . . . the 1972 race could be labeled 'ideological' " (abstract).

The authors further indicate that they found evidence of an "increase in the ideological nature of public opinion" (p. 768). This seems to be a different use of the word "ideological." Do the authors of "Majority Party" mean perhaps that yardsticks are used more than in the past? It is doubtful that "yardstick" could be substituted in either of the quoted passages and still retain the intended meaning.

Whereas Downs argued that voters employ ideology as a *substitute* for information.[56] Philip

[53] So many demographic traits are good behavioral predictors that social scientists routinely scrutinize attitudinal data for the "relevant" demographic breaks; when a question occasionally does not fit into the usual pattern, it may even be taken as a scientific breakthrough: "The point is that in absence of the ordinary guidelines of group position that would allow the citizen to adopt the position of those like him or the guideline of group-relatedness that would allow the citizen to adopt a position he perceives as relevant for the groups with which he identifies, cognitive and affective relationship to the events themselves may structure attitudes." From Sidney Verba, Richard A. Brody, Edwin B. Parker, Norman H. Nie, Nelson W. Polsby, Paul Ekman, and Gordon S. Black, "Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam," *American Political Science Review* 61 (June 1967), 331. There has been a change in attitudes toward the relevance of demographic variables in assessing candidates. In the 1960 election, Kennedy's Catholicism was considered an irrelevant, illegitimate topic by voting commentators. Yet by 1974, there was considerable serious discussion about whether an individual as personally wealthy as Nelson Rockefeller was qualified to be a vice-president. Should an Arab-American or a Jewish-American be President?

[54] Donald E. Stokes and Warren E. Miller, "Party Government and the Saliency of Congress," in *Elections and the Political Order*, ed. Campbell et al., p. 290.

[55] The strategies appropriate for voters under conditions of uncertainty have recently been the subject of some analysis. See, for example, Benjamin I. Page, "The Theory of Political Ambiguity," *American Political Science Review* (forthcoming). The concept of a risky candidate is related to—but distinct from—the concept of candidate competence. See Kenneth A. Shepsle, "The Strategy of Ambiguity: Uncertainty and Electoral Competition," *American Political Science Review* 66 (June 1972), 555–568.

* The arguments in this section are, for the most part, distilled from recent work by Joe A. Oppenheimer and Norman Frohlich. See Joe A. Oppenheimer, "Relating Coalitions of Minorities to the Voters Paradox, or Putting the Fly in the Democratic Pie," paper given at the 1972 meeting of the Southwest Political Science Association, San Antonio, Texas, March 30–April 1, 1972; Joe A. Oppenheimer, "Some Political Implications of 'Vote Trading and Voting Paradox: A Proof of Logical Equivalence': A Comment, "*American Political Science Review* 69 (September 1975); Norman Frohlich and Joe A. Oppenheimer, *Modern Political Economy* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, forthcoming), Chapter 7.

[56] Downs argued that under conditions of uncertainty" . . . many a voter finds party ideologies useful because they remove the necessity of his relating every issue to his own philosophy. Ideologies help him focus attention on the differences between the parties; therefore they can be used as samples of all the differentiating stands. With this short cut a voter can save himself the cost of being informed upon a wider range of issues." Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, p. 98.

Converse argued that the use of a single dimension of issue evaluation like the liberal-conservative continuum required "relatively full information."[57] Thus, because the American electorate exhibited low levels of political information, ideology would not be a major factor in American politics. Or, in other words, the American electorate was too uniformed to be Downsian. Ideology was transformed from an information cost-saving device into a criterion for telling when a voter was using relatively informed, sophisticated reasoning, and the use of ideology came to be seen as a sign of growth and enlightenment.

Despite this important difference in the two conceptions of ideology, the authors of "Majority Party" have adopted notions about the implications of ideology which were originally formulated by Downs; they adopt these notions directly from Downs's work without reference to the corrections and modifications which have appeared since 1957. A major and incorrect Downsian assumption is that all the various "yardsticks" a voter might employ would aggregate over the electorate to a one-dimensional issue space, as in the traditional notions of left-right or liberal-conservative continua. Donald Stokes, in a critique of Downs's spatial modeling of party competition, pointed out that voters, in fact, use multiple dimensions for evaluation of issues and argued that the multidimensional issue space itself was a variable to be studied rather than assumed.[58] When issues are not single-peaked, or when different issues have different salience for different voters, or when there is more than one issue or when abstention is high, there is no reason to expect party convergence to a "central" position and indeed there may not even be a "center." The important and enduring aspect of Downs's work—his focus on information costs—remains vital to understanding politics, but it is necessary to move away from simple notions of convergence.

The SRC's search for ideology was motivated not only by a desire to find "good citizens," but also by the belief that the existence of a unidimensional structure had major implications for the political system. "If an electorate responds to public affairs in terms of one or a few well-defined and stable ideological dimensions on which there is little movement of opinion, political controversy will be relatively tightly bounded and the possibilities of party maneuver—and alteration in office—relatively circumscribed."[59] Downs also made this argument for a two-party system.[60] He assumed that voters always vote for the party closest to their position on the continuum. If voters were symmetrically distributed along this single dimension and the parties or candidates engaged in vote-maximizing strategies, then both parties would converge on the center of the continuum. Neither party would have an incentive to deviate from the center because, by doing so, it would increase the distance between itself and some of its centrist constituents, thus throwing the election to the opposition. The implications for the political system were

(1) that each party would adopt an ideologically consistent platform or set of issue positions which could be designated by a point on a one-dimensional issue space
(2) that there exists a unique, vote-maximizing platform
(3) that this platform is located at the center of the issue space
(4) that the platforms of the two parties would, therefore, converge toward stable points near the center or median, *cetaris paribus*.

A body of theory and a methodology has evolved to aid in the search for this "ideological" continuum.[61] Ideological attitude structure is first equated with tightly constrained attitude sets. Tight constraint, in turn, is evidenced by high correlations, across the electorate, between attitudes on different political issues. Constraint, or consistency, is operationalized by the size of the inter-issue correlations in a population. And, finally, as in "Majority Party," these correlations are interpreted as a measure of the facility of the electorate in ordering political issues within a liberal-conservative framework.

When the authors of "Majority Party" find higher correlations between issues than in the past (and despite the different measures employed in the past), they call this evidence of increased constraint—i.e., an "increase in the ideological nature of public opinion." They trace this increase to the increased educational level of the population, which they apparently feel has filled the information gap identified by Converse. Whatever the theoretical problems of such a claim, they are bold indeed when placed against the results of the "Majority Party" factor analysis of issue positions. Here the authors find four distinct dimensions of policy preference. How does "Majority Party" get four dimensions from a unidimensional space?

Furthermore, "Majority Party" notes that

[57] Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," p. 227.
[58] Stokes, "Spatial Models of Party Competition,"
[59] Campbell et al., *The American Voter*, p. 550.
[60] For the sake of simplicity, the authors will always assume two parties or two candidates in this analysis.
[61] See, for example, Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," or Norman H. Nie with Kristi Andersen, "Mass Belief Systems Revisited: Political Change and Attitude Structure." *The Journal of Politics*, 36 (August 1974), 540–591.

nearly a quarter of their sample could not place themselves on a single summary liberal-conservative scale, despite the fact that they could use issue-specific scales to place themselves and the individual candidates. (p. 776, fn. 41) Indeed, the claims made by the authors of "Majority Party" to have provided evidence for the determinate nature of the issue dimension in 1972 are best seen as projections by the analysts. The attempt to find an "ideological" continuum is misdirected conceptually, normatively, and theoretically.

Conceptually, it is important to understand what is being measured by the interissue correlation matrix, the traditional tool for the search. Specifically, the correlation matrix does not measure the extent to which individuals employ the liberal-conservative continuum, or any other continuum, in their issue space. For example, in a two-issue world where everyone in the electorate perceives each issue in liberal-conservative terms and lines up at one of the "extremist" positions on each issue, the populations can be distributed in a two-by-two matrix with four groups being defined by their issue positions: those who are conservative on both, those who are liberal on both, those who are liberal on the first and conservative on the second, and those who are conservative on the first and liberal on the second. Each group is perfectly "ideological" on each issue, but the correlation between the positions on the two issues for the entire population can range from -1.0 to $+1.0$, depending entirely on the relative sizes of the four groups.

Clearly, it cannot be argued that individuals holding one liberal and one conservative position are internally inconsistent. Such an argument would require a demonstration that the liberal-conservative continuum has a logical basis rather than an empirical one. Consider the application of such a dimension to the broadest possible division of issues into foreign policy and domestic policy. Further, suppose that every individual in the electorate perceives the issues within each broad category in ideological terms. Suppose the liberal ends of the domestic and foreign policy dimensions were, respectively, welfare statism and isolationism, while the conservative ends were free enterprise and interventionism. Can it be demonstrated that there is a logical inconsistency in the holding of any pair of positions on these issues?

Of course, there is a sense in which "consistency" could be used. An economist might argue, for example, that two "liberal" goals—such as the minimum wage and full employment—are, in practice, contradictory. In this sense, a person who embraces both is fooling himself and behaving inconsistently. Thus, a consistent program would be one in which the macro-consequences of its different policy preferences would not be contradictory. This use of inconsistency is surely not what the authors of "Majority Party" are talking about. The correlation matrix approach to the search for ideology measures the extent to which everyone in the electorate lines up in agreement on all issues; it is not a measure of the extent to which individuals recognize or employ ideologies.

Normatively, it is ironic that the authors of "Majority Party" greet supposed evidence of one-dimensionality as a positive development. Apparently, this line of reasoning comes from the Converse position that relatively full information is a prerequisite for ideology and the association of information with education. The implication of the argument, however, is that more educated people tend to become simple-minded and view the world in terms of a single liberal-conservative dimension, while the less educated have a multi-dimensional view of the world and are thus confused. Perhaps the authors believe there is one "real" underlying issue which the "liberal-conservative" axis has a tendency to approximate as information increases.

Theoretically, the critique can be pushed a step further to the underpinnings of the model of one-dimensional politics. The conditions necessary for a single dimension to provide a summary scale on which every voter's position on a number of issues can be located are so restrictive as to render the very idea empirically meaningless.[62]

First of all, even if only one issue were facing the electorate, there might, in fact, be multiple dimensions of evaluation for that issue. In order for a single dimension to emerge, and so serve as a continuum over which voter preferences vary as a direct function of distances, opinions on the issue must be single-peaked—that is, there must be a unique ordering of the alternatives such that, for every individual, there is a point from which his preferences fall off in both directions never to rise again. The Vietnam war is a classic case of an issue that is not single-peaked and that has often, therefore, been misinterpreted in voting studies. It has often been assumed that for all voters there was a Vietnam continuum with withdrawal at one end, escalation at the other and the status quo in the center. Therefore, when a number of "hawks" voted for Eugene McCarthy in the 1968 primaries, it was assumed that these people were voting "directly counter to their own policy preferences,"[63]

[62] Of course, there is another model under which a single dimension, such as the pro-Democratic to pro-Republican continuum described in *The Voter Decides*, would arise. That is the "loyalist" model, where the electorate is incapable of ordering issues in any way which is not defined by the party but follows the "party line" slavishly.

[63] Although our disagreement here is with the logical basis of the assumption that hawks for McCarthy were obviously and clearly misguided, this example has assumed so much importance that its empirical basis needs

because Lyndon Johnson, positioned at the status quo, would have been closer to their position. In fact, however, there existed throughout the war a number of people whose preference ordering was: (1) escalate, (2) withdraw, and (3) maintain the status quo.[64]

It is trivial to show that the absence of single peakedness destroys any possibility of a determinant outcome.[65] Suppose, for example, that in the single-issue Vietnam example above, one-third of the electorate prefers withdrawal to maintaining the status quo but maintaining the status quo to escalation, a second third prefers maintaining the status quo to escalation but escalation to withdrawal, while the remainder prefer escalation to withdrawal but withdrawal to the status quo. Under these conditions, even though there is but one issue, there is no party platform that can command a majority of support over all other party platforms. Similarly, there is no "centrist" position on the issue. Suppose one party adopts a withdrawal platform. Under the assumptions of this model, the other party can command two-thirds of the votes with an escalation platform. This platform, in turn, could be beaten by a party that advocated the status quo, and the latter party would lose to a party advocating withdrawal. This absence of a stable vote-maximizing strategy for the parties will be referred to as "cycling" in the arguments to follow.

Even if all the issues are single-peaked, however, and even if there is perfect "consistency" as measured in "Majority Party"—i.e., an issue correlation matrix where every entry is +1.0—there is still no determinate outcome, and a winning strategy for party will not necessarily be a "consistent" strategy, because not all voters will weigh each issue identically. Suppose, for example, that there are three issues and the electorate is evenly divided into strict liberals, conservatives, and moderates, with "consistent" positions on all three issues. Now suppose further that liberals care most about issue one, moderates feel most intensely about issue two, and conservatives are most intense on the third issue.[66] Then, a party which adopts any "consistent" platform on the three issues can be defeated by a party that adopts a platform with liberal, moderate and conservative positions on the three issues, respectively. The cycling can continue in a number of ways. A party which adopted a liberal, moderate, moderate platform, for example would beat the liberal, moderate, conservative party, and would lose in turn, to a party with a "consistently" moderate platform. Again, there is no stable vote-maximizing platform.

Even if all issues were single-peaked, and even if all voters had the same intensity on all issues, it can be shown that there still would not be a determinate outcome to the maneuvering of vote-maximizing parties.[67] And even if there were but one issue or dimension and that one were single-peaked, vote-maximizing parties would not necessarily converge as predicted. In this simplest of all cases, the dime-store analogy that Downs adapted from Hotelling and Smithies for his work is simply not an appropriate model for the political problem at hand.[68] In the Hotelling-Smithies work, the two stores converged at the geographic center of the market area because this was the point at which each store could maximize the number of symmetrically distributed customers who would find each store closest. If either store moved from the center, the other could move to a position to which all of its former customers and some of its competitor's customers would be closer. The stable solution, then, was an equal division of the marketplace by convergence, and Downs adapted this model for his theory of spatial party competition.

When applying this model to voting, however, the cost of voting has nothing to do with the distance between the voter and the party, or even with the distance between the two parties. The cost of

to be reviewed. When Phillip Converse talks of the widely noted paradox that "many voters across the county had moved from a 'leftist' McCarthy vote in the primaries to a 'rightist' Wallace vote in the general election" or when Converse talks of voters for whom McCarthy was the "wrong"candidate (the wrong McCarthy?) he is referring to the SRC's 1968 election analysis and its reference to "a major McCarthy to Wallace transfer." The empirical basis offered for these statements is fourteen (14) voters. See Converse et al., "Continuity and Change in American Politics . . . ", pp. 1093–1095; Philip Converse, "Public Opinion and Voting Behavior," *Handbook of Political Science*, ed. Nelson Polsby and Fred Greenstein (Reading, Mass.: Addison Wesley, 1975), pp. 81, 100, 120, 124.

[64] Cambridge Survey Research 159-147 showed 6.2 per cent of respondents volunteered this preference order in June 1972 when it was *not offered* to them by interviewers who presented only the common scale.

[65] Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, pp. 60–62.

[66] No justification is presented for the assumption, implied several times by the authors of "Majority Party." that voters in "extreme" positions are most intense about issues, or that such voters "intensely favored," "intensely preferred" their positions.

This is the familiar myth of the moderate centrist and the intense extremist. However, it is simply not the case that people in the middle of a scale are *necessarily* less intense about their position than are those on the extreme. Consider, for example, a scale with "no tenure" for university professors at one end, "status quo" in the center, and "student determination of tenure" at the other extreme. Would the people with the most intense feelings be the extremists? Miller et al., "A Majority Party . . . ," (pp. 763, 764).

[67] See for example: William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook, *An Introduction to Positive Political Theory* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973), p. 107.

[68] Harold Hotelling, "Stability in Competition," *The Economic Journal* 39 (1929), 41–57; and Arthur Smithies. "Optimum Location in Spatial Competition," *The Journal of Political Economy*, 49 (1941), 423–439.

voting for each voter depends on the time involved, the opportunity costs, risks, etc. All these are independent of party positions. A voter votes if his perceived costs are lower than his perceived benefits—that is, if the costs are lower than a measure based on party differential. As the parties converge, the party differential goes to zero, and there is no incentive to vote related to the outcome of the election because it will not matter who wins, regardless of the costs of voting. As parties diverge, the party differential increases, and more voters will find it worthwhile to vote. The ideal place to be is where the party differential is larger than the cost of voting for the greatest number of people who favor you. Once abstention is introduced, a candidate is not guaranteed a winning position with a centrist strategy even if there is only one issue and even if that issue is single peaked. Especially with the low turnouts now common, a noncentrist strategy could have a differential impact on turnout rates sufficient to defeat any centrist strategy.

In sum, the notion of the "safe" maximizing center is without foundation. The Scammon and Wattenberg notion that "Wallace's strength, like the strength of any national political figure is in direct relation to his proximity to the center," is incomplete and misleading.[69] Centrist positions are not necessarily vote-maximizing positions. Many issues, we have seen, do not even have a center, but even when they do, there is surely no foundation for such views, especially when only 55 to 60 per cent of the electorate votes. Given recent turnouts, it is highly plausible that in 1976 less than 30 per cent of the over-18 population can make someone President. Noncentrist candidates can win, and the lower the turnouts, the more possible this becomes.

The 1972 Election

Why did George McGovern lose the 1972 election to Richard Nixon? More pointedly, why did George McGovern lose by so much? Were his perceived issue positions too extreme for the majority of American voters? Did he lose the natural advantage of a Democratic candidate because "partisan defection" helped to "suppress the impact of party identification" (abstract)?

Without claiming that the 1972 election studies conducted for the McGovern campaign provide definitive answers to any of these questions, some points from the data do provide insights into the campaign, into the reasons Nixon beat McGovern, and into the relationship of evaluations of candidate competence and issues. Equally important, they help focus on questions that need to be asked in future election studies.

[69] R. M. Scammon and B. J. Wattenberg, *The Real Majority* (New York: G. P. Putnam & Sons, 1970).

At this point, it should be abundantly clear that we disagree with the thrust of the discussion of the 1972 election presented in "Majority Party." Our approach points to a different analysis of McGovern's dramatic descent in the polls between June and November and his substantial defeat in the election. It suggests that this reversal was due in great measure to McGovern's perceived incompetence rather than to his issue positions. Applying the investor-voter model, the data show that the size of McGovern's targeted issue-publics and the strength of his personal ratings gave him at least a chance to win. (This contention is supported both by aggregate poll data and, more directly, by analysis of panel data on particular support groups.) The election started out as a "race." The data also show that during the course of the campaign. McGovern's issue constituency remained competitive, while ratings of his performance plunged.

In McGovern's apparent failure to motivate the support of his natural constituency, we find evidence for our contention that the voters' evaluation of the candidate's ability to deliver—or competence—constitutes a separate and independent dimension of the vote decision. Voters clearly differentiated between issue proximity and competence.[70] To be sure, McGovern did lose many votes because people did not like his policies The major reason that a "race" turned into a "rout," however, was that McGovern was deserted by large numbers of his own issue publics. They left him because of the widespread perception of his incompetence, a perception fostered largely by the Eagleton affair in July and August, problems of general campaign style, and the constant campaign crises of July and August 1972.

The six-factor model points to an increase in the role of candidates as factors in the vote. But the candidate factor is not merely a reflection of a candidate's positions; it is also an independent measure of a candidate's perceived ability, which —in George McGovern's case—appears to have made five points difference in the outcome of the election.[71]

[70] Evidence of this is that unprecedented ticket-splitting took place. If one is to believe "Majority Party," millions of people simultaneously rejected George McGovern's issue positions, then turned around to vote for candidates holding basically the same positions. The victory of Jim Abourezk in South Dakota as McGovern lost his home state and the victories of Dick Clark, Joe Biden, or Walter Mondale must raise some questions concerning pure proximity measures.

[71] Other surveys in which we repeated the policy questions verify for us that McGovern was losing the "liberal" constituencies and not that the "liberal" constituencies were shrinking. The effects observed were clearly not regression to the mean or any other statistical artifact of the panel format. Nixon simply held his t_1 issue and demographic constituencies in every single case far better than did McGovern.

Any view that McGovern was foreordained to defeat because of his "extreme" positions on the issues or that there was never a "horserace" in 1972 simply does not agree with the polls taken for the campaign in late June or independent polls by Gallup and Harris. To begin with, in June it was not certain that George Wallace, despite the shooting, would not be able to run for President again, and so voters were questioned about numerous two- and three-way presidential contests. The results in Table 6 show that George McGovern was a stronger candidate than a "centrist" like Edmund Muskie and, at a time when over 15 per cent of the registered voters still knew too little to rate their impression of him as favorable or unfavorable, was only four points weaker than Edward Kennedy.

Table 6. Standings in the Election Race (Late June—CSR #149–157)

With Wallace		*Without Wallace*	
Nixon	41%	Nixon	51%
McGovern	30	McGovern	38
Wallace	18	Undecided	11
Undecided	12		
Nixon	42%	Nixon	49%
Kennedy	36	Kennedy	40
Wallace	14	Undecided	11
Undecided	8		
Nixon	43%	Nixon	53%
Muskie	27	Muskie	32
Wallace	19	Undecided	16
Undecided	12		

(N=11,000)

Furthermore, a McGovern-Kennedy ticket trailed Nixon-Agnew by just one point—45 per cent to 46 per cent—and a McGovern-Muskie ticket trailed Nixon-Agnew by 42 per cent to 48 per cent.

While Kennedy was clearly the strongest candidate as of the end of June, McGovern at that time had some strengths and sources of support available to no other Democrat. On the one hand, McGovern was weaker than Kennedy and slightly weaker than Humphrey had been among the urban ethnics traditionally so important to Democratic victories. On the other hand, McGovern was considerably stronger than Humphrey had been and was as strong as Kennedy among the young voters. In addition, George McGovern in June was considerably stronger than any other Democratic candidate among the suburban white collar voters of all parties. In fact, McGovern had a sizable, unique constituency—amounting to almost six per cent of the total registered voting age population—that would vote either for George McGovern or no other candidate of either party, and this was roughly equivalent to the size of George Wallace's unique constituency.

Three months later, at the end of September, McGovern was further away than ever from victory, the race having gone from 51 per cent versus 38 per cent to 57 per cent versus 32 per cent (a margin that on election day became 61 per cent to 39 per cent) during a period when he had been expected to gain. What happened? Did the voters find out that he was a radical and vote against him because he was an extremist? Did voters prefer peace with honor in Vietnam to a hasty pullout or bloodbath? Or did "middle-America" turn away from McGovern because he looked indecisive and incompetent during the campaign, and because of his inability to handle attacks launched from all sides by the Nixon "surrogates"?

Survey data throughout the period of the campaign show that voters were extremely unclear about where McGovern stood on a number of issues and had very little knowledge of the content of McGovern's programs, particularly taxes and welfare. When questioned about them, they often volunteered things such as "He's confused, how should I know?" or simply said they would not listen to what he had to say. Low evaluations of McGovern's competence apparently diminished his ability to get across information on his positions. This seems to have resulted in people who were "actually" closer to McGovern perceiving themselves as closer to Nixon, and—more commonly—people choosing to support Nixon despite perceiving themselves as closer to McGovern on issues.

Our own panel data show that major changes from June to September took place among what should have been McGovern issue-publics. For example, among those who supported a guaranteed annual income, McGovern led 51 per cent to 39 per cent in June; Nixon was ahead 46 per cent to 45 per cent in September. The voters who thought that the military budget should be reduced drastically went from 54 to 35 per cent for McGovern to 45 per cent to 44 per cent against him. The 25 percent of the registered voters who thought that Vietnam was the most crucial issue *and* that the U.S. should withdraw immediately *and* who were also in favor of a guaranteed annual income were for McGovern 65 per cent to 25 per cent in June but only 52 per cent to 38 per cent in September. First-time voters, roughly 8 per cent of the electorate, were for McGovern 56 per cent to 38 per cent in June and had completely switched to favor Nixon 52 per cent to 37 per cent by September. These last two changes alone account for 5 per cent of the total vote. Clearly, McGovern was losing his "natural constituencies" as much as he

Table 7. Issue Heats and Attitudes toward Nixon*

Which candidate do you personally feel can do a better job of finding a solution to:

	Nixon	Neither	McGovern
Vietnam			
June	40%	28	32
September	54%	13	32
Improving Economy			
June	40%	30	33
September	51%	17	32
Tax Reform			
June	29%	43	28
September	57%	10	33

Nixon's Job Performance Rating

	Excellent	Good	Don't know	Fair	Poor
June	12%	39	1	33	16
September	11%	41	2	32	15

(Agree or Disagree:)
Richard Nixon really cares about people like me.

	Agree	Don't know	Disagree
June	47%	10	43
September	50%	7	43

* All data in this and subsequent tables from Cambridge Survey Research National survey #159-147 in June and #159-180 in September

was losing undecided voters, Wallace supporters, and traditional "New Deal" Democrats.

Among the whole population, Nixon increased his lead over McGovern as the person who could "do the best job" on a number of issues.

Moreover, while the incumbent's ratings were stable, McGovern's personal ratings changed drastically during this critical period of the campaign. Although, as Table 8 shows, the McGovern campaign successfully increased the perception of McGovern as a concerned individual—McGovern actually had higher concern and care ratings than did Nixon—the voters showed substantial ability to differentiate among candidate traits. While McGovern's concern-care ratings were steadily *rising* during this period of his falling political fortunes, Table 8 also shows that his ratings on the questions used to index basic presidential competence *plummeted*.

Table 8. George McGovern Rating—Concern and Competence

	Agree	Don't know	Disagree
George McGovern really cares about people like me.			
June	41%	30	29
September	55%	14	31
George McGovern is not qualified to be President.			
June	27%	24	50
September	42%	9	49
McGovern has the vision to provide solutions to the country's problems.			
June	35%	32	33
September	39%	12	49

In view of the idea that McGovern lost because he was a "Goldwater of the left," it is instructive to look at the answers given in September, when voters were asked what they most disliked about George McGovern. Comments that could be described as having issue content—welfare, Vietnam, tax program issues in general, too liberal, abortion, amnesty, drugs, etc.—amounted to 24 per cent of all these references. Twice as many voters said things like "indecisive" or "unqualified." One out of every ten voters specifically referred to the Eagleton affair in pointing out what was most disliked about George McGovern as a possible president—more than the total who mentioned Vietnam or welfare. This same preponderance of personal criticisms over issue criticisms was found among defecting Democrats and voters who were for McGovern at time one and then switched. Of course, increased awareness of McGovern's issue positions played a part in the decline, but the fall in his perceived competence was a major crippler.

A look at the changes in vote preferences be-

tween June and September for the various demographic and issue-publics among whom McGovern's early strength was located emphasizes the importance of perceived competence or the ability to deliver. When McGovern began to look as if he lacked the capability to manage and administer, numerous people whose ideal issue positions were "close" to his, shifted to Nixon on the question of which man they thought could do a better job in a particular area. We are forced to settle for this indirect, inferential and less than entirely satisfying method because it simply is not clear how to specify the functional form relating voter issue positions, perceived candidate positions, and the two candidate ratings. Without a valid functional form, the indirect effects of competence on the policy preferences cannot be calculated. For purposes of this initial investigation however, we use a regression model to calculate the direct effect of competence.

While our main interest here is in demonstrating the substantial effect of competence on the vote decision, it is necessary, of course, to estimate a complete equation. In addition to party identification, a Nixon performance rating and a McGovern competence rating, the three major issues (by way of salience criteria) were included. Obviously, there were countless other issues of importance to a few or more voters, but the specification bias introduced by a truncated issue array was observed to be trivial and virtually unnoticeable. Because party is included directly, and because we use the strongest "most likely to be significant" technique for issue proximities, there is a minimal chance of any bias in the writing of the equation that would make the candidate variables appear significant. That is, the deck is stacked against the candidate variables in this equation. But they are, in fact, clearly non-zero, statistically significant, and of considerable clout at both time one and time two.

In both equations, the presence of three strong issue measures has not masked the two candidate performance and competence variables. There is a direct and significant impact on the vote of candidate ratings. Equally important, further tests revealed that no additional issue inclusions weakened that impact, and no "affect-type" candidate variables (i.e., "warmth" or favorability thermometer) had as strong an effect as the measures of performance and competence, given even the weak and preliminary nature of our competence measure. In addition, it is interesting to note that as the campaign developed and more information became readily available and thus, less costly for the voter—the party weight declined. Also, as Vietnam was heating up again, the war issue became more salient, and as McGovern collapsed, the issue of tax reform lost considerable weight. The straight economic management issue (unemployment, inflation and business conditions) was accorded more weight by voters overall than was Vietnam.

Looking at the $B_i\bar{X}_i$'s in Table 9 in order to assess the net effect of each factor on the vote, we can see McGovern lost more between June and October on competence than on any other single issue. That is, the direct impact of competence, ignoring the difficult-to-measure effects of competence on issue heats, was larger than that of any single issue. Almost a third of McGovern's loss was a direct function of the decline in his competence ratings, apart from any change in issue assessments. In other words, it is entirely possible that if the Eagleton affair had not paralyzed McGovern at a crucial state of the campaign, and if he had been able to deal with the panoply of Nixon surrogates (the cabinet and subcabinet level officials who took part in a well-choreographed assault on McGovern issue by issue) all of whom had to be answered by McGovern, McGovern might have lost by only 55 per cent to 45 per cent. If this had occurred, George McGovern would now be the odds-on favorite for 1976 instead of living proof that "extremists" never win.

Conclusion

On one point, we are in total agreement with the authors of "Majority Party": a fresh approach to the study of voting is needed. The disagreement is on what that approach should be. The authors of "Majority Party" claim to have found a "new" voter, whose increased education is changing the basis of his vote from parties and candidates to issues and ideology. The authors of "Majority Party" have crossed the line in the debate between those who see voting as based on candidates, parties, and psychological motivations and those who see it as based on issues, ideology, and rational choice. Yet when crossing the line, they have failed to recognize that the dichotomy was false in the first place. It was produced by mistaken standards and theories used in analyzing the whole body of SRC election studies.

The authors of "Majority Party" gloss over the discontinuity of their work with the past by implying that the voters rather than the theory, have changed (i.e., that the voters have outgrown the framework in which *The American Voter* placed them). Where previously voters were too uninformed to be Downsian, education has now enabled them to behave in a sophisticated way. We want to state plainly that we see the old theories as inapplicable not because they are outdated, but because they were wrong: the standards they applied to the voter were misleading and the tests they applied faulty.

In particular, the old theories were wrong about

Table 9. Regression Equations for June and September, 1972[a] and Changes[b] in $\bar{X}$, $B\bar{X}$

	B_0	Party (t)	Nixon Performance (t)	McGovern Competence (t)	War policy area (t)	Economy policy area (t)	Tax policy area (t)	N	R/R^2
June	−.43	.39 (5.83)	−.43 (9.64)	.28 (7.14)	.46 (5.74)	.72 (7.68)	.43 (4.58)	1009	.82/.67
September	−.39	.24 (3.87)	−.36 (8.31)	.38 (11.27)	.66 (8.66)	.72 (8.66)	.22 (2.65)	1009	.84/.71

	Party		Nixon Performance		McGovern Competence		War Heat		Economy Heat		Tax Heat	
	$\bar{X}$	$B\bar{X}$	$\bar{X}$	$B\bar{X}$	$\bar{X}$	$B\bar{X}$	$\bar{X}$	$B\bar{X}$	$\bar{X}$	$B\bar{X}$	$\bar{X}$	$B\bar{X}$
June	.17	.066	.034	−.013	.32	.09	−.09	−.05	−.114	−.08	−.005	−.002
September	.17	.042	.014	.005	−.02	.008	−.212	−.13	−.197	−.14	−.13	−.06
Difference*	−.024		+.018		−.082		−.08		−.06		−.058	

[a] Dependent variable was a scale from +3 (McGovern) to −3 (Nixon). Nixon's performance was scored so + = pro-Nixon, all other scales were scored so that + = pro-McGovern. Mean of the dependent variable at time one was −.42 and at time two it was −67.

[b] In the seven-point dependent variable positive = McGovern; negative = Nixon.

* Difference = $(B\bar{X}_{t2} - B\bar{X}_{t1})$.

the nature of party, seeing the affective and ignoring the instrumental. They were wrong about the invariance of interest and involvement over a lifetime. They were wrong when they assumed that there was little feedback from party performance to party identification. They were wrong when they assumed that voters took their cues from party and candidate lines and ignored cues from their daily lives and self-interest. More than anything that we can say, the events of the 1960s proved them wrong: the changes of party, the growth of black participation, the success of issue-based protest movements in toppling at least one president from within his own party, and certainly the rise of George Wallace—perhaps even the rise of George McGovern.

The authors of "Majority Party" are almost always wrong, or at least without foundation, when they talk about "change" but use a new proximity model; the new findings on 1972 are produced by new instruments, and where direct comparisons are possible the new and old instruments do not agree. "Majority Party" is wrong, for example, when it argues that candidates have decreased rather than increased in importance.

Moreover, the new "Majority Party" approach to voting is misguided in several important respects. It is wrong about ideology—particularly when it sees the use of ideology as a manifestation of sophistication rather than as a cost-saving device. It is also wrong about the relation between candidate and issues. For example, it is a mistake to imply, as they do, that the voter will take the promise of proximity on issues in lieu of predictions of actual performance, and it is wrong for them to portray candidate concerns as antithetical to issue concerns, elements to be neutralized so that issues can shine through. And finally, the authors of "Majority Party," in their rush to modernize, have erred by embracing parts of the Downsian model which are either inapplicable to the American political system or simply wrong.

Rather than attempt patchwork revisions as the authors of "Majority Party" have done, one must challenge the old theories at their core—their view of the American voter. Using concepts from group theories and standards based on democratic ideals, the old theories developed expectations, hypotheses, and more than a few normative judgments—in particular, placing all the onus for apathy or poor performance on the voter and reifying "consistency." The authors of "Majority Party," while incorporating other methods, do not seriously challenge the old view of the voter.

As we suggest, one fresh approach may begin with the idea that the voter is using his vote as an

investment in one or more collective goods, made under conditions of uncertainty with costly and imperfect information. As an investor the voter is concerned with outputs, and because the outputs are collective goods, there is incentive to be a free-rider and pass the responsibility to others to inform themselves. Combined with the costliness of information, this leads to the use of informational cost-saving devices like party, ideology or demographic characteristics and an expectation that voters will be most informed when information is "free" or when it is obtained not to prepare for voting but for use in daily life. Combined with the weak nature of the American party system and the power of the President, this leads to a focus on the candidate himself and not just on his party. As an investor, the voter is concerned not with abstract policies of the candidate, but rather with what the candidate can be expected to "deliver" and, thus, the voter looks for signs of competence.

We feel this approach points the way toward questions for further research, questions whose answers are critical to the analysis of candidate strategy and voter behavior. Among the most intriguing of these are the following:

(1) To what extent is the competence component of candidate evaluation independent of issue positions and what is the nature of the interaction? We have argued that there is a competence dimension to candidate evaluation. Clearly, there will be an interaction between the positions that a candidate takes on issues and the voter's evaluation of his competence, but equally clearly, this is not all. What else goes into the evaluation of competence? The ability to handle hecklers? Reporters? Looks? Reputation? Success in business? Has this changed with television? How substantial is the "halo" effect, where competence is ascribed to the candidate with acceptable positions and denied to the candidate with unacceptable ones? What is the relation between trust and competence?

(2) What tests does the voter use in different contexts? We have argued that voters will base their evaluations of candidates on the most visible and reliable cues available to them, which are often demographic characteristics. This suggests a field of voting research in what might be called cueing or attribution theory. When the voter "interviews" a candidate for the job of president, what questions does he use? Does he test in areas he, the voter, feels he knows well, like social problems? Does he test on issues such as abortion and corporal punishment, and infer capability elsewhere to those who agree with him?

(3) Do voters adopt different information strategies for different races and different tests for different jobs? A related area of inquiry is raised by the federal structure of the American system and its effect on candidate evaluation. For example, competence may be a more important dimension for evaluation of candidates for administrative offices, such as president and mayor, than for legislative positions. Furthermore, since the "legislator" can't be expected to deliver as much, straight "proximity" without consideration of competence may be used more than in an executive race. Would the McGovern/Nixon vote have been the same in a race for the Senate?

(4) To what extent do the media contribute to de-emphasis or relocation of the focus of political parties? We have argued that party labels may be employed by voters as information shortcuts. Modern media coverage of contests for the presidency, however, makes available to the voter a wealth of information about the candidates beyond the party label. Such extensive coverage does not characterize most other races. This raises an important question, then, about the impact of the media on the structure of the American political system.

(5) What effect does modern media coverage have on voters' evaluation of the trustworthiness of candidates and on the long-run stability of coalitions? In addition to expanding the information available to voters, extensive media coverage of modern elections has the further effect of opening up the smoke-filled rooms and revealing the coalitional nature of candidate support groups. What happens, for example, when a white Southern Democrat discovers that he is in the same coalition with Eastern liberals and blacks? "If you're good for them," a voter might reason, "can you possibly be good for me?"

(6) How do voters evaluate the economic management performance of Presidents and other leaders? The investor-voter model would lead us to expect that economic issues will be of near-universal concern to voters, because information about one or more economic variables—such as inflation, price supports, parity levels, unemployment benefits, social security increases—is obtained in planning daily life. Indeed, our analysis of the 1972 election showed economic management to be a policy area of high impact, whereas "Majority Party," by looking at social security type economic items, and ignoring inflation, unemployment and busi-

ness conditions, found economics to be an unimportant area for the voters. The entire economic area has, as our treatment suggests, been heavily underplayed, and future voting researchers would be well advised to study popular perceptions and evaluations of various different kinds of economic conditions and taxes. How and in what way s do voters most notice inflation, and do they see any contradictions between fighting inflation and unemployment? What are the causal models voters have of the relations between government policy and their own economic condition?

We have discussed three different models of the American voter: the original SRC model for the citizen voter, the more educated, ideological "Downsian" voter of "Majority Party," and our investor-voter. The differences in the models are summed up by the main question they suggest is in the minds of the voters. The old SRC model suggests that the voter asks, "Where do my affections lie?" The "Majority Party" revised model suggests that the voter asks, "What promises are closest to my ideals?" We instead suggest that the American voter goes beyond affect and promises to ask, "What have you done for me lately?"

Comment on "A Majority Party in Disarray"

FREDERICK T. STEEPER and ROBERT M. TEETER
Market Opinion Research

We agree that issue voting was a very important factor in the 1972 presidential election. We do not agree, however, with two consequences seen by CPS in the rise in issue voting: (1) that the 1972 patterns portend great ideological battles for future presidential elections and (2) that the political parties must change their issueless ways in order to cope with an increasingly polarized electorate. Those grand consequences could be taken more seriously if the increased issue voting reflected *enduring polarizations* in the electorate and not *candidate-induced polarizations*. Miller et al. instead use both causes in explaining the increase in issue voting without explicitly labeling the two causes and without mentioning the different implications each has for the strategies of political parties and the nature of future elections.

In addition to its unclear theoretical statements, we find CPS's running commentary on the Vietnam War issue to be almost totally erroneous. This is no small matter as the war issue was CPS's strongest example of a policy cleavage in 1972, and the war issue obviously bore the brunt of the high correlations involving the combined issue indices used throughout the analysis. The CPS analysis, generally, is guilty of overly dramatizing the meaning of the 1972 issue patterns, and our own findings on the Vietnam War will serve as our empirical demonstration of this point.

The Vietnam War Issue

CPS found that the Vietnam War was a pivotal issue of great importance to the election outcome. With this important point we agree, but our agreement stops there. Basically, the CPS group makes two contradictory assertions about the war issue—both of which are incorrect. First, they present a picture of McGovern overestimating the speed of the electorate's drift to the left and consequently placing himself too far to the left for the voters to support him. In this view, Nixon, who was perceived to have changed little on the issues, became the closer candidate to a majority of voters virtually by default. The first interpretation wrongly assigns only minor importance to the impact that Nixon's perceived policies had on the vote. The dynamics of the issue lie only with the far left position staked out by McGovern and not with the voters' reactions to what they saw Nixon doing.

The second assertion presents Nixon as the candidate of those who "favored an escalation of the war and renewed national commitment to achieve a military victory" (p. 756). In ascribing a rather startling bit of issue positioning to Nixon, the second interpretation is a gross distortion of how his supporters perceived his Vietnam policy.

The most widely held perception of Nixon's Vietnam policy was that he was "bringing the boys home." Incredibly *nowhere* in their entire review of this issue do the authors mention troop withdrawals as part of Nixon's policy. This is not a point of a fair representation of Nixon's policies; but, rather, one of analytically incorporating the paramount positive perception that the American voters had toward Nixon and the war. The impression CPS leaves with the reader that Nixon won a landslide victory based on a coalition of voters who favored an escalation in the war is directly contrary to what MOR was continually finding throughout the election year.

Across our surveys in 1972, we consistently found Nixon's biggest asset was that a clear plurality of voters perceived him as successfully *de-escalating* the war. For example, in January, 1972, the single most frequent perception of the "most important accomplishments of the Nixon administration" was his phased withdrawal of troops from Vietnam. Fully 38 percent of the voters *volunteered* this as one of Nixon's chief accomplishments during his first term in office; no other response or set of responses came close to equalling the positive impact of the withdrawal perception. In eighteen states also surveyed during January, the same accomplishment was attributed to Nixon. The volunteered mentions of troop withdrawals ran no lower than 33 per cent (in Missouri) and reached a high of 49 per cent (in New Hampshire). In all eighteen states this single perception far outdistanced the others in the voters' minds.

As the CPS authors stated, the Vietnam War was the most salient issue in the election and, as such, was also most frequently cited as a failure of the Nixon administration. Nationally, however, a 38 per cent to 21 per cent plurality saw Nixon's handling of the war as an accomplishment rather than a failure. Only in California (35 per cent to 28 per cent) and in Missouri (33 per cent to 20 per cent) did Nixon's plurality fall below a 15-point margin.

Particularly damaging to the CPS interpretation, these volunteered responses do *not* indicate that the war was actively perceived as a position

issue demarcated by immediate withdrawal and military victory. Instead, they imply a milder dichotomy than the one used by CPS. Some voters approved of Nixon's phased withdrawal program while others judged it as being too slow. Almost everyone who mentioned it wanted the U.S. out of the war and, at issue, was the speed and conditions of the withdrawal. The positive responses, significantly, are not based on perceptions of Nixon winning the Vietnam War. Tables 1 and 2 represent the general tone of the Vietnam data the Nixon campaign was receiving throughout 1972, and given this tone, the issue loses much of its ideological content.

Tables 1 and 2 also reveal that Nixon's real vulnerability was the economy. By about a 17 per cent to 15 per cent margin, more voters pointed to his various economic policies as failures. Other findings in our surveys in regard to Nixon's perceived handling of the economy were even more negative than this result. Typically, MOR's issue handling ratings taken on Nixon showed "foreign policy" and "the Vietnam War" to be his strongest issue areas and "unemployment" and "inflation" to be his weakest issues with the voters.[1]

Given these and similar findings it should be obvious that McGovern's "principal error" in 1972 was not his "overestimating the speed" of the "drift toward an anti-war opinion," as CPS advises us (p. 758). It was more simply his emphasizing the Vietnam War rather than economic problems as the issue upon which the voters should base their voting decision. The Nixon strategists could not have been happier.

But how do we account for the formidable array of CPS data which seems to support conclusions so different from ours? First, there is a matter of data manipulation. When using a seven-point scale, the analyst is faced with the arbitrary choice of defining the left as points 1 and 2 or points 1, 2, and 3. The same follows for defining the right. Most significantly, the size of the center will expand or collapse depending on the choice made.

CPS uses the broad definitions of the extremes and, consequently, 40 per cent of their pre-election respondents, the modal group, are in favor of immediate withdrawal from Vietnam. Only 23 per cent are in the center. If the narrow definition is used, the mode changes to the center (45 per cent) with 28 per cent at the left favoring immediate withdrawal. The modal perception of Nixon's position also shifts from the right polar extreme to the center when the tighter definition of favoring a military victory is used. Significantly, only the meaning of McGovern's perceived position is unaffected by this unavoidable shell game. (See Table 3.)

The broad definition of the polar positions does support the CPS picture of McGovern standing on the plurality side of the Vietnam issue with his principal error being only that he is too frequently seen as supporting immediate withdrawal (75 per cent). Nixon, on the other hand, is on the wrong side of the issue. In spite of this, Nixon is closer to a majority of voters only because McGovern is perceived so far to the left, or so goes the CPS analysis.

However, the centrist description of Nixon and the electorate on Vietnam is the more accurate one and is much more consistent with our other measures on the subject. We would guess that if CPS checked other results in their interview, the centrist description would be validated and the polarization pattern would be revealed as a serious distortion of their other Vietnam issue findings.

The second source of their misrepresentation of the Vietnam issue lies in the content of their question. No doubt in the interest of gathering data comparable to those of their previous studies, CPS stayed with their verbal anchors of "withdrawal" and "victory." Unfortunately, this dichotomy was not as appropriate in 1972 as it had been in previous years. To measure the voters' basic orientation toward an issue there is a good argument for stating the two sides in the most extreme terms. But, the CPS authors take their subsequent results too seriously: they try to have us believe that in the perceived national debate on Vietnam, voters saw the choices as immediate withdrawal versus military victory. As our unprompted, open-ended data show more clearly, this simply was not the case.

In addition to the volunteered responses, we also used a seven-point scaling question but with the extremes being (1) "withdraw all troops immediately in the belief that North Vietnam will then release our prisoners" and (2) "we should continue to withdraw our troops gradually but not withdraw them completely until our prisoners of war have been released." The proof of the greater relevance of this dichotomy to the actual campaign is the significant level of agreement it uncovered in the voters' perceptions of Nixon's position. An average 80 per cent of the voters in seven states surveyed placed Nixon on the side of conditional withdrawal broadly defined, and 68 per cent placed him in favor of conditional withdrawal even when narrowly defined. Table 3 shows the contrasting results obtained by the CPS and MOR issue scales and the change in meaning of the CPS results when their extremes are defined more strictly.

At the time these data were collected (June 13–

[1] These ratings used the question, "How well do you think President Nixon has handled the following issues—extremely well, very well, fairly well, not very well, or not at all well."

Table 1. What Are the Most Important Accomplishments of the Nixon Administration?

		East				Midwest				South								West	
	National	New Hampshire	New Jersey	New York	Pennsylvania	Ohio	Indiana	Wisconsin	Iowa	Maryland	Virginia	North Carolina	Kentucky	Tennessee	Florida	Texas	Missouri	Oregon	Calif.
War/Handling of Vietnam Trying to end Vietnam War/Withdrawal of troops/Bringing our boys home/Getting our men home/De-escalation of Vietnam War/Withdrawal without defeat/Toned Vietnam situation down	38%	49%	39%	39%	42%	38%	39%	41%	40%	41%	40%	40%	48%	48%	39%	38%	33%	42%	35%
Wage/Price control program/Phase I Price freeze program/Wage freeze helps a lot. Phase II was good/Phase I sure helped	8	9	9	9	9	14	9	13	10	8	11	7	9	6	9	7	9	6	7
Control inflation/Economic strides Inflation is better now/Trying to curb inflation/Controlling our economy/Stabilizing our economy	7	9	8	8	7	6	8	6	7	7	8	5	6	5	9	10	5	10	11
Improved foreign relations Recognized Red China/Maintaining position of U.S. in world affairs/Opened relations with Red China	6	5	4	8	4	6	4	3	6	5	4	4	2	2	3	5	6	5	11
All others																			
Nothing good/No accomplishments Just don't approve of him	17	8	18	10	12	15	12	16	9	16	10	14	7	11	15	10	17	10	13
Don't know/Refused/No Mention	12	8	11	18	15	11	18	10	13	11	13	17	18	18	11	18	18	17	14
Number of cases	100% (1019)	100% (608)	100% (807)	100% (1007)	100% (799)	100% (797)	100% (800)	100% (800)	100% (604)	100% (799)	100% (796)	100% (803)	100% (806)	100% (801)	100% (805)	100% (1003)	100% (800)	100% (599)	100% (1003)

Table 2. What Are the Major Failures of the Nixon Administration?

		East				Midwest				South								West	
	National	New Hampshire	New Jersey	New York	Pennsylvania	Ohio	Indiana	Wisconsin	Iowa	Maryland	Virginia	North Carolina	Kentucky	Tennessee	Florida	Texas	Missouri	Oregon	Calif.
War/Not ending Vietnam War Not ending the Vietnam War/Slow in getting out/He hasn't done anything/Peace/Having our boys slaughtered/Misled a lot of people on Vietnam/Hasn't stopped activity in Vietnam	21%	12%	19%	25%	26%	22%	20%	18%	19%	23%	22%	17%	13%	16%	12%	22%	20%	19%	28%
Inflation/Economic policy Waited too long to stop inflation/Could have come earlier/Economy is bad/Should control our economy better	8	9	6	9	8	10	7	11	8	9	9	4	—	7	6	10	7	12	8
Unemployment/Lack of jobs Too many people out of work/Create more work	5	5	7	5	6	8	6	5	5	7	4	2	6	4	2	6	14	8	7
Wage/Price control program Phase II of the price freeze/Put freeze on too late/Don't like how he did it/Wage control	4	4	3	4	6	5	5	10	3	4	4	3	15	4	2	7	5	5	5
Foreign relations/Foreign aid Don't like the way they play footsie with Red China/His policy with Russia/Too much foreign aid	2	5	2	4	2	4	3	2	3	2	3	2	1	2	3	3	2	4	4
Everything bad/All failures No good/Doing a terrible job	3	2	2	3	4	3	3	3	2	3	3	2	—	4	3	5	7	8	4
All others	16	17	13	—	7	6	10	11	19	9	10	12	12	2	16	2	6	1	2
Nothing bad/No failures He hasn't failed/Done as well as he could/Can't think of any failures	12	15	12	10	9	12	14	9	9	9	11	12	14	18	17	8	8	7	8
Don't know/Refused/No Mention	13	19	20	16	19	14	20	16	19	14	15	29	28	27	22	16	17	17	11
Number of cases	(1019)	(608)	(807)	(1007)	(799)	(797)	(800)	(800)	(604)	(799)	(798)	(803)	(806)	(801)	(805)	(1003)	(800)	(599)	(1003)

Table 3. Alternative Descriptions of the Voters' Positions and Their Perceptions of Nixon and McGovern on the Vietnam War[a]

	CPS Data: Immediate Withdrawal/ Military Victory			Nixon Data: Immediate Withdrawal/ Conditional Withdrawal[b]		
	Self	Nixon	McGovern	Self	Nixon	McGovern
	(1333)	(1214)	(1214)	(7 States)	(7 States)	(7 States)
Broad Definition of Extremes						
Left	[40%]	21%	[75%]	30%	6%	[58%]
Center	23	26	6	9	12	11
Right	28	[45]	6	[54]	[80]	12
Don't know	2	*	13	1	2	19
Narrow Definition of Extremes						
Left	28	9	[69]	24	3	[49]
Center	[45]	[53]	14	24	27	24
Right	18	28	4	[45]	[68]	8
Don't know	2	*	13	1	2	19

[a] Proportions for respondents' self locations are based on total samples with percentage for uninterested voters not shown.

[b] Nixon data are dased on the average result across seven states: California (N=1,000), Illinois (N=800), New Jersey (N=897), New York (N=1,000), Ohio (N=800), Pennsylvania (N=800), and Texas (N=1,000); with each state weighted equally. The interviewing was done during June, 1972.

29, 1972) the voter's perceptions of McGovern were less clear than were their perceptions of Nixon. In California, however, where the highly salient presidential preference primary had been held a week earlier, the perceptions of McGovern were close to the national perceptions found by CPS in the fall. Sixty-three per cent of the California voters perceived McGovern as unambiguously in support of immediate withdrawal, and an additional 9 per cent saw him as at least leaning toward that position.

In summary, there were exceptionally high levels of agreement by the voters about the positions taken by Nixon and McGovern on the war. Nixon was perceived not as favoring a military victory but as favoring conditional withdrawal. Moreover, Nixon's *past actions* on Vietnam had generated considerable support for his re-election, a point completely omitted by the CPS analysis. The Vietnam issue served to catalyze voters in two ways: the voters were significantly *attracted to Nixon* based on his past record and his policy for the future as well as being *repelled by McGovern* based on his perceived policy for the future.

The Vietnam War also served the CPS authors as a major example of the alleged "national liberal trend on questions of public policy" (p. 758). Imputing an ideological meaning to the shift of opinion on the Vietnam War is overdoing it; it is one further example of their tendency to exaggerate the implications of their findings. A true shift to a liberal orientation on foreign policy would mean that more Americans than before felt that displays of good will on our part were a better way to elicit positive responses from a communist government like North Vietnam. CPS shows us no data that suggest so fundamental a change. A counter-hypothesis for the change is that the American people had become appalled by the persistence of an ugly war and wanted it over one way or the other. Such a feeling could grow, and with it the support for immediate withdrawal, without touching the voters' more ideological beliefs about the trustworthiness of Communist governments. In fact, Nixon's position incorporated a record of troop withdrawals (ending our participation) with a *distrust* of the good will of North Vietnam (conditional withdrawal) and, thereby, hit the most responsive chord in the electorate.

Because of their misrepresentation of the Vietnam War issue. Miller et al. miss completely a major irony about the 1972 campaign. McGovern's issue strategy played directly into Nixon's hands. Nixon was most vulnerable on his perceived handling of the economy, while his strong suits were Vietnam and foreign policy. But guided by his personal convictions rather than good political sense, McGovern missed his opportunity to call Nixon to task on the economy. Instead, he threw down the gauntlet exactly where the Nixon strategists wanted it thrown, i.e., on the war issue and the candidates perceived abilities to handle foreign policy generally. We wonder how much dis-

array there would have been among the Democrats if they had had a candidate who had summoned them to battle with their familiar bugle-call of more jobs and higher wages.

Types of Polarization of the Electorate

As we stated at the outset, we find running through the CPS analysis two explanations for the high levels of issue voting and, by implication, two types of issue polarization. One is induced by elite behavior, and the other originates in the existing policy demands of the voters. Whether or not the CPS authors recognize the differing implication which each holds, they never explicitly tell us. They simply cite one and then the other in no apparent systematic fashion. This is unfortunate because the difference between the two is indeed crucial to their generalizations about the strategies of our political parties and the nature of future elections.

To understand the difference between the two polarizations presented by CPS, consider two types of voters. The first is the voter who intensely favors a particular solution to a problem and offers his vote to the candidate who supports his solution. To this voter the issue is, above all, a position issue. In favoring his own solution, he typically opposes competing solutions as intensely as he supports his own. His chief significance for the formulation of campaign strategy is his demand that the candidates take clear positions on his issue. The advocates of immediate withdrawal, of complete military victory in Vietnam, of stiffer penalties for criminals, and of the legalization of marijuana are examples of such voters and examples of the types of issues which define them.

The second type is the voter who essentially reacts to a candidate's proposed solution to a problem although this voter *may not* have considered the problem itself of great importance. This is candidate-induced issue voting. The voter did not demand that the candidate take a position; but once he did, the voter perceived the position to be so outrageous that it immediately became an important factor to his voting decision. This second voter is reacting to the first voter. The issue would never have been an issue if the first voter and his candidate had not put it on the campaign agenda. At least the first two of the "three A's"—"amnesty, acid, and abortion"—were the foci of candidate-induced issue voting and probably characterize McGovern's role better than the statement that he was in the "vanguard" of emerging issue demands of a majority of Americans.

The two types of individual issue voting can obviously result in different types of issue polarization overall. Thus, there can be a polarization involving an issue which divides the electorate into two opposing camps, each actively demanding that their solution be used to solve the problem, e.g., victory or withdrawal from Vietnam. Or there can be a polarization involving an issue that is important to *some* voters that only becomes important to others when an unacceptable solution to the problem is thrust upon them, e.g., busing to achieve school integration.

This distinction is extremely important because each of the two types carries different political implications. The first arises from an unresolved problem and will fade only when the problem is resolved. Faced with such an electorate, the parties and candidates have no choice but to address the problem or their platforms will be considered irrelevant by the voters. They may align themselves clearly in one camp or attempt to promote a compromise, but either way they must speak to the problem. Moreover, the parties and candidates will continually be confronted with these choices until the issue is resolved.

The second type of polarization, on the other hand, comes into being from elite behavior—that is, from a court ruling, an announced government policy, or the selection of a particular candidate. The last of these is the cause of chief interest, since it means that a *national party can choose* whether or not to polarize the electorate. They may choose to nominate a McGovern in 1972 or a Goldwater in 1964 in the belief that the resulting polarization will yield a majority coalition at their pole; or they may choose to do so in order to wage the good fight—win or lose. Whatever the reason for the choice, the party has the option the next time around *not* to nominate a polarizing candidate, without any disastrous repercussions for doing so.

As important as this distinction is, the CPS analysis uses both without comment. Its explanations of increased issue voting flip-flop between (1) the position that the change exists independently of particular candidates and elite behavior and (2) the position that the change can be directly attributed to the selection of ideologically oriented candidates who give the campaign a greater issue focus.

The authors made an excellent statement on the discipline's failure adequately to incorporate leadership behavior as "a major source of the observed change in the quality of mass attitudes" and, thereby, come down on the side of leader-induced polarizations. They specifically cite as sources of the increased issue voting in the '60's—Kennedy's legislative program, the nomination of Goldwater, the dogged efforts of national television during Johnson's administration, and Wallace's particular brand of articulated policy alternatives. All with the result "that national leaders were injecting a large element of policy-based controversy in American politics" (p. 754). The same types of statement return in their summation in which they

state that the greater ideological structuring of political attitudes "reflects the fact that the past 12 years have witnessed an increased articulation of the ideological differences between the parties [and] "can be understood to be the consequence of spokesmen, and movements, utilizing public—and often out-of-the-ordinary channels for airing their grievances" (p. 768). Finally, they say "the growth of issue polarization in the electorate, and the increased importance of issues as determinants of the vote decision have been, at least in part, a response to a new policy-oriented style of elite leadership" (p. 771).

This is very clear, and we heartily agree. We should like to add, however, that the primary agents of this "new policy-oriented style of elite leadership"—Goldwater, McGovern, and Wallace —also failed disastrously in the overriding goal of electoral politics—i.e., winning elections. The clear lesson to party strategists would seem to be that ideological candidates cannot win. In 1964, some claimed that a majority could be mobilized at the conservative pole, but it did not happen. In 1972, others claimed that a majority could be mobilized at the liberal pole; but again, it did not happen. Given this experience one would think the parties would be well advised to cease nominating candidates who "inject policy-based controversy" into elections and to go instead with centrist candidates. But another side to the CPS analysis does not allow the parties such an easy course.

Their lead sentence states that "the 1972 election marked the third term running that one of the major parties failed to cope with the polarization of policy demands among its supporters. . ." (p. 753). Instead of creating the defeating polarization by their own actions, we are now told they "failed to cope" with something that was presumably already there. Similarly, they state that political parties and political leaders face significant problems as a result of "constituents (who) have been aroused to a high concern over questions of government policy" (p. 754). (Perhaps all the ideological injections have created a monster that is out of control?) In a remarkably biased interpretation of McGovern's candidacy as being ahead of its time, their major criticism of him is only that he "sensed but misgauged the changes occurring in popular attitudes and policy demands" (p. 761), and not the possibility that he introduced issue positions or allowed issue perceptions of him to persist which contributed to his defeat.

This second view, of course, is important to CPS's most significant conclusion, namely that a realigment has become a realistic possibility. The present polarizations reflect the existence of "enduring social problems" (and not candidate statements?) which foreshadow the possibility "that subsequent electoral contests will be fought along lines of deepening policy cleavages" (p. 754). Miller et al. indicate that the reduced relationship between voting and party identification will last until (1) the new issues disappear, (2) the party leaders re-orient the parties, or (3) the voters realign themselves. Nominating moderates who do not lose 50 per cent of the party faithful by creating divisive controversies is not a fourth option within this view.

Of course, nominating moderate or centrist candidates has become an anathema to CPS (Arthur H. Miller, "Political Issues and Trust in Government: 1964–1970" [*APSR*, Vol. LXVIII, September, 1974]). The normative theme, with a liberal slant, of "responsible party government" also runs throughout the present article. In the "issueless '50's," we are told Eisenhower "obliterated foreign policy as an arena for national partisan dispute" (p. 753). Attempts "to define new domestic policy goals for the Democratic party" were "thwarted" (p. 753). Real problems were left unsolved as "the national leadership of both parties deprived their followers of any great sense of urgency to define the problems and argue over alternative solutions" (p. 753).

Clearly the judgment is being made that the nation's "enduring social problems" can be better solved by placing their possible solutions in the political arena. We do not object to their taking a normative stand. But, we are suspicious of an analysis that concludes that party leaders will be electorally punished if they do not do what the authors think they *ought* to do.

Moreover, the record suggests just the opposite. For a candidate to follow what the CPS authors recommend—representation of previously glossed over problems—will, more often than not, result in the candidate's losing on an issue of his own making. This is partly what happened to McGovern on amnesty, marijuana, and the $1,000 guaranteed income, and to Goldwater on a military victory in Vietnam, selling TVA, and criticizing social security.

Concluding Comments

In light of the growing relevance of issues to voting behavior documented by CPS, we have tried to draw attention to two alternative conceptualizations of the phenomenon which should guide future research strategy. Even the refinement presented here does not cover one of the most important roles that issues play in election outcomes. In our ongoing surveys for political candidates, we find a third role for issues which does not involve perceived *position* differences between candidates. In this instance, the effect of the issue on voting behavior is mediated by the voter's

general confidence or trust in a particular candidate "to handle" the problem.

The issue has CPS's "demanding" quality in it, i.e., the voter is demanding a solution to a problem and is judging the candidates on the probability that they will solve it. But this voter does not have a strong preference for any particular solution. In fact, he may be totally confused or ignorant about a solution—as in the case of inflation and unemployment. The key perceptions appear to be whether or not the candidate is genuinely "concerned" about the problem, will always do the "right thing," and can "get results." These are very diffuse feelings about the candidates and one could argue that we are crossing from "issue voting" into "candidate preference" as a factor in voting behavior. However, an issue concern is central to a voter's evaluation of the candidate rather than the candidates' personality or charisma.

We are suggesting that it is often an oversimplification to separate issues from candidate preference as the two can be meshed together. For example, two familiar long-standing stereotypes in the American voter's mind are that the Democrats can handle the economy better than the Republicans and the Republicans can handle foreign policy better than the Democrats. There are no polarizing positions involved in these monumentally important perceptions, but they are certainly issue-related and do influence voting behavior. Or take as another example a person who votes for an Eisenhower or a Nixon because "he has more foreign policy experience." Is this issue voting or candidate preference? The dichotomy does not adequately handle these examples.

What further disturbs us is that voting based on *issue confidence* rather than *issue position* is the typical case in subpresidential elections which are the concern of most of our surveys. (Incidentally, we seldom find polarizing issues at the subpresidential level. If the CPS issue data reflect enduring issue cleavages in the electorate, it is curious that these cleavages fade quickly once one leaves the national scene.) The CPS paradigm, therefore, misses one of the major ways that issues can influence voting behavior. We hope that voting based on issue confidence will be explicitly incorporated in future research paradigms.

Comment: Political Methodologies in Disarray: Some Alternative Interpretations of the 1972 Election

DAVID E. REPASS
University of Connecticut

The analysis of American electoral behavior in recent years has produced a variety of divergent interpretations. While one author stresses party identification as the most important variable in presidential voting decisions, another finds candidates to be the most critical factor; other researchers demonstrate that issues are a vital ingredient in the electoral decision, and then still other analysts discover an ideological component, and so on.[1] Convergence upon a commonly accepted set of explanatory factors seems to have eluded us.

Perhaps these differing interpretations are a natural result of studying an electorate that is in an unsteady state—an electorate that is changing in significant ways, as Arthur Miller et al. imply. Or perhaps our instruments and methods have changed in such a way that we have obscured underlying continuities in the basic factors affecting voters' decisions. I would advance the latter proposition. It is my contention that the factors affecting the electoral decision have changed relatively little in the past four elections. That is, the relative weight of the three principal factors in the voting decision—candidates, issues, and party identification—have remained quite steady over time, with candidates always the most important factor. Also, I believe that Philip Converse's fundamental finding—that relatively few voters conceptualize politics in terms of a liberal-conservative continuum—still holds true.[2] Miller et al. contend quite the opposite—they conclude that issue voting and ideology have become increasingly important in the 1960s and provide the principal explanations of the 1972 election. Such diametrically different interpretations cannot be fully resolved within the space of this comment, but at least I would like to indicate some alternative approaches to the analysis of the 1972 election and alert the reader to some of the misleading methodological applications that I believe are contained in the analysis performed by Miller et al.

I will, for the most part, be using the same data that Miller analyzed—the CPS 1972 national election study. But in order to gain perspective on the "new" developments in 1972 claimed by Miller et al. and to demonstrate similarities and differences in electoral behavior over time, I will make use of a number of previous election studies as well.[3]

Relative Importance of Candidates, Issues, and Party Identification

First, let us examine the relative importance of three major variables—candidates, issues, and party identification—in the past four elections. (Unfortunately, lack of continuity in measurement precludes comparison with the 1952 and 1956 elections.) Respondents' net attitude toward each of the candidates, their most salient issue concern (MSI), and their party identification (PI) were used

[1] The reader may wish to refer to some of the literature on voting behavior which contains these divergent interpretations. I have selected a few prominent examples of studies that have emphasized (1) party identification, (2) candidates, (3) issues, or (4) ideology as the major explanatory factor in voting decisions. The selected studies have all been published within the last ten years, and all are based on survey rather than aggregate data.

(1) *Party identification emphasis:* Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, Jerrold G. Rusk, and Arthur C. Wolfe, "Continuity and Change in American Politics: Parties and Issues in the 1968 Election," *American Political Science Review* 63 (December, 1969), see especially pp. 1096–1099. (2) *Emphasis on candidates:* Donald E. Stokes, "Some Dynamic Elements in Contests for the Presidency," *American Political Science Review* 60 (March, 1966), see especially p. 27. Stanley Kelley, Jr. and Thad W. Mirer, "The Simple Act of Voting," *American Political Science Review* 68 (June, 1974), 572–591. (3) *Emphasis on issues:* V. O. Key, Jr., *The Responsible Electorate* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966). Richard W. Boyd, "Popular Control of Public Policy: A Normal Vote Analysis of the 1968 Election," *American Political Science Review* 66 (June, 1972), 429–449. Others, such as Pomper, have studied issues, but have not related issues to voting behavior. See Gerald M. Pomper, "From Confusion to Clarity: Issues and American Voters, 1956–1968," *American Political Science Review* 66 (June, 1972), 415–428. (4) *The ideological factor:* Norman H. Nie with Kristi Andersen, "Mass Belief Systems Revisited: Political Change and Attitude Structure," *Journal of Politics* 36 (August, 1974), see especially pp. 580–583. John Osgood Field and Ronald E. Anderson, "Ideology in the Public's Conceptualization of the 1964 Election," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 33 (Fall, 1969), 380–398. John C. Pierce, "Party Identification and the Changing Role of Ideology in American Politics," *Midwest Journal of Political Science* 14 (February, 1970), 25–42.

[2] Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in *Ideology and Discontent*, ed. David E. Apter (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 206–261.

[3] These data were made available through the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research. Computer time was provided by The University of Connecticut Computer Center. The analysis and interpretation of the data are my own.

in the following multiple regression equations to predict vote (V):[4]

1972

(1) $V = .335\ \text{McG} - .307\ \text{Nix} + .187\ \text{MSI} + .124\ \text{PI}$ $(R = .75)$

1968

(2) $V = .271\ \text{HHH} - .244\ \text{Nix} - .128\ \text{Wal} + .185\ \text{MSI} + .235\ \text{PI}$ $(R = .76)$

1964

(3) $V = .243\ \text{LBJ} - .325\ \text{GH}_2\text{O} + .198\ \text{MSI} + .211\ \text{PI}$ $(R = .79)$

1960

(4) $V = .275\ \text{JFK} - .248\ \text{Nix} + .168\ \text{MSI} + .282\ \text{PI}$ $(R = .79)$

The resulting beta-weights clearly indicate that the candidates were the most important factor in each of the elections—1960 through 1972. The importance of issues has remained stable throughout each of the past three elections (1964, 1968, and 1972), with issues playing a somewhat smaller role in the 1960 election. (The measure of issue concern that I am using here is a weakened version of the Strength of Issue Partisanship measure developed in my "Issue Salience and Party Choice" article. Had the more complete measure of issue partisanship been available, the beta-weight of the issue variable [MSI] would have been increased by about .03. Thus, it would probably be safe to assume that the issue coefficients in the above equations would really be .200 or a bit more if respondents' full range of issue concerns had been available for each election studied.)[5]

Finally, the direct effect of party identification on vote does vary from one election to the next.[6] This change in the importance of party identification is in part explained by the extent of defection in an election. When there is a landslide—as in 1964 and 1972—and many party identifiers defect to the opposite candidate, obviously party identification is not going to be as strong a predictor of vote. The massive defection of Democrats to Nixon in 1972 is particularly noticeable in the low weight on party identification that year. A more fundamental alteration in the role of party identification may also be taking place, owing particularly to the increased proportion of independents (as mentioned by Miller et al.). Conclusive evidence of a long-term weakening of the party identification variable remains for future elections and further analysis to determine. We can see, however, that Miller's conclusion that "issues can be expected to play an increasingly significant role in future elections" has little substantiation when we look at Equations 1 through 4. In 1972, for ex-

[4] The Most Salient Issue (MSI) variable in Equations 2, 3, and 4 is based on an open-ended question that asked, "What do you personally feel are the most important problems the government should try to take care of?" In 1972, the wording of this question was changed to read: "What do you think are the most important problems facing the country?"

The party identification measure (PI) is based on the standard SRC-CPS question that has been asked since 1952. See Miller et al. footnote 2 for the exact wording.

The measure of attitude toward each of the candidates in 1960, 1964, and 1968 was developed from open-ended questions that asked respondents' likes and dislikes about the two (or in 1968, the three) candidates. The measure is the sum of the positive comments about a candidate minus the sum of the negative comments. In 1972, the measure of candidate attitude based on open-ended comments was not available in conjunction with the MSI measure. (Two separate samples with two different questionnaires had been used in the 1972 election study.) Therefore, the measure of candidate attitude in Equation 1 had to be based on a pre-election feeling "thermometer" question. A careful check was made to see if the "thermometer" measure could validly be used as a close surrogate for the measure based on open-ended questions. I found that it could, with only slight adjustments necessary to make it comparable with previous election year measures. (Detailed information on the testing procedure and adjustments can be obtained from the author.)

For the 1968 equation (Equation 2), I used a dichotomous dependent variable (V) with both a Wallace vote and a Nixon vote scored as a non-Democratic vote. Alternative methods of dealing with the three-candidate race in 1968 were explored and this method was found to be the best.

The number of cases that each equation (1 through 4) is based upon is the total number of voters in each election study. Respondents who did not have an attitude on a particular variable were placed at the mid or neutral point of the attitude measure.

[5] See my article "Issue Salience and Party Choice," *American Political Science Review* 65 (June, 1971), 389–400, for a description of the Strength of Issue Partisanship measure. The measure was based on degree of concern and party preference on a *number* of issues. Since the 1972 election study recorded party preference on only one issue (the one problem the respondent thought was most important), the Strength of Issue Partisanship measure could not be built for 1972. The measure could not be calculated for 1960 either because the 1960 election study did not probe for degree of concern. To maintain comparability from one equation to the next, therefore, the MSI measure had to be based on only one issue—the single most important problem—in each election study.

I was able to build the Strength of Issue Partisanship measure for 1964 and 1968. When this multi-point measure, based on a more complete set of issue concerns, was substituted for the MSI measure in Equations 2 and 3, the beta-weight of the issue variable increased by about .03 in each equation.

[6] I want to stress that I am talking here of the *direct* effect of party identification in explaining vote. The *indirect* effects of party identification in influencing attitudes toward candidates and perceptions of party differences on issue concerns is not examined in this comment.

ample, a decline in the importance of party identification was not accompanied by an increase in the importance of issues.

Turning to the 1972 election in particular—focusing on Equation 1—the reader should note the relatively high beta-weights attached to the candidate variables. Attitudes toward McGovern heavily influenced the overall electoral decision in 1972—indeed the McGovern candidacy had a greater impact on voting choice than any other candidate in the past decade. Attitudes toward Nixon also strongly influenced the 1972 electoral decision. *The 1972 election was, above all else, an election decided by the candidate factor.*

Miller et al. gave very little attention to this dominant candidate factor in their analysis of the 1972 election; rather they devoted much of their analysis to showing the importance of issues in 1972. The issue measures used by Miller et al. were based on preformulated seven-point scale questions. In order to test the overall effect of issues as measured by these preformulated questions, I made use of multiple regression analysis. Several of the issue measures used by Miller et al.—the questions on Vietnam, Campus Unrest, Urban Unrest, and Aid to Minorities—were substituted one at a time into my Equation 1 in place of the MSI variable.[7] On the average, these issues—which Miller found to be of considerable import in 1972—produced beta-weights of scarcely more than .100. Only the Campus Unrest measure, with a coefficient of .148, came close to the .187 registered by the MSI measure. Thus, the preformulated issue scale questions which were used so extensively by Miller et al. were less predictive of vote than the MSI measure—a measure which is based on the respondent's freely selected choice of an issue. Once again we see that when issues are measured by open-ended questions, a greater degree of issue voting can be demonstrated than when preformulated questions are used.[8]

Given the evidence just presented, how is it that Miller et al. found issues, especially as measured by preformulated questions, to be of such great importance in 1972, and why did candidates not emerge more dominantly in their analysis?[9] The answer to these questions lies in two basic oversights in the Miller analysis: (1) a failure to control for the candidate variable at certain key points in the analysis, and (2) a reliance on the candidate proximity measure as a true measure of issue effect.

Using Controls in Normal-Vote Analysis

In their Figures 2a through 2f, Miller et al. use normal-vote analysis and present what appears to be an impressive demonstration of partisan defection based on issues. At best, normal-vote analysis presents certain problems for the analyst. As Brody and Page have pointed out, "Taking the issues one at a time means that the approach is continually reapportioning the same observed variation in the vote. In this way many factors can appear as indispensable in explaining the vote. Given the multifaceted nature of political reality, disciplined statements about the causes of behavior will be necessarily multivariate."[10] Use of proper procedures and controls can help to overcome these problems. Developing a cluster of related issues into a combined index, instead of taking issues one at a time, will help minimize "continual reapportionment." One issue cluster can be controlled while examining another. This is especially necessary if several issues are correlated with each other as is true of items in Miller's Figure 2.

But more serious than not considering the overlapping effects of several issues is Miller's failure to control for the candidate variable. To illustrate this point, let us take the Vietnam issue—an issue that had a considerable short-term impact in 1972 according to Miller's Figure 2a. In my Figure 1, we can see what happens when attitudes toward candidates are taken into consideration. Here, I have divided the sample into those respondents who were, on balance, favorable to Nixon (Figure 1a), those who were favorable to McGovern (Figure 1c), and those who were neutral or had little difference in their feelings toward the candidates (Figure 1b).[11] When definite feelings toward the candidates were in evidence (Figures 1a and 1c), the expected vote and the observed vote

[7] In order to keep these issue measures as similar to the MSI measure as possible, a *party proximity* measure was calculated for each preformulated issue used.

[8] This reiterates an observation that was first made in my article "Issue Salience and Party Choice."

[9] In all fairness, I should point out that in the original version of the 1972 election analysis by Miller et al., as reported in a paper presented at the 1973 American Political Science Association meeting, the candidate factor was more clearly identified and discussed than in their present article. About all that remains of that original discussion and analysis is a sentence near the end of the present article that says: "After the affective ratings of the candidates, the next most important short-term [*sic*] factor accounting for the voter's decision was a liberal-conservative ideology . . . ." But even in the original, the authors placed heavy interpretive emphasis on factors other than the candidates.

For reasons explained in my discussion of the candidate proximity measure, the beta-weights for the candidates in Miller's multiple regression equations were not as large as they should have been. Had the beta-weights for candidates in their analysis been at the high level that I found in my Equation 1, Miller et al. would probably have given the candidate factor more importance in their interpretation.

[10] Richard A. Brody and Benjamin I. Page, "Comment: The Assessment of Policy Voting," *American Political Science Review* 66 (June, 1972), 455.

[11] Net attitude toward candidates was measured by si-

Figures 1a–1c: Normal Vote Analysis of Vietnam Issue with Attitude Toward Candidate Controlled

Figure 1a.
Nixon More Favorably Perceived Than McGovern




Figure 1b.
Little Difference in Feelings Toward Candidates or Neutral





Figure 1c.
McGovern More Favorably Perceived Than Nixon



* I have modified Boyd's *S* measure to fit this situation. See footnote 12.

closely parallel each other regardless of respondents' position on the issue scale. Except for an unexpected 19 per cent vote for McGovern among the pro-Nixon extreme doves, the Vietnam question had relatively little impact when attitude toward candidate was controlled. Among those who were neutral or had little difference in their feelings toward the candidates—about 20 per cent of the sample—the effect of the issue was more noticeable, but even here the *S* (short-term effect measure) was not as high as in Miller's Figure 2a. Among this middle group (my Figure 1b), the observed vote line did not move in a steady slope from upper left to lower right as we would expect if the issue positions were exerting a consistent pull.[12]

When using a control variable in normal-vote analysis, a summary measure of the short-term effects of an issue can be obtained by taking a weighted average of the *S* values within each control group. Such a measure, which we might call S_c (Boyd's *S* when controlling), yielded a value of 3.45 for the data described by my Figures 1a through 1c.

In a similar fashion, I performed a normal-vote analysis controlling for the candidate variable on several other issue measures used by Miller in his Figure 2. The results were all very similar to those obtained with the Vietnam issue—relatively low S_c values. The strong pull of issues, as depicted in

---

multaneously observing respondents' affect toward both candidates. (Affect was measured by the pre-election feeling "thermometer" question.) Those who were relatively warm toward Nixon and cool toward McGovern were put in the "Nixon More Favorably Perceived than McGovern" group. To be included in this group, there had to be at least a 30° difference between the candidates in thermometer ratings. Similarly, the "McGovern More Favorably Perceived than Nixon" group was composed of those who were substantially warmer toward McGovern than Nixon. The "Little Difference in Feelings or Neutral" group were those who placed both candidates within about 10° of each other on the "thermometer," or who placed both candidates at the 50° or neutral mark.

[12] There are certain difficulties with Boyd's *S* measure. (See Richard W. Boyd, "Popular Control of Public Policy," *American Political Science Review* 66 [June, 1972], 448–449.) One problem stems from the use of *absolute values* in the computational formula. As a result, Boyd's *S* is unable to detect whether the observed vote line moves away from the expected vote line in an appropriate direction. For the data represented by my Figure 1b I have adjusted Boyd's measure to compensate for this shortcoming.

I should also point out that Boyd's *S* cannot be used as a measure to compare the overall impact of one issue versus another issue in an election. It lacks a standard base. Miller et al. do not try to use Boyd's *S* in this way. Boyd and others have attempted, however, to rank order the impact of issues in an election, using the *S* value as the indicator of impact. This is incorrect.

I have been working on modifications of Boyd's *S* to remedy these difficulties and will be happy to furnish further information on request.

Miller's Figure 2, is more apparent than real.[13] What we are really observing in that figure is a strong overlay of the candidate factor.

The Candidate Proximity Measure

Issue questions, in a new format first introduced in 1968, were used extensively in the 1972 CPS election study. In these questions, respondents are asked in quick succession to locate their own issue position on a seven-point scale, and then asked to locate the position of the Democratic party, the Republican party, and the perceived position of each of the candidates on the issue. From such data, it is possible to calculate the relative distance or proximities between the position on the scale that the respondent chooses for himself and the position the respondent selects for the candidates and the parties. The political science literature has contained several warnings about the use of such proximity measures,[14] and, indeed, Miller et al. recognize the problems inherent in this type of measure. (See especially their footnote 21, beginning with the second paragraph.) Nonetheless, Miller et al. do use a candidate proximity measure throughout much of their analysis.[15]

The difficulty with the candidate proximity measure is that respondents can either project their own issue positions onto their favored candidate, or rationalize their issue responses by placing themselves close to their favored candidate. In either case, attitude toward candidate strongly influences the distance between the respondent's position on an issue scale and his location of candidates on that scale. For these respondents, attitude toward candidates, *not position on issues*, is the dominant factor being measured by candidate proximity measures. There is no way to determine how many respondents engage in this kind of psychological maneuvering when responding to this type of question, but the data presented below indicate there are sufficient numbers to create serious problems when candidate proximity measures are used as indicators of issue effects.

One indication of the extent to which psychological positioning (projection or rationalization) is taking place can be found in the very strong correlations between the attitude toward candidate and the candidate proximity measures calculated for several different issues (average $tau_b = .350$)[16] This correlation remains quite high regardless of the respondent's position on the issue; this means that a considerable amount of inappropriate positioning of candidates is occurring, as we can observe in my Table 1 below. For example, doves who liked Nixon better than McGovern were not likely to put McGovern closer to themselves on that issue, and "hard liners" on the campus unrest issue who liked McGovern better than Nixon usually did not place Nixon closer to their own position. Such inappropriate placement of candidates is endemic when this type of question format is used, raising serious doubts about employing these measures in the study of policy voting.

Miller et al. first use the candidate proximity measures in their Figures 3 and 4. These figures present an impressive demonstration of short-term effects—but effects of what? In these figures, we are looking at a combination of both candidate attitudes and issue positions at the same time, and we have no idea how much each factor is affecting the resultant defection from party identification. Miller may have increased his "predictive power" through the use of the candidate proximity measure, but he has done it at the expense of clarity and at the risk of misinterpretation.

[13] This conclusion should not be interpreted to mean that issues were unimportant in the 1972 election. The reader should bear in mind that we are working here with responses to a single item in a survey and that these issue items are measured by preformulated fixed-choice questions. The importance or salience of the issue to the respondent is unknown. Miller et al. refer several times to the issues represented in their Figure 2 as "salient" and they assume that, taken alone, these preformulated questions are a measure of "attitude." In their footnote 20 they point to the fact that a "saliency screen" is used with these questions. (The screen question was: "Or haven't you thought much about this?") Such screening questions, which try to discourage respondents who do not have an attitude from answering the question, have been used in SRC-CPS studies since the 1950's. Yet these screens have not kept respondents who have only very casual or fleeting feelings about the questions from giving a response. The fact that in the normal vote analysis just presented (with candidate attitude controlled) responses to such preformulated issue questions were not strongly related to vote is evidence, once again, that salience is not detected by these preformulated questions.

[14] Problems of projection and rationalization specifically related to these new issue scale questions have been discussed by Richard Brody and Benjamin Page in "Comment: The Assessment of Policy Voting" and also in their article "Policy Voting and the Electoral Process: The Vietnam War Issue," *American Political Science Review* 66 (September, 1972), 986–989. Gerald Finch worked extensively with proximity measures in his dissertation "Policy and Candidate Choice in the 1968 American Presidential Election" (Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Minnesota, 1973), see especially Chap. 3.

[15] See footnote 20 in Miller et al. for the exact method of calculating candidate proximity. Whenever I use proximity measures, I follow the same method of calculation.

[16] The candidate proximity measure for each of several different issues was correlated with the attitude toward candidate variable; the correlation varied to some extent depending on which issue was used. The resulting coefficients were averaged to arrive at the .350 figure.

Correlations were also calculated between respondents' party identification and *party* proximity measures for several issues. This yielded an average tau_b of .250—a full point below the candidate attitude-candidate proximity link. Thus, although psychological adjustment takes place in locating party positions, the party proximity measure does not create as severe a distortion problem as the candidate proximity measure.

Table 1. Appropriateness of Perceived Candidate Position on Various Issues, Attitude toward Candidate Controlled[a]

Net Attitude Toward Candidates	Respondents' Issue Position					
	Vietnam		Campus Unrest		Aid to Minorities	
	Dove[b]	Hawk[c]	Pro-student[b]	Use force[c]	Government help[b]	Leave on own[c]
Pro-Nixon	36% (74)	82% (130)	36% (28)	62% (241)	32% (88)	57% (167)
Pro-McGovern	79% (129)	47% (15)	78% (59)	17% (65)	84% (70)	28% (32)

[a] Entry in each cell is per cent of those in the cell who placed the *appropriate* candidate closer to the issue position they selected. Only those respondents who placed themselves in the two most extreme positions on the seven-point scale (1, 2, or 6, 7) were used in this table.

[b] McGovern was considered the appropriate candidate to be proximate to these positions.

[c] Nixon was considered the appropriate candidate to be proximate to these positions.

Actually, much of what we see in their Figures 3 and 4 is the effect of the candidate variable. For example, let us take Miller's Figure 3a (Vietnam proximity measure) and control for attitudes toward candidates as I did earlier in my Figure 1. When this control was instituted, the candidate proximity measure for the Vietnam issue produced an S value of 0.71 among those who perceived Nixon more favorably than McGovern, and an S of 0.93 among those who liked McGovern better than Nixon. The S value for those with neutral or little difference in feelings toward the candidates was 10.07. This averages to an overall short-term effect (S_e) of 3.09 for the Vietnam proximity measure. Thus, if we control for the influence of candidate attitudes in Miller's Figure 3a, there is not much short-term issue effect left. Indeed, the effect of the Vietnam issue was slightly greater when the respondent's own position on the question was used. (Recall that the value of S_e for data in my Figure 1 was 3.45.)

Later in Miller's article, multiple regression analysis is introduced, again using the candidate proximity measure to test issue effects. Miller contends that by including attitude toward candidates and party identification in "the same explanatory equation containing the issue [proximity] measures," any spurious relationship arising from rationalization and projection effects of the proximity measure can be "removed" (see his footnote 21). Let us see what happens if we introduce candidate proximity measures into a multiple regression equation with attitude toward candidate and party identification already in the equation. When the candidate proximity measure for two of the issues (Vietnam and Campus Unrest) were added to my Equation 1, the beta coefficient for the attitude toward McGovern variable went down by .06, the coefficient for the Nixon variable went down by .07, and the multiple correlation coefficient (R) increased by just .02 (from .75 to .77). The more proximity measures that were added to the equation, the lower the candidate beta coefficients became, with virtually no further increase in explained variation (R^2). For example, adding five proximity measures to the equation reduced each of the candidate beta-weights by a full point (minus .100)—about a thirty per cent reduction from the initial values. The rationalization and projection effects latent in the candidate proximity measure cannot be "removed" by the multiple regression technique; rather such a regression equation simply transfers explanatory power from the explicit measure of candidate attitude to the proximity measure in which candidate attitude is imbedded.

Miller et al. combined a number of candidate proximity measures into composite indices and used these compound proximity measures in a multiple regression analysis. (See their footnote 28.) No wonder candidates did not look very important to them; they had pulled much of the explanatory power away from the candidates by using these compound proximity measures in the same equation with the candidate variable. Miller et al. conclude that "the proximity measures of issue attitudes were exceptionally potent predictors of vote" in the 1972 election. Actually, candidate attitudes were ascendant and had strong collateral effects on the proximity measures.[17]

[17] The reader should also be aware that when Miller uses path analysis to demonstrate the combined effect of party identification and issues on the vote—concluding that "the total effect of party identification was .51 whereas the issue effect was .55"—he leaves the candidate variable out of the model entirely. Miller's footnote 29, however,

Interdependence between Issue Positions and Attitudes toward Candidates

It might be argued that attitudes toward Nixon and McGovern were in large measure formed on the basis of voters' issue concerns. This is certainly the assumption behind much of the Miller et al. interpretation. If attitudes toward candidates were strongly shaped by issue concerns in 1972, then controlling for the candidate variable, as I have done in the preceding sections of this comment, may have inappropriately reduced the importance of issues.

Without a multiwave panel study that could have monitored change in responses from a time prior to the conventions through election day, it is hard to tell how much issues were determining attitudes toward candidates, how much attitudes toward candidates were influencing placements on issue scale questions, or what combination of these phenomena were taking place. Some voters undoubtedly developed attitudes about the candidates based on issue concerns, others may have rationalized their issue positions to align with their already preferred candidate, and still others may have based their assessments of candidates on considerations unrelated to issues. Given a single interview, no mathematical or statistical technique could possibly disentangle these different types of behavior. Some data from the 1972 election study, however, may permit us to check for each of the three types of behavior.


One opportunity to test for these types of behavior lies in the structure of the 1972 CPS study. Because there was a pre- and a postelection interview, and because there were twin samples, a means is available, in some measure, to demonstrate whether or not rationalization was taking place. One sample was asked the Vietnam scale question in the pre-election interview; an identical sample was asked that question in the postelection interview. Both samples contain a pre-election measure of attitudes toward candidates. Now, let us take just those respondents in both samples who indicated in the pre-election interview that they liked McGovern better than Nixon. If rationalization (persuasion) were taking place, those voters who answered the Vietnam question in the postelection interview would be more likely than those answering in the pre-election interview to align their position with the candidate they favored. Indeed, the pro-McGovern respondents who answered the Vietnam question in the pre-election interview were 77 per cent doves and 11 per cent hawks, while the postelection responders were 84 per cent doves and 5 per cent hawks. This net difference of 13 per cent lends support to the hypothesis that rationalization was taking place.[18] Of course, some of the pro-McGovern respondents who had been asked the Vietnam question in the pre-election interview may already have rationalized their Vietnam position prior to or during the pre-election interview. Thus, when we see a skewed distribution of responses to issue scale questions among voters with a definite preference for one candidate, as we did in my Figure 1c, we can surmise that the response pattern is in part due to rationalization.

On the other hand, an attempt to use a similar pre- and postelection design to demonstrate that

---


does show a causal model that includes the candidate variable. Thus, the picture we see (the arrow diagram in footnote 29) and the discussion in the text are based on quite different models.

In addition, Miller's measure of "Total Effects" in his footnote 29 is questionable. The usual method of measuring the contribution of each path in a model of this sort is as follows:



Miller apparently ascribes the variance in these four paths to the effects of party identification (PI) alone despite the fact that three of the paths include issues or candidates or both.

Miller's Issues effect (.58) and Candidate effect (.45) are apparently based on a different, three-variable model:



This three-variable model drops the party identification variable, yet the only way that this variable could properly be eliminated is if the coefficient for the direct path between party identification and vote (Path 4) were close to zero. Obviously this is not the case. See Donald E. Stokes, "Compound Paths in Political Analysis" in *Mathematical Applications in Political Science, V*, ed. James F. Herndon and Joseph L. Bernd (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1971), p. 82.

Finally, the direction of the arrow between Issues and Candidates in Miller's model should probably be reversed so that it goes *from* Candidates *to* Issues. The Issues measure is a compound of a number of *candidate* proximity measures, and we have seen how candidate attitude affects proximity.

[18] Among pro-Nixon respondents, the distribution of responses to the Vietnam question were the same in the pre- and the postelection question. Perhaps with negotiations under way and the outcome uncertain, Nixon's position was not perceived as clearly as McGovern's; thus rationalizing responses would not tend to move toward a definite position on the scale.

issues had an effect on attitudes toward candidates proved to be unproductive. Both the pre- and postelection interviews in 1972 contained a "thermometer" question to measure attitudes toward candidates. Thus, change in candidate attitude between the first and second interview could easily be ascertained. If issue position did have an effect on feelings toward candidates, then hawks should have become less favorable to McGovern. Or, perhaps with peace negotiations under way, doves would look more favorably on Nixon and hawks feel cheated of total victory. In any event, no such effects could be found. Those respondents who gave their position on the Vietnam scale in the preelection interview showed no tendency to change their feelings toward either of the candidates in any way that related to their position on the issue. Of course, attitudes toward candidates may already have been rather fully developed by the time the pre-election interview was conducted, and there are a number of other methodological weaknesses in this approach. A well-designed multiwave panel study is needed. It is interesting to note, however, that by using the pre- and postelection interview as a modified panel design, evidence that attitudes toward candidates effected change in issue positions was detected, but no trace of the reverse process (issues determining candidate attitude) was found.

Let us now turn to another kind of datum found in the 1972 election study. So far we have worked principally with the affective component of candidate attitudes as measured by the feeling "thermometer." In addition to this measure of affect, respondents were also asked open-ended questions about what they liked and disliked about the two candidates. From these comments, we can get an idea of the major cognitive elements in attitudes toward the candidates. Table 2 presents a summary tabulation of the various kinds of comments made in response to these open-ended questions.

Looking for issue content, we see, first of all, that a sizeable number of comments (14 per cent) were made about the Vietnam issue. In contrast, very few comments made in reference to the candidates had anything to do with busing, law and order, drugs (acid), amnesty, abortion, or military spending. Added together, this set of issues made up only 3 per cent of all the comments about both candidates. Yet these are the issues that form the basis for many of the preformulated questions used in the analysis by Miller et al.

The data in Table 2 indicate that the Eagleton affair was an appreciable factor in the development of attitudes toward McGovern. Eighty-three respondents explicitly mentioned it. Also, there were large clusters of comments having to do with McGovern being weak, indecisive, vacillating, undependable, insincere, and someone who breaks promises. Many of these cognitions can probably be attributed to the impression people gained of McGovern as a result of the wavering support he gave to his initial running mate.

A number of comments about McGovern were also recorded in the welfare and tax policy categories. Although it is not possible to tell from the coded data, many of these comments probably had to do with the "$1000 per year" welfare program that was attributed to McGovern.

Attitudes toward Nixon (generally positive) were almost as important a factor in the 1972 election as attitudes toward McGovern. (See my Equation 1.) Favorable comments about his foreign policies (not just Vietnam, but detente with Russia, recognition of Red China, and other foreign policy comments) account for a large part of the responses made about Nixon. Another important cluster of attitudes toward Nixon were nonissue comments about his experience and performance in office. There were also a number of references, both positive and negative, to inflation and other economic policies. (Miller et al. do not include economic variables of this sort in their analysis.[19])

Looking over the entire array of comments in my Table 2, we see that the bulk of cognitive elements toward both candidates—about 60 per cent of them—had to do with leadership abilities, personal qualities, group and party references, or general like and dislike responses. Certainly not many cognitions meshed with the preformulated issue questions studied by Miller et al. Only the Vietnam issue used by Miller et al. drew a substantial number of comments.

Let us test for the effect of the Vietnam issue when it formed an explicit part of a respondent's cognitions toward either candidate. (About half of all respondents mentioned Vietnam when commenting on the candidates.) Theoretically, if the Vietnam issue (as measured by the respondent's position on the preformulated Vietnam question) was influencing attitude toward candidate, then those who made a specific reference to the issue when discussing candidates should show a higher correlation between issue position and attitude toward candidate than those who did not refer to the issue. There is some support for this issue-candidate attitude link in the data, but not enough to make us think that the Vietnam issue was a major factor in determining overall valence toward candidates. The Pearsonian correlation between self-placement on the Vietnam question and net pro and con comments about candidates increased

[19] I am referring here to the economics of the business cycle, not the cluster of issues that Miller et al. labeled "economic." Their "economic" dimension had to do with questions of general social welfare.

Table 2. Attitudes toward the Candidates, 1972

McGovern		Nixon		
Pro	Anti	Pro	Anti	
				Leadership abilities, personal qualities
9	27	330	19	Performance in office, experience
7		30		Hard working, conscientious
9	23	25	5	Intelligence, ability to understand nation's problems
3	21	14	4	Dependability, reliability, impulsiveness
92		85		Honest, sincere, keeps promises
	109		146	Dishonest, insincere, breaks promises
7		39		Strong, decisive, have confidence in him
	212		9	Weak, indecisive, vacillating
	83			Eagleton affair
			21	Watergate
			21	Dishonest; corrupt government
	15		30	Lacks principles, ideals; too much of a politician
17		13		Man of high principles, ideals; not a politican
50	64	125	80	Other abilities and qualities
				General approaches, philosophy
	105			Too idealistic, impractical
23	73	3	2	Liberal, favors social change
		11	1	Conservative, against social change
	32			Soft on communism; extremist, too far out
	3			More liberal than most Democrats, would change Democratic policies
14	20	14	24	Other specific references to government programs and approaches
	62			Too negative, tears down other side, no solutions of his own
42	51	19	14	General, vague comments about ideas, policies
				Domestic policies
20	126	13	20	Welfare, poverty problems
35	25	11	26	Tax policy
7		41	35	Inflation
49	32	70	93	Other economic
4	16	24	10	Busing
1	2	12	12	Law and order
	13	4	4	Drugs
3	35	10		Amnesty
	3			Abortion
24	19	22	26	Other domestic issues
				Foreign policies
144	151	298	176	Vietnam
		62	8	Policy toward Red China
		41	8	Detente, relations with Russia
5	35			Weaker military position, Pentagon spending cuts
6	36	117	52	Other foreign policy comments
				Group references
67	12	13	22	Common man, "People like me"
9	5	3	64	Big business, the rich
47	4	18	17	Poor; old people
17	17		2	Young people
41	18	10	32	Other groups
35		7	21	Traditional Dem/Rep, always been a good Dem/Rep; he's a Dem/Rep

Table 2. (Continued)

McGovern		Nixon		
Pro	Anti	Pro	Anti	
1	22	9	13	Men around him (staff); followers
7	10	4	2	Connections with people in party, other leaders, bosses
7	29	11	10	Other party-related comments
				General
56	107	184	51	Like/dislike him; will do good/bad job
41	110	23	29	Appearance, speeches, campaign tactics
49	12	76	25	Other miscellaneous
948	1739	1791	1135	*Total*

by .07 when those who did mention Vietnam were compared with those who did not make an explicit reference to Vietnam when discussing candidates.[20] In general, then, we can say that attitudes toward candidates in 1972 were based on a variety of considerations and that these attitudes were not strongly related to the issues examined in Miller's study.

Finally, we should note that less than 9 per cent of the sample (96 people) talked of McGovern as being a liberal, and only a handful of respondents chose to talk about Nixon in liberal or conservative terms.[21] Also, there were 32 comments suggesting that McGovern was "too far out." Yet Miller et al. conclude that the left-right dimension "provided a simple policy yardstick by which the presidential candidates were evaluated." If so, relatively few articulated it.

Measuring Ideology

For many years, political scientists have tried to measure the presence of ideology—particularly a liberal-conservative ideology—among the American electorate. Converse's seminal work on "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," based on data from the 1956 to 1960 period, produced compelling evidence that a large majority of Americans did not have a coherent recognition or understanding of liberalism and conservatism. A little more than a decade later, Miller et al. conclude that the 1972 election may "more appropriately be labeled an ideological election." They present a long quote from Converse's earlier work and presumably have Converse's definition in mind when they say that they have found a "broad segment of the population in 1972" who are ideological.

Converse defined ideology or belief system as "a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence."[22] Elaborating on this concept, Converse emphasized that people with an ideology should have "contextual knowledge"—should know what idea-elements go together and why. Converse also said that when cognizing such a term as "liberal" or "conservative," "the actor must bring a good deal of meaning to the term, which is to say that he must understand the constraints surrounding it."[23]

I do not believe that the data presented by Miller et al. support their general statements about ideological sophistication among the public in 1972. The reader will recall that Converse relied heavily on open-ended materials in assessing the extent of ideological understanding among the electorate. Miller et al. use entirely different measures to reach their conclusions, relying on (1) a new liberal-conservative scale question (first introduced in 1972)[24] and (2) a matrix of intercorrelations among issue scale responses. (See Miller's Table 2.) Let us deal with the new liberal-conservative scale measure first.

The New Liberal-Conservative Measure. In examining responses to the liberal-conservative scale question, I found, first of all, that more than 30 per cent of the sample did not place themselves on the scale at all, suggesting that these respondents either were not liberals or conservatives, or that they were totally unfamiliar with those terms. Among the approximately 70 per cent of respondents who did venture onto the scale, 18 per cent placed one of the candidates on the wrong side of

[20] If net feeling toward candidates is measured by the thermometer questions and is used in this correlation instead of net attitude toward candidates as determined by open-ended questions, the Pearsonian *r* goes up by only .04.

[21] Prior to this, when discussing comments made about candidates, I have given proportions based on the *number of comments*. Here I am considering the proportion of *respondents* who made certain references. There were 1119 respondents in this sample.

[23] Converse, "Nature of Belief Systems," p. 207.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 214.

[24] The exact format of the liberal-conservative scale question is as follows:


the scale—that is, put McGovern on the conservative end or Nixon on the liberal side—and another 9 per cent misplaced *both* candidates. A little more than half (52 per cent) of those who chose a position on the scale for themselves correctly placed both candidates. The rest (about 20 per cent) placed one candidate correctly and saw the other candidate as in the middle. Given the proportion of known error, we can surmise that some of the "correct" placements of the candidates may have been chance occurrences. Unfortunately, frame-of-reference materials were not gathered with this question, so we have no idea of what meanings respondents were supplying to the terms "liberal" and "conservative."[25]

Miller et al. fail to take sufficient account of the problems inherent in this new question. First, they do not inform the reader that the 30 per cent of the sample who did not choose to place themselves on the liberal-conservative scale were omitted in their analysis. About half of these respondents voted. Thus, whenever Miller presents findings based on this scale, and uses it to predict vote, only a subset of the electorate has been analyzed.[26] But there is a more serious problem in Miller's analysis; he calculated a candidate proximity measure based on this liberal-conservative scale question, apparently including those who placed one or both of the candidates incorrectly. I have already discussed the problems inherent in the use of candidate proximity measures. It is upon the basis of this proximity measure—and not upon the respondent's self-location on the scale—that Miller rests his conclusions about the great importance of ideology in voters' decisions in 1972.

Using a regression analysis that simultaneously tested the effects of party identification, feelings toward the two candidates, several issue clusters (measured by proximity indices) and the liberal-conservative *proximity* measure, Miller found that the liberal-conservative and the "war" indices were quite important in explaining the vote. When I tested the liberal-conservative variable by adding it to my Equation 1—using the respondent's *self-placement* on the liberal-conservative scale—the measure was found to add virtually nothing to the explanation of the vote. (The multiple R did not increase at all, and the beta-weight was .039.) Thus, this new liberal-conservative scale contributes very little to our repertoire of predictive variables.

Has Ideological Awareness Increased? In light of Miller's claim of increasing ideological awareness among the American electorate, it is important to compare the ideological orientations of the American electorate in 1972 with those in previous elections. The best method of measuring this change would be a thorough contextual analysis of open-ended materials, following the example set by Converse. Since this method is very time consuming, such data could not be developed for inclusion in this comment. Another measure, however, can be used to assess change in ideological attachments over the past three elections. This measure is based on respondents' feelings toward various groups including "liberals" and "conservatives" as measured by thermometer questions that have been included in SRC-CPS election studies since 1964. John Pierce has called this "affective ideology."[27]

We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. I'm going to show you a seven-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal to extremely conservative.



Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this?

Where would you place Richard Nixon?

Where would you place George McGovern?

[25] We do know from previous survey materials that people often bring meanings to the terms "liberal" or "conservative" that fall short of the concepts political scientists would supply to those terms. For example, Converse found a Stratum II that contained a rather large number of people who defined liberalism-conservatism in terms of a simple "spend-save" dimension. Others equated conservative with "conservation" and some even talked of conserving natural resources. (See Converse, "Nature of Belief Systems," pp. 222–223.)

George Gallup has also asked a national sample to state what "comes to your mind when you think of someone who is a (liberal) (conservative)?" "Spending too freely," "generous," "permissive"; "saves," "cautious," "careful" are some of the terms used in Gallup's codes to describe many of the responses to his question. (Incidentally, over 35 percent in the Gallup survey could not even begin to supply a meaning to the term "liberal" or the term "conservative.") See The Gallup Opinion Index, Report No. 59 (May, 1970), pp. 6–7.

[26] In his footnote 28, Miller says that he uses the "case deletion" procedure when performing computer analysis. This would eliminate any respondent who did not answer a question. Not only were the many respondents who did not place themselves on the liberal-conservative scale left out by this procedure, but others who failed to answer any one of the many issue questions examined by Miller were also dropped. Thus, the multiple regression analysis upon which he bases conclusions about the entire electorate contains only that subset of respondents who gave an opinion on all issues presented to them in the interview. Miller should have reported the number of cases remaining in his analysis and generalized only about that subset.

[27] John Pierce, "Changing Role of Ideology in American Politics," p. 30.

If we cross-classify each respondent's feelings toward "liberals" with his or her feelings toward "conservatives" and examine the resulting pattern of responses, we find that some respondents are very warm toward liberals and very cool toward conservatives, or vice versa. Others have somewhat less intense reactions, but still fall into a consistent pattern—warm toward one group and cool toward the other. Another set of respondents are inconsistent—they are warm toward both groups or cool toward both—a pattern that suggests that the liberal-conservative continuum is not a meanful dimension for these respondents. Still others are neutral toward both groups, indicating either lack of familiarity with the terms "liberal" and "conservative" or indifference.[28] Table 3 shows the distribution of these combined response patterns in 1964, 1968, and 1972.[29] Note that there has been no significant change in affect toward "liberals" and "conservatives" during this period. Certainly the proportion of voters who seem to be attuned to a liberal-conservative dimension (i.e., do not have neutral or inconsistent reactions to the terms "liberal" and "conservative") has not increased significantly.[30]

The Matrix Method of Testing for Ideological Constraint. In addition to the use of the liberal-conservative proximity measure, Miller et al. attempt "to authenticate a role for 'ideology' in the 1972 election" by presenting a table which shows clusters of intercorrelations among issue items and the relation between these issue items and the liberal-conservative scale. (See their Table 2.) Miller et al. assume that the intercorrelations in this table demonstrate the kind of constraint and consistency of attitude that Converse equated with an ideology or belief system.

In Figure 2, I have attempted to diagram Converse's definition of a belief system. The diagram depicts one individual who has a central belief that he is a conservative and who has a rather wide range of interconnected idea-elements that are consistent with and cluster around this central concept. For such individuals, responses to various issue questions would, of course, be highly intercorrelated. Although Miller's Table 2 shows the existence of several intercorrelated issue responses, this is not necessarily proof that ideology exists.

The basic method used by Converse was *individual level* analysis—the examination of individual responses to open-ended questions to determine the proportions of individuals in various

[28] A few respondents may have been cold toward both "liberals" and "conservatives" not because of indifference but because they have a strong ideology which is neither liberal nor conservative. (They may be "moderates," "radicals," "socialists," etc.) This would not create a problem for our analysis here, however; it is the change in the proportions of "liberals" and "conservatives" over the past decade that is being investigated.

[29] When 1972 respondents who had placed themselves on Miller's liberal-conservative scale were compared with those I identified as liberals or conservatives through the use of the thermometer questions (reported in Table 3), it was found that about 11 per cent more placed themselves as liberals or conservatives on Miller's scale. Interestingly, of those who were "Inconsistent or Neutral" as measured by the thermometer procedure, 17 per cent placed themselves as liberals, and 18 per cent as conservatives on Miller's scale—a 50-50 division that suggests randomness.

[30] Other studies, beside Miller's, may have led political scientists to conclude that there has been an increase in the number of ideologically oriented people within the mass public. In particular, Norman Nie's article "Mass Belief Systems Revisited: Political Change and Attitude Structure" lends support to that conclusion. The reader is advised to take a careful look at the change in content of the questions Nie used in that analysis, particularly the marked difference in items that make up the "Cold War" dimension before 1964 and those used from 1964 onward.


In "Party Identification and the Changing Role of Ideology in American Politics" John Pierce found no increase in the proportion of "informational" ideologues in 1964. It was the "informational" ideologue that Converse was searching for in his "Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics."

Table 3. Liberal-Conservative Feelings, 1964–1972, Voters Only

Liberal			Conservative			
Strong[a]	Weak[b]		Weak[b]	Strong[a]	Inconsistent or Neutral	Total
2.3%	13.2	*1964*	17.7	6.6	60.3	100%
1.7%	12.3	*1968*	21.6	6.4	58.0	100%
3.2%	11.9	*1972*	19.4	7.4	58.0	100%

[a] Strong = highly differentiated; large distance between feelings toward liberals and conservatives
[b] Weak = less strong but consistent feelings.

Figure 2. Ideological Model



ideological levels or strata.[31] In Miller's Table 2, we are looking at correlations between one item paired separately with each of the other items; consistency of *individual* responses across several items cannot be demonstrated by this method. Also, as we shall see, the fact that a broad range of *items* correlates with a liberal-conservative scale is not proof that substantial numbers of *individuals* are "translating certain political issues and events into a liberal-conservative framework" as Miller et al. contend.

For example, let us take the four intercorrelated items that Miller labels the "social" domain. Locating a cluster of this sort is only the first step in the analysis. We need to follow each individual and note how he or she answered each of the four questions in order to find out how many respondents answered the items in a consistent or "constrained" fashion. The results of this type of analysis showed that 15 per cent of the sample gave consistently "liberal" responses, and 15 per cent gave consistently "conservative" responses—30 per cent consistent respondents in all in this "social" domain.[32] (I am, of course, using the terms "liberal" and "conservative" here as a literary convenience.[33]) Of this 30 per cent who responded consistently "liberal" or consistently "conservative" to the "social" items, only about half located themselves on the appropriate side of Miller's liberal-conservative scale. About 10 per cent misidentified—placing themselves on the wrong side of the scale given their stance on the four "social" issues, and the rest either placed themselves in the middle (22 per cent) or chose not to place themselves on the scale at all (18 per cent). Thus, of the entire sample, only about 15 per cent were consistent "liberals" or "conservatives" in the "social" issue domain who also identified themselves with the appropriate liberal or conservative label.

In addition to the "social" issue cluster, I also examined individual respondents on a four-item "economic" cluster. The four items in the cluster had to do with (1) government seeing to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living, (2) government action to control inflation, (3) government insurance to cover all medical and hospital expenses, and (4) a more steeply graduated income tax rate. (Miller did not include two of these items in his Table 2—the question on inflation and the one on the income tax.) Using the same methods that were applied to the "social" issue items, I found that 4 per cent of the sample gave consistent "conservative" responses and 16 per cent gave consistent "liberal" responses in the "economic" domain. Of this 20 per cent who gave consistently "liberal" or "conservative" responses in this "economic" domain, only 38 per cent placed themselves appropriately on the liberal-conservative scale. This means that just 7 per cent of the sample answered these four economic items in a pattern consistent with their self-located position on the liberal-conservative scale. The "economic" domain in 1972 was less connected with

[31] At one point in his "Nature of Belief Systems" article Converse did present matrices of interitem correlations. The purpose of that analysis was to compare a political elite with the general public. This use of the matrix method by Converse was ancillary and was not his principal method. See Converse, pp. 227–231.

[32] To be considered consistently "liberal," the respondent had to give "liberal" responses (scale positions 1, 2, or 3) to at least three out of the four questions. Failure to answer one question, or responding in the middle (4 position) on one question, was accepted, but the respondent could not have given a "conservative" response and still be considered consistent. The same criteria were used to determine consistent "conservatives," except of course here we search for responses on the other side of the scale (positions 5, 6, and 7).

It is interesting that in the "social" cluster in Miller's Table 2, the average correlation was .39. With that degree of intercorrelation, only 30 per cent of the sample had "constrained" or consistent responses across the four items.

[33] See John Kessel, "Comment: The Issues in Issue Voting," *American Political Science Review* 66 (June, 1972), 463.

liberal-conservative terminology than other issue domains were.

Finally, I looked at the three-item "war" cluster shown in Miller's Table 2. In this case, a much larger subset of consistent respondents emerged—perhaps partly as a result of statistical probability (fewer questions to be inconsistent on). Thirty-six per cent of the sample gave consistently "conservative" responses in this issue domain, and 17 per cent gave consistently "liberal" responses. (Taking the Vietnam question by itself, the dove or "liberal" position was favored ten to seven over the hawk or "conservative" position, but the addition of the amnesty and military spending issues that are in this cluster revealed the above two-to-one edge of consistent "conservatives" over "liberals.") Of the consistent "conservatives," only a little more than a third (36 per cent) placed themselves on the conservative side of Miller's liberal-conservative scale, while about half (48 per cent) of the consistent "liberals" chose the liberal side of the scale. In all, 21 per cent of the entire sample were consistent "liberals" or "conservatives" in the "war" domain who also selected an appropriate position on the liberal-conservative scale.

Thus, a number of respondents whose consistent response patterns indicated that they held an attitude in an issue domain also appropriately placed themselves on the liberal-conservative continuum. But even then we have no way of knowing whether or not these respondents who appropriately located themselves did so with an understanding of what term went with what policy position. For example, of the Vietnam hawks who were against amnesty and for military spending, how many placed themselves on the conservative side of Miller's scale because they had a contextual understanding that it was appropriate to be a conservative given their stand on the war issues? Without frame-of-reference materials, we do not know the meanings these respondents attached to the terms "liberal" and "conservative," and without this kind of cognitive information, contextual analysis is not possible. It seems incorrect, therefore, to call these respondents ideologues. We might, however, call them "quasi-ideological."

The largest subset of "quasi-ideological" respondents—21 per cent—were found in the "war" domain. This is a sizeable number of potential voters, but certainly not a "broad segment," as Miller et al. assert. As we have seen, other domains contained fewer "quasi-ideological" respondents: 15 per cent in the "social" domain and 7 per cent in the "economic" area. (These percentages should not be added together, since some of the same people would be in two or more different clusters.)

Locating Ideologues. If we were to try to use the data available to locate ideologues within Converse's definition (as diagrammed in my Figure 2), we could first take a self-identified liberal or conservative and test for constraint among a "relatively wide range"[34] of idea-elements. For example, let us take all those who placed themselves on the liberal side of Miller's scale. They compose 18 per cent of the sample. About half of these self-located liberals were consistent "liberals" in the three-item "war" domain, but if, in addition, we look at their responses to the question on health insurance and the one on aid to minorities, the number of respondents who remain consistently "liberal" diminishes. Only a little more than one-fourth of our original pool of self-located liberals gave consistent "liberal" responses to these five items—the three military items, health insurance, and minority aid. We are left with less than 5 per cent of the sample and have not incorporated all the issues suggested by my Figure 2. In the same manner, we can take self-located conservatives and follow their response patterns across these five issues. Here we start with a larger group—27 per cent of the sample—who placed themselves on the conservative side of Miller's scale. About half were consistent "conservatives" in the "war" domain, but on the other two items "conservative" responses fell off rapidly. We end up with only 4 per cent of the sample who placed themselves as conservatives and who gave consistently "conservative" responses to the five items. If we look for constraint across a range of idea-elements, or across issue domains, we find very few who are ideologues as depicted in Figure 2.

We can observe, then, that when individual-level analysis is performed on the data subsumed by Miller's Table 2, relatively few respondents exhibit the degree of consistency in attitudes that Miller's matrix is supposed to demonstrate. In short, *a matrix of correlations does not an ideology make.*

Interpreting Issue Clusters. Perhaps the belief system described in my Figure 2 is too wide ranging and complex. Some political scientists might wish to relax the assumptions of Converse's definition of ideology by not requiring individuals to think of themselves in liberal or conservative terms. These analysts might be satisfied to define a belief system or ideology as simply a constrained configuration of ideas or attitudes. We have observed that responses to a number of issue questions in the 1972 election study did cluster. In particular,

[34] Converse explicitly prescribed a "relatively wide range" of idea-elements in his concept of a belief system. "Nature of Belief Systems," pp. 208–209.

we have noted that issue items intercorrelated to form issue domains in Miller's Table 2, and, when I performed individual level analysis on these data, we saw that significant proportions of respondents did give consistent responses to the items in the "war" domain and the "social" domain. One might interpret these constrained sets of responses as limited belief systems or "attenuated ideologies" (where the range of idea-elements is limited and a broader concept such as "liberal" or "conservative" is not included). Perhaps many political scientists assume such an "attenuated ideology" exists when they see a set of issues cluster as in the case of the "war" domain and the "social" domain.

There may be another interpretation that could explain the existence of these clusters, however. First, we should make a clear distinction between a *set of attitudes* or idea-elements which are consciously bound together (a belief system) and a *set of responses* to several issue questions (a response pattern). In Figure 3, I have diagrammed a situation in which individuals form a general attitude toward a single kind of problem, series of similar events, or some fairly long-term historical occurrence (such as economic difficulties, rioting, war in Vietnam, etc.). If several similar questions—questions containing common object referents—are asked of these people, responses could intercorrelate not because of a conscious awareness of what-idea-elements go together, but because responses to different questions are triggered by a *single core attitude*. A single attitude would not be considered an "ideology" even under a relaxed definition.


Converse anticipated this second type of "constraint" when he discussed social groupings (viz., Negroes) as central objects in belief systems.[35] I am expanding his formulation to include major events and problems as central objects that could act in the same way as social groups did in his discussion. The point Converse made is that if you ask several questions all containing the same group referent, you will get highly correlated responses because of a strong attitude toward the group.

Analysis of the "social" cluster indicates that when consistent responses were made to several issue items in the 1972 study they probably stemmed more often from a single attitude source than from an "ideology," although both of these phenomena were undoubtedly present. The four items in the "social" cluster had to do with urban unrest, campus unrest, government help to blacks and other minorities, and stopping "criminal activity even at the risk of reducing the rights of the accused." Perhaps many of those who responded in a consistent fashion to these four items had a single core attitude toward social disruption. In that case, individuals with this attitude would also respond in a similar way to other items in the 1972 interview having the same referent—the referent being people and activities that are perceived to be socially disruptive.

To test for this "response pattern," I developed a Social Disruption index which summarized responses to the four items in the "social" domain. (The index was built by scoring "liberal" responses as $+1$, "conservative" responses as -1, other responses as 0, and finding the net score for each respondent. The 30 per cent who had consistent response patterns in the "social" domain ended up, of course, at the extremes of the index.) This Social Disruption index was then correlated with a number of other issue questions and with feelings toward various groups. The highest correlations ($tau_b > .300$) were with feelings toward urban rioters, black militants, marijuana users, and feelings toward ministers who lead protest marches. Responses to issue scale questions on busing and legalization of marijuana also correlated very highly with this Social Disruption index. These findings lend strong support to the assumptions of the Single Core Attitude model (Figure 3). For many respondents, these various questions were probably tapping a core attitude toward social disruption—the rioting in cities, campus disturbances, Woodstocks, etc. of the late '60s and early '70s.

[35] Converse, "Nature of Belief Systems," pp. 234–238.

Figure 3. Single Core Attitude Model



As a further indication of this phenomenon, let us go back to 1970—a point in time closer to some of these events. The same four issue questions that form Miller's "social" domain and my Social Disruption index were also included in the CPS 1970 congressional election study. A greater crystallization or coalescing of responses is evident then. In 1970, 36 per cent of the sample were found to be consistent "liberals" or consistent "conservatives" on these "social" questions.[36] Furthermore, only 8 per cent in 1970 failed to respond to more than two questions, while 15 per cent in 1972 did not answer more than two of the four items. These data indicate that this issue domain was beginning to fade in 1972.

Apparently, once the stimuli (events, activities, etc.) fade, the attitude (response pattern) diminishes as well. An ideology—even an attenuated one—should have some durability and not be so subject to current stimuli. This is not to say that "attenuated ideologies" do not exist. The point is that issue clusters can result from a single attitude as well as from a belief system. *Political scientists should therefore be cautious in interpreting intercorrelations among issue items as prima facie evidence of ideological constraint.*

Another methodological observation should be made briefly about issue clustering. Interitem correlations can be found in data from the 1950s as well as in data from the 1960s and 1970s. Whenever two or more questions with the same referent have been asked in the same interview, these items usually correlate as well as any of the clusters in Miller's Table 2. In 1956, for example, only two questions were asked that had Negroes or civil rights as a referent.[37] Responses to these two questions correlated with a Pearsonian r of .33. In 1968, more questions pertaining to blacks and civil rights were asked and most of them intercorrelated.[38] In 1972, three questions were asked that had clear referents to the war in Vietnam; they clustered, as we have seen. No such war-related cluster could be found in previous studies since not as many war-related questions were asked. In short, the increase in interitem correlations since the 1950s that has been noted by Norman Nie and reconfirmed by Miller can be attributed in large measure to the number of common referent questions in any given study.

Salient Issue Domains in 1972. Let us now take the major issue clusters found in the 1972 data and test their importance in the overall electoral decision. Whether we interpret issue clusters as "attenuated ideologies" or as single core attitudes, we do know that by asking *several* preformulated questions that are relevant to the same general issue and identifying those respondents who give consistent responses, we can locate subsets of the population who have a real attitude toward an issue. A Social Disruption index, which summarized responses to the four items in the "social" domain, was described earlier. Scores on this index represent the strength of each respondent's attitude toward that issue. I also developed a Military index from the three items in the "war" domain, and an Economic index from the four item "economic" cluster.

In my Equation 1, various issue concerns are represented by the Most Salient Issue (MSI) variable. People were, of course, concerned with a variety of problems in 1972, and thus the MSI variable contains a variety of "issue publics." If the Military index is substituted in Equation 1 in place of the MSI variable, the resulting beta-weight is .198—a bit higher even than the MSI measure. The Social Disruption index, substituted in Equation 1 in place of the MSI variable, produces a beta-weight of .114; the respondent's most salient issue concern in this case is a better predictor of vote than the Social Disruption issue. The Economic index did not fare well in Equation 1; this issue domain, at least as expressed in the preformulated CPS questions, was not important in 1972.[39] In general, then, I would agree with Miller's conclusion that the "war" issue and to some extent the "social" issue were issue domains "that contributed significantly to the explanation of the vote" in 1972. But bear in mind, this is only after the candidate variable has appropriately been taken into consideration.

Policy Differences among Democrats in 1972: A Deep and Enduring Schism?

Miller et al. stress the polarizing effects of certain individual issues and point to "deep policy schism" among Democratic identifiers. Their

[36] Twenty-two per cent were consistent "conservatives" and 14 per cent were consistent "liberals" in 1970.

[37] The two questions had to do with the government in Washington seeing to it that Negroes get fair treatment in jobs and housing, and the government in Washington staying out of school desegregation.

[38] About 40 per cent of the 1968 sample gave consistent responses to the following four items (about half were "liberal" and half "conservative"): government in Washington seeing to it that Negroes get fair treatment in jobs; government seeing to it that white and Negro children are allowed to go to the same schools; government support of the right of Negroes to go to any hotel or restaurant they can afford; and general favorable or unfavorable attitudes toward desegregation. An index built from these items strongly correlated with respondents' reactions to the speed of the civil rights movement, and the degree of violence they perceived in the movement.

[39] Fourteen per cent of the respondents mentioned inflation or high prices as the most important problem in 1972, and an additional 9 per cent referred to unemployment or general economic conditions as their top concern. Altogether these economic issues were second only to Vietnam—which 25 per cent mentioned as the most important issue.

Table 1, in particular, is offered as evidence of "a substantial degree of intraparty polarization." This is a very interesting and dramatic table, especially when we examine the differences between the Democrats who voted for McGovern and those who defected to Nixon. These data should be interpreted with some care, however. Again, rationalization of issue positions is a part of what we are seeing in Table 1.[40] We should also note that, although the table may give the impression of a "left-right" division among Democrats across a broad range of issues, the findings in Miller's Table 1 derive mostly from two basic attitudes that are reflected in a number of separate issue questions. We have previously identified a subset of respondents who had an attitude toward Social Disruption and another subset with an attitude in the Military domain. Removing either group of these respondents from Table 1 erases the differences between Democrats who voted for McGovern and those who voted for Nixon.[41] Furthermore, the labeling of responses to these issue questions in the "left," "center," "right" terminology does not mean that a great many Democrats were responding to these issues in an ideological way; rather such labeling should be seen as a literary convenience—a shorthand description for the specific positions that were spelled out in the issue questions.

Most important, the data presented in Miller's Table 1 are essentially descriptive; that is, they describe how these Democrats responded to a series of issue questions. That the issues *caused* them to vote as they did is not demonstrated in Table 1—and I am sure Miller et al. did not intend the table to be so interpreted. For evidence of how important these issues were in voters' decisions, let us look at a multiple regression analysis examing *only the Democrats:*

(5) $V = .426\ \text{McG} - .304\ \text{Nix} + .206\ M$

$(R = .76)$

(6) $V = .486\ \text{McG} - .304\ \text{Nix} + .083\ SD$

$(R = .71),$

where M is the Military index and SD is the Social Disruption index. For Democrats, then, the Military issue was important in explaining vote, but the Social Disruption issue was not. Equations 5 and 6 also demonstrate that the relative qualities of the candidates, especially McGovern, had a lot to do with Democratic loyalty or defection.

Now, to test the "depth" of the "polarization," let us look at the *number*, of Democrats who held attitudes in the Military and Social Disruption domains and ended up in opposite camps. In the case of the Social Disruption issue, 18 per cent of all voting Democrats both were consistent "liberals" in this issue domain and voted for McGovern; 11 per cent were consistent "conservatives" in the Social Disruption domain and voted for Nixon. Even if all those who had an attitude on the Social Disruption issue had voted *because* of the issue—which is clearly not the case (see Equation 6)—a minority of Democratic voters (18 per cent versus 11 per cent) would have been responsible for the "deep schism" in the "social" domain. In the Military domain, 23 per cent of all voting Democrats gave consistently "liberal" responses on the "war" issues and voted for McGovern, and 23 per cent were consistent "conservatives" on these items and voted for Nixon. Thus, most of the real division among Democrats was based on a difference in attitude on the Military issue.

On the basis of data from the 1968 and 1972 elections, Miller et al. conclude that an "enduring schism [exists] within the Democratic ranks" which in turn suggests the "possibilities of partisan realignment." (When we talk of "Democratic ranks" I presume we are referring to party identifiers among the mass public, and not the elites who are the party itself.) If major issues endure for a period of time, the possibilities for realignment do indeed exist. But if we look at the nature of the two most important issue domains in 1972 and note the probable reasons for their saliency, we might well question the assumption of long-term or enduring cleavage based on these issues. The Military issue domain stemmed primarily from reaction to the war in Vietnam, and the Social Disruption domain apparently was seeded mostly by reactions to rioting by blacks and to the antiwar demonstrations. With the war over and the domestic incidents it spawned discontinued, there is little reason to believe that the Military issue do-

[40] If Miller et al. had used just the pre-election responses to the Vietnam question in Table 1, they would have been less likely to have incorporated rationalized positioning on this issue item. Looking at pre-election responses only, the Democrats who voted for McGovern were 63 per cent dove and 15 per cent hawk—a 48-percentage-point spread rather than the 57-point difference shown in Miller's Table 1. Democrats who voted for Nixon were 32 per cent dove and 37 per cent hawk if only pre-election responders are included—a 5-percentage-point difference rather than the 9-point margin shown in Miller's Table 1.

[41] When those with consistent "liberal" and "conservative" attitudes on Social Disruption were removed from Miller's Table 1, differences in the percentages of "left" and "right" responses between Democrats who had voted for McGovern and those who had voted for Nixon disappeared on four items—marijuana, campus unrest, aid to minorities, and busing. Differences between "loyalists" and defectors also vanished on two other issues—Vietnam and amnesty—when those who had a core attitude in the Military domain were removed from Miller's Table 1.

main will remain salient (unless, of course, the United States becomes involved in another such war). If rioting or other forms of social unrest should resume on a wide scale, however, the Social Disruption domain could become salient again.

Conclusions

Divergent findings, and assertions of "spectacular" (Miller, p. 754) change in the American electorate have brought confusion and needless digression to an important field of study. New measures and different techniques can lead researchers to perceive change in the electorate that is not there. In particular, this comment has stressed some of the dangers in the use of two new methodological applications: (1) the candidate proximity measure which basically transfers candidate attitude and makes it look like an issue attitude, and (2) new techniques for measuring ideology which differ greatly from Converse's original concept and method.

Another major purpose of this comment has been to refocus attention upon the relative weights of the three basic factors—candidates, issues, and party identification—in recent elections. My analysis indicates that attitude toward candidates remains of critical importance in the electoral decision, especially in 1972.[42] Also, I have reexamined the role of ideology in recent elections and have found once again that most of the public does not make systematic use of the liberal-conservative continuum in evaluating political events and issues. The importance of the ideological variable in explaining voting behavior is still minimal. This is not to say that specific issues are of little consequence in elections. Issues most certainly have weight in the predictive equations I developed at the beginning of this comment. I have had, perforce, to emphasize the candidate variable here because Miller et al. misplaced it and greatly exaggerated the importance of issues and ideology.

One further point should be made. Political scientists are all too prone to interpret ideological inconsistency and confusion among the public as electoral incompetence. Because most voters do not perceive the liberal-conservative continuum as political scientists have been trained to do, does not mean that voters cannot make competent assessments of candidates and issues.[43] Perhaps the political scientist should pay less attention to the liberal-conservative dimension, rather than expecting the electorate to pay more attention to it. Liberalism-conservatism is, after all, a limiting, single-track concept that cannot begin to explain multidimensional issue space, nor the diverse patterns of issue attitudes that have developed in individuals' minds.

[42] This is the same conclusion I reached in my article "Issue Salience and Party Choice." There I pointed out that "candidate image emerges as the most important factor in individual voting choice in 1964, but issues had a strong independent effect as well" (p. 400).

[43] For a further discussion of this point see my paper "Levels of Rationality Among the American Electorate" presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association (1974), especially pp. 49–55.

Ideology in the 1972 Election: Myth or Reality—A Rejoinder*

ARTHUR H. MILLER AND WARREN E. MILLER

The University of Michigan

Broad conceptions of voting are not discovered; they are invented. Fundamentally different concepts of voting naturally direct attention to distinctly different political objects, questions and conclusions. When viewed as a process, the concept of voting leads to a concern with those factors which may affect relationships between the vote and such political objects as candidates, parties or issues or which may explain differences in these relationships, whether found at one point in time or across different time points. The conception of voting as a condition or a single act, on the other hand, suggests a preoccupation with a fixed set of relationships and can lead to the static interpretation that differences between previous and recent research findings arise because the earlier work was flawed or inadequate. We think the purpose of scientific inquiry is more adequately served by an approach that seeks to understand the conditions that depress some relationships while accentuating others. Knowing the relative weights for party identification, candidates or issues in the voter's decision-making rule, for example, is important for comprehending the results of a specific election. It is far more significant for the general study of voting behavior to know the cause of a shift in the relative weights across a series of elections than it is to know which factor was more important in a particular election.

"A Majority Party in Disarray" attempted to deal with the 1972 presidential election in terms of these broad questions and offered some preliminary findings of relevance to theoretical topics of voter preferences, party and candidate strategies. Few theoretical questions have been conclusively answered by studies of voting behavior, not because the field is lacking in careful studies or major advances in research, but because the number of cases available for investigation through modern empirical techniques is limited. We think voting can best be regarded as a process of interactions between voters and candidates that is affected by partisan and group loyalties, by issues of the day, by social and economic conditions, and by a number of other factors present in the political environment. Each new election offers an opportunity for broadening the evidentiary base for testing theoretical statements and from which generalizations about elections may be made. An election thus provides a natural laboratory setting in which the reciprocal influence relationship that exists between politicians and citizens can be observed under the unique conditions of that particular election. The larger the number of elections available for study, the more confidence can be placed in generalizations about elections and electoral behavior, and the more refined will the theories become as they are confronted with empirical evidence.

The crucial task in this interplay of theory and data is the determination of how the unique characteristics of an election influence the relationships between more enduring political objects, attitudes and social cleavages. Paradoxically, new developments in the study of voting behavior often prove temporarily disruptive to the search for generalizable findings. As the study of voting behavior matures, new concepts and new theoretical questions are raised, prompting the development of new measurement techniques better suited for testing the hypotheses and operationalizing the new concepts. While findings derived from these new approaches and techniques may not be directly comparable with previous research, if they are found methodologically sound and produce meaningful substantive results, the study of voting behavior benefits in the long run.

Given these considerations, we welcome the opportunity that this symposium provides for further discussion of topics only briefly mentioned in "Majority Party." Our reply to topics raised in the "Comments" attempts to clarify some of the concerns with further analysis of CPS election study data. The length of the "Comments," however, prevents response to specific criticisms except as they relate to theoretical points of general interest.

The Meaning of Candidate Affect

Previous research findings[1] from the Center for Political Studies (CPS) have demonstrated that


* We gratefully acknowledge the technical assistance of Peter Joftis, the editorial assistance of Oksana Malanchuk, and the insightful comments of Herbert Weisberg on a preliminary draft of this rejoinder.

[1] The early University of Michigan work most specifically focused on the impact of candidate attributes was reported in Donald E. Stokes, Angus Campbell, and Warren E. Miller, "Components of Electoral Decision," *American Political Science Review*, 52 (June 1958), 367–387; Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, "Some Dynamic Elements of Contests for the Presidency," *American Political Science Review*, 60 (March 1966), 19–28.

candidate-related attributes are short-term forces that have sharply affected the individual vote decision in the national presidential elections between 1952 and 1972. References in the commentaries[2] on "Majority Party" to the importance of the candidates in 1972 thus come as no surprise. What is mildly disturbing is the argument that the CPS research on the 1972 election overlooked and underestimated the importance of the candidates as a factor affecting individual vote preferences. This claim is something of a misrepresentation of the facts, and it certainly ignores the original version of "Majority Party"[3] as well as previously published CPS research on the 1972 election.[4]

Misperceptions aside, a matter of broader interest and relevance is the empirical evidence, reported in detail elsewhere,[5] which suggests that there have been substantial shifts in the importance of candidates, issues and partisan attitudes as predictors of the vote—contrary to the RePass position contending that "the relative weight of the three principal factors in the voting decision . . . have *remained quite steady over time*. . . ."[6] Prior to 1972, partisan attitudes had been one of the most important factors explaining the vote decision. Yet, although the 1972 election marked the first occurrence of a substantial decline in the correlation between party identification and the two-party presidential vote,[7] a long-term trend toward

Figure 1. Importance of Candidates and Parties in Predicting the Vote, 1952–1972



both decreased importance of partisan attitudes and increased importance of candidate images as predictors of the vote has been taking place. The regression coefficients graphed in Figure 1 indicate the relative importance of party and candidate images as independent variables predicting the two-party vote in the presidential elections between 1952 and 1972.[8] The importance of affect toward the parties as a determinant of the vote decision has declined substantially over this twenty-year period. In 1956, affect toward the parties was a more potent explanation of the vote (beta=.47) than was affect toward the candidates (.33); by 1972, the importance of partisan attitudes had diminished to the level of having almost no independent effect on the vote (.08), whereas candidate images had strongly increased in potency (.74).

Clearly, the "Comments" are in agreement with our earlier report which shows the strong effect of candidate evaluations on the vote in 1972. Disagreement arises over the substantive interpretation that should be given to candidate affect. We do not believe that voting for a candidate on the basis of personal characteristics implies "irrational" voting behavior. A voter may make deliberate assumptions both about types of policy decisions and expected performance in office primarily on the basis of a candidate's personal characteristics. A candidate who is perceived as decisive may be expected, once in office, to deal with national problems in a similarly competent

[2] "Comment on 'A Majority Party in Disarray'" by Frederick Steeper and Robert Teeter reached us after the major arguments for this rejoinder had been developed; we thus make no specific reference to their piece. Their main discussion, which focused on the Vietnam issue, rests heavily on their interpretation of marginal distributions rather than on a cogent test determining if their Vietnam variables correlate with the *vote* or other criterion variables differently than did those used by CPS. As we did not have access to their data, and because their data apparently does not include questions about actual vote, further elaboration seems unnecessary. Our rejoinder does, however, deal with many of their arguments, especially their concluding comments.

"Comment: What Have You Done for Me Lately? Toward an Investment Theory of Voting" by Samuel L. Popkin, John W. Gorman, Charles Phillips and Jeffrey A. Smith will be referred to as the Popkin "Comment" for purposes of brevity (pp. 779–813).

[3] The original version of "Majority Party in Disarray" was presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association in September, 1973. An initial evaluation of the paper by the *Review* produced specific instructions for shortening. The deleted material focused primarily on the candidates and the question of partisan realignment and has been published previously. See Arthur H. Miller and Warren E. Miller, "Issues, Candidates and Partisan Divisions in the 1972 American Presidential Election," *British Journal of Political Science*, 5 (October 1975), 393–434.

[4] Miller and Miller, "Issues, Candidates and Partisan Divisions," p. 422.

[5] *Ibid.*

[6] David RePass, "Comment: Political Methodologies in Disarray," p. 814.

[7] Miller and Miller, "Issues, Candidates and Partisan Division," p. 422.

[8] The candidate and party affect measures used in the regressions were based on a series of questions asking respondents what they liked and disliked about each party and candidate. The positive and negative comments about each party and again for each candidate were summed to provide two indices, one for the parties and the other for the candidates. The final indices are "net" affect measures, that is, they indicate the preponderance of positive or negative attitudes toward the Republican candidate or party over those toward the Democratic candidate or party. These indices are similar but not identical to those originally employed by Donald E. Stokes in "Some Dynamic Elements of Contests for the Presidency."

fashion; if perceived as honest and empathic, he may be seen as unlikely to initiate policy decisions calculated to advantage one group to the detriment of another. Consideration of such personal attributes as these may, therefore, lead to an overall positive or negative evaluation of the candidate and an eventual vote decision that reflects this candidate valence.

The types of personal characteristics and political factors that determine candidate valence, however, still remain in question. Popkin[9] has suggested that perceived candidate competence and demographic characteristics of both the candidate and the candidate's supporters are major determinants of candidate evaluations. Weisburg and Rusk [10] have demonstrated the importance of issue orientation as a correlate of candidate affect, although RePass[11] argues that attitudes toward the candidates were not related to issues in 1972. Still other research[12] suggests the possibility that personality attributes may determine how citizens relate to candidates and political leaders.

Personality Characteristics. Popkin has suggested that voters may simply evaluate political leaders on the basis of either their demographic traits—age, race and ethnicity—or those of their supporters.[13] This hypothesis can be tested directly by means of responses to open-ended questions in the election studies which inquire about what people like and dislike about the candidates.

In 1972, the thirty-four separate and distinct characteristics mentioned for each of the candidates were factor analyzed to determine the major personality dimensions that voters had used in evaluating the candidates.[14] The factor analysis revealed five basic dimensions of candidate attributes. The first dimension, labeled "competence," includes comments about the candidate's experience and ability. The second deals with "trust" and incorporates statements about the candidate's honesty and integrity. "Reliability" seems to capture the essence of the responses on the third dimension: responsibility, decisiveness, and stability. "Leadership appeal" is characterized by comments about the candidate as inspiring, communicative, warm and likeable, and the final dimension focuses on the candidate's personal appearance: age, health and other types of demographic features.

About 30 per cent of the voters referred to the candidates in terms of personal attributes and they distributed their remarks unequally across the five dimensions. Evaluations of the two candidates were sharply differentiated by only the competence and reliability dimensions. Competence was mentioned most often (31%) by voters as an expression of what they liked or disliked about Nixon, and these remarks were predominantly positive (89%) among voters whose positive and negative statements were not equally balanced. Trust (21%) and reliability (12%) were cited less frequently in reference to Nixon but were also generally positive (43% and 73%, respectively). Reliability was the most salient perceived candidate personality dimension used by voters (25%) when discussing McGovern, but almost all such statements (91%) were *negative*. Some voters (19%) made reference to the trust dimension when commenting about McGovern and many of these were favorable (51%); those mentioning competence (16%), however, were much less so (only 13% made positive comments). Very few voters (5–6%) referred to the leadership appeal dimension for either candidate and fewer still (1% and 4%, respectively) referred to the demographic characteristics of Nixon or McGovern. The candidates apparently offered the voters a clear choice with respect to the personality attributes of competence and reliability, with Nixon perceived as far more competent and reliable.

The relative impact that these different personality attribute dimensions had on the vote also varied. Using the ten separate attribute dimensions in the components analysis, rather than combining them into Democratic and Republican candidate components as in the original six-components analysis,[15] reveals that only the McGovern trust

[9] Popkin, "Comment," pp. 793–795.

[10] See Herbert F. Weisberg and Jerrold G. Rusk, "Dimensions of Candidate Evaluation," *American Political Science Review*, 64 (December 1970), 1167–1185; and Jerrold G. Rusk and Herbert F. Weisberg, "Perceptions of Political Candidates: Implications for Electoral Change," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 16 (August 1972), 388–410.

[11] RePass, "Comment," p. 823.

[12] James D. Barber, *The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972) is most suggestive on this topic.

[13] Popkin, "Comment," p. 794.

[14] The factor analysis was accomplished by forming a series of dummy variables from the codes to the likes/dislikes questions that deal with candidate attributes. These dummy variables were coded "1" if the respondent mentioned a particular candidate characteristic and "0" if no mention was made. A tetrachoric *r* correlation matrix was then computed for the 34 resulting dummy variables and subjected to factor analysis; the resulting five dimensions accounted for 65 per cent of the total item variance. Tetrachoric *r* was considered the appropriate coefficient for this analysis because we sought information about the underlying dimensional structure. See Herbert F. Weisberg, "Models of Statistical Relationship," *American Political Science Review* 68 (December 1974), 1638–1655 for a discussion of Tetrachoric *r*.

[15] The six-components analysis as originally conducted by Stokes in "Some Dynamic Elements" employed six indices that were constructed from responses to the open-ended questions asking the survey respondents what they liked and disliked about the parties and the candidates. The six components or indices refer to (1) the personal characteristics of the Democratic candidate, (2) the personal characteristics of the Republican candidate, (3) party management, (4) domestic issues, (5) foreign issues, and

and reliability dimensions among the Democratic candidate components were statistically significant explanations of the vote (regression coefficient b's = .16 and .12, respectively). In contrast, Nixon's competence was the most important Republican candidate component (b = .13), while trust (b = .11) and reliability (b = .09) were slightly less important.

These findings, which provide a refinement of the single general personal attributes measure usually employed in the traditional six-components analysis, suggest that while competence and reliability were the most salient attribute dimensions in 1972—and leadership appeal and demographics, the least salient—perceptions of McGovern's lack of trustworthiness and Nixon's competence had the largest impact on the vote decision in the 1972 election. Contrary to Popkin's suggestion that earlier CPS research had ignored the "competence" dimension, the analysis clearly indicates that candidate competence was subsumed by the personal attributes components used in the six-components analysis. Furthermore, additional analyses disclose that the Nixon competence, trust and reliability dimensions and the McGovern trust, reliability and leadership appeal dimensions were significantly related to the candidate thermometer measures used in "Majority Party," even after controlling for issue differences and party identification. The thermometer measure used in "Majority Party" therefore captured not only competence but the other personal attribute dimensions as well.

Our initial research on the 1972 election also included a more direct measure of competence than the thermometers used in "Majority Party."[16] Since the competence of a nonincumbent may be best assessed through the voter's judgment of the candidate's campaign performance—a possible explanation for the insignificant findings with the McGovern competence dimension in the components analysis—we asked voters to tell us how well they thought McGovern had run his campaign. Of the 30 per cent of all voters who thought that McGovern had done a "good job" in managing his campaign, 53 per cent voted for him; only 25 per cent of those who felt he had done a "poor job" did so. This relationship remains significant even after controlling for party identification and issue orientation. This judgment about McGovern's competence during the campaign was also associated with his general affective rating on the feeling thermometer: those who thought McGovern had managed his campaign well tended to evaluate him more positively (Pearson r = .30).

The association between perceived competence and evaluations of McGovern, as well as the relationship between competence and the vote, are strongly affected by education. Among the grade school educated, these correlations were much higher (.41 and .46, respectively) than they were among those with at least some college education (.18 and .14). This is not to say that those voters with some college education were less inclined to criticize McGovern's campaign performance, but rather that they simply did not translate this perception into a candidate evaluation or vote decision as readily as did the less well educated. It would appear that those subgroups of the population with only a grade school education use different criteria and information when evaluating candidates and casting votes than do voters with more formal education; their concerns seem more concentrated on the manner in which a candidate would conduct the affairs of the office, while the substance of the problems a president would confront and his proposed solutions for them appear of higher priority to the better educated voter.

Issues and Candidate Affect. As suggested by "Majority Party," evaluations of the candidates may also reflect the impact of policy orientations. Voters may like or dislike particular candidates because they agree or disagree with the policy positions of the candidate. RePass has called into question the connection between candidate appraisal and issue orientation by arguing that issue salience does not increase the correlation between the voter's issue position and candidate evaluations. After an analysis of open-ended material, he concludes that there is not enough evidence "... to make us think that the Vietnam issue was a major factor in determining overall valence toward candidates" and that "in general, ... attitudes toward candidates in 1972 were based on a variety of considerations and these attitudes were *not strongly related to issues*."[17]

In "Majority Party" (see Table 3), we concluded that the issue orientation of voters was clearly associated with affective ratings of the candidates. Not only were both candidates evaluated differently with respect to the issues—especially one as important as Vietnam—but, as the data of Figure 2 demonstrate, this relationship was influenced to some extent by the saliency of the issue, as well. As the size of the correlations (eta)[18] indicate, attitudes toward both McGovern and Nixon were more systematically related to issue positions


(6) group benefits. Each index is scored to indicate the preponderance of negative or positive comments by subtracting the number of "dislike" statements related to the specific index from the number of "like" comments that the respondent volunteers.

[16] See Miller and Miller, "Issues, Candidates and Partisan Divisions."

[17] RePass, "Comment," p. 823; italics added.

[18] Eta is the appropriate statistic to use here because the theory leads to an expectation of a nonlinear relationship. Eta is sensitive to nonlinearity whereas Pearson's r is not.

Figure 2. Mean Thermometer Ratings of the Candidates by Vietnam Policy Preference and Issue Salience



among respondents who readily discussed the candidates in terms of the Vietnam issue than among those who did not. There is a linear decline in affect toward McGovern as one moves along the Vietnam scale and away from an immediate withdrawal position, which McGovern was perceived to favor (average placement of McGovern on the Vietnam scale was 1.7). On the other hand, Nixon was perceived as taking a position located near the center of the scale (average placement of 4.6) and thus received a higher rating from those voters who expressed policy preferences near the center positions on the scale. Both the linear pattern for McGovern and the curvilinear pattern of affect toward Nixon emerge most clearly for those voters whose open-ended responses indicated concern over the Vietnam issue.

Clearly the level of voters' information is a continuing and critical concern for theories of voting behavior. It is not surprising that there are more systematic relationships between candidate assessments and policy preferences among those better versed in the topic area—even one that had so thoroughly permeated public awareness as had Vietnam. These findings suggest the importance of studying factors that affect the flow of information from the political environment (such as media content, candidate speeches, and campaign literature) to the voters (media exposure, indirect information sources, factors affecting misperception), variables that deserve increased attention in future studies.

In summary, affect toward the candidates in 1972 was related to the issue orientation of both the voters and the candidates, as well as to assessments of the candidate's personal attributes.[19] Perceived candidate competence was only one dimension used by voters to evaluate the 1972 candidates, and not necessarily the most significant one. Trust and reliability were also important. Leadership appeal was considerably less significant; the demographic characteristics of the candidates were rarely mentioned by voters and therefore had no significant relationship with candidate affect.

The Role of Issues

The role that "Majority Party" attributes to issues in affecting the outcome of the 1972 election has also been questioned by the "Comments." The Popkin comment states that the six-components analysis they performed and the analysis performed in "Majority Party" provide divergent results and thus at least one of the approaches must be "flawed." This presumed discrepancy, which revolves around the relative importance of issues as a factor affecting the electoral decision, is the primary basis for their critical attack on both *The American Voter* and "Majority Party." Popkin's replication of the six-components regression analysis suggests an all time low effect on the electoral outcome for domestic issues in 1972 and a vote impact for foreign issues that differs only trivially from that obtained in the 1952 election.[20] "Majority Party," on the other hand, while not making explicit comparisons with previous elections, primarily because method innovations limited such comparisons, concluded that in 1972 the *direct* impact of the candidates was relatively more important than issues[21] but that issues had substantially more direct effect on the vote than did party identification. It was also implied in "Majority Party" that issues were particularly salient and important factors in 1972 relative to past elections.

Responses to the open-ended likes/dislikes questions employed in the components analysis

[19] Miller and Miller, "Issues, Candidates and Partisan Division," incorporates a discussion that also explores the impact of party identification, the Eagleton affair and cultural orientation on candidate evaluations.

[20] Popkin, "Comment," p. 782.

[21] The Popkin and RePass suggestion that "Majority Party" understated the relative importance of the candidate factor has already been discussed and therefore needs no further elaboration.

The four variable causal model presented in footnote 30 of "Majority Party" also showed a larger *direct* effect of candidates on the vote but a slightly larger *total* effect for issues. To clear the confusion evidenced by RePass' footnote 17, it should be noted that only the total effects for the causal model were presented in the footnote both to save space and because they were the only statistics of relevance to the substantive discussion. Given our theoretical model, candidates and issues would not affect the vote through party identification; the total effects presented were therefore appropriate for our model.


can be analyzed from various perspectives. Only two of these—the relative salience of candidate, party, issue and group-related attitudes over time and the impact of these political objects on the vote—are of relevance here because they reflect upon the validity of "Majority Party" statements about issue awareness and the impact of issues on the vote.

First, how has the frequency of responses regarding each of these political objects varied over time? "Majority Party" suggested that issue saliency was particularly high in 1972. Figure 3 indicates that there has been a gradual *increase* during recent elections in mentions of foreign and domestic issues and a corresponding *decline* in references to the personal attributes of candidates, while the salience of group ties to politics and questions of party management have not changed significantly over time.

Second despite the greater frequency of references to policy issues than to candidates attributes in 1972, regression analysis with the six-components model reaffirmed the earlier CPS finding that candidate affect had a more substantial direct effect on the vote in 1972 than did issues, just as had been true for the other five presidential elections between 1952 and 1972. Furthermore, the measures of partisan advantage ($b \cdot \bar{x}$) displayed in Table 1 clearly reveal that McGovern hurt his own vote more than any previous Democratic candidate has done. Nixon's personal characteristics, meanwhile, were a definite advantage for him in 1972, adding nearly 4 per cent of the vote to his net partisan support. The positive reactions to Nixon, combined with the negative attitudes toward McGovern, resulted in a total net Republican advantage of over 8 per cent of the vote, the largest net impact of candidate images for any of the elections between 1952 and 1972.

At the same time, domestic and foreign issues had a much larger combined impact on the vote outcome in 1972 than was true for any previous election although, disregarding the direction of the impact of each set of issues, their separate importance (1.35 and 3.23, respectively) about

Figure 3. Saliency of Candidates, Issues, Group Benefits, and Party Management, 1952–1972



equaled their counterparts for 1952. These findings are similar but not identical to those reported by Popkin. One should note, however, an important pattern to the data displayed in Table 1 that runs contrary to Popkin's suggestion that the *outcome* of the 1972 election was no more affected by issues than was the 1952 election.[22] The two sets of issues must, of course, be combined if comparisons are to be made with the results of "Majority Party" because comments in that article about the overall importance of issues did not distinguish between foreign and domestic. The data of Table 1 demonstrate that the impact of both foreign and domestic policy issues favored the *same party* in 1972, as had been true for the last two elections, and that the combined impact had not been equaled in any of the five preceding elections. Prior to 1964, the effect of issues was split between the parties: domestic issues favored the Democratic party and foreign policy issues favored the Republicans. In 1964, however, both foreign and domestic issues advantaged the Democratic candidate, and in 1968 and 1972, both sets of issues advantaged the Republican candidate. The total net advantage accruing to the Democrats or Republi-

[22] Popkin, "Comment," p. 782.

Table 1. Net Impact ($b_i \cdot \bar{x}_i$) of the Six Components on the Vote, 1952–1972[a]

Year	Democratic Candidate	Republican Candidate	Party Management	Groups	Foreign Policy	Domestic Policy
1952	−1.18[b]	4.37	5.40	−4.29	3.30	−1.34
1956	0.17	7.60	1.18	−5.50	2.46	−0.88
1960	−1.99	5.70	1.20	−4.01	1.80	−0.54
1964	−3.93	−2.60	−0.30	−2.59	−0.25	−2.36
1968	0.90	1.60	1.50	−3.60	1.00	1.10
1972	4.29	3.98	0.04	−4.55	3.23	1.35

[a] Computations were based on all five responses to the open-ended questions.
[b] A negative value indicates a Democratic vote advantage; a positive value, a Republican vote advantage.

cans from both sets of issues combined is, therefore, a more accurate indicator of the *total issue impact on the outcome* of the election than are the separate figures of Table 1.


A measure of the total net partisan advantage accruing because of the candidates or because of issues (see Figure 4) indicates that, as implied by "Majority Party," issues had a far more substantial impact on the election outcome in 1972 than in any of the previous elections examined. Indeed, the total net impact of issues in 1964 and 1968 was also higher than in the elections of the 'fifties, but in both these elections the net vote shift advantaging a particular party was considerably less than the 4.58 percentage points found for 1972. A comparison of the impact of issues in 1972 with that of previous years clearly suggests a more substantial increase in "issue effect" than "candidate effect" for 1972 relative to previous elections. For example, the net impact of candidates on the election outcome was only slightly higher in 1972 than in 1956; but the net impact of the issues in 1972 was nearly double what it had been during the 'fifties.

Despite the relative increase in the importance of issues, the net impact of all issues was still less than the total net impact of the candidates in 1972. This relative net impact of candidates and issues, contrary to Popkin's suggestion,[23] was also sharply affected by education. The net impact of issues among those with only a high school (4.05%) or grade school (0.87%) education was much smaller than the net candidate impact (9.74% and 5.20%, respectively). The difference in the impact of issues and candidates was nearly nonexistent for those with some higher education (6.59% and 7.02%). Issues clearly had a disproportionately larger impact on the 1972 vote among individuals with at least some college education than for those with less education.

Briefly, this replication of the six-components analysis presents evidence that supports the major conclusions reached in "Majority Party" and other previously published CPS reports on the 1972 election. We fail to find any discrepancy between the six-components analysis and the findings of "Majority Party." On the contrary, the longitudinal comparisons allowed by the replication provide evidence on the importance of issues in 1972 relative to previous elections, thus going beyond the comparisons made in "Majority Party." They also provide support for the notion that the outcome of the election was far more dependent on

[23] Popkin, "Comment," pp. 783–784. It should be noted that the electoral impact of "group benefits" also varied by level of education in 1972. Group references had a larger impact ($b_i \cdot \bar{x}_i$ of 5.04%) on the vote among grade school educated than among high school (4.81%) or college educated (3.96%) respondents. Party management was statistically insignificant and had a zero weight for all three levels of education.

Figure 4. Total Net Impact of Candidates and Issues Ignoring Party Direction



the issues than was any presidential election during the previous twenty years. One should keep in mind, however, that the importance of issues in 1972 was partially the result of the educational composition of the 1972 voters.

How are we to account for the obvious contradiction between the results of our six-components analysis and those obtained by Popkin? The principal explanation appears to be a difference in approach. It should be noted that Popkin[24] did not actually replicate the earlier SRC/CPS approach, as is acknowledged in their "Comment";[25] their analysis did not incorporate the fourth and fifth responses into the likes/dislikes questions.[26] These were, however, included in the analyses reported above and in the replication of the Stokes analysis conducted for the elections prior to 1972 by Kagay and Caldeira,[27] both of which—in con-

[24] The RePass approach to issue importance cannot be used for purposes of across-time comparisons because, as he indicates in footnote 5 of his comment, the 1972 measure of issue importance is not comparable to the previous studies.

[25] See Popkin, "Comment," footnote 9 (p. 781).

[26] Because funding for the 1972 CPS national election study was limited, several economizing measures were employed, one of which was to code only the first three responses to open-ended materials into the data file. For the purpose of this rejoinder, we returned to the protocols and coded the fourth and fifth responses into our data.

It should also be noted that contrary to Popkin's footnote 9, the assignment of responses to the specific components are not indicated by the codebook; coders work from individual codes, not from the subtitles presented in the user's codebook. The Popkin six-components analysis does not therefore replicate the collapsing of code categories into the components as they have been used in previous SRC/CPS work.

[27] Michael R. Kagay and Greg A. Caldeira, "I Like the Looks of his Face: Elements of Electoral Choice, 1952–1972." Paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, September 2–5, 1975. The Kagay and Caldeira piece not only uses the full five responses to the open-ended questions asked prior to 1972, but it is also an excellent replication of the original scheme used to combine codes into the specific components.

trast to the results reported by Popkin—not only confirm the conclusions reached by "Majority Party" about the 1972 election but also support the implicit comparisons between 1972 and previous elections therein.

The Theoretical Importance of the Proximity Measure

Given the high degree of similarity between the results of analyses performed with the six-components model and the measures applied in "Majority Party," one might question the incentive for using the newer methods. Two reasons are offered: the first stems from a methodological limitation of the six-components model; the second reflects the substantive advantage of the newer measures.

The "likes/dislikes" questions are biased against both policy and group responses because they explicitly ask the respondent about parties and candidates, and *not* about issues. We wondered what a components analysis would demonstrate if respondents had also been asked open-ended questions from which an "issues component" might have been constructed. The additional impact of issues that might be demonstrated by such a technique can be at least crudely estimated by adding a general measure of the respondent's social issue orientation and an index of the respondent's own position on the war issues to the six-components regression. We found that the addition of two such variables increased the explained variance by 6 percentage points, with no significant decline in the regression weights assigned to the candidates. There was, however, an increase in the weight of domestic issues to near equivalence with the impact of the Democratic candidate and a new weight for foreign issues that was slightly larger than the Democratic candidate weight. Thus, while the six-components approach based only on the "likes/dislikes" questions has the advantage of the open-ended format which reduces somewhat the possibility that responses may simply be a reflection rather than a cause of the vote intention, it may underestimate the importance of the issue components.[28]

The six-components approach is also limited in that it does not *explicitly* convey an explanatory model of the vote decision. How do issue, candidate and party responses get merged by the voters into an electoral choice? While the six-components analysis demonstrates the relative impact of these factors, it does not provide a theoretical model that describes how the components become linked together.[29] The elements of a behavioral model linking candidates, issues and the vote choice have, on the other hand, been specified by *The American Voter;* they have been elaborated by Brody and Page;[30] and they have been operationalized with the proximity measures used in "Majority Party." Briefly stated, the model specifies that voters have various issue preferences, that candidates are perceived to take differing policy positions, and that voters cast their ballot in accordance with some function that describes the relationship between their perception of the candidate positions and their own issue preferences. Such a model represents an attempt to combine a concern with candidate strategies, that is, how the candidates present themselves to the voters, with a concern for questions of voter perceptions and policy preference.

While the proximity measures appear to provide a methodological advance over previous approaches to issue voting, they also suffer from certain inherent problems, namely, persuasion and projection.[31] Voters may not have firmly fixed policy preferences; indeed, their preferences may be easily manipulated by persuasive politicians. Similarly, issue proximity may be an effect of candidate evaluations or the vote intention rather than a cause of the vote decision. Respondents may project preferred policy stands onto the candidates either because they have decided to vote for a particular candidate or because they like the candidate for a reason unrelated to issues stands; they therefore simply assume, without supporting information, that he shares their policy position. An electoral choice that reflects a close issue proximity between the candidate and the voter would not, however, meet the definition of issue voting if the similarity of issue positions was simply the result of persuasion or projection. Yet, both persuasion and projection could inflate the relationship between an issue proximity measure and the vote, thereby leading to erroneous conclusions about the importance of issue voting. Indeed, RePass has argued that these problems are so severe that the proximity measures simply reflect affect towards the candidates and not issue related evaluations.[32]

Several factors including issue saliency, the degree to which candidates actually take distinct issue positions, the costs involved in obtaining in-

[28] These results seem to contradict the RePass contention that " . . . when issues are measured by open-ended questions, a greater degree of issue voting can be demonstrated than when preformulated questions are used." See RePass, "Comment," p. 816.

[29] An excellent theoretical interpretation of the components model has been offered by Stanley Kelley, Jr. and Thad W. Mirer in "The Simple Act of Voting," *American Political Science Review*, 68 (June 1974), 572–791.

[30] Richard A. Brody and Benjamin I. Page, "Comment: The Assessment of Policy Voting," *American Political Science Review*, 66 (June, 1972), 450–458.

[31] These problems are discussed in "Majority Party" and in Brody and Page, "Comment: The Assessment of Policy Voting."

[32] RePass, "Comment," pp. 818–819.

formation about the candidate's policy positions, the length of time over which voters have held specific issue positions and the certainty with which their attitudes are held should all affect the relationship between candidate ratings and issue proximity. While an empirical exploration of how these factors influence this relationship seems very relevant to this discussion, our investigation will focus more narrowly on the one problem raised by the RePass "Comment," that of the direct impact of affect for the candidate on misperceptions of the candidate's issue positions and on shifts in the voter's own policy preferences.

That candidate evaluations were related to both the issue positions preferred by voters and the policy stands candidates were perceived to have taken in 1972 has already been discussed.[33] RePass contends, however, that affect toward the candidates should be viewed as a cause of voter issue positions and voter perceptions of candidate policy stands, rather than as a consequent of issue orientations, as argued in "Majority Party." RePass argues that a substantial degree of "inappropriate placement of candidates" results because voters attempt to bring the placement of the candidates into alignment with their affective ratings of the candidates.[34] Doves, for example, tended to place Nixon closer to their own position on the Vietnam scale *if* they liked him more than McGovern, while those who were opposed to immediate withdrawal placed McGovern closer *if* they preferred him to Nixon. The analysis RePass presents on this point is at least somewhat misleading because it counts as accurate only those placements of candidates that result in the "appropriate" candidate being positioned *closer* to the voter than the other candidate. In effect, tied or equidistant placements are thereby considered errors in RePass' analysis. It seems to us that a voter who favors immediate withdrawal and who rates Nixon higher than McGovern on the feeling thermometer but places both candidates equidistant from his own issue position should not be considered as having positioned Nixon "inappropriately." Yet this is exactly how Table 1 of the RePass "Comment" has been constructed.

We reconstructed the RePass table using the criterion that an "inappropriate placement" occurs only when a respondent places closer to his own position the candidate that had been placed, on the average, further away from his own issue position. This produces far fewer "errors of placement" (see Table 2). The error rate for respondents whose policy positions were most mismatched with the average perceived position of the candidates remains quite high, ranging from 27 to 40 per cent. The data leave no doubt that, as RePass argues, misperception of candidate policy positions may occur as a result of non-issue-related affect toward the candidates. But the degree of "inappropriate placement" of candidates revealed by Table 2 does not seem to warrant " . . . raising

[33] For a more complete discussion of these topics related to the 1972 election, see Miller and Miller, "Issues, Candidates and Partisan Divisions in the 1972 Election," as well as Warren E. Miller and Teresa E. Levitin, *Leadership Change: New Politics and the American Electorate*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop Publishers, Inc. 1976).

[34] RePass, "Comment," p. 818.

Table 2. Appropriateness of Perceived Candidate Position on Issues with Attitude Toward Candidate Controlled[a]

	Respondents' Issue Position					
	Vietnam		Campus Unrest		Aid to Minorities	
Net Attitude Toward Candidates[b]	Dove[c]	Hawk[d]	Pro-student[c]	Use force[d]	Government help[c]	Leave on own[d]
Pro-Nixon	71% (122)	97% (252)	65% (33)	94% (195)	73% (102)	95% (280)
Pro-McGovern	97% (233)	62% (21)	100% (48)	61% (28)	97% (155)	60% (50)

[a] Entry in each cell is the per cent of those in the cell who placed either the appropriate candidate closer or both candidates equally close to the issue position they selected.

[b] Respondents classified as favoring a candidate rated the particular candidate 30° higher than the other candidate on the pre-election feeling thermometers.

[c] McGovern was considered the appropriate candidate to be proximate to these positions because on the average he was placed closer to them.

[d] Nixon was considered the appropriate candidate to be proximate to these positions; on the average he was placed closer to them.

serious doubts about employing these measures in the study of policy voting."[35]

The proportion of misperception that these errors represent for the total set of respondents should not be overstated. The cells in Table 2 that exhibit the highest error rates have relatively few cases.[36] When the per cent of inappropriate responses is calculated for all the respondents in the four cells corresponding to a particular issue of Table 2, an error rate of 9 per cent is found for the Vietnam issue, 8.9 per cent for campus unrest and 11.2 per cent for aid to minorities. Misperception clearly occurs among voters, probably as a consequence of several causes including candidate strategies of taking differing policy positions when addressing varying audiences, lack of information, and projection resulting from candidate affect or partisan ties. It is an important phenomenon that deserves far more attention and the issue proximity measures provide a useful set of indicators for its study.

Going beyond an investigation of misperception, RePass reports a substantial degree of rationalization of issue position on the Vietnam question. His argument is that "If rationalization (persuasion) were taking place, those voters who answered the Vietnam question in the post-election interview would be more likely than those answering in the pre-election interview to align their position with the candidate they favored."[37] His analysis of the pre- and post-election responses to the Vietnam scale appears to indicate significantly more support for immediate withdrawal among those post-election respondents who favored McGovern, thus presumably supporting his hypothesis. Theoretically, if such rationalization of issue position were occurring, we should expect to find a similar pre/post difference for the three other issue questions—government guarantees of a job and good standard of living, tax reform, and how to deal with inflation—as well as for the Vietnam issue. Likewise, if rationalization were occurring, and if it can be discerned with the pre/post comparisons suggested by RePass, it can be hypothesized that Nixon also had a persuasive effect on his supporters—popular opinion at the time suggests that he was far more persuasive than McGovern. The rationalization hypothesis would therefore predict pre- to post-election shifts in a liberal direction for McGovern supporters and shifts in a conservative direction for Nixon supporters. A strict replication of the pre/post comparisons reported by RePass for the Vietnam issue failed to reveal any support for the hypothesis, regardless of the issue area—*including Vietnam*—and regardless of candidate preference (see Table 3). In fact, the minor differences between the pre- and post-election issue distributions show that McGovern supporters gave slightly less liberal responses in the post-election period than those who had reported their issue preferences before the election while no systematic shifts were found for Nixon supporters. In light of these data, the RePass findings seem inexplicable.

This should not, however, be interpreted to mean that the data of Table 3 argue definitely against the occurrence of rationalization. Rationalization of issue position or shifts in issue preferences caused by candidate persuasion cannot be ascertained from comparisons suggested by RePass. Conclusive evidence of either projection or persuasion effect on issue preferences could only be obtained from panel data spanning the entire campaign period from the early primaries to election day. Even with panel data, it might be very difficult to untangle the simultaneous interactions of party loyalty, candidate evaluations and policy preferences. Indeed, it is this problem of the mutual interaction between policy preferences, perceived candidates' stands, and candidate evaluations that produce yet another criticism of the proximity measures.

RePass argues that the correlation between the issue proximity measures and the vote is spurious because the actual cause of the relationship is affect toward the candidates.[38] The argument is buttressed with evidence from a normal vote analysis of the Vietnam proximity measure while controlling for attitudes toward candidates. His normal vote analysis, which reveals near zero short-term issue effects remaining for respondents after controlling for candidate thermometer ratings, is somewhat misleading, however, since it involves a curious combination of those respondents who rated one candidate 30 or more degrees higher than the other candidate on the feeling thermometer *and* those who rated the two candidates nearly the same (difference of 10 degrees or less). The 20 per cent of all respondents who rated one of the candidates anywhere from 11 to 29 degrees higher than the other candidate are eliminated from the analysis.

In fact, a normal vote analysis of the Vietnam proximity measure for those who rated Nixon 11 to 29 degrees higher than McGovern and for those who favored McGovern over Nixon by a similar difference, as well as for voters with little or no dif-

[35] RePass, "Comment," p. 818.

[36] It should be noted that the number of cases in Table 2 does not correspond to that in the RePass Table 1. We have investigated this discrepancy carefully and can only conclude that either there is an error in the RePass analysis or that he used a definition of issue position and thermometer ratings other than indicated in his table. Whatever the explanation for the discrepancy, Table 2 follows the definitions exactly as presented in the RePass "Comment."

[37] RePass, "Comment," p. 820.

[38] *Ibid.*, p. 820.

Table 3. Pre- and Post-Election Issue Scale Distributions for McGovern and Nixon Supporters

Vietnam					Standard of Living				
	Pro-McGovern[a]		Pro-Nixon[b]			Pro-McGovern[a]		Pro-Nixon[b]	
Immediate Withdrawal	Pre	Post	Pre	Post	Govt. Aid	Pre	Post	Pre	Post
1	48	46	8	8	1	35	29	7	6
2	16	16	7	7	2	15	11	4	3
3	12	14	11	12	3	11	19	7	7
4	13	14	29	29	4	19	23	23	22
5	3	4	18	19	5	8	7	18	17
6	2	2	8	11	6	1	3	12	15
7	6	4	19	14	7	11	8	29	30
Victory	100%	100%	100%	100%	Do on Own	100%	100%	100%	100%
(*N*)	(195)	(203)	(488)	(456)	(*N*)	(224)	(146)	(492)	(390)
Tax Reform					Inflation				
	Pro-McGovern[a]		Pro-Nixon[b]			Pro-McGovern[a]		Pro-Nixon[b]	
Reform Taxes	Pre	Post	Pre	Post	Fight Inflation	Pre	Post	Pre	Post
1	36	29	19	19	1	58	50	42	31
2	14	16	9	12	2	12	21	14	19
3	9	13	10	13	3	12	13	17	21
4	10	11	17	15	4	10	12	19	21
5	2	1	6	7	5	3	3	5	5
6	3	6	5	7	6	2	1	1	2
7	26	24	34	27	7	3	—	2	1
No Change	100%	100%	100%	100%	Leave Alone	100%	100%	100%	100%
(*N*)	(222)	(140)	(479)	(391)	(*N*)	(187)	(184)	(471)	(399)


[a] McGovern rated 30° higher than Nixon on thermometer.
[b] Nixon rated 30° higher than McGovern on thermometer.

ference in their ratings of the two candidates, (see Figure 5) revealed short-term issue effects (*S*) of 6.98, 9.97 and 12.89, respectively. It is true that issue proximity on the Vietnam withdrawal question did not have a substantial effect on the electoral decision of voters who expressed *overwhelmingly* more positive affect toward one of the candidates (difference of at least 30 degrees). But for the 41 per cent of all voters who did not have extremely divergent attitudes toward the candidates, the issue proximity measure was quite important. Furthermore, the single-item Vietnam proximity measure represents the exception rather than the rule for the effect of candidate evaluations on the relationship between issue proximity and the vote. The issue proximity indices for the four issue domains (war, social, economic and cultural) used in "Majority Party" show more robust relationships with the vote even when controlling for extreme affect (difference of 30 or more degrees) toward the candidates. The short-term effect of the social proximity index was, for example, 4.65 for those extremely more favorable toward McGovern and $S=3.50$ for those extremely more favorable toward Nixon. Issue proximity, therefore, had a significant residual effect on the vote in 1972 even after controlling for the combined effect of candidate evaluation and party identification.[39] The relationship between issue proximity and the vote was not spurious, nor was it simply a reflection of candidate evaluations.

Again, it should be recognized that these findings do not disprove or untangle the simultaneous interactions that take place among issue, candidate, and party related attitudes. In 1972 particularly, evaluations of the candidates and the issues

[39] It should be noted that the normal vote short-term statistics incorporate a control for strength of party identification as part of the analysis approach. That is, the statistic indicates the degree of deviation away from the long-term or partisan baseline that is normally expected. Thus, RePass controlled for both candidate and party effects by using the normal vote analysis among subgroups defined by candidate ratings.

Figure 5. Normal Vote Analysis of Vietnam Proximity Measure Controlling for Relative Candidate Affect



[a] Nixon rated 11–29 degrees higher than McGovern on thermometer.
[b] McGovern rated 11–29 degrees higher than Nixon on thermometer.

were intertwined, making a complete statistical separation not only difficult but substantially meaningless. Still, the extent of this interaction should not be overstated. If the voter's own issue position, perceived candidate position, affect toward candidates and party loyalty are bound together by intensive simultaneous interactions, there simply should be stronger associations between these factors than the 15 to 20 per cent common variance (interitem r squared) that is found empirically.

An important point that seems to have been overlooked by the commentators, and which needs emphasis, is that the proximity measures operationalize a behavioral model that explicitly specifies the linkage between the voter and the vote. Analyses relying entirely upon the respondent's own issue preference as an indicator when measuring the impact of issues on the vote simply are not able to answer the linkage question. The discovery of a relationship between the voter's policy preference and the vote leads to an inference that the voter's ballot was cast for the party or candidate believed most likely to support the preferred policy. But this remains an inference that the researcher makes about the correlation between the self-location type of question and the vote. The power of the proximity measure is that it explicitly tests this inference with a measurement model that incorporates the components of the theory under consideration. That the measurement of the issue voting model can be improved is obvious, every measure can be improved. Nevertheless, this approach has forced us to think in terms of the behavioral model and the explicit measurement of the linkages that are theoretically necessary for issue voting to occur. Proximity measures seem to us to constitute an important ad-

vance in the empirical examination and conceptualization of issue voting. To condemn the measure at this point is analogous to discarding the wheel because the first one sometimes falls off the axle or even breaks.

Ideology


According to "Majority Party," the importance of issue voting in 1972 was, in part, associated with the degree of ideology or attitudinal constraint evident among the voters. The strength and pattern of interitem correlations, and the correlation between the respondent's position on various issues and a subjective liberal/conservative distinction, were used as an indirect measure of the highly organized, tightly constrained set of attitude elements generally associated with the concept of ideological belief systems. No evidence was found to support the notion of a Downsian, one-dimensional left-right issue space. In fact, four distinct issue dimensions were extracted from the array of issues contained in the study and were demonstrated to have varying degrees of impact on the vote among different population subgroups.[40] However, a generally higher degree of attitude constraint in 1972 than in previous elections was suggested by the strength of the correlations among the items identified with each issue dimension, as well as by the correlations between the dimensions and self-placement on the liberal/conservative scale. These correlations, when considered in conjunction with other data,[41] seemed to be clear evidence of the ideological nature of the 1972 electorate.

The commentaries on "Majority Party" question the validity of the evidence used to support the conclusion that ideology was an important factor in 1972. RePass contends that the issue items and the liberal/conservative scale used in the 1972 study are not sufficiently comparable to items used in previous studies and that therefore correlations among these items can not constitute evidence of an increase in ideology.[42] The Popkin critique argues that interitem correlations do not measure the extent to which such basic dimensions of judgment as the liberal-conservative continuum are used in organizing attitude elements because this evidence is ". . . best seen as projections by the analysts."[43]

Trends in Ideology. The evidence provided by "Majority Party" was indeed indirect rather than conclusive support for the hypothesis that 1972 voters were more ideological than those in previous elections. More conclusive evidence could only be obtained through a comparison of the ideological constraint found in 1972 and that found in previous elections when exactly the same measurement procedures are applied. We have therefore turned to the "levels of conceptualization" coding originally employed by Converse to measure the incidence of belief systems reflected in open-ended responses.[44]

A comparison of the proportion of "ideologues" and "near-ideologues" found with the very same levels of conceptualization coding for 1956, 1968 and 1972 reveals an unmistakably higher level of ideology in 1972 than in the two previous elections for which the coding has been done[45] (see Figure 6). By 1972, the proportion of the total sample classified as having an ideology (as defined in *The American Voter* with ideologues and near-ideologues combined) was more than twice the propor-

Figure 6. Levels of Ideology in the United States, 1956, 1968 and 1972



[40] See Miller and Miller, "Issues, Candidates and Partisan Divisions in the 1972 Election," pp. 415–422 for a discussion of how important the four issue domains were for various population subgroups.

[41] Other data suggesting the ideological nature of the 1972 electorate include the strong relationship between the liberal/conservative scale and the vote, the nearly one-dimensional solution for the candidate evaluation analysis summarized in footnote 38 of "Majority Party," and the trend toward more attitude constraint that has been reported by a number of scholars, including Norman Nie and Kristi Andersen in "Mass Belief Systems Revisited," *Journal of Politics*, 36 (August 1974), 540–591.

[42] RePass, "Comment," pp. 823–825.

[43] Popkin, "Comment," p. 797.

[44] The same coding scheme previously used in *The American Voter* and by Converse to construct levels of conceptualization was employed in coding the 1972 levels of ideology. We have, however, collapsed the several non-ideology codes into a single category. The three resulting categories—ideologues, near-ideologues and non-ideologues—are sufficient for the substantive question under discussion here, namely, degree of ideology.

[45] The 1968 levels of conceptualization coding was performed by Hans Klingemann and William E. Wright and their results are reported in Philip E. Converse, "Public Opinion and Voting Behavior," Volume 4 of the *Handbook of Political Science*, Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, editors, p. 102. "Unclassified" respondents have been excluded from the calculation of any percentages for 1972 so that our figures would be comparable to those reported by Converse.

tion found for 1956 (27% compared to 13%). Among *voters* the 1956–1972 difference was even sharper. In 1956, only 16 per cent of the voters had been categorized as ideological; in 1972, this was true for more than a third of all voters (37 per cent).[46] These data then provide independent, strictly comparable and more direct evidence in support of our earlier inference that 1972, in comparison with previous elections, was an unusually ideological election.

Validation of Methods. Questions of ideology in the 1972 election, however, go beyond the simple frequency with which people display ideological constraint. The "Comments" also challenge the validity of the methodology used in "Majority Party" to measure ideological constraints. The levels of conceptualization coding provide an opportunity to test for convergent validity by determining if the interitem correlations presumed by "Majority Party" to indicate ideology were indeed larger among ideologues than among nonideologues.[47] But before we proceed to a validation of "Majority Party" methods with the levels of conceptualization coding, it is important to demonstrate that classification as an ideologue in 1972 *was* an indication of a rich contextual grasp of politics and not simply a reflection of education inasmuch as there was a moderate correlation (Tau=.30) between education and levels of ideology in 1972.

A series of questions asking about the liberal and conservative orientations of the Democratic and Republican parties permits at least one test of the validity of the ideology coding. When asked whether Democrats or Republicans were more conservative, nearly one-third of the nonideologues, compared to 10 per cent of near-ideologues and only 4 per cent of ideologues, responded that they did not even want to guess.[48] This hesitancy to deal with the concept of liberal and conservative was evident even among college educated nonideologues: nearly 20 per cent would not guess. In addition to this reluctance to employ the general liberal-conservative distinction, nonideologues were considerably less likely than ideologues to designate the Republicans as the more conservative party (51% compared to 91%). A clear and accurate differentiation of the two parties in terms of a liberal/conservative distinction was far more prevalent among ideologues than nonideologues even after controlling for level of education. Among college-educated respondents, for example, 94 per cent of the ideologues and only 67 per cent of nonideologues designated the Republican party as the more conservative.

Having ascertained that ideological constraint is not synonymous with educational attainment, we can now reexamine the data in Table 2 of "Majority Party" for the relationship of ideology to the interitem correlations. The size of the interitem correlations were used by "Majority Party" as indirect measures of ideology, but the "Comments" claim that they are not an appropriate indicator of attitude structure or ideology as defined by Converse. A calculation of the interitem correlations and the correlations between the issue scales and self-placement on the liberal/conservative scale for all ideologues and for nonideologues separately provides contrary evidence. Not only are the average interitem correlations significantly higher for ideologues (.45) than for nonideologues (.24) within issue domains, but the between-domain correlations averaged .29 for ideologues and only .10 for nonideologues. Validation of the liberal/conservative-issue scale correlations as indicators of ideology was also established. Among ideologues, the average correlation between the issues and the liberal/conservative scale was again significantly higher (.49) than for nonideologues (.20). These differences in the strength of the interitem correlations not only substantiate the conclusions of "Majority Party" and confirm the interpretation of the correlations as indicating degree of ideology, but they provide a validation of the two methods as well.

The Electoral Effects of Ideology. Having reaffirmed the more ideological stance of the 1972 electorate, we can now review the impact this heightened ideology had on the electoral decision by means of a comparison of ideologues and nonideologues. The ideologues in 1972 were far more interested in politics, invested more time in following public affairs through several media sources, and turned out to vote at a much higher rate. Nonideologues, consequently, had a lower turnout rate than the total population rate, which was very low in 1972. Ideologues also perceived sharper policy differences between the candidates. Although

[46] The 1972 increase in ideology is even more interesting when it is noted that ideologues do not include the 5 per cent of all respondents who referred to McGovern as "too liberal" or "too radical" even if they could talk about being "too liberal" in terms of the issues. These individuals were not included in either level of ideology because we thought that the phrase "too liberal" might perhaps indicate a ritualistic criticism of McGovern rather than a developed, consistent understanding of politics in terms of broad dimensions such as a liberal to conservative distinction or a broad set of policy considerations.

[47] See Philip E. Converse, "Public Opinion and Voting Behavior," in the *Handbook of Political Science* for a discussion of the theoretical relevance of this test among ideologues, and nonideologues, as well as for a discussion of how social conditions might affect the relationship between survey items.

[48] That the percentage of respondents refusing to guess which party was more conservative is lower than that of any previous election survey is also evidence in confirmation of the ideological nature of the 1972 election.

there was no difference between the two groups in the correlation of the vote and affect toward the candidates, the vote was much more strongly related to the issues for ideologues than it was for nonideologues. The correlation between the vote and the respondent's own position on the several issue items in the survey ranged from .25 to .62 for ideologues and from .04 to .40 among nonideologues; the correlation between the social issue proximity measure and the vote was .69 for ideologues and .43 for nonideologues.

Finally, this relatively greater impact of issues on the vote decision of ideologues was independently validated with a six-components regression analysis for the two groups. The regression coefficients produced by the components analysis revealed that the issues (domestic and foreign) were more than twice as important for ideologues as for nonideologues: the net Republican vote advantage ($b_i \cdot \bar{x}_i$) accruing from issues was 8.45 per cent for ideologues and only 2.99 per cent for nonideologues. Conversely, candidate attributes had substantially less net impact on the vote than issues for ideologues (6.50 per cent) while among nonideologues candidate attributes were the predominant factor (9.72 per cent Republican advantage). The six-components analysis also provided a better overall explanation of the vote decision for ideologues (R squared of .55) than it did for nonideologues (R squared of .46). While issues clearly had a more substantial impact on the vote among ideologues, the perceived competence of the candidates was a crucial consideration for nonideologues. Ratings of how competently McGovern had conducted his campaign were significantly correlated with the vote only among nonideologues ($r = .42$). In general, these data suggest that ideologues had a highly consistent understanding of politics, a coherence of thought that promoted an efficient translation of policy preferences and issue-related candidate evaluations into a vote decision. As an added attraction, the similarity of the analysis results produced by the new-issue proximity measures and the six-components regression provides still further validation of the new methods.

As Converse has suggested, the levels of conceptualization and interitem correlations reflect different approaches to the study of ideology.[49] Our analyses demonstrate that while the two approaches are not identical, they are associated. The findings also indicate that levels of conceptualization are affected by political events and perceived candidate policy stands in a manner that accentuates issue attitude consistency and heightens the impact of issues on the electoral decision and outcome. The prevalence of ideological predispositions among 1972 voters apparently increased the intercorrelation among the issues as well as the association between specific issues and a general liberal-conservative orientation, thereby helping to make the 1972 election uniquely ideological.

The principal effect of ideology in the 1972 election was to increase the relative impact of issues on the electoral outcome. Whether or not the 1972 data represent a trend toward an increasing impact of ideological conceptualization and issues on U.S. elections depends on what causes ideology and attitude consistency. As level of ideology was somewhat related to educational attainment, the long-term trend toward a more highly educated public may have a continuing influence on the increased incidence of ideological thinking about politics. This does not mean that nonideological voters are irrational or incapable of reaching a meaningful, informed vote decision. Indeed, up to now discussions of voter rationality have not seemed scientifically useful. For the most part, the concept of "rationality" has not been empirically operationalized and therefore usually remains part of the researchers subjective interpretation rather than a scientifically established distinction. What would be useful and relevant is further investigation of the possible contributions to an increase or decrease in attitude constraint. "Majority Party," for example, suggested that an increase in candidate articulation of the policy differences between the parties, widespread media coverage of events that provoked public debates between conflicting groups, and a general upgrading in the quality of the political rhetoric of election campaigns may be the most important causes of the growth in political attitude consistency because they help clarify the connections between various government actions, policy outputs and group benefits. Obviously, political leaders play an important role in determining which issues appear on the public agenda, the dimensionality of the issue space and the amount of policy relevant information available to the public. Similarly, the media can affect the public's grasp of politics as it provides a critical information link between the political environment and the voters. Monitoring all these factors over time is essential for explaining and understanding the dynamics connecting ideology and issues to voting behavior. At this writing, the future impact of ideology on elections remains uncertain, but the analysis presented here leaves little doubt about its substantial effect on the 1972 election.

[49] Philip E. Converse, "Public Opinion and Voting Behavior" contains a discussion of the difference between interitem correlations or attitude structure indicators and indicators bearing on more explicit use or recognition of ideological concepts.

Policy Polarization

An investigation of the issue-related polarization within the rank of Democratic identifiers was closely related to the discussion of issues and ideology in "Majority Party." The "Comments" attack the polarization notion through reanalyses that purport to show that in 1972 there was very little issue polarization among the Democrats.[50] We had thought that the polarization was quite obvious and that the evidence provided by "Majority Party" on this point was fairly conclusive. The explanation for the Popkin conclusion of *less* issue polarization in 1972 than in any previous election seems to be that their measure indicates vote-related partisan polarization and not issue polarization, a distinction made by Kagay and Caldeira[51] that needs no further elaboration here.

Polarization can be defined in various ways, but perhaps the most straightforward datum on this topic is the percentage of party identifiers who defected to the opposite party. A higher defection rate occurred in 1972 than in any previous election during the past twenty years: one-quarter of self-identified strong Democrats and 49 per cent of weak Democrats voted for Nixon. This Democratic defection was even higher than the 1964 Republican defection (10 per cent of strong Republicans and 42 per cent of weak Republicans voted for Johnson). While these defection rates indicate divisions within particular party ranks, they, much like the Popkin data, do not describe the divisions with respect to policy differences. Kagay and Caldeira, on the other hand, have demonstrated that the high degree of vote defection in both 1964 and 1972 was more a result of polarization over issues than of polarization over candidates.[52] Furthermore, their findings reveal that polarization over issues was higher in 1972 than in any of the elections previously studied.

The examination of policy polarization was not intended, however, only to explain vote defection. Our primary concern in "Majority Party" was to demonstrate that issue-related divisions exist within the Democratic party and that Republican candidates could employ campaign strategies that capitalize on these schisms. How enduring these or similar issues are thus becomes an important question. The issues important in 1972 had been debated for some time before the campaign; it therefore seemed reasonable to conclude that the issues, issue preferences, and divisions among voters had not been created by the particular candidates of the 1972 campaign. Given that the issues had been salient for some time, the voters were aware of them and could evaluate the candidates in terms of their policy preferences on these issues. Similarly, the longevity of issues that were salient and divisive among Democrats in 1972 is also important for the outcome of immediate future elections. If 1972 issues are still on the public agenda in 1976, and if the Democrats remain polarized on these issues, they may affect the outcome of the 1976 election.

At the time this rejoinder is being written, it is too early to know with any degree of certainty what issues will be most salient in the general election campaign. Several have already emerged from the primary campaign: unemployment and general economic problems, the responsibility of government for guaranteeing everyone a job and a good standard of living, school busing to bring about racial integration, government assistance to minority groups, and the stance to take with individuals accused of committing a crime. All of these issues were, to some extent, salient in 1972 and 1974 and were therefore included in the CPS election surveys for both years.

Panel data from the CPS surveys comparing the 1972 and 1974 distributions of issue preferences among Democrats who had voted for McGovern and Nixon are presented in Table 4, and a comparison of the 1972 and 1974 distributions reveals only minor attitude shifts during the two years. On the question of how well the government was handling the economic problems of inflation and unemployment, a large and understandable change in attitudes had by 1974 eliminated much but not all of the difference on that item observed for McGovern and Nixon Democrats in 1972. Apart from this one exception, very little change occurred from 1972 to 1974. The other issue items and the liberal/conservative scale reveal only slight attitude shifts that basically do little to eliminate the policy polarization existing within the Democratic ranks, issue differences that could potentially divide the Democrats once again in 1976. The country remains divided on basic issues and the challenge of the '70's for political leaders is to see if the demands reflected by these divisions can be handled without a major change in the party system.

Voter Models

The Popkin "Comment" insists on comparing a "voter-citizen" and an "investor-voter" model of voters. It does not seem to us that the voter-citizen model, as described in the Popkin "Comment," is used either explicitly or implicitly in the work of "Majority Party," despite the assertions of Popkin et al. These models are Popkin's invention, and although the Popkin article provides a great deal of

[50] Popkin, "Comment," pp. 785–786, RePass, "Comment," pp. 829–830.

[51] See Kagay and Caldeira, "I Like the Look of His Face," pp. 41–58, for a discussion of polarization.

[52] *Ibid.*; see especially their Figure 6.

Table 4. Issue Polarization Within the Democratic Ranks, Panel Data 1972–1974[a]

		1972		1974	
		Democrats Voting for McGovern	Democrats Voting for Nixon	Democrats Who Voted for McGovern	Democrats Who Voted for Nixon
(*N*)		(261)	(201)	(261)	(201)
Busing:	Left	24%	2%	20%	4%
	Center	8	2	16	7
	Right	68	96	64	89
Rights of Accused:	Left	46%	29%	50%	29%
	Center	20	15	20	17
	Right	34	56	30	54
Govt. Help Minorities:	Left	51%	25%	52%	19%
	Center	24	27	21	29
	Right	25	48	27	52
Standard of Living:	Left	56%	20%	42%	23%
	Center	21	26	27	27
	Right	23	54	31	50
Govt. Handling Economy:	Good Job	7%	26%	3%	9%
	Fair	56	64	39	46
	Poor	37	10	58	46
Liberal-Conservative:	Left	52%	12%	52%	17%
	Center	37	42	38	47
	Right	11	46	10	36

[a] These data are based on the panel component of the CPS 1972 and 1974 election studies; that is, they reflect responses from the same set of individuals in both surveys.

qualitative description of the two models, nowhere in the "Comment" are the models either operationalized or tested. Nevertheless, claims are made about how one of the models is "false" and "flawed," while the other presumably offers a more accurate description of the voter. More accurate according to what criteria? The empirical data provided toward the end of the "Comment" seem to have no bearing on an investor-voter model of voting. Indeed, the data are not entirely relevant to questions of *voting* behavior since the dependent variable was apparently a candidate rating scale and not the vote.[53] Moreover, the most immediate conclusion to be drawn from the Popkin data is that the issues were more robust predictors of possible vote intention than was candidate competence (see Table 10 in Popkin "Comment").

Still, while an empirical operationalization of the investor-voter model is not offered by the "Comment," the concept does raise questions about information costs, voting under uncertainty, misperception, and perceived candidate competence. These are important questions and parsimonious models are useful if they direct attention to new concepts or if they produce new generalizations. The Popkin "Comment" suggests that what is new about the investor-voter model is the concept of candidate competence. But the six-components analysis has always taken into account images of competence, and the CPS analysis of the 1972 election captured this concept as well through the "feeling thermometers" and through questions probing perceptions of McGovern's campaign performance.

[53] The footnote on Table 10 of the Popkin "Comment" describes the dependent variable as " . . . a scale from +3 (McGovern) to −3 (Nixon)."

Conclusion

When analyses and replications are performed carefully, further investigation of CPS election study data not only validate our methods but reaffirm the argument that voters were offered particularly clear and distinct candidate and policy related electoral choices in 1972; various attributes of the specific candidates weighed heavily in the vote calculus; issue-related differences factionalized the Democratic ranks, attenuating the effect of party loyalties on the total outcome; and the impact of broad policy orientations and ideology remained strong even after controlling for all other major explanations of the electoral decision. The

electoral effect of candidates and issues were clearly interrelated in 1972 and increased jointly in importance relative to the past, with issues increasing the most and partisan effects declining to an all-time low. Beyond these findings, the CPS 1972 election report emphasized the need for more investigation of those factors in the political environment that influence voters' perceptions and misperceptions, the agenda of social issues and individual policy preferences.

The study also raised questions of responsiveness that focused on the interplay between voter preferences, candidate strategies and political outcomes. That 42 per cent of self-identified Democrats voted for other than their preferred party in the 1972 presidential race indicates a crisis for a responsive party system. And while issue polarization was characteristic of the population in 1972, it was even more extreme among the activists who participated in the campaigns, primaries and conventions that eventually selected the candidates. Whether or not this condition will be changed in the 1976 election through a diminution of issue salience or a shift in candidate strategies remains uncertain at this time. What is clear, however, is that a lack of responsiveness arises because parties and candidates lead the public to expect one thing and then provide another. Imperfections in information can affect images much more than the reality of government outputs and political events. A lack of responsiveness obtains when the misinformed image contradicts the reality of political events; Watergate, for example, revealed that the voters' beliefs in Nixon's trustworthiness were based on misperception. Cues about candidate styles and attributes may be the most readily accessible information upon which voters can base their electoral decision, but these cues may also be the most easily manipulable.

Despite this concern, the belief that a leader is trustworthy and sincere may at times be more important for the functioning of a democratic system than agreement on the issues. The programmatic functioning of a democratic political system is greatly encumbered by leaders who do not have the confidence of the people. Leadership styles are important in this regard and can often be just as divisive as issues that polarize the population.

Policy and candidate considerations are not, however, independent. Indeed, McGovern's articulation of the issues not only brought policy questions to the forefront of electoral decision making in 1972, but also, ironically, increased the votes obtained by Nixon since he, rather than McGovern, was perceived as the candidate best prepared to deal with the issues. It is easy to overlook the formidable personal strength stemming from the perceived competence, reliability and trust that Nixon brought to the 1972 contest. His preeminence as the nation's political head stands above all else in a unitary explanation of his stunning electoral success in 1972.

Yet, when the relative importance of candidates and issues are compared with previous elections during the past twenty years, it becomes apparent that issues and ideology were the factors uniquely affecting the outcome of the 1972 election. Issues were not only more salient in 1972 than in prior elections, but the net electoral impact of foreign and domestic issues combined was substantially greater than ever before. The additional empirical evidence presented above demonstrates that issue awareness and policy preferences interacted with the clearly articulated candidate differences to produce a vote heavily laden with ideology and policy concerns. All the evidence supports and reaffirms our prior conclusion that 1972 was an ideological election.

Performance and Instability in Military and Nonmilitary Regime Systems*

R. D. McKinlay and A. S. Cohan
The University of Lancaster

Military coups are a phenomenon which has been widespread during the past fifteen years and has attracted considerable research.[1] Military regimes established as a consequence of coups have, however, drawn little attention. This is unfortunate, for it is the *performance* of a regime, rather than its *origin* which is likely to affect the processes of economic and social change in the particular country. The relative lack of research on military regimes is understandable. Some time must elapse from the time of the coup before the performance of the military regime may be assessed. Now, however, a sufficient population of military regimes exists to permit the systematic examination of their performance.

Two sources have contributed to our knowledge of the performance of military regimes thus far. First, works on military intervention have, on occasion, made reference to the characteristics of military rule.[2] A second and smaller collection has focused directly on military performance, either through case studies or through more general statements which tend to be largely unsubstantiated and overdrawn.[3]

This article is the first of a series of reports on a cross-national aggregate project designed to examine the performance of military regimes. Our objective in this first paper is to compare the performance of military regime systems with that of nonmilitary regime systems. A military regime system is any system in which the armed forces have made a coup and subsequently established a government whose main executive post is held by a military person and which lasts for at least the major part of one year. The focus of this first paper is not on military regimes themselves but on the more general topic of systems which have experienced military regimes compared with those which have not.

Research Design

It is inadequate to examine systematically the performance of military regime systems without comparing them with nonmilitary regime systems. The population for this study, therefore, consists of all independent countries of the world which have been categorized into two subpopulations, defined in terms of whether they have experienced a military regime.[4] The time period chosen for this article was the decade 1961–70, since this period includes the majority of military regimes.

The performance of the two types of system is compared across twenty-five variables which are

* The authors wish to thank the Social Science Research Council (England) which provided funds for this project, and Anthony Mughan who acted as research assistant.

[1] The works vary substantially both in scope and method. The most common form consists either of individual case studies or anthologies of case studies. Examples are C. E. Welch, ed., *Soldier and State in Africa* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970); H. Bienen, ed., *The Military Intervenes* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1968); J. C. Hurewitz, *Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension* (New York: Praeger, 1969); E. Lieuwen, *Arms and Politics in Latin America* (New York: Praeger, 1961); J. J. Johnson, ed., *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962); J. Van Doorn, ed., *Armed Forces and Society* (The Hague: Mouton, 1968). There is also a smaller collection of synthesizing works. See, for example, M. Janowitz, *Military in the Political Development of New Nations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964); S. E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback* (New York: Praeger, 1962); W. Gutteridge, *Military Institutions in the New States* (New York: Praeger, 1965); E. Luttwak, *Coup d'État* (New York: Knopf, 1969).

[2] See, for example, S. E. Finer (above); L. W. Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization," *European Journal of Sociology*, 2, no. 1 (1961), pp. 82–92. K. Hopkins, "Civil-Military Relations in Underdeveloped Countries," *British Journal of Sociology*, 17 (June, 1966), 165–182; A. R. Zolberg, "Military Rule and Political Development in Tropical Africa," in *Military Profession and Military Regimes*, ed. J. Van Doorn (The Hague: Mouton, 1969).

[3] Examples of case studies are R. Luckham, *The Nigerian Military* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971); E. Be'eri, *Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society* (New York: Praeger, 1970); A. Stepan, *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971). Examples of more general statements are E. Feit, "Pen, Sword and People," *World Politics*, 25 (January, 1973), 251–273; E. A. Nordlinger, "Soldiers in Mufti: The Impact of Military Rule Upon Economic and Social Change in the Non-Western States," *American Political Science Review*, 64 (December, 1970), 1131–1148; A. R. Willner, "Perspectives on Military Elites as Rulers and Wielders of Power," *Journal of Comparative Administration*, 2 (November, 1970), 261–276; R. Pinkney, "The Theory and Practice of Military Government," *Political Studies*, 21 (June, 1973), 152–166; H. Bienen, ed., *The Military and Modernization* (Chicago: Aldine, Atherton, 1971).

[4] Communist Countries were excluded because of noncomparability of economic data.

categorized into five main groupings. These variables were collected on an annual basis and, where appropriate, means or percentages or growth rates for the ten year period were calculated.[5] The variables used in this study follow:

Political Activity and Political Change Variables[6]

1. Percentage of years the constitution is banned;
2. Percentage of years that the legislature is banned;
3. Percentage of years that political parties are banned;
4. Mean percentage of cabinet posts held by military personnel;
5. The number of constitution changes; and
6. The number of main executive changes.

Military Capability Variables[7]

7. Mean size of the armed forces per 10,000 population;
8. Mean military expenditure as a percentage of GNP;
9. The diversification of the armed forces measured in terms of the size of the navy and air-forces as a percentage of the total size;
10. The rate of growth of the size of the armed force; and
11. The rate of growth of constant military expenditure.

Background Economic Variables[8]

12. Constant *per capita* gross national product (GNP);
13. Budget as a percentage of GNP;
14. Gross domestic fixed capital formation (GDFCF) as a percentage of GNP;
15. Primary production as a percentage of gross domestic product; and
16. Number of doctors per 100,000 population.

International Economic Variables[9]

17. Exports as a percentage of GNP;
18. Imports as a percentage of GNP;
19. International liquidity as a percentage of imports;
20. Balance of payments position on goods and services;
21. Balance of payments position on private investment; and
22. Balance of payments position on central government capital.

Economic Performance Variables

23. Rate of growth of constant *per capita* GNP;
24. Rate of growth of cost of living index; and
25. Rate of growth of exports.

The basic design of this article is to compare the performance of military and nonmilitary regime systems across these five categories of variables. The general comparison between the two types of system, however, will be elaborated by the inclusion of four control variables: GNP; geographic area; duration of the military regime in military regime systems (in years); and the number of coups in military regime systems. The control variables are used in two ways. For the first type of control the variables have been categorized. GNP is divided into four levels, five geographic areas are used, and both duration and number of coups are divided into four categories.[10] Thus, the two types of system are compared within the categories of each of the control variables. For example, military and nonmilitary regime systems are compared within the various GNP levels, and military regime systems of different regime duration are compared with nonmilitary regime systems. This type of control, which holds the control variable constant, permits us to examine whether aggregate differences between military and nonmilitary regime systems still occur when controls are introduced and whether such differences remain unchanged using the various control categories.

The second method of control involves the use of partial correlation and multiple regression which is based on adjusting rather than actually holding variables constant. It is used in two situations. When the number of cases is too small or the number of variables too large for constant type controls to be employed usefully, partial

[5] Some of the recent standard data compilations such as C. L. Taylor and M. C. Hudson, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972) and A. Banks, *Cross-Polity Time Series Data* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1971) were not adequate, given the wide range of variables used.

[6] The main data sources for the political variables were *Statesman's Yearbook* (London: Macmillan, 1950–70); *Europe Yearbook* (London: Europa Publications, 1958–70); Richard P. Stebbins and Alba Amoia, eds., *Political Handbook and Atlas of the World* (New York; Simon and Schuster, 1970); *Whitaker's Almanac* (London: Whitaker's Publications, 1950–70); and *Keesing's Contemporary Archives* (London: Keesing's Publications, 1950–70).

[7] The main data sources were *The Military Balance* (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1960–72); Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament (Stockholm: Almquivst, 1968–72); Richard Booth, "The Armed Forces of African States," *Adelphi Papers*, #67 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1970).

[8] The main data sources were *United Nations, Statistical Yearbook* (New York, 1951–72); *United Nations, Yearbook of International Trade Statistics* (New York, 1950–72); *United Nations, Yearbook of National Account Statistics* (New York: 1964–72); and *International Financial Statistics* (Washington: International Monetary Fund, 1964–72).

[9] The main area not covered is monetary transfers involving transactions of deposit money banks and central banks.

[10] Per capita GNP is divided into the following categories: $0–$150, $151–$400, $401–$900, and $901 +. This last category is not used as it contains no military regime systems. The geographic areas are Central America and the Caribbean, South America, The Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, Central and Southeast Asia. Duration is categorized as 0–1 year, 1–2 years, 2–5 years and 5 + years. The number of coups is categorized as 0, 1, 2, and 3 +.

correlation and multiple regression are adequate. When it is necessary to assess the importance of an independent variable, such as the occurrence of a military regime or the duration of the regime, in influencing any of the performance variables the above techniques permit the controlling of a large number of other variables.

Cluster Analysis

Given the large number of cases and large array of variables, we have constructed a simplified introductory picture of the population. The most appropriate multivariate technique for this purpose is cluster analysis. As a method of empirical typology formation, cluster analysis permits the construction of empirical profiles which help to simplify and categorize a large population. Cluster analysis specifically enables the researcher to determine which systems group together, i.e., how the cases are distributed, and which variables provide the defining characteristics of any such groupings. Thus, it is possible to examine in general terms whether military regime systems cluster separately from nonmilitary regime systems and which variables, if any, make the military regime systems distinctive.

The cluster analysis was run on 101 cases with 25 variables using an iterative or relocation method. This method is superior to a number of other hierarchical techniques because it permits relocation of cases once clustering has begun. The similarity coefficient used was the error sum, which is designed to minimize variance within clusters.

One of the main problems in cluster analysis is that clustering will occur even in the absence of empirical justification for such clustering. The accuracy of the clusters may be examined in two ways. First, the dendogram gives a measure of the error scores at which clustering takes place. Second, examination of the F ratio and t-tests provides a measure of the degree of homogeneity of each of the clusters. By means of these criteria, five clusters appear to represent the optimal number to be extracted.[11]

The first cluster is defined in terms of very low levels of political activity, high circulation of executives and poor economic performance. The second cluster is defined primarily in terms of weak positions on each of the three economic categories. The background economic variables have the lowest score of any cluster; the international trade profile is consistently lower than the overall mean but, comparatively, not as weak as the background factors, and economic performance is poor but not as low as in the first cluster. The third cluster is characterized by high military scores and high rates of economic performance. The fourth cluster is defined by very high levels of political activity, a strong international trading position and very strong economic performance. Finally, the fifth cluster is characterized by very high levels of political activity and exceptionally high values on the background economic variables.

Table 1. Distribution of Military Regime Systems and Nonmilitary Regime Systems by Clusters[a]

Type of System	Cluster Numbers					
	1	2	3	4	5	(Total)
MRS	13 (7)	18 (17)	4 (4)	2 (7)	0	37
NMRS	3 (9)	24 (25)	5 (5)	13 (8)	19	64
(Total)	16	42	9	15	19	101

[a] The bracketed figures are the expected scores if the fifth cluster level is removed.

What is particularly interesting is that military regime systems do not constitute a homogeneous grouping. If cluster 5, which includes the high income systems of Western Europe, the U.S.A., Canada, Australia and New Zealand, and Japan is removed, the distribution of cases is not particularly skewed. Indeed, clusters 2 and 3 which contain 59 per cent of military regime systems contain the expected ratio of military and nonmilitary regime systems. Thus some 60 per cent of military regime systems cluster with nonmilitary regime systems. Clusters 1 and 4 are very skewed as cluster 1 is predominantly a military regime group and cluster 4 is mainly a civilian regime group.

Some preliminary observations on the nature of military regime systems may be made from this cluster analysis. Levels of political activity appear to play an important role in characterizing military regime systems. The first three clusters, especially the first one, are very different from the latter two. None of the military variables greatly assists in characterizing military regime systems. Indeed, in cluster 3, where the size and expenditure of the military are particularly significant variables, the ratio between military and nonmilitary regime systems conforms to expectations. In economic terms, clusters 1 and 2, containing 84 per cent of military regime systems, have the poorest rates of performance and also the weakest background position. Cluster 2, containing just under half the military regime systems also has the weakest international trade position.

These findings must be regarded as tentative, because the distribution of the cases within each cluster is unknown. But the observations on the profiles of each cluster and the distribution of cases within each cluster indicate that the five categories of variables do provide useful compara-

[11] The scores for each of the clusters are contained in the first appendix.

tive reference points. The remaining sections of this article will compare more rigorously the military and nonmilitary regime systems in each of the five categories of variables.

Political Performance

Military regime systems differ from nonmilitary regime systems in having substantially greater restrictions on a number of formal political institutions. As expected they also contain a larger number of military personnel in the cabinets. The occurrence of a military regime is, of course, the primary factor accounting for these differences.

T-tests between military and nonmilitary regime systems indicates that there are significant differences on all the levels of political activity variables, but the level of significance of the ban on political parties is not as high as on the other variables tested. Given that bans on civilian institutions are not associated with the high-income systems, it would be expected that the removal of these systems would increase the scores of low-income nonmilitary regime systems. This is, indeed, the case. But the increase of the scores of the low-income nonmilitary regime systems is not substantial, and the basic profile of differences remains unchanged.[12] The only difference is that the ban on political parties is no longer significant.

Because of the differences between military and nonmilitary regime systems, it is necessary to examine to what extent these differences may be attributed directly to the occurrence of a military regime. For this purpose multiple regression, introducing as a dummy variable the presence or absence of a military regime, can be used. Regression analysis on each of the four political activity variables shows that the occurrence of a military regime is a significant estimator (at the .01 level) of all the variables except the ban on political parties.[13]

Table 2. Levels of Political Activity by Type of Regime[a]

Type of System	Levels of Political Activity: Mean % Years Constitution not full	Mean % Years Legislature Banned	Mean % Years Parties Banned	Mean % Military in Cabinet
MRS	34.7	36.0	22.1	22.3
NMRS	8.4**	3.2**	10.2*	3.1**
NMRS(900–)	11.5**	4.5**	14.2	4.2

[a] The significance levels are for tests between military regime systems (MRS) and nonmilitary regime systems NMRS and between military regime systems and low-income nonmilitary regime systems (NMRS[900–]).

* Significant at .05 level.

** Significant at .01 level.

Thus it seems that while restrictions on the constitution and legislatures and a high percentage of military in the cabinet differentiate the military and low income nonmilitary regime systems, a ban on political parties does not. Several reasons may help to explain the lower incidence of political party bans. Such bans involve a larger number of aggrieved people and are thus likely to create more opposition to the military regime. Additionally, leading party personnel may be used outside the framework of constitutions and legislatures to aid the regime. Further, and related to the above, political parties may be used to provide mediating functions between populations and regimes.

Military and nonmilitary regime systems are again clearly differentiated in terms of political change. Even when the high-income systems are removed the profile remains essentially the same. The expected large number of executive changes in military regime systems may be a consequence of the coups by which military regimes were established. There is, however, also a high incidence of changes in the constitution. A constitution change normally indicates a substantial restructuring of government. Thus, military regime systems may be undergoing more extensive formal change, which in turn may indicate greater difficulty in establishing a viable formal structure.

[12] The basic comparison used throughout this paper is between all military regime systems and nonmilitary regime systems. In most comparisons we have removed the high-income systems. A high-income system is defined as one which has a mean per capita GNP of $900 or more for the period between 1961–70. The eighteen high-income systems were removed primarily because they differ so markedly in economic terms from the rest of the world. This was confirmed by the cluster analysis. Since no military regime systems fall into the high income group the high-income system would distort the picture of the nonmilitary regime system. In the aggregate comparisons, data on all nonmilitary regime systems and on low-income nonmilitary regime systems were included, but wherever comparisons using the various controls were done, the high-income systems were excluded.

[13] The independent variables used in the regression analyses were: a dummy variable for whether a military regime had occurred, the percentage of the cabinet that was made up of military personnel, size of military, expenditure on the military, per capita GNP, rate of growth of GNP, and trade balance. All regression equations are significant at the .01 level. In the case of constitution ban 37 per cent of variance is explained; for legislature ban 53 per cent of variance is explained; and for military in the cabinet 58 per cent is explained. It is interesting to note that percentage military in the cabinet is a significant estimator of constitution and legislature ban; military size is a significant estimator of constitution ban and military in the cabinet; and military expenditure is a significant estimator of legislature ban. Thus a number of military variables, independent of whether or not there has been a military regime, seem to be related to restrictions on levels of political activity.

Table 3. Political Change by Type of Regime[a]

Type of System	Political Change: Number of Constitution Changes	Political Change: Number of Main Executives
MRS	1.7	4.1
NMRS	0.3**	2.4**
NMRS (900–)	0.4**	2.1**

[a] The significance levels are for tests between military regime systems and nonmilitary regime systems, and military regime systems and low income nonmilitary regime systems.

** Significant at the .01 level.

The comparison between the two types of system may be refined by differentiating military regime systems in terms of number of coups and the duration of the military regime. Analyses of variance indicate that significant variation exists between regime duration and each of the political activity variables, with the exception of the ban on political parties. Extension of the analysis of variance shows a significant progressive increase in restrictions in the levels of political activity as the duration of the regime increases.[14] In fact, only when the duration of the military regime extends for more than two years do the differences between low income nonmilitary and military regime systems become pronounced. With reference to political change, there is again a significant relationship between regime duration and the political change variables; however, the progression, found in the case of the activity variables, is not repeated.

Additionally there is a significant relationship between the number of coups and the political activity and political change variables with the exception of the ban on political parties.[15] Unlike the tabulations using regime duration, however, the political activity variables do not show a progressive increase with the number of coups. On the other hand, the political change indicators do show a clearer progression. In general, when military regime systems are classified by coups, they show a greater degree of homogeneity than when they are classified by the duration of the regime.

We can examine the relative impact of regime duration and the number of coups on political activity and political change by using multiple regression analysis. Although the number of coups does have a positive independent impact on some of the political activity variables, regime duration is the more powerful variable in explaining levels of political activity.[16] It is the number of coups,

[14] *T*-tests on the constitution ban show that the ban in military regime systems (0–2 years) is significantly lower than the ban in military regime systems (2–5 years) at the .01 level and that the ban on the latter is significantly lower at the .05 level than the ban in military regime systems (5+). The same results hold for the percentage of the cabinet made up of military personnel. Difference tests on the legislature ban show the ban in military regime systems (0–2 years) is significantly lower at the .01 level than the bans in military regime systems (2–5 years and 5+).

[15] Difference of means tests show that there are significant differences between noncoup systems and each of the one, two and three coup categories at the .01 level on legislative ban, percentage military in the cabinet and number of constitution changes. For the constitution ban the differences are significant at the .01 level between noncoup systems and the one- and two-coup systems and at the .05 level between non-coup systems and the three-coup systems. On none of these variables are there any differences that are significant between the one-, two-, and three-coup systems. On number of executives there are significant differences between the noncoup and each of the different coup categories at the .01 level, but there are also some differences between the coup categories. The two-coup category has more executives than the one-coup category. This is significant at the .05 level. The three-coup category has more executives than the one- or two-coup categories (significant at the .01 and .05 levels respectively).

[16] The multiple regressions contained the same variables as did the earlier ones except that the dummy variable of

Table 4. Levels of Political Activity and Political Change by Duration[a]

Type of System	Levels of Political Activity and Political Change: Mean %** Years Constitution Not Fulfilled	Mean %** Years Legislature Banned	Mean % Years Parties Banned	Mean %** Military in Cabinet	Number** Constitution Changes	Number* of Executives
NMRS (900–)	11.5	4.5	4.2	4.2	0.4	2.1
MRS (0–2 Years)	8.5	9.0	9.1	11.4	1.1	4.1
MRS (2–5 Years)	31.1	40.2	24.4	20.2	2.0	4.5
MRS (5+ Years)	56.5	45.3	20.4	32.2	1.8	3.4

[a] The significance levels relate to analysis of variance tests for each variable.

** Significant at the .01 level.

* Significant at the .10 level.

Table 5. Levels of Political Activity and Political Change by Number of Coups*

Type of System	Levels of Political Activity and Political Change: Mean %* Years Constitution Not Fulfilled	Mean %** Years Legislature Banned	Mean % Years Parties Banned	Mean %** Military in Cabinet	Number** Constitution Changes	Number** of Executives
NMRS (900–)	11.5	4.5	14.2	4.2	0.4	2.1
MRS (one coup)	33.6	32.5	17.8	21.4	1.6	3.4
MRS (two coups)	44.2	41.2	34.3	21.2	2.3	4.5
MRS (three or more coups)	34.8	39.8	18.8	27.8	2.3	6.5

* The significance levels relate to analysis of variance tests for each variable.
** Significant at the .01 level.
* Significant at the .05 level.

however, rather than regime duration that has the more powerful effect on political change. Thus, the greater degree of political change which characterizes military regime systems would seem to be attributable to the incidence of coups rather than to the duration of the subsequent military regime.[17]

Finally, partial correlations reveal that when regime system, and no transference of restrictions tween the existence of a military regime and levels of political activity drops dramatically. Thus restrictions on political activity would seem to be a function of the military regime in the military regime system, and no transference of restrictions to the civilian regimes in the military regime systems occurs once the military regime is terminated.

Across the whole range of political indicators, the military and low-income nonmilitary regime systems of Africa and Asia are the most clearly differentiated; and the regimes of the Middle East and North Africa are quite similar to each other. Those of Latin America occupy an intermediate position.[18]

Table 6. Total and Partial Correlations between Military Regime and Levels of Political Activity

Levels of Political Activity	Presence of Military Regime: Presence Military Regime	Presence of Military Regime Controlling for Duration
Mean % Years Constitution Banned	0.41**	−0.03
Mean % Years Legislature Banned	0.62**	0.19*
Mean % Years Parties Banned	0.23*	0.09
Mean % Military in Cabinet	0.65**	0.17

** Significant at the .01 level.
* Significant at the .05 level.

When GNP is controlled, the two types of system follow the aggregate profiles both with respect to levels of political activity and to levels of political change. Thus military regime systems are consistently different from low-income nonmilitary regime systems regardless of their particular GNP level. With reference to levels of political activity, however, GNP does seem to bear a different relationship to each of the two types of system. While restrictions on political activity in low-income nonmilitary regime systems increase slightly from low to middle GNP levels and then decrease substantially, the restrictions in military regime systems are fairly constant. Thus, while there is an expected downward trend in restrictions on political activity in low-income nonmilitary regime systems as GNP increases, this does not hold true for military regime systems where restrictions are generally uniform regardless of the particular level of GNP. The consequence of the varying influence of GNP on the two types of system is to make the

whether a military regime had occurred was replaced by the variables of duration and number of coups. All the regression equations were significant at the .01 level with 43 per cent, 60 per cent, and 67 per cent of the variance of constitution ban, legislative ban, and military in the cabinet being explained.

[17] The simple correlations of number of coups with number of constitution changes and number of executive changes are .62 and .51 respectively, both significant at the .01 level. When duration is controlled, these correlations become .49 and .52, respectively, both still significant at the .01 level. The simple correlation between duration and number of constitution changes and number of executives are .45 and .17, the first of which is significant at the .01 level. When number of coups is controlled, these correlations become .14 and −.19, only the latter of which is significant at the .05 level.

[18] In Africa there are significant differences on all political activity and political change variables. In Asia the same holds true with the exception of the ban on political parties. In the Middle East and North Africa significant differences occur only on the percentage military in the cabinet and party bans. In both Central and South America there are significant differences on the percentage military in the cabinet, party ban, and legislation bans.

difference between military regime systems and nonmilitary regime systems (900-) most marked at high GNP levels and least marked at middle GNP levels.

Military regime systems consistently have a greater number of constitution changes regardless of GNP, although the number of changes in military regime systems declines as GNP increases making the difference between the two types of system least pronounced at high GNP levels. While the number of executive changes is fairly constant in military regime systems across GNP levels, executive changes progressively increase in low income nonmilitary regime systems as GNP increases. As a consequence there is no significant difference in the high GNP level. In contrast to levels of political activity, therefore, it is in the high GNP level that the differences between military and low-income nonmilitary systems are least marked.

Military Performance

Two contending hypotheses enjoy the status of widely held beliefs about the relationship between military regimes and the size of and expenditure on the armed forces. One hypothesis holds that military regimes increase both the size and expenditure on the armed forces. This would give military regime systems higher mean values on size, expenditure, and the rates of growth of size and expenditure than nonmilitary regime systems. The other hypothesis is that military size and expenditure tend to be higher in nonmilitary regime systems because civilian governments wish to inhibit the initiation of military coups through favorable allocations to the armed forces, thus giving higher mean values to the nonmilitary regime systems. Neither hypothesis appears to be valid.

Few significant differences exist between military and nonmilitary regime systems in the military dimension. The armed forces in military regime systems have expenditure levels which are quite similar to nonmilitary regime systems, and their armed forces are slightly smaller. Further, the armed forces of the military regime systems are significantly less diversified than their nonmilitary counterparts. While the rate of growth of size is somewhat higher, the expenditure growth rate is slightly lower. Once high-income systems are removed, the two types of system become closer in size, growth rate of size, and diversification. The expenditure level is slightly higher in military regime systems, but the growth rate of expenditure is significantly lower. Thus, initially, military and nonmilitary regime systems are very similar in the military dimension.

This finding may be refined by introducing controls for GNP, by testing for differences between military and nonmilitary regime systems within GNP levels. The only variations demonstrated through GNP controls are that the military regime systems in low GNP levels have higher expenditure and higher levels of diversification than low income nonmilitary regime systems. But this higher rate of expenditure must be qualified by the lower rates of growth of expenditure in the military regime system. Thus, military and low-income nonmilitary regime systems do not differ significantly within GNP levels.

The failure to find any major differences between military regime systems and low-income nonmilitary regime systems both in aggregate terms and using GNP controls can be complemented by the use of multiple regression in which a larger array of variables is used. The results of multiple regression analysis on each of the military variables show that the occurrence of a military regime is not a significant estimator for any of these variables.[19] Thus, it is clear that despite their en-

[19] All regression equations are significant at the .01 level, but the amounts of variance explained for each of the rates of growth are not impressive. The independent variables used for each of the rates of growth are the dummy variable of whether a military regime has occurred, diversification, size, and expenditure of the military, GNP, rate of growth, budget, and international liquidity. The variance explained in each case is 21 per cent. The amount of variance explained for size and ex-

Table 7. Military Size and Expenditure by Type of Regime[a]

Type of System	Military Size and Expenditure				
	Military Size	Military Expenditure as % GNP	Diversification	Rate of Growth of Size	Rate of Growth of Expenditure
MRS	47.9	3.21	11.64	8.10	8.80
NMRS	56.4	3.15	16.42*	5.64	9.60
NMRS (900–)	44.9	2.76	8.60	7.85	11.74*

[a] The significance levels are from tests between military regime systems and nonmilitary regime systems, and between military regime systems and low income nonmilitary regime systems.

* Significant at .10 level.

hanced political role, the armed forces in military regime systems are no more favored in terms of size and expenditure than the armed forces in low-income nonmilitary regime systems.

When the two types of system are classified by area, the main finding is that, unlike the case of political variables, hardly any deviations from the basic profile occur. Indeed, only four significant differences appear, and no area manifests more than one.[20] The most striking finding is related not to the difference between the two types of system, but to the substantial range in each of the variables across areas.[21] Thus, while area, or more precisely, factors contained within each area, have an important influence on military variables in general, it is of little utility in showing up differences between military and low-income nonmilitary regime systems within areas.

The main conclusion concerning the variables of regime duration and number of coups is that neither has a significant influence on the military variables. It might have been expected that a disposition to favor the armed forces would be most pronounced in the systems in which the military regime was of long duration or where more coups occurred. Neither of these expectations is valid. In contrast to the political variables category, therefore, regime duration and the number of military coups do not produce any important or independent variations from the general picture.

Economic Background

Significant differences between military and nonmilitary regime systems are found on all the background economic variables. These differences, however, are directly attributable to the influence of the high-income systems. Such differences disappear when the high income systems are removed from the analysis. Although the military regime systems do score consistently lower than the nonmilitary regime systems, none of these differences is significant. Further, when military and nonmilitary regime systems are compared across the background variables within GNP levels, no significant differences occur. There is, therefore, no indication that military regime systems have a

penditure are 65 per cent and 59 per cent respectively. The independent variables for size are the dummy variable, diversification, expenditure, GNP, rate of growth of GNP, budget and international liquidity. The variables for expenditure are identical to the above except that size of the military is substituted for expenditure.

[20] The differences are the following: Sub-Saharan Africa, where the low-income nonmilitary regime systems rate of growth of expenditure is significantly higher at the .05 level; Central America, where the rate of growth of size is significantly higher in the military regime systems at the .10 level; South America, where the size in the low-income nonmilitary regime systems is significantly higher at the .10 level.

[21] For example, military size in military regime systems and low-income nonmilitary regime systems ranges from 9.6 and 9.2 in Africa to 91.1 and 94.0 in Asia; expenditure ranges from 0.87 and 1.40 in Central America to 6.86 and 6.30 in the Middle East and North Africa. Diversification ranges from 2.34 and 1.94 in Africa to 29.0 and 32.0 in South America. Rates of growth of size range from 4.30 and 1.35 in Central America to 13.8 and 11.7 in Africa. Rates of growth of expenditure range from 3.10 and 1.70 in Central America to 12.3 and 19.3 in Africa.

Table 8. Military Size and Expenditure by Duration

	Military Size and Expenditure				
Type of System	Military Size	Military Expenditure % GNP	Diversification	Rate of Growth of Size	Rate of Growth of Expenditure
NMRS (900–)	44.9	2.7	8.6	7.9	11.7
MRS (0–2 yr)	45.8	2.7	11.2	10.8	7.4
MRS (2–5 yr)	41.5	2.4	9.6	8.2	9.6
MRS (5+ yr)	61.9	4.6	14.8	6.1	8.3

Table 9. Military Size and Expenditure by Number of Coups

	Military Size and Expenditure				
Type of System	Military Size	Military Expenditure % GNP	Diversification	Rate of Growth of Size	Rate of Growth of Expenditure
NMRS (900–)	44.9	2.7	8.6	7.9	11.7
MRS (one coup)	51.6	3.1	12.3	6.1	8.2
MRS (two coups)	45.0	2.6	13.5	14.7	10.0
MRS (three or more coups)	42.5	4.4	11.3	5.6	7.3

weaker background economic position than the nonmilitary regime systems.

Area controls, however, do indicate some differences between military and low-income nonmilitary regime systems which was not the case using military variables. The military regime systems in Africa and Asia particularly seem to be located in the weaker economic systems of these two areas. The within-area differences correspond to the within-area political differences where Africa and Asia demonstrated the most pronounced differences between military regime systems and nonmilitary regime systems.[22]

While there is no evidence that military regime systems are confined to weaker economic systems, the general literature on development indicates that some association exists between weaker economic systems and the number of coups or the duration of the military regime in military regime systems. However, analyses of variance both of regime duration and the number of coups on the five background economic variables yield no significant results. Further, all the correlations between regime duration or the number of coups and the economic variables have negligible values. Thus, once the high-income systems are removed, military regime systems are not located in the weaker economic systems. Nor are the systems characterized by multiple coups or long-term military regimes associated with weaker economies.

International Economic Performance

In contrast to the general background economic factors, there is some limited evidence to indicate the military regime systems are in a somewhat weaker international trading position than low-income nonmilitary regime systems.

Nonmilitary regime systems have more extensive commitments to international trade (as measured by export and import levels) and better trading positions (as measured by the trade balance). International liquidity and direct investment are very similar in both types of system. Military regime systems have significantly higher central government capital balances. When the high-income systems are removed, the low-income nonmilitary regime systems still have a significantly stronger commitment to international trade; however, their trade balance, while stronger, is not significantly so. Both direct investment and central government capital balances change markedly. The low-income nonmilitary regime systems now have a significantly higher direct investment balance, but central government capital balances are similar. International liquidity similarities remain essentially unchanged. Thus in contrast to the background economic variables, the removal of the high-income systems does not eliminate all the significant differences between military and low income nonmilitary regime systems.

Controls for GNP, however, lessen the differences between military and low-income nonmilitary regime systems. Controlling for GNP, partial correlations do show a weaker relationship than the total correlations between the occurrence of a military regime and the six international trade variables. Even adjusting for GNP, however, there is still a significant negative relationship between military regime systems and international trade commitment.[23] Furthermore, although first-order partial correlations controlling for GNP do not show a significant relationship between military regime systems or direct investment balances, multiple regression analysis indicates that the occurrence of a military regime is a significant negative estimator of trade and direct investment bal-

[22] In Africa, military regime systems have lower GNP, lower GDFCF and fewer doctors. Each difference is significant at the .10 level. In Asia, military regime systems have lower GNP, smaller budgets and fewer doctors. The differences are significant at the .05 level.

[23] The partial correlations between type of regime and exports and type of regime and imports controlling for GNP are −.23 and −.19, respectively, significant at the .01 and .05 levels.

Table 10. Background Economic Variables by Type of System[a]

Type of System	Background Economic Variables				
	Constant GNP per capita	GDFCF % GNP	Primary Production % GNP	Budget % GNP	Number of Doctors
MRS	218.9	15.8	32.2	16.0	27.8
NMRS	724.9**	18.4**	22.9**	19.2*	60.7**
NMRS (900–)	272.6	16.2	29.1	17.8	29.8

[a] Significance levels are derived from tests between military regime systems and nonmilitary regime systems and between military regime systems and low income nonmilitary regime systems.

* Significant at .05 level.

** Significant at .01 level.

Table 11. Background Economic Variables by Duration

Type of System	Background Economic Variables				
	Constant GNP per capita	GDFCF % GNP	Primary Production % GNP	Budget % GNP	Number of Doctors
NMRS (900–)	272.6	16.2	29.1	17.8	29.8
MRS (0–2 yrs.)	270.2	16.4	31.8	15.8	17.4
MRS (2–5 yrs.)	221.0	15.7	33.3	15.4	33.2
MRS (5+ yrs.)	182.5	15.7	31.1	17.7	24.7

Table 12. Background Economic Variables by Number of Coups

Type of System	Background Economic Variables				
	Constant GNP per capita	GDFCF % GNP	Primary Production % GNP	Budget % GNP	Number of Doctors
NMRS (900–)	272.6	16.2	29.1	17.8	29.8
MRS (one coup)	234.1	16.8	30.7	17.0	28.0
MRS (two coups)	207.8	13.7	37.7	12.7	30.5
MRS (three or more coups)	175.0	15.3	28.1	17.8	23.0

Table 13. International Trading Position by Type of System[a]

Type of System	International Trading Position					
	Exports % GNP	Imports % GNP	Trade Balance % GNP	Direct Investment Balance % GNP	Central Govt. Capital Balance % GNP	Internat. Liquidity % Imports
MRS	18.2	20.7	−4.05	1.24	1.07	34.2
NMRS	26.4***	25.5**	−2.43**	1.47	0.76*	35.6
NMRS (900–)	27.2***	25.6**	−3.41	2.00*	1.03	34.1

[a] Significance levels are derived from *t*-tests between military regime systems and nonmilitary regime systems, and between military regime systems and low income nonmilitary regime systems.

* Significant at .10 level.

** Significant at .05 level.

*** Significant at .01 level.

ances (at the .10 and .05 levels respectively).[24]

When GNP is held constant, however, by comparing military and low income nonmilitary regime systems within GNP levels, the differences are not as clear as would seem from above. Although military regime systems have lower levels of exports and imports than low income nonmilitary regime systems in each of the GNP categories, the differences are pronounced only in the middle GNP level. No significant differences appear on trade balance in any of the GNP levels, and military regime systems in the high GNP level have a stronger trade balance than their nonmilitary counterparts. Since the trade balances of the military and nonmilitary regimes in the middle GNP level are almost identical, the aggregate difference must be attributable only to the score of the

[24] The regressions on trade balance and direct investment balance are both significant at the .01 level. In the former, 58 per cent of variance is explained and in the latter, 40 per cent. The independent variables are the dummy of whether a military regime has occurred, GNP, rate of growth of GNP, exports, international liquidity, central government capital balance. Direct balance and trade balance were alternatively used where appropriate.

military regime systems in the low GNP level. The direct investment balances of both types of regime system in both the low and middle GNP levels are almost identical, thus, the aggregate difference in direct investment balance must be attributable largely to the significantly lower balance of the military regime systems in the high GNP level. No significant differences appear for central government capital balance and international liquidity.

Thus, when GNP controls are introduced, military regime systems in aggregate terms do seem to have a weaker commitment to international trade, but this weaker commitment is primarily restricted to the middle GNP levels. The evidence indicating that military regime systems have weaker trade balances is not particularly strong. The evidence indicating they have lower direct investment balances, however, is stronger, but this, too, seems to be restricted to only the high GNP level. The aggregate similarities in terms of central government capital balances and international liquidity remain unchanged.

The patterns established for each of the areas on the background economic variables are generally replicated on the international trade variables. Thus in Africa and Asia, once again, the clearest differences between military and low income nonmilitary regime systems are found. In both cases the military regime systems are significantly less committed to international trade (at the .05 level for exports and the .10 level for imports), and African military regime systems have a significantly worse trade balance (at the .05 level), but on other variables there is little difference. Asian military regime systems are an exception, for they have a significantly better international liquidity position, but the other differences follow as expected. In Latin America, the differences between the two types of system are not as marked; indeed, in South America particularly there are no significant differences. The differences that do occur, however, are in the expected direction. In Central America, the differences again follow the general profile with the exception of the trade balance, which is significantly worse in nonmilitary regime systems (at the .05 level). In the Middle East and North Africa, international trade commitment and international liquidity are virtually identical for both types of system; however, the trade balance is worse, although not significantly, in the nonmilitary regime system and direct investment is significantly higher (at the .05 level).

Analyses of variance of the number of coups on the international trade variables yield no significant differences. Further, although there are some weak correlations between the number of coups and the six international trade variables, the correlations become negligible once GNP is controlled. Thus, multiple coups cannot be associated with a weaker commitment to international trade, nor do multiple coups adversely affect the various components of a country's balance of payments. Regime duration, however, is of greater importance. While analyses of variance do not yield any significant results, there are three correlations of interest. Significant negative correlations between regime duration and export and import levels are slightly reduced when GNP is controlled but still remain significant. A positive correlation between duration and international liquidity becomes significant when GNP is controlled, suggesting that longer duration military regime systems do seem to be characterized by lower export and import levels. On the other hand, duration does not have

Table 14. International Trading Position by Type of System and GNP Level[a]

GNP Level	Type of System	International Trading Position					
		Exports % GNP	Imports % GNP	Trade Bal. % GNP	Direct Bal. % GNP	Central Bal. % GNP	Internat. Liquidity % Imports
Low Level GNP	MRS	15.1	19.7	−5.99	0.97	1.30	33.6
	NMRS	22.0*	19.7	−4.67	0.98	1.68	27.6
Middle Level GNP	MRS	19.6	20.4	−3.06	1.53	1.10	32.0
	NMRS	30.4**	27.4**	−3.01	1.66	1.03	31.7
High Level GNP	MRS	26.0	26.2	−0.96	1.28	0.42	45.2
	NMRS	28.0	29.7	−3.09	3.35*	0.57	46.6

[a] Significance levels are derived from tests between military regime systems and nonmilitary regime systems within GNP levels.

* Significant at .10 level.

** Significant at .05 level.

Table 15. International Trade Position by Duration

Type of System	International Trade Position					
	Exports % GNP	Imports % GNP	Trade Balance % GNP	Direct Investment Balance % GNP	Central Govt. Capital Balance % GNP	Internat. Liquidity % Imports
NMRS (900–)	27.2	25.6	−3.41	2.00	1.03	34.1
MRS (0–2 yr)	24.2	24.5	−3.37	1.68	1.11	34.8
MRS (2–5 yr)	16.2	21.2	−5.29	1.67	1.21	28.1
MRS (5+ yr)	17.8	17.8	−3.07	0.47	1.04	44.3

Table 16. Total and Partial Correlations Between Duration and International Trade Variables Controlling for GNP

Duration	International Trade Variables		
	Exports % GNP	Imports % GNP	Internat. Liquidity % Imports
Duration	−.24*	−.26*	.17
Duration Controlling GNP	−.21*	−.23*	.22*

* Significant at .05 level.

Table 17. Economic Performance by Type of System[a]

Type of System	Economic Performance		
	Rate of Growth of Constant per capita GNP	Rate of Growth Cost of Living Index	Rate of Growth Exports
MRS	3.33	11.28	8.85
NMRS	3.66	5.22*	9.65
NMRS (900–)	2.71		9.20

[a] Tests are between military regime systems and nonmilitary regime systems, and between military regime systems and low income nonmilitary regime systems.

* Significant at .10 level.

any pronounced effect on the balance of payments, and longer duration systems do have better international liquidity positions.

Economic Performance

Examination of the two categories of background economic and international trade variables demonstrates that although no extensive differences between military and low income nonmilitary systems are found, what differences do exist place the military regime systems in the weaker position. The economic analysis is completed by examining performance along three summary rates of growth.

The overall comparison between the two types of system indicates that the cost of living increase is significantly higher in military regime systems, but the rates of growth of GNP and exports are very close. The difference in the cost of living increase is significant only at the .10 level, and since GNP is measured in constant terms, not too much importance can be attached to this finding. When the high income systems are removed the basic similarity between the two types of system remains although the difference in the cost of living growth rate is no longer significant. Thus, military regime systems are marginally poorer in terms of background factors and weaker in some areas of international trade, but they perform generally as well as nonmilitary systems.

Given the positive correlation between GNP and the rate of growth of GNP and the fact that military regime systems have a higher rate of growth of GNP, better performance by them would have been expected. However, partial correlations, controlling for GNP, do not reveal any significant relationships thus eliminating the possibility of better performance by military regime systems.

When the two types of regime are categorized by GNP levels, only two significant differences appear within these levels. These are both in the high GNP category and indicate that military regime systems at this level have higher rates of growth both of GNP and of exports (significant at the .10 level). The number of cases of military regime systems is too small, however, to permit any firm inferences, but the results do not support the conventional view that as GNP increases it is the systems having poorer rates of economic performance that are likely to be characterized by military regimes.

For four of the five areas, tabulations dealing with both the background economic and international trade categories show that the relationship between the two types of system follow the pattern

of the general comparison. Differences among areas do appear, however, in terms of the degree of difference between the two types of system. The area tabulations of economic performance indicators differ somewhat from this general picture.[25]

African military regime systems have weaker background and international trade positions and do not perform as well as the equivalent nonmilitary regime systems. Asian military regime systems have weaker background and international trade positions, but perform as well as the low-income nonmilitary regime systems. Latin American military regime systems are marginally weaker on background factors, have similar international trade positions, but perform slightly better than the nonmilitary systems. Both types of system in the Middle East and North Africa are generally similar across all three categories of economic variables.

It might have been expected that systems characterized by multiple coups or by long-term military regimes would have the lowest performance rates. Generally, this is not the case, but regime duration rather than the number of coups has some slight relationship with the performance variables.

Analyses of variance of number of coups with the three performance indicators yield no significant results. In addition, all of the correlations between the number of coups and the performance variables give negligible values even when GNP is controlled. It must be concluded, therefore, that there are no important differences in economic performance between the types of regime regardless of the number of coups.

[25] The performance rates of the African military regime systems are consistently lower than their nonmilitary counterparts with the rate of growth of GNP being lower at the .10 level. The Asian military regime systems, which had a similar profile to the African military regime systems in the two previous categories, have poorer performance rates on cost of living and exports than the low income nonmilitary regime systems but a better rate of growth of GNP, but the differences are not significant. The military regime systems of Latin America have significantly higher export growth rates (at the .01 level) and lower cost of living increases (significant at the .05 level for Central America). The military regime systems of the Middle East and North Africa have better performance rates than the nonmilitary counterparts, but the differences are not significant.

Table 18. Economic Performance by Number of Coups

Type of System	Economic Performance: Rate of Growth of Constant per capita GNP	Rate of Growth of Cost of Living Index	Rate of Growth of Exports
NMRS (900–)	2.71	5.74	9.20
MRS (one coup)	4.01	13.19	10.61
MRS (two coups)	2.35	8.72	3.91
MRS (three or more coups)	1.70	4.60	8.33

Table 19. Economic Performance by Duration[a]

Type of System	Economic Performance: Rate of Growth of Constant per capita GNP	Rate of Growth of Cost of Living Index	Rate of Growth of Exports*
NMRS (900–)	2.71	5.74	9.20
MRS (0–2 yrs.)	5.30	3.92	13.50
MRS (2–5 yrs.)	2.49	6.04	11.33
MRS (5+ yrs.)	3.29	21.66	2.73

[a] Tests are analysis of variance for each variable.
* Significant at .05 level.

Analyses of variance of duration with the performance indicators provide one significant result related to the rate of growth of exports. Here the deviant case is the long-duration military regime systems, which have a very low rate of growth of exports.[26]

It will be recalled from the previous section that low levels of exports and imports were found to be related to long-duration military regime systems. The general relationship between export rates of growth and duration, however, must be interpreted with caution. The partial correlation between export rate of growth and regime duration, controlling for GNP, is insignificant, and multiple regression analysis does not show regime duration to be a significant estimator of the rate of growth of exports.[27] Total correlations and partial correlations, controlling for GNP, between regime duration and rates of growth of GNP and cost of living also yield negligible values. Thus, there is some evidence to relate long-term military regime systems to low export rate of growth, but the main conclusion must be that the two types of system do not differ from one another generally, even when considering the duration of the military regimes.

Conclusion

The primary concern of this article has been to examine, first, in what respects and to what degree

[26] Difference of means tests show that the military regime systems of 5+ years differs from low income nonmilitary regime systems, military regime systems (0–2 years), and military regime systems (2–5 years) at the .05, .10, and .01 levels respectively.

[27] The regression is significant at the .01 level and explains 34 per cent of variance of the rate of growth of exports. The independent variables are the number of coups, duration, GNP, rate of growth of GNP, exports, international liquidity, and GDFCF.

military and nonmilitary regime systems differ and, second, to deduce from such differences what the occurrence of a military regime may tell us about the question of instability.

It is clear from the cluster analysis that across a wide range of political, military, and economic variables, military regime systems are not universally different from nonmilitary regime systems. There is, however, some clustering of military regime systems. This picture has been clarified by comparing the two types of system across five categories of variables and by employing a number of controls for each of these comparisons. The consequence of these comparisons is to demonstrate that, as expected, the two types of system are clearly different from one another in what might be termed a political dimension and, to a lesser degree, they differ in terms of their international trading position, but they cannot be differentiated from one another by military, background economic, or economic performance criteria. Thus, systems which have experienced military regimes are not restricted to the weaker economic systems of the world once the small group of high income systems are removed. Their economic performance rates compare favorably with nonmilitary regime systems and, despite military rule, they do not, in general, have larger armed forces or greater military expenditure. While military regime systems do not have as firm a commitment to international trade, they are most clearly distinct from nonmilitary regime systems only in their lower levels of political activity and higher levels of political change.

Although classification by GNP levels indicate substantial variations within both types of system, any aggregate differences between the two types of system are generally constant across GNP levels. The same findings hold for the area controls that were utilized, but to a lesser degree. The main exception is the Middle East and North Africa, where very few differences exist between the two types of system. While each of the remaining areas generally follow the aggregate profile, area variations do occur largely in terms of the *degree* of difference between military regime systems and nonmilitary regime systems. Differences between the two types of system are most pronounced in Africa and Asia and much less pronounced in Latin America. Duration of the military regime and the number of coups explain little variance of the military, background economic, and economic performance variables. Thus, in these dimensions, military regime systems do not differ from nonmilitary regime systems regardless of the length of the military regime or of the number of coups that may have occurred. These variables, however, do have important influences on the political, and, to a lesser extent, on the international trade variables. Regime duration is the more powerful indicator of the levels of political activity, as might be expected. On the other hand, the number of coups is indicative of more rapid political change.

Some observations concerning the connection between military regime systems and the general notion of instability may also be made by relating differences between the two types of system to some of the control variables. If instability is defined strictly in terms of levels of political activity and political change, then military regime systems are certainly less stable than nonmilitary regime systems. If, however, instability is defined in economic terms, so that economic weakness indicates instability, then military regime systems are no less stable than nonmilitary regime systems. Thus, if the occurrence of a military regime is used as an indicator of political instability in the sense of indicating lower levels of political activity and higher levels of political change, it must be emphasized that political instability does not explain the internal or external economic situation; nor does it tell us anything about the size and the expenditure of the armed forces. The absence of a connection between the political and economic variables is particularly important. If a relationship between political instability and economic performance had been established, then the question of the impact of the economic dimension upon the political dimension and *vice versa* would have been raised. In many instances, the two types of system are not dissimilar in terms of the political variables as many low income nonmilitary regime systems restrict political activity. Further, military regime systems do not constitute a homogeneous population; considerable variation is found among them. Some military regime systems have had just one coup; others have had several. Some have had long lasting military regimes; others have had regimes of very short duration. Some perform well economically, others display economic weakness. It is important to know both the regime duration and the number of coups before any statement concerning political instability can be made. A whole range of factors must be known to cope with economic weakness. Military regime systems which experience longer term military regimes are considerably more restrictive in the political activity dimension while those with a higher number of coups are less stable with regard to the question of political change. Simply postulating, therefore, political or economic instability on the basis of the incidence of a military regime is clearly inadequate and possibly misleading.

APPENDIX

List of Variables

1. Number of coups
2. Percentage of years constitution not fulfilled
3. Number of executives

4. Percentage of years the legislature is banned
5. Percentage of years political parties are banned
6. Mean percentage of the Cabinet made up of military personnel
7. Navy and Air Force as a percentage of the total military size
8. Mean size of military
9. Expenditure on the military
10. Rate of growth of military size
11. Rate of growth of expenditure on the military
12. *Per capita* Gross National Product
13. Rate of growth of GNP
14. Rate of growth of exports
15. Rate of growth of cost of living index
16. Budget as a percentage of GNP
17. Exports as a percentage of GNP
18. Imports as a percentage of GNP
19. International liquidity as a percentage of imports
20. Gross domestic fixed capital formation as a percentage of GNP
21. Primary production as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product
22. Trade Balance
23. Direct Investment
24. Central Balance
25. Number of doctors per 100,000 population

Mean Scores of Clusters

Variable	Cluster: 1	2	3	4	5	Population Mean*
1	1.88	.62	.56	.13	0	.63
2	53.44	14.02	23.22	2.00	0	18.41
3	4.81	2.52	3.00	2.67	3.32	3.09
4	51.75	13.17	14.44	2.00	0	15.74
5	27.13	14.70	33.67	7.93	0	15.26
6	29.56	9.24	17.00	1.93	.53	10.39
7	20.80	5.19	14.22	4.80	38.47	14.53
8	47.44	21.57	200.11	24.87	76.79	52.46
9	3.94	2.17	9.61	1.52	3.28	3.23
10	4.64	9.97	4.00	4.63	1.19	6.86
11	5.71	13.03	9.49	9.47	3.61	9.25
12	283.10	141.30	372.56	448.07	1760.58	534.56
13	1.75	1.77	6.61	9.38	5.20	3.27
14	5.73	7.89	13.63	13.84	10.15	9.37
15	18.81	4.63	9.20	3.07	5.19	7.16
16	17.31	14.74	22.78	21.20	21.26	1.81
17	21.19	18.60	16.78	38.60	23.63	2.28
18	18.38	20.17	26.22	38.33	23.21	23.70
19	43.13	26.48	53.44	37.76	37.84	35.31
20	16.44	14.19	17.22	20.73	23.26	17.50
21	26.75	39.86	26.00	18.93	8.89	27.61
22	−1.91	−4.26	−5.29	−4.07	−0.35	−3.21
23	1.09	1.09	1.43	3.48	.42	1.35
24	.73	1.29	1.38	1.01	.04	.93
25	−42.06	13.83	68.33	41.60	126.00	48.39

* The over-all population mean is included in order to present the general picture compared with the individual clusters.

Science and Rule in Bacon's Utopia: An Introduction to the Reading of the *New Atlantis**

J. WEINBERGER

Michigan State University

Modern utopian thought springs from the promise of modern science. It is the political expression of the claim of science to relieve man's estate and to enlarge the bounds of human empire.[1] The modern utopianism of modern science is nowhere more succinctly presented than in the claim Hobbes made for his novel political science. When founded on the principles of the new science with its "clear and exact method," the study of morals and politics would disclose a "true and certain rule of action by which we might know whether that which we undertake be just or unjust."[2] For Hobbes, the final victory of science over nature depended on the conquest of the problem of human nature, which Hobbes thought to be the problem of political rule. The aim of the new science of politics was to abolish the grounds of political controversy and thus to dissolve the problematic character of political discourse and life. The question of rule was reduced to the simple recognition of positive law; the new political science would guarantee that the precepts of natural law would be contained in the conventional precepts of civil law.[3]

The claim of the new science obscured the distinction between theoretical and practical speech, for the perfection of speech about man and nature was to facilitate the perfection of practical life. As determined by Hobbes's application of scientific method to politics, modern scientific discourse about politics is inherently utopian. The development of modern utopianism is not simply the development of a particular mode of political thinking, but is, rather, "a perfect paradigm of the course of modernity." Thus unlike Plato's *Republic* and More's *Utopia*, modern utopia has "ceased to be ironical and has become oppositional."[4] Whereas premodern utopia articulated human perfection by reflecting on the inherent delimitation of human nature, modern utopia illuminates present human defect from the standpoint of a future achievable human perfection. In modernity the literal meaning of utopia has been reversed; it no longer points to no place but, rather, lights the path to every place.

Bacon's *New Atlantis* is anomalous when seen in the light of the course of modernity. For the *New Atlantis* depicts a society formed by the rule of science, but it presents no explicit teaching about natural right or political rule. We wonder, then, why the political utopianism of modern science was not simply coeval with the origins of modern science. Though Hobbes was the first to proclaim the birth of political science, he was neither the first pioneer of science nor the first to proclaim modern teachings about morality and politics.[5] According to Rawley, it was Bacon's intention to include an account of the best regime in the *New Atlantis*, but the labor required and the enticement of natural history diverted his attention.[6] If Rawley is correct, the *New Atlantis* is incomplete simply because it lacks a political teaching. We might conclude, then, that the novelty of Hobbes's political science consists simply in his being the first to apply the new science of nature to

* The preparation of this study was aided by a Fellowship Research Grant from the Earhart Foundation. I would like to thank the Trustees of Earhart Foundation for their gracious and generous financial assistance.

[1] *The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury*, ed. Sir William Molesworth, 11 vols. (London: John Bohn, 1839–45), hereafter EW, I, 7; Bacon, *Novum Organum*, I, 3; II, 1–4; *Advancement of Learning*, hereafter *Advancement*, in *The Works of Francis Bacon*, ed. James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denon Heath, 14 vols. (London: Longman and Co., etc., 1857–74), hereafter BW, III, 294–95.

[2] EW I, 9. Cf. *De Cive*, *Ep. Ded.*, EW II, i–viii; EW I, 8–10; EW IV, 1.

[3] Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. C. B. Macpherson (Baltimore: Penguin, 1968), Ch. 26, p. 314. See *De Cive* VI, EW II, 85. The utopian legacy of the new science can be seen in both the realist or positivist and the idealist interpretations of the new science. Thus Kant argues that the pure notion of duty (*der Begriff der Pflicht in seiner ganzen Reinigkeit*) is simple and clear to a child of eight or nine even in complex situations. "Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taught aber nicht für die Praxis," *Kleinere Schriften zur Geschichtsphilosophie Ethik und Politik* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1964), p. 82. Cf. Plato *Republic* 331c1–9. See also Kant, "Metaphysiche Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre," 49, Anhang, Beschluss, *Metaphysik Der Sitten* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1966) pp. 139–166, 205–208.

[4] Eva Brann makes these last two points in her elegant and important study of More's *Utopia*. See "An Exquisite Platform: Utopia," *Interpretation*, 3 (1972), 24–25. This is true for the modern anti-utopian utopia as well as for modern utopia simply understood. See also Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1954), p. 192; Robert Musil, *The Man Without Qualities* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1953–1961), I, ii, 62; Bertrand de Jouvenel, "Utopia for Practical Purposes," *Utopias and Utopian Thought*, ed. Frank E. Manuel (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966), pp. 226ff.

[5] See Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., "Hobbes and the Science of Indirect Government," *American Political Science Review*, 65 (March, 1971), 97–98.

[6] See Rawley's note to the reader, BW III, 127.

the human things.[7] If Rawley is not correct, Bacon's motives were more complex, and the *New Atlantis* would present the promise of science in conjunction with a circumspect prudence toward any teaching about political rule. The *New Atlantis* would then be *both* oppositional and ironical, and for Bacon the relationship between science and political rule would be problematic. It might then be the case that the post-Baconian link between modern science and a certain, demonstrable political science sprang from the necessity to modify Bacon's teaching about science for the sake of moral and political perfection. The question of the *New Atlantis* is the question of its completeness, and the question of its completeness points to the roots of modernity. To study the *New Atlantis* is to study the coherence of the utopian promise of modern science.

The *New Atlantis* and the Coherence of Bacon's Corpus

Bacon's *New Atlantis* appears to be a strange choice of texts for an inquiry into the utopian character of modern scientific discourse about politics. It could be argued that since Bacon's works antedate Hobbes's political science, it is no wonder that the *New Atlantis* is not a serious reflection about politics at all. According to the traditional account, the *New Atlantis* is incomplete because it does not contain a teaching about government or political rule. This traditional account still obtains: most scholars accept the *New Atlantis* as a part of the plan of the *Great Instauration* because they take it to be a primitive description of a scientific academy and because it does *not* contain a thematic account of government.[8] This must mean that there is no commonly accepted "most important" political treatise by Bacon because he wrote no political treatise. Particular advice about particular problems offered to particular men may be interesting, but especially in Bacon's case, they do not seem to constitute a coherent and comprehensive account of man's political nature. Bacon's political writings consist of several of the *Essays: Of Nobility, Of Seditions and Troubles, Of Empire, Of Counsel, Of the True Greatness of Kingdoms and Estates, Of Faction;* the fragment *Of The True Greatness of Britain*, and fragments, letters and speeches touching holy war, British domestic policy, and policy toward Spain. These writings treat some matters of political negotiation and policy and focus mainly on the enlarging of British political influence in the world. But they do not make up a treatise on the fundamental considerations of political philosophy: the nature of the best regime, the ends of political life, and the nature and relations between the virtues of justice, moderation, wisdom and courage.

The lack of a political teaching in Bacon's works reflects a serious disunity in Bacon's teaching as a whole. Common knowledge justly reveres Bacon for his role in the birth of modern natural science. But if Bacon's importance is as a founder of modern science, his teaching can be but an interesting historical relic, for modern science doubtless has far surpassed its crude genesis with respect to method and content. The modern reader of Bacon's writings on natural history must find them to be quaint, and so only decent charity prevents them from being considered ridiculous. If the modern reader turns to Bacon's writings about method, he will find that they are incomplete and encumbered by metaphysical concerns now considered to have no place in the progress of scientific discovery. Indeed, these metaphysical concerns were so damaging as to blind Bacon to the crucial importance of mathematics for the interpretation and conquest of nature. If the modern reader is interested in the historical relics of modernity at all, he will be better served by turning his attention to Descartes and the origins of mathematical physics than to Bacon, who failed to recognize the importance of Copernicus and Galileo.[9]

If Bacon's writings are useless to one concerned with the method and content of modern science, the importance of his teaching about science must be his recommendation of practically useful science as the horizon for man's self-improvement. But surely this recommendation is a self-evident commonplace. The importance of this recommendation is again merely historical; its importance is visible from a contrast to its historical context that was unenlightened and darkened by the obscurities of prescientific thinking. Thus Bacon's importance is as a pioneer. But in the light of the urgent task of penetrating and conquering nature—Bacon's own view of the human project—pioneers deserve reverence but not serious reflection. Reverence does not necessarily deflect our time and energy from the scientific project; serious reflection most certainly does. It seems that on the basis of Bacon's only serious teaching, serious reflection on that teaching must be less than serious.

We are faced with a disconcerting alternative. Either Bacon's works are not important, or they are imperative for the serious student because the scientific project is problematic. Of course, by itself the latter possibility does not justify a reading of Bacon. Rather, we can profitably turn to Bacon if the scientific project is or may be problematic

[7] Cf. Mansfield, p. 98.

[8] See F. H. Anderson, *The Philosophy of Francis Bacon* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp. 24, 36, 40, 295; Francis Bacon, *New Atlantis*, ed. Alfred B. Gough (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1915), pp. xxvii–xxix.

[9] See Paolo Rossi, *Francis Bacon* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968), pp. 138–39, 223; Bacon, *New Atlantis*, ed. Gough, pp. xvi–xvii; cf. Anderson, pp. 292–303.

and if Bacon's teaching illuminates *how* it may be problematic. This means that Bacon's teaching about science is important only if it is a part of a comprehensive teaching about science, human ends, and human perfection. But Bacon's writings do not appear to provide such a comprehensive teaching. Bacon's most famous writings about man's morals and manners are the *Essays* and the *New Atlantis*. But while the *Essays* treat manners, morals, and, in a cursory way, politics, they do not treat these subjects in relation to the project of a new science. The *New Atlantis* is incomplete, and, according to the traditional account, it is incomplete because it lacks a teaching about the "best state or mould of a commonwealth." The *New Atlantis* is incomplete because it fails to combine an account of the organization of the project of science with an account of the political rule necessary for the best form of human life.

A unified and comprehensive account of man and science appears to be lacking even in those works that treat the virtue of science thematically. In the *Advancement of Learning*, Bacon argues that piety requires the dignity of natural philosophy to be separated from the proscribed articulation of human ends and perfection.[10] In concert with this piety, Bacon only hints at the virtue of knowledge as man's conquest of nature and argues that knowledge is useful for various human virtues without questioning the nature or status of those virtues as virtues. When Bacon discusses the human good, he makes several dogmatic assertions of the superiority of the "communicative good" over the "private and particular good" and the "active good" over the "passive good."[11] But in these very brief assertions, Bacon gives no systematic description of the nature or content of the human good and the human virtues, and, what is more important, he makes no mention of the human good and the human virtues in connection with the virtue of knowledge in general or natural science in particular.

In the *Wisdom of the Ancients*, *Masculine Birth of Time*, *Thoughts and Conclusions*, and the *Great Instauration*, Bacon declares the end of knowledge to be the human mastery of nature by means of practical natural science, but in none of these works is the nature of man as conqueror explicitly articulated. It seems that Bacon's works provide no complete and comprehensive account of science and human perfection. If modern utopianism is the political expression of the claim of science to determine the horizon of human possibilities, Bacon's writings hardly seem to be such an expression. Not only does the *New Atlantis* seem to lack a political teaching, but Bacon's works as a whole appear to provide no unified basis from which we might infer such a teaching.

But the preceding argument may be much too hasty. If we are to search for the meeting of Bacon's teachings about science and man, we must proceed by taking our bearings from Bacon's own words, and there is a Baconian work that presents an explicit organization of his scientific project. Bacon's sole organizational work must be the start of any attempt to penetrate the comprehensive, unified whole of his teaching.

The *Great Instauration* announces Bacon's plan for the complete reformation of human science and knowledge, which will "lay the foundation, not of any sect or doctrine, but of human power and utility" in order to "command nature in action." Bacon's intention was to insure the harmony of theory and practice, of the "intellectual and terrestrial globes," which will guarantee man's power over nature.[12] Elsewhere Bacon argues that the noblest end of science is the preservation and restoration of the corruptible things.[13] The *Great Instauration* is Bacon's public announcement of the whole of his project, and the conventional demands of piety prevent explicit identification of the commanding of nature with the conquest of nature's corruptibility. But since Bacon does hold the end of science to be the conquest of nature's corruptibility, and since the fullest commanding of nature must include overcoming natural decay, it is this highest conquest that in fact governs the plan of the *Great Instauration*.

A first glance at the *Great Instauration*, however, disappoints our hope of discovering a unified and comprehensive consideration of science and human perfection. For the most obtrusive characteristic of Bacon's great instauration is its incompleteness, an incompleteness acknowledged by Bacon himself. Part one is to be a division of the sciences, but it is declared to be wanting, although "some account of them will be found in the second Book of the 'Proficience and Advancement of Learning.' "[14] Part two is to present the new inductive method or the "art itself of interpreting nature" and is provided in the *Novum Organum*, but only as "a summary digested into aphorisms."[15] Part three is to be a foundational natural history, or the actual "first food" or factual

[10] *Advancement*, BW III, 265.

[11] *Advancement*, BW III, 417–445; cf. 421, 424.

[12] *Great Instauration*, hereafter *GI*, BW IV, Proem., 8, 21, 23–24; *Novum Organum* I, 3, 83, II, 1–4; *Advancement*, BW III, 294–95.

[13] *De Sapientia Veterum*, XI, BW VI, 646,720. Natural philosophy thus "proposes to itself as its noblest work of all, nothing less than the restitution and renovation of things corruptible, and (what is the same thing in a lower degree) the conservation of bodies in the state in which they are, and the retardation of dissolution and putrefaction."

[14] BW IV, 35.

[15] *Ibid.*

material on which the new method will work. Although this part of the instauration is the most filled out,[16] it is incomplete according to Bacon's description of its particulars in the *Great Instauration*.[17] Part four is to "set forth examples of inquiry and invention" according to his method and is missing except for a very small fragment.[18] Part five is to present Bacon's own provisional discoveries not "according to the true rules and methods of interpretation, but by the ordinary use of the understanding in inquiring and discovering." Like part four, part five is missing except for a very small fragment.[19] Part six is to disclose and set forth the "developed and established" new philosophy that will be the "real business and fortune of the human race, and all power of operation."[20] But as a formally identified part of the plan, part six is missing altogether.

In view of the incompleteness of the project outlined in the *Great Instauration*, a unified and comprehensive consideration of the crucial questions of science and man seems to be lacking. This lack is all the more important since Bacon's discussion of scientific method is admittedly incomplete and but a "summary digestion." This confirms our earlier observation that it would be less than profitable to return to Bacon for any serious consideration of scientific method as we know it today. Again we find that the important theme is the way of the new science in the light of human ends and perfection. It is all the more dismaying, then, that there is no completed part of the plan that would present a thematic account of the virtue of the new science as a part of a comprehensive teaching about human ends and perfection. Although the *Great Instauration* projects such an account as part six, Bacon thwarts our search by failing to identify even a part or hint of its completion. At best the *Great Instauration* repeats and directs us to the dogmatic and incomplete remarks about the human and scientific virtues in the *Advancement of Learning*. It would appear that Bacon tells us nothing important about scientific method and tells us nothing about the crucial problem of the virtue or value of science itself. Small wonder it is that, in the absence of a substantial consideration of the latter problem, most scholars approach Bacon with an interest in the teaching about method. Small wonder it is also, then, that these scholars are hard pressed to demonstrate the importance of Bacon as anything other than a quaint relic of an age which was but the infancy of scientific enlightenment.

But perhaps the massive incompleteness of the great instauration as outlined in the work of that name is more apparent than real, and so perhaps the crucial question of the value of science constitutes a completed part of the plan. The plan of the *Great Instauration* presents a general picture of the end and method of the new science, rather than the step by step proceeding of the new science to its end. This cannot be otherwise, for parts three, five and six must be incomplete simply because of Bacon's personal mortality.[21] Since part four is "in fact nothing more than an application of the second part in detail and at large,"[22] the first and second parts, which are provided, present the thematic core of the plan, for the coherence and intelligibility of the plan does *not* depend on its being complete or immediately completable. Bacon makes this point in a subtle way when he explains the incompletability of part six. Bacon says that part six would "disclose and set forth that philosophy by which the legitimate, chaste, and severe course of inquiry which I have explained and provided is at length developed and established."[23] In the light of Bacon's remarks in the preface and in the descriptions of parts three and five, it goes without saying that part six must be beyond hope of completion for Bacon. Bacon's personal mortality prevents his giving a full account of the completely developed penetration, understanding, and conquest of nature. But Bacon does *not* say that the picture of the end of science, the condition where "human knowledge and power do really meet in one," is inconceivable. Rather, he says that the fortune of the human race, which will give issue to Bacon's beginning, cannot *easily* be conceived or imagined.[24] This means, of course, that with difficulty man's fortune can be conceived or imagined. The human possibilities illuminated by the new science of nature can be articulated before the step-by-step way of the new science is fully presented or completed. By the implication of his own words, Bacon's claim that part six is simply incompletable is less than strictly true.

Since part six can be completed before the perfection of method and before the specific content of the new science is completed, then if it exists, it must be a description of human life liberated or being liberated in the way that the new science promises to liberate. If part six exists, it must be a description of human life liberated "to some degree" from the "necessities and miseries of humanity,"[25] and that degree will be measured by the preservation of the corruptible things. We must look to Bacon's corpus to see if such a de-

[16] See Anderson, pp. 34–36, 40.
[17] *GI*, BW IV, 27–31.
[18] *GI*, BW IV, 31; *Scala intellectus sive filum labyrinthi*, BW II, 687–89.
[19] *GI*, BW IV, 31–32; *Prodromi sive anticipationes philosophiae secundae*, BW II, 690–92.
[20] *GI*, BW IV, 32–33.
[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 21, 29–33.
[22] *Ibid.*, p. 31.
[23] *Ibid.*, p. 32.
[24] *Ibid.*
[25] *Ibid.*, p. 27.

scription exists, and the writing that is the obvious candidate is the *New Atlantis*. The *New Atlantis* presents the picture of a society of men dedicated to the pursuit of science and so to the end governing the pursuit of science. Other than the description of the scientific institution, the longest description of the society visited by the sailors is the description of the festival celebrating the procreation and preservation of the human body, surely the most important of the corruptible things.

However much the preceding argument may be true, it does not alter the obvious fact that the *New Atlantis* is incomplete. The work that would treat the virtue of science in the light of human ends and perfection is incomplete, and so all we have discovered is that the incompleteness of the *New Atlantis* reflects the crucial disunity of Bacon's teaching as a whole. But lest we give up the chase in disgust, we must be reminded of Bacon's remark in the description of part six. The imagining and conceiving of man's scientific fortune is possible but difficult. The pressing task must be to explore the way of this difficulty and the reason for it.

The *New Atlantis* and the Whole of Bacon's Teaching

Next to the title, obvious incompleteness is the most obtrusive characteristic of the *New Atlantis*. But what is omitted because of the formal incompleteness? According to the traditional account, the *New Atlantis* is incomplete because it does not contain a teaching about government or political rule. We noted that the traditional account still obtains, but if we have been correct so far, the very worth of Bacon's teaching depends on the falsity of this account. Since a comprehensive account of the human good must include an account of government, the question of the traditional view of the incompleteness of the *New Atlantis* becomes the most important question guiding any approach to Bacon's teaching.

A first glance at the *New Atlantis* both supports and subverts the traditional account. On the one hand, the *New Atlantis* is not simply silent about government. We learn that Bensalem is a monarchy, and much of the *New Atlantis* is an account of the origin of Bensalemite law and a description of its customs. On the other hand, this apparently sketchy information would hardly seem to be a comprehensive account of the best form of commonwealth. If we are to discern how the *New Atlantis* is a comprehensive description of human perfection facilitated by science, we must discern how the sketchy political information could possibly be a whole or complete part of a complete teaching about the true, scientific human good. A reconsideration of the place of the *New Atlantis* in the plan of Bacon's great instauration provides the necessary clue for this discernment.

If we are correct to view the *New Atlantis* as the image or pattern of human life where knowledge and power do really meet in one, then it must be the end that governs the articulation of parts one and two of the *Great Instauration*. The need for the new method and the announcement of the sufficient and deficient sciences is governed by human possibilities that determine the fortune of the human race, for it is this fortune that will give issue to Bacon's account of beginnings.[26] There must be a harmony between the content of the *New Atlantis* and the content of parts one and two of the *Great Instauration*. If there is a particular way in which these parts are incomplete, it must be reflected in the incompleteness of the *New Atlantis*. Thus if there is a particular way in which the *Novum Organum* and the division of the sciences are incomplete, it will provide a positive determination of just how the *New Atlantis* is incomplete. But if we find such a positive determination, is it not the discovery of fool's gold? Would not such a positive determination simply confirm the worthlessness of Bacon's work? We must hope that the positive determination of incompleteness provides the determination of the completeness of Bacon's teaching.

The positive determination of incompleteness is not to be found in the incompleteness of the *Novum Organum*, which presents the new inductive method in but a "summary" form "digested into aphorisms." In the light of Bacon's remarks about his personal mortality and hopes for the completion of his project, it is clear that the account of method need not be fully articulated in order for the plan of his instauration to be complete as an outline of proper directions and ends. This does not apply to the division of the sciences, however, because the particularization of the deficient and sufficient sciences is determined by the human possibilities that constitute man's fortune. The exact determination of the means to the perfection of these sciences, the actual fulfillment of their content, can and must wait for the labor of others. The positive determination of the incompleteness of the *New Atlantis* depends on the determination of the incompleteness of the division of the sciences.

In the *Great Instauration*, Bacon openly informs the reader that the division of the sciences is incomplete. The heading of the first part of the *Great Instauration* declares that the first part is "wanting," although "some account of them will be found in the Second Book of the 'Proficience and Advancement of Learning, Divine and Human.' "[27] But in the dedication of *An Advertisement Touching An Holy War*, Bacon asserts that the expanded, Latin version of his "book of Advancement of Learning" will "serve in lieu of the first part of the Instauration and acquit [his]

[26] *GI*, BW IV, 32.
[27] BW IV, 35.

promise in that part."[28] This contradiction is important for two reasons. First, the translation and expansion of the *Advancement of Learning*, the *De Augmentis*, does not significantly change the determination of the sciences judged to be lacking or insufficient.[29] Second, it is very curious that Bacon did not announce the completeness of part one in the *De Augmentis* itself. Rather, he chose to make this important announcement in a fragment that is apparently unrelated to the division of the sciences. Bacon was certainly aware of the importance of the announcement; although he did not include it in the *De Augmentis*, he instructed Rawley to translate and publish the *Advertisement* even though it was to remain as an incomplete fragment.[30] Bacon's strange indirectness can be understood only by understanding how the claim of the *Great Instauration* and the claim of the *Advertisement* can be consistent. That is, Bacon's strange indirectness can be understood only by discerning how the division of the sciences, and so also the *New Atlantis*, can be both complete and incomplete. It appears that we have begun to find our clue: however we find the division of the sciences to be incomplete, we must be prepared to discover that that incompleteness is a positive part of a whole or complete teaching about man's scientific fortune.

Bacon provides an explicit standard of completeness for part one in his description of that part in the *Great Instauration*. He says that in the division of the sciences it is his intention "not merely to set down a simple title or a concise argument of that which is wanting," but "(provided it be a matter of any worth) to take care to subjoin either directions for the execution of such a work, or else a portion of the work itself executed by myself as a sample of the whole: thus giving assistance in every case by work or by counsel."[31] In the *Novum Organum*, Bacon asserts that his new method is "certainly meant" to apply to natural philosophy, logic, ethics, and politics.[32] Of these important sciences, only politics is listed merely by mention of "simple title" in the *Advancement of Learning*. In the division of the sciences in the *Advancement of Learning*, the study of government is the third part of civil knowledge, the first two parts of which are knowledge of conversation and knowledge of negotiation. Knowledge of conversation is declared to be not deficient and is, therefore, not discussed. However, the two parts of knowledge of negotiation or business, wisdom of counsel and wisdom of pressing a man's own fortune, are explicated in great detail. At one point Bacon provides so many examples that he apologizes for dwelling longer than is "agreeable to the proportion of an example."[33] Thus in the contexts both of the division in general and of civil knowledge in particular, the mention or division of the science of government stands out by its conspicuous violation of Bacon's announced standard of completeness.

The reason for Bacon's silence is not because the science of politics is complete or sufficient, for we know that the new method must be applied to it. Rather, Bacon states explicitly that the study of government or political science is a subject "secret and retired." The reason for this secrecy is that political science is either too hard or not fit to utter.[34] It is easy to see why that which is not fit to be uttered must be unuttered, for to speak what must not be spoken is to cause damage or alarm. But why should the difficult be unuttered? There can be but one reason: if the speaking of the difficult is forbidden, it is because as spoken it will cause damage or alarm. The argument from difficulty is assimilated to the argument from unfitness since both are problematic because of possible damage or alarm.

In the *De Augmentis*, the secrecy of political science is demonstrated with even greater emphasis.[35] In the *De Augmentis*, Bacon underscores the secrecy of political science by distinguishing between those parts of civil knowledge which do not belong to the secrets of empire. Just as in the *Advancement of Learning*, political science is the third of three parts of civil knowledge. The first, knowledge of conversation, is sufficient. The second, knowledge of negotiation, is deficient and so many examples of such a doctrine are given. Unlike the *Advancement of Learning*, however, the *De Augmentis* emphasizes the secrecy of the third part, political science, by distinguishing between those parts of political science which are deficient and which can be treated, for which he gives examples "according to his custom," and those parts of political science which cannot be mentioned and so which cannot be divided. The reason Bacon gives for his silence is deference to King James who is "such a master"

[28] *Advertisement Touching An Holy War*, BW VII, 13–14.

[29] The *De Augmentis* expands, truncates, and rearranges parts of the *Advancement of Learning*. In the *De Augmentis* Bacon adds as a deficient science the noblest part of medicine, the prolongation of life, omits as a deficient "science" the laws to suppress the arts of sensual pleasure, and mentions the defective consideration of the relationship between the rational and irrational parts of the soul. BW IV, 391–97; cf. *Advancement*, BW III, 377–79. These changes strengthen the present case.

[30] The *Advertisement Touching An Holy War* was written while the *De Augmentis* was in the hands of translators. Spedding also wonders why the *De Augmentis* was not entitled "Division of the Sciences: Part One of the Great Instauration," BW I, 415–420; cf. BW VII, 3–7.

[31] *GI*, BW IV, 23.

[32] *Novum Organum* I, 127, BW IV, 112.

[33] *Advancement*, BW III, 452; the discussion of Civil Knowledge covers BW III, 445–477.

[34] *Advancements*, BW III, 473–76.

[35] *De Augmentis*, BW V, 31–110.

in the art of government and to whom the *De Augmentis* and the *Advancement of Learning* were dedicated. But certainly in comparison to the *Advancement of Learning*, Bacon's stance toward the King in the *De Augmentis* is less than deferential. Brevity is not the same as silence, and even so, Bacon is not brief in his examples of the mentionable parts of political science. Again, with greater emphasis laced with audacity, Bacon argues that the reason for his silence is the secret nature of political science.

Bacon's clues disclose how the division of the sciences is incomplete. The division of the sciences articulates the "intellectual globe" that must become harmonious with the "terrestrial globe" for the issue of man's true fortune.[36] But although the new harmony between the intellectual and terrestrial globes must include a teaching about government or politics, any comprehensive pattern or plan of these globes, i.e., man's scientific fortune, must be outwardly incomplete because of the unmentionableness of dangerous political science. Since the *New Atlantis* is the image or pattern of man's scientific fortune, the division of the sciences and the *New Atlantis* stand together in a relationship of mutual dependence. Although the *New Atlantis* must be of highest importance as the outline of the human possibilities governing the particularization of the deficient sciences, the division of the sciences must be articulated and followed if true human fortune is to be given issue. Thus the image or pattern illuminated by the *New Atlantis* must be congruous with the principles of the division, and for this reason we must conclude that the *New Atlantis* is incomplete because of the unmentionableness of dangerous political science.

Bacon's clues disclose how the division of the sciences and the *New Atlantis* are incomplete, but they also insist that the division of the sciences is complete, that the duty of part one has been "acquitted," and so they insist that the *New Atlantis* is complete. This means that both the division of the sciences and the *New Atlantis* must contain a teaching about government, but that it must be presented in an informal and indirect way that conforms to the retiredness and secrecy of political science. The *New Atlantis* is incomplete because it presents an image or pattern of scientific perfection that lacks a formal, direct, and open account of political science. The *New Atlantis* is complete because it presents an image or pattern of scientific perfection that includes an informal, indirect, and secret teaching about government that is dangerous and problematic. Our attempt to reach the core of Bacon's teaching directs us to his teaching about human perfection based on man's rule over nature. But before we can investigate that human utility, we are silently taught that in spite of man's rule over nature and the conquest of nature's corruptibility, the rule of men over men is problematic.

Bacon's articulate silence was governed by an extraordinarily circumspect prudence. This prudence is disclosed by reexamining the way we have come. In the *De Augmentis*, Bacon remarks that if his "leisure time shall hereafter produce anything concerning political knowledge, the work will perchance be either abortive or posthumous." In the meantime he presents those parts of civil knowledge "which do not belong to the secrets of empire" so that all the sciences being "ranged as it were in their proper seats," the seat of political science will not be left vacant.[37] In this description Bacon is unclear as to whether the alternative "abortive or posthumous" is meant to be inclusive or exclusive. On the one hand, it would seem that Bacon's description is inclusive, that is, that the political teaching will be either abortive or posthumous and possibly both. For the *New Atlantis* is both abortive and posthumous.[38] On the other hand, it would seem that Bacon's description is exclusive, for the division of the sciences, which must mirror the *New Atlantis*, is abortive but nonposthumous. Thus the description of his political teaching is both inclusive and exclusive. Although the *New Atlantis* must mirror the division of the sciences, and vice versa, the *New Atlantis* is the head of Bacon's teaching about man's scientific fortune because it presents an image or pattern of human life as it is lived according to the perfection of natural science. According to our way of discovery, guided by Bacon himself, the combination of the abortive and nonposthumous with the abortive and posthumous illuminates the complete and the posthumous. The combination of the division of the sciences with the *New Atlantis* makes available Bacon's complete teaching by means of the clue given in a political work, *An Advertisement Touching An Holy War*. The latter work is the key, but the door that it opens was presented only after Bacon's death. Bacon's extraordinary prudence underscores the serious importance of its cause: the completeness provided by Bacon's silent or secret political teaching is the completeness of Bacon's most important teaching—the teaching about the human ends and perfection that illuminate the new science of nature and that are facilitated by the new science.

We are now prepared to see how the sketchy political information in the *New Atlantis* completes a whole part of a comprehensive teaching

[36] *GI*, BW IV, 22–23, 32; *Novum Organum* I, 3, 84, II, 1–4, BW IV, 47, 81–82, 119–122; *Advancement*, BW III, 294–95.

[37] *De Augmentis*, BW V, 79.

[38] Although written in its final form in 1624, the *New Atlantis* was published by Rawley in 1627, after Bacon's death.

about the true, scientific human good. The danger of political science is the danger of Bacon's comprehensive teaching about science and man. The serious reader of Bacon must be open to the possibility that Bacon's political teaching is the core of his teaching about the human possibilities freed by the new science of nature. Since the noblest end of the new science is the preservation and resurrection of the human body, the most important of the corruptible things, the limit of that preservation and resurrection may consist in the relations between human bodies rather than in the nature of any or all particular human bodies. But if political science and so the full understanding of the possible relations between human bodies is so dangerous as to require Bacon's circumspect prudence, the serious reader of Bacon must be open to the possibility that the human possibilities freed by the new science are morally problematic in their very perfection. The ground on which Bacon's teaching about science and man comes together is his political science, and we know now why this ground must be elusive. But this elusiveness is ultimately important because of the coexistence of Bacon's explicit optimism and zeal for the conquests of science and the prudent, articulate silence of his central political teaching. Whatever the moral problems and dangers of the new science may be, Bacon intends for mankind to embrace them as a part of man's necessary fortune. Bacon intends for mankind as a whole to embrace a fortune that can be seen in its entirety only by those men who are the most courageous and resolute.

If the combined completeness and incompleteness of the *New Atlantis* issue in a dangerous teaching about government, just how is the *New Atlantis* complete and incomplete, and what does the *New Atlantis* reveal about the dangerous political problem of man's scientific fortune? The title and final line declaring formal incompleteness are the most obtrusive parts of the *New Atlantis*. "New Atlantis" is not an obvious title. "Bensalem," "Renfusa," or "Salomon's House" would all be more plausible titles, for Atlantis is mentioned only as the country defeated by the ancient Bensalemites and destroyed by natural catastrophe.[39] The title calls our attention to another important account of the ancient Atlantis in a way that suggests the reformation or perfection of the ancient Atlantis. The other account, to which Bacon explicitly refers, is that of Plato. Since Bacon's title is less than obvious, the connection between the ancient Atlantis and Bensalem is obscure. But the less than obvious title openly directs our attention to Plato's account in the *Timaeus* and *Critias*, and so to the ends of the old and new stories. For like Bacon's story, the *Critias* is incomplete. Plato's dialogue breaks off just as Zeus, angered by the prideful insolence of Atlantis, prepares to announce his intended chastisement of Atlantis to the assembly of the gods. Thus we are uninformed of Zeus' punishing that was to moderate and harmonize the Atlantians.[40] That Bacon repeats the incompleteness of the *Critias* appears strange in the light of the title. Since the title suggests the reformation or perfection of the ancient Atlantis, one would expect the opposite of what in the *Critias* insures the imperfection or defectiveness of Atlantis. One would expect the *New Atlantis* to be finished so as to illuminate the true perfection of Atlantis.

In comparison to the *Critias*, however, the *New Atlantis* is a finished story. Whereas the speech of Zeus that would describe the defect and future perfection of Atlantis is omitted, the speech of the Father of Salomon's House that describes the "true state of Salomon's House," the "noblest foundation" ever upon the earth and the "lanthorn" of Bensalem, is provided to reveal the perfection of the new Atlantis for "the good of other nations."[41] So although the story is declared to be incomplete, it is not transparently clear in what the incompleteness of the *New Atlantis* consists, how the title is related to the final line, and how the new Atlantis is related to the old. As directed by Bacon's circumspect prudence, we know that to penetrate the *New Atlantis* is to penetrate the unity or completeness of Bacon's comprehensive teaching about science and man, and we know that the core of that teaching may be a teaching about political science. We can determine the latter possibility only by working through the *New Atlantis* to see if the directions and content of a political teaching can be found. But whatever the directions and content may be, we can pursue them only by careful attention to Bacon's prudent and circumspect way. In the *New Atlantis*, Bacon teaches by what he does not say as guided by what he does say, and by the careful combination of his articulate silence with an indirect but available structure of allusions.

Arrival in Bensalem

The story narrated in the *New Atlantis* consists of two overlapping major themes. The first major theme depicts the changing character of the sailors who visit Bensalem and who ultimately become the announcers of Bensalem's virtues. This first theme is itself twofold: its first section tells of the plight of the sailors, who are at the mercy of nature's necessity and chance and who consider themselves to be unfree; the second section tells of the sailors' experiences after they come to regard

[39] *New Atlantis*, hereafter, *NA*, BW III, 141–44.

[40] δίκην αὐτοῖς ἐπιθεῖναι βουληθείς, ἵνα γένοιντο ἐμμελέστεροι σωφρονισθέντες *Critias* 120d6–121c4; cf. 106a–b8. See *Timaeus* 22a, 25a–25b6; *Phaedrus* 278d7; *Laws* 676ff.

[41] *NA*, BW III, 145, 156, 166.

themselves as free men.[42] The second major theme of the story depicts the revelation of Bensalem to the sailors. It is composed of four sections. The first section portrays the way the sailors are received by the Bensalemites; the second section presents a history of Bensalem that explains its Christianity and laws of secrecy; the third section describes the current practices that extol and control Bensalemite erotic behavior; and the fourth section presents a description of the House of Salomon by the Father.[43] The two major themes overlap and intersect. The cut between the two sections of the first major theme is also the cut between the second and third sections of the second major theme. This shared cut is the sailors' declaration of their liberation. Taken together, the two major themes combine to form a third major theme that springs from the story as a whole. This third theme presents the revelation of Bensalem to the rest of the world, and since the intersection of the first two constituent themes is the sailors' declaration of their liberation, we must wonder whether and why liberation is necessary for their becoming the announcers of Bensalem.

Although the liberation of the sailors and the revelation to them of Bensalem come together to form the universal revelation of Bensalem, the two revelations are not identical. The difference between them consists precisely in the degree or fullness of revelation. Although the sailors, through the narrator, tell all that they know, the Bensalemites do not tell all that *they* know.[44] The sailors are not told all there is to know of Bensalem's laws of secrecy, and this must seem strange in the light of the central deed of the story. This deed is the unveiling of Bensalem and its exposure to the rest of the world, which eliminates the need for the laws of secrecy. The universal revelation that subverts the reason for secrecy is itself limited by secrecy. Thus, only a careful study of the story will provide a complete revelation that unveils the secrecy inherent in the revelation of Bensalem to the sailors and the world. Only a comprehensive understanding of this secrecy illuminates the true nature of the sailors' liberation and the liberation of their worldwide audience.

The sailors are speakers of Spanish and English and are, therefore, representatives of the early European masters of exploration. The narrator begins by relating how the men became subject to the vicissitudes of wind and sea, which they take to be the product of God's providence.[45] Their predicament is not their fault, for they have taken care to make "good spare of their victuals." In response to God's inhospitable providence, the men display lax or superficial piety and pray only when their bodies are in danger. No mention of prayer is made in describing their departure; we are not told if a priest is on board, and the men pray only for survival, not for the forgiveness of sin. The prayer, beseeching God, who "showeth His wonders in the deep," makes obvious reference to Psalms 107:23–32, where God rains great storms to terrify men in ships only to redeem them and bring them to their "desired haven." A close look reveals that Bacon reverses the Psalmist's story. Though strong winds afflict the sailors, it is these same strong winds, not calm, that bring them to a haven that is at first not desired. While the men of the psalm do nothing to help themselves, and "reel and stagger" and come to their "wits' end," Bacon's sailors do all in their power to save themselves, turning to prayer only as a last resort. Although the sailors refer to God as creator, His creating is mentioned in the context of scarcity of victual and hostility of sea. Comparison of Bacon's "psalm" to that of the psalmist underscores the superficial piety of the sailors and suggests a contrast between their own prudent responsibility and the irresponsibility of divine providence. At this point in the narrative, the sailors are ignorant of the House of Salomon and hence are ignorant of the possible Bensalemite control of wind and sea.[46] Bacon's change in the psalm, then, suggests the possibility that the providence displayed in the *New Atlantis* replaces the providence of an irresponsible and hostile creator. Thus in the beginning, the sailors' ignorance of Bensalemite science causes them to seek final refuge in the bonds of heavenly grace; this ignorance and their gradual enlightenment provide the background for their liberation.

In contrast to what has become of Plato's Atlantis,[47] Bensalem is an island naturally open to ships, although access to the port and city is strictly controlled by law. The Bensalemites are "humane" but prudent: the "man of place" or high rank claims to worry only about disease but stays "a flightshot" away. The accounts of the first encounters and of the sailors' going ashore are characterized by unusual procedures and events.[48] The sailors learn gradually that tips are scorned in Bensalem as double payment. The Bensalemites are very concerned with the precise limitation of rewards and with the prevention of "extras" or petty bribes. A second kind of tip, the sailors' promise of God's "reward" to the Bensalemite officer, while not scorned, is met with silence—a

[42] The two sections of the first major theme are: *NA*, BW III, (1) 129–147, (2) 147–166.

[43] The four sections of the second major theme are: *Ibid.*, (1) pp. 129–136, (2) pp. 136–147, (3) pp. 147–154; (4) pp. 154–166.

[44] *NA*, BW III, 135, 136, 139–40, 144, 146; cf. 156.

[45] *Ibid.*, p. 129.

[46] *Ibid.*, p. 157.

[47] See *Critias* 113e.

strange reaction for a Christian man. The oath required of the sailors illuminates this strange reaction. Before the sailors are allowed to come ashore, they must swear "by the merits" of Jesus that they are not pirates and have not shed blood "lawfully or unlawfully" within forty days. The conditions of the oath refer merely to the tainting of recent bloodshed and make no distinction between lawful and unlawful killing. With respect to righteousness, this is a contradiction of the Old Law, which makes a distinction between lawful and unlawful killing.[49] Taken together, the oath and the "psalm" hint that Bensalemite law provides a grace superior to that of Christ, that Bensalemite law surpasses both the Old and New Laws, but in a way that would count recent killing worse than old murder. Bensalem acknowledges the human lust for blood, and its law permits an oath that obscures the difference between killing and murder.

The men go ashore and are confined for three days while their sick are cured by the marvelous medicine of Bensalem. During their confinement the narrator addresses the sailors, likening their situation to that of Jonah and suggesting that they behave with restraint because their hospitable confinement may be a pretext for careful scrutiny by the Bensalemites. The differences between the sailors' plight and that of Jonah are obvious. Jonah fled from divine command, while the sailors travel for exploration or money or both. God sent a tempest to buffet Jonah, while strong winds of suspicious origin firmly guide the sailors to their destiny. Jonah subjected himself to bodily harm, while the sailors appear solely concerned to avoid bodily harm. Jonah brought tidings of destruction and learned a lesson in pity, while the sailors bring no such tidings but do learn something of pity.[50] While Jonah obeys divine command, the sailors obey only Bensalemite command. It is in this context that the sailors first mention the well-being of the soul, although the reason for their concern is explicitly utilitarian, and weal of body is mentioned in the same breath with weal of the soul. Thus, comparison of Bacon's Jonah with the biblical Jonah again suggests that Bensalem offers a grace that surpasses the power of divine grace to save or preserve body and soul. Like Jonah, the sailors learn something about pity, but, since the grounds of that pity may be a new kind of grace, we must wonder whether in Bensalem a new kind of pity will replace divine pity.

[49] Exodus 20:13; 21:12–14; Numbers 35:9–34; Deut. 5:17. The Bible requires the exile of the manslayer because of the avenger's desire for revenge. See Maimonides, *Guide of the Perplexed* III, 40, 41. With respect to the sailors, the oath must be necessary only because of the danger of the killer's bloodlust.

[50] *NA*, BW III, 154.

The sequel to the narrator's speech illuminates the unseemliness that lies beneath the outward hospitality of Bensalemite ways. The narrator's suspicions are confirmed.[51] With the next visit of a Bensalemite official we learn that the sailors still fear for their lives but that this fear is dampened by the speech and offer of the official. The sailors are informed that they may be told some things they will not be unwilling to hear. Providing they do not go beyond one "Karan" from the city walls without special leave, the state will allow them to stay for six weeks or more, and if they have any request, they must not fear to ask it of the Bensalemites because their countenances will not be "made to fall." All this is possible because the Strangers' House is rich; it has been thirty-seven years since any strangers have visited.

The official's remark that the sailors may be told some things that will be happily heard indicates other things that would be unhappily heard. This points to the possible grounds of Bensalemite inhospitality and the narrator's earlier concern. The offer to stay comes after the three days of confinement. Since the Bensalemites study ways to control wind and sea, there may be another reason for the wealthiness of the Strangers' House. The Strangers' House could be rich simply because the Bensalemites have chosen not to spend their wealth on men they have previously brought to the island. The governor of course speaks only of a lack of visitors, but the power of Bensalemite science to draw "visitors" to its shores and the necessary laws of secrecy illuminate the harsh reality feared by the narrator.[52] For when the governor-priest later explicates King Solamona's laws of secrecy, he remarks that no strangers have been detained against their will and that the sailors must think that anything reported by returning strangers would be "taken where they came but for a dream."[53] In the sequel, however, it is said that the missions of the Fellows of Salomon's House (the scientific institution) are strictly governed by the laws of secrecy.[54] This of course reflects the reason for the laws of secrecy: protection from corruption or attack by foreigners who might change or despoil the island.[55] Surely, then, the laws of secrecy assume the credulousness of non-Bensalemite peoples. The final revelation of the House of Salomon, meant as it is "for the good of other nations," also presupposes such credulousness.[56] The conclusion that must be drawn is obvious. Until the visit of the sailors, no strangers left Bensalem, and those who were unwilling to stay must have been imprisoned or killed.

[51] *Ibid.*, pp. 135–36.

[52] See below, n. 97.

[53] *NA*, BW III, 145.

[54] *Ibid.*, p. 146.

[55] *Ibid.*, p. 144.

[56] *Ibid.*, p. 166.

The Bensalemites are outwardly moderate, humane, and Christian, but a close examination of their oath and their laws suggests the subversion of divine law and the extreme opposite of hospitality. In this light, the seemingly commonplace and polite offer that gilds the Bensalemites' ambiguous hospitality must be viewed with circumspection. The offer is an open offer; the official says that *any* request will be met. Bacon modestly fails to mention the most notorious need of disembarking sailors, but we may now wonder if the offer goes beyond the healthy lust of seamen. The offer can be fully understood only in the light of Joabin's later mention of "Lot's Offer,"[57] but at this point we know that although all things may not be told, all things may be requested. If the Bensalemites' policy toward unwanted visitors may require murder unrestrained by divine or civil law, we may wonder whether for some wanted visitors, no request by such visitors will be too base.

The first part of the *New Atlantis* shows that the Bensalemite hospitality offered to the unliberated sailors suggests a combination of restraint and excess. The sailors are capable of great restraint: for the sake of their bodies and souls they restrain their use of victuals, restrain their "vices and unworthiness," and accept the travel limitation in spite of the inflammation of their hearts. Yet even this restraint is not at first as extensive as Bensalemite restraint, for they only gradually conform to the Bensalemite scorn of tips. But Bensalemite restraint, like Bensalemite Christiantity and humanity, is beclouded by the harshness and baseness suggested by ambiguous hospitality. This hospitality hints at the coherence of moral opposites but not in a formally open way, and the secrecy of the *New Atlantis* illuminates the obscure grounds of the explicit secrecy of Bensalem. Bacon directs our attention to the possibility that the imperatives governing the choice and reception of visitors as the announcers of science necessitate the opposites of Bensalem's outward hospitality and restraint. The propagation of Bensalemite perfection is not immune from the possible problem of immoral means for moral ends. The important question is whether this problem is the sole root of Bensalem's secrecy. If it is, the *New Atlantis* must appear to be incomplete because of a problem that is overcome with the perfection of science. If it is not, the *New Atlantis* must appear to be incomplete because of a problem at the heart of man's scientific fortune.

Bensalem's Past: The Histories

Since the sailors are ignorant of Bensalem while the Bensalemites know about the sailors, the sailors are permitted to ask questions about Bensalem and its people. The questions prompt the governor-priest to relate the religious and institutional histories of Bensalem, which illuminate the nature of Bensalemite secrecy and the nature of the sailors' liberation.[58]

The first question asks about the nature of Bensalem's conversion to Christianity. The answer relates an instance of the miracle of revelation but is actually a subversion of divine revelation. For the implication of the wise man's prayer is that scientific speech must be the vehicle for divine miracles. Miracles must be "acknowledged" and "testified" for people by a man with the requisite scientific knowledge. Without this acknowledgment it would be impossible to discern true miracles from art, natural phenomena, fraud, or illusion. In the Bible, however, discursive speech is distinguished from miracles or signs; the miracles of God are meant to circumvent the need for speech. There is, therefore, no biblical distinction between true and false miracles but only between true and false speech, between true and false prophecy. Bacon, however, assimilates the veracity of prophecy to the veracity of miracles, and the result of this assimilation is the debunking of both. In the *Advancement of Learning*, Bacon implies that there can be no standard for verifying miracles as distinct from natural oddities because both are by nature rare. Thus there can be no certain distinction between true miracles and tales or impostures.[59] Insofar as Bensalem holds the wise man of Salomon's House to be the necessary judge of miracles, it invokes a natural scientific standard that is necessary and yet inapplicable. The Bensalemite test for veracious miracles debunks the status of miracles altogether. Bacon includes in this debunking not just the miraculous transmission of previously revealed divine speech, but also an original miracle of divine revelation. Without trustworthy divine revelation, the shepherding of Christ or divine providence is impossible.[60] Bensalem's saving and liberation of the sailors has nothing to do with God's claim to save and to liberate.

It is in the context of the debunking history of revelation that the names of the *New Atlantis* are revealed. The island is called "Bensalem," and the city on the eastern coast is called "Renfusa." Bensalem is a word of obvious Hebrew origin and is fashioned from the words "ben" and "šalem." The compound would be rendered "son or offspring of completeness, safety and peace." Bensalem, then, is the offspring of completeness as the product of science and scientific rule; Bensalem is

[57] *NA*, BW III, 153. See below, p. 881, n. 89.

[58] *NA*, BW III, 136–147.

[59] *Advancement*, BW III, 287–88. See below, nn. 65–67.

[60] Not only does the Bible fail to mention judges of miracles from Bensalem's House of Salomon, but the biblical King Solomon's natural history is lost and is not a part of the canon. *Advancement*, BW III, 298–99; I Kings 4:33.

the product of the completion or perfection of human knowledge and so represents the harmony of the possible intellectual and terrestrial globes. In spite of the formal incompleteness of the story, the name of the island explicitly suggests completeness and perfection. Bensalem is a complete and perfected model of the end of Bacon's great instauration. The island's name is revealed just before the veracity and hence the worth of divine revelation is debunked. Bensalem's perfection is independent of divine shepherding or providence.[61] All the more important, then, is the name of the city, which is probably the port visited by the sailors.[62] "Renfusa" is a combination of the Greek words *ρήν* and *φύσις*, which would be rendered "sheeplike" or "sheep-natured." Since sheep are in need of a shepherd, it is clear that the shepherd of the Bensalemites is not the debunked shepherd of divine revelation, but, rather, the independent perfection of science and scientific rule. The ambiguous relation of the shepherd to his flock is, therefore, not to be overlooked. If the history of Bensalem replaces the history of providence, it must be asked how and to what degree the Bensalemites are, in fact, sheep. The answer to this query more fully illuminates the saving and liberation of the sailors.

The speech about Bensalem's history repeats the replacement of divine providence by Bensalemite rule and reveals a problem inherent in that rule; it illuminates the relation between sheep and shepherd. The history follows the account of Bensalem's Christianization and provides a partial answer to the sailors' query about Bensalem's secrecy. The first part explains why the rest of the world has no intercourse with Bensalem, and the second part explains why the Bensalemites remain hidden from the world in spite of Bensalem's intercourse with the rest of the world.[63] The civil history of Bensalem is the history of the coming of scientific rule. It must be noted at the outset that a history of Bensalem is a history of the perfection of science and as such is the perfection of human history. Thus Bacon's remarks about civil history in the division of the sciences are of great importance for understanding the civil history of Bensalem.[64]

In the *Advancement of Learning*, Bacon likens the three kinds of civil history to three kinds of pictures or images: unfinished, perfect, and defaced.[65] Thus there are three kinds of civil history: memorials, perfect histories, and antiquities. Perfect histories are either of times, lives, or actions. The history of times, which is the most complete kind of civil history, is distributed by God's providence and is divided into the antiquities of the world, the history of Greece and Rome, and modern history. Although the history of times and divine providence are linked, Bacon makes no mention of the history of God's works—the Bible—in his discussion of the history of times. Rather, he treats the two parts of the Bible, the history of prophecy and the history of providence, as parts of a separate discussion of ecclesiastical history.[66] But in the first part of the *Advancement of Learning*, Bacon argues that ecclesiastical history often errs because miracles are too often given easy credit by "the people" only later to be esteemed old wives' tales or impostures. But at this crucial point in the *Advancement of Learning*, Bacon gives no hint as to what the criteria for judging the veracity of miracles may be. Rather, he contrasts his silence on this point to the mention of the standard of veracity in natural history: rareness and seeming incredibility. The standard of natural history only emphasizes his silence, for this standard cannot be used to discriminate between miracles because miracles are by definition rare and seemingly incredible.[67] The unstated implication must be that there are no criteria for judging the veracity of miracles and that proper acceptance of miracles is simply indistinguishable from ignorance, superstitious simplicity, and politic toleration. In this respect, the *New Atlantis* is in perfect accord with the teaching of the division of the sciences.

Since the veracity of the Bible depends on the miracle of revelation, and since the demonstrable veracity of miracles is debunked, the Bible can prudently be taken only as a human document with human limitations. Since it is neither the history of Greece and Rome nor modern history, and since it purports to divide times and declare the end of days, the Bible can at best be the remaining kind of the civil history of times: it can at best be the antiquity of God's providence. But since antiquities are "defaced" and "subject to the shipwrecks of time," the Scriptures must be defective history rather than perfect history. With circumspect prudence, Bacon argues that the history of God's providence is simply a defective and incomplete part of civil history. If there is an end of days, it can be declared only by a completed, per-

[61] The vehicle of Bensalemite perfection, the natural science of the House of Salomon, comes to Bensalem before the saving grace of Jesus. See below, p. 878.

[62] The sailors are brought to Bensalem by a "wind from the south, with a point east." *NA*, BW III, 129. Thus the wind came from the south-east and would have caused them to land on the eastern shore of the island. Renfusa is a city on the eastern shore of the island.

[63] *NA*, BW III, 139–143, 143–47.

[64] *Advancement*, BW III, 333–37.

[65] *Ibid.*

[66] *Ibid.*, pp. 340–42. In the *De Augmentis* Bacon treats ecclesiastical history as a part of civil history. *De Augmentis*, BW IV, 243–44. Again, this minor change strengthens the present argument.

[67] *Advancement*, BW III, 287–88. Of course, this *is* the standard used in Bensalem.

fect, universal history of times that is *not* the history of God's works.

Bacon argues that a perfected or completed history of times *is* possible in a proper history of Great Britain, which is "after the manner of the sacred history" because both relate the uniting of separated kingdoms.[68] Bacon implies that completed or perfected modern history will replace the sacred history in dividing times and declaring the end of days. Modern history in the form of a proper history of Great Britain will distribute the history of times and proclaim the end of days, which means that the proper history of Great Britain will declare completed or perfected human nature.

In his mention of the sacred history, Bacon refers only to the "story of the Ten Tribes and of the Two Tribes as twins together."In the context that points to the inherent limitation of sacred history, Bacon limits the sacred history to the period from the Exodus to the united Davidic monarchy. He makes no mention of the second empire or monarchy, the empire of Jesus Christ. It is, then, not immediately clear how perfectible modern history replaces the history of divine providence. While modern or perfected history replaces the claim of Christ to save, it is not clear whether the modern replacement of providence takes account of the difference between David and Jesus. From the standpoint of pious Christianity, which characterizes the outward appearance of Bensalemite society, this distinction is of paramount importance. The difference between the old and new covenants consists in the saving grace of Jesus whose divine and human perfection contrasts with the defects of the first of the House of David. Bacon's silence with respect to this crucial difference is striking. It suggests that the difference is of no importance and points to the possibility that perfected modern history, which proclaims perfected human nature, preserves the fundamental characteristic of Davidic-Solomonic hegemony. As any schoolboy knows, the rule of David and his successors was characterized by the sexual excesses and sins of David and the prophecy of Nathan. Thus if perfected modern history preserves the fundamental characteristic of Davidic hegemony, the human perfection it announces will be characterized by Davidic excess. Bacon's discussion of perfected civil history tells us what to note in his example of perfected civil history; if the example excludes the distinction between David and Jesus, we must wonder about the nature of scientific human perfection or completeness.

Bacon argues that the perfection of science will be coeval with the "circling of the earth, as the heavenly bodies do."[69] That is, the perfection of science will be coeval with the circumnavigation of the terrestrial globe. Bensalem, of course, represents the possibility of such circumnavigation, and the sailors have been shown to represent the European masters of exploration, the Spanish and the English. The narrator writes in English, and we wonder if this does not reflect Spanish subservience to English exploration. Thus the sailing of the men to Bensalem represents the future way of Great Britain to the perfection of science and hence to the fulfillment and perfection of human destiny. The history of Britain's future is, therefore, the history of Bensalem, which ends in the true end of days. It declares the perfection of man, which, as perfect, distributes the history of times and ends the history of times. Thus the history of Bensalem and the history of England converge.[70] It is all the more important, therefore, to note whether the history of Bensalem as perfected history, or the culmination of man's scientific fortune, admits the crucial distinction between David and Jesus.

The history related by the governor-priest tells the stories of Altabin's triumph over the insolent Atlantians, the institution by king Solamona of Salomon's House, and the institution of the Bensalemite laws of secrecy. As we should expect, the civil history of Bensalem contains the history of the coming of science. From the clues provided by the governor-priest, the chronology of Bensalemite history can be reconstructed, as well as the date of the sailors' voyage.[71] If the "six score years" since navigation has begun to increase be reckoned from the obvious beginning of European navigation, 1492, the sailor's voyage takes place in 1612.[72] The time referred to as "three thousand years ago" would, then, be 1388 B.C., 458 years before the biblical Solomon completed the temple in 930 B.C., and the date of king Solamona's reign, which brought Salomon's House, would be 288 B.C. The first mention of Bensalem's past is before the acme of Davidic greatness, and the event

[68] *Advancement*, BW III, 336.

[69] *Ibid.*, p. 340.

[70] It is of course unimportant whether England or another country was to be the bearer of modern history. Bacon's choice is properly patriotic, but the important points are that only modern history is said to be perfectible, and that Bensalem is the model of life governed by modern science, which is the principle of human perfection.

[71] See Howard B. White, *Peace Among the Willows: The Political Philosophy of Francis Bacon* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968), pp. 104 n. 30, 121–22.

[72] This date puts the voyage after the publication of the *Advancement of Learning* and before the *Novum Organum* and *De Augmentis*, and it provides a clue to the primacy of the *Advancement of Learning* in the whole of Bacon's writings. The division of the sciences contained in the *Advancement of Learning* provides the description of the intellectual globe that will tame and conquer the terrestrial globe. Cf. White, pp. 104 n. 30, 121–22, 197–98.

heralding the completion of Bensalemite greatness —Solamona's institution of the scientific academy —is 642 years after the acme of Davidic greatness. Thus the history and perfection of Bensalem as the model for human perfection is chronologically within the era of David's sin and Nathan's prophecy. Bensalem's perfection predates the coming of Christ; in spite of the Bensalemite replacing of Christ's saving and Christ's kingdom, the replacement of Bensalemite (English) history for sacred history excludes the distinction between Jesus and David. Although we can identify pre-Davidic beginnings of Bensalem, we cannot find a post-Davidic past and so an event that would obviate the prophecy of Nathan. Thus Bacon's remarks about history and his example of perfected history come together; the distinction between Jesus and David is no part of the human perfection that replaces the promise of sacred history. Unless the advent of Solamona's reign explicitly obviates the prophecy of Nathan, we can expect the characteristics of Bensalem's Davidic past to be manifest in its post-Christian but "Davidic" present, which is England's and mankind's future. This important possibility can be finally accepted only after an examination of Bensalem's present and the speech of Joabin. It should be noted, however, in addition to the obvious implication of Joabin's name, that the unit of measure in Bensalem is the "Karan," a Hebrew word that can mean a ruler of the House of David and a horn.[73]

Bacon's account of Bensalem's early encounter with the Atlantians (Coyans) makes explicit reference to Plato's account of Atlantis and Athens in the *Timaeus* and *Critias*. Important differences and distortions separate the two accounts, however, and suggest a Baconian revision of Plato's teaching about nature's necessity, and excess and moderation. Plato teaches that the Athenians defeated the technically advanced but insolent, prideful, and tyrannous Atlantians, and that they magnanimously freed those who dwelled within the bounds of Heracles despite their failure to aid in their own liberation.[74] Bacon hides the magnanimity of the Athenians by declaring his uncertainty about the identity of the Greeks who, along with the Bensalemites, defeated the invading Atlantians. Rather, he contrasts the ruthlessness of the Athenians (or whoever it was), who destroyed every ship and man of the invading Atlantians (Tyrambelians), with the extraordinary humanity and clemency of Altabin, the king of the Bensalemites at the time.

In Plato's account, at a later time from the conflict, earthquakes and floods destroyed the entire body of Athenian warriors and caused the entire island of Atlantis to be swallowed by the sea. The deed no longer lives in Athenian memory because Athens, along with the rest of the world except for the Egyptians, was subject to "many and diverse destructions of mankind, of which the greatest are by fire and water, and lesser by countless other means."[75] In Plato's account, Egyptian antiquity depends upon the combination of memory and piety, for although they are immune from rain and fire because of the fortuitous presence of the Nile, they are not immune from earthquakes.[76] In Plato's account, then, both the moderate and the insolent were destroyed by nature's ravages; the distinction between them was preserved only in the mnemonic speech of the pious Egyptians. In Bacon's account, while Atlantis and the rest of the world are destroyed by "accidents of time," which consist of violent natural destruction or slow natural decay, the Bensalemites are saved from such destruction by the coming of science. Nature's power to destroy wholly is overcome; no one suffers the total annihilation of Plato's Atlantis. Thus, for Bacon, Bensalem combines the deeds of the Athenians (Greeks) and the surviving antiquity of Egypt. The difference between Egypt and Bensalem consists in the difference between piety and natural science. As might be guessed by now, this difference is, for Bacon, simply the difference between nature's chance and the scientific conquest of nature. He is careful to note that "that whole tract is little subject to earthquakes."[77]

For Plato, the distinction between moderate and immoderate deeds can be permanent only in speech, for with respect to the rewards of deeds as such, the moderate and the immoderate are ultimately linked by the indiscriminate chastisement of natural catastrophe and decay. But since Plato teaches that it is not speeches that are permanent and enduring, but rather the intelligible things or *ideas* disclosed by speeches, the enduringly moderate or moderate in itself is in fact twice removed from particular moderate or immoderate deeds.[78] For Plato, the search for the eternal *ideas* of the human virtues discloses the distinction between theory and practice. The articulation of the eternal *ideas* of the virtues explains the intelligibility of

[73] Ezekiel 29:21; Psalms 132:17. The verb form means to send out rays or display horns.

[74] *Timaeus* 24e–25d7; *Critias* 120d6–121c4.

[75] *Timaeus* 21cl–23dl.

[76] Seth Benardete, "On Plato's *Timaeus* and Timaeus Science Fiction," *Interpretation*, 2 (Summer, 1971), 30; *Timaeus* 22cl–23al, 25e8–d7.

[77] *NA*, BW III, 142. Bacon refers to the natural disaster at once as "Divine Revenge" and as a "main accident of time." *NA*, BW III, 143. It is by no means clear that the destruction of Atlantis in Plato's account is due to divine revenge, for there is no thematic connection between the missing speech of Zeus and the destruction of Atlantis. See *Timaeus* 25c8–d7; *Critias* 121b7–c4: Benardete, p. 30; cf. *Timaeus* 21a7–el; *Phaedrus* 272c7–278d2.

[78] *Republic* 474c–480a.

particular deeds as moderate or immoderate, but discloses the indeterminateness of particular deeds as singularly moderate or immoderate. For Bacon, the scientific overcoming of the distinction between speeches and deeds, between theory and practice, consists in the overcoming or conquest of natural catastrophe and decay and results in the permanence of speeches and deeds. As shown by the contrast of Plato's Athens and Atlantis to Bacon's Atlantis and Bensalem, the scientific conquest of natural catastrophe and decay facilitates the permanent and certain distinction between moderate and immoderate deeds. But Bacon has distorted the Platonic account of Atlantis, and our first comparison of the two accounts must be revised. The revision discloses astonishing results.

According to Bacon's distortion, the Athenians were no less ruthless than the Atlantians; the barbarism of the Athenians is contrasted with the extraordinary humanity of Altabin. Yet the Bensalemite overcoming of natural castastrophe and decay as well as necessity and chance, the creation of the perfected combination of Athens and Egypt, is the work of Solamona rather than Altabin.[79] It is Solamona who brought science to Bensalem and is said to be its lawgiver; it was his intention to perfect the prescientific humanity of Altabin that was subject to natural decay. Yet Solamona's laws are laws of secrecy that contain the harsh reality of the most extreme inhospitality and inhumanity.[80] Thus the humanity and hospitality of Altabin contrast with the potential inhumanity and inhospitality of Solamona's reign and laws that complete the humanity of Altabin. The humanity perfected by scientific conquest is a problematic humanity. It is in this light that Bacon's distortion of Plato is intelligible. If the deeds preserved by the memory of Egypt reveal no distinction between the moderate and the immoderate, the replacement of Egypt by Bensalem makes eternal the link between the moderate and the immoderate.

But we must not contrast Bacon's version of Plato's Athens with his description of Altabin's Bensalem. In terms of moral virtue, Plato's Athens and Altabin's Bensalem considered together contrast with Bacon's distorted Athens and Solamona's Bensalem considered together. The proper comparison is between Plato's moderate Athens and the humane Altabin, on the one hand, and Bacon's immoderate Athens and Solamona's Bensalem, on the other hand. Bensalem is a new Atlantis; Bacon's distorted Athens and Bensalem are alike in their immoderation and different only in their different susceptibility to natural catastrophe and decay. Bacon's Bensalem perfects and immortalizes the immoderation of Bacon's distorted Athens, but this means that Bensalem immortalizes the insolent pride of the old Atlantis.

For Plato, the distinction between the moderate and the immoderate is indeterminate with respect to particular human deeds. But while the distinction between the moderate and the immoderate is problematic in deed, the distinction as such is intelligible and is disclosed by the link between ephemeral speeches and the eternal things. Thus while there is no divine speech about justice or moderation, there is human speech that pursues the divine and illuminates the eternal grounds of justice and moderation.[81] Although there can be no certain, demonstrable determination of particular moderate deeds, the theoretical pursuit of the moderate as such moderates the lure of those practical goods for the sake of which men commonly behave in moderate or immoderate ways. The common fate of Athens and Atlantis is not disheartening because human virtue is not determined by the strict superiority of one particular deed over another. Rather, the rough, indeterminate practical distinction between moderate and immoderate deeds, expressed by right opinion, is grounded on the distinction between theory and practice and the consequent superiority of the theoretical to the practical life.[82]

For Bacon, the scientific conquest of natural catastrophe and decay permits practical life to endure. But the subtle contrast Bacon presents between the old and the new Atlantis suggests that the immortalization of practical life makes eternal the link between moderate and immoderate deeds, and we must wonder if this does not subvert the ground of any possible moderation. For Bacon, like Plato, there is no divine speech about justice and moderation. But unlike Plato, Bacon gives an account of the new Atlantis that is incomplete because of the dangerous, unmentionable product of the new science that will perfect human practice by facilitating the preservation and restoration of the corruptible things. While these suppositions spring from an interpretation of

[79] The war and natural decay that afflicted the "rest of the world," as distinct from the "main accident of time," took place *after* the beginning of Solamona's rule and the institution of science. We know this because Solamona found an island where the entrance of strangers was frequent and for that reason ordained the prohibitions that "touch the entrance of strangers." *NA*, BW III, 144. Solamona came upon an island that was both "happy and flourishing," and his intention was "to give perpetuity to that which was in his time so happily established." Altabin's name means "twice lofty," and his double loftiness or perfection of humanity and war was incomplete without the third perfection, the perfection of science. Altabin's perfection was defective because of its susceptibility to natural decay and chance.

[80] See above, p. 874, Solamona's founding laws hide Bensalem's origins by indirectly dictating that recent killing be considered worse than old murder.

[81] *Republic* 377b–383a, 474c–480a, 505a–511e.

[82] Cf., for instance, *Republic* 611b9–621d3; *Meno* 96d5–100b12.

Bensalem's past, they are confirmed by the revelation of Bensalem's present, upon which the meaning of Bensalem's history and the whole of the *New Atlantis* depend.

Bensalem's Present: The Feast and Joabin's Speech

The cut between Bensalem's past and present corresponds to the cut between the two sections that illustrate the sailors' changes of heart and mind. It is at the juncture between Bensalem's past and present that the the sailors exhibit restraint that springs from desire rather than fear and declare their liberation. The historical speeches that proclaim the replacement of divine providence by Bensalem's promise and the laws of secrecy provide the background for the sailors' new-found freedom. Their freedom consists, therefore, in freedom from the limitations on bodily weal that they have known, and in corresponding freedom from the bonds of divine grace or providence.[83] The speeches about Bensalem's present illuminate the relation between Bensalem's past and present, which in turn reveals the true nature of the sailors' new restraint and freedom.

The revelation of Bensalem's present consists of two parts: the first is a description of the sum of Bensalem's promise, and the second describes the regulation of that promise. The feast of the Tirsan[84] (any father of thirty living descendants) is sponsored by the Bensalemite regime and honors the promise of the regime, the preservation and generation of the human body, which shows Bensalem to be "compounded of all goodness." Because of the Bensalemite priority of body over soul, the state of the soul is not the primary consideration in the feast of the Tirsan. Rather, it is "granted to any man that shall live to see thirty persons descended of his body alive together, and all above three years old." At the same time that the festival honors the ultimate priority of body over soul, it reveals the stringent moral restraints imposed by the Bensalemite regime. The regime guarantees, with the power of law, the orders of the Tirsan on the moral seemliness of his favored family. As we learn from Joabin, Bensalem is the "virgin of the world"[85] who sees as the sum of all goodness the preservation and generation of the human body. The feast honors the end of Bensalemite restraint and humanity: the preservation of the human body and the most intense pleasure that accompanies the procreation of human bodies. In the action of the story, the sailors, who restrain body and soul for the sake of the weal of their bodies, show themselves to be open to the promise of Bensalem. While the humane restraint of the Bensalemites appears to reflect the humanity and restraint of Altabin and Solamona, the sequel to the description of the feast reveals the restraint and humanity of Bensalem to be problematic. This problematic restraint and humanity is confirmed by reflection on the relation of the Bensalemite past to the Bensalemite present.

The speech of Joabin explicates the full meaning of the feast.[86] He is asked about marriage laws and customs because the relation of the feast to the narrator makes him wonder about "nuptial copulation" from which proceeds the "propagation of families." Joabin's remarks consist of a long speech about European and Bensalemite marriage and a short mention of the "Adam and Eve's pools."

Joabin first characterizes European and Bensalemite marriage practices. Whereas Bensalem is the most chaste of nations, "free from all pollution and foulness," and the "virgin of the world," European marriage practices are foul and debauched. In Europe, marriage is "ordained a remedy for unlawful concupiscence," but since Europeans have at hand "a remedy more agreeable to their corrupt will, marriage is almost expulsed." For "the depraved custom of change, and the delight in meretricious embracements (where sin is turned into an art) maketh marriage a dull thing and a kind of imposition or tax." The Europeans liken marriage to prostitution when they argue that prostitution, like marriage, should be tolerated because it prevents "greater evils; as advoutries, deflowering of virgins, unnatural lust, and the like." But Joabin says that the Bensalemites hold this argument to be a preposterous wisdom, and they call it "Lot's Offer; who to save his guests from abusing, offered his daughters. . . ."

After a brief interruption by the narrator, Joabin describes the laws that regulate Bensalemite nuptial copulation. There is no polygamy; there is a month wait between first interview and marriage or contract for marriage; marriage without parental consent is "mulcted in the inheritors," (i.e., the children are penalized); and finally, "because of the many hidden defects in men and women's bodies," before a contract is made, one friend of

[83] *NA*, BW III, 147. The sailors declare their liberation in the sixteenth paragraph of the story. The sixteenth Essay in the *Essays* treats atheism and is followed by the seventeenth Essay on superstition. The principle of the sixteenth Essay is that any belief about God is better than unbelief. The principle of the seventeenth Essay is that unbelief is better than wrong or heretical belief. Given that such a contradiction must aways redound to the benefit of unbelief or atheism, Bacon here makes an argument for atheism. In the seventeenth paragraph the narrator forgets a difference between six and seven days. If Essays sixteen and seventeen come together as a true essay on atheism, the number of Essays is equal to the number of paragraphs in the *New Atlantis*.

[84] *NA*, BW III, 147–151.

[85] *Ibid.*, p. 152.

[86] *Ibid.*, pp. 151–54.

the potential bride and one friend of the potential groom are permitted to see the bride and groom "severally bathe naked" in the Adam and Eve's pools that are situated near every town.

Joabin's speech is the most important in the *New Atlantis*. Joabin as speaker is of crucial importance: except for the wise man who judged the miracle, Joabin is the only post-Solamonic character described as wise. The Father of Salomon's House, who makes the final speech revealing the "true state" of Salomon's House is *not* described as wise. Not only is Joabin said to be wise, but he is also said to be "learned, . . . of great policy, and excellently seen in the laws and customs of Bensalem." Joabin is, therefore, wise in the study of government or rule, and as such he speaks of the Jewish dreams "from tradition" rather than from conviction of truth.[87] Joabin knows the Jewish dreams as dreams; as a man wise in general and wise in policy, he transcends the myths of Bensalem. It is as a man wise in general and wise in policy that Joabin exhibits the only comprehensive wisdom in the *New Atlantis*. In terms of explicit description, Joabin's wisdom surpasses even that of the large-hearted founder and lawgiver Solamona. It is all the more important, then, that Joabin's speech illuminates the fundamental problem of Bensalem's promise.

As Bacon has Joabin present it, the Bensalemite characterization of European marriage and prostitution as "Lot's Offer" is subtly inappropriate. Joabin argues that the European practice is to offer daughters (prostitutes or wives) to save other daughters, the potential victims of unnatural lust and rape. But Lot offered his virgin daughters to save male strangers, an act of extraordinary hospitality.[88] If Joabin's characterization is meant to contrast European and Bensalemite practices—and this is Bacon's intention since the context is an explicit contrast of Bensalem to Europe—Bacon has Joabin express Bensalemite abhorrence of the offering of daughters to save daughters, but has him indirectly approve the offering of daughters for the sake of visiting strangers. The example of "Lot's Offer" points to the Bensalemite offer to the sailors and to Bacon's modest but conspicuous silence regarding the sailors' sexual desires.[89] By means of subtle allusion and conspicuous silence, Bacon causes Joabin's speech to suggest the Bensalemite secrecy that hides the immoral means necessary for the propagation and rule of science. Just as restraint is necessary for the propagation and rule of science, so too are laws of secrecy that mask the unrestraint of "unlawful lust" necessary for the proper treatment of necessary strangers.

We are reminded of the harsh alternative to Bensalemite hospitality when the narrator says that Joabin's speech reminds him of his sin as Elias reminded the widow of Sarepta. Bacon causes the narrator to ignore the widow's fear that Elias had come to kill her son.[90] The laws of secrecy hide Bensalem from the world in more than the obvious way; they mask Bensalem's hospitality and humanity, which can include basely open offers and the inhumane opposite of hospitality. Joabin's speech, which reflects the present practice of the "son of completeness" or perfection, illuminates the immoral means that are necessary for the promise of Bensalem's perfection. The speech reveals the secrecy necessary to overcome the temporal gap between Bensalem as a completed model and the task illuminated by the sailors' odyssey, the way of science to the actual lived reality of the image or model of scientific perfection.

The institution of the Adam and Eve's pools[91] is an important part of Bensalem, which, as the offspring of completeness, is the model of scientific perfection. The institution of the Adam and Eve's pools regulates nuptial copulation by preventing the dissatisfaction with one's own partner made possible by the discovery of the "many hidden defects in men and women's bodies." The noblest end of science is the preservation of the human body. The pools regulate the act of generation and the most intense pleasure preserved by the conquest of bodily decay, they regulate the pleasure that informs the very end of science itself. Joabin's speech also exhibits a second crucial silence or secrecy; his remarks are interrupted at the point where obvious queries about this astonishing institution would naturally arise. Although we know that desire for bodies other than one's own mate's is a potential problem in Bensalem—this is the very reason for the institution of the pools—Bacon causes Joabin to make no mention of possible licentious desire provoked by that which is most conducive to the breakdown of restraint. Thus Bacon ignores the obvious possibility that a friend of a suitor might make a false report of bodily defect because he desired the intended partner for himself, for Bacon is silent about the sex and marital status of the friends. Thus, although Bacon acknowledges the desire for a more perfect or beautiful body and informs us that this

[87] *NA*, BW III, 151. The narrator does not simply ascribe the Jewish dreams to Joabin but, rather, says that "surely this man . . . would ever acknowledge" them. He is careful to point out that Joabin espouses Bensalemite Jewish belief by tradition; to recognize tradition is not necessarily to acknowledge truth.

[88] Genesis 19:1–11.

[89] See above, p. 875. One modest editor saw fit to omit the discussion of marriage and eros for the sake of "modern taste." *New Atlantis*, ed. Gough, p. vi.

[90] I Kings 17:18.

[91] *NA*, BW III, 154.

desire must be regulated, he describes Bensalem as having an institution that ignores the very erotic desire it is designed to regulate. By causing Joabin to be silent because of a crucial interruption, Bacon describes an institution designed to control Bensalem's erotic behavior that in fact reinforces the licentious possibilities of choosiness, the love of one's own, and the desire for more. Although the institution is meant to keep the rooster in the coop, it exacerbates the possibilities of adultery and cuckoldry.

Bacon's indirect description of Bensalem's erotic practice is important in the light of what must by now be obvious. The only man said to be wise in general and wise in policy, who articulates the astonishing Bensalemite erotic practice, is named *Joabin*. Not only was Joab David's strong lieutenant in his rise to power, but he is known as one of the most ruthless men in the Old Testament. It was Joab who committed murder, who slew David's son, and who carried out the treachery against Uriah the Hittite. It was Joab, then, who assisted in adultery and cuckoldry; he was David's horns in matters that deal with horns.[92] In the light of Bacon's indirect description it is again obvious that the institution and practice of the Adam and Eve's pools, revealed to us by Joabin, are imitations of the sin of David, which arose from the viewing of a friend's wife bathing.[93] In the speech of Joabin, Bacon teaches by means of a subtle structure of allusion and conspicuous silence. With Joabin's speech, Bacon confirms the web of indirect suggestions of a problematic Bensalemite humanity and perfection that leads up to the speech. The speech of Joabin links Bensalem's past and present so as to disclose the dangerous truth about the perfection of science and man's scientific fortune. We noted earlier that unless the coming of Solamona obviated the prophecy of Nathan, unless it eliminated the defect of excessive desire, the defective characteristics of Bensalem's Davidic past would be present in its Davidic present and, hence, in England's and mankind's scientific future. Both the speech and name of Joabin, far from signaling the obviation of Nathan's prophecy, point to the repetition of Davidic excess. Bacon identifies Joabin with Joab and so identifies the ruthless Joab and the problem of excessive desire with the man of comprehensive wisdom. But "Joabin" is simply the plural form of "Joab"; Joabin's name and speech are not only of Joabin, not only of a wise man, but of all other and future men of comprehensive wisdom.

If the Davidic characteristics of Bensalem's past are inherent in Bensalem's present and future, the possibility of insolent excess is inherent in the promise of science. The grounds of that excess, which knows only the limits of barbarism,[94] are the desires of one human body for another. One justly wonders, then, about the final disposition of unnecessary and undesired strangers. The contrast wrought by the institution of science in the history of Bensalem *is*, then, between the simple magnanimity and humanity of Athens and Altabin on the one hand, and the problematic magnanimity and humanity of the distorted Athens and Bensalem, or the new Atlantis, on the other hand. The speech of Joabin completes a picture that shows the true depth of Bensalem's problematic humanity to consist in the grotesque possibilities of excessive desire. Bacon's point is that since science requires restraint for most men, the full range of possibilities promised by science cannot be revealed in its entirety. Bensalem is not on the surface a nation of barbarous cannibals; on the contrary, the Bensalemites are sheep—"Tirsan" is a Persian word (tarsān) meaning timid or fearful—and they are shepherded by the rule of science. It is all the more important, therefore, to wonder in what or in whom the ultimate *rule* of science consists.

Joabin's speech explicates the secrecy which is a means of science to its end and which is abolished by the central deed of the story, the revelation of Bensalemite science to the world. But Joabin's speech also explicates the more profound secrecy which is inherent in the end and perfection of science and which is not abolished by the universal revelation of science. This latter secrecy necessitates Bacon's prudent, circumspect, and indirect way of teaching. It is only by following Bacon's way that we can see how the *New Atlantis* contains a teaching about political science, and so that we can see how the *New Atlantis* and the whole of Bacon's teaching are complete.

Conclusion

The last section of the story presents the magnificent return of a Father of Salomon's House, his revelation to the narrator of the "true state of Salomon's House," and the final deed of the story, the Father's giving of a "great largess" or tip to the narrator and his fellows.[95] The Father's speech about the "true state" of Salomon's House reveals that it is dedicated to the study of the things above, the things below, and the things in between, which constitute the visible whole.[96] The study of the things above, however, does not include the

[92] See n. 73 above.
[93] II Samuel 11:2–5.
[94] See *Advancement*, BW III, 290–95, 420–26; *De Sapientia Veterum*, XII, XIII, XVI, BW VI, 649–652, 654, 723–26, 728.
[95] *NA*, BW III, 154–166.
[96] *Ibid.*, p. 157.

study of the celestial heaven.[97] The visible whole, the conquest of which is the "enlarging of the bounds of Human Empire," is limited to the realm inhabitable by the human body. The celestial heaven is excluded from the visible whole studied by the new science because of man's limited ability to fly. In the light of the eternal promise of science, the celestial heaven can be no image of the delimitation of human nature; the celestial heaven is ignored because it contributes in no way to the eternal, intelligible whole that is illuminated and constituted by science and human power.

Perhaps a more important study omitted from the House of Salomon is the study of policy or government. The House of Salomon studies natural philosphy and logic, it studies all varieties of bodies that are useful for the preservation and perfection of human bodies, but it does not study the relations between human (ensouled) bodies. In accordance with the secret and retired nature of government, the regime of Bensalem is hidden from view. It is not completely hidden, however. We learn that Bensalem is a monarchy, and we see its laws and deeds that regulate secrecy and erotic affairs. While the men of Salomon's House decide matters of secrecy, they do so without the science that governs the practice of secrecy.[98] Their practice of secrecy points to someone learned in political science who would adjudicate their decisions. Thus, wherever the Bensalemite regime is located, it is clear that the wisdom that guides its rule does not spring from the House of Salomon. The Bensalemite regime must perpetuate secrecy, even toward the fellows and Fathers of Salomon's House, because of the problem of human eros. It must be wondered whether the Father himself is not a servant of the one who truly rules because the true ruler alone understands the full range of human possibilities illuminated by the new science. Bacon's mention of the Father's pity[99] would, then, be doubly ironic. At the same time that its ambiguity reflects the scorn and compassion the Father feels for his sheep, it reflects the sheepishness of the Father himself.

Consideration of the possible source of wise Bensalemite rule obviously leads to a consideration of Joabin's comprehensive wisdom. If the true rule of science springs from a comprehensive understanding of science and man, then Joabin's comprehensive wisdom must be the source of the true rule of science. But Joabin's comprehensive wisdom also illuminates the fundamental and enduring problems of scientific rule. Joabin's wisdom, which reflects the harmony of speech and deed and the full range of human possibilities engendered by that harmony, illustrates the problem inherent in the very end or perfection of science itself.

The teaching about scientific rule is located in Joabin's wisdom, but that very teaching necessitates the outward incompleteness of the story. The completeness of the *New Atlantis* consists in a teaching about scientific rule that must appear to be missing. Bacon argues that the conquests of science will facilitate the subduing and overcoming "to some degree" of the "necessities and miseries" of humanity, and it is only in Joabin's political wisdom that the limit of this overcoming is to be found. The limit of the overcoming of necessity and misery does not consist in the delimitation of the human body as such; for the new science, the corruptibility of man's body is simply the jealous act of a conquerable God. Rather, the limits of the overcoming of human necessity and misery, as disclosed by Joabin's wisdom and Bensalemite rule, consist in the problematic relationships between human bodies whose desires are not limited merely to self-preservation.

The new Atlantis promises to preserve and restore the most important of the corruptible things, the human body, and so promises to preserve and restore the desires and pleasures of the human body. But as Bacon teaches in the *New Atlantis*, the preservation and restoration of desire must include the desire for more. The new science promises that human desire will be freed from the limits of the corruptible body and so from the disproportion between body and soul. The new science suggests the possibility in lived reality of what would, before the new science, be possible only in speech or imagination. The new Atlantis promises to all men what most men desire, but the teaching of the *New Atlantis* shows that the perfection of science contains possible grotesque extremes that may threaten the felicity of some or even most men. The extraordinary restraint of the sheeplike Bensalemites is necessary for the conquests of science. But if the promise of science encourages and opens the way for human conquest, it does nothing to restrain the horizons of those men who are by nature conquerors.

The combination of Bacon's open recommendation of scientific conquest with his knowledge of the fundamental moral problem of this conquest

[97] The House of Salomon contains instruments of astronomy that are kept in a "mathematical house." *Ibid.*, p. 164. The mathematical house is not a part of the "upper region" that is dedicated to the study of weather phenomena. Rather, astronomy is located in the middle region, which is the region inhabited by men, and is not accorded a highest position. Astronomy studies the heaven, then, as it affects men, but it does not study the celestial heaven, which constitutes the whole that envelops the high, the low, and the in-between. The difference between high, middle, and low is dictated simply by the location of the phenomena affecting man; in the House of Salomon, it is not a cosmic distinction. Cf. Plato, *Apology* 18b7–10, *Republic* 527d–529c3.

[98] *NA*, BW III, 165.

[99] *Ibid.*, p. 154.

was sufficient to require his prudent, circumspect, and indirect way of teaching. But the most profound and perhaps shocking reason for the apparent incompleteness or secrecy of the *New Atlantis* is its indirect teaching about those who contemplate the virtues of the new conquest and conquerors. For the wise speech that illuminates the possibilities and limits of human virtue comes from a source that represents the transgressing of those limits. The new science perfects practical life in a way that is problematic with respect to excess and moderation, but for Bacon, the nature of the theoretical life can be no basis for a defense of moderation. The very superiority of the new science consists in overcoming the distinction between theory and practice, and the *New Atlantis* teaches us that comprehensive wisdom is itself problematic precisely with respect to the possibilities of excess and moderation. The *New Atlantis* discloses that the perfection of human speech and deed, which depends on restraint and perfects humanity, points directly to human speech and deed that know no restraint and no humanity.[100] The full meaning of the promise of science is disclosed by the man who is wise in general and wise in policy: comprehensive wisdom about the meaning of science and human ends is coextensive with comprehensive political wisdom. The deepest problem of Bensalemite (scientific) rule springs from its connection to the morally unstable knowledge about conquest and moderation that illuminates the whole of which man is the constitutive part.

The comprehensively wise Joabin encompasses, in speech and potential deed, the moderation and immoderation inherent in the end of science. The speech and deed of the Baconian wise man or self-knower reveal the necessary coexistence of the moderate and the immoderate within the comprehensive good articulated by science. The speech and deed of the wise man point at one and the same time to the unified grounds of restraint and excess, moderation and immoderation. The political rule that springs from the wisest human speech and deed is necessary because of the restraint necessary for science and the regulation of human eros, and yet that speech and deed together articulate and manifest the most extreme human possibilities. The rule of science must always be unstable with respect to restraint and excess; the ironic final deed of the story is an act of double payment, an admitted excess in Bensalem.[101]

Joabin reminds us not of Socrates, but rather of Timaeus as described by Socrates. Timaeus provided the cosmogony and cosmology that preceded the account of the best city in motion,[102] the story of Athens and Atlantis. Like Timaeus, Joabin combines the excellence of policy and philosophy.[103] Like Timaeus' speech, Joabin's wise speech, which must be the final product of Bacon's great instauration, takes its bearings from the somatic and visible since, for Bacon, the only difference between image and lived reality is a temporal difference.[104] Thus Bacon, like Timaeus, views man and the cosmic whole from the standpoint of the somatic and the visible. Also like Timaeus this standpoint entails the problem of the inability of the ensouled human body to be or to imitate the body of the visible whole.[105] However, unlike Timaeus' speech, which is admittedly mythic and less than true, Bacon's speech is meant truly to illuminate lived reality. The question that arises, then, is how, for Bacon, the combination of the scientific measures of body and soul coupled with the new unconcern for astronomy and the celestial heaven produces a true science of bodies in motion.[106]

Whereas for Plato, who is Bacon's target in the *New Atlantis*, the distinction between moderate and immoderate deeds cannot be strictly demonstrated, and so is rough or indeterminate in practical life, the contemplation of the distinction between theory and practice—the contemplation of a theoretical problem—provides the sole stable ground for moderation. Thus it is the speech of the man who pursues wisdom that illuminates and buttresses the meaning of moderation. For Bacon, the speech of the man whose wisdom pursues the conquest of nature discloses the link between moderation and immoderation and subverts the stable ground of any possible moderation. Bacon teaches that comprehensive wisdom is located in political science and that political science discloses the immoderation of any moderate speech to be linked to the immoderation of any moderate deed. His teaching is breath-taking because of its audacious resoluteness. Bacon recommends that men embrace the scientific conquest of natural necessity and chance, and so urges them to embrace the necessary possibility of the most extreme moral chance. The prudent dress of Bacon's utopia is necessitated by the restraint required by science and its open promise to the many. To

[100] White misses the crucial importance of Joabin because he does not consider Joabin in the context of the literary whole of the *New Atlantis*. See above, n. 72, and White, pp. 245–46.

[101] *NA*, BW III, 165.

[102] *Timaeus* 19b3–c9.

[103] *Ibid.*, 20a2–7.

[104] *Ibid.*, 19b3–20c3, 28b2–29d3; Benardete, pp. 26–29, 32–37.

[105] Benardete, p. 63; *Timaeus* 86b1–92C3.

[106] *Timaeus* 29b–d3; *Republic* 528a9–530d2; Benardete, pp. 22, 25. The complex symbolism of the feast of the Tirsan, which extols the noblest end of science and thus the human conquest and constitution of the natural whole, can be understood only in the light of the full explication of these measures.

know and embrace the full range of scientific possibilities requires a stouter and more resolute soul. Nietzsche declared of Bacon that

> the strength required for the vision of the most powerful reality is not only compatible with the most powerful strength for action, for monstrous action, for crime—it even presupposes it. We are very far from knowing enough about Lord Bacon, the first realist in every great sense of that word, to know everything he did, wanted, and experienced in himself.

It would be a slight to both Nietzsche and Bacon to think that this remark refers to the petty transgression of bribery.[107]

The *New Atlantis* is at once the core and the prolegomenon to the whole of Bacon's teaching. Bacon's prudent way requires that once the reader discovers the completeness of the *New Atlantis*, he must turn to the whole of Bacon's teaching in the light of the *New Atlantis*. For the completeness of the *New Atlantis* is the key to the unity of Bacon's teaching about science and man. The fundamental Baconian theme is the virtue of science as the highest human activity, and this theme consists in a teaching about the nature and virtue of the conquests facilitated by science. Bacon's fundamental teaching raises the questions related to the question of conquest: the questions of self-knowledge, the relationship of the active to the contemplative life, and, ultimately, the nature of and relations between the virtues of wisdom, courage, justice, and moderation. But these questions are encompassed by the question of the best regime and the ends of political life. The *New Atlantis* and Bacon's teaching as a whole are complete because they present a new, audacious, and morally problematic stance toward the traditional questions of political philosophy.

[107] Friedrich Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, II, 4. Hobbesian political science, which forged the link between modern science and a certain, demonstrable doctrine of political rule, was directed at the Baconian problem of moderation and was based on the pretense of just such a slight.

"Virtue, Obligation and Politics," Revisited*

RICHARD M. BANK
University of California, Santa Barbara
STEVEN R. MCCARL
University of Denver

Much contemporary literature in moral philosophy discusses how concepts condition understanding, especially because they sensitize us to certain questions and exclude others. Stephen Salkever in this *Review*[1] applied this line of reasoning to political philosophy and discovered two paradigms of politics: one based on the concept of virtue (ancient political philosophy), the other resting on obligation (modern political thought). The virtue paradigm understands politics as "a relationship among individual human beings in which some public value or law takes the place of private desire as the most authoritative guide to action." The political community, then, "is that structure (or pattern of relationships) which has as its aim the development of moral virtue among its citizens."[2] This public good, moral virtue, which leads to happiness, is intelligible only if man can possess it. Good, in other words, is grounded in human nature; one cannot do ethics without doing moral psychology.[3] Furthermore, one cannot do ethics without doing politics, because whether or not the good character potential in man is developed depends upon the kind of relationships men have, which is largely determined by politics.

The politics of obligation, on the other hand, does not assume that virtue is intelligible, or needs to be intelligible, except insofar as a belief in the value of freedom (or community) might imply some kind of limited good or virtue. It is more accurate, however, to say that the value of freedom reflects a rejection of virtue as meaningful: since characterizing the good life is impossible, the value of the ends that individuals pursue cannot be assessed except insofar as they may frustrate the purposes of others. Therefore the ideal of politics is freedom—a situation in which as many individuals as possible can realize as many of their ends as possible. The uses of liberty, or the purposes for the sake of which communities may be organized are of no consequence, because those uses or purposes cannot be evaluated. The only thing humans have in common is the common pursuit of individually determined goals (or communally determined goals): politics is only of importance as a means to liberty or community, which is established by contract.[4] Thus, the only meaningful questions are "Why should I obey the state?" and "Who is to rule?," but certainly not "What is justice, or the good life?" The paradigm of obligation focuses on "the reconciliation of the requirements (needs and desires) of the individual and the requirements of society as a whole."[5] The concern about obligation reveals the view that there cannot be a political (or any sort of public) solution to the question of the best human life, and there can hardly be anything but a prudential, as opposed to a moral, obligation to the political community.[6]

Within the virtue paradigm Salkever distinguishes three qualitatively distinct life-styles—the economic, the political, and the philosophical—which also represent three potentially dominant principles of human nature. They form a hierarchy such that the political is superior to the economic, and the philosophical is superior to the political.[7] Our position is based generally on a theory of cognitive development common to John Dewey, Jean Piaget, and Lawrence Kohlberg.[8] Specif-

* The authors wish to thank Dave Bayley, Christopher Deering, Kurt Fischer, Caroline Freeman, David Paulsmeyer, Thomas Schrock, and Peter Steinberger for their critical comments on earlier versions of this article.

[1] Stephen G. Salkever, "Virtue, Obligation and Politics," *American Political Science Review*, 68 (March, 1974), 78–92.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 81 and 84.

[3] See A. C. MacIntyre, "Hume on 'Is and Ought'," reprinted in *The Is/Ought Question*, ed. William D. Hudson (London: Macmillan, 1969), p. 49.

[4] Salkever, "Virtue," p. 89.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 79.

[6] According to the obligation paradigm, the needs and desires of the individual are either not known, or not knowable, and even if to some extent they are known, they do not lead to moral virtue. Moral virtue is here understood as "the quality on account of whose presence we praise actions and characters as being good." Salkever, p. 85.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 82.

[8] See, e.g., John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct* (New York: Random House, 1930); Jean Piaget, *The Psychology of Intelligence* (Totowa, New Jersey: Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1966), and, with Barbel Inhelder, *The Psychology of the Child* (New York: Basic Books, 1969); Kurt W. Fischer, *Piaget, Learning, and Cognitive Development* (W. H. Freeman & Co., 1976); Lawrence Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive Developmental Approach to Socialization" in *Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research*, ed. David Goslin (New York: Rand McNally, 1969) and "From Is to Ought: How to Commit

Table 1. Salkever's Virtue Paradigm and Kohlberg's Cognitive-Moral Levels

The Virtue Paradigm*	Cognitive-Moral Levels**
I. *The Economic Level* Economic man is primarily concerned with the satisfaction of his selfish needs and wants. There are of course the needs common to other animals (food, self-preservation, shelter, sex, etc.), together with the range of desires unique to man, e.g., the desire to acquire material wealth. Economic man's needs are practically limitless: he is Hobbes's natural man, committed to a perpetual search for security and well-being. Accordingly, he enters into relationships only if he expects to obtain something he desires.	I. *Preconventional Level* The individual is responsive to cultural labels of good and bad, right or wrong, but he interprets these labels in terms of either the physical or hedonistic consequences of action (punishment, reward, exchange of favors), or in terms of the physical power of those who enunciate the rules and labels. Stage 1: The punishment obedience orientation. Stage 2: The instrumental relativist orientation.
II. *The Political Level or Level of Moral Virtue* Political man subordinates his selfish desires to the aims of the polis or political community. The public good replaces the private as the primary guide to action. Moral virtues such as self-control, generosity, courage and justice become important inasmuch as the possession of such virtues gives one "standing" in the community. Man enters into a political relationship because all good (moral virtue) depends on the community, and he reciprocates by serving and defending the community, its institutions and values.	II. *The Conventional Level* Maintaining the expectations of the individual's family, group or nation is perceived as valuable in its own right, regardless of the immediate and obvious consequences. The attitude is not only one of *conformity* to the social order, but of loyalty to it, of actively maintaining, supporting, and justifying the order, and of identifying with the persons or groups in it. Stage 3: The interpersonal concordance or "good boy-nice girl" orientation. Stage 4A: The "law and order" orientation. 4B: The societal value orientation.
III. *The Philosophical Level or Level of Intellectual Virtue* Philosophical man seeks intellectual virtue, i.e., the fullest possible extent of the human capacity for understanding. "He has a voracious appetite for learning. His curiosity is not like that of a craftsman who learns only what is useful in the narrow sense and whose interest is limited by his craft. The philosopher learns simply because it seems good and an end in itself." He enters into a community to learn, and because moral virtue is necessary to intellectual virtue.	III. *The Principled, Autonomous, or Postconventional Level* There is a clear effort to define moral values and principles which have validity and application apart from the authority of the groups or persons holding these principles, and apart from the individual's own identification with these groups. Stage 5A: The social-utility legalistic orientation. 5B: The higher law and conscience orientation. Stage 6: The universal ethical-principle orientation.

* Sources: Salkever, "Virtue"; the quotation describing philosophical man is from Allan Bloom, *The Republic of Plato* (New York: Basic Books, 1968), p. 392.

** Kohlberg, "From Is to Ought," pp. 164–165, 196–213; "Continuities in Childhood and Adult Moral Development," chapter 45 (manuscript) in *Moralization, The Cognitive Developmental Approach*, ed. Kohlberg and Turiel, pp. 20–41.

ically, we rely on the three levels[9] of cognitive-moral development identified by Kohlberg which parallel the three life-styles Salkever extracts from the works of Plato and Aristotle (see Table 1).[10] There are two major differences, however, between our developmental perspective and Salkever's construction and comparison of the virtue and obligation paradigms. First, for us normative

the Naturalistic Fallacy and Get Away with It in the Study of Moral Development," in *Cognitive Development and Epistemology*, ed. Theodore Mischel (New York: Academic Press, 1971).

[9] Fischer, *Piaget*.

[10] Kohlberg's own research includes a 12-year study of the same 75 boys from adolescence (ages 10–16) through young manhood (ages 22–28) at three-year intervals, plus cross-cultural studies of middle-class boys in Taiwan, Mexico, and Great Britain, together with studies of villagers in Taiwan, Malaysia, Turkey, and Yucatan. A discussion of this research can be found in "From Is to Ought," pp. 163–183. More recent studies by Kohlberg and others can be found in *Moralization, the Cognitive Developmental Approach*, ed. Kohlberg and Elliot Turiel (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973). For a critique of Kohlberg's methodology, see William Kurtines and Esther Blank Grief, "The Development of Moral Thought: Review and Evaluation of Kohlberg's Approach," *Psychological Bulletin*, 81 (August, 1974), 453–470. Kurtines and Grief argue that "the empirical utility of [Kohlberg's] model has yet to be demonstrated." While their argument deserves attention, it does not compromise the theoretical foundations upon which this article is based. For example, the same three levels of cognitive-moral development that Kohlberg identifies can be found in Dewey, "Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics," in *The Early Works*, vol. 3: *1882–1898* (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1969), especially, pp. 355–357. See also, Piaget, *The Moral Judgment of the Child* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1948).

Table 2. Definition of Kohlberg's Stages*

I. Preconventional Level

Stage 1: The punishment and obedience orientation. The physical consequences of an action determine its goodness or badness regardless of the human meaning or values of these consequences. Avoidance of punishment and unquestioning deference to power are values in their own right, not in terms of respect for an underlying moral order supported by punishment and authority (the latter being Stage 4). Stage 1 thus defines the "socio-moral" order in terms of differentials of power, status, and possessions rather than in terms of equality or reciprocity.

Stage 2: The instrumental relativist orientation. Right action consists of what instrumentally satisfies one's own needs and occasionally the needs of others. Human relations are viewed in terms such as those in the marketplace. Elements of fairness, reciprocity, and equal sharing are present, but they are always interpreted in a physical, pragmatic way. The Stage 2 sense of fairness as quantitative equality in exchange and distribution between individuals prescribes positively acts of reciprocity conceived as the equal exchange of favors or blows, or as acts of cooperation in terms of a goal of which each person gets an equal share; negatively, noninterference in the sphere of another is deemed right.

II. Conventional Level

Stage 3: The interpersonal concordance or "good boy-nice girl" orientation. Good behavior is what pleases or helps others and is approved by them. There is much conformity to stereotypical images of what is majority or "natural" behavior. The sense of justice centers on the Golden Rule ideal of imaginative reciprocity rather than exchange. Related to this is a conception of equity. Since the Stage 3 individual can take the role of others in other than concrete terms, since he can consider what he would *wish* in the other's place, equity implies that it is fair to give more to a helpless person to make up for his helplessness. Behavior is frequently judged by intention—"he means well" becomes important for the first time. The socio-moral order is conceived as primarily dyadic relations of mutual role-taking, mutual affection, gratitude, and concern for one another's approval. One earns approval by being "nice."

Stage 4A: The "law and order" orientation. The individual is oriented toward authority, fixed rules, and the maining the given social order for its own sake. Justice is defined in terms of a social order of rules and roles which are shared and accepted by the entire community, and which constitute the community. In terms of role-taking, this means that each actor must orient to the other's orientation as a part of a larger shared system to which they both belong, and to which all are oriented. Justice is no longer a matter of real or ideal reciprocity or equality between individuals as dyads, but a matter of relations between each individual and the system. Questions of positive reciprocity are questions of the relation of individual work and merit to the rewards of the system; merit should be rewarded by the system and every individual must contribute to society. Conversely, "vengeance" is the right of society and is conceived not as vengeance but as "paying one's debt to society." The equality element of justice appears primarily in terms of the uniform and regular administration of the law, and as equity in an order of merit.

Stage 4B: The societal value orientation. The individual is oriented to what is behind the rules of a given social order, e.g., to the purpose of the law and rules in terms of utility or the welfare of the majority of others, the wishes, agreement and viewpoint of the majority which lie behind the rules, and the "moral law" as the consensus of society's norms and beliefs, which may still conflict with the legal law at particular points. Still, the basic orientation is "conventional." While society's specific rules are interpreted in terms of their underlying shared values and purposes, they are reflected on from society's point of view. Society's point of view is still, itself, unquestioned, and is not, itself, reflected on from some "outside-of-society" perspective.

III. Principled Level

Stage 5A: The social-contract legalistic orientation (generally with utilitarian overtones). Right action tends to be defined in terms of general individual rights and of standards that have been critically examined and agreed upon by the whole of society. There is clear awareness of the relativism of personal values and opinions and a corresponding emphasis upon procedural rules for reaching consensus. Aside from what is constitutionally and democratically agreed upon, right action is a matter of personal values and opinions. The result is an emphasis upon the "legal point of view," but with an additional emphasis upon the possibility of changing the law in terms of rational considerations of social utility (rather than "freezing" it in terms of Stage 4). The law's function is seen as adjudicating between the rights and interests of one group of individuals as opposed to another, rather than as protecting the rights of all "decent" citizens. Outside the legal realm, free agreement and contract is the binding element of obligation. The social contract, which is the basis of the socio-moral order, is a justice conception which presupposes reciprocity of the partners to the agreement and equality between them prior to the agreement, and the form of this agreement takes priority over substantive justice, once agreement has been reached.

Stage 5B: Higher law and conscience orientation. The individual identifies morality with a conception of natural rights, i.e., rights which are naturally or intrinsically defined, such as rights of life and freedom. Society's demands

* Kohlberg, "From Is to Ought," pp. 164–165, 196–213; "Continuities," pp. 20–41.

Table 2. Continued

upon the individual are valid only to the extent that they are based on a recognition of these rights which, in effect, provide the criteria for a blueprint of society, criteria by which one law or society may be said to be better than another. Accordingly, the individual defines the socio-moral order in terms of justification. With respect to limitations of freedom, for instance, reasons must be given for constraining people in the pursuit of what they take as good.

Stage 6: The universal ethical-principle orientation. Right is defined by the decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical principles that appeal to logical comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency. These principles are abstract and ethical (the Golden Rule, the categorical imperative); they are not concrete moral rules like the Ten Commandments. At heart these are universal principles of justice, of the reciprocity and equality of human rights, and of respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons. Obligation is defined in terms of "a rational being acting as a moral agent," deciding from "a disinterested point of view that allows one to make decisions consistent with the decisions of any rational agent in a similar situation." The considerations determining one's choice are those which "any rational agent" in a similar situation should consider.

development follows a cognitive-developmental sequence, making Salkever's three life-styles not only hierarchical, but empirically sequential (in time). Secondly, Salkever juxtaposes the two paradigms, claiming that they are not mutually exclusive, they are just different perspectives from within either of which the distinctions of the other are insignificant. Our analysis of the obligation paradigm leads us to conclude that it is comparable to Salkever's political man and to Kohlberg's conventional level. Thus the obligation paradigm is better understood as a stage in a developmental theory, rather than as juxtaposed to the virtue paradigm. (Similarly, the highest activity within the virtue paradigm—philosophic man—is better understood as a higher and later stage than obligation.)

As a result of employing a cognitive-developmental framework we are able to (1) clarify the relationship between intellectual virtue (philosophic man) and moral virtue (political man)—a relationship that is obscured by Salkever's approach; (2) add a provocative dimension to the literature of political theory by considering the theories of Machiavelli, Hobbes and Locke to be expressions of the conventional level of cognitive-moral development, and by briefly considering the theories of Rawls and Rousseau as expressions of the principled level of cognitive-moral development; (3) support Salkever's case for the virtue paradigm by relating the findings of contemporary moral psychologists to the history of political thought; (4) contribute to the theoretical and empirical understanding of the nature of morals; and (5) provide theoretically promising possibilities for empirical research in the field of political philosophy.

The Developmental Approach

The label "cognitive-developmental" can be applied to a variety of specific theories of social and cognitive development, but we are most concerned with Kohlberg's theory of moral development and those theories upon which his work is largely based, viz., the theories of Dewey and Piaget. At the very least these theories share three basic assumptions: (1) development involves qualitative changes in cognitive structures, i.e., changes in the organization or pattern of thought; (2) cognitive structures result from the active interaction of the organism and the environment rather than representing different levels of maturation or learning (in the sense of a direct shaping of the organism's responses to accord with environmental structures); and (3) the direction of development of cognitive structures is toward greater equilibrium or balance between the action of the organism upon the environment and of the environment upon the organism.[11]

The notion of qualitative change presupposes a distinction between mental structure and learning in general. Structure refers to the organization, mode, or pattern of response and not to specific responses determined by familiarity.[12] Suppose, for example, two children are confronted with the task of arranging a number of sticks by length.[13] If both children *organize* the problem in the same manner, e.g., by systematically comparing one

[11] Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence," p. 348.

[12] Dewey refers to such structures as habits: "The essence of habit is an acquired predisposition to *ways* or modes of response . . . rather than bare recurrence of specific acts." *Human Nature*, pp. 40–41. Piaget and Kohlberg categorize such structures in terms of cognitive stages which form an invariant and hierarchical sequence. These stages form an order of increasingly differentiated and integrated structures to solve the same problems at different levels of complexity and abstraction. Higher stages displace (or rather reintegrate) the structures found at lower stages, and the structures of lower stages are therefore both necessary for and available at higher stages. Analogously, calculus is built upon the arithmetic skills of addition and multiplication and cannot precede them; still, the mathematician who uses calculus can also add and multiply. See Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence," p. 351.

[13] Seriation of sticks is a standard Piagetian test. It is not an easy perceptual task as the sticks are generally between $\frac{1}{4}$ and $\frac{1}{2}$ inch different in length. A discussion of procedure and the interpretation of various responses can be found in Piaget, *Genetic Epistemology* (New York: Norton, 1971), pp. 28–29.

stick to the next, there is no difference in their structural competence. If one child arranges the sticks faster than the other (but using the same procedure), we could speak of a quantitative (as opposed to qualitative) difference in their behavior, i.e., a difference in *performance*.[14] On the other hand, if one constructs his series by systematically comparing one stick to the next while the other randomly arranges the sticks and seriates them only after a number of attempts using trial and error, we could speak of a qualitative difference in mental structure.

With respect to moral judgments, qualitative novelty involves the distinction between form and content.[15] Consider the following moral dilemma:

> In Europe, a woman was near death from a very bad disease, a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium for which a druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost him to make. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could only get together about half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying, and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said, "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money from it." So Heinz got desperate and broke into the man's store to steal the drug for his wife.[16]

If, for example, two persons answer affirmatively to the question "Should Heinz have stolen the drug?," the *content* of their responses would be the same. But the underlying thought organization, the *form*, the reasons behind their respective responses may be quite different: e.g., one might respond that Heinz should steal the drug because if his wife died, he would have no one to cook and clean for him (Stage 2), while in contrast, the other might argue that a person's right to live takes precedence over the right to make a profit (Stage 5). In short, the same affirmative response may nevertheless reflect qualitative differences in moral reasoning.

On the other hand, qualitatively similar reasoning can be used to justify both stealing and not stealing the drug. An individual at Stage 4, for example, could argue that Heinz, as a husband, has a duty to steal the drug, while Heinz, as a citizen, has a duty to obey and respect the law. The form or structure of reasoning is the same in this instance while the content is different.

The development of moral reasoning, then, refers not to an increased internalization of cultural rules any more than the development of logic is an internalization of the linguistic forms of the culture.[17] Stages of moral and logical reasoning do not refer to cultural contents but rather to organizational structures which emerge from an interaction between an individual and his environment.[18] According to Piaget, in every relation between a living being and its environment, the former modifies the latter by imposing its own structure. In this way, physiologically, the organism absorbs substances and changes them into something compatible with its own substance (assimilation). An act of assimilation, however, requires that the organism adapt the structure it imposes to the substance to be absorbed and modified (accommodation). Psychologically the process is the same except the interaction is entirely functional: assimilation no longer alters assimilated objects in a physicochemical manner, but simply incorporates them into its own form of activity, and accommodation only modifies this activity.[19] In short, assimilation refers to an organism's active attempts to apply *schemes* to objects and

[14] Most social learning theories do not make distinctions between quantitative and qualitative changes in behavior because both specific acts and general cognitive categories (space, time, causality, etc.) are considered to be reflections of structures that exist outside the individual. Kohlberg writes: "[Stimulus-response theory] explains the learning of logical operations or 'truths' in terms of the same processes as those involved in learning a social dance step (which is cognitively neutral), or those involved in 'learning' a psychosis or a pattern of maze errors (which are cognitively erroneous)." "From Is to Ought," p. 152.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 230.

[16] This story is based on one of the nine dilemmas which make up the Kohlberg questionnaire most often used to assess levels of moral reasoning. Each story confronts the subject with a moral dilemma, and following each story, an interviewer asks a series of questions designed to bring out the reasoning a person uses in dealing with the dilemma. A brief account of how to use and score the Kohlberg questionnaire can be found in N. Porter and N. Taylor, "A Handbook for Assessing Moral Reasoning" (mimeograph, available from the Moral Education and Research Foundation, Harvard University).

[17] Kohlberg, "From Is to Ought," p. 194.

[18] These structures are the most basic modes of connecting experienced events—e.g., the relations of causality, substantiality, space, time, quantity, logic (referring to relations of inclusion or implication between classes or propositions), and justice (the mode of organizing role-taking experiences). See Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence," p. 350; see also Isaiah Berlin's rich essay, "Does Political Theory Still Exist," reprinted in *Contemporary Political Thought: Issues in Scope, Value, and Direction*, ed. J. A. Gould and V. V. Thursby (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969), pp. 328–357, especially pp. 350–351. If stages depended upon acquired associations, reasoning would vary by culture since different cultures teach different associations. While cultural factors cannot alter the form or sequence of development, they may speed up, slow down, or stop development, depending on the variety of experiences they generate. We discuss the types of experiences conducive to development below.

[19] Piaget, *Psychology of Intelligence*, pp. 7–8. Dewey draws the same parallel: "[H]abits are like [physiological] functions in many respects, and especially in requiring the cooperation of organism and environment. . . . [N]atural operations like breathing and digesting, acquired ones like speech and honesty, are functions of the surroundings as truly as of a person. They are things done *by* the environment by means of organic structures or acquired dispositions." *Human Nature*, p. 17.

events in the world, and accommodation refers to the adjustment of those schemes to the characteristics of the things to be known.[20]

For example, when an infant tries to pick up his rattle, he attempts to apply a particular scheme for grasping the rattle, choosing the scheme and adjusting it accordingly to the shape of the rattle. A "scheme" in this sense is an organized action or form of activity applied by an organism to its environment.[21] For Piaget, knowledge of objects and events in the world results from the equilibration of assimilation and accommodation precipitated by the organism's attempts to apply its schemes. Fischer describes this process:

> An infant comes to know objects by grasping them in his hand, and must often change the way he is holding his hand in order to grasp an unfamiliar object. He finds that different objects must be grasped in different ways, and that some (such as walls) cannot be grasped at all. In the same way that the child adjusts his hand to fit different objects, he adjusts his schemes to fit different objects and events. This modification of schemes is what produces intellectual growth.[22]

In this manner the very young infant *differentiates* his grasping scheme with respect to a variety of objects. At the same time he is differentiating a number of other schemes including his looking, hearing, and sucking schemes. Such schemes, built upon the reflexes of the newborn infant, are called primary schemes since the infant cannot yet intercoordinate or integrate these schemes with each other.[23] The infant at the level of primary schemes, for instance, can only grasp objects which his hand encounters, independent of what he sees. But as his grasping and looking schemes become more and more differentiated (as he gets better at looking and grasping), the infant begins to explore the connections between these schemes. The child may grasp his rattle out of his field of vision and, by accident at first, bring the rattle into view and look at it, or his hand may at random bump into an object at which he is already looking. In short, the environment presents the chance juxtaposition of schemes which the child then explores. Such behavior characterizes the beginning of the intercoordination of primary schemes. When the infant completes this intercoordination, we can speak of the secondary schemes grasping-in-order-to-look and looking-in-order-to-grasp.

Piaget describes this process of intercoordination or integration of schemes as reciprocal or mutual assimilation. In other words, component schemes incorporate (assimilate) and modify (accommodate) each other in order to form a higher-order consolidated scheme. The integrated or consolidated scheme represents a qualitative advance over its component schemes (secondary schemes are qualitatively different from and functionally superior to primary schemes). A consolidated scheme in turn is differentiated and becomes a component for higher-order integrations (secondary schemes are components of tertiary schemes, and so on). In this manner, differentiation and integration of cognitive structures imply an invariant and hierarchical sequence of cognitive stages.

The process is much the same with respect to the development of moral judgment, but the environment, instead of presenting the chance juxtaposition of grasping and looking schemes, etc., presents the juxtaposition of conflicting points of view or role expectations. For instance, in the story of the dying woman and the druggist, suppose Heinz has a Stage 4 orientation. Since his moral reasoning is conventional, he is primarily concerned with maintaining the social order and its institutions. If he takes the role of a husband, which implies the duty to "honor, cherish, and protect," he must steal the drug. On the other hand, if he takes the role of a citizen, he must consider the implications of stealing the drug as a generalized member of society: "If one person breaks the law for a good reason, then everyone will find good reasons, and everyone will break the law."[24] If he recognizes the juxtaposition of these role claims as a situation of competing institutional claims—to maintain the institution of marriage, he must steal the drug; to maintain society and its laws in general, he must not steal the drug—he will be unable to resolve such a conflict with Stage 4 reasoning. In other words, if he differentiates the claims of marriage as a social institution from the claims of society in more general terms, he must reintegrate or reconcile the competing claims from a broader, more universal perspective, viz., a perspective outside that of any constituted society.[25]

[20] Fischer, *Piaget*, chapter 2, p. 15 (manuscript).

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 12.

[22] *Ibid.*, pp. 12–13. For a more general account of the process of equilibration, see Dewey, *Human Nature*, pp. 81, 169–170.

[23] Piaget, *The Origins of Intelligence in Children* (New York: Norton, 1963). This means that an infant at the level of primary schemes does not associate his various sensory-motor understandings of objects and events. For example, his rattle is not a "rattle" as we understand it, but a series of unrelated *tableaux*: a sound *tableau*, a visual *tableau*, a tactile *tableau*, etc.

[24] Heinz could also take the role of his wife or the role of the druggist, but to do so at the conventional level would only define his duties as a husband and as a generalized member of society respectively.

[25] The process of reconciling competing claims, or the process of equilibration generally, can be characterized as a process of controlling anxiety at successive levels of abstraction. For a statement of this view in a number of related contexts, see Abraham H. Maslow, *Motivation*

The recognition of moral conflicts in terms of irreconcilable institutional claims characterizes the beginning of a movement from Stage 4 to Stage 5 or, more generally, a movement from conventional to principled reasoning. As this movement continues, the differentiation of distinct and contradictory institutional claims from the claims of society in general often generalizes so that competing claims between classes, sexes, generations, nations, etc., become relative to one's point of view. For instance, "from the Nazi point of view, it was justifiable to kill six million Jews." Since values become relative to one's perspective, the values of one society are considered just as arbitrary as the values of another. This relativistic tendency can become so generalized that morality becomes a question of personal preference—"it's moral for me."

An individual in transition from the conventional to the principled level, therefore, often appears to be at Stage 2, the stage of instrumental relativism. But there is a fundamental difference between Stage 2 and Stage "4½" relativists. An individual at Stage 2 makes judgments on the basis of selfish needs and wants, i.e., judgments instrumental to his wish. He is not aware of any other point of view and does not, therefore, question the validity of moral terms: good is what's good for him. On the other hand, a Stage 4½ relativist is aware of the social point of view (Stage 4) but denies its final validity in defining what the individual should do. There is an equally valid individual point of view with equally valid definitions of "good" and "right," this viewpoint not being necessarily selfish, but self-realizing, one of ethical egoism.[26]

A position of ethical egoism provides the foundation for the differentiation of individuals as human beings from their socially prescribed roles as spouses, citizens, etc. In other words, each individual comes to represent a source of equally valid definitions of what is good and right. The individual's self-centered view is thus generalized and integrated into a conception of individual rights: an individual can pursue what he believes to be good only to the extent that others respect his right to do so; he must therefore reciprocally respect the right of others to do the same. As we might suspect, Stage 5 retains a clear awareness of the relativism of personal values and opinions, but right action tends to be defined in terms of general individual rights, and society's demands are recognized as legitimate to the extent that they are based on a recognition of these rights. This recognition is ideally embodied in a social contract which presupposes reciprocity of the partners to the agreement and equality between them prior to the agreement.[27]

The movement from stage to stage is best characterized as a process of differentiation and integration. In parallel fashion it is a movement toward increased *prescriptivity* and *universality*.[28] A prescriptive moral structure is, at bottom, a principle, the validity of which does not depend on external events or conditions.[29] A universal moral structure is one which can be applied with consistency to any person, independent of his status. With respect to the moral value of human life, for example, the sequence of stages herein discussed represents a sequence of increasing prescriptivity inasmuch as the moral imperative to value life becomes increasingly independent of the factual properties of the life in question,[30] and it also defines a sequence of increasing universality inasmuch as successive stages define a wider circle of others subject to moral consideration and respect, from persons with physical and social status at Stage 1 to all of mankind at Stage 6. Because conventional morality is not fully prescriptive, it leads to internal contradictions manifest in conflicting and apparently irreconcilable institutional claims, and because it is not fully universal, it defines rights which are different for different social units: classes, races, generations, nations, etc. In contrast, principled morality resolves such conflicts in a stable, self-consistent manner.[31] According to Kohlberg, the general rule at the principled level is that, in situations of conflicting claims, the only valid claims are those consistent with the recognition of the related claims of others, and a claim is only final if one would uphold it as final no matter which role in the situation he were to play. This formula is a statement of reversible or equilibrated role-taking,[32] i.e., it provides a

and Personality (New York: Harper & Row, 1954), Ernest Becker, *The Birth and Death of Meaning*, 2nd ed. (New York: Free Press, 1971), and Erik H. Erikson, *Identity: Youth and Crisis* (New York: Norton, 1968), pp. 15–44, 91–141.

[26] Kohlberg, "Continuities," p. 25.

[27] *Ibid.*

[28] Kohlberg, "From Is to Ought," p. 185.

[29] For Kohlberg, "the increasingly prescriptive nature of more mature moral judgments is reflected in the series of differentiations . . . of 'is' and 'ought' (or of morality as internal principles from external events and expectations)." *Ibid.*, p. 184.

[30] The value of a person's life is successively differentiated from the value of his property possessions, his "usefulness," his family, his nation, and his individual rights, so that at Stage 6 his life is valued in-and-of-itself, independent of any other considerations. *Ibid.*, pp. 168–169.

[31] *Ibid.*, pp. 185, 213. With respect to the "Heinz example," the druggist's claim to withhold property at the expense of a life is not reversible, i.e., he could not have recognized this claim as valid in the wife's role; on the other hand, the wife's claim to life at the expense of property rights is a valid claim which she could recognize if she were to switch roles with the druggist. *Ibid.*, p. 213.

[32] Piaget writes: " . . . development [must be] regarded as an evolution governed by an inherent need for equi-

mechanism which insures that, in situations of conflicting claims, the solution can be shared by all the actors, assuming none of them know which role in the situation they occupy. The structure of this mechanism is the structure of the principle of justice as fairness, elaborated by John Rawls among others.[33]

Of course, Salkever includes Rawls among the modern political theorists in the obligation paradigm.[34] He questions the applicability of Rawls's theory of justice to the virtue paradigm primarily because of Rawls's claim that the question of the best life for man cannot be rationally or objectively answered.[35] Rawls's position with respect to the best life for man, however, presents no problems from our developmental perspective. In the first place, we use Rawls's statement of justice as fairness to define the structure, not the specific content, of principled thought (our term) or intellectual virtue (Salkever's term). The essential function of structure is organizational. Richard Peters writes: "Fundamental principles of morality such as fairness and the consideration of interests only give us general criteria of relevance for determining moral issues. They prescribe what sorts of considerations are to count as reasons."[36]

Justice as fairness, or structure or reason (rationality) in general, then, while not *sufficient* to answer the question of the best life for man, is clearly *necessary*.

Second, the principle of justice as fairness is not a simple extension of economic or rational choice —and thus irrelevant to questions of good or virtue—as Salkever suggests.[37] The principle of justice as fairness in fact presupposes the virtue paradigm to the extent that it depends on at least a minimal definition of good, a point of which Rawls himself is quite aware.[38] While justice cannot prescribe precisely what we ought to do, still it rules out certain courses of action and sensitizes us to the features of a situation which are morally relevant.[39] In this regard Dorothy Emmet argues against the claim advanced by Professor Hare and others that "universalizability,"—the rule "treat relevantly like cases alike and relevantly different cases differently"—as a strictly formal criterion, is constitutive of moral judgment. She maintains that an appeal to relevance amounts to adopting the substantive notion of fairness. Moreover, understood as impartiality in applying moral principles, universalizability takes on the substantive moral character of fairness. In other words, there is no reason to treat relevantly like cases alike, other than consistency, which is no reason at all, unless we first postulate fairness as good or right in-and-of-itself.[40]

Finally, Salkever's claim that Rawls's theory of justice cannot objectively answer the question of the best life for man is at best irrelevant to his claim that justice as fairness is inapplicable to the virtue paradigm, for the question of the best life cannot, even from within the virtue paradigm, be answered objectively. Indeed, the Greek notion of a life of intellectual virtue depends on the subjective experience of good for its content. Such experience, however, presupposes the structure of principled thought, so that from the Greek view, to achieve intellectual virtue is *at least* to achieve Stage 6 autonomy.[41]

---

librium." *Psychology of Intelligence*, p. 49. The same concept can be found in Dewey, *Human Nature*, especially pp. 169–170.

[33] John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971).

[34] As he does with Rawls, Salkever tends to place Rousseau in the obligation paradigm, although he admits the latter sometimes employs the language of virtue, Salkever, "Virtue," pp. 85, 92 (footnote 60). We understand both Rawls and Rousseau in terms of the virtue paradigm. Rousseau's theory of the general will is in fact fundamentally equivalent to Rawls's theory of justice as fairness. Rousseau writes: "The undertakings which bind us to the social body are obligatory only because they are mutual; and their nature is such that in fulfilling them we cannot work for others without working for ourselves. Why is it that the general will is always in the right, and that all continually will the happiness of each one, unless it is because there is not a man who does not think of 'each' as meaning him, and considers himself in voting for all?" *Social Contract*, trans. G. D. H. Cole (New York: Dutton, 1950). II.iv., p. 29. For a discussion of the structural nature of the general will, see, e.g., I. vii., p. 17; II. iv., p. 29; II. vi., pp. 35, 37; also, Allan Bloom, "Jean-Jacques Rousseau," in *History of Political Philosophy*, ed. Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963), p. 524. Salkever's paradigmatical scheme cannot account for Rousseau's use of the language of legitmacy and his ambiguity about the best life for man without placing him in the obligation paradigm. We understand Rousseau's concepts of legitimacy and the good life in connection with the general will, and thus within the virtue paradigm. Authority is legitimate for Rousseau only to the extent that it expresses the general will, and the life of virtue must certainly include as a minimum obedience to the general will (or legitimate authority).

[35] See Salkever, "Virtue," pp. 78 (footnote 4), 80 (footnote 13), 82 (footnote 20).

[36] Richard S. Peters, "Concrete Principles and the Rational Passions," in *Moral Education*, ed. Nancy F. and T. R. Sizer (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 33.

[37] Salkever, "Virtue," p. 81 (footnote 19).

[38] See Rawls, *Justice*, sec. 60.

[39] Peters, "Concrete Principles," p. 34.

[40] Dorothy Emmet, *Rules, Roles, and Relations* (London: Macmillan, 1966), chap. 4. For Hare's argument, see R. M. Hare, *Freedom and Reason* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), and "Universalizability," in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1954–55.

[41] This is not to suggest that in the Greek view there is no objective good unique to man's nature, only that to understand that good requires its subjective experience. See our discussion of moral understanding, below. More generally, any ethic at the principled level will have some content built into it—this is Emmet's point. We claim only that the Greek concept of intellectual virtue, Kohl-

The fact that justice as fairness emerges as the most basic principle of organizing role-taking experiences at Stage 6 provides concrete meaning to the developmental assumption that the principles of moral reasoning emerge from an interaction between the self and the social environment. It is clear that a sense of justice would not develop without the experience of social interaction, i.e., without opportunities to take the role of others. Justice, then, does not reflect the preprogrammed tendencies of a biological organism. But neither is it a direct expression of the structure of the environment, a rule imposed from the outside. It is rather the expression of an ideal equilibrium between the actions of the self toward others and the actions of others toward the self. According to Piaget, "the rule of justice is a sort of imminent condition of social relationships or a law governing their equilibrium."[42] If we then accept the developmental assumption that moral principles emerge from an interaction between the self and the social environment, it follows that there should be elements of justice present from the beginnings of moral behavior, and this is in fact the case.

The concept of justice at the preconventional level is a functional extension of the private aims of economic man. Since his is primarily a selfish motivation, economic man enters into social relationships only if such relationships promote the satisfaction of his personal needs and wants.[43] He makes a charitable contribution, for example, not for the benefit of the underprivileged, but as a tax write-off, and he attributes such motivation to others as well. Accordingly, justice at this level operates in a concrete fashion, as the quantitative equality of exchange, and as reciprocal relationships implied by the expression "you scratch my back, I'll scratch yours."[44] While reciprocal relationships continue only so long as they remain useful, within such relationships there is a sense of obligation to fulfill one's end of the bargain, a duty which defines the corresponding right of "eye-for-an-eye" retribution. Justice at this level is the justice of the marketplace and the justice of thieves.[45]

Eventually economic man comes at least to the practical recognition that society and its institutions, formal and informal, are instrumental to the satisfaction of his private needs and wants. So, without forming any critical theory of institutions, without considering whether they are what they should be, he identifies himself, his own life, with the social forms and ideals in which he lives, and repels any attack upon them as he would an attack upon himself.[46] "The demands which the existing institutions make upon him," writes Dewey, "are not felt as the coercions of a despot, but as expressions of his own will, and requiring loyalty as such."[47] Economic man thus becomes political man and, accordingly, justice no longer operates as a matter of concrete reciprocity or equality between individuals, but in terms of the relations between each individual and the system.[48] Kohlberg provides the following description of the Stage 4 concepts of justice:

> Questions of positive reciprocity are questions of the relations of individual work and merit to rewards of the system, "a good day's work for a good day's pay"; merit should be rewarded by the system and every individual must contribute to society. Accordingly, Stage 4 positive reciprocity is exchange of reward for effort or merit, not interpersonal exchange of goods or services. Negative reciprocity is even more clearly centered on the social system: vengeance is the right of society and is conceived not as vengeance but as "paying your debt to society." The equality element of justice appears primarily in terms of the uniform and regular administration of the law, and as equity in an order of merit. Social inequality is allowed where it is reciprocal to effort, moral conformity, and talent, but unequal favoring of the "idle" and "immoral," poor, students, etc., is strongly rejected.[49]

The most basic principle of justice at the principled level is equality or distributive justice, the principle that "none should be held to have a claim to better treatment than another, in advance of good grounds being produced."[50] Questions of reciprocity at this level are nothing more than questions of mutual respect. Equality and reciprocity at this level are the substantive essence of justice as fairness and, taken together, imply the imperative to treat each individual as an end in himself.[51]

---

berg's Stage 6, Rawls's justice as fairness, and Rousseau's general will are structurally compatible, despite any differences in content. See footnote 62, below.

[42] Piaget, *Moral Judgment*, p. 196, Kohlberg, "From Is to Ought," p. 194.

[43] See Salkever's account of economic man, "Virtue," pp. 80–81.

[44] Kohlberg, "From Is to Ought," p. 164.

[45] The expressions "let the buyer beware" and "honor among thieves" might be said to be statements of preconventional justice since they imply reciprocal relationships governed by preconventional concepts of obligation and retribution. Also relevant here are the descriptions of "traditional" societies found in Jean Duvignaud, *Change at Shebika: Report from a North African Village* (New York: Vintage Books, 1970); Clifford Geertz, *Peddlers and Princes: Social Development and Economic Change in Two Indonesian Towns* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1963); and Edward C. Banfield, *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society* (New York: Free Press, 1958).

[46] Dewey, "Critical Theory of Ethics," p. 356.

[47] *Ibid.*

[48] Kohlberg, "From Is to Ought," p. 199.

[49] *Ibid.*

[50] This particular statement of the equality principle is taken from S. I. Benn and R. S. Peter, "Justice and Equality," in *The Concept of Equality*, ed. William T. Blackstone (Minneapolis, Minn.: Burgess, 1969), p. 57.

[51] According to Andrew Reck, the concept of equality

Movement from level to level (or stage to stage) depends on the opportunities for role-taking afforded by the social environment. Role-taking most generally refers to two interrelated processes: the reaction to others as like the self, and the reaction to the self's behavior from the others' point of view.[52] An individual in short must be able to think of himself in the shoes of another. Now it is very difficult for a master to think of himself in the role of his slave, less difficult for an officer to imagine himself as a private, and still less difficult for two players on opposing baseball teams to reverse their roles. This might suggest that baseball players can imaginatively switch roles only because they themselves are familiar with the role of the other. But more basically it suggests that role-taking depends on the *shareability* of roles. The master will never be the slave, nor will the slave be the master. Accordingly, master-slave relationships offer few opportunities for role-taking since neither party can easily imagine himself in the role of the other. More generally, "the *shareability* of rules and role expectations in an institution or social unit," writes Kohlberg, "rests centrally upon a justice structure underlying specific rule and role definitions."[53] In a negative sense, rules and roles which are *not* grounded in justice do not have the quality of shareability since their very nature is arbitrary: they do not exist apart from those who enunciate the rules and fill the roles. It follows that institutions better organized in terms of justice provide greater opportunities for role-taking and, consequently, for development as well.[54] From a developmental point of view, then, the political problem is one of providing just institutions, a view shared by the ancient Greeks.[55] In fact, the Greeks may have been the first cognitive-developmental psychologists.

At any rate it is clear that the notion of development had a pervasive influence on the whole of Greek philosophy and psychology. Indeed, Robert Nisbet argues that the metaphor of growth became the basis of the entire Greek world view. In this regard he quotes Professor Sambursky:

> The Greek remained closely attached to the cosmos as the result of his viewing the cosmos as a living organism, a body that can be understood and comprehended in its entirety. The Greek had a profound awareness which was characterized by his biological approach to the world of matter. The teleological principle is essentially biological and anthropomorphic, so that the first basis for the conception of order in the universe was found in the system of the world of living things.[56]

For Nisbet, the concept of *physis* best summarizes the Greek preoccupation with growth and development. He writes: "If the nature of a thing is how it

"presupposes metaphysically: 1) that each man is an independent, continuant, individual entity or substance, and 2) that each man partakes of the same essential humanity with other men." Reck, "Metaphysics of Equality," in *The Concept of Equality*, ed. Blackstone, p. 139. If we consider these propositions as worthy of respect, thus combining the principle of equality and reciprocity as mutual respect, it follows that we ought to treat individuals as ends. Along these same lines, Paul Tillich writes: "The relation of equality and justice depends on the power of being in a man and his corresponding claim for justice. . . . What is decisive is only that man is considered as a deliberating, deciding, responsible person. Therefore one had better speak of the principle of personality as a principle of justice. The content of this principle is the demand to treat every person as a person." *Love, Power, and Justice: Ontological Analyses and Ethical Applications* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 59–60.

[52] George H. Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934) and James Mark Baldwin, *Thoughts and Things* (New York: MacMillan, 1906), 3 vols. Corresponding to the two processes of role-taking are the notions that moral judgments are based on sympathy for others and that the moral judge must adopt the perspective of an "impartial spectator" or a "generalized other." Kohlberg, "From Is to Ought," p. 190. It is an easy step from here to the claim that justice represents an ideal equilibrium of social interaction if one avoids the pitfalls of the utilitarian maximization principle. According to Rawls, decisions by the "impartial spectator" for utilitarians in general are those which maximize the total sum of happiness. Such decisions almost by definition "short-change" some individuals and are not, therefore, consistent with the process of reacting to others like the self. Rawls, *Justice*, sec. 5.

[53] "From Is to Ought," p. 193. This idea is also central to Hart's justification of the equality principle. Hart argues that any system of morality which incorporates a notion of "rights" presupposes the equality principle. H. L. A. Hart, "Are There Any Natural Rights?" in *Society, Law, and Morality*, ed. Frederick A. Olafson (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1961). For a discussion of Hart's argument, see William T. Blackstone, "On the Meaning and Justification of the Equality Principle" in *The Concept of Equality*, p. 129. In this same regard, Rawls writes: "The primary subject of justice is the basic structure of society, or more exactly, the way in which social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation." *Justice*, p. 7.

[54] Just institutions *per se* may not be enough to generate the opportunities for role-taking necessary for development to the principled or even conventional levels. The institutions of a given social environment must be varied so as to provide, not just opportunities for interpersonal relationships, but a matrix of complex interactions. The fact that the populations of many "traditional" societies remain for the most part at the preconventional level can thus in part be explained. Kohlberg's own research in two isolated villages supports this view. Kohlberg, "From Is to Ought," p. 173. Other examples can be found in Duvignaud, *Change at Shebika*, Geertz, *Peddlers and Princes*, and Banfield, *Moral Basis of a Backward Society*. In one setting—Shebika—the case can be made that the role-taking opportunities generated by the presence of Duvignaud's research team precipitated a general movement from preconventional to conventional thought. See Duvignaud, *Shebika*, especially pp. 297–298.

[55] See especially Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* Book 10.

[56] S. Sambursky, *Physical World of the Greeks*, tr. Merton Dagut (New York: MacMillan, 1956), pp. 241–242, cited in Robert A. Nisbet, *Social Change and History: Aspects of the Western Theory of Development* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 21.

grows, and if everything in the universe, physical and social alike, has a *physis* of its own, a distinctive way of growing, a life-cycle, then the task of the philosopher or scientist is clear. It is to find out what the *physis* is of each thing: to learn its original condition, its successive stages of development, the external factors such as water, light, and heat, that affect it, and, finally, what its 'end' is; that is, its final form, the form which may be said to be the ultimate 'cause' of it all."[57] The cognitive-developmental account of moral development, we might suggest, presupposes the notion of *physis*: given the biological organism we call *homo sapiens*, the development of intelligence in general and moral reasoning in particular follows a formal pattern of differentiation and integration, defining successive and qualitatively distinct stages of development; it depends on opportunities for role-taking afforded by the external environment; and it tends toward an ideal equilibrium or final form of justice.[58] But not only is developmental theory compatible with the concept of *physis* or an expression of it, a cognitive-developmental approach is at least useful if not necessary to an explication of the Greek notion of social reform.

Any psychological theory of development must account for the roles of both the organism and the environment. There are essentially three possibilities: either development proceeds primarily from the organism (nativistic, innate, maturational theories), from the environment (stimulus-response, social learning, associationistic theories), or from an interaction of the two (cognitive-developmental theories).[59] The theoretical differences between these three broad streams of thought are often subtle, matters of emphasis and interpretation. But a practical analysis of each approach, a study of their social and political implications, reveals that the differences are quite real.

If we assume that social and political institutions differ in their capacity to fulfill the "public good," i.e., that from a moral perspective some are more desirable than others (an assumption the Greeks clearly make), it follows that social reform is a moral matter and, in turn, that the determinants of moral conduct also determine the direction and degree of social change. Accordingly, if the moral is a product of human nature, if it flows from that which is native or innate, then social change must follow changes in human nature: good men *make* good institutions. If, on the other hand, the moral is an expression of the effects of social institutions upon men (the environmental position) social change must precede changes in human nature: good men *presupposes* good institutions. In contrast, if moral conduct is not an expression entirely of human nature or environmental influence, but the product of the interaction of the two, then social progress can originate from two sources: from within man and from without.

It is just such an argument which John Dewey employs to justify an interactional theory of development. For Dewey, neither the innate nor the environmental position offers a practical solution to social ills: the former relies on "an appeal to inner rectitude and benevolence" to elicit change, while the latter "throws us back upon accident, usually disguised as a necessary law of history or evolution, and trusts to some violent change, symbolized by civil war, to usher in an abrupt millennium."[60] But this argument is not Dewey's alone. We can, for example, find the same case in Aristotle's *Ethics*.[61] In his discussion of ethics and politics, Aristotle outlines a theory of social reform which appears to be based on an argument with no end, a vicious circle. A good polis, he writes, depends on good legislation which in turn depends on wise legislators. A wise legislator is one who knows the good, but he only comes to know the good if he is properly brought up and educated in good habits. To be properly brought up, however, requires participation in good institutions; in other words, a proper education depends on a good polis, which in turn depends on good legislation, and so on, *ad infinitum*. The only way to make sense of this argument is to assume that the good is a product of the interaction between man and his environment, for then change can originate both from within man and from within his social environment.

In brief, the Greek view of human nature and development is more than compatible with our

[57] Nisbet, *Social Change*, p. 22. For a standard interpretation of *physis*, see Strauss and Cropsey, *History of Political Philosophy*, 2nd. ed., p. 3.

[58] See Dewey, *Human Nature*, pp. 258–259.

[59] Maturational and environmental theories can be respectively described as involving primarily *assimilation* or *accommodation*. See Kohlberg, "The Concepts of Developmental Psychology as the Central Guide to Education," a paper presented at the Conference on Psychology and the Process of Schooling in the Next Decade: Alternative Conceptions, Minneapolis, Minn., pp. 2–3. According to the cognitive-developmental view, maturation serves to open up new possibilities, thus it constitutes a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the appearance of certain cognitive structures. The possibilities thus opened up need to be fulfilled, and for this to occur, the maturation must be reinforced by functional exercise and a minimum of experience. Piaget and Inhelder, *The Psychology of the Child*, p. 154.

[60] Dewey, *Human Nature*, pp. 10–11.

[61] Aristotle *Ethics* Book 10. With respect to Plato's conception of social reform, it can be argued that an interactional account represents an underlying premise of the *Republic*. The philosopher-kings who are to construct the "ideal" state must develop their knowledge of good without the benefit of the good institutions of such a state. But on the other hand, Socrates and Glaucon hope to derive the meaning of justice from the institutions of the Republic.

cognitive-developmental account: it is equivalent to an early expression of this theory.[62] Accordingly, the viture paradigm described by Salkever fits neatly into our developmental scheme. For Salkever there are three potentially dominant principles of human nature, each corresponding to a way of life: "If the economic life is dominated by the love of self (or of life), and the political life by love of city (and of having a 'good name' in the city), the philosophic life is controlled by the love of truth or being."[63] These three ways of life correspond respectively to the three levels of development—preconventional, conventional and principled (Table 1)—and they form not only a hierarchy but an invariant ontogenetic sequence of development as well. In the following section we demonstrate that the obligation theory of politics is an expression of conventional thought, i.e., that the virtue paradigm includes within it the obligation paradigm. In this regard we show that Machiavelli, Hobbes and Locke—all obligation theorists—base their political aims on a vision of man at the conventional level or below.[64]

The Politics of Obligation as Conventional Thought

Machiavelli has the classical view of the relationship between politics and ethics. This position is concisely described by Isaiah Berlin: "Since men are beings made by nature to live in communities, their communal purposes are the ultimate values from which the rest are derived, or with which their ends as individuals are identified. . . . Ethics . . . cannot be known save by understanding the purpose and character of the polis. . . ."[65] The point is that without a political community men are nothing, for only within a political community will common public notions of excellence arise, thereby making it possible for men to excel—to attain virtue. Virtuosity in politics is the virtuosity of the performing artist rather than the creative artist; it is action in the presence of an audience: the performance itself. The political community is the stage, the audience and the performers, in a manner of speaking. Virtuosity is the expression of politics.[66]

Machiavelli is concerned about what is good for man, but he is not willing to go beyond saying that a political community is good. The political community is good because without it no good of any kind is possible. There is also the thesis that the presence of a political community must entail some degree of such universal values as safety of life, individual freedom, and protection from deliberately inflicted harm, and that it is such values that make a political community worthwhile to human beings. It is even arguable, as H. L. A. Hart puts it, "that a human society in which these values are not recognized at all in its morality is neither an empirical nor a logical possibility, and that even if it were, such a socety could be of no practical value for human beings."[67] Machiavelli comes very close to this position when, in discussing whether or not cruelty is conducive to political stability, he says:

> I believe that this depends on whether cruelty is used well or ill. It may be said to be used well (if we may speak of using well a thing in itself bad) when all cruel deeds are committed at once in order to make sure of the state and thereafter discontinued to make way for the consideration of the welfare of the subjects. Bad use of cruelty we find in most cases where the cruel acts, though few to begin with, become more numerous with time. Those who practice the first kind may find some defense for their state in the eyes of God and man, but as far as the second class, it is impossible for them to stay in power.[68]

Nevertheless Machiavelli does not look upon politics as an educational process leading to moral virtue, where moral virtue entails a perspective by which to evaluate virtuosity—a perspective beyond the community (or conventional level). Machiavelli's consuming interest is the creation and maintenance of political structure.[69] By default good becomes either having a "good name" in the city (which signifies the support of the politi-

[62] The major difference between the Greek view, i.e., the virtue paradigm, and the cognitive-developmental perspective is that, from the latter point of view, the Greeks confuse form and content. For example, "intellectual virtue" has content built into it, while Stage 6 is primarily structural or organizational in character. Still, the structural component of intellectual virtue is the structure of Stage 6.

[63] Salkever, "Virtue," p. 82.

[64] Since later stages of development are reintegrations of earlier stages, the latter are both necessary for and available to the former. See footnote 12, above. Thus, while the politics of obligation is justified primarily at the conventional level, it is possible to appeal for support to the preconventional level, as Hobbes and Locke do (see Table 3).

[65] Isaiah Berlin, "The Question of Machiavelli," in *New York Review of Books*, 17 (November 4, 1971), p. 23.


[66] Hannah Arendt, "What is Freedom?" in *Between Past and Future* (Cleveland, Ohio: World Publishing Company, 1963), p. 153. Arendt also makes the interesting point that Christianity understood goodness to consist of acts unrecognized by secular man as good: only in the eyes of God, so to speak, were they recognized. Goodness then was unvirtuous, which helps explain Machiavelli's animosity to the church. Arendt summarizes: " . . . the problem of religious rule over the secular realm was inescapably this: either the public realm corrupted the religious body and thereby became itself corrupt, or the religious body remained uncorrupt and destroyed the public realm (virtuosity) altogether." Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 77.

[67] H. L. A. Hart, *Law, Liberty, and Morality* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1963), p. 70.

[68] Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*, ed. Thomas G. Bergin (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1947), pp. 25–26.

[69] *Ibid.*, p. 52.

Table 3. The Politics of Obligation in Perspective: The Developmental View



cal community) or being a virtuoso (which signifies a thriving political community).

On the other hand Machiavelli argues neither that might makes right nor that politics should serve private interests. So while he is not at the principled level, he is also not at the preconventional level. Might is not justifiable as a goal; it is justifiable only in connection with the creation and maintenance of political community. Virtuosity is justifiable as an end, but it is not possible without politics. The same can be said of might, understood as virtuosity, keeping in mind the kind of limitations mentioned in connection with cruelty. Neither optimistic, nor nihilistic, Machiavelli is a modified obligation theorist who fits into the virtue-developmental paradigm at the conventional level (see Table 3).[70]

Hobbes, too, is preoccupied with the political order, but his analysis of the sources of disorder and his prescriptions for dealing with disorder distinguish him from Machiavelli. First, like Machiavelli, Hobbes does not make might equivalent to right. He maintains validity of moral judgment: power does in fact determine what happens, but power does not make it right. Leo Strauss points this out by noting that Hobbes distinguishes between unjust vanity and just fear of violent death. Had he not done so he would be in the naturalist camp where man's natural appetites —all his passions, especially vanity—are as justified by nature as is reason.[71] For Hobbes, power based on appetite cannot make itself right. Yet power as "common power"—political structure—is the source of all right, because only it can ultimately check private individual desires; practically and theoretically speaking, without it appetite and reason become equally valid.

> To this warre of every man against every man, this also is consequent: that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice have there no place. Where there is no common power, there is no law: where no law, no injustice. Force, and fraud, are in warre the two cardinall vertues. Justice and injustice are none of the faculties neither of the body, nor mind. If they were, they might be in a man that were alone in the world, as well as his senses, and passions. They are qualities, that relate to men in society, not in solitude.[72]

In one respect Hobbes seems to assume a preconventional level: fear is the motive behind the reason upon which the political structure exists. On the other hand, reason is more justifiable than vanity according to nature, which does not indicate

[70] Machiavelli's views of human nature also put him in the middle, at the conventional level. His analysis of power shows that political structure is realistic, but human beings are too wicked to make the principled level realistic. For the former, see *The Prince*, pp. 24–26, 34, 52; for the latter, *ibid.*, pp. 44–45, 48, 51.

[71] Leo Strauss, *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), p. viii.

[72] Hobbes, *Leviathan* (New York: Dutton, Everyman's Library, 1914), p. 66. For similar passages in *Leviathan* supporting and enlarging this theme, see pp. 70, 74, 88–89, 116.

an "ethics" based on power (see Table 1). Hobbes seems to be both within and above the preconventional level.

Seen from the postconventional level, in terms of the relationship of the principled or autonomous level to the "common power" (the political order), Hobbes's statements on human nature do not warrant concluding that the cultivation of reason and truth through mutual respect, openness, and reciprocity will lead to justice.[73] On the contrary, we think Irene Coltman's statement accurately reveals Hobbes's rejection of the principled level:

> Their [referring to such moderate advisors to the King as Falkland and Clarendon] devotion to good causes was to Hobbes a method of rebellion. Their search for truth was a way of being disobedient just as the desire to know good and evil was the primal act of disobedience. They said that ideals transcended patriotism, in order to justify their treachery and they made themselves the sole judge of what ideals they would follow: ideals that emanated from themselves and sanctified their impulses. The good king, to them, was one who had surrendered his kingship by giving up his absolute authority. The good man was the bad citizen who followed his private truth and went his own way. Insanely complacent about letting the social order fall apart, intellectuals and all private men who claimed this sort of freedom were, Hobbes thought, the enemies of society and of civilization.[74]

The distance between Hobbes and the principled level of the virtue paradigm is evident in other interpretations of Hobbes as well. Norman Jacobson, for example, finds in the *Leviathan* not the virtue paradigm's position that there is a good for man suitable to his nature, but the notion that man can master his nature. Man accomplishes this by the power of language—man's creation, not God's or nature's. Through the creation of a scientific language the problem of order is solved. Henceforth to discuss politics is to discuss geometry; there is no time for the passions that give rise to conflicts and disorder. Objective, precise, neutralizing science becomes Leviathan. The principled or autonomous level is nowhere to be found.[75]

Hobbes occupies a middle ground between the preconventional and the principled levels.[76] No better statement to this effect exists than Strauss's:

> For, by starting from "right" and thus denying the primacy of "law" (or, what amounts fundamentally to the same, of "virtue"), Hobbes makes a stand against the idealistic tradition. On the other hand, by basing morals and politics on "right," and not on purely natural inclinations or appetites, Hobbes makes a stand against the naturalistic tradition. That is to say, the principle of "right" stands midway between strictly moral principles (such as those of the traditional natural law, on the one hand, and purely natural principles (such as pleasure, appetite, or even utility) on the other.[77]

The function of politics for Locke, as Salkever points out, is the protection of privately determined enterprises:

> The commonwealth seems to me to be a society of men constituted only for the procuring, preserving and advancing their own civil interests. Civil interests I call life, liberty, health and indolency of body; and the possession of outward things, such as money, lands, houses, furniture and the like.[78]

This position is largely a result of Locke's views of man and philosophy.[79] "What is good for man?" is not only a question beyond man's capacity to answer, it is politically irrelevant, as the practical solution is public policy that conforms to community standards. Two comments by Locke help to show this:

> We are not born in heaven but in this world, where our being is to be preserved with meat, drink, and clothing, and other necessaries that are not born with us, but must be got and kept with forecast, care and labour, and therefore we cannot be all devotion, all praises and hallelujahs, and perpetually in the vision of things above . . .[80]

[73] See especially *Leviathan*, pp. 51–54, 64, 88.

[74] Irene Coltman, *Private Men & Public Causes: Philosophy & Politics in the English Civil War* (London: Faber & Faber Limited, 1962), pp. 22–23. See also pp. 140, 161, 189–191. From within the developmental paradigm Hobbes's reaction to people like Falkland and Clarendon is justified; they do not represent an authentic Stage 6. Martin Luther King and Socrates would be authentic examples, because principled thought must include as well as surpass previous stages—loyalty to the political order (conventional level) must be maintained at the same time that principles are. Morality does not transcend the political realm; the political realm is the schoolhouse of morality.

[75] Norman Jacobson, *Thomas Hobbes as Creator* (New York: General Learning Press, 1971).

[76] The function of politics for Hobbes, according to Table 3, is "order for the sake of civil society." It is true that civil society is worthwhile because of the values it promotes—industry, culture, navigation, knowledge, arts and letters, freedom, etc. Hobbes's concern seems to be that when those values become uppermost in men's minds, then the pursuit of them may undermine civil society. It is for this reason we describe Hobbes's position as order for the sake of civil society.

[77] Leo Strauss, *Hobbes*, p. viii.

[78] Locke, *A Letter Concerning Toleration*, citation in Salkever, "Virtue," p. 87. Sheldon Wolin makes the interesting point that liberal man is not so much acquisitive as he is ultra-sensitive to his social position, which is dependent upon property. Acquisitiveness results from the fear of losing status in the eyes of the community—a Stage 4 position. Wolin, *Politics & Vision* (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown, & Co., 1960), p. 328. On the political significance of property as economic growth, see Robert Goldwin, "John Locke," in *History of Political Philosophy*, 2nd ed., ed. Strauss and Cropsey, pp. 469–470.

[79] John Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, ed. Peter Laslett (New York and Toronto: The New American Library, Inc., 1965), p. 396. In these passages Locke describes man as too biased to receive the plain and intelligible standards of right and wrong in the law of nature.

[80] Wolin, *Politics*, p. 298, citing H. R. Fox-Bourne, *The*

And thus all private judgment of every particular member being excluded, the community comes to be umpire, by settled standing rules, indifferent, and the same to all parties.[81]

These views culminate in the liberal position (see Adam Smith and Spencer, for example) of distributing goods by the impersonal judgment of the market mechanism, rather than by a standard of justice. This position emphasizes freedom, but without concern for evaluating what courses of action result from freedom; it is the obligation paradigm par excellence. It also describes the conventional level, because it does not offer standards or methods to define moral values and principles which have validity and application apart from the authority of the groups or persons holding these principles, and apart from the individual's own identification with these groups. This is readily apparent in the emphasis Locke places on society:

The first and fundamental natural law . . . is the preservation of society. . . . [82] [But the preservation of society is motivated by the desire for self-preservation:] The first and strongest desire God planted in man, and wrought into the very principle of their nature, being that of self-preservation. . . . [83]

Self-preservation as the means to peace and preservation is not a theory of good or obligation that goes very far. Where the preservation of the society is at odds with the preservation of the individual, society must be obeyed because without society, i.e., without a set of mutual expectations based on trust, without order, freedom would not exist.[84] But where the individual's life, and his freedom, therefore, is at stake this argument breaks down. Every theory exclusively committed to freedom encounters a dead end, because it does not offer a means of choosing between conflicting purposes (the presence of conflicting purposes is evidence of the existence of freedom).

Where the virtue paradigm sees reason and justice as man's ends (to be served by the passions) Locke sees the passion of self-preservation. From self-preservation he arrives at freedom, but he can go no further. There is no doubt that he is not at the principled level: even the questions which lead to autonomy (Stage 6) are superfluous for Locke.

Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Locke stop short of virtue; they do not see politics as education for justice. Given our interactional theory—moral conduct is an expression of the interaction of human nature and environment—then their historical circumstances help to explain why they set their sights no higher. But in more fortunate times, as in the case of classical Greece and perhaps, we venture to say, of contemporary western civilization,[85] politics can be looked upon as a process for moral development, no better expression of which can be found than that by John Dewey:

When we observe that morals is at home wherever considerations of the worse or better are involved, we are committed to noting that morality is a continuing process not a fixed achievement. Morals means growth of conduct in meaning; at least it means that kind of expansion in meaning which is consequent upon observations of the conditions and outcome of conduct. It is all one with growing. Growing and growth are the same fact expanded in actuality or telescoped in thought. In the largest sense of the word, morals is education. It is learning the meaning of what we are about and employing that meaning in action. The good, satisfaction, "end," of growth of present action in shades and scope of meaning is the only good within our control, and the only one, accordingly, for which responsibility exists. The rest is luck, fortune.[86]

From our developmental perspective, Dewey's "meaning," Salkever's "truth and being," as well as our "principles and autonomy" must be understood as the highest stage of politics. As such they come first in importance—ultimately they justify politics, yet they do not come first in time. First, politics must guarantee a minimum of security—the preoccupation of Hobbes; afford man an opportunity to display virtuosity in the sense of performing exceptionally well in terms of the political community's values—the preoccupation of Machiavelli; and guarantee man freedom in return for giving up unbridled lust—Locke's concern. The conventional and preconventional levels that these views exemplify do not ever simply go away, and neither do the functions of politics at the conventional and preconventional levels. Plato goes to great lengths to point this out; a political community always exists simultaneously at various levels:

Life of John Locke, 2 vols. (New York: King, 1876), vol. 1, p. 396.

[81] Locke, *Second Treatise*, p. 367.

[82] *Ibid.*, p. 401. Also see pp. 393–394, 412–413.

[83] Locke, *First Treatise*, p. 244.

[84] On the nature and significance of trust in Locke, see Peter Laslett, "Introduction," in *Two Treatises*, pp. 126–135. Also see Goldwin, "Locke," p. 483: "Locke is profound and comprehensive on the reasons for founding political society, but those reasons turn out to be such that he is prevented by their very character from considering in what direction society should develop after the founding is secure."

[85] James S. Coleman argues, however, that the rise of "corporate actors" restricts role-taking opportunities: ". . . when [an individual] carries out an action toward a corporate actor, he cannot see himself ever in the corporate actor's place. He will never become a corporate actor. For that reason, he will feel fewer pangs of guilt when he rips out a public telephone or steals paper from the office than he would if he had committed similar acts against a person." Coleman, *Power and the Structure of Society* (New York: Norton, 1974), p. 97. We should also state explicitly that, even in the best of environments, few persons will reach the highest levels of cognitive-moral development. See, for example, footnote 88 below.

[86] Dewey, *Human Nature*, p. 259.

this is one message of the *Republic*.[87] Justice as education for virtue is the end of politics, yes, but its realization (in degrees—never fully) is dependent upon the acknowledged importance of such functions of politics as Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Locke had in mind. Thus politics as virtue, where education for justice is the function of politics, incorporates as well as exceeds politics as obligation.

While our developmental view incorporates politics as obligation (obligation fits in at the conventional level) there is a tension between higher and lower stages within the paradigm. In the first place, the conventional level can be understood from the principled level, but the principled level cannot be understood from the conventional level.[88] Politics at the preconventional and conventional levels, and politics at the postconventional level also highlight different facets of human behavior. The politics of the preconventional and conventional levels focus on civilized man as a creature of emulation; in his effort to make something of himself, i.e., to prove himself superior to others, he creates largely arbitrary, socially recognized values upon which social stratification and inequality rest. Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Locke seem preoccupied with man in this dress. The postconventional view of politics focuses on man as he promotes equality and justice through growth and sharing, as he increasingly considers others independently of goods, status, and prestige, and as he enlarges the circle of others subject to his moral consideration and respect. Tension between these two views of politics exists, but reality consists of both.

Moral Understanding

The understanding of virtue—ethics, values, morality, or whatever term chosen—is comparable to the understanding of such phenomena as marriage in at least two respects. First, an understanding of virtue or marriage presupposes its experience, and second, a condition for the experience of either virtue or marriage is the prior acceptance of its validity. There is a difference, for example, between the experience of marriage and the experience of a trial marriage, where the relationship from the outset is understood to be provisional. The acceptance of the validity of a lasting commitment is essential to the experience of marriage (not trial marriage); an understanding of marriage is only possible, therefore, when the validity of a lasting commitment is accepted beforehand. Otherwise the experience of marriage and consequently, the understanding) does not occur. Similarly, an acceptance of the validity of virtue makes possible a participatory (as opposed to, say, an analytic) understanding of virtue.[89]

Aristotle makes two comments in the *Ethics* which support and clarify these views. He says first, "A young man is not a proper hearer of lectures on political science; for he is inexperienced in the actions that occur in life, but its discussions start from these and are about these."[90] Aristotle means inexperienced in a subjective sense. He does not mean, for example, someone who does not know what the word marriage means, but someone whose social experience has been so limited that he cannot, even imaginatively, come close to understanding marriage from the inside. Aristotle is also indicating that political science involves ethics, the understanding of which depends upon participatory experience. In this regard he says, "Anyone who is to listen intelligently to lectures about what is good and noble must have been brought up in good habits."[91] Aristotle makes this statement while trying to determine the nature of "good"; consequently, he seems to beg the question by referring to "good" habits. There is a reason for this, as Joseph Schwab points out so well: "If an argument is to appeal to experience of the inward effects and satisfactions of certain kinds of actions and undergoings, those inward effects and satisfactions must have been experienced by those the argument addresses."[92] Good habits will provide experiences of the inward effects and satisfactions to which moral arguments appeal.

Piaget carries this line of reasoning further:

> In the same way that a kind of contradiction exists in adhering to an intellectual truth from the outside (without having rediscovered and reverified it), so it can be asked whether there does not exist some moral inconsistency in recognizing a duty without having come to it by an independent method. . . . In other words, just as a pupil can recite his lessons without understanding them

[87] In this respect see Bloom, *Republic*, pp. 307–436. For example, Bloom writes (p. 410): "He shows what a regime would have to be in order to be just and why such a regime is impossible. Regimes can be improved but never perfected; injustice will always remain. The proper spirit of reform, then, is moderation. Socrates constructs his utopia to point up the dangers of what we would call utopianism; as such it is the greatest critique of political idealism ever written. The *Republic* serves to moderate the extreme passion for political justice by showing the limits of what can be demanded and expected of the city; and, at the same time, it shows the direction in which the immoderate desires can be meaningfully channeled."

[88] In the "Apology" and "Crito" Socrates understands the conventional level; he is even an expression of it: his loyalty to the polis leads to his death (although his love of philosophy was a factor as well). The jury, however, is not at Socrates's principled level, and cannot appreciate his philosophic activities. What is entailed in understanding a stage is discussed below (901–903).

[89] Fred M. Frohock, *Normative Political Theory* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1974), pp. 14–15.

[90] Aristotle *Ethics* 1095a.

[91] *Ibid.*, 1095b.

[92] Joseph Schwab, *College Curriculum & Student Protest* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1969), p. 127.

and can substitute verbalism for rational activity, so a child obeying is sometimes a spirit subjugated to an external conformism, but does not understand the real meaning or facts surrounding the rules he obeys, or the possibility of adapting them or making new ones in different circumstances.[93]

Understanding develops in two steps: first the acceptance of validity—by faith or trust—then a testing by recreating. The commitment involved in the first step is facilitated by justice, understood as the shareability of rules, roles, and relations, or rather by the mutual respect and reciprocity involved therein. In short, justice promotes communication—the experiencing of others—without which development of higher stages is impossible. Piaget calls the process "decentering":

> We have stated that the two correlative aspects of the personality are independence and reciprocity. In contrast to the individual who has not yet reached the stage of "personality," and whose characteristics are to be oblivious of all rules and to center on himself whatever interrelations he has with his physical and social environments, the person is an individual who situates his ego in its true perspective in relation to the ego of others. He inserts it into a system of reciprocity which implies simultaneously an independent discipline, and a basic de-centering of his own activity. The two basic problems of ethical education are, therefore, to assure this de-centering and to build this discipline.[94]

The processes of de-centering, communication, justice and learning merge into a complex activity, with each process contributing to the others. Justice can therefore be considered as a means to understanding and communication, as well as the result of understanding and communication.[95]

Development to the principled or autonomous level is the aim of justice as a process. Arrival at the principled level is indicated by autonomy; the appeal of such moral sensitivities as, for example, respect for persons is internal rather than external. An understanding of Stage 6 (the autonomous or principled level) is thus available only to persons at Stage 6, for if the internal appeal is not present, then the principles of the stage will neither be attractive nor meaningful from the inside, and if they are not appealing and meaningful from the inside, they do not constitute Stage 6. Consequently, the virtue paradigm (Stage 6) is not meaningful from the obligation perspective (Stage 4), but the obligation paradigm is understandable from the virtue perspective. Salkever, on the other hand, is neutral concerning the justifiability of the two paradigms: "I have in no way 'refuted' the legitimacy (or obligation) paradigm. . . ."[96] Our position is that understanding the virtue paradigm at Stage 6 leads to accepting the obligation paradigm as a means but not an end. The obligation paradigm is an incomplete view of human nature and development; it does not go as far as the virtue paradigm does toward justice (keeping in mind that justice is open-ended, attainable only to a degree, and is not always a feasible pursuit).

If virtue did not have to be understood from the inside, then justice in practice would not be necessary: politics would not have to provide the means, justice—the reciprocity and the trust necessary to participatory understanding—to the end, justice—the shareability of rules, roles, and relations. Justice as a means to justice must be qualified, however, by taking into account the fact that people are at various stages of moral development. Policies that would lead to moral development in some cases would not in others. (It is necessary to deal with persons at their cognitive level.) This reaffirms the importance of the communicative and imaginative faculties in achieving the realistic appraisal of character and consequences so necessary for wise moral choices.[97]

The virtue paradigm's answer to "What is the best life?" is described by Salkever as rational and nonidiosyncratic, implying an objective answer that arrives at standards which hold good for all. Beyond this Salkever does not go, his purpose not requiring such a venture. To elucidate the cognitive-developmental perspective does require going further. The principles that emerge at Stage 6 do not say specifically what good is, but rather indicate considerations to which one must be sensitive.[98] These considerations turn out to be those conducive to moral and cognitive development, keeping in mind the interdependence of moral and cognitive aspects of development. For example, sharing in social roles, the product of a certain quality of moral relationships, is vital to cognitive development, and certain cognitive skills—reversibility, for example—are necessary for such moral relationships as reciprocity. We have noted the importance of trust and commitment in this process, and it is important to recall the movement

[93] Piaget, *To Understand Is To Invent* (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1973), pp. 118–119.

[94] *Ibid.*, p. 111–112.

[95] *Ibid.*, p. 117.

[96] Salkever, "Virtue," p. 92.

[97] Depth of moral understanding has more to do with giving moral principles content than with grasping more and more abstract theories. Giving content to such principles as impartiality, freedom, respect for persons, and consideration of interests requires an understanding of persons which is best arrived at by sharing a common life with them. Breadth of understanding is of equal importance. Awareness of complexity of roles, activities, motives, and rules is important, and knowledge of historical, political, economic, and social facts is indispensable to the process of giving principles realistic content. See Peters, "Concrete Principles," pp. 53–54.

[98] For an account of such principles, see Kohlberg, Table 2; Peters, "Concrete Principles," pp. 29–55, especially pp. 35–44; Hart, *Law, Liberty, and Morality*, pp. 70–71.

toward greater equilibrium. The goal of the developmental perspective ("good") is that kind of learning or understanding that leads to further learning and understanding. Given the fact of change in both the organism and the environment, and given the interaction theory, equilibrium must be considered a continuing process dependent upon continuing understanding. In this sense the developmental perspective is rational, nonidiosyncratic, and open-ended.[99]

Yet understanding through justice, and justice through understanding, are not always viable pursuits. There are times when the obligation paradigm is necessary (so thought Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Locke of their situations), and occasions when preconventional sensitivities are dominant (Hobbes's condition of war). But even then the future can be promising; the possibilities of man and his activities in common through politics raise ever anew the possibility of justice. The superiority of the principled level of development over the conventional (obligation paradigm) is that, having experienced the conventional stage, it can employ conventional morality when necessary, whereas the obligation paradigm is powerless to promote principled moral and political development when opportunities to do so exist.

Conclusion

At the heart of Salkever's case for the virtue paradigm is the idea that ". . . there is a direct path from the political question to the human question, since we can fully answer the question of whether or how political life is choice-worthy only on the basis of an understanding of what human beings are—an understanding, that is to say, of human nature."[100] Our position is also based on an understanding of human nature. We have argued that the nature of a thing is how it grows, that man grows (develops cognitively and morally) in the presence of justice, so human nature is to be understood in connection with justice. But the "end" of human development according to our thinking is open-ended understanding—Dewey's concept of meaning, the kind of understanding that must lead to more understanding. Justice is sensitivity to the moral principles (see Peter's four principles, or Hart's formal values) that both produce understanding (development) and yet result from understanding. Thus human nature is human development—a process of justice and understanding.

Salkever's virtue paradigm centers on the question "What is good for man?" Does such an inquiry flow from man's nature? Our argument would be yes: it is man's nature to develop, and dealing with this question is a form and a reflection of that development. Yet there seems to be a self-fulfilling hypothesis here. Once the question "What is good for man?" is entertained, the process of understanding (keeping in mind the relationship between understanding and justice) has begun, and understanding becomes the answer to the question as well as the means to answering it.

Thus the significance of the question "What is good for man?" is that it reveals man's distinctive powers of understanding and justice:[101] its presence indicates that the processes of understanding and justice are occurring, and it makes man aware of his capacity for development through these processes, thereby encouraging their continuation. This does not mean moral sensitivity cannot develop without an awareness of the developmental process itself. Rather it suggests that the moral sensibilities (and understanding, of course, since they go together) are more likely to develop and thrive where (through literature, drama, history, philosophy, religion, etc.) man's reflections of his morality are present as a continuing contribution to the development of understanding and morality. In this service Salkever's virtue paradigm performs well, especially when augmented by cognitive-developmental moral psychology.

To grasp the nature of man's distinctive powers requires the use of those powers. This observation is similar to a point made earlier in reference to the principled or autonomous level of development: that the appeal of moral principles at this level rests upon their inward effects and satisfactions (thus "autonomous"), such that persons without the experience of those inward effects and satisfactions cannot understand the moral quality of those at the autonomous level. Inside understanding is necessary to grasp the inside understanding of others. Even at the conventional level of morality a person not tuned into the group will not grasp the morality of those who are. This line of reasoning can be expanded to the generalization that it

[99] In addition to being open-ended, the developmental perspective is pluralistic: the principles of Stage 6 are not necessarily mutually compatible. The following statement by Berlin can be reconciled with a Stage 6 orientation: "The world that we encounter in ordinary experience is one in which we are faced with choices between ends equally ultimate, the realization of some of which must inevitably involve the sacrifice of others. Indeed, it is because this is their situation that men place such immense value upon the freedom to choose; for if they had the assurance that in some perfect state, realizable by men on earth, no ends pursued by them would ever be in conflict, the necessity and agony of choice would disappear, and with it the central importance of the freedom to choose." Isaiah Berlin, *Two Concepts of Liberty* (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 54.

[100] Salkever, "Virtue," p. 80.

[101] Salkever notes that "Stuart Hampshire argues that any idea of human goodness depends on some idea of the 'distinctive powers of humanity.' " We are also arguing that any idea of the distinctive powers of humanity depends on some idea of human goodness. Salkever, "Virtue," p. 80.

takes a moral agent (man) to know one (man); we cannot abstract our moral sensitivities if we are to understand moral characteristics of man—the moral dimension of man being the phenomenon that separates him from other animals. To grasp the nature of man's distinctive powers requires the use of those powers.[102]

On the basis of a cognitive-developmental approach to moral psychology we have analyzed the meaning and significance of Salkever's two paradigms of political thought. Our first step was to present the cognitive-developmental theory and its findings. We then analyzed the two paradigms in terms of this theory, which required placing Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Rawls within our developmental scheme. And finally, the nature of understanding moral principles was developed from the cognitive-developmental perspective. We assume, as does Salkever, that any account of political good (public good as opposed to private) must be based on moral psychology, that it must deal with the question "What is good for the most inclusive of all publics, the human species?";[103] We, however, go two steps beyond Salkever by showing the significance of the question, and by providing an answer to it (both of which bear upon the understanding of morality). An underlying purpose of our research is to reveal and to promote the political relevance and significance of moral psychology in general, and cognitive-developmental psychology in particular.

[102] Compare to Strauss: "Hobbes's political philosophy is really, as its originator claims, based on a knowledge of men which is deepened and corroborated by the self-knowledge and self-examination of the individual, and not on a general scientific or metaphysical theory. And because it is based on experience of human life, it can never, in spite of all the temptations of natural science, fall completely into the danger of abstraction from moral life and neglect of moral difference. Hobbes's political philosophy has thus for that very reason a moral basis, because it is not derived from natural science but is founded on first-hand experience of human life," Strauss, *Hobbes*, p. 29.

[103] Salkever, "Virtue," p. 80.

The Future of Community Control*

NORMAN I. FAINSTEIN
New School for Social Research

SUSAN S. FAINSTEIN
Livingston College, Rutgers University

It is now more than a decade since the slogan black power symbolized a radical reorientation in the movement to improve the condition of American minority groups. It is eight years since the clash between black activists in New York City and the United Federation of Teachers (UFT) linked the issue of municipal decentralization with black power under the rubric of community control. The early 'seventies have been a period of reduced militancy, but legacies of the 1960s persist. We now expect that black groups will participate in the pluralist bargaining structure (black power devoid of radical potential), and we continue to experiment with the structure of municipal government in order to make it more responsive to neighborhood-based demands. While race remains a crucial determinant of attitude in the debate over municipal reform, changes in historical circumstances have influenced the ideologies of blacks and whites so that the term community control has taken on more complex meanings and its identification with specifically racial demands has diminished. It is our purpose here to explore the meaning of community control for black and white community leaders in New York City; to investigate the importance of racial background, perceptions of city services, and neighborhood contexts in determining that meaning; and to relate our findings to the political future of urban minorities.

Two Types of Community Control Ideology

The argument in favor of community control has been made within two related, but distinguishable, ideological frameworks. The first, which we shall refer to as the *democratic model*, presents the demand for vesting governmental authority at the neighborhood level in terms of the liberal democratic tradition. According to this model individuals become alienated from government and society unless they can effectively participate in the determination of public policy as it affects them most directly:

> It is primarily at the neighborhood level that meaningful (i.e., potentially rewarding) opportunities for the exercise of urban citizenship exist. And it is the breakdown of neighborhood controls (neighborhood self-government, if you will) that accounts for the principal concerns of urban citizens. When they can neither take for granted nor influence by their actions and those of their neighbors the standards of conduct within their own neighborhood community, they experience what to them are "urban problems"—problems that arise directly out of the unmanageable consequences of living in close proximity.[1]

Size of the governmental unit is a significant limiting condition on the capacity of citizens for self-government. Large-scale units, although capable of commanding more resources and controlling a broader range of policy than small ones, permit only a minuscule proportion of the population to participate actively in decisionmaking. They submerge even fairly large minorities within a mass of competing interests and produce a majority based on the lowest common denominator. Even if his or her goal is far short of direct democracy, the reformer still must seek to break up vast governing structures if he or she is to realize any degree of citizen participation and responsive administration:

> It must be pretty clear by now that if we want to reduce time's implacable constraints in order to increase opportunities for participation, we shall have to find ways by which citizens can participate more fully in smaller units, units smaller than nation-state or megalopolis. These smaller units must be, I think, neighborhoods and cities of human proportions. This means both preserving and creating. To move in this direction is to transform into terms appropriate to modern life a much older perspective on the human dimensions of an urban polity, a perspective that the explosive and fascinating eruption of megalopolis during the past century has all but buried from view.[2]

The argument for decentralization based on democratic principles has no necessary implica-

* The research reported here was conducted as part of the New York City Neighborhood Project at the Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University. The New York City Neighborhood Project was funded by Grant No. GI-32437, Advanced Productivity Research and Technology Division of the Research Applied to National Needs Directorate (RANN), National Science Foundation. Any opinions, findings, conclusions or recommendations expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of NSF.

We wish to acknowledge the assistance provided by Gary Barrett, Charles L. Bennett, Neil Bomberg, Fran LaSpina, Peter Roggemann, and Mary Jane Wilson.

[1] James Q. Wilson, "The Urban Unease," *The Public Interest*, No. 12 (Summer, 1968), p. 28.

[2] Robert Dahl, *After the Revolution?* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), p. 153.

tions for racial separatism. Kotler, who is perhaps the strongest and most romantic recent proponent of the democratic community, goes so far as to maintain that community control is a universalistic principle which, by protecting the rights of minorities, inhibits separatist drives:

> By gaining legal authority, the neighborhood government participates in the constituted power of the state. This has no value for purposes of separatism. It is not only endangered by such a policy; it is also the best protection against it.[3]

The second paradigm of community control, which we call the *race-conflict model*, stresses the utilization of the homogeneous black neighborhood as a vehicle for the mobilization of political power. As Carmichael and Hamilton wrote, "We must begin to think of the black community as a base of organization to control institutions in the community."[4] While the race-conflict model also emphasizes the importance of citizen participation for both the political education of individuals and the assurance of just outcomes, its principal thrust is the identification of geographic community with racial group. Community control thus becomes the *black* demand for participation in large cities.[5] In general the two models differ according to their preoccupation with different actors in the political system—the democratic construct is concerned with governmental processes as they involve individuals and territorially defined groups; the race-conflict model is oriented towards outcomes for groups defined by their social status.

Both models have a common root in reaction to the urban dialectic of machine and reform.[6] These two structural forms have shaped the ideology and institutions of American cities since the last century, and their clash has provided much of the drama of local politics. Although antagonistic to each other, neither machine nor reform provides a means of representation of locally based policy interests. Despite its ward organization, the machine excluded neighborhood groups interested in public goods; reform, in its achievement of centralized, professionalized city government, virtually eliminated the representational function or urban public institutions altogether. The triumph of reform has meant that in most cities policy is made by functionally organized central bureaucracies, governed by universal norms and insulated from grass-roots pressure.[7]

The democratic and race-conflict models of community control converge in their concern over the powerlessness of bureaucratic clients. They can be distinguished, however, according to the grounds on which they counter the reform values of professionalism, centralization, and universalism. The democratic model attacks the legitimacy of contemporary governmental institutions because they deprive individuals of their right to affect the formulation and implementation of governmental policy. According to the democratic argument, professionalism and centralization prevent responsiveness by public officials to the needs of constituents.

The race-conflict model contends that the reliance on universalism as a legitimating value results in discrimination against the interests of relatively deprived groups.[8] Only the winning of power by groups which have been treated discriminatorily can result in a redress of their grievances. This view is based on an evaluation of government as a zero-sum game and assumes that a redistribution of jobs, contracts, and services in favor of blacks will occur at the expense of previously favored groups. The redistributive argument is, of course, threatening to those who receive income and status from the present system; and it precipitated the acute reaction to community control which created the New York school confrontation. Holders of the race conflict ideology thus do not expect that power will be ceded to them gracefully, but rather that it must be seized through militant, although not necessarily violent, tactics. Built on a colonial analogy,[9] the race conflict model considers the situation of blacks as resulting from exploitation that can be eliminated only through radical changes in the socioeconomic structure.

The empirical dominance of one or the other

[3] Milton Kotler, *Neighborhood Government* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969), p. 93. Kotler, in this work, presents the argument in favor of neighborhood democracy in its most extreme form, and traces its roots to the origins of the American republic. Yates, however, asserts that while local democracy is often considered characteristic of the American political tradition, it was in fact more myth than history. Douglas Yates, *Neighborhood Democracy* (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1973), p. 12.

[4] Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton, *Black Power* (New York: Vintage, 1967), p. 166.

[5] See Alan Altshuler, *Community Control* (New York: Pegasus, 1970).

[6] See Norman I. Fainstein and Susan S. Fainstein, *Urban Political Movements* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974), chap. 1; J. David Greenstone and Paul E. Peterson, *Race and Authority in Urban Politics* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1973), chap. 4.

[7] While proponents of community control promote values of lay participation, decentralization, and group particularism, they do not see these as requiring the jettisoning of technical expertise and fair treatment of individuals. Rather, they claim that reform principles have been carried out to an extreme where they produce results contrary to their original intentions.

[8] See Leonard J. Fein, "Community Schools and Social Theory: The Limits of Universalism," in *Community Control of Schools*, ed. Henry M. Levin (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1970), pp. 76–99.

[9] Carmichael and Hamilton, *op cit.*; Robert Blauner, *Racial Oppression in America* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), chap. 3; Ira Katznelson, *Black Men, White Cities* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), chap. 3.

model of community control has important theoretical and practical consequences. The theoretical question is whether the position of minority groups in America is sufficiently unique to cause them to adopt a radical ideology, or whether, despite their situation as a victimized and isolated stratum, they nonetheless remain adherents of the liberal democratic political formula. If the latter is true, then cultural values could be so strong as to outweigh marked structural differences in shaping group ideologies. While even the more moderate, democratic type of community control ideology is opposed to the status quo, it does not repudiate the concepts of individualism and majority rule that underlie American liberalism. Rather it presses for institutional forms under which those values can be better realized. Adherence to this model by blacks and Latins would signify that even the least assimilable groups in American society continue to view the world through the framework of an ideology which values individual freedom and mobility above all, and promises participation in a pluralistic society.

In practice, widespread belief in the democratic model would mean that urban political institutions could be made more flexibile and responsive without necessarily precipitating hostile outbreaks and increased polarization. Such an outcome may be viewed as either a palliative, representing minor accommodation and coöptation of dissidents, or as evidence of reformism and adaptability. The calm acceptance of Boston's little city halls[10] and New York's Office of Neighborhood Government,[11] the assimilation of many of the poverty and Model Cities programs into the regular political structure, and the willingness of big city mayors to lobby for their continuance—all these seem to point to the prevalence of the reformist rather than the radical ideology. Within that ideological framework, these developments provide evidence of minority group successes and confirm a pluralistic world view. Outside of that framework, they are evidence of coöptation which points to the truth of demystifying, group-conflict ideologies.[12]

Our hypotheses, which we test by examining the orientations toward community control of white and minority community leaders within New York City, are that (1) among both groups the holders of the democratic model of community control far exceed adherents to the race conflict model, but that, (2) because they view their group interests differently, minority leaders are willing to carry the implementation of this democratic model much farther than are most whites. This difference means that the strong racial component which persists in attitudes toward community control is expressed largely through institutional preferences rather than ideological rationales. We further expect to discover that among both white and minority leaders evaluation of the functioning of city services powerfully determines attitudes toward decentralization of authority. Finally, we predict that the institutional preferences of leaders will vary according to the particular situation in which they find themselves, and thus will differ according to the homogeneity and balance of power in any specific community.

Attitudes Toward Community Control of Community Leaders in New York City

New York City presents an especially interesting locale in which to examine attitudes toward decentralization and community control. Politics in the city is characterized by a high level of ethnic and racial consciousness. Here, more than in most other American cities, black (and to some extent Hispanic) leaders make explicit ideological appeals to racial solidarity and participate in a politics of group conflict which further heightens minority-white ideological differences.[13] In contrast to a city like Chicago, where intergroup exchanges have been made primarily within the organizational confines of the political machine, New York's weak party structures have long encouraged the public mobilization of ethnic and racial sentiment as a vehicle for enhancing the power of local leaders. As far back as the 'thirties, the efforts of blacks to enter the political process took the form of establishing citywide interest groups which articulated "racial" programs, rather than working strictly within the established structure of the declining Tammany organization.[14] When agitation on behalf of poor black and Hispanic communities surfaced in northern cities during the 'sixties, New York became a major center of racial conflict and developed ideological demands. In fact, many of the programmatic elements which would later be termed "black power" and "community control" appeared in the city during the early 'sixties in the activities of Mobilization for Youth, an agency sponsored by

[10] See Eric A. Nordlinger, *Decentralizing the City: A Study of Boston's Little City Halls* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1972).

[11] See Susan S. Fainstein *et al.*, "Community Leadership and the Office of Neighborhood Government in Bushwick, Crown Heights and Wakefield-Edenwald" (New York: Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University, November, 1973), interim report; Susan S. Fainstein and Fran LaSpina, "District Service Cabinets and the Office of Neighborhood Government" (New York: Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University, November, 1973), interim report.

[12] See Frances Fox Piven, "The Great Society as Political Strategy," in Richard A. Cloward and Frances Fox Piven, *The Politics of Turmoil* (New York: Pantheon, 1974), pp. 271–83.

[13] Greenstone and Peterson, *Race and Authority in Urban Politics*, pp. 39–43.

[14] Katznelson, *Black Men, White Cities*, chap. 5.

the Ford Foundation's Gray Areas Program which quickly took a stance of racial militance.[15] Thus, well-developed ideological thinking should be found among New York City leaders, if it is to be found anywhere; and so should positions of racial militance.

For structural reasons, too, New York should be the place where community control ideology and opposition to it, would be most highly developed. In no other American city is the central government so highly bureaucratized and so distant—both politically and geographically—from local communities. The scale of the city means that areas designated "local" or "communities" would constitute sizable cities elsewhere in America. Thus, the official "communities" in New York which have received some increased power over government agencies in the early 'seventies are the Community Planning Districts (CPDs). The CPDs average 125,000 in population, and some have more than 200,000. Analysts of city affairs, as well as most politicians and civic leaders, have recognized for some years the problems of acute bureaucratic insulation, goal displacement, rigidity and lack of responsiveness to the environment which constitute the "bureaucratic phenomenon."[16]

During the late 'sixties, New York was rocked by severe racial conflict resulting from the efforts of some minority group leaders to effect community control over the city's largest bureaucracy, the school system. The association of community control with racial militancy (especially with "black power") was one of the factors which helped to defeat the movement, at least in its more radical form. The open warfare between minority communities and city bureaucracies on the one hand reflected the city's politics of group mobilization and the objective conditions stemming from the bureaucratic phenomenon, but on the other, contributed greatly to minority-white conflict and to the symbolic association of community control with minority solidarity and power. The very term "community control" became a condensation symbol which evoked strong hostility from many whites.

The community control controversies emphasized the need to deal with the problem of the large bureaucracies, and the inadequacy of linkage structures connecting the administrative centers of government with ordinary citizens in their neighborhoods, particularly with minority neighborhoods where citizens were both most dependent upon public services and most dissatisfied with their quality. The low legitimacy of some bureaucratic structures meant that they became centers of popular mobilization, instead of stabilizing instruments of social control.

The end of the decade could, then, be categorized by two ideological currents, an inter-racial split over community control, as well as a collective recognition that some structural changes could benefit all New York communities. The future of community control and decentralization will hinge largely on which tendency becomes dominant. Thus, New York City is a research site where the problems which have produced demands for governmental reform in many large cities are most acute, and where the relatively high degree of ideological concern about community control issues should make analysis of leadership attitudes particularly interesting in pointing to the political solutions which are likely to be adopted.

The Office of Neighborhood Government

The waning of the movement for community control was associated with continued efforts by the administration of Mayor Lindsay to deal with the bureaucratic phenomenon and the attenuation of mechanisms linking city and public. Some of the city officials who had helped to precipitate the battle for community control of education tried again to reform governmental structures, but this time with much greater caution, and in an historical context less racially charged. After two abortive attempts at establishing new community institutions, the city began an experimental program in the winter of 1971–72 called the Office of Neighborhood Government (ONG).

The Office of Neighborhood Government was aimed at establishing some degree of administrative decentralization and area-based coordination among the dozen or more agencies servicing a community planning district. A district cabinet of agency representatives was chaired by a professional district manager who, with a small staff, attempted to monitor agency performance, determine community (i.e., CPD) priorities, suggest new programs, and link the city bureaucracies with local organizations and civic leaders. In some places, the district managers created neighborhood councils, a step in the direction of community control.

ONGs were initially established in five CPDs.[17] These five experimental districts, and three additional CPDs which were chosen for comparative purposes,[18] constitute the areas from which our

[15] Joseph Helfgot, "Professional Reform Organizations and the Symbolic Representation of the Poor," *American Sociological Review*, 39 (August, 1974), 475–91.

[16] Michel Crozier defines the term in *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967).

[17] Brooklyn No. 4 (Bushwick), Brooklyn No. 8 (Crown Heights), Manhattan No. 12 (Washington Heights), Bronx No. 13 (Wakefield-Edenwald), and Queens No. 14 (Rockaways).

[18] Brooklyn No. 5 (East New York), Bronx No. 5 (Grand Concourse), and Queens No. 3 (Jackson Heights).

data are drawn. On the whole they fall into the second and third quartiles of CPDs in terms of socioeconomic status, social problems, and racial segregation. They range from being about 20 per cent white to 80 per cent white, and are broadly representative of many areas of New York and other large American cities.[19] Information about politics in such typical yet anonymous places, and about the attitudes of their leadership structure, is therefore of interest to the urban political sociologist, particularly given the relative paucity of such data in the literature.

This paper is based upon four primary sources of empirical evidence. First, a closed-ended field survey of a total sample of 368 community leaders chosen through a reputational methodology was carried out during 1972 in four of the five experimental CPDs and in the three control districts. (The survey was pretested in the other ONG district, the Rockaways.) Second, intensive, semi-structured interviews were conducted during 1973 with a sample of 114 community leaders active in three CPDs: Bushwick, Crown Heights, and Wakefield-Edenwald. Both leadership samples included members of community planning boards, police precinct councils, community (anti-poverty) corporation boards, clergymen, officers of a wide range of voluntary organizations (such as PTA's, taxpayers and block or neighborhood improvement groups, tenants councils and race or ethnic organizations), city councilmen, state legislators, and party leaders. Third, voluntary organizations, protest groups, quasi-government agencies, and the political clubs and parties were observed directly during 1973 and 1974 in Bushwick, Crown Heights, and Wakefield-Edenwald. Fourth, all city bureaucrats (e.g., police precinct captains, district sanitation supervisors) who sat on the five ONG cabinets were interviewed in 1973. This population consisted of 78 individuals.

The next section of the paper will depend mainly on the first two sources of data, which we will designate, respectively, the *survey* of community leaders and the *interviews* with community leaders. Field observation data are used to illustrate the impact of community types on operational orientations toward community control. Finally, the cabinet interviews are examined in the last section, when we discuss the attitudes of minority-group cadres within city bureaucracies.

(An extensive discussion of sample characteristics and of methodological issues is contained in an appendix to this article which, for reasons of space, could not be printed here. Interested readers may request copies from the authors.)

[19] More detailed information is provided in Norman Fainstein and Susan Fainstein, "Political Representation and the Urban District," paper presented at the 1975 meeting of the American Sociological Association, and in Nathalie Friedman and Naomi Golding, "Urban Residents and Neighborhood Government: Profile of the Public in Seven Urban Neighborhoods of New York City" (New York: Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University, June 1973).

Racial Differences in Ideological and Operational Orientations Toward Community Control

An ideology is a differentiated and logically organized set of beliefs which identifies relevant social and political actors, diagnoses the forces which constrain them, and proposes courses of action which are ethically justifiable and can lead to valued ends. The race-conflict and democratic systems of beliefs are alternative ideologies by this definition, even though they are not complete in the sense that they focus only on particular political questions and problems, and could be fitted into more general typologies of political thought.

Individuals employing the same ideological framework may have different *operational beliefs* about group interests, probable outcomes, and appropriate actions in concrete situations. For example, there is much greater consensus among Americans about the liberal ideological belief in freedom of speech than in the operational belief that communists should be allowed to speak in their communities.[20] Operational beliefs are easier to specify than are the patterns we call ideologies. And because they are more closely tied to immediate situations, they are more readily utilized predictors of behavior than are ideologies.

The survey and interviews provide evidence about both the community control ideologies and the operational beliefs of community leaders. After describing both levels of thought and analyzing some of the factors which explain differences among leaders, we will consider the implications of these findings for the possible future of community control.

Ideologies of community control. The overwhelming majority of community leaders favors some form of community control and shares one of the two ideological frameworks supportive of it. When leaders are presented with a list of city services in their CPDs, only 18 per cent of those surveyed oppose any degree of local control over the agency they *least* wish to control, the fire department (Table 1). Opposition to community control averages less than 10 per cent for the entire array of thirteen services. Of the 97 leaders whose beliefs about community control are codable into ideological types, 92 (95 per cent) advance either the race conflict or the democratic supporting ideologies (Table 2). *The evidence is unambiguous in pointing to a positive orientation toward local*

[20] Empirical evidence and a theoretical discussion of the concept of ideology versus operational or procedural beliefs is provided by Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," *American Political Science Review*, 58 (1964), 361–82.

Table 1. Orientation of Community Leaders Toward Operationalization of Community Control for Each of Thirteen City Services[a]

Service	Percentage Favoring Decision-Making Powers	Percentage Favoring Advisory Powers	Percentage Opposing Community Control	Percentage Don't Know/ Doesn't Matter
Recreation	61[b]	35	3	1
Drug Addict Treatment Programs	52	40	7	1
Housing Maintenance & Code Enforcement	52	38	9	1
Public Schools	52	39	8	1
Parks	50	42	6	2
Street Repairs	44	46	8	2
Health Services	44	48	8	0
Sanitation	40	52	6	2
Traffic	32	58	8	2
Police Protection	30	56	12	2
Welfare	29	52	16	3
Subway & Bus Lines	27	58	11	4
Fire Protection	20	58	18	4

[a] Services are ranked in decreasing order of percentage favoring decision-making power.
[b] Percentages sum to 100 horizontally. *N*'s vary slightly, but are approximately 350 for each row.

control over government agencies by the entire community leadership stratum.

When leaders explain what they mean by community control most invoke a democratic type of ideology. About 14 per cent (see Table 2) employ an ideological framework which can be interpreted as reflecting the race-conflict type. In coding for this type of ideology we accepted rather subtle indicators of racial orientation, because the overt support for black power or racial militancy which was current six or seven years ago is almost completely absent from the interview responses. Here is a typical expression of race-conflict ideology:

> People must be made aware of their potential to influence government policy and education processes. People have to learn how to protect themselves. The crisis is immense, staggering. The biggest problem is to get the poor to participate in government. . . . We have to learn to share [power]. Black politicians should make it clear that they represent the black community. . . .
>
> We must train our people to do research and gain evidence in their favor. We're going to win. . . .

Missing from this and other race-conflict arguments are explicit statements concerning racism, the colonial status of minority groups, or the zero-sum nature of politics. Rather, the emphasis is on development of minority communities so that they can act effectively within (rather than against) governmental institutions. Outcomes and institutional processes are linked. Accountability to the community will both help facilitate community development and guarantee an adequate share of services. Nevertheless, adherents to race-conflict ideas do clearly equate "community" with minority-group collectivities, rather than with a geographical area, and their major concern is in improving the situation of racial minorities.

There are several possible explanations for the moderation shown by supporters of the race-conflict position. Minority group respondents may have chosen their words carefully in talking with our white interviewers. This stratum of leaders, however, produced the activists who participated in the urban political movements of the 'sixties, when many of them were willing to get involved in public confrontations with city officials and frequently with the police as well. Methodological factors seem to us of less importance in accounting for the lack of militant rhetoric than do changes which have taken place in the situation of minority groups. First, at the time of the interviews, the political climate nationwide was one of conservatism, declining expectations, and political "realism," all of which discouraged racial militancy. Second, minority-group community leaders had better access to governmental institutions and the political process than they did in the mid-

Table 2. Types of Ideology Used by Community Leaders Interviewed in Bushwick, Crown Heights, and Wakefield-Edenwald as Rationales for Community Control[a]

	Support Some Form of Community Control		Oppose All Forms of Community Control
	Ideology used to Rationalize Support is:		
	Race-Conflict Type	*Democratic Type*	
Minority Leaders	20%[b] (11)	80% (45)	0%
White Leaders	7% (3)	81% (33)	12% (5)

[a] Tabulation based on analysis of 97 interviews with community leaders who provided codable responses to the following question: "The Charter Commission is particularly concerned with devising ways of making city institutions more responsive to citizens. What suggestions do you have?" Interviewers probed for attitudes about decentralization, citizen participation, decision-making or advisory power for community boards, elective versus appointed boards.

[b] Percentages sum to 100 per cent horizontally. Of the 45 minority leaders, 10 are Hispanic. Three of the Hispanic leaders support Hispanic group power, and 8 of the 48 black leaders support black power. These are roughly comparable percentages. Since minority leaders tend not to focus on black-Hispanic conflict, the aggregation of black and Hispanic leaders into a single minority-group designation seems justifiable for the purposes of this analysis.

'sixties. Whether this was viewed as progress or co-optation, it seemed to have dampened rhetoric considerably, and to have led to efforts to use the system, to work through newly developed channels of communication. Finally, the need for some kind of bureaucratic decentralization and local political input had been recognized as a general problem in New York City, no longer as primarily a racial demand. Minority leaders, while having a greater stake in community control than whites, could frame their demands in terms which did not undermine the possibility of interracial coalition.

Approximately four-fifths of community leaders rationalize support for community control through a democractic-type ideology (Table 2). As the following examples (from five respondents) indicate, however, within a common ideological framework beliefs vary considerably concerning the manner in which local control should be effected and the degree of power local majorities should have over city agencies:

> There's a need for real change, change that would provide a greater voice with power to speak for those who live in the city and are victims of the existing situation. What is needed is an organization to speak for the community.
>
> * * *
>
> We need simultaneously to have community development and administrative decentralization. We need the orderly interpretation of the feelings of the community . . . so the community can have input into city offices. We need to get away from street rhetoric and to have a formal mechanism for input.
>
> * * *
>
> City agencies have become too large. I feel decentralization at this point would help; the community would set the priorities for the agencies. . . .
>
> I go for decentralization and, of course, citizen participation. I favor neighborhood boards with real power. Advisory power is just the status quo. They should have power over personnel, the budget—so as to give a chance for the community people to participate in city government and to keep city government money here. Part of the problem is that people setting policy don't live in the area they are setting the policy for. It is only a job for them.
>
> * * *
>
> To restructure the agencies you should put a member of every board or organization or of the Community Corporation [community action agency] Board into an affiliation with a service agency at a decisional level. . . . That community person should be consulted on services and priorities. If the agency doesn't perform, this liaison should finger the person responsible and report him to higher political officials. These liaisons should report monthly to the local community organization office.
>
> * * *
>
> Elected officials should give more attention to the needs of their constituency. The Borough President should have more power. The City must eliminate the superagencies and give the Borough President the authority.

This range of responses suggests that the dominance of democratic ideology among community leaders, whatever their racial background, may mask large differences in operational beliefs about community control. Qualitative examination of the interviews confirms two generalizations about these differences: first, that individuals who utilize a race-conflict ideology are certain to want to operationalize community control by giving relatively great power to local communities; but, sec-

community control (a large plurality of both minority and white leaders) encompass a great range of possible degrees and modes of operationalization. And, as we will show, although racial differences in ideological rationales for community control are fairly small, racial differences in operational beliefs are quite large.

Operational support for community control. The survey provides considerable evidence about the predictors of operational support for community

control. The main indicators of operational support derive from the item presented in Table 1. Respondents were asked whether they favored (1) local decision making or (2) local advisory powers over thirteen separate city services, or (3) whether they opposed community control altogether. Since so few people oppose community control, the practical distinction is between those who favor decision-making powers versus all others, and an aggregate indicator of their general support can be provided by the total number of agencies over which they wish to extend local decision-making powers. Using these indicators of operational support for community control, we find that the racial background of community leaders is a significant predictor of degree of operational support, but that income, education, religion, partisan affiliation and extent of organizational activity are not correlated with such support.

If we examine the first column in Table 1, we see considerable range in the percentage of respondents favoring decision-making powers over the various services. The services are ranked according to this percentage, which is greatest for recreation (61 per cent) and least for fire protection (20 per cent). This large range suggests that community leaders judge the particulars of each service separately, rather than having an undifferentiated response set toward community control. Table 3 shows that willingness to operationalize community control seems to depend upon a complex assessment of the conditions affecting a given city service.

With one exception rank order is similar regardless of race, even though a greater percentage of minority than white leaders operationally support community control over every single service.[21] The percentage of minority leaders showing high support is, in general, between 15 and 20 per cent greater than the white percentage. The largest interracial differences are in support for community control of drug addiction programs, housing maintenance, schools, health services, sanitation, and police protection (20 per cent or more in each case; Table 3). For each service, the race of a leader is a statistically significant predictor of the leader's degree of support for community control (i.e. for local *decision-making* power). Gamma correlation coefficients range between .29 and .53, with all significant at better than the .05 level.

[21] The only service with a ranking that differs significantly depending on the race of leaders is police protection. Presumably this may be explained by minority leaders assigning a much higher priority to controlling the police because of their greater interest in changing current police practices.

Table 3. Orientation Toward Community Control of Minority and White Leaders for Each of Thirteen City Services[a]

Service	Percentage of Each Racial Group Favoring Decision-making Powers[b]		Gamma Correlation between Race and Decision-making Powers	Significance of Chi-square with 1 df; *P* Less Than:
	Minority	White		
Recreation	71	56	.37	.01
Drug Addict Treatment Programs	69	43	.48	.001
Housing Maintenance and Code Enf.	66	45	.44	.001
Public Schools	65	43	.41	.001
Parks	59	46	.28	.05
Street Repairs	57	37	.38	.01
Health Services	58	36	.41	.001
Sanitation	53	33	.39	.01
Traffic	40	28	.29	.05
Police Protection	46	21	.53	.001
Welfare	41	23	.42	.001
Subway & Bus Lines	37	21	.36	.01
Fire Protection	33	14	.51	.001

[a] Services are ranked in decreasing order of percentage of *all* leaders favoring decision-making powers (as in Table 1).

[b] Based on *N* favoring decision-making powers, advisory powers, or opposing community control for each racial group. *N*'s vary slightly, but are approximately 350 for each row.

Table 4. Index of Minority and White Operational Support for Local Decision-making Power over City Services

Rank		(Range of Scores[a] Included in Rank)	Minority	White	All
Least Support	0	(.00–.08)	17% (21)	31% (74)	26% (95)
	1	(.09–.25)	10% (12)	16% (39)	14% (51)
	2	(.26–.50)	18% (22)	19% (46)	19% (68)
Most	3	(.51–.69)	16% (20)	17% (40)	17% (60)
Support	4	(.70–1.000)	39% (47)	17% (41)	24% (88)
			100% (122)	100% (240)	100% (362)

Gamma = .41
Chi-square = 23.44 with 4 df;
P less than .0001

[a] Index score = number of services over which respondent favored *decision-making* power divided by number of services rated in terms of "decision-making," "advisory," or "opposed to community control." Services for which response was DK or "Doesn't Matter" are excluded from the computation, and respondents with 4 or more such exclusions are eliminated from the tabulation. The resulting scores are essentially the percentage of the thirteen city services over which respondent favored decision-making powers. Almost all respondents in the lowest rank "0" did not favor decision-making powers over any services; while those in the highest rank "4" favored such powers over 10 or more of the thirteen services.

Racial differences in support for community control are presented in a more simplified form by the index described in Table 4. As would be expected from the previous findings, minority leaders score considerably higher on the index than do whites. Only 17 per cent of minority leaders, but 31 per cent of white leaders, fall into the lowest index rank; while 39 per cent of minority leaders and 17 per cent of whites show the highest level of support for community control. The Gamma correlation between race and the five-rank index is .41. *Thus, there are consistently large interracial differences with regard to degree of operational support for community control despite similar ideological rationales and similar overall support for some kind of local citizen participation.*

This apparent anomaly is, in part, explained by the existence of other political beliefs according to which blacks and whites differ. Our data, in fact, point to such an attitudinal correlate of operational support. Using a two-item index of support for citizen militancy, we find considerably greater support for militancy among minority leaders than among whites (Gamma = .62; Table 5). Furthermore, there is a strong correlation between support for militancy and for community control (Gamma = .42; Table 9). A factor, therefore, which accounts for greater minority support for community control is the predisposition of minority leaders toward citizen militancy. Intraracial variation in orientation toward community control can likewise be partially explained by this attitudinal correlate (see Table 9, columns 2 and 3).

General political beliefs offer one explanation for varying attitudes toward operationalizing community control. Another explanation relies on analysis of the overall structural position of minority groups in American cities. Eisinger argues that the social position of individual respondents is less important in accounting for racial differences in support for protest activities than is the structural position of the group with which individuals identify.[22] By this logic minority leaders would support community control more than whites if the interests of minority groups are advanced by community control to a greater extent than those of whites. The process by which community leaders come collectively to represent their racial groups need not be conscious and is, in any event, not accessible to us without additional data.

Race constitutes a dominant and continuously functioning structural force shaping the interests and beliefs of community leaders. Further factors, arising out of the specific political situations in which individuals find themselves, assist in explaining the variations within racial groups. These situationally specific factors include perception of the quality of city agencies, experience with actual instances of decentralization and community input, and the relations among social groups in the community. Stress upon the importance of situationally specific beliefs about the costs and benefits of operationalizing community control should not obscure the importance of race as a discriminating variable. It does, however, point to the complex set of cross-cutting cleavages and interests to which community leaders are sensitive.

[22] Peter K. Eisinger, "Racial Differences in Protest Participation," *American Political Science Review*, 68 (June 1974), 592–606.

Table 5. Support for Citizen Militancy by Minority and White Community Leaders

Rank on Index of Support for Citizen Militancy[a]	Minority	White	All
Lowest	6% (7)	20% (44)	15% (51)
Intermediate	74% (85)	76% (169)	75% (254)
Highest	20% (23)	4% (9)	10% (32)
	100% (115)	100% (222)	100% (337)
Gamma = .62			
Chi-square = 29.78 with 2 df; *P* less than .0001			

[a] The index is based on two questions from the survey with which the respondent could strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree:

(1) Tenants are justified in organizing a rent strike if the landlord fails to make needed repairs in a building.

(2) Sometimes violence is necessary to bring about important changes in society.

Forty-four per cent strongly agreed with the rent strike item, and 39% agreed; 9% strongly agreed with the violence item, and 27% agreed.

The index was constructed so as to clearly identify individuals at the two extremes of support for militancy. Only respondents who *strongly* agreed with the violence item were labeled "highest supporters." Those who disagreed or strongly disagreed with *both* items were placed in the "lowest support" category. Those who agreed with the violence item and agreed or strongly agreed with the rent strike item were designated as "moderate supporters" of militancy. There were six cases where an individual agreed or strongly agreed with the violence question but disagreed or strongly disagreed with the rent strike question. These cases were designated as "logical errors" and not included in the index.

Situational Factors Affecting Operational Support for Community Control

Our evidence suggests three situational factors which influence attitudes toward community control. First, the more dissatisfied leaders are with governmental performance, the more likely they are to favor community control. Second, like the doctors who support Medicaid when they find it in fact raises rather than lowers their incomes, leaders who have had favorable experience of actual programs of decentralization and community control indicate higher levels of operational support for community control. Third, the operational model of community control which leaders desire to see implemented is strongly influenced by the racial composition and political organization of their local districts. These propositions reflect situationally specific interest cleavages which cross-cut the basic interracial divisions among community leaders.

Quality of agency performance. Leaders show considerable variation in their evaluations of the performance of different city agencies in their districts. The average evaluation of city services also varies among the districts, and does so in a manner which probably reflects objective reality (see Table 7). While there is an overall correlation between race and rank on an index of service evaluation (Table 6), closer analysis shows that this association is minimal or even reversed in three of the seven CPDs. These data suggest that leaders' perception of the quality of services is tied to factors situationally specific to each agency and to each CPD.

Table 6. Racial Differences in the Evaluation of the Quality of Local City Services

Rank on Index[a]	Minority Leaders	White Leaders	All Leaders
1. Most Positive Evaluation	26%	38%	34%
2. Intermediate	29	35	33
3. Most Negative Evaluation	46	27	33
	101%	100%	100%
Gamma = .29	*N* = 122	*N* = 240	*N* = 362
Chi-square = 13.02 with 2 df; *P* less than .002			

[a] Respondents were asked to rate the quality of each of thirteen city services in in their own Community Planning District on a five point scale from excellent to very bad. The services were the same as those in the community control item.

The index is based on a summation (weighted by score) of the number of services each respondent rated "very bad" or "bad" divided by the number of services rated "excellent," "good," "fair," "bad," or "very bad." This index was divided into ranks at the 34th and 67th percentile.

Table 7. Racial Differences in the Evaluation of the Quality of Local City Services for Leaders from the Same Community Planning Districts

Community Planning District	Percentage of Each Group of Leaders Falling into the Lowest Rank (Most Negative Evaluation) on the Service Index[a]			Racial Differences Within Districts
	All Leaders from District	Minority (a)	White (b)	(a) minus (b)
East N.Y. (Brooklyn)	46% (N=50)	63%	38%	25%
Bushwick (Brooklyn)	43 (N=49)	59	23	36
Jackson Heights (Queens)	33 (N=55)	47	25	22
Grand Concourse (Bronx)	32 (N=56)	70	24	46
Crown Heights (Brooklyn)	32 (N=50)	27	36	−9
Wakefield-Edenwald (Bronx)	26 (N=51)	32	22	10
Washington Heights (Manhattan)	24 (N=51)	22	24	−2

[a] This index is defined in Table 6. Note that respondents are ranking the services in *their own* Community Planning Districts.

The evaluation of city services is negatively correlated with operational support for community control, and this correlation remains unchanged when minority and white leaders are examined separately. Table 8 shows these relationships most simply by cross-tabulating the variables in dichotomized form. (Table 9 shows similar Gamma correlations for the full indexes.) Within the minority group, there is a 17 percentage point difference in positive support for community control between those with lower and higher rankings on the service index (Gamma = .34); within the white group, the difference is 19 per cent (Gamma = .39). Thus, the overall perception by leaders of the quality of city services apparently influences their willingness to operationalize community control over those services. We have also examined these relationships for individual services, and our findings are identical. The correlation within each social group between an index of service evaluation and com-

Table 8. Racial Differences in the Relation between Support for Community Control and Evaluation of the Quality of Local Services

	Minority		White	
	Lower Service Evaluation[a]	Higher Service Evaluation[b]	Lower Service Evaluation	Higher Service Evaluation
Lower Support for Community Control[c]	36% (20)	53% (35)	52% (34)	71% (125)
Higher Support for Community Control[d]	64% (36)	47% (31)	48% (31)	29% (50)
	100% (56)	100% (66)	100% (65)	100% (175)
Gamma = −.34			Gamma = −.39	
Chi-square = 3.94 with 1 df; P less than .05			Chi-square = 7.93 with 1 df; P less than .01	

[a] Rank 3 on service evaluation index defined in Table 6.
[b] Rank 1 and 2 on service evaluation index.
[c] Ranks 0, 1, and 2 on index of support for community control defined in Table 4.
[d] Ranks 3 and 4 on index of support for community control.

Table 9. Summary of Predictors of Operational Support for Community Control for All Leaders, and for Minority and White Leaders Examined Separately

Predictor	Gamma Correlations between Rank on Index of Support for Community Control and Specified Variables for: All Leaders	Minority Leaders	White Leaders
Race (Minority Status)	.35*[e]	—	—
Education[a]	−.05	.09	−.02
Income[b]	−.04	−.03	−.03
Index of Support for Militancy[c]	.42*	.31*	.38*
Index of Evaluation of Quality of City Services[d]	−.28*	−.28[f]	−.26*

[a] Four rank index.
[b] Five rank index.
[c] Three rank index using categories specified in Table 5.
[d] Three rank index using categories as specified in Table 6.
[e] All coefficients marked with an asterisk are significant using a Chi-square statistic at .05 level or beyond.
[f] This cross-tabulation has 15 cells (since the community control index has five ranks), and 8 df. Collapsing either or both of the indexes produces a Chi-square significant at better than .05 and a Gamma higher than .28. (See Table 8.)

munity control attitudes is replicated service by service. The more negatively a leader rates a particular service (say, police protection in his CPD), the more likely the leader is to favor local decision-making powers over that service.

Nevertheless, analysis of Table 8 (and examination of service-by-service relationships) also shows that the basic disparity in support for community control *between* racial groups is not eliminated when service evaluation is partialled out. Among the leaders with lower service evaluations, 64 per cent of minority leaders, but only 48 per cent of whites, indicate higher support for community control. This 16 percentage point difference within service-evaluation groupings is comparable to the differences within each racial group when service evaluation is a variable. Computation of correlation coefficients between race and community control for the higher and lower service-evaluation groupings produces Gammas, respectively, of .38 and .33, which are almost identical to those between community control and service evaluation within each racial group. (Table 9 shows similar results using the full indexes for the two variables.) We conclude, therefore, that the structurally rooted factor of race and the situationally specific factor of service evaluation are equally important as predictors of the dependent variable. Jointly, they explain a good deal of the variance in levels of operational support for community control.

Experience with programs of decentralization and community control. Since 1969 New York City has established a number of programs intended to produce administrative decentralization and mechanisms for local input or community control. The most significant programs involving to some degree both elements of institutional change are the Community School Boards and the Office of Neighborhood Government (ONG). The response of community leaders to each of these programs provides additional evidence about the way situational factors affect the basic racial cleavages in operational support for community control. Each presents leaders with a concrete institutional form and actual experience. In these instances, the operational orientation of leaders need not depend entirely on deductions from general propositions.

In actual practice, community control of schools in New York took a much less radical form than white critics had feared or than minority advocates had desired during the period of major interracial hostility in the 'sixties. The thirty-odd community school boards have been, in general, dominated by groups supportive of educational professionalism. This leads us to expect that, at the least, white opposition to community control of education would be lessened by contact with the new institutional arrangements, although it is not clear what effect these arrangements might have for minority leaders.

Table 10 presents data on support for community control of schools among self-identified specialists in educational problems. White educational specialists indicate much higher approval of community control of education than white non-specialists. Sixty-six per cent of the white specialists, as opposed to 37 per cent of other white leaders, endorse local decision-making powers over schools.[23] This suggests that familiarity with the actual operation of school decentralization has created support for its continuation.[24]

[23] The percentage of white specialists most supportive of community control of schools is identical to the percentage of all minority leaders in this category. There is no difference between minority specialists and other minority leaders, however. From additional analyses, we also know that white specialists and nonspecialists do not differ from each other in their support for community control over other city services. Moreover, the relationship between specialization and support for community control over the institution with which leaders are most familiar does not hold for other city services.

[24] It does not tell us whether our sample of white specialists has increased its level of support from what it was prior

Table 10. Orientation toward Community Control of Schools of White and Minority Leaders by Problem Specialization[a]

	Minority		White	
	Educational Specialists	Nonspecialists	Educational Specialists	Nonspecialists
Oppose Community Control of Schools or Favor Only Advisory Powers	33% (8)	35% (34)	34% (13)	63% (126)
Favor Decision-making Powers Over Schools	67% (16)	65% (63)	66% (25)	37% (75)
	100%(24)	100% (97)	100% (38)	100%(201)
Gamma = −.04 Chi-square = .03 with 1 df; *P* less than .80			Gamma = −.53 Chi-square = 10.65 with 1 df; *P* less than .01	

[a] Leaders were asked which one of a list of "problems" they had "the most experience dealing with" in their community planning district. Those who identified schools are designated educational specialists.

ONG presents a second example of a governmental program which provided a concrete stimulus for leadership attitudes. As we will discuss shortly, ONG constituted only a step toward community control, and the program was introduced in a way least likely to exacerbate latent racial cleavages. Probably as a result of these specific aspects of the ONG innovation, the response of community leaders in Bushwick, Crown Heights and Wakefield-Edenwald to ONG reflected no racial division.[25] Fifty-eight per cent of minority leaders interviewed expressed positive evaluations of ONG; 18 per cent gave mixed evaluations; and 18 per cent were negative (3 of the 60 minority leaders had uncertain opinions). The white breakdown was virtually identical, with 58 per cent positive, 16 per cent mixed, and 13 per cent negative (4 of 31 white leaders were uncertain). These findings underline once more the complexity of forecasting leadership responses to actual programs. The politics of implementation of community control does not depend on leadership ideologies and general attitudes alone. Predicting the impact of specific programs requires taking into account situational factors, such as the process by which institutional innovation is effected and the particular interests which leaders think are being served in the actual instance.

Types of communities. Several dimensions are involved in a typology of neighborhoods which would explain variation in the politics of community control. First, the social class of residents should indicate their level of dependence on governmental services and bureaucracies. Second, racial composition is obviously important given what we know about the general correlation between race and operational support for community control. Third, social divisions within a single neighborhood and the relative power of the various groups within the community affect their interests in institutional change. Such dimensions help identify how leaders measure the effects on their constituencies of alternative programs of administrative decentralization and community control.

Brief examinations of the Bushwick, Crown Heights, and Wakefield-Edenwald districts illustrate how community type affects orientations toward local control. Bushwick is the most ethnically pluralistic yet homogeneously poor of the three CPDs. It is divided among a shrinking white population of Italian and German ethnicity (25 per cent of the total), blacks (30 per cent) and Hispanics (45 per cent). Most people in Bushwick are working or lower class. The district had a median income in 1969 of about $6500, or $400 less than the New York City norm. In Bushwick, the primary concern of all groups of leaders seems to be community development, both in an economic and social sense. The relative lack of civic leadership is seriously compounded by the virtual desertion of the district by partisan political organizations. The main centers of community activity and of linkage with city government are the community corporation (originally a community action agency under the federal poverty program) and ONG.

to 1969, or whether there has been selective recruitment into the educational arena of whites who favor community control of schools. If viewed with caution, however, the data do seem to describe a cleavage which results from situational experience with, or vested interests in, actual programs.

[25] The following data are drawn from Fainstein *et al.*, "Community Leadership and the Office of Neighborhood Government. . . ."

Bushwick leaders emphasize the need to increase public services in the district and see community control as a means for doing this. But control in Bushwick must be advanced in spite of the inactivity of the population. Thus, leaders believe that new institutional structures should not be premised on widespread community participation. Rather, Bushwick needs more professionals who would act as its advocates within the city bureaucratic arena. According to this conception, community control in Bushwick might take a technocratic form, with ONG and community corporation professionals advancing the interests of the Bushwick community through virtual rather than mandated representation of the larger population.

Crown Heights falls between Bushwick and Wakefield-Edenwald in terms of both racial and economic composition. Blacks are in a numerical majority, comprising 75 per cent of the population, with the remainder divided between a small Hispanic group (5 per cent) and whites (20 per cent), most of whom are Jews. The Jewish population is dominated by a tightly knit sectarian community of Hasidim. The 1969 median income was $7,500. Both blacks and whites are divided along economic lines. Many blacks (approximately 50 per cent) are homeowners and thereby rooted in the district, while the Hasidim are also rooted, but for religious and cultural reasons. The politics of Crown Heights is defined by a sharp cleavage between homeowners and renters, which is reflected in splits within the Democratic party leadership. Crown Heights has a high level of civic activity among all social groups. The Hasidim, however, have political power far beyond their numbers in the district, both because they have religious ties with bureaucrats in the central city government, and because they have been able to vote as a disciplined bloc in local elections (something the blacks have not accomplished). As a result of their voting power, the Hasidim have considerable influence in one of the Democratic party clubs and dominate the board of the community corporation. The major vehicle linking the black majority with government agencies is a community board created by ONG. The board represents local civic organizations and is controlled by black groups.

Black leaders in Crown Heights strongly favor community control through the ONG community board. They feel they need a vehicle for resolving conflicts among civic and partisan organizations, so that the "community" can focus its attentions on collective development. They want representation on any local board, however, to reflect the interests of communal groups in proportion to their share of the population. Because the Hasidim dominate popular elections, black leaders prefer to have an appointed board. The Hasidim, for their part, would like to maintain the status quo. They are probably correct in seeing any form of community control as likely to be disadvantageous for themselves since they are a numerical minority in the CPD. In the context of Crown Heights, the politics of community control centers about maintaining unity within a popular majority beset by cleavages, and balancing democratic norms against the power of a unified minority fearful of being overwhelmed at the local level.

Wakefield-Edenwald is a relatively well-off district almost three-quarters white (primarily Italian). Most whites are homeowners as are almost half of the black residents. The district is politically conservative. Homeowners are concerned with maintaining property values and a high level of "hard" services (e.g., sanitation, fire). There are many organizations in the district, with a cohesive structure of civic leaders who tend to be alienated from the relatively active Democratic and Republican clubs. The black lower class (perhaps 10 per cent of the entire population) is segregated into a remote corner of the CPD where a public housing project is located. This part of the black community is politically disorganized. Black homeowners participate in civic organizations, but not in partisan ones; their interests differ little from those of the white majority, and racial agitation is rarely evident.

In Wakefield, community control is seen as a vehicle for giving this geographically remote CPD a greater share of city resources and a local say over how these will be distributed. The emphasis is on decentralization rather than community power. Few leaders desire the establishment of a local board with decision-making powers, though most would like to see the community consulted by city bureaucrats. The minority of leaders who are active in the political clubs want elected officials to have more power, while the civic leaders are suspicious of politicians and want any structures of local input to be nonpartisan. Wakefield does not suffer from the problems of Bushwick or Crown Heights, and neither does it present much of an indigenous force for community control.

These sketches of three very different types of communities suggest the ways in which local situational factors influence the politics of community control. The descriptions of the three CPDs also call attention to the dynamic elements which must be considered in making any predictions about community control. In the next section we further examine these dynamic forces, but this time at a citywide and national level.

Community Control: A Prognosis

The future of community control, as an issue and an ideology, will be determined by a combination of factors deriving from broad ideological currents, national and citywide policies, and specific

local situations. The continued dominance of the democratic model, and in fact the continuation of community control as a meaningful organizing concept around which to center discussions of local politics, depends on a variety of different inputs, some of them unpredictable. The phrase community control had no particular significance when Banfield and Wilson published their path-breaking text on urban politics in 1963;[26] its disappearance from the urban scene might be just as sudden. In this section we examine the variables at the citywide and national level which affect the debate over community participation in policy making and implementation, and which will determine its longevity as an issue.

Citywide Factors. New York City presents two contrasting cases of the implementation of experiments in community participation and administrative decentralization—one in school decentralization that culminated in a crisis, and the second, the Office of Neighborhood Government (ONG), which was accepted calmly. While a significant factor in differentiating the reactions to the two experiments was the difference in militancy of the times in which they occurred, an important contributing cause also was the strategy pursued by governmental policy-makers. Comparison of the city government's role in these two experiments should help to isolate some of the variables which can make community control into a more or less controversial issue.[27]

In 1967 the New York City Board of Education, in response to great dissatisfaction with the school system expressed by vocal black parents, and at the prompting of the Ford Foundation, set up three demonstration school districts (IS 201, Two Bridges, and Ocean Hill-Brownsville). Their declared purpose was to show the effects of placing limited control over school policy at the community level. The three demonstration districts quickly elected governing boards which interpreted their mandate as going well beyond the planning function visualized by the Board of Education. There was also hostility between the governing boards and professional school employees, eventually resulting in the transfer by the Ocean Hill board of a group of teachers out of the district and the lengthy teachers' strike of 1968. Intense emotion surrounded the conflict, and it came to symbolize a whole range of issues concerning the relationships between clients and public bureaucracies and between the races.

Throughout the school decentralization controversy the city administration played an indecisive role. No central office, either under the Board of Education or the Mayor, coordinated the decentralization effort. A research institute at Queens College provided the fledgling districts with what technical assistance they received. The Board of Education, although the nominal sponsor of the program, quickly lost control of it. The Mayor, while acting as an advocate of the program until the political consequences of doing so became too heavy, had no statutory power over an educational program. Many of the individuals associated with the experiment, including governing board members and some school personnel, believed that the programs could be meaningful only if their supporters were willing to confront the school bureaucracy directly.

In contrast, the ONG experiment was mounted with great caution. Its promoters, some of whom had been involved in the school dispute, devoted much attention to developing a program that would be politically viable. Thus, while many of them hoped to see considerable power transferred to community boards, their rhetoric concentrated primarily on administrative decentralization rather than community participation, and when they referred to participation it was in terms of democratic rather than race-conflict ideology. The program was set up so that the five experimental districts reported to a central Office of Neighborhood Government, which itself was directly under the Mayor. The Mayor issued a directive to the agencies under his control that ONG was vested with his authority. The director of the central office was diligent in keeping track of the activities of the neighborhood offices and selling the program to the various city bureaucracies. A key role was played by the local district managers who acted as intermediaries between neighborhood groups and the city service agencies. Some of the districts had community boards and others did not; in all cases the district manager worked actively to insure cooperation between community groups and the district service cabinet. He also worked especially hard to see that local elected officials did not regard ONG as usurping their role, and sought to provide staff services to these officials and give them credit for ONG activities.

A second important factor contributing to the nonthreatening nature of the ONG experiment was the composition of the district service cabinets. The establishment of cabinet structures enhanced the authority of district service chiefs, who while only occupying middling positions within their agencies, were at the top from the district perspective. Besides giving their egos a boost, the new structure permitted cabinet members to consult

[26] Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, *City Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard University and M.I.T. Press, 1963).

[27] A more extended analysis is provided in Susan S. Fainstein and Norman I. Fainstein, "From the Folks Who Brought You Ocean Hill-Brownsville," *New York Affairs* 2, No. 2 (1974), 104–115.

with their counterparts about district matters without going all the way up the agency hierarchy and back down again. As long as forces in the community were not viewed as hostile by the cabinet members, there was little reason for them not to welcome the new structure, and, in fact, of 82 cabinet members interviewed, 68 (83 percent) regarded the district cabinet as useful or very useful and only 4 members (5 per cent) evaluated it negatively.[28]

The fact that the cabinet bureaucrats were not seen as enemies by community leaders in the experimental districts results in part from the cautiousness of the ONG program in comparison with the far more ambitious school decentralization experiment. The rhetoric of some of the school decentralizers, including that of the Bundy Commission,[29] proclaimed that the educational system needed a thorough overhaul and that the experiments in community participation were a step in that direction. This overhaul was taken to mean major changes in the civil service rules which had long kept the administrative cadres of the system white and insulated from parental pressures. The goals of the school experiments thus were perceived as a direct threat by the administrative hierarchy and the teachers' and supervisors' unions, while the limited scope of the ONG experiment meant that it provided little threat to established interests.

Another important reason for the serenity surrounding ONG, however, was itself a product of the programs and activism of the 'sixties. One effect of strong pressures for bureaucratic change was minority-group recruitment to agency positions. Thus, 19 of the 82 district service cabinet members, or nearly a quarter, were nonwhite (only one was Puerto Rican). As a result, the client-bureaucratic cleavage was no longer so clearly reinforced by a minority-white division. Moreover, the presence of blacks on the cabinets created an ideological force within the bureaucracy supporting community control. This finding is particularly noteworthy since it indicates that blacks who "make it" maintain an ideological commitment different from their white peers (Table 11). The very high relationship between race and attitude toward community control among cabinet members (Gamma = .80) revealed in Table 11 is striking when compared with the relationship shown in Table 3 for community leaders, where Gamma ranges between .28 and .51.

Despite the presence of blacks on the service cabinets, and the preponderance of cabinet members of both races who support at least advisory powers for neighborhood groups, analysis of the cabinet interviews shows that the potential for racially polarized conflict between community activists and bureaucracies over local control has not disappeared. Further inspection of Table 11 indicates that the higher correlation between race and operational support for community control by cabinet members than by community leaders results almost entirely from the more negative attitudes toward community decision-making powers held by white cabinet members as compared with white community leaders. Only 18 per cent of white cabinet members favor decision-making powers for local boards, while above 40 per cent of white leaders favor local decision-making powers over at least some city services. Moreover, as Table 12 indicates, when the white group of cabinet members is examined by type of bureaucratic status, only 5 per cent of the 21 whites in the "hard services" support decision-making powers (just one black cabinet member held a position in the hard services). The implication of this finding is that intrusion by community groups into these service areas could well precipitate hostile reactions.

On the whole, the ONG experience suggests that the two citywide factors which most influence

Table 11. Relationship between Race and Support for Advisory versus Decision-making Power for Community Boards among Bureaucrats on District Service Cabinets

	Minority[a]	White
Favor Advisory Powers for Community Boards	33% (5)	82% (32)
Favor Decision-making Powers for Community Boards	67% (10)	18% (7)
	100% (15)[b]	100% (39)[c]

Gamma = .80

Chi-square = 11.92 with 1 df; *P* less than .001

[a] One Puerto Rican was included in this group.

[b] Fifteen of the 19 minority members interviewed responded to the probe concerning community boards.

[c] An additional 19 white members did not respond to the probe concerning community boards, and one white member opposed any form of community participation. While it is possible that the exclusion of 19 respondents may bias the results presented here, it is most likely that failure to answer points to a negative attitude toward community participation. In that case the table would understate the correlation between race and attitude.

[28] Fainstein and LaSpina, "District Service Cabinets and the Office of Neighborhood Government," part II.

[29] Mayor's Advisory Panel on Decentralization of the New York City Schools (Bundy Commission), *Reconnection for Learning* (New York: Praeger, 1967).

Table 12. Relationship between Service Area and Support for Advisory versus Decision-making Power for Community Boards among White[a] Bureaucrats on District Service Cabinets[b]

	Hard Services[c]	Soft Services[d]
Support Advisory Powers for Community Boards	95% (20)	66% (12)
Support Decision-making Powers for Community Boards	5% (1)	34% (6)
	100% (21)	100% (18)

P (Fisher's Exact) = .03

[a] There was only one black cabinet member in a hard service area.

[b] Nineteen white members did not respond to the probe concerning community boards, and one white member opposed any form of community participation.

[c] Hard services are sanitation, police, sewer, fire, water resources, traffic control, highway maintenance, and parks.

[d] Soft services are health, education, planning, human resources, aging, housing, youth, social services, welfare, drug addiction.

reactions to the introduction of decentralized governmental programs are the strategies followed by the program's sponsors and the responses of the affected bureaucrats. Community control could become an extremely divisive issue once again in New York if it is pressed as a redistributional program, particularly if it is interpreted as an attack on the still white-controlled hard service bureaucracies. In cities where racial integration of the service bureaucracies has proceeded less far than in New York, we would expect that programs for neighborhood participation, when neighborhoods are black and bureaucrats are white, would continue to produce interracial conflict.

National Factors. The policies of city governments will produce wide variations from place to place in the introduction of decentralized programs and the intensity of conflict surrounding them. The parameters, however, will be set by the national situation; urban conflict will be as much affected by federal programs and national currents concerning relations between the races as by particular events in any one city. Whether the federal government chooses revenue-sharing as its method of "returning government to the people" or reverts to the Johnson administration programs of maximum feasible participation will significantly influence not just the kinds of programs offered to city dwellers but also the extent of minority activism and white reaction.

The dismantling of the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), the demise of Model Cities, and the insistence that funding of organizations to benefit the poor must be channeled through regular governmental bodies have meant a decline in the resources available to ghetto residents in their battle against the status quo. Although few of these programs directly sponsored militant action,[30] they spawned militant leaders and raised the expectations of large numbers of people, thereby creating highly volatile situations. Reduced prospects of funding, a change in the national mood, and the routinization of organizations serving poor people have all served to reduce volatility. The strength of the counterattack following the urban disorders of the last decade made many black leaders wary of radical strategies. As a result, we have seen a nationwide decline in conflict organizations and militant rhetoric.

This decline, however, has not meant a return to the 1950s. There are a number of legacies of the previous era. Most important are the intermediate structures such as community planning boards, health boards, housing councils, block associations, and community corporations which arose in response to the urban programs of the 'sixties. These provided an arena for the development of a new cadre of civic leaders in areas of the city where, since the decline of the political machine, there had been almost a total absence of representative institutions. While the absolute number of participants in these structures is small and they lack authoritative power, such participants nonetheless act as attentive publics. The existence of a layer of even weak intermediate structures means some access, some patronage, and a reservoir of experienced individuals used to dealing with bureaucratic agencies.

A national Democratic administration would undoubtedly redirect attention toward the cities once again. Whether it would also foment the level of political activism which characterized the last period of Democratic ascendancy is an open question.[31] Fear of intense reaction by whites,

[30] See Fainstein and Fainstein, *Urban Political Movements*, pp. 31–36; Kenneth Clark and Jeanette Hopkins, *A Relevant War Against Poverty* (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), p. 65; James J. Vanecko, "Community Mobilization and Institutional Change: The Influence of the Community Action Program in Large Cities," in *Planned Social Intervention*, ed. Louis A. Zurcher (New York: Chandler, 1970), p. 270.

[31] Piven argues that coöptation of dissidents, increases in welfare spending, and the lessened political power of the cities vis-à-vis the suburbs all mean that the Democratic party in the future will not feel compelled to pay attention to the black urban masses. Frances Fox Piven, "The Urban Crisis: Who Got What, and Why?" in Cloward and Piven, *The Politics of Turmoil*, pp. 338–9. Her premise is that ghetto activism forced responses, rather than govern-

and realization that much of the earlier conflict was between deprived groups fighting with each other over limited resources, may make it less likely that minority leaders will again regard widespread mobilization as a useful strategy. J. Q. Wilson's prediction in *Negro Politics*[32] that black leadership would be primarily specialized and bureaucratically oriented is sustained, even though in 1968 it appeared outdated. Although the current dominance of the democratic type of community control ideology over the race-conflict type may diminish, the basis for a rapid shift is not at the moment obvious. Which of the two ideologies is more valid or would produce better tactics from the minority-group point of view is a different question.

As we have seen, within the broad type of the democratic model there is a split, correlated with race, over operational beliefs in community control. Blacks and Hispanics are continuing to push for community decision-making powers based on their position not so much as racial minorities but as a bureaucratic clientele. This pressure, combined with a recognition on the part of even conservative policy makers that too much centralization leads to rigidity and poor areal coordination, means that we will continue to see programs aimed at devolving authority to lower administrative levels and providing channels for citizen input into bureaucracies. These programs, however, have for the last six years been implemented without any large infusion of new resources. While they have created more flexibility and more responsiveness, as well as new neighborhood leaders and new bureaucrats whose social backgrounds more closely resemble those of their clients, they have not produced basic changes in the distribution of social benefits. Nor have they really had much effect on the dominant position of central bureaucratic authorities and unions of service providers.[33]

The various movements for community control and programs for decentralizing urban bureaucracies, then, have provided some new chips for the previously most disadvantaged players in the urban ecology of games.[34] Robert Dahl has commented that

> a central guiding thread of American constitutional development has been the evolution of a political system in which all the active and legitimate groups in the population can make themselves heard at some crucial stage in the process of decision.[35]

Decentralization and the creation of new linkage structures enlarge the number of groups participating in the policy-making process and increase the legitimacy and bargaining power of the relatively deprived. In other words, deprived minorities in many urban areas have now been absorbed into the pluralist bargaining system. Where once their impact on the political marketplace was no more substantial than that of the impoverished consumer on the economic one, they may now participate on a level analogous to the individual with some money to spend but little to invest. The predictable result is compromise, an occasional gain, but no major redistribution across social classes.[36]

The game, moreover, is limited to the municipal level. The greater power of racial minorities to control garbage collections or allocations in the city budget is not reflected in a commensurate ability to influence national priorities. In an era of rapid inflation and high unemployment, achievements at the local level often seem insignificant and diversionary, although there is no compelling logic to show that the energy spent on local causes could be easily redirected to more general issues.

The question of whether community control is a useful strategy for minority groups has been much debated.[37] Its general endorsement by whites as well as blacks, the lessening of its identification as a specifically black cause, despite the willingness of minorities to carry its implementation farther than most whites would, and its framing in democratic rather than group conflict terms, tend to validate the criticism by radicals that it is a moderate and coöptative strategy. Whether to sacrifice the limited but tangible gains that it

ment programs creating activism, as Moynihan has argued. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding* (New York: Free Press, 1969), pp. 134–5. An alternative view is that the two factors, programs for the poor and activism by the poor, are interactive and intensify each other, even while coöptative tendencies are also at work. Fainstein and Fainstein, pp. 231–3.

[32] James Q. Wilson, *Negro Politics* (New York: Free Press, 1960), chap. 8.

[33] See Sterling D. Spero and John M. Capozzola, *The Urban Community and its Unionized Bureaucracies* (New York: Dunellen, 1973); The American Assembly, *Public Workers and Public Unions*, ed. Sam Zagoria (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972).

[34] Norton E. Long, "The Local Community as an Ecology of Games." *American Journal of Sociology*, 64 (November 1958), 251–61.

[35] Robert A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 137.

[36] See Robert Paul Wolff, *The Poverty of Liberalism* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968).

[37] See Dorothy Buckton James, "The Limits of Liberal Reform"; Ira Katznelson, "Antagonistic Ambiguity: Notes of Reformism and Decentralization"; and Dorothy Buckton James, "Response," *Politics and Society*, 2 (Spring 1972), 309–36. We provide a policy-oriented analysis in Susan S. Fainstein and Norman I. Fainstein, "Local Control as Social Reform: Planning for Big Cities in the Seventies," *Journal of the American Institute of Planners* (July 1976), 275–285.

brings in the hopes of larger redistributive goals is tied up with a number of political and normative judgments. These concern the possibility of radical black-white coalition, the virulence of majority reaction to militant strategies, the capacity of minority groups to constitute a revolutionary class, and the superiority of a direct system of income redistribution to one of service provision. The continued predominance among minority and white urban leaders of an ideology of community control based on the democratic model indicates a general acceptance on their part of the inevitability, although not necessarily the desirability, of the pluralist model of urban politics.

COMMUNICATIONS

What Gordon Tullock Really Said

TO THE EDITOR:

Now that there is a citation index for the social sciences, every footnote citation can be depended upon to increase the real wealth of a scholar. Under the circumstances, I am happy to be cited in the Arcelus and Meltzer article.[1] Unfortunately, what Arcelus and Meltzer say I said is almost the exact opposite of what I really did say.[2]

I suspect that Arcelus and Meltzer in fact depended on Riker and Ordeshook.[3] Riker and Ordeshook were working not from the final text of my book, but from a very early draft. Further, so far as I can see, they had somewhat imperfect memories of what was in even this early draft. However, because of the wide circulation their joint textbook has achieved, this particular misinterpretation of my views is becoming a widely cited part of my "works."

I should not like to close this comment without saying that this particular slip on the part of Arcelus, Meltzer, Riker, and Ordeshook does not, in my view, detract from the general excellence of their work. Indeed, I have used *An Introduction to Positive Political Theory* in teaching and intend to continue using it. But even Homer nods.

GORDON TULLOCK
Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University

[1] "Tullock, p. 110–114, argues that in a typical election, there are many voters so P is small and R is negative. He concludes that voting is irrational. Riker and Ordeshook, p. 28–34 respond that P depends on the closeness of the election, not just the number of voters and also add D to the equation." Francisco Arcelus and Allan H. Meltzer, "The Effect of Aggregate Economic Variables on Congressional Elections," *APSR*, 69 (December, 1975), fn. 11, p. 1233.

[2] "The equation, if it is thought to be in any way descriptive of the real world, would imply that people would be more likely to vote in close elections, . . . since D would be larger . . . . The . . . hypothesis was tested by Riker and Ordeshook and found to be correct." Gordon Tullock, *Toward a Mathematics of Politics* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1967), pp. 110–11.

[3] William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook, "A Theory of the Calculus of Voting," *APSR*, 62 (March, 1968), 25–42; also, *An Introduction to Positive Political Theory* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973).

Whom Did Wallace Hurt in 1968?

TO THE EDITOR:

The possibility of a Wallace-As-Independent candidacy in 1976 raises anew the question of the effect of his candidacy on the 1968 election.

A great deal has been written about the roots of the Wallace vote and about the Wallace sympathizers who nevertheless voted for a major party candidate (see: Lipset and Raab, *The Politics of Unreason* [New York: Harper and Row, 1970], 338–427). But Wallaceites who remained hidden cannot have figured in Wallace's effect on the outcome in 1968. Wallace's impact must be measured by discussing actual Wallace voters and by figuring out how much the outcome would have differed if he had not run against Humphrey and Nixon.

If Wallace voters had strictly followed their ordinary party preferences, it would have been unambiguous that Humphrey paid the heavier price for the Wallace candidacy. Consider the data in Table 1.

But of course voters do not strictly follow partisanship, and knowledge of party identification will not help us predict the votes of "independents." According to Brody and Page ("Indifference, Alienation and Rational Decision," *Public Choice*, 15 [1973], 1–17) and Kelley and Mirer ("The Simple Act of Voting," *American Political Science Review*, 68 [June 1974], 572–591), voters appear to follow relatively simple decision rules. By using these rules we can examine the distribution of expected votes of those who voted for Wallace in 1968 under the counterfactual condition of no Wallace candidacy.

These decision rules are: (1)—Voters who say they favor[1] one candidate more than another are very likely—on the order of 95 per cent—to vote for their favored candidate. This rule holds regardless of how much they favor their favorite or even whether their most favored candidate is rated unfavorably. Americans appear to distinguish the lesser of two evils or the greater of two goods and vote accordingly. (2) Voters who are neutral or indifferent toward the candidates, i.e., those voters who give the candidates the same favorability rating, tend to vote for the candidate of their party.

Applying these rules to Wallace voters in 1968 we find that Humphrey was hurt more by Wallace's candidacy than Nixon was. But the disadvantage is not nearly as marked as the distribution of Wallace voters' partisanship would lead us to expect. Combining the two samples, the joint distribution on the two decision rules is shown in Table 2.

These data lead us to conclude that absent the Wallace candidacy, 55 per cent of the Wallace voters would have voted for Humphrey, 42 per

[1] Favorability is measured here by candidate "thermometer" ratings in the SRC sample and by a Likert scale in the ORC sample. Previous studies have shown that the two formats yield identical results as far as the decision rules are concerned.

Table 1

	Party Identification[a]			
	Democrat	Independent	Republican	N^b
Wallace Voters	58.5%	17.4%	24.1%	195
Rest of Sample	56.6	9.2	34.1	2211

[a] "Leaners" are grouped with their fellow partisans.
[b] Data are combined from the SRC/CPS, 1968 postelection survey ($N=1384$) and a postelection survey carried out by Opinion Research Corporation for the Stanford based Issues in an Election Project ($N=1153$).

Table 2

Balance of Favorability Judgment		Party Identification: Democrat	Independent	Republican	Column: N	Column: %
Pro-Humphrey		30[a]	19	24	73	37.4
Neutral		34	6	2	42	21.5
Pro-Nixon		50	9	21	80	41.0
	Row N	114	34	47	195	
	%	58.5	17.4	24.1		

[a] Entries are the number of Wallace voters satisfying the combination of conditions under the decision rules.

Table 3

Southern Region Balance of Favorability Judgment		Party Identification: Democrat	Independent	Republican	Column: N	Column: %
Pro-Humphrey		24	12	15	51	43.2
Neutral		19	1	1	21	17.8
Pro-Nixon		33	5	8	46	39.0
	Row N	76	18	24	118	
	%	64.4	15.3	20.3		

Non-Southern Region Balance of Favorability Judgment		Party Identification: Democrat	Independent	Republican	Column: N	Column: %
Pro-Humphrey		6	7	9	22	28.6
Neutral		15	5	1	21	27.3
Pro-Nixon		17	4	13	34	44.2
	Row N	38	16	23	77	
	%	49.3	20.8	29.9		

cent would have supported Nixon, and the remaining three per cent (the six "Neutral-Independents") would probably have abstained.

A coarse regional breakdown indicates that Humphrey was seriously affected by the Wallace candidacy only in the South. See Table 3.

These data yield the following distribution of expected votes:

Expected Vote	South	Non-South
Humphrey	59.3%	48.1%
Nixon	39.8	45.5
Non-Vote	0.8	6.5

These survey data will not permit us to examine the effect that Wallace's absence from the ballot would have had on the electoral vote.[2] But nationwide, the distribution of Wallace voters in accord with the decision rules would have affected the balance of the two-party popular vote very little. Instead of Humphrey's receiving 49% of the two-party vote in these combined samples, if the Wallace vote divided as expected, Humphrey would have received 49.85% of the two-party vote. Perhaps this change would have increased the suspense of an already tense election eve, but surely little else would have followed from the one and one-half per cent shift in the popular vote that is our best estimate of the effect of "No Wallace" in 1968.

RICHARD A. BRODY
Stanford University

[2] If we were willing to assume that the observed distribution of "second preferences" held throughout the region, in the South, Humphrey would have had popular majorities in all five of the states that Wallace carried in 1968 (including Georgia and Arkansas where Humphrey ran third). In the six southern states that Nixon carried, however, a combination of Wallace weakness and Nixon strength means that Humphrey would not have gained a majority of the popular vote in any of these six states. In the 26 states outside of the South that Nixon carried, Humphrey's slight lead as "second preference" to Wallace, would not have helped him at all. Even in Ohio, Missouri and New Jersey, (where distribution of the Wallace vote in accord with the division for the entire non-southern region gives Humphrey his greatest boost, he falls short of the requisite majority. Thus under the assumption of uniform distribution, Humphrey gains all of Wallace's 45 electoral votes but still comes up short in the final tally.

The States' Role in Public Policy: A Clarification

TO THE EDITOR:

In December, 1973, I presented three tables measuring the state share of the national variance in a *Review* article.[1] Since these tables have been a source of repeated misinterpretation and misuse, I would like to clarify their purpose with an example and to summarize why they cannot be used to evaluate the states' role in public policy.

[1] Douglas D. Rose, "National and Local Forces in State Politics: The Implications of Multi-Level Policy Analysis," *American Political Science Review*, 67 (December, 1973), Tables 1, 2 and 3.

At the time I wrote the article, researchers in state politics characteristically were basing their conclusions on methods which could not distinguish among three crucially different situations. In the first situation, which researchers usually assumed to be the actual state of affairs, state governments each made and implemented policy on the basis of what was possible and desirable for their state. Though states operated completely independently, they happened to follow a common pattern in their policy decision making, so we could discover the empirical laws describing state policy making by comparing states on their "inputs" and "outputs." The empirical law would be the rule linking resources and policy.

In the second situation, some national policy maker such as the federal government made policies, after considering what was possible and desirable, and applied them to individuals everywhere in the country; the policy resulted from a rule which linked an individual's resources to his policy benefits, so that we could discover the rule by comparing individuals on their resources and policy benefits. In the third situation, several levels of government made rules which all affected the policy; by examining the relationship of resources to policy benefits for states, we could only discover the net rule, not the separate rules at each level.

Researchers have three ways of knowing which of these situations is occurring: we can know who actually makes policy decisions, we can know what the different decisions would be if different actors made the decisions, and we can know the different patterns of variance at the individual level which would result from the different situations. Using any of these requires attention to more than one level of analysis; when researchers confined their data to the state level, they could not know which situation existed.

A Simplified Illustration. The Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program illustrates the problem. Consider for illustrative purposes that the program rules describe a broad-gauge welfare program not limited to families with dependent children. It is a federal program: the federal government sets up the program, provides the basic money, and sets the basic rule, the famous "thirty and one-third" rule. Again, let us simplify the rule to the following:

(1) no welfare is received by an individual unless his income (I) falls below some standard (A);

(2) the amount of welfare received (W) is proportional (.67) to the difference between income and the standard.

In addition to being a federal program, AFDC is a state program; states implement the program with some discretion and can modify the basic rule somewhat (in the guarantee level, setting a maximum payment, treatment of child care, etc.). Thus we have two levels, federal and state, operating with different rules.

Let us ignore the impact of the program (redistribution of income toward equality) and just concentrate on describing the policy. The federal input into policy follows the rule and the distribution of income in the population. Measure the income distribution with two variables, a dummy variable R, designating whether a case is rich or poor by whether the case is above or below the standard income, and a graduated variable I, applicable only to the poor, describing income in dollars. The federal variance in welfare payments (W) is a function of the rule and the variance of these two income distribution measures. Statistically, the federal variance is

$$(.67)^2(A - \bar{I})^2\bar{R}(1 - \bar{R}) + \bar{R}\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N_r} .67^2(I_i - \bar{I})^2}{N_r}$$

In words, the federal input in welfare variance is (1) the mean payment squared times the variance in poverty (recipients), plus (2) the mean poverty (recipients) times the variance of payments among the poor (recipients). If these welfare payments were regressed against the income distribution measures, we would conclude that the rule (regression coefficients) was: rich people get no welfare, poor people get two-thirds the difference between their income and some constant (standard) A. We would be correct.

Though, as described so far, the policy decisions have nothing to do with the states in actuality, the federal input into welfare will result in state differences in welfare payments if the states differ on income. The federal rule will translate income differences among individuals into welfare differences among individuals; if poor individuals tend to cluster in some states, then those states will get more welfare payments. Specifically, the between state income variances will translate into between state welfare variances by exactly the same formula (reflecting exactly the same federal rule) as do individual level variances. While the relationship at the state level is spurious, it will show a perfect correlation between income and welfare. If we looked at only the between state variances, we could deduce the payment rule from a regression analysis, but we could not know that it was a federal rule. Instead, we would be likely to conclude that states decided welfare payments, that the states' decisions were determined solely by economic considerations, and that poor states were making a greater "welfare effort" than were rich states. All these conclusions would be false.

Now consider an actual state input into welfare policy. Suppose states have to come up with some matching funds. States with many poor people will not have much of a tax base from which to collect the funds; so, let us assume, they come up short on matching funds, so people in their state will receive fewer federal funds than they otherwise would. For simplicity's sake, assume that the adjustment takes the form of reducing the payments; rich states do the opposite. State input into welfare policy thus adjusts the federal "two-thirds" rule by the proportion of a state's citizens who are poor ($\bar{R} - \bar{R}_s$). The net effect of these state adjustments is to decrease the between-state share of the welfare variance, as states are moving toward a common welfare payment per capita score despite the differences in poverty between their citizens. Suppose we now regressed between-state welfare variance on between-state income distribution variance; we would not come up with the federal and state rules separately but in confusing combinations. The deduced rule would be: (1) rich people get nothing, (2) poor people get $(.67 - \bar{R})$ times the difference between the standard and their income. Since in any particular analysis, $\bar{R}$ is a constant (.11 for instance), the only difference in results between the federal and federal-plus-state situations would be in the size of the coefficient, so the analyst would need to know the federal rule in order to understand that his results reflected the operation of two levels. As long as the analysis is confined to state level data and knowledge, the results do not give any clues to who is making what decisions.

If we look at both state- and individual-level data, we can deduce a great deal about the levels operating. The fact that the between state share of the variance on both input and output variances is more than zero and less than one indicates that two levels might be operating. The main clue lies not in examining income and welfare separately, however, but in comparing them. As the example has been given, if *only* the federal level is operating, the state share of the variance on income and welfare payments would be the same; with two levels operating, the state share of the variance on welfare will be much lower than the state share of the variance on income. It would be immediately obvious that two levels operate with two different rules. State characteristics on the aggregate would obviously be affecting policy at the individual level. Also, it would be obvious that while the

national rule was to translate income differences into welfare differences, the state input was, to the contrary, to negate these economic considerations and move all states toward a similar welfare payment per capita. In the original article, the illustrative results here were the characteristic results found empirically. The problem was real. States were only one of several levels making policy, and the state input into policy reduced the role of socioeconomic considerations, thereby producing highly similar policies in the states.

Legitimate and Illegitimate Uses of the State Share of the Variance. The comparison of shares of the variance on social and on policy variables indicated that state policies were in fact often the reverse of what we had thought and that we could not even measure state policies unless we considered the context within which they occurred. The intended effect was to encourage the study of states within a national and federal governmental context. To some degree this has been happening.

Just as frequently, the tables have been misused by being interpreted as summary measures of the importance of states in American politics. This misinterpretation ignores three aspects of the tables: (1) no reasonable standard of importance exists for the measure; (2) impacts which are common across states are not measured; and (3) policies which are redistributive within states are not measured. The problem of a standard of importance is normative and causal as well as statistical. On social variables such as sex, we do not expect governments to account for all the variance in the population; it is not clear that it is even possible for half the states to be all male and half all female as a permanent arrangement; I doubt that many would consider this a desirable distribution, and even fewer of us would consider it desirable for governments to mandate the arrangement. While the 100 per cent of the variance standard is important statistically in understanding what governments do, it is not a reasonable standard of the importance of governments. Standards of lesser magnitude, e.g., 50 per cent of the variance, appear to be equally unjustified without specific elaboration.

Similar problems obtain for politics and policy: Is it really possible or desirable to have all voters or all Democrats in a few states? Are states unimportant for policies when they lack a monopoly or, as in the electoral college, does their importance increase with internal diversity? If divorces only occur in Nevada, only Colorado allows abortion, or only New York regulates water use in summertime, does the variance accounted for make states more or less important than if policies and policy impacts are spread more widely within and among states? The lack of a reasonable standard is tied to the second problem: when states have similar policies, societies and impacts, the states do not account for much variance, yet the consequences within any state are not diminished merely because other states display similar characteristics. As many authors—Walker, Munger, Gray, Menzel, Eyestone, etc.—have indicated, similar policies often exist in the states. Yet both the causes and the consequences of the policies are important; as I have demonstrated, the similarity in policy often masks independent processes occurring within each state. Variance, by definition, deals only with what varies; when the important state policies are similar across states, variance does not measure the important policies. Finally, some of the most important policies of governments are not public goods shared by all citizens (and thus reflected in averages across individuals) but instead are redistributions among citizens, which may be zero-sum (and thus not all are reflected in averages across individuals) and are reflected directly only by measuring variance within a state. Prior to the 1965 Voting Rights Act, many Southern states redistributed voting power away from blacks and toward whites; surely this policy was not important merely to the degree that it lowered the overall turnout rate—yet that is the only aspect of the policy which shows up in between-state variance. While states do not at present appear to engage in redistributions of equivalent magnitude,[2] the problem cannot even be examined by relying on between state variance (without special transformations, a la Fry and Winters). The state share of the national variance thus simply does not measure potentially important state impacts which are redistributive or common across states, and of the impacts measured there is no standard of importance which is reasonable in normative or causal terms which could be used to evaluate states.

One of the main purposes of the tables was to indicate the inadequacy of treating variance of single variables as an adequate basis for studying states. It is therefore somewhat ironic that I now have to argue that the same variance figure on the same single variables (this time divided by the national variance) is neither an adequate basis for refusing to study states nor an adequate justification for restricting the study of states to case studies and global variables "unaffected" by the national society or individual level behavior. As students of American national government occasionally discover, states cannot simply be ignored;

[2] For an examination of state redistributive effects, see my "Comment: The American States' Impact on Voter Turnout," *American Political Science Review*, 69 (March, 1975), 124–131.

the complexities involved in studying them cannot be vanquished by letters to the editor.

DOUGLAS D. ROSE
Tulane University

Issue Areas and Differentials in Bureaucratic Power

TO THE EDITOR

As a student of state politics and bureaucratic policy making, and further, as one who learned that sometimes esoteric trade working with and for Professor Jack L Walker, I read "Variations in Elite Perceptions of American States as Referents for Public Policy Making" (Fred Grupp and Alan Richards, Sept. 1975, pp. 850–858) with the keenest of interest. To anyone who regularly reads the section of the *Review* titled Communications this will sound as hollow as it does obligatory, but I found the article to be stimulating, informative, and quite well done. I have already made classroom use of its Table 1, and I must confess that much of the *Review* does not find its way into my daily teaching performance. Still, I do have a complaint to register.

Grupp and Richards offer, and substantiate, the hypothesis that "the greater the inequality of esteem in a policy area, the greater the influence of administrators in that policy area" (p. 856). I have no quarrel with the hypothesis itself; indeed I am quite convinced they are right. My problem arises when they begin to tell us *why* they are right. In their conclusion they offer the following explanation for the observed relationship between consensus on quality state programs and administrative influence. In their own words, ". . . executives in those policy areas characterized by high levels of consensus about the better state programs have their influence increased because they are able to approach legislators or the governor's staff with specific policy proposals which are known to be working well in those highly esteemed states. This advantage does not accrue to executives in policy areas where there are no acknowledged leaders" (p. 858).

I find several objections to this path of explanation. First, does it not assume that the administrators are aware of whether or not consensus exists within their own field about who is "the best"? If knowledge of that consensus were not assumed, then why would the bureaucrat who saw in Maine the country's best welfare program feel he or she has "less to offer the other policy makers" (p. 856) than any of the 30 public works officials who felt California was the nation's leader in that area? Yet so far as I can tell from their article, Grupp and Richards asked each administrator to name the state he or she felt had the best program. They did not ask whether this was a view these administrators felt was shared by similar professionals in other states. I am not convinced that we can infer from Grupp and Richard's work, or even from Walker's earlier efforts, that these officials are really aware of the level of consensus on program quality that exists in their area of specialization. Until we can be sure of their awareness of that consensus (or its lack) I do not see how we can conclude that such an awareness influences the perceptions of program administrators of their influence in the policy process.

Perhaps even more important, the Grupp and Richards explanation assumes that politicians (governors, their staffs, and members of the legislature) are also aware of the extent of program quality consensus within the various policy areas and that politicians and bureaucrats tend to agree on who runs the "best show in town." If such an assumption is not being made, then what makes the public works official's argument that it works in California more persuasive than the welfare officer's statement that it was successful in Nevada or Vermont? Until we actually ask them, can we assume that governors and legislators are aware of bureaucratic perceptions of program quality, or that the assessments made by these political officials as to who runs the best program in a particular policy area will parallel the judgments made by administrators in that same area?

Finally, even if administrators are aware of "inequality of esteem" within their own policy areas, on what grounds do we assume that the administrator who perceived West Virginia as the nation's welfare leader would feel he or she "has less to offer" than one of the "gang" who saw California as "top dog" in public works? As one who has been close to the training of welfare professionals I can imagine no group more likely to believe in the validity of its proposed solutions. It seems to me that West Virginia's secret admirer, like Maine's, Vermont's, or Oklahoma's may well feel that he or she can "provide a proven solution to the problem"; the question is whether or not that solution will be accepted, and that is a question that goes far beyond the administrator's conviction that the solution proposed is workable.

Still, as I said at the beginning, I cheerfully accept the hypothesis that administrators will feel more influential (and probably be more influential) in policy areas characterized by considerable agreement on program quality. The reason I can accept it is simple: both program quality consensus and administrators' perceptions of their influence are reflections of a third variable, the nature of the policy area in question. If it is an area like welfare or business regulation that has long been a political battleground and affects deeply felt American values there is likely to be

little consensus, even among program administrators, on the "right" course to follow. Similarly, since these issues have intruded themselves into past races for the governnorship and the state legislature, and may be expected to do so again in the future, politicians are going to be reluctant to delegate their resolution to a set of officials who will not have to face the voters come November. Presumably, experienced bureaucrats will sense this attitude and adjust their perceptions of their own influence accordingly. On the other hand, executives in far less controversial areas like public works or public health administration (excluding the potentially explosive Medicaid program) would seem in a better position to arrive at some internal professional agreement on program quality and would face politicians far less concerned about exercising control over the final shape of policy outcomes. Once again, the bureaucratic executive will perceive this lessened concern and adjust his or her perceptions of agency influence on these policy decisions.

In addition to the differences in the level of political conflict surrounding various policy areas, some policy questions, on their surface, appear to require more expert knowledge for their solution than do others. In other words, some things just look more complicated than others. The governor and his or her staff almost certainly view the expertise of a public health epidemiologist talking about immunization programs in a very different light than they would view the expertise of a welfare administrator discussing eligibility requirements for AFDC. Though not unrelated to differences in the level of political conflict, this probably reflects an even deeper cultural perception about the nature of expert knowledge, as well as the need to use it. I can only speculate about why, but there are some areas of public policy in which the value placed on specialized knowledge is high and other areas in which it is low, and I suspect that bureaucrats soon become aware of which kind of area they are operating in and adjust their perceptions of their own influence on policy decisions accordingly. Our welfare bureaucrat enamored of Maine's excellence probably feels he or she can "provide a proven solution" but knows from years of trying that the political controversy surrounding welfare, as well as the politician's habit of downplaying the potential contribution of a welfare executive's expertise, will affect that politician's response to that "proven solution." It seems safe to conclude that administrators would take that realization into account when assessing their agencies' political influence. A public health administrator who knows that he or she works in a less controversial area and that specialized knowledge is seen as essential in that field will have far greater confidence about the agency's ability to influence policy choices.

If others agree with this objection to Grupp and Richards, as well as with my conviction that they have produced a truly important article, perhaps we will have a real world example of that always hoped for but ever elusive "building on one another's work" that is supposed to be the essence of a scholarly community.

DENNIS D. RILEY
University of Minnesota, Duluth

TO THE EDITOR:

We find Professor Riley's comments reasonable, even plausible. Our discussion (p. 855) of differences in policy areas is similar to the points he raises—i.e., we are aware that some policy areas, such as welfare, are controversial and that the expertise employed in some areas, such as public health, is apt to be accorded great respect by political leaders. We chose not to highlight these assertions in our concluding remarks because they remain suppositions; our findings were made within Walker's theoretical context.

Further, we are more impressed than Professor Riley with the capacity of the national, professional associations of state officials (p. 851) to inform the executive and legislative branches of state government of programs and policies which are working well in other states. It would be revealing to see how many persons serving on the staff of the governor, in the Legislative Reference Service, or in the state legislature regularly attend the meetings of these professional organizations and receive their newsletters or other publications. Should there be considerable interaction between the professional associations and these policy makers, our explanation of our findings would receive additional support.

We believe the issue is still open. Professor Riley's stimulating comments are, in our view, not an example of "building on another's work," but rather a call to further research. We did write that the state executives' "ability to influence policy outcomes varies by policy area, within as yet uncharted limits" (p. 858).

Finally, we are very pleased that he found our article useful in the classroom.

FRED W. GRUPP, JR.
University of Connecticut
ALAN R. RICHARDS
Louisiana State University

Critical Elections and the Supreme Court: Putting the Cart after the Horse

TO THE EDITOR:

In recent years, political scientists have increasingly come to appreciate the impact of realign-

ments of the American electorate on the making of public policy. A recent article by Richard Funston, "The Supreme Court and Critical Elections," *APSR*, 69 (September, 1975), 793–811, extends consideration of this mass-elite linkage to the actions of the Court in declaring national legislation unconstitutional. Funston is to be commended for attempting to explain Supreme Court behavior in terms of factors external to the Court itself, for the clarity of his exposition, and for his compelling assessment of the role of the Supreme Court in American politics. Yet, the principal theory which he advances remains untested. We cannot determine from his study what impact electoral realignments (in producing new legislative majorities) have had on the activities of the Supreme Court.

Funston has theorized that the Supreme Court is significantly more likely to declare laws unconstitutional when it remains the last bastion for the (old) national majority recently vanquished in realignment. This theory seems quite straightforward: During a period of realignment, one legislative majority is replaced by another. Later, after presidential appointments have changed the composition of the Court, the Court comes to reflect that same national majority. In the interim, when the Court reflects the vanquished majority, it confronts the new majority directly by declaring acts of that majority unconstitutional.

In his empirical analysis, Funston provides us with three different tests of his theory—concluding that each provides strong support for it. (1) He compares Court actions (i.e., striking down national legislation as unconstitutional) during the periods in which realignments took place with Court actions during the remaining non-realignment years. (2) He compares Court actions during "the total years of partisan realignment phases plus the total number of years necessary for a fifth or majority appointment to be made to the Court *after the beginning* of each of the realignment phases" with those in the remaining years. (3) He compares Court actions during "the total years of partisan realignment phases plus the total number of years necessary for a fifth or majority appointment to be made to the Court *after the end* of each of the realignment phases" with those in the remaining years. In each of these tests, the years in which he expects the Supreme Court to oppose the new majority include the eight-year period during which Funston contends that the realignment itself was taking place: 1820–1828, 1852–1860, 1888–1896, and 1928–1936.

None of these comparisons provides an adequate test for the theory Funston has advanced. The problem is that, by using the years in which the realignment is taking place, Funston has included many years in which the "emerging majority" had not yet become a legislative majority. The Jacksonian Democrats did not take power fully until 1829, Republican control began in 1861 and was later reasserted in 1897, and the Democrats did not become a legislative majority (i.e., control both Congress and the President) until 1933. In fact, of the 36 years in Funston's realignment phases, the Supreme Court "confronted" the old majority in exactly half and the new majority in only six (four during the New Deal period)! When we include laws declared unconstitutional which are at most four years old, the number of cases in which "old majorities" on the Court have overturned "old majorities" elsewhere may well increase.

No test of the Funston theory is adequate which includes these "realigning phase" years. Instead, attention should be focused on the first years after the realignment has been consummated by the installation of a new legislative majority—but before that "new majority" has been able to alter the basic composition of the Supreme Court. Thus, Funston at least should have studied the behavior of the Court from 1829 to 1836, 1861 to 1864, 1897 to 1909, and 1933 to 1940—in each case, the period from the new majority's seizure of control of both Congress and the Presidency to the appointment of a Court majority by "new majority" Presidents. To be even more precise, Funston should have taken into account the possibility that the "new majority" already had allies on the Court—i.e., McKinley "inherited" a Court in 1897 in which only three justices had been appointed by Democratic presidents. Finally, in order to be certain that old and new majorities are confronting one another, Funston should also examine the background of each case individually (there are not so many that the task is oppressive) instead of including all those in which the Court has negated laws four years old or less.

That Funston's theory has been supported with inadequate tests is not as puzzling as it may seem at first glance. A majority of the decisions to declare national legislation unconstitutional were rendered during the New Deal realignment phase. During the last four years of this period, a new majority was ensconced in Congress and the White House and faced a hostile Supreme Court. The confrontations between the Court and the more popular branches of government during this period alone may have produced the overall relationship. Thus, in order to demonstrate that a more enduring pattern of institutional conflict has been identified, a separate table for the non–New Deal periods should be provided.

The fact of the matter is that the observation made in the previous paragraph and Funston's are little more than speculation without the proper empirical tests. Funston should make these tests and report his results to the profession. His theory

is too interesting and too important for our understanding of policy consequences from realignments to leave the matter unresolved.

PAUL ALLEN BECK
University of Pittsburgh

TO THE EDITOR:

I think Professor Beck's criticisms very well taken. Indeed, they reflect certain caveats which I myself noted in my article. While his reservations about the analysis are appropriate, however, the vigor with which he presses them suggests that he has, in part, missed the point of the essay.

After three paragraphs which reasonably accurately summarize "The Supreme Court and Critical Elections," Professor Beck's central point (italicized, lest the unwary reader miss it) is made at the beginning of his fourth paragraph. I agree with that point. But I fail to see how it materially adds anything to what I wrote (p. 807):

> . . . The use here of some years before the elections which brought new coalitions to power as part of the realignment phases may very probably have artificially deflated the indexes for the critical periods. . . . Perhaps future research might attempt to determine the year of the ascendancy of the new coalition. . . . Such attempts to determine precise years of ascendancy, however, not only must contend with the scholarly contentiousness about which elections actually involved realignments but also will be liable to the charge that they have defined the critical periods so as to inflate the statistical results. . . . If the results reported here can be achieved by using realignment phases not inherently favorable to the thesis, they may perhaps be considered to be even more persuasive.

As for Beck's remarks concerning the New Deal period, I would simply refer him to my footnote 67.

"The Supreme Court and Critical Elections" was intended—and, I think, can and should so be read—as a synthetic rather than an original analytic effort. It was an attempt, as I stated in several places, to both integrate and test the assertions of certain leaders in our profession—most notably Dahl, but also Burnham—*on their own terms*. This effort at replication was dictated by my belief that we social scientists too little attempt to build upon one another's work as do our brethren in the natural sciences.

I could not more agree with Professor Beck that such an integrative statement as is represented by my article is but the beginning not the end of analysis, and I very much concur in his judgment that such an analysis must "examine the background of each case individually." I said as much in the article (p. 808):

> Ultimately, the subject calls for an extended, systematic, historical examination of the Court's decision making explicitly based upon the electoral classification scheme devised by the S.R.C. and elaborated by others, a treatment of the Court similar to that which Chambers and Burnham have done for the parties. . . . Any study such as this, based upon aggregate data, necessarily sacrifices situational focus for numerological standardization; but Supreme Court decisions are not fungible goods.

Indeed, my conception of what is required is apparently much more ambitious than Beck's; I think we need nothing less than a definitive intellectual history of the Court; something we do not now have. (See also my note 84.) I am encouraged that someone with Professor Beck's analytic skills also thinks the pursuit important.

RICHARD FUNSTON
San Diego State University

Alliance Behavior in Nineteenth-Century Europe

TO THE EDITOR:

In their recent analysis of nineteenth-century European alliance activity, McGowan and Rood allude to two separate dimensions of alliance aggregation—spatial and temporal. "If these [Kaplan's] rules are violated, either by a rigid enmity, such as existed between France and Germany after the annexation of Alsace Lorraine [spatial], or by a decline in the system alliance formation rate [temporal], then a loss of system flexibility will result and system-changing events are likely."[1]

Despite their repeated assertions that independence and flexibility in the matter of "whom the alliance partners are"[2] are vital to the maintenance of a balance of power system and their quoting Kaplan in the same vein ("the 'balance of power' system postulates that any alignment is as probable as any other alignment prior to a consideration of the specific interests which divide nations. Moreover, any particular alignment should not predispose the same nations to align themselves with each other at the next opportunity"),[3] the authors go on to ignore the spatial dimension of alliance aggregation in their data analysis. They test, instead, three hypotheses which concern the times at which alliances in nineteenth-century Europe were formed. These are

> H1: in a balance of power international system, the occurrence of alliances will be stochastically distributed (the number of alliances formed per unit of time is a Poisson random variable), and
>
> H2: in a balance of power international system, the time intervals between alliances are randomly distributed (the distribution of interalliance intervals is a negative exponential random variable).[4]

[1] Patrick J. McGowan and Robert M. Rood, "Alliance Behavior in Balance of Power Systems: Applying a Poisson Model to Nineteenth-Century Europe," *American Political Science Review*, 69 (September 1975), 862.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 861.

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] *Ibid.*

and

H3: in a balance of power international system, a decline in the systemic rate of alliance formation precedes system changing events, such as general war.[5]

Past scholarship, however, hardly agrees with McGowan and Rood that the time at which alliances are formed is the most important aspect of their relation to the operation of balance of power systems. Edward Gulick's account of European alliances is generally accepted as a classic account of the operation of a balance of power system (Robert Jervis's observation that Gulick's subject matter is more properly to be considered a "concert system" notwithstanding). In citing an example of the requisite (especially for the "holder of the balance") "mobility of action" for the maintenance of a balance of power system,[6] he emphasizes the identities of allies and opponents at least as much as, if not indeed more than, the times at which the alliances were concluded. Richard Rosecrance argues that

the balancing system of Europe required states to ally or oppose each other according to the presumed distribution of power: if ideological bonds or animosities had arisen, states could no longer have charted their courses on power considerations alone; states would have refused to balance against their ideological *confreres* or to align themselves with ideological opponents, regardless of the configuration of power.[7]

Dina Zinnes assumes the importance of spatial flexibility when she constructs her analytic model of a "hypothetical world" of possible alliance combinations in such a way that "the labels of the nations are unimportant. The relevant factors are the number of alliances of various sizes and the placing and number of power equalities and inequalities."[8] Nicholas Spykman offers simply that "he who plays the balance of power can have no permanent friends. His devotion can be to no specific state but only to balanced power. The ally of today is the enemy of tomorrow. One of the charms of power politics is that it offers no opportunity to grow weary of one's friends."[9]

It seems likely, then, that if threats to a very polarized (spatially nonrandom) system occur randomly (or according to a Poisson distribution), causing alliance formation within the system, most students of the balance of power "theory" would say that the system itself is neither fluid nor flexible (i.e., it would be a rigid system responding to random stimuli). On the other hand, a system of spatially random alliances would usually be considered fluid and flexible whether it was responding to random or nonrandom (temporally) stimuli. Therefore, the more important of the two dimensions of alliance aggregation would seem to be the spatial one.

Although McGowan and Rood have given us an excellent analysis of the temporal randomness of nineteenth-century alliances in Europe, it would be far more interesting and important to know whether these same temporally Poisson-distributed alliances exhibit spatial randomness as well. If they do, then McGowan and Rood's analysis (not to mention balance of power "theory" itself) would gain much more credibility. If, however, spatial alignment during the period is shown to be nonrandom—and more especially if the resulting pattern of alliance partners is indistinguishable from that of the 1910–1914 period's rigidity (which has been said to have been the cause of the disintegration of the European balance of power system and its transformation to a more-or-less bipolar one), then not only might McGowan and Rood's analysis lose much of its credibility and theoretical usefulness but also the usefulness of structural theories for the study of international politics in general might be brought into question.[10]

McGowan and Rood's data consist of 54 alliances among European states during the period 1814–1909. Although other states occasionally are included in these alliances, most of the activity concerns only five states—Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia. Their alignments during the period can be summarized according to partners as follows:

State	Prussia	Russia	Aligned with France	Great Britain	other
Austria	20	12	3	13	12
Prussia		11	1	6	9
Russia			7	9	3
France				9	6
Great Britain					10

[5] McGowan and Rood, p. 862.

[6] Edward Vose Gulick, *Europe's Classical Balance of Power* (New York: Norton, 1967), p. 68.

[7] Richard N. Rosecrance, *Action and Reaction in World Politics* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963), p. 28.

[8] Dina A. Zinnes, "An Analytical Study of the Balance of Power Theories," *Journal of Peace Research* 4 (1967), 273.

[9] Nicholas Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1942), p. 103.

[10] Arthur L. Stinchcombe's ideas concerning theory testing should be apparent here, if only in some twisted form. See especially his *Constructing Social Theories* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968).

From this table, the frequencies of bilateral relations within the system can be seen. These can then be listed according to frequency (starting with the most frequently-found partnership):

Austria-Prussia	20
Austria-Great Britain	13
Austria-Russia	12
Prussia-Russia	11
Russia-Great Britain	9
France-Great Britain	9
Russia-France	7
Prussia-Great Britain	6
Austria-France	3
Prussia-France	1

Since there are ten possible pairs of states in the data set, the probability that any one pair will occur, given that any one pair is just as likely as any other, is 1/10. Ninety-one bilateral ties occur in the matrix above. Therefore, an hypothesis of spatial randomness among the states under consideration would predict that each cell frequency would be 9.1. It is immediately apparent from both the matrix and the list presented above that this is not the case. The alliances which formed the McGowan-Rood data set are not spatially random.

One finds instead that Austria is allied with Prussia more than twice as often as random distribution would predict. On the other hand, a Prussia-France alliance almost never occurs at all and an Austria-France one is very little more frequent. Only the Great Britain-Russia and France-Great Britain ties occur as frequently as balance of power "theory" would expect.

If Austria-Prussia alliances predominated during the 1814–1909 period in Europe while Great Britain-Russia and France-Great Britain alliances occurred at least no less frequently than they would by chance, the modal alliance pattern for the system as a whole would seem very little different from the pattern which obtained in 1914.[11] Balance of power "theory" (and all structural theories of international politics) then faces the question of why pre-1910 European alliance rigidity did not cause international system transformation whereas post-1910 rigidity did. The only satisfactory answer to this question may have to be found at the individual-nation-as-actor level of analysis.[12] Although this is another matter deserving further empirical research, it should be noted that Kaplan himself considered balance of power systems to be "subsystem dominant,"[13] in other words, not amenable to systems (structural) theories and explanations at all: but rather dependent upon the actions and orientations of individual states.

Finally, an even more fundamental criticism can be made of both the McGowan and Rood analysis and this very brief one. Both analyses are in some fundamental sense after the fact of alliance, concerning themselves only with the point at which the "specific interests" of states have already shown themselves and the states in the system have taken up sides according to those interests. Kaplan's classic statement bears repeating: "the 'balance of power' system postulates that any alignment is as probable as any other alignment *prior to a consideration of the specific interests which divide nations* (emphasis added)." By the time alliances form, it is too late to determine this probability. Any study which concerns itself solely with alliances which have already come into being cannot adequately address itself to the task of testing balance of power "theory."

FRED H. LAWSON
University of California, Los Angeles

[11] If the grand coalitions which were formed just after the Congress of Vienna are dropped from the McGowan and Rood data set, then the general bipolarity of the European state system during the remainder of the nineteenth century becomes considerably more evident. With an hypothesis of randomness expecting identical frequencies of 5.3 for each bilateral combination, the following frequencies are actually observed:

Austria-Prussia	14
France-Great Britain	7
Austria-Russia	7
Austria-Great Britain	7
Russia-France	6
Prussia-Russia	6
Russia-Great Britain	4
Prussia-Great Britain	1
Austria-France	1
Prussia-France	0

[12] For a very precise delimitation of the two levels of international political analysis, see William B. Moul, "The Level of Analysis Problem Revisited," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 6 (September 1973), 494–513.

[13] Morton A. Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics* (New York: Wiley, 1957), pp. 27, 125.

TO THE EDITOR:

As we understand Mr. Lawson, he makes six points in his criticism of our recent study of balance of power alliance behavior in nineteenth-century Europe:

(1) the choice of alliance partner (and, by implication, opponent) is an important aspect of balance of power theory;

(2) we ignored this "spatial" dimension of alliance aggregation in our exclusively "temporal" study;

(3) if alliance pairings among the five great European powers in the nineteenth century are approximately random, then our analysis and balance of power theory "would gain much more credibility," but if "spatial alignment . . . is . . . nonrandom," then our study and other "structural theories" of international politics "might be brought into question";

(4) according to his presentation of our data,[1] alliances "are not spatially random";

(5) moreover, *ex post facto* research, such as our original study and his comment, cannot "test" balance of power theory;

(6) therefore, our study and balance of power theories are of dubious value.

We appreciate Mr. Lawson's interest in our paper and we welcome this opportunity to respond to his interpretation of our work and thereby to extend research in this important area of international relations theory.

Before we discuss each issue Mr. Lawson has raised, two general comments are in order. First, although he cites Moul's fine paper,[2] we do not think he has fully understood its relevance to his critique. The units of analysis and the treatment of time are completely different in our article and in his comment. We presented a longitudinal study of one international system, whereas Lawson works with a single aggregated cross-section of time (96 years!) and ten pairs of states. In Moul's language, for Lawson to claim that his critique says *anything* about the findings of our article is a clear instance of "confounding the ecological fallacy with a cross-sectional—longitudinal fallacy."[3] However, Lawson's presentation of our data is of interest in its own right, a point we shall consider. Second, Lawson has not reanalyzed our data, he has simply presented *without citation* and with several counting errors[4] information reported four years ago in Table 7 and Appendix A of Rood's dissertation.[5]

(1) Without question, *at the levels of states and pairs of states*, patterns of choice of alliance partner are a fundamental aspect of balance of power theory. However, to examine this issue in an entirely static, cross-sectional fashion as Lawson does obscures the dynamic, sequential nature of alignments, making it difficult to discuss in an intelligent manner alliance flexibility and also making more probable a spatially skewed distribution of the behavior between pairs of states, or any other interacting units for that matter.[6]

(2) It is obvious that we did not examine the *dyadic level* problem of alliance choice in our exclusively *system level* paper. It is also obvious that Mr. Lawson has not read carefully or has not understood fully our article and Rood's dissertation from which he obtained our data. To repeat what we said in our article,[7] Rood's study was an explicit test of the *dyadic level* proposition that "any alignment is as probable as any other alignment prior to a consideration of the specific interests which divide nations."[8] Rood was unable to falsify this proposition when a probabilistic model of agreement among pairs of actors developed by Brams and O'Leary was applied to the data.[9] Moreover, subsequent research has shown that deviations from this model may be explained statistically by the magnitude of war within each pair of states,[10] a violation of its assumptions that balance-of-power theory predictions should affect choice of alliance partners *and* opponents.[11]

(3) We strongly agree that if it can be demonstrated that alliances occur on both a spatially and temporarily random basis, then our study and balance-of-power theory will have their credibility enhanced. The problem with Lawson's critique is that skewed cross-sectional data *are not necessarily evidence of nonrandomness in statistical models*, particularly (a) when one works with a simplistic probability model, equal probability, (b) when the N is small, only ten dyads, and (c) when the author merely "eyeballs" the data rather than applying the appropriate statistical goodness of fit test. Lawson, in his "analysis" of our data, makes the same mistake Londoners did during World War II when they were sure that German rocket bombs fell in clusters in certain neighborhoods. A Poisson-based analysis of the spatial distribution of south London bomb hits indicated perfect randomness.[12] We would advise Mr. Lawson to heed Feller's conclusion regarding "the established fact that to the untrained eye randomness appears as

[1] We made these data available to Mr. Lawson at his request, a fact he fails to acknowledge.

[2] William B. Moul, "The Level of Analysis Problem Revisited," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 6 (September, 1973), 494–513.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 501–502.

[4] The errors are: (1) our alliances number 55, not 54; (2) the Austria-Prussia pair has 21, not 20 alliances, and (3) the Austria-Great Britain pair has 12, not 13. These correct figures are used in the new analysis we report in this communication.

[5] Robert M. Rood, "Agreement in the International System" (Ph.D. dissertation in Political Science, Syracuse University, 1973), 88, 183–201.

[6] Edwin Kuh, "The Validity of Cross-Sectionally Estimated Behavior Equations in Time Series Applications," *Econometrica* 27 (1959), 197–214.

[7] Patrick J. McGowan and Robert M. Rood, "Alliance Behavior in Balance of Power Systems: Applying a Poisson Model to Nineteenth-Century Europe," *American Political Science Review* 69 (September, 1975), 863.

[8] Morton A. Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics* (New York: Wiley Science Editions, 1964), Preface.

[9] Rood, "Agreement in the International System," pp. 159–163; Steven J. Brams and Michael K. O'Leary, "An Axiomatic Model of Voting Bodies," *American Political Science Review* 64 (June, 1970), 449–470.

[10] Robert M. Rood, "The Dyadic Distribution of Alliance Commitments," Columbia: Department of Government and International Studies, University of South Carolina, mimeo, 1975.

[11] That is, the patterned relationships of international conflict (magnitude of war within dyads) certainly are "specific interests which divide nations."

[12] William Feller, *An Introduction to Probability Theory and Its Applications*, 3rd ed. (New York: Wiley, 1968), 160–161.

regularity or tendency to cluster."[13]

(4) In point of fact, alliance choice *is* randomly distributed in the five power nineteenth-century European balance of power system. Table 1 shows this when the spatial *t*-axis is defined in terms of pairs of states and grouped in units of four alliances. We have also calculated goodness-of-fit tests for cutting points of two and three alliance units with similar results. Substantively, contrary to Lawson's reading of our data, we can report that the hypothesis, *in a balaace-of-power system, pairwise choice of alliance partner will be stochastically distributed* (the number of alliances formed per dyad is a Poisson random variable), cannot be rejected and is independent of how the number of alliances is categorized. Methodologically, Table 1 is cross-sectional (spatial) with all the attendant problems we have discussed regarding such analyses, and the N is very small. Nevertheless, we appreciate Mr. Lawson's stimulus and we hope that this original demonstration of the spatial randomness of alliances leads him to find more credible our original study as well as balance of power theory and structural theories of international politics in general.

Table 1. The Pair-wise Choice of Alliance Partners in Europe, 1814–1914, as a Poisson Distribution

Number of alliances per dyad	p[a]	Number Observed	Number Expected
0–3	.0198	2	.2
4–7	.2924	2	2.9
8–11	.4709	3	4.7
≥12	.2068	3	2.1
		10	9.9

$\chi^2 = 4.48$, d.f. $= 3$, $p = .21$

Kolmogorov–Smirnov test[b], $p > .20$

[a] Calculated from T. Kitagawa, *Tables of the Poisson Distribution* (Tokyo: Baifukan, 1952).

[b] Calculated from Sidney Siegel, *Nonparametric Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1956), pp. 47–51.

[13] Feller, *Probability Theory*, p. 161.

(5) It is difficult to determine what Mr. Lawson means by his concluding criticism that balance of power theory cannot be "tested" by nonexperimental methods including historical research and quantitative international political analysis. If he is correct, then the "theory" is no more empirical than the statement "everything which happens is God's will." We think Professor Kaplan intends to say more than such truisms and that in making statements about possible alliance partners and opponents, one must include the specific interests which divide nations as part of the statement of initial conditions from which the explanation (postdiction) or prediction is deduced. Could Kaplan mean anything else by his "classic statement" and still claim to advocate a "scientific" approach to the study of international relations as he so often does?[14]

(6) For all of these reasons, including his changes in the level of analysis and temporal organization, we cannot accept Mr. Lawson's criticisms. We do, however, thank him for his interest in our work.

PATRICK J. MCGOWAN
University of Southern California
ROBERT M. ROOD
University of South Carolina

[14] Morton A. Kaplan, "The New Great Debate: Traditionalism vs. Science in International Relations," in K. Knorr and J. N. Rosenau, eds., *Contending Approaches to International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), pp. 38–61.

EDITORIAL COMMENT

The Election of 1972: You Read it Here Last. With each passing presidential election, larger and larger bodies of public opinion data are collected—and by more and different sorts of people. The *Review* has frequently published the results of election studies done by our colleagues at the University of Michigan which through the years has focused the efforts of academics from many institutions. David Broder of the *Washington Post* suggested to us that when we presented the Michigan Center for Political Studies 1972 findings, we might also gather up comments and analyses from students having access to public opinion data originally generated in behalf of the McGovern and Nixon candidacies. The result of our followup has borne the fruit visible in the current issue, a symposium unusually complex and difficult to put together analyzing the 1972 presidential election just in time for the 1976 election. Art may or may not imitate life; we couldn't say. We do note, however, that social science tags along after real life at a respectful distance—in this case, four years.

Good Advice Needed. Now is a good time to remind readers that if they have suggestions or ideas to improve the *Review*, the transition period between managing editors is a strategic moment to let fly. Our successors in Pittsburgh are far more receptive and open minded than the barnacle-encrusted current management is likely to be. If you write, please do not omit a word of good cheer and commiseration, since a good part of the energies of any new administration must go into cleaning out the cobwebs neglected by the old.

Already improvements have been made in the processing of manuscripts. Prospective contributors should attend to the new instructions, printed in each issue, which, if followed, will cut costs without attenuating service to authors or readers. Good ideas like that are what we are after.

Articles Accepted for Future Publication

Joel D. Aberbach, University of Michigan, "Power Consciousness: A Comparative Analysis"

C. Arnold Anderson, University of Chicago, "Conceptual Framework for Political Socialization in Developing Societies"

John M. Bacheller, Kirkland College, "Lobbyists and the Legislative Process: The Impact of Environmental Constraints"

Paul Allen Beck, University of Pittsburgh, "Partisan Dealignment in the Postwar South"

Robert A. Bernstein, Texas A&M University, "Divisive Primaries Do Hurt: U.S. Senate Races, 1956–1972"

Paul R. Brass, University of Washington, "Party Systems and Government Stability in the Indian States"

Steven R. Brown, Kent State University, "Toward An Experimental Analysis of Political Literature"

Charles D. Cary, University of Iowa, "A Technique of Computer Content Analysis of Transliterated Russian Language Textual Materials: A Research Note"

Clarke E. Cochran, Texas Tech University, "Authority and Community: The Contributions of Carl Friedrich, Yves Simon, and Michael Polanyi"

Neal E. Cutler, University of Southern California, "Demographic, Social Psychological, and Political Factors in the Politics of Age: A Call for Research in Political Gerontology"

Barbara Deckard, University of California, Riverside, "Party Realignment and the Transformation of the Political Agenda—The House of Representatives, 1925–1938"

Shaheen F. Dil, Princeton University, "The Cabal in Kabul: Great Power Interaction in Afghanistan

Lowell Dittmer, State University of New York, Buffalo, "Thought Reform and the Cultural Revolution: An Analysis of the Symbolism of Chinese Polemics"

Robert Eyestone, University of Minnesota, "Confusion, Diffusion and Innovation"

Richard F. Fenno, Jr., University of Rochester, "Congressmen in Their Constituencies: An Exploration"

Norman Frohlich, Joe A. Oppenheimer, Jeffrey Smith and Oran R. Young, University of Texas at Austin, "A Test of Downsian Voter Rationality: 1964 Presidential Voting"

Dante Germino, University of Virginia, "Eric Voegelin's Framework for Political Evaluation in His Recently Published Work"

John A. Ferejohn, California Institute of Technology. "On the Decline of Competition in Congressional Elections"

John V. Gillespie, Dina A. Zinnes, Philip A. Schrodt, G. S. Tahim and Richard Rubinson, Indiana University, "An Optimal Control Model of Arms Races"

R. Kenneth Godwin and W. Bruce Shepard, Oregon State University, "Political Processes and Public Expenditures: A Re-examination Based on Theories of Representative Government"

Robert T. Golembiewski, University of Georgia, "A Critique of 'Democratic Administration' and Its Supporting Ideation"

George D. Greenberg, Jeffrey A. Miller, Lawrence B. Mohr and Bruce C. Vladeck, University of Michigan, "Developing Public Policy Theory: Perspectives from Empirical Research"

Russell Hardin, University of Pennsylvania, "Hol-

low Victory: The Minimum Winning Coalition"

Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, "Industrial Conflict in Advanced Industrial Societies"

Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, "Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy"

Robert W. Jackman, Michigan State University, "Politicians in Uniform: Military Governments and Social Change in the Third World"

M. Kent Jennings and Gregory B. Markus, University of Michigan, "The Effect of Military Service on Political Attitudes: A Panel Study"

Bryan D. Jones, Saadia Greenberg, Joseph Drew, and Clifford Kaufman, Wayne State University, "Bureaucratic Response to Citizen-Initiated Contacts: Environmental Enforcement in Detroit"

Sam Kernell, University of Minnesota, "Presidential Popularity and Negative Voting: An Alternative Explanation of the Mid-Term Congressional Decline of the President's Party"

Arthur J. Lerman, St. John's University, "National Elite and Local Politician in Taiwan"

Michael S. Lewis-Beck, University of Iowa, "The Relative Importance of Socioeconomic and Political Variables for Public Policy"

Michael Margolis, University of Pittsburgh, "From Confusion to Confusion—Issues and the American Voter (1956–1972)"

Richard D. McKelvey, Carnegie-Mellon University and John H. Aldrich, Michigan State University, "A Method of Scaling, with Applications to the 1968 and 1972 Presidential Elections"

Richard D. McKelvey and Peter C. Ordeshook, Carnegie-Mellon University, "Symmetric Spatial Games Without Majority Rule Equilibria"

J. Miller McPherson, Susan Welch, University of Nebraska, and Cal Clark, New Mexico State University, "The Stability and Reliability of Political Efficacy: Using Path Analysis to Test Alternative Models"

Paul E. Meehl, University of Minnedota, "The Selfish Voter Paradox and the Thrown-Away Vote Argument"

Abraham H. Miller, Louis H. Bolce and Mark Halligan, University of Cincinnati, "The J-Curve Theory and the Black Urban Riots: An Empirical Test of Progressive Relative Deprivation Theory Using Both Objective and Perceptual Indicators"

Edward N. Muller, State University of New York at Stony Brook, "Behavioral Correlates of Political Support"

Edward N. Muller and Thomas O. Jukam, State University of New York at Stony Brook, "On the Meaning of Political Support"

Garrison Nelson, University of Vermont, "Partisan Patterns of House Leadership Change, 1789–1976"

Helmut Norpoth, University of Cologne, "Explaining Party Cohesion in Congress: The Case of Shared Policy Attitudes"

Thomas C. Nowak, Waynesburg College and Kay A Snyder, Michigan State University, "Politics and Administration: The Philippines Before Martial Law"

Thomas L. Pangle, Yale University, "The Political Psychology of Religion in Plato's *Laws*"

James L. Perry, University of California, Irvine and Charles H. Levine, Syracuse University, "An Interorganizational Analysis of Power, Conflict, and Settlements in Public Sector Collective Bargaining"

James H. Qualls, The Johns Hopkins University, "Barber's Typological Analysis of Political Leaders"

David Resnick, Cornell University, "Crude Communism and Revolution"

Neil R. Richardson, University of Texas at Austin, "Political Compliance and U. S. Trade Dominance"

Howard Rosenthal, Carnegie-Mellon University, and Subatra K. Sen, University of Rochester, "Spatial Voting Models for the French Fifth Republic"

Barry S. Rundquist, University of Illinois, Urbana, Gerald S. Strom, University of Illinois at Chicago Circle, and John G. Peters, University of Nebraska, "Corrupt Politicians and Their Electoral Support: Some Theoretical and Experimental Observations"

Lester M. Salamon, Duke University, and John J. Siegfried, Vanderbilt University, "Economic Power and Political Influence: The Impact of Industry Structure on Public Policy"

Lars Schoultz, Miami University, "The Socioeconomic Determinants of Popular-Authoritarian Electoral Behavior: The Case of Peronism"

Thomas Schwartz, Carnegie-Mellon University, "Collective Choice, Separation of Issues and Vote Trading"

Donald D. Searing, University of North Carolina, "Measuring Politicians' Values: Administration and Assessment of a Ranking Technique in the British House of Commons"

Gerald S. Strom, University of Illinois at Chicago Circle, and Barry S. Rundquist, University of Illinois, Urbana, "A Revised Theory of Winning in House-Senate Conferences"

Peter J. Steinberger, University of California, Riverside, "Hegel as a Social Scientist"

Fred H. Willhoite, Jr., Coe College, "Primates and Political Authority: A Biobehavioral Perspective"

Gerald C. Wright, Jr., Florida Atlantic University, "Contextual Models of Electoral Behavior: The Southern Wallace Vote"

Marvin Zetterbaum, University of California, Davis, "Equality and Human Need"

On the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences**

RALPH ROSS

Scripps College, The Claremont Colleges

The *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* had its origin in a series of discussions about how to revise the earlier *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: Macmillan, 1930). It was decided not to revise it, but to create a new encyclopedia, because social science seemed to be growing and changing so rapidly that our generation, and perhaps each succeeding one, needed its own statement. There are so many new ideas about what social science is and ought to be in the *International Encyclopedia*, that revision of the older *Encyclopedia* would not have been able to incorporate them in its structure. Continuity between the two is not only evident in many articles but also in the overlap of some sixty contributors.

The *International Encyclopedia* is both narrower and broader than the *Encyclopedia*. It does not compete with general encyclopedias on topics they do well. It has less purely descriptive matter and sheer information than the *Encyclopedia*, but more on methods and ideas. Indeed, its emphasis is on analytic and comparative study (the *Encyclopedia* did not, for example, have an article on comparative politics), and its editors believe that historical and descriptive materials in the articles should be illustrative of concepts and theories; people wanting the materials themselves in greater detail can find them elsewhere. New scientific interests are revealed by more studies and more pages on such subjects as human biology and linguistics, and on the relationships between social sciences and other studies, including literature and the arts.

We may be misled by the title, *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, for it gives the impression that the work it presumably supersedes, the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, was only American, or at least not intentionally international in scope, and that is not true. American contributors to it were chosen, sheerly for the sake of convenience, if they were thought to be as able as their foreign counterparts; otherwise they were not chosen. Foreign contributors were asked to write in their own languages, which were translated. And all contributors were expected to be concerned with social science everywhere. Part Two of the Introduction (which alone covered about 118 very large double-column pages) was devoted almost entirely to the place of social science in Great Britain, the countries of Europe, Latin America, and Japan. The *International Encyclopedia*, despite its name, is chiefly American and English in its contributors.

The history of social science was more concentrated and had far more range in the older encyclopedia. Part One of the Introduction, which would make a stout volume in itself, dealt with the growth of social science from ancient Greece to its own time. The individual periods were discussed by such scholars as E. R. A. Seligman, W. L. Westermann, Tenney Frank, Harold Laski, Charles Beard, and Robert MacIver.

There was also a self-conscious attempt at unity which is lacking in the *International Encyclopedia*. There one must read widely to discover assumptions unstated by the editors. The *Encyclopedia's* editors were explicit; they found the social sciences justifying themselves as separate disciplines and continuing to exist in "water-tight compartments" (Vol. I, p. xvii, 1937 edition). Whatever virtue this had in the development of science the compartments should not be permanent, and the editors wanted to break them down. "The conclusions reached by the separate sciences were gradually recognized, therefore, as incomplete and provisional, and the demand went forth to attempt a better analysis through a more comprehensive synthesis" (Vol. I, p. xvii). The movement toward a science of society thus received an official cachet. The *International Encyclopedia* is quite unclear on the subject and, although some studies, like political sociology, combine elements that were once separate, water-tight compartments are found everywhere.

The *Encyclopedia* was less restrictive, more catholic, in what it surveyed. It designated ethics, education, philosophy, and psychology as semi-social sciences, and included articles under those headings with a view, perhaps, to completing that comprehensive science of society which shows the influences of common activities within the group on each of its members. Seligman, the editor-in-chief, even recognized "the sciences with social implications" (Vol. I, p. 3) as a class of social science. The *International Encyclopedia* treats psychology at length, including physiological psychology, as a part of social science, and contains articles on ethics and education, but it has no article on philosophy at all, in contrast to the *Encyclopedia*, which had a long, excellent article on the subject by John Dewey. Altogether, I must express a preference for the *Encyclopedia* as a

* *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.* Edited by David L. Sills. (New York: The Macmillan Company & The Free Press, 17 volumes. 1968. $495.)

more coherent, more intellectual, better edited work.

Biographies of living persons were excluded from the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*. Thus, for all the attention he attracted at the time, and although his work was completed, there was no biography of Gaetano Mosca. The *International Encyclopedia*, however, includes biographies of living persons assumed to have already completed most of their work, so their ideas and contributions can be judged; in practice, that amounts to including people thought to be important to social science who were born before 1891. It is a tribute to the choice of contributors to the *Encyclopedia* that more than one hundred of them were found worthy of being biographees in the *International Encyclopedia*.

In general, the articles in the *International Encyclopedia* are in alphabetical order, but where it seems reasonable they are placed under a more general subject. Thus the Rorschach Test comes under Projective Methods, and Balance of Payments under International Monetary Economics. The articles have useful selected bibliographies. The index lists, first, contributors, and then articles, in alphabetical order, and concludes with a classification of articles under appropriate rubrics.

Much of the academic community was involved in the preparation of the *International Encyclopedia*. David L. Sills was the editor; he was assisted by Associate Editors, Special Editors, and Editorial Staff. W. Allen Wallis was chairman of a distinguished Editorial Advisory Board and, a nostalgic note, Alvin Johnson, who was Associate Editor of the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, was Honorary Editor of the *International Encyclopedia* and gave time and counsel to the editors, although he was over ninety years old.

Before dealing with specfics, I should like to try to capture the overall character of the *International Encyclopedia*, the quality that gives it whatever coherence it has. The publication date is 1968, just yesterday in the world of scholarship, but the articles must have been written a little earlier, and ours is a time of rapid change. What I am suggesting is that the editors and contributors, people of distinction in the academy, made up a kind of Establishment of the social sciences, which is already being criticized, sometimes quite feebly, sometimes trenchantly and in essentials. I am not concerned here with the criticism of those younger, and occasionally older, scholars who were radicalized by the political atmosphere of the late '60's and want to politicize social science and scientific associations; I am interested in the kind of criticism that reconsiders the assumptions and general direction of the social sciences, and that may affect their future. It may prove useful to characterize the *International Encylopedia* by comparison not just with its predecessor, but with a great encyclopedic landmark of an earlier age, and for that I have chosen the *Encyclopédie* of the eighteenth century. The *Encyclopédie* was not intended just as a vast compendium of human knowledge in the Age of Reason, but as a synthesis larger and more ambitious than that aimed at in the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*. The dreams of science are fitful, but recurrent, and although one aspect of the vision of Diderot and D'Alembert is still repeated by some philosophers of science, the reality, at least of the social sciences, is farther from the dream than it was in 1930.

The View of Knowledge

Evaluation and criticism get better and worse with the passing of time. Because we are not men of the Enlightenment, we do not breathe their air of ideas and values; we must, intellectually, reconstruct the climate of the Enlightenment, and we are prone to error. But we have new perspectives, which let us see past time from a vantage point that makes relations and patterns clearer, and some of our information is new. Thus what the philosophes took to be simply knowledge, we see as part of their age. In that respect, if not in others, we can write of Diderot's *Encyclopedia* with a confidence unmatched by Diderot's contemporaries. So it will be in the future with the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*. In the meantime, it is still rewarding to compare the *International Encyclopedia*, in its view of knowledge, with Diderot's *Encyclopedia*.

The French *Encyclopedia* embraced all knowledge, not just the social sciences, and classified knowledge under the general headings, Memory, Reason, and Imagination (see below). The *International Encyclopedia* less schematically classifies knowledge in the social sciences under the headings of subjects, or branches of study, like Demography, Econometrics, and Social Psychology (in the extremely useful Index, Vol. 17).

D'Alembert, in his *Preliminary Discourse to the Encyclopedia of Diderot*,[1] is concerned with the way knowledge arises, and holds much of Locke's (and Condillac's) epistemology. "We can divide all our knowledge," he says, "into direct and reflective knowledge" (p. 6). Direct knowledge comes from the senses; reflective knowledge is what we make of direct knowledge. The first thing we learn from our sensations is the fact of our existence. "From this it follows that our first reflective ideas must be concerned with ourselves, that is to say, must concern that thinking principle which constitutes our nature and which is in no

[1] Published in 1751. My references are to the Library of Liberal Arts edition, Indianapolis and New York, 1963.

way distinct from ourselves" (p. 8). Thus Descartes follows on Locke.

Unlike Diderot and his colleagues, the editors of the *International Encyclopedia* hold no philosophical theory of knowledge on which its contributors would agree, except for the scientific method of our day, whose victory over all rival methods is complete in these pages. Diderot's *Encyclopedia*, too, had a special concern with scientific method, but it was essentially the method of Newton and the Newtonians, with an assist from Locke (see D'Alembert, p. 16ff.). The *International Encyclopedia* attends to the history of ideas in each of its subjects, sometimes thoroughly, as in Dwight Waldo's "Public Administration," sometimes casually, as in "Taxation." The *Encyclopedia* of Diderot takes the position that history is the basic source of certain kinds of knowledge, especially of ethics, politics, and human nature. On human nature and ethics, D'Alembert is quite Hobbesian and makes much of self-preservation. Human nature, ethics, and politics are a kind of continuum, although D'Alembert offers a caution: he describes politics as ". . . a sort of ethics of a particular and serious kind, to which the principles of ordinary ethics can on occasion be accommodated only with much subtlety" (p. 36).

Although Memory, Reason, and Imagination are the general headings under which D'Alembert places all knowledge, they are not utterly distinct from each other. They are, indeed, all faculties of Understanding, and are closely related. History (in the large sense in which everything has a history) comes from memory, Philosophy (which includes natural philosophy, or science—even to veterinary medicine) from reason, and the Fine Arts (all capitals are D'Alembert's) from imagination. Yet "Imagination acts no less in a geometer [i.e., mathematician] who creates than in a poet who invents" (p. 51f.). And all the subjects D'Alembert names are branches of knowledge, including the Fine Arts, not so readily accepted in our day as yielding knowledge.

Underlying the whole enterprise of Diderot's *Encyclopedia* is a belief in the unity and ultimate simplicity of knowledge. It is a belief that sustained the fascinating diversity of work and interest so typical of the philosophes of the Enlightenment, a quality popularly associated only with Renaissance man. In studying and doing many different things, the men of the Enlightenment were still concerned with one thing, knowledge, as it was revealed in all the activities of mind. D'Alembert himself, whose talents were not perhaps so great and diverse as Voltaire's, or Rousseau's, or Hume's, was a distinguished mathematician and scientist, a student of philosophy and psychology, about which he wrote elegantly, and the author of a work on music (*Élémens de Musique*, 1792) that was much acclaimed. He did not, like Rousseau, write operas, but he collaborated with him on articles about music in the *Encyclopedia*.

The great theme of the French *Encyclopedia* can be stated simply, as D'Alembert did. "The universe," he wrote, "if we may be permitted to say so, would only be one fact and one great truth for whoever knew how to embrace it from a single point of view" (p. 29). This faith is sometimes called the unity of science, but it is not that in our sense of "science"; it is the unity of "knowledge," which is all that "science" initially meant. Today we have distinguished science from other kinds of knowledge, like legal knowledge, and from activities like art, whether or not they yield knowledge. Science, to us, rests on observation and culminates in general laws, and that rules out many things from our own faith (which many share) in the unity of science. D'Alembert held a larger doctrine. Typically, he said: ". . . it is readily apparent that the sciences and the arts are mutually supporting, and that consequently there is a chain that binds them together" (p. 5).

Today's belief in the unity of science is like D'Alembert's in one respect: its idea that to unify science is to "reduce" it to its fundamentals. D'Alembert's version of reduction is implicit in this passage: ". . . if it is often difficult to reduce each particular science or art to a small number of rules or general notions, it is no less difficult to encompass the infinitely varied branches of human knowledge in a truly unified system" (p. 5). Perhaps each subject was ideally to be "reduced" to a few general laws, and then connected to other subjects by "a chain that binds them together," and the whole finally seen "from a single point of view" as "one great truth." Current ideas, less widely accepted at the moment than the unity of knowledge was by the philosophes, give the basic physical sciences a high priority, and present an ideal "reduction" of science as the statement of all scientific knowledge in physico-chemical terms.

This "reduction" includes human behavior, and so psychology as well as the other social sciences, but it excludes the arts. Properly so, too, when knowledge shrinks to science, for it is hard even to image "reducing" *Macbeth* or Michelangelo's *David* in any way, let alone stating them in physico-chemical terms. In their heyday, the logical positivists held the unity of science to be a cardinal principle of their philosophy, and sponsored the relatively small *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science*, which contains some splendid articles, but neither that doctrine nor the Enlightenment's unity of knowledge are the central themes in the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*.

Let me try to state those themes, as I see them recur in many articles. Whatever the individual

contributors or editorial staff may have thought they were doing, the *International Encyclopedia* does not merely report the current state of each subject, but the current state of social science itself. With only minor disagreement among the contributors, social science is perceived as continuous in general method with physical science and, perhaps as a result of that, is understood by some contributors as value-free. The *International Encyclopedia* is the fullest statement of what a (perhaps value-free) social science, modeled on physical science, has accomplished in our time.

Some contributors, like Sheldon Wolin ("Political Theory: Trends and Goals"), think it naive to expect social science to be value-free, but many contributors simply take it for granted. The more theoretical among them are explicit, and distinguish fact from value in different degrees. The range starts with Arnold Brecht ("Political Theory: Approaches," Vol. 12), who wants to use the word "science" in such a way that "the validity of ultimate moral standards of valuation cannot be established through scientific means" (p. 308), but still permits "scientific political theory" to function "so as to make an informed choice [of goals and goal-values] possible" (p. 313). This may be a refusal to meet the issue squarely, because of the word "ultimate." An informed choice among values is a great deal; it goes a long way toward making facts relevant to values, and it may be *hubris* to expect more. Also, Brecht wants us to put the study of "goals and goal-values in the center of political theory, where it used to be" (p. 313), but on a strictly scientific base. Perhaps that, too, is *hubris*.

The range of opinion on fact and value continues throughout the *International Encyclopedia*, and one reads Felix E. Oppenheim saying bluntly ". . . normative principles cannot be derived from factual generalizations" ("Equality: The Concept of Equality," Vol. 5, p. 107), without Brecht's elaborate qualifications. This is an extension of the social-scientific claim to be value-free, as is the first statement I quoted from Brecht, going beyond description of science as containing facts which are value-free to a philosophical position in which values are fact-free. Perhaps normative principles cannot be derived (i.e., logically inferred) from factual generalizations *alone*, but Oppenheim's failure to qualify his principle in this way makes it seem that we cannot learn about our values from experience, that factual generalizations do not affect values. Experience leads us to facts and factual generalizations, and experience shows they do bring clarification and alteration of values; if they did not, we would all be doomed to dogmatism or caprice.

As for a value-free social science: what parts of it are value-free? There can be little dispute that values enter science in the selection of problems and the application of conclusions. Beyond that, matters are less clear. Do values enter in the choice of methods, for example? They may. The area of value-free science, then, becomes, first, the ways in which methods, however selected, lead to conclusions and, second, the actual statements within the body of social science, including particular descriptions and generalizations. Here, however, the values *of science* play their part. Data are selected because of their relevance to hypotheses, those aspects of experience which are thus relevant are described, other aspects are ignored, and the described aspects of experience are called "data." If only the *shape* of a snowflake is relevant to a hypothesis, its color and temperature are ignored. Generalizations are formulated so they are testable and, perhaps, relate clearly to other generalizations. Experiments must be replicable, and evidence must be honest.

To rule the values of science out of the general realm of values, which is a possible defense against what I have said, one must either qualify the statement that science is value-free by asserting that it is free of nonscientific values, or one must classify scientific values as procedure or method, thus denying they are values at all. Perhaps in the second case one can accept truth as a value and relegate all other scientific values to the category of means. Then one can possibly assert that science *ought* to be value-free and ask whether in fact it is.

Another justification for value-free social science might come from the perspective of use and application. The truth such science discovers would work when used. For some, that is itself a definition of truth. Again, this argument is all right, too, so far as it goes, but it leads quickly to an ethical quagmire, because of the ambiguity of the word "work." Should all the conclusions of social and behavioral science be spoken freely, or is it better to repress some conclusions in the interest of a just society, *whatever we mean by that*? If, for instance, it should turn out, in repeated studies, that ethnic group A falls far short, on the average, of other ethnic groups in the amount and quality of education its members can absorb, might not one consequence of such knowledge be an imposed inequality of educational opportunity, and might not that inequality lead to more and worse consequences? Such truth would "work," in a sense, but not as many people would want it to. Shall we then repress the utterance of some conclusions? And can we? If the conclusions are known, will they not be said? It is only a little step from granting that we should, but cannot, repress dissemination of those conclusions, to advocating that we should repress the research that might breed them.

Perhaps the social scientist wants to be above the social battle and simply proclaim that science its uses then falls on others. At once we are back to the initial argument about the physical scientists who discovered nuclear fission. Is a human being entitled to compartmentalize his life so that, as scientist, he forbids himself to know how his conclusions will probably be applied, even when that is obvious? As a matter of fact, mustn't he lie to himself sometimes, pretending he does not know what he does know? An unhappy situation for any scientist, but especially for the social scientist, because the probable application of scientific knowledge is a legitimate question in social science.

Then, what of the sentences within social and behavioral sciences? Are they all free of implied value? Max Weber, who wanted a value-free social science, said the state has a monopoly of legitimate force. Is "legitimate" a value-free word? Doesn't "illegitimate force" sound morally bad? And how about the current description of politics as "the authoritative allocation of values"? Isn't authority legitimate and good, as opposed to illegitimate and bad? Further, when a "social item" is called functional for the maintenance of a system, only those who oppose the system itself are likely to think of that item as bad; for others it is probably felt to be good. If we agree that something is dysfunctional, don't we want to be rid of it if we can? Being rid of it, or substituting something functional for it, requires purposive action, and purposive action is hard to conceive without some value or values to guide it. Even if we do not intend to act, a need for action is implied.

When the economist says that particular legislation will increase inflation or unemployment or will bring depression, his statement is more than prediction; it is also a warning that our values will not be served. When the political scientist asserts that some governmental action may cause civil disorder, there is no value-neutrality in "civil disorder." We may not only conclude that some sentences in social science are not at the moment value-free, but we may question whether social science can at any time be entirely value-free. The thrust of that question comes not only from the subject matter of social science, which is human behavior, but from the nature of language as it is developed in human cultures.

Ordinary language is drenched in values. Most people have trouble articulating their own values explicitly, but those values fashion their conduct and their words. The language of imaginative literature is even richer in values than ordinary language, while the language of natural science eliminates values as much as possible. The poet is always concerned with valuing, and shapes his language to reveal his values. The physicist may be obsessed with scientific values, but uses language in his scientific work so it results from, but does not reveal, those values. Yet even natural science, when it deals with matters that affect man, uses of necessity a less neutral vocabulary. Language about quasars can be quite neutral, but language about pollution cannot, at least in the same degree.

Social science may seek a technical language, but it can be utterly technical only here and there, usually in the use of mathematics. Otherwise social science is condemned to ordinary language and its heavy freight of value. It stands somewhere between common speech and the language of natural science; and however much it aspires to the latter, it is mired in the former.

There is still another point to be made about value-neutrality, apart from the individual sentences of social science. I have suggested considerable agreement about the importance of value in choosing a problem. As social science gains in prestige, one can anticipate mounting social pressure to work on problems that are not merely of scientific interest but bear on the problems society is facing. Successful work can then become a basis for public policy. Indeed, this is already the case. I cannot believe that a social scientist who knows that his work may influence public policy will regularly do that work with no hint of the policy he prefers, even when that preferred policy must be carefully based on the outcome of his research. And policy, of course, always involves value judgment. Even a study of the relationship between types of housing and the incidence of crime contains an implied preference for a type of housing that correlates with a low incidence of crime, unless other consequences of it are even more dreadful. Should such a study be undertaken when a public housing agency is interested in the question and clamors for more information, the policy implications of the study are likely to be overwhelming.

These considerations cast doubt on the possibility that a social science can be modeled on the physical sciences. And there is a reasonable chance that the idea of physical science in the minds of most social scientists is quite different from the idea of physical science in the minds of most physicists. I am thinking of the paradoxes of quantum mechanics, like those that come from holding both a wave and corpuscular theory of light, and of the primacy of the indeterminacy principle, at least in dealing with subatomic particles. If the ideas of physical science held by physicists and sociologists are indeed different, then many social scientists are imitating a model of their own construction, to which they ascribe the high prestige properly due to quite another model. But that is really of small consequence compared to the question whether the scientific model of social science, wherever it

comes from, is indeed appropriate to social science.

A completely obvious difficulty with the nomological pattern of physical science in its application to social science is consistently neglected: the creation of a great work of art. One can undoubtedly state general laws about painters and the conditions under which they paint. These laws might apply to Leonardo as plausibly as to any other painter, but how could they explain that, on one occasion, what he painted was *The Virgin and Child and St. Anne*. I don't mean the subject; I mean the picture itself which, whatever its relations to other pictures, is sufficiently different from them so that *it is a unique event* in the history of the world.

What happens when we constantly fit particular occurrences into the Procrustean bed of general law is that we eliminate individual differences and individual purpose. There is no great problem in treating atoms *of the same kind* in this way; they are not different from each other and they have no purposes. But dealing with people may very well be another matter. It seems entirely possible to explain some events individually and thus to include purpose, with all its value-components, in the explanation. Would such procedure destroy social science? I see no reason why it would. Its consequence, however, would be a new direction in social science, perhaps part of the social science of the future, and perhaps with a different name, in which exploration of purpose and value, with due regard to morals, held a central place.

Propositions about Administration

A large body of knowledge, well enough organized so that the information one wants is never beyond his finger tips, can be immensely useful. That is surely true of the *International Encyclopedia* although, as I shall try to show, there are problems of inconsistency throughout it. One use to which the *International Encyclopedia* lends itself is a summary of knowledge in a given area. Thus Howard R. Alker, Jr. and P. G. Bock published a piece called "Propositions About International Relations" in the *Political Science Annual of 1972*, basing their propositions on material in the *International Encyclopedia*. It is impressive work and, in an effort to see how readily it can be done, I tried my hand at the same sort of job for Administration and Public Administration.

My results were somewhat unsatisfactory, or I should record them here. In order to write such a set of propositions with any confidence that they represent the thought of the distinguished authors of articles on the subject, I would have to be sure they all agree, and that does not seem to be so, although here and there a subset of propositions is relatively clear. Herbert Simon, for example, takes some conclusions of human relations research to be unexceptionable, especially as they apply to blue-collar workers and lower supervisory levels of organization (Vol. 1, "Administrative Behavior"). Three such propositions follow:

(1) Employees who feel more free to set their own work pace prove to be more productive than those who lack this sense of freedom.

(2) Noneconomic motivations, especially in primary work groups, are more important determinants of human behavior than economists of scientific management suppose.

(3) Under many circumstances, moves to more nonauthoritarian and egalitarian management styles increase productivity, acceptance of change, and worker satisfactions.

All this has little to do with the motivations of executives; it is rather motivation induced in others by executives. It is about executives and administrators of the higher echelons that we know least. Also, Simon's concern with business administration, whose emphasis is on productivity and profit, does not always appeal to those students of public administration whose interest in public policy is quite different in nature. Dwight Waldo expresses it this way: "Simply put, students in Public Administration were inclined to feel that Simon's work did not describe the world of public administration as they had experienced and observed it. To a generation emancipated from the politics-administration dichotomy, Simon's separation of fact and value seemed but another artificial division of the universe into two realms" (Vol. 13, p. 155).

Even within public administration itself, the disagreements are serious; they begin with a question of definition. There is substantial agreement that administrators affect policy. They don't simply carry out decisions made by politicians. But administrators who are not elected must be distinguished from politicians who are. Herbert Kaufman defines administrators as appointed officers in governmental service who supervise others, and he distinguishes administrators from formal rulers who are, one assumes, elected or hereditary (Vol. 1, "The Administrative Function"). Norton Long defines administrators as public officials other than judges or legislators (Vol. 1, "The Administrative Process") and so differs from Kaufman by including all those in the executive branch of government as administrators, thus meaning what journalists do, or for that matter the man in the street, when they speak of "the administration."

Waldo finds no moment in history when the study of public administration began, but comments that an essay by the young Woodrow Wilson is often taken as a symbolic beginning (Vol. 13, p. 146). Wilson wanted to use European ways of

training civil servants and studying administration, not, of course, for their monarchical or autocratic ends, but to perfect our "republican-democratic constitutional system." The more one reads about administration the more one wonders whether we are not perfecting the double-edged means and neglecting the ends. Indeed, Waldo argues that among the areas inadequately studied today is "the tremendous expansion of 'government by contract and grant,' which has blurred the lines between the public and private sectors and between the federal and state spheres" (Vol. 13, p. 153). Perhaps, if the study of public administration becomes increasingly value-free, we may totally neglect such matters.

I hope Alker and Bock's propositions were based on greater agreement than I could find in the writers on administration, although international relations strikes me as a subject at least as controversial as administration. Of course, one is on fairly safe ground in dealing with international treaties and agreements, although much is hidden from us, and on even safer ground in dealing with the structure of administrative agencies, at least as they are described in organization charts; but process, behavior, and function are another matter. Let me cite one conclusion about the study of public administration in Waldo's careful and thorough article on the subject:

> That the political process reaches deeply into public administration and that the making of public policy is an important activity of public administration have . . . been all but universally recognized. But the response has been varied: there is still no general agreement on what conclusions follow, what the methodological implications are, what lines of inquiry are indicated as most appropriate and fruitful, what the implications are for programs of education and training. The discipline is presently trying to find its way through the tangle of issues. Many of the issues are posed in putative dichotomies and verbal antinomies: politics and administration, political science and Public Administration, science and art, pure science and practical science, fact and value, prescription and description, administrative science and administrative sciences, diversity and similarity, absolutism and relativism, universality and uniqueness, generality and concreteness. Whether in general or in any particular case the dichotomies are properly conceived, the antinomies properly opposed, is questionable, and they undoubtedly present a tangled skein to the student. In the last analysis, however, it must be universally conceded that important problems are involved (Vol. 13, p. 154).

Indeed, very important problems are involved, some of which, unlike most of Waldo's catalogue, are at the very heart of democratic government—problems like consent, representation, and responsibility. But these are problems that seem to slip through the net of Public Administration or were never in it because they were placed in still other nets. The treatment of administration in these articles is therefore as interesting for what is unsaid as for what is said. As a single instance, let us consider the disparity I have mentioned in the definitions of administration.

What is left unsaid is the enormous difference in consequences that follows from this difference in definition. Neglecting that difference means little for the description of the administrative process or administrative behavior, even for Public Administration as a study, but it means much for the study of discontent, dissent, and revolution. When the people assume that the government or the state is separate from the administration (and the government, as I have said, is usually equated with the executive), then discontent may lead the people to appeal to the king or president to save them from his corrupt and wicked ministers. Russians used to appeal to the Czar to replace the ministers who were in fact carrying out his orders, and American colonials begged George III to protect them from his own policy, but as usual in such behavior, to get the beauty of it hot one must go to Machiavelli. In *The Prince* he tells us that Cesare Borgia "took the Romagna," which "had previously been governed by weak rulers, who had rather despoiled their subjects than governed them . . . so that the province was a prey to robbery, assaults, and every kind of disorder."

"He, therefore, judged it necessary to give them a good government in order to make them peaceful and obedient to his rule. For this purpose he appointed Messer Remirro de Orco, a cruel and able man, to whom he gave the fullest authority. This man, in a short time, was highly successful in rendering the country orderly and united, whereupon the duke, not deeming such excessive authority expedient, lest it should become hateful, appointed a civil court of justice in the center of the province under an excellent president, to which each city appointed its own advocate. And as he knew that the harshness of the past had engendered some amount of hatred, in order to purge the minds of the people and to win them over completely, he resolved to show that if any cruelty had taken place it was not by his orders, but through the harsh disposition of his minister. And having found the opportunity he had him cut in half and placed one morning in the public square at Cesena with a piece of wood and blood-stained knife at his side. The ferocity of this spectacle caused the people both satisfaction and amazement" (*The Prince and The Discourses*, Modern Library, p. 27).

When, however, the public makes no distinction between government and administration, it blames the government for what goes wrong. This may

happen regularly at times of great public outrage, but it is probably fed by the arrogance of less Machiavellian rulers than Cesare, who do not hesitate to support their ministers openly. Then King Charles's head rolls, the Czar is shot, or an American president resigns. The president, in any case, is not so remote from the public that his political positions are utterly unknown, so he may survive some scandals like the Tweed Ring or Teapot Dome, but his complicity in Vietnam bombings and Watergate can destroy him. Thus the practical consequences of abstract or technical distinctions as they trickle down to the media, public opinion, and political action are unintended because they were not considered.

Consistencies and Inconsistencies

In turning to the specifics of the *International Encyclopedia*, one notes instantly a high level of individual performance and an excellent use of human resources. There are too many good articles to single out the best, and many articles are written by just the person one wants to read on the subject (although one misses people one has expected, Robert Merton, Paul Samuelson, Ernest Nagel, and others): Talcott Parsons, for example, contributes eight magisterial pieces. Current interests are thoroughly pursued: Systems Analysis gets 5 articles and 43 double-column pages; Information Storage and Retrieval gets 5 articles and 29 pages. The prose is all readable and was, presumably, carefully edited.

The inclusion, already noted, of much history of each topic, puts subjects in perspective and indicates the difference between the ideas and methods guiding current work and the ideas and methods of the past, including the immediate past. This virtue is enhanced by a wealth of biographies which point out contributions to social thought in both the past and the present. There is even a re-emergence of neglected work; Arthur F. Bentley is a case in point: his quite original book *The Process of Government* was published in 1908 (again in 1935, but little noticed) and not republished with any acclaim until 41 years later. Instead of the silence about him, which lasted far too long, there are many references in the *International Encyclopedia*, and a biography.

The selection of people for biographical inclusion is judicious, on the whole. Although they are often neglected in contemporary discussion, T. H. Green and Bernard Bosanquet are given a rightful place here. All the major figures are in evidence, but the cutoff point, as one moves down the scale in importance, is not always clear. That, of course, is an obvious complaint that any reviewer would make of any work like this. It is perhaps sensible, granted a limitation of space, to have biographies of Bentham and J. S. Mill, but not of James Mill. Is it equally sensible to include Grotius and Bodin, but not Pufendorf? And what was the cutoff point that excluded Plekhanov and Bukharin but included Harry Elmer Barnes and Samuel A. Stouffer?

The work of the editors is by no means on the high level of so many contributors, and where the contributors err, the editors are at fault, too, in not knowing it. Let us look first at some matters of organization. A question about the principle of selection, and that of classification, enters in the choice of topics, as well as in that of biographies. There are separate articles, for example, on alienation and integration, but none on anomie, which is treated under "Durkheim." A more serious question is whether there are genuine differences in the various disciplines that make up the social sciences, but that is not entirely a question of editorial decision; it is also a matter of nomenclature and work in the field. Thus there are separate articles on what may not be separate subjects, Political Behavior and Political Sociology, the former indexed under Political Science and the latter under Sociology, and separate articles on Cultural Anthropology and Social Anthropology. To mark a further difficulty, there is not only "Political Sociology," but also "Political Anthropology: The Field," and there is no "Political Organization" under "Political Science," but only under "Political Anthropology."

The distinction between culture and society, or between cultural systems and social systems, is sufficiently established that it may justify a distinction between anthropology and sociology or lead to a division of study in both anthropology and sociology. In fact, the articles, by their very names, intimate that such a division is made between cultural study and social study in anthropology, but not in sociology (whereas "culture" has seemed a key category of anthropology and "society" of sociology), although if the culture-society distinction yields two types of work in anthropology, it would seem reasonable that it do the same in sociology. Yet the names seem to mislead the reader into a distinction without much difference. Is it merely the case that when English anthropologists say "social," Americans say "cultural"? And must the *International Encyclopedia* duplicate articles because of such habits? It does so: when one examines the American David Mandelbaum's article, "Cultural Anthropology," and the Englishman Raymond Firth's "Social Anthropology," one is struck by a virtual identity of definition. Mandelbaum writes: "The central task of cultural anthropology . . . is to study the similarities and differences in behavior among human groups, to depict the character of the various cultures and the processes of stability, change, and development that are characteristic

to them" (Vol. 1, p. 313). Firth defines his subject thus: "Social anthropology aims at understanding and explaining the diversity of human behavior by a comparative study of social relationships and processes over as wide a range of societies as possible" (Vol 1, p. 320).

Further similarities under different names are hidden in other ways. In her article, "Political Anthropology: The Field," Elizabeth Colson distinguishes her subject from Political Science by calling attention to the mechanisms of control "in the seemingly amorphous stateless societies" (Vol. 12, p. 191). Such societies are apparently the meat on which anthropology feeds, but alien to the political scientist's diet. Yet in M. G. Smith's article, "Political Anthropology: Political Organization," not only stateless societies are treated, but medieval China and Japan, ancient Athens and Rome, and feudal France and Britain. In the very concept of political organization from the standpoint of anthropology, Smith shares the same ground as political scientists. He says: "Political organization has been defined structurally by reference to institutions that regulate the use of force and functionally with reference to social cooperation and leadership. Political organization can be described in terms of the processes of decision making found in a given population" (Vol. 12, p. 193).

The overlap (or identity) between subjects seems, if possible, even greater as one reads what is said of behavioral study in political science and of political sociology. Some universities recognize the difficulty of distinguishing the two clearly, if at all, by offering joint appointments in Political Science and Sociology to students of political behavior. In "Political Behavior," Heinz Eulau says: "The analysis of political behavior proceeds from the assumption that politics as a special form of human activity is not, and cannot be, independent of what is known or knowable about social behavior generally. The primary objective of such analysis, therefore, is to link what is specifically political with other aspects of social relations" (Vol. 12, p. 203). And in "Political Sociology," Morris Janowitz says of his subject: "Broadly conceived, political sociology is concerned with the social basis of power in all institutional sectors of society . . . in narrower terms, political sociology focuses on the organizational analysis of political groups and political leadership" (Vol. 12, p. 298). Although their subjects are similar, to say the least, the political scientist emphasizes the social basis of his work, perhaps to separate his subject from the rest of political science, and the sociologist emphasizes the political character of his work, especially when he writes "in narrower terms," perhaps to separate his subject from the rest of sociology.

Then, when writing of particular areas within their subjects, Eulau and Janowitz come even closer, as their treatment of elites testifies. Thus Eulau writes: "The systematic study of elites, particularly in terms of their social backgrounds, has long been a concern of political science, but more recently research has been directed to recruitment and career patterns, much of it conducted in specific institutional settings" (Vol. 12, p. 205). Curiously, the same type of study of elites went on in political sociology, and an identical change in emphasis has come recently, for Janowitz tells us: "Elite analysis has shifted from an exclusive concern with social background as a determinant of elite behavior to a broader concern with the processes of recruitment, career development, and patterns of interactions" (Vol. 12, p. 303). One wonders whether separate treatment of two subjects, political behavior and political sociology, is based on another distinction without a difference, and whether a number of subjects listed separately in the *International Encyclopedia* are kept apart, not by the demands of knowledge, which would unite them, but by the academic autonomy of university departments. Nonetheless, the separation of subjects in these volumes was an editorial decision, possibly an implicit one, and the editors must be held responsible.

A minor aberration that occurs too often in the *International Encyclopedia* is the slip, when suddenly something silly is said, and the minor error, which may be where the contributor nods, and where an alert editor would have intervened. The tendency to document everything, whether it needs documentation or not, is sometimes responsible for these follies, which almost approach the level of saying, "It sometimes rains, as Professor Robinson so sagely observed." Worth noting, too, is that some scholars invent names for well-known phenomena and then, because they are given credit every time one of their names is used, there is finally an assumption that they discovered each phenomenon they named or renamed.

There are many examples. In an otherwise sophisticated article on political theory, Sheldon Wolin describes a current development: "The contemporary conventions reject so-called grand or comprehensive theories and prefer to pursue testable hypotheses. According to one representative viewpoint, 'Whether the proposition is true or false depends on the degree to which the proposition and the real world correspond' (Dahl 1963, p. 8)" (Vol. 12, p. 327). This sounds as though Robert Dahl, in his *A Preface to Democratic Theory*, disclosed, along with other representative theorists of of our day, a new and rigorous demand of political study, which turns out to be only the hoary, bewhiskered correspondence theory of truth.

James C. Davies ("Literature: Political Fiction") writes about some political fiction with insight and admiration, and reveals very wide reading. Yet somehow he has characterized a great novel in an utterly unrecognizable way. "Franz Kafka in *The Castle*," he says, "has his protagonist, K., use sex to get ahead, to try to get the attention of the leader, the unseen chief in the castle. The wretch K fails because he is concentered all in self and at last can only throw himself on the infinite mercy that accompanies infinite power" (Vol. 9, p. 438). Incidentally, "the wretched K." would be more accurate than "the wretch K."

One article that might be singled out as especially cogent, Seymour Martin Lipset's "Social Stratification: Social Class," contains a sentence that an editor should have deleted or altered radically. After suggesting that stratification ought to be studied internationally as well as nationally, and that vast differences in per capita income and national wealth affect class relationships between nations as well as within them, Lipset adds: "A Chinese communist has already advanced the thesis that the significant class struggle is between the predominantly rural nations, which are underdeveloped and very poor, and the urbanized, wealthy ones (Piao 1965)" (Vol. 15, p. 314). The reference to Piao is to an article by Lin Piao in the Peking Review. Lin Piao, now vanished, China's Defense Minister at the time Lipset wrote, and expected by many Sinologists to be Mao's successor, deserved more of a description than "a Chinese communist," and since Lin was his family name, the reference should have been to Lin, not Piao. More important is the error of crediting to Lin Piao an idea that comes directly out of Lenin's *Imperialism; the Highest Stage of Capitalism* (1917), a regular source of Chinese communist thought—an idea, further, that was not even original in its basic form to Lenin, but borrowed openly from J. A. Hobson, whose *Imperialism; A Study* was first published in 1902; so that what is stated as a new development in the study of social stratification is, in nearly its current form, almost as old as the twentieth century. Everyone who has written a book has made such errors, but editors usually keep them from the printed page.

Should these slips have been caught by the editors and removed with a blue pencil? That question raises the whole issue of the editing of the *International Encyclopedia*. The copy editing is superb (e.g., there are almost no typographical errors) but who did the actual editing, copy editors or the contributors' peers? It is important to ask that question, because the contributors sometimes contradict each other, define the same thing differently, or come to opposed "definitive conclusions" about the same matter (this is an encyclopedia, after all, and its contents are readily taken as definitive). But, first, there are many small examples of what may be simple editorial carelessness. In his "Ideology: Concept and Function," Edward Shils writes about ideology for the most part as it functioned in Nazi Germany and still functions in the Soviet Union. He contends, for example, that no great ideology has ever been committed to the scientific pursuit of truth, and says further: "Ideologies which concentrate on politics do so because for them politics embraces everything else. . . . Thus, no sphere has any intrinsic value of its own. There is no privacy, no autonomous spheres of art, religion, economic activity, or science" (Vol. 7, p. 68). It must have been the editors, for it could not have been Shils, who wrote in brackets at the end of the article: "For specific examples of ideologies, see *Democracy*. . . ." Whoever wrote that either did not read the article or did not understand it at all.

Under the general heading "Interaction," Talcott Parsons has an article called "Social Interaction," which is immediately followed by Guy E. Swanson's "Symbolic Interaction." In his first paragraph, Swanson informs us: "Among sociologists it [symbolic interaction] is often called social interaction" (Vol. 7, p. 440). The articles are in fact not on the same subject, but the reader is easily misled into believing they are.

Should the editors have checked for diverse comments on the same matter? Should they have notified contributors who contradicted each other, and asked them to reach some agreement or at least make clear what their disagreement was, and with what other articles they were disagreeing? That would seem a simple assumption of responsibility, but it is not common here. The series of articles on evolution, for example, reveal a conflict about what has happened to human evolution as society and culture have developed, but the antagonists simply utter their own conclusions, with no indication that they are at all controversial or that other distinguished evolutionists disagree with them. S. L. Washburn and Jane Lancaster, in "Evolution: Human Evolution," state it as fact that man is not adapted biologically to the complex cultures he created. "Human biology evolved to be adaptive in a world of small society, great hazards, and personal skill. The human actor in modern society is too dominance seeking, too acquisitive" (Vol. 5, p. 221). Elman R. Service, in "Evolution: Cultural Evolution," views cultural evolution as transcending biological evolution, and gives the impression that we act in ways for which our biology is not adequate, though our culture is. He even finds contemporary cultural demands "*contra*biological" in repressing sexual behavior and in requiring that we share food, not simply compete for it (Vol. 5, p. 222).

Theodosius Dobzhansky, however, makes a

case for man's biological adaptation to modern society in his "Evolution: Evolution and Behavior," where he says that the chief determining factor in human evolution is culture. Human traits are characterized by genetic fixity and specialization or by genetic plasticity. As examples of these, genetic fixity occurs when natural selection favors mutant genes which in some climates make the inhabitants darkly pigmented, and genetic plasticity makes the pigmentation of other populations depend on exposure to the sun. Natural selection has on the whole, Dobzhansky says, favored plasticity of behavior; "Man's cardinal adaptive trait is his educability" (Vol. 5, p. 236).

In the article "Race," which is not under the general heading "Evolution," Marvin Harris cites and agrees with Dobzhansky, and states the position in a more extreme form: " . . . selection for behavioral plasticity, for freedom from gene-specific behavior, for high-order generalized learning receptivity, has been the most important source of biological control over the direction of hominid evolution during the last million and a half years" (Vol. 13, p. 267).

A last example: Seymour Martin Lipset holds (in the article cited) that alienation in Marx is essentially man's loss of autonomy (his truly human condition) because he is told what work to do, and how to do it, instead of being allowed a free and autonomous choice (Vol. 15, p. 300). But in his article, "Alienation," George Lichtheim says Marx believed that man's truly human or essential being exists in his labor, and that alienation arises from depriving man of the product of that labor, which is his own labor objectified, thus estranging him from both nature and himself (Vol. 1, p. 265f.). These are two quite different accounts of what Marx wrote in a few pages of his *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1884*, but they never mention each other.

Another matter that should be treated has nothing to do with editing or editorial policy, except indirectly, but with the degree of specialization of many contributors. That specialization is a hallmark of much contemporary scholarship, surely among Americans, and has brought a vast increase of knowledge, sometimes at the cost of breadth and an accurate perception of relationships between fields, a quality the editors particularly sought. The complaint itself is a commonplace which gains interest only through documentation, for there one can find the kinds of limits specialization imposes even on first-rate scholars.

In "Values: The Concept of Values," Robin M. Williams, Jr. deals of necessity with modern philosophers who write on the subject. The philosophers Williams discusses are Stephen C. Pepper and Ralph Barton Perry. Perry, in particular, had a considerable influence at one time through his characterization of values as any object of any interest. But that is not what Williams is really concerned with. He makes a distinction between the desired and the desirable, emphasizing the idea of values as the desirable, rather than what is merely desired. This he calls "one of the more widely accepted definitions in the social science literature" (Vol. 16, p. 283). It is a sophisticated definition, not easily used with simple scientific techniques, because the desirable is what ought to be desired in a given situation, and that cannot be discovered by, say, questionnaires, which can only ascertain what people do desire. The distinction and the definition are John Dewey's, part of his often unacknowledged influence on social science, but Williams does not mention his name. The reader is thus deprived of the chance of pursuing the idea in its fullest and most original form.

Val R. Lorwin, in his article, "Syndicalism," traces the syndicalist movements in Europe and America but, in his section on Italian syndicalism, omits any reference to its early role in the movement that led to fascism, probably its most disastrous mistake. Is this because Lorwin worked on syndicalism, but not on fascism, which might, if one did not study its development, seem another subject, with no roots in syndicalism?

Sometimes a contributor puts in material with which he has only a nodding acquaintance and then, if it is far away and long ago, may be supercilious about it. As an example, Leonard Berkowitz, in "Aggression: Psychological Aspects," comments, "Since the time of Aristotle, social science folklore has contended that an individual can be 'purged' of his emotions by displaying his feelings" (Vol. 1, p. 172). I assume the reference to Aristotle is to his *Poetics*, where he deals with purgation of the emotions. But, first, Aristotle is not talking about the purgation of all the emotions, but only of pity and terror which, in the *Rhetoric*, he describes as morbid. Secondly, it is the audience who are purged and the actors who arouse pity and terror in them, and not just by a display of emotion, but by incident and verse. As for the reference to folklore, one may agree or disagree with the *Poetics*, but he is bound to take it seriously if he has ever read it. If the reader of Berkowitz's article is innocent of Aristotle, he may be confirmed in the belief that his innocence is like that of Adam, not to be given up on pain of (social scientific) banishment.

The lack of sophistication that specialization can breed not only keeps it narrow, but on occasion simplifies in a way that violates the facts. Lorwin misses the full range of syndicalist possibility; one could not guess from his article that

Georges Sorel praised Lenin in 1919 and the Italian fascists in 1921. Berkowitz is deprived of understanding the development through time of Aristotle's doctrine of purgation, especially as it profoundly influenced the thought of Sigmund Freud. And Milton Rokeach dams the rich complexity of human values so that they flow into the straitened channel of egoism. In "Attitudes: The Nature of Attitudes," he writes, " . . . The function that seems to be served by all the values in one's value system is the enhancement of what McDougall has aptly called the master of all sentiment, the sentiment of self-regard" (Vol. 1, p. 457). That is a statement that can be defended only by the kind of ingenuity expended so lavishly to prove that all human action is pleasure-seeking, and like those arguments, its persuasiveness depends on begging the question.

While the editors are to be commended for the space given to the arts (Aesthetics, Architecture, Crafts, Drama, Fine Arts, Literature, Music, Primitive Art are general headings), a specialized preoccupation is noticeable in the articles themselves. They are written from the standpoint of social science, which is only right and fair in this setting. But they usually give no indication that there is any other standpoint, that literature, music, art, and aesthetics have their own warrant; and when a concession to other possibilities is made, there is no mention of what they are. Thus Irvin L. Child says correctly: "Although the term *aesthetics* has other specialized meanings, it has come to refer, in the context of social science, to the whole body of generalized inquiry especially relevant to the arts." Then, without hint of what the "other special meanings" are, he continues: "Aesthetics is the study of man's behavior and experience in creating art, in perceiving and understanding art, and in being influenced by art" ("Aesthetics," Vol. 1, p. 116). Yet, basic to the study of aesthetics itself is exploration of the creative process, of the nature of art, and of criteria which can distinguish good art from bad art, and better art from worse art. Child's article otherwise is sophisticated, and his range of reference properly includes Rudolf Arnheim's *Art and Visual Perception* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954), in which aesthetics penetrates the psychology of art, but the elimination of aesthetics from this article on aesthetics takes from Child and his readers any shred of personal judgment and evaluation and makes them dependent, as he puts it, on "the likes and dislikes of experts in an art, or their evaluative judgments" (*ibid.*, p. 120).

Harold G. McCurdy's "Literature: The Psychology of Literature" is, in general, most able and learned, yet it shares with Robert Escarpit's "Literature: The Sociology of Literature" an almost exclusive emphasis on literature as communication. However adequate such an approach is to expository writing, it is quite inadequate to imaginative writing (i.e., verse, drama, and fiction), in which experience is probed, shattered, and shaped, and a new experience is created which is shared, rather than merely communicated. Communication, of course, is an important element in society, and there is every reason why a sociologist should be concerned with literature as communication. But he should not therefore *conceive* literature exclusively as a pattern of communication, nor should his interest in communication lead him to forget the social and psychological importance of shared experience, which is a vital element in community. Escarpit does forget it; writing of literature as a pattern of communication, he says: "But this pattern alone is sufficient for the needed sociological investigation" (Vol. 9, p. 419).

Escarpit finally defines literature in terms of this pattern, thus converting what is "sufficient for the needed sociological investigation" into the very meaning of literature. "We are thus led to conceive of literature as a two-way communication in which an original message is broadcast by the writer to a community of readers, whose response to him takes the shape of thoughts, words, acts, and other messages, which react on one another and on the writer himself" (*ibid.*). Imagine how a first-rate literary critic would respond.

Beyond this Escarpit does not go, theoretically. He writes at length and informatively on such things as the nations and languages in which most books are published and read, the percentage of books translated, book selling, and the book market. All this is very useful, but it seems peripheral to the sociology of literature. What I regard as central is neglected, perhaps because it requires an interest in history that some sociologists do not have. The great questions, I believe, include: Under what social conditions is a great literature produced (e.g., the literature of classical Athens, of Elizabethan England, of seventeenth-century France)? Under what conditions are different forms of literature produced (e.g., why drama in Elizabethan England, lyric verse in the English Age of Romanticism, and fiction everywhere with the growth and triumph of the middle class?)? What are the social effects of literature of one kind and another?

These examples are sufficient, I hope, to illustrate the ways in which specialization, when not combined with other and related knowledge, narrows a focus and even misleads. There are many more instances of this narrowness in the *International Encyclopedia*, as there are many other instances of slips and of unmentioned disagreement and controversy. In the last case, I offered only a controversy about evolution as an example. Permit

me to add briefly, lest that seem isolated, two articles on prejudice.

For both Otto Klineberg ("Prejudice: The Concept") and J. Milton Yinger ("Prejudice: Social Discrimination"), prejudice is a prejudgment, existing before the relevant information has been examined. After that they disagree, without reference to each other. Klineberg thinks we can be prejudiced against either individuals or groups; Yinger that we are prejudiced against individuals *because* of their group affiliations. "Prejudice can be defined as an inner tendency to respond to persons on the basis of their group membership; it is a rigid, emotional prejudgment that gives an individual confidence that he knows all about a person when he knows his membership in a symbolically important group" (Vol. 12, p. 449). The issue is never joined. One assumes these contributors did not read each other's articles and no comment was made to them by the editors. Yet Klineberg allows what Yinger precludes, prejudice against a person, regardless of his group membership, because of his shifty eyes, clammy hands, or whatever, before there is any other knowledge of what sort of person he is. (Not that such knowledge always changes things; some prejudices are impervious to knowledge, despite Klineberg and Yinger.)

I should like to make two comments in concluding this review. For all the approval of the fact-value distinction among a group of contemporary social scientists, some topics trigger instant evaluations. Prejudice is, of course, one of these; social scientists are not likely to talk of healthy prejudices, especially as Klineberg and Yinger define prejudice. Edmund Burke had a different view of prejudice, but he also defined it differently. Nor are social scientists today likely to agree with Nietzsche that the weak and botched should perish. But perhaps nothing arouses so much open scientific commitment as democracy. Giovanni Sartori (Vol. 4, "Democracy") does much editorializing and utters many valuable value judgments. That might be expected, and the hardheaded may mutter something derogatory about political theorists. But value judgments about democracy also enter the very citadel of behavioral study.

In "Political Sociology," Morris Janowitz concludes his discussion with a straightforward avowal of the relation of his subject to values, and at the moment to democracy. "Political sociologists have been men of strong opinions, and they have been concerned with the value implictions of their work. But it is only since the end of World War II, particularly under the influences of the newer types of economic analysis, that some political sociologists have become interested in theoretical formulations which explore explicitly the conditions under which political democracy would be maximized . . . political sociology has come to be linked to the analysis of the economic, social, and psychological preconditions for political democracy" (Vol. 12, p. 306).

By and large, the contributors write about their topics calmly, neither starry-eyed about the future nor crying doom. But the *malaise* of our day can creep in, and then one hears a somber note, quickly muted, which may sound the end of an era. The late George Lichtheim was more explicit; he was not an academic social scientist and he operated with fewer restraints than they do. He argues that

> positivist sociology in the late nineteenth century fell heir to the unsolved problems of traditional metaphysics. . . . What appears at one level as the disintegration of traditional ways of life is reflected at a different level in the dichotomy of "facts" and "values." Since the intellectuals as a group form a stratum of society in which material tension is immediately experienced in theoretical terms, their role in developing concepts which reflect their own peculiar situation is obviously crucial. Provisionally it may be suggested that the intelligentsia's rejection of the modern world is central to the contemporary situation in philosophy. Yet this world is itself the creation of a rational science in which intellectuals have traditionally placed their faith. The paradox suggests that we may have come to the end of an important chapter in modern cultural history ("Alienation," Vol. 1, p. 268).

Lichtheim's judgment of our time includes, however inadvertently, the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* itself, but it derives, I am confident, from his knowledge of the literary and political intelligentsia and the journals where their work appears. Far fewer social scientists reject the modern world. Yet their work makes up a good part of the world that the intelligentsia reject and that is partly rejected, too, from within the ranks of social science.

An important conclusion about the *International Encyclopedia* is that it represents its time, and represents it very well, although in our day of increasingly rapid change, that time may already be the past. For this the editors and, especially, the contributors deserve enormous credit, although the editors did not do the coherent job they should have. Quarrels with articles in the *International Encyclopedia* (and my quarrels are evident enough) are quarrels with thought in our time, not just with social science, because much that can be said justly about social science can be said with equal justice about other branches of academic knowledge and about the nonacademic intelligentsia as well. Some criticisms apply especially to social science, though, and others to the rest of contemporary thought. Whatever new directions thought may take, social science as it appears in these pages will have made its mark and contribution.

Philosophy and International Violence*

TERRY NARDIN
State University of New York at Buffalo

The study of international politics has no established place in philosophy as an academic discipline. Professional philosophers who discuss the subject at all typically do so under the stimulus of external events, rather than as an outgrowth of other philosophical inquiry, and are likely to conceive what they have to say primarily as a contribution to public affairs. The fact that most of the attention among philosophers to international politics in recent years has been concerned with warfare, war crimes, and related themes pertaining to what might be called "international violence" bears this out. Violence is (or was) an *issue* of current affairs. As such, it is marginal to the more enduring concerns of philosophy, and the interest of philosophers in it is understandably a transient one. This is not to say that the scholarship produced under these conditions is without value; on the contrary, it is just because it does constitute an unusual contribution to our understanding of international politics that this work should receive wide consideration. Yet because the main stimulus underlying the recent growth of philosophical interest in the subject is one that arises outside of philosophy itself, that interest is likely to dissipate once the external forces sustaining it have diminished. It would therefore be good if the results of this interest could be assimilated and developed within the framework of continuing scholarship by those engaged in political and international studies.

In order for this to happen both the nature and limitations of this latest contribution of philosophy to the study of international politics must be understood. If one of its features is a tendency to abandon the field for greener pastures, another is the thoroughness with which the grass is cropped by this particular species of ruminant. Instead of the broad speculations about "the nature and causes of war" characteristic of so much of what passes for philosophy in the study of international affairs, the essays that constitute the books reviewed here contain knowledgeable and skillfully executed analyses of particular aspects of this highly organized form of human violence, such as strategic bombing,[1] genocide,[2] war crimes trials,[3] and conscientious objection.[4] Both the advantages and liabilities of the analytical style of philosophy pursued in these essays are related to this close attention to particular events, practices, and current controversies. The approach is one that *can* yield specific, fresh, and expert reconsiderations of fundamental problems. It can also go astray to become no more than a stale and inept rehashing of trivial problems. There is enough work of superior quality and interest, however, to reward time spent with these essays.

In a review of this kind it would be impossible to treat the results of each particular inquiry in detail, and in any case a broader assessment of the fundamental problems underlying the specific issues of contemporary debate might do more to advance the subject. I have therefore chosen to focus on four problems of general philosophical significance for the analysis of the various substantive topics currently receiving attention: (1) the nature and justification of the laws of war as an institution for the regulation of international violence, (2) the proper grounds for moral judgment of military conduct, (3) the dilemmas of attributing responsibility and blame for acts of military violence, and (4) the implications of alternative descriptions of such acts for both legal and moral judgment. These rubrics do not, however, exhaust the range of topics explored in these volumes.

* *Philosophy of War*, ed. Lewis White Beck (Special issue of *The Monist*, 57 [October, 1973]. Pp. 461–606. $2.25).

War and Moral Responsibility, ed. Marshall Cohen, Thomas Nagel, and Thomas Scanlon (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974. Pp. 182. $2.95).

Individual and Collective Responsibility: The Massacre at My Lai, ed. Peter A. French (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman Pub. Co., 1972. Pp. 207. $3.75).

Philosophy, Morality, and International Affairs, ed. Virginia Held, Sidney Morgenbesser, and Thomas Nagel (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974. Pp. 338. $3.95).

War and Morality, ed. Richard A. Wasserstrom (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1970. Pp. 136. $3.50).

[1] John C. Ford, S.J., "The Morality of Obliteration Bombing," in *War and Morality*, pp. 15–41, and Michael Walzer, "World War II: Why Was This War Different?," in *War and Moral Responsibility*, pp. 85–103.

[2] Hugo Adam Bedau, "Genocide in Vietnam?," in *Philosophy, Morality, and International Affairs*, pp. 5–46. Bedau's essay is an example of the helpful results that can be produced by the combination of analytical skill and substantive (in this case, legal) knowledge.

[3] The implications of "Nuremberg" are explored in many of the essays in these volumes, while the Calley trial provides the point of departure for those assembled in *Individual and Collective Responsibility*.

[4] Alan Gewirth, "Reasons and Conscience: The Claims of the Selective Conscientious Objector," *Philosophy, Morality, and International Affairs*, pp. 89–117.

Violence Under Law?

Because violence is often thought of as the antithesis of rule-governed human activity, the notion that its initiation and conduct might be made subject to legal regulation strikes many people as self-contradictory. But the air of paradox thus generated is partially dissipated as soon as particular military practices and the legal rules that help to define and order them are brought into focus. For then, although there may be little agreement concerning the applicability, validity, or efficacy of particular rules, there can be little doubt that there *are* rules whose applicability, validity, or efficacy is being debated. Traditionally these rules have been divided into distinct bodies of law according to whether they sought to regulate the initiation of violence by states (*jus ad bellum*) or the conduct of hostilities once begun (*jus in bello*). The first seeks to establish a regime of law according to which the resort to armed force can be judged lawful or unlawful. The second seeks to limit the harm that belligerents can do to one anothers' armed forces, prisoners of war, and civilian populations; to facilitate diplomatic, medical, and humanitarian relief activities during periods of hostilities; and to regulate in numerous other ways the practices and relationships that arise under the special conditions of organized armed conflict.

With one or two exceptions, questions about the initiation of armed force have not occasioned particular interest among the philosophers represented in these volumes, although it is the principal question at issue in traditional discussions of the just war, and has provided the source of endless debates in legal circles concerning such matters as the definition of aggression or the legality of particular acts such as American intervention in Indochina. Insofar as there is presently a general legal attitude on this question, it seeks to identify lawful resorts to force with those that are undertaken in self-defense, and to rule out as unlawful the "aggressive" resort to force, aggression being identified with armed attacks against other states. Although the legal issues are in fact much more complicated, this distinction between lawful and unlawful war reflects a basic principle embodied in the United Nations Charter. It is similar to that contained in the Charter and Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal, with its category of "crimes against peace" according to which German leaders were prosecuted for waging aggressive war. Legally speaking, this conception of unlawful war replaced an earlier conception in which the resort to force was neither lawful nor unlawful, but rather (with certain qualifications and exceptions) a right whose exercise was left by international law to the discretion of individual states. As James Turner Johnson shows in his critique of it,[5] the newer conception of an unjust war as a war of aggression is one that has also infiltrated religious thinking on the just war; papal pronouncements, for example, have in recent years reinterpreted the traditional criteria for the just war (such as "just cause" and "right intention") so as to make them similar to those of the Nuremberg and United Nations Charters. The philosopher tends to regard this conception with much suspicion; as G. E. M. Anscombe puts it, "The present-day conception of 'aggression' . . . is a bad one. Why *must* it be wrong to strike the first blow in a struggle? The only question is, who is in the right?"[6] Johnson, too, urges a reconstruction of the *jus ad bellum* along traditional lines, but neither critic is explicit in suggesting how the traditional criteria such as just cause and right intention are to be incorporated in an effective *legal* regime.

Indeed, the difficulties are obvious. For all its defects, the criterion of "armed attack" is at least *relatively* clear. Naturally, there are continual pressures for existing legal criteria to be extended so as to legitimize almost any uses of force that states and other potential belligerents might wish to undertake; but it is just this problem that the legal process, as it goes on in United Nations debates, diplomatic negotiations and correspondence, judicial proceedings, and legal scholarship is designed to overcome. Thus, the criterion of armed attack is itself an attempt to limit the freedom of states to interpret the meaning of "aggression," a much more flexible notion. Similarly, over the years a relatively narrow conception of self-defense has evolved to distinguish this plea from the far more comprehensive justifications implied by notions such as self-preservation, self-help, and necessity. In contrast to the traditional just war criteria, which require moral agreement and the identification of intentions, the initiation of armed attacks and acts of self-defense against them are easier to identify and to define in an agreed way. One must therefore go further than merely noticing the moral deficiencies of present-day conceptions of unlawful war, which are in any case well known to international lawyers who have been struggling with these criteria for many decades, and try to weigh the costs and benefits of alternative principles according to which judgments of particular acts of violence in international disputes might be made. In doing so, it will be necessary to take account of the extremely diverse forms that violence can take and the circumstances under which it might occur, including such forms of action as blockades and "quarantines," interventions of various kinds, reprisals, and terrorist acts. The law can no longer, if it ever could, limit itself to regulating the movement of uniformed troops across clearly demarcated national boundaries.

[5] "Toward Reconstructing the *Jus Ad Bellum*," in *Philosophy of War*, pp. 461–488.

[6] "War and Murder," in *War and Morality*, pp. 43–44.

Any such more refined and particular examination of the forms and occasions for initiating violence will also call into question the point of distinguishing between *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*—the laws of war—which presupposes a clear distinction between war and peace as legal states that has been all but abandoned in current thought and practice. Perhaps the recognition of this fact is partly responsible for the concentration of most of the philosophical interest in law and warfare on the *jus in bello*, broadly reinterpreted so as to include civil as well as international armed conflicts.

The diversity of existing opinion concerning the laws of war is illustrated, in microcosm, by the various attitudes expressed in these essays toward the Nuremberg trials. They are merely the most recent of a long line of commentaries on the trials, and in the broad range of attitudes toward them that they display do not differ notably from their forerunners. Philosophical interest in Nuremberg can perhaps without too much distortion be made to conform to three stages in the reinterpretation of the Nuremberg events in the context of the Indochina War. In the first stage the moral dismay occasioned by the war and by American practices in it was uppermost. The Nuremberg principles offered a set of standards that were not only readily at hand, but possessed the particular appropriateness of having been inspired and applied by Americans, so that to judge by the Nuremberg principles was to judge ourselves by our own standards. Conscientious objectors soon began to express their position in the form of what became known as the "Nuremberg defense," and others wondered if there were not grounds here for identifying American military commanders and political leaders as war criminals. In this first stage, the moral and legal aspects of the Nuremberg principles were not clearly distinguished; a "war crime" could mean either a legal or a moral wrong, or both; and prominent writers, such as Telford Taylor, wrote as if the laws of war constituted a system of moral principles for judging acts of war.

The second stage consisted of greater discrimination and some disenchantment in the application of the Nuremberg principles. It was discovered, for example, that the law applied at Nuremberg left much to be desired, morally speaking, and commentators began to warn of the dangers of placing too much weight on the Nuremberg background as a basis for criticizing American military practices in Indochina. Thus, a writer like Richard A. Wasserstrom worried about the implications of a body of rules that appeared to him to equate military necessity with mere utility or advantage, or that employed legally and morally dubious notions such as those of criminal conspiracy and collective criminal liability.[7] Earlier criticisms of the Nuremberg trials from the point of view of fairness were resurrected. The Nuremberg precedent began to appear painfully complex and increasingly inapplicable from the legal point of view, as well as quite below standard from the perspective of morality. And this disenchantment leads directly to the third stage, in which the attempt to assimilate the Nuremberg experience becomes most fully philosophical. This stage is characterized by two sorts of inquiry. One is the careful analysis and criticism of the concepts employed or presupposed by the Nuremberg principles—concepts such as responsibility and guilt, or those which, like superior orders, embody particular understandings of the scope and limits of legal defenses. The other comprises attempts to articulate rationally defensible principles in terms of which the legal principles applied at Nuremberg could be judged, and upon which reconstructions of them might be founded. A similar evolution of ideas can be traced in attitudes toward other aspects of the laws of war such as the Geneva Conventions and related legal norms such as those of the Genocide Convention.

Underlying these changes is a deep interest, amounting almost to preoccupation, with moral issues; and although this is perhaps more to be commended than criticized, it has led to hasty judgments on the difficult issues of the relationship between morality and the laws of war. For example, Wasserstrom, whose doubts about the Nuremberg precedent have already been mentioned, finds the laws of war to be so morally deficient that we must cease to take them seriously as standards to be used in making judgments concerning military conduct. Instead, we should seek to articulate morally defensible standards upon which we might rely in judging war: "A preoccupation . . . with our legal responsibilities can tend to deflect attention from what is surely the central concern: that individuals, especially in time of war, try to do the morally right and obligatory things."[8] This rather blanket repudiation of a rich and well-established legal institution is surely an overreaction. As one of Wasserstrom's critics points out, to demolish existing institutions in order to clear the ground for the construction of new ones that

[7] "The Relevance of Nuremberg," in *War and Moral Responsibility*, pp. 134–158.

[8] Ibid., p. 158. The point is developed by Wasserstrom in a second essay: "The Responsibility of the Individual for War Crimes," in *Philosophy, Morality, and International Affairs*, pp. 47–70. Cf. Sanford Levinson in "Responsibility for Crimes of War," in *War and Moral Responsibility*, p. 109; "It would be better to focus clearly on the *morality* of warfare and to speak unequivocally of moral condemnation than to pretend that the category of 'war crimes' or 'war criminals' is meaningful."

more closely approximate a moral ideal is a dangerous tactic of political change.[9] Also implied in Wasserstrom's view is an argument for disobedience to the laws of war where they conflict with the requirements of morality; it is an argument of which we should be particularly wary. In this view the laws of war are seen as so bad, morally speaking, that the repudiation by governments and individuals of their obligations under them is scarcely thought to need justification. The anarchic implications of a principle according to which everyone—statesman or citizen, commander or corporal—takes "morality," not law, as the proper guide for both thought and action with respect to international violence are obvious.

Perhaps it is the uncertain content and legal status of the laws of war, together with widespread ignorance of how the system actually works, that explains why these issues have so far been debated with an imprecision that would be intolerable in discussions of political obligation and civil disobedience in the context of domestic law. It is, for example, important to discriminate among the various agents whose acts are affected by the laws of war, and to delineate the various ways in which they are affected. Its rules appear in a different guise to the young man facing induction and contemplating conscientious objection, the soldier in the field who is moved to reinterpret or disobey orders, or the policy maker choosing among alternative military strategies. Much more thought will also have to be given to the nature and purpose of the laws of war, which are variously presented in these essays as a coercive system of criminal law, as an impotent caricature of law properly so called, as a device for coordinating the pursuit of common interests among belligerents, and as a rallying point for principled opposition to morally atrocious policies and practices. The features of the laws of war as an institution and its place in the political order merit closer philosophical attention, not to mention the much more intensive empirical study from which philosophical criticism can be divorced only at the cost of impoverishing both.

Moral Puzzles

The unsatisfactory state of philosophical discussion of the legal dimensions of warfare reflects the fact that philosophers writing about it have been for the most part only peripherally concerned with the criticism and revision of law. The main task for philosophy, as they see it, has been to understand war as a subject for *moral* reflection and judgment. It is the attempt to solve the evident moral dilemmas raised in so acute a form by warfare that constitutes the principal interest of analytical philosophy in this area. With few exceptions, other philosophical tasks have been made subordinate to the pursuit of this goal. Thus, the criticism of law is motivated largely by a wish to articulate standards more adequate from the moral point of view than those presently embedded in the legal institutions affecting international violence. Similarly, the conceptual inquiries so characteristic of analytical philosophy are scarcely motivated by the intrinsic philosophical interest of the concepts particular to discourse about war, which is minimal, but rather by the wish to solve moral problems. There are different reasons for this interest in moral questions. It may occur as the result of an attempt to solve a practical problem, such as how to justify selective conscientious objection. Or it may be undertaken in a spirit of moral outrage and of determination to advance in public debate the standards of sanity and virtue. Sometimes the subject seems to be taken up as little more than a field for the application of moral theory, as a setting for the conduct of moral or meta-ethical debates originating outside the realm of warfare itself: a new theatre opened up in the Hundred Years War between the forces of Utilitarianism and Deontology. Whatever its motives, a preoccupation with moral questions is the leading characteristic of contemporary philosophical interest in war.

The sense of paradox is scarcely less apparent in moral controversies concerning warfare than it is in those concerned with questions of law. Force is sometimes justified to defend the community against those who would destroy it, but its employment is seldom able to avoid the infliction of harm on those who have done nothing to deserve it. It is possible to distinguish two contrasting approaches to the resolution of moral dilemmas of this kind. One is to accept them as unresolvable, and to note that on certain questions at least no conclusive answer exists. The other is to insist that, properly qualified and interpreted, such dilemmas can always be resolved in terms of some higher principle; that morality is not a system of static ideals, but rather a way of resolving just such dilemmas of human action; and that while to apply moral principles in practice may involve making assumptions, these need not be arbitrary but, on the contrary, are required by morality to be rationally defensible. To those that are drawn to the first approach, the second will appear dogmatic; those drawn to the latter find the first nihilistic. Whereas the second approach must emphasize the capacity of reason to resolve moral dilemmas (as suggested by the very name "reason of state" for the principles according to which the

[9] Marshall Cohen, "Morality and the Laws of War," in *Philosophy, Morality, and International Affairs*, p. 86.

apparent contradictions between Christian morality and the requirements of the common good as protected by the state were at one time thought to be resolvable) the first is apt to criticize this approach, not as wrong, but as impossible. It looks upon moral reasoning as something that can only be done *within* a given morality, that is, according to an ordered collection of principles. Within the system, it is thought, one can proceed deductively from premise to conclusion; and indeed rationality in moral judgment means, on this view, being consistent in the application of one's basic principles when making judgments about particular cases. It is the choice between apparently incompatible systems of principles that cannot be rationally defended. The impulse here is to say that each captures an aspect of the truth, and reflects a certain moral attitude. Such at least is Thomas Nagel's conclusion with respect to the systems he labels "utilitarianism" and "absolutism": "We must face the pessimistic alternative that these two forms of moral intuition are not capable of being brought together into a single, coherent moral system. . . ."[10] The philosopher who has arrived at this conclusion is of little help in seeking to reconcile conflicting moral claims—although, if he is right, this is no defect of his position.

It is interesting that Nagel refers to a theory of moral obligation such as utilitarianism as a "form of moral intuition." Does he mean to suggest that although one can rationally apply utilitarian principles in making moral judgments there are no rational grounds for or against being a utilitarian? A number of other contributors to these volumes have evidently taken him as suggesting something of this kind, and have sought to defend their own conceptions of moral obligation as applied to war against the implied charge of dogmatism. I shall mention two such replies that reveal characteristic and important themes in contemporary analytical moral philosophy.

In defending a non-utilitarian approach to the morality of warfare, Jeffrie G. Murphy argues that certain kinds of judgments are constitutive of morality as such; they are what distinguish it from other systems of principles such as law or etiquette. They are not the sorts of judgments that admit of further justification: "No reasons can be given for why it is wrong to kill babies." And: "The person who cannot just *see* that there is something evil about killing babies could not, I suspect, be made to see anything else about morality."[11] Nagel's suggestion is pluralist in the sense that it simply points to the existence of distinct moral attitudes, identifies them as different forms of moral intuition, and allows that with respect to certain questions at least the different conclusions to which they lead must be accepted as reflecting a state of affairs that moral theory is unable to rectify. Murphy's examples, however, would seem to require a single comprehensive moral system capable of accommodating apparent contradictions.

What distinguishes Murphy's view from dogmatism is a definitional move according to which a judgment such as that it is wrong to kill the innocent is presented not as a moral *conclusion*, but rather as one of the premises of any reasoning that could be called moral. Principles like this one help to define what is to count as a moral judgment at all; as Murphy puts it, they explicate what may be called the moral point of view. Therefore, to insist upon such principles as "absolute" is only to insist upon their relevance for moral judgment, and not to claim that they can never be overridden. If something is a morally relevant consideration, then of course it must be taken into account in reaching moral judgments in situations where it applies. The function of ultimate moral principles is not to distinguish the moral from the immoral—that would be dogmatic—but to distinguish the moral from the nonmoral. Once we have grasped what are to count as moral considerations, we can proceed to engage in discursive reasoning in which we assign different degrees of priority to various principles and arrive at particular judgments. This does away with the problem of irreconcilable moral absolutes. On the other hand, by itself it also fails to generate any determinate moral conclusions at all, for what are now required are additional principles according to which we can decide how much weight is to be given to the different and doubtless conflicting principles that will arise when a particular case is looked at from the moral point of view.

The second reply to the kind of view represented by Nagel tries not only to reconcile conflicting moral principles but to do so in a way that sidesteps an a priori definition of moral relevance. As developed by Richard Brandt, it amounts to a rather straightforward application of John Rawls's rational contract theory of justice.[12] According to this theory, the principles of justice are those that rational persons seeking only to maximize their own interests would choose in an imaginary "original position." These are the basic principles according to which the constitutional rules for a society in which they will all live are in turn to be decided. In order to guarantee impartiality, they are not to know their future positions in such a society, and must thus be imagined to be choosing

[10] "War and Massacre," in *War and Moral Responsibility*, p. 23.

[11] "The Killing of the Innocent," in *Philosophy of War*, p. 536.

[12] "Utilitarianism and the Rules of War," in *War and Moral Responsibility*, pp. 46–61.

the basic principles from behind a "veil of ignorance." Applying this theory to the problem of identifying the principles of justice for war, Brandt has imaginary national representatives deciding, under similarly abstract conditions, upon rules for the future regulation of armed conflicts among states, should such conflicts occur. The point of this thought-experiment is to uncover a single coherent set of nonarbitrary moral principles of international violence—a set of principles, that is, which does not merely constitute one form of moral intuition among others, but the unique set that rational, impartial contractors would choose under the idealized conditions of the original position. As Brandt himself notes, this is roughly the question that national diplomatic representatives faced in negotiating the first codified laws of war at the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 (although the requirements of the original position, especially that of the veil of ignorance, are imperfectly realized). The principles that Brandt derives are in fact remarkably similar to those underlying the laws of war as they presently exist, and include not only humanitarian restrictions that do not impair military efficiency but also certain restrictions that would entail military losses. Assuming such losses were not decisive for the outcome of the war, and could be presumed to be evenly distributed among possible participants in a future war, the acceptance of such restrictions would correspond to the long-run advantage of each state. And in fact the least well-regulated practices of war are those, such as the use of nuclear weapons or the tactics of guerrilla terrorism, that appear to possess military utility for just a few members of international society. Virtually all states, on the other hand, have an identical interest in having their prisoners humanely treated by the enemy and in preserving the possibility of truces and reliable communications with one another.

Whereas Rawls presents his theory as an alternative to utilitarian conceptions of justice, Brandt suggests (without really arguing the point) that the rules of war generated by an application of the original position to the problem of regulating international violence are those that utilitarian considerations of a certain kind (namely those of the "rule-utilitarianism" defended by Brandt in other contexts as a general theory of moral obligation) would support. The merits of this proposal cannot be examined here, but it is worth pointing out that a number of other essays reflect the ecumenical tendency of Brandt's analysis.[13] Several echo the conclusion urged by Kant in *Perpetual Peace* that a means cannot be evaluated only in terms of its proximate end; its employment has other consequences in the short and long run, including the restriction of future choices. Although usually taken as an inspiration for attacks on utilitarian conceptions of justice (as in Rawls's theory), Kant's criticism of political expediency can also be seen as being based on a perception of its incompatibility with long-run utility: he reminds us that although present actions are limited by necessity, they also create the necessities of the future. We must act justly now in order to encourage the growth of conditions that will allow us to act justly in the future. If this Kantian perspective is correct, then the gaps between what is reasonable, what is just, and what is prudent are not as great as one might think when initially confronted with the paradoxes of morality in the midst of violence. On the other hand, the scope of this conclusion, even if it is warranted, must not be exaggerated, for the conduct that might be regulated by public rules of war is by no means coextensive with the diversity of ways that human beings can affect one another in situations of war, nor are judgments of what is right and wrong by any means the only judgments people make that might count as moral judgments.

Legal and Moral Blame

There is, for example, a distinction between doing something wrong and doing something that is morally blameworthy. Following Machiavelli, one might suggest that there are times when to do wrong should be praised: when, for example, the leader who breaks the laws to protect the public good should be regarded as a hero rather than a scoundrel. Against the impulse to say that in such a case the act was not really wrong, all things considered, it may be argued that the various forms of moral judgment involved in such a case cannot all be reduced to a common standard, and that the person who does evil that good may come of it is guilty of a moral crime even if his act is justified. Perhaps, as Michael Walzer suggests, as political actors we become legally or morally blameworthy whenever we break the rules of the communities of which we are members, whatever our motives, and remain—like the civil disobedient—under an obligation to pay the penalty even when violation of the rules is justified by other—for example, utilitarian—considerations.[14] Whether or not one accepts this particular account of doing wrong and

[13] Especially R. M. Hare's "Rules of War and Moral Reasoning," in *War and Moral Responsibility*, pp. 46–61.

[14] "Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands," in *War and Moral Responsibility*, pp. 62–82. Walzer distinguishes this attitude toward the problem of doing evil that good may come of it from two others: the Machiavellian, which despite its rhetoric of paradox actually disposes of the problem by deciding that the end justifies the means, and the Weberian, according to which to act politically becomes the vocation of those who accept the necessity of doing evil and suffering guilt for the sake of others.

being blameworthy, to retain some such distinction is to permit inconsistencies between different forms of moral judgment that systematic theories in ethics have always sought to overcome. For to judge an act is not the same as to judge its agent, and in many situations of moral judgment—of which the incidents of war provide excellent, but by no means the only, examples—the various judgments that we make about act and agent do not necessarily reveal the application of a coherent set of basic principles.

What is involved here can be illustrated by considering the various responses one could make to a charge of wrongdoing—say of participating in the artillery bombardment of military targets which are located in built-up areas, and which cannot be destroyed without also causing substantial destruction of civilian lives and property. One might seek to defend such attacks on the grounds that they are not prohibited by the laws of war, or that it is not wrong to attempt to hinder the efforts of those who are engaged in the attempt to harm you or your community even if innocent people must thereby be made to suffer. By such arguments, the attempt is made to justify the act as right, or at least as "all right," through the appeal to some legal or moral rule that requires or at least permits it to be done, or by invoking the good results that are supposed to result from its commission. But a moment's reflection shows that even if such arguments are successful in justifying the attacks in question, they do not necessarily justify a particular individual's participation in them: he may, for example, have been motivated solely by hatred or by a desire for personal advancement. On the other hand, although the attacks may turn out to be unjustified, it does not necessarily follow that his participation in them was wrong, for he may have been doing his duty as he saw it; that a military act is wrong should not preclude recognition of the courage, selflessness, and other morally praiseworthy traits of some of those who participated in it. In thus seeking to justify the individual's participation in a wrongful act, we are likely to try to distinguish what *he* did from what was done, and to argue that the former at least was not wrong under the circumstances. He is not to be blamed, either because the attack in which he participated is not wrong or because his participation in it can be shown to be justified even if the attack itself is not.

Both of these responses to the charge of wrongdoing may be contrasted with a third form of defense, one that acknowledges the wrongfulness of the act, but argues that the agent is nevertheless not to be blamed. This is a defense that is often advanced on behalf of soldiers who have committed atrocities, and it naturally receives close attention in the books reviewed here. Instead of justifying the act, this form of defense seeks to excuse the agent. One way of trying to do this is to show that he cannot really be held responsible for the act or its consequences. People are sometimes excused from responsibility for acts that are due to some accident, mistake, or incapacity; in our example, the accused may have participated under duress or been kept in ignorance of the fact that in bombarding the enemy he was also harming noncombatants. In such cases we may be unable to identify any defect in the agent for which he could be blamed. Indeed, the event may scarcely qualify as his act; under certain circumstances it may be more truly represented as something that has happened to him rather than something he has done. Alternatively, there are situations in which an agent may be excused even though there is some defect that renders him responsible, at least in part, for what has happened, because of some standard that applies to the judgment of action in situations such as that in which his act was done.[15] The soldier is often unable to trust his own judgment against the consensus of his peers and superiors, or is so overcome with exhaustion, fear, or rage as to cause him to become momentarily indifferent or hostile to the welfare of innocent people he knows himself to be injuring. While independence of mind and rigid self-discipline are virtues, they are not ones an individual acting in such extreme and trying circumstances can reasonably be expected to display. It would be wrong, so the argument goes, to blame him for succumbing to pressures that only an exceptional individual could resist. In contrast to the first sort of excuse, which qualifies the extent to which a given act can properly be said to have been done by the agent, excuses of the second kind qualify the extent to which an agent is properly censurable. To excuse in this sense is to try to show that his act does not fall below the standards applicable to a particular situation because anyone, or almost anyone, would have acted as he did under the circumstances. We might praise the exceptions, but cannot regard such exceptional behavior as obligatory.

Such judgments are influenced by the fact that the acts of international violence we criticize, justify, or excuse are often collective acts and their agents often collective agents.[16] It is not only that judgments of acts and agents must recognize that in war individual action occurs in a collective context that transforms the significance of elementary acts like killing, and places new and different constraints upon human behavior. Equally

[15] Peter A. French, "Morally Blaming Whole Populations," in *Philosophy, Morality, and International Affairs*, p. 273.

[16] See the volume of essays on this topic edited by Peter A. French, *Individual and Collective Responsibility*, as well as his essay cited above.

important, and usually more puzzling, are the issues raised by the actions *of* collectives. Can "acts" be ascribed to collectives? Are there "collective agents" that can be held morally or legally responsible for wrongdoing? Both the traditional doctrine of the just war and the Nuremberg charge of "waging aggressive war" which we have seen contrasted in theories of moral obligation appear, in the context of discussions of blame, to share a common framework of assumptions about collective action: in both, war is an act which can be judged in terms of conceptions of responsibility, blame, excuse and other categories of individual action. As has often been observed (for example, by defenders of "methodological individualism") this way of conceptualizing collective action encounters difficulties insofar as it seeks to present a descriptive or causal account of complex human interactions. Even so, we might still wish to retain such conceptions for the purposes of moral and legal judgment. For example, we might—as is done in making the charge of criminal conspiracy—wish to blame particular individuals for the acts of other members of a common collective, or to distribute blame for a collective act over many individual participants in it, each of whom made only a partial contribution to its completion.

Despite the complexity of the issues involved, questions of responsibility and blame raised by acts that are the outcome of organized collective processes are in fact among the more easily defined and intelligibly discussed aspects of the subject of collective responsibility. It is in connection with such organized collective acts that relatively definite, if objectionable, legal principles such as superior orders, command responsibility, and criminal conspiracy have been articulated and applied; here, at least, is grist for the philosophical critic's mill. But situations of organized collective action do not exhaust the possibilities for ascriptions of collective responsibility for acts of international violence, as is suggested by the common opinion that Germans in general were responsible for the crimes of the Nazis, or that Americans in general should be blamed for the atrocious acts of members of the United States armed forces in Indochina. Here we enter an area of thought in which legal principles are virtually nonexistent and moral notions primitive, unarticulated, and confused. Yet even those who reject the notion that all members of large and loosely defined collectives can be held responsible for such acts might allow the need for a conception of moral responsibility applicable to a wider circle of persons than those involved in some immediate and recognized way. How should the boundaries of the *unorganized* collectives whose members are jointly responsible for a particular act or outcome be delimited? According to one suggestion, collective moral responsibility is properly ascribed to all those who would be willing to participate in the act if they were placed in the same circumstances as those who did actually perform it.[17] According to another, it is the members of the class of those who should have constituted themselves into an organized group and sought to prevent its occurrence that are morally responsible.[18] What such suggestions have in common is the aim of identifying the elements that would justify blaming some and excusing other members of an unorganized collective linked with wrongful violence. There seems, however, to be a confusion in these accounts between whether people are to be blamed for the violence itself or for the fault of falling short of other standards, such as those requiring that they not be willing to participate in such acts or even that they actively oppose their commission. Further analysis of the related concepts of responsibility, blame, fault, liability, culpability, and guilt, together with explorations of the applicability of principles such as negligence or vicarious liability borrowed from civil and criminal law, might contribute to the clarification of the obscurities surrounding the notion of collective responsibility. Yet such an approach also has its limits. In particular it is no substitute for inquiry explicitly aimed at clarifying those moral obligations of citizens that are presupposed by various conceptions of responsibility. These are in part obligations derived from standards of citizenship, and therefore perhaps more progress would be made if collective responsibility were to be understood in this way, as a problem of political philosophy, and not approached through the back door as an appendage to the problem of allocating blame for past horrors. It is just because they are so closely connected that blame cannot be profitably studied apart from the study of those standards of law and public morality from which our obligations as members of collectives are derived.

The Interdependence of Descriptions and Judgments

Judgments of violence may be influenced by the terms in which the acts to be judged are described and interpreted. To call an act a "reprisal" or an "accident" is not only to identify but also to describe it in terms that imply some evaluation of it. The outcome of such evaluations will often depend upon which description of the act is accepted as the "correct" description. There is thus an interaction between descriptions of acts of violence and judgments of them. Certain excuses, for example,

[17] Haskell Fain, "Some Moral Infirmities of Justice," in *Individual and Collective Responsibility*, p. 32.

[18] Virginia Held, "Moral Responsibility and Collective Action," in *Individual and Collective Responsibility*, p. 115.

apply descriptions that in some way question the "actness" of the violence for which a defense is being offered. They describe the violence as something other than the agent's act, as something that happened to him rather than something he did, or as not exactly what he did because in fact he was really doing something else. Other descriptions dispute the wrongness of the act, emphasizing features of it that would tend to justify rather than accuse: he was simply "obeying orders" or "defending himself." In this way, disagreeable forms of violence are assimilated to more acceptable categories of action; conversely, if one's objective is to criticize, then acts favorably described may be redescribed in terms that suggest their unacceptability. Because one so often encounters alternative descriptions having different implications for legal and moral judgment, one must understand the various forms of act-description used in talking about international violence, as well as the criteria according to which the limits of permissible descriptions are drawn.[19]

Because the description we apply to an act can affect our judgment of it, there must be some way to winnow descriptions that are correct, relevant, or appropriate from those that are not. To vary a familiar sort of example: a man firing in combat may be said to be clearing a landing zone, obeying orders, wasting ammunition, defending his country, overtaxing his heart, and violating the laws of war—all at the same time. Depending upon the context, we may select out one or more such descriptions to characterize his act. Some acts have a significance according to a social rule that provides the criterion for their identification as an act of a certain kind, according to which—for example—moving two pieces of ivory in a certain way across a patterned board counts as "castling," or entering another's house at night with the intent to commit a felony constitutes "burglary." In other cases, an observer may provide the description appropriate to his particular interests or responsibilities: the field commander, quartermaster, medical specialist, and military lawyer each have a professional perspective on acts like firing in combat according to which different descriptions become relevant. The description may also involve the interests and intentions of the agent himself: we have not got it quite right when we describe a terrorist taking a letter-bomb to the post office as just "mailing a letter." These differences of interpretation arise in part because what we call acts are constructed of other acts related to each other in various ways. One act may constitute a temporal phase of another, more extended, act (as running the first lap is one phase of running a race). Or the act may be a species of a more inclusive genus (reading Locke's *Second Treatise*, as opposed to just reading), or a means to an end (breaking eggs in making an omelet).

Of particular significance for judging acts of violence is the relation between an act and its consequences, for often instead of criticizing or defending an act by pointing to its consequences, we may judge the act indirectly by characterizing it in terms of those consequences. If I observe a person (A) firing a gun at another person (B), who is in turn about to kill a third (C), what I have observed is a chain of acts and consequences involving, among other things, the tensing of a finger on a trigger, the functioning of a trigger mechanism, the detonation of a gunpowder charge in a cartridge, the propulsion of a bullet out of the barrel of the gun, the impact of the bullet on its victim, his death, etc. One description of the act that might be made is to say that the person firing the gun killed another person (that is, that A killed B). Another, more favorable to the agent, is that he saved a third person's life (A saved C). If one feels inclined to protest that the latter description is not really a description of the act proper, but rather an attempt to justify it by appealing in a veiled way to its (putatively) good consequences, he should be prepared to answer the argument that the description "A killed B" is not really a description of the act proper, either, for what really happened was that A fired a gun, with the consequence that B was killed. Or that A tensed his finger, with the consequence that the gun went off—etc. And once one embarks on a train of reasoning of this kind, it becomes possible to discover many different act-descriptions, many different ways of dividing a series of events into "act" and "consequences." Hence the need for rules according to which some ways of making the division will override others that might in another context prove decisive. It is because we are applying such a rule that we judge, in the preceding example, that the formulation "A killed B" constitutes the appropriate description of what happened. Which rule is to be applied depends upon the context of judgment. Thus although the interests of various observers might result in divergent descriptions of an act for which someone is being tried in a court of law, it is the description arrived at by the court applying legal categories and principles that is "correct" in that context, and not those possibly favored by plaintiff, defendant, or spectators. Similarly, moral rules place limits on the freedom with which the acts judged according to them can be described.

The application of these distinctions to judg-

[19] This problem is explicitly considered by two contributors to *Philosophy, Morality, and International Affairs*: Joseph Margolis, "War and Ideology," pp. 246–265, and Kai Nielsen, "Social Science and American Foreign Policy," pp. 286–319. It is, however, implicit in each of the controversies we have examined, as I hope will soon become apparent.

ments of international violence is well illustrated by the problem, raised in many of these essays, of distinguishing legitimate killing in war from murder.[20] War involves the killing of innocent people, but it would be mistaken to regard all innocent deaths as murder; the problem is to distinguish those that are appropriately described as murders or war crimes from those that are not. Clearly it is no solution to this problem to describe an act involving the deaths of innocent persons in terms of its other consequences, intended or actual, that are more defensible and according to which the deaths of innocents might be justified. The relevant distinction, it has been suggested, is between deliberately bringing about the deaths of innocent persons either as an end in itself or as a means to an end, and acting in such a way in the pursuit of a legitimate end that innocent people suffer injury and death as an incidental and undesired side effect. It is on the basis of this distinction that one can understand the moral difference between, let us say, participation in precision bombing attacks on German operated railways in northern France prior to the Normandy invasion, in which the deaths of French civilians occurred and could be foreseen, and participation in the obliteration bombing of German cities with the express purpose of demoralizing their civilian inhabitants. In the first case one could say that to participate is not to murder (that is, deliberately kill) civilians, for doing so constitutes neither the purpose of the attacks nor a means to the realization of their purpose. But the infliction of injury and death upon civilians is, in the second case, if not the main purpose of the attacks at least a necessary means to the end of undermining civilian morale. To describe both attacks as attempts to weaken German military resistance is not mistaken, but it is a description that hides a legally and morally relevant distinction between alternative means to this end. Causally speaking, the participant in one form of attack is in the same relationship to the deaths accompanying it as the participant in the other; if we excuse or justify the first and blame the second, it is on the basis of criteria that require the two acts to be described in such a way as to permit the relevant distinction between them to be made.

[20] See the essays by Ford, Anscombe, Nagel, and Murphy already cited.

The problem of act-descriptions also has implications for inquiry aimed at the explanation of international violence. Like legal and moral judgments, the explanatory accounts devised by historians and social scientists are influenced by the descriptions employed in the interpretation of the phenomena that they seek to explain. Here both doctrines of method and substantive theories provide the source of criteria for choosing among alternative descriptions, and those in turn often reflect the application of distinctions derived from legal and moral discourse. Often, of course, the observer is insufficiently aware of this fact, and in selecting or in simply using without question a particular set of descriptions he may be unwittingly engaged in the perpetuation of judgments embedded in them. The analysis and criticism of explanatory theories of international violence would therefore appear to constitute an interesting and fruitful field for philosophical inquiry, one as deserving of attention as the study of its legal and moral dimensions. Yet this aspect of the subject is almost entirely overlooked by the contributors to these volumes.[21]

A rich diversity of questions, both cultivated and neglected, thus awaits those who are drawn to explore the regions in which philosophy, war, and international politics are joined. The body of work we have considered here provides both a reconnaissance of these regions and some tools for further exploration. Yet we shouldn't forget that the subject has been investigated for centuries, and that new tools alone are unlikely to produce significant results. Like other ways of thought, those of the analytical philosopher are sometimes unimaginatively exercised upon ill-chosen problems, with negligible results. Discernment is necessary in the choice of lines of inquiry, and in the study of international politics this requires an appreciation of history, institutions, and the empirical substance of policy. The philosophy of war and international politics presented in these volumes is interesting precisely because it does combine analytical skill with substantive knowledge to a degree unusual in recent philosophical commentary on the subject.

[21] An exception is Sidney Morgenbesser, "Imperialism: Some Preliminary Distinctions," in *Philosophy, Morality, and International Affairs*, pp. 201–245.

BOOK REVIEWS

Montesquieu's Philosophy of Liberalism: A Commentary on *The Spirit of the Laws*. By Thomas L. Pangle. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1973. Pp. 336. $10.00.)

The Spirit of the Laws is a puzzle. Its organization and its purpose have been as great a mystery as some parts of it have been clear. Thomas Pangle proposes an answer: Montesquieu is a liberal who advocated the establishment of commercial republics, as far as circumstances permit. Montesquieu's book is a gradual unfolding of that teaching. In Part One, according to Professor Pangle, Montesquieu exposes the inadequacy of the traditional regimes, among which the small republic based on virtue and equality is the most attractive. In Part Two, Montesquieu proposes liberal republicanism, based on freedom as the guarantor of the security of the individual. This proposal, Pangle argues, is grounded in Montesquieu's view of the English regime. In Part Three, Montesquieu examines the natural difficulties and facilitating aspects of climate and terrain. Pangle says this argument moves Montesquieu perilously close to modern historicism and sociology. Part Four pursues a description of modern commerce and its advantages, and the possibilities it creates for the arts and for legislation, if not philosophy. Religion is argued to be essentially different from politics and Christian natural law is argued to be pernicious for politics. In his final chapter, Pangle considers Books 26 and 29 and the final books on France. These form the concluding discussion of natural law and legislation. The political purpose of freedom, expressed as the moderation of the legislator, must find its way between the low universals of the natural law and the peculiar circumstances of any particular polity. France is

This view of *The Spirit of the Laws* is persuasive because it takes into account the depth of because it takes into account the depth of Montesquieu's understanding of the political alternatives, particularly liberalism, exemplified by the English commerical republic. However, the political and intellectual climate in which Montesquieu lived and wrote was not one of unrelenting censorship of admiration for England, particularly its commerce, or of great distrust of modern philosophy. Rather, provided a formal respect was paid the king and the church, the situation was the opposite. French admiration for England was increasing, and, as Rousseau was soon to note, the intolerance of the Enlightenment for any but its own rivaled that of the Church. In view of this situation, Montesquieu's reticence about England could easily have had as much to do with the enthusiasm of England's followers as his fear of having the authorities think he joined them.

One must, therefore, be careful about Montesquieu's treatment of the ancients. Pangle complains that Montesquieu treats Plato's *Republic* and *Laws* as "serious practical proposals" (p. 65), implying that such treatment could never have been that of the ancients. Montesquieu follows Aristotle's lead in Book II of the *Politics* in this. Similarly, Pangle complains that Montesquieu lowers music from the peak of the citizen's education (p. 65). The clearest teaching of the *Republic,* however, is that music and gymnastic together were to establish a balance within the souls of the guardians. Montesquieu says that music aroused something in the spirit of the citizens other than the political virtue of dedication to their common existence (Bk. 4, ch. 8) which did not lead to the savagery of the speculative sciences. That the place of music was intermediate between philosophy and political life understood as common existence, and even that philosophy is not easily domesticated to political life—these ideas are not clearly outside Plato's understanding. If Montesquieu needs to be as subtle about his view of the ancients as of the moderns, these passages, which lead Pangle to see a radical distinction between Montesquieu and the ancients, do not lead easily to that conclusion.

Pangle's treatment of monarchies is as questionable. Monarchy, as Montesquieu describes it, is a curious regime, characterized not by its ruler, the monarch, but by the honor of the nobility. This structural difference between regimes is pointed out again by Montesquieu's emphasis on the size of monarchies (Bk. 8, chs. 16-20). Montesquieu repeatedly refers his reader back to these chapters. Monarchies are essentially different from republics, democratic or aristocratic, and from despotisms. Montesquieu, then, has not set up the regimes of Part One as a simple alternative to the liberal republicanism of Part Two. Rather, he has proposed some different regimes which the reader must pursue through *The Spirit of the Laws* in order to grasp the spirit of those distinctions and of yet another regime.

Although I would neither begin as Pangle did, nor proceed in his manner in a consideration of the *Spirit of the Laws,* his book is fascinating to read. It is the sort of book one reads arguing every step of the way, but emerging with a much

clearer understanding of what the questions in Montesquieu are and how one ought to understand him. This is because he takes Montesquieu's interest in politics and its improvement seriously and follows Montesquieu's argument as he sees it through *The Spirit of the Laws*. I would advise anyone interested in our liberal republican regime or in Montesquieu to read this book and to pursue the argument grounded in the text and in serious political questions where Pangle put it and where it belongs.

ANNE M. COHLER

Chicago, Illinois

Bentham's Political Thought. Edited by Bhiku Parekh. (New York: Barnes & Noble division of Harper & Row, 1973. Pp. 340. $15.00, cloth; $4.95, paper.)

Bentham scholars will welcome this book because the 280 pages of extracts that it contains (arranged by the editor in twenty-two chapters and five appendices) make available some material that has not yet been printed in the volumes so far published of the definitive edition of Bentham's writings that is being prepared by the Bentham Project housed at University College, London. They will also welcome it because, in the previously published work that is included, not only are the tamperings of the earliest editors avoided, but in addition, some of the transcriptions of more recent editors are amended. They will be interested, too, in the rationale of the selection procedure adopted that is given by the editor in his short (37-page) preface and introduction. They may ask themselves, however, whether Dr. Parekh has not perhaps rather over-trimmed Bentham's thought in order to fit it into his own conception, stated in the preface, of "what is expected in a work on political philosophy" (p. 7). As applied to Bentham, this involves starting with an ontology, proceeding to a theory of man, and, in particular, the place in this theory of pleasure and pain, moving next to analysis of key political concepts, then to an account of ideal political society, and finally to a discussion of the nature of political argument. Bentham scholars are likely, too, to wish that Dr. Parekh had given fuller references in his introduction which would have guided them to all the parts of the extracts on which the main points in his exposition of Bentham's political thought are based.

A degree of unease may also occur when one notices that the editor gives few indications in the introduction or elsewhere of changes in Bentham's positions, apart from rather general allusions to his earlier nonradical and late radical standpoints. Since in most cases the dates of the various extracts are to be found in footnotes, the unwary reader might be led to suppose that, except on radicalism, Bentham's positions remained unchanged from 1773 to 1829. The very unwary reader might be even more misled by an odd lapse on the part of the editor when he says in his preliminary note to the extracts presented in Chapter 2 (p. 51): "Having examined the nature of fictitious entities in the previous chapter he [Bentham] now goes on to develop a technique of analysing them by relating them to some real entities." The previous chapter (which, of course, is the editor's chapter, not Bentham's) consists of extracts, for which dates are not given, from mss. U.C.L. box 102, and Chapter 2 consists of extracts from mss. U.C.L. box 101, written in 1814, 1826 and 1813, (p. 330, chap. 1 note 1, chap. 2 note 1).

In his preface Dr. Parekh says, "If the book gives a reasonably coherent account of Bentham's political philosophy and inspires students of Bentham to go to the original works, the labour will not have been in vain" (p. 11). But it is clear that the book is not at all suitable for unaided beginners and that it will be useful for students only if they are given considerable guidance. The preface and introduction, indeed, assume previous knowledge of Bentham (including acquaintance with the significance of "Panopticon"), and little there or in the notes links Bentham with earlier and later thinkers. There are some passages in which Bentham's views are set out in relation to those of others, but they are unlikely to help the beginner very much. At least one passage will seem distinctly puzzling in its reference to "the classical liberalism of Hobbes and especially of Locke" (p. 42), unless the reader is already familiar with some other literature, such as Dr. Parekh's own contribution "Liberalism and Morality" in *The Morality of Politics* the collection that he edited with R. N. Berki. (London: Allen & Unwin, 1972).

Nonetheless, it is useful to have the various extracts together in one volume, and the introduction, short as it is, does draw attention to certain themes in Bentham that do not appear to have been emphasized by others, especially Bentham's elaboration of the rendering of services as a central feature of his theory of government, and his treatment of the power of the sovereign in terms of the sovereign's dependence upon the extent of a disposition to obedience on the part of subjects. The last point, however, might well have led to a consideration of yet another interesting theme, Bentham's discussion of indirect legislation; unfortunately that topic is not touched on.

It should be mentioned, however, that *Ben-*

tham's Political Thought is not to stand alone. The publishers announce on the jacket that Dr. Parekh "is currently working on a critical study of Bentham," and therefore some of the gaps I have mentioned may be filled by that work. If they are, then Bentham scholars will be better placed to assess the interpretation that is summarized in the present volume.

WILFRID HARRISON
University of Warwick, England

Dynamische Demokratie: Zur konkreten Utopie gesellschaftlicher Gleichheit. By Anton Pelinka. (Stuttgart/Berlin/Köln/Mainz: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1974. Pp. 148. DM 18.80.)

Anton Pelinka, professor of political science at the recently founded *Gesamthochschule* at Essen, says in his new book, *Dynamic Democracy*, that he is primarily concerned with the process of democratization, from the perspective of what he labels "dynamic democracy" (p. 7). From his discussion of the relation between societal and political practice, Pelinka also arrives at a model of democracy.

He curtly dismisses the political conceptions of democracy set forth by Locke, Montesquieu, the authors of the *Federalist Papers*, and Rousseau and the juristic conception set forth by Carl Schmitt because, he claims, they are based on abstract postulates. He finds himself in partial agreement with the thought of Robert Michels, Vilfredo Pareto, Gaetano Mosca, Joseph Schumpeter, Anthony Downs, Gabriel Almond, Sidney Verba, and Robert Dahl, among others. He compliments these writers for focusing on the actual practices of democracies, but is, nevertheless, ultimately disappointed with the writings of Michels, Pareto, Mosca, Schumpeter, and Downs because, he says, they see "democracy" only as a "method," a "procedure" devoid of specific content (p. 15). But Pelinka welcomes the dynamic element inherent in the notion of active "political participation" as developed by Almond, Verba, and Dahl, though here too he laments the absence of a definite content (p. 18).

One may thus understand why Pelinka thrusts to the forefront those who have ascribed to the concept of "democracy" a norm he considers to be positive (e.g., Peter Bachrach—no mention is made of John Rawls and Christopher Jencks). For Pelinka, a dynamic democracy is, first of all, an operational procedure. As such it is in a constant state of flux, and in a constant state of development perpetually attempting to draw ever more people into the democratic process (p. 116). Equality and freedom are the goals. In the words of the author:

> Democracy is the realization of as equal a measure of freedom for all as possible. Freedom and equality are not opposites. Equality is nevertheless the variable quantity, which in its entirety can be maximized and also minimized. Equality is the concrete, the real utopia of dynamic democracy. It is utopia because its complete realization cannot be anticipated in the foreseeable future. And it is concrete and real because a given society can be judged according to the extent to which it has achieved partial equality; and because this observable measure of equality can be intensified in the direction of utopia, of total equality of power (p. 74).

Pelinka's discussion of both the process of moving toward the goal and the end product itself reveals one of his fundamental assumptions, namely, that man is now more or less rational and that in the course of history he will develop into an almost or even fully rational being. In this context one may understand Pelinka's argument that in the developmental process toward the hoped-for goal, power has to be made ever more "visible," "measurable" (p. 40), and "controllable" (p. 42), until it need no longer be based on "coercion" (p. 43). To achieve this diffusion of power, the author hopes, at least implicitly, to help the course of history along by educating man politically (pp. 101-102).

Pelinka's discussion gives rise to many questions, including the injecting into politics of an ideology considered to be true and absolute. But his fundamental weakness is his failure to integrate his conception of a developing democracy into the actual world of political reality, i.e., into the framework of a politically pluralist world.

Pelinka is silent on how a dynamic democracy, in the process of developing, can and should cope with political emergencies, whether internal or external. He does not solve anything by merely stating that a dynamic democracy in the process of developing is not only cognizant of, but also encourages conflict, and then equating conflict with domestic unrest (p. 57). What if such unrest were to become so sharp that a distinction must instantly be drawn between friend and foe? In a society in which political power is constantly divided, subdivided, and torn asunder, who will decide that an emergency exists? Who decides how it is to be resolved? Does this sort of developing democracy make any provision for emergency situations, and hence for emergency legislation to which individuals can be forced to conform?

Had Pelinka not skirted fundamental questions, his otherwise interesting discussion would not have been left hanging in the air. In the construction of a political system whose starting point is the actual world, reality must not and can not simply be ignored and wished away.

GEORGE SCHWAB
The City College and
The City University of New York

The Nature of Human Values. By Milton Rokeach. (New York: The Free Press, 1973. Pp. 438. $13.95.)

It is the business of political (and other) philosophy to explicate the nature of values, to contrast them to each other, to argue the case for some preferred set, and to relate these to the practices of institutions and societies. Some portion of this work could be expanded and, I think, improved, if we had some way of finding out who has what values, what behaviors follow from holding some set of values as contrasted to another, how values change, and how societies and social groups differ in their value preferences. The study of ideology, of public opinion, of electoral behavior, of decision making would similarly gain. (Of course the question of which values *should* be preferred is properly a philosophical question, although the cost/benefit problem is also a social scientific one.) In *The Nature of Human Values,* Professor Rokeach has come forward with a measure of values and some interesting, provocative research.

The concept of value is elusive: should it be divided between concepts of the desired and of the desirable, as Clyde Kluckhohn has argued? Rokeach says "no" because the desirable is "nothing more than a special kind of preference" (p. 11). Is it another word for "need," or can needs be translated into values, as Robert White has argued? Rokeach says they are by no means the same, for if they were the same, rats would have values; rather values are cognitive representations of needs. A value is not an attitude, for attitudes require objects or situations, and values do not. Values are more flexible than traits; they subsume interests. Thus, "A value is an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence" (p. 5). It is enduring (but Rokeach can manipulate them), it is a belief (true-false, good-bad, and also prescriptive), and is to be divided into "modes of conduct" (instrumental) and end-states of existence (terminal).

The measurement or identification of values has always run into the problem of method; basically there are two: (1) ask people directly, (2) infer from behavior or expression, oral or written, the underlying value informing these expressive acts. Rokeach adopts the first of these. After wide scanning of many lists (but not Lasswell's) Rokeach develops his own list of 18 terminal values (a comfortable life, a world at peace, equality, freedom, inner harmony, etc.) and 18 instrumental values (ambitious, clean, forgiving, polite, intellectual, self-controlled, etc.). He presents these lists to his respondents and asks them to rank them. Test-retest reliabilities on the final form among different samples are .74 on the terminal values, and between .65 and .70 for the instrumental values. The validity is a different matter; in general, Rokeach's measure predicts not only attitudes but also behavior, and the relevant values are modestly correlated (.25 to .35) to McClelland's measurements of need. After some initial skepticism, I am persuaded by the research findings of those who have used the instrument that it is sufficiently valid to become a useful tool in an area that desperately needs one.

What does Rokeach find out? In a national survey he discovers that Americans (in 1968) value most "a world at peace, family security, freedom" and value least "pleasure, social recognition (!), and a world of beauty." They want people to be honest, but are indifferent about their being intellectual or logical. Three years later (see *Public Opinion Quarterly,* Summer, 1974) the valuation of "a comfortable life" and of being "clean" had declined, while "equality" and "a world of beauty" had increased, but there had been a general stability over that short time period. Since values are both elements of personality and reflections of social norms, information on the sources and content of change—about which much vapid material is written—may be one useful advantage of Rokeach's measure.

By social class: in the working class, compared to the middle class, there is no evidence of a Banfield-type culture of poverty (hedonism or present-time orientation), but there is much more conformism and religiosity. With income controlled, blacks show generally the same pattern as whites, except for their higher valuation of equality. There is no special black culture—so far as Rokeach's values go. By age: as one matures, "loving," "a world of beauty" and hedonism decline; "self-realization" values are highest in the college years. By political party there is no difference, but by candidate preference the ranking of "equality," from low to high, is as follows: Republican candidate supporters generally, McGovern supporters, then Kennedy/Johnson supporters. (More trouble for the interpreters of McGovern support.)

But the excitement in this study lies elsewhere. Two chapters on ideology find first that a thematic content analysis focussing on the two values that Rokeach believes to be most relevant—freedom and equality—in the writings of Lenin, socialist humanists, Goldwater, and Hitler, reveals a neat pattern: Lenin is high on equality and low on freedom, Goldwater is high on freedom and low on equality, Hitler is low on both, the socialist humanists are high on both, and these differences are such that the evalua-

tions of these concepts are at the poles of their value scales. Students who themselves have these relative value patterns reveal, through a variety of questions to test their ideologies and identifications, that such value preferences predict (determine?) ideological preferences. The "socialist" value types (high on both freedom and equality) are most "accurate" in their perceptions of the ideological implications of these values. "Communist" value types (high on equality and low on freedom—a small group) do prefer Communist symbols, slogans, personalities more than others, but they prefer fascist symbols even more. This anomaly, if that is what it is, is interpreted by Rokeach as reflecting a common misperception of ideology which limits it to one dimension on which all four ideological types are ranked, rather than the two dimensions he finds actually describe them better. Further, he discovers a "law of activism": extreme (high or low) valuation of freedom or equality is a necessary condition for sustained political activism.

The values can be manipulated rather easily: a casual mention to those who ranked freedom high and equality low, to the effect that they might be interested in freedom only for themselves, induced changes in attitudes and such behaviors as joining new civil rights groups and changing careers. The finding disturbs Rokeach, as it does me.

In spite of some methodological imperialism, the book and method illuminate some dark corners of politics, even if they do not light up the sky. We will be hearing more about Rokeach's value measure.

ROBERT E. LANE
Yale University

The Heirs of Stalin. Dissidence and The Soviet Regime, 1953-1970. Edited by Abraham Rothberg. (Ithaca and New York: Cornell University Press, 1972. Pp. 450. $14.50.)

As the title indicates, the book deals with that phenomenon in Soviet society which is now commonly though inaccurately designated in the West as "dissidence," while the parallel term in the Soviet Union is *inakomyslie* or "another way of thinking." One of the most prominent "dissidents" and a highly qualified scientist, Dr. Khodorovich, recently protested in one of her *samizdat* essays against the term as a politically loaded misnomer. The term, she wrote, presupposes those who think in one way and those who think otherwise. But in fact *samizdat* today is the only forum of thought in the USSR, for thought cannot develop when it is subordinate to dictates of an ideology which has lost all credence, dictates of a dead ideology. Two types of thought presuppose a real or implied dialogue between them, but what dialogue can there be between two chess-players, continues Mrs. Khodorovich, when one chess-player, every time he loses a figure, mops all the adversary's figures physically off the board.

Although the above generalization can be somewhat questioned, for in the field of, say, mathematical and natural sciences, advances in thought can (after the fall of Lysenko) be expressed in the official press; some original writing can still be found in *Novy mir* and other literary publications, and historians can write quite truthfully about the less controversial and more distant topics of historiography and get their findings published. But on the whole, particularly in the spheres of *Weltanschauung*, philosophy, religion, social and political thinking, Dr. Khodorovich's statement is correct. Furthermore, when one speaks to the so-called "dissidents" recently arrived in the West, one discovers that most of the more original historians, scientists and literary figures who continue to have their works published in the official press are personal friends of many of the well-known "dissidents." In other words, they are the "silent majority" of the so-called "dissidence" and potential *samizdatchiks* themselves. In fact, despite the increased pressures and more severe punishments, with every departure to the West and with every new arrest there appear in the Soviet *samizdat* new names to replace those who left; e.g., the Moscow-based mathematician, member of the Armenian Academy of Sciences, Yurii Orlov, the writers V. Kornilov, Voinovich, etc.

Mr. Rothberg's book itself should convince the Western Sovietologist how far behind the times he is in his continued concentration on the official Soviet press and his almost total disregard for *samizdat*, hypnotized by the quantitative disproportions between the two and by the external weight of Soviet foreign policies. Western intellectuals seem to ignore their own intellectual cradle of individualism and minority opinion.

Unfortunately, *The Heirs of Stalin* is a predominantly descriptive work, and not an analytical one. His chapters are individual case descriptions, either of individual "dissident" personalities or of fates of individual "controversial" works of art. There are extensive quotations. Documents and relevant writings are cited, much conscientious footnoting is done. So, the book leaves no doubt as to its realiability and factual accuracy. But there are no serious attempts at conceptualization, at an analysis of the whole phenomenon of "dissent" and "samizdat," no real thread or connection between the individual chapters and cases individually cited, stated, and

even analyzed to some extent. Consequently, the reader is left with fragmentary impressions, with considerable information on individual cases, but no appreciation of the whole post-Stalin development of Soviet society. Even if Mr. Rothberg had only reproduced Siniavsky's "On Socialist Realism" and some parts of his *Trial Begins* he would have given the reader a much more synthesized and overall understanding of Soviet society since 1953, than by all his fragmented chapters, which on their own only serve as an excellent illustration. But of what? Of Siniavsky's thesis (written as early as 1956-57) that ever since the death of Stalin, "we have entered a cycle of destructions and reassessments" (*Fantasticheskii mir Abrama Tertza,* New York, 1966, p. 455).

One could question the author's method of subdividing the book into "professional" sections: "Artistic Dissidence," "Political Dissidence," "Scientific Dissidence." Much more representative subdivisions would be according to schools of thought; e.g., "Neo-Marxism," "Neo-Slavophilism," "Neo-Liberalism," "Christian-Socialism," "Democratic Socialism" "Neo-Fascism," etc.; for one finds scientists as well as artists among all these ideational groupings and trends, while divisions by professions are just as artificial as the Marxist attempts to squeeze schools and trends of thought into frames of class origins.

There are some minor errors and misspellings of names (such as on pp. 174, 177, 185, 190, 210, 214, and elsewhere), some repetitions, some misleading labels of "liberal," "dogmatist," "more liberal," slapped on individual Soviet literary *apparatchiks* and other "with-it" figures. Why, for instance, is the super-subservient literary *apparatchik* S. Mikhalkov claimed to be more liberal than a similar *apparatchik,* G. Markov (p. 141)? Both have become "famous" in their campaign against Solzhenitsyn in the period from 1969 to 1974, and both now occupy key positions in the Writers' Union.

Nevertheless, it should be repeated, the book is a very valuable "first" in the English language on the "unofficial" or "unapproved" part of the post-Stalin Soviet intelligentsia and society and should be widely read and popularized in the ranks of thoughtful Western readers.

D. Pospielovsky
The University of Western Ontario

Science and Politics. By Jean-Jacques Salomon. (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1973. Pp. 277. $15.00.)

At least until the Second World War, the history of the relations between science and politics was represented often as the story of the struggle between the forces of reason and unreason. The atomic blasts at the end of World War II blurred the distinction by making science appear as both a more credible instrument of public policy and a less credible contributor to the promotion of rationality in public affairs. During the 'fifties and 'sixties, as the growing role of science in public affairs was increasingly accepted as a fact, the questions which were raised centered less on whether science should enter the political domain than on how this process, which was regarded as inevitable, should be effected without the politicization of science or the delegitimation of politics.

As a question bearing not only on the mechanics of government but also on the nation's deepest values and commitments, the relations between truth and power have remained a favorite theme for the philosophers, moralists, ideologists, martyrs and seers of the age. Don K. Price, moving from government to academia, was perhaps the first to treat the question about the place of science in democratic politics systematically (in *Government and Science* [New York: New York University Press, 1954] and *The Scientific Estate* [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965]). Even though Price was concerned primarily with defining an American solution to this problem, his book raised some fundamental theoretical questions whose significance for understanding the relations of science and politics goes beyond the specific contingencies of the American system.

This promising beginning, however, remained without a follow-up. By and large the wealth of accumulating historical material in this field has not been subject to conceptual regimentation and has not been illuminated by ongoing theoretical discourse. Instead the preoccupation with the subject has given rise on the one hand to moral and ideological literature on the social responsibilities of scientists and the obligations of the state to science and, on the other hand, to pragmatic literature on questions of science policy.

Salomon's book has not altered this intellectual landscape. In combining a discussion of the practical problems of science policy with a discussion of the responsibility of scientists in politics, it is in fact fairly representative of much of the literature which has evolved around this subject since World War II. A long-time participant-observer from his strategic position as head of the Science Policy Division of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in Paris, Salomon tries to bring together what he calls "philosophical discourse" and "realism" in a study of "the irrationality of the institution which most strikingly embodies the rationality of the West" (p. xv).

His book consists of three parts: Part I, "The New World" (pp. 3-68), presents a brief and schematic history of the relations of science and politics from the seventeenth century to the present, emphasizing the growing interpenetration of scientific knowledge and political power in the modern state. Part II, "Politics in Science" (pp. 71-144), consists of discussions of problems of science policy, such as planning and forecasting the development of science and the allocation of resources among different parts of science. Part III, "Science in Politics" (pp. 147-253), raises questions about the moral and political implications of scientists' roles in public affairs.

The general result is disappointing. Even though Salomon is a sophisticated observer with wide experience as well as an admirable mastery of a vast literature, his book lacks both the kind of documented evidence that could make it significant for the historian of science and politics, and the analytical rigor and theoretical depth that would make it useful for the social scientist. Instead, this volume takes on the characteristics of that special genre which has produced the business executive's "philosophy of the economy" or the practicing diplomat's "theory of international relations"—a cluster of worldly common-sense observations made by thinking participants who bring from their eventful odyssey into the "real world" some precious insights, some moral teaching, and some visions or warnings of what is in store for us in the future.

This kind of literature, however, is not entirely without its own value insofar as it furnishes insights into the symbolic constructs with which participants organize and systematize their experience. Of particular interest in Salomon's book is the underlying tension between the commitment to the ethos of science and to the cultural diffusion of scientific knowledge on the one hand, and the disenchantment and skepticism generated by the encounter with the "logic" of politics on the other. This book can be read at least in part as a description of the political education of scientists, a process through which they discover the limits of the power of knowledge and rationality in public affairs.

Salomon's main argument seems to be that since World War II a process of convergence of science and politics, whose signs were already manifest after World War I, became widely recognized and progressively institutionalized. He suggests that the fusion of the scientific and the political activities has altered the role of the scientist in society, that it has turned him from a "savant"—a definer of truths enjoying the status of a "cultural figure"—into a lower-grade technician, a sort of "production agent" in the service of political power (p. 251). In advancing this argument, Salomon adds to a discourse already overburdened by neologisms the term "techno-nature" (p. 174) to indicate this convergence between science and politics—where perhaps it may have been the better part of wisdom to heed Occam's great dictum that "entities ought not to be multiplied except out of necessity." Even though, as Salomon suggests, the interpenetration of science and politics is the dominant feature of the state of science in contemporary society since World War II, his discussion of this phenomenon is handicapped by a frame of reference within which it is defined as another phase in the Manichaean history of the struggle of science "against the spirit of authority" (p. 73). He views politics primarily as the cultural manifestation of the irrational and the growing centrality of scientists in public affairs as threatening the glory of science as the cultural expression and symbol of truth.

This perspective obviously is not congenial for a study of the interrelations of science and politics as distinctive cultural activities involving the interaction of different languages, modes of action and institutions.

An investigator uninhibited by a demonological "theory" of politics and unconfined by the narrow concerns of science policy could, perhaps, direct the inquiry on the interrelations of science and politics toward a host of strategic questions which remain largely untouched by Salomon and others in this field. It might be fruitful, for instance, to raise such questions as: what are the political significance and uses of the social authority of scientists in political contexts aside from their intellectual skills? How does their professional role as men of knowledge interact with their roles in the larger society as popularizers, advisers, critics or legitimators? How is the selective reception of scientific knowledge in the public domain affected by the prevailing ideologies, the distribution of political power, the nature of political authority, the procedures of public policy and other such characteristics of political systems? Does science influence public perceptions and evaluations of government performance? What are the differences in the ways the scientific enterprise is socially organized in relation to political authority among different political systems, and what is their significance for comparative studies in politics and culture?

From the perspective of political science, the interrelations between science and politics ultimately fall within the boundaries of such classical topics as "rationality and politics," "truth and justice," "knowledge and authority." The potential contribution of modern political

science to these traditional debates is not confined, however, to the novelties introduced by the historical specificity of modern forms of knowledge, politics or their interrelations. It may perhaps lie no less in the conceptual innovations which would open the way for studying knowledge and rationality in the dynamic context of political interaction and public policy and integrating the related scholarly tradition of political theory with modern theories of organizational and political behavior. Even though Salomon's book does not represent a significant step in this direction, it is a good representative of the present state of the art and may help clarify the limits which must be transcended if our understanding of relations of science and politics is to be enhanced.

YARON EZRAHI
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Psychoanalysis and the Law. By C. G. Schoenfeld. (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C Thomas, 1973. Pp. 285. $13.75.)

After a brief flurry of interest sparked by Harold Lasswell, few political scientists made any effort during the 1930s and 1940s to apply psychodynamic categories to the study of political behavior. Psychoanalytic insights were used by sociologists and anthropologists during the 1940s and 1950s, primarily for "national character" studies, and Talcott Parsons attempted to incorporate psychodynamic categories into the theory of action. By the late 1950s, however, interest had dropped off. The one enduring monument of the whole period was *The Authoritarian Personality* which, despite its flaws, has continued to influence and serve as a research guide for social psychologists, sociologists, and political scientists.

During the late 1950s and early 1960s, a few political scientists such as Lucian Pye continued the effort to interweave dynamic concepts of personality with the study of politics, but the bulk of the work in the area was left to psychologists and psychoanalysts with social concerns such as Kenneth Keniston, Robert Lifton, and Erich Fromm.

More recently interest has gradually revived. Following the lead of Erik Erikson, increasing numbers of historians are turning to "psychobiography," and a spate of books and articles indicates that political scientists dealing with problems of socialization are attempting, once again, to bring psychological (if not always psychoanalytic) insights to bear on their work. Thus far, however, the approach has barely gotten off the ground. There are many reasons for this, but at least two are immediately relevant with regard to psychoanalysis. First, psychoanalytic theory remains highly reductionist. Quite naturally, political scientists are not attracted to a discipline which treats the political world as epiphenomenal, i.e., as consisting of acts which are merely a projection and rationalization of primitive urges. Second, psychoanalytic theory is still based largely on clinical insights. Thus little effort has been made to develop propositions which can be tested at least in part, and instruments which can test them in some way or another.

By and large, then, books and articles which attempt to develop psychoanalytic perspectives still tend to be highly speculative and fail to offer the kind of approach or evidence which might commend them to working political scientists. Too many are still of a type which (a) review basic psychoanalytic hypotheses for a lay audience, (b) speculate about the inter-relationships between unconscious motives and social processes without offering any evidence for these speculations. Often such volumes promise much, if the research could be done, but after reading four or five which traverse the same ground with the same promise, one begins to become impatient.

The above comments apply to classics like Lasswell's *Psychopathology and Politics,* Kardiner et al., *The Psychological Frontiers of Society,* and Fromm's *Escape from Freedom* as well as to such lesser known works as Money-Kyrle's, *Psychoanalysis and Politics* and Ranyard West's, *Conscience and Society.* They also apply to the many psychoanalytically oriented "national character" studies which were supposedly to open the way to understanding the politics of particular nations.

Unfortunately Schoenfeld's book is of this type. The author is a lawyer trained in psychoanalysis, and it is clear from his writing that he is a serious scholar. But his attempted marriage of psychoanalysis and law fails for the reasons noted.

Essentially the volume consists of a very elementary discussion of psychoanalytic hypotheses followed by (1) propositions which are so ambiguous that they add nothing to our knowledge; (2) propositions which are so outrageous on the face of it that one is tempted to dismiss them out of hand; (3) propositions which are interesting, and which might conceivably be of some value but for which little or no evidence is offered. Let me offer some examples chosen at random:

In discussing the role of the Supreme Court in American society, Schoenfeld asks why so many Americans were shocked and dismayed by Roosevelt's "Court packing" plan. The answer is obvious to the author. The Court was a parent

surrogate to Americans, and Roosevelt's plan was perceived as an attack upon this surrogate. The author never asks why Roosevelt was not also a parent surrogate, nor (although he is aware of the fact) does he ever ask why most other nations do not have supreme courts which are regarded as parent surrogates. The Court's role, he suggests, stemmed primarily from the trauma of the Civil War which led to its elevation to the position it came to occupy, and other traumas confirmed this position. Yet many nations have faced comparable traumas without creating a "parent surrogate" court of this type. There may be something to the author's contention, but *only* if placed in a social and cultural context which explains the relevant differences between the United States and other nations, and supplies some evidence for the propositions offered.

Elsewhere Schoenfeld suggests that police brutality may be the result of the police acting upon unconscious sadistic impulses, but that those who "overemphasize" police brutality may unconsciously be trying to undermine the ability of the society to control aggression. Either or both propositions may be true, and reminding academic intellectuals that police chiefs and "hard hats" are not necessarily the only people behaving irrationally may serve some purpose, but the mere statement of the issue in the form in which Schoenfeld puts it leads us nowhere. The volume, incidentally, offers a rather lengthy discussion of unconscious aggression and the law, but aside from some references to Lorenz, the general discussion of the issue consists primarily of quotations from Freud and other psychoanalysts stressing the importance of the problem.

Just one final example. Schoenfeld reviews at length the problem of judicial "activism" versus judicial "restraint." His conclusion is that the arguments in favor of both are partly valid from a psychoanalytic perspective and therefore he can really come to no conclusion, unless it be that individuals should recognize that both judicial activism and judicial restraint are legitimate and necessary. The discussion hardly helps us with the problems we face in this area, and even the sympathetic reader is likely to conclude that reading it was something of a waste of time.

We do not need books which tell us how important it is to investigate unconscious mental processes as they apply to law or politics. We *do* need studies which demonstrate that we can reasonably do so in ways which enable us to have some confidence in our results. *The Authoritarian Personality,* with all its weaknesses, pointed in the right direction. One article which throws some light on our actual political experience by making use of psychodynamic hypotheses (and testing them) will convince more scholars to take such hypotheses into account than will dozens of volumes which, like this one, merely urge us to do so, and add little, if anything, to our understanding.

STANLEY ROTHMAN
Smith College

Voluntary Associations: Perspectives on the Literature. By Constance Smith and Ann Freedman. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972. Pp. 250. $8.00, paper.)

The political scientist, having paid $8.00 for this paperback, is likely to feel further annoyance at finding the familiar subjects of interest groups, pluralism, and elitism dealt with from the perspective of scholars interested in voluntarism. As such it has a superficial quality which borders on the misleading, through some may find the very distinctiveness of its viewpoint suggestive in its implications.

This volume is indirectly related to David Horton Smith's Center for a Voluntary Society. The annual collections issued by this society (*Voluntary Action Research:* 1972, etc.), however, reflect a tone which the organization theorist will probably regard as more sophisticated than the present volume. Even the bibliographic function of these collections is in some ways superior, though neither they nor the present volume can match in usefulness Ralph Stogdill's related survey of the literature *Handbook of Leadership* (New York: The Free Press, 1974).

Smith and Freedman (Constance Smith was Dean of Radcliffe Institute prior to her death in 1970; Ann Freedman is Associate Professor of Political Science at Roosevelt University) begin their volume with "A Theoretical Overview" focusing on organizational typologies. Here the typologies of Clark and Wilson, Blau and Scott, and others are very briefly outlined. Organization theorists will be dumbfounded by the omission of famous constructs which belong in such a review, such as the typologies of Talcott Parsons, Amitai Etzioni, or James Thompson. On the other hand, several lesser-known contributions are outlined. No attempt at critical evaluation or synthesis is made here or in the following section on "Small Group Theory," which surveys the reviews of the subject, again without critical comment.

Chapter Two presents "The Pluralist Thesis." First "The American Tradition" is outlined, treating Tocqueville, Bryce, the social historical work of the Handlins, and a few minor contributions, and omitting discussion of the Federalists,

Calhoun, and the conservative theorists of the post-bellum period. Classical pluralism receives somewhat better coverage, though the discussion is so superficial one gets no feeling for the issues involved or the differences with those in the pluralist tradition who preceded or followed. Contemporary American pluralism is treated in a conventional section outlining ideas of Rose, Kornhauser, McConnell, Truman, Latham, Bentley, Key, Banfield, Lindblom, and a few others.

Chapter Three on "Pluralism: Attack and Defense" briefly treats Schattschneider, Lowi, Mills, Hunter, Schumpeter, Lipset, Polsby, Dahl, and Walker. A few discussions, such as that on Kornhauser, are extended enough to be of substantive interest. Some, like that on community power structure research, are so superficial they could better have been left out entirely. The radical elitist position is portrayed in stereotyped and dated terms, ignoring authors who followed Mills (e.g., Domhoff).

Chapter Four outlines writings on "Voluntary Associations and the Political System: Data." Here we find a survey of Milbrath, Lane, Almond and Verba; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee; Prewitt, Stouffer, Rossi, Rosenau, Cutright, and others. Chapter Five surveys literature on participation in politics. Chapter Six surveys sociological literature on the relation to voluntary association memberships of class, race, ethnicity, sex, age, and attitudes. After this a much better treatment of community studies ensues. Two final chapters discuss "how-to" literature, studies of particular voluntary associations, and studies of VISTA and other government-related voluntary programs.

All these chapters, like the ones earlier, serve the useful purpose of providing the interested scholar with a concise overview of selected literature in the various related fields of interest. Throughout the discussion is bibliographic rather than critical, and hence the level is necessarily elementary. The surveys are neither comprehensive nor up-to-date, even for 1971. Omissions are striking, to the point of misleading the uninformed user.

In sum, Smith and Freedman have cast a wide net and have pulled in much that is of interest—some conventional, some important, some trivial. Their material is presented under headings no more arbitrary than the next, and while the presentation seems rambling because no critical argument is being made, researchers may find useful the orderly listing of more than six hundred sources pertaining to voluntarism. If the net result is less than compelling, this is less attributable to the authors than to the intellectual confusion which seems to surround the formation of new subdisciplines, whether urban studies or voluntary action.

G. David Garson
Tufts University

The Baku Commune, 1917–1918: Class and Nationality in the Russian Revolution. By Ronald Grigor Suny. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972. Pp. xxviii, 412. $15.00.)

This study, characterized by good scholarship, proceeds to set the record straight before an official interpretation of the history of the Baku Commune in Soviet historiography which was maintained for reasons of political necessity. Professor Ronald Grigor Suny's work has the additional merit of focusing on a period and a place that have received only limited attention in Western scholarship. This is all the more welcome as the case of the Baku Commune condenses in time and space the major questions and problems the Bolsheviks were eventually called to deal with throughout the tsarist empire. And if Baku had not been threatened by and eventually fallen to the Turks in mid-September 1918, Stepan Shaumian, Prokofiia Dzhaparidze, and their Bolshevik colleagues might have given Lenin and the others in Petrograd an example of Bolshevik power based on worker class-consciousness and cohesion where terror was virtually nonexistent. Shaumian might have even shown how to avoid interethnic warfare in Transcaucasia. As Suny writes: "More moderate than their Petrograd comrades, they had deep roots in the city, long training in the economic struggle, and a sensitivity to the dangers of interethnic warfare" (p. 344). External factors were however not the only ones to plague Baku, for the city was a microcosm of the nationality problems the Bolsheviks had to face in Russia. The author deals with these problems with great sensitivity and care.

Suny has left few stones unturned in his research, and his study is as thorough as it is fascinating. He has not only brought to light a literature on Baku written in the U.S.S.R. in the 1920s, which, even if it is pro-Bolshevik, had not yet suffered the later Stalinist deformations, but through his own research, he has given Western scholarship an analysis of the problems created in Baku by class and especially by nationality during the Russian Revolution. In fact, the two variables were inextricably connected: "Most of the skilled workers, office employees, and administrators were Armenians and Russians, while the Azerbaijanis and Daghestanis formed the bulk of the drillers and field workers. Nationality tended to accentuate differences of status

within the working class" (pp. 13-14). Its oil fields made Baku a vital city in the power struggle waged throughout Russia in 1917 and 1918. Shaumian and his comrades were able to rise to power despite the seemingly unsurmountable nationality problems partly because of the inability of other parties, especially the Mensheviks and the Right Social Revolutionaries who held power in the Soviet after the February Revolution, to respond to the anticapitalist mood of the workers which the Bolsheviks knew how to exploit. They successfully led the September strike, and throughout October it looked as if they might carry themselves to total power, given the cohesion the working class manifested around them. This was not to be, however, for Shaumian was no Lenin, as Suny writes: "There was no Lenin in Baku who combined a resolute will to power with the necessary influence within the party, no one to argue that 'to wait is a crime against the revolution' " (p. 349). This class cohesion was short-lived and under external pressures gave way to national warfare which proved the undoing of Bolshevik power and resulted in the loss of Baku to the Turks.

On the question of political power, the Baku Commune and especially its chairman, Shaumian, stand out as examples of tolerance and democracy. Political parties were allowed to function and publish their newspapers; all Shaumian required was that they recognize Soviet power. Their participation in the Sovnarkom depended on this recognition. The rules of democracy were observed and when the Bolsheviks lost the confidence of the Soviet, they withdrew. This was indeed rather un-Bolshevik and un-Leninist behavior and within the context of the Revolution in Russia, where tolerance was the exception rather than the rule, it led to the undoing of the Baku Bolshevik leadership. When Baku fell to the Turks, twenty-six of the leading members of the Soviet who had fled the city, including Shaumian and Dzhaparidze, were captured by the Ashkhabad Committee, then in the hands of the Social Revolutionaries, and executed. Bolshevik power in Azerbaijan returned only in April 1920.

Although there is no theoretical model or lesson to be drawn from the Baku Commune, its history as presented by Suny is a valuable addition to the history of the Russian Revolution.

STANISLAV KIRSCHBAUM
York University

Flucht in den Mythos: Die Deutschnationale Volkspartei und die Niederlage von 1918. By Annelise Thimme. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Rupprecht, 1969. Pp. 195. DM 7.80.)

In the complicated political spectrum of the Weimar Republic, the principal conservative role was assumed within days of the November, 1918 revolution by the newly created German National People's Party (*Deutschnationale Volkspartei*—DNVP). Intended to group various right-wing elements that otherwise despaired of survival in a democratic republic, the Party from the beginning was troubled with organizational and leadership difficulties, seriously hampering its political effectiveness. Having to satisfy East Elbian Junkers of the old German Conservative Party on the one hand, Christian Socialist workers in Westphalian industry, white-collar workers in Hamburg (members of the active *Deutschnationaler Handlungsgehilfenverband*), and remnants of the superpatriotic wartime German Fatherland Party among others, a satisfactory Nationalist platform was never easy to put together even at the best of times. There need be little surprise, then, if the Party demonstrated striking inconsistencies in its day-to-day activities and, in its basic programme, tended to those vague generalities identified by historian Annelise Thimme as a flight to myth.

Professor Thimme of the University of Alberta attempts to explain the essential character and motivation of the Nationalist Right in a relatively short study covering the whole period of the Republic. Although not intended to be a party history, the work is useful to those who want quick access to information on the platform, basic ideas, leadership, and tactics of the DNVP. But it remains an exercise in interpretation rather than research.

Essentially hostile to the new regime, the DNVP was never able to make the transition of Gustav Stresemann's German People's Party to reasoned support of the system. At best the Nationalists were ambivalent, as Professor Thimme ably demonstrates. They cooperated positively on aspects of the constitution in various committees of the National Constituent Assembly, and later twice joined government coalitions. The latter experience proved unfortunate for the coalitions as well as the Party itself. Its essential nature was not only to be negative under existing circumstances, but also to serve as an opposition: the disloyal opposition, for the most part, of *enragés* whose ire could be expected to rise at the prospect of even momentary successes of the hard-pressed Weimar Republic. If the Party could not command the votes needed to give it power, still it helped shape a public opinion that did much to nullify the liberating effect of Stresemann's imaginative foreign policy. The Dawes and Young plans, the Locarno Treaty, even Germany's entry in the League of Nations were denounced with constant vitriol. Stresemann had sought refuge in Bis-

marck's dictum of the primacy of foreign affairs. It was countered, with no little success, by a Nationalist line of vilification that endured through the Republic's fourteen years, with no genuine truce. The irresponsible, obstructionist tactic was to be adopted and pushed even further by the National Socialists whom the Nationalists attempted to use. In the end the Nazis were able to use and discard the Nationalists with ease.

Thimme follows others in showing the Nationalist juxtaposition of myth against myth: that is, the stab-in-the-back legend versus the November revolution. Nor is there much new in her description of the discomforts of the authoritarian, Nationalist personality in the environment of a democratic society. More difficult, and less successful is the author's attempt to characterize the Nationalists psychologically. Where hate prevails, she notes quite late in the book and almost parenthetically, there are also feelings of guilt and *Angst*. These in turn create the characteristic elements of frustration and aggression in the Nationalist style. The subjective chaos among these conservatives then would appear to be much greater than the objective chaos caused in Germany by the revolt against the Empire. That may well be—but Thimme's writing abounds in too many such unproved or only half-demonstrated surmises from different strands of social science. And there the suggestions remain, thought-provoking sometimes or merely irritating and misleading, for the most part unintegrated with the historical phenomenon under consideration. The result, then, is to create mystification about a group perhaps not really all that difficult to comprehend.

The Right has been amply studied in other countries, but overshadowed in Germany by the Fascist experience. Certainly the German version of the Right after 1918 is worthy of study on its own, if only to show how the conservative side undermined itself as a credible political alternative even as figuratively it dug the Republic's grave. While the subject has not attracted many writers, the outlines are now in place. We must now await further efforts to put it all together.

LEWIS HERTZMAN
York University, Toronto

Utopia and Reform in the Enlightenment. By Franco Venturi. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971. Pp. v, 160. $8.50.)

The Shape of Utopia: Studies in a Literary Genre. By Robert C. Elliott. (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1970. Pp. xii, 158. $6.50.)

In the publication of his 1969 G. M. Trevelyan Lectures Franco Venturi has made available to a wider audience a series of essays that are stimulating, richly suggestive, and as impressive in their thesis as in the range of their scholarly reference. They are also frustrating and unnecessarily difficult.

Venturi is initially concerned with the way that intellectual historians tend to see their task. He protests that they have been excessively preoccupied with finding the roots and sources of ideas at the cost of slighting the question of how various ideas function in their immediate social and political context. "Evidently we must not follow the ideas back to their origins, but examine their function in the history of the eighteenth century. Philosophers are tempted to push upstream until they arrive at the source. Historians must tell us how the river made its way, among what obstacles and difficulties" (pp. 2-3).

As a model of that approach Venturi seizes upon the circumstances that influenced the meaning of the republican ideal in eighteenth-century political discourse, showing how a republican model initially associated with reform eventually played a decisive role in utopian thinking. In his view, ideas of political reform were generally articulated as restatements of a republican theory of politics, a republican theory owing at least as much to the example of contemporary republican institutions as it did to the history of classical antiquity. The first group of enlightened intellectuals to come to grips with immediate political problems linked the problems of greater intellectual liberty with the question of an enlarged political liberty. Toland, Molesworth, Collins, Moyle, Trenchard, Shaftesbury and their colleagues held that the struggles for a genuinely rational religion (deism) and a truly rational politics (republicanism) were, in fact, simply different aspects of the same endeavor. They were important as transmitters of the idea of a moral republicanism to enlightened thinkers on the continent who, in the troubled times around the middle of the century, were in need of a rational reform ideology.

By the middle of the century the existing republics had declined to a point where they existed at the sufferance of the great powers. It was clear, Venturi tells us, that their problems of endemic political instability and financial crisis were practically insoluble. As the existing republics became manifestly inadequate as models for the reform of the institutions of the large nation state, republicanism became increasingly a matter of an ethical idea. Hence, as Venturi shows, a thinker like d'Argenson could speak of the ideal French king serving as the protector of his people, making France a sort of monarchical republic. The republican ideal in the minds of

thinkers as diverse as Montesquieu, Diderot, and Rousseau essentially meant moral government free of the caprices of absolutism. Furthermore, influenced by the change in moral thought, the republican ethical ideal lost its classical association with the virtue of frugality and assumed overtones which tied morality and prosperity together. Venturi suggests, correctly it seems, that it is more useful to think of political thought in the late eighteenth century in terms of modifications of the republican tradition than in terms of an unfolding democratic theory.

As a moral ideal, the prospect of a republican monarchy served to animate the reforming efforts of men such as Turgot and many lesser figures. But in the 1770s and 1780s the possibility of reform seemed increasingly remote and the philosophers wearied of talk of it. Venturi chooses to discuss this process and the radicalization of the reform impulse by considering the nature and fate of Becarria's ideas on the right to punish. Becarria came close to advancing a utopian critique of social and political institutions, but he would not go beyond the suggestion that property rights might perhaps be unnecessary. He offered a reforming, utilitarian program designed to abolish unnecessary barbarity in the system of justice. In his discussion of the French responses to Becarria's views, Venturi makes it clear that Voltaire had little interest in Becarria's theoretical principles, but much interest in his ideas as practical weapons to be used in the war against palpable injustice. Diderot, considering it impossible to preserve the social order while also saving the criminal element, could not even make pragmatic use of the Italian's book. Others, Mably and Linguet for example, argued that the necessity for punishment derived from the unequal distribution of property and that unjust laws were required by an unjust society. Thus, Venturi argues, reformers were led to the conclusion that the only path to genuine justice led beyond reform to the abolition of the immoral social, economic, and political order. Reform was merely cosmetic, a change in appearances which would only hide the fact of radical institutional injustice. Only a society without sharp social and economic divisions, ideally a society without property, would allow the republican moral ideal to become reality.

This brief summary scarcely does justice to the scope of Venturi's perspective which embraces a host of minor figures in western Europe and the development of political ideas in Poland, Italy, Spain and elsewhere. Valuable as these references are, however, it is regrettable that Venturi has occasionally sacrificed clarity for the sake of breadth. Lectures cannot be expected to be as exhaustive or definitive as a monograph. Nonetheless, even within the limits imposed by the lecture format, Venturi's ideas could have been put forward more clearly. The central theme of the work is obscure on a first reading, a defect that could be remedied easily with a paragraph sharply establishing the focus. Central terms are sometimes used in very special senses that are not adequately discriminated. The reader is too often left following Venturi into remote areas without a solid sense of purpose. Yet this splendid book sheds much light on a critically important topic, and it suggests a multitude of issues requiring further investigation. As a seminal work it ought to be read by anyone concerned with the political thought of the eighteenth century, but to be comprehended it will have to be read more than once.

Among the seven previously published articles brought together by Professor Elliott at least three ought to interest specialists in intellectual history and the history of political theory. In the first, "Saturnalia, Satire and Utopia," he focuses on the way in which both satirical and utopian literature create their effect, at least in part, by implicitly or explicitly establishing a standard in terms of which existing society is found defective. In utopian literature this criticism is the most positive argument in favor of the proposed utopian model. In early modern utopian literature utopia was offered as a nonrealizable standard in terms of which the faults of the present could be better seen and thus reformed.

In the essay on "The Fear of Utopia" Elliott shows that in modern times utopian theories have tended to function as descriptions of a "nowhere" which is to be brought into historical existence. As utopia has lost its association with reform and become the basis of radical political action and governmental policy, the term has come to suggest fanaticism and unrealistic expectations. Nonetheless, the terrors and frustrations of twentieth-century history would seem to provide adequate background for a flourishing utopian literature. Yet as the potential of behaviorist psychology, mind-altering drugs, and social engineering seem increasingly ominous, it has been difficult to create esthetically and morally attractive radical models of society. In his discussion of recent "Anti-Anti-Utopias" Elliott considers the ways in which B. F. Skinner in *Walden Two* and Aldous Huxley in *Island* have tried to elaborate postmodern utopias. In this insightful and stimulating brief book the author is sensitive to the continual interplay between writer, text, and society in a manner that makes his comments valuable to others besides students of literature.

RODNEY W. KILCUP
University of Washington

Foundations of Political Action: An Exchange Theory of Politics. By Sidney R. Waldman. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 1972. Pp. 256. $3.95.)

In *Foundations of Political Action*, Professor Waldman, building on the work of George Homans, constructs a model of political exchange, fortifies it with propositions from learning theory for realism, and demonstrates that many broad- and narrow-gauge social theories can be brought within its terms. He has written an interesting book.

Waldman is at once confident of the wide explanatory power of exchange analysis and critical of the psychological assumptions with which it has so far been infused by economists, sociologists, and political scientists. He sets out to refine the assumptions with data about the ways in which people seek rewards from one another and reinforce each other's behavior patterns. The result is a reduction of old and new lines of thought in the study of the individual and society to statements about the exchange of human activities.

Illustrative chapters on political culture, modernization, legitimacy, political parties and interest groups, and conflict resolution follow the general arguments. To regard political behavior as give and take is less commonplace in some of these areas than in others, and therefore the chapters are not equally provocative. But on the whole, they are a mine of ideas. The strength of the book is in these chapters. They can be consulted separately by those with matching interests.

At the end of the volume, Waldman goes on to suggest other applications:

> The theory could be applied to an examination and analysis of electoral politics (the exchanges between parties and voters, between competing parties, between would-be officeholders and their following, between party activists and voters, between candidates and the media, etc.). It could be used to analyze the rationales underlying party and voter activities and, for that matter, to analyze the exchanges between legislative parties. It could be used to examine the relations of the mass media to the public, the government, and the business community, to analyze the relations between various interest groups, and to explain the bases of power in various institutions. It could be used to analyze the dynamics of revolutionary and radical movements . . . (pp. 205-6).

And so on, at some length.

Waldman's forte is the manipulation of ideas. He is as often as not content to establish the equivalence of exchange and other theories, describing many things with a single model rather than concentrating his resources to describe a few things better. It is suggestive, for example, but not clearly advantageous to translate Peter Blau's idea of the growth of trust between those who exchange into the reward-and-reinforcement language of learning theory.

And Waldman is conspicuously more interested in putting theories together than in making sure they work, for all of his criticism of unchecked *a priori* reasoning in the social sciences. He sometimes falls into a categorical mode of expression—notably that X "explains" Y—that obscures an underlying commitment to empiricism. His statements should read as hypotheses to be tested, or further tested, whatever the nuances of his style.

Foundations of Political Action is not the best introduction to exchange theory for undergraduates. The writing is unnecessarily difficult. The general reader will still find Blau's *Exchange and Power in Social Life* more to the point. Waldman's book is to be recommended instead to those with a serious interest in the elaboration of exchange theory or in one or more of the topics he has selected for illustration.

The publisher includes this volume in its series on comparative politics only by stretching the term some.

ROBERT J. SICKELS
The University of New Mexico

Systems Theory in International Relations: A Study in Metaphoric Hypertrophy. By John J. Weltman. (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Co., 1973. Pp. 99. $12.00.)

This book is a critique of the systems-theory approach to international relations. The author begins by suggesting that the roots of the approach are in general systems theory and sociological functionalism, both of which are characterized as "holistic" and overly abstract. He then focuses on the works of Morton Kaplan, Ernst Haas, and Richard Rosecrance.

Professor Weltman performs a valuable service in the second chapter by condensing the main features of *Systems and Process in International Politics*, and Kaplan's subsequent revisions of that work, into nineteen pages of quotations and commentary. Weltman discusses problems raised by Kaplan's notions of stability, equilibrium, regulation and disturbance. For example, he says, "In what sense a change involving change in the system itself can still be indicative of a form of *stability* is unfortunately not made clear" (p. 16). Weltman criticizes the "six essential rules" of the balance of power or multipolar system and the rules of the loose bipolar system as tautological or logically inconsistent or both.

In the third chapter, the author takes aim at *Beyond the Nation-State*. Weltman criticizes

Haas for using the systems approach to relabel old concepts without adding to their usefulness, for classifying states into ideological types, for talking about the motives or objectives of states and international organizations as if they were not "complex, ambiguous, and resistant to description" (p. 41), and for "the ease with which the approach is employed to give a pejorative characterization to one group of states" (p. 46). His main concern, however, is that "Haas is unable to demonstrate the necessity of the systems approach in arriving at his substantive conclusions" (p. 48). This is the weakest chapter in the book.

In the fourth chapter, Weltman criticizes Richard Rosecrance's *Action and Reaction in World Politics*. This chapter is much more on the mark than the previous one, emphasizing as it does that the main explanatory variables, the "disruptive" and "regulative" factors in Rosecrance's nine historical systems, are not defined precisely and are not measured independently of the dependent variable, international "stability." He also criticizes Rosecrance for overemphasizing the effect of ideology on cooperation and conflict in international systems.

The fifth and sixth chapters are devoted to a review and critique of works on "regions" or "subsystems" and on bipolarity and multipolarity. Although it is a fair review, the criticicisms are neither original nor convincing. Weltman fails to discuss any of the empirical findings of scholars like Bruce Russett, Steven Brams, and Michael Haas.

Weltman reserves the final chapter for a summary and his ideas for an alternative approach. He criticizes systems theorists, especially Kaplan and Rosecrance, for "reifying" the concept of a system (p. 78). He criticizes them for not providing testable hypotheses or quantifiable variables. He suggests that even if quantification were possible, the systems approach would still be unable to provide novel hypotheses. I disagree. It seems clear to me that this approach already provided novel hypotheses. Hypotheses linking the "stability" (peacefulness) of international systems to bipolarity and multipolarity are novel. They are much more precise and testable than traditional "balance of power" formulations. Using international systems as units of analysis is novel. Indeed, it is one of the perhaps unanticipated effects of systems theory that we are now talking about hypotheses at all.

The alternative which the author proposes begins with Weber's fourfold typology of conduct: 1) goal-oriented conduct, 2) value-related conduct, 3) private, emotional conduct, and 4) traditional conduct. Weltman suggests that political action is primarily goal-oriented and tradition-oriented activity. Social relationships are the results of interactions between individuals are therefore highly complex. "A state is not an organism, but a bundle of individual action" (p. 87). Nevertheless, the state may die if essential "behavioral orientations" are changed. These essential behavioral orientations are the product of tradition-oriented behavior, sometimes originating from goal-oriented activity.

Given this epistemology, Weltman suggests four "levels of analysis" for the study of cooperation-conflict in international politics: 1) the state, 2) "discrete interstate social relations," 3) a map of these relations in a given period of time, and 4) the "typological evolution of this map" (p. 90). What these levels mean is not entirely clear from the two pages which are devoted to them. Nor is it clear what the author means by saying that "in the abstract" his approach "would appear promising" (p. 91).

I found this book to be difficult to read, primarily because it condenses into such a small space the arguments which originally occupied several thousand pages. But that is also one of its primary attractions. It would be useful for graduate assignments, in conjunction with the original works. Nevertheless, Weltman is not consistently careful in his criticisms, and he shows very little awareness of the field outside the works cited in the book. This is particularly unfortunate since several writers have attempted to extend or modify the systems approach in ways which answer some of Weltman's criticisms. For example, Steven Brams attempted to replace the systems approach with a "structural" approach, based on mathematical theories which allow quantification of variables and hypothesis testing. The fact that these theories are "holistic" requires some rethinking on the part of critics of systems theory. Herbert Simon, in his *Sciences of the Artificial* and articles on decomposable systems, extended the range and applicability of systems theory far beyond the limits imposed by Bertalanffy or Talcott Parsons. A more satisfactory critique of systems theory would have to take into account a wider range of works than are discussed in this book. An exploration of the theoretical similarities between systems theory and "structuralism," although a very difficult undertaking, would be extremely valuable.

JEFFREY A. HART
Princeton University

System and Structure: Essays in Communication and Exchange. By Anthony Wilden. (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1972. Pp. 540. $23.75.)

This volume collects the numerous essays in which Anthony Wilden has developed some

aspects of communication theory and applied these insights to a selected group of thinkers and topics in the social and psychological sciences. Principal attention is directed to "structural" anthropology and psychoanalysis. The reader will encounter an extended critique of Levi-Strauss, the anthropologist, and Lacan, the psychoanalyst, who is credited with driving his French audience to reread (or, more likely, to read) the collected writings of Freud. Creative use is made of Gregory Bateson's "double-bind" principle and also of Bateson's theory of mind.

Wilden is at home with "the complex epistemological reorganization" now taking place, which he succinctly, if technically, characterizes

> in a number of different but related ways: from stasis to process, from entity to relationship, from atom to gestalt, from aggregate to whole, from heap to structure, from part to system, from analytics to dialects, from closed systems to open systems, from causality to constraint, from energy to information, from bioenergetics to communication, from equilibrium theory to negative entropy—in a word, from atom to system and thence to ecosystem (p. 241).

Political scientists will be disappointed to find that power outcomes are not given explicit systematic treatment, although many of the intellectual tools required for such an undertaking are packed in the bag. However, one of the principal theses put forward by Wilden is expressly "political." The author endeavors to connect some features of the prestructuralist epoch with the class system. An example of this mode of approach is the discussion of Piaget in Chapter 11. The argument is that Piaget's conception of development is not truly contextual. Rather, it remains rigidly, not flexibly, systematic. This is attributed to the influence of a middle-class environment on Piaget's outlook. Such an environment is asserted to be incompatible with the acceptance of drastic change pursued by drastic methods.

Among the most rewarding chapters is Chapter 7 which examines analog and digital communication. Analog conceptions are continuous, Professor Wilden reminds us. Therefore, in a world of continual interaction (or process), these conceptions are more fundamentally oriented than digital frameworks can be. Chapter 12 discusses "Ecosystem and Metasystem," setting forth "a morphogenic model of emergence in open systems." Closed systems reiterate past patterns of relationship. Open systems, by contrast, are able to establish new ways of relating themselves to energy sources. The problem is to account for, and to provide programs for directing the crystalizing of new, if inveterately provisional, structures in open systems.

In future work it is to be hoped that Wilden will demonstrate how his approach can be used to obtain more innovative results than the revival of hypotheses about the rigid perspectives of the middle classes. The analysis of exchanges among valued outcomes can be fruitfully carried much further. As employed in the present essays the distinction between "symbolic" and "imaginary" exchange is one of the many promising leads.

HAROLD D. LASSWELL
Yale University and
Policy Sciences Center, New York

Congressmen's Voting Decisions. By John W. Kingdon. (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1973. Pp. 313. $8.95, cloth; $4.50, paper.)

John Kingdon is a reasonable man. His earlier study of the beliefs and strategies of political candidates investigated a reasonable subject by reasonable means and with reasonable conclusions. His new book on the House of Representatives more or less follows suit. Little here contradicts or departs radically from the recent tradition of legislative research, nor are many of the ideas or conclusions particularly startling. But neither are there glaring problems with what he has done. To be reasonable, however, is to risk being forgettable. I suspect that legislative scholars will read this book without any perceptible effect on their blood pressure, and come away without much more than the satisfaction of having made another attempt, however futile, to keep up with the work in their field.

Professor Kingdon focuses on congressmen's voting decisions on the floor of the House. While paying properly footnoted obeisance to the many studies which correlate (at a minimum) roll-call votes with everything imaginable, he recognizes that such analyses do not confront the human problem of an individual representative making a specific voting decision. His emphasis, therefore, is on how individual congressmen decide to vote under pressures of time and information. To find an answer, he turns to the members of the House themselves, asking them not about their approach to legislative decision making generally, but about why they voted as they did the week before. In multiple interviews with a stratified sample of congressmen, he asked them how they had made up their minds on recent votes which were somehow prominent, if not highly divisive. If his sampling and interviewing techniques do not permit exact replication, Kingdon's approach meets a more demanding standard—gathering useful information without confirming politicians' worst prejudices about political scientists.

The first half of Kingdon's analysis is devoted,

chapter by chapter, to a discussion of who and what might influence how a congressman votes. In order, he considers the impact of constituency, fellow congressmen, party and committee leadership, interest groups, the administration and executive branch, staff, and the media. In brief, he concludes that the first two are by far the most important, that the other possible sources of influence range in independent impact from marginal to negligible, and that, to the extent the others are important, they operate indirectly by influencing the attitudes of constituents and colleagues. Kingdon's enthusiasm for his subject seems to diminish somewhat in rough proportion to the importance of the influence he discusses in each chapter. His opening chapters are especially appealing, combining a relatively graceful style with a cogent synthesis of his own data and the literature from which he draws his inspiration. Unfortunately, his discussions of interest groups, congressional leaders, and the executive branch are somewhat more perfunctory, presumably because his data generally minimize their direct impact on individual decision making.

In his second set of chapters, Kingdon attempts to draw his disparate threads together into a model of congressional voting which he describes as "the consensus mode of decision." Without doing too much damage to the complexity of the argument, it may be summarized as follows: (1) when all or almost all of the potential sources of influence point in the same direction, that is the direction the congressman will take; and (2) this is what usually happens. Whether this argument appears reasonable or merely trivial depends ultimately, I suppose, on the knowledge that each reader brings to it. It certainly conforms with David Mayhew's recent emphasis on political self-preservation as a guiding principle of congressional behavior.

Kingdon avoids the danger of portraying the congressman-as-billiard-ball by emphasizing the extent to which the Congress and each of its members can create at least the appearance of a consensual decision-making environment. For example, the tendency for many committees to avoid conflict on the floor also eases the decision-making burden for the non-committee member by resolving or submerging the conflict he might otherwise confront. Even when conflict exists, however, it is mitigated (or avoided altogether) by a natural propensity to perceive and associate selectively, thereby constructing a decision-making environment which is apparently consensual and in harmony with the congressman's own predispositions. In Kingdon's terms, such "preconsensus processes" enable congressmen to remain within the comfortable confines of the consensus mode even on matters of high controversy.

In this book, Kingdon combines elements of a monograph and a text, imbedding the results of his own research in a synthesis which draws effectively on earlier work. It will be of some interest to specialists, but of greater value to teachers who descend from the heights of systems analysis to confront the question of how a congressman can vote for billion dollar bills without knowing the first thing about them.

STANLEY BACH
University of Massachusetts

A History of Regulatory Taxation. By R. Alton Lee. (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1973. Pp. 228. $15.25.)

This book is not primarily for the public-law scholar nor for the student of Congress. The author is a historian, and his book is likely to be of greatest interest to economic historians and to those interested in the extension of the national police power through efforts of Congress to regulate or outlaw products or activities through the taxing power. For more than a century Congress has occasionally chosen to use its taxing power to eliminate such diverse products and activities as state bank notes, oleomargarine, adulterated flour and dairy products, phosphorus matches, drugs and narcotics, child labor, gambling, guns, and grain and cotton futures. In the case of agriculture and mining, Congress tried in the New Deal period to assist these occupations through the use of taxes that would help to regularize wages and prices through reducing supplies.

Regulatory taxes, Professor Lee tells us, were frequently chosen when Congress questioned the constitutionality of its police powers in regulating interstate commerce. And, of course, industries regulated through taxes sought to overturn such legislation through the courts. Since the Supreme Court tended to find acts to tax to be purely revenue measures and within the power of Congress until 1914, Congress continued to use the taxing power for regulating interstate commerce. From 1914 until well within the New Deal period, the Supreme Court justices found tax measures that raised little or no revenue unconstitutional because (1) they interfered with the rights of the states in their exercise of the police power, or (2) taxed some sectors of the public for the special benefit of others (agriculture and mining). The court thus restricted congressional regulation of interstate commerce whether directly or through the taxing power for a period of almost 25 years. Subsequently Congress usually has regulated business directly under the

interstate commerce clause. When Congress has used the taxing power in more recent years for regulation as in the case of narcotics and gun control, Professor Lee believes the results have been unsatisfactory.

Occasionally statements or assumptions of fact in the book are intriguing and suggest interesting further studies. For example, in chapter seven, the summary of the abolition of phosphorus matches through the taxing power includes the information that the Diamond Match Company, on request of President Taft in 1911, made its patents on the safety match available to its competitors and even sent men from its factory to other factories in the nation to assist in initial manufacture of this new match. I wonder whether this action was motivated purely by the altruism of the firm's president or board, or by concern to avoid further public outcry against the unsocial behavior by trusts, or what? How is such behavior stimulated? What about the recent addition of women and minorities on boards of directors of some of our major companies? Do such acts provide a more positive public image of the companies, of women and minorities? Are there policy consequences for the companies in employment? In other ways?

This is a short, useful, but not distinguished book, with a price tag that will limit its sales almost entirely to libraries. I wonder whether this and many other such books might not come out exclusively in quality paperback at a substantially lower price than $15.25 announced for this one.

CLARA PENNIMAN
The University of Wisconsin, Madison

Programs in Aid of the Poor for the 1970s. By Sar H. Levitan. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973. Pp. 146, index. $6.00, cloth; $1.95, paper.)

This book, which updates an earlier volume, contains a compact though detailed appraisal of U. S. government programs undertaken on behalf of the poor. Its author, Professor Sar Levitan, divides such programs among four categories and for each presents a concise description and evaluation of its ability to alleviate poverty at its present level of funding. (See pp. xi-xii.)

(1) "Income maintenance programs aimed at aiding the poor who are outside the work force" (largely the aged and female-headed families with dependent children).

(2) "Programs supplying goods and services" (medical services, food stamps, housing, etc.).

(3) Programs whose immediate goal is to avert the spread of poverty to new generations (birth control, child care, education).

(4) Programs to aid the working poor (manpower programs, the author's immediate area of specialization; equal employment opportunity; minimum wage legislation, etc.).

In the final chapter Levitan turns to goals and priorities. He recommends the adoption of comprehensive income maintenance, "more orderly . . . than the present haphazard, hit-or-miss public assistance programs," in which the income guarantee would, say, be set at "75 per cent of the level of income that would raise the recipient to the poverty threshold" (p. 134). Once this goal is reached, Levitan, in designing antipoverty policy, would emphasize programs in education, job training and job creation, and housing, and strengthen protective legislation to assure a proper institutional environment. The price tag of these "proposed modest priorities," he claims, "would be on the order of $20 to $25 million, and involve an increase of some 50 per cent of all public and private outlays in aid of the poor" (pp. 139-40).

As a primer, well-written and descriptive, this book, unlike most, will prove quite useful. No sophistication in economics is required of its audience. Thus, for the interested citizen or public official with limited time but an interest in familiarizing himself with the subject, it is a good starting point, and then some. For those with an analytic bent, however, it is a comfortable and fact-filled reference, generous in opinion and descriptive detail, but little more.

Levitan's openly displayed sympathy for antipoverty measures is both a strength and a weakness. His value bias is so explicit that the reader can easily allow for it and refocus the issues in terms of his or her own values. The chapter headings, quotations from the Bible and Talmud, indicate that Levitan, motivated by empathy, sees aid to the poor as something that is "right," a matter of "doing good," mandated by a sense of social justice. Indeed, these selections, from sources as diverse as Maimonides and Matthew, may themselves justify the price of the book. But the singlemindedness with which Levitan discusses redistributive programs, focusing almost entirely on their ability to reduce measured poverty at the expense of political justification and cost-effectiveness, leaves me more than a bit uncomfortable.

There is, I think, a far more analytic, and thus more substantive, basis for our social concern with poverty, producing programs to alleviate it, than the treatment in this book captures. The discussion of income redistribution to the poor, for a setting of representative democracy, raises far more complex issues of optimal amount and form than Levitan seems to recognize. To be sure one must consider what the poor themselves

think redistribution can do for them, and how quickly it can do it. But, if the aim is to *do* something for the poor, not just to wish it, the preferences of the taxpayer-donors who must finance such programs must also be considered. This is illustrated, regrettably, by the importance taken on by the work incentive issue in the political failure of a series of income guarantee proposals. Whether the disincentives which preoccupied the opponents of such legislation are real is less important than whether voters, whose vocal support its enactment required, thought and cared about them. Levitan's presentation would be more penetrating, albeit more difficult for those not schooled in the micro-foundations of public choice, if it examined why and how redistributive programs, which nominally benefit only a minority of the electorate, emerge from representative political process. It would be more useful, in setting forth a feasible basis for policy, if Levitan took into account that redistributive programs represent mutual self-interest, benefiting both donors and recipients, rather than obligations that the well-to-do must suffer for moral reasons, even if these are opposed to their self-interest.

To be even more pragmatic, it might be well argued that Levitan should give more emphasis than he does to the nature of the process, bureaucratic or market, through which anti-poverty programs operate. Indeed, his implicit distrust of the market, manifested, for example, in comments on the effectiveness of trickle-down on the supply of housing, is in my view a weakness of his discussion.

Fairness to Levitan requires me to make clear that these criticisms apply not only to his book but to the bulk of the output of the "income maintenance research industry." I make no pretense that the opinion they reflect, which is my own, is shared by a majority of those knowledgeable in the field. Dominance of heart over mind may reflect an admirable perspective in some humanistic inquiry. As a characteristic of policy analysis, however, it is fatal. When it comes to matters of distribution, too many legislators and the voters they represent are from Missouri; and too many of my fellow economists, including many who fancy themselves among the most pragmatic, are from Utopia.

HAROLD M. HOCHMAN
The Urban Institute

The Politics of Depression: Political Behavior in the Northeast, 1893–1896. By Samuel T. McSeveney. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972. Pp. xvi, 333. $9.75.)

In recent years historians have approached the historical roots of popular voting behavior with the same resolve—and a few of the same statistical tools—that political scientists like V. O. Key have used to analyze contemporary patterns. In this book, the fruit of many years of meticulous fact-gathering by a student of Samuel P. Hays, a significant portion of the story has been told. New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut were close battlegrounds in the 1880s and 1890s, especially the Empire State with its big electoral bonus for anyone who could chart his way through a bewildering variety of voter groups and a labyrinth of political factionalism. Professor McSeveney attends closely to the wealth of minor civil division, census, and electoral data to show how the nuances of rhetoric and event interacted to produce subtle decisive shifts in voting behavior.

Ethno-religious groupings, the author is convinced, were the primary units of party identification. While most historians would perforce agree, a more synthetic conceptual approach and a more sophisticated analytic technique would have greatly strengthened McSeveney's argument. In any case there is little doubt that in the Northeast, as in the Midwest, disputes among pietistic (e.g., Methodist, Congregational) and liturgical (especially Catholic) voters triggered the deepest emotional responses. The pietists, seeking to modernize society overnight by suppressing intemperance, gambling, and political corruption, made the G.O.P. their vehicle for reform. The Democrats regrouped the liturgicals by making laissez-faire into an anti-modernizing weapon. This succeeded until the cruel impact of the Depression of 1893 forced the urbanized electorate to appreciate the benefits of a full employment high-tariff policy and (in 1896) a probusiness financial policy. Bryan's moralism, like Cleveland's, left the unemployed and underemployed cold and hungry for McKinley's full dinner pail.

Most of McSeveney's nonstatistical information comes from a close reading of a dozen major metropolitan newspapers. He also combed the private correspondence of the leading politicians, thereby adding authority to his analysis of leadership perceptions and maneuvers. Had the author a keener ear for the lively quote or the apt phrase, his monograph would be pleasant to read. As it is, only dedicated specialists are likely to work their way through this dissertation. Further research will be needed before the full picture of northeastern politics can be seen. Nonetheless, a vital piece of jigsaw is now available to anyone who puzzles over the historical mysteries of American voting behavior.

RICHARD JENSEN
University of Illinois, Chicago and Newberry Library, Chicago

"Lessons" of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy. By Ernest R. May. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973. Pp. 220. $6.95.)

This is a well-written and thought-provoking little book by a distinguished American historian. In the preface, Professor May cites three theses which he hopes to prove: one, "that framers of foreign policy are often influenced by beliefs about what history teaches or portends"; two, "that policy-makers ordinarily use history badly"; three, "that policy-makers can, if they will, use history more discriminatingly."

The book is divided into two parts, the first consisting of four case studies around Roosevelt's prosecution of the Second World War and his efforts to build a new world order, Truman's decision in 1947 to aid Greece and Turkey, Truman's reactions to the outbreak of war in Korea in 1950, and Kennedy's and Johnson's decisions to defend South Vietnam with American arms. Part two of the book includes an analysis of the Johnson Administration's decision to bomb North Vietnam, a chapter entitled "Prediction: U. S. Foreign Policy in the Next Decade," and a final chapter in which the author pleads the case for professional historians being better used by foreign policy makers in the future.

The most interesting part of the book, in my view, is the analysis of the four episodes in American diplomacy cited above. Professor May makes a persuasive case for the view that Roosevelt's preparation for the postwar world was heavily influenced by his fear of a return to isolationist sentiment similar to what occurred in the 1920s. Roosevelt faulted Wilson for failing in 1918–19 to bring the Senate fully into the policy formulation regarding the League of Nations and other postwar planning, and he made great efforts to avoid that "lesson" of history in planning for the United Nations and other such proposals. The author also presents a convincing case that Truman was heavily influenced in his decisions in 1947 and in 1950 by his perception of what happened in the 1930's, when the Western powers did not challenge Germany, Italy or Japan in their aggressions until almost too late. He argues that Truman, like Roosevelt, may have overreacted because of a faulty reading of history. Finally, he takes Kennedy and Johnson to task for badly interpreting history in the decisions to intervene in Vietnam and the way in which the war was fought.

These four chapters are especially interesting and well documented, and therefore the reader is left somewhat puzzled by this statement which follows the case histories and tends to contradict them: "As with decisions by Roosevelt and Truman, so with those of Kennedy and Johnson one can plausibly argue that the outcome would have been the same even if inferences from history had played no part in the reasoning" (p. 115). Earlier Professor May states that he does not quarrel with the decisions made by Roosevelt in 1944-45, or with those of Truman in 1947 and 1950; he contends their decisions were sound but the reasoning by which they arrived at them leaves something to be desired from the viewpoint of a professional historian. He is tougher on Kennedy and Johnson, however, arguing that even though the decisions to go into Vietnam were made after the most careful staffing within the Executive Branch and agreed to by nearly all the highest echelons, the decisions were based on faulty premises and probably will be judged by history to have been "misbegotten blunders" (p. 121).

The chapter on predictions about U. S. foreign policy in the next decade does not measure up in scholarship to the earlier part of the book. To be scholarly about predicting the future, the historian would need to employ some of the analytical tools of the political scientist in order to assess what the international environment might look like in the 1980s and what changes might take place in American society by then. Here the author speculates about what the future might hold simply on the basis of his reading of the United States' behavior in the world since World War II. The historian's predictive powers are probably no better than those of political scientists or of competent journalists even though he has a clearer understanding of the past. What Professor May's study shows is that even history may not serve as a very good guide to understanding the future during periods of revolutionary change. In any case, this chapter lacks both documentation and convincing analysis.

Despite these few drawbacks, the book is worth reading. Thoughtful Americans will ponder, and debate, for years why "the best and the brightest" could have been so misguided about the degree of national interest the United States had in Vietnam in the 1960s. This book provides a fair and well-documented appraisal of what went wrong.

DONALD E. NUECHTERLEIN
Federal Executive Institute
Charlottesville, Virginia

Political Parties in Revolutionary Massachusetts. By Stephen E. Patterson. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1973. Pp. ix, 299. $12.50.)

Historians debate vigorously the question of when political parties appeared in the United States. Many agree that modern parties took

their basic form by the 1840s, but claims for the appearance of party earlier have a long tradition. Of course these claims are tied usually to different, modest definitions of party. Now Stephen Patterson has asserted that parties existed in Massachusetts from the 1750s to 1780. This not only clashes with other recent works, but also finds little support from Patterson's own evidence. Further, Patterson organizes his narrative with concepts that are anachronistic and chaotic. This is particularly unfortunate because he writes with skill and has worked hard. Though the book helps us to understand the complex divisions which accompanied Americans' passage to rebellion in one state, it is counter-productive with regard to party development.

Patterson insists that his parties were not "short-lived, issue-oriented coalitions but rather established parties that produced highly consistent voting patterns . . . over a number of years" (p. vii). They were not highly organized nor conscious creations of politicians but still a "structure of [two] party politics imposed itself on the controversy with Great Britain, defining the tactics of the Revolution" (p. 4).

Patterson recognizes that political elites still condemned "party" and "faction" because of their incompatibility with republican assumptions about government and society. He contends, however, that rhetoric lagged behind behavior, and discovers a gap between "antipartisan theory and partisan reality." Patterson tries initially to establish the reality of his parties by indiscriminately assembling usages of the term "party" or equivalents in Massachusetts from Jonathan Edwards in the 1720s to John Adams in 1817. These examples often have nothing to do with the "developing parties" which Patterson repeatedly asserts existed from 1757 to 1780. Sometimes "party" references are to temporary divisions within towns, but Patterson otherwise argues that mostly "the provincial parties represented intertown rather than intratown rivalries" (p. 4).

Indeed, from the late 1750s to the mid 1770s Patterson's claim rests primarily on his analysis of six available roll-call votes in the legislature in 1757, 1758, 1759, 1762 (when there were two), and 1764. These data, he warns, cannot be the basis for generalizations about the entire state. Of 204 towns in a 1761 tax list, only about 120 sent representatives to the legislature in any year, while absenteeism cut the average number responding in the six roll calls to 84. Patterson still finds some 122 "politically active" towns, of which 50 voted "with great regularity" with "the Court party," 52 voted with "the Country party," and 20 were "evenly divided." Partisanship appeared "in the remarkably consistent voting behavior of 102 of 122 politically active towns" (p. 33). But close examination of Patterson's active towns indicates that the data from which he generalizes should be reduced still more. Many towns classified as active frequently did not vote on all six roll calls. Thus, Hopkinton did not vote on the first five, but its single 1764 vote on whether Thomas Hutchinson would serve as the agent of Massachusetts in London earned it a place in the Court party. Similarly, 16 Court, 9 Country, and 8 evenly divided towns actually did not vote on half or more of the six roll calls. When votes with the opposition are added, 19 Court and 18 Country towns either did not vote or went with the opposition on half or more of the six roll calls. Other dubious classification criteria might be mentioned, but for more than a third of alleged "active" towns, I find voting neither very regular nor remarkably consistent.

Most of Patterson's efforts go toward showing that economic and geographic conflicts in Massachusetts influenced the course of Revolutionary politics. The difficulty comes in his insistence on describing any political conflict with any kind of social basis as partisan. About halfway through the book he sensibly remarks that "to men at the time, partisanship was a refusal to view public issues in a disinterested way. . . . In republican terms, partisanship was . . . selfishness . . . it was a political expression of economic differences" (p. 149). This may shed light on what eighteenth-century men meant when they accused rivals of being partisans. It does not at all mean that "established" parties imposed their "structure" on the Revolutionary period.

Patterson's Court-Country dichotomy relies heavily on a system of classifying towns on a commercial-cosmopolitan scale which Van Beck Hall developed for the 1780s in *Politics Without Parties: Massachusetts, 1780-1791* (Pittsburgh; University of Pittsburgh Press, 1972). Patterson applies Hall's index without modification to the 1760s (see p. 42), while rejecting the central contribution of Hall's study. Hall, finding sociopolitical cleavages similar to those Patterson uncovers, recognized that the 18th-century historian must do without the "ready-made" analytic structure which the party concept provides and must organize political data differently. Similarly, Jackson T. Main, in *Political Parties Before the Constitution* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1973), finds parties in state legislatures in the 1780s and describes their social, economic, and cultural roots. But Main's legislative blocs are more convincingly established and he accurately calls them "preparty 'parties' " (p. xviii).

Patterson's approach also clashes with that found in Robert Zemsky's excellent study of the

Massachusetts legislature before 1757: *Merchants, Farmers and River Gods: An Essay on Eighteenth-Century American Politics* (Boston: Gambit, 1971). Between 1739 and 1756 Zemsky found 17 roll calls in contrast to Patterson's 6 between 1757 and 1764. Yet Zemsky observed that the House was suspicious of roll calls, did not ordinarily decide questions that way, and kept its debates secret. The scarcity of public roll calls "is an implicit warning about the relevance of such data." More important, Zemsky found no evidence of party behavior and emphasized the weakness of institutions and the strength of an antiparty ethos.

Patterson's narrative mostly has nothing to do with parties, but with movement to Revolution by shifting coalitions in the 1770s. He frequently calls the Country party the "revolutionary" party, yet takes some pains to show that Countrymen divided over the Revolution and that factions in the late 1770s were far more sectional than earlier. Patterson asserts that the east-west division generally coincided with merchant-farmer and maritime-country cleavages, though parts of his narrative show considerable fluidity among these cliché dichotomies. The latter is the strength of this book, but to appreciate it one must ignore the author's conceptual confusions. This book needed tough criticism before going to press. The political scientist seeking insight into eighteenth-century political culture will profit more by turning to Zemsky, Hall, or Main.

RONALD P. FORMISANO
Clark University

Dams, Parks and Politics: Resource Development and Preservation in The Truman-Eisenhower Era. By Elmo Richardson. (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1973. Pp. 247. $11.25.)

The Truman-Eisenhower era seems far removed from contemporary national concern with environmental issues. Professor Richardson demonstrates, however, that essentially the same issues generated political controversy of comparable intensity, though on a less visible level, during this presumably quiescent period. Students of natural resource policy will find the major conflicts familiar. They involve, first, the conflict between resource development and resource preservation, and, second, the debate over federal versus local control of resource development. Richardson's history discusses these recurring controversies as they were played out during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. For the most part, the drama takes place within the Department of the Interior, with the conflict between the mutually exclusive objectives of development and preservation finding embodiment in the Bureau of Reclamation and the National Park Service, respectively.

Conservation organizations such as The Sierra Club (renamed "The Sahara Club" by dam proponents during one such conflict) will find vindication in this book for their view that eternal vigilance is the price of a national park system. At every turn, it appears, there are interests eager to put the national parks to better use by the building of dams within park boundaries: Be it for the generation of hydroelectric power, for irrigation, or even for increased recreational opportunities, the Park Service and its supporters find the principle of "park inviolability" continually under attack. And, the attacks come not only from private economic interests but frequently from a collaboration of those interests with their own "colleagues" in Interior. Park proponents may well ask, with friends like this, who needs enemies?

Understandably, the Park Service's preservationist stance is frequently compromised by pressing economic needs, and Richardson's book is an interesting, and well-documented, account of the nature of conflict resolution within a politically fragmented department. As such, it is a useful companion volume to Harold Ickes' diary which discusses his tenure as Secretary of the Interior under FDR.

The second dispute which colors resource issues is the fundamental question as to who should have control of and ultimate responsibility for resource development, the private or the public sector? Naturally the issue is hardly ever stated so clearly; nevertheless that is what numerous policy questions in this area amount to. As Richardson says in the first pages, "By the time Roosevelt's presidency came to an end, Americans were committed to resource development, but still divided on the means to achieve it" (p. 18). He then shows that the difference between the Democratic administration under Truman and the Republican administration under Eisenhower on this important policy issue were slight. The Democrats leaned towards federal control of resource development while Republicans, such as Interior Secretary McKay ("Giveaway McKay"), leaned away. The difference was one of emphasis and not of substantial change. Thus in his concluding chapter Richardson asks perhaps the most pertinent question for political scientists, ". . . did it make any difference 'who was sitting on the lid' as policy maker" (p. 198)? A few pages later he answers by concluding:

> . . . the intersection of the issues of preservation and development of resources during the decade offered striking evidence against the American belief in the effectiveness of party turnover . . . An examination of

federal resource policy in 1956 reveals no substantial alteration in procedure or substance from 1946. The debate over centralism versus localism which raged at the beginning of the period proved to be directed not at the decision makers so much as at the polling booth (p. 201).

Richardson's history of resource policy under two administrations thus supports a conclusion suspected by many who have studied what Grant McConnell has called "the politics of land and water"; and that is that there is little substantive change and a lot of ideological debate in governmental resource policy. The same debates have continued throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s. It will be interesting to see whether the energy crisis, the food crisis, and the population crisis will force any significant modifications in federal policy.

JEANNE NIENABER
The University of Arizona

The Indispensable Enemy: Labor and the Anti-Chinese Movement in California. By Alexander Saxton. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971. Pp. 293. $8.50.)

The anti-Chinese movement in the second half of the last century has often been interpreted as being economic in origin. According to this view, the anti-Chinese movement was a grass-roots phenomenon in which the mobilization of the white wage workers, farmers, and shop proprietors won the economic competition with the imported cheap Asian laborers. Professor Alexander Saxton has written this book to offer an explanation which is much broader than, but could incorporate, this cheap-labor argument. He contends that the California labor and party politics dictated the direction of the anti-Chinese course, and he has used historical evidence to illustrate the various political purposes which the Chinese labor issue served for the major proponents of the anti-Chinese movement. Thus, this book, a historical study of the labor movement in California and its relationship with the Chinese labor issue, presents an effort to put the anti-Chinese movement in the "right" perspective.

In the first of the book's three sections, Professor Saxton examines the ideological background of the anti-Chinese movement; he indicates that discrimination against Chinese in jobs and in the right to discover and exploit gold deposits was institutionalized since their earliest immigration. This discrimination reflected an attitude and behavior pattern which derived from the concept of white superiority, a concept stressed by the Democratic party through the years of its efforts to defend slavery and to stage a comeback after the Civil War.

In the second section, the national economic and political forces which shaped the course of the labor movement are carefully specified. Saxton also identifies the internal issues, the change of leadership, and the tactics each of the important anti-Chinese organizations used in campaigns against the Chinese laborers. Two major points are stressed here. First, the anti-Chinese stance was instrumental to the victory of the Democratic party in the 1867 California election, as well as the ascendancy of Kearny and the Workingman's Party, the election of Mayor Kalloch in San Francisco, and the recruitment of membership in California trade unions. Second, the anti-Chinese movement became institutionalized in California politics and in the structure of organized labor. As the author writes on the jacket blurb, the Chinese issue "penetrated all tendencies of political ideology from socialism on the one side to Republican on the other, and helped to cement an alliance in California between trade unionism and the progressive movement."

I find that the author, throughout the discussion in the second section, does not include adequate materials in dealing with the reactions, the coping style, and the defensive moves adopted by the Chinese laborers and their leaders. This leaves the reader wondering what Chinese did except to be persecuted and forced to move. Furthermore, I have some questions about the selection of materials. For example, it would have been appropriate for the author to discuss the reliability of the newspaper materials and to tell the reader what was the quality of newspaper reports. In any case, these are minor shortcomings. As a whole, the second section of the book is most interesting, informative, organized, illuminating, and amply documented, and it can be recommended to students of race relations or labor politics.

The final section of the book deals with the impact of the anti-Chinese movement. The author points out that the American Federation of Labor's racially exclusive policies against Chinese and other Orientals reinforced the exclusionary practices which were later directed to blacks in organized labor. Moreover, it furnished a race- or nationality-based argument for a later-adopted federal policy in restricting immigrants from Asia and some European countries. In short, the author examines the impact mainly on national policies. He should also have considered the effects of anti-Orientalism on the life experiences of Asian Americans, especially the segregation, isolation, and discrimination they experienced before and after World War II.

WEN H. KUO
University of Utah

The Politics of Violence: The New Urban Blacks and the Watts Riot. By David Sears and John B. McConahay. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973. Pp. 244. $4.95.)

We are a decade in time and generations in consciousness beyond the events in Watts, but that riot or rebellion—the first of the truly big ghetto convulsions of the 1960s—is still a compelling subject for analysis. Consider, for a moment, its sheer magnitude. Sears and McConahay estimate that at least 31,000 adults took an active part in the disturbances at some point, a number which the authors note is equal to three combat divisions or to one and one-half times the maximum number of troops under Washington's command in the Revolution. Thirty-four people were killed in Watts, and more than a thousand were injured. The casualties amounted to more than double the American losses at the Battle of Bunker Hill.

The historical comparison is deliberate and not inappropriate: like Bunker Hill, Watts was in its own way a turning point, marking the end of the southern-inspired civil rights movement and the emergence of a new northern-generated militance. *The Politics of Violence* is a thorough attempt, based on survey data collected in the months following Watts, to explore from a social-psychological perspective the causes and some of the consequences of those six days in the summer of 1965. While the authors choose to call the events in Watts a riot (for that is the word most commonly used by their respondents and by the media), they are nevertheless fully cognizant of the symbolic implications of that term. But their central thesis—namely, that the riot was a profoundly political event, in effect a rebellion, rather than an aimless excursion for fun and profit—leaves no doubt where their sympathies lie.

The argument that the riots of the last decade were political rather than criminal manifestations is by now a familiar one. Indeed, many of the patterns revealed by this present survey will also be familiar to anyone who has followed the voluminous riot literature even in the most casual way. The virtues of this book, then, lie not in its often standard findings on the correlates and interpretations of riot activity in contemporary American cities, but rather in the complexity and implications of its theoretical perspectives.

The riot is viewed as a spark resulting from the conjunction in time and space of two vastly differently socialized populations: the new urban blacks and Southern California whites. The highest rate of riot participation, the authors observed, occurred among young blacks (under 30) reared in Los Angeles. The participation of this group significantly outstripped that of southern-reared blacks and migrants from other northern cities. Thus the authors hypothesize that there was a distinctive psychology at work among these new urban blacks, a product in part of distinctive childhood socialization which made them more likely to riot. They argue that the prevailing cultural forces at work in the *northern* socialization process in contrast to those at work in the southern socialization process were likely in the generation preceding Watts to produce greater political sophistication (hence greater sensitivity to unchanging levels of political and social equality), greater feelings of subjective deprivation (the young northern blacks' comparison levels against which they evaluate their own achievement are set higher), and more positive black identity. Combined with the perception that conventional mechanisms for grievance redress did not work well for blacks, as well as with a host of locally generated grievances against Los Angeles politicians, police, and merchants, these attitudes would conduce to riot participation.

The survey data establish the accuracy of this argument. The authors are able to show that a politically disaffected, sophisticated, subjectively deprived group with grievances specific to Los Angeles existed, that its members were socialized in Los Angeles, and that these characteristics were related to riot activity.

One of the strengths of this argument is that it offers a more airtight explanation of riot participation than the monocausal psychological theories like frustration-aggression or relative deprivation, which have seemed to give social scientists such trouble in the testing. Tracing the roots of violence back to presumed early socialization experiences, as well as resting the explanation on grievances growing out of adult experiences in the political system, provides a rich longitudinal perspective unmatched in this literature.

To establish the Los Angeles context the authors construct a much less complex theory of white socialization to explain what the authors see to be that city's pervasive "symbolic racism" (yet how explain the eventual triumph of Tom Bradley in an overwhelmingly white electorate?). This symbolic racism, manifested primarily by a common resort to abstract moralistic judgments about blacks as a group, is the consequence in the authors' view of white Southern California's familistic culture of privatism, racial isolation, and intense property consciousness. These aspects of life in the white southwest are seen in turn to be products of childhood socialization in the white Protestant middle-class Midwest, the place of origin of a disproportionate number of Southern Californians. All of these characteristics served to produce a massive

naiveté about blacks and a commitment to a set of Babbitt-like political routines and conventions irrelevant to and unconscious of the black condition.

The portrait of the Southern California whites does great justice to many of our presuppositions, but it is less successful than the portrait of the blacks. For one thing the authors present many fewer data to back it up. For another, the portrait seems a stereotype. Some of the writing here is just plain silly-sounding, as when they tell us that these "middle Americans" value "honesty" more than "human values." It is, Karl Lamb would surely tell us, a one-dimensional view that stresses the barbecue pit and crabgrass killer as the dominant cultural symbols. But in the end this is a relatively modest problem in an otherwise meticulously crafted book.

The most significant contribution this work makes in my view is not that it is the most ambitious single-riot study conducted from a micro perspective, but rather that it is one of the only efforts to explore adult political behavior as a function of childhood socialization experiences. The import of the socialization studies is that they purport to identify learning experiences in the early part of life which have consequences for adult political life. Yet the socialization literature is curiously devoid of studies of adult behavior which is related explicitly to the earlier socialization experience. Naturally, the lengthy time dimension involved in such an effort is a problem. One cannot easily observe his childhood subjects grow to maturity, although this type of analysis requires following in effect one age cohort over time. But what the researcher can do instead is to identify and examine cultural forces which bear on the growing up process which he presumes prevailed in the time and place of the childhood of his adult subjects. To do this, of course, is to simplify and to aggregate what is in fact a much more complex and differentiated set of experiences. It is also to make some potentially risky assumptions (with what degree of certainty, for example, can one claim to have identified what the important cultural forces were?). But if that enterprise is formidable, it is by no means impossible. Sears and McConahay have performed the task boldly and convincingly in this book.

PETER K. EISINGER
University of Wisconsin, Madison

The Uses of Disorder: Personal Identity and City Life. By Richard Sennett. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1970. Pp. 198. $4.95.)

This book advances a novel and interesting thesis: the root of our contemporary malaise is urban planning, and the solution is to enforce a kind of creative anarchy on city life. I personally found the hypothesis improbable and the solution unappealing, but this is the kind of book in which evaluations are necessarily subjective. Those interested in the topic will want to read and judge for themselves. Fortunately, unlike many other social theorists with equally sweeping visions and wider fame, Sennett's prose is both lucid and fun to read.

Sennett believes life in America is pretty bad—sterile, intolerant, dull, narrowing, and violent. He locates the cause in an urban planning process that sees the city as a machine composed of interconnected parts and designs it so that the parts are separated except for functional interconnections. This results in social homogeneity in neighborhoods of the city and lack of contact among the inhabitants. The most deleterious effect of this style of organizing urban areas is that it reinforces the human tendency, experienced most strongly as a way of handling the adolescent identity crisis, to simplify and purify experience so that challenges are avoided and other people stereotyped and held at a distance. Moreover, Sennett feels that growing up in communities of this kind causes this disposition to "self-imposed slavery" to be perpetuated into adulthood. Only if the disposition is overcome in adolescence by social settings that "permit the young to act out their painless dreams [of a purified existence] and fail constructively" (p. 129) will individuals enter adulthood with the character structures that will enable them to deal with life in a creative way.

Sennett's argument is based on deductions from the psychology of Erik Erikson and a selected group of studies of aspects of city life (annoyingly, none of the studies is footnoted; on the other hand, they are clearly illustrations rather than evidence, so maybe it doesn't make much difference). Apart from the lack of empirical evidence—which is inevitable in this kind of a book—I found two problems with the argument (in addition to finding it intuitively unlikely). First, Sennett seems to me to mistake Erikson's psychology. Erikson regarded as unusual and pathological the kind of response to the adolescent identity crisis that Sennett identifies as typical in America. Second, Sennett is unclear about the genesis of the problem. He clearly believes things were not always this way but vacillates between regarding modern urban planning as the cause of unhealthy adolescence and identifying undesirable character structures as the basis of support for planning. Since Sennett's policy proposal calls for the re-creation of some aspects of the dense city life of the past, the former would make more sense. Yet, Sennett cites his own study of families in nineteenth-

century Chicago to indicate that the intense family life that he sees as producing an undesirable adolescence represented a reaction against the very urban disorder he proposes to reintroduce.

Sennett's policy proposal is to reproduce the density and disorder of the urban life of an earlier era through "survival communities" where people are forced to confront each other. "As a rule of change, the situations creating survival encounters would be as follows: there would be no policing, nor any other form of central control, of schooling, zoning, renewal, or city activities that could be performed through common community action, or, even more importantly, through direct, nonviolent conflict in the city itself" (p. 141). As an example, Sennett says, "If a bar down the street were too noisy for the children of the neighborhood to sleep, the parents would have to squeeze the bar owner themselves, by picketing or informal pressure, for no zoning laws would apply throughout the city" (p. 144). I personally do not find the vision of a society that deliberately creates unpleasant environments in order to encourage the formation of neighborhood T-groups an appealing one, nor do I believe that free time is so plentiful a commodity that we can afford to sacrifice it by giving up as much of the division of labor as Sennett proposes. Those who find life in America as sick as Sennett does and who find his diagnosis of the source of illness persuasive may disagree and opt for the "truly chaotic urban life" Sennett prescribes.

DAVID NEXON

Russell Sage Foundation

The Political Web of American Schools. By Frederick Wirt and Michael W. Kirst. (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Co., 1972. Pp. 295. $7.95.)

This book has been needed for a long time. The field of "politics and education," as the authors note, is only gradually attracting the attention of political scientists. Additionally, among those few political scientists who do take an occasional look at schools, political socialization—as distinguished from educational governance—is the preferred agenda of research.

The great merit of this book is to place school governance within a framework normally applied to the *general* governing process. That is, they raise questions traditionally asked by political scientists and seek to answer them with the data available from studies of educational policy making. The framework which guides the book is, not surprisingly, systems theory. One might argue that the authors (one associated with a school of education, the other with a political science department) have thus guaranteed that nothing need be excluded, and that is not really the point. Systems theory is a link between two disciplines; it has been used (uncritically) by educationists while being the focus of a major debate among political scientists. Wirt and Kirst selfconsciously address themselves to both educationists and political scientists and have chosen a good device to gain the attention of both.

The survey of the literature is exhaustive. Virtually everything written on the subject at the time is included and fitted neatly into the organizational framework. The inclusive nature of the literature search, however, leads to two problems. First, the authors simply cannot answer some of the questions they pose. Second, their review of the literature is uncritical. No effort is made to point out some glaring errors in research. Both problems are probably excusable, especially the former. Much would have been gained, however, had the authors provided some estimate of the extent to which the reported research conformed to accepted standards of scholarship.

Aside from these relatively minor faults, the book has much to recommend it. It is relatively free of obfuscating jargon and is quite well organized. All levels of policy making (federal, state, and local) are examined. A particularly strong point of the book is the degree to which it continually draws attention to the major struggle in educational policy making: the clash between experts and laymen. In a system which pays symbolic deference to the ideology of lay control, reliance upon experts has become a way of life. Wirt and Kirst uncover scant evidence to suggest any but the most occasional exception to the power of the experts. They note, however, that the "new politics" of public education, with its clearly participatory thrust, is viewed as a serious threat by the "bureaucratic forces." An intriguing question is, of course, who will win? On these points, the book is suggestive rather than conclusive. Perhaps this is because there are no answers. If the authors contemplate any extension of their work, it would be extremely useful for them to attempt to identify the conditions under which bureaucratic domination is successfully challenged. I am confident that the book will receive the sustained attention it so richly deserves.

HARMON ZEIGLER

University of Oregon

A Grain of Mustard Seed: The Awakening of the Brazilian Revolution. By Marcio Moreira Alves. (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday Anchor Press, 1973. Pp. 194. $1.95, paper.)

Most of this book is not about revolutionary awakening, except of the kind which the author

himself has come to through his experience as a journalist, federal deputy, and exile. It is an account of repression, prefaced by autobiography and concluded with a strategy for overthrowing the system of repression.

Neither as history, nor as autobiography, nor as a program for liberation is the book satisfactory. But it is still worth reading. Many of its faults can be traced to the author's decision to write a popularized analysis of contemporary Brazil for a foreign audience. Within these limits, Moreira Alves largely succeeds. His book is free of the more simplistic ranting against bloodthirsty generals, profit-maddened capitalists, and the like. As introductory reading, it is a good companion piece to the recent Pelican paperbacks by two other Brazilian exiles—Miguel Arraes, *Brazil: The People and the Power* (1972), and Francisco Julião, *Cambão—The Yoke: The Hidden Face of Brazil* (1972).

As a serious chronicle of repression, however, the book is defective. In the first place, it is too sketchy. Better accounts can be found in the author's own previous (but untranslated) work: *Torturas e Torturados* (1966) and *O Cristo do Povo* (1968). Second, the analysis of economic repression and cooptation, fully as important to an understanding of Brazilian authoritarianism, is schematic and derivative. For some reason, Moreira Alves ignores the important work of Fernando Henrique Cardoso in this field.

As autobiography, the book is engaging, up to a point. Moreira Alves hardly sees himself as a Galahad of liberation. He questions his motives and casts a shrewd eye on his youthful naiveté. He is insightful about the functions of family connections and loyalties in Brazil. But I finished the book wanting to know more about Moreira Alves's personal development and, especially, about his experience in exile. The politics of exile is now a significant, and almost completely unknown, episode in the growth of Brazilian revolutionary thought. Moreira Alves, however, expressly states that "personal stories, though they may be of interest to clarify an evolution, are of little importance to the long popular struggle that is a revolution" (p. 3). This position is debatable, especially when the "impersonal analysis" which takes its place is hard to follow. But, to be fair, the book cannot be criticized unduly for omitting what the author did not intend it to contain.

It is as political analysis that *A Grain of Mustard Seed* is most puzzling. Moreira Alves's main conclusion is that armed struggle is "the only alternative the regime has left open" (p. 187). Resistance, therefore, depends mainly (or initially?) on this tactic. In one sense, the recommendation is plausible. Opposition from within the system has been virtually a total loss. But it can also be argued that violent opposition is the one avenue that the regime has completely blocked off. The mechanisms of physical coercion at the disposal of the regime are vast, terrible—and successful.

It is not clear how a policy favoring armed struggle follows from Moreira Alves's analysis. My guess is that the author knows more about physical coercion than about the varieties of economic, utilitarian control—a myopia which he shares with many humanistic Catholics in Brazil. Running through the book is the assumption that the economic system is so transparently exploitative, despite censorship and propaganda, that the government survives mainly on the basis of brute force and with the connivance of the United States. But the economic system is fairly clever; and, though Moreira Alves recognizes its cooptative ingenuity in general, he does not explore it in much detail. His analysis is not therefore convincing as a basis for calculated revolutionary action, even though a sound case can be made that the present situation may end with a violent upheaval. The strengths and the vulnerability of systems like the Brazilian can more rigorously be appreciated by consulting Hirschman and Rothchild's "The Changing Tolerance for Income Inequality in the Course of Economic Development," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 87 (November, 1973), 544-566, and Alejandro Portes, "On the Logic of Post-Factum Explanations: The Hypothesis of Lower-Class Frustration as the Cause of Leftist Radicalism," *Social Forces*, 50 (September, 1971), 26-44.

PETER MCDONOUGH
University of Michigan

Developmental Personnel, A Psycho-Social Study Across Three States in India. By B.C. Muthayya and I. Gnanakannan. (Hyderabad: National Institute of Community Development, 1973. Pp. vi, 185. Rs. 25.)

This study reports the results of a comparative survey of Indian Community Development administrators' background and psychological characteristics and the relationship of these factors to job satisfaction. The fact that the survey was conducted by the National Institute of Community Development may be interpreted as a reaffirmation by the Indian government of the importance of the administrative component in the development effort; in the recent past much attention has focused on Panchayati Raj, the political component. Students of administration will welcome the book for this reason, as well as for the massive amount of data that was gathered. Unfortunately, however, limitations in the

authors' analysis and presentation prevent readers from reaping the full benefits of this major research effort.

The authors begin by making the assumption (perhaps less true in employment-scarce India than elsewhere) that "one's job performance is, to a great extent, influenced by one's level of satisfaction on the job" (p. 7). Their goal is to identify the personal and psychological variables that produce job satisfaction in the hope that recruitment and training practices can be changed to produce more satisfied and productive administrators.

The survey was conducted in 1970 in Mysore, Tamil Nadu, and Kerala states. Data were gathered from 791 administrators who worked in 271 blocks at varying development stages in 18 of the 42 districts in these states. Specifically, 225 Block Development Officers (BDOs), 133 *mukhyasevikas,* 240 *gramsevaks,* and 193 *gramsevikas* participated in the study. Data were also gathered from 91 senior rural service college students in Tamil Nadu for comparison with the data collected from this state's administrative sample. Finally, 411 job performance evaluations were gathered from collectors, district development assistants, and BDOs in the sample. The first two groups evaluated the BDOs, and the BDOs evaluated their subordinates who participated in the study. The investigators used a mail survey and visited sample blocks to insure that schedules were properly completed. The schedules were tailored to suit administrative roles and asked both closed and openended questions. The closed-ended questions related to participants' backgrounds, personality variables, job satisfaction, social intelligence, and satisfaction with their assigned community. Openended questions probed attitudes about the Community Development and Panchayati Raj programs.

After the introductory and methodological chapters a deluge of data is presented without much analysis. Almost a hundred tables are presented in the 110 pages that cover the chapters reporting the closed-ended data on respondents' background characteristics, their response to various personality and job satisfaction measures, and correlations between background and personality variables and job satisfaction. Much of the accompanying text merely restates data apparent in the tables without interpretation. For example, the authors report that significant portions of the respondents occupied their present positions before the initiation of the Panchayati Raj Program and that many were recruited from the Revenue Department. But they do not suggest how these previous experiences may affect their relations with the elective representatives of this program.

Further, the authors do not explain how ecological differences between the states may account for differences in responses. For example, what is it about the Mysore setting that explains why BDOs there have higher job dissatisfaction scores relative to those of BDOs in the other states? No recognition is given to the South Indian focus of the study or how the findings might relate to other areas of India. This lack of analysis is particularly disappointing because one would expect Indians to have greater insight into these questions than Westerners who work from a different cultural base.

The next chapter discusses administrators' opinions about the Community Development and Panchayati Raj programs. The openended responses were organized by role into four categories—attitudes about administration, training, Community Development, and panchayats and elected representatives. No tables are presented here, although often they would have been more appropriate than the text, which is a quantitative description of the findings. Particularly in this chapter, the authors missed an opportunity to focus and analyze their data because of their failure to include quotations from the participants' openended responses.

Finally, the last chapter summarizes the findings and devotes two pages to the presentation of eleven suggestions. Consequently, the suggestions are vague and merely identify some issues related to job satisfaction. The wealth of data discussed in the book is not adequately used to support these suggestions or to specify how changes could be made to enhance satisfaction.

The book represents a hopeful start toward understanding the attitudes and behavior of Indian development administrators. One has the impression, however, that the book was published quickly and without adequate thought about how the data could be most usefully presented to other scholars. In addition, the authors should have included a copy of the questionnaire and noted references for the various scales that were used, such as the nine personality measures. Finally, an effort should have been made to place the study's findings in perspective by referring to other administrative studies. One hopes that the authors will provide more analyses of these rich data in the future.

DAN FRITZ
University of Southern California
Leonard Davis School of Gerontology

The Hero's Children: The Post-War Generation of Eastern Europe. By Paul Neuburg. (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1973. Pp. 383. $2.95.)

The Hero's Children is about social change in

Eastern Europe since World War II and particularly, since the death of Stalin, about the relationship of the Party to the people, and especially the young. It also addresses itself to the general problem of how stable the regimes in question are and how the ideologically generated processes of modernization affected the population and its political attitudes. Throughout, Neuburg, a writer and journalist, compares Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Bulgaria in regard to the issues raised. His book is an ambitious undertaking based on the author's travels in Eastern Europe (undertaken since 1968), his knowledge of the area because of his background (a Hungarian "56-er") and recent sociological surveys and other relevant literature coming out of Eastern Europe. The author has an obvious "feel" for the area, enhanced by his many conversations with the natives during his visits.

Neuburg has been most successful in conveying "the daily life and concerns" of young people in Eastern Europe (especially in Chapter 6, "Ways of Life"). At the same time his enterprise falters when he intends to provide a somewhat grandiose and overambitious conceptual-theoretical scheme, embodied in what he calls the "central idea" of the book, namely "of the Party as Hero and the young as the Hero's Children."

The idea of the Party as Hero and the youth as its children seems to me to be contrived, adding little to clarify or focus the main concerns of the book. "Heroic" means, apparently, ideological as opposed to pragmatic. The lack of clarity is illustrated by such propositions as: "It is however only in theory that the Party may pose for ever on the one hand as the Vanguard of Perfection and Rationality Incarnate and on the other as History's Hero and the Champion of Progress. In practice, as both the Being static at the centre of all affairs and the Motor of Becoming inexorably productive of change, it is bound to become ensnared by just the dialectics it thought itself destined to command on behalf of the future" (p. 56).

If one overlooks such cumbersome theorizing, many interesting points and concerns emerge. Perhaps the most important, which transcends Eastern Europe and its younger generations, is the relationship between materialism and idealism, affluence and political liberalism, improved standards of living and rising nonmaterial aspirations. These issues have been raised and debated frequently in the Soviet context, but at present they are more appropriate to Eastern Europe. The issue may also be posed as the degree of interdependence between the political-ideological and economic spheres. The author, like many Western social scientists, believes that the developing economic arrangements and institutions of Eastern Europe are less and less compatible with high levels of centralization, ideological constraints, and the still prevailing authoritarian superstructures. "As specialists take over one specialized function after another, and as each new generation becomes better at managing for itself, so the State, while remaining a live body, will cease to have any room for the Party as its centre" (p. 361). It is the familiar proposition of the apolitical specialists squeezing out the die-hard ideologues, and if true, it has vast implications. Yet, especially for a sociologist aware of the functionalist perspective, it is hard to conceive of a society run by such pragmatists without another elite stratum elaborating and dispensing some set of values which transcend the instrumental concerns of the specialists.

Nevertheless even those like myself who are skeptical about such ideas, usually subsumed under "convergence" or "modernization," must concede that there is something to them, especially in regard to Eastern Europe. Of course it is not easy to determine why Eastern European societies are becoming more "Westernized": is it because they have become more urban, industrial and productive, or is it because their historical traditions and values, geographical conditions and cultural contacts have been different? In any case, one aspect of modernization and convergence can hardly be disputed. It is the growing similarity between the social problems—crime, delinquency, family instability, various forms of escapism, pollution, etc. —that urban, industrial societies create, notwithstanding their different political arrangements. The same applies to our old Western favorite, alienation, more elusive yet hard not to recognize when encountered under socialism as much as under capitalism. Yet critics of Western societies rarely suggest that high levels of scientific, technological, and industrial development, and the attendant complexity, provide barriers to antidemocratic tendencies or trends. Quite the contrary, they are often seen as merely providing better tools for the manipulation of the masses, or devices for lulling them into a false sense of security and satisfaction with their lot.

While many of the major speculations and projections of the book are difficult to substantiate, there is an abundance of interesting information and insightful comment about the attitudes of East European youth. These very attitudes lend themselves to divergent interpretations about their contribution to the long-range political stability of the systems involved. Thus we learn, or are given fresh evidence and examples of, the pervasively apolitical attitudes of the

young, their intense materialism, consumer orientation, cynicism about political ideals and ideologies (and especially the official ones), their achievement orientation, their support of authority even when mixed with disrespect for its prevailing ideological legitimations. We also learn that, "Instead of wholly destroying former conventions, change and the effects of the Party's social policy have combined to spread formerly middle class attitudes through almost the whole of what now counts as society" (p. 242). Sociological surveys cited further, indicate that "Occupations are . . . rated by the majority much less according to the satisfaction they offer than according to the money they bring in" (p. 273).

The young are not in the mood to challenge authority or to harbor extravagant expectations concerning either political freedoms or social justice or spiritual fulfillment. The young generally doubt the value of revolutions (p. 276). A Polish student summarized prevailing attitudes: "We don't dream of shaking off the yoke. Only of making it more bearable" (p. 319). While these attitudes in their somewhat paradoxical combination are not apt to please the Party, neither do they seriously threaten its power in the foreseeable future. It will probably take a long time before either material expectations become so intense as to be incapable of satisfaction, or their satisfaction will lead to the type of spiritual quest and restlessness that characterizes large segments of the young in Western societies. But even if that were to occur, both the surviving traditions of the area and the watchful eyes of Big Brother to the East will, in all probability, constrain the forces pressing for radical change.

PAUL HOLLANDER
University of Massachusetts, Amherst

The Making of an Australian Prime Minister. By Laurie Oakes and David Solomon. (Melbourne: Cheshire, 1973. Pp. 318. $A3.50, paper.)

This is the tale of how heroes make history, a gossipy but readable account of the events which brought Gough Whitlam to power in December 1972, the first federal Labor government in Australia since 1949. Laurie Oakes is political correspondent for the Melbourne *Sun* and David Solomon is political correspondent for the *Canberra Times*.

Quite simply, this is a story of the events which changed the demoralized party of 1966 into the victors of 1972, with their promises (or threats) to create a Sweden in the South Seas. The book offers a useful summary of this period. It contains important clues for deciphering Australian politics: splenetic personal feuds, veto groups, endemic localism, the mild chicanery of the partisans, the substitution of trigger words and the gut reaction in the absence of anything resembling ideological conflict. It is a reminder of the Labor party traumas between 1967 and 1971, of the sheer bumbledom of the Coalition's closing years, and the bizarre qualities of Australian political leadership. It conveys color and it contains an amount of useful detail, names, figures, events. It demonstrates again that the best informed observers of current politics, and the most active, are the lobby correspondents. The problem is how to put their talents to better use.

For the tone of the book is also a comment on the poverty of political debate in Australia. Ideas and philosophies are subordinated to the task of detailing the gloss and the marginalia of the campaign. The authors' brushwork is deft but without much depth in theme or structure. The book deals mainly with the curiously self-conscious power-play of a small group of individuals as recorded by the media. Ideas or policies of any kind are scarcely discussed. This is unfortunate because social issues were of growing and perhaps decisive importance in the outer suburban electorates of Sydney and Melbourne. The rise of an "ideology of concern," heralding perhaps some change in the traditional, materialist affiliations of the Australian electorate goes largely unrecorded. The book does not attempt to develop the explanation of the social and political significance of the incidents it chronicles. Its content is also a commentary upon what the media see and report in Australian politics. It serves itself as a carrier of traditional beliefs and ideas about politics. Initially attractive, the book's failure to do more than speculate and generalize finally becomes tedious. Even in politics, the human element becomes boring when it is left so entirely to its own devices. Despite its title, this is not of the same species as the "Making of a President" series.

Oversimplified history of this kind produces distortion. The authors fall victim to the deceptive simplicity of their own narrative. Some issues are not fully developed: the significance of the changing class composition and outlook of the Labor party under Whitlam; the tensions within the Unions in Labor's thrust for power. More seriously, discussion of the campaign as a power-struggle is too one-sided; Liberal leaders are presented as strolling actors surprised to be caught on stage when the curtain went up. The story of how a government crumbled and power slipped through the fingers of the exhausted men in office is told too baldly. Also, for a man whose ascent to power was apparently predestined, Whitlam remains himself a shadowy figure.

Admittedly, this is asking the book to be something it was not meant to be. Yet if we accept the book uncritically at face value we run a hidden danger: Australian readers may too readily accept the deceptive simplicity of the narrative. The book's flaw is making a major (even momentous) political event seem so obvious as to require no further explanation. The fact that it was "time," as the slogan went, was enough. For a political system whose own political vocabulary and imagination is limited, the plausible rationalizations which this book presents should not be substituted for a genuinely critical attempt at explanation and understanding.

H. V. Emy

Monash University, Australia

Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics. By Guillermo A. O'Donnell. Politics of Modernization Series, No. 9. (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1973. Pp. 219. $3.25, paper.)

The key to a fair appraisal of this publication by O'Donnell is to be found in the first sentence of the preface where he states, "I wrote this work while doing graduate study in political science at Yale University" (p. vii). He does not call it a book and this is indeed accurate, since *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism* lacks not only an introduction and an index but also integration. The publications in this series are apparently not intended to be finished products, but rather tentative contributions to the discussion of Latin American topics. Throughout the work O'Donnell emphasizes the preliminary character of his findings. An equally significant point in the above quotation concerns the university where the author did his graduate work in the United States. It should be noted, however, that O'Donnell, an Argentine, has also done advanced study in Latin America and has published in Spanish.

This publication is a collection of four essays in which the author applies some approaches from his graduate training to the study of Latin America. The work would be iconoclastic were it not that the images attacked here are scarcely taken seriously anywhere today. O'Donnell probably did clear the conceptual ground as he intended, but the reader is obliged to waste a great deal of time while the author fiddles around with approaches of dubious utility for the study of Latin America. The annoyance is most serious in the first part of Chapter I (and a point frequently returned to) where he takes up the old argument that more socioeconomic development leads to more political democracy. O'Donnell knows full well, and the reader need not be reminded, that this finding has little support in Latin America. This same sort of exercise is undertaken throughout Chapter IV where he applies some elements of game theory to the study of party competition in Argentina. It is obvious from his caveats and the manner of applying the model that he could have come up with the same conclusions without bothering with the approach. It is, as he notes, an impossible game in Argentina, and one does not require much theory, let alone axioms, to know this.

More must be said about the preliminary nature of this work and of the author's intentions in writing it. He is apparently attempting to clarify concepts and determine the types of relevant data in order to carry out empirical work. This publication is not, therefore, a contribution to data or new material, but rather an effort to deal with existing information in sorting through various approaches. In order to clarify his argument O'Donnell frequently uses propositions and hypotheses which indicate where he is going, but as could be expected, not enough material is available to test them. And this is in spite of an abundance of footnotes which makes for very hard reading. Because of the tentativeness of this exercise, its conclusions must be viewed with skepticism. For instance, on page 51, O'Donnell argues that political democracies are found at intermediate levels of modernization. Since Chile and Uruguay are at this level, and are no longer democratic, one concludes that a proposition has been disproved. However, on page 114 he notes that the chances for survival of the democracies are not good. In short, he cannot be directly contradicted because the work is highly tentative, is not integrated, and is not meant to constitute a single argument.

Insofar as any theme dominates the work, it is the relationship of modernization and political systems. The author argues that in Latin America the size of the domestic markets and the productive structure of the modern areas are the major determinants of social differentiation. Increased differentiation means greater social complexity, and political pluralization is the political expression of this differentiation. O'Donnell finds that the Latin American countries differ on the dimensions of this differentiation and these in turn both directly and indirectly determine the three patterns of political system he defines. He then does historical, and largely structural, analyses of Argentina and Brazil and concludes that at high levels of modernization there is an elective affinity for what he terms "bureaucratic-authoritarian" regimes. These regimes are characterized by the growth of organizational strength of social sectors, governmental attempts at control by "encapsulation,"

the career patterns and power bases of most incumbents of technocratic roles, and the pivotal role played by large bureaucracies (p. 95). His argument is supported by abundant evidence and is depressingly thorough and accurate in the case of Argentina. The argument is persuasive enough in general, although less so in the case of Brazil, but many readers will probably quibble over the definitions and measurement of both modernization and the types of political systems. This is a far-reaching argument, and I expect that O'Donnell will both modify and strengthen it in his present empirical work.

This is a useful work for those interested in the politics of Latin America. It is not easy to read and the argument is complex and partial, but O'Donnell has done an impressive job of both stating the conceptual problems and bringing together much of the material by which they might be studied and perhaps even solved.

THOMAS C. BRUNEAU

McGill University, Montreal

The Price of Liberty: Personality and Politics in Colonial Nigeria. By Kenneth W. Post and George D. Jenkins. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1973. Pp. 494. $27.50.)

This is a political biography of Alhaji Adegoke Adelabu, son of Ibadan and erstwhile Leader of the Opposition in the Western House of Assembly in the period preceding Nigeria's independence. Though he died in a car crash in 1958, at the age of forty-three, Adelabu's career sheds much light on the nature of opposition in the Western Region and on the decline of the NCNC as a nationalist party. The subtitle of the book, however, is misleading because this is not a study of Adelabu's personality on the order of the George's study of Wilson, say, or of Tucker's study of Stalin.

Though the authors had the great good fortune to have access to their subject's private papers—which allows them to weave a fascinating story in meticulous detail—nowhere do they attempt to interpret Adelabu's motives or style outside of the period and of its political exigencies. Adelabu's appeal, however, derives as much from his puckish sense of humor and his roguish ways as it does from his political skills! "I am humbler than Shaw, physically stronger than Gandhi, more cultured than Stalin, older than Jesus, more educated than Shakespeare, more worldly-wise than Socrates and better tailored than Lincoln" (p. 123). Making no reference to personality theory and seemingly not steeped in Yoruba culture and rhetoric, the authors are alternatively admiring, amused, and appalled by their subject, but nowhere do they help us to understand his style.

The strength of *The Price of Liberty* lies in its political history of regionalism as experienced by one who opposed its triumph. The decade of the 'fifties saw a retreating imperialism mesh with indigenous forces to construct a federal framework based on narrow communal and sectional interests. This arrangement came to be called the "Regionalist System" and it was to have disastrous results for Nigeria. Adelabu opposed regionalism from the first, partly because he was a nationalist resisting centrifugal forces, but mostly because he was a son of Ibadan, and saw in the dominance of the Action Group the decline of his power in his own constituency. The logic of the situation—not his personality—led him to align himself with the opponents of the Action Group, the NCNC and its leader, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe.

But beyond Adelabu's own political machinations there is the fascinating story of decolonization in Nigeria. Here the authors make an important contribution by filling in and correcting in significant places the landscapes left for us by earlier works of Coleman, Sklar, and Post himself. Taking Adelabu's point of view, for example, they show that the break between the Western branch of the NCNC and the national party occurred as much from the vacillations of the national leadership and its attempt at compromising its fight with the regionalists as it did from Yoruba suspicions of Ibo dominance. The impression, therefore, that the NCNC was doomed to become a regionalist party like the NPC and the Action Group, and that communalism was fated for Nigeria would seem not to be justified by the data presented by Post and Jenkins. This is an important point, as this study of Adelabu makes clear, and it is one that ought to be more fully discussed in a separate study of Dr. Azikiwe.

ROBERT MELSON

Purdue University

Revolution and Politics in Russia. Essays in Memory of B. I. Nicolaevsky. Edited by Alexander and Janet Rabinowitch with Ladis K. D. Kristof. Russian and East European Series Vol. 41, Russian & East European Institute, Indiana University. (Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1972. Pp. xii, 416. $12.75.)

The late Boris Ivanovich Nicolaevsky was probably the most learned, imaginative, prolific, and influential historian and analyst of the origins and development of Bolshevik rule in Russia of our generation. This volume was originally planned as far back as 1965 as a *Festschrift* to be

presented to him on his eightieth birthday, 20 October 1967. But the completion of the volume, which includes many detailed and ambitious contributions, was delayed. Nicolaevsky's death on 21 February 1966 resulted in the transformation of the projected *Festschrift* into a memorial volume, which did not see the light of day until over six years later. It was fitting that the Russian and East European Institute of Indiana University, which is now one of the leading centers of Russian studies in the English-speaking world, should have sponsored the volume.

Boris Nicolaevsky, whom hundreds of students of the Russian revolutionary movement (including this reviewer) remember with deep gratitude for his help as well as with respect and affection was born on 20 October 1887, in a small town in the foothills of the Urals. He was the son of a priest. Like many of his idealistic contemporaries, he began his revolutionary activities while still at school, and was arrested at the age of sixteen. His formal education ended at this point: for the rest of his life in Russia until his arrest and expulsion in 1921, he continued intensive study of Russian social and political conditions and history and of the revolutionary movement and actively participated in the social democratic movement. Nicolaevsky was at first inclined to side with the Bolsheviks after the split in the party in 1903, but, as Professor Ladis Kristof points out in his excellent contribution ("The Formative Years") this was due much less to ideological reasons than to the fact that "the Mensheviks were universally blamed for the split" (p. 13). (The historian now in possession of more facts can only marvel at this early success of Bolshevik propaganda.) Professor Kristof's account of Nicolaevsky's political activities up to 1917 is of particular value not because Nicolaevsky's political career was as important as those of the major figures in the Menshevik ranks, but because it too displayed the fairness and objectivity which always characterized Nicolaevsky's judgment as a historian. He certainly did not hesitate to condemn actions which he thought were detrimental to the aims of the social democratic movement. But a political opponent did not automatically become *caput lupinum* for whom no good word could be said, nor did an ally escape criticism when he was deemed to deserve it.

In exile Nicolaevsky continued, indeed much expanded, his scholarly activities. He remained in Europe until 1940, when the advance of Hitler's forces on Paris drove him into a second exile, the United States. He had meanwhile amassed a unique collection of all kinds of rare and unpublished materials on the Russian revolutionary movement. It comes as a shock to those of us, like myself, who remember Boris Nicolaevsky's apartment in West Side New York bulging with documents, files, and packages to learn that the major part of his collection was lost in Paris. According to the late Professor Moseley, Anna Mikhailovna Bourgina, later to become Mrs. Nicolaevsky, "risked her own life by remaining behind in occupied France (after Nicolaevsky's departure) in order to safeguard the collection" (p. 33). The major part of the collection was, however, discovered by agents of the Alfred Rosenberg office and transferred to Frankfurt, to the Institute on Judaism and Bolshevism. In the confusion at the end of the war, when these materials were discovered by an American lieutenant, he (reportedly) handed them over to the Soviet authorities because they were mostly printed or written in Russian, and they were promptly shipped to the Soviet Union. We learn these facts from the article on "The American Years" by the late Philip E. Mosely who died before this volume saw the light of day. It was indeed Mosely who, more than anyone else, made it possible for Nicolaevsky to live and work first in New York, then in California, for twenty-seven years, writing, advising younger scholars, and continuously rebuilding his collection of materials. This collection remains one of the most valuable sources on Russian revolutionary history in existence outside Russia. The bulk of the collection is now at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace at Stanford University, where Mrs. Nicolaevsky has continued the work of indexing and annotating it. More than ten thousand items from the collection are in Indiana University Library.

The "Selected Bibliography" contributed by Anna M. Bourgina (Mrs. Nicolaevsky) is of the greatest value. It makes no claim to completeness, because Nicolaevsky's contributions to socialist periodicals were so numerous that they can probably never be fully listed. Even so, Mrs. Nicolaevsky has listed his articles and reviews from the main periodicals to which her late husband contributed in eighteen closely printed pages. These include both Nicolaevsky's ephemeral comments on current events in the Soviet Union (which were usually better informed and more perceptive than those of anyone else, as events later confirmed) and detailed historical studies based on much research. The bibliography also lists the main books—on Azev the spy, on Forced Labor, on Marx, and the invaluable annotated editions of papers and letters of Axelrod, Martov and Plekhanov, among others. It is worth adding one of Nicolaevsky's main works which does not appear in the bibliography: it was regrettably never published for lack of funds, even though funds have so often been forth-

coming for less worthy publications. This work consists of the first six volumes (this was as far as he had got when he died) covering the least studied period of Russian social democracy—between 1906 and the First World War. The completed volumes are deposited in typescript in several libraries and go up to 1912. They consist of unpublished documents from the author's own and from other collections with extensive introduction and commentary. These volumes throw an entirely new light on the history of the period as traditionally reiterated by a generation of historians.

The remaining fourteen contributions span a period of more than one hundred and fifty years —from a study of Andrei Turgenev (Raeff) to one on the vital CPSU Praesidium meeting of February 1961, the evidence on which is dissected with great ingenuity by Robert M. Slusser. The span of time and the variety of subjects, every one of which would have interested Nicolaevsky, and on every one of which he would, had he lived to see this volume, have had penetrating comments to add, are an appropriate tribute to his scholarship. Equally appropriate are the scholarship and high standard of all the contributors. The reviewer of a symposium is invariably faced with the problem of either selecting unfairly or giving a catalogue. Two outstanding articles can be passed over, however, because in each case, since they were written, the author has published an important volume which embraces the subject of the earlier article—Robert C. Tucker on "Stalin's Revolutionary Career before 1917," now in part covered by the first volume of his monumental biography of Stalin; and Stephen F. Cohen's "In Praise of War Communism: Bukharin's 'The Economics of the Transition Period,' " which is now also dealt with in Cohen's splendid biography of Bukharin. The other subjects covered are the Group for the Emancipation of Labor (Frankel), Russian and Jewish Social Democracy (Wildman), Marxist Revolutionaries and the Dilemma of Power (Getzler), the Railwaymen in the General Strike of 1905 (Sablinsky), the Social Democratic Movement in Latvia (Kalnins), the Petrograd Garrison and the Bolshevik Seizure of Power (Rabinowitch), the Berlin Conference of the Three Internationals in 1922 (Sukiennicki), the Kaminsky Brigade (Dallin), the Rehabilitation of Pokrovskii (Keep), and a Possible New Soviet Model of Modern Society (George Fischer).

So much for the catalogue of what is to be found in this important publication in the field of Russian revolutionary history and of the Soviet Union. Without wishing to be invidious in selecting particular articles for emphasis, I think it is important for readers of the *APSR* to know which particular articles open up new ground, in the sense that they are the result of research on unpublished or very little known material. Professor Marc Raeff's contribution on "Andrei I. Turgenev and his Circle" falls into this category, since it provides new information on the least known of the three famous Turgenev brothers, Andrei, who died at the age of twenty-two in 1803 before he could achieve the fame of his brothers Alexander and Nicolai, but who was probably very typical of the enlightened generation of young Russians of good family at the turn of the nineteenth and eighteenth centuries. Professor Raeff sees in him and his circle forerunners of Stankevich and his circle thirty or forty years later and has some very perceptive things to say on the subject. Then there is Professor Kalnins' contribution on Latvian social democracy, although not based on unpublished sources, makes extensive use of Latvian language sources which few historians of Russia can read. Lastly, there is Professor Dallin's study of the Kaminsky Brigade—not because of the importance of the episode in the Second World War, but because this is the first published study of the result of extensive research in the German wartime archives. Kaminsky, as Professor Dallin says, was a persistent Soviet type, combining "ability and arrogance, ambition and mediocrity, nihilism and conviction" (p. 280). He and his brigade ended as little more than bandits: his main contribution to the far from simple story of Russian collaboration with the Germans in the Second World War has been to enable Soviet propaganda, Western gullibility and plain ignorance to combine to tarnish the reputation of the genuinely idealistic, if misguided movement associated with the name of Vlasov. It is much to be regretted that many more fine contributions to this book should have had no more than a mention in this review.

LEONARD SCHAPIRO
London School of Economics

Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 8/1973. Edited by Stein Rokkan. (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget & Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, 1973. Pp. 286. $15.00.)

What distinguishes *Scandinavian Political Studies Vol. 8* (edited by Stein Rokkan with the assistance of Helga Hernes and Helen Aareskjold) from the previous volumes of the Nordic political science associations' yearbook, is the number of articles which deal with the penetration of national by international politics. Several deal explicitly with *the* major recent event in four of the five polities (all but Iceland)—the strategy toward and decision about the European Community.

Three papers discuss the relationship between situation and strategy. Knud Midgaard, Halvor Stenstadvold, and Arild Underdal (Oslo) analyze "political interlocutions." Do not be put off by the unfortunate terminology; interlocution, a term taken from philosophy of language, is used here to group for analytical purposes diverse phenomena, many of interest to political scientists: debates, negotiations, conversations, dialogues. In the spirit of Erving Goffmann and Thomas Schelling (who although respectively from sociology and economics coincide in their emphasis on the structure of situations in which actors operate), Midgaard et al. begin "a systematic study of the situations political actors confront when participating in debates and negotiations. . . ." In examining the familiar category "time," a distinction is made between "time available for negotiations" and "time in relation to other events and processes." Short time available is said to favor such games as "chicken," longer time, games of attrition. Likewise, for the usually vacuous concept of "context" are substituted analytically useful subcategories which alert us to the actual or potential consequences of our negotiations for other actors (who, therefore, might be tempted to try to affect them).

Related in spirit, although very different in technique, is the investigation by Bo Bjerulf (Lund, Sweden) of the impact of formal voting rules on strategic dispositions of actors. It aims to "establish the strategic potentials and other properties of two common voting procedures and to discuss the potential effects of these properties on parliamentary decision making." Carl-Einar Stalvant (Stockholm) examines the recent negotiations between Sweden and the Common Market. His account confirms that the Swedish decision makers *either* misunderstood the nature of the Community, underestimating the seriousness of its political aspirations, *or* planned their diplomatic strategy *as if* those assumptions were true in the hope or on the chance that favorable results could be obtained.

A second group of articles deals with the impact of the international environment or of foreign policy choices upon domestic politics. Jørgen Elklit and Nikolaj Petersen (Århus, Denmark) note that the referendum on the EEC elicited the highest turnout ever (90.1%) in Danish elections. Henry Valen (Oslo) shows that in the Norwegian referendum the turnout rate was 5% *below* the previous election; he found that turnout varied with degree of *local* unanimity. The relatively unified (anti-EEC) environments in the periphery resulted in extraordinarily high mobilization; the center was generally less homogeneous, reducing participation rates (although in homogeneous—pro EEC—wards in Oslo, turnout was also high). The net effect was to reduce the traditional disparity in participation between center and periphery. Ottar Hellevik and Nils Petter Gleditsch (Peace Research Institute-Oslo) attribute the periphery's uncommon influence instead to what they believe to be the relatively better position of peripheries (geographical and social) under direct, rather than indirect, representation. Also dealing with the interpenetration of foreign and domestic politics, Kari Sulevo (Helsinki) attempts, with the aid of content analysis of Finnish press editorials, to connect changes in the international system with changes in Finnish attitudes towards a Nordic grouping. While the thesis makes good sense—the postwar history of the other Nordic countries also suggests that the Nordic option is a function of the opportunities available in the wider international environment—this excessively abstract and largely impenetrable article fails to make a convincing case. Finally, the review of the leftward shift in Icelandic politics by Olafur Grimsson (Iceland) indicates the part played by the fisheries-limit and defense treaty issues in internal politics there.

Risto Alapuro (Helsinki) makes a stimulating comparison between the ideologies and political impact of nationalist-fascistic student movements in interwar Finland and Roumania. He uses Lipset's idea of the attractions of fascism for deprived groups and Gusfield's concept of "status politics" to account for student ideologies. The decline of the status of bureaucrats in newly independent and relatively democratized Finland was significant to students, largely oriented toward bureaucratic careers. Similarly, in interwar Roumania the vast and rapid expansion of higher education was far beyond what could be absorbed. In both countries student ideologies were "populist," looking for support to the peasantry. In Finland, for example, the organized student movement, which immediately after the civil war had recruited from both Swedish-speaking and Finnish-speaking students, by the mid-1920s became a Finnish-speaking movement leading a struggle against the "Swedish upper class." Alapuro argues that this is status politics. But we have penetrating hypotheses by Albert Breton and Harry Johnson to shed light on such situations, showing the "rational" (interest-connected, goal-connected) elements in what seems purely status politics. In this case one would guess that the competition with Swedish-speakers for jobs, particularly bureaucratic jobs, was a not negligible factor. The appeal to the peasantry, or to the nation, becomes a tool in elite rivalry.

Alapuro also argues, correctly in my view, for the possibility of separate explanations of the sources of leadership for, and mass support of, a movement. He turns to Barrington Moore for an explanation of the varying resonance of similar ideas in different social settings, and concludes that the "structure and social importance of the peasantry" determined the depth of response to fascism in Roumania and its transient nature in Finland. I hope that such fascinating comparisons of the political development of the Nordic countries, comparisons with outside countries as well as each other, will continue to be central in *SPS*.

Election and media studies are "traditional" in *SPS*. An interesting conclusion from the study of party identification in a multiparty system by Ole Borre (Århus) and Daniel Katz (Michigan) is that if the "bourgeois" and "socialist" parties in Denmark are grouped together, and if party identification is taken to mean identification with the bloc, then it is a better predictor than in U.S. election studies. Claes-Olof Olsson and Lennart Weibull (Göteborg, Sweden) argue that the "gatekeeper" concept in communications research needs to be more closely tied to the political system; they suggest more weight instead on "national conceptions of news." Since their data deal with the reporting of news in Scandinavia, it would be interesting to test their contention in less consensual systems as well.

There is great variation in the readability of these articles. One of the purposes of publication in a world language is to gain a wider audience for the excellent research done in the Nordic countries—and in its short history *SPS* has succeeded remarkably; one may hope, therefore, that more resources will be devoted to editing for clarity of organization and expression, minimization of abstract terminology where possible, and sufficient concreteness in background and illustration to make the contents readily understandable to foreign readers. *SPS* has an indispensable analytically organized annual bibliography.

BARBARA G. HASKEL

McGill University

Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future. Edited by Alfred Stepan. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1973. Pp. xi, 265. $10.00.)

This is unquestionably an important book, containing rigorous and systematic analyses, yet it frustratingly adds up to something less than the sum of its individually quite impressive parts. Its basic concept is not to be faulted: a symposium, held on the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the Brazilian military's seizure of power, in which a select group of social scientists probe the nature and dynamics of the system which had emerged between 1964 and 1971. Fully competent in describing concisely what had occurred to that point and generally sound on important questions of causation, the participating scholars have met with far less success in their projections and prognostications.

Since the future of this authoritarian regime is one of the major concerns of this volume and serves to distinguish it from other recent collective efforts (such as those assessed in this *Review*, 67 [September-December 1973] 1089-90 and 1421-24), it seems legitimate to ask how well the authors' predictions fit the actual developments of the past five years. They fit reasonably well up to the date of publication in late 1973 but rather poorly since then. Comparison of the constituent essays which have best and worst withstood the test of time leads me to conclude that in this instance, there is an inverse relationship between the rigidity of analytical schemes and the quality of forecasting. Thus, the greatest weaknesses of this study, as well as much of its broader interest and significance stem from a "deliberate search for new conceptual frames of reference to help put the process in Brazil in a larger comparative framework" (p. viii). As might be expected in a collaborative venture, the attempts in this respect have been uneven, with the results even more so.

The opening chapter on "Politics and Economic Policy Making in Authoritarian Brazil, 1937-71" by University of Wisconsin historian Thomas Skidmore underscores the continuities between the Estado Nôvo (1937-45) and the post-1964 period of authoritarian rule. While this essay is essential for an adequate appreciation of contemporary Brazil, it, like the rest of the book, lags behind the changing reality. The present for Skidmore is the early months of the Médici administration (October 1969 to March 1974); by now the policies of the Geisel government and particularly the elections of November 1974 must lead one to question his flat assertion that the regime has left itself no "extractive option" (p. 16). In a similar vein, the dominance of the "hard line" within the officer corps basic to his political analysis was very doubtful at the time Skidmore was writing; since then the trend has been strongly in the opposite direction. One of the keys to the durability of the regime is not an alliance of the technocrats and "hard-line" military, the feature upon which Skidmore concentrates, but rather a coalition of the tecnicos and the military moderates so clearly in command of the present government. Essentially, then, his look into the future (pp. 44-46) is flawed by the mistaken assumption that the military's hard-line rightists were entrenched in

positions from which they could determine the subsequent course of events.

While of interest for comparative perspectives, particularly in the contemporary Peruvian case, Stepan's own chapter adds nothing to his previous work on the Brazilian military and its role in politics. Indeed, this is the most dated portion of the book, with no information past 1969 and most of the analysis dealing with trends through the mid-1960s. This failure to deal with important tendencies already evident by the time of writing weakens the entire volume, since none of the other contributors has ever conducted research on the Armed Forces, the most crucial element of the Brazilian political system. The economic chapters by Albert Fishlow, Samuel Morley, and Gordon Smith are of a high quality, but need to be balanced by a reading of diverging analyses by Professor Werner Baer, such as his chapter in *Brazil in the Sixties,* edited by Riordan Roett (Nashville, Tenn.: Vanderbilt University Press, 1972). The most serious defect of these papers is a consistent failure to bring out the neo-Bismarckian character of Brazil's present political economy and concomitant overvaluation of the political influence of internationally linked industrialists and the private financial sector.

Prominent Brazilian sociologist Fernando Henrique Cardoso has contributed a highly conceptual essay on "Associated-Dependent Development: Theoretical and Practical Implications" (pp. 142-76). Containing substantial ideological and polemical elements, it should require the serious scholarly reader to seek first-hand familiarity with the works of the Brazilian authors under attack by this productive and creative contributor to the currently burgeoning literature on dependency theory. (It might be noted that Hélio Jaguaribe, Cândido Mendes, and Celso Furtado have significantly refined their analyses in more recent studies than those of the 1966-69 period upon which Cardoso focuses.)

The most provocative, yet in some ways the least persuasive paper is Philippe Schmitter's attempt to view Brazilian developments in terms of "Portugalization" (pp. 179-232). Given subsequent events in that European country, this term may by now have taken on a connotation quite different from that intended five years ago by Professor Schmitter. Departing from the premise of his earlier work that "there may be an elective affinity between certain structural and behavioral attributes of 'delayed-dependent' development and protracted authoritarian rule" (p. 184), this University of Chicago political scientist weds a Bonapartist model to a study of policy outputs and outcomes. In his own terms "deliberately speculative and evaluative," Schmitter's essay places very heavy stress upon trends of the 1964-69 period, reinforcing his argument with very selective data from 1970-71. By contrasting his picture of evolution toward a "single, no-party system" (pp. 209-11) with the vigorous comeback of the opposition party, the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB), in the November 1974 elections, one can recognize the dangers of this type of straight-line projection. Indeed, accepting Schmitter's basic interpretation of the present regime (pp. 228-32), one would have expected that the 1974 elections would either have been manipulated to prevent major gains by the opposition or the results set aside. Instead, there is considerable evidence that the government at its highest levels welcomed the reinvigoration of the parliamentary opposition as a step toward decompressing an authoritarian situation. Implicit in Schmitter's analysis is a belief that the 1973-74 presidential succession would accentuate factionalism within the military; since the actual effect of this process was rather one of consolidation, one must doubt others of Schmitter's imaginative speculations.

The varied writings of Juan Linz are of such consistent excellence that we have come to expect a great deal of him. In this case we are not disappointed. Although the only contributor not to have conducted research in as well as on Brazil, he does an outstanding job of putting Brazil in comparative perspective. Since he, even more explicitly and directly than Schmitter, is concerned with the future, it seems fair to assess his thoughtful interpretation in light of subsequent developments. Events have borne out this Yale political sociologist's view that nonparty legitimacy—either charismatic or corporativist—would not be tried in Brazil, nor would institutionalization involve fascist-type or socialist, populist single-party solutions. Certainly Brazil's current leaders could fully subscribe to Linz's conclusion that "it will be a very difficult task to create a broadly popular hegemonic or predominant party in Brazil" (p. 249). Yet they may note with interest his choice of *will* rather than *would* as the operative verb. Then, too, one might question the assumption that institutionalization of the political system need be achieved within a few years as long as progress toward this end is being made and congruent changes are being brought about in the society and economic realm.

RONALD M. SCHNEIDER
Queens College, CUNY

Class, Race and Political Behaviour in Urban Jamaica. By Carl Stone. (Kingston, Jamaica: Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies, 1973. Pp. 188. $3.50.)

During the last decade scholars have traced

the development of the two-party system in Jamaica, examined the involvement of race in the electoral process in Trinidad and Guyana, explored the charismatic qualities of the leader in Granada, and emphasized the impotence of colored and black political elites to effect social and economic change throughout the Commonwealth Caribbean. Professor Carl Stone's book is a useful contribution to West Indian political science. Unlike most previous researchers he has worked at the microlevel and employed questionnaire material derived from quota samples representative of the adult population of a subinsular community—in this case Kingston, the capital of Jamaica.

The political situation in Jamaica is well known in outline, but Stone clarifies some of the details. Since universal adult suffrage was introduced in 1944, politics have been dominated by the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP), created by Alexander Bustamante, and the Peoples' National Party (PNP), founded by Norman Manley. Eight general elections have been held in the last 30 years; the JLP has won five, the PNP three. The JLP was originally an offshoot of the Bustamante Industrial Trade Union. The PNP rapidly established its own union wing, first the radical Trades Union Council, and, after the expulsion of the Marxists from the party in 1952, the National Workers Union.

There is still a tendency for the JLP to be associated with big business and the lower class, and for the PNP to draw its staunchest support from the brown middle stratum in Kingston, but both parties are now essentially multiple-class coalitions, geared to collecting as many votes as possible at the general elections. Each party has a low commitment to ideology, each is led by a politician claiming messianic qualities, each supports the national ethic of multiracialism, each bestows patronage on capital and labor. The author correctly concludes that "voting preserves a facade and appearance of mass control over political life, while social and economic elites exercise preeminent influence on the day-to-day decision-making process" (p. 71).

Stone argues that "material affluence and income are the main determinants of social status in contemporary urban Jamaica, although race, education, training, and class acculturation clearly affect the economic life chances of the individual" (p. 11). He therefore subdivides his Kingston sample into occupational grades, with big businessmen at the apex of the socioeconomic scale and at the base "a somewhat loosely defined residual category of unskilled and low status labour such as casual workers, domestic servants and itinerant street vendors" (p. 12).

A sense of solidarity among Kingston's manual workers has been frustrated by the emergence of a unionized elite, which has been co-opted by the two political parties seeking to maintain the *status quo*. At the opposite pole stands the unemployed sector, which comprises more than one-fifth of the capital's labor force, and is alienated from the multiple-class coalitions. Neither political party can preserve its upper class support and at the same time satisfy the demands for material improvement voiced by the underprivileged.

The book shows that as the occupational scale is descended, alienation from the established order increases. Discontent is expressed in abstention from voting, a marked preparedness to support a third party, and willingness to resort to violence. Urban Jamaicans express polarized attitudes to race and nationalism. The majority favors the *status quo*, but the lower class demands an end to white economic domination, and rejects multiracialism in favor of black solidarity. Blacks tend to be more radical than browns in all matters that pertain to race and economy; unionized labor is more conservative than nonunionized workers when confronted with the same issues. The unemployed, however, are the most vocal supporters of black power, the Ras Tafari, black capitalism and nationalization of the bauxite industry. There is a time-series relationship between unemployment and crime, and the unemployed are involved in sporadic street riots.

The strength of this book lies in its attempt to quantify the qualitative judgements made by other social scientists who have worked in Jamaica. Moreover, the author displays considerable realism when he points to the durabiltiy of the two-party system, the capacity of the parties for regeneration, the dependence of the lower class on sporadic political patronage, the low quality of leadership which has characterized "third" parties in Jamaica. He shows that problems emerge when extrapolating from the alienated poor in Kingston to the situation in rural Jamaica, where the presence of a landholding peasantry is conducive to the *status quo*.

Methodologically the book has two weaknesses. Many of the occupational groups in the sample are very small, but statistical tests of significance are not employed to provide a rigorous basis for comparison between them. Second, Stone's dismissal of M. G. Smith's concept of social and cultural pluralism, on the grounds that interviewees complain only of material deprivation, is nothing short of cavalier. Stone's error does not invalidate his findings, but reference to the plural framework of Jamaican society would enhance his conclusions.

COLIN G. CLARKE
University of Liverpool, England

Elites against Democracy: Leadership Ideals in Bourgeois Political Thought in Germany, 1890–1933. By Walter Struve. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1973. Pp. 486. $20.00, cloth; $9.75, paper.)

Struve is a social historian, who, as such, claims to be far better qualified to examine the phenomenon of elitism than are social scientists, whose work is often "a function of their attentiveness to the manipulative and policy requirements of the U.S. *imperium*" and to "the class they serve" (p. 475). Plagued by "fantasies" that power is exercised primarily by "holders of formal political offices" or by dispersed "functional elites," social scientists have become mere "cheerleaders of the American Century and analysts for the ruling class" (p. ix).

This is a collection of biographical essays in which Professor Struve argues that in response to the rise of Marxism, such "bourgeois" thinkers as Friedrich Naumann, Max Weber, Walter Rathenau, and Oswald Spengler devised elite theories which they hoped could direct the power of the masses in support of the "bourgeois social order." All advocated an "open-yet-authoritarian elite," or "democracy of personnel selection" (p. 3), which would rest on three assumptions: A few men would always rule and make all crucial decisions; other citizens could or should play little if any role in formulating decisions or in controlling the elite; finally, recruitment would not be restricted to only one segment of the society. In Struve's opinion, the goals of this democracy without "popular control" were not only to strengthen Germany, but more importantly to "establish the uncontested hegemony of the bourgeoisie" and to satisfy the demands of "monopoly capital" (p. 17). He insists that the latter goals applied regardless of whether the theorists themselves were aware that they were serving these goals; the bourgeois social origin and status of these thinkers determined their views.

In a chapter entitled "The Sources of National Socialist Elitism." Struve links these theorists, the National Socialists, and the "United States imperialists," all of whom called for elites which would "function within the parameters of bourgeois society" (p. 419). By weakening the aristocracy and the old upper class, the National Socialists destroyed the impediments to "monopoly capital" and thereby helped bring West German capitalism into the "U.S. *imperium*" (p. 459).

Certainly, few influential German writers at the time advocated "popular control," although Struve's failure to describe how such control should be exercised makes it difficult to determine how elitist a thinker really is by comparison. Also, although he excessively minimizes its relative significance, Struve is correct in noting that many Germans argued for a non-Marxist social order with the firm support of all Germans in order to strengthen German foreign policy claims. This is, however, hardly an original insight, as the works of Fritz Fischer, Gerhard Ritter, Karl Dietrich Erdmann, and others reveal.

The book's strengths are outweighed by its weaknesses. The terminology which Struve uses is extremely imprecise. Such terms as "big bourgeoisie," "haute bourgeoisie," "middle class," "monopoly capital," "left liberals," "right wingers," etc. are used with little or no effort to define them or to distinguish them from one another. Perhaps the major problem is that Struve borrows uncritically the language of such writers as Jürgen Kuczynski, whose writings endure allegedly because they are based securely in "the fertile bed of Marxism" (p. 468). A second major weakness is Struve's unsubstantiated argument that earlier German elite theories describe contemporary United States, Britain and France "better than the dogmas of political democracy" (p. ix). Because Struve fails to provide parallels and examples, his assertion remains unconvincing.

Finally, Struve's persistent attempts to assert economic causation in political thought remain highly unpersuasive not only because he provides such meager evidence, but because he admits to having "slighted the economic nexus of social history and the impact of the development of the institutions of monopoly capitalism upon bourgeois political and intellectual culture" (p. 20). His argument of the importance of social origin and status is slightly more credible, although he by no means succeeds in showing that such factors determine political ideas. For example, he asserts that the social origins and status of Leonard Nelson and most of his followers "impeded their efforts to comprehend Marxism" (p. 208). Struve ignores the fact that Nelson, his students, and Marx himself were intellectuals with almost identical social origins.

Political scientists who are seeking biographical information will perhaps find this book of limited use although earlier biographies by Heuss, Mommsen, Kessler, and others are more highly recommended. Those who want a more precise understanding of elites and elite thinking may safely leave this book on the shelf.

WAYNE C. THOMPSON
Lynchburg College

The International Labor Movement in Transition: Essays on Africa, Asia, Europe and South America. Edited by Adolf Sturmthal and James G. Scoville. (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1973. Pp. 294. $12.50.)

For a number of years, Adolf Sturmthal, one of the deans of comparative trade-union studies, has been exploring the related questions of:

> [First] What were the conditions which caused some labor movements in some periods to emphasize political rather than economic objectives and means of action? And second, what were the circumstances that led to the development and vast expansion of the collective bargaining system in the United States and Great Britain.

Related to these questions, and one of the central subjects explored in this volume, is the likelihood that other countries in the world would replicate the U.S.-British experience, with the expansion of collective bargaining.

Sturmthal himself has set forth a general theory of union development, in terms of market conditions. He holds that at the stage in development when labor is in excess supply, one can expect unions to stress political action. The obverse is that when labor is in short supply, i.e. when the modern sector grows, birth rates decline, etc., unionism will take on more of an economic, a collective-bargaining emphasis. All of the foregoing are conditioned, however, by a particular country's social and political history. Ideology, in the case of labor movements, can also continue as a kind of independent variable, for a long period after economic conditions have changed.

Thus, one finds certain "constants," as Sellier's chapter in the volume records for France, where the statist-dirigiste tradition tends to force unions and management back toward a dependence on government action, even in periods which seem opportune for autonomous collective bargaining. Or a tradition of enterprise dependence, apparently deeply imbedded in Japan, which persists even when labor market conditions seem to favor the emergence of unionism and bargaining, more in the American (or British) style.

Sturmthal and his co-editor, Scoville, have collected a series of contributions on union development in a variety of countries to test their general theses. The result is a useful volume though as is almost inevitable in such cases, the contributions are uneven, and a few of them appear to be wide of the mark of testing the editors' general theses.

Jan Pen, for example, contributes a chapter on Dutch union attitudes toward central wage policy, which is interesting enough, but doesn't shed much light on the editors' central theses about union development. One of the factors (among a number) which Pen says makes it increasingly difficult today to bring about union acceptance of any central wage policy is the rise of "affluence" and with it a new-left socialist critique. That critique attacks every accommodation with the "establishment," as well as the unions' failure to pay sufficient heed to nonmaterial factors such as environment.

In such a setting it becomes difficult for the Dutch unions (especially the socialist-oriented NVV) to cooperate with any government (read establishment) plans for a central wage policy. This conclusion is interesting in itself, but a bit difficult to assimilate into the Sturmthal-Scoville overriding general schema of union development.

The chapter on German union evolution by Peter Lösche comes closer to testing some of the Sturmthal-Scoville theses. Lösche concludes that the early, enduring ideological commitment of German unions to revolutionary political (and social) reform explains the labor movement's general philosophy and political program, since the end of World War II. On the other hand, labor market conditions and great shortages since the German economic miracle got under way, help explain the increasing practical emphasis on bargaining in the past decade or so.

The chapter on "The Economic Power of Argentine Manufacturing Labor Unions" by Carlos E. Sanchez and Aldo A. Arnauldo bears out the relationship between political and economic unionism, though in a somewhat special manner. The political support of unions by the Peron government helped build the modern Argentine labor movement in the 1940s, but this movement went into decline with Peron's overthrow in 1955. New political support, and the passage of favorable legislation in 1958 strengthened the unions, and they translated this strength into new bargaining efforts. The authors demonstrate the striking bargaining gains thereupon achieved for union members in a number of industries. This appears to be a case where political power is translated into economic bargaining power, without clear evidence that labor market conditions changed substantially.

Peter Kilby in his chapter on unionism in Nigeria sees little likelihood in "Sturmthal's prediction, that voluntary collective bargaining, will, in fact, emerge at the labor-scarce stage." He finds that Nigerian unionism, structured along Anglo-Saxon lines fails "to serve any 'essential' need and thus elicits no sustained loyalty from either its leaders or its members." Rather, he goes on to say, unions are a "channel for the protest of relatively privileged wage earners against the distribution of the national wealth

between themselves and those at the apex of the distribution pyramid. . . ." (p. 258). Kilby concludes that the politicized Anglo-Saxon model [Nigeria] has resulted in a worse rather than an improved state of industrial relations, as compared to "the pre-existing non-unionized situation" (p. 258). Kilby generalizes his findings about the undesirable results and prospects of Nigerian unionism to other "underdeveloped countries."

Aside from those already referred to, there is a chapter by Bert Hoselitz on labor markets and two on Japan, one by H. Kawada and R. Komatsu and the other by Koji Taira.

While the volume does not always meet the editors' objective of testing their theses about union development, it is stimulating and useful. At the least, it should convince most readers that conventional Anglo-Saxon models are not likely to offer very much help in understanding union development in most of today's world. On the other hand, I find that *elements* of this "model" offer partial insights into union behavior in many unlikely areas. Complaints about "economism" by Communist Party officials against mainland Chinese unions, the emergence of a craft-union bargaining mentality in parts of Asia, these as well as some pieces of this very volume under review attest to the continued usefulness of the bargaining model as *one* (though by no means the only one) angle of vision into aspects of union activity and philosophy. Like all other general theories of unionism, including those of Sturmthal and Scoville, however, the Anglo-Saxon model does indeed have important limitations.

E. M. KASSALOW
University of Wisconsin, Madison

Native Fascism in the Successor States, 1918–1945. Edited by Peter F. Sugar. (Santa Barbara, Calif.: American Bibliographical Center —Clio Press, 1971. Pp. 166. $4.50, paper.)

The twelve short historical studies published here were originally presented as papers to a conference on this theme organized by the University of Washington in 1966. Three features of the collection make it a useful addition to the growing literature on European fascism: the juxtaposition of a "native" and an American interpretation of developments in each country; the inclusion of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia (generally omitted from similar symposia); and the exclusive focus on native Central and East European fascism. The value of these features would have been enhanced by a clearer division of labor between the contributions on each country, by greater consistency of documentation, and, most important, by a definition of the basic term of reference, fascism. The editor's statement that it was "simply taken for granted" and that all contributors show a "basic common understanding of which movements were truly fascistic" (p. 148) is less than useful in the light of the variety of definitions used by the contributors.

What all the contributors do agree is that the regimes which stayed in power in these countries between the wars were something other than fascist (Pilsudski's Poland is compared to France under de Gaulle [p. 86]), but the description of Horthy's regime as walking a tight-rope between "aristocratic parliamentarianism and fascistic authoritarianism" (p. 70) raises the fundamental problem of definition which becomes increasingly important in any analysis of the "authoritarian" regimes as they move toward fascism without actually reaching it.

In view of the general use of the German and Italian varieties as yardsticks and in view of the basic economic, social and cultural differences between their settings and those of Eastern Europe, it is not surprising that native fascism in the successor states has exhibited some distinctive characteristics. The differences among the six countries often appear greater than the similarities, though some interesting common features do emerge. Professor Fellner stresses the strong religious, particularly Catholic, element, and certainly this was important in the political life of Austria, Slovakia and Romania, but nationalism in its various forms seems a far more important condition for, and determinant of, fascism in East Europe.

Some interesting and fairly distinctive East European patterns of social support for fascism can be extrapolated from the studies. The mass peasant base one might have expected did not materialize. As for the workers, the Hungarian Arrow Cross was exceptional in attracting some of the non-unionized to its ranks; the overwhelming majority of the relatively small proletariats were socialist or Communist. Students played an active role, and Professor Ranki offers some evidence to show that officers and ex-officers adhered in greater numbers than their West European counterparts, but all this fell short of the support necessary to gain political power. The editor's observation that the fascists were merely biding their time until the authoritarian regimes degenerated into fascism is unpersuasive, particularly as it is not borne out by his contributors. All the studies emphasize the political weakness and peripheral nature of native fascism until events in the international arena jolted it into prominence.

The quality of the contributions in this collection is uneven. Some are valuable: Professor Havranek's *Fascism in Czechoslovakia* explores

relatively unfamiliar ground, while Professor Fellner's *The Background of Austrian Fascism*, Professor Barany's *The Roots of Hungarian Fascism* and Professor Wandycz's *Fascism in Poland 1918-39* all provide useful appraisals of well-known material. As a whole, however, the collection does not add significantly to our understanding of this important phenomenon. This is in part due to the lack of a clear comparative framework for which the editor's suggestive conclusion does not really compensate. A systematic, comparative cross-national study of native fascism in this area might concentrate and shed more light on the relationship between this phenomenon and key variables such as political culture, economic conditions, social structure and political organization. In this way the mining of the "mountain of problems presented by the study of these fascist movements" could proceed beyond "surface scratching" (p. 156).

ALEX PRAVDA
University of Reading, England

Indonesia After Sukarno. By J. M. van der Kroef. (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1971. Pp. 253. $6.00.)

This volume from the prolific pen of Professor van der Kroef considers the political and economic condition of Indonesia from the outset of the abortive coup of October 1965 until the holding of the country's second general elections in July 1971. The period in question is demarcated by two episodes which indicate political change of great significance, namely, the fall of Sukarno and the electoral validation of the succeeding order of Suharto. Professor van der Kroef deals methodically with these episodes and other related issues of the period. His point of entry is the abortive coup itself, arguing on the question of initiative that "it now seems likely that P.K.I. leaders, alarmed in August 1965 over reports of Sukarno's rapidly declining health, allied themselves with a number of dissident Army officers, some of them in the Central Java-based Diponegoro division, others in the East Java-based Brawidjaja division" (p. 6). Van der Kroef is prepared to distinguish, however, between the P.K.I. per se and a coup group within it, and claims:

> It seems equally evident, however, that the statements of Sudisman and other Indonesian Communists that the P.K.I. as such was not involved in the coup, have some substance of truth also, although wittingly or not many party and front members were obviously engaged in preparations for it. Available evidence thus far strongly suggests that, either because of caution or because of poor coordination, only a few politburo members and party provincial and district leaders appear to have been aware that a coup was being planned (pp. 9-10).

Concerning a related aspect of the abortive coup Professor van der Kroef asserts, though without convincing evidence, that "The Government of People's China from the start was aware of and materially assisted the *Gestapu* conspirators" (p. 6).

After this diagnosis of origins, the author considers the immediate consequences of the abortive coup, including the bloodbath of the implicated and the innocent. In discussing the actual toppling of Sukarno, he makes the cogent observation that Sukarno's political fall was not inevitable but was a consequence in part of his insistence on trying to protect the pivotal role of the radical left and also of his refusal to concede any sense of accountability as president. Of further interest is a consideration of the role and position of the political parties during the post-coup period of manoeuvre when the military leadership of the recently instituted New Order was determined to circumscribe their activities. In assessing the process of constitutional change, which was not completed until after the end of the period in question, the author investigates some of the less appealing features of Suharto's New Order and remarks that "the treatment of the political prisoners and the obvious inability of Indonesia's judical system to cope with them and with the problem of civil and human rights which they pose, had already by the end of 1968 become perhaps the worst unrelieved scandal of the Suharto regime" (p. 72).

Other matters that are considered in some depth and in an informed manner are the prospects for Communist revival (in which a healthy skepticism about some governmental claims is displayed) the so-called "act of free choice" in West Irian, the problems of economic rehabilitation, and the changing character of foreign policy. In the chapter on foreign policy, attention is devoted to the break with China and the extent to which the formal reinstatement of the "independent and active" formula does correspond with actual state practice. In addition, the author addresses himself to Indonesia's support for ASEAN seen as the basis for a new security arrangement for Southeast Asia outside of a formal security pact. The concluding chapter discusses the preliminaries to the elections of 1971 and highlights the emergence of *Golkar* and the role of the Army in managing a political enterprise designed to root the New Order in constitutional legality; actual results are given without a detailed breakdown.

The general tone of this volume, exemplified in some of the author's concluding comments, indicates a skepticism about the stability and enduring quality of what is described as a semi-military regime. Professor van der Kroef puts forward the thesis that such a regime will become "unsupportable" if it fails to provide tangible

economic benefits. To the extent that this regime has not succeeded in transforming the deep-rooted constituencies of Indonesian politics, such an argument is valid if less than conclusive on its own. As a general survey of its time, this book contains a substantial amount of detailed information and on balance makes a successful attempt to interpret a complex series of events.

MICHAEL LEIFER
The London School of Economics and Political Science

The Blacks in Canada: A History. By Robin Winks. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1971. Pp. 546. $15.00.)

Beginning with the first black in New France about whom there is information, young Olivier Le Jeune, Professor Robin Winks proceeds with meticulous detail and lucid exposition to give us an example of history writing at its best. The result is a definitive history of blacks in Canada which will stand as a benchmark for further research, whether historical or not. Sociologists and political scientists will remain indebted to Winks for giving us, in such easily accessible form, the materials from which to build further and more contemporary analyses, for example, on the development of civil rights in Canada or the extent of ethnic differentiation within the black community.

The black experience in Canada, as Winks documents, has not been a happy one. One may wonder if it could have been otherwise. Blacks first came as transported slaves, and if slavery was not always devastating in its effects, particularly for the relatively few in New France and household slaves generally, it was still the most deplorable of human conditions. Blacks were often caught up in social movements originating elsewhere that concerned their fate—most obviously abolition, but also 'back to Africa' schemes, Booker T. Washington's self-help movement, the heartbreaking efforts at settling utopian communities, and other similar developments. In all of these, whites were largely indifferent, occasionally involved on the side of blacks, and often sanctimonious in assessing the benefits of life in Canada. In one area, Nova Scotia, racism was strong almost from the outset, and the combination of poverty and discrimination continue almost till today to make miserable the lives of black residents.

Given the thoroughness of Winks's historical research, and the fairness with which he assesses the handicaps confronting blacks in Canada, it is perhaps surprising how unsympathetically Winks treats those leaders, both black and white, who have attempted to better the condition of blacks. As a sociologist, I suspect that this lack of sympathy is due to the historian's inclination to place inordinate emphasis on the significance of leadership. For one thing, while it is true that some leaders were charlatans and easily seduced away from the goals of helping blacks, others were magnificent, even in their blind convictions that what they were doing was right, when all evidence was to the contrary. Here I think of such people as John Clarkson, a white Englishman, who led a group from Nova Scotia to Sierra Leone, under the most incredible hardships. Another is Josiah Henson, thought to be the model of Harriet Beecher Stowe's Uncle Tom. But more important, I believe, were the devastating consequences of slavery, that made any leader's task almost impossible. While there seems to be some inclination now to speak of the benign aspects of slavery, basically I feel this is absurd, and Winks himself makes no such claims. What he seems not to fully appreciate, though he does document it, is the way slavery, particularly plantation slavery, overwhelmingly destroyed those social and psychological mechanisms for dealing with the future beyond mere survival. When former slaves were faced with the poorest of land, as in Nova Scotia, with the general difficulty of establishing communal settlements by any less than angels, as in Upper Canada (now Ontario) and with instances of white hostility—then their successes, no matter how limited, need to be viewed more sympathetically.

Winks comes through as an activist, eager for blacks to take the initiative in changing their status, and critical of whites who do not help them. This is most evident when he deals with four mechanisms of self-help. His activist stance leads him to view black churches as appropriate to a stockade mentality, but generally not helpful in breaking down barriers. Yet his meticulous research may allow others to make different judgments, as they consider clerics and leaders of the old school like White and Oliver in Nova Scotia. With respect to education, he tells us horror stories that Canadians are inclined to wish did not exist. For example, up until 1936, blacks in the village of Birchtown, Nova Scotia, did not receive any schooling, and that in an area where blacks had been present since 1787. The last segregated school in Ontario did not close its doors until 1965. With the black press, Winks can tell what is to him a more satisfying story—it has often been bold and forthright in the defense of black interests. At the same time, the black press suffers not only from overwhelming competition from the United States, but also from the general circulation press in Canada. Finally, he asserts, the organization of blacks into associations for the protection and promotion of their

interests remains more a task for the future than a mature effort.

This last statement leads me to conclude that Winks has written not only a definitive history of blacks in Canada, but also, and inevitably, a comment on the history of Canada. Blacks today remain a fragmented community to some degree because Canada is a fragmented society. If blacks did not face as dreadful conditions in Canada as they did in the United States, this is a reflection of the slower, more civil pace of life in Canada, and the greater emphasis on control of overt aggression. It was reflected in the proud heritage of British justice, which made judges the principal heroes of abolition, virtually ending slavery in the 1820s, though it was not legally abolished until 1834. At the same time, these styles of life contributed to a slowness in improving conditions for blacks, compounded of a reluctance to alter the status quo and a moralistic sense of superiority to those in the United States, which prevented acknowledging the existence of problems.

MILDRED A. SCHWARTZ
University of Illinois at Chicago Circle

The Afro-Asian Movement: Ideology and Foreign Policy of the Third World. By David Kimche. (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press and New York: Halsted Press, 1973. Pp. vii, 296. $16.75.)

The promise of the short title, "The Afro-Asian Movement," is, within a clearly definable range, most usefully fulfilled; and only a publisher would expect a study of this length to deal fully with "ideology and foreign policy of the third world"—perhaps "some aspects of . . ." and "*in* the third world" would have been more disarming—and accurate.

For Dr. David Kimche's study, based on a Ph.D. thesis and written while he was a visiting Research Associate of the Shiloah Center of Tel Aviv University, is primarily a history of the several continuities of events which have constituted the Afro-Asian Movement. This descriptive chronology, with its accounts of conferences, preliminary meetings, follow-ups and consequences, is narrative in style and contains commentaries with shrewd insights obtained from a study of the relevant conference papers and documents, contemporary press and radio files, a wide range of secondary sources, and interviews with key participants. Consistent with the purposes of the Shiloah Center, this is a study "where Israeli scholarship is in a position to make a special contribution."

Following a survey of pre-1945 Afro-Asian activities adequate for the purposes of his study, Dr. Kimche devotes roughly a third of the book to a critical description of the "governmental" Afro-Asian sequence—the road to Bandung, the two conferences of the nonaligned nations in Belgrade and Cairo, and the "demise of Afro-Asianism" at the abortive Algiers conference of June, 1965. Dr. Kimche then moves back to 1954 and picks up the sequence of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization, following it through its many manifestations as the pressures which negated Bandung—the Sino-Russian disputes, and Sino-Indian border conflict, the divergence of purposes within the region—destroy the coherence of the movement even as it climaxes in the Havana Solidarity Conference of 1966.

To this narrative Dr. Kimche adds three "case studies" dealing with India, Indonesia, and Africa. These are useful in anchoring the flights of Afro-Asianism to the realities of national politics, but the choice of topics also reveals the imbalance of the study. It is heavily influenced by informants whose information, usually anonymous, is not possible to assess. The space devoted to India and the understanding Dr. Kimche shows of Soviet policies is not balanced by his handling of China; his intimate accounts of selected African policies are not balanced with Southeast Asian studies—the Indonesian case study is not complete.

Readers must unfortunately be warned that the index is totally inadequate and that footnoting is inconsistent.

Dr. Kimche's main contributions are (i) his exposition of differentiated streams of Afro-Asian activity, (ii) his account of the Bandung Conference, placing it clearly in context so that the actualities and the "myth" of Bandung can be distinguished and the impact of the latter assessed, and (iii) his explanation of the positive factors which have moved a new generation of leaders from heady dreams of international politics to the creation of functional organizations more nearly designed to solve specific problems—from "solidarity" to the Southeast Asian Council of Ministers of Education, for example.

This is not to belittle the contribution the author has made in his analysis of Afro-Asianism: changing leadership turning to internal problems whose solutions are not furthered by ideological disputes centered on the legitimacy of Maoism, tensions within the Afro-Asian movement, and the changing relationships of Afro-Asian countries with the major powers. All of this is, in its essentials, convincingly argued.

How important to Dr. Kimche's total contribution is then his failure to deal with China in China's terms? He makes no relevant reference, for example, to either Chairman Mao Tse-tung

or to Mao's thought; the only reference to China's position regarding great power hegemony (p. 245) is expressed in racist terms based on the author's conversation with Oscar Kambona and others—despite his listing of the *Peking Review* in the bibliography. Chou En-lai appears enigmatically, surprises his audiences, and disappears once more behind the bamboo curtain, forever inscrutable.

This approach may not in fact be a deficiency. Dr. Kimche's China is China as seen by Nehru—is the China of all those with whom the study deals. That this was so—and indeed may still be so in many cases—is a fact of great significance. Bafflement with China led to boredom with China's arguments; African leaders and others had more important problems. China's impact was tremendous, but to understand this one should, perhaps, not understand China.

There are other problems. The reader will, for example, have to bring considerable knowledge to bear if he wishes to follow all the author's comments on esoteric local or regional political problems. Opposition to Malaysian participation is stated, but Indonesian inspired Maphilindo and "confrontation" is not mentioned. Only a specialist in Nigerian politics will presumably recognize the initials NCNC, while others will puzzle over North Kalimantan. Nor is Burma's seclusion noted or the work of the Colombo Plan mentioned; the declaration of the Colombo Powers is referred to but the important contents are not provided.

But these comments serve only to stress the nature of Dr. Kimche's undoubted contribution which lies in the clear, expository sweep he has given to the chronology of the Afro-Asian movement and to the perceptive comments he has provided in explanation.

FRANK H. H. KING
University of Hong Kong

Psychological Dimensions of U.S.-Japanese Relations. By Hiroshi Kitamura. (Cambridge, Mass.: The Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1971. Pp. 46. $1.75, paper.)

A series of events which had occurred from the summer of 1971 to the fall of 1972—starting with President Nixon's announcement of his plan to visit Red China and ending with Japan's restoration of diplomatic relations with Red China—opened a new era in the relationship between Japan and the United States.

In his short but excellent essay written just a few months before these developments began, Mr. Kitamura, a Japanese career diplomat, predicted that these "changes in the relationship will inevitably require both countries to make the following psychological adjustments: (1) to try to resolve psychological distortions concerning the other which have long existed in both countries; (2) to try to adjust traditional psychological attitudes to changes in the U.S.-Japanese relationship so that both countries can accommodate to the new situations which surround them" (p. 8). If we fail to take initiatives in these adjustments, he warns, "we are likely to find ourselves in a stalemate as serious in its own way as that of the 1930s" (p. 8). The author points out three sources of psychological problems: (1) an unbalanced relationship, (2) cultural differences, and (3) racial differences, which respectively constitute the titles of the chapters in the main part of this book.

The psychological problems of the Japanese arise more from an unbalanced relationship. They become unique, he emphasizes, when "certain psychological traits of the Japanese character have become intertwined with the relationship of unevenness" (p. 10). Three elements of the Japanese character: sense of hierarchy, "*amae*" psychology, and attention gap and their psychological derivatives are explained in detail. "*Amae*," a "Japanese word which has no English equivalent, means to depend and presume upon other's benevolence" (p. 12).

The psychological problems of Americans, on the other hand, arise more from cultural dissimilarities than from other sources. Many Americans are so confident and zealous in their search for moral good and material wealth that they regard their faith and values as the best and those of different cultures as inferior. These aspects of the American national character affect the cultural dissimilarity and transform it into a source of psychological problems.

In the concluding chapter, the author suggests how "the two countries could make psychological adjustments in order to avoid a harmful escalation of conflicts caused by the interaction of psychological factors" (p. 35). The most important and effective psychological adjustment is to realize the vital role that psychological factors have played in Japanese-American relations. The ultimate resolution of the psychological problems then requires eliminating the sources Kitamura has enumerated. He offers his prescriptions for both the American and Japanese sides. Although written five years ago, this retains its validity. As Professor Edwin O. Reischauer aptly puts it in his introduction to this book, "It is perhaps just as well that Mr. Kitamura was unaware of impeding developments, for otherwise his attention might have been drawn to these concrete issues and away from the more

important underlying problem of mutual understanding between Americans and Japanese."

ICHIRO MIYAKE
Doshisha University, Japan

The Virgin Islands: A Caribbean Lilliput. By Gordon K. Lewis. (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1972. Pp. 382. $12.00.)

The U.S. Virgin Islands are a small group in the northeastern Caribbean with a total area about one-ninth that of Rhode Island and a population not large enough to fill the Los Angeles Coliseum. Before reading this excellent book, one might make this observation in complete innocence. Afterwards, one is aware, at least, of the insensitivity of it. Just as when we were children we heard of Lilliput as a funny little place with funny little people, so when we became adults we learned that it was really a mirror of ourselves.

Professor Lewis tells us everything we always wanted to know about the Virgin Islands, raising disturbing questions along the way. It is not an exercise in fault-finding or in placing the blame, but rather a thoughtful analysis of an extremely complex situation. The Virgin Islands are a microcosm of most problems facing most societies, with the added complications of political status and economic dependency. The United States purchased the islands from Denmark in 1917 for military reasons, without giving much thought to the people who were included in the sale. During the U.S. Navy's administration, the islands were looked upon as little more than "a war vessel or fleet at anchor" (p. 55). Civilian rule since 1931 has not been much better. "The territory . . . is altogether at the mercy of Congress," Professor Lewis writes after a lengthy discussion about the "glacial pace," indifference, and arrogance of the U.S. Congress. "The same is true of the various federal agencies that control and supervise so much of the territorial activities. Everything that the territory gets is given as a favor, not as a matter of right" (p. 350). He points out, however, that in many areas where the islanders exercise jurisdiction, they, too, are often unjust. Their wretched treatment of the West Indian aliens provides evidence of this.

Woven skilfully into the larger issues is a veritable textbook about the Virgins: history, government, politics, the economy, and society. Of obvious value to the scholar and student, it would also be useful to the tourist, who might read it instead of the "fun-in-the-sun" brochures. Professor Lewis compiles an insider's list of hotels, restaurants, and shops, while discussing seriously the nature and impact of tourism, the "mainstay" of the islands' present prosperity. A nice, easy style combined with substance is the hallmark of this book.

The issue of race is as pervasive as that of colonialism, and Professor Lewis seems to understand it well. "It is almost official dogma in the islands that color, as a problem, does not exist. . . . It would be more true to say that there is a color problem but that it is not couched in the harsh, polarizing terms of the North American white-black confrontation" (p. 248). He affirms, however, that the "Americanization" of the islands has introduced certain racist attitudes of the mainland variety. Because race cuts across all class, caste, and social lines in the Virgins, it has not been a cohesive force so far, but Professor Lewis perceives a number of signals for the growth of "black power" sentiment. Still, in writing about the governorship of Ralph Paiewonsky during the 1960s, he notes that "the Virgins were the only place in the United States where it was possible to witness the spectacle of a Jewish governor ruling in alliance with a black legislature, with a handful of white continentals seeking to penetrate the inner corridors of power" (pp. 326-327).

This pluralism is compounded by the "American connection." Status is not yet a political issue, and Professor Lewis asserts that the Virgin Islanders have a "dependency complex" stronger than that of any Caribbean people. Nonetheless, viewing the situation in the context of Caribbean affairs, he is bold to suggest that the Virgin Islands may sooner or later seek to be independent.

This is an outstanding book. One may disagree with Professor Lewis's analysis based upon one's reason or prejudice, but no one can dispute his humanity, his clarity, and his scholarly treatment of the subject.

CHARLES D. AMERINGER
The Pennsylvania State University

The Brazilian-American Alliance, 1937-1945. By Frank D. McCann, Jr. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1973. Pp. xiv, 527. $18.50.)

U.S.-Brazilian relations constitute an unusually significant chapter in the history of U.S. policy toward developing countries. Until the second World War, Britain continued to be Brazil's largest foreign investor, although trade was already shifting toward North America. By 1945 U.S. influence had become predominant. Obviously the war must have been an important factor.

Frank McCann has now told the story of how the strategic demands of war brought the governments of Franklin Roosevelt and Getúlio Vargas

into an alliance which insured "hegemony over Brazil's economic and military sectors" for the U.S. (p. 454). The U.S. badly needed Brazilian raw materials and military bases on Brazil's northeastern coast. In return for meeting those needs, Brazil extracted financial and technical help for its own mobilization effort.

The raw materials (especially quartz) and bases served their purpose. Brazil's northeastern bulge became the "trampoline to victory" in the Battle of the Atlantic and the North African campaign. The Brazilians were proud to have played a wartime role that included sending an expeditionary army division which fought (after agonizing delays in their proper training and equipping) under the command of the U.S. Fifth Army in Italy.

This wartime alliance was built to outlast the war. U.S. policy-makers wanted to maximize the future trade potential with Brazil. They also wanted to make the U.S. the exclusive foreign supplier of military equipment and training. As postwar history has shown, both goals were achieved. In the process the U.S. made a commitment to aid basic Brazilian economic development, including industrialization. As early as 1940 the U.S. pledged a $30 million loan to build Brazil's first steel mill at Volta Redonda. As McCann notes, this was a forerunner of the ambitious aid programs directed at the Third World in the 1950s and 1960s. Anyone interested in the rationale and context of such programs can learn much from McCann's careful analysis of government thinking. Vargas bargained shrewdly, trying to play off U.S. and German offers. But the coming of the war clouded the German option. Brazil accepted the American bid and headed into an ever deeper dependence on the U.S. Neither German trade, nor British investment, nor French military missions were ever again to threaten U.S. hegemony in Latin America's largest country.

McCann's impressively researched monograph offers richly informative detail on the leading Brazil actors: Oswaldo Aranha, the expansive Ambassador to Washington and later Foreign Minister; Getúlio Vargas, whose enigmatic political style kept his enemies off balance; Dutra and Góes Monteiro, the opportunistic generals who finally shifted from a pro-German to a pro-Allied stand. On the U.S. side, the feud between Sumner Welles and Cordell Hull is once again documented. This time we see how, before his ouster, Welles had effectively helped make growing U.S. hegemony palatable to the Brazilians. He was greatly aided by Jefferson Caffrey, the U.S. Ambassador in Rio, who had developed an extraordinary rapport with the Brazilians.

The author gained access to numerous public and private archives in both the U.S. and Brazil, including U.S. military records. As a result his excellent documentation relies almost entirely on primary sources. Specialists will want to compare McCann's interpretation with the relevant chapters in Moniz Bandeira, *Presença dos Estados Unidos no Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro, 1973), although it should be noted that Bandeira did not consult U.S. archives. McCann's fluent style further enhances a book which will be essential reading for anyone interested in the origins of postwar U.S. economic and military policies toward the developing world.

THOMAS E. SKIDMORE
University of Wisconsin, Madison

Conflicts and Conspiracies: Brazil and Portugal, 1750-1808. By Kenneth R. Maxwell. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1973. Pp. 289. $14.95.)

Brazil becomes the center of attention for eighteenth-century European diplomats and merchants in Kenneth Maxwell's fascinating and important study, *Conflicts and Conspiracies: Brazil and Portugal 1750-1808*. Based upon extensive archival research in Brazil, Portugal, and Great Britain, Maxwell's complex yet readable account tells how Portugal fashioned a colonial policy in Brazil to keep British merchants out without antagonizing Portugal's position inside Britain's informal empire. Unfortunately for Portugal, this colonial policy led to abortive movements for independence in Brazil, and eventually led to closer and more direct relations between Britain and Brazil.

As Professor Maxwell tells the story, Portugal joined Britain's informal empire in 1703 through the Treaty of Methuen which opened British markets to port wine, and Portuguese markets to British textiles. As British goods flooded the Portuguese market, British factors eventually controlled most of Portugal's export trade and provided credit for Portuguese colonists in Brazil. What made this all possible was the discovery of gold and diamonds in Brazil, and Portugal's easy wealth encouraged her to continue buying British goods rather than spurring industrial development. The death of João V in 1750 and the accession of José I and his minister, the Marquis of Pombal, offered Portugal the opportunity to control the future infiltration of British merchants without breaking the Anglo-Portuguese alliance. Pombal, Portugal's virtual ruler from 1750 to 1777, initiated a new colonial policy which was supposed to raise mining taxes, protect Portuguese merchants and producers of sugar and tobacco from British creditors, and use the anticipated increased revenues to finance Portuguese industrialization.

The effects of Pombaline reforms in Brazil proved to be quite different from original expectations. Pombal invented a colonial policy innocuous enough not to antagonize the British government, but almost lost Brazil to revolts. Anticipated changes in gold-mining taxes led in 1789 to a major conspiracy in the gold fields of Minas Gerais. Removal of price controls in 1781 apparently sparked a revolt in Bahia in 1798. Both conspiracies failed, and the possibility of losing Brazil led to reforms in Brazilian colonial policy. Even though British traders had been closed out of newly revived Brazilian industries, Britain watched Brazil's growth with great interest. As Maxwell aptly points out, Brazil had become more important to Great Britain than Portugal was. Thus it came as no surprise to knowledgeable observers when the British encouraged the Portuguese court to abandon Portugal to the advancing Napoleonic forces in 1808 and to move to Brazil, Portugal's most important asset. Finally, after 1808 Britain eventually replaced Portugal as Brazil's major trading partner.

Maxwell's analysis of interrelationships among Brazil, Portugal, and Great Britain is a major addition to the existing literature on international relations in the eighteenth century. His organization and conclusions about British influence in Brazilian revolts, however, tend to weaken the thesis. Despite efforts to connect the Minas conspiracy with British-linked merchants in Rio, there appears to be little direct relation between the Brazilian uprisings and private or public British policy. Even Maxwell admits that natural factors and human factors transformed Pombaline reforms into an inflexible body of regulations. Inflexibility then led to conspiracy. Thus the accounts of the two conspiracies become isolated segments unrelated to general questions of Anglo-Portuguese relations. Despite these shortcomings, *Conflicts and Conspiracies* is an impressive work which should become required reading for anyone interested in the interaction of these three countries.

DONNA GUY

University of Arizona

Social Hierarchies: 1450 to the Present. By Roland Mousnier. Translated from the French by Peter Evans. Edited by Margaret Clarke. (New York: Schocken, 1973. Pp. 206. $9.00.)

Professor of History at the Sorbonne, Mousnier has arrived at a wide-eyed discovery of functional theory that will not impress American social scientists because it virtually ignores the enormous stratification literature of the last 30 years. Before criticizing the book, I shall summarize the argument in sufficient detail to do justice to the oddness of its propositions.

Stratification systems reward individuals to ensure that they carry out necessary societal functions (p. 11). Each function is evaluated by general opinion about the knowledge needed to carry it out and the degree of responsibility involved (p. 14). A person's main function corresponds to his job (p. 15), but other stratification criteria such as race, birth, religious purity, property, community activities, and personal qualities are grouped together to determine a person's rank. To understand the system of a given society, scholars should examine correlations among these scales; many sociologists, such as Aristotle, Plato, and Voltaire, mistakenly focused only on economic factors.

The main types of stratification are estate, caste, and class. The most important is the estate (or order) type, because societies organized on this principle are most numerous (p. 49) and most likely to prevail in the future (p. 189). Based on social esteem, rank is established by consensus on the importance of a function. Such consensus is the basic organizing principle of society (p. 49). Estate societies develop in two phases. The first is based on a religious intensity of feeling (p. 51), and the highest positions are filled by those with the most ardent faith. Social rank derives from the prestige attached to the strength of a person's feelings (p. 61). This phase is democratic because anyone, regardless of birth, can reach a level of intense feeling, act upon it, and thereby attain the highest rank (p. 62). In the second phase, the hierarchy is structured not by degree of faith but by adherence to the substance of faith (p. 64).

The rest of the book describes the order principle that organized various societies, about ten pages to each: military in seventeenth-century France; administrative in Mandarin China; theocratic in Rome and Tibet; liturgical in seventeenth-century Moscow; ideological in Revolutionary France, Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union; and technocratic, increasingly dominant in the twentieth century.

The book's argument is flawed in three ways. First, despite lip service to sociological complexity, the author rejects vulgar Marxism only to accept vulgar functionalism. Class society theorists, Mousnier incorrectly believes, hold that wealth determines prestige and power. Rejecting this view as simplistic, Mousnier accepts its converse: prestige determines power and wealth. The simple monism of his causal chain thus ignores the complex interplay of sociological variables. His further proposition that "men in general" concur on the importance of social functions implicitly assumes that what is good for society is so self-evident that all men (women are invisible in the entire book) will concur.

Second, Mousnier never confronts the mea-

surement problems his theory involves. He lists a number of stratification criteria, but he never explains how to decide which estate an individual should be placed in if all these criteria must be taken into account, nor does he explain how to identify discrete estates when the criteria not only overlap but also consist of continua rather than of unambiguously bounded categories. Nor is the problem of weighting considered. In short, the author fails to consider the stratification literature of the past 30 years.

Third, Mousnier's theory of emotional stratification—high positions are filled by those with the most ardent faith—is hard to believe. Apart from the problem of measuring degrees of fervor, the notion that popes, princes, and presidents attained their positions because their faith was more ardent than that of acolytes, nuns, peasants, factory workers, or housewives contradicts both common sense and social science. The casual rejection of the findings of thousands of stratification studies makes this book almost useless to social scientists.

JOAN HUBER
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

Manuel de Pratique Diplomatique: L'Ambassade. By Farag Moussa. (Brussels: Bruylant, 1972. Pp. 411. 1.569 francs.)

It is often said that the role of the ambassador has become less and less important with the passage of time and the changing world order—especially with the coming of instant communications and the arrival of a whole host of technical problems that have to be dealt with through diplomatic channels. With detailed instructions from the foreign office on every important issue, the argument runs, and with a steady flow of technical experts going abroad to negotiate particular problems, what is there left for the ambassador to do?

This question, as well as many related issues, are ably dealt with by the author in his handbook on modern diplomacy. He includes a discussion of the nature of the modern embassy and other types of diplomatic missions, the structure and organization of the embassy, the members of the ambassador's team and their functions, the relations of the embassy with the authorities of the sending and receiving states and with other foreign embassies, the relations of the embassy with the press—a problem of growing importance—and other special problems such as the role of the non-resident ambassador, the protection by the embassy of the interests of third states, and the special status of ambassadors who represent more than one state.

The book is designed to fill three main gaps in the literature on the practice of modern diplomacy. First of all, the classical works of the interwar years, like those of Raoul Genet and Ernest Satow, are no longer as useful as they once were. The emphasis of this book is on the realities of contemporary diplomacy, and most of the illustrations are drawn from the postwar period down to 1971. Second, most recent works on the subject place a good deal of emphasis on the legal and protocol aspects of diplomacy; Moussa's emphasis is on practice rather than theory. Finally, it should be noted that, unlike most of the books on diplomacy which deal with the diplomacy of international conferences or special diplomatic missions, this one is basically a study of the embassy as an instrument of bilateral diplomacy.

The author is well equipped, both by temperament and background, to carry out his mission. He is the son of an Egyptian career diplomat and has himself served both in the foreign service of his country and as an international civil servant with the Arab League. Consequently, he has consulted not only the books and memoirs written by scholars and diplomats, he has also put to effective use the diplomatic lists, the circular notes and the directives put out by various embassies and foreign offices. Moreover, in the preparation of his manuscript, he has conferred with many diplomats at all levels representing different kinds of countries and social systems. As a result, the book contains a good many helpful examples and illustrations of the main points made in the text, with numerous references to the experience of the new nations.

The writer's principal concern is the embassy and, of course, the embassy's principal officer, the ambassador. Admittedly, the ambassador's role has undergone great changes during this century. Today, for example, there are some 50 agencies and departments of the United States government interested in foreign policy and many of these have representatives stationed abroad. As a result, our ambassadors in many posts find themselves surrounded by commercial, labor, agricultural and military attaches, CIA officials, foreign-aid and treasury experts, public affairs and cultural relations officers, and a host of other technical experts. They thus tend to function more as managers of a team than as chief negotiators for their governments.

Yet even in his negotiating role, as the author points out, the ambassador serves as much more than just a letter box whose principal mission is to deliver messages from the Department of State or the Foreign Office. In the normal course of events he enjoys considerable latitude. In a good many areas of activity, for example, most ambassadors are not tied down by specific in-

structions from their foreign offices. Moreover, some of them may have played an important role in framing the foreign policies of their governments and in formulating their own set of instructions, and they always have the privilege of recommending changes in their instructions, many of which are accepted by their foreign offices. There are other tricks in the trade, as well: some may find it more convenient to follow the spirit of their instructions rather than the precise letter, while others may even ignore or hold up the execution of their instructions for a period of time. Finally, the *manner* in which ambassadors transmit or present their government's views may be as important as the communications themselves.

Aspiring young foreign service officers will be glad to know that even in this rapidly shrinking world of ours, the ambassador still has an important part to play in the great drama of international politics. And whether they aspire to be ambassadors or not I strongly recommend this book to them—and to all others interested in the modern embassy—for it is exceptionally well organized, easy to read, and very well documented. We owe the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace still another debt of gratitude for sponsoring this very useful project.

FRANCIS O. WILCOX
The Johns Hopkins University
School of Advanced International Studies

The United Nations: A Reassessment—Sanctions, Peacekeeping, and Humanitarian Assistance. Edited by John M. Paxman and George T. Boggs. (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1973. Pp. xii, 153. $10.00.)

Not long ago, serious assessments of the United Nations more often than not were somewhat optimistic in outlook, even when they expressed doubts about the commitments of governments to a powerful organization. Emphasis tended to be upon growth of UN programs and the potential for constructive development in the direction of expanded UN services and functions.

The overall tone of this book is radically different. In this volume, the product of a symposium held at the University of Virginia School of Law in March, 1972, the contributors question again and again the fundamental ability of the United Nations to serve the world order system effectively. For example, on the first page of their preface, the editors assert that the organization's "record of response to the needs of the international community in the recent past has at best been shabby" (p. vii), Richard Falk comments on the inability of the UN to deal with the growing worldwide ecological challenge effectively, and suggests that a "central guidance capability"—which, presumably cannot be engendered through the UN—is required for ecological salvation. Michael Reisman states of the Bangladesh war that "the quintessential obscenity of this holocaust was the attempt by the Security Council to condemn India as an aggressor when India decided to intervene and stop the carnage in East Pakistan" (p. 31). John Salzberg argues, also of the Bangladesh crisis, that "the failure of the United Nations to fully respond to . . . the massive violations of human rights (by the Pakistani government) contributed to the inevitability of the armed conflict" (p. 114).

But it is Gidon Gottlieb, in the book's lead article, who raises the most fundamental challenge when he declares that "conventional wisdom that the United Nations should be made more effective is no longer taken for granted" (p. 1). He then expresses "ten fundamental doubts" in the form of questions, about the desirability of trying to make the UN more effective. The author is clearly nagged in particular by two basic kinds of questions about the very essence of the UN. The first reflects his skepticism that Charter provisions speak realistically and authoritatively to the political divisions of today's world. The second expresses the fear that a more "effective" UN, far from providing a transition to improved structures of world order, would only legitimize further the virtually unchecked sovereignty of the 140 or so states of the world.

These are serious questions, deserving of the fullest consideration by a group of scholars gathered to "reassess" the work of the United Nations. Yet in spite of the evidence that a number of the contributors to this volume may share at least much of Gottlieb's skepticism, these questions are not addressed in any very coherent fashion. The reader is left with the frustrating impression that the participants here (with a very few exceptions) are prepared only to "muddle through" in about the same way as the UN itself does, offering serious criticisms of various aspects of the work of the organization, but little in the way of suggestions for constructive alternatives.

This sense of frustration is no doubt heightened by the problems inherent in any symposium format—problems that seem magnified when the symposium is reduced to print. First, the contributions are of uneven quality and tone. Some are imaginative and original (Reisman's discussion of civic enforcement of international humanitarian law is a good case in point). Others are little more than *reportage* of the details of events that might not be widely known, while still others (most notably, the discussions by U.S. and Soviet spokesmen of UN peacekeeping forces) are

largely presentations of two governmental positions that are by now depressingly familiar.

Second, however time-honored the practice of asking a selected few to introduce symposium topics for panel discussion, such introductory comments cry out for further development when one sees them published. It is no disparagement of the remarks of Inis L. Claude, Jr., John Norton Moore, and Richard B. Lillich to say that the page or two allotted each is scarcely sufficient for provocative comments on the issues of sanctions, peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance, respectively. Finally, the commentary and discussion following each section is only as interesting or relevant as the individual speaker chose to make it. Discussions of matters tangential to the subject do not enhance the reader's sense of coherent and fully developed analysis, whatever snippets of knowledge or insight they may contain.

If the profound reservations expressed in this volume about the capacity of the United Nations to respond effectively to world order needs are warranted—and many of them surely are—then this is the time for more serious attention to constructive alternatives to, or revisions of, the UN system. One can only hope that effective action will be taken before, rather than after, the system collapses catastrophically. Perhaps the chief merit of books such as this one is that they remind us of the urgency of that task.

LYNN H. MILLER

Temple University

The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation. By George H. Quester. (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973. Pp. 245. $11.50.)

In an uncertain international order, in which the influence of the superpowers may be declining, the norms of behavior familiar during the years of their universal antagonism may be dissolving and the autonomy of a certain kind of middle power may be increasing—in this setting the issue of nuclear proliferation is beginning once again to appear on the agenda of world politics. India exploded an underground nuclear "device" early in 1974. The dramatic rise in the cost of fossil fuels has enhanced the importance of nuclear reactors, of which weapons-grade fissionable material can be a byproduct, in both national and international politics, as evidenced by the Nixon promise of both fuel and reactors to Israel and Egypt, or France's deal with Iran. And in May 1975 a major international conference will review the operation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty which was agreed upon in 1968 and became effective in 1970.

By its provisions the superpowers sought to limit the nuclear club to its then five members—the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain, France and China—with a vague promise to engage in arms limitation themselves, even vaguer guarantees of support for non-nuclear powers subjected to nuclear threats, and complex provisions for using the International Atomic Energy Agency to prevent the diversion of nuclear material and technology from civil to military purposes. It was an instrument imposed on the international community by the superpowers with the support of one other member of the club of five—Britain, plus two or three near-nuclear powers—Canada and Sweden, for instance, and of a host of small countries who could never aspire to such a status and feared the consequences of proliferation for regional order in their area. Will it hold in a situation where the evolution of a "special relationship" between Washington and Moscow may be inescapable, the value of nuclear guarantees more dubious than ever, and access to weapon technology and nuclear materials is steadily becoming more diffused?

Professor Quester knows a great deal about this problem and has chosen to make a particular kind of contribution to the elucidation of it. He has not re-examined the arguments for and against nuclear proliferation, or its probable impact on world politics, which was hotly debated by such writers as Pierre Gallois and Leonard Beaton, or examined by Stanley Hoffman, Raymond Aron, myself, and many others, in the 1960s. Instead he has been traveling to the capitals of the countries that were particularly outraged or nervous in the later 1960s at the prospect of foregoing the nuclear option forever, and has listened to the arguments taking place there. It is a book about probabilities rather than consequences, and this explains the arrangement of his chapters. After a rather perfunctory examination of the Soviet and the American positions on proliferation and the Treaty, he takes us immediately to New Delhi (India never signed the NPT). Although the book was published at the end of 1973, he can be said effectively to have forecast the Indian bomb, in the form it took, namely a so called "peaceful" explosion, detonated underground, largely designed to assert Indian scientific prestige and political credibility, and in the knowledge that neither superpower would be prepared to react forcefully against an action by so large a country yet not affecting their own security. Professor Quester doubts, however, whether India can rest content simply with a demonstration of nuclear know-how and argues that she may find herself on the same escalator as her five nuclear predecessors: "In

terms of India's image, an early detonation without a rapid follow-up to H-bombs and advanced delivery systems might also make India look foolish and incompetent for the longer run, as Indian postdetonation progress will inevitably be compared with that of Communist China" (p. 80).

He then takes us to Jerusalem (he rightly talks of capital cities, since nuclear weapons are the subject of debate between scientist, soldier, official and politician, not voters). Israel too is a nonsignatory of the Treaty, and Jerusalem had strong strategic incentives, even before the Yom Kippur war, for introducing a more effective system of local deterrence than ground and air forces: yet it would be politically ruinous for her relationship with the United States or the hope of any progress in relation with her neighbors, to test a nuclear bomb. He tells us, "It is thus entirely possible that Israel will become the first example of quasi-proliferation, understood to have nuclear weapons ready to fire but never having proved this, to those in the world who require a detonation as a proof" (p. 102).

From Jerusalem the examination moves to Tokyo, the capital of an advanced yet vulnerable country, whose experts can envisage no specific scenario that would require a Japanese bomb but where "the NPT seems to imply that Japan is taken for granted as acquiescent and not a great power . . . the loser of World War II (p. 111). And so on down the scale of probabilities: Stockholm, where the nuclear option was seriously considered ten years ago and then rejected; Brasilia, Buenos Aires, and Santiago, capitals that wish to keep their options open; Ottawa, where it was long ago decided that a Canadian bomb made no sense; Canberra, where the debate was much sharper; Bonn, once the great source of Soviet anxieties but now more irked by the Treaty's inspection provisions than by its substance; Rome and Pretoria.

Professor Quester has made a useful contribution to expert discussion on proliferation, but he gives little assistance to the layman. He is weak on narrative, he is weak on the presentation of his sources, and he does not even help the reader with a simple table showing which countries had signed or ratified the Treaty when he wrote. He makes some mistakes of fact such as discussing Euratom as if it were still separate from the European Community, and, more important, he does not adequately discuss the relationship of other factors—the growing cost and complexity of delivery systems, the demography of the country whose leaders must make a choice, the stability or strength of government, the quality of its adversaries—to the nature of that choice.

ALASTAIR BUCHAN
Late of Oxford University

Third-Party Settlement of Disputes in Theory and Practice. By Lillian L. Randolph. (New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1973. Pp. 385. $18.50.)

The author's announced purpose is to demonstrate that independent third-party action generally can assist in obtaining peaceful resolution of and party satisfaction relating to disputes. In dealing with this worthy goal, Professor Randolph treats the role of third parties in international and "inter-nation" (municipal) situations. The author finds that the goal of peaceful resolution of disputes has special relevancy in the area of international disputes, particularly where the danger of catastrophic violence exists. The goal of party satisfaction relates more to municipal disputes.

We are told that the perspectives of the three participants in the process vary. Disputants are generally supportive of peaceful resolution or party satisfaction. Third-parties and the public are seen as favoring resolution because of concern over catastrophic violence. It is argued that these interacting considerations will induce disputants to accept third-party judgments, since the larger interests of all will be served thereby.

The author accords enormous importance to public support as a condition for strong third-party authority, saying "such [support] enables third parties to proceed to resolution irrespective of the will of the parties" (p. 13). Instead of seeking to identify the reasons for the general defectiveness of public support—especially internationally—the author urges the improvement of the third-party process through the acceptance of national commitments to such dispute-resolving processes prior to the existence of a dispute or by at least allowing the third party's power to influence the other parties.

Professor Randolph examines the interplay of forces which contributes to successes or failures of third-party activities. One scheme of analysis was to compare settlements resulting from situations where a party or parties dominated the settlement process with settlements resulting from a mediator-dominated situation. The author concludes that a party-dominated situation was more likely to fail in resolving the dispute than when the process was mediator-dominated. Since the party-dominated situations were international in character, and since mediator-dominated situations were those having a municipal quality, the author concludes that the third-party process has not been very successful in mitigating the tensions of states. When, however, settlements of a regional nature were investigated, it was concluded that in the European region settlements were mediator-dominated. In

other regions the settlements were party-dominated.

The question must be asked whether the author's conclusions are sufficiently related to hard facts or to precisely identified concepts to be entirely credible. Unfortunately, she uses such terms in the argument as "public support," "catastrophic violence," "power," "party-mediator domination," "persuasion," and "enforcement," among others, without providing precise operational meanings for such concepts. Since so much of the author's thesis is based on the meaning attributed to these terms, and since the reader is given so little sense of meaning of these terms in the several contexts discussed, the value of the author's argument is diminished.

For example, in the case of "public support," it would be helpful to know the situs, quantity, quality, intensity, reliability, institutional framework, and sanctioning process related to such support in order to appraise the utility of the third-party process. Or, it would be helpful to be able to identify and measure the amount of violence which must be experienced before it becomes "catastrophic," whether, for example, catastrophic violence is limited to weapons capable of mass destruction, or whether such violence as a substantial or total interruption in the world movement of energy would qualify; or, indeed, how one would measure national or individual perceptions of the presence of such catastrophic violence. The book combines generalities and abstractions with much specific information, but the specifics often fail to support the more general propositions. One is left to speculate about the real availability of third-party processes, especially in disputes among nations. Nor does the author make clear in what circumstances it would be possible to derive substantial benefit at the world level from successful experience with municipal use of third-party processes.

The book contains four very detailed and useful appendices. The first lists world institutions applying permanent procedures and identifies cases which have come before them. The second lists states possessing membership in international tribunals and parties to international agreements or specified clauses providing solely for pacific settlement of disputes. The third identifies the voting records of national judges sitting on the World Court. The fourth is a synopsis of the activities of the World Court, the European Court of the Communities, and the European Commission of Human Rights.

CARL Q. CHRISTOL

University of Southern California

Evolution and International Organization: Toward a New Level of Sociopolitical Integration. By Volker Rittberger. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973. Pp. 120. 22.50 guilders.)

Rittberger's volume is an interesting approach to the study of international organization using an evolutionary-theoretical framework. International organization is seen as a new distinct level of sociopolitical integration similar, in the evolutionary perspective, to other levels such as the state, the tribe, etc. The first and major part of the study attempts to establish a causal linkage between the advance of industrial civilization as a basic social force and its concomitant sociopolitical and ideological processes on the one hand, and the transition from the nation-state level to the international organization level of sociopolitical integration on the other. Rittberger contends that the linkage between these processes of change is mediated by the emergence of the intelligentsia, seen as a major sociostructural consequence of the advance of industrial civilization. Other independent variables likely to enhance the growth of international organization are highly destructive international wars and "previous international organization experience." The last variable is based on the belief that international organization seems to breed more international organization. Of particular relevance here is functionalist theory with its assertion that the successful transnational satisfaction of needs through intergovernmental organizations is likely to lead to additional organizational efforts.

An obvious problem is the operationalization and measurement of these variables. The spread of industrial civilization is measured by the production of pig iron and crude steel per capita of total population of all independent states. The measurement for the emergence of the intelligentsia is based on the number of students enrolled in institutions of higher learning as a proportion of the same total population, while the experience of war relies on the Singer-Wallace data on interstate wars. (J. David Singer and Michael Wallace, "Intergovernmental Organization and the Preservation of Peace, 1816-1964; Some Bivariate Relationships," *International Organization*, 24 [Spring 1970], 520-547). Finally, "previous international organization experience" and the growth of international organization, the dependent variable, emphasize the growth of IGO bureaucracies and are measured on the basis of budgetary expenditures of UN system and predecessor organizations as a proportion of national government expenditures.

Utilizing bivariate and multivariate analysis, Rittberger concludes from the correlations that

his hypothesis is basically confirmed. But the relationship between "previous international organization experience" and international organization building is ambiguous; it seems that these experiences contribute to the growth of UN specialized agencies rather than to that of the total United Nations system, supporting evidence perhaps for the functionalist theory and its law of "inverse salience" that declares that international organizations are more likely to grow when their tasks are less susceptible to controversial interpretation by national leadership groups. (Joseph S. Nye, *Peace in Parts* [Boston: Little, Brown, 1971], p. 98.)

Rittberger's second basic hypothesis posits that increases in international organization building tend to reduce the instances of warfare among nation-states. His correlation coefficients do not support this hypothesis, and therefore he suggests that international organization building within the global context is ineffectual as a constraint on national leadership groups, especially those of the major powers.

While the innovative theoretical nature of the book is appealing, some critical points must be raised:

(1) In much of the book Rittberger talks about "supranational bureaucracies" which seem to be equated with any IGO bureaucracy. Since the term "supranational" in much of the international organization literature has a special connotation referring to the ability of IGO institutions to issue binding regulations upon the population under their jurisdiction, the term should not be applied loosely.

(2) The term "integration" used frequently in Chapters 2-4 is not defined. In Chapter 5, however, we have a very extensive definitional discussion (pages 84-88), and the reader wonders whether or not this definition applies to the whole book.

(3) The measurements used for the first hypothesis seem to lack sufficient refinement for adequate results. The production of pig iron and crude steel as a measure of industrial technology, the indicator for the spread of industrial civilization, may not be appropriate for the last 25 years. Students enrollment in institutions of higher learning may be an inadequate measure for the emergence of the intelligentsia.

These comments should not detract from the fundamental value of this book, which is worthwhile reading for all interested in the study of international organization.

WERNER J. FELD

University of New Orleans

The Great Wheel: The World Monetary System, a Reinterpretation. By Sidney E. Rolfe and James Burtle. (New York: Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Co., 1973. Pp. 279. $9.95.)

The argument of this book—for it is primarily a polemic set in a historical frame—is directed mostly at business executives, practicing and presumptive, and at all those who operate in international markets and are (not unreasonably) anxious about the international monetary system with which they have to live. Not to worry, they are soothingly told. Lie back and enjoy it. All that scary stuff about competitive devaluation starting the world economy down the slippery path to economic nationalism and depression, the authors declare, is unscientific myth, an old wives' tale. Grown-up people should not be taken in. Of course floating rates of exchange do create problems, and you can lose your shirt—but the authors offer extensive, sensible and practical advice (pp. 195-255) on how best to cope with them.

The polemic shows good marketing sense. The prospect is for continuing inflation and thus for continuing instablity of exchange rates, so the book should sell well, especially in business schools and corporation finance departments.

But politics professors and students might also take a good look at it, especially the historical framework which takes up more than two-thirds of the book. There are minor inaccuracies and some rather rash and sweeping simplifications of complex historical processes. But it does provide the missing monetary dimension to a lot of international political history—and it does so in a brisk and commendably readable style, slowing the pace and expanding the supportive detail as the story approaches the present.

Used with caution, Chapter 12 on Mercantilism Revisited might also make a useful addition to reading lists for international political economy courses. It attempts a straightforward exposition of an important issue in contemporary international relations. Mercantilism is castigated by the authors—as by most neoclassical economists—as "the economic concomitant of nationalism," yet the text also makes it plain that from Keynes on, mercantilist policies have been primarily motivated by a genuine concern in government that the market economy should provide not just more wealth, but more welfare. This—as Cooper, Kindleberger, Camps, and others have perceived—is the central dilemma of economic interdependence. As men in an undergoverned frontier society sometimes had to violate social norms to secure their families' welfare, so governments in an undergoverned world

economy are sometimes led into policies that may well not serve the international interest. Even the United States—one might say particularly the United States—cannot escape this dilemma. Here, in a nutshell, is one reason for treating the authors' conclusions about the international monetary system with caution. For this Candide, at least, the book is altogether too Panglossian.

A second reason is that the main conclusion has been overtaken by the Arabs and their petrodollars. The authors contend that Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) could serve, like South African gold in the international monetary system of the 1890s and US dollar deficits in 1950s and 1960s, as the growth-engendering drive behind what Adam Smith called "the great wheel." But now we have the different problem of coping with too much liquidity—or at least too much liquidity in what is subjectively thought of as the "wrong" place.

A third reason is that at this point some rather flimsy—even deceptive—steps are built into the wall of argument. For instance, to say the United States Treasury introduced the idea of SDRs (p. 191) abbreviates the facts to the point of distortion. And it's a bit much to present Paul Einzig as a champion of SDRs when (as he would have quickly protested if he were alive now) he always maintained that the initials stood for "Speedier Doom Results."

SUSAN STRANGE
London School of Economics

International Studies and the Social Sciences: Problems, Priorities and Prospects in the United States. By James N. Rosenau. (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1973. Pp. 147. $9.00, cloth; $5.00, paper.)

Five basic assumptions underlie *International Studies and the Social Sciences*, and if they are true, the impressive edifice built by Professor James Rosenau, in a study undertaken for the International Studies Association, survives and stands. If they are false or only partly true, the whole monolithic structure crumbles and falls as an independent and comprehensive system. The assumptions are: (1) International studies have undergone a scientific revolution. What preceded this revolution may have been useful for the times, but its philosophical and historical orientation and the older scholars who still espouse it have at best a minor and subordinate role for the future. (2) The decline of international studies in higher education results from the boredom of students who are introduced to current events and foreign policy problems but not given the analytical skills to understand them. (3) International studies have suffered from a "pressure for relevance [which is] insatiable" (p. 19). "Funding agencies want relevance; students want relevance; colleges want relevance. . . ." (p. 18). (4) The way to discover the parameters and growth of international studies is to request selected scholarly journals, whose editorial boards have in recent years weighted the field in a given way, to pick an elite sample of generalists and send them questionnaires. When less than half reply to a question, write this off as a methodological error or the impatience of scholars with details. (5) There is a widespread skepticism about the scientific approach. "From the President of the United States to the local newspaper editor, from the halls of Congress to . . . academe, from the seats of power to the centers of revolution . . . social science is seen more as an obstacle than a tool of progress" (p. 76). The answer to skepticism is to mount "campaigns designed to educate officials and publics. . . ." (p. 77). "Either through the International Studies Association or some other appropriate organization, the case . . . should be energetically and continuously pressed on the society and its public officials" (p. 109).

The tragedy of the present study with all its advanced scientific terminology and apparatus is that these five propositions or underlying assumptions are at most only partially true. Indeed, for them to be otherwise would be a refutation of everything we know about the advancement of knowledge. Most of the study's conclusions are inherent in the approach; the methodology and the questions raised not surprisingly reflect a clearcut and well-stated viewpoint. In this the study is not unique. Its uniqueness rests only in the pretense it brings no fixed views to the problem. Listen to its credo: the wave of the future is with "quantification, advanced methodologies, and technical terminology," and "these outlooks and procedures will lead to increased comprehension and an enhancement of man's ability to cope with new challenges" (p. 78). Not only does the study represent a point of view; a missionary effort on the part of ISA or others is called for to propagate and extend the viewpoint. Some modest role remains for other outlooks and procedures. For example "the commitment to explicitness and precision in research does not preclude the use of intuition and imagination in the formulation of problems and hypotheses" (p. 78). Yet to pretend for one moment that Rosenau and his colleagues don't bring to their study commitments that virtually predetermine their inquiry's shape and direction is illusory. Nor would it be any different for those of us with opposing views and assumptions—say, the members of the Niebuhr panel at the 1974 annual

meetings of the American Political Science Association.

My criticism, then, is that Rosenau's criteria of selection of questions and issues and the use he makes of his dramatis personnae once he has them prejudge all the interesting and oft-debated problems he considers. But on his specific assumptions: (1) The scientific revolution he heralds has had far more modest results than he proclaims. That rather ancient group of pre-scientific historians and philosophers such as Niebuhr, Kennan, Marshall, Halle, and Morgenthau continue to be read, and a new group has emerged, all absent from his elite sample but including Brzezinski, Deutsch, Hoffman, Claude, Huntington, Osgood, and Sterling—and yes, Kissinger. Something must be wrong with a study whose computer failed to pick up even one of this group. (2) If students, especially in the late 1960s were bored with current events and foreign policy problems, how much greater was their boredom with diagrams and models (an objective questionnaire would be useful here)? (3) The pressure for relevance can be overdone. Paul Freund notes that if he had studied only what was relevant as a student in the 1930s he would never have gone beyond business cycles. Is there an opposite risk of making a fetish of what is patently irrelevant to the consumer or patient in the bed? (4) The overall framework of the Rosenau study leads to the selection of certain journals, certain scholars (see my alternative list above) and certain questions. Would the results have been the same if he had queried the editors of the *Review of Politics, Social Research, Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs*, and *Political Science Quarterly*? (5) The approach to skeptics on science is comparable to that of recent nominating committees of APSA which year after year chose scholars representative of one school of thought and thereby invited contested elections. In 1974, the nominating committee had two choices: to continue this practice or to broaden the spectrum of political science by nominating someone well-regarded by all sectors. Rather than calling for a nationwide campaign for a single methodology and approach, I would challenge Rosenau to broaden his concept of science to include philosophy, policy analysis, and history. This might be a more promising way of reducing skepticism while building networks of new mutualities of interest and respect. For all these reasons I find his assumptions incomplete and his study, while provocative and suggestive, less than the broad design required to describe contemporary international studies.

KENNETH W. THOMPSON
International Council for Educational Development

Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1930 to 1945. By Antony C. Sutton. (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1971. Pp. 401. $10.00.)

This book is Mr. Sutton's second volume in a three-volume series on the transfer of western technology to the Soviet Union. Mr. Sutton's present work covers the period 1930 to 1945 when the Soviet economy largely acquired its present industrialized base. The author, a Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution, quotes Stalin as saying that about two-thirds of all the large industrial enterprises constructed in the Soviet Union before and during World War II were built with United States help or technical assistance. The author maintains that Stalin forgot to mention the remaining one-third of the enterprises. These, Mr. Sutton contends, were the result of technical assistance provided by the industrialized nations of western Europe—largely Germany.

Against this background of Soviet economic development, Mr. Sutton advances his "inability hypothesis" concerning the Soviets' lack of indigenous technical ability to generate their own progress, hence the heavy dependence on western technological transfers. Although major writers on the Soviet economy have recognized the importance of Soviet dependence on western technology, this aspect of Soviet industrialization has not been fully examined. Mr. Sutton sets out "to close the empirical gap" on the amount and the extent of Soviet borrowing from the West.

The author has done a prodigious amount of research work to support his hypothesis. The bulk of his material comes from the U.S. State Department Decimal File and official German sources, as official Soviet sources were not too plentiful for this period. In addition, he has covered the relevant major western industrial and financial publications. The data are well organized and clearly presented. After stating his objectives, Sutton deals with the Soviet termination of foreign concessions in the early 1930s, and he concludes ". . . that any joint enterprise with a Communist nation is inexorably destined for seizure when the advantages to the Communist nation have ceased or when no further financial or technological investment can be extracted from the foreign partner" (p. 31).

After the Soviets had experimented with concessionary agreements, they turned to the technical assistance agreements and individual contracts with foreign companies, engineers and consultants. It is this type of agreement that Mr. Sutton investigates and analyzes during the period under review. He treats the various industries on a chapter by chapter basis, and his grasp of the technical details is superb. There are or-

ganizational charts, engineering designs, photographs of equipment, tables of data, helpful footnotes, appendices, bibliography and an excellent index to satisfy the requirements of serious scholarship. One minor shortcoming in his organization of the material is that some chapters have conclusions while others, for no apparent reason, do not.

Following his treatment of the major industrial sectors of the Soviet economy, Mr. Sutton analyzes the process of technical transfer and the problems the westerners encountered as well as the difficulties the Soviets experienced with the assimilation of the borrowed technology. Mr. Sutton then compares the amount of western technology received with Soviet growth rates for various sectors of the economy for the period 1930-1945. He finds that the sectors of the Soviet economy which experienced high growth rates were mainly the ones which received western technical assistance. These areas were primarily in heavy industry. In his conclusion he returns to his "inability hypothesis" and finds that the data support this hypothesis. He only finds two major Soviet innovations, SKB synthetic rubber and the Ramzin "once-through" boiler, and points out that these were supplemented with western methods by 1945. Mr. Sutton recognizes an additional Soviet achievement in the conversion of American and British equipment to the metric system. Hence, Soviet technology from 1930 to 1945 was western technology converted to the metric system.

One finds it very hard to disagree with Mr. Sutton's findings. If anything, he overstates his case, but it would be extremely difficult to refute the mass of evidence he presents. At times, he seems to begrudge the Soviets this transfer of technology and lays inordinate stress on Soviet technological inabilities. In point of fact, once the Soviets made the decision to industrialize, deliberate borrowing from the West was the primary means of achieving this end, especially since many engineers from the old regime had fled abroad and those that remained were regarded with suspicion. In effect, their policies resulted in a minor technological transfer in reverse. Also, Sutton fails to mention the depression of the 1930s in the West, and its effect on idle firms and unemployed engineers. These were able to maintain their salaries and skills working on projects in the Soviet Union.

In the course of examining the transfer of technology from the West to the Soviets, this study throws an interesting and surprising sidelight on the subject of doing business with the Soviets. The West has not generally approved of Soviet foreign and domestic policies, but there exists in many quarters a strong opinion that the Soviets have excellent credit and keep their word with respect to business agreements. This view is touted during the present time of detente when the Soviets are seeking trade concessions. Those businessmen who are seeking opportunities in the Soviet Union would do well to read Mr. Sutton's book. Perhaps the Soviets have changed, but during the period under review the Soviet record shows breaches of contract, unethical practices, patent infringements, defaults on salary payments, pirating of designs and much evidence of bad faith in their dealings.

Mr. Sutton's book is a valuable contribution to the literature on the Soviet economy. It might be suggested as a supplemental text in courses in comparative economic systems and in economic growth and development. The bulk of development literature deals with various types of growth models, some of which are very sophisticated and highly theoretical. Mr. Sutton's method of dealing with technological transfers, an important component of economic development, demonstrates that an extremely complicated process can be analyzed and presented in a clear manner by diligent and patient research. His preferences are obviously for a market-type economic system, but he concludes: "In the light of the history of technological transfers, the Soviet choice of western techniques has been superb" (p. 292). That the Soviets have adopted western technology is beyond doubt. The hypothesis which needs to be tested for the present is whether a centralized planning system can put it to work efficiently.

CARL B. TURNER

North Carolina State University, Raleigh

Political Science on the firing line

The book that closes the gap between the classroom and practical government.

Free & Independent



The Initiation of a College Professor into State Politics

Step-by-step through the Ongoing Dynamics of Politics and Legislation

by FRANK SMALLWOOD
DARTMOUTH COLLEGE
Vermont State Senate, 1972-74

FRANK SMALLWOOD has been a professor at Dartmouth College since 1960, currently serving both as the Orvil E. Dryfoos Professor of Public Affairs and as a vice president and dean of student affairs. He lives in Norwich, Vermont, and it is from this base—and out of the conviction that "there is an important difference between studying and doing"—that he utilized his first sabbatical leave in ten years to enter politics.

The uses of Political Science in Actual Practice

Thus, FREE AND INDEPENDENT is a first-person account, lively and absorbing, of a political scientist's venture into the political arena. Smallwood campaigned for office, he was elected, and he served two years in the Vermont State Senate. At every step, he faced practical challenges, first on the firing line of electioneering, then in legislative battles over such issues as women's rights, land use, energy, health and welfare, the environment and tax reform, plus more routine but important bills that don't grab the headlines but still affect us all.

This book reveals the realities of political life behind the scenes of politicking and legislating where our laws begin: the state legislature. It illustrates for the teacher the uses of political science throughout the political process.

235 pages. Biblio. Index. Hardbound $10.95. Classroom edition, paperback, $5.95. Educational discounts apply. 10 days' exam privilege without obligation. Address Dept. PS

PARTIAL CONTENTS:

Where It All Begins: The big business of state government. **Getting Organized:** Four key challenges. **The Primary Race:** Practical politics along the road to recognition. **Election Night:** The zero-sum game. **The Senate Chamber:** Discovering political "folkways." **The Search for the Public Interest:** Action in the committee rooms. Monitoring the bureaucracy. Federal-State relations. **Vox Populi:** Public hearings. Lobbying. Easier to kill a bill than to pass it. **The Working Press:** Working for whom? **The Personal Dimension:** Pressures of political life.

THE STEPHEN GREENE PRESS
Brattleboro, VT 05301

PRINCETON

BLACKS IN POWER

A Comparative Study of Black and White Elected Officials

Leonard A. Cole ▫ "This study . . . is a happy exception [to the current flood of books about black politics], for it is solidly based on empirical research and never sacrifices verifiability for universality . . . . The merits of this book are many: its originality, its comparative focus, its brevity, its straightforward style, its excellent tables and figures, its useful appendices, its superb section on busing, its more than adequate Index, and its solid grounding in modern social science methodology. Prof. Cole has brought reason and light where formerly there was mostly bombast."—Francis M. Wilhoit, *The Annals* $12.50

EQUALITY AND PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT

Edited by Marshall Cohen, Thomas Nagel, and Thomas Scanlon ▫ These essays, originally published in *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, consider the moral problems associated with improving the social position of disadvantages groups. The contributors demonstrate the close connection between moral philosophy and questions of law and policy. *A Philosophy & Public Affairs Reader.* Cloth, 8.50 • Paper, $2.95

Now in Paperback

THE POLITICAL CHARACTER OF ADOLESCENCE

The Influence of Families and Schools

M. KENT JENNINGS and RICHARD G. NIEMI

"It merits the highest praise possible for a scholarly work."—*American Journal of Sociology*
Paper, $3.75 • Cloth, $12.50

Write for our new Political Science Catalogue.
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS • Princeton, New Jersey 08540

When your book is out of print, is it out of reach?

It needn't be. It used to be that when a book went out of print, it went out of reach . . . at least, out of convenient reach. As many as 35,000 titles have faced oblivion each year . . . many of them important works by distinguished scholars. You can stop that from happening to your book, and assure its continuing availability, through University Microfilms on-demand reprint service. And you can receive the following benefits:

Continuing promotion: a bibliographic record of your title will be maintained in the Books on Demand data base for promotion in our comprehensive catalog and subject bibliographies when appropriate.

Demand Reprint Service: a microfilm master will be made of your book and preserved in our vault for production of bound Xerographic or microfilm reprints on demand.

Author's Copy: you will receive a microfilm copy of your book for your personal library.

Royalties: a royalty will be paid for all reprint sales of your book.

Available on Demand permanently: to make your book permanently available on demand, you are asked to sign a reprint agreement, furnish us with a non-returnable copy of your book, and pay a modest fee to cover the cost of the services. A small effort, indeed, to keep your book within reach . . . permanently.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION and a reprint agreement, please write: University Microfilms International, Author Program Coordinator, 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 48106.

University Microfilms International

NEW LOW PRICE

1973
APSA Biographical Directory

The sixth edition of the APSA Biographical Directory was published in January 1973 and copies may now be ordered for immediate delivery. The Directory includes names and addresses of approximately 12,500 individual APSA members as well as biographical information on over 7,000 political scientists. The Directory also includes appendices classifying members by geographical location and fields of interest.

ORDER FORM

Name_____

Address_____

_____ Zip_____

PRICE LIST

APSA MEMBERS: ☐ Hardback, $7.50; ☐ Paperback, $5.00

NON-MEMBER: ☐ Hardback, $12.50; ☐ Paperback, $10.00

Send form with payment (prepaid) to:
1973 APSA Biographical Directory
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

LOW COST GROUP INSURANCE AVAILABLE TO APSA MEMBERS

APSA INSURANCE PLANS

Group Life Insurance

- $30,000 protection with gradual reductions after age 50.
- Lifetime coverage as long as you are a member of APSA.
- Optional Dependent Life Coverage.

Accidental Death and Specific Loss

- Worldwide Coverage.
- Permanent Total Disability Benefits.

Hospital Cash Plan

- $20 or $40 each and every day hospitalized.
- Payable for up to 365 days for each period of hospital confinement.
- Benefits begin with the first day of hospitalization.
- Daily benefits are doubled if you are hospitalized for cancer.

For further information write to:

Director, Insurance Programs
The American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036



America in an Interdependent World

Problems of United States Foreign Policy
David A. Baldwin, editor
American responses to an interdependent world are the foci of this multidisciplinary study. Old perceptions of an invulnerable America serving as the world's breadbasket, conscience, and policeman are being increasingly questioned. The present book, an outgrowth of a faculty study group organized at Dartmouth College and sponsored by the Department of State, identifies a number of major foreign-policy problems that will face the United States in the next five years. The authors emphasize the need for a fundamental reassessment of America's world role in terms of long-range trends in the international system.

Contents
Foreword/*Gene M. Lyons*
Foreign Policy Problems, 1975–1980: Framework for Analysis/*David A. Baldwin*
Who Next? The Spread of Nuclear Weapons/*Louis Morton*
Interdependence, Flexible Exchange Rates, and Capital Controls: The International Monetary Order in Transition/*Michael P. Mazur*
Multinational Corporations and Foreign Policy/*Kjell-Arne Ringbakk*
The Developing Countries in the World Economy: A Question of Bargaining Power?/*Michael P. Mazur*
Food and Population: Policies for the United States/*Donella H. Meadows*
Interdependence and American Commitment to Promote Development in the Third World: Africa—The Hardest Case/*Nelson Kasfir*
The United States, India, and India's Neighbors/*Howard L. Erdman*
The Changing Dynamics of Hemispheric Politics/*Kalman H. Silvert*
Domestic Attitudes as Constraints on American Foreign Policy Leaders/*Laurence I. Radway*
The United States and the United Nations/*Donald W. McNemar*
Published for Dartmouth College.
Cloth, $12.50; paper, $6.50

University Press of New England
Box 979
Hanover, New Hampshire 03755

HARVARD LAW SCHOOL

CAMBRIDGE · MASSACHUSETTS · 02138

Liberal Arts Fellowships in Law

For the academic year 1977-78 Harvard Law School offers four or five Liberal Arts Fellowships to college and university teachers in the arts and sciences for a year at the Harvard Law School. Holders of these Fellowships will have the title of Fellow in Law and . . . (History, Sociology, Political Science, Economics, Philosophy, etc., depending upon their particular discipline).

The purpose of the fellowships is to enable teachers in the social sciences or humanities to study fundamental techniques, concepts, and aims of law, so that, in their teaching and research, they will be better able to use legal materials and legal insights which are relevant to their own disciplines.

Fellowship holders will presumably take at least two first-year courses in law, in addition to more advanced courses, and will participate in a joint seminar. The year of study will not count toward a degree.

The fellowship grant covers tuition and health fees only. The Chairman of the Liberal Arts Fellowships Committee will be glad to write a letter to any funding agency to which the applicant has applied describing the Program and indicating the extent of the Committee's interest in inviting the applicant to be a Fellow.

Applications should include a biographical résumé (including academic record and list of publications), a statement explaining what the applicant hopes to achieve through his year of study, and two letters of recommendation (mailed to the Chairman directly from the referees). There is no special application form.

Applications for 1977-78 should be submitted before January 15, 1977, to the Chairman, Committee on Liberal Arts Fellowships, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138.

Awards will be announced before February 15, 1977.

1976 STAND OUTS!

Just Published:

LEADERSHIP AND CHANGE: THE NEW POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN ELECTORATE

Warren E. Miller & Teresa E. Levitin—both of Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan

Critical analysis of the contribution of the New Politics period to continuity and change in the American electorate—and how it may influence future changes.

256 pp. Paper $6.95 Cloth $10.00

Recently Out and Already "In":

Significant and teachable as text or component—

BLACK AMERICANS AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

Lucius J. Barker & Jesse J. McCorry Jr.—both of Washington University 1976 383 pp. Paper $7.95 Cloth $9.95

Rapidly becoming the standard—

STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

Murray S. Stedman Jr.—Temple University

1976 419 pp. Cloth $7.95

Timely and provocative as a component—

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: REFORM IN THE POST-WATERGATE ERA

David C. Saffell—Ohio Northern University

1976 267 pp. Paper $5.95

Novel and stimulating—

CONTEMPORARY POLITICS: EUROPE

Alexander J. Groth, Nancy I. Lieber, Robert J. Lieber—all of University of California, Davis 1976 500 pp. Cloth $11.95

For your examination copies, please write to Richard P. Marran, Winthrop Publishers, Inc., 17 Dunster Street, Cambridge, Mass. 02138.

Winthrop Publishers

STAND OUTS! 1977

Revision of a Best-Seller...

THE LOGIC OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 2nd Edition
Steven Rosen—Brandeis University
Walter Jones—Northeastern University

These Exciting New Texts...

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM: A RADICAL APPROACH
Edward S. Greenberg—University of Colorado

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: STRATEGY AND CHOICE
Peter Aranson—Georgia Institute of Technology

INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL ANALYSIS
David E. Apter—Yale University

AMERICAN POLITICS IN THE BUREAUCRATIC AGE
Eugene Lewis—Hamilton College

INTRODUCTION TO CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND ANALYSIS
Martin Shapiro—University of California, San Diego
Douglas Hobbs—University of California, Los Angeles

And a Combination of a New Text and a Reader Revision...

DYNAMICS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION and PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY, 2nd Edition
Fred A. Kramer—University of Massachusetts

For your examination copies, please write to Richard P. Marran, Winthrop Publishers, Inc., 17 Dunster Street, Cambridge, Mass. 02138.



Winthrop Publishers

NEW FROM PRINCETON

Democracy Without Consensus
Communalism and Political Stability in Malaysia
KARL VON VORYS
By examining the political development of Malaysia, a country which has experimented with changes in the democratic model, the author discusses forms of democratic systems adopted by states emerging from colonial rule since World War II. "This is an important case study in developmental politics.... Von Vorys helps to restore the explanation of political development to the realm of politics (where it belongs)...." *— Milton J. Esman, Center for International Studies, Cornell University* $20.00

The Vietnam War and International Law
Volume 4: The Concluding Phase
Edited by RICHARD A. FALK
This concluding volume of *The Vietnam War and International Law* focuses on the last stages of America's combat role in Indochina. Contributors to the volume—lawyers, scholars, and government officials—include Dean Rusk, Eugene V. Rostow, Richard A. Falk, John Norton Moore, and Richard Wasserstrom. *Sponsored by the American Society of International Law.* Cloth, $35.00 • Limited Paperback Edition, $13.50

The Chinese Communist Treatment of Counter-revolutionaries, 1924-1949
PATRICIA GRIFFIN
Griffin contends that an understanding of how the Chinese Communists created a legal system at a time of rapid shifts in the political culture is essential to a grasp of more recent events. Focusing on the Communists' definition and treatment of counter-revolutionaries, she described and assesses the contribution of environment, ideology, and leadership in the development of legal techniques used by the Communists in their rise to power. *Studies in East Asian Law, Harvard University.* $15.00

Conflict in Africa
Concepts and Realities
ADDA B. BOZEMAN
The author compares Western ideas about conflict and its resolution to the nature of conflict in Africa south of the Sahara in its many social, political, and cultural aspects. Bozeman shows how African perspectives on war and diplomacy have evolved under the influence of non-literacy, tribalism, and a concept of undifferentiated time, and concludes that Western concepts cannot apply to African realities. Cloth, $27.50 • Limited Paperback Edition, $12.50

The Colonial Transformation of Kenya
The Kamba, Kikuyu, and Maasai from 1900 to 1939
ROBERT L. TIGNOR
"This is one of the best researched volumes on twentieth-century East African affairs that I have read. The whole study is based upon sound and judicious interpretations drawn from an impressive body of raw materials. In almost every chapter there are important new interpretations of events."— *Norman R. Bennett, Boston University* $25.00

Legal Reform in Occupied Japan
A Participant Looks Back
ALFRED C. OPPLER
After a distinguished career as a jurist in Germany, Alfred Oppler came to the United States in 1939, and in 1946 he was invited to Tokyo, where he was SCAP's authority on reform of the Japanese legal order to implement the principles of the new Constitution. Here is the account of the legal reforms and the methods used to achieve them. $20.00


Now in Paperback

Tradition and Modernization in Japanese Culture
Edited by DONALD H. SHIVELY
Studies in the Modernization of Japan
Paper, $5.95 • Cloth, $14.50

The Political Elite of Iran
MARVIN ZONIS
Princeton Studies of the Near East
Paper, $4.95 • Cloth, $15.00

Write for our new Political Science Catalogue.

Princeton University Press
Princeton, New Jersey 08540



Unchosen Presidents

The Vice President and Other Frustrations of Presidential Succession

Allan P. Sindler

How best to provide for presidential succession, an old and vexing American problem, has taken on a new urgency with the extraordinary events of 1973-1974. Sindler clears out much of the heavy underbrush obscuring the subject. "A keen, succinct study of the problems of Presidential succession." —*Kirkus Reviews*

128 pages, $5.95

The Drugging of the Americas

How Multinational Drug Companies Say One Thing About Their Products to Physicians in the United States, and Another Thing to Physicians in Latin America

Milton Silverman

Drug companies in the United States are required by law to limit their claims to what they can prove,, and to make full disclosure of all known hazards. Silverman finds that many multinational drug companies are circumventing similar laws in Latin America in order to sell more of their products. He provides detailed comparisons of the promotion of 28 separate prescription drugs in the U.S. and Latin America.

161 pages, $8.00

Landownership in Nepal

Mahesh C. Regmi

In his Foreward Leo Rose refers to this book as "the most important volume yet published on Nepal," where 93 percent of the population engages in agriculture. Land is the prime source of wealth, and ownership of land has historically implied prestige, affluence, and power

269 pages, $15.00

Fascism: A Reader's Guide

Analysis, Interpretations, and Bibliography

Edited by Walter Laqueur

Despite the three decades that have passed since the end of the second world war, fascism remains a subject of heated argument and controversy. Here, in what is undoubtedly the definitive treatment of fascism, thirteen authorities provide both a much-needed reference handbook and an original work of synthesis and new interpretation.

500 pages, $25.00

Peking Politics, 1918-1923

Factionalism and the Failure of Constitutionalism

Andrew J. Nathan

Although political discussion in early Republican China centered on the faith that a proper constitution would make China strong, factionalism repeatedly brought constitutions to naught. Nathan analyzes both the sources of the constitutionalist faith and the destructive effects of factionalism.

318 pages, $15.00

The Arabs and Zionism Before World War I

Neville J. Mandel

Mandel explodes the myth that the Arabs discovered the "challenge" of Zionism only as a consequence of the Balfour Declaration. He has discovered that, contrary to popular belief, the Arabs were aware of Zionist aims and activities in Palestine before 1914—and largely opposed to them.

268 pages, Illustrated, $13.50

The Africanization of Jobs

Educational and Occupational Segmentations in the Camerouns

Remi Clignet

Clignet shows that the extent and form of bargaining power enjoyed by differing types of wage earners and their employers vary widely. As a result, the influence of education on modes of entry into the labor force, on patterns of access to higher skill levels, and finally on income is culturally relative.

256 pages, 66 tables, $12.50

At bookstores

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS
BERKELEY 94720



Supplementary Empirical Teaching Units in Political Science: American Politics

New computer related instructional materials whereby students learn important substantive topics in American politics as they learn methods of analysis.

Seven SETUPS are Available Now for Class Use

Voting Behavior: The 1972 Election by Bruce D. Bowen, C. Anthony Broh, Charles L. Prysby.

Political Socialization Across the Generations by Paul Allen Beck, Jere W. Bruner, L. Douglas Dobson.

Political Participation by F. Christopher Arterton, Harlan Hahn.

The Supreme Court in American Politics: Policy Through Law by John Paul Ryan, C. Neal Tate.

U.S. Energy, Environment and Economic Problems: A Public Policy Simulation by Barry Hughes.

Representation in the United States Congress: 1973 by Ray A. Geigle and Peter J. Hartjens.

The Dynamics of Political Budgeting: A Public Policy Simulation by Marvin K. Hoffman.

Each SETUPS is a module that can be taught in one to two weeks. SETUPS were designed to supplement instruction in introductory courses. But SETUPS have been field tested successfully in upper division courses. SETUPS were developed by faculty in a workshop supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation to the American Political Science Association and hosted by the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research, summer, 1974.

Each SETUPS Module Includes a Monograph and a Data Set

The monograph is a 5½" x 8½" paperback of approximately 100 pages with:

1. A substantive essay on the topic.
2. Analytical exercises.
3. Instructions about how to do the exercises.
4. Suggestions for further readings and exercises.
5. A code book for the data set.

The data set is prepared and distributed by the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research. The SETUPS data can be ordered for use with SPSS, OSIRIS or as card image.

The minimum SETUPS order is 25 copies–in any combination of titles. Each SETUPS will cost $3.50. *(Note: We are reducing the price in response to the demand.)* Lower prices are arranged for bulk orders. An order for 25 or more SETUPS will entitle you to the data sets for *all the SETUPS* at no extra charge.

TO ORDER SETUPS

Fill out the form below and the SETUPS Monographs will be sent to your bookstore. When we confirm the bookstore order, we shall send you a data-specification form.

Please complete and return this form to:

SETUPS: American Politics
American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

Name_____

Department_____

College_____

Address_____

City_____ State_____ Zip_____

I am planning to use the following SETUPS in_____
course title

No._____of: *Voting Behavior*

No._____of: *Political Socialization*

No._____of: *Political Participation*

No._____of: *The Supreme Court in American Politics*

No._____of: *Public Policy: U.S. Energy, Environment and Economic Problems*

No._____of: *Representation in the United States Congress: 1973*

No._____of: *The Dynamics of Political Budgeting*



Asian Profile

ASIA'S INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL

devoted exclusively to multi-disciplinary study of Asian affairs

PUBLISHED	Bi-monthly in February, April, June, August, October, and December
LANGUAGE	All articles in English
COVERAGE	China, Japan, Korea, Southeast Asia and South Asia
CONTENT	Articles on topics of current interest by scholars from both inside and outside Asia. Explicitly illustrated with pertinent maps, diagrams, photographs and tables
RATES	Annual subscription U.S.$25.00 post free Back issues: Vol. 1, 1973 (3 issues) U.S.$12.50 post free Vol. 2, 1974 (6 issues) U.S.$25.00 post free Vol. 3, 1975 (6 issues) U.S.$25.00 post free Single copy U.S.$4.50 post free
AVAILABLE FROM	**ASIAN RESEARCH SERVICE** P. O. Box 2232, G. P. O., Hong Kong

LO SPETTATORE INTERNAZIONALE

A quarterly review of international politics published in English by the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) of Rome. Each issue contains articles by Italian and foreign authors and a regular survey of Italy's position in international politics and commerce.

Among the articles published in the last issue of 1975 were the following:

Cesare Merlini — *Italy's Role in the International Scenario*

Stefano Silvestri — *The International Political System*

Roberto Aliboni — *Economic Policies and International Co-operation*

Gianni Bonvicini — *The Foreign Relations of the European Community and Political Co-operation*

Gianluca Devoto — *Italy's Armaments Program and Nuclear Proliferation*

Vincenzo Russo — *Italy's Monetary Policy*

Maria Valeria Agostini — *Italy's Regional Policy*

Bona Pozzoli — *Italy's Bilateral Policy*

In forthcoming issues of 1976 articles on the EEC's Mediterranean policy, arms standardization, the changing situation in southern Europe, investment and labor in the Mediterranean, and Italy's place in the international scene will be featured.

Editor-in-chief: Cesare Merlini

Editorial Offices: Istituto Affari Internazionali Viale Mazzini 88 (Rome) 00195

Subscription Rates for 1976:

Italy	Lit. 5000 or
Europe	Lit. 6000 or $ 9.50
Other Countries	Lit. 7000 or $11.00

Orders should be sent directly to the publisher:

Società editrice il Mulino
Via S. Stefano 6 — P.O. Box 119
40100 (Bologna) Italy

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT and the ERA of the NEW DEAL

General Editor: Frank Freidel, Harvard University

My America: 1928-1938
Louis Adamic
669 pp. $39.50*
ISBN 0-306-70801-9

American Stuff:
An Anthology of the Prose and Verse by Members of the Federal Writers Project
318 pp. $19.50
ISBN 0-306-70806-X

Wartime Shipyard:
A Study in Social Disunity
Katherine Archibald
237 pp. $17.50
ISBN 0-306-70802-7

Inflation in the United States
Lester Chandler
402 pp. $25.00
ISBN 0-306-70804-3

Price and Related Controls in the United States
Seymour E. Harris
393 pp. $25.00
ISBN 0-306-70828-0

Inflation and the American Economy
Seymour E. Harris
659 pp. $35.00
ISBN 0-306-70827-2

Tomorrow a New World
Paul K. Conkin
359 pp. $22.50
ISBN 0-306-70805-1

Puerto Rican Politics and the New Deal
Thomas Mathews
345 pp. $22.50
ISBN 0-306-70752-7

1933: Characters in Crisis
Herbert Feis
366 pp. $22.50*
ISBN 0-306-70807-8

Wartime Production Controls
David Novick
447 pp. $27.50
ISBN 0-306-70818-3

The Detroit Race Riot
Robert Shogan and Tom Craig
199 pp. $17.50
ISBN 0-306-70808-6

The Fervent Years
Harold Clurman
329 pp. $19.50
ISBN 0-306-70819-1

The Price of Power
Hanson W. Baldwin
361 pp. $22.50*
ISBN 0-306-70803-5

*Not available from Da Capo Press in the British Commonwealth, excluding Canada.

DA CAPO PRESS, INC. 227 West 17th Street, New York, NY 10011

United Kingdom: Plenum Publishing Co. Ltd., Black Arrow House, 2 Chandos Road, London NW10 6NR England

Prices slightly higher outside the U.S. Prices subject to change without notice.

New from

THE POLITICS OF EXCLUSION
MICHAEL N. DANIELSON

The Politics of Exclusion is an account of the attempt to open up the suburbs to the urban poor. An in-depth study of the social and economic motives underlying exclusionary housing practices, this is an important book for political scientists and for those interested in urban politics, urban planning, and social reform.
cloth, $17.50; paper, $5.95

DEVELOPING THE ICBM
A Study in Bureaucratic Politics
EDMUND BEARD

This Bancroft Award-winning study traces the development of the American intercontinental ballistic missile. Stressing the interrelation of politics, strategy, and weapons choice, the author demonstrates that cultural resistance within the Air Force to the idea of long-range ballistic rockets was at least as important as technological or strategic factors in dictating the weapon's progress. $15.00

THE "TAR BABY" OPTION
American Policy Toward Southern Rhodesia
ANTHONY LAKE

Feeling that "no area of the world has been viewed by Americans with greater moral disapproval and yet less attention than southern Africa," author Anthony Lake offers this detailed account of America's Southern Rhodesia policy since the Smith government's unilateral declaration of independence from Great Britain in 1965. The book provides information essential to an understanding of the current crisis in the region. cloth, $17.50; paper, $5.95

ELITE STRUCTURE AND IDEOLOGY
A Theory with Applications to Norway
JOHN HIGLEY, G. LOWELL FIELD, and KNUT GRØHOLT

Ranging over a large number of societies, historical and contemporary, this book presents a general theory of elite structure and ideology as they relate to political stability and instability. There is a special emphasis on Norwegian society with information presented in the context of the general theory. $17.50



COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS
Address for orders: 136 South Broadway, Irvington, New York 10533

Columbia

An important new book from the pages of *Political Science Quarterly*, "one of the liveliest and freshest of serious, scholarly journals"*:

AMERICAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE 1970s
A *Political Science Quarterly* Reader
DEMETRIOS CARALEY, Editor

The 1970s have been a time of remarkable turbulence and change on the American political scene. Noteworthy political events included the resignation of a president and vice president and the near bankruptcy of the nation's largest city, to name a few. Almost every one of the significant events of this period has been cogently discussed and analyzed in *Political Science Quarterly,* America's foremost political science journal. These timely and relevant essays are now brought together in book form. The collection is comprehensive and offers a useful tool for putting recent events in perspective.

Between these covers one can read Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., on presidential succession; Samuel P. Huntington on the dynamics of political change; Alpheus Thomas Mason on the Burger Court; Demetrios Caraley on congressional politics and the plight of the city; and many other leading scholars commenting on the key issues of the day. In addition, the historic Watergate briefs are reproduced in their entirety. This volume is not only an interesting account of this turbulent period but also a welcome background for the concerned voter in this election year.

cloth, $17.50; paper, $6.95

*Robert Lekachman, Distinguished Professor, City University of New York



COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS
Address for orders: 136 South Broadway, Irvington, New York 10533

Students, professors, and those interested in the study of politics and government are invited to become members of the AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION.

JOIN APSA

Membership includes:

The American Political Science Review—quarterly journal of scholarly articles and book reviews in political science, and

PS—quarterly journal of association news and articles of professional concern.

Opportunity to register in the APSA Personnel Service—currently lists the largest number of political science teaching and research positions.

Attend the APSA Annual Meeting, September 2-5, 1976, Chicago, Illinois.

Name_____

Mailing Address_____

_____ Zip_____

This is an application for membership. Upon receipt of this form we will mail you a membership card and begin a year's subscription to the AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW and PS.

Student ..... $12 ☐

Annual:

If your annual income is under $12,000 ..... $25 ☐
$12,000-14,999 ..... $30 ☐
$15,000-19,999 ..... $35 ☐
$20,000-24,999 ..... $40 ☐
$25,000-29,999 ..... $45 ☐
over $30,000 ..... $50 ☐

Add $2 for foreign postage.

Please send with remittance to:

Membership Secretary
AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

In paperback from Dell

God, Money and The New Capitalism are explored in

ECONOMICS, SOCIETY AND CULTURE


by Robert Ghelardi

Spotlighting the questionable origins and consequent fallacies of Keynes's economic philosophy—which has influenced American fiscal policy since World War II—this study is one of the first to show how economics can break out of its artificial self-containment to become, instead, a workable instrument of human culture and moral purpose.

Ghelardi proposes a new, arresting model of Western culture to which philosophy and all the arts are seen to conform. He identifies the foremost issue of our time as the conflict between the State's attempt to control the social order and culture's effect as society's most powerful integrator. Within this conflict, he finds the elusive middle way between capitalism's alienating individualism and the communist/socialist principles of collectivism.

Finally, Ghelardi eschews the Keynesian dogma and—although still drawing upon American economic tradition—demonstrates his theory's viability by citing case after case in which its spontaneous application has begun to render the words "inflation" and "depression" obsolete.

A DELTA ORIGINAL $3.95



LIBERATING FEMINISM

Benjamin R. Barber

The first coherent analysis of the women's movement to make sense of the morass of rhetoric and ideology pouring forth from both the radical feminists and the male chauvinists. "Read it. It's about all of us: men, women and gods."—*The Village Voice* DELTA BOOK $2.65

RUSSIA ON OUR MINDS

Delia and Ferdinand Kuhn

An in-depth view of Russia, her people, institutions, culture, and beliefs, given through first-hand interviews and observations. "A new kind of book about Russia and one badly needed by all of us Americans . . ."—William L. Shirer
LAUREL EDITION $1.75

THE MIND OF CHINA

Ben-Ami Scharfstein

A distinguished study of traditional China which brings to life the essential ideas and customs of the last thousand years. "A scholarly and exquisitely cadenced work."—*Publishers Weekly*
DELTA BOOK $2.95

DELL PUBLISHING CO., INC.
1 Dag Hammarskjold Plaza
New York, N. Y. 10017

NEW, from Lexington Books

Financing the 1972 Election
Herbert E. Alexander, with
Eugenia Grohman, Caroline D. Jones, Clifford W. Brown
Citizens' Research Foundation
800pp. $21.95

Education, Inequality, and National Policy
edited by **Nelson F. Ashline,**
Illinois State Department of Education;
Thomas R. Pezzullo; and **Charles I. Norris,**
University of Rhode Island
224pp. $14.00

International Politics of Energy Interdependence
Nazli Choucri, with **Vincent Ferraro,** *M.I.T.*
272pp. $20.00

China's Foreign Aid
An Instrument of Peking's Foreign Policy
John F. Copper, *University of Maryland*
224pp. $17.50

The Federal Government and Educational R&D
Richard A. Dershimer,
American Educational Research Association
In Press Fall 1976

Congress and the Colleges
The National Politics of Higher Education
Lawrence E. Gladieux,
College Entrance Examination Board;
Thomas R. Wolanin, *University of Wisconsin*
288pp. $18.50

State Financial Incentives to Industry
Daryl A. Hellman, *Northeastern University;*
Gregory H. Wassall, *University of Hartford;*
Laurance H. Falk, *Rutgers University*
160pp. $15.50

The Carrying Capacity of a Nation
Growth and the Quality of Life
Peter W. House, Edward R. Williams
Office of Research and Development, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
384pp. $17.00

International Regulatory Regimes
Case Studies in Health, Meteorology, and Food
David Lieve,
American Society for International Law
In Press Summer 1976

Stress and Contradiction in Modern Capitalism
Public Policy and the Theory of the State
edited by **Leon N. Lindberg,** *University of Wisconsin;* **Robert Alford,** *University of California;* **Colin Crouch,** *London School of Economics and Political Science;* **Claus Offe,** *University of Bielefeld*
464pp. $21.00

The Participatory Democracy
Women and Minorities in a More Representative Public Service
Harry Kranz
272pp. $17.50

Interdependence
The European-American Connection in the Global Context
Gerhard Mally, *Atlantic Council of the U.S.*
256pp. $17.50

The New Internationalism
Strategy and Initiatives for U.S. Foreign Economic Policy
Wilbur F. Monroe,
Council on International Economic Policy
256pp. $16.00

Bahrain
Political Development in a Modernizing Society
Emile A. Nakhleh,
Mount Saint Mary's College
208pp. $16.00

Policy Issues in Education
edited by **Allan C. Ornstein** and **Steven Miller,** *Loyola University*
176pp. $15.00

Energy Planning and Policy
The Political Economy of Project Independence
Thomas H. Tietenberg,
Federal Energy Administration
192pp. $15.00

Latin American Inflation
Susan Wachter, *University of Pennsylvania*
In Press Fall 1976

Housing and Housing Policy in the U.S. and the U.K.
Harold L. Wolman,
University of Massachusetts
144pp. $13.00



D.C. HEATH AND COMPANY
125 Spring Street
Lexington, Massachusetts 02173

Lexington Books



PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS AND AMERICAN POLITICS: Voters, Candidates, and Campaigns since 1952 (paperbound)
Herbert B. Asher, The Ohio State University

CONGRESS, THE BUREAUCRACY, AND PUBLIC POLICY (paperbound)
Randall B. Ripley and **Grace A. Franklin,** both of the Ohio State University

URBAN POLITICS IN THE SUBURBAN ERA (paperbound)
Thomas P. Murphy, University of Maryland, and
John Rehfuss, Northern Illinois University

TEXAS GOVERNMENT TODAY: Structures, Functions, Political Processes (paperbound)
Beryl E. Pettus, Sam Houston State University, and
Randall W. Bland, Southwest Texas State University

THE DORSEY PRESS • **Homewood, Illinois 60430**

From LEARNING SYSTEMS COMPANY
Programmed Learning Aids (PLAIDS) for Self Review in

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (paperbound)
Norman R. Luttbeg, Florida State University

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (paperbound)
Joseph T. Keenan, DePaul University

Examination copies for adoption consideration available on request; please indicate course title and text presently used.

Write for our complete Catalog

"This volume should be of interest all across the board in the social sciences, in government circles, and among communications specialists.

"It takes the theory of political participation considerably beyond its present Europe-America centered bias, and offers a definition that more effectively encompasses the varieties of participation in the so-called second and third worlds."

—Gabriel A. Almond

A sophisticated problem-focused book with far-reaching conclusions.

NO EASY CHOICE

Political Participation in Developing Countries

Samuel P. Huntington and Joan M. Nelson

$10.50

Harvard University Press

Cambridge, Mass. 02138

On the Silence of the Declaration of Independence

Paul Eidelberg,
Henry Salvatori
Research Professor,
Claremont Men's College

Can the Declaration assume once again the importance and relevance it possessed for the statesmen of 1776? Paul Eidelberg proposes such a revitalization by examining elements overlooked in traditional interpretations. In the "silences" of the document he finds a semi-aristrocratic view of mankind, reflecting a dedication to reason and to qualities of civility more characteristic of *some* men than of men in general. He then uses these political principles to analyze contemporary political thought and policy.

128 pp., cloth, $7.00

Party Leadership in the States

Robert J. Huckshorn,
Florida Atlantic University

The first full-scale study of state party leadership and organization in this country. Interviews with eighty incumbent state party chairmen and over a hundred other party leaders detail the history of state parties, the legal basis for powers exercised by party officers and the social characteristics and career patterns of party officials. Both traditional and modern functions served by party chairmen are fully explored, followed by suggestions for reform and strengthening of state party organization.

" . . . one of the best studies of political parties as formal politics that I have seen. . . . Most of the material in this book is unique"—James A. Riedel, SUNY at Albany.

400 pp., cloth, $15.00

University of Massachusetts Press Box 429b Amherst, Mass. 01002

Listing and Order Form for Publications of the AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

Quarterly journal of scholarly articles and book reviews in political science. Included in APSA membership. Back issues: $10.50 per copy; $42.00 per volume.

PS

Quarterly journal of Association news and articles of professional concern. Included in APSA membership. Back issues: $2.00 per copy; $5.00 per volume.

DEA NEWS FOR TEACHERS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Newspaper on education and the curriculum. Included in APSA membership.

ANNUAL MEETING PROGRAM

Final program for APSA Annual Meeting. Included in Annual Meeting Registration. Extra copies: $.50.

APSA ANNUAL MEETING PAPERS**

Hard copies, $3.00 each.

APSA ANNUAL MEETING PROCEEDINGS**

Microfilm reels of all papers, 1901-1912; 1956-present. $22.00 per reel. (approx. 7 reels per meeting.)

CUMULATIVE INDEX TO THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW**

1906-1968, $6.50.

CUMULATIVE INDEX TO THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL MEETINGS**

Key word index to all papers included in proceedings of Annual Meetings for 1904-1912; 1956-1970: $18.50.

WOMEN IN POLITICAL SCIENCE: STUDIES AND REPORTS, 1969-71 OF THE APSA COMMITTEE ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION**

PB 486, $11.00.

POLITICAL SCIENCE THESAURUS

A major reference tool in political science; this volume represents the terminology control device for a computer-based information retrieval service. Individuals: Hardback: $20.00; Paper: $15.00. Institutions: Hardback: $30.00; Paper: $25.00.

APSA BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY (Sixth Edition, 1973)

Biographical information on over 7,000 Association members, plus names and addresses for approximately 12,500 members. Members: Hardback: $7.50; Paper: $5.00. Non-Members: Hardback: $12.50; Paper: $10.00.

APSA DIRECTORY OF MEMBERS: ANNUAL SUPPLEMENT TO THE APSA BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY

Names and current addresses of all APSA members. $3.00 each.

GUIDE TO PUBLICATION IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

Co-sponsored by the APSA Committee on the Status of Women and the Women's Caucus for Political Science. $1.00.

ROSTER OF WOMEN IN POLITICAL SCIENCE (4th edition)

Biographical information on women political scientists. $3.00 each.

ANNUAL APSA DIRECTORY OF DEPARTMENT CHAIRPERSONS

Names and addresses of Chairpersons of departments offering political science at four-year institutions. $20.00 each.

PERSONNEL SERVICE GUIDELINES FOR EMPLOYERS AND APPLICANTS

Pamphlet containing information and guidelines for members of the APSA Personnel Service and for employers listing their vacancies in the Personnel Service Newsletter. No charge.

PERSONNEL SERVICE NEWSLETTER

Monthly listing of positions for political scientists. APSA Members: $8.00 subscription.

**Order from: Customer Service Department, University Microfilms, 313 North First Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106.

CAREERS AND THE STUDY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE: A GUIDE FOR UNDERGRADUATES

A monograph discussing the relationship between political science knowledge and skills and careers in law, government, business, journalism, teaching, etc. $.50 each; bulk rates available.

GUIDE TO GRADUATE STUDY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

Compilation of Ph.D. and Masters programs in political science. The 1976 Guide is revised and expanded to include listings of faculty and fields of specialization. $4.00 each.

SOURCES OF FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR POLITICAL SCIENTISTS: RESEARCH EDUCATION, PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT BULLETIN 1: SUPPORT FOR PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT: FELLOWSHIPS AND TRAINEESHIPS

Information on post-doctoral fellowships, internship programs, special training support and foreign travel grants available to faculty and advanced graduate students. $1.00 each.

GLOBAL DIMENSIONS IN U.S. EDUCATION

A joint publication of the APSA Committee on Pre-Collegiate Education, the Education Commission of the International Studies Association, and the Center for War/Peace Studies of the N.Y. Friends Group, Inc. Four publications: The Elementary School, The Secondary School, The University, The Community. $1.50 each, $5.00 per set.

COMPARING POLITICAL EXPERIENCES

Complete description of an alternative course for high school government instruction. $2.75 each.

SETUPS: AMERICAN POLITICS

Supplementary Empirical Teaching Units in Political Science

New computer related instructional materials whereby students learn important substantive topics in American politics as they learn methods of analysis. *Voting Behavior: The 1972 Election* by Bruce D. Bowen, C. Anthony Broh, Charles L. Prysby. *Political Socialization Across the Generations* by Paul Allen Beck, Jere W. Bruner, L. Douglas Dobson. *Political Participation* by F. Christopher Arterton, Harlan Hahn. *Representation in the United States Congress: 1973* by Ray A. Geigle, Peter G. Hartjens. *The Supreme Court in American Politics: Policy Through Law* by John Paul Ryan, C. Neal Tate. *U.S. Energy, Environment and Economic Problems: A Public Policy Simulation* by Barry Hughes. *The Dynamics of Political Budgeting: A Public Policy Simulation* by Marvin K. Hoffman. For information and price list write: APSA Division of Educational Affairs.

INSTRUCTIONAL RESOURCE MONOGRAPHS

Guides on materials and methods for teaching and learning in political science. *A Guide to Library Sources in Political Science: American Government* by Clement E. Vose. $6.50 hardback; $4.00 paperback. *PSI and Political Science: Using the Personalized System of Instruction to Teach American Politics*, edited by Ralph B. Earle Jr. $3.50 paperback. *Simple Simulations*, by Charles Walcott with Anne Walcott. $3.50 paperback. *Computer-Assisted Instruction in Political Science*, edited by Jonathan Pool. $4.00 paperback.

LEGISLATIVE SERVICE PROJECT MANUALS

Individual manuals available for: Kansas, Kentucky, Montana, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island. $2.50 each.

POLITICAL SCIENCE AND STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

A volume on the current and future state of research and educational programs in the field of state and local government. $3.75 each.

APSA MEMBERSHIP MAILING LISTS AND LABELS

For information and price list, contact Membership Secretary, APSA.

APSA POLITICAL SCIENCE DEPARTMENT CHAIRPERSONS MAILING LABELS

For information and price list, contact APSA Departmental Services Program.

Order Form

I am enclosing a check for $_____, for _____

_____

_____ (list publications).

Name _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

Order from: American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

(All orders must be prepaid)

CHE'S GUERRILLA WAR
Regis Debray
Translated by
Rosemary Sheed

One of the most important books to come out of Latin America in decades. Debray, the well-known French radical, who was with Che Guevara in Bolivia, analyzes the failure of Che's revolutionary struggle and ponders its message for future revolutionaries.
(A1884) $2.50

THE ORIGINS OF MODERN LEFTISM
Richard Gombin
Translated by
Michael K. Perl

An unbiased look at the New Left — a growing international movement that aims to occupy the vacuum created by the failure of official communism. The coherent exposition of a radical alternative to Marxism/Leninism. (A1846) $2.95

HOW CONSERVATIVES THINK
Edited by Philip W. Buck

Writings by outstanding British conservatives from the seventeenth century to the present provide an essential background to understanding conservatism today. Contributors range from Edmund Burke to Robert Peel, Benjamin Disraeli to Winston Churchill. (A1885) $3.25

MEDIEVAL POLITICAL THOUGHT
Walter Ullmann

Previously published in Pelican books as *A History of Political Thought: The Middle Ages*. A survey of the origins and development of political ideas in Western Europe between the fifth and twelfth centuries.
(Y102) $4.95

RESIGNATION IN PROTEST:
Political and Ethical Choices Between Loyalty to Team and Loyalty to Conscience in American Public Life
Edward Weisband and Thomas M. Franck

An original examination of the behavior of senior government officials when they are in disagreement with administration policies.
(C615) $2.95

THE MAN ON HORSEBACK:
The Role of the Military in Politics
S. E. Finer

The definitive book on the military in politics. "The writer's discussion of the motives and situations which precipitate military intervention is as thorough as his examination of the historical reasons."
—*Spectator*
(Y106) $5.95

THE LEFT IN BRITAIN: 1956-1968
David Widgery

The fortunes of the British left — from the Soviet intervention in Hungary to the student riots in Paris. Referring to contemporary sources, Widgery shows how working-class groups have combined with middle-class writers to transform what it means to be "on the left."
(Y99) $7.95

Write for free catalogues.

PENGUIN BOOKS

625 Madison Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10022

Announcing the fifth issue of . . .

THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER

EDITOR
George W. Carey
MANAGING EDITOR
Robert A. Schadler
* * *
BOARD OF EDITORS
Christian Bay
George C. S. Benson
John P. East
John Hallowell
Robert Horwitz
Charles S. Hyneman
Karl Lamb
Harvey Mansfield, Jr.
Nelson Polsby
Ellis Sandoz
Mulford Q. Sibley
J. David Singer
Richard F. Staar
Herbert J. Storing
Gordon Tullock

* An Annual Review, Featuring Article-Length Reviews of the Leading Political Science Textbooks, The Great Classics and Recent Studies in Law and Politics

"The Political Science Reviewer meets a need which we too long recognized but did nothing about—the careful reexamination of seminal and mind-clearing books which lie at the bottom of professional presumptions and beliefs. Their choice of books and men to review them in the first two issues show that the editors of the *Reviewer* are equal to the great responsibilities they have assumed."

CHARLES S. HYNEMAN
Distinguished Professor of Political Science
Indiana University

Vol. V CONTENTS Fall, 1975

* Modernity and Authority in Bertrand de Jouvenel ..... *Michael Dillon*
* The Works of Henry A. Kissinger ..... *James & Diane Dornan*
* Crosskey's Once and Future Constitution ..... *Laurin A. Wollan, Jr.*
* Hans J. Morgenthau's Version of *Realpolitik* ..... *Cecil V. Crabb, Jr. & June Savoy*
* The Political Significance of Heidegger's *Being and Time* ..... *Mark Blitz*
* Thoughts on Ludwig Wittgenstein and Political Analysis ..... *George Graham*
* The Recent Literature on Locke's Political Philosophy ..... *Michael P. Zuckert*
* Textbooks in American Political Theory ..... *Gordon Lloyd*
* The Poverty of Robert Paul Wolff ..... *Kent A. Kirwan*
* A Portrait of the Discipline ..... *Sami G. Hajjar, et al.*

Responses:
* The Occasions of Freedom of Speech ..... *George Anastaplo*
* Biopolitical Behavioral Theory ..... *Glendon Schubert*

Please enter my subscription to *The Political Science Reviewer.*
(14 S. Bryn Mawr Avenue, Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania 19010)

☐ Volume V only ☐ Volume IV only ☐ Volume III only
☐ Volumes IV & V ☐ Volumes V & VI ☐ Volumes IV, V, VI


Price: one volume, $6.00; two volumes, $10.00; three volumes, $15.00

Name _____

Street _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

Timely Books for a Bicentennial Election



POWER AND THE PRESIDENCY

Edited by Philip C. Dolce & George H. Skau

Originally part of a CBS-TV series entitled, "The American Presidency: The Men and the Office," these provocative essays represent the divergent views of leading historians, journalists and political scientists. In 26 essays, the experts analyze specific administrations from George Washington to Richard Nixon and explain why the Presidency of the United States is the most powerful office in the world.

September 1976 Index, bibliography
Over 50 illustrations 352 pages
$12.50, clothbound $4.95, paperbound

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Strategies of American Electoral Politics

Fourth Edition

Nelson W. Polsby and Aaron Wildavsky

$8.95, $4.95 paperback

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS
597 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017

PRICES, PROFIT, AND PRODUCTION
How Much is Enough?

J. William Leasure and Marjorie Shepherd Turner

As the United States enters the mid 1970s, it suffers from spiraling inflation, chronically high unemployment, and serious shortages of fuel and consumer products. Yet, while consumers and wage earners tighten their belts, many companies report record profits.

Prices, Profit, and Production offers a practical cure for these economic ills: the Profit Stabilization Principle, which would tie industry profits and prices together so that prices could not rise unless a company's profits dropped below an acceptable level. To explain their plan, the authors introduce the ideas of Friedman, Galbraith, and others and explain complex economic concepts in a clear and understandable manner. A valuable book for students of public policy, American politics, and contemporary economic problems. *$3.50 paper*

THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO PRESS
Albuquerque, New Mexico 87131


SORTIE 8 AVRIL 1976 /ON SALE 8 APRIL 1976

Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques

Renaud de la Genière	LE BUDGET	relié 110 F isbn 2-7246-0343-5	broché 78 F isbn 2-7246-0336-2	400 p. cahiers n° 201
Lothar [illegible] Rueh[illegible]	LA POLITIQUE MILITAIRE DE LA CINQUIÈME RÉPUBLIQUE	relié 110 F isbn 2-7246-0351-6	broché 76 F isbn 2-7246-0328-1	448 p. cahiers n° 193
Bertr[illegible] Radi[illegible]	STRATÉGIE DE LA GRÈVE Pour une approche fonctionnaliste du Parti communiste français	relié 110 F isbn 2-7246-0348-6	broché 78 F isbn 2-7246-0341-9	260 p. travaux et recherches n° 40
Jeann[illegible] Becqu[illegible] Leclerc[illegible]	PARADOXES DU POUVOIR LOCAL	relié 115 F isbn 2-7246-0346-X	broché 80 F isbn 2-7246-0339-7	248 p. travaux et recherches n° 38
Jacq[illegible] Jud[illegible]	LA RECONSTRUCTION DU PARTI SOCIALISTE 1921-1926	relié 115 F isbn 2-7246-0345-1	broché 85 F isbn 2-7246-0338-9	250 p. travaux et recherches n° 39
Bernard Miche[illegible]	BANQUES ET BANQUIERS EN AUTRICHE AU DÉBUT DU XX^e SIÈCLE	relié 198 F isbn 2-7246-0347-8	broché 164 F isbn 2-7246-0340-0	408 p. cahiers n° 199
Jacques [illegible] Levesque	L'URSS ET LA RÉVOLUTION UKRAINE	relié 115 F isbn 2-7246-0350-8	broché 75 F isbn 2-7246-0344-3	256 p. travaux et recherches n° 42
Emmanuel Sivan	COMMUNISME ET NATIONALISME EN ALGÉRIE 1920-1962	relié 122 F isbn 2-7246-0349-4	broché 92 F isbn 2-7246-0342-7	264 p. travaux et recherches n° 41

27, rue saint-guillaume - 75341 paris cedex 07 france

NEW EDITIONS OF THREE OUTSTANDING AND WIDELY-ADOPTED TEXTS




ROBERT A. DAHL'S

DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES, Promise and Performance, Third Edition

. . . a systematic and thorough analysis of our political institutions and processes. Professor Dahl, of Yale University, presents an exposition on the American political system and encourages readers to develop their own perspectives and evaluations. An Instructor's Manual is also available.

514 pages
Paper / 528-65010-6




AMERICAN IDEOLOGIES: The Competing Political Beliefs of The 1970's, Third Edition

By Kenneth M. Dolbeare, University of Massachusetts, and Patricia Dolbeare

. . . a description, examination, and evaluation of eleven major ideologies, illustrating their similarities and differences.

232 pages
Paper / 528-65018-1



AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT: An Introduction to Political Institutions, Second Edition

By Robert S. Ross, California State University at Chico

. . . a brief introduction to the major components of the federal government. The attention given to recent events helps the student to understand the relationship between government and those governed. An Instructor's Manual is available.

249 pages
Paper / 528-65005-X


SEE
ALL THREE,
AND MORE,
AT OUR BOOTH
37!

RAND McNALLY COLLEGE PUBLISHING COMPANY
P.O. BOX 7600 / CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60680

OIL RESOURCES
Who Gets What How?
Kenneth W. Dam
Examines the recent experiences of Great Britain and Norway in the licensing of private companies to exploit government-owned oil resources in the North Sea.
208 pages Cloth $11.95

THE POWERHOLDERS
David Kipnis
Explores the psychological aspects of using power in a variety of settings, including presidents, military officers, corporate executives, union leaders, husbands, wives, and parents.
248 pages Cloth $12.50

SCHOOL POLITICS, CHICAGO STYLE
Paul E. Peterson
The first comprehensive study of an urban school system that considers policy formation from both bargaining and unitary perspectives.
320 pages Cloth $15.00



MACAULAY AND THE WHIG TRADITION
Joseph Hamburger
A thoroughly documented account of Macaulay's evolution as a political thinker and a challenging analysis of his mature views.
304 pages Cloth $17.50

GERMANY AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS
Christoph M. Kimmich
Studies previously unexamined archival materials to provide the first book-length reconstruction and interpretation of Germany's relationship with the League.
280 pages Cloth $17.50

Now in Paper

GREAT CONTEMPORARIES
Winston S. Churchill
388 pages Paper $4.95

REBELLION IN THE UNIVERSITY
Seymour Martin Lipset
With a new Introduction by the author
352 pages Paper $4.95

POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND WELFARE
Planning and Politico-economic Systems Resolved into Basic Social Processes
Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom
592 pages Paper $6.95

THE PEOPLE SHALL JUDGE
Readings in the Formation of American Policy
Volume I in two parts
Selected and Edited by the Staff, Social Sciences I
The College of the University of Chicago
Paper TBA

The University of Chicago PRESS

Chicago 60637

CONTINUUM BOOKS

In his brilliant new work, THE DIALECTIC OF IDEOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGY, Gouldner relates both ideology and sociology to the revolution in printing technology and the emergence of bourgeois society. Pointing to the importance of ideology for the bourgeois class system, he emphasizes its "renaissance" in today's consumerism and the resulting crisis for capitalism.

Grounded in both classical American sociology and neo-Marxist critical theory, Professor Gouldner's work combines a remarkable empirical sweep with a lucid analysis of connections between these theoretical traditions. Throughout, he moves toward the formulation of a modern politics centered on new techniques of communication.

A Continuum Book
$12.95

Alvin W. Gouldner


THE DIALECTIC OF IDEOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGY

The Origins, Grammar, and Future of Ideology




THE SEABURY PRESS
815 Second Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10017

Definitive new insights into:




China...

China Perceived by JOHN K. FAIRBANK. "It speaks to many audiences, effectively and with remarkable freshness, on a wide range of issues." —*The China Quarterly.* "In a class by itself, reminding us once again of Fairbank's extraordinary role as America's foremost expert on China." —*The New Republic.* $3.95




The Nixon Era...

The Time of Illusion by JONATHAN SCHELL. "A thoughtful and deservedly acclaimed meditation on the decade which, in 1974, 'finally brought the American Constitutional system to the edge of breakdown.'" —*Foreign Affairs.* "A magnificent work filled with insights so profound they almost leave you gasping." —*National Observer.* $3.95



The New Politics...

Power Shift by KIRKPATRICK SALE. "An important and successful interpretation of a generation of turbulent change in the American political economy." —ROBERT LEKACHMAN, *N.Y. Times Book Review,* front page review. "Deeply researched, brilliantly elaborated, compellingly written." —J. ANTHONY LUKAS. $3.95




Watergate...


Washington Journal by ELIZABETH DREW. "A brilliant evocation of the downfall of Agnew and Nixon. Drew knew everyone involved, she covered every event, and she brought to her task the talents of a great reporter." —JOHN CHANCELLOR. "A sober, thorough and sensitive report." —*N.Y. Times Book Review.* $4.95

Now in paperback from
VINTAGE BOOKS
A division of Random House


INSTRUCTIONAL RESOURCE MONOGRAPHS




Information and evaluation for teachers, librarians, and students on U.S. government publications, general reference books, library facilities, and their utilization.



As a guide to the development of an alternative (to lecture and discussion sections) method of teaching and learning, this monograph is a collection of essays on the objectives, organization and impact of using the personalized system of instruction in political science. Examples are given on topics in American politics.



A selective guide to the development, applicability and impact of simulations and games, with examples for the design of original role playing exercises.



A guide to the theory, design and application of computer-assisted instruction for interactive teaching and learning in political science. Examples from several subfields, including political philosophy.

ORDER FORM

☐ *A Guide to Library Sources in Political Science: American Government*, by Clement E. Vose ($4.00 paperback, $6.50 hard cover).

☐ *PSI and Political Science: Using the Personalized System of Instruction to Teach American Politics*, edited by Ralph B. Earle, Jr., ($3.50 paperback).

☐ *Simple Simulations*, by Charles Walcott with Anne Walcott ($3.50 paperback).

☐ *Computer-Assisted Instruction in Political Science*, edited by Jonathan Pool ($4.00 paperback).

Name_____

Address_____

City_____ State_____ Zip_____

Send form prepaid to:

DIVISION OF EDUCATIONAL AFFAIRS
American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

PERSONNEL SERVICE

The American Political Science Association's Personnel Service operates as a clearinghouse, bringing together political scientists seeking positions and prospective employers. Registration in the service is open to members of the Association and to Political Science Departments. Membership in the Service, which includes a subscription to the monthly Newsletter, is $8.00 per year. Membership in the Credential Referral Service of the Personnel Service is an additional $8.00.

NEWSLETTER

A Newsletter, listing openings for political scientists including teaching, administrative and research openings, is mailed monthly to all Personnel Service members. Positions are listed by institution with a brief description of each opening.

CREDENTIAL REFERRAL SERVICE

A file will be maintained at the Association office for all members of the Credential Referral Service. This file will include a resume, a dissertation abstract and/or a list of publications, and up to three letters of reference for each member. Referrals are made upon the request of a member or of an institution.

EMPLOYERS USING THE SERVICE

The Association's Council has adopted a policy that it is a professional obligation of all political science departments to list publicly all vacancies in the APSA Personnel Service Newsletter for which they are recruiting at the Instructor, Assistant and Associate Professor levels. In addition, the listing of openings at the Full Professor level is strongly encouraged. There is no cost to the institution listing its vacancies with the Service. Forms for listing openings in the Newsletter are available from the Personnel Service.

For further information concerning the Personnel Service, write to:

Director, Personnel Service
The American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

The International Political Science Association
Invitation to Membership-1976

The International Political Science Association welcomes political scientists as members. The Association, founded in 1949, is composed of three categories of members: individuals, institutions, and national associations.

Membership in the Association of $6.00 a year entitles members to receive the Newsletter giving information about IPSA activities and meetings; to purchase material published under IPSA auspices — including the *International Bibliography of Political Science,* published annually by Stevens in London and sets of papers submitted at IPSA meetings at reduced cost; and to register at IPSA meetings at lower rates.

Individual members are entitled also to receive at lower rates either the *International Political Science Abstracts* published bi-monthly by the Association itself or the *International Social Science Journal,* the quarterly organ of the Department of Social Sciences of UNESCO. To join the Association send your name and check to the International Political Science Association, General Secretariat, 43 rue des Champs Elysées, B-1050, Bruxelles, Belgium.

New from Halsted Press–

CONTINUITIES AND DISCONTINUITIES IN POLITICAL THOUGHT
Edited by **D. Dodge** and **D.H. Baird.**
ISBN 0-470-21744-8 1975 314 pp.
Cloth $13.95
ISBN 0-470-21745-6 1975 314 pp.
(A Schenkman publication) Paper $7.95

ELITE RECRUITMENT IN DEMOCRATIC POLITIES: Comparative Studies
Edited by **H. Eulau** and **M.M. Czudnowski.**
ISBN 0-470-15056-4 1976 300 pp. $17.50
(A Sage Publications book)

A GENERAL THEORY OF BUREAUCRACY
By **Elliott Jaques.**
ISBN 0-470-15097-1 1976 300 pp. $19.50

MANAGEMENT OF POWER
By **P.G. Swingle.**
ISBN 0-470-15030-0 1976 250 pp. $15.00
(A Lawrence Erlbaum Associates publication)

UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT AND WAR, VOLUME II: The Conflict Helix
By **R.J. Rummel.**
ISBN 0-470-15123-4 1976 300 pp. $17.50
(A Sage Publications book)

THE POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF FEDERALISM
By **R.D. Dikshit.**
ISBN 0-470-21553-4 1976 273 pp. $22.50

LEGISLATIVE STAFFING: A Comparative Perspective
Edited by **J.J. Heaphey** and **A.P. Balutis.**
ISBN 0-470-36671-0 1976 244 pp. $16.95
(A Sage Publications book)

THE POLITICAL PURSESTRINGS: The Role of the Legislature in the Budgetary Process
Edited by **A.P. Balutis** and **D.K. Butler.**
ISBN 0-470-04651-1 1975 221 pp. $15.00
(A Sage Publications book)

WHITE LIBERALISM IN TRANSITION
By **Judith Caditz.**
ISBN 0-470-15182-X 1976 200 pp. $12.50
(A Spectrum publication)

THE CITY IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
Edited by **J. Walton** and **L.H. Masotti.**
ISBN 0-470-15217-6 1976 317 pp. $17.50
(A Sage Publications book)

SOCIAL POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
By **D. Collins.**
ISBN 0-470-16583-9 1975 286 pp. $19.75

THE MANDARINS OF WESTERN EUROPE: The Political Roles of Top Civil Servants
By **Mattei Dogan.**
ISBN 0-470-21749-9 1975 314 pp. $17.50
(A Sage Publications book)

COMPARATIVE UNION DEMOCRACY: Organization and Opposition in British and American Unions
By **J.D. Edelstein** and **M. Warner.**
ISBN 0-470-23268-4 1976 378 pp. $19.95

WORK AND WELFARE IN BRITAIN AND THE USA
By **Bruno Stein.**
ISBN 0-470-15007-6 1976 112 pp. $10.95


Prices are subject to change without notice.
Prices slightly higher in Canada.

These books are available for 30 days free examination from Dept. 13,



HALSTED PRESS,
A Division of
John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,
605 Third Avenue,
New York, N.Y. 10016 A5697-67

Now in paperback!



Popular entertainment or propaganda?

FILMS AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR
by Roger Manvell

A richly illustrated examination of the way in which the world's filmmakers have represented the Second World War on the screen. Under the guise of popular entertainment, these films were used to incite nations and individuals to fight, and thus became essential weapons during the war. In the postwar period, films were used to explain —or explain away—the issues involved after new political alignments had been made. Beyond the complex story of screen propaganda, the author shows how much is to be learned about the motivations of war as they have developed during the twentieth century.

"Offers not only a story of the use of film as propaganda and later as historical interpreter, but...provides a parallel between what actually was happening in the world during the years covered and how that was presented on film. A valuable addition to the library of the serious film student, the film buff, and the history buff."—*New Vistas*
Heavily illustrated with film clips.

A DELTA BOOK $4.95

Just published—

RUSSIA ON OUR MINDS
Delia and Ferdinand Kuhn

An in-depth view of Russia, her people, institutions, culture, and beliefs given through first-hand interviews and observations. A LAUREL EDITION $1.75

IN DEFENSE OF HOMO SAPIENS
Joan Marble Cook

"A vigorous critique of the "bad animal" concept of man currently popularized in the social sciences. "Backed by a wealth of sound references."—*Atlantic Monthly*
A LAUREL EDITION $1.75

STOP THE PRESSES, I WANT TO GET OFF!
Edited by Richard Pollak

A collection of twenty-three articles from the pages of [MORE] magazine, including profiles of press people, background pieces on major news stories, investigations of major journalism institutions, plus much more.
A DELTA BOOK $3.95

FREEDOM TO DIE: MORAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF EUTHANASIA
O. Ruth Russell

A comprehensive history and forthright examination of all the ethical, religious, and legal issues involved in the euthanasia debate. A LAUREL EDITION $1.95

WOMAN IN THE YEAR 2000
Maggie Tripp


26 first-time-in-print articles by writers including Bella Abzug, Gloria Steinem, Alvin Toffler, and others, which give a lively, prophetic guide for women and society in the twenty-first century. A LAUREL EDITION $2.25

For a complete list of books in the social and political sciences, please write to:

DELL

Dell Publishing Co., Inc.
1 Dag Hammarskjold Plaza • N.Y., N.Y. 10017

RECENT BOOKS FROM HARPER & ROW



THE 103RD BALLOT
The Incredible Story of the Disastrous Democratic Convention of 1924
By Robert K. Murray. The year was 1924 and the Democrats, leaderless and divided, seemed headed for a catastrophe as their convention went to three bruising weeks and 103 ballots. "An exciting reconstruction of one of the most dramatic episodes in American political history."
—*Theodore H. White.* Illustrated, $10.95

LYNDON JOHNSON AND THE AMERICAN DREAM
By Doris Kearns. "Nothing else written about Lyndon Johnson so brilliantly illuminates his personality or so objectively assesses his frustrations and achievements. This is the indispensable book about Johnson and his presidency."—*Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.* $12.50

THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1865-1900
By Charles S. Campbell. "A detached, closely researched diplomatic and political history of the post-Civil War efforts to establish the U.S. as an overseas power."
—*Kirkus Reviews.* The New American Nation Series. Illustrated, $15.00

THE PAST MASTERS
Politics and Politicians 1906-1939
By Harold Macmillan. In this lively and informative book, the former Prime Minister recalls the giants of the generation before his own, his sometimes mentors and colleagues, Lloyd George, Ramsay MacDonald, Baldwin, Chamberlain and Churchill. Illustrated, $15.00

THE JOURNALS OF DAVID E. LILIENTHAL
Volume VI—Creativity and Conflict, 1964-1967
In this self-portrait, Lilienthal is revealed as a man of extraordinary optimism and energy, moving through the tumultuous and often tragic events of the mid-1960s. "One of the great journals of our time."—*Jonathan Daniels.* Illustrated, $20.00

THE BRIBE
By Philip Ross. When the young, Democratic mayor of Fort Lee, New Jersey, is offered half a million dollars to influence a zoning ordinance, his refusal to cooperate leads to a suspenseful true story of FBI stakeouts, mob entrapment and conviction. "Fast paced ... compelling ... startling."—*Jack Anderson* $8.95


THE MURDER OF ALLENDE
And The End of the Chilean Way to Socialism
By Robinson Rojas Sandford. A leading Chilean journalist who lived through his country's bloody, right-wing coup now reveals startling details of the military, industrial and commercial conspiracy—abetted by North American interests—to bring down the Allende government. $10.95

OLD FACES OF 1976
By Richard Reeves. Revealing, perceptive views of Jerry Ford, Nelson Rockefeller, Teddy Kennedy, George Wallace, Hubert Humphrey, Ronald Reagan, Jimmy Carter, Ed Muskie, Scoop Jackson, George McGovern, Hugh Carey, Abe Beame, Jack Javits, Jerry Brown and other figures in today's political arena. "Dick Reeves is one of the best political reporters in the country."—*Edwin Newman, NBC News* $10.00


At bookstores



Harper & Row
10 E. 53rd St., New York 10022
1817




TOUCHSTONE



PAPERBACKS

SIMON AND SCHUSTER
630 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10020



For complimentary examination copies and catalogs, write on your departmental letterhead to School and Library Services, address above. Include details on course in which you are considering using title requested, and advise us where you have seen announcement.

Melman, Seymour
THE PERMANENT WAR ECONOMY
American Capitalism in Decline

"Melman examines such areas as the decline of industrial efficiency, trade-offs between social and military programs, and the conversion of defense industries to peaceful uses . . . his discussion of the conversion of defense industries should be of wide interest. . . . Recommended for economics and political science collections."—*Library Journal.* "This book . . . is important because it deals with a most important question."—*Choice.* "The time may finally be right for these sensible ideas!"—*New York Times Book Review.*
☐ 22261 Index $4.95

Redman, Eric
THE DANCE OF LEGISLATION
Foreword by Richard E. Neustadt

The book traces the drafting and passing of a piece of legislation—the National Health Service Corps Act—with all the maneuvers, plots, counterplots, alarums, frustrations, triumphs and sheer work and dedication involved. "An outstanding book for undergraduates interested in politics. . . . There have been many case studies written to illuminate the legislative process . . . but Redman's effort is distinctive . . . the book may stimulate some young readers into considering seriously a career in politics."—*Choice.* ". . . a unique and innovative study. . . . A fascinating account of the day-to-day strategy of lawmaking."—*Library Journal.* "Few writers have actually produced a book that has such a useful blend of information, self-deprecatory humor, and keen rendering of the distinctive atmosphere of Congress." —William V. Shannon, *The New York Times Book Review.*
☐ 21746 $3.95

Thayer, George
WHO SHAKES THE MONEY TREE?
American Campaign Financing Practices from 1789 to the Present

Examining the ways in which American political campaigns are financed, Thayer goes beyond the visible shoots of the money tree to trace the roots that reach far down into every aspect of American life. "An enormously entertaining and wise treatise."—Robert Sherrill, *Chicago Tribune.* "The extraordinary number of illustrations makes very interesting reading. . . . The book is well indexed."—*Choice.* "Thayer offers many good perceptive observations . . ."—*Library Journal*
☐ 21913 Index $2.95

Barnet, Richard J. and Ronald E. Müller
GLOBAL REACH
The Power of the Multinational Corporations

"Based on a synthesis of recent analytical studies, this work presents a cool-headed appraisal of the significance of multinational firms for all of human existence. . . . An outstanding treatment that combines readability with careful analysis."—*Library Journal.* "Interesting in presentation no less than important in substance."—Leon H. Keyserling, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors and President of the Conference on Economic Progress. "An impressive amount of quantitative, qualitative, and anecdotal information on the multinationals . . ."—Thomas Horst, *Harvard Magazine.* "Rewarding, readable, and provocative."—*Business Week.* "A superb book that demands to be read."—*The New York Times.*
☐ 22104 $4.95

Kaufman, Arnold S.
THE RADICAL LIBERAL: The New Politics, Theory and Practice
☐ 20576 Biblio., Index $1.95

READ THE SOVIET MIND



Adam Ulam displays his extraordinary ability to penetrate the core of the Soviet mind as he examines 100 years of Russian revolutionary thought and the men who shaped it.

Writing with keen insight and uncommon sense, he shows the continuity of thought that stretches from Herzen to Trotsky, Stalin, Khrushchev, and, finally, Solzhenitsyn.

$15.00

Ideologies and Illusions

Revolutionary Thought from Herzen to Solzhenitsyn

Adam B. Ulam

Harvard University Press
Cambridge, Mass. 02138

Newest additions to Little, Brown's distinguished Political Science list . . .

Politics in France

Third Edition

Henry W. Ehrmann

Since 1971, when the Second Edition of this leading study of politics in France appeared, that country has gone through one national referendum, one parliamentary election, one presidential election, and a rather drastic restructuring of its party system. This new Third Edition will help students understand these important events in both their new and old contexts.

Professor Ehrmann was also prompted to write this revision by the continuing, impressive output of studies on modern French politics. Ehrmann critically reviews the most important discussions and indicates major areas that remain open for further investigation.

Paper approx. 384 pages
August 1976 $5.95 tent.

Cases in Comparative Politics

Third Edition

James B. Christoph
Indiana University
Bernard E. Brown
City University of New York

Extensively revised and updated, this new Third Edition of CASES IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS features eight case studies—two each on Britain, France, Germany, and the U.S.S.R.—that examine foreign and domestic policy-making in those countries. All of the cases were written by specialists expressly for this volume. New cases on university reform in France, codetermination in West Germany, and Ostpolitik have been added to this edition, and important new material has been incorporated into all the other cases. An introductory section deals with the case method in comparative politics and the concept of decision-making.

Paper approx. 368 pages
August 1976 $6.95 tent.

Coming later this Fall . . .

Power and Interdependence

World Politics in Transition

Robert O. Keohane
Stanford University
Joseph S. Nye
Harvard University

Transnational politics—a contemporary theoretical approach to world politics, applied to four historically-extensive case studies.

Cloth approx. 300 pages
November 1976 $12.95 tent.
Also available in paperback: $5.95 tent.

Felony Justice

An Organizational Analysis of Criminal Courts

James Eisenstein
Pennsylvania State University
Herbert Jacob
Northwestern University

A comparative analysis of felony dispositions in Chicago, Detroit, and Baltimore.

Cloth approx. 280 pages
November 1976 $12.95 tent.
Also available in paperback: $5.95 tent.

Other Recent Publications . . .

The Basics of American Politics

Gary Wasserman
Medgar Evers College, CUNY
with Ed Beard and Marsha Hurst

A new, brief and inexpensive introductory text. Simply and straightforwardly, this lean volume deals with the most elemental structures and functions of American government. The theme of politics as a game unifies the book and focuses attention on the dynamic competition for power and values. Emphasis is placed on the effects of, and our constant involvement in, politics.
Paper 239 pages
1976 $4.95

American Government

Readings and Cases
Fifth Edition

Peter Woll
Brandeis University

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT—now available in an updated Fifth Edition—focuses on issues that are central to an understanding of the governmental process. The new edition provides the same excellent coverage of Constitutional cases and historical and analytical background materials as the earlier editions. But 40% of the readings in this edition are new; they deal with contemporary problems and the stresses that have been placed on the political system in the 1970s. A new Instructor's Manual is also available.
Paper 581 pages
1975 $6.95

U.S. Foreign Policy and World Order

James A. Nathan
James K. Oliver
Both at the University of Delaware

Nathan and Oliver's outstanding new foreign policy text offers: (1) a detailed, comprehensive overview of U.S. foreign policy since World War II; (2) a systematic, unifying theme: the evolution of military force and the threat of force as the primary instrumentality of American foreign policy; (3) a synthesis of the political-strategic and economic elements of U.S. foreign policy; and (4) an integrated analysis of foreign policy and domestic institutions.
Paper 608 pages
1976 $10.95

Politics in the American States

A Comparative Analysis
Third Edition

Herbert Jacob
Northwestern University
Kenneth N. Vines
SUNY, Buffalo

The leading text in the field of state politics has been substantially revised and rewritten for its new Third Edition. It features a new chapter on the regulation of the environment, a new chapter on Federalism, five new authors (all chapters are either new or rewritten), and a greater emphasis on lucid explanation rather than statistical analysis.
Cloth 528 pages
1976 $12.95

Political Change in the Metropolis

John J. Harrigan
Hamline University

POLITICAL CHANGE IN THE METROPOLIS is a new text that integrates coverage of central-city, suburban, and metropolitan-level politics, as well as the politics of Federal involvement in urban affairs. One major analytical theme—the bias of political change—draws the author's material into a coherent and logical argument. Thorough coverage of machine politics, ethnic politics, the political reform movement, and community control is provided.
Paper 464 pages
1976 $8.95



Announcing
the Outstanding Candidate in '76



the new Third Edition of

DEMOCRACY UNDER PRESSURE
An Introduction to the American Political System

MILTON C. CUMMINGS, JR., The Johns Hopkins University
DAVID WISE

...the best-selling introduction to American government, acclaimed in its previous edition as "The most current, topical, and provocative introductory textbook of its kind."* *Democrarcy Under Pressure* offers a critical yet balanced examination of the processes and structures of the American political system written in a style that is at once scholarly, highly readable, and thought-provoking. And this new Third Edition—as current, topical, and provocative as its predecessors—analyzes such recent developments in American politics as:

- the 1976 presidential primaries, nominating conventions, and election
- election reforms and the workings of the new Federal Election Commission
- abuses of power by federal intelligence agencies; the Church and Pike committee investigations; the new Senate oversight committee and its proposed legislative reforms.
- the impact of the Burger Court on civil rights and civil liberties
- multinational corporations and their growing influence both at home and abroad
- our growing awareness of the limitations of governmental solutions to national problems
- our understanding of the restraints on American power throughout the world
- the issues raised by our energy needs vs. ecological stability

Publication: *Spring 1977*

*William J. Jervey, Florida Technological University

DEMOCRACY UNDER PRESSURE
...the winning candidate in '76

Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc.
New York · Chicago · San Francisco · Atlanta

New This Fall

DÉTENTE AND THE DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT IN THE USSR
Frederick C. Barghoorn, Yale University
The first investigation of the links between Soviet-American détente and Soviet internal policy. "An important document on a vital subject." —Zbigniew Brzezinski
234 pages $12.95

STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
The Political Economy of Reform
Edited by **Alan K. Campbell** and **Roy W. Bahl,** both, Syracuse University
This examination of fifty years of state and local government reform focuses on the *results* of governmental reorganization.
210 pages $13.95

REVOLUTIONARY LAW AND ORDER
Politics and Social Change in the USSR
Peter H. Juviler, Barnard College, Columbia University
A comprehensive examination of the Russians' quest for law and order through security from crime and through effective law enforcement.
288 pages $13.95

ALIENATION AND IDENTIFICATION
Morton A. Kaplan, University of Chicago
A philosophical exploration of alienation and identification, showing the ways in which these concepts illuminate human nature.
160 pages $10.00

JUSTICE, HUMAN NATURE, AND POLITICAL OBLIGATION
Morton A. Kaplan, University of Chicago
Perceptively examines the character of the good and the just and demonstrates the objectivity of values.
224 pages $11.95

MODERNIZATION AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Edward L. Morse, Council on Foreign Relations
A fascinating look at what is new and unique about international behavior in the contemporary world.
192 pages $12.95

KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS
Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Harvard Law School
"An extraordinarily brilliant work, breathtaking in its ambitions and formidable in its achievement . . . a major work of political philosophy and social theory . . ." —*The New Republic*
336 pages paper, $4.95

TOWARD WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY
Essays in Honor of Myres S. McDougal
Edited by **W. Michael Reisman,** Yale Law School, and **Burns H. Weston,** College of Law, University of Iowa
A brilliant collection of essays dealing with the role of law in modern society.
672 pages $25.00

MANAGING PRESIDENTIAL OBJECTIVES
Richard Rose, University of Strathclyde, Scotland
Examines the institutionalized presidency, particularly the Office of Management and Budget.
192 pages $12.95

IN SEARCH OF GLOBAL PATTERNS
Edited by **James N. Rosenau,** University of Southern California
Portrays the origins and motivations behind the search for global patterns, the failures and accomplishments, the future trends, and important problems.
432 pages $15.00

POLITICS OF THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION
The Balances of Power
Ferenc A. Vali, University of Massachusetts at Amherst
Examines the problems of the region both in the context of the global balance of power, and the more restricted local power relations.
320 pages $14.95

CHINA'S HIGHER LEADERSHIP IN THE SOCIALIST TRADITION
Paul Wong, San Francisco State University
The *first* large-scale study of Chinese leadership.
384 pages $15.95

the Free Press
A Division of MACMILLAN PUBLISHING CO., INC., 1000 Brown Street, Riverside, New Jersey 08075

Essential Books on the

UNITED STATES V. NIXON
The President Before the Supreme Court
Edited by Professor Leon Friedman, *Hofstra Law School*

Published in association with Chelsea House Publishers

"An invaluable volume to all students of American government."—from the review in *Choice,* which selected it as one of the "outstanding academic books of 1975."

Here, in their entirety, are the eleven actual briefs, decisions, and verbatim transcripts of oral testimony which triggered the resignation of Nixon. Professor Alan F. Westin contributes an introductory essay.

ISBN 0-8352-0802-8. LC 74-16403. CIP. 1975. 619 pages. $15.00.

THE GROWTH OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER
A Documented History
By Professor William M. Goldsmith, *Brandeis University*

Published in association with Chelsea House Publishers

"Here Goldsmith has presented a sweep of scholarly literature that will be difficult to match and improbable to surpass in the near future... a classic work."—from the review in *Choice,* which selected it as one of the "outstanding academic books of 1975."

The uniqueness of the presidential office requires a reference work that elucidates as it documents and analyzes as it narrates. This study of the evolution of presidential power documents the expansion and contraction of the office, the struggles with Congress, the courts, and public opinion. The scope ranges from the office's political antecedents through Watergate.

ISBN 0-8352-0778-1. LC 74-9623. CIP. 1975. 2,342 pages.
$96.50 the 3-vol. set.

ALL ABOUT POLITICS
Questions and Answers on the U.S. Political Process
By Paul A. Theis and William P. Steponkus

"Non-partisan... lively and informative."—American Reference Books Annual

Two political pros ask and then answer 400 of the most revealing questions pertaining to every area of the complex world of American politics. The questions span regional and ethnic voting biases, the utilization of volunteers, and the origins of the "Eastern Establishment." Illustrated.

ISBN 0-8352-0528-2. LC 72-8470. 1972. CIP. 228 pages. $12.95.

PUBLIC OPINION
Changing Attitudes on Contemporary Political and Social Issues
(A CBS News Reference Book)
By Robert Chandler

"A most interesting book."—RQ

Tabulates and analyzes the results of nine exhaustive polls taken during the late 1960's by CBS News: The Bill of Rights, Black and White Attitudes, Women's Liberation, The Generation Gap, Marijuana, President Watching, Political Polling, The War in Vietnam, The Environment.

ISBN 0-8352-0548-7. LC 72-1739. CIP. 1972. 195 pages. $12.95.

American Political Process

"These two volumes will stand as models for the valuable preservation of source documents, evidence, testimony."—Doris Grumbach, *The New Republic*

WOMEN AND THE "EQUAL RIGHTS" AMENDMENT
Senate Subcommittee Hearings on the Constitutional Amendment, 91st Congress
Edited by Catharine Stimpson in conjunction with the Congressional Information Service

Includes 34 oral testimonies by activists, scholars, concerned citizens, legislators—and presents the texts of 28 prepared statements and 41 major background documents. Fully indexed.

ISBN 0-8352-0532-0. LC 77-39745. 1972. 538 pages. $13.95.

DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN
Congressional Hearings on Equal Rights in Education and Employment
Edited by Catharine Stimpson in conjunction with the Congressional Information Service

Part 1 contains 23 oral testimonies by Shirley Chisholm, Frankie Freeman, Wilma Scott Heide, Lucy Komisar, and others given at the 91st Congress' hearings. Part II contains 53 position papers, surveys, charts, tables.
ISBN 0-8352-0608-4. LC 72-13703. CIP. 1973. 558 pages. $14.50.

WOMEN IN PUBLIC OFFICE
A Biographical Directory and Statistical Analysis Handbook
Compiled by the Center for the American Woman and Politics, Eagleton Institute of Politics, Rutgers University

Biographical profiles of thousands of elected and appointed officials in a state-by-state listing—congresswomen, governors, mayors, judges, city councilwomen, members of state boards and commissions, and more. Includes statistical summaries and analyses.

ISBN 0-8352-0861-3. LC 75-37487. 1976. 8½" x 11". 455 pages. $19.95.

Order from:
R.R. Bowker Order Dept.,
P.O. Box 1807, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106.

Outside Western Hemisphere: Bowker, Erasmus House, Epping, Essex, England.

All orders plus shipping and handling. Sales tax added where applicable. Prices are subject to change and slightly higher outside the U.S. and its possessions.

BOWKER
NEW YORK & LONDON

WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER
Abraham D. Sofaer, Columbia University School of Law
Recent presidential initiatives and assertions of power in foreign affairs led the American Bar Association to fund a comprehensive study of the allocation of such power within the branches of American Government. This first volume of the study analyzes the Constitution, its background, and the process by which it was drafted and ratified; it then continues through the first forty years of history under the present constitution.
Available $15.00

PRISON REFORM AND STATE ELITES
Richard A. Berk, Northwestern University and Peter H. Rossi, University of Massachusetts
Clear-cut strategies for implementing prison reform —this comparison of prison reform efforts identifies the characteristics of decision-making 'elites' and how to locate within these elites support for reform as well as opponents of change.
In preparation ca $15.00

THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL MONETARY REFORM: The Exchange Crisis
Michael J. Brenner, Boston University
This review of negotiations leading to fundamental revisions in the international monetary systems—particularly flexible exchange rates—is an important guide to the intricate and vital issues of international economic life and the politics of collective decision-making.
Available $13.50

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND THE NEAR-NUCLEAR COUNTRIES
Edited by Onkar Marwah and Ann Schulz, Clark University
Issues in the nuclear strategic debate that divide first and second order states; the process of proliferation and its consequences for the international political system.
Available $16.50

THE NEW URBAN POLITICS
Edited by Louis H. Masotti and Robert L. Lineberry, Center for Urban Affairs, Northwestern University
These original essays by urban scholars present new perspectives on urban politics and issues—includes discussions of emerging issues and actors and reformulations of traditional issues.
Available $14.00

FEAR IN THE COUNTRYSIDE: The Control of Agricultural Resources in the Poor Countries by Non-Peasant Elites
E. G. Vallienatos, Center for Populations Studies, Harvard University
A challenging analysis of world food problems and the adverse impact of 'Green Revolution' strategies on social change—suggests new policies geared to encouraging social change—the transfer of 'appropriate' technologies and the strengthening of the role of the small farmer throughout the world.
Available $14.00

THE POLITICS OF HIGHER EDUCATION AND PUBLIC POLICY: A Study of the American Council on Education
Donald M. Stewart, The University of Pennsylvania
An indepth study of the higher education sector in this country — its values and decision processes, its involvement and influence in government and conversely, its responsiveness to government policies —an informative guide to the politics of interest groups.
In preparation $15.00 (est.)

A COMPARATIVE ATLAS OF AMERICA'S GREAT CITIES
Twenty Metropolitan Regions
Edited by Ronald Abler, The Pennsylvania State University; John S. Adams, University of Minnesota and Ronald Abler, Text; Ki-Suk Lee, Chief Cartographer
Published by the University of Minnesota Press, this comprehensive atlas offers a wealth of information derived and interpreted from the findings of the 1970 U.S. census. *(Available from the University of Minnesota Press, 2037 University Avenue Southwest, Minneapolis, MN 55455.)*

COMPARATIVE METROPOLITAN ANALYSIS PROJECT
The University of Minnesota Press and Ballinger Publishing Company are pleased to announce the publication of a series of distinguished books prepared by the Comparative Metropolitan Analysis Project. Sponsored by the Association of American Geographers and funded by the National Science Foundation, this four-year research and writing effort has produced new and critically important conceptual approaches to understanding the issues that confront American Cities.

URBAN POLICY-MAKING AND METROPOLITAN DYNAMICS
A Comparative Geographical Analysis
Edited by John S. Adams, University of Minnesota
A comparison and evaluation of the progress made in urban policy during the Sixties throughout the country's major metropolitan areas.
Available $25.00

CONTEMPORARY METROPOLITAN AMERICA
Twenty Geographical Vignettes
Edited by John S. Adams, University of Minnesota
Skillfully-drawn portraits of America's twenty largest cities prepared by local geographers who blend first-hand knowledge with empirical data compiled by the Comparative Metropolitan Analysis Project.
December Four Volumes $60.00 (the set)

POLICING A FREE SOCIETY
Herman Goldstein, University of Wisconsin Law School
The quality of policing has a very direct effect on the quality of life in a democracy, but the American public persists in its neglect of complex, yet remediable problems that thwart the most determined efforts to achieve a high level of policing. Drawing upon his unique blend of experience, Herman Goldstein has provided the integrated framework that is essential to understanding and attacking these problems—and relating them to the goal of improving the quality of service provided the citizenry.
Available ca. $15.00

For information on these and related Ballinger titles, please write for our catalog.

Ballinger
PUBLISHING COMPANY
17 Dunster Street, Harvard Square, Cambridge, MA 02138

PRAEGER SPECIAL STUDIES

SEABED POLITICS
BARRY BUZAN
330 pp. Aug., 1976 LC 75-36406
ISBN 0-275-22850-9 $20.00

LATIN AMERICA'S NEW INTERNATIONALISM
The End of Hemispheric Isolation
Edited by ROGER W. FONTAINE and JAMES D. THEBERGE
348 pp. July, 1976 LC 76-14779
ISBN 0-275-56750-8 $21.50

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF EAST-WEST TRADE
CONNIE M. FRIESEN
220 pp. Sept., 1976 LC 76-14395
ISBN 0-275-56920-9 $18.50

THE POLITICS OF LAND-USE LAW
Developers vs. Citizens Groups in the Courts
R. ROBERT LINOWES and DON T. ALLENSWORTH
140 pp. Sept., 1976 LC 75-44935
ISBN 0-275-56910-1 $15.00

THE MULTINATIONAL BUSINESSMAN AND FOREIGN POLICY
Entrepreneurial Politics in East-West Trade and Investment
JEFFREY M. BROOKSTONE
ca. 190 pp. Nov., 1976 LC 76-12845
ISBN 0-275-23360-X ca. $15.00

CURRENT ISSUES IN U.S. DEFENSE POLICY
Center for Defense Information, edited by DAVID T. JOHNSON and BARRY R. SCHNEIDER
270 pp. July, 1976 LC 75-23990
ISBN 0-275-56020-1 $18.50

THE EXECUTIVE, CONGRESS, AND FOREIGN POLICY
Studies of the Nixon Administration
JOHN LEHMAN
270 pp. July, 1976 LC 76-13835
ISBN 0-275-56490-8 $18.50

THE PORTUGUESE REVOLUTION AND THE ARMED FORCES MOVEMENT
RONA M. FIELDS
312 pp. July, 1976 LC 75-19785
ISBN 0-275-55610-7 $22.50

SMALL STATES AND SEGMENTED SOCIETIES
National Political Integration in a Global Environment
Edited by STEPHANIE G. NEUMAN
256 pp. Aug., 1976 LC 75-23986
ISBN 0-275-55730-8 $16.50

NATIONS IN ARMS
The Theory and Practice of Territorial Defense
ADAM ROBERTS
ca. 280 pp. Aug., 1976 LC 76-10671
ISBN 0-275-23170-4 $18.50

THE ARAB BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL
Economic Aggression and World Reaction
DAN S. CHILL
138 pp. Sept., 1976 LC 76-14431
ISBN 0-275-56810-5 $14.00

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
Edited by HENRY R. NAU
348 pp. Sept., 1976 LC 76-2908
ISBN 0-275-56790-7 $22.50

MATHEMATICAL MODELS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Edited by DINA A. ZINNES and JOHN V. GILLESPIE
ca. 540 pp. Sept., 1976 LC 75-25000
ISBN 0-275-55870-3 $29.50

WOMEN AND WORLD DEVELOPMENT
With an Annotated Bibliography
Edited by IRENE TINKER, MICHELE BO BRAMSEN, and MAYRA BUVINIC
ca. 400 pp. Sept., 1976 LC 76-20602
ISBN 0-275-56520-3 $22.50

PRAEGER PUBLISHERS 111 Fourth Avenue, N.Y., N.Y., 10003

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION AND THE

UNIVERSITY CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

ANNOUNCE

A New Annual Reference Publication

UNITED STATES POLITICAL SCIENCE DOCUMENTS

United States Political Science Documents (USPSD) is the published version of a computer-based file of political science information being developed continually by the University Center for International Studies, University of Pittsburgh, in conjunction with the American Political Science Association.

Over the past ten years the political, social, and policy sciences have been inundated with an increasing flow of journal information. Not until now has a convenient sorting, filing, and evaluation process been developed to enable the academic community to keep up with the masses of information in a timely manner. This is why *USPSD* was created.

Volume I of *USPSD* will include between 2,000 and 2,500 documents published during 1975. The set will be available from UCIS Publications during the summer of 1976. For further information or to place your order, write to UCIS Publications at the address below.

USPSD will enable you conveniently to keep abreast of all the major journals in the field of political, social, and policy science, such as:

American Political Science Review
Comparative Political Studies
Comparative Politics
Economic Development and Cultural Change
Foreign Affairs
Foreign Policy
International and Intercultural Communication Annual
International Development Review
International Education and Cultural Change
International Interaction
International Organization
International Relations
International Studies Quarterly
Journal of Conflict Resolution
Journal of International Affairs
Policy Analysis
Policy Studies Journal
Studies in Comparative Communism
Studies in Comparative International Development
World Affairs
World Politics

USPSD will be an annual reference publication which examines and analyzes every article in over 120 major political, social and policy science journals.

Each entry in *USPSD* provides:

1. Author;
2. Title;
3. Journal Source and pagination;
4. An Abstract that describes the scope, purpose, methods employed, and results obtained in each article;
5. A listing of Special Features that include titles of all tables, graphs, figures, and maps used in each article;
6. A listing of Authors Cited in footnotes or references;
7. A listing of Key Subject Descriptors attributed to each article;
8. A listing of the major Geographic Areas referred to in each article;
9. A listing of Proper Names of organizations, political institutions, laws, etc. mentioned in each article.

USPSD will be published annually in TWO PARTS. The abstracts of the journal articles will comprise PART II and include those items listed above. PART I consists of five indexes to all the articles abstracted in Part II; they are divided according to:


1. Author(s) of each article;
2. Descriptor Subjects that are attributed to each article (The descriptions are taken from over 3,000 terms listed in the Political Science Thesaurus);
3. Geographic Areas referred to in each article;
4. Proper Names of organizations, political institutions, laws, etc. mentioned in each article;
5. Journal in which each article is published.

USPSD can be purchased as a two volume set—PARTS I & II—or PART I, the indexes, can be purchased separately. Prices for both are as follows:

	Regular price	APSA-member price
PARTS I & II (Index & documents)	$90.00	$75.00
PART I (Index only)	$75.00	$60.00



University Center for International Studies
Publications Section
University of Pittsburgh
G-6 Mervis Hall
Pittsburgh, PA 15260
USA



The 5th edition of the authoritative compilation of Ph.D. and Masters programs in political science is completely revised and now contains the *names and fields of specialization of all faculty in graduate departments.*

$4.00 (prepaid)

Available Direct From:
The American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036



How to win revolutions and influence politics.

J. Bowyer Bell walked down Murder Mile in Aden, was fired upon in Northern Ireland, and interviewed governors, guerrillas, arms smugglers, mercenaries, and Mau Mau to write this book.

It is an intense, and intensive, examination of the strategies of the revolts that erupted across the British Empire between 1944 and 1974. Bell describes in vivid detail the strategy, tactics, responses, and final outcome of each revolt – from Israel to the Gold Coast, from Malaya to Kenya.

George Quester called *On Revolt*, "Immensely readable, exhaustively researched in the field and in the literature, conveying a great deal of detail I have not seen in print before."

On Revolt

Strategies of National Liberation
J. Bowyer Bell
$15.00

Harvard University Press
Cambridge, Mass. 02138

from APSA...

CUMULATIVE INDEX TO
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL MEETINGS

Key word index to all papers included in proceedings of Annual Meetings from 1904-12 and 1956-70. 887 p. $18.95 prepaid

ALSO AVAILABLE:

APSA ANNUAL MEETING PAPERS

Hard copies, including 1974 Meeting Papers, $3.00 each

APSA ANNUAL MEETING PROCEEDINGS

Microfilm reels of all papers, 1904-12 and 1956-74

CUMULATIVE INDEX to the
AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

1906-1968, $6.50 prepaid

AVAILABLE DIRECT FROM:

Customer Services Department
University Microfilms
300 North Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106

Coming in November from New Viewpoints

THE UNITED STATES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTH AMERICA 1945-1975
By Samuel L. Bally, Rutgers University
Calling for a major re-evaluation of our policy, Dr. Bally effectively challenges some of the most widely held conventional views of U.S.-South American relations, including those that have prevailed in the State Department. He argues convincingly that many of the problems between the two continents are caused not by neglect, but by the effective implementation of policy, suggesting that the interests of the U.S. and South America are not necessarily compatible. Tables. Bibliography.

Hardcover 531-05387-3 $15.00
Paperbound 531-05594-9 $ 6.95

HARRY TRUMAN'S CHINA POLICY: McCarthyism and the Diplomacy of Hysteria, 1947-1951
By Lewis McCarroll Purifoy, Emory and Henry College
In policy statements of January, 1950, the Administration solemnly affirmed that it would not engage in land wars in Asia. Why then, later in the same year, did America lunge desperately at the Asian continent? The author believes it was the frenzied McCarthyite attacks on the government for its alleged softness on Communism—and only this—that brought about the reversal of America's policy of nonintervention. Purifoy's book is a superb study of how not to conduct foreign policy.

Hardcover 531-05386-5 $12.95
Paperbound 531-05593-0 $ 5.95

NEW VIEWPOINTS / A Division of Franklin Watts, Inc. / 730 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10019

Duke University Press

PUBLICATIONS OF THE CONSORTIUM FOR COMPARATIVE LEGISLATIVE STUDIES

Malcolm E. Jewell, General Editor

INFLUENCE IN PARLIAMENT: CANADA
Allan Kornberg and William Mishler

Probably the most ambitious and successful study undertaken of a single parliamentary body, this book adds significantly to existing knowledge about the Canadian Parliament and makes important contributions to the comparative study of legislative systems and behavior.
Summer 1976
$14.75

LEGISLATIVE AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
Lebanon, 1842–1972
Abdo I. Baaklini

"Abdo Baaklini's seminal work on the Lebanese Parliament could be taken as a model for the proliferation of legislative case studies which is critically needed in legislative research. Making use of a variety of methods and drawing on attitudinal and behavioral data, Baaklini adroitly sets the Lebanese Parliament into its historical and political setting." Alan P. Balutis, POLITY
Summer 1976
$11.50

LEGISLATIVE SYSTEMS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
G.R.Boynton and Chong Lim Kim, editors

Focuses on countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America and on the role played by the legislatures of the countries discussed. The essays challenge traditional assumptions about legislatures and relate legislatures to broader political systems and problems of political development.
1975
$11.75

Other books in the Comparative Legislative Studies Series, to be published in 1977:

THE SUPREME SOVIET: POLITICS AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN THE SOVIET UNION
Peter Vanneman

LEGISLATURES IN PLURAL SOCIETIES
Albert F. Eldridge, editor

Available at your bookseller or directly from

DUKE UNIVERSITY PRESS
6697 COLLEGE STATION, DURHAM, NORTH CAROLINA 27708

Change and Continuity in American Politics

The Social Bases of Political Parties
David Knoke
Using the Survey Research Center's data on presidential elections from 1952-1972, Knoke provides the most penetrating recent analysis of the social bases for party political support in the United States. He constructs a causal model to show how religion, race, region, and socioeconomic status affect identification with a particular party. $11.50

Japan Faces China

Political and Economic Relations in the Postwar Era
Chae-Jin Lee
Utilizing information collected from indigenous published materials and personal interviews, as well as quantitative data from trade statistics, opinion polls, election results, and voting records, Chae-Jin Lee analyzes the complex of factors that influenced Sino-Japanese relations from 1949 through 1972. He shows in particular how Japan's ruling Liberal-Democratic Party, opposition Japan Socialist Party, and other political groups fluctuated in their policies toward China and also examines the influence exerted on the Japanese government by business and labor interests. $12.50

Comparative Human Rights

edited by Richard P. Claude
"This extraordinarily insightful study seeks to bring the methods and findings of comparative study and policy science to bear upon the increasingly important problem of human rights. It deserves the attention of all who are concerned with clarifying and implementing a law of human dignity." — *Myres S. McDougal, Sterling Professor of Law, Emeritus, Yale University*
$16.50

New in paperback

Southern Politics and the Second Reconstruction

Numan V. Bartley and Hugh D. Graham
"A work of exhaustive research and mature judgments, based largely on analyses of both voting and survey research data but also on interviews and more traditional historical sources, SOUTHERN POLITICS AND THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION is very likely the most engrossing and important statement on recent southern politics yet in print. Clearly written and jargon-free, copiously illustrated with readable tables, maps, and graphs, it has bottom-of-the-page documentation, an extended bibliographic essay, and a note on methodology lucid enough to be understood even by nonquantifiers." — *Journal of Southern History* $3.65 paperback, $12.50 hardcover

Johns Hopkins

The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, Maryland 21218

From GLP . . .

texts that invite involvement and discussion




BUREAUCRACY AND THE MODERN WORLD

Victor A. Thompson (University of Florida)

This comprehensive text offers a moral or philosophical basis for organization without sacrificing the behavioral understanding gained in recent years. It sets forth the moral assumptions of modern institutions, especially those engaged in providing goods and services, both public and private.

1976 150 pages paper, $5.95



CORRUPTION IN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM

Larry L. Berg (University of Southern California), Harlan Hahn (University of Southern California), John R. Schmidhauser (University of Southern California)

The purpose of this book is to assist students and other citizens in a reappraisal of the sources of—and reasons for—the systemic corruption found in the very structure of American politics.

1976 224 pages paper, $4.50

CONGRESSIONAL REFORM IN THE SEVENTIES

Leroy N. Rieselbach (Indiana University)

Indicating why Congress has not initiated public policy and suggesting that beneath this surface deference lies Congress' spirit of independence, this text discusses the first serious reform movement in the United States Congress in nearly three decades.

1977 160 pages paper, $3.95 (tent.)

To request examination copies, write Director of Marketing

GENERAL LEARNING PRESS

Morristown, New Jersey 07960

Available in Canada from GLC Publishers, Ltd., Agincourt, Ontario

Announcing Congressional Quarterly's

Politics and Public Policy Series

Supplementary Textbooks in Political Science written by leading scholars and published by Congressional Quarterly Press

Advisory Editor
Robert L. Peabody, Johns Hopkins University

Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process

by Walter J. Oleszek

A study of the legislative process in Congress. The organization, rules, procedures and folkways of the House of Representatives and Senate are examined from the perspective of how ideas are transformed into public laws. Intended to provide a clear understanding of how and why the contemporary Congress functions as it does, the study discusses the political and institutional environment of senators and representatives, the formulation of legislation, processing of legislation by committees, scheduling of bills and floor consideration, resolution of differences between the houses, and Congress' oversight role. Special emphasis is placed on the influence the organization and procedures of Congress have on strategies for enacting or blocking legislation, bargaining between members and, ultimately, the shape of public policy. In response to a number of factors, Congress' organization and processes have changed significantly in recent years. Both chambers have instituted procedures to open legislative proceedings to more public view; to strengthen oversight capabilities; to improve the budgetmaking process; to modify the seniority system and to enhance the role of party caucuses. These and other new developments are carefully assessed. February 1977. Approx. 225 pages. $4.50

Financing Politics: Money, Elections and Political Reform

by Herbert E. Alexander

A thorough analysis of an issue that goes to the basic fibers of our democratic system—the financing of electoral politics. The book discusses how money is raised, handled, spent and regulated in American elections. The history of the increasing costs of political campaigns is documented. The author considers the perennial question of whether big spending is the way to political success, showing where and how money has been a deciding factor and where—surprisingly—it has not. Campaign finance reform is examined as a case study of political reform—with analyses of the effects of major election reform legislation in 1971, 1974 and 1976. The record of campaign finance in the 1972 and 1976 presidential elections, including the campaign abuses associated with the Watergate affair and the successes and failures of the Federal Election Commission, provide a backdrop for an overview of money in politics and election reform.

October 1976. Approx. 225 pages. $4.50

Review Copies

Congressional Quarterly Press
1414 22nd St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037

Please mail information on review copies of:
☐ **Financing Politics**
☐ **Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process**

Name _____

Address _____

_____ Zip _____

The American Political Science Review

Articles and Essays by R. Kenneth Godwin and W. Bruce Shepard, David Resnick, Shlomo Avineri, Helmut Norpoth, Richard D. McKelvey and Peter C. Ordeshook, James L. Perry and Charles H. Levine, Russell Hardin, Ithiel de Sola Pool, Colin S. Gray

---


Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr.
Industrial Conflict in Advanced Industrial Societies

Thomas L. Pangle
The Political Psychology of Religion in Plato's *Laws*

Robert W. Jackman
Politicians in Uniform

Neil R. Richardson
Political Compliance and U.S. Trade Dominance


Fred H. Willhoite, Jr.
Primates and Political Authority



Published Quarterly by

The American Political Science Association

Vol. LXX December 1976 No. 4



what's new

KENNETH PREWITT and SIDNEY VERBA

PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

SECOND EDITION

The Second Edition of PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, the shortened paperback version of the authors' AN INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN GOVERNMENT has undergone thorough revision. Chapters on political parties and elections, congress, and the presidency have been extensively rewritten and updated to incorporate key developments through the 1976 elections. The new edition also reflects the changes heralded in last year's revision of the longer text—including six new descriptive sections on how governmental institutions work. Tentative: 416 pages; $8.50/paper. February 1977. ISBN 0-06-045282-X. *Instructor's Manual.*

REO M. CHRISTENSON

CHALLENGE AND DECISION

POLITICAL ISSUES OF OUR TIME, FIFTH EDITION

Widely adopted and consistently acclaimed through four editions, the Fifth Edition of CHALLENGE AND DECISION is concise and provocative in its treatment of major domestic political issues.

Presenting a well-rounded range of viewpoints to stimulate classroom discussion, the author analyzes the origins, development, and future course of current political problems. New to this edition are chapters on energy, the economy, the budget, the feminist movement, and pornography. Over 50% of the book constitutes new material. 244 pages; $5.50/paper. August 1976. ISBN 0-06-041267-4.

VERNON F. ANDERSON and ROGER A. VAN WINKLE

IN THE ARENA

THE CARE AND FEEDING OF AMERICAN POLITICS

Facts, analysis, insights, and commentary are candidly revealed by political participants and seasoned observers in this unique book on running for public office. The smoothly integrated text and readings show how the serious game of politics is actually played in local and national arenas and how the campaign process fits into the broad scope of American government.

Special features of the book include a class-tested campaign simulation and boxed inserts presenting unusual or interesting aspects of politics. 425 pages; $6.95/paper. August 1976. ISBN 0-06-046811-4.

To request examination copies, write to Lilian Schein. Dept. 354. Please include course title, enrollment, and present text.

10 East 53d Street, New York, N.Y. 10022

Harper & Row

The American Political Science Review

Vol. LXX December 1976 No. 4

CONTENTS

1030 Editorial Comment

1033 Industrial Conflict in Advanced Industrial Societies — Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr.

1059 The Political Psychology of Religion in Plato's *Laws* — Thomas L. Pangle

1078 Politicians in Uniform: Military Governments and Social Change in the Third World — Robert W. Jackman

1098 Political Compliance and U.S. Trade Dominance — Neil R. Richardson

1110 Primates and Political Authority: A Biobehavioral Perspective — Fred H. Willhoite, Jr.

1127 Political Processes and Public Expenditures: A Re-examination Based on Theories of Representative Government — R. Kenneth Godwin and W. Bruce Shepard

1136 Crude Communism and Revolution — David Resnick
Comment — Shlomo Avineri
Rejoinder — David Resnick

1156 Explaining Party Cohesion in Congress: The Case of Shared Policy Attitudes — Helmut Norpoth

1172 Symmetric Spatial Games Without Majority Rule Equilibria — Richard D. McKelvey and Peter C. Ordeshook

1185 An Interorganizational Analysis of Power, Conflict, and Settlements in Public Sector Collective Bargaining — James L. Perry and Charles H. Levine

1202 Hollow Victory: The Minimum Winning Coalition — Russell Hardin

1215 Communications

1234 Book Reviews and Essays


1234 Government and the Media — Ithiel de Sola Pool

1242 Detente, Arms Control and Strategy: Perspectives on SALT — Colin S. Gray

Index to Volume LXX

Office of publication: Curtis Reed Plaza, Menasha, Wisconsin
Second class postage paid at Washington, D.C., and at additional mailing offices.
Printed in the United States of America by George Banta Company, Inc., Menasha, Wisconsin.

Copyright, 1976 by the American Political Science Association.



New Instructions to Contributors

Address correspondence about contributions to the *Review* concerning issues before the issue of September 1977 to Nelson W. Polsby, Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, California 94720; and issues after September 1977 (including all new manuscripts) starting January 1, 1976, to Charles O. Jones, *American Political Science Review*, Department of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15260. Address all correspondence about pending manuscripts to Charles O. Jones.

Please submit *four* copies of a manuscript to be considered for publication. *Unfortunately, due to increased postage costs, we can no longer return manuscripts to the author.* Manuscripts must be typed and mimeographed or photocopied, with all written material double-spaced (including quotations). Please do not send the original typescript. Since manuscripts are sent out anonymously for evaluation, the author's name and affiliation should appear only on a separate covering sheet and all footnotes identifying the author should also appear on a separate sheet. An abstract of less than 150 words should accompany the manuscript.

The footnote form is that used by most scientific journals. Explanatory notes only will be permitted for most manuscripts (see below); references will be listed alphabetically at the end of the manuscript and in-text references will be made by inserting author or title, year, and page number, if appropriate. For illustration see Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975). Note: authors of manuscripts on the history of political thought may, if they prefer, use the traditional footnote form when referring to the individual theorist's work; the reference form should be used when referring to secondary works.

All manuscripts will be examined carefully for length. Referees will be asked to recommend where cuts might be made, without affecting the principal contribution. Manuscripts over 30 pages will be reviewed with particular care to determine if such length is warranted. Except in extraordinary circumstances, manuscripts over 50 pages will be returned to the author. Resubmission may follow compliance with the page limit. Manuscripts must be prepared as noted above, double-spaced throughout, with standard margins. Tables, charts, and references will be included in the page count.

Communications must follow the form of regular manuscripts (including reference listings where appropriate). They must be brief and to the point.

Figures should be drawn on white paper with India ink and the original tracings or drawings retained by the author (for transmission later to the printer). Copies only should accompany the manuscript. Tables should be typed on a separate page. Insert a guide line, e.g., "Table 1 about here," at the appropriate place in the manuscript.

ARTICLES

1033 **Industrial Conflict in Advanced Industrial Societies.** This study focuses on strike activity during the 1950–1969 period in ten industrial societies, The first section of the paper deals with issues of strike measurement and introduces a three-dimensional characterization of strike activity which forms the basis of the subsequent statistical analyses. The next section examines postwar trends in industrial conflict in order to evaluate the argument that strike activity is "withering away" in advanced industrial societies. Time plots of the aggregate volume of industrial conflict show that there has been no general downward movement in strike activity during the postwar period.

The third part of the paper develops a number of theoretically plausible statistical models to explain year-to-year fluctuations in the volume of strikes. The empirical results of this section indicate that (1) there is a pronounced inverse relationship between strike activity and the level of unemployment, which suggests that on the whole strikes are timed to capitalize on the strategic advantages of a tight labor market; (2) industrial conflict responds to movements in real wages rather than money wages, which indicates that labor is not misled by a "money illusion"; (3) Labor and Socialist parties are not able to deter strike activity in the short-run despite their strong electoral incentive to do so; and (4) the volume of strikes does seem to be influenced by the relative size of Communist parties, which suggests that such parties remain important agencies for the mobilization of discontent and the crystallization of labor-capital cleavages.

By DOUGLAS A. HIBBS, JR., Associate Professor of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

1059 **The Political Psychology of Religion in Plato's *Laws*.** This paper explains Plato's conception of the relation between politics and "political religion" (ideology) in a nonliberal participatory republican system. The discussion is in the form of a commentary on the drama of a part of Plato's *Laws*. The underlying methodological assumption is that Plato presented his political teaching not so much through the speeches as through the drama of the dialogue, and that he held this to be the most appropriate form for political science because in this way political science can most effectively stimulate thought about its subject matter, the psyche involved in social action.

Following Plato, we focus first on the psychological needs such a political system generates and attempts to satisfy through civil religion. We then move to a consideration of how political "theology" serves to mediate between science and society, or the philosopher and the city.

The essay is intended to contribute to the Montesquieuian project engaging the attention of more and more political theorists: the endeavor to help contemporary political science and psychology escape from the trammeling parochialism of exclusive attention to twentieth century theoretical categories and empirical experiences.

By THOMAS L. PANGLE, Associate Professor of Political Science, Yale University.

1078 **Politicians in Uniform: Military Governments and Social Change in the Third World.** This paper examines three arguments about the impact of military regimes on social change (i.e., economic growth and social reform) in Third-World countries. The first asserts that military governments are progressive; the second claims that they are conservative or reactionary; while the third states that the impact of military regimes on social change varies by level of development. An analysis of covariance model is specified and used first to reanalyze data previously examined by Nordlinger. The results provide no support for any of the three hypotheses, but limitations of the data prevent this from being a convincing test. The model is therefore tested with a second set of data covering 77 politically independent countries of the Third World for the decade 1960 to 1970. Again, the estimates are inconsistent with all three hypotheses and suggest instead that military regimes have no unique effects on social change, regardless of societal type. The paper concludes that the civilian-military government distinction is of little use in the explanation of social change.

By ROBERT W. JACKMAN, Associate Professor of Political Science, Michigan State University.

1098 **Political Compliance and U.S. Trade Dominance.** This study examines influence relations between the United States and countries that are dependent upon their foreign trade with it.

The hypotheses are concerned with political compliance expected of these dependencies as a consequence of their economic vulnerabilities to pressure from the U.S. Informed by trade-related variables and U.N. General Assembly voting behavior of the mid-1960s, the hypotheses find some support. The evidence shows that its dependencies, especially those in the western hemisphere, agree with the U.S. in General Assembly roll calls to a greater degree than do other countries. This compliant behavior, however, is confined to votes that pit the United States against the Soviet Union; when the superpowers are in partial or complete agreement, U.S. dependencies are no more in accord with the U.S. than are other countries. Throughout the study, dependencies are proposed to be vulnerable along four dimensions of their economic circumstances. Interestingly, the respective effects of these four factors are not as hypothesized. Their relative weights in contributing to compliance are largely as expected, but the nature of their partial associations is not. Finally, it happens that most of the dependencies turn out to be Latin American and Caribbean countries, a fact that complicates the interpretation of the statistical results.

By NEIL R. RICHARDSON, Assistant Professor of Government, The University of Texas at Austin.

1110 **Primates and Political Authority: A Biobehavioral Perspective.** This paper presents an evolutionary-biological perspective on the stratification of political authority, power, and influence. The rudiments and relevance of a biobehavioral approach are indicated, particularly in regard to study of the behavior of subhuman primate species. Dominance-deference behavior patterns in four species—rhesus macaques, savanna baboons, gorillas, and chimpanzees—are described and compared, followed by discussion of some stratification concepts that have been derived from primate studies and applied to human societies. The possible continuing influence on man's behavior of his evolutionary history is considered through discussion of a zoologist's attempt to reconstruct it, and through tentative reinterpretations of social psychological conceptions of leader-follower relationships and dispositions to obey authority figures. Finally, it is suggested that the modern conception of political authority *per se* as contingent and contrived may be empirically untenable, and, if so, that certain implications may follow concerning theories of political obligation and constitutionalism.

By FRED H. WILLHOITE, JR., Professor of Political Science, Coe College.

1127 **Political Processes and Public Expenditures: A Re-examination Based on Theories of Representative Government.** Studies attempting to predict public expenditures using political variables have generally incorrectly assumed that political, like socioeconomic, variables function as determinants of policy levels and types. If one assumes, however, that the function of the political process in representative government is to translate citizens' demands for various levels of services as accurately as possible, then political variables must be conceptualized as mediating in character. In the absence of knowledge of whether public services are being oversupplied or undersupplied in relation to citizen demands, the effects of political variables can therefore, be better tested by moving beyond single-equation regression models.

An alternative method for examining impacts of political variables is presented by integrating them with conventional theories of political representation. This leads to a concept of "translation error," and ways of examining relationships between this concept and political variables are explicated. Finally, the greater theoretical utility of this reformulation for the study of public policy is examined, and empirical studies which indicate its validity are cited.

By R. KENNETH GODWIN, Associate Professor of Political Science, Oregon State University, and W. BRUCE SHEPARD, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Oregon State University.

1136 **Crude Communism and Revolution.** The paper is an examination of the relationship between Marx's theory of communism and his theory of revolution in the early writings. Avineri's claim that the *Paris Manuscripts* contain a two stage theory of future society is critically evaluated. It is argued that by crude communism Marx meant an incorrect theory of communism and not a description of the next stage of society. Confusion results from taking Marx's discussion of two stages in the *Critique of the Gotha Program* and reading the more sophisticated analysis of the later works back into the early writings. A discussion of the relationship between revolutionary theory and practice as formulated in the early writing is offered in order to sub-

stantiate the claim that Marx never thought that socialist society had to pass through the stage of crude communism.

By DAVID RESNICK, Assistant Professor of Government, Cornell University.

Comment. By SHLOMO AVINERI, Herbert Samuel Professor of Government, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

Rejoinder. By DAVID RESNICK.

1156 **Explaining Party Cohesion in Congress: The Case of Shared Policy Attitudes.** Partisanship has often been noted as one of the most conspicuous factors in legislative voting in the U.S. Congress. This paper attempts to trace party voting to shared policy goals. After the mean attitudes of congressmen belonging to the same party were ascertained for a number of policy domains, the effect of mean party attitudes on roll-call voting was estimated by regression analysis, taking into account the deviation of individual congressmen from their respective mean party attitudes. The results demonstrate that in all three policy domains examined, i.e., social welfare, civil rights, and foreign policy, shared party attitudes leave a strong imprint on individual roll-call decisions. The voting decisions of congressmen, in fact, are found to owe more to the shared party attitudes than to their own individual attitudes. The paper also explores the communication process through which shared policy attitudes are translated within Congress into partisan roll-call votes and points to a way of reconciling the "predispositional" and the "interactional" approach to legislative decision making.

By HELMUT NORPOTH, Research Associate, Zentralarchiv für empirische Sozialforschung, University of Cologne.

1172 **Symmetric Spatial Games Without Majority Rule Equilibria.** The assumptions imposed in spatial models of election competition generally are restrictive in that they require either unidimensional issue spaces or symmetrically distributed electorate preferences. We attribute such assumptions to the reliance of these models on a single concept of a solution to the election game —pure strategy equilibria—and to the fact that such equilibria do not exist in general under less severe restrictions. This essay considers, then, the possibility that candidates adopt mixed minimax strategies. We show, for a general class of symmetric zero-sum two-person games, that the domain of these minimax strategies is restricted to a subset of the strategy space and that for spatial games this set not only exists, but if preferences are characterized by continuous densities, it is typically small. Thus, the hypothesis that candidates abide by mixed minimax strategies can limit considerably our expectation as to the policies candidates eventually advocate. Additionally, we examine the frequently blurred distinction between spatial conceptualizations of two-candidate elections and of committees, and we conclude that if pure strategy equilibria do not exist, this distinction is especially important since committees and elections can produce entirely different outcomes.

By RICHARD D. MCKELVEY, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Carnegie-Mellon University, and PETER C. ORDESHOOK, Professor of Political Science, Carnegie-Mellon University.

1185 **An Interorganizational Analysis of Power, Conflict, and Settlements in Public Sector Collective Bargaining.** Despite increased interest in public sector collective bargaining, a survey of recent attempts to build theory about the dynamics and outcomes of union-management negotiations in public organizations reveals that little progress has been made. One approach that appears fruitful is interorganizational analysis. In an interorganizational context, organizations interact with other autonomous organizations to make joint decisions that have implications for both parties and for the larger system. This study focuses on five interorganizational variables that are useful for understanding the collective bargaining process in the public sector: (1) goal divergence; (2) stability of the relationship; (3) organizational dependence; (4) conflictual behavior; (5) contractual change.

From these theoretical concepts, five propositions are derived which serve as the basis for the research hypotheses. The hypotheses were tested on a sample of 60 cases drawn from a population of 535 collective bargaining negotiations in New York City from 1968 through 1972. The test of the research hypotheses resulted in these conclusions: (1) a substantial amount of the conflictual behavior in public sector collective bargaining is explained by goal divergence, stability of the relationship, and asymmetry of relative dependence favoring one of the organiza-

tions; and (2) contractual change is explained by goal divergence, conflictual behavior, and asymmetry of relative dependence favoring one of the organizations.

By JAMES L. PERRY, Assistant Professor, Graduate School of Administration, University of California, Irvine, and CHARLES H. LEVINE, Associate Professor, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University.

1202 **Hollow Victory: The Minimum Winning Coalition.** The proof of Riker's size principle is inadequate for the general class of zero-sum bargaining games (whether symmetric or asymmetric) and the principle is valid only for a very restricted class of games—the supersymmetric games and their asymmetric counterparts. Butterworth's modification of the size principle (the maximum number of positive gainers principle) can be extended to cover games which are only approximately symmetric. Roll-call voting in the United States House of Representatives overwhelmingly violates the size principle; hence, the House does not generally play a supersymmetric zero-sum bargaining game. More generally, both Butterworth's and Riker's principles seem inapplicable to large bodies.

By RUSSELL HARDIN, Associate Professor of Government and Politics, University of Maryland, College Park.

1215 **COMMUNICATIONS**

From Bradley C. Canon and S. Sidney Ulmer, Richard Funston, Chester Spatt, Guillermo Owen, Stephen V. Stephens, John E. Hunter and T. Daniel Coggin, Theodore S. Arrington, Christopher Achen

---

1234 **BOOK REVIEWS AND ESSAYS**

Government and the Media. Chris Argyris, *Behind the Front Page;* James Aronson, *Deadline for the Media: Today's Challenges to Press, TV & Radio* and *The Press and the Cold War;* Robert O. Blanchard, ed., *Congress and the News Media;* Lee Brown, *The Reluctant Reformation: On Criticizing the Press in America;* Robert Cirino, *Don't Blame the People: How the News Media Use Bias, Distortion, and Censorship to Manipulate Public Opinion;* Edith Efron, *The News Twisters;* Edward Jay Epstein, *News From Nowhere: Television and the News;* Robert E. Gilbert, *Television and Presidential Politics;* John Hohenberg, *Free Press/Free People: The Best Cause;* Joseph Keeley, *The Left-Leaning Antenna: Political Bias in Television;* Richard W. Lee, ed., *Politics and the Press;* John Luskin, *Lippmann, Liberty and the Press;* Lester Markel, *What You Don't Know Can Hurt You: A Study in Public Opinion and Public Emotion;* John C. Merrill, *The Imperative of Freedom: A Philosophy of Journalistic Autonomy;* Newton N. Minow, John Barlow Martin, Lee M. Mitchell, *Presidential Television;* William Rivers, *The Adversaries: Politics and the Press;* Leon V. Sigal, *Reporters and Officials;* William Small, *To Kill a Messenger: Television News and the Real World;* Jeremy Tunstall, *Journalists at Work: Specialist Correspondents;* Charles W. Whalen, Jr., *Your Right to Know,* George F. Will, ed., *Press, Politics and Popular Government.*

By ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, Professor of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

1242 **Detente, Arms Control and Strategy: Perspectives on SALT.** Matthew P. Gallagher and Karl F. Spielmann, Jr., *Soviet Decision-Making for Defense: A Critique of U.S. Perspectives on the Arms Race;* Morton A. Kaplan, ed., *SALT: Problems and Prospects;* William R. Kintner and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, eds., *SALT: Implications for Arms Control in the 1970's;* John Newhouse, *Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT;* Richard Rosecrance, ed., *The Future of the International Strategic System;* Mason Willrich and John B. Rhinelander, eds., *SALT: The Moscow Agreements and Beyond.*

By COLIN S. GRAY, Hudson Institute.

1257 **Political Theory, History of Political Thought and Methodology**
A. J. Ayer, *Russell and Moore: The Analytical Heritage.* David Berlinski, p. 1257
David Caute, *Frantz Fanon;* and Peter Geismar, *Fanon.* Bernard S. Morris, p. 1258

William Sloane Coffin, Jr. and Morris I. Leibman, *Civil Disobedience: Aid or Hindrance to Justice?;* Richard J. Regan, S.J., *Private Conscience and Public Law: The American Experience;* and Elliot M. Zashin, *Civil Disobedience and Democracy.* Robert F. Sasseen, p. 1259
S. N. Eisenstadt, *Tradition, Change, and Modernity.* Marion J. Levy, Jr., p. 1261
The Fabian Society, *Socialism and Affluence,* and *The Fifth Social Service: A Critical Analysis of the Seebohm Proposals.* Della Nevitt, p. 1264
Werner Fuchs et al., eds., *Lexikon Zur Soziologie.* Gianfranco Poggi, p. 1265
A. James Gregor, *Interpretations of Fascism.* Stanley G. Payne, p. 1266
Louis J. Halle, *The Ideological Imagination.* Lawrence A. Scaff, p. 1267
Donald W. Hanson, *From Kingdom to Commonwealth: The Development of Civic Consciousness in English Political Thought.* Paul E. Sigmund, p. 1268
G. C. Harcourt, *Some Cambridge Controversies in the Theory of Capital.* Leland B. Yeager, p. 1270
Robert Havemann, *Questions, Answers, Questions: From the Biography of a German Marxist.* Paul Breines, p. 1271
Frederick Jameson, *Marxism and Form: Twentieth Century Dialectical Theories of Literature.* Paul Piccone, p. 1272
Elliot Jaques, *Work, Creativity, and Social Justice;* Staffan B. Linder, *The Harried Leisure Class;* Special Task Force to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, *Work in America. Report of a Special Task Force to the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare;* and Yves Simon, *Work, Society and Culture.* Sebastian de Grazia, p. 1273
Martin Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, 1923–1950.* Hans Speier, p. 1276
Barry D. Karl, *Charles E. Merriam and the Study of Politics.* Gabriel A. Almond, p. 1278
Leonard Krieger. *The German Idea of Freedom: History of a Political Tradition.* James J. Sheehan, p. 1279
Vincent Lemieux, *Parenté et Politique: l'organisation sociale dans l'Ile d'Orléans.* Kenneth McRoberts, p. 1281
Eugene Lunn, *Prophet of Community: The Romantic Socialism of Gustav Landauer.* Carl Landauer, p. 1282
Steven Marcus, *Engels, Manchester, and the Working Class.* E. V. Walter, p. 1283
Philip Mason, *Patterns of Dominance.* M. Mushkat, Jr., p. 1283
J. S. McClelland, ed., *The French Right (from de Maistre to Maurras);* Michael D. Biddis, ed., *Gobineau: Selected Political Writings;* John Carroll, compiler, *Max Stirner: The Ego and His Own;* Alfred Rosenberg, *Race and Race History and Other Essays.* Eugen Weber, p. 1284
Barrington Moore, Jr., *Reflections on the Causes of Human Misery and Upon Certain Proposals to Eliminate Them.* Alan Stone, p. 1286
A. E. Keir Nash, ed., *Governance and Population: The Governmental Implications of Population Changes.* R. Kenneth Godwin, p. 1288
Robert Nozick, *Anarchy, State and Utopia.* Douglas Rae, p. 1289
Nicholas Rescher, *Welfare: The Social Issues in Philosophical Perspective.* Charles E. Gilbert, p. 1291
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Government of Poland.* Richard B. Carter, p. 1292
Hans A. Schmitt, ed., *Historians of Modern Europe.* Robert Woito, p. 1294
J. Lyndon Shanley, ed., *The Writings of Henry D. Thoreau: Walden;* Joseph J. Moldenhauer, ed., *The Writings of Henry D. Thoreau: The Maine Woods;* Wendell Glick, ed., *The Writings of Henry D. Thoreau: Reform Papers.* David M. Atkinson, p. 1295
Ian Taylor and Laurie Taylor, eds., *Politics and Deviance.* Martin Plax, p. 1297

1298 American Government and Politics

David W. Adamany, *Campaign Finance in America.* John R. Owens, p. 1298
James David Barber, *The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House.* Arnold A. Rogow, p. 1299
Steven B. Canby, *Military Manpower Procurement: A Policy Analysis.* Gary L. Wamsley, p. 1301
Charles Chatfield, *For Peace and Justice: Pacifism in America, 1914–1941.* Justus D. Doenecke, p. 1302
Robert L. Crain and Carol Sachs Weisman, *Discrimination, Personality, and Achievement: A Survey of Northern Blacks;* and Kent S. Miller and Ralph Mason Dreger, eds., *Comparative Studies of Blacks and Whites in the United States.* Thomas F. Pettigrew, p. 1303
Chandler Davidson, *Biracial Politics: Conflict and Coalition in the Metropolitan South.* Richard Murray, p. 1305
Vine Deloria, Jr., *Behind the Trail of Broken Treaties;* and Theodore W. Taylor, *The States and Their Indian Citizens.* Frances Svensson, p. 1306

Heinz Eulau and Kenneth Prewitt, *Labyrinths of Democracy: Adaptations, Linkages, Representation, and Policies in Urban Politics.* John H. Kessel, p. 1308
Louis S. Gerteis, *From Contraband to Freedman: Federal Policy Toward Southern Blacks, 1861–1865.* William S. McFeely, p. 1309
Richard Hellman, *Government Competition in the Electric Utility Industry: A Theoretical and Empirical Study.* Harry M. Trebing, p. 1310
Lawrence D. Longley and Alan G. Braun, *The Politics of Electoral College Reform.* Laurin L. Henry, p. 1311
Neil R. McMillen, *The Citizens' Council: Organized Resistance to the Second Reconstruction: 1954–1964.* James D. Thomas, p. 1313
Jeanne Nienaber and Aaron Wildavsky, *The Budgeting and Evaluation of Federal Recreation Programs, or Money Doesn't Grow on Trees.* Allen Schick, p. 1313
Martin H. Seiden, *Cable Television U.S.A.;* and Harvey J. Levin, *The Invisible Resource.* Frank Wolf, p. 1315
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., ed., *History of U.S. Political Parties, Vol. I: 1789–1860, From Factions to Parties; Vol. II: 1860–1910, The Gilded Age of Politics; Vol. III: 1910–1945, From Square Deal to New Deal; Vol. IV: 1945–1972, The Politics of Change.* Austin Ranney, p. 1316
David G. Temple, *Merger Politics: Local Government in Tidewater Virginia.* Chester W. Bain, p. 1316
Hanes Walton, Jr., *Black Politics: A Theoretical and Structural Analysis.* Carolyn Sue Williams, p. 1317
Raymond E. Wolfinger, *The Politics of Progress.* Paul E. Peterson, p. 1318

1320 Comparative Government and Politics

Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution. Occupation and Resistance, 1944–1946.* J. A. C. Mackie, p. 1320
Shlomo Avineri, ed., *Israel and the Palestinians.* Amos Perlmutter, p. 1321
Brenda E. F. Beck, *Peasant Society in Konku: A Study of Right and Left Subcastes in South India.* Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr., p. 1322
Ralph Braibanti, *Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan.* Lawrence Ziring, p. 1323
Patrick Buckland, *Irish Unionism 1: The Anglo-Irish and the New Ireland, 1885 to 1922;* and *Irish Unionism 2: Ulster Unionism and the Origins of Northern Ireland, 1886 to 1922,* Alan J. Ward, p. 1324
Shahid Javed Burki, *A Study of Chinese Communes, 1965.* Benedict Stavis, p. 1326
Derek Channon, *The Strategy and Structure of British Enterprise.* Stephen Blank, p. 1326
Ian Clegg, *Workers' Self-Management in Algeria;* and Gérard Duprat, *Révolution et Autogestion Rurale en Algérie.* Clement Henry Moore, p. 1328
Jack Dennis and M. Kent Jennings, eds., *Comparative Political Socialization.* Roberta S. Sigel, p. 1329
Ronald Dore, *British Factory—Japanese Factory: The Origins of National Diversity in Industrial Relations.* George O. Totten, p. 1331
Ernest Gellner and Charles Micaud, eds., *Arabs and Berbers: From Tribe to Nation in North Africa.* Jean-Claude Vatin, p. 1332
Sailesh Ghandra Ghosh, *Decision-making and Power in the British Conservative Party: A Study of the Indian Problem.* Geoffrey Lambert, p. 1334
Natalia Gorbanevskaya, *Red Square at Noon.* Frederick C. Barghoorn, p. 1335
Werner G. Hahn, *The Politics of Soviet Agriculture, 1960–1970.* Linda L. Lubrano, p. 1336
D. A. Hamer, *Liberal Politics in the Age of Gladstone and Rosebery: A Study in Leadership and Policy.* Robert Kelley, p. 1337
Claire Holt, ed., *Culture and Politics in Indonesia.* Rex Mortimer, p. 1338
Robert N. Kearney, *Trade Unions and Politics in Ceylon.* Calvin A. Woodward, p. 1339
Lorenzo Kent Kimball, *The Changing Pattern of Political Power in Iraq, 1958 to 1971.* Glenn Perry, p. 1341
Enver M. Koury, *The Patterns of Mass Movements in Arab Revolutionary–Progressive States.* Subhi Abu-Gosh, p. 1341
William M. Lafferty, *Economic Development and the Response of Labor in Scandinavia: A Multi-Level Analysis.* Joseph B. Board, p. 1343
Aprodicio A. Laquian, *Slums Are For People: The Barrio Magsaysay Pilot Project in Philippine Urban Community Development;* and Colette Pétonnet, *Those People: The Subculture of a Housing Project.* E. V. Walter, p. 1344
Georges Lefebvre, *The Great Fear of 1789: Rural Panic in Revolutionary France;* and Alison Patrick, *The Men of the First French Republic: Political Alignments in the National Convention of 1792.* Roy Pierce, p. 1345
A. Lerumo, *Fifty Fighting Years: The South African Communist Party, 1921–1971.* Aaron Segal, p. 1347
R. William Liddle, ed., *Political Participation in Modern Indonesia.* Donald Hindley, p. 1348

John M. H. Lindbeck, ed., *China: Management of a Revolutionary Society.* Ian W. A. C. Adie, p. 1349
Norman Miller and Roderick Aya, eds., *National Liberation: Revolution in the Third World;* and Donald C. Hodges and Robert E. A. Shanab, eds., *National Liberation Fronts, 1960–1970.* W. Scott Thompson, p. 1351
Clement Henry Moore, *Politics in North Africa: Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia.* Malcolm H. Kerr, p. 1353
Lloyd D. Musolf, *Mixed Enterprise: A Developmental Perspective.* Roger W. Benjamin, p. 1354
Clark D. Neher, *Rural Thai Government: The Politics of the Budgetary Process.* David Morell, p. 1355
Donald L. Niewyk, *Socialist, Anti-Semite, and Jew: German Social Democracy Confronts the Problem of Anti-Semitism, 1918–1933.* Vernon L. Lidtke, p. 1356
Robert A. Packenham, *Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science.* Joseph LaPalombara, p. 1356
Stephen E. Palmer, Jr and Robert R. King, *Yugoslav Communism and the Macedonian Question.* John C. Campbell, p. 1358
Gianfranco Pasquino, *Modernizzazione e Sviluppo Politico* and *Militari e Potere in America Latina.* Torcuato S. Di Tella, p. 1359
Frederic L. Pryor, *Public Expenditures in Communist and Capitalist Nations.* Karl de Schweinitz, Jr., p. 1361
Barry M. Richman, *Industrial Society in Communist China.* Thomas W. Robinson, p. 1362
Gerhard Ritter, *The Sword and the Scepter: The Problem of Militarism in Germany. Vol. 3: The Tragedy of Statesmanship—Bethmann Hollweg as War Chancellor (1914–1917); Vol. 4: The Reign of German Militarism and the Disaster of 1918.* Gordon A. Craig, p. 1363
René Rémond, *The Right Wing in France From 1815 to de Gaulle.* D. B. Goldey, p. 1365
Elie Adib Salem, *Modernization Without Revolution: Lebanon's Experience.* Manfred Halpern, p. 1365
Robert A. Scalapino, ed., *Elites in the People's Republic of China.* David M. Lampton, p. 1366
James C. Scott, *Comparative Political Corruption.* William B. Gwyn, p. 1368
A. H. Somjee, *Democracy and Political Change in Village India: A Case Study.* Ralph H. Retzlaff, p. 1369
Soviet Criminal Law and Procedure: The RSFSR Codes. Trans. by Harold J. Berman and James W. Spindler. Peter H. Solomon, Jr., p. 1371
Douglas Wheeler and René Pelissier, *Angola.* John Marcum, p. 1372

1373 International Politics, Law and Organization

Jagdish N. Bhagwati, ed., *Economics and World Order from the 1970s to the 1990s.* Lawrence A. Veit, p. 1373
Hedley Bull, *The Moscow Agreements and Strategic Arms Limitation.* Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr., p. 1374
Lucius C. Caflisch, ed., *Annals of International Studies: Hydrospace in International Relations, Vol. 4—1973.* Robert G. Wirsing, p. 1375
John Lewis Evans, *The Communist International, 1919–1943;* The Institute of Marxism-Leninism, Central Committee of the C.P.S.U., *Outline History of the Communist International;* and Helmut Gruber, *Soviet Russia Masters the Comintern: International Communism in the Era of Stalin's Ascendancy.* John W. Strong, p. 1377
Forschungsinstituts der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, *Regionale Verflechtung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Empirische Analysen und Theoretische Probleme, Schriften des Forschungsinstituts der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik,* e. V. Bonn, Band 33. Henri J. Warmenhoven, p. 1380
Louis Henkin, *Foreign Affairs and the Constitution.* Whittle Johnston, p. 1381
Ray Jones, *The Nineteenth-Century Foreign Office: An Administrative History.* Keith Wilson, p. 1382
Morton A. Kaplan, *The Rationale for NATO: European Collective Security—Past and Present.* Nils Ørvik, p. 1383
John T. McAlister, Jr., *Vietnam: The Origins of Revolution.* Charles A. Joiner, p. 1384
James A. Rahl, ed., *Common Market and American Antitrust: Overlap and Conflict.* M. A. Adelman, p. 1384
Ram Rahul, *Politics of Central Asia.* Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, p. 1385
James N. Rosenau, Vincent Davis and Maurice East, eds., *The Analysis of International Politics.* Davis B. Bobrow, p. 1386
Henry G. Schermers, *International Institutional Law: Vol. I, Structure; Vol. II, Functioning and Legal Order.* Charles H. McLaughlin, p. 1388
Franz Schurmann, *The Logic of World Power: An Inquiry into the Origins, Currents, and Contradictions of World Politics.* Richard A. Falk, p. 1390
Robert W. Tucker, *The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy.* H. Bradford Westerfield, p. 1392

About the American Political Science Review

The American Political Science Review, published quarterly during the months of March, June, September, and December, is supplied to all APSA members. Membership dues are charged according to the following schedule:

Membership Category	*Dues*
Regular	
Annual income	
Under $12,000	$25
$12,000–14,999	$30
$15,000–19,999	$35
$20,000–24,999	$40
$25,000–29,999	$45
$30,000 and over	$50
Student and Retired	$12
Family	$5
Life	$1000
Institutional (includes *APSR* and *PS*)	$50 domestic $52 foreign

Student memberships are limited to five years per person. Foreign currency at the official exchange rate will be accepted for foreign subscriptions and foreign membership fees. The equivalent of $3 for additional postage should be added for foreign subscriptions.

Current issues are priced at $10.50 per copy; for *back issues prior* to 1970 address Walter J. Johnson, Inc., 355 Chestnut St., Norwood, New Jersey 07648; for issues 1970 and later send request directly to the American Political Science Association.

Applications for membership, orders for the *Review*, and remittances should be addressed to the Executive Director, The American Political Science Association, 1527 New Hampshire Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. *Notices of change of address* should be received in the Washington office by the 25th day of the months before publication.

Address books intended for review to Paul A. Beck, Book Review Editor, *American Political Science Review*, Department of Political Science, Mervis Hall, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15260. Information, including News and Notes, for the Association's news-journal, *PS*, should be sent to 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036; advertising reprint and circulation correspondence should be sent to the Executive Director at the Washington office. Domestic claims for non-receipt of issues must be made within six months of the month of publication; overseas claims, one year. Advertising information and rates are available from Nancy Edgerton, Adv. Manager, APSA, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

Articles and notes appearing in the *Review* before the June 1953 issues were indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature*. Current issues are indexed by *The International Political Science Abstracts* and the *Social Sciences and Humanities Index*. Microfilm of the *Review*, beginning with Volume 1, may be obtained from University Microfilms, 313 North First Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106. A *Cumulative Index of the Review*, Volumes 1–62; 1906–1968, may also be obtained from University Microfilms. Articles appearing in the *Review* are listed regularly in *ABC Pol Sci* and *Current Contents: Behavioral, Social & Management Sciences*. Book reviews are indexed in *Book Review Index*.

Articles Accepted for Future Publication

Joel D. Aberbach, University of Michigan, "Power Consciousness: A Comparative Analysis"

John B. Bacheller, Kirkland College, "Lobbyists and the Legislative Process: The Impact of Environmental Constraints"

Paul Allen Beck, University of Pittsburgh, "Partisan Dealignment in the Post-War South"

Robert A. Bernstein, Texas A & M University, "Divisive Primaries Do Hurt: U. S. Senate Races, 1956–1972"

Paul R. Brass, University of Washington, "Party Systems and Government Stability in the Indian States"

Steven R. Brown, Kent State University, "Toward An Experimental Analysis of Political Literature"

Paul Burstein, Yale University, "Social Cleavages and Party Choice in Israel: "A Log-linear Analysis"

Melissa A. Butler, The Johns Hopkins University, "Early Liberal Roots of Feminism: John Locke and the Attack on Patriarchy"

George W. Carey, Georgetown University, "Separation of Powers and the Madisonian Model: A Reply to the Critics"

Charles D. Cary, University of Iowa, "A Technique of Computer Content Analysis of Transliterated Russian Language Textual Materials: A Research Note"

Clarke E. Cochran, Texas Tech University, "Authority and Community: The Contributions of Carl Friedrich, Yves Simon, and Michael Polanyi"

Neal E. Cutler, University of Southern California, "Demographic, Social Psychological, and Political Factors in the Politics of Age: A Call for Research in Political Gerontology"

Richard K. Dagger, Arizona State University, "What is Political Obligation?"

Barbara Deckard, University of California, Riverside, "Party Realignment and the Transformation of the Political Agenda: The House of Representatives, 1925–1938"

Shaheen F. Dil, Princeton University, "The Cabal in Kabul: Great Power Interaction in Afghanistan

Lowell Dittmer, State University of New York, Buffalo, "Thought Reform and the Cultural Revolution: An Analysis of the Symbolism of Chinese Polemics"

Robert Eyestone, University of Minnesota, "Confusion, Diffusion and Innovation"

Richard F. Fenno, Jr., University of Rochester, "Congressmen in Their Constituencies: An Exploration"

Norman Frohlich, Joe A. Oppenheimer, Jeffrey Smith and Oran R. Young, University of Texas, Austin, "A Test of Downsian Voter Rationality: 1964 Presidential Voting"

Dante Germino, University of Virginia, "Eric Voegelin's Framework for Political Evaluation in His Recently Published Work"

John A. Ferejohn, California Institute of Technology, "On the Decline of Competition in Congressional Elections"

John V. Gillespie, Dina A. Zinnes, Philip A. Schrodt, G. S. Tahim and Richard Rubinson, Indiana University, "An Optimal Control Model of Arms Races"

Robert T. Golembiewski, University of Georgia, "A Critique of 'Democratic Administration' and Its Supporting Ideation"

George D. Greenberg, Jeffrey A. Miller, Lawrence B. Mohr and Bruce C. Vladeck, University of Michigan, "Developing Public Policy Theory: Perspectives from Empirical Research"

John G. Gunnell, State University of New York at Albany, "The Myth of the Tradition"

Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, "Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy"

M. Kent Jennings and Gregory B. Markus, University of Michigan, "The Effect of Military Service on Political Attitudes: A Panel Study"

Bryan D. Jones, Saadia Greenberg, Joseph Drew, and Clifford Kaufman, Wayne State University, "Bureaucratic Response to Citizen-Initiated Contacts: Environmental Enforcement in Detroit"

Barbara Kellerman, Tufts University, "Mentoring in Political Life: The Case of Willy Brandt"

Sam Kernell, University of Minnesota, "Presidential Popularity and Negative Voting: An Alternative Explanation of the Mid-Term Congressional Decline of the President's Party"

James H. Kuklinski, Wichita State University, "Representativeness: A Policy Analysis"

Arthur J. Lerman, St. John's University, "National Elite and Local Politician in Taiwan"

Michael S. Lewis-Beck, University of Iowa, "The Relative Importance of Socioeconomic and Political Variables for Public Policy"

Michael Margolis, University of Pittsburgh, "From Confusion to Confusion—Issues and the American Voter (1956–1972)"

Richard D. McKelvey, Carnegie-Mellon University and John H. Aldrich, Michigan State University, "A Method of Scaling, with Applications to the 1968 and 1972 Presidential Elections"

J. Miller McPherson, Susan Welch, University of Nebraska, and Cal Clark, New Mexico State University. "The Stability and Reliability of Political Efficacy: Using Path Analysis to Test Alternative Models"

Paul E. Meehl, University of Minnesota, "The Selfish Voter Paradox and the Thrown-Away Vote Argument"

Abraham H. Miller, University of Cincinnati, Louis H. Bolce, Fordham University at Lincoln Center, and Mark Halligan, Northwestern University Law School, "The J-Curve Theory and the Black Urban Riots: An Empirical Test of Progressive Relative Deprivation Theory"

Edward N. Muller, State University of New York at Stony Brook, "Behavorial Correlates of Political Support"

Edward N. Muller and Thomas O. Jukam, State University of New York at Stony Brook, "On the Meaning of Political Support"

Garrison Nelson, University of Vermont, "Partisan Patterns of House Leadership Change, 1789–1976"

Thomas C. Nowak, Waynesburg College and Kay A. Snyder, Michigan State University, "Politics and Administration: The Philippines Before Martial Law"

David E. Price, Duke University, "Policy Making in Congressional Committees: The Impact of 'Environmental' Factors"

James H. Qualls, The Johns Hopkins University, "Barber's Typological Analysis of Political Leaders"

Steven J. Rosen, Institute of Advanced Studies (Canberra, Australia), "Nuclearization and Stability in the Middle East"

Howard Rosenthal, Carnegie-Mellon University, and Subatra K. Sen, University of Rochester, "Spatial Voting Models for the French Fifth Republic"

Barry S. Rundquist, University of Illinois, Urbana, Gerald S. Strom, University of Illinois at Chicago Circle, and John G. Peters, University of Nebraska, "Corrupt Politicians and Their Electoral Support: Some Theoretical and Experimental Observations"

Lester M. Salamon, Duke University, and John J. Siegfried, Vanderbilt University, "Economic Power and Political Influence: The Impact of Industry Structure on Public Policy"

Lars Schoultz, Miami University, "The Socio-Economic Determinants of Popular-Authoritarian Electoral Behavior: The Case of Peronism"

Thomas Schwartz, Carnegie-Mellon University, "Collective Choice, Separation of Issues and Vote Trading"

Donald D. Searing, University of North Carolina, "Measuring Politicians' Values: Administration and Assessment of a Ranking Technique in the British House of Commons"

Goldie Shabad, University of Chicago, and Sidney Verba, Harvard University, 'Workers' Councils and Political Stratification: The Yugoslav Experience"

Gerald S. Strom, University of Illinois at Chicago Circle, and Barry S. Rundquist, University of Illinois, Urbana, "A Revised Theory of Winning in House-Senate Conferences"

Peter J. Steinberger, University of California, Riverside, "Hegel as a Social Scientist"

Donley T. Studlar, Centre College of Kentucky, "Policy Voting in Britain: The Colored Immigration Issue in the 1964, 1966, and 1970 General Elections"

Gerald C. Wright, Jr., Florida Atlantic University, "Contextual Models of Electoral Behavior: The Southern Wallace Vote"

Marvin Zetterbaum, University of California, Davis, "Equality and Human Need"

Industrial Conflict in Advanced Industrial Societies*

DOUGLAS A. HIBBS, JR.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Labor strikes have long held the interest of economic historians, social scientists, industrial relations specialists, and statisticians. The reason is that secular movements and short-term fluctuations in strike activity are an invaluable source of quantitative information about the state of labor-capital relations, working-class militancy, and general socioeconomic unrest. In part because strike participation was commonly viewed during the nineteenth century as a form of criminal activity, but also because strikes are overt, dramatic expressions of discontent, data on industrial disputes have been carefully compiled over long time periods in most industrial nations. The size, duration, and frequency of strikes are of course not the only indices of working-class grievances. Chronic absenteeism, high labor turnover rates, pilferage, work slowdowns, outright sabotage, as well as various kinds of political protest and rebellion, are also significant manifestations of discontent which, unlike strikes, have unfortunately not been recorded with any regularity. Nevertheless, strikes remain an important instrument of collective working-class economic action, and they pose a direct challenge to the authority of management, capital and, increasingly, government in industrial societies.

This study focuses on strike activity during the 1950–1969 period in ten advanced industrial societies: Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Two considerations motivated the selection of these nations for investigation. First, working-class economic and political organizations, have on the whole been free of direct repression in these societies since World War II, and patterns of labor-management confrontation can therefore be meaningfully compared. Second, reliable data on socioeconomic and political variables necessary for the empirical evaluation of theoretical arguments are available for each of these countries during most of the postwar period.

The main body of the paper has three principal parts. The first section deals with issues of strike measurement and introduces a three-dimensional characterization of strike activity which forms the basis of subsequent statistical analyses. The next section examines trends in industrial conflict in the postwar period and is designed to dispose of the argument that strike activity and labor militancy are "withering away" in advanced industrial societies. The third and most important part of the study develops a number of theoretically plausible statistical models to explain short-term fluctuations in the volume of strikes. The models investigated in this section incorporate a variety of economic and political factors that are commonly believed to influence strike activity. The economic factors include (1) movements in real wages, which are given an expectation-achievement theoretical rationalization; (2) the demand for labor, as indexed by the unemployment rate; and (3) changes in the ratio of aggregate profits to total employee compensation, that is, changes in the relative share of labor vs. capital in the national income. Among the most important political influences evaluated in these models are (1) the incentive of labor-oriented Socialist parties to discourage strike activity on the part of their working-class constituencies, which is posited to be a function of the competitive position of labor-Socialist parties in the political system; and (2) the relative size of Communist parties, which are viewed as significant agencies for the mobilization of labor discontent. A fourth and concluding section of the paper reviews the evidence concerning the impact of economic and political factors on fluctuations in industrial conflict and develops some implications of the statis-

* This research has been supported by National Science Foundation Grant GS 33121. An earlier version of the paper was presented at the IXth World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Montreal, Canada, August 19–25, 1973. This revision has benefited greatly from the comments of Hayward Alker, Donald Blackmer, Daniel Lerner, Charles Myers and Joseph Quinn of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Benjamin Page and Adam Przeworski of the University of Chicago, Robert Jackman of Michigan State University, Domenico Mastrangelo of the University of Wisconsin, Peter Lange of Harvard University, and Douglas Smith of Carleton University. I am also grateful to John Chandler and Arthur Neff of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Everett Kassalow of the University of Wisconsin, M. Lacroix of the International Labor Office, Geneva and E. Paltig and A. Suchinsky of the Office of External Research, U.S. Dept. of State for providing advice on data sources and supplying a variety of data series. Finally, I am pleased to acknowledge the heroic efforts of Robert Berrier, Rhonda Crane, Giustina Mastrangelo, James Short, Marie Taylor and Nicholas Vasilatos in assisting me with data collection, analysis, editing and typing.

tical results for labor militancy in advanced industrial societies and working-class rationality in the use of the strike weapon.

Strike Measurement

The International Labor Office compiles and publishes data on three basic components of industrial conflict that are supplied by national labor ministries: number of strikes, number of workers involved (strikers), and number of man-days lost. Annual data on these components are reported for economy-wide totals and for nine separate sectors of economic activity. Since strikes rarely occur in the agricultural sector (and those that do are not recorded with great accuracy), it is sensible to exclude agriculture from international and intertemporal comparisons. The mining sector has also been excluded from this analysis because of the rather special character of labor-capital relations in that industry.[1] Hence this study focuses on aggregate strike activity outside of agriculture and mining.

Following the earlier, seminal work of Forchheimer, Knowles, and Goetz-Girey, and the more recent work of Shorter and Tilly, the basic industrial conflict components are used in conjunction with data on employment to form three theoretically distinct strike dimensions — size, duration, and frequency:[2]

Size: Strikers per strike

Duration: Man-days lost per striker

Frequency: Strikes per 1,000 civilian wage and salary workers.

Each of these dimensions is suitable for cross-time, cross-country analysis; however, it is advantageous to array them into a three-dimensional solid or cuboid that represents the profile or "shape" of strikes in a particular nation during a particular time-period. Figure 1 displays two distinctive, hypothetical strike shapes. 1 (a)

[1] The well-known political leftism of miners is paralleled by their atypical militancy in economic confrontations with management. See, for example, Clark Kerr and Abraham Siegel, "The Interindustry Propensity to Strike — An International Comparison," in *Industrial Conflict*, ed. Arthur Kornhauser, Robert Dubin and Arthur Ross (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954).

[2] See K. Forchheimer, "Some International Aspects of the Strike Movement," *Oxford University Institute of Statistics Bulletin*, 10 (January, 1948); K.G.J.C. Knowles, *Strikes — A Study in Industrial Conflict* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1952); Robert Goetz-Girey, *Le Mouvement des Grèves en France 1919–1962* (Paris: Editions Sirey, 1963); and Edward Shorter and Charles Tilly, "The Shape of Strikes in France, 1830–1960," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 13 (January 1971), 60–86.

Small proprietors, entrepreneurs, *rentiers* and other self-employed persons are on the whole not relevant to industrial conflict but constitute a significant fraction of the civilian labor force in some nations and time periods. Therefore they have been excluded from the frequency ratio. The self-employed do of course occasionally strike (witness, for example, the strikes by independent French shopkeepers over the government's profit and price controls in 1973, or the strikes by independent truckers over fuel pricing issues in the United States). However, such events are not included in the industrial conflict data reported to the I.L.O. and are in any case not germane to the line of analysis pursued here.




Figure 1. Hypothetical Strike Profiles

depicts the profile shown by Shorter and Tilly[3] to describe nineteenth and early twentieth century strikes in many industrial nations. The typical strike during this initial stage of industrialization was comparatively small in size (few strikers per strike) reflecting the small scale of early establishments; of long duration (many man-days lost per striker) evidencing the bitter, protracted resistance that newly-formed unions encountered from employers; and relatively low in frequency (few strikes per 1000 workers), indicating the rather weak organization and mobilization of the labor force.

Figure 1(b) represents a "modern" strike profile which Shorter and Tilly suggest was more common in the mid-twentieth century. It shows a vastly increased average strike size which was in part produced by the consolidation of industrial establishments, somewhat higher frequency corresponding to the heightened mobilization and organization of the working class, and markedly reduced duration. Hence what might be called the "trench warfare" pattern of infrequent, long, but relatively small strikes that typified disputes between capital and newly organized labor in the nineteenth century seems to have been supplanted by a "guerrilla warfare" pattern of frequent, short, and relatively large "lightning" strikes in more recent decades.

Aside from the structural changes that undoubtedly contributed to this historical evolution of strike profiles (growth in firm size, the extension of labor organization, and so on), there appears to be a rational basis for labor's abandoning the trench warfare pattern of Figure 1(a) in favor of the guerrilla warfare approach of Figure 1(b). Although the evidence on this score is slim, Knowles's study of industrial conflict in Great Britain and Peterson's analysis of work-stoppages in the United States indicate that strike outcomes were more likely to be favorable to employers when conflicts were infrequent, long in duration, and small in size, whereas the probability of worker's victory was enhanced when strikes were frequent, short in duration, and large in size.[4] Thus, the long-term change in strike profiles may partly reflect a working-class learning process informed by the historical experience of labor-capital struggles.

Contemporary cross-national patterns provide some additional evidence that rational working-class behavior may underlie observed differences in aggregate strike shapes. For example, in France and Italy where the most important unions are essentially Leninist organizations with relatively small memberships and slender financial resources, the guerrilla warfare strike profile of Figure 1(b) is pronounced. Organized labor in these nations could not well withstand long sieges or tests of strength against management and therefore the relatively large, brief, and frequent "lightning" strike prevails.[5] The strike profiles of the United States and Canada, on the other hand, more nearly resemble the trench warfare pattern of Figure 1(a). Unions in these countries have large dues-paying memberships and as a result command the substantial strike funds necesary to engage in comparatively long trials of strength against management.

Although comparative time-series analysis of strike profiles is a potentially useful line of inquiry, the primary purpose of this paper is to develop statistical models explaining short-run postwar fluctuations in overall strike magnitudes. What we need is a single series that captures the net "damage" or impact of strikes. Perhaps the most suitable index of overall strike activity is the volume of the three-dimensional strike profile. The volume of any cuboid is of course the product of its three dimensions. Accordingly we calculate a quantity akin to the physical concept of volume:

$$\textit{Strike Volume} = \begin{matrix}\text{Man-days lost}\\ \text{per 1000 wage}\\ \text{and salary workers}\end{matrix} = \text{Frequency} \times \text{Duration} \times \text{Size}$$

$$= \frac{\textit{Strikes}}{\text{1000 workers}} \times \frac{\textit{Man-days lost}}{\text{Striker}} \times \frac{\textit{Strikers}}{\text{Strike}}$$

[3] Edward Shorter and Charles Tilly, "The Shape of Strikes in France."

[4] Knowles, *Strikes*, and Florence Peterson, *Strikes in the United States, 1880–1936* (Washington: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin No. 651, 1937).

[5] The contrast between the traditional, war-of-attrition strike familiar to most Americans and the guerrilla warfare strategy described in the text is put into even sharper focus by the description of the latter pattern given by Blumenfeld: "Italian unions, which have no strike funds, have developed a whole range of disruptive activities. Among these are the 'chessboard' strike, involving only selected departments; the 'paybook' strike, in which every worker whose paycard carries an odd number engages in disputes on odd days of the week, while workers with even numbers fight out their claims on the even days; and strikes in which blue-collar workers lay down their tools in the morning but return to work after lunch, only to find that the white-collar clerks are out — thus stopping work for an entire day with the loss of only a half a day's pay." See Yorick Blumenfeld, "Industrial Strife in Western Europe," *Editorial Research Reports*, 21 (June 1971),

Man-days lost from strikes per 1000 wage and salary workers not only has substantial theoretical justification, being the volume of a three-dimensional profile that characterizes strike activity at any time or place, but also has obvious intuitive appeal as a comprehensive index of industrial conflict. Since it represents the net impact of a nation's overall strike profile it permits comparative, dynamic analyses that are not confounded by changes in a single conflict dimension. Erroneous conclusions about the "withering away" of industrial conflict, which can arise by focusing exclusively on one strike dimension and mistaking decreases in it for decreases in overall strike activity, are therefore avoided. Notice, for example, the reduction in strike duration but not in overall strike volume between Figures 1a and 1b.

A Withering Away of the Strike?

Perhaps the most influential comparative investigation of strike activity is Ross and Hartman's *Changing Patterns of Industrial Conflict* (1960). One of the principal conclusions of this study is that industrial conflict has (with few exceptions) virtually "withered away" in advanced industrial societies. Ross and Hartman attribute this decline in strike activity to changes in employer policies, dispute-settlement techniques, governmental functions, and union programs, as well as to the persistence of full employment, the decline of ideology and class bitterness, the improvement of living standards and *embourgeoisement* of the working class, and to the enormous growth in white collar, professional and service class employment that has accompanied the shift from industrial to "postindustrial" socioeconomic formations.

The following section evaluates a number of these propositions more formally — here we focus directly on the "withering away" thesis. Ross and Hartman construct a large number of strike indices in the course of their analysis, but unfortunately the withering away argument depends heavily on only two measures: man-days lost per union member ("Membership Loss Ratio") and man-days lost per striker ("Duration"). The former ratio is a particularly weak index from which to draw general conclusions about the time path of industrial conflict. For some countries union membership data are notoriously inaccurate (e.g., France and Italy), and the meaning of unionization differs so greatly across nations that international comparison of a union membership ratio is highly suspect. More important, the general temporal decline Ross and Hartman observe in man-days lost per union member is at least in part an artifact of the union membership rate of growth exceeding that of the total wage and salary labor force during the period of massive labor mobilization treated by their study (1900–1956). In other words, if union membership was growing with respect to time more rapidly than the total wage and salary labor force, then it is possible for man-days lost per *union member* to exhibit a downward time trend, while man-days lost per *worker* was holding steady or even increasing through time. Indeed, the data series reported by Ross and Hartman in the appendices of their study indicate this was true in many industrial societies.

Decreases over time in the second index, man-days lost per striker (duration), are of course not artificial, but do not necessarily imply a declining strike volume, as the reduction in strike duration but not overall strike volume between Figures 1(a) and 1(b) illustrates. The most direct way to evaluate the secular evolution of aggregate strike activity is to examine the volume of strikes over time. Figure 2 presents graphs of strike volumes — man-days lost per 1000 wage and salary workers — for each of the ten nations investigated in this paper.

It is apparent from these graphs that despite the substantial growth of postindustrial, service-oriented sectors of economic activity in all of these nations, and notwithstanding the supposed decline of ideology and *embourgeoisement* of the working-class, there has been no general "withering away" of the strike in the postwar period. The strike volumes of most of the nations in Figure 2 simply do not exhibit any pronounced downward trend. Indeed, *long-run* time trend analyses of a more formal sort (not reported here) reveal that substantial declines in aggregate strike activity are found only in the smaller democracies of Northern Europe and Scandinavia.[6] The evolution of postindus-

409–426. Sartori provides an interesting, although exaggerated, assessment of the leverage that "guerrilla warfare" strike strategies (known as *scioperi articolati* in Italy and *débrayages* or *grèves tournantes* in France) gives labor in service-dependent, "postindustrial" societies. See Giovanni Sartori," "Il Potere Del Lavoro Nella Societa Post-Pacificata," *Revista Italiana Di Scienza Politica,* ANNO III (Aprile 1973), 31–81.

[6] An extensive analysis of twentieth century trends in industrial conflict is given in my paper "Long-Run Trends in Strike Activity in Comparative Perspective," mimeo., 1976. Aaron's thoughtful review of the evidence for six European nations, and Erickson and Grofman's preliminary analyses of long-term trends in fifteen industrial societies also square with the conclusions drawn here. See Benjamin Aaron, "Methods of

trial social structure, then, does not seem to have resolved the grievances or reduced the militancy of wage labor. As the French sociologist Alain Touraine has observed, "A purely consumer society in which the industrial sector would be very much restricted and the problems of work no longer of interest to leisured wage-earners is sociological fiction. . . . The chiefs of the industrial complex would not be so preoccupied with the problems of labor if they were not worried about new protests and socio-political militancy in a milieu they had judged conservative."[7]

Although the graphs in Figure 2 give no evidence of a general downward movement or "withering" of strike activity, the conflict series do show substantial cross-national variation and year-to-year fluctuation. The next section develops some statistical models designed to account for the short-term fluctuations casually.

Statistical Models of Industrial Conflict

A survey of the literature on industrial conflict suggests that most of the factors believed to influence intertemporal and international variations in strike activity can conveniently be partitioned into two broad categories. These are (1) the state of the economy, particularly, movements in real wages, profits, and the demand for labor; and (2) the configuration of parties in the political system, especially the competitive position of labor-oriented parties on the non-Communist left and the extent of Communist Party influence in the work force. This section briefly develops the relevant theoretical arguments, attempts to specify the appropriate structural equations, evaluates the capability of contrasting models to account for postwar (1950–1969) fluctuations in the volume of strikes in

Industrial Action: Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Legislatures," chapter 2 in *Industrial Conflicts: A Comparative Legal Survey*, ed. Benjamin Aaron and K. W. Wedderburn (London: Wm. Clowes & Sons, Ltd., 1972); and K. Erickson and B. Grofman, "A Comparative Longitudinal Analysis of Strike Activity: Applications to Industrialized and Industrializing Economies," Paper delivered at the International Political Science Association Meeting, Montreal, Canada, August, 1973.

[7] Alain Touraine, *The Post-Industrial Society* (New York: Random House 1971), p. 16.





Figure 2. The Volume of Strikes (Man-Days Lost Per 1000 Workers) in Ten Advanced Industrial Societies 1950–1969







Figure 2. Continued

ITALY



JAPAN





Figure 2. Continued







Figure 2. Continued

SWEDEN



UNITED KINGDOM




Figure 2. Continued




Figure 2. Continued

the ten-nation sample, and tests the stability of model parameters across institutionally diverse industrial relations systems.

Unemployment, Profits, and Real Wages. It has frequently been argued (although not without qualifications) that the strike is a more effective weapon during periods of general prosperity than during periods of widespread economic hardship. Indeed, there is considerable evidence that strike activity tends to follow the business cycle, increasing at cycle peaks and dropping off during business downturns.[8] Business cycle hypotheses and related propositions are best articulated in terms of unemployment, profits, and real wages.

The level of unemployment is perhaps the most sensitive indicator of general business conditions (countercyclical), and it is natural to expect working-class militancy to vary inversely with it. Low unemployment offers great strategic advantages to an aggressive labor force. A tight labor market means that management will have difficulty replacing potential strikers, who in any case can anticipate good prospects for securing permanent employment elsewhere if employers are able to replace them successfully. Opportunities for temporary or part-time employment during the course of a strike are also likely to be good. The situation is reversed when unemployment is high and there is an excess supply of labor. Strike-breakers are more easily recruited by employers and alternative job opportunities for strikers are reduced.[9] Faced

[8] See Jean Bouvier, "Mouvement Ouvrier at Conjonctures Economiques," *Le Mouvement Social* (Juillet-Septembre, 1964), pp. 3–30; Robert Goetz-Girey, *Le Mouvement des Grèves en France;* Knowles, *Strikes;* F. S. O'Brien, "Industrial Conflict and Business Fluctuations: A Comment," *Journal of Political Economy,* 73 (1965), 650–654; Albert Rees, "Industrial Conflict and Business Fluctuations," in Kornhauser, Dubin and Ross, *Industrial Conflict;* and Andrew Weintrub, "Prosperity Versus Strikes: An Empirical Approach," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review,* 19 (January 1966), 231–238.

[9] It is not really necessary that employers *actually* replace strikers with great regularity — it is the *psychological* threat that is important, and this is heightened during periods of high unemployment. For example, after the 1970–71 recession in the United States, *The Wall Street Journal* ran a front page article on the "conciliatory mood" of U.S. workers. The story read in part: " . . . across the country at large and small companies, workers are choosing to be more conciliatory when faced with the threat of losing their jobs. This is

with decreased product demand, capital is unlikely to be affected adversely by a prolonged work stoppage, and may even welcome an interruption of production in a period of receding profits and excessive inventories.[10] Hence, potential strikers are more vulnerable and militancy is discouraged. Letting SV and U denote strike volume and the level of unemployment, respectively, we therefore would expect $\partial SV_t/\partial U_t < 0$.

The effect of profits on strikes is more problematic. From the perspective of working class aggressiveness, the relevant quantity is returns to capital as a ratio of returns to labor, that is, Aggregate Business Profits/Total Employee Compensation. It seems reasonable to assume that when the profit ratio is increasing, workers will escalate their demands and press them more militantly. Other things being equal, this should produce an upward movement in the volume of strikes. However, management is more likely to yield to labor demands in such situations because of the severe opportunity costs of absorbing a strike when markets are expanding and profits are potentially high. As Hicks put it in his classic *The Theory of Wages*, ". . . when trade is good, the cost of a strike to the employers will be immensely enhanced. Once an employer is making large profits, and expects those profits to continue in the near future, he is an easy mark for union demands. He will nearly always be prepared to make some concession in order to avoid a strike."[11] The net impact of changes in profits on strike activity is therefore uncertain. Letting ΔC denote the rate of change of the profit ratio, we have $\partial SV_t/\partial \Delta C_t \lesseqgtr 0$.

My specification of the influence of real wages[12] on industrial conflict is based on expectation-achievement theory. The thrust of the theory is that aggressive, violent, or protest behavior is caused in part by a gap between expectation and achievement. Variants of the theory have appeared in all branches of social science. For example, writing of civil violence, Gurr observes: "The fundamental cause of civil strife is deprivation-induced discontent: the greater the discrepancy between what men believe they deserve and what they think they are capable of attaining, the greater their discontent. The more intense and widespread discontents are in society, the more intense and widespread strife is likely to be."[13] Similarly, James Davies has argued that collective disorder ". . . is most likely to take place when a prolonged period of rising expectations and rising gratifications is followed by a short period of sharp reversal, during which the gap between expectations and gratifications quickenly widens and becomes intolerable."[14] In a statement of the theory closer to the topic of this study, the psychologists Krech and Crutchfield have written: "A wage rate is psychologically inadequate, no matter how large in absolute amount, if it results in a wide discrepancy between the worker's level of aspiration and his level of achievement."[15]

Although expectation-achievement theory has not received consistent support from empirical studies and tends to understate or ignore altogether the importance of structural factors for conflict behavior, the basic thesis provides a plausible theoretical framework within which to specify the impact of real wage movements on strike activity. Since labor-management conflict

---

in sharp contrast to the labor scene of recent years (i.e., when unemployment was low), both union and corporate officials agree. Not long ago, they say, rank-and-filers . . . would probably have been angered by the thought of concessions . . . many manufacturing executives have openly complained in recent years that too much control had passed from management to labor. With sales sagging . . . they feel safer in attempting to restore what they call "balance" (January 26, 1972, p. 1, cited in Raford Boddy and James Crotty, "Class Conflict and Macropolicy: The Political Business Cycle," *Review of Radical Political Economics*, 7 [Spring, 1974], 1–19).

[10] For a contrary argument which contends that strikes have greater disutility for firms when economic activity is low (unemployment high) see John Vanderkamp, "Economic Activity and Strikes in Canada," *Industrial Relations*, 9 (February 1970), 215–230.

[11] Sir John Hicks, *The Theory of Wages* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1963), p. 156.

[12] "Real" wages refer of course to money wages deflated for price increases, that is, $R = W/P$ where R, W, and P denote real wages, money wages, and a price index, respectively. A following section deals with the "money illusion" thesis that labor militancy responds to money wage increases alone.

[13] "A Comparative Study of Civil Strife," in *Violence in America*, ed. Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr (New York: New American Library 1969), p. 590.

[14] James C. Davis, "The Curve of Rising and Declining Satisfactions as a Cause of Some Great Revolutions and a Contained Rebellion," in Graham and Gurr, p. 671.

[15] David Krech and R. S. Crutchfield, *Theory and Problems of Social Psychology* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1948), p. 542. Economists and industrial relations specialists also have used expectational explanations of worker unrest and militancy. See, for example, *Trade Union Government and Collective Bargaining: Some Critical Issues*, ed. Joel Seidman (New York: Praeger Publishers 1970), particularly the essays of Barbash and Wirtz.

typically centers on proportional wage increases rather than wage levels,[16] a reasonable functional form in the present context is

$$(1)\quad SV_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1(\Delta R_{t-1} - \Delta R^*_{t-1}) + \text{other factors}$$

$$\partial SV_t/\partial(\Delta R_{t-1} - \Delta R^*_{t-1}) < 0,$$

where SV = strike volume (man-days lost per 1000 workers)
ΔR = actual percentage rate of change of real wages
ΔR^* = expected percentage rate of change of real wages.

Strike volume in the current period is therefore hypothesized to be (partly) a function of the disparity between actual and expected real wage changes in the recent past. When ΔR_{t-1} exceeds ΔR^*_{t-1} strike activity should decrease, whereas if the gap between actual and expected real wage changes runs the other way, strike volume is anticipated to increase.[17]

As things stand ΔR^* is unobserved and Equation (1) is not estimable. Since attitudinal (survey) time-series data on labor force real wage expectations do not exist, we need a plausible model that specifies ΔR^* in terms of observed quantities. The theoretical and statistical literature on the formation of expectations (expectation generating functions) presents several reasonable alternatives.[18] Consider first the so-called "extrapolative" expectations model:

$$(2)\quad \Delta R^*_t = \Delta R_{t-1} + \gamma(\Delta R_{t-1} - \Delta R_{t-2}).$$

The extrapolative expectations model asserts that the expected change in real wages in the current period equals the actual change in the previous period plus a correction to allow for the trend observed over the preceding period. If $\gamma > 0$, the labor force expects past trends to continue (extrapolative expectations), whereas if $\gamma < 0$ a reversal of past trends is anticipated (regressive expectations). If $\gamma = 0$, real wage expectations are static.

Collecting the hypotheses regarding unemployment, profit ratios, and the gap between actual and expected real wage increases yields the following theoretical model:

$$(3)\quad SV_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1(\Delta R_{t-1} - \Delta R^*_{t-1}) + \beta_2 U_t + \beta_3 \Delta C_t + \epsilon_t.$$

Substitution of the extrapolative model of (2) for ΔR^*_{t-1} in (3) produces an estimating equation that is composed entirely of observed variables.

$$(4)\quad SV_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1[\Delta R_{t-1} - (\Delta R_{t-2} + \gamma(\Delta R_{t-2} - \Delta R_{t-3}))] + \beta_2 U_t + \beta_3 \Delta C_t + \epsilon_t$$

$$SV_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \Delta R_{t-1} - \beta_1 \Delta R_{t-2} - \beta_1 \gamma \Delta R_{t-2} + \beta_1 \gamma \Delta R_{t-3} + \beta_2 U_t + \beta_3 \Delta C_t + \epsilon_t$$

$$SV_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1(\Delta R_{t-1} - \Delta R_{t-2}) - \beta_1 \gamma(\Delta R_{t-2} - \Delta R_{t-3}) + \beta_2 U_t + \beta_3 \Delta C_t + \epsilon_t$$

A second model for expectations is the "adaptive" scheme. As initially formulated by Cagan and Nerlove, this model is

$$(5)\quad \Delta R^*_t - \Delta R^*_{t-1} = (1 - \lambda)(\Delta R_{t-1} - \Delta R^*_{t-1}) \qquad 0 < \lambda < 1.$$

The conventional adaptive model posits that expectations are revised linearly each period in proportion to some fraction of last period's forecast error. Hence, current expectations are formed

[16] Even the massive strikes of May–June 1968 in France (which were viewed largely as spontaneous "political" events in many popular and academic accounts) centered in the overwhelming majority of cases around traditional demands for wage increases and were called, promoted, and directed by the usual labor organizations. (See Claude Durand, "Revendications Explicites et Revendications Latentes," *Sociologie du Travail* (October–Décembre 1973), pp. 394–409 and George Ross, "French Working Class Politics After May–June 1968: A New Working Class?" Paper delivered at the 1973 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, Louisiana, September 1973. Such strikes of course have important political implications in the sense that they challenge state economic policies designed to hold down the rate of increase of wages and prices.

[17] In the current period ΔR is likely to be influenced by SV and so the model in (1) should be viewed as an abbreviated form of a larger system within which ΔR and ΔR^* are lagged endogenous variables.

[18] See Kenneth J. Arrow and Marc Nerlove, "A Note on Expectations and Stability," *Econometrica*, 26 (April 1958), 297–305; Phillip D. Cagan, "The Monetary Dynamics of Hyperinflation," in *Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money*, ed. Milton Friedman (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956); Allan C. Enthoven and Kenneth J. Arrow, "A Theorem on Expectations and the Stability of Equilibrium," *Econometrica*, 22 (April 1956), 288-293; Josef Hadar, "On Expectations and Stability," *Behavioral Science*, 13 (November 1968), 445–454; Marc Nerlove, "Adaptive Expectations and Cobweb Phenomena," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 72 (May 1958), 227–240; and Steven J. Turnovsky, "Empirical Evidence on the Formation of Price Expectations," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 65 (December 1970), 1441–1454.

by adapting or modifying previous expectations in the light of previous experience. This implies, however, that if real wage increases are accurately anticipated in the past, expectations are static, that is, when $\Delta R_{t-1}=\Delta R^*_{t-1}$, $\Delta R^*_t=\Delta R^*_{t-1}$. For our purposes it seems more reasonable to allow for a systematic escalation of labor-force real wage expectations over time. Accordingly, the standard adaptive expectations model is modified to provide for a trend:

$$(6)\quad (\Delta R^*_t-\Delta R^*_{t-1})=(1-\lambda)(\Delta R_{t-1}-\Delta R^*_{t-1})+\delta\Delta R^*_{t-1}$$
$$0<\delta<1$$
$$0<(\lambda+\delta)<1.$$

This model permits current expectations to escalate (or de-escalate) by the trend factor $\delta\Delta R^*_{t+1}$ even if actual and expected real wage increases in the recent past are identical.

Rewriting the modified adaptive expectations model of (6) yields

$$(7)\quad \Delta R^*_t = \Delta R^*_{t-1} + \Delta R_{t-1} - \lambda\Delta R_{t-1} - \Delta R^*_{t-1} + \lambda\Delta R^*_{t-1} + \delta\Delta R^*_{t-1}$$
$$\Delta R^*_t = (1-\lambda)\Delta R_{t-1} + (\lambda+\delta)\Delta R^*_{t-1},$$

which upon repeated substitution gives

$$(8)\quad \Delta R^*_t = (1-\lambda)\sum_{i=0}^{\infty}(\lambda+\delta)^i\,\Delta R_{t-i-1}.$$

The theoretical model for strike volume in (3) corresponding to the revised adaptive expectations scheme in (8) can now be written:

$$(9)\quad SV_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1\left[\Delta R_{t-1} - \left((1-\lambda)\sum_{i=0}^{\infty}(\lambda+\delta)^i\,\Delta R_{t-i-2}\right)\right] + \beta_2 U_t + \beta_3\Delta C_t + \epsilon_t.$$

The infinite, geometrically declining lag in ΔR_{t-i-2} means that (9) is not estimable in its present form. This is readily circumvented by applying the so-called "Koyck transformation." Lagging (9) one period and multiplying through by $(\lambda+\delta)$ we obtain

$$(10)\quad (\lambda+\delta)SV_{t-1} = (\lambda+\delta)\beta_0 + (\lambda+\delta)\beta_1\left[\Delta R_{t-2} - \left((1-\lambda)\sum_{i=0}^{\infty}(\lambda+\delta)^i\,\Delta R_{t-i-3}\right)\right] + (\lambda+\delta)\beta_2 U_{t-1} + (\lambda+\delta)\beta_3\Delta C_{t-1} + (\lambda+\delta)\epsilon_{t-1}.$$

Subtracting this expression from (9) produces an empirical estimating function with finite lag.[19]

$$(11)\quad SV_t = \beta_0(1-\lambda-\delta) + (\lambda+\delta)SV_{t-1} + \beta_1(\Delta R_{t-1}-\Delta R_{t-2}) - \beta_1\delta\Delta R_{t-2} + \beta_2 U_t - (\lambda+\delta)\beta_2 U_{t-1} + \beta_3\Delta C_t - (\lambda+\delta)\beta_3\Delta C_{t-1} + (\epsilon_t - (\lambda+\delta)\epsilon_{t-1}).$$

Our final expectation-achievement function has a theoretical basis somewhat different from that underlying the previous models. In this specification, strike activity is determined by the gap between actual real wage changes over *several* recent periods and the expected *long-run* increase in real wages.[20]

$$(12)\quad SV_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1(\Delta R' - \Delta R^*) + \text{other factors}$$
$$\partial SV_t/\partial(\Delta R' - \Delta R^*) < 0,$$

where $\Delta R'$ = actual real wage changes over several recent periods
ΔR^* = the expected long-run increase in real wages.

Thus, the volume of strikes is hypothesized to increase or decrease depending on whether the rate of change of real wages during recent years has exceeded or fallen short of labor's long-run expectations.

[19] For those who prefer elegance, the result in (11) follows directly from lag algebra. Let B equal a backshift operator such that $B^iY_t = Y_{t-i}$ and rewrite (9)

(a) $SV_t = B_0 + \beta_1[\Delta R_{t-1} - ((1-\lambda)\sum_{i=0}^{\infty}((\lambda+\delta)B)^i\,\Delta R_{t-2})] + \beta_2 U_t + \beta_3\Delta C_t + \epsilon_t$. $\sum_{i=0}^{\infty}((\lambda+\delta)\beta^i)$ may be viewed as a convergent geometric series with solution $1/1-(\lambda+\delta)B$, and thus (a) implies:

(b) $SV_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1[\Delta R_{t-1} - \frac{(1-\lambda)}{1-(\lambda+\delta)B}\Delta R_{t-2}] + \beta_2 U_t + B_3\Delta C_t + \epsilon_t$.

Clearing $_{(b)}$ of the denominator $1-(\lambda+\delta)B$ yields the estimating equation given in (11).

[20] This model is adopted from Orley Ashenfelter and George E. Johnson, "Bargaining Theory, Trade Unions, and Industrial Strike Activity," *American Economic Review*, 50 (March 1969) 35–49. I am grateful to Robert Solow for helping me derive the implications of various lag functions which led to the interpretation given here.

The mechanisms for $\Delta R'$ and ΔR^* are as follows. Recent experience, $\Delta R'$, is defined simply as a finite moving average of previous real wage changes.

$$(13) \qquad \Delta R_t' = \sum_{i=1}^{J} \alpha_i \Delta R_{t-i}$$

$$\Sigma \alpha_i = 1.$$

Long-run expectations, ΔR^*, are formed as the weighted sum of a constant (very long-term) increase parameter (L) and a finite moving average of previous real wage changes.

$$(14) \quad \Delta R_t^* = (1-\rho)L + \rho \sum_{i=1}^{K} \phi_i \Delta R_{t-i}$$

$$\Sigma \phi_i = 1$$

$$0 < \rho < 1.$$

The theoretical expectation-achievement model in (12) can now be expressed in terms of observed variables by substitution of (13) and (14).

$$(15) \quad SV_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \left[\sum_{i=1}^{J} \alpha_i \Delta R_{t-i} - \left((1-\rho)L + \rho \sum_{i=1}^{K} \cdot \phi_i \Delta R_{t-i} \right) \right] + \text{other factors}$$

$$SV_t = [\beta_0 - \beta_1(1-\rho)L] + \beta_1 \cdot \left[\sum_{i=1}^{N} (\alpha_i - \rho\phi_i) \Delta R_{t-i} \right] + \text{other factors.}$$

Rewriting, we have

$$(16) \qquad SV_t = \beta_0' + \beta_1 \sum_{i=1}^{N} \mu_i \Delta R_{t-i} + \text{other factors,}$$

$$\text{where } \beta_0' = \beta_0 - \beta_1(1-\rho)L$$

$$\mu_i = (\alpha_i - \rho\phi_i).$$

The lag functions determining the behavior of (13)–(16) are likely to have the following properties. The weighted average of real wage changes defining $\Delta R'$ ("recent experience") will depend heavily on the outcomes of the latest periods, perhaps peaking after a few lags, and the experience of more distant periods will be rapidly discounted. Hence the α_i coefficients forming $\Delta R'$ should be governed by a low-order polynomial lag distribution with a steep rate of decay. In contrast, it is reasonable to anticipate the moving average component of long-run real wage expectations (ΔR^*) to be weighted more equally by current and past experience, which implies a linear or quasigeometric lag distribution with a relatively slow rate of decay in the ϕ_i. The difference of these lag functions (μ_i) is therefore likely to exhibit an inverted U-shaped distribution, which is conveniently estimated by the polynomial distributed lag method of Shirley Almon.[21]

To sum up at midstream, the discussion thus far has developed three plausible models specifying the impact of unemployment, business profits, and real wage changes on the volume of strikes:

Expectation-Achievement Gap: Extrapolative Expectations

$$(17a) \quad SV_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1(\Delta R_{t-1} - \Delta R_{t-2}) - \beta_1\gamma(\Delta R_{t-2} - \Delta R_{t-3}) + \beta_2 U_t + \beta_3 \Delta C_t + \epsilon_t$$

$$\beta_1 < 0, 0 < \gamma < 1, \beta_2 < 0, \beta_3 < 0$$

Expectation-Achievement Gap: Adaptive Expectations (with trend)

$$(17b) \quad SV_t = \beta_0(1-\lambda-\delta) + (\lambda+\delta)SV_{t-1} + \beta_1(\Delta R_{t-1} - \Delta R_{t-2}) - \beta_1\delta\Delta R_{t-2} + \beta_2 U_t - (\lambda+\delta)\beta_2 U_{t-1} + \beta_3 \Delta C_t - (\lambda+\delta)\beta_3 \Delta C_{t-1} + (\epsilon_t - (\lambda+\delta)\epsilon_{t-1})$$

$$0 < (\lambda+\delta) < 1, \beta_1 < 0, 0 < \delta < 1, \beta_2 < 0, \beta_3 < 0$$

Expectation-Achievement Gap: Long-Run Expectations (polynomial distributed lag)

$$(17c) \quad SV_t = \beta_0' + \beta_1 \sum_{i=1}^{N} \mu_i \Delta R_{t-i} + \beta_2 U_t + \beta_3 \Delta C_t + \epsilon_t$$

$$\beta_0' < 0, \beta_1 \Sigma \mu_i < 0, \beta_2 < 0, \beta_3 \lesseqgtr 0,$$

where ΔR = the percentage rate of change of real wages,
U_t = the percentage of the civilian labor force unemployed, and
ΔC_t = the rate of change of aggregate profits/total employee compensation.

Table 1 reports the estimation results for Equations (17a)–(17c). Notice that the estimation

[21] Shirley Almon, "The Distributed Lag Between Capital Appropriations and Expenditures," *Econometrica*, 33 (January 1965), 178–196.

Table 1. Strike Volumes in Ten Advanced Industrial Societies, 1950–1969[a] Estimation Results for Equations 17a, 17b and 17c

Equation	U_t	U_{t-1}	ΔC_t	ΔC_{t-1}	$\sum_{i=1}^{k} \Delta R_{t-i}$	$[\Delta R_{t-1} - \Delta R_{t-2}]$	$[\Delta R_{t-2} - \Delta R_{t-3}]$	SV_{t-1}	ΔR_{t-3}	R^2
(17a)	−74.2		484.9			3.3	6.5			.52
	(−5.1)		(0.5)			(0.5)	(1.1)			
(17b)	−47.8	−39.1	792.7	−573.2		−7.3		.006	−13.7	.52
	(−1.7)	(−1.4)	(0.8)	(−0.6)		(−0.8)		(0.05)	(−1.1)	
(17c)	−94.1		452.5		−44.7					.53
	(−5.0)		(0.4)		(−2.0)					

[a] The t-statistics for the regression coefficient estimates are in parentheses. Constant terms vary by country and are omitted. U_t is the % of the civilian labor force unemployed. R_t is average hourly money earnings deflated by the consumer price index. ΔR denotes the % rate of change: $[R_t - R_{t-1}/R_{t-1}] * 100$. C_t denotes the ratio of profits to total employee compensation. ΔC is the rate of change: $[C_t - C_{t-1}]$. SV_t is the volume of strikes outside of Agriculture and Mining and is defined as Total Mandays Lost per 1000 Wage and Salary Earners. The TROLL/1 system was used for estimation.
Sources: Strike data are from I. L. O., *Yearbook of Labor Statistics*, various years. Unemployment and labor force data are from OECD, *Manpower Statistics 1950–1962; Labour Force Statistics 1958–1969*. Employee compensation and Profits data are from OECD, *National Accounts Statistics*. Consumer Price Index data are from *U. N. Statistical Yearbook*, various years. Money earnings data were provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, U. S. Department of Labor.

strategy is to pool all observations (20 year time-series, 10 nations), so that strictly speaking the functions should be indexed $SV_{nt} = f(\Delta R_{nt-i}, U_{nt}, \Delta C_{nt})$; $n = 1 \ldots 10$, $t = 1950 \ldots 1969$. Furthermore, all parameters except the constant term are constrained at this point to be invariant through time and space. This amounts to replacing the general intercept constant, β_0, with a series of country-by-country dummy variables, $\sum_{n=1}^{10} \alpha_n$, which pick up the net effects of nation-specific, time-invariant, structural-historical factors not captured explicitly (causally) in the equations.[22] Therefore the models are geared to explaining fluctuations in strike activity in the presence of a location parameter or ignorance term that varies across countries.

The estimates for (17a) and (17b) in Table 1 indicate that neither the extrapolative expectations model nor the adaptive expectations model performs very well in this body of data. The coefficients of the real wage change (ΔR) terms are without exception statistically insignificant and in several cases have the wrong sign. The extrapolative equation (17a) was estimated both linearly (by ordinary least squares) and nonlinearly (along the lines proposed by Marquardt)[23] with the constraint that the parameter γ lie in the interval 0 to 1. The adaptive expectations function (17b) was similarly estimated by ordinary least squares and by a nonlinear-instrumental variables procedure designed to preserve consistency in the presence of the lagged endogenous SV_{t-1} term and potentially autocorrelated disturbances.[24] The constraints imposed in this non-

[22] A fixed, dummy variable approach to the pooled estimation problem is taken here in preference to the alternative random variables, "error components" approach because of computational ease, and also because an important assumption necessary to preserve the consistency of the latter method — that "specific ignorance" be independent of regressors — seems unreasonable. Extensive analyses of pooled estimation strategies are given by G. S. Maddala, "The Use of Variance Components Models in Pooling Cross Section and Time Series Data," *Econometrica*, 39 (March 1971), 341–358; Marc Nerlove, "Further Evidence on the Estimation of Dynamic Economic Relations from a Time Series of Cross Sections," *Econometrica*, 39 (March 1971), 359–382; and T. D. Wallace and Ashig Hussain, "The Use of Error Components Models in Combining Cross Sections with Time Series Data," *Econometrica*, 37 (January 1969), 55–72. Note also that the long-run increase expression $(1-\rho)$ L in (15) is necessarily embedded within the nation-specific intercepts of (17c) and therefore is effectively "lost" for inferential purposes (i.e., these parameters are underidentified).

[23] Donald W. Marquardt, "An Algorithm for Least Squares Estimation of Non-Linear Parameters," *Journal of the Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics* 11 (June 1963), 431–441.

[24] Note that even if the disturbance of the original adaptive expectations function in (9) is "white noise," application of the Koyck transformation introduces a first-order moving average error process in the estimating equation (17b). As it turned out, however, the errors displayed negligible serial correlation in all equations and so instrumental variables as well as the rather complicated estimation procedures required to secure efficiency in a pooled data model proved unnecessary. A discussion of the estimation problems

linear regression were $0<(\lambda+\delta)<1$ and $0<\delta<1$. Despite great efforts to maximize the success of these models, it appears that strike activity in advanced industrial societies during the postwar period is not well explained by expectation-achievement gap functions of the extrapolative or adaptive variety.

The regression results in Table 1 do, however, provide evidence in favor of the "long-run" (polynomial distributed lag) expectation-achievement gap model of (17c).[25] Recall that this model asserts that if actual real wage increases over several recent years exceed labor's long-run expectations, then the volume of strikes should decline. The significant negative estimate for the $\sum_{i=1}^{5} \Delta R_{t-i}$ lag coefficients clearly supports the long-run expectations hypothesis, and suggests that labor has a "memory" extending many periods back through time in the sense that a change in real wages influences strike activity (negatively or positively) for several subsequent years.[26]

The level of unemployment (U_t) consistently displays a significant and sizable negative coefficient as hypothesized. This indicates that the strategic considerations outlined earlier govern labor's use of the strike and that strikes should be viewed as tactical weapons in struggles against management and not as poorly timed, spontaneous protests. Moreover, this relationship suggests that labor grievances are, as Rees[27] put it, "durable" or at least "semi-durable," and that industrial conflict therefore represents a rational translation of working class discontent into overt action.

The parameter for the rate of change in profit ratios (ΔC_t) is insignificant in all regressions. This probably reflects the contrasting effects attributed to profits earlier—increasing labor's demands and aggressiveness on the one hand, but decreasing capital's incentive to resist on the other. Thus, profits do not appear to have a very important influence on fluctuations in industrial conflict and the profit term should therefore be deleted from a revised model.[28]

Industrial Relations Systems and Strike Dynamics. The validity of previous conclusions concerning the impact of real wages, unemployment, and profit ratios on strike activity rests in part on the assumption that the structural coefficients are more or less constant through time and space. Although there is little reason to suspect systematic time-wise shifts in these coefficients during the postwar period, there is cause to question whether the parameters are equivalent cross-nationally, given the diversity of national institutional arrangements.

When considering the importance of institutional diversity in explaining cross-national differences in strike activity, industrial relations specialists have given great attention, not surprisingly, to contrasting systems of industrial relations. (Certain features of the political system are also considered important, but this is taken up later.) The usual argument is that centralized systems of collective bargaining, in which labor and management organizations impose real behavioral constraints on their respective clienteles (with or without government coordination), serve to diminish or contain the level of industrial conflict. As Ross and Hartman put it: "Just as unions in centralized systems eliminate improvident emotional gestures

posed by auto-correlated disturbances and lagged endogenous variables is provided in Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr., "Problems of Statistical Estimation and Casual Inference in Time-Series Regression Models," in *Sociological Methodology 1973–74, ed.* Herbert Costner (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Inc., 1974), pp. 252–308.

[25] The best fitting model was a second degree polynomial constrained to drop-off to zero after a five period lag. Similar results are reported by Ashenfelter and Johnson, "Bargaining Theory," and John H. Pencavel, "An Investigation into Industrial Strike Activity in Britain," *Economica,* 37 (August 1970), 239–256, for quarterly models of strike frequency in the United States and Great Britain respectively. The estimation technique used here was initially proposed by Shirley Almon, "The Distributed Lag." A comprehensive review of distributed lag formulations generally is given by Phoebus J. Dhrymes, *Distributed Lags: Problems of Estimation and Formulation* (San Francisco: Holden Day, 1971).

[26] A plot of the lag distribution coefficients is presented in a following section, after several additional hypotheses are incorporated into the strike volume model. The real wage data used here are average hourly earnings in the manufacturing sector deflated by the consumer price index. Movements in manufacturing wages are presumed to reflect closely economy-wide changes (cf. Orley Ashenfelter, George E. Johnson and John H. Pencavel, "Trade Unions and the Rate of Change of Money Wages in United States Manufacturing Industry," *The Review of Economic Studies,* 39 (January 1972: Appendix). Analyses using total annual employee compensation per civilian labor force member produced results virtually identical to those in Table 1.

[27] Albert Rees, "Industrial Conflict and Business Fluctuations."

[28] Although the profits result is theoretically plausible, the statistical insignificance of this variable may stem from excessive measurement error. Profits data are easily subjected to the artistry of corporate accountants, are well-known to be "hidden" as costs via accelerated depreciation tax laws, and are difficult to determine for unincorporated businesses. Furthermore, a significant fraction of the labor force in all economically advanced societies is employed in nonprofit activities. The profits-to-wages ratio is also correlated with real wages and unemployment. However, excessive colinearity is not a problem here: the multiple R^2 of profits/wages with the remaining independent variables is .17.

by the rank and file, likewise employer associations exclude reckless or primitive attitudes to which small businessmen in particular are subject. . . . The knowledge that any strike will be large and expensive serves as a deterrent to both sides. . . . Furthermore, employers within an industry do not have to worry about suffering a competitive disadvantage when all of them are subject to the same demands. . . . At the same time unions tend to be less aggressive since different branches are not competing to make the best showing within an indutsry."[29]

There is less than unanimous agreement, however, that centralized labor-management bargaining systems contain strike activity quite as effectively as Ross and Hartman and others have suggested. Malles, for example, expresses doubt as to whether "there is any correlation at all between a particular type of industrial relations system and the incidence of industrial warfare."[30] Sturmthal has even argued that highly centralized labor organizations and bargaining structures can lead to heightened grass roots unrest because of the "distance" created between the rank and file and the level at which decisions are made.[31]

Three modal types of collective bargaining systems are readily identified in the descriptive literature:[32]

(1) *Decentralized systems* characterized by firm-level bargaining (e.g., Canada, Japan, and the United States) or by anarchic labor-management relations embedded within a formal superstructure of multi-employer bargaining that imposes few constraints on the principal actors (France, Italy).

(2) *Centralized systems* typified by industry-wide bargaining or by multi-employer bargaining with industry-wide constraints (e.g., Belgium until 1959, the Netherlands after 1963, and the United Kingdom throughout most of the postwar period).

(3) *Highly centralized systems* within which economy-wide bargaining, or industry-wide bargaining with economy-wide constraints, prevails (e.g., Belgium after 1959, the Netherlands prior to 1964, Norway, and Sweden).

Simple calculation of strike volume means for each type of bargaining system leaves no doubt that during the postwar period the average level of strike activity covaried with the degree of centralization: mean man-days lost per 1000 wage and salary workers are 425, 172, and 67 for decentralized, centralized, and highly centralized systems, respectively. In this paper, however, interest is focused primarily on the stability of the structural (regression) coefficients of real wages, unemployment, and profits across these diverse systems of industrial relations. Recall that the most successful equation in Table 1 was the "long-run" expectations model of (17c):

$$(18)\quad SV_t = \beta_0' + \beta_1 \sum_{i=1}^{5} \mu_i \Delta R_{t-i} + \beta_2 U_t + \beta_3 \Delta C_t + \epsilon_t.$$

Let D_1 denote a binary or dummy variable equal to unity for centralized collective bargaining systems and equal to zero otherwise, and let D_2 denote a dummy variable equal to unity for highly centralized bargaining systems and zero otherwise. (Decentralized systems comprise the null case.) It is now possible to specify an alternative, unconstrained model that permits

[29] Arthur M. Ross and Paul T. Hartman, *Changing Patterns of Industrial Conflict* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960), pp. 49-50.

[30] Paul Malles, *Trends in Industrial Relations Systems of Continental Europe* (Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada, Task Force on Labour Relations, 1969).

[31] Adolf Sturmthal, *Comparative Labor Movements: Ideological Roots and Institutional Developments* (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1972).

[32] A great many studies were consulted in developing these categories. Among the most useful of those not already cited were: W. Albeda, "Recent Trends in Collective Bargaining in the Netherlands," *International Labour Review*, 103 (March 1971), 247–268; Robert F. Banks, "The Pattern of Collective Bargaining," chapter 3, *Industrial Relations: Contemporary Problems and Perspectives*, ed. Ben C. Roberts (London: Methuen and Co., Ltd. 1968); Roger Blanpain, "Recent Trends in Collective Bargaining in Belgium," *International Labour Review*, 104 (July–August 1971) 111–129; Donald E. Cullen, "Recent Trends in Collective Bargaining in the United States," *International Labour Review*, 105 (June 1972), 507–529; Yves Delamotte, "Recent Trends in Collective Bargaining in France," *International Labour Review*, 103 (April 1971), 351–377; Gino Giugni, "Recent Trends in Collective Bargaining in Italy," *International Labour Review*, 104 (October 1971), 307–328; Bruce W. Heady, "Trade Unions and National Wages Policies," *Journal of Politics*, 32 (1970), 407–439; Gunnar Hogberg, "Recent Trends in Collective Bargaining in Sweden," *International Labour Review*, 107 (March 1973), 223–238; David L. Horowitz, *The Italian Labor Movement*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963); Val R. Lorwin, *The French Labor Movement* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954); Val R. Lorwin, "Labor Organizations and Politics in Belgium and France," in *National Labor Movements in the Postwar World*, ed. Everett Kassalow (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1963); Tadashi Mitsufuji and Hagisawa, "Recent Trends in Collective Bargaining in Japan," *International Labour Review*, 105 (February 1972), 135–153; Ben C. Roberts and Sheila Rothwell, "Recent Trends in Collective Bargaining in the United Kingdom," *International Labour Review*, 106 (December 1972), 543–571; and Adolf Sturmthal, *Contemporary Collective Bargaining in Seven Countries* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press 1957).

the parameters to vary across the three types of industrial relations systems. (The intercept-constant, β_0', already takes a unique value for each country and so is not affected by this respecification.)

$$(19)\quad SV_t = \beta_0' + \beta_1 \sum_{i=1}^{5} \mu_i \Delta R_{t-i} + \alpha_1 \sum_{i=1}^{5} \pi_i (\Delta R_{t-i} * D_1) + \gamma_1 \sum_{i=1}^{5} \omega_i (\Delta R_{t-i} * D_2) + \beta_2 U_t + \alpha_2 (U_t * D_1) + \gamma_2 (U_t * D_2) + \beta_3 \Delta C_t + \alpha_3 (\Delta C_t * D_1) + \gamma_3 (\Delta C_t * D_2) + \epsilon_t.$$

Table 2 reports the estimation results for the respecified long-run expectations model of (19). Clearly, these estimates lend support to the earlier presumption of parameter equivalence across contrasting industrial relations systems. More formally, the joint hypothesis that all coefficients are common across bargaining systems, i.e.,

$$\beta_1 \Sigma \mu_i = \alpha_1 \Sigma \pi_i = \gamma_1 \Sigma \omega_i$$
$$\beta_j = \alpha_j = \gamma_j \; (j = 2,3),$$

may be evaluated by computing the following F ratio:

$$F = \frac{[RSS_{(18)} - RSS_{(19)}]/r}{RSS_{(19)}/T - K},$$

where

RSS denotes the residual sum of squares in the respective equations,
r denotes the number of restrictions or constraints in (18), and
$T - K$ denotes the number of degrees of freedom of RSS (19).

Computation of this test statistic gives $F(8,113) = 0.9$, which is insignificant at any conventional level. Therefore, although the mean level of strike activity during the postwar period covaries strongly with the degree of centralization in collective bargaining, estimation of the unconstrained model yields results which do not challenge the earlier assumption that the structural parameters governing the impact of real wages, unemployment, and profits (the latter being of little importance) are approximately equivalent across institutionally diverse systems of industrial relations.[33]

The Money Illusion Hypothesis. In addition to the presumption of parameter equivalence, the analyses of previous sections also tacitly assumed that labor's propensity to strike is influenced by changes in real wages as opposed to changes in money wages. Therefore before incorporating certain features of the political system into the strike volume model it is important to dispose of the so-called "money illusion" thesis. The money illusion hypothesis holds that since movements in real wages are less perceptible than changes in money wages, working-class attention focuses largely on the latter, and hence workers are deceived by increases in money wages alone. Knowles's study of strikes in the United Kingdom, for example, concludes (albeit with considerable hesitancy): "Arguments based on the level of real wages are relatively unimportant at the level of strikes, even though they may have some importance at the level of negotiation, since (a) a rise in real wages is less evident and 'tangible' than a rise in money wages, and (b) a fall in real wages, even where it is immediately apparent, is less likely than is a cut in money wages to be taken as a deliberate act of the employers . . . and therefore is less likely to meet with immediate resistance."[34]

[33] Analogous tests for parameter stability were undertaken for equations (17a) and (17b), and for various other subsets of nation-year observations, but the results add little to what already has been reported.

[34] K. G. J. C. Knowles, *Strikes — A Study in Industrial Conflict* (1952), p. 227. The idea that workers

Table 2. Strike Volumes in Ten Advanced Industrial Societies, 1950–1969[a]
Estimation Results for Equation 19

$\sum_{i=1}^{5} \Delta R_{t-i}$	$\sum_{i=1}^{5} \Delta R_{t-i} * D_1$	$\sum_{i=1}^{5} \Delta R_{t-i} * D_2$	U_t	$U_t * D_1$	$U_t * D_2$	ΔC_t	$\Delta C_t * D_1$	$\Delta C_t * D_2$	R^2
−49.3	−22.7	6.9	−102.9	119.7	67.6	994.3	−7140.4	374.4	.56
(−1.7)	(−0.4)	(0.1)	(−5.1)	(1.4)	(0.7)	(0.7)	(−1.4)	(0.2)	

[a] The t-statistics for the regression coefficient estimates are in parentheses. Constant terms vary by country and are omitted. Variables are defined in Table 1 and in the text.
Sources: See Table 1.

Although it has been true historically that decreases in money wages have been vigorously resisted by labor, recent quantitative studies of postwar industrial conflict in Canada, Great Britain and the United States indicate that movements in prices and money wages act essentially as "mirror-images" with regard to strike activity.[35]

Since $\Delta R = \Delta W - \Delta P$[36]—where ΔR, ΔW and ΔP denote the percentage rate of change of real wages, money wages and prices, respectively—the money illusion hypothesis is tested simply by replacing $\Sigma \Delta R_{t-i}$ with $\Sigma \Delta W_{t-i}$ and $\Sigma \Delta P_{t-i}$ in a revised version of (17c). Accordingly we estimate the model (which omits the nonsignificant ΔC_t term)

$$(20) \qquad SV_t = \beta_0' + \beta_1 \sum_{i=1}^{5} \pi_i \Delta W_{t-i} + \beta_2 \sum_{i=1}^{5} \omega_i \Delta P_{t-i} + \beta_3 U_t + \epsilon_t.$$

Confirmation of the hypothesis requires that movements in money wages have a greater effect on strike activity than movements in prices, that is, the (negative) sum of the lag coefficients for ΔW_{t-i} should be significantly larger in absolute value than the corresponding (positive) sum of the ΔP_{t-i} lag coefficients. Table 3 reveals that if anything, just the reverse is true.

Table 3. Strike Volumes in Ten Advanced Industrial Societies, 1950–1969[a] Estimation Results for Equation 20

$\sum_{i=1}^{5} \Delta W_{t-i}$	$\sum_{i=1}^{5} \Delta P_{t-i}$	U_t	R^2
−44.5	53.3	−93.3	.53
(−2.0)	(1.4)	(−4.9)	

[a] The t-statistics for the regression coefficients are in parentheses. Constant terms vary by country and are omitted. Variables are defined in Table 1 and in the text.
Sources: See Table 1.

The difference, however, is neither theoretically nor statistically important; the standard F-test of the null hypothesis,

$$\beta_1 \Sigma \pi_i (\Delta W) = -\beta_2 \Sigma \omega_i (\Delta P),$$

yields $F(2,120) = .06$, which is insignificant at virtually any test level.

The evidence clearly demonstrates, then, that labor does not suffer from a money illusion, but, on the contrary, takes price changes as well as money wage changes fully into account in the use of the strike. This again suggests that strike activity is governed by a rational and rather sophisticated calculus.[37]

Strikes and the Political System. Beyond the economic factors appearing in the previous models, certain characteristics of the political system are also commonly believed to influence the magnitude of industrial conflict. The most important are the relative status in the political system of labor-oriented parties on the non-Communist left, the presence of governments controlled outright by Labor or Socialist parties, and the extent of Communist party influence in the labor force.

It has often been noted in comparative studies of industrial conflict that where Labor and Socialist parties are serious contenders for political power, the use of the strike weapon is restrained. The argument that Labor parties act to discourage worker militancy is well summarized by Ross and Hartman: "Why is labor political action a deterrent to strikes? First, strikes are injurious to the political fortunes of the labor party. Middle-class votes must be attracted if the party is to be successful, but the middle-class voter is antagonized by strikes. . . . Second, worker unrest is channeled off into the political sphere. Demands that would otherwise be made upon the employer are directed against the government instead."[38] There are numerous illustrations of this line of reasoning. For example, anticipating good prospects for a Labour Party victory in the British general elections of 1964, Harold Wilson urged railway union leaders in the spring of 1963 to prevent a

suffer from a money illusion apparently originated with John M. Keynes, *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1936).

[35] See Ashenfelter and Johnson, "Bargaining Theory"; Pencavel, "Strike Activity in Britain"; Vanderkamp, "Economic Activity and Strikes in Canada."

[36] Actually the continuous time equality $\frac{1}{W/P}\frac{d\,W/P}{dt} = \frac{1}{W}\frac{dW}{dt} - \frac{1}{P}\frac{dP}{dt}$ is only approximated by the discrete time relation $\Delta R = \Delta W - \Delta P$. However, for our purposes the difference is negligible.

[37] It is worth noting here that Kramer found percentage changes in prices and per capita monetary income to act as "mirror images" in their effects on fluctuations in the partisan division of the vote for the U.S. House of Representatives during the 1896–1964 period. Kramer interpreted this, quite properly, as evidence of rational mass electoral behavior. See Gerald Kramer, "Short-Term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior, 1896–1964, "*American Political Science Review*, 65 (March 1971), 131–143.

[38] Ross and Hartman, *Changing Patterns and Industrial Conflict*, p. 69.

scheduled work-stoppage because "such a strike would damage Labour severely in public eyes and jeopardize its position in the elections." *The New York Times* observed, "Fresh in every Labour politician's memory is the six-week London bus strike of 1958. The strike has been considered a major reason for Labour's overwhelming defeat by the Conservatives a year later."[39]

How might this argument be incorporated into a formal model of strike activity? First, an index is needed that permits specification of a plausible incentive function governing the inclination of Labor or Socialist parties to deter strike activity on the part of their constituencies. It would then be possible to evaluate the success of Labor-Socialist parties in actually diminishing the volume of strikes by relating the incentive function to the variable SV_t.

In terms of the theoretical argument briefly outlined above, the incentive of Labor-Socialist parties to discourage strikes in order to attract the middle-class votes deemed necessary for electoral success is likely to hinge on their competitive position in the party system. Following Przeworski and Sprague,[40] two things are assumed with regard to party competition: (1) the goal of party competition is electoral victory, and victory is defined as becoming the largest party; and (2) the goal is perceived in terms of the outcome of the last election. Victory, then, may be as little as ¼ of the vote in a multiparty system and greater than ½ the vote in a two-party system.

For simplicity, parties are classified in four political blocs or *tendances:* Communist, Non-Communist Labor-Socialist, Center, and Right. The competitive position of Labor-Socialist parties can now be defined as the difference or distance between their percentage vote share and that of the largest *tendance* in the system:

$$(21)\quad LD_t = \max(V_{t-1}) - LV_{t-1},$$

where: LD_t = Labor-Socialist % vote share distance
LV_{t-1} = Labor-Socialist % vote share in the preceding election
$\max(V_{t-1})$ = % vote share of the largest *tendance* in the preceding election.

It seems reasonable to suppose that the incentive of Labor-Socialist parties to dampen industrial conflict in hopes of attracting (or retaining) the marginal middle-class votes necessary to achieve (or maintain) plurality status in the party system would depend nonlinearly on their vote share distance (LD_t). Figure 3 depicts a likely form for this relationship. It suggests that the incentive (LI_t) should be very large when Labor's distance from its principal rival(s) in the party system (LD_t) is small or nil but should quickly decline (asymptotically approaching zero) as the distance increases. In other words, Labor-Socialist party elites have substantial motivation to restrain working-class




Figure 3. Theoretical Incentive Function

[39] Cited in Everett M. Kassalow, *Trade Unions and Industrial Relations: An International Comparison* (New York: Random House 1969), p. 52.

[40] Adam Przeworski and John Sprague, "Concepts in Search of Explicit Formulation: A Study in Measurement," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 15 (May 1971), 183–218.

militancy when electoral victory is very close at hand, but this incentive subsides rapidly with small increments in LD_t (especially at the lower ranges) given the risk of unnecessarily antagonizing hard core supporters or losing them to more radical competitors on the left. The most appropriate formalization of the model depicted in Figure 3 is a slightly modified reciprocal function. Accordingly, the Labor-Socialist Incentive index is defined:

$$(22) \qquad LI_t = 1 \text{ if } LD_t \leq 1$$
$$= LD^{-1} \text{ otherwise.}$$

Finally, the theory at hand seems best articulated by positing an inverse, linear relationship between the volume of strikes (SV_t) and the incentive index (LI_t):

$$(23) \qquad SV_t = f(LI_t, \ldots) \; f \text{ linear}$$
$$\partial SV_t/\partial LI_t < 0.$$

In conjunction with the decrease in strike activity ascribed to sharply competitive Labor-Socialist parties, an additional influence on working-class militancy is often attributed to the presence of Labor governments. It is argued that, other things being equal, workers, or at least union leaders, are much more reluctant to see a Labor or Socialist government embarrassed by severe strike activity than a Conservative one. Consequently, "if the labor party comes into power, the deterrent effect is even stronger. The trade union officials, having invested heavily in the party, are disinclined to do anything that would have the effect of sabotaging its program . . . and will show maximum restraint in the use of the strike."[41]

This hypothesis is evaluated straightforwardly by including in the model a Labor-Socialist Government dummy variable (LG_t) taking a value of unity when a Labor or Socialist party was in power and a value of zero otherwise. (Coalition governments were coded 1 only if Labor or Socialist parties had a plurality of key cabinet posts.) If workers as well as trade-union elites in fact respond to the partisan character of the government in the way that this argument suggests, strike activity should be lower during the tenure of Labor or Socialist administrations than it is during the tenure of Centrist or Rightist ones. Hence we have:

$$(24) \qquad SV_t = f(LI_t, LG_t, \ldots)$$
$$\partial SV_t/\partial LG_t < 0.$$

[41] Ross and Hartman, *Changing Patterns of Industrial Conflict*, p. 69.

The model or mini-model in (24) presumes that the effects of LI_t and LG_t operate continuously in time. Perhaps it is more plausible to assume that these influences are activated only in election years. Unions, for example, might make a real effort to minimize industrial conflict during the crucial election year period but are far less likely to relinquish the strike during the entire tenure of a Labor or Socialist administration. Similarly, party officials may find it infeasible (if not unnecessary) to attempt to discourage strikes in nonelection years no matter how close they are to "victory." These qualifications suggest revising (24) such that

$$(25) \qquad SV_t = f(LI_t{}^*E_t, LG_t{}^*E_t, \ldots),$$

where E_t is a dummy variable equal to unity in the year preceding an election and zero otherwise. The specification in (25) therefore constrains the effects of the Labor-Socialist Incentive index (LI_t) and Labor-Socialist Governments (LG_t) to be zero in nonelection years.

Finally, the strike model should also incorporate a term representing Communist party influence in the labor force. Communist parties in most advanced industrial societies are of course no longer revolutionary in the traditional Marxist sense. Indeed the French and Italian parties and their union affiliates (by far the largest in Europe) have in recent years exhibited caution, if not moderation, in the use of the strike and related protest activities in order to avoid unnecessarily alienating less radical or militant segments of society.[42] However, despite the significant tactical variations exhibited by Communist movements during the postwar period in confronting dynamic sociopolitical environments, it seems clear that in contrast to other major political actors in industrial societies of the West, Communist parties remain important agencies for the mobilization of discontent and the crystallization of labor-capital cleavages. Presuming that there is nearly always a certain reservoir of latent grievance or discontent which is not manifested in overt conflict unless mobilized and channeled by radical agencies on the left, it is anticipated that sizable Communist parties will have a systematic impact on strike activity beyond that attributable to the economic variables considered previously and opposite to that of Labor parties and Labor governments.

[42] See Donald L. M. Blackmer, "Italian Communism: Strategy for the 1970's," *Problems of Communism*, 21 (May–June 1972), 41–56, and George Ross, "French Working Class Politics After May–June 1968: A New Working Class?", Paper delivered at the 1973 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, Louisiana, September, 1973.

Using Communist party membership as a fraction of the civilian labor force (CP_t) to index the relative extent of Communist organizational mobilization, the preceding discussion suggests the function

$$SV_t = f(CP_t, \ldots) \qquad (26)$$
$$\partial SV_t/\partial CP_t > 0.$$

The precise form of (26) is unspecified; it is unlikely that a conventional linear formulation will adequately capture the response of strike activity to variations in Communist membership. In particular, a plausible argument can be made that Communist parties cannot effectively mobilize labor discontent and thereby influence industrial conflict appreciably unless membership size (relative to the total work force) reaches a certain "critical mass" or threshold. Increments in CP_t above the critical threshold might lead to substantial increases in industrial conflict until an upper bound or "grievance exhaustion" point is reached beyond which further growth in party size has little or no additional effect on strike activity. A nonlinear relationship of this sort is shown in Figure 4 and is given formally by the function

$$SV_t = e^{\alpha - \lambda/CP_t}. \qquad (27)$$

To recapitulate: Figure 4 and Equation (27) simply articulate the idea that beyond some initial threshold, strike activity moves rapidly upward with increases in Communist party size (the rate of response being greatest at the point of inflection $\lambda/2$) but then levels off, asymptotically approaching an upper bound or grievance exhaustion level e^{α}.

Combining the political hypotheses of this section with the most successful economic model developed previously yields the following equation for the volume of strikes:

$$SV_t = \beta_0' + \beta_1 \sum_{i=1}^{5} \mu_i \Delta R_{t-i} + \beta_2 U_t + \beta_3 LI_t{}^* E_t + \beta_4 LG_t{}^* E_t + e^{\alpha - \lambda/CP_t} + \epsilon_t \qquad (28)$$
$$\beta \Sigma \mu_i < 0, \beta_2 < 0, \beta_3 < 0, \beta_4 < 0,$$
$$\alpha > 0, \lambda > 0.$$

Table 4 reports the estimation results for three versions of the basic model in (28). Clearly, both the Labor-Socialist Incentive index (LI_t) and the Labor-Socialist Government dummy (LG_t) exhibit negligible influence on strike activity. The estimated coefficients of these variables oscillate in sign across specifications and the t-statistics are inignificant at any conventional test level. Moreover, this is true whether the hypothesized (negative) effects are permitted to operate in all years (28a) or are restricted to election years only (28b).

Interpretation of the Labor government (LG_t) result is straightforward: during the postwar period left-wing governments have been no more successful than center or right-wing governments in discouraging short-run upward




Figure 4. Hypothetical Relationship of Communist Party Membership and the Volume of Strikes

Table 4. Strike Volumes in Ten Advanced Industrial Societies, 1950–1969[a] Estimation Results for Equation 28

Equation	$\sum_{i=1}^{5} \Delta R_{t-i}$	U_t	LI_t	LG_t	$e^{\alpha CP_t}$	$LI_t{}^*E_t$	$LG_t{}^*E_t$	R^2
(28a)	−58.6	−89.1	−62.1	81.9	0.08			.58
	(−2.8)	(−4.9)	(−0.4)	(0.9)	(27.1)			
(28b)	−60.1	−89.4			0.08	16.9	−80.8	.58
	(−2.8)	(−4.9)			(27.1)	(0.1)	(−0.6)	
(28c)	−59.2	−89.3			0.08			.58
	(−2.8)	(−5.0)			(27.2)			

[a] The t-statistics for the regression coefficient estimates are in parentheses. Constant terms vary by country and are omitted. ΔR and U_t are defined in Table 1. LI_t denotes the Labor-Socialist Party Incentive index and equals unity when LD_t is ≤ 1 and LD_{t-1} otherwise, where LD_t = max vote share minus the Labor-Socialist vote share. LG_t and E_t are Labor Socialist Government and Election year dummy variables, respectively. CP_t is Communist Party membership per 1000 civilian workers.

Sources: Electoral data and Communist party membership data are primarily from U. S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, *World Strength of Communist Party Organizations,* annual volumes 1950-1970. See Table 1 for the sources of other variables.

movements in strike activity, notwithstanding the electoral ties of the former to the working-class.[43] From the workers' point of view, the correspondence of interests with Socialist party elites is simply less than perfect. As Ernest Bevin put it when leading the strikes of dock and tramway workers in Britain just after the first Labour government came into office in 1923: "There is work to do in the industrial field as well as in the political arena. While it is true that the two are to some extent part of the same effort, we must not lose sight of the fact that governments may come and governments may go, but the workers' fight for betterment of conditions must go on all the time."[44] Subsequent Labour government leaders have been no more effective in deterring labor militancy and strikes than the first Labour Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald.

The implication of the Incentive index (LI_t) result, unlike that of the Labor government dummy variable outcome, is not unambiguous For example, it is possible that the incentive function presented in Figure 3 and in Equation (22) is poorly specified, or that its definition in terms of vote share distances in (21) is too simple. However, alternatives to the incentive function developed in the text, elaborations of the basic specification in (24), and analyses permitting the coefficients to vary across subsets of countries produced results no better than those reported in Table 4.[45] Thus, it is plausible that Labor-Socialist party attempts to discourage strike activity are indeed governed by a model akin to that outlined previously, but that

[43] Similar conclusions with regard to Great Britain are reached by John E. T. Eldridge, *Industrial Disputes: Essays in the Sociology of Industrial Relations* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968); and Herbert A. Turner, *The Trend of Strikes* (Leeds: Leeds University Press, 1963). It should be understood that the results associated with the political party terms apply only to nations experiencing oscilliations in Labor-Socialist rule. The effects of long-term leftist rule on labor militancy (e.g., in Sweden, Norway and Denmark where the Left has governed almost continuously during the postwar period) are absorbed by the country-specific constant terms. The consequences of such long-standing political and institutional differences are discussed in great detail in my paper "Long-Run Trends in Strike Activity in Comparative Perspective."

[44] Cited in Kassalow, *Trade Unions and Industrial Relations,* p. 50.

[45] Several of these alternatives are worth mentioning. First, since the translation of electoral votes into legislative seats is by no means direct [see Douglas W. Rae, *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws* (New Haven: Yale University Press, revised edition, 1971), for an exhaustive analysis], the incentive function of Labor-Socialist Party elites in (22) was also defined in terms of seat shares as opposed to vote shares. Second, Equation (23) was revised to incorporate the capability as well as the motivation of party elites to discourage strike activity; where capability was measured in terms of the size of the Labor-Socialist political constituency (voters). Third, the Labor-Socialist vote share distance in (21), as well as the seat share variant described in the first point above, was modified to include (a) the vote or seat share of the U.S. Democratic party — following Greenstone's argument [J. David Greenstone, *Labor in American Politics* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969] that American labor and the Democrats have become interpenetrated in a way that is at least partially equivalent to party-union alliances in much of Western Europe — and, (b) the vote or seat share of the French Communist Party (PCF) during the period of the left alliance. As noted in the text, none of these modifications led to empirical outcomes significantly different from those reported in Table 4.

such attempts, on the whole, have been unsuccessful.

This apparent failure of party elites to reduce the use of the strike may stem less from the unresponsiveness or "irresponsibility" of top union leadership than from the fundamental radicalism and militancy of the rank-and-file. In Great Britain, where there is a close, organic relationship between trade union and Labour party elites, the vast majority of strikes during the last decade have been unsanctioned, "illegal" conflicts typically led by left-wing shop steward militants.[46] Although the British case is probably the best documented, wildcat strikes, contract rejections and other manifestations of grass-roots rebelliousness have also become serious issues in Canada, the United States, and continental Europe.[47] Strikes, then, not only are weapons in disputes with private capital, but can also serve as instruments of rank and file rebellion against union authority, and in some situations, state authority. Hence, the conclusions of Ross and Hartman's influential study that "labor political action, labor parties, and labor governments have helped pave the way toward renunciation of the strike," and that political action is "more in line with the middle-class orientation of workers in advanced industrial societies,"[48] seem to be seriously at odds with the empirical data.

Although the results in Table 4 give no evidence in favor of arguments concerning the impact of Labor-Socialist parties and governments on short-run fluctuations in strike activity, they do substantiate the anticipated effect of Communist party influence in the labor force. The initial specification of a "critical mass"/"grievance exhaustion" model represented by the function $SV_t = e^{\alpha - \lambda/CP_t}, \ldots,$ however, produced coefficient estimates that were statistically insignificant, unstable in sign, and unreasonable in magnitude. (A standard nonlinear algorithm in conjuction with reasonable initial parameter guesses was used.) An alternative, unbounded exponential function of the form $SV_t = e^{\alpha CP_t} \ldots,$ which preserves the idea that strike activity should increase (decrease) rapidly and nonlinearly with growth (decline) in Communist mobilization, proved to be far more successful in describing the relationship of industrial conflict to Communist membership over the range of variation observed in the latter variable in this body of data. The highly significant estimates[49] for this revised exponential model (reported throughout Table 4) support the original proposition that sizable Communist parties are associated with levels of industrial conflict that cannot be attributed to such economic factors as changing rates of increase in real wages ($\Sigma \Delta R_{t-i}$) or fluctuations in the demand for labor (U_t).

Conclusions

The evidence developed in this study supports several tentative conclusions. Time plots of the volume of strikes presented in the first section indicate that arguments about the withering away of industrial conflict and related statements concerning the vitiation of labor militancy in advanced industrial societies are not compatible with the empirical data. There simply is no sign of a general downward movement in the aggregate volume of strikes during the 1950–1969 period. To push the implications of this a bit further and in a more general direction, the trends in strike activity tend to complement other streams of evidence contradicting macrosociological arguments about the "integration" of labor in advanced capitalist

[46] J. F. B. Goodman, "Strikes in the United Kingdom: Recent Statistics and Trends," *International Labour Review*, 95 (May 1967), 465–481; and Michael Silver, "Recent British Strike Trends: A Factual Analysis," *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, 11 (March 1973), 66–104. The situation was reversed, however, after the passage of the Industrial Relations Act of 1971, which was bitterly resented by the British trade union establishment and which stimulated the normally moderate Trades Union Congress (the peak union organization) to join the shop stewards in pressing the militant position. Consequently, nearly 80 per cent of the man-days lost in strike activity in the years after 1971 were due to "official" disputes. A detailed analysis is given by Gerald Dorfman, "An End to Producer Group Politics in Britain?: The Industrial Relations Act of 1971," paper delivered at The 1973 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, Louisiana, September, 1973. The dynamics underlying differential responsiveness of union leadership and the rank-and-file to the wider political interests of Labor-Socialist parties is of course an important problem, which the simple models developed here cannot address with any authority.

[47] See John S. Greenbaum, "The Rebellious Rank and File," *Personnel*, 49 (March–April 1972), 20–25; Stuart M. Jamieson, *Times of Troubles Labour Unrest and Industrial Conflict in Canada, 1900–66*, (Ottawa: Economic Council, Task Force on Labour Relations, 1968); Seidman, *Trade Union Government and Collective Bargaining;* and Stanley Weir, "Rebellion in American Labor's Rank and File," in *Workers' Control*, ed. Gary Hunnius, G. David Garson and John Case (New York: Vintage Books 1973).

[48] Ross and Hartman, *Changing Patterns of Industrial Conflict*, p. 58.

[49] The *t*-statistics in this nonlinear model should be interpreted with caution since strictly speaking they have meaning only in terms of the linearized equation at the solution point. There is no question, however, that the exponential form given in Table 4 outperforms all reasonable alternative functions.




Figure 5: Distribution of Real Wage Lag Coefficients (from Table 4, 28c)

societies and the *embourgeoisement* of workers in the face of unprecedented affluence.

Patterns in the fluctuation of industrial conflict also suggest that the working class exercises considerable sophistication in the use of the strike weapon. The pronounced inverse relationship between the volume of industrial conflict and the rate of unemployment demonstrates that on the whole strikes are timed to capitalize on the strategic advantages of a tight labor market. What Hobsbawm has called "the common sense of demanding concessions when conditions are favorable" indeed seems to prevail.[50] Moreover, labor does not appear to be misled by a "money illusion." The empirical results clearly show that price changes are no less important than money wage changes in their effects on strike activity. Industrial conflict therefore responds to movements in real wages rather than money wages, which is further and rather persuasive evidence that rational behavior underlies observed strike fluctuations.

The real wage function that proved to be most successful empirically was a polynomial distributed lag in $\sum_{i=1}^{5} \Delta R_{t-i}$ (graphed in Figure 5). The general form of this lag distribution was deduced from a formal specification of a "long-run" expectations variant of the basic expectation-achievement hypothesis, although the lag function does not depend in any essential way on this particular theoretical rationalization. Without becoming very firmly attached to the precise shape or exact coefficient values of this lag distribution,[51] it can be said that labor militancy appears to be governed, in part, by a "memory" persisting several periods back through time, in the sense that a change in real wages affects strike activity over a number of subsequent years. More specifically, the estimates indicate that an equilibrium reduction of 1 per cent in the rate of change of real wages is associated with a strike volume increase on the order of 59 man-days lost per 1000 workers, which is distributed nonlinearly over about 5 periods.

Finally, the analyses in the last section of the paper reveal that Labor-Socialist party elites are, on the whole, unable to deter short-run

[50] E. J. Hobsbawm, "Economic Fluctuations and Some Social Movements Since 1800," *Economic History Review*, Second Series, 5 (1952), 1–25.

[51] Since the real wages variable is undoubtedly measured with significant error, one should not place great confidence in the exact values of the individual lag coefficients or in the lag distribution. This follows from the results of a recent paper by Grether and Maddala which shows that measurement error in an exogenous variable typically leads to the appearance of a *longer* lag distribution than is actually the case, but at the same time produces a *better* estimate of the total response. In the case at hand, this means the $\beta_1 \Sigma \mu_i = -59.2$ in (28c) of Table 4 is probably a good estimate of the total response of SV_t to $\Sigma \Delta R_{t-1}$ (the total multiplier), although the lag distribution index $i = 1 \ldots 5$ may be too long. See David Grether and G. S. Maddala, "Errors in Variables and Serially Correlated Disturbances in Distributed Lag Models," *Econometrica*, 41 (March 1973), 255–262.

increases in strike activity despite their strong incentive to do so (especially when the prospects of electoral victory are good) and notwithstanding their political ties to organized labor. Similarly, industrial conflict exhibits no consistent tendency to drop-off during the tenure of governments controlled by Labor or Socialist parties. The empirical evidence for the postwar period suggests, therefore, that left-wing parties and governments relying upon symbolic, electorally expedient appeals to political solidarity, which are not accompanied by tangible rewards to labor (wages, hours, fringe benefits and so on), have had little success in discouraging working-class militancy. In contrast, strike activity does appear to vary (nonlinearly) with the relative size of Communist party membership. This lends support to the earlier proposition that Communist parties in advanced industrial societies remain important agencies for the mobilization of latent discontent and the crystallization of labor-capital cleavages.

Extensions of the simple single-equation strike models presented in this study have obvious implications for public policy. One of the most important problems confronting industrial nations during the postwar period is the trade-off that appears to exist between unemployment and the rate of wage-price inflation (the so-called Phillips curve). If labor militancy or strike activity in the current period influences wage movements in current and subsequent periods independently of market conditions, then this implies a lagged reciprocity between strikes and wage changes, and more important, means that strike activity affects, perhaps crucially, the unemployment-inflation dilemma. This seems clear enough intuitively, although conventional economic formulations of the problem rarely consider labor aggressiveness explicitly.[52] In any case, an adequate treatment of the economic and political dimensions of these linkages would extend this paper far beyond its present length and requires empirical analyses not yet completed.

[52] The work of Hines and Ashenfelter et al., are important exceptions to the restrictive treatment of the employment-inflation problem found in the bulk of the empirical economic studies. See A. G. Hines, "Trade Unions and Wage Inflation in the United Kingdom 1893–1961," *Review of Economic Studies*, 31 (October 1964), 221–252; and Orley Ashenfelter, George E. Johnson and John H. Pencavel, "Trade Unions and the Rate of Change of Money Wages in United States Manufacturing Industry," *The Review of Economic Studies*, 39 (January 1972), 27–54. Also, see my forthcoming paper "Labor Militancy and Wage Inflation: A Comparative Analysis."

The Political Psychology of Religion in Plato's *Laws*

THOMAS L. PANGLE
Yale University

Introduction

Why is it important that we turn our serious attention to Plato's *Laws?* How will the study of this antique work help us to come to grips with the dilemma of modern democracy? We find ourselves citizens of rich and powerful regimes which administer enormously dynamic societies; yet the accelerating pace of change, the increasing sense of motion, go together with a dramatically decreasing sense of purpose and direction. We can openly wonder what our prosperity and freedom are for. What kinds of men and women, what ways of life, are intended to be the "users" of this liberty and wealth? Given the predominance in the twentieth century West of a version of liberalism which seeks to relegate such questions of purpose to the subpolitical sphere of private or "social" decision, it is not surprising to find, in reaction to the quandary, considerable speculation about alternatives to liberal democracy. But speculation of this kind is not, or should not be, limited to partisans of revolutionary change. In fact, this speculation is the proper task of political philosophy, which is almost by definition nonpartisan. The investigation of alternatives—the reflection on the merits, the strengths and weaknesses, the possible future improvements or dangers of contemporary democracy — will be productive of real political knowledge only if it is conducted in a spirit not of commitment but of open-minded and imaginative intellectual experimentation. We wonder about human needs, political, social, or personal, that may be frustrated or even unknown in the contemporary political universe. And yet prior to the investigation itself we have no way of knowing whether these needs can be answered in the modern context without risking even greater dissatisfactions. It may be that the philosophic inquiry into alternatives may only make clearer the essential limits of all political aspiration in modern, technological mass society. On the other hand, it is likely that such investigation will lead to some improvement in our understanding of the best direction in which to move to secure at least small improvements in our public life.

If we decide to undertake a serious inquiry into republican alternatives to liberalism we are led necessarily toward historical studies, for these alone expose us to the full range of republicanism—a range that extends far beyond the bounds of present-day varieties of liberal, plebescitarian, and Marxist systems. Now perhaps the most appealing of historical republican regimes, the one which has attracted admirers in almost every generation, is the classical city. It is easy to entertain the suspicion that in some *poleis* men had experiences and exercised capacities whose lack in our social lives today underlies a good part of our frustration and purposelessness. Still, the very suspicion that stimulates our intense interest may cloud our vision. In our desire to find a concrete embodiment of what we feel to be missing from our public life we are too prone to brush aside those elements of the *polis* which we find immediately unattractive. Yet the features that seem most alien may be so only because they are unintelligible to us; and their lack of intelligibility may be the surest sign that these are the elements of political life which we have lost sight of. In meditating on things that the classical theorists praise and that we find repugnant, we may discover politically relevant aspects of the soul, needs of the soul, which are now only dimly visible to us.

It is in the light of these considerations that we turn to a study of the Platonic dialogue which contains the most detailed classical presentation of the best city. I believe the chief reason why the *Laws* is so rarely studied by political scientists, and that when studied it seems so alien, is the emphasis on the gods and "religion" which pervades the work. The laws put forward by Plato's chief interlocutor (an old "Athenian stranger") are surely not revealed by god; but, just as surely, they are proposed with an eye to god at all times. The *Laws* is the only Platonic work that literally begins with the word "god." The occasion of the dialogue is a pilgrimage made by three old men to a sacred cave, and the conversation seems to take the place of the homage to the god of the cave (see 625a, 643a).[1] To extend this contrast with the *Republic,* one may say figuratively that in the *Laws* Cephalus never leaves and that his sons arrive only in the tenth

[1] Unless otherwise indicated, numerical references are to the standard Stephanus pagination of Plato's *Laws* and other dialogues. All translations are my own. I have used the edition of John Burnet, *Platonis Opera,* 5 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907).

book. The more one reads the *Laws* the more one is tempted to think that for Plato political science and a kind of theology are inseparable.[2] The full significance of this for us becomes apparent when we contrast the attitude toward religion held by the philosophic sources of modern republican theory. Whether one thinks of the first wave of modern theory (Spinoza, Locke, Montesquieu) or of the second (Kant, Hegel, Marx), it is apparent that the "theological-political problem," or, to speak practically, the reduction of religious influence on politics, is considered to be the key preliminary task of political science. It is true that both the thinkers who founded and those who radicalized the Enlightenment directed their critique mainly against Judaeo-Christian political theology; it is also true that they often used the Greek and Roman philosophers as allies in their struggle against the "Kingdom of Darkness." And they were correct to the extent that they detected a greater concern for politics in pagan reflections on the relation between politics and religion. But we need not rely on Fustel de Coulanges, we need only peruse with care the classical texts themselves, to see that the enlightenment separation between theology and political theory is in the final analysis directed against classical as well as against medieval or Biblical thought.

Plato no less than Thomas denies the modern thesis which holds that political life becomes more healthy when citizens are "liberated" from the "myths" of religion. But why does he do so? Plato's reasons are surely not the same as the Christian reasons, nor even the same as Rousseau's,[3] though all may share some common ground. A more satisfactory way of asking for Plato's reasons is to ask for his explanation of what he would understand to be the best relation between religion and politics. Now this is precisely what Plato attempts to give through the dramatic exchange he presents in the tenth book of the *Laws*. By meticulous attention to the drama of this section we can hope to bring to light Plato's reasons (psychological, political, suprapolitical) for what is to us perhaps the strangest feature of his political theory. In accomplishing this we may even be introduced to a new way of approaching some of the greatest political ills of our century, for if Plato is right, all modern thought has overlooked or distorted an absolutely essential dimension of political life.

Given the importance of the theme of Book Ten for our acceptance or rejection of the teaching in the *Laws* as a whole, and given the fact that Klinias himself, the prospective legislator, calls the discussion in Book Ten "the best prelude to all the laws" (887c1), it is not inappropriate to begin by virtually ignoring the first nine books. Nonetheless, we must give some consideration to the immediate context. The Athenian gives his defense of "civil religion" near the end of his elaboration of the penal code — a rather odd place, it may seem at first sight, for Plato's most extensive treatment of theology.[4] But the context is in fact one of the keys to the interpretation of the theology: the primary function of the three proofs in Book Ten is the support of the penal code. In Book Nine it had been frequently noted that penal law is effective only if the criminal is caught. But magistrates cannot look into the hearts of men, and therefore cannot detect all crime (not to speak of the possibility that they may punish the innocent). If the potential criminals are to be properly fearful and if the citizens are to believe the penal code is truly just, there must exist divine sanctions in this life or after death.[5] Book Ten's central proof is the proof that a Hades exists where the gods punish the unjust. The further "psychological" implication of this punitive character of the theology will emerge presently.

For now it is more important to note that the Athenian's interest here goes beyond the prevention of crime in the general populace. He focuses on a minority, the impious and hubristic young. He almost brings these rebels to life, and by speaking through them creates a dialogue within the dialogue whose only participants thus far have been the very old. The Athenian's theology seems meant to redeem the young whose minds have been corrupted by impiety. Their impiety is of three types, based on three erroneous opinions: 1) the gods

[2] Avicenna goes so far as to say that the *Laws* is a work on prophecy: *On the Divisions of the Rational Sciences*, in Ralph Lerner and Muhsin Mahdi, eds., *Medieval Political Philosophy, A Sourcebook* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1963), p. 97.

[3] I have tried to bring out the difference between Rousseau's treatment of "civil religion" in the *Social Contract* and Plato's in the *Laws* in "Politics and Religion in Plato's *Laws*: Some Preliminary Reflections," in *Essays in Arts and Science, III* (1974), 19–28.

[4] According to Vanhoutte, the peculiarity of the context is one convincing sign that Plato failed to revise properly this work: Maurice Vanhoutte, *La philosophie politique de Platon dans les "Lois"* (Louvain: Publications Universitaires de Louvain, 1954), p. 17.

[5] See 865d, 870e, 871b, 872, 874, 880–1, 913d, 917a–d, 931e, 958d–959e; cf. Jules Simon, *Etude sur la theodicée de Platon et d'Aristote* (Paris: Joubert, 1840), p. 269, and Victor Martin, "Sur la condamnation des athées par Platon au Xe Livre des Lois," *Studia Philosophica* II (1951), 105–6.

do not exist; 2) the gods exist but have no care for men; 3) the gods exist, have a care for men, and are bribable (885b6–9). From this threefold distinction the plan of Book Ten emerges as the Athenian refutes each of these beliefs, in this order. Prior to the first refutation, however, there is a section devoted to removing certain obstacles which stand in the way of any argumentation about the gods.

Prolegomena to the Refutation of the Atheists

885c1–886a5: The Abandonment of Zeus. Having heard the Athenian introduce the young upstarts in a fitting tone of disrespect, the old Cretan statesman Klinias breaks a silence of nine pages (876a–885c) to ask indignantly what should be "done or even said to them." The Athenian replies with a soothing term of address, requesting that they first listen to what he "prophesies" the "joking and contemptuous" young men might say. He presents the young men addressing the old men as "strangers," calmly reminding Klinias that they are not now sitting in judgment. The young men demand to be convinced by reasonable persuasion, and ascribe their delinquency to the influence of the best poets, orators, prophets, and priests, who all teach that the gods can be bribed. Gingerly, without uttering a word in his own name, the Athenian has reminded Klinias of the enormous difficulties in all the traditional theological authorities.[6] At the same time, we begin to realize that the Athenian intends to teach us his own art of theological rhetoric; could it be that his real theological adversaries are not the young rebels but the old guard?

In this second characterization the Athenian has described the impious as mostly young men with unjust desires and no well-developed theories (he is silent about the group who hold the central opinion — see 899d6ff). Klinias is in consequence rather scornful and offers to prove the gods' existence. But he abandons without a struggle the defense of the Homeric gods and bases his proof instead on the earth and sun and other stars and the natural orderliness of such things. Klinias is thus induced to set the tone of Book Ten: except for two oaths "by Zeus," the name of an Olympian god is never mentioned (891c7, 895d1; cf. 904e4). Although he probably recalls what the Athenian said earlier about the divine orderliness of the heavens and even the "planets" (820aff.), his refraining from mentioning the Olympian gods need not stem from "philosophy" or even from disbelief in the Olympians. As Klinias here indicates, when a prudent man of any nation is called upon to demonstrate the existence of the gods he turns to the visible order and visible "highest things." The reasonableness of this step causes a kind of unanimity among all peoples and the unanimity reinforces the appearance of reasonableness.[7] The natural theology of the astral gods emerges from the common sense of the nonphilosopher.[8]

886a6–887c4: The "Apology of the City." The Athenian stranger next startles Klinias with the first of several surprises. Contrary to the impression he originally gave, he begins to express respect for the arguments of the impious and denies that their motives are all base. Klinias suddenly is told that his ignorance of certain books familiar to all Athenians has led him to underestimate the profound reasonings which support the point of view of the impious young — reasonings which Klinias has unwittingly committed himself to refuting. Since the Athenian praises here the "virtue of the regimes" which make Spartans and Cretans ignorant of the strong arguments for atheism (886a11), we are forced to wonder why he introduces these corrupting arguments into the code of laws for the new Cretan regime. The Athenian seems to be the corrupter of the young as well as their redeemer (cf. 680c and 634d-e). The Athenian's civil theology is meant to defend the opinions necessary for dedication to good citizenship; but he is willing to risk

[6] Cf. 636d, 886c, 941.

[7] Compare 887e2–7, *Apology of Socrates* 26d, *Cratylus* 397d, *Epinomis* 987a; Cicero, *De Natura Deorum* II ii; Aristophanes, *Peace* 406; and above all *Deuteronomy* 4:19. See also Edwin Bourdieu England, *The Laws of Plato*, 2 vols. (Manchester: University Press, 1921), at 887e2. William Guthrie's discussion suffers from his failure to consider these passages in the *Laws* as well as the passage cited from the *Apology*: see *The Greeks and Their Gods* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955), pp. 211–14.

[8] Space does not permit us to do more than note the absence in Klinias's proof of all sense of the uncanny, the mysterious, the *holy* — what Rudolph Otto called the "numinous." This absence characterizes Book Ten as a whole. We must leave open the question whether the absence indicates a flaw in Plato's attempt to understand the "religious experience" and all that it implies for politics. An answer would require, among other things, coherent reflection on the contrast between "the holy" and what Plato's Socrates speaks of as the "daemonic" (cf. 885c3). The first steps in such reflection are prepared by Otto's discussion of Goethe's notion of the daemonic: *The Idea of the Holy*, trans. John Harvey (London: Oxford University Press [1950], 1972), pp. 150ff. Consider here Gershom Scholem, *On The Kabbalah and Its Symbolism* (New York: Schocken Books, 1965), pp. 88ff.; and Hans Jonas, *The Gnostic Religion* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963), chapter 10, especially pp. 250-5.

weakening that defense in order to move the city's opinions in the direction of truth. The wise fathers who rule the city, men with natures like Klinias' and Megillus', cannot face such a challenge without gradual and extensive preparation. The long introduction to the arguments themselves is in part the model of such preparation — a model that future young citizens with natures like the Athenian's must listen to and learn to follow.

The most serious writings which stand behind the impious young "Athenians" belong not to ancient poets but to "new and wise" men who assert that the heavenly bodies are mere stone and earth. These men and their pupils do not of course imply that the gods are bribable. We have almost insensibly left behind "most" of the impious young (cf. 885e) and have had our attention turned to a small minority of radical atheists. Confronted with this opposition Klinias understandably expresses some dismay.

So at this point the pious old Athenian raises for the first time the suggestion that they give up. He asks whether they should defend themselves (*apologeomai*) in court against the atheists' accusation that they, as representatives of the city, are doing "terrible things" or whether they should simply institute penalties without further ado. This way of putting it gives the impression that the atheists speak from a position of moral or even legal superiority. The Athenian mentions only *one* problem in continuing: the discussion will have to be rather long. He has presented the situation in a way calculated to make Klinias urge him to continue — to continue with the "apology of the city" before the tribunal of the "wise" and their students.[9]

By expressing reservations about the length of the speech required the Athenian induces Klinias to remind them all vigorously of the agreed-on form for the preludes — lengthy, reasonable persuasion suitable for free men rather than curt speech (mere law) fit for slaves (719c–723d, 857d). He goes on to portray with passion the political need for belief in gods; he mentions "persuasion" twice but no longer "the truth."[10] It is this pious passion that the Athenian is ready to confront and attempt to subdue.

887c5–888d6: "Thumos." Instead of proceeding with his proofs, the Athenian, in his longest speech in all Book Ten, pleads for moderation in both the old and the young men. The greater part of this speech is a very sympathetic suggestion that the older men moderate their "*thumos*." (*Thumos* means primarily anger or, more broadly, "spiritedness": 717d, 731aff., 863b, 866d, 934d.) After noting that Klinias has spoken with such eager spirit (*prothumōs*) as to seem to call for prayer, the Athenian asks them to consider how they might speak without *thumos* (*mē thumō* — 887c7; *athumos* — 888a5), quenching *thumos* (*sbesantes ton thumon* — 888a6).[11] He thus indicates that the greatest obstacle to "dialogue" (888a6) about gods is *thumos*. His anxious concern seems to point to *thumos* as the core of what we would call "religious zeal." It appears that the prolegomena to the refutation of the atheists is more than a model of theological rhetoric: it is an exploration through drama of the psychological reasons why such rhetoric is necessary.

Why does the Athenian stranger imply that *thumos* is that element in the soul which is at the root of religious zeal? How and why can Plato's "psychology of religion" trace the root of religious passion to anger or *thumos*? Let us begin by thinking of what anger looks to as its goal, namely, punishment, and recall our remarks about the context of this theology. Keeping in mind the present passage, we realize that the fact the gods are invoked above all as a support for the penal code is not merely or even mainly the result of the legislator's wish to restrain the wicked. The moral indignation of all the decent citizens cries out for gods who will avenge injustice. The legislator bows to this fact of political psychology. Earlier in the *Laws* we have learned that *thumos*, as the source of moral indignation, is practically the heart of good citizenship: "he who helps the magistrates as much as he can in punishing, he is the great man in the city, the perfect man; let this man be proclaimed as the bearer of victory in virtue . . . " (730d5–7). Now we learn that the Athenian places this desire to punish at the heart of zealous piety.[12]

But even this can be only part of the story, for the desire to punish is only part of what

[9] Consider here Plato *Apology of Socrates* as a whole and Leo Strauss, *What is Political Philosophy?* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 32–3. The note of Diès to this passage is charmingly naive: Platon, *Oeuvres complètes*, vol. XII, ed. and trans. A. Diès (Paris: Société d'edition "Les Belles Lettres," 1956), p. 144.

[10] Contrast 887b6 and c3, with 885e7, and see England's comment on the latter passage.

[11] *Thumos* and words of the same root occur five times in this speech (887c6, c7, 888a4, a5, a6), making it one of the more extensive references to *thumos* in Plato. Of the two most extensive references in the *Republic*, the first occurs just prior to the elaboration of the theology (*Republic* 375a–376c).

[12] Cf. William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (New York: New American Library, [1903] 1964), p. 341: "Pragmatically, the most important attribute of God is his punitive justice."

Plato means by *thumos*. First we need to return to the surface to observe just what the Athenian does here. In a passionate speech he demonstrates by example the power of the reason for anger or *thumos* at the young unbelievers. What is implied in the denial of the gods, he shows, is the denial of one's own parents who nourished and educated one from birth — nay, not only of one's own parents but of all parents everywhere in the world. The Athenian, apparently blind to facts he showed us earlier, speaks without reference to the traditional Olympian gods; indeed he speaks as if the only gods worshipped anywhere in the world were the heavenly bodies. He goes so far as to say that "even a half-wit would agree there is not one sufficient reason" for denying the gods of one's fathers (887e8). Continuing in this abusive tone, he declares that the unbelievers are motivated only by "gluttonous desire for pleasure" (888a3).

The Athenian is not "letting himself go." He is rather revealing, for Klinias and all to see and ponder, the blinding force of the indignation that supports the submission to the gods of the fathers. By bringing *thumos* before us in all its living power he makes us perfectly aware of what we have to overcome. If we are to understand the connection between piety, *thumos*, and the family — if we are to comprehend fully in what sense *thumos* is the source of the gods — we need to reflect on this speech in the light of Plato's other presentations of *thumos*.

According to the *Republic*, *thumos* is one of the three parts of the soul, distinguished from reason and desire. It is understood primarily as anger but it represents, or is the source of, a range of phenomena including high spirit, competitiveness, love of honor, courage, and shame. The analysis of *thumos* in the *Republic* is somewhat obscured because of the parallelism Socrates insists on between the city and the soul. The high place of *thumos* in the city distorts the discussion of the place of *thumos* in the soul.[13] To arrive at an undistorted understanding we do well to follow Plato's hints and start from an analysis of a simple and common form of anger.[14] Anger follows upon frustrated desire. When we desire a good, move toward that good, and are then thwarted, an emotion appears which urges us to overcome the obstacle to the fulfillment of our desire. The same emotion is present when in moving away from an evil we are thwarted in flight. That emotion is *thumos*. It is first of all an impulse to overcome, or as Thomas Aquinas puts it, a response to arduous good, a response which serves desire.[15]

The second moment of this emotion is a sense of *self*. In moving toward a desired good our attention is focused on the object of desire: we tend to forget ourselves. But when we are thwarted, we are made painfully aware of the separation between the object and ourselves. We become conscious of ourselves as deprived and become directly concerned not only with achieving the object but also, and perhaps even more, with restoring ourselves to a good situation. This strong awareness of self develops further in the effort to overcome the evil or to have revenge. We can easily forget the original object of desire and become absorbed with a new goal, involving a sense of self which is not identical with simple self-love, for *thumos* and its sense of injustice may well lead us to risk our lives. *Thumos* gives birth to self-love in the sense of self-esteem, esteem for oneself as compared first with "the enemy", but soon with all other men and things.

A third moment of *thumos* is the mysterious tendency to assign complete responsibility to that which frustrates desire. *Thumos* even personifies lifeless objects — our impulse is to kick back at the chair on which we stubbed our toe; and in the *Laws* the penal code includes punishments for animals and stones (873e-874a; cf. *Exodus* 21:28–32). This assigning of responsibility gains added impetus from self-esteem, for injury that results from some intention endows us with more significance than injury that results from blind chance. These three fundamental moments persist in

[13] See the discussions by Leo Strauss, *The City and Man* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), pp. 110–2, 129, 138; and Allan Bloom, *The Republic of Plato* (New York: Basic Books, 968), pp. 353–8, 375–8, 436.

[14] Cf. *Republic* 439d–440a, and especially 439e5. The strange example of Leontius should be considered together with the story of Cyrus in Xenophon's *Cyropaedeia* I iv 24, as well as other similar war stories. See also Aristotle *On the Soul* 432a24ff.

[15] Cf. *Summa Theologiae* Ia ques. 8 art. 2, ques. 81 art. 2, Ia IIae ques. 23 art. 2; *Commentary on Aristotle's On the Soul* 803–6. For a proper understanding of the teaching about *thumos* in the *Republic*, it is necessary to consider the order of topics which forms the context of the first emergence of *thumos* in the city: (1) the "city of sows," (2) frustrated desires, (3) war and *thumos*, (4) theology (*Republic* 369ff.). William James (pp. 210–11) devotes a paragraph to an unusually vivid and helpful sketch of what Plato would call *thumos;* his failure to link this insight with his general theme, however, is only one of many inadequacies in his discussion of the varieties of religious experience. Since James wrote, there does not seem to have been much progress in overcoming, let alone recognizing, the parochialism of his approach. See, e.g., Donald Capps, "Contemporary Psychology of Religion," *Social Research* 41 (Summer, 1974), 362–83; Geoffrey E. W. Scobie, *Psychology of Religion* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1975), chap. 4.

varying degrees in the more complex manifestations of *thumos,* in the courage that overcomes danger, in the proud firmness and sense of shame that overcomes base temptation, and in the sense of honor that leads a man to overcome all obstacles in order to be first.

If we focus on the second aspect, self-esteem, which shows itself most clearly in the sense of honor and love of glory, we see that this passion extends also to possessions, to the things that are one's own. This fact is strikingly manifest in the *thumotic* warrior class of the *Republic* who, like "philosophic dogs," love their fellow citizens and hate foreigners. In his discussion of them Aristotle is led to say that *thumos* is "the power by which we love *(philoumen)*" (*Politics* 1327b38–1328a17), meaning apparently that *thumos* is the source of the love of *one's own.* This manifestation of *thumos* becomes difficult to separate from desire. Provisionally we can say this: pure desire or love *(erōs)* seems to make us forget ourselves in the attraction to the thing loved; the more love is love of something as one's own, the more it seems to involve *thumos.* One sign is the fact that we are more apt to get angry at friends and brothers than at the beloved who has not yet accepted us. The part of our love which demands that those we love should reciprocate comes from *thumos (Politics* 1328a1ff.; *Laws* 717d). And this attachment to one's own calls for the belief that there are gods who watch over our city, our family, our property. In alliance with the gods one might overcome the hostility or indifference of the rest of the cosmos and implant on it one's indelible mark.[16] Such a belief implies that the actions of each individual are of importance to the gods. It leads to the notion that the gods as well as men are thumotic and are concerned with their own things; and that the gods' things include men and things that can be affected by men. It is the basis for the view that the gods call each man to account for what he has done and punish or reward him accordingly.

This self-esteeming part of *thumos* demands that each man be in control of his actions, and thus it goes hand in hand with the third part, the tendency to assign full responsibility. Even more important, the personifying tendency of *thumos* is one great source of man's capacity to imagine that the natural forces that act on him are the acts of responsible beings.[17]

The Athenian points to all these elements when he emphasizes that the atheists are men who turn against all parents, all family everywhere (see also the reference to the threat of incest at 886c and 890b). When he asks Klinias to subdue his *thumos* he is calling on him to subdue this irrational longing that his own people have cosmic significance. This begins his attempt to introduce Klinias and others to the possibility that the gods or highest things are untouched by the injustice of human beings and have disdain for the affairs of men.[18] In so doing, he prepares us for a civil theology which will to a considerable extent loosen the ties between the gods and the love of one's own. Another way of stating the Athenian's demand for the quenching of *thumos* is to say that he asks Klinias to be open to the possibility that the highest good for man, like that of the gods, cannot be taken away by others, or is not dependent on our having it as our private possession.

There is, finally, one other ingredient of *thumos* which leads to piety. The view of the world which *thumos* encourages is always in conflict with painful but obvious facts. It therefore has a tendency to become a tragic view of the world, as Homer's account of Achilles shows; the very regime of the *Laws,* according to the Athenian, is "the most beautiful tragedy" (817b). *Thumos* itself can sustain this view, however, in the form of hope. The passion which responds as anger or courage to immediate and near opposition also responds as hope to opposition seen in the distance.[19] *Thumos* as hope may even include hope for an afterlife or for divine intervention in this life. One of the meanings of the word *athumos* that the Athenian stranger uses is "faint-hearted." The Athenian asks Klinias to enter into the argument without *thumos,* and therefore without a heart full of hopes.

It is difficult to say how much Klinias understands of what the Athenian means here, not to speak of other parts of the *Laws.* It is doubtful, to say the least, whether Klinias as proud

[16] This is perhaps the place to note more precisely the context of the theology: it interrupts the discussion of penal laws intended to protect property (884a, 913aff.). The differences between the theology of the *Republic* and the theology of the *Laws* are due in part to the very different status of property in the two works.

[17] Consider, for example, Achilles' relation to the river in *Iliad* XXI 235ff. (cf. *Republic* 391b and Bloom, 356).

[18] Aristotle (*Rhetoric* 1408a16–17) indicates the commonsense source of the two possible postures toward the gods when he discusses the appropriate language to be used to describe evils. The appropriate language for *hubris* is anger, while for impiety (*asebeia*), disgust is fitting. The former implies injury, the latter contempt.

legislator for his new city could overcome his thumotic attachments without even knowing of other attachments to replace them.[20] It is even more doubtful whether the citizens who will listen to this prelude will overcome their *thumos*. At the end of this whole discussion, the Athenian makes it clear that his demand has not been satisfied, even by himself. The proof is not adequate, he says, because "it has been spoken rather eagerly somehow, out of a love of quarreling . . . on account of this an eager *thumos* (*prothumia*) has filled us so that we spoke rather vigorously" (907b10–c5; cf. 890e1). The whole proof must then be read with a view to the fact that the conditions the Athenian insisted on as essential to a "dialogue" have not been entirely fulfilled. Given the inextinguishable thumotic passions of good citizens, the Athenian cannot dispense with authentic religious passion in his exposition of civil religion. On the contrary, he must generate in himself a level of *thumos* which will in some degree match the temper of the city. This is indicated not only by the tone of the present speech but also by his use of oaths, a characteristic of angry talk (cf. 922d). The Athenian swears more often in Book Ten than in any other part of the *Laws*.[21] The theology of the *Laws* will occupy a middle ground between strict civil theology and a truly philosophic theology.

The thumotic attachment to self is an obstacle not only for the old men. Turning to a representative young atheist, the Athenian admonishes him to recall "first of all one great thing" — that his argument is not new. The love of truth alone, not the desire for one's own originality, qualifies a young man for "dialogue." After this the Athenian urges him to await the superior wisdom age will bring; he thus provides a soothing balm to any hurt the old men may have experienced in the admonition expressed to them (see Klinias' reaction at 888d6). Yet the authority of the old is tempered. The youth is not told to submit passively to lawful opinion but rather to "investigate" (*anaskopeō*—888c9). This is only the first sign of the common ground shared by the Athenian and the atheists.

888d7–890a9: The Pre-Socratic Science of "Nature." The most theoretical section of the *Laws* now begins as we learn that the serious atheists derive their conviction from a comprehensive account of all the things that "come into being," an account based on the distinction between nature, chance, and art.[22] The Athenian does not discuss how these terms or this distinction emerged, but according to the order of presentation it seems that the "wise men" began by recognizing a dichotomy between things made by art (human creation) and things not made by art, and drew attention to the priority in time, and therefore in rank, of the things not made by art. Every transformation made by art in a material is limited by the pre-existing characteristics of the particular material and of the artists. Therefore the things not made by art "are" more truly, are "the greatest and noblest things," while the things made by art are "lesser things" (889a4-8). The things not made by art are "by nature." But "nature" must be further analyzed. The things which set the bounds for art are themselves "produced" from more fundamental things. Fire, water, earth, and air are the most fundamental things, the only things which are not said to "come into being" but only to "be" (889b1-2; cf. a7).[23]

Fundamental here means prior in causal power or responsibility. In the initial presentation, which we are inclined to call the most profound, the atheists are not said to call the

[20] Thomas brings out with impressive clarity the intimate psychological connection between anger (the "irascible faculty") and hope: *Summa Theologiae* Ia ques. 82 art. 5, Ia IIae ques. 23 art. 2, 3, 4, ques. 25 art. 3; *Commentary on Aristotle's On the Soul* 806.

[21] Cf. 890e1 where the Athenian again characterizes Klinias as "most eager-spirited." Certainly Klinias will have to ponder this as well as other parts of Book Ten, using the notes he says he took during the conversation (*Epinomis* 980d).

[22] The oaths in Book Ten are at 891c, 895d, 905d. The Athenian swears only six other times in the rest of the *Laws* (662c, 683e, 691b, 720c, 721a, 858c). Consider here also the Athenian's momentary sense of near shame (886a7). In contrast to the Athenian, Klinias never swears in Book Ten (he has five oaths in the rest of the *Laws* — 660b, 715d, 814b, 821c, 965e). This is a sign that Klinias is less passionate than usual, or that his *thumos*, while it has not disappeared, is more quenched than at other times.

[23] Note that the passage we are about to investigate represents the only contemporary account of pre-Socratic philosophy which has come down to us in unfragmentary form. For the best discussion of the moral and political import of pre-Socratic philosophy, see Leo Strauss, *Natural Right and History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), chap. 3. See also Strauss, *The City and Man*, pp. 14–17.

[24] Something close to the four elements to which the atheists ascribe all the beings seem to be treated by the Athenian in the context of farming (water, earth, the sun, and wind — 845d); with regard to an interest in farming there may be more agreement between the Athenian stranger and the pre-Socratics than meets the eye. See 889d6 and Leo Strauss, *Xenophon's Socratic Discourse* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1970), pp. 195–6.

four elements the "first things"; they use the word "first" only when they speak of the relation of the products of nature to the products of art (889a7). Does this mean that the atheists do not necessarily assign temporal priority to the four elements? Do they perhaps hold, for example, that heavenly bodies of some sort have existed always, forever coming into being and passing away, without there ever having been a time when the four elements existed "pure" and unmixed (cf. Aristotle *On the Soul* 405a28ff.)? If this were so, then "nature" in the most fundamental sense would mean not the four elements, but "the eternal productive and destructive action of the four elements" (or, perhaps more cautiously, "the coming-into-being and passing-away connected with the four elements").

Here the Athenian does not give this or any other definition of nature. Instead, after pointing to this possibility, he veils it by supplying several pages later (891b8–c5) a definition which is so clear that we are tempted to read it back into the original presentation. The visible hesitation with which he presents the definition does not by any means take away the temptation. His words are: "The one who is saying these things comes close to holding that fire, water, earth, and air are the first things, and comes close to naming these things nature" (891c1–3). This definition promotes an impression that the atheists assign strict temporal priority to the elements and can conceive of them as existing unmixed — although the sense of priority intended by the word "first" is ambiguous. Still later, in a final presentation of the atheists' definition of nature, the Athenian steps back a bit toward the definition implicit in his first and fullest presentation of the atheists' views: "nature, they mean to say, is the coming-into-being connected with the first things" (892c2–3). Neither of his stated definitions is downright misleading, but the Athenian seems strangely reluctant to bring out the possible eternity of the generative action or motion of the elements, and strangely eager to equate causal priority with priority in time. The reason will begin to appear shortly.

The four elements which are preeminently nature exist as bodies in motion; they are without soul; this means, to say the least, that they lack all of the properties we see to be specifically human — they are indifferent to "humanity." They move, meet, and sometimes form composites, new bodies. When the atheists speak of the elements existing "by nature *and by chance*" they seem to refer to the way in which the elements, nature, works or moves: the motions of the four elements and hence the composites which result from this motion, are purely random. The randomness, the atheists say, exists "from necessity" (*kata tuchēn ex anangkēs*—889c1). By this they mean that the randomness arises out of the unchangeable properties of the motions of the four elements. Each of the elements will have certain constant properties, such as speed and mass; and the motion of fire cannot suddenly become the motion of water or exhaust itself altogether. But although the motions and composites are thus determined, they are no less random, for none of the particular composites are any more or less necessary than the infinite other composites which may come into being and pass away. Since according to the atheists all things are such composite bodies, no new thing is needed to explain the emergence of life (889c4).

Each kind of composite, although it comes into being by chance and is not external, has its own particular characteristics. With a view to the mode of expression used a little later, we can call these characteristics its particular "nature" (889d5ff.). Nature in the most fundamental sense, i.e., the activity of the elements, is indifferent to the existence or disappearance, prosperity or failure of any sort of composite being. But the particular nature of each composite can provide a standard for the natural good and bad for it. Seen from the perspective of the elements, all situations of composite beings are equally natural and equally by chance. But seen from the perspective of a composite being, some situations are in accord with its natural function and are therefore natural, while other situations are not in accord with its natural function and therefore happen to it by chance.

Man is one of these later, composite beings. But he differs from all other beings in that he is characterized by the power to mold himself and his environment through *art* (889c6–d1)—hence the amazing variety in the ways of man, in contrast to the unvarying ways of other things; hence the ability to make things *seem* different to man than they truly are by nature (889d1–3). The outstanding example is man's creation through art of a way of life in some city which then coercively claims that this way of life is the only way good for human nature. Art's power of deception or self-deception is at the root of the atheists' depreciation of art as opposed to nature. The arts can be divided into arts more and less natural. As unnatural arts the Athenian has the atheists point especially to painting and music (889d3). These arts, they say, change the appearance of things so as to

make men believe things are other than they truly are. They can give man needs, fears, and concerns which he does not truly have, which are in no way required for his successful functioning. They achieve this in great part by creating images of men, of things, or even of wholly imaginary beings which can never be yet which we fear or long to imitate. Since the products of these arts do not refer to or imitate anything that exists, they are arbitrary; what they turn out to be is, from the viewpoint of human nature, a matter of chance. There can also be "serious" or natural arts, however, arts which follow and work according to the natural working of things, composite bodies. Medicine, for example, corrects the human body with a view to its true needs and nature (889d6).

But according to the atheists, the art of politics and even more the art of legislation are not natural arts. We discover here that the denial of the gods is only the most immediately shocking part of a much broader attack on the validity of all law and the naturalness of all political life and aspiration. As the Athenian presents it, the dispute about the gods leads directly and necessarily to the dispute about the existence of "natural right" (*ta dikaia phusei*— 889e7). In order to understand why and to what extent this is so, why the natural basis for justice stands or falls with a natural basis for civic gods, and vice versa, we need to remind ourselves of the Athenian's earlier analysis of law and "the regime" (*politeia:* 625a6–7, 689e–701b, 712b–715c, 886b11).[24] According to his argument law is not the fundamental political phenomenon. Law is given its order and direction by the decision as to the human type which will constitute the ruling group in the city. This decision sets up and defines the "regime." The way of life of the authoritative group determines the way of life, the specific virtues and excellences, to which the whole city looks up and is dedicated. In every regime the beliefs about the gods or the most revered things, however much they may be adopted from tradition, are transformed to become the crowning expression of the morality that is the regime (890b6–c2): the gods are "such as the laws say they are" (885b4, 890a6,b7, 904a9). As we shall see, the Athenian himself would seem to hold that the opinions about the gods in some cities may be perceptions of the truth about the nature of man and the cosmos; the more just or in accordance with nature the regime, the more truth in its opinions, up to a certain point. What makes the atheists' critique so thoroughgoing and profound is that they deny all truth to every regime's opinion about justice and the proper way of life. As we often hear said today, these opinions are mere "ideologies"; the cities have no idea of the way things really are.

In each city, say the atheists, there is a never-ending dispute about what is just. Each city is continually changing its laws, even its most fundamental laws and its regime. Each of the opinions about justice which it legislates is given with the same authority (889e7–8). This clear sign of the arbitrary character of the laws and the just things points to the truth about them. Each decision about what is just or noble can be traced to essentially chance circumstances which precluded the consideration of other notions of what is just, and the circumstances which made one individual or group the strongest and hence able to impose its interest and opinion.

But such a description of the establishment of law in most cases would not be a sufficient proof of the *impossibility* of nonarbitrary, reasoned legislation based on what is good by nature for all the men in a city. The core of the atheists' rejection of natural justice must depend on an analysis of the natural good for man. The following analysis is barely visible in the Athenian's presentation here. "Justice" is equivalent to "the common good." The notion that there is a true or natural basis for justice depends then on the assertion that what is truly good for man can be common, common to a whole city. The atheists deny that the naturally good for man can be common. This follows from the assertion that man, like all other things, is soulless composite body in motion. Each man is nothing but body; the good for man is the good for his body, and as the Athenian some time earlier has conceded, the body with its pleasures and pains cannot be shared, at least not by any group as large as a city (739c–d).[25] Goods which please the body can be "shared" in the sense that they must finally be divided up and consumed or enjoyed by each; but they cannot be shared together, in the sense that their enjoyment, like that of seeing the sunset, for instance, does not require being divided up and parceled out, and hence does not induce competition.

[24] Klinias seems at first puzzled by the connection between the dispute about the gods and the denial of a natural basis for law and politics: see his reaction at 889e2 and the Athenian's response, "O blessed" (i.e., for your ignorance — cf. 831c1 and 886a6).

[25] This shows why the theoretical position of the atheists can with some justice be equated with the view that the good is bodily pleasure: 886a9, 888a3, 908c2.

According to this analysis of the human good we see that in each of the cities most men obey the law because they are deceived into thinking it represents some common good greater than many tempting private goods. In fact, the regime and its laws almost always exist for the sake of some private good — of some class alliance or of some individuals. Those who are privately benefited may or may not be aware of the deceptiveness of the claim of the regime to exist for the sake of the common good.[26]

Having proceeded thus far in the elaboration of his opponents' views, the Athenian creates a slight break in his account by pausing to address his two interlocutors as "my friends" (890a2–3).[27] He thus reminds them of the political projects which is the only known basis of his friendship with them, and calls them to attention, preparing them a bit for the immediate sequel. Prior to the slight interruption they had just heard an account of the nature of things, an account almost entirely hostile to all political life. Now they will hear a political teaching with recommendations or imperatives drawn from the teaching about nature. Those who draw these political conclusions are "men (*andres*) considered wise by young people (*anthrōpoi*—cf. 891c8)." It is not immediately clear whether these men are those who developed the natural philosophy or whether they are men who repeat what others have developed and add a political teaching; but they are said to include poets[28] as well as "prose writers" (890a4). Is the political teaching which follows not a "corruption," or at any rate a problematic derivation from what the thinkers about nature hold? True, the natural philosophers, while denying all natural status to the art of legislation, conceded "some small bit" to the art of politics (889d): politics is by nature good to the extent that a man promotes his security by engaging in political life and taking advantage of the deceived multitude who do not recognize the falseness of the common good. But the "poets and prose writers considered wise by the young" go further. They say there is a kind of justice according to nature. The "most just thing is victory by force"; "the right life according to nature is ruling over the rest and not being a slave to others according to the law" (890a4–5, 8–9. We note that this "art" of the natural rule of the stronger over the weaker imitates or accords with the natural predominance in the cosmos of the stronger bodily motion over the weaker. It is clear that the ultimate aim of such political activity would be the overthrow of the existing regime in order to rule as tyrants in the open (890a7).

In his explanation of their views the Athenian has blurred with remarkable ease several different kinds of atheists and atheistic opinions. He has in this way indicated for us the variety of his opponents even as he compelled us to focus on the politically most relevant or active type. The atheists last described certainly do not believe that the philosophic or even the simply private life is superior to political life; philosophy and the philosophic life are never mentioned in Book Ten. It is even more curious that in describing their opinions the Athenian never mentions "the good" or "good things," although he mentions "noble things" and even "noble things by nature" (889e6). He also never mentions pleasure here (contrast 886a9, 888a3, 908c2). We are compelled to ask whether the atheists see the nobility of rule merely as a means to private (bodily) pleasure and private good or whether they are attracted by the noble splendor of rule and public honor for their own sakes. To the extent to which the latter is true, their good would seem to become dependent on bowing to the notions of "service to the city" and "the common good," notions which they claim are wholly false. This is the general direction that Socrates takes in refuting Callicles and Thrasymachus. But in this discussion the Athenian only hints at such a problem because he is interested more in confronting the sophists' opinion about the gods and the account of nature which underlies and supports them.

890b1–893a9: The Socratic Science of "Soul." The description of the atheists' arguments leaves Klinias a bit stunned. Whereas before he predicted that the argument would be "difficult" (886e2), he now says this argument is the "ruin of young people in their public affairs and in

[26] It is possible that with a view to war, the citizens as a whole form an alliance of selfish interests set over against the rest of men. This was the interpretation of Sparta and Crete held originally by Klinias (625e–626a). But as the Athenian showed, this understanding does not give adequate support to the city's claim about the common good. Such an alliance only holds as long as it is not to the advantage of groups or individuals to desert; the alliance does not support the city's claim to have the right to sacrifice the goods and lives of citizens. And it quite fails to provide a basis for the sense of sanctity of the city: nothing makes this group, "our" group, intrinsically better than any other group (626–30).

[27] I owe this observation and part of what follows to David Bolotin.

[28] Especially the poet Pindar, who seems to have taught the Athenian that by nature strength gives a right to rule (690b–c, 714b–715a). Cf. England on 890a5.

their families" (890b1–2). The Athenian does not try to reassure Klinias; instead, he tells him that he speaks the truth and then asks for the second time whether they should give up. Before he had asked, "What should *we* say, what should *we* do," Now, just after addressing Klinias alone by name for the first time in Book Ten, he aks, "What do you think the legislator should do?" (886e6, 890b3–4); Klinias is handed the responsibility of dealing with the atheists. The use of the word "do" but not "say" characterizes the remark as a whole — the Athenian devotes much more of it to asking whether they should stop talking and institute penalties than to asking whether they should continue to try to persuade the atheists. By this he leads Klinias to urge even more strongly that they continue; having seen the full gravity and complexity of the sophisticated arguments, Klinias realizes that punishment alone cannot ward off so strong an attack; he cannot let the Athenian give up while a hope of refuting the opponents remains. But in contrast to what he said when he first suggested giving up, this time the Athenian no longer holds out the hope that it will be possible to refute the atheists: they "have been prepared from old" (887a5–6, 890b4).

Klinias's reply shows that the Athenian has successfully moderated without dashing his hopes for refutation, and has drawn his attention to his extreme need for help. Klinias has not, however, lost his alertness; he sees that "nature or something not less than nature" must be the standard, and he understands that the Athenian's argument will turn on the relationship of law and art to mind (*nous*—890d6–7; cf. 886a2–4, 889c5). But the Athenian is not yet satisfied with the still "most eager-spirited Klinias" (890e1). He raises a new difficulty, the problem of giving as refutation complex arguments in a legal prelude that is addressed to the multitude, and reminds him "again," but in stronger terms, of the "enormous" length the argument requires (890e1–3).

Since Klinias had already answered once before the objection about length and considers it the lesser problem, he answers it first with a mildly admonitory question that reminds us all of the spirit in which the whole dialogue began. The discussion of drunkenness with which the Athenian opened the conversation served to loosen the tongues of the old Spartan and Cretan by reminding them of forbidden pleasures and perhaps of youthful transgressions; it made all three "vicariously drunk."[29] The Athenian here has made it necessary for Klinias to recall to them the beginning and hence to reinvigorate the freedom of speech and thought, the youthfulness, that the beginning produced.

Klinias then deals with the new objection, the difficulty of speaking before a multitude. He readily concedes that the multitude of citizens will include many who are not intelligent enough to understand the argument about the gods, but he argues that the prelude, as something written, exists for the slow learner to study over and over. Klinias agrees that the public pronouncement of the most important prelude — the best prelude for all the laws — will be unintelligible to many of the citizens. He thus frees the Athenian from a limitation that has characterized all the other preludes (cf. 718bff., 857bff.). The Athenian has correctly counted on Klinias's gentlemanly contempt for the multitude to make it possible for the city's opinions about the highest things to be above the level of understanding of most. The inegalitarian nature of Klinias's concession is one of the most obvious reasons why such a defense of the gods as the Athenian gives could not be given in a democratic regime.

At this point, just after Klinias has said that the written prelude will be available for the slow learner to study, Plato has Megillus speak a few approving words, his only words in Book Ten (891a8, b7). The *Laws* is not as lacking in wit as many scholars maintain.[30]

Having left behind the multitude and even Megillus, the Athenian feels called upon to invoke more strongly than ever before the "partnership" between him and Klinias. He proceeds to restate the atheists' position with the clear definition of nature that we have discussed,

---

[29] See Strauss, *What Is Political Philosophy?*, pp. 31-2. Cf. Eric Voegelin, *Order and History*, 6 vols. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1956) III, 240–1.

[30] A full understanding of Book Ten would require further consideration of Megillus's role. Throughout the *Laws* his importance is out of all proportion to the number and length of his "laconic" utterances; but in Book Ten he takes on a special importance. This is shown by the mild apology the Athenian makes to him here (891b2–6) as well as by the fact that the Athenian addresses him relatively frequently in Book Ten (he addresses "Megillus and Klinias" at 888d and 899c; Megillus alone here at 891b; and "Klinias and Megillus" at 900c. I believe he addresses the two together about thirteen times in the rest of the *Laws* and Megillus alone about six other times). Megillus rather than Klinias has shown the capacity to keep the Athenian from straying away from human affairs toward the truly divine things (803b–804b); he is closer to the human type which will constitute the ruling majority, the "regime" of the new city. By making the discussion of the gods acceptable if not comprehensible to Megillus, the Athenian assures that the theology is acceptable to the multitude of the citizens.

and adds that according to this understanding "soul" is derived later from the four elements (cf. 889b5). He then says, swearing by Zeus, that they have found the source of error of all those who have ever investigated about nature (891c7). The Athenian's refutation of the atheists begins with an assertion supported (at first) with nothing but a passionate oath; he secures a sense of certainty in the hearer before presenting any arguments. But oaths are not needed to support assertions whose justifications are clear and as Klinias's response shows, the meaning of this assertion is not at all clear: above all, we have not been told what is meant by "soul." The Athenian says he cannot explain without using "rather unfamiliar arguments." Klinias fully senses his need for help; he has in addition the Athenian's assurance that the source of the error of the atheists has been discovered; he cannot possibly let the refutation stop now. With understandable reluctance, and addressing the Athenian as "you amazing man," Klinias agrees that the Athenian can go outside the sphere of legislation to use "unfamiliar arguments" (891e1–3) — unfamiliar, we may add, not only to the multitude but to the legislator himself. It turns out that the same criterion which first persuaded Klinias to rank himself above the multitude of citizens now makes him rank himself closer to the multitude than to the Athenian. The distinction between the philosopher and all the nonphilosophers proves to be more important than the distinction between the statesman-founder and his people. Will there be anyone in this city (except perhaps some of the redeemed young) who knows who the gods of the city are?

Adopting "unfamiliar" or philosophic language, the Athenian begins his explanation by saying that the atheists have not properly understood what is "the first cause of the coming-into-being and passing-away of all things" (891e5–6). He does not, however, proceed to say what is the first cause; instead he indicates that his predecessors have failed to understand nature because they have failed to understand the soul, "what it happens to be, what power it has, and above all how it comes into being." "Soul," he says, "comes into being among the first things, prior to all bodies, and is, more than anything else, the cause of changes in bodies and of all reordering of bodies" (892a2–7). He thus leaves us in the dark about what might be the other "first things" which may not come into being, and which may cause the coming-into-being of bodies (and perhaps even of souls).[31] A greater cause of dissatisfaction is the Athenian's continuing failure to define "soul." We suspect that he means something more or less like the human soul (cf. 891e7, 886b1), and when, a few lines later, we hear that opinion, supervision, mind, art, and law are "things akin to soul," our suspicion seems confirmed. But if these five things are only "akin," then none of them *is* soul. Could soul be understood here as principally the passions (*erōs* and *thumos*)?[32] Could a misunderstanding of the passions — more than a misunderstanding of mind *(nous)*, art, or law — be the source of the pre-Socratic misapprehension of nature (cf. 967a–c)? At any rate, if soul is prior to body then the things akin to soul are prior to the things belonging to body. Passing over the obscurity about the first things besides soul and especially about whatever might be the cause of the coming-into-being of soul, the Athenian asserts that the deeds of art and mind must be "the great and fair deeds" and that "it must be most correct almost (*schēdon orthotata*) to say that soul is preeminently by nature."

But what does all this have to do with the gods? The nerve of the Athenian's argument seems to be this: something like what we call "the soul" in man, with its power to use art and mind, is prior in time and hence in dignity and causal power to all the bodily phenomena the atheists called nature. Therefore the city which reveres something resembling the human soul as the oldest and most powerful thing is much closer to the truth than are the atheists. The city is also nearer the truth when it honors arts and laws which promote the good of the soul above arts which serve the good of the body. A great deal turns, then, on whether "someone can show that soul is older than body" (892c6).

But even this achievement would not entirely vindicate the city. In the first place, if the city is truly to revere the soul it must know what the soul is; secondly, if the city's claim to be devoted to and to promote a common good is to be justified on the basis of the soul, the good for the soul must be shown to coincide with the common good. It follows, by the way,

[31] Certainly, according to the Athenian, soul is not the only thing that causes changes in bodies: after all, do not bodies cause changes in bodies?

[32] Compare R. Hackforth, *Plato's Phaedrus* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), p. 76: "It is significant that the two dialogues in which the moving function of soul is prominent — *Phaedrus* and *Laws* — are the only two in which the passions (emotions) and desires are clearly attributed to discarnate soul."

that once we establish what soul is and what is good for it, we have a natural standard for judging which arts, laws, and opinions are better and which worse. It must be admitted that at this point the Athenian hardly draws attention to these latter issues. He focuses on the issue of the soul's priority in time. Indeed, he seems to assume that *all* art, law, and opinion, as well as mind and supervision, is equally "akin to soul."

If we refer to the distinction originated by the atheists, we may say that whereas they made chance the principal part of nature and denigrated art, the Athenian makes art the principal part of nature and is altogether silent about chance. To leave it at this, however, would not do justice to the remarkable degree of agreement between the Athenian and his opponents. For the Athenian, as for the atheists and for the Platonic Socrates, the key question is "what is nature," nature understood as the first or fundamental cause. Contrary to the Platonic Socrates, and in agreement with a certain (exaggerated? — see above) version of the atheistic view, the Athenian holds that the first causes are the first things *in time*: priority in rank is the same as priority in time. To bring out more clearly the implication of the agreement between the Athenian, the atheists, and the city, in opposition to Socrates, we may say that the thesis is "the oldest (*presbutaton*) is the best."[33] Closely related to this is the un-Socratic forgetting of the ageless things which do not come into being or pass away. We are told by the Athenian that soul and the things akin to soul (including mind) all "come into being" (892a4–5, 8), and he accepts the notion that "nature is the coming-into-being connected with the first things" (892c2–3). Book Ten as a whole is silent about the *ideas*.[34]

[33] For the replacement of the term "first things" (*prōta*) by the terms "older things" or "oldest things" (*presbutera* or *presbutata*) see 892b1, c6, 895b5, 896b3, c6–7, and above all *Epinomis* 980d.

[34] To put it another way, the question "What is soul?" is never really asked, and is replaced by the question "How does soul come into being?" The Athenian cannot, however, completely avoid the word *eidos*: 894a8, 895c5. Victor Brochard decisively refuted Lutoslawski's claim that the *ideas* are omitted in Book Ten because they are missing from the *Laws* as a whole (hence indicating a radical change in Plato's thought). But Brochard failed to explain sufficiently why the *ideas*, mentioned or discussed elsewhere (especially 965b, 967d), are never referred to in Book Ten. See Brochard, "Les *Lois* de Platon et la théorie des idées," in *Etudes de philosophie ancienne et de philosophie moderne* (Paris; J. Vrin, [1912] 1954), pp. 151–68, and especially pp. 163–4.

Before finally beginning his refutation of the atheists, the Athenian raises one last difficulty (892c9–893a7). Klinias has had a taste of the "unfamiliar" arguments, but the Athenian now makes it clear that he can have no active part in the "dialogue" about the gods. He and his Spartan friend can only listen in silence as the nameless Athenian proceeds alone, both speaking on behalf of a nameless atheist and responding to that atheist's questions, until the "whole" argument about the priority of soul is completed. For engaging in this argument is like fording a swift-flowing river — dangerous for old men lacking in strength. The simile of the river softens the Athenian's attack on the old by focusing on the age of their bodies, a proper excuse not to ford such a river. After all, it is not the superiority of old body but of old soul that is essential to the city. But what the old men actually are warned not to wade into is no river but an argument which only the Athenian can put forward (cf. England ad loc.) and which only the Athenian can master, through the strength of his youthful soul: the argument that soul is oldest and therefore best can be defended only by the youngest soul — the Athenian soul open and eager for new and strange things (contrast 888c1ff.).

The Athenian's remark here is the culmination of the drama which has prepared the way for a theoretical defense, based on nature, of the city's gods. The preparation of the legislator has been at the same time a demonstration to us why such a defense is necessary, a demonstration of what the function of civil theology is. We now understand that that purpose goes beyond answering the political and psychological (thumotic) needs of the citizenry. In the case of attentive citizens, the preparatory section begins to make them self-conscious about those needs; in the case of the "young in soul," regardless of the age of their bodies, the preparation and the theology awaken and begin to answer their doubts about the truth of the authoritative political opinions. For some, this beginning will be enough. For others it will not. At the end of Book Ten a new institution, the "nocturnal council," is introduced. This semi-secret body, whose power and complexity grows as the *Laws* draws to an end, will meet every night with those who have been convicted of impiety without beastiality, and will continually study and reconsider (cf. 899c6–7) the arguments in Book Ten and others no less wonderful. The place where the nocturnal council meets in private, and where the impious are sent, is named the *sophronisterion* ("the moder-

ation-tank"—908a4, 909a1). This name is a comic word coined by Plato in answer to a comic word coined by Aristophanes. In the *Clouds*, Socrates and his followers meet in the *phrontisterion* ("the think-tank").[35] Book Ten shows how philosophy can find a home in a city ruled by nonphilosophers. Combining moderation (*sophrosunē*) with thought (*phronēsis*), philosophy uses theological rhetoric to make a home for itself by first exposing the nakedness of the city and then inducing the rulers to request that the philosopher come to cover that nakedness. Through theology, philosophy makes atheism — the denial of natural right, the denial of the city — a living challenge within the city. Philosophy comes to sight as being for the sake of theology which is in turn for the sake of the city; we are eventually led to wonder whether it is not equally the case that the city is for the sake of the theology which is for the sake of philosophy.

But these various functions of the theology do not completely harmonize with one another. The unphilosophic needs of most citizens which the theology must satisfy are, as we have seen, obstacles to philosophy—unmovable obstacles to any fully theoretical discussion of the gods. The public theology can therefore be no more than an attenuated account which satisfies the needs of the city while at the same time it invites and stimulates a train of thought that goes beyond the surface doctrine. In the Athenian's preliminary sketch of the argument about soul we have already begun to see how he creates a doctrine whose lacunae and paradoxes point the attentive listener in the direction of a different account. For the present we can only draw attention to a few of the outstanding features which help show the path from the paradoxical surface of the theology to its unambiguous core.

Refutation of the Atheists

893b1–894a9: A Sketch of Platonic Physics. Plato seems now to have set the stage for a unique and most remarkable conversation. We anticipate hearing a philosopher's dialogue with himself, his self-questioning as he conjures up in thought an intellectual equal who would disagree on *the* fundamental issues. Our hopes are only slightly dampened when we hear the Athenian begin by invoking the aid of "god" as well as of "those whose existence is to be proved"; by now we have come to expect that the proof of the existence of the gods is predestined by the political exigencies of the situation. We are predestined, however, to a more severe disappointment. Whether we can overcome our frustration, whether the aborted dialogue irritates us or whets our desire, is part of the test the Athenian, and Plato, create for us.

In answer to the atheist's first question, do all things stand still, or is the opposite true (all move),[36] or do some move and some remain at rest, the Athenian gives the common-sense answer that some move and some remain at rest.[37] In accordance with the previously noted abstraction from the unchanging *ideas*, the Athenian has the atheist refrain from any attempt at refuting or even inquiring into the thesis that some things do not move or change. The atheist instead turns to a discussion of motion and asks two more questions which seem designed to begin a classification of motion in terms of its spatial character, i.e., as locomotion, change in or of place. At the third question, which distinguishes rotational from linear locomotion, the Athenian, rather than answering, reveals dissatisfaction with the imprecision of the atheist and asks the first of his own questions. Following this point the Athenian creates a certain ambiguity about who is supposed to be speaking which lines, but I am strongly inclined to believe that we should assign all the longer utterances to the Athenian, who has taken over the initiative. Reading thus, we find the atheist answering the Athenian's first question with a simple "yes," and the Athenian then proceeding to dwell on the qualitatively different character of rotational locomotion. There was no hint of such a qualitative difference in the atheist's question. As for the reason why the Athenian finds circular rotation a "source of wonders," it seems to depend on the geometrical relationships which he knows would obtain in the spinning of a perfect circle or sphere and which allow it to move at different speeds in the same place at the same time (893d1–5). At the end of the Athenian's further classification of locomotion, including combination (increase of mass) and dissolution, the atheist expresses full agreement.

This is the last we will ever hear from the atheist, for when the Athenian proceeds to talk about the motion which is "growth" and insists that this cannot be understood as mere increase

[35] *Clouds* 94. See also the quotations from comic poetry in the explicit discussion of philosophy in Book Twelve: 967c5–d1.

[36] The Greek word for motion, *kinēsis*, also means change, and this should be borne in mind throughout.

[37] In this he joins the Platonic and Xenophontic Socrates against the pre-Socratics: see Xenophon *Memorabilia* I i 14 and Plato *Theaetetus* 180d (where Socrates says his is the view of the cobblers).

and decrease resulting from complex locomotion of matter, the atheist is never allowed to reply. We are left even more curious when we are kept from hearing what the atheist would say to the Athenian's question and answer regarding coming-into-being. The Athenian's own account (894a3–5) is based on a striking but obscure geometric analogy that characterizes coming-into-being as the emergence of perceptible or three-dimensional objects from the successive dimensional "growths" of a non-dimensional point or source (*archē*).[38] What the Athenian gives us, it turns out, is not a real refutation of the atheists but rather an unusually abstract, compressed statement which only hints at key points of criticism.

Considering this exchange in the light of the fuller presentation of the atheists' views a few pages earlier, we draw the following conclusions. Not only does the Athenian differ from the atheists in that he takes account of things which do not change, but furthermore he denies that change can all be understood as the result of locomotion, however complex. One cannot understand the "growth" of a thing (say, a puppy) without seeing the increase and decrease of matter as regulated by the "lasting character" (*hexis diamenousa*: e.g., the "dogness") of the thing; when the character disappears or is replaced, then (as in cancer) increase as well as decrease simply destroys the thing. Growth is the interaction of the changing and the unchanging (893e6–894a1; cf. 894a7).[39] Moreover, even in the case of simple locomotion in dead matter, the Athenian (unlike his "materialist" opponents) cannot study "physics" apart from the nonmaterial entities of geometry and number: to understand the rotation of a star, for example, one must consider the geometric properties of a circle never present in any matter (893c7–d5). Finally, the way we follow by our minds alone the timeless geometrical construction or "generation" of the spatial properties of visible objects from unseen first principles (the point, the moving point which is the line, the moving line which is the plane, etc.) is one key to the way the visible beings (dogs, men, stars) "come into being" in matter, from invisible but intelligible principles (894a1–8).

894a9–899b9: The "Ideas" and the Soul. At the end of his mysterious remarks about coming-into-being, the Athenian abruptly turns to Megillus and Klinias, addressing them, "Oh friends" (894b1).[40] In a remarkably brief time the Athenian first has slid into the questioner's role originally assigned to the atheist and then has maneuvered Klinias into his own former role as respondent. The Athenian can introduce into the legal prelude no more than a glimpse of truly philosophic debate — a glimpse that points to "another and longer road" beginning from something other than the primacy of soul understood as self-moved motion. Until the atheist receded from view, the Athenian could not bring himself even to mention soul; although he discussed the cause of coming-into-being, he never referred to the temporal priority or to the self-moving capacity of that cause. To come to grips with the proof of the existence of gods that now unfolds, we need first to lay out the stages of the argument; after that we can try to assess the relative validity of the parts in order to understand what the Athenian's real views are and what are the reasons for his deviations from those views.

At the outset he gets Klinias to agree that all motion, however else it may be classified, can be divided into two kinds: motion which not only moves other motions but also moves itself; and motion which can move other motions but not itself and hence is always moved by another, preceding, motion. Nothing is ever said about the possibility of a thing which could cause other things to move but would itself remain unmoved. That the self-moved motion exists, that it is the most active, the first both in power and time, and the cause of all other motion, is proved on the basis of a premise stemming not from the Athenian but from what "most" of the atheists "dare to say," namely, that "all the things that come into being once somehow stood still together" (895a6–b1). At this point we still wonder what precisely all this has to do with "soul."

In the second stage (cf. 895c1) it is established, with more participation from Klinias, that our only direct experience of self-moved motion is the motion we call "living." Further-

[38] Some light is thrown on this very dark sentence by the commentaries gathered together and summarized in England, ad loc. See also Aristotle's partial elucidation in *On the Soul* 404b18ff. as well as Joseph Moreau, *L'Ame du monde de Platon aux Stoiciens* (Paris: Société d'edition "Les Belles Lettres," 1939), p. 61; J. B. Skemp, *The Theory of Motion in Plato's Later Dialogues* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1942), p. 104; Paul Kucharski, *Étude sur la doctrine Pythagoricienne de la tetrade* (Paris: Société d'edition "Les belles lettres," 1952), pp. 71–4.

[39] Cf. *Theaetetus* 181cff., *Parmenides* 138c, and Aristotle *Physics* VII ii.

[40] Could the accounts before and after the Athenian's invocation of his "friends" bear the same relation to one another as the accounts before and after his identical interruption of his presentation of the atheists' views (cf. p. 1068 above)?

more, whenever we apply the term "soul" to anything, we mean something is "alive."[41] After digressing to give, in the name of Zeus, a lesson about the nature of names and definitions, the Athenian claims that soul must be defined as the motion that moves itself. Hence soul is the oldest cause of all motion, if not the oldest thing simply, and rules by nature over all body. Is soul then god? Is soul "Zeus"?

The third stage shows that since soul, as the cause of all moving things, must be the cause of the evil, base, and unjust as well as of the good, noble, and just, there must be two souls or two sorts of soul. Somewhat to our surprise we learn now that priority in age, in power, and in rank over body does not necessarily imply goodness. Soul becomes good only when it "takes as its helper mind (*nous*), god in the true sense of the word for the gods."[42] But then which sort of soul predominates in the cosmos — the good, divine sort or the opposite? (Two things are certain; soul by itself is not divine, and the divine is not omnipotent.)

The last stage (or two stages: 897b7, 898c9) establishes the predominance of the divine kind of soul. The heavenly bodies, which manifestly dominate the whole universe, have a motion (orderly, circular revolution) which indicates that they are moved by soul possessing *nous* — for circular motion is an "image" of the motion of *nous* — and can therefore be worshipped as gods. This culmination of the argument is explicitly unscientific: the original theology of the "amazing" Klinias (897c4) is here vindicated through the Athenian's poetic use of "imagination" and "fine craftsmanship in speech" (898b2–3).

What strikes us as most plausible in all this is the assertion that the motion of living beings possesses, to greater and lesser degrees, an indeterminacy and independence that is missing from the motion of dead matter, and that living motion is capable of setting dead matter into motion. This phenomenon of living motion is surely a key part of what we intend by "soul." In addition, it makes sense to say that this independent motion can lead to good or evil, and that in many cases at least the motion is good when it is orderly and reasonable, "helped by mind." But beyond this there are enormous difficulties, some of them revealed by the Athenian's own words, some by the reactions of Klinias.

To begin with, the Athenian himself indicates that the proof that self-moved motion is the oldest and first cause of all motion is based on a "daring" premise of "most" atheists. If they did not hold this premise it is hard to see (*pace* Kant's "First Antinomy of Reason") what difficulties the atheists would encounter in believing that there has been an infinite regress of motion preceded by motion. It is true, an infinite regress of *causes* might seem to beg the question of cause (consider 894e), and this is part of the reason why the atheists lend themselves to being presented as the Athenian presents them here. As we have been (pp. 1065–1066, 1071 above), it transpires that the materialists' lack of concern for the unmovable and their emphasis on the priority in rank of things prior in time can be seen as common ground shared by the city in its reverence for the old — and the Athenian here makes full use of this possibility. But he does not himself endorse the "daring" premise of a beginning point for all motion. After all, it leaves quite unexplained the cause of the coming-into-being of the self-moved motion. Taken together with his abortive dialogue with the atheist, this lack of endorsement silently points to the possibility of another account in which the fundamental cause of the coming-into-being of all or some motion (self-moved or not) would be a thing or things not in motion and to that extent timeless, exerting force not through an original "push" but instead, perhaps, eliciting the motion of things in the form of a purpose. This might imply that some of the most recent motions are closest to the "first" cause. As we shall see presently, something more than the need to support the sanctity of the ancestral, forces the Athenian to ignore such a possibility in building his theology.

But granting the necessity for an original self-moved motion, we see, immediately that even this is not enough to establish any relation between the "oldest" cause and the old humanity or soul revered by the city. For why must the self-moved be nonmaterial? Why, for example, may not some matter be "explosive"? (Perhaps we have no experience of self-moved explosiveness because it exhausted itself in an original eruption.) Or why may not self-move-

[41] The Greek word *psychē*, lacking of course all specifically Christian connotations, can more easily be applied to nonhuman life than can our modern word "soul." The Athenian fully exploits the breadth or ambiguity of the Greek word.

[42] Cf. 631d5. The Greek may have been written " . . . *divine* in the true sense of the word . . . ," but on the major textual difficulty I follow the manuscripts and Burnet against all the emendations. For this use of *orthōs*, see *Phaedo* 67b4, 82c2–3, *Apology of Socrates* 40a3; Euripides *Alcestis* 637, *Hippolytus* 1169–70, *Andromache* 377–8, and see John Burnet, *Plato's Phaedo* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), commenting on 67b4. Stallbaum's discussion and proposed emendation are, however, cogent and attractive.

ment be a property of the elements when they are pure and unmixed — as they may have been in the beginning? The Athenian himself points to this latter possibility, but Klinias fails to take him up and ask how or when we could ever see self-moved motion in "unmixed" earth or fire or water (895c5). Instead Klinias suggests that the Athenian must mean that whenever we speak of self-moved motion we mean "life," and the Athenian, with a certain lack of enthusiasm, agrees (895c7–9).[43]

This leads straight into the most overt problem in the Athenian's proof of the gods' existence. After agreeing to identify self-moved motion with life, the two agree further that where there is life there is soul, and from this the Athenian commits the fallacy of arguing that soul must be defined as life. In so doing he ignores the different kinds of life and hence ignores the different kinds of soul, the defining species of soul. The rhetorical device he employs is a misleading analogy to mathematics: the division of all numbers into even and odd, as a proper division of the kinds of number, seems a model for the division of being into living and dead, or self-moved and moved by another. But numbers, unlike the natural species of things, are homogeneous: and evenness, unlike life, is an undifferentiated category.[44] Even Klinias finds it rather difficult to accept this "definition" of soul, but his eagerness to help win the argument prevents him from pressing his doubts.[45]

By abstracting from the *ideas* the Athenian is enabled to abstract from the *ideas* or forms of soul. He "mathematizes" the soul, or in other words he defines soul in terms of what is common to all soul. He adopts a version of the fundamental error of his opponents in order to draw a series of conclusions very different from theirs. Instead of reducing all complex and high manifestations of life to derivatives of lower, simpler life, he reads into all life, all soul, the capacities of the most complex, the human soul. He is therefore allowed to argue that the self-motion which is the source of all the motion in the cosmos must have been endowed with all the higher faculties of soul (896c9–d1).[46] More than that. Since he gives to every manifestation of soul the power possessed by the first cause of all motion, he can imply that all soul is simply dominant over body; he is able to forget the diversity of greater and lesser independence from body that different types of soul display. In particular, he can ignore the range of motions, from nutrition to pure reason, that exists within the human soul. He obscures the fact that much of the time soul is moved by body or in response to body, even in the most rational man. By obscuring this fact, the theology tends to assign to every man complete responsibility for his actions. It is true, soul becomes "good" only when it "takes *nous* as its helper," and the process by which this occurs is never spelled out. But we are left with the impresion that it is up to soul to choose whether or not it does so. Evil is ascribed entirely to soul, not to body, and as we have seen, the Athenian is stubbornly silent about chance. And all this applies to living things in general, not just to man. For all we know, any soul may "take *nous* as its helper" and begin to act divine: the theology "personifies" all life. As the Athenian says in conclusion, according to this theology "all things are full of gods" (899b9).

While the theology thus far does not promise personal immortality, and while it endows this particular city and its traditions with no special significance for the gods, it satisfies most of the major demands of *thumos*. Every man is called upon to assume his responsibilities and play his role in the struggle to overcome the evil sort of soul. There is even a sense in which the definition of soul as self-moved motion is a definition of the soul *as thumos*. If we recur to our earlier discussion of the basic dichotomy in the passions (*erōs* and *thumos*) and consider that dichotomy in the light of the twofold division of all motion, we see that *erōs* falls into the category of a motion moved by something outside itself, while *thumos* has among its properties not only a strong sense of self and of independence but a curious lack of any real object outside or beyond itself. The denigration of the moved motion that is *erōs* goes together with the forgetting of the eternal, unmoved things which are the ultimate objects and causes

[43] Contrast the other responses of the Athenian to Klinias's contributions, especially 894d5, 898c9.

[44] This is why there are for the Platonic Socrates no *ideas* of individual numbers (or of geometric entities), although there are *ideas* of odd and even. See *Republic* 510c–511a; Aristotle *Metaphysics* 987b14ff.; Jacob Klein, *Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origins of Algebra* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1968), pp. 56-7, 69ff. It appears that mathematics can be misleading as well as illuminating for the study of nature; the false mathematical physics goes with the neglect of the *ideas*.

[45] When the Athenian asks the crucial question, "Can we say the definition of soul is anything other than the motion with the power to move itself?" Klinias responds by repeating the question, as if he couldn't quite believe his ears ("Are you saying that . . . ?") — to which the Athenian replies hastily, "I say so, at least (*phēmi ge*), and if this is so, then . . . " (895e10–896a5).

[46] See the very just criticism by Paul Elmer More in *The Religion of Plato* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1921), p. 115.

of erotic motion and generation (cf. 721bff. and *Symposium* 210e–212a).

In the principal and seemingly most coherent part of his theology the Athenian honors motion at the expense of rest and thumotic motion at the expense of erotic motion. He makes everything akin to political man; he creates a cosmos filled with, moved by, responsible beings engaged in the mighty moral drama of a universal contest between active good and active evil. The "problem of evil" is not solved, here at any rate, by ascribing evil to chance, or to "ignorance," to a "lack" or a "falling-off" (contrast 857ff.); evil is presented as a daemonic force pervading the universe. This is a civil religion rich with themes for epic myth — a vast canvas waiting to be filled with the songs and dances and poetry of a people who love the moral without being moralists. In creating such a vision the Athenian imposes on the phenomena a splendidly simple and homogeneous order: all life, all motion, is divided into that which is rooted in the acts of the good kind of soul and that which is rooted in the acts of the bad kind of soul. However much the different species of beings seem unlike or unrelated to one another, in the most important respect every individual of every species can be understood as intimately allied with others, cooperating on one side or the other of the divine struggle.

Yet at the same time, in the very act of erecting this awesome mythic structure, the Athenian begins, through eloquent silences and fruitful errors, to describe another articulation of the whole. This articulation begins not from the homogeneity of beings and the consequent kinship of all things to the human soul, but rather from the essential heterogeneity of things and hence from the problematic, if not disorderly, character of the relation between the human and the nonhuman (and, within the human, between the soul and its parts and between the soul and the body). Such an interpretation places man much more at the mercy of indifferent or alien forces — forces he may call "chance" and which, in part at least, reflect the tension between the fundamental parts or "tribes" which compose the whole. Moreover, in severing the link between man's moral action and a cosmic struggle the Athenian's implicit cosmology necessarily diminishes the significance of political life: the city ceases to be so clearly the microcosm. On the other hand, the citizen who begins to face this situation as the true human situation may find himself filled with a new sense of incompleteness; a new longing may set his soul in motion, a longing that does not manifest itself in political action but in private action and thought. Such experiences, if and when they are introduced into a soul by the Athenian's paradoxes, are the first rungs on a ladder that leads beyond the "horizon" that makes even this city a kind of cave. The Athenian does not leave us in a position to say a great deal about the goal of the ascent. But this much seems suggested: what the climber seeks is to know clearly the unique and distinct cause or source of each of the various kinds of being (e.g., man, dog, star, etc.). And the Athenian hints that it is an error to expect these roots or fundamental causes to be reducible to one another or to some "first cause": they will rather be seen as a plurality, coexisting always, timelessly, although each is the cause of many things that "happen," that come into being in time.

To perceive this underlying teaching of the Athenian's theology we need not rely solely on implicit hints. Even on its surface, the theology is not simply a monument to *thumos*. In the last and seemingly least philosophic section the Athenian redresses the balance and in fact transforms dramatically the tone and content of the theology. Up until the discussion of the motion of *nous* we had been led to believe in the similarity of human and divine soul, and in their mutual concern for one another. Now we hear that *nous*, "god in the true sense of the word," has a motion of its own, different from all ten of the motions previously under discussion but more comparable to circular motion than to any of the other nine, including soul or self-moved motion (897e4ff.). Nothing is said as to the coming-into-being of the motion of *nous*. Like the circular motion which is its "image," *nous* remains in unchanging but ceaseless activity, "according to the same things, in the same way, around the same things, towards the same things, according to one reason and one order" (898a8–b1). This would seem to imply that as soul approaches the divine motion it becomes more preoccupied with the unchanging truth and pays less attention to temporal affairs.[47]

Having given *thumos* almost its due, the Athenian concludes by making the city revere as its greatest god a being which seems to look down on the petty comings and goings of men.[48]

[47] Compare Aristotle's comment in *On the Soul* 407a22–24: "If the circular movement is unending, there must be something which mind is always thinking — what can this be? For all practical thought has an end; it all goes on for the sake of something outside the process of thought."

[48] The Athenian shifts from saying that the gods "care for" the cosmos to saying that they merely "order" it: 897e7, 898c3–4, 898b8. See also Friedrich Solmsen, *Plato's Theology* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1942), pp. 149–50, 162–3.

Even the second-ranked sidereal gods — the relation of whose bodies to the soul or souls which move them is left surprisingly ambiguous — act as if they were unaffected by what men do on earth. Men may feel gratitude for the regular cycle of days and seasons brought by the heavens; but there is not a hint that the gods ever interrupt their beautiful motions to bring fearful punishment to the wicked or special reward to the just.[49] The starry gods dwell in a visible but faraway place. And if circular motion is a reliable sign of the presence of gods, how much of the earth manifests any divine presence? Are there gods of a third rank who dwell on earth — or could it be that earth is that part of the cosmos where the wicked kind of soul without *nous* holds dominion? Little wonder that by the end of this refutation the Athenian feels compelled to go on and devote one and a half times as many pages to a proof of divine providence and justice. Never in that proof does he mention the astral gods; his argument is based on a deduction from the "virtues" of the gods, not their motions. But we must leave to another time any comment on the rich elaboration of the psychology of indignation and belief contained in those pages.

The Athenian's philosophic-poetic conclusion has rendered the theology as a whole profoundly ambiguous. We realize now that his purpose is not only to serve the thumotic needs of the city and the philosophic needs of the philosophers and potential philosophers. By making the city as a whole look up to the visible heavens not out of fear or hope but rather for the sake of the heavens' imagery of divine reason, the philosopher fills all the citizens with uncomprehending gratitude and awe for what is truly highest. He edifies his city; he adorns it by giving it the gift of the capacity to "sing the most beautiful song" (cf. 666d11, 668b4).

We are thus given an intimation of the Athenian's answer to the question always present but never explicitly addressed in the theology, the question of the good for soul — the common good which is the goal of the restless motion that is soul. The Athenian implies that the good at which souls aim insofar as they "take *nous*" is none other than the motion of *nous* (mind) itself, for its own sake. Mind, thought, is something of which any soul can partake without diminishing the share available for all other souls. Yet if this is the true common good, the conclusion is inescapable that the city as a whole does not partake of it except in a very diluted form. To this extent the pre-Socratics are right. The city can, however, honor or look up to the common good. Some kind of looking up, some sense of rank and sense of shame, is of the essence of the city. Piety is at home in the city, and the Athenian has proved that piety, when understood, can be led without violence to dedicate itself to a kind of reason. This is what the pre-Socratics failed to comprehend, and this is part of the reason why the issue is, as the Athenian later insists (966dff.), not the status of reason (*nous*) but the status of soul—soul which is understood not primarily as reason but as what it manifests itself to be, as piety. And this is why the science regarding soul is the same as the science regarding gods.

Longing to find a home for the mind liberated from the myths of the city and its gods, the pre-Socratics turned to the "whole nature." In abandoning themselves to that vast and silent cosmos they missed the fact that the whole is a "cosmos" only because it produces the city, for the city and its gods are in a sense the human soul, and the human soul is or can become the only natural home of the mind. But in order for this to happen the soul must be acted upon, and before that it must be understood. To understand the soul is to understand its gods; psychology and theology are in the end the same. The city and its gods can become the home of the mind to the degree that they can become the home of philosophy. How and to what extent this is possible, how and to what extent the city can "take *nous* as its helper," is shown by the Athenian more in deed than in word (cf. especially 897b1–2 with d5–6, the only reference to "justice" in the proof). The drama more than the argument of the *Laws* is Plato's theology.

[49] In order to see what the Athenian's presentation of the heavens omits, compare Critias, fragment 25, in Hermann Diels, ed., *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 2 vols. (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1922): " . . . and then when the laws forbade them to commit open crimes of violence but they did them in secret, at that time it seems to me some clever and wise man invented fear of the gods for mortals in order that there would be terror for the wicked, even if they act or speak or think in secret . . . and he said that the gods dwelt in the place where, in speaking of it, he could most frighten man: the place from whence he knew that fears exist for mortals and rewards for a hard life, in the upper region, where men saw lightning and heard the dreaded thunder . . . and so with terror he surrounded mankind . . . " (my translation). Compare Solmsen, p. 35. The Athenian himself has not long before spoken of the fact that the gods kill men with lightning as a punishment: 873e. Cf. Xenophon *Memorabilia* IV iii 14 and Victor Goldschmidt, *La Religion de Platon* (Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1949), pp. 123ff.

Politicians in Uniform: Military Governments and Social Change in The Third World*

ROBERT W. JACKMAN
Michigan State University

A mild controversy has emerged in recent years concerning the possible effects of military rule on social change in Third-World countries. Some observers argue that, in the absence of other established social and political organizations, the military is likely to act as a progressive force, inducing economic growth and social change. Other analysts make a contrary argument, that political intervention by the military should essentially be seen as a conservative or even a reactionary activity by the defenders of the status of entrenched elite groups, designed to inhibit economic and social change. Still others have suggested that the social and economic policy consequences of military rule vary according to the type of society being considered.

The purpose of this paper is to assess empirically the validity of these contending hypotheses about the effects of military rule on social change for a sample of Third-World countries. Throughout the paper, the term "social change" is used broadly to include economic growth and social reform. In particular, social change refers to transformations of the type implied in such terms as "modernization," and "social mobilization,"[1] as well as to the transformations that may accompany the expansion of health, welfare, education, and related facilities. Finally, by "Third-World" I refer to non-Western, non-Communist-bloc countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East.

* I would like to thank Mary R. Jackman, William M. Mason, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, and Brian D. Silver for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper, and Arlene Sanderson for her assistance. This research was supported in part by an All-University Research Grant at Michigan State University, and in part by the National Science Foundation (SOC75-22661). Some of the data were originally collected by Charles L. Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, and made available through the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research. Neither the original collectors of the data nor the Consortium bears any responsibility for the analyses or interpretations presented here.

[1] Marion J. Levy, Jr. defines modernization as a positive function of " . . . the ratio of inanimate to animate sources of power" (*Modernization and the Structure of Societies* [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966], p. 35). Karl W. Deutsch defines social mobilization as "something that happens to large numbers of people in areas which undergo modernization, i.e., where advanced, non-traditional practices in culture, technology and economic life are introduced and accepted on a considerable scale" ("Social Mobilization and Political Development," *American Political Science Review*, 55 [September 1961], 493–514, at p. 493).

Theoretical Background

Perhaps the dominant theme of scholarly analyses of the 1950s and the early 1960s was that the military constitutes a modernizing force. Such an interpretation is of course consistent with the justifications for political intervention offered by the military themselves. Almost without exception, the leaders of *coups d'état* and new juntas declare that their action is necessary for national reconstruction and economic growth. Typically, they argue that political parties and civilian politicians have become corrupt and have monopolized social and economic resources, while the economy has stagnated and the "nation as a whole has suffered, allowing social antagonisms to emerge. Only a period of reformist military rule (at least "transitional") can correct these developments and thereby facilitate economic growth and modernization.[2]

Many social scientists have agreed with this prognosis. Thus, Marion Levy argues that in modernizing societies, the military is typically the organization that is most efficient at ". . . combining maximum rates of modernization with maximum levels of stability and control."[3] His case is predicated on the assumptions (a) that in the early stages of modernization competing organizations and institutions are weak or nonexistent; (b) that the military provides some of the few available channels for social mobility to attract the talent of emerging societies; (c) that the military is a rationally based organization with relatively sophisticated technological requirements; and (d) that "military

[2] On this point, see among others J. C. Hurewitz, *Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension* (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 117; and Claude E. Welch, Jr., "The Roots and Implications of Military Intervention," pp. 1–59 in *Soldier and State in Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Military Intervention and Political Change*, ed. Claude E. Welch (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1970), at p. 35. This theme is clearly dominant in news reports of military *coups* during the 1960s, as summarized in the sources cited in footnote 36 below.

[3] Levy, *Modernization and Structure*, p. 603.

technology is not radically different from the technology that is in general characteristic of modernization."[4] Levy hypothesizes that when these conditions converge (as is likely in Third-World countries), military governments will constitute a modernizing force.

The same argument has been advanced by others. For example, Lucian Pye suggests that the modernization of military organizations should produce spill-over effects:

> Above all else . . . the revolution in military technology has caused the army leaders of the newly emergent countries to be extremely sensitive to the extent to which their countries are economically and technologically backward. Called upon to perform roles basic to advanced societies, the more politically conscious officers can hardly avoid being aware of the need for substantial change in their own societies.[5]

Both Manfred Halpern and Guy Pauker reach similar conclusions concerning the Middle East/North Africa and Southeast Asia respectively, arguing that in these societies the officer corps usually have few ties with traditional "feudal" elites and that in fact many officers joined the military to escape the effects of the economic and social stagnation perpetuated by those traditional elites.[6] For these reasons, these analysts infer that military intervention in politics is likely to be a progressive force inducing modernization.

More recent studies have tended to question this general conclusion. While a similar emphasis is placed on the organizational characteristics of the military, the revisionists focus on different apects of the military's organizational structure. In particular, they make two arguments. First, it is argued that because military governments usually represent a relatively effective and disciplined organization, once they assume power they are primarily concerned with preserving and maintaining order in the wider society. Such goals are likely to become all-encompassing as it becomes clear how difficult they are to achieve. While the military may have enough organizational resources to overthrow an existing government, these resources are generally insufficient when it comes to the day-to-day business of governing and maintaining political stability. Thus, even if social change was proclaimed as the justification for the original intervention in politics, military governments are unlikely to have sufficient political and organizational skills to pursue modernizing policies; besides, they typically find that the organizational skills that they do possess are taxed to their limits by the problems of maintaining both general social order and control over competing political contenders (often from rival factions within the military iteslf).[7]

The second revisionist argument focuses on the corporate self-interest of the military. Here it is suggested that military governments are most likely to display a concern with maintaining or increasing the prerogatives and status of both the military and the middle class (from which the officer corps is drawn), even when such efforts conflict with the interests and aspirations of the wider society. Thus, military governments are likely to increase expenditures in the defense sector of the economy and at the same time to reduce the proportion of government expenditures allocated to civilian, non-defense programs. Similarly, these governments are unlikely to engage in programs that would help mobilize the lower classes, for to do so would be to create additional contenders for power and additional demands on resources, which would constitute a threat to both the middle class and their representatives, the officer corps.[8]

[4] Levy, p. 603.

[5] Lucian W. Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization," pp. 69–89 in *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries,* ed. John J. Johnson (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1962), at p. 78. The term "politicians in uniform," which I have used in the title of the present paper, comes from this analysis by Pye (p. 69).

[6] Guy J. Pauker, "Southeast Asia as a Problem Area in the Next Decade," *World Politics,* 11 (April 1959), 325–345, at pp. 339–340; Manfred Halpern, "Middle Eastern Armies and the New Middle Class," pp. 277–315 in Johnson (ed.), *Role of the Military,* at pp. 291–299; and Halpern, *The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 258. See also Edward Shils, "The Military in the Political Development of the New States," pp. 7–67 in Johnson (ed.), *Role of the Military.*

[7] See among others Lyle N. McAlister, "Recent Research and Writings on the Role of the Military in Latin America," *Latin American Research Review,* 2 (Fall 1966), 5–36; the essays in Welch (ed.), *Soldier and State in Africa;* and Henry Bienen, "The Background to Contemporary Study of Militaries and Modernization," pp. 1–33 in *The Military and Modernization,* ed. Henry Bienen (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1971), at pp. 17–19.

[8] Edwin Lieuwen, *Generals vs. Presidents: Neo-Militarism in Latin America* (New York: Praeger, 1964); Martin C. Needler, "Political Development and Military Intervention in Latin America," *American Political Science Review,* 60 (September 1966), 616–626, at p. 619; Jae Souk Sohn, "Political Dominance and Political Failure: The Role of the Military in the Republic of Korea," pp. 103–121 in *The Military Intervenes: Case Studies in Political Development,* ed. Henry Bienen (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1968); and Eric A. Nordlinger, "Soldiers in Mufti: The Impact of Military Rule Upon Economic and Social

In short, the revisionists do not disagree with the argument that the military is often the most effective organization in Third-World countries. The first revisionist perspective, however, suggests that this in itself does not imply that military regimes have the political and organizational skills appropriate to the pursuit of modernizing policies even when such goals are proclaimed by these regimes. The second revisionist perspective goes further to question whether military regimes are even initially concerned with social reform, arguing instead that they are more typically concerned with protecting their own middle-class and corporate interests and with preserving social order than they are with social change. These scholars therefore conclude that military regimes are likely to act as reactionary forces, or at most as conservative forces inhibiting social change.

In an effort to reconcile these revisionist arguments with those of their predecessors, Samuel Huntington has argued that both cases are essentially correct, but that the specific outcome of military rule depends on the type of society being considered:

> As society changes, so does the role of the military. In the world of oligarchy, the soldier is a radical; in the middle-class world he is a participant and arbiter; as the mass society looms on the horizon he becomes the conservative guardian of the existing order. Thus, paradoxically but understandably, the more backward a society is, the more progressive the role of its military; the more advanced a society becomes, the more conservative and reactionary becomes the role of its military.[9]

In other words, Huntington suggests that the effects of military rule vary by degree of "backwardness." While he does not specify the meaning of backwardness in detail, his discussion implies that the term refers to the level of social and economic development. Where the initial level of development is low, military rule will have positive effects on rates of social change, since there will be few middle-class interests for the officer corps to protect. On the other hand, at higher levels of development military rule will tend to inhibit further social change, since in such countries middle-class interests are sufficiently well-developed so that the officer corps will protect those interests from encroachments by lower-class and peasant elements.

Huntington's hypothesis is of particular interest because support for the argument that military governments are conservative or reactionary comes disproportionately from students of Latin American politics, while support for the alternative view comes primarily from students of other Third-World countries. Note that when compared to other Third-World countries, Latin American societies are relatively "nonbackward." For one thing, they are much older than the other Third-World countries, in the sense that they generally achieved national independence in the nineteenth century as opposed to the post-Second-World-War period.[10] Similarly, the middle classes are much larger and politically more important in Latin American countries than in other Third-World countries.[11] Thus, Huntington's hypothesis is not as inconsistent with the earlier arguments as it may initially appear because it implies that military governments in Latin America tend to act as conservative forces protecting both their own corporate interests and those of the middle class. In other regions of the Third World, however, where the middle classes are less numerous and significant, his hypothesis implies that military governments are likely to constitute a more progressive social force, since they have few corporate and social interests to protect.

These various arguments have received relatively little systematic empirical comparative analysis. Some recent research on Latin American countries by Philippe Schmitter and Jerry Weaver[12] indicates that military rule has no

Change in the Non-Western States," *American Political Science Review*, 64 (December 1970), 1131–1148, at pp. 1134-1138.

[9] Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 221.

[10] For data on this point, see Charles L. Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*, 2nd ed. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1972), pp. 26–28.

[11] On this point, see the data on the "importance of the indigenous middle class" in Irma Adelman and Cynthia T. Morris, *Society, Politics, and Economic Development: A Quantitative Approach* (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967), pp. 30–33. Excluding Greece, Japan, Rhodesia, and South Africa from the calculations (which leaves us with 70 countries), the mean value for middle-class size is 70.7 for the 21 Latin American countries while the mean value for the remaining 49 countries is 46.5 (the scale ranges from 5 to 95).

[12] Philippe C. Schmitter, "Military Intervention, Political Competitiveness and Public Policy in Latin America: 1950–1967," pp. 425–506 in *On Military Intervention*, ed. Morris Janowitz and Jacques Van Doorn (Rotterdam, Netherlands: Rotterdam University Press, 1971); and Jerry L. Weaver, "Assessing the Impact of Military Rule: Alternative Approaches," pp. 58–116 in *Military Rule in Latin America: Function, Consequences and Perspectives*, ed. Philippe C. Schmitter (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1973).

liscernible social and economic policy consequences. As Schmitter puts it:

How much Latin American countries invest, industrialize, increase their GNP, raise their cost of living, increase their school enrollment and/or engage in foreign trade seems more the product of environmental or ecological factors than the willful acts of politicians grouped according to their competitiveness or civilian/military status.... In summary, no regime type seems to be exclusively responsible for "developmental success" in Latin America.[13]

Studies restricted to Latin America, however, cannot fully address either the Huntington hypothesis or indeed any hypothesis concerning the effects of military rule in nonindustrialized settings, since, as I have already noted, Latin American countries are not sufficiently heterogeneous in their levels of social and economic development. Eric Nordlinger's study, "Soldiers in Mufti," appears to be the only systematic analysis that goes beyond one region to consider a sample of all Third-World countries. His correlational analysis, based on data collected by Irma Adelman and Cynthia Morris,[14] essentially considers Huntington's hypothesis outlined above, and concludes that, subject to some small revision, Huntington is essentially correct.

The data . . . thus tend to bear out the hypothesis that the officers act in accordance with their class interests, either failing to act as modernizing agents or opposing economic and social change where the middle class is relatively wealthy and established — where change is presumably seen to involve the redistribution of economic privileges. . . . There is only one revision that ought to be made of Huntington's interpretation. Analysis of the Adelman and Morris data indicates that it is only at the very lowest levels of political participation and only in the context of a minuscule middle class that the officers sponsor modernizing policies.[15]

In the following section of the paper a fresh analysis of the impact of military rule on social change is presented. First, I specify a general model that allows an evaluation of the merits of the competing theoretical arguments reviewed above. Second, this model is applied to the Adelman and Morris data in order to reconsider the conclusions reached by Nordlinger with those data. Finally, the model is tested with a new set of data covering the decade from 1960 to 1970 for 77 independent countries of the Third World.

Analysis

The Model. To determine which (if any) of the competing hypotheses concerning the effects of military rule on social change is valid, we need a model that allows for three different sets of effects. First, the model should specify the direct additive effects of military rule on social change. Second, it should include parameters for the direct additive effects of the level of economic development (or degree of "backwardness") on social change. Third, in view of Huntington's proposition, the model should also permit the effects of military rule on social change to vary according to the level of economic development. As I shall show below, this final consideration involves the specification of a statistical interaction between military rule and level of economic development.

Given these considerations, the most appropriate analytic strategy involves a covariance analysis model, of the following form:

$$(1) \qquad Y = \alpha + \beta X + \sum_{i=2}^{n} \gamma_i Z_i + \sum_{i=2}^{n} \delta_i (XZ_i) + \epsilon,$$

where Y represents the amount of social change, X denotes the degree of political involvement by the military, Z_i represents the effect of the i^{th} level of economic development (there being a total of n such levels), XZ_i designates the effects of military rule within the i^{th} level of economic development, and ϵ is a stochastic disturbance term. In this model, X (the degree of military involvement in politics) is treated as a continuous variable, while the level of economic development is specified as a set of dummy variables (the Z_i) representing n discrete categories.

This specification is perhaps best understood with reference to a concrete example. Figure 1 presents one hypothetical set of estimates for the simple case where two levels of economic development are specified (i.e., where n assumes a maximum value of 2). Here, Z_2 is equal to 1 if the country is in the high level of economic development category, and zero otherwise. Given the inclusion of α and β in equation (1), and to avoid a linear dependency, γ_1 and δ_1 are constrained to a value of zero.[16] Thus, the

[13] Schmitter, "Military Intervention and Public Policy," pp. 492–493.

[14] Adelman and Morris, *Society, Politics, and Economic Development.*

[15] Nordlinger, "Soldiers in Mufti," pp. 1143–1144.

[16] On this point, see Daniel B. Suits, "Use of Dummy Variables in Regression Equations," *Journal of the American Statistical Association,* 52 (December 1957), 548–551. For general discussions of covariance analysis within the regression framework, see among others




Figure 1. Hypothetical Effects of Military Rule on Social Change, by Level of Socioeconomic Development

hypothetical estimates in Figure 1 would, if true, be consistent with Huntington's hypothesis. At the low level of development, Z_2 equals zero, and so the third and fourth terms in equation (1) are also zero. Thus, for this category, the intercept is α and the slope (β) is positive, in line with Huntington's argument that in "backward" countries, military rule is a progressive force bringing "modernization." At the high level of development (when $Z_2=1$), there is not only an adjustment to the intercept, which for this category becomes $(\alpha+\gamma_2)$, but also an adjustment to the slope, which at the high development category is therefore $(\beta+\delta_2)$. In Figure 1 this adjusted slope is negative (δ_2 is therefore negative and approximately twice as large in absolute magnitude as β), which represents Huntington's argument that in this case, military rule is a reactionary force inhibiting modernization.

It should be emphasized that Figure 1 is wholly hypothetical and represents only one of many possible sets of estimates for equation (1). Thus, if the data were to be consistent with the proposition that military governments are a modernizing force regardless of societal type, we would expect a positive parameter estimate for β combined with estimates for the δ_i not significantly different from zero. The hypothesis of reactionary military-government effects implies the same pattern except that β is negative. Neither argument provides us with any expectations concerning the γ_1, which represent the additive effects of the level of economic development. The behavior of the estimates for the δ_i, however, is critical to the argument that the effects of military rule on social change vary with the level of economic development. Specifically, if Huntington's argument is correct, we would expect a pattern resembling that outlined in Figure 1, with positive military-government effects at lower levels of development and at least slightly negative military-government effects at higher levels of development. Finally, the null hypothesis (i.e., that there are no military-govern-

Jacob Cohen, "Multiple Regression as a General Data-Analytic System," *Psychological Bulletin*, 70 (December 1968), 218–231; Jan Kmenta, *Elements of Econometrics* (New York: MacMillan, 1971), 419–423; and J. Johnston, *Econometric Methods*, second ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972), 176–207.

ment effects) implies zero values for both β and the δ_i. Again, this hypothesis provides us with no expectations concerning the additive effects of the level of economic development, denoted by α and the γ_i.

Soldiers in Mufti: a Reexamination. In this section, the analysis of the covariance model just introduced is applied to data that were collected by Adelman and Morris;[17] these data were analyzed earlier by Nordlinger, who concluded that they are consistent with the proposition put forward by Huntington. The analysis that follows is based on the same variables and set of countries that were examined by Nordlinger.

To gauge the degree of military involvement in politics, Nordlinger used the Adelman and Morris classification of countries by what they call the "political strength of the military." This classification has the following three broad categories: (1) "Countries in which the military was in direct control during some part of the period 1957–62;" (2) "Countries in which the military was an important political influence but was not in direct political control during most of the period 1957–62;" and (3) "Countries in which the military had little or no political influence during the period 1957–62." Within these general categories, Adelman and Morris further subdivided countries according to the political strength of the military. For example, within the first category they distinguish beween countries where the military was in direct political control (a) for the *entire* period, (b) for *most* of the period, (c) for only one or two years in the period from 1957 to 1962.[18]

As indicators of modernization, Nordlinger took the following seven variables (the numbers in parentheses refer to the pages in Adelman and Morris on which these variables are described):[19]

1. *Leadership commitment to economic development, 1957 to 1962* (pp. 78–81). This variable has

> three broad categories on the basis of the following judgments: (1) whether the heads of government and semiofficial national agencies . . . involved in direct or indirect central guidance of the economy typically make concerted efforts to promote the economic growth of the country; (2) whether or not this planning effort includes purposive attempts to alter institutional arrangements that clearly block the achievement of development goals; and (3) whether or not there is a national plan and a planning group functioning within the government which is charged full time with executing the plan.

2. *Rate of growth of gross national product per capita in constant prices for the period 1950/51 to 1963/64* (pp. 87-90).

3. *Gross investment rate, 1957 to 1962* (pp. 93–96), calculated as the average ratio of gross investment to gross national product during this period.

4. *Change in degree of industrialization, 1950 to 1963* (pp. 99–100), defined as a composite of three statistical elements: "(1) the average annual rate of change in constant prices in industrial output (mining, manufacturing, electricity, and water) for the period 1950–63; (2) the change since 1950 in the proportion of gross domestic product originating in industry; and (3) the change since 1950 in the proportion of the total male labor force employed in industry."

5. *Improvement in agricultural productivity, 1950 to 1963* (pp. 107–108), "a composite variable based upon (1) judgments regarding the extent of use of mechanical power, fertilizer, and other modern techniques in agriculture cross-checked by quantitative data (where available and appropriate) on the use of tractors and fertilizer and (2) qualitative and quantitative information regarding the relative weights of traditional and modern agriculture."

6. *Change in the effectiveness of the tax systems, 1950 to 1963* (pp. 116–118), a composite variable consisting of three basic elements: (1) "The change in the ratio of government domestic revenue to GNP;" (2) "the average annual rate of increase in real government domestic revenue;" and (3) "the change in ratio of direct tax to total government domestic revenue."

7. *Rate of improvement in human resources, Circa 1957 to 1961* (pp. 123–126), defined in terms of two sets of school enrollment data: "enrollment at the second level of education as a percentage of the age group fifteen to nineteen and enrollment at the third level of education as a percentage of the appropriate age group."

Taking these seven measures of social and

[17] The Adelman-Morris data were originally collected for and are described in their book, *Society, Politics, and Economic Development*. The sample of countries consists of 74 non-Western, non-Communist countries, "which, as of 1950, were underdeveloped with respect to social and economic structure" and which, if not independent by 1962, were at least "recognized national units" (p. 9).

[18] For full details on this variable, see Adelman and Morris, pp. 74–76. The numerical scores for the variable are described on pp. 14–15.

[19] Numerical scores for the following variables are all described in Adelman and Morris, pp. 14–15.

economic change as his dependent variables, Nordlinger examined the extent to which they are affected by the degree of political strength of the military, within categories of economic development. Economic development was defined in two ways. First, Nordlinger took the Adelman-Morris measure of the importance of the indigenous middle class, defined as the percentage of the male labor force " . . . in commerce, banking, insurance, or in technical, professional, managerial, administrative, or clerical employments," circa 1960.[20] This variable is grouped into three levels of development: low (less than 10 per cent middle class), medium (between 10 and 19 per cent middle class), and high (more than 19 per cent middle class). Nordlinger's second index of the level of economic development is the Adelman-Morris measure of the "degree of modernization of outlook," circa 1960, which also has three categories. First, and in the highest level of development, are "countries in which the outlook of the urban educated population was significantly modernized, judging by the standards of less-developed countries, and in which programs of political, social, and economic modernization had gained significant support among both the urban and rural populations." Second are "countries in which the outlook of the urban educated population was significantly modernized but in which programs of political, social, and economic modernization had gained significant support only among the urban population." Third, and at the lowest level of development, are "countries in which the outlook of the educated urban sector was partially but not significantly modernized and in which programs of modernization, if they existed, had gained relatively little support among either the urban or rural population."[21]

[20] Adelman and Morris, p. 31.

[21] *Ibid*, pp. 50–51.

Table 1. Effects of Political Strength of the Military on Seven Indicators of Social Change Within Categories of Middle-Class Size, circa 1957 to 1963 ($N=74$)

Dependent Variable	Constant	Military Strength (X)	Medium Middle Class (Z_2)	Large Middle Class (Z_3)	XZ_2	XZ_3	R^2
1. Leadership commitment to growth	34.456* (8.324)	−.082 (.181)	15.301 (11.445)	32.936* (14.045)	−.121 (.224)	−.253 (.352)	.154
2. GNP per capita growth rate	26.982* (7.446)	.214 (.162)	27.172* (10.238)	46.177* (12.564)	−.126 (.200)	−.431 (.315)	.268
3. Gross investment rate	24.358* (5.797)	−.090 (.126)	29.123* (7.971)	36.797* (9.781)	−.286 (.156)	.065 (.245)	.383
4. Industrial growth rate	10.934 (7.864)	.240 (.171)	34.400* (10.813)	55.381* (13.269)	.069 (.211)	−.227 (.332)	.462
5. Agricultural productivity growth rate	35.866* (6.108)	.000 (.133)	17.652* (8.398)	33.570* (10.305)	.078 (.164)	−.155 (.258)	.292
6. Tax effectiveness growth rate	36.176* (7.322)	−.083 (.160)	14.227 (10.068)	24.310 (12.354)	.161 (.197)	.087 (.309)	.209
7. Change in human resources	18.031* (6.769)	.109 (.147)	32.734* (9.307)	61.365* (11.420)	−.040 (.182)	−.042 (.286)	.517

Data are from Irma Adelman and Cynthia T. Morris, *Society, Politics, and Economic Development* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967) and are described in the text of this paper. Main table entries are the parameter estimates, and numbers below them in parentheses are their standard errors. Starred (*) estimates are more than twice their standard errors.

Table 2. Effects of Political Strength of the Military on Seven Indicators of Social Change Within Categories of Degree of Modernization of Outlook, circa 1957 to 1963 ($N=74$)

Dependent Variable	Constant	Military Strength (X)	Medium Moderniz'n (Z_2)	High Moderniz'n (Z_3)	XZ_2	XZ_3	R^2
1. Leadership commitment to growth	37.269* (7.660)	−.117 (.151)	8.191 (12.126)	24.622* (11.590)	−.107 (.218)	.018 (.249)	.202
2. GNP per capita growth rate	22.616* (6.637)	.343* (.131)	24.701* (10.506)	52.562* (10.042)	−.237 (.189)	−.493* (.216)	.352
3. Gross investment rate	22.582* (5.343)	.105 (.105)	32.253* (8.459)	39.491* (8.085)	−.330* (.152)	−.174 (.174)	.415
4. Industrial growth rate	5.784 (8.124)	.630* (.160)	34.041* (12.862)	55.109* (12.293)	−.515* (.232)	−.442 (.264)	.360
5. Agricultural productivity growth rate	31.697* (6.008)	.277* (.118)	16.188 (9.511)	36.336* (9.091)	−.299 (.171)	−.382 (.196)	.236
6. Tax effectiveness growth rate	29.784* (7.177)	.275 (.142)	23.821* (11.362)	25.244* (10.860)	−.461* (.205)	−.179 (.234)	.153
7. Change in human resources	11.121 (6.250)	.415* (.123)	30.524* (9.894)	70.758* (9.456)	−.393* (.178)	−.573* (.203)	.541

Data are from Adelman and Morris, *Society, Politics, and Economic Development*, and are described in the text of this paper. Main table entries are the parameter estimates, and numbers below them in parentheses are their standard errors. Starred (*) estimates are more than twice their standard errors.

Nordlinger's analytic strategy was then to calculate zero-order correlation coefficients between the political strength of the military and each of the seven indicators of modernization, within the three categories of middle-class size and degree of modernization of outlook, respectively. This strategy generates a total of 42 correlation coefficients. In contrast, I shall fit the model specified in the last section to the same data, which gives fourteen sets of parameters to estimate. That is, there are seven different dependent variables (or seven alternative indicators for Y), and two three-category measures of the level of economic development (or two alternative versions of Z, each with $n=3$ categories). Finally, X is measured by the Adelman-Morris indicator of the political strength of the military.

The least-squares estimates for equation (1) with the Adelman-Morris data are presented in Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 reports the estimates for the regressions of the seven social-change indicators on the political strength of the military within the three categories of the importance (size) of the indigenous middle class, while Table 2 reports the same regressions within the three categories of degree of modernization of outlook.

From Table 1 it is clear that these estimates provide no support for *any* of the three main arguments outlined earlier in this paper, and they completely contradict the inferences that Nordlinger drew from the same data. First, none of the seven estimates for the political strength of the military (X) is significantly different from zero,[22] which means that we can

[22] A parameter estimate is considered statistically "significant" in this analysis if it is at least twice the size of its standard error of estimate: this criterion is the same as examining the t-ratios associated with each coefficient and rejecting those not statistically significant at approximately the .05 level. Strictly speaking, this test is not fully appropriate given that the sample of nations under consideration was not chosen randomly: however, it does provide a useful *a priori* criterion in view of the fact that I am not treating equation (1) as a fixed-effects model.

reject the arguments that military governments are *either* reactionary *or* progressive forces, regardless of the society's level of economic development (as measured by middle-class size). Recall that were either of these straightforward hypotheses correct, we would have expected statistically significant parameter estimates (either all positive or all negative) for the political strength of the military (β in equation [1]), combined with nonsignificant estimates for the two interaction terms (the δ_i in equation [1]). The pattern of the estimates in Table 1 clearly does not conform to these expectations. In addition, none of the estimates for the interaction terms is statistically significant, which indicates that the effects of military rule are not contingent on middle-class size.[23] Instead, the data show that social change generally varies according to the level of economic development, regardless of the political strength of the military. For example, rates of change in human resources (the seventh dependent variable) increase with size of middle class, from an average of 18.031 in the lowest category, through 50.765 in the middle category, to 79.396 in the highest middle-class size category.[24]

Essentially the same conclusions are implied by the estimates in Table 2. In five of the seven regressions, no consistent support is found for *any* of the three arguments discussed earlier. Rates of social change appear simply to depend on the level of development, as defined by degree of modernization of outlook, in these five regressions. In two instances, however (involving the second and seventh dependent variables: GNP per capita growth rate and changes in human resources, respectively), the data are partly consistent with Huntington's hypothesis and Nordlinger's conclusion. In these two cases, the parameter estimates for military rule are positive and statistically significant for countries in the low-development category, and the adjustments to those estimates (i.e., the δ_i) are negative and statistically significant for the countries in the highest development categories. Thus, for GNP per capita growth rates, the slope at the low level of degree of modernization is .343, while at the high level it is —.150 (i.e., .343 — .493). Similarly, for rates of change in human resources, the slope at the low level is .415, while at the high level it is —.158 (i.e., .415 — .573).

This, however, provides only partial support for Huntington's proposition, since the fact that the adjustments to the slopes are statistically significant does not imply that the adjusted slopes themselves are significantly different from zero. In fact, the above two adjusted slopes in the high-development category (i.e., —.150 and —.158) are *not* significantly different from zero.[25] Consequently, these estimates indicate that the effects of military rule on these two measures of social change do vary systematically across categories of level of modernization, but only in the sense that the effects are positive at the lowest level, while they are zero in the other two categories. This is indeed modest support for Huntington's argument, which implies negative, nonzero effects at higher levels of development. It also contradicts Nordlinger's analysis, which actually reports such negative effects for these two dependent variables.

Before discussing these results further, we should pursue a variation of this model suggested by Nordlinger that deals with possible regional (instead of level-of-development) effects. As noted earlier, there is substantial variation between geographic regions in mean levels of economic development: African countries are generally the least developed and Latin American countries are generally the most developed, while Asian and Middle East coun-

[23] Note that no parameters are estimated for Z_1 or XZ_1 (i.e., γ_1 and δ_1). This is consistent with the specification in equation (1) where γ_1 and δ_1 were constrained to a value of zero in order to avoid a linear dependency.

[24] These calculations are made by summing $(\alpha + \gamma_2)$ and $(\alpha + \gamma_3)$, respectively, since the γ_i are adjustments to the constant. Thus, the mean change in human resources for the lowest category of middle-class size is estimated by the constant (18.031); that for the intermediate category is (18.031 + 32.734); while the mean for the highest category is (18.031 + 61.365). For a discussion of dummy-variable regression analysis in terms of estimating conditional expectations, see Arthur S. Goldberger, *Topics in Regression Analysis* (New York: Macmillan, 1968), pp. 3–38.

[25] The statistical test for the adjusted slopes (rather than the adjustments themselves) is described in Johnston, *Econometric Methods*, at p. 179. Using the notation of equation (1) above, and focusing on the adjustment to β from δ_3, we first sum the estimates for the two coefficients $(\hat{\beta}+\hat{\delta}_3)$, and divide this sum by the estimated standard error

$$\sqrt{\text{var } \hat{\beta} + \text{var } \hat{\delta}_3 + 2 \text{ cov}(\hat{\beta},\hat{\delta}_3)}$$

where the three terms in the standard error are obtained from the variance-covariance matrix of coefficients. The standard error of the adjusted slope for GNP per capita growth rates in the high modernization category is .172, which is larger than the adjusted coefficient (—.150). Similarly, the standard error of the adjusted slope for rates of change in human resources in the high modernization category is .162, which is again larger than the adjusted coefficient (—.158).

tries tend to fall in between. Thus, if we treat geographic region as a proxy measure of the level of economic development, a regional-effects model offers an alternative procedure for examining further the arguments discussed above. If, for example, Huntington's argument is correct, we would expect the effects of military rule on social change in Africa to be positive, while we would expect those for Latin America to be negative. Additionally, we would anticipate no pronounced effects of military rule on social change in either Asia or the Middle East.

In examining possible regional effects, I have grouped the 74 countries into the same four regions defined by Nordlinger: the Middle East (including North Africa), Latin America, Asia, and Africa. But instead of calculating correlations between the political strength of the military and the seven indicators of social change within geographic regions, I have simply modified the model in equation (1) by redefining the Z_i (the level-of-development effects) to refer to regional effects.[26]

The regression estimates for the effects of the political strength of the military on the seven Adelman-Morris indicators of social change within these regions are reported in Table 3. As might be expected, in light of the estimates in the first two tables, they provide no support for the arguments that the military is either a modernizing or a reactionary force, regardless of geographic region. That is, none of the estimates of the effects of military political strength (X) is significantly different from zero. Of more interest is the fact that (with one possible exception) these results provide no support for a regional-effects model. For six of the seven dependent variables, none of the parameter estimates for the interaction terms is significant, which, combined with similar results for

[26] Thus, for the regional-effects models, Z has four categories. The Middle East (Z_1) is taken as the "excluded" category.

Table 3. Effects of Political Strength of the Military on Seven Indicators of Social Change, Within Regions, circa 1957 to 1963 ($N = 74$)

Dependent Variable	Constant	Military Strength (X)	Latin America (Z_2)	Asia (Z_3)	Africa (Z_4)	XZ_2	XZ_3	XZ_4	R^2
1. Leadership commitment to growth	46.653* (12.871)	−.155 (.225)	8.848 (16.286)	4.376 (19.758)	−5.900 (15.513)	.226 (.283)	−.019 (.338)	.232 (.348)	.087
2. GNP per capita growth rate	76.193* (11.645)	−.239 (.203)	−21.511 (14.734)	−26.293 (17.875)	−48.831* (14.035)	.236 (.256)	.237 (.305)	.693* (.315)	.191
3. Gross investment rate	56.819* (9.477)	−.196 (.165)	7.144 (11.991)	−7.698 (14.547)	−28.568* (11.422)	−.062 (.208)	−.031 (.249)	.237 (.257)	.255
4. Industrial growth rate	56.115* (13.415)	−.027 (.234)	−4.422 (16.973)	4.261 (20.592)	−47.964* (16.168)	.050 (.295)	−.084 (.352)	.510 (.363)	.293
5. Agricultural productivity growth rate	52.381* (10.041)	−.023 (.175)	1.027 (12.704)	18.720 (15.412)	−19.082 (12.101)	−.027 (.221)	−.281 (.263)	.524 (.272)	.136
6. Tax effectiveness growth rate	67.569* (11.150)	−.084 (.195)	−20.294 (14.108)	−11.265 (17.116)	−33.278* (13.439)	−.001 (.245)	.007 (.292)	.148 (.302)	.172
7. Change in human resources	63.228* (10.749)	−.094 (.187)	9.884 (13.600)	8.957 (16.499)	−51.121* (12.954)	−.166 (.236)	−.263 (.282)	.367 (.291)	.450

Data are from Adelman and Morris, *Society, Politics, and Economic Development*, and are described in the text of this paper. Main table entries are the parameter estimates, and numbers below them in parentheses are their standard errors. Starred (*) estimates are more than twice their standard errors.

X, means that military rule has no discernible impact on social change in any of the four geographic regions. Instead, the estimates for Z_4 simply indicate that, in general, African countries have slower rates of social change than other countries.

Only the estimates for GNP per capita growth rates suggest that the effects of military rule vary by region, and they thereby provide modest support for the Huntington argument. Here, the effects of military rule for African countries are positive,[27] while military rule has no impact on GNP per capita growth rates, one way or the other, in the other regions. Yet this is weak support for the regional-effects hypothesis, given that Huntington's argument implies negative military-government effects for the other regions and that Nordlinger actually reports such negative effects.

In short, Tables 1 through 3 provide little support for the Huntington hypothesis. Of a total of 21 sets of regression estimates, only three are even partly consistent with his argument, while the remaining 18 contradict it. To check on the robustness of the three sets of estimates that are partly congruent with the original argument, these estimates were recalculated using alternative measures of the dependent variables. The Adelman-Morris measure of GNP per capita growth rates was replaced with average annual rates of change in energy consumption per capita, 1960 to 1965, as reported in the recent *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*.[28] Similarly, the Adelman-Morris measure of rates of change in human resources (which, it will be recalled, is based on school enrollments) was replaced with average annual percentage rates of change in adjusted school enrollment ratios, 1960 to 1965, as reported in the same source.[29] All of

[27] Again, the slope here is given by summing β and δ_4, which, since the estimate for β is not significantly different from zero, gives $(0 + .693) = .693$.

[28] Taylor and Hudson, *World Handbook*, pp. 326-328. Data on GNP growth rates have too many cases with missing data for our purposes.

[29] *Ibid.*, pp. 225-228, for the 1965 country values. The 1960 series is available from the *World Handbook* data released by the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research (ICPR) at the University of Michigan. Average annual rates of change were calculated as follows:

$$\text{change} = [\ln(X_1/X_2)]\ [100/K],$$

where X_1 is the 1965 score; X_2 is the 1960 score; and K is the number of years between the two scores (in this case, 5). For details on the calculation of average annual rates of change, see George W. Barclay, *Techniques of Population Research* (New York: Wiley, 1958), pp. 28-33.

Table 4. Effects of Political Strength of the Military on (a) Two Indicators of Social Change Within Categories of Degree of Modernization, and (b) One Indicator of Social Change Within Regions, circa 1957 to 1965 (N=72)

Dependent Variable	Constant	Military Strength (X)	Medium Modernization (Z_2)	High Modernization (Z_3)	XZ_2	XZ_3	R^2
1. Energy consumption per capita growth 1960–65	6.282* (1.573)	.001 (.031)	−1.029 (2.520)	1.000 (2.338)	−.023 (.044)	−.059 (.050)	.067
2. School enrollment growth 1960–65	8.073* (1.316)	−.057* (.026)	−4.432* (2.151)	−6.415* (1.993)	.043 (.038)	.034 (.043)	.239

Dependent Variable	Constant	Military Strength (X)	Latin America (Z_2)	Asia (Z_3)	Africa (Z_4)	XZ_2	XZ_3	XZ_4	R^2
1. Energy consumption per capita growth 1960–65	5.888* (2.406)	−.015 (.420)	.277 (3.104)	−.050 (3.694)	1.360 (2.927)	−.019 (.534)	.026 (.063)	−.465 (.655)	.057

Independent variables are defined as in Tables 2 and 3. The dependent variables are described in Charles L. Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*, second edition (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1972), and in the text of this paper. Missing data on the dependent variables reduces the N from 74 to 72.

the independent variables are defined as in Tables 2 and 3 above.

Table 4 presents the results of these recalculations. The revised parameter estimates are again inconsistent with the Huntington hypothesis. First, none of the parameter estimates for the interaction terms is significantly different from zero. Second, only one of the three parameter estimates for the political strength of the military (i.e., that for school enrollment growth) is more than twice the size of its standard error. This, of course, is inconsistent with Nordlinger's conclusion; besides, the simple bivariate regression of school enrollment growth on the political strength of the military produces a parameter estimate that is less than twice the size of its standard error (along with an R^2 of .033). Thus, the results in Table 4 are consistent with the 18 sets of parameter estimates in Tables 1 through 3, which show that military governments have little systematic impact on social change, regardless of societal type. In short, Table 4 indicates that the three apparent exceptions in the earlier tables to this general statement are not particularly robust, in the sense that they cannot withstand even a modest attempt at replication.

That this reanalysis of the Adelman-Morris data contradicts the earlier analysis by Nordlinger deserves comment. Essentially, the difference is due to Nordlinger's reliance on correlation coefficients calculated separately within level-of-development and regional categories, as opposed to my reliance on the metric (or unstandardized) regression coefficients, using an analysis of covariance model that explicitly specifies and allows for level-of-development and regional effects. The covariance model in equation (1) is superior to Nordlinger's procedure because it allows for statistical tests of difference (the t-ratios) across categories of the within-category slopes (i.e., the regression coefficients). This means we have been able to subject the proposition that the effects of military rule on social change vary by either region or level of development to tests of statistical significance.[30]

In addition, correlation coefficients are not particularly useful in this context, since, as standardized statistics, they are sensitive not only to changes in the "true" underlying relationship, but also to the ratio of the variances of each pair of variables being considered. This sensitivity becomes potentially troublesome for analyses like Nordlinger's, which compares the size of bivariate correlation coefficients between the same pairs of variables across discrete groups of countries. That is, Nordlinger stratified the 74 countries into three separate categories (on the basis of level of development) and then compared within-stratum correlation coefficients across strata. The problem here is that the ratio of the within-stratum standard deviations of the variables involved also varies across these strata, which directly affects the within-stratum correlation coefficients. Thus, Nordlinger's correlations are themselves subject to artificial fluctuations, in the sense that, in addition to possible cross-strata variations in the true underlying relationships, they also reflect cross-strata variations in the ratios of the within-stratum variances (or standard deviations).[31] In contrast, comparisons across strata

[30] In addition, by retaining all of the observations in the analytic design, the number of degrees of freedom retained for these tests is maximized, as it would not have been had separate regressions been estimated within each level-of-development or regional category. On this point, see Kmenta, *Elements of Econometrics*, at p. 421.

[31] For general discussion on this point, see among others John W. Tukey, "Causation, Regression, and Path Analysis," chapter 3 in *Statistics and Mathematics in Biology*, ed. Oscar Kempthorne et al. (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State College Press, 1954); and H. M. Blalock, Jr., "Causal Inferences, Closed Populations, and Measures of Association," *American Political Science Review*, 61 (March 1967), 130–136.

To illustrate the differences involved here, consider the following table, which reports the within-region relationships between the Adelman-Morris measure of "changes in human resources" (i.e., school enrollment ratios, designated here as y) and their measure of the political strength of the military (designated here as x):

Region	r_{xy}	=	s_x/s_y	×	b_{yx}
Latin America	–.435		1.676		–.260
Asia	–.342		.961		–.356
Africa	.336		1.229		.274
Middle East	–.115		1.229		–.094

Note that the ratio of the within-stratum standard deviations does in fact vary substantially across strata (from .961 to 1.676), and that this in turn substantially affects the relative magnitudes of the coefficients. Where the correlation coefficients suggest that the strongest (negative) effect of military rule on changes in enrollment ratios occurs in Latin America, the regression coefficients show the strongest effect occurring in Asia.

Incidentally, while I have been able to reproduce the Adelman-Morris zero-order correlations (reported in *Society, Politics, and Economic Development* at pp. 281–283), I have had more difficulty reproducing the within-stratum correlations reported by Nordlinger in his Tables 2, 3, and 4. My estimates are close to his in the cases of the third and fourth tables, and the mean differences between the (absolute) magnitudes of his correlations and mine are .010 and .011 for his tables 3 and 4 respectively. However, the mean difference between the absolute size of the correlations in his Table 2 and mine for this table is .079.

of the metric regression coefficients generated with a covariance analysis model are not subject to distortion from variation in within-stratum variances, and they therefore offer a more meaningful basis for the comparison of the nature of the true effects.

These considerations, along with the empirical results of this section, indicate that the Adelman-Morris data provide little support for the conclusions that Nordlinger has drawn from them. Unfortunately, these data themselves have serious limitations, which means that they cannot be used to generate an overwhelming challenge to Huntington's original hypothesis. First, while the independent variables (and in particular the political strength of the military) cover the period from 1957 to 1962, many of the dependent variables cover the period from about 1950 to 1963. The temporal problem with these data clearly impedes our ability to consider the effects of military involvement in politics on social change.[32]

Second, the 74 observations in the Adelman-Morris data file include three countries not normally considered part of the Third World (Greece, Japan, and South Africa), as well as 22 others that had not achieved political independence by January 1, 1960 (in spite of the fact that most of the variables cover the period 1957 to 1962, and some of them span the 1950 to 1962 period). While national sovereignty may not have been important to the analytic purposes for which Adelman and Morris originally collected these data, it clearly is critical to the hypotheses at hand. In particular, it is difficult to visualize indigenous military governments within the colonial setting.[33] To be sure, a reanalysis of these data with non-Third-World and nonindependent countries excluded (which reduces the N to 49) does not alter the conclusions of this section (the estimates are not reported here). On the other hand, these exclusions leave only five African countries in the sample, which makes regional comparisons impossible. The exclusions also remove a large proportion of the poorest Third-World countries from consideration, even though these countries are important to an evaluation of Huntington's hypothesis.

Finally, there is reason to believe that the Adelman-Morris measure of the political strength of the military is not particularly suited to our present purposes. In particular, intermediate values on this variable were assigned to countries " . . . in which the military was an important political influence *but was not in direct political control.*"[34] Most of the studies discussed in the first part of this paper, however, considered the effects of *direct* military intervention and political control on social change. Direct control is also critical to the claims typically made by the military themselves after *coups d'état*: such action is usually justified on the grounds that it is necessary to remove the existing ineffective or corrupt political leaders before social change can occur, and that only a period of military rule (at least temporary) can "clean up" politics in this manner and then initiate social change. Of course, the armed forces have to constitute "an important political influence" before they can mount successful *coups,* but such influence is not synonymous with direct political control. Given the hypotheses under consideration, a preferable measure would identify the duration of military governments that initially achieved direct political control through extra-constitutional means.

In short, these considerations imply that while Nordlinger's inferences are incorrect, the arguments put forward by Huntington have yet to be systematically evaluated. The next section of this paper attempts such an evaluation with more recent data that do not suffer from the limitations just discussed.

Military Governments and Social Change, 1960 to 1970. We now apply the model in equation (1) to data covering the ten-year period from 1960 to 1970 for the 77 independent Third-World countries listed in the Appendix.[35]

The measure of political intervention by the military emphasizes the duration of their direct control of the machinery of government. To be included in the index, such control had initially to take the form of an irregular, extra-constitutional power transfer — that is, a military *coup d'état.* This criterion is obviously important if we are to distinguish regimes such as the one headed by General Ne Win of Burma from that headed by General Dwight Eisenhower of the United States. Duration of military rule was then coded (in months) for the period from December 31, 1960 to December 31, 1970, so

[32] Nordlinger also notes this problem in his preliminary discussion ("Soldiers in Mulfti," p. 138).

[33] This is also a problem with a more recent analysis that has come to my attention as this paper is going to press. See R. D. McKinlay and A. S. Cohan, "A Comparative Analysis of the Political and Economic Performance of Military and Civilian Regimes: A Cross-National Aggregate Study," *Comparative Politics,* 8 (October 1975), pp. 1–30.

[34] Adelman and Morris, *Society, Politics, and Economic Development,* p. 75. Italics added.

[35] To be included in the analysis, countries had to be independent before December 31, 1962.

that the maximum possible score is 120. In addition, military regimes were counted as starting on December 31, 1960 if a *coup* occurred before that date but the chief executive installed at the earlier time remained in power into 1961, as did General Ayub Kahn of Pakistan. Finally, if elections occurred ("rigged" or otherwise) but were won by the incumbent from the officer corps who had originally gained power through a *coup d'état*, such elections were not counted as interruptions to the period of military rule. This procedure is required because for one thing, it is in general quite difficult to judge the extent to which elections are "rigged," and for another, military regimes that initially seize power through extra-constitutional means may often enjoy considerable popular support. Cases in point where elections took place within military regimes include the regimes of General Barrientos in Bolivia and of General Pak Chung Hi in South Korea.[36]

To gauge the extent of social change over the same period, I have relied on four distinct measures. The first of these is the average annual percentage change in energy consumption per capita, 1960 to 1970, expressed in kilograms per capita of coal-equivalent energy.[37] As an indicator of economic growth, this reflects the same kind of change that is captured by four of the measures of economic growth employed by Nordlinger.[38] In particular, it reflects changes in the degree of industrial growth and in the degree of productivity of the economy as a whole. Besides, it is consistent both with Levy's discussion of modernization mentioned at the outset of this paper and with Deutsch's concept of social mobilization.

As a second indicator of social change, I have taken average annual percentage changes in school enrollment ratios, 1960 to 1970. These data are available from UNESCO, which defines the "enrollment ratio" as " . . . the total enrollment of all ages divided by the population of the specific age groups which correspond to the age groups of primary and secondary schooling. The result is expressed as a percentage. These ratios have been calculated taking into account the differing national systems of education and the duration of schooling at the first and second levels."[39] This variable measures the same aspect of social change as is measured by the rate of improvement in human resources, which was the last of Nordlinger's seven indicators of social change.

The third measure registers changes in health care. Specifically, it consists of the average annual percentage change in the number of physicians per 1,000 population, from 1960 to 1970.[40] While this variable taps a dimension of social change that differs from the other two variables just introduced, it does reflect an im-

[36] The primary data source for this variable is *Keesing's Contemporary Archives* (London: Keesings, Ltd.), which is published weekly. This source was also cross-checked against others, including the country profiles in Donald G. Morrison, Robert C. Mitchell, John N. Paden, and Hugh M. Stevenson, *Black Africa: A Comparative Handbook* (New York: Free Press, 1972), the data in Kenneth Ruddle and Philip Gillette, *Latin American Political Statistics* (Los Angeles: Latin American Center, UCLA, 1972), the data on coups in William R. Thompson, *The Grievances of Military Coup-Makers* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics, 01-047, Sage Publications, 1973), at pp. 68–70, along with the papers in the following books: *The Politics of the Coup D'Etat: Five Case Studies*, ed. William G. Andrews and Uri Ra'anan (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1969); Bienen (ed.), *The Military Intervenes;* and Janowitz and Van Doorn (eds.), *On Military Intervention*. The cross-checking indicates that the primary source is quite accurate: in no cases were the data in *Keesing's Contemporary Archives* contradicted by the other sources.

[37] The 1970 data are from United Nations, *Statistical Yearbook 1971* (New York: Statistical Office of the U.N., 1972), pp. 336–339 and United Nations, *Statistical Yearbook 1974* (New York: Statistical Office of the U.N., 1975), pp. 359–362. The 1960 data are described in Taylor and Hudson, *World Handbook*, and reported in the series released by the ICPR at the University of Michigan. This second source was also cross-checked against the data in the United Nations *Statistical Yearbook* of 1961, pp. 278–280. Average annual rates of change were calculated as described in footnote 29, where X_1 is the 1970 score; X_2 is the 1960 score; and K is the number of years between the two scores (in this case, 10).

[38] Recall that these measures of social change were: GNP per capita growth rates; gross investment rates; industrial growth; and improvements in agricultural productivity.

[39] UNESCO, *Statistical Yearbook 1971* (Paris: UNESCO, 1972), p. 99. Data for both 1960 and 1970 are from the 1971 *Statistical Yearbook*, pp. 101–119, and from the UNESCO *Statistical Yearbook* of 1972, pp. 93–114. Average annual rates of change were again calculated as described in footnote 29 above: in a few cases 1968 or 1969 data were substituted for (unavailable) 1970 scores, and in these cases K assumed a value of 8 or 9, instead of 10. Data for Taiwan are missing.

[40] Data for the total number of physicians (1960) are from the ICPR version of the *World Handbook* and from the United Nations *Statistical Yearbooks* of 1962, 1963, 1964 and 1965. Discrepancies between these two sources were resolved in favor of the second one. Population data for 1960 are also taken from the ICPR version of the *World Handbook*. The 1960 physicians per 1,000 population ratios were generated from these variables. The 1970 physicians per 1,000 population ratios are derived from the United Nations *Statistical Yearbooks* of 1971, 1972, and 1973 at pp. 711–714; 747–750; and 719–722 respectively. Average annual rates of change were calculated as described in footnotes 29 and 39 above.

Table 5. Intercorrelations Among the Four Indicators of Social Change, 1960 to 1970[a]

	1	2	3	4
1. Energy consumption growth	1.000	.415	.119	.116
2. School enrollment growth	76	1.000	.141	.267
3. Physicians per 1,000 population growth	77	76	1.000	.118
4. Radios per 1,000 population growth	75	75	75	1.000

[a] The data and their sources are described in the text of this paper. Entries in the upper diagonal are pair-wise product-moment correlation coefficients; entries in the lower diagonal indicate the number of cases on which these coefficients are based. Data for variable 2 are missing for Taiwan, and data for variable 4 are missing for Taiwan and Yemen.

portant aspect of physical well-being that has subsequent effects on other aspects of well-being, such as infant mortality and life expectancy rates (for which, unfortunately, data on a sufficiently wide scale are as yet unavailable). In addition, for reasons discussed elsewhere, this variable reflects changes in part of the *distribution* of health benefits (an important material good), in the sense that higher ratios imply greater health benefits for the less wealthy.[41] At the same time, changes in physician-to-population ratios do share with changes in both energy consumption rates and school enrollment ratios a characteristic that is important to the hypotheses of this analysis, because all three of these variables are potentially available for fairly rapid manipulation by policy makers. In contrast, for example, even successful programs designed to decrease infant mortality rates may take a much longer time before their effects are readily discernible.

The final measure reflects changes in access to the mass media, in this case, radios.[42] The growth of the mass media generally reflects growth in the proportion of the population that is mobilized, with obvious implications for social and political change.[43] My focus on changes in the ratio of radio receivers to population is relevant for two reasons. First, this is a variable that is potentially capable of considerable growth at a rapid rate, even in non-industrialized societies. Second, radios can be an effective form of mass communication in the absence of a literate population.

I should emphasize that these four variables are not intended to serve as a unidimensional index of "social change." Indeed, as Table 5 shows, the empirical interrelationships among these variables are quite modest. Changes in per capita energy consumption rates are modestly associated with changes in school enrollment ratios, while each of these variables in turn is very weakly related to changes in both physician- and radio-to-population ratios. There are, however, no compelling theoretical reasons for assuming that social change is unidimensional. In fact, rapid economic growth may be incompatible (in the short run, at least) with some of these other facets of social change, for the reasons outlined by Mancur Olson, and others.[44] Thus, the four variables I have just introduced allow us to examine the effects of military rule on four *distinct aspects* of social change.

In addition to these data on both social change and military intervention in politics, a measure of the *level* of economic development is required before we can estimate equation (1). Here I have relied on the level of energy consumption per capita (again expressed in kilograms of coal equivalents) for 1960. The 1960 data were chosen so that we may examine the effects of military rule on social change during the subsequent decade given the *initial* level of economic development. This measure is, of course, highly correlated with others, such as gross national product or gross domestic product per capita, but it has the practical advantage over them of presenting us with no

[41] See Robert W. Jackman, *Politics and Social Equality: A Comparative Analysis* (New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1975), especially chapter 2.

[42] Data for radio receivers per 1,000 population for 1960 and 1970 are from the UNESCO *Statistical Yearbooks* of 1972 and 1973 at pp. 840–849 and pp. 732–737 respectively. Some 1960 values are from the ICPR version of the *World Handbook*. Average annual rates of change were calculated as described in footnotes 29 and 39 above.

[43] Cf., Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development."

[44] Mancur Olson, Jr., "Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force," *Journal of Economic History*, 23 (December 1963), 529–552.

cases of missing data. In the following analysis the raw scores for countries have been grouped into three categories: countries with a 1960 energy consumption rate of less than 75 kilograms per capita ($N = 30$) were assigned to a low category; those with energy consumption rates from 75 to 250 kilograms per capita ($N = 24$) were assigned to the intermediate category; and those with energy consumption rates greater than 250 kilograms per capita ($N = 23$) were placed in the high category.[45]

The least-squares estimates of equation (1) based on these data are reported in Table 6. They provide little consistent support for any of the hypotheses reviewed in the first section of this paper. First, the models for the first and fourth dependent variables (growth rates of energy consumption per capita and the radio to population ratio) provides no non-zero estimates for either the direct effects of military rule (X_1) or the adjustments to the slopes (i.e., the XZ_i terms). Second, in the case of growth in the physicians-to-population ratio, the estimate for XZ_2 suggests that military rule may result in social change among countries at intermediate levels of development ($N = 24$). This result, however, is inconsistent with any of the three basic arguments discussed earlier. Besides, the estimates of a revised model that includes only those independent variables for which the estimates in the third row of Table 6 were more than twice their standard errors produce an insignificant parameter value for the term in XZ_2. This suggests that the estimate of that parameter in the third row of Table 6 is not robust.

Only the estimates for the second dependent variable appear consistent with one of the earlier arguments, insofar as they suggest that military governments inhibit growth in school enrollment ratios, regardless of the level of economic development. To pursue this possibility, I estimated a modified version of equation (1), with both of the interaction terms (i.e., the δ_i) set to zero. This revised model produced significant estimates for all coefficients *except* β. The modified estimates thus provide no support for even the simple argument that military juntas systematically affect growth in school enrollment ratios.[46]

[45] See footnote 37 above for the 1960 energy consumption per capita data sources. This classification provides three categories of approximately equal size. In addition, the cutoff points coincide with "breaks" in the data, in the sense that no country falls within ±5 kilograms (of energy consumption per capita) of the cutoff points.

[46] The modified model produced the following estimates (with standard errors in parentheses): $\hat{\alpha} = 6.505$ (.582); $\hat{\beta} = -.013$ (.008); $\hat{\gamma}_2 = -2.462$ (.776); $\hat{\gamma}_3 = -3.672$ (.792); $R^2 = .257$; $\bar{R}^2 = .226$. I also estimated a model with both β and the δ_i set to zero, for which the estimated $\bar{R}^2$ is .212, which is very close to the $\bar{R}^2$s for either of the more complete models (for a definition and discussion of $\bar{R}^2$, see, e.g., Kmenta, *Elements of Econometrics*, at p. 365).

Table 6. Effects of Military Intervention in Politics on Three Indicators of Social Change, 1960 to 1970, Within Categories of 1960 Level of Economic Development ($N = 77$)

Dependent Variable	Constant	Military Intervention (X)	Medium Development (Z_2)	High Development (Z_3)	XZ_2	XZ_3	R^2
1. Energy consumption growth	7.345* (1.123)	−.009 (.022)	−1.054 (1.634)	−2.115 (1.655)	−.036 (.036)	.0002 (.033)	.078
2. School enrollment growth[a]	6.955* (.664)	−.027* (.013)	−3.002* (.967)	−4.557* (.998)	.018 (.021)	.028 (.019)	.280
3. Physicians per 1,000 population growth	4.760* (.956)	−.014 (.019)	−2.576 (1.392)	−3.580* (1.410)	.066* (.031)	.045 (.028)	.135
4. Radios per 1,000 population growth[b]	14.702* (2.057)	.054 (.042)	−8.116* (2.995)	−11.420* (3.090)	−.028 (.067)	.018 (.061)	.290

The data and their sources are described in the text of this paper. Main table entries are the parameter estimates, and numbers below them in parentheses are their standard errors. Starred (*) estimates are more than twice their standard errors.

[a] School enrollment data for Taiwan are missing, so the estimates in this row of the table are based on an N of 76.

[b] Radios per 1,000 population data are missing for Taiwan and Yemen, so the estimates in this row are based on an N of 75.

Table 7. Effects of Military Intervention in Politics on Three Indicators of Social Change, 1960 to 1970, Within Regions ($N=77$)

Dependent Variable	Constant	Military Intervention (X)	Latin America (Z_2)	Asia (Z_3)	Africa (Z_4)	XZ_2	XZ_3	XZ_4	R^2
1. Energy consumption growth	6.711* (1.451)	−.037 (.028)	−2.700 (1.906)	−.274 (2.096)	2.125 (1.875)	.037 (.039)	.052 (.036)	−.053 (.045)	.173
2. School enrollment growth[a]	3.975* (.874)	−.014 (.017)	−2.297* (1.149)	1.535 (1.303)	2.982* (1.130)	.028 (.024)	−.002 (.022)	−.017 (.027)	.331
3. Physicians per 1,000 population growth	1.861 (1.359)	.022 (.026)	.433 (1.786)	.388 (1.964)	2.277 (1.757)	.011 (.037)	−.005 (.034)	−.019 (.042)	.064
4. Radios per 1,000 population growth[b]	3.716 (2.836)	.091 (.057)	1.646 (3.726)	10.276* (4.226)	7.580* (3.666)	−.107 (.079)	−.045 (.073)	.011 (.089)	.279

The data and their sources are described in the text of this paper. Main table entries are the parameter estimates, and numbers below them in parentheses are their standard errors. Starred (*) estimates are more than twice their standard errors.

[a] School enrollment data for Taiwan are missing, so the estimates in this row of the table are based on an N of 76.

[b] Radios per 1,000 population data are missing for Taiwan and Yemen, so the estimates in this row are based on an N of 75.

In addition to these results concerning military rule, Table 6 shows that average annual rates of change in energy consumption per capita are not sensitive to the initial level of economic development. The remaining three measures of social change, in contrast, do vary (inversely) with level of economic development, so that countries at lower levels of development have higher rates of growth, while those in the highest development category have the lowest rates.

Table 7 reports the parameter estimates for a variant on equation (1) that specifies the possible effects of military governments on social change within geographic regions. Countries have been grouped into the same four regions that were identified in Table 3: the Middle East (and North Africa), Latin America, Asia and Africa.[47] Recall that the rationale for examining possible regional differences is that these groups of countries vary in their average levels of economic development, with African countries as a group being the poorest and Latin American countries being the least poor.[48] If the estimates in Table 7 were to support Huntington's hypothesis, we would anticipate that military rule promotes social change in African countries while it retards such change in the other regions (including Latin America in particular). The estimates in Table 7 provide no support for this argument. None of the estimates for the effects of military rule (i.e., β and the δ_i) is significantly different from zero, which is consistent with the inferences drawn from Table 6.

It might be objected that these results are distorted because the distribution of X (duration of military rule) is skewed, since only 36 (46.8%) of the 77 countries listed in the Appendix have non-zero (positive) values on this variable. This raises the possibility that the variance of the disturbance in each of the models I have estimated is heteroskedastic (i.e., not constant for all observations).[49] More specifically, it is likely that the variance of the disturbance for $X = 0$ is greater than the variance of the disturbance when X assumes other

[47] The countries are classified by the four regions described in the Appendix.

[48] This expectation is borne out in the regional mean values for energy consumption per capita, 1960. The regional means are: Africa, 50; Asia, 126; Middle East, 336 (this figure excludes Kuwait: with Kuwait included, the Middle East mean is 714); Latin America, 582.

[49] A key assumption of the ordinary least squares estimates of equation (1) is homoskedasticity, which implies

$E(\epsilon_j^2) = \sigma^2$ for all j (where the subscript j refers to the j^{th} observation). When this assumption is not met, the disturbances are said to be heteroskedastic, which implies

$E(\epsilon_j^2) = \sigma_j^2$

Although the ordinary least-squares estimates are unbiased and consistent under heteroskedasticity, they are not efficient. This means that the estimated standard errors are biased (for a useful discussion of this problem, see Kmenta, *Elements of Econometrics*, pp. 249–269).

values. To pursue this possibility, I re-estimated the models in Tables 6 and 7, excluding the 41 countries that experienced no military juntas.[50] The results of this reanalysis, along with a visual inspection of the appropriate scatterplots, indicate that the estimated standard errors reported in Tables 6 and 7 are not biased.

One final possibility deserves consideration. The measure of political intervention by the military is based on the duration of direct military rule. It does not, however, distinguish between uninterrupted military rule and a series of intermittent military governments. For example, two countries could have the same score on this variable (say, 75), but in the first country this count is based on a continuous 75-month period of military government, while in the second the same score reflects the presence during the decade of three distinct military governments, each of which lasted for 25 months.[51] This distinction is of potential importance because stable governments, military *or* civilian, are more likely to have the capacity to institute policies effectively than are less stable governments.[52] In terms of the arguments considered in this paper, this implies that the duration of military rule may affect social change when the military regimes involved are fairly stable. If on the other hand, they are relatively unstable, it implies that military regimes would have no noticeable effects on social change.

To determine whether variations in the continuity of military regimes systematically affect the estimates reported in the last two tables, those analyses were repeated excluding countries that experienced more than one *coup d'état* during the period under investigation (the fifteen countries involved here are noted in the Appendix). Many of the remaining 62 countries have experienced sustained periods of military rule, but none experienced a series of discrete military juntas during the decade beginning in 1960. Thus, this sample of 62 countries allows us to examine the effects of the duration of *relatively continuous* military regimes on social change.

Tables 8 and 9 report the parameter estimates for this subset of observations for the period from 1960 to 1970. Again, these estimates are consistent with those reported earlier in Tables 6 and 7. The two apparent exceptions

[50] These estimates are not reported here for reasons of space. Note that the distribution of X (Duration of military rule) is approximately normal for the 36 countries with $X>0$.

[51] This second outcome could indicate either that military governments were continuous but that every 25 months a new junta replaced the existing one through a *coup*, or that each 25-month period of military rule was followed or interrupted by (at least) a brief period of civilian government.

[52] On this point, see among others the discussion of "durability" in Harry Eckstein, *The Evaluation of Political Performance: Problems and Prospects* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics, 01-017, Sage Publications, 1971).

Table 8. Effects of Military Intervention in Politics on Three Indicators of Social Change, 1960 to 1970, Within Categories of 1960 Level of Economic Development: Countries With More Than One *Coup* Excluded ($N=62$)

Dependent Variable	Constant	Military Intervention (X)	Medium Development (Z_1)	High Development (Z_2)	XZ_2	XZ_3	R^2
1. Energy consumption growth	6.883* (1.212)	−.018 (.025)	−.495 (1.727)	−1.634 (1.754)	−.018 (.040)	.018 (.037)	.041
2. School enrollment growth[a]	7.114* (.709)	−.031* (.014)	−3.257* (1.011)	−4.827* (1.046)	.017 (.024)	.037 (.022)	.317
3. Physicians per 1,000 population growth	4.435* (1.028)	−.035 (.021)	−2.253 (1.465)	−3.182* (1.488)	.079* (.034)	.067* (.032)	.136
4. Radios per 1,000 population growth[a]	15.678* (2.237)	.040 (.045)	−9.846* (3.186)	−12.296* (3.299)	−.026 (.074)	−.016 (.069)	.325

The data and their sources are described in the text of this paper. Main table entries are the parameter estimates, and numbers below them in parentheses are their standard errors. Starred (*) estimates are more than twice their standard errors.

[a] School enrollment and radios per 1,000 population data for Taiwan are missing, so the estimates for these dependent variables are based on an N of 61.

Table 9. Effects of Military Intervention in Politics on Three Indicators of Social Change, 1960 to 1970, Within Regions: Countries With More Than One *Coup* Excluded ($N=62$)

Dependent Variable	Constant	Military Intervention (X)	Latin America (Z_2)	Asia (Z_3)	Africa (Z_4)	XZ_2	XZ_3	XZ_4	R^2
1. Energy consumption growth	6.635*	−.050	−2.579	−1.434	2.088	.054	.061	−.028	.160
	(1.490)	(.038)	(1.961)	(2.196)	(1.932)	(.048)	(.045)	(.056)	
2. School enrollment growth[a]	3.891*	−.005	−2.264	1.079	3.104*	.018	−.018	−.009	.391
	(.881)	(.022)	(1.159)	(1.346)	(1.142)	(.029)	(.027)	(.033)	
3. Physicians per 1,000 population growth	1.866	−.009	.757	−.702	2.366	.040	.028	−.018	.086
	(1.389)	(.035)	(1.828)	(2.047)	(1.801)	(.045)	(.042)	(.052)	
4. Radios per 1,000 population growth[a]	3.793	.009	.732	11.266*	7.287	−.061	.016	.166	.372
	(2.835)	(.072)	(3.732)	(4.335)	(3.677)	(.092)	(.086)	(.106)	

The data and their resources are described in the text of this paper. Main table entries are the parameter estimates, and numbers below them in parentheses are their standard errors. Starred (*) estimates are more than twice their standard errors.

[a] School enrollment and radios per 1,000 population data for Taiwan are missing, so the estimates for these dependent variables are based on an N of 61.

are the estimates for β in the equation for school enrollment growth rates and for the δ_i in the equation for growth in the physician-to-population ratio in Table 8. Like the corresponding estimates in Table 6, however, these are not robust and present no substantial challenge to the basic conclusion.[53] The analyses presented in Tables 8 and 9 thus indicate that the presence in the analysis of countries that had experienced more than one *coup* during the decade does not systematically affect the results reported earlier. In short, military intervention in the politics of the Third World has no unique effects on social change, regardless of either the level of economic development or geographic region.

Discussion

In this paper I have attempted to assess the empirical validity of three contrasting views of the effects of military governments on social change in countries of the Third World. The first and more optimistic of these views suggests that such regimes are typically progressive forces promoting social change, while the second view more pessimistically sees military governments as conservative or even reactionary forces that actively inhibit social change. The third perspective comes from Huntington and seeks to integrate the first two by hypothesizing that the effects of military governments on social change vary by the level of economic development: in poor countries, these governments tend to be reformist and progressive, while in more wealthy countries they become conservative (if not reactionary) movements seeking to protect the privileges of entrenched social groups.

The empirical analysis just presented lends no support to any of these viewpoints. Instead, both the reexamination of the Adelman and Morris data and the analysis of more recent data indicate that military governments have no unique effects on social change, regardless of level of economic development. This conclusion clearly contradicts the earlier analysis by Nordlinger, but the difference is readily explained in methodological terms. More interestingly, the present analysis is consistent with the results reported by Schmitter and Weaver for Latin America.[54] They, however, were not able to address the Huntington hypothesis fully, given their focus solely on Latin American countries, which are relatively wealthy when compared to other countries of the Third World. The present analysis extends the con-

[53] A modified model for school enrollment growth rates of the form discussed above in the text and in footnote 46 (with the δ_i set to zero) produced an estimate of β that was considerably less than twice its standard error. Similarly, a modified model for physicians to population growth rates with β constrained to a value of zero produced insignificant estimates for both of the δ_i. Note also that an application of the checks for heteroskedasticity discussed above indicates again that none of these conclusions is due to biased standard errors of estimate.

[54] Schmitter, "Military Intervention and Public Policy," *passim;* and Weaver, "Assessing the Impact of Military Rule," *passim.*

clusion reached by Schmitter and Weaver, and indicates that the pattern they find for Latin America holds more generally.

We can conclude that blanket statements portraying military governments in the Third World as either progressive or reactionary are without empirical foundation. This implies that many observers may have been mistaken in attributing unique political skills to the military, whether directed toward progressive or conservative ends. We can also conclude that military regimes do not assume different mantles as countries of the Third World become wealthier. In short, the simple civilian-military government distinction appears to be of little use in the explanation of social change.

Appendix: Country Values for Duration of Military Rule (in Months), December 31, 1960 to December 31, 1970 ($N = 77$)

Africa		Liberia	0
Burundi	54	Mali	25
Cameroon	0	Mauritania	0
Central African Republic	60	Niger	0
Chad	0	Nigeria*	59
Congo (Brazzaville)*	28	Rwanda	0
Dahomey*	43	Senegal	0
Ethiopia	0	Sierra Leone*	13
Gabon	0	Somalia	14
Ghana	53	Sudan	65
Guinea	0	Tanzania	0
Ivory Coast	0	Togo*	48
Zaire (Congo-Kinshasa)*	61	Uganda	0
		Upper Volta	60
Asia		Guatemala	39
Afghanistan	0	Haiti	0
Burma	109	Honduras	87
Cambodia	9	Jamaica	0
India	0	Mexico	0
Indonesia	58	Nicaragua	0
Laos*	0	Panama	27
Malaysia	0	Paraguay	0
Nepal	0	Peru*	39
Pakistan	120	Trinidad and Tobago	0
Philippines	0	Uruguay	0
South Korea	114	Venezuela	0
South Vietnam*	86		
Sri Lanka (Ceylon)	0	**Middle East (and North Africa)**	
Taiwan	0	Algeria	66
Thailand	120	Egypt	117
		Iran	0
Latin America		Iraq*	120
Argentina*	54	Israel	0
Bolivia*	74	Jordan	0
Brazil	81	Kuwait	0
Chile	0	Lebanon	0
Colombia	0	Libya	16
Costa Rica	0	Morocco	0
Dominican Republic	0	Saudi Arabia	0
Ecuador*	33	Syria*	39
El Salvador	120	Tunisia	0
		Turkey	18
		Yemen*	81

* These countries (of which there are fifteen) experienced more than one military *coup d'état* during the period. They are therefore excluded from the analyses reported in Tables 8 and 9 of this paper.

Political Compliance and U.S. Trade Dominance*

NEIL R. RICHARDSON
The University of Texas at Austin

An axiom among students of international politics is that there are vast disparities in the relative abilities of nations to influence each other. It is usually assumed that the roots of superior influence include population size, economic productivity, and military might. What is not fully clear, however, is how or whether such factors operate systematically. Are there patterns to the asymmetrical influence exercised by dominant nations? How is such influence made manifest?

The present study addresses these questions by developing and testing an economic explanation of international political submissiveness in a hierarchical world. Data from the 1960s are used to examine the role of the United States as a dominant nation with influence over a subsystem of dependencies. Both the fact and the extent of influence are assessed using foreign trade-related variables suggested by international trade theory.

A central proposition is that U.S. dependencies should distinguish themselves by displaying greater voting agreement with the U.S. in the United Nations General Assembly than do other countries. The extent to which voting agreement is in fact an objective of the U.S., and hence a meaningful index of its dominance on issues of importance to it is also explored. Finally, a tentative ordering of the potency of each of the economic variables in question is considered.

* This article is adapted from the author's doctoral dissertation, *Trade Dependence and Political Cooperation Among Nations* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1974). Generous help with the original manuscript was offered by Stuart Bremer, Dorwin Cartwright, A. F. K. Organski, and especially Raymond Tanter who chaired the project. Bruce Buchanan, Helmut Norpoth, Ivan Orton, A. T. J. Vernooy, and two anonymous referees have also provided valuable assistance at different stages. Many of the data were collected and made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research, Ann Arbor, Michigan. Neither the original collectors of the data nor the Consortium bears any responsibility for the analyses or interpretations presented here. Early phases of the study were facilitated by a dissertation grant from the Department of Political Science, The University of Michigan. Preparation of the manuscript for this article was aided by support from the University Research Institute, The University of Texas at Austin. An earlier version was delivered at the 1975 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, September 2-5, 1975.

Theoretical Considerations

The hypotheses considered in later pages are derived from an explanation which assumes that nations exist in a global hierarchy. As suggested, the notion of a hierarchical international system is hardly novel. But systematic explanations of resultant influence relations between powerful and weak nations are relatively scarce.[1]

It is generally agreed, however, that somehow a nation's influence capabilities depend on the amount of resources it has available. One way to conceptualize this connection between a nation's influence potential and its resource base is to view resources as goods and services which can be offered to, or withheld from, a second nation as the first chooses.[2] In this way, the first nation can influence the second by affecting the latter's benefits, costs, and probability of success.

This perspective on influence capabilities can usefully be adapted to a hierarchical analysis based on international trade theory.[3] To do so requires, as a first step, an understanding that trade between nations is beneficial to each participant. The benefits, in turn, result from differences in endowments of land, labor, and capital which best suit countries to the manufacture of different products, to attendant economies of scale provided by larger markets, and the like.

[1] Recent volumes exploring this general perspective include Steven L. Spiegel, *Dominance and Diversity: The International Hierarchy* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972), and Marshall R. Singer, *Weak States in a World of Powers: The Dynamics of International Relationships* (New York: The Free Press, 1972).

[2] This explication of the assumed relationship between rank and influence paraphrases *Group Dynamics: Research and Theory*, ed. Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander, 3rd ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 220.

The application of this idea to asymmetrical politics is exemplified by Edgar Litt and Michael Parenti, *Democracy's Ordeal in America: A Guide to Political Theory and Action* (Hinsdale, Ill.: Dryden Press, 1973), pp. 30–33.

[3] The reader is referred elsewhere for a full exposition of the fundamental trade theory employed here. See, for example, Charles P. Kindleberger, *International Economics*, rev. ed. (Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, 1958), chapters 5 and 6, or Paul T. Ellsworth, *The International Economy*, rev. ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1958), chapters 4 through 7.

But in a hierarchical world, an international system composed of national economies of widely differing sizes, the rudiments of trade theory bear implications beyond a mere "division of labor" characterization.

Thus, consider international trade transactions between unequals, the first being the United States and the second a small economy. In a hypothetical case where each annually sells 200 million dollars worth of goods to the other, the consequences are different for the two; the market value of the commodities is symmetrical but the effects of the exchange are not. The benefits to the second nation are greater because a proportionately greater share of its domestic consumption now occurs at reduced, import prices. Meanwhile, and more important in the present context, a proportionately greater share of its total economic activity depends on a foreign market for its exports. In sum, as a result of this transaction, the second nation becomes more *export dependent* than is the United States because the latter has the capacity to manipulate more benefits and costs (for example, via interruption of trade) than does the former.

The political ramifications of such economic interactions are not difficult to apprehend. Because the larger economy dominates the smaller one through their mutual trade, the latter will be constrained to exhibit "cooperative" behavior born of economic dependence; it should behave deferentially. Borrowing a term used by social psychologists, I shall hereafter refer to such political behavior on the part of economic dependencies as "compliance."[4]

The following proposition summarizes this form of political behavior: Nations that engage in substantial trade with a dominant partner should display compliant political behavior toward it. In more abstract language, the preceding exposition describes a hierarchical international system in which nations are differentially constrained according to their rank.

It should be added that the argument presented to this point is consistent with prior empirical investigations. For example, Karl Deutsch and Alexander Eckstein have demonstrated that large (industrial) national economies clearly tend to rely on foreign trade as a constituent part of their total economic activity to a lesser degree than do small (nonindustrial) countries.[5] And Bela Balassa confirms that the great majority of exports from small, underdeveloped economies are sold in industrialized markets.[6] In combination, these two observations lend additional credence to the present economic characterization. Nonindustrial, that is, economically small nations are relatively heavily dependent upon foreign trade, and the buyers of their exports are chiefly those economic giants whose own resources are so great as to put them in a dominant position in the partnership.[7] Finally, trade flows for the United States accord with this global configuration. Whereas, for 1965, U.S. foreign trade made up only 7.3 per cent of its gross national product (GNP), Costa Rican trade with the U.S. *alone* accounted for some 19 per cent of that small economy's GNP.[8]

To this juncture, the political compliance of dependencies has been described as only a manifestation of export dependence. Trade theory prompts the inclusion of three supplemental factors: commodity concentration, recipient concentration, and economic development.

A common conception regarding international trade has it that small, nonindustrial economies have few commodities to sell on the world market owing to their narrow bases of production. Whether or not this is an accurate description of those countries in particular, there is theoretical reason to believe that undiversified export activity is a source of vulnerability for any nation. The logic is simple. A downward shift in price or demand for any single export commodity is to some extent damaging to any economy. The smaller the number of different exports a country has, the greater is its loss should any one product suffer market misfortunes. Thus, commodity concentration in exports should be particularly worrisome to

[4] See Herbert C. Kelman, "Compliance, Identification, and Internalization: Three Processes of Attitude Change," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 2 (March 1958), 51–60. Kelman's compliance and conformity as overt behavior styles correspond to the expectations here. But they do not require "internalization," behavior motivated by the intrinsic rewards of the acts for the actor. Also see Cartwright and Zander, p. 230.

[5] Karl W. Deutsch and Alexander Eckstein, "National Industrialization and the Declining Share of the International Economic Sector, 1890–1959," *World Politics*, 13 (January 1961), 267–299.

[6] Bela A. Balassa, *Trade Prospects for Developing Countries* (Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, 1964), p. 12, where the U.S., Canada, non-Communist Europe and Yugoslavia, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa are classified "developed."

[7] This same configuration is explored by Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Imperialism," *Journal of Peace Research*, 8, No. 2 (1971), 81–117; Francois Perroux, *L'économie du XX^e siècle* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de Frances, 1961), pp. 27–56.

[8] Data are from the United Nations, Statistical Office, *Yearbook of International Trade Statistics*, 1965 (New York: United Nations, 1967).

a country highly dependent on its overseas markets.[9]

Another economic factor is recipient concentration, where "recipients" are countries other than the principal partner that buy exports from the nation in question. The point here again is that a lack of diversity is a liability for the exporter, in this case because recipients other than the dominant partner represent alternative markets which may be available should the dominant outlet be closed off. A small number of alternative markets reduces the exporter's immediately available buyers of goods no longer sold to the dominant country. Thus, the greater the concentration of (alternative) recipients, the greater should be a dependency's political compliance as insurance against loss of its largest market.[10]

Finally, theoretical discussions suggest that lack of economic development itself heightens dependency.[11] As suggested earlier, underdeveloped economies gain proportionately more from a given amount of trade than do their industrialized partners. In addition, insofar as such trade is thought to be a means to generate needed capital for development, their perceived stake in foreign commerce is further augmented.[12] Accordingly, any decrease in trade would thereby entail particularly high costs. Lack of economic development, then, is a further liability itself, exacerbating export dependence, and it should be manifested in increased political compliance with the dominant trade partner.

Now how do these factors relate to each other? The preceding paragraphs offer some clues that permit the analysis to advance an additional step. That is, a brief reconsideration of the four economic concepts — export dependence, commodity concentration, recipient concentration, and economic development — provides some basis for speculation as to their respective potencies in producing political compliance.

Taking commodity concentration and recipient concentration first, the former is likely to be more worrisome for the dependency. The reason for this is not difficult to grasp. The dependency that heavily relies on a single export product may suffer a disastrous price or demand decrease for that good at the hands of its dominant buyer. On the other hand, even a dependency with just a few other major buyers will continue to have some available markets for its exports should it lose its largest outlet. Thus, recipient concentration would appear to be a less threatening circumstance than commodity concentration.

Recipient concentration should also be less consequential in producing compliance than is export dependence. The reason for this expectation is that dependent status is an immediate fact of the dependency's existence, whereas the perils of recipient concentration deal with the availability of future, prospective markets if the country's trade circumstances should suddenly worsen.

Moreover, economic development is likewise probably more relevant than is recipient concentration to a dependency's political behavior. This is a defensible ordering because little economic development represents a systemic weakness in the dependency's economy. By comparison, a concentration of alternative export markets represents, after all, a potential hazard only in the economy's foreign trade sector (at least initially).

Thus, with recipient concentration as the fourth most important factor, attention can now be turned to the other three. Consider next commodity concentration and export dependence. An economy that produces a very narrow range of export goods yet relies on overseas markets for a limited share of its total economic activity is ultimately vulnerable only to the extent that it relies on that trade. But another dependency in opposite circumstances — low concentration and high export dependence — while not jeopardized in any one line of goods, can be devastated by unfavorable sanctions visited upon it by its dominant trade partner. Therefore, commodity concentration can be ranked behind export dependence.

In addition, economic development should

[9] Also note that nonindustrial economies often rely heavily upon agricultural exports, those very goods historically susceptible to dramatic price changes. See, for example, Richard N. Cooper, *The Economics of Interdependence: Economic Policy in the Atlantic Community* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), p. 80.

[10] See Peter J. Lloyd, *International Trade Problems of Small Nations* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1968), p. 46; Albert O. Hirschman, *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1945), pp. 30, 85–86; Singer, *Weak States*, pp. 239, 222–223.

[11] David Vital, for example, asserts that economic dependence stems from several factors, including level of economic development, as well as the impact of foreign trade on the economy: " . . . the actual dependence of a given small power on foreign economic factors . . . will depend on the volume of foreign trade relative to total economic activity, on the rate and *level of economic development*, on the chosen fields of specialization, on the variety of the nation's domestic resources and the skill with which they are utilized . . . ." In *The Inequality of States* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 55 (emphasis added).

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 47; Lloyd, pp. 21-22.

also be ranked in importance ahead of commodity concentration. Parallel to the argument regarding recipient concentration, commodity diversification only bears on the external share of a country's total economic activity, whereas economic development is crucial to the entirety of a country's resilience in times of duress. Commodity concentration, then, is probably third most important among the economic factors.

Speculation regarding the potencies of export dependence and economic development is, happily, facilitated by the above discussion. Again, economic development represents vitality in the entire national system, and export dependence is a vulnerability particular to just some portion of it. That is, even an extremely export-dependent country may be able to recover from a damaging blow to its foreign market if the economy is sufficiently developed to engage in compensatory domestic expansion or to nurture new overseas buyers. On the other hand, an economy only marginally dependent on exports to a dominant partner would suffer greater costs if that principal market were lost. Therefore, it seems reasonable to suspect that low economic development would induce a dependency's compliance more forcefully than would the *extent* of the dependence itself.

The transitive ordering of these factors is, then, in order of decreasing importance to compliance, (1) economic development, (2) export dependence, (3) commodity concentration, and (4) recipient concentration. But more must be said of the compliance expected to result from these constructs.

Political Compliance

In returning to the expectation that U.S. export dependencies should be politically compliant, one must consider the outward signs of such submissiveness. Governments have a variety of means by which to bestow political favors, including amicable and frequent diplomatic discourse, public and private diplomatic support on matters regarding third states, intervention to facilitate relations between private parties, and so on. But the publicity and frequency of such occasions varies so greatly among countries in the contemporary world that they are difficult to specify in a systematic and comprehensive fashion.

On the other hand, votes in some international organizations are regular and public statements of the member governments through their delegates.[13] Additionally, the United Nations General Assembly has been singled out as appropriate to this study owing to its almost universal membership.

Moreover, it is also asserted that General Assembly roll calls reveal patterns of voting alignments of particular interest to the present investigation.[14] Inis Claude says that "the major states have at least as much influence within and upon [the Assembly] as they are entitled to. by virtue of their size, strength, and general importance."[15] Robert Keohane identifies economic dependence as an important motive for roll call agreement: "The more dependent a state is on a great power for trade, aid, or protection, the more responsive it is likely to be to pressure" in the General Assembly.[16]

The Assembly annually votes on a wide range of substantive issues. Among the many resolutions subject to roll call procedures, some of them are doubtless of greater interest to the U.S. government than others are. Accordingly, it would seem likely that the U.S. would attempt to elicit its dependencies' compliance on votes most salient to it. Thus, the essence of this discussion suggests that the dependencies should display greater compliance when the outcome is more important to the U.S.

There is abundant reason to believe that the United States has ascribed great importance to its cold war relationship with the Soviet Union.[17] Even after the onset of détente in the

---

[13] This paraphrases David Truman, *The Congressional Party* (New York: Wiley, 1959), p. 13, as quoted in Hayward R. Alker, Jr. and Bruce M. Russett, *World Politics in the General Assembly* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), p. 23. Also see Thomas Hovet, Jr., *Bloc Politics in the United Nations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 113.

[14] Hovet, p. 14.

[15] *The Changing United Nations* (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 53. The same thesis is documented in case studies by John G. Stoessinger, *The United Nations and the Superpowers* (New York: Random House, 1965).

[16] Robert O. Keohane, "Political Influence in the General Assembly," *International Conciliation*, No. 557 (March 1966), p. 19. Empirical support for this proposition includes Eugene R. Wittkopf, "Foreign Aid and United Nations Votes: A Comparative Study," *American Political Science Review*, 67 (September 1973), 868–888; Marshall R. Singer and Barton Sensenig III, "Elections Within the United Nations: An Experimental Study Utilizing Statistical Analysis," *International Organization*, 17 (Autumn 1963), 901–925. Wittkopf found some positive connection between U.S. foreign aid allocation and its recipients' Assembly and committee agreement with the donor in 1963 and 1966. Singer and Sensenig, accounting for nations' economic, military, perceptual, and communications ties with the superpowers, discovered these bonds to be associated with voting agreement on cold war questions from 1946 to 1959, though more so for interdependencies than for dependencies.

[17] Alker and Russett, *World Politics in the General Assembly*, chap. 10, present interesting evidence on

mid-1960s, the continuing superpower arms race bears witness to the salience of their antagonisms and mutual suspicions. In sum, U.S. dependencies should exhibit greater compliance on cold war votes than on others.

Derived Hypotheses

The preceding theoretical exposition provides a basis for the hypotheses of this study. The first hypothesis is a broad one, reflecting the primary thrust of the investigation. It distinguishes between dependencies and other countries on the presumption that the economic circumstances of the former will motivate them to display compliant political behavior.

H.1 A nation that is export dependent upon the United States will exhibit greater General Assembly voting agreement with it than will others that are not dependent.

The next hypothesis accounts for the distinction between those political issues more or less salient to the United States.

H.2 A dependency will exhibit greater compliance toward the United States on cold war issues than on other matters.

The third hypothesis captures the transitive ordering of the four economic factors for dependencies.

H.3 A dependency of the United States will display voting agreement with it in accordance with the following factors, listed in order of decreasing importance: (1) declining economic development; (2) increasing export dependence; (3) increasing commodity concentration; (4) increasing recipient concentration.

Operationalizing the Concepts

The concepts now identifiable as essential to this study are (1) export dependence, (2) commodity concentration, (3) recipient concentration, (4) economic development, (5) political compliance, and (6) issue salience. The following paragraphs indicate how they are operationalized for the empirical results which follow thereafter.

Export dependence upon a dominant nation must actually tap two ingredients. First, a nation can only be export dependent if foreign sales are important to that nation's economic health.[18] Additionally, of course, dependency status also requires that the country sell a large share of its exports to the dominant one. Both ingredients thus require relative measures, and each is necessary for a nation to be export dependent.[19]

Accordingly, two simple ratios have been constructed for each considered country. The first ratio is

$$a_i/GNP_i,$$

where a_i is the value of total exports of any country i and GNP_i is that same country's gross national product.[20] The second ratio is

$$a_{i,}/a_i,$$

where a_i represents the value of country i's

nations' issue "intensities" in the General Assembly. Tabulating the numbers of speeches made in that body by different nations, they conclude that by 1961 (the last session they examined), the United States and the Soviet Union had become increasingly intense regarding their "East-West" confrontations, of which cold war issues were a major component.

[18] A similar argument is expressed in Bruce M. Russett's theoretical discussion of economic interdependence; see his *International Regions and the International System: A Study in Political Ecology* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), chap. 8, especially p. 124.

[19] A well-known measure, "relative acceptance" *(RA)*, was developed by Richard I. Savage and Karl W. Deutsch, "A Statistical Model of the Gross Analysis of Transaction Flows," *Econometrica*, 28 (July 1960), 551–572. Measures which divide trade by a nation's gross national product have been used by Russett, *International Regions*, and by Singer, *Weak States*. Cal Clark and Susan Welch have come to the conclusion that investigations such as the present one should more appropriately use a trade/*GNP* measure than one resembling *RA*. See their "Western European Trade as a Measure of Integration: Untangling the Interpretations," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 16 (September 1972), 353–382, especially p. 337. Marshall Singer, *Weak States*, combines these two indicators in the same multiplicative fashion used here to measure export dependence, although his ratios are based upon total trade and gross domestic product. The bases for the present choices appear in the following footnote. Singer's formula is presented in his pp. 237–240. Curiously, however, as Singer attempts to establish a threshold value to distinguish "dependent" nations from others, he first argues (p. 238) that an index value of 0.067 is a reasonable partition. But then he less explicitly makes a contrary case (p. 239): " . . . any state that derives even 10 per cent of its Gross Domestic Product from trade with one country is *tied* to that Power" (emphasis added). The ambiguity may revolve around whether he equates "dependent" and "tied."

[20] The decision to use export figures rather than "trade" (roughly exports plus imports) is based on four considerations: (1) Degree of commodity concentrations in export trade is much less than in import trade, thus maximizing variance in the "active" variable, as indicated by Lloyd, p. 14. (For a lucid discussion of systematic, extraneous, and error variance problems in research design, see Fred N. Kerlinger, *Foundations of Behavioral Research*, 2nd ed. [New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973] chap. 17.) (2) Exports appear to be more insulated than imports from economic aid, particularly for the values of underdeveloped nations, thereby minimizing systematic extraneous variance, as indicated by Deutsch and Eckstein, "National Industrialization," p. 274, Singer,

exports to country j. The two ratios can then be multiplied to generate

$$ED_{ij} = a_{ij}/GNP_i,$$

where ED_{ij} is an export dependence score for country i on country j.

The concept of *commodity concentration* is relatively straightforward. The indicator must identify the extent to which shares of total exports are distributed across a range of commodity classes. In other words, the need again is for a measure of relative distributions of values.

A concentration index developed by James Ray and J. David Singer has been chosen from among several measures of concentration (or inequality) available.[21] It is represented by the following formula:

$$CON = \sqrt{\frac{(S_i)^2 - (1/N)}{1 - (1/N)}},$$

where S_i is the percentage share of goods for each unit i (commodity class) and N is the number of units considered. One advantage of this index, when compared to others, is that it does not tend to overvalue the preponderance of the larger shares of an uneven distribution among classes.

A second characteristic of *CON* makes it an appropriate index for *recipient concentration*, as well. Its full range of possible values, 0.00 to 1.00, does not change as the number of units varies. This is an especially important attribute in view of the wide variation in numbers of recipients (units) among the included countries.

Economic development is frequently measured by gross national product per capita (*GNP*/capita). This measure provides no information regarding the domestic distribution of wealth, but it does offer an approximation of the amount of capital available for investment and industrial growth. Now "real" income per capita is a more meaningful measure of individual and collective economic status. But, unfortunately, the reliability of the relevant data is "almost inversely proportional" to their validity.[22] Accordingly, *GNP* per capita is used in this study, logarithmically transformed to approximate a normal distribution.

Regardless of its causes, *political compliance* or cooperation, as the case may be, might be expected to vary substantially. The questions treated here again demand a measure which captures the extent of expected behavior relative to the unexpected. Using Arend Lijphart's Index of Agreement *(IA)*, the accord among General Assembly roll call positions for a pair of nations over a series of votes can be summarized.[23] Lijphart's index is

$$IA = [f + (1/2g)]/t,$$

where

- f = number of votes on which the pair agrees (Yes-Yes, Abstain-Abstain, No-No)
- g = number of votes on which the pair partially agrees (Yes-Abstain, No-Abstain)
- t = total number of votes on which the pair voted.

An important assumption of this index is that abstentions represent a position midway between Yes and No. Lijphart argues that this coding rule is particularly appropriate in the General Assembly setting where nations may wish to vote "against" resolutions without offending its supporters by casting a No vote.[24]

Finally, in the context of this study, *issue salience* refers to the greater weight attached by the U.S. to cold war voting support than it imputes to other roll calls. Thus, the roll calls must be partitioned into two categories, "Cold War" and "Others."

The rule that governs the coding of each roll call into one of these two groups is simple. On

---

Weak States, pp. 248 and 256, and Masakatsu Sato, "A Model of U.S. Foreign Aid Allocation: An Application of a Rational Decision-Making Scheme," in *Approaches to Measurement in International Relations: A Non-Evangelical Survey*, ed. John E. Mueller (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969), pp. 198–215. (3) Import values usually include the costs of transport and insurance, export values avoid the introduction of this sort of systematic extraneous variance; (4) Nations with relatively small shares of *all* international trade by virtue of their low resource and industrial base are also, by and large, nations whose exports are most commodity concentrated, according to Michael Michaely, "Concentration of Exports and Imports: An International Comparison," *Economic Journal* 68 (December 1958), 727.

[21] See James Lee Ray and J. David Singer, "Measuring the Concentration of Power in the International System," *Sociological Methods & Research*, 1 (May 1973), 403–437.

[22] Arthur S. Banks and Robert B. Textor, *A Cross-Polity Survey* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1963), p. 63.

[23] Arend Lijphart, "The Analysis of Bloc Voting in the General Assembly," *American Political Science Review*, 62 (December 1963), 902–917. Absences, as opposed to abstentions, are not coded in these data. As John E. Mueller puts it, an absent delegate is usually not present "for reasons which are best attributed to apathy or disinterest." *Approaches to Measurement*, p. 139. Similarly, those delegates present but not voting are not included, since inferring their positions would be a dubious enterprise in terms of validity or reliability.

[24] Lijphart, p. 910.

those items where the United States and the Soviet Union take positions in complete disagreement, the roll calls are designated "Cold War" ($n = 15$).[25] "Others" is the residual category for votes in which the bloc leaders are in agreement, partial agreement, or else where the Soviet Union did not vote and the United States did ($n = 9$). (If the U.S. did not vote, the roll call is discarded as of no use in computing *IA*'s with the U.S. as half of each pair.)

Data Sources

These operations call for data drawn from several sources. To develop the Export Dependence index, the design requires the coding of (1) the value of total exports by country, (2) the value of total exports to the United States by country, and (3) *GNP* for each country. The source for coding total exports values is the 1965 United Nations *Yearbook of International Trade Statistics*.[26] Exports to the United States are taken from the same source. *GNP* figures for the same year are from Charles Taylor and Michael Hudson, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*,[27] as is *GNP* per capita, the latter to measure economic development.

To measure commodity concentrations by the *CON* index requires only two kinds of data: (1) the number of commodity classes considered; (2) each country's distribution of export percentage shares across those classes. The *Yearbook of International Trade Statistics* provides a tenfold scheme standardized for goods in trade according to the revised Standard International Trade Classification, a taxonomy followed here.

The index values for recipient concentration are based on (1) the number of recipients for each country's exports and (2) the percentage shares of each country's exports to each of its recipients, the United States excluded. (Recall that the U.S. is excluded because the search is for other partners as alternatives to the dominant market.) These data are also based on 1965 values from the U.N. *Yearbook*.

Finally, data for the Index of Agreement, tapping political compliance and cooperation, are drawn from the U.N. General Assembly Plenary Session roll calls for 1965.[28] From these Assembly records three types of information are drawn to meaure agreement: (1) the total number of roll calls in which both countries voted, for each pair; (2) the number of votes with ballot agreement; (3) the number of votes with partial agreement. In addition, to increase the validity of this data set, unanimous and near-unanimous roll calls (90 per cent agreement or more) are excluded because they provide little or no discriminatory information. The same decision also applies to votes specific to each paragraph of a resolution that is so dismembered for separate roll calls, and for the reason that they are nearly always redundancies which would introduce unwanted inflations of agreement or disagreement.[29]

Table 1 summarizes the indicators, measures, and data sources employed. Deleting those countries for which data were unavailable on at least one variable, there remain 103 countries with complete files used in the empirical analyses that follow.

Results

Before any statistical analyses relevant to the hypotheses can be discussed, the identity of the U.S. dependencies, from among the 103 countries, must be established. Here the task is to distinguish a subsystem on the basis of a reasonable criterion. Since dependencies have earlier been described in terms of the extent of their trade ties to the dominant U.S., the export dependence measure is an obvious choice.[30] Not so obvious, however, is the threshold value separating them from other countries.

[25] Alternative means of operationalizing "Cold War" voting are possible, of course. Analogous to Alker's and Russett's technique *(World Politics)*, a factor analysis of roll calls could be used to identify those in which the United States and other "western" nations vote in opposition to the Soviet Union and other "eastern" delegations. A second alternative, however, is employed by Robert J. Mokken and Frans N. Stockman, "A Theory and Method of Roll Call Analysis," paper delivered to the Eighth World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Munich, 1970 (second mimeo, December 1971). Mokken and Stockman (p. 2-2) operationalized "East-West confrontation" " . . . by taking those issues (key votes) in which the U.S.A. and at least nine other NATO countries oppose the U.S.S.R. and at least five other Warsawpact countries." (Cited and quoted with the authors' permission.)

[26] United Nations, Statistical Office, *Yearbook of International Trade Statistics*, 1965 (New York: United Nations, 1967).

[27] Taylor and Hudson, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*, 2nd ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), pp. 306–313.

[28] Acknowledgments to Robert Beattie for making these data available through the International Relations Archive, Inter-University Consortium for Political Research, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

[29] This is a frequent practice when dealing with such data. See Alker and Russett; Lijphart, "Analysis of Bloc Voting," p. 910.

[30] Social psychologist Kurt Lewin preferred interactional criteria to attributional ones for purposes of partitioning: "A group is best defined as *a dynamic whole based on interdependence rather than on similarity*," in his *Resolving Social Conflicts* (New York: Harper, 1948), p. 184 (emphasis in the original).

Table 1

Indicators, Measures, and Data Sources

Indicator	Measure	Data Source
export dependence	export dependence index (*ED*)	a) total exports: *Yearbook*, 1965
		b) exports to U.S.: *Yearbook*, 1965
		c) *GNP*: *World Handbook*
commodity concentration	concentration index (*CON*)	commodity shares; # commodity classes: *Yearbook*, 1965
recipient concentration	concentration index (*CON*)	recipient shares; # recipients: *Yearbook*, 1965
economic development	*GNP* per capita	*World Handbook*
political compliance	index of agreement (*IA*)	General Assembly roll calls, 1965

Marshall Singer has suggested a 10 per cent cutoff for his trade/*GNP* ratio which, in turn, suggests a 5 per cent value here where only exports appear in the numerator.[31] Admittedly, the threshold has no particular theoretical origin, but it does satisfy an empirical criterion reflecting the presence or absence of alternate dominant trade partners. Of the 21 countries with ratios of 5 per cent or more on the *ED* index, only three (Nicaragua, Saudi Arabia, and Gabon) are more closely trade-tied to a nation other than the United States.[32] Compare this ratio (18:21) to the next eleven nations with 3 or 4 per cent scores, falling just below the partition. Of this second group, only four export more to the U.S. than to some other partner (4:11). A list of the 21 countries designated as dependencies follows, ordered by the extent of their dependence on exports to the U.S., where higher scores indicate greater dependence.

Table 2

Dependencies of the United States, Ordered by Export Dependence (ED)

Country	*ED* Value
Colombia	.05
Guatemala	.05
Peru	.05
Ecuador	.06
El Salvador	.06
Ethiopia	.06
Haiti	.06
Nicaragua	.06
Uganda	.06
Panama	.07
Philippines	.07
Saudi Arabia	.07
Bolivia	.09
Canada	.09
Jamaica	.09
Costa Rica	.10
Dominican Republic	.10
Gabon	.14
Venezuela	.14
Trinidad and Tobago	.20
Liberia	.23

A glance at the list immediately reveals the "westernness" of the subsystem; the members are not randomly dispersed geographically. Instead, fifteen of the twenty-one are about equally distributed among Caribbean, Central and South American locations.[33] This characteristic of the group is consistent with Hans Linne-

[31] Singer, *Weak States*, pp. 238–239. Also see note 19, above, regarding Singer's apparent indecision on this threshold level.

[32] Nicaragua and Saudi Arabia are, by this measure, much more dependent on Japan than on the United States. Gabon is much more dependent on exports to its former metropole, France.

[33] Russett, *International Regions*, pp. 133–143, finds that twelve of these fifteen Western Hemisphere dependencies were "interdependent" traders in his two clusters of American countries. His overlap with this study is reduced owing to his search for *reciprocal* trade ties.

mann's discovery that geographical proximity is a valuable predictor of relative trade flows.[34]

With the dependencies now identified, the study hypotheses can be tested empirically. The first hypothesis, predicting that the dependencies would be in closer agreement to U.S. positions than would other countries, statistically states that differences in agreement among members of each group will be smaller than differences between the groups, with dependencies scoring higher. Analysis of variance shows that the two groups of nations do not differ appreciably on "Other" votes ($p > .77$). The picture is markedly different, however, on "Cold War" issues. Here the dependencies clearly agree with the U.S. significantly more than do the nondependent countries ($p = .0001$). Group agreement averages appear in Table 3.

Table 3

Agreement Averages by Group and Issue

	Dependencies	Nondependencies
Cold War ($n = 15$)	.598	.410
Other ($n = 9$)	.883	.855

Of course, this same evidence also bears upon the second hypothesis, predicting that dependencies will be more compliant on Cold War roll calls. Comparing dependencies' averages on the two issue categories (Cold War vs. Others), the hypothesis fails the empirical test in that their agreement on Cold War votes is lower rather than higher. That finding, however, is considerably mitigated by the fact that the remaining 82 countries tend to depart from the U.S. on Cold War votes significantly more than do dependencies. That is, although its dependencies agree with the U.S. less on Cold War roll calls than on Others, there is evidence that they are compliant when the superpowers are in full disagreement.

To clarify the matter, consider the plausibility of the following rationale. First, it should be noted that if the U.S. attaches greater utilities to Cold War issues than to Others, that does not imply that governments will therefore necessarily tend to agree with it more on Cold War votes. Instead, the proposition only implies that the U.S. will more often employ whatever resources it commands, including economic incentives accompanying its foreign trade relations, in efforts to muster Assembly support on those roll calls most salient to it. Thus, the fact that levels of agreement with the U.S. are lower on Cold War votes may mean that nations, dependent and otherwise, are less inclined to vote against the Soviet position despite U.S. efforts to the contrary. And the observation that dependencies are measurably more agreeable than nondependencies on Cold War votes supports this interpretation. Notice, however, that U.S. dependencies by this account are subject along with other countries to some unspecified influence by the Soviet Union, as well as by the United States.[35]

The third hypothesis, predicting a transitive ordering of the respective impacts of the economic variables upon compliance, is scrutinized by means of linear multiple regressions.[36] These results appear in Table 4.

Table 4

Partial Associations for Dependencies[a]

	Issue Category	
	Cold War ($n = 15$)	Other ($n = 9$)
(log) Economic Development	.44 (.00)	.14 (.00)
Export Dependence	−.31 (.00)	−.23 (.00)
Commodity Concentration	.47 (.52)	.04 (.09)
Recipient Concentration	.02 (.56)	−.29 (.10)

[a] Values are beta weights; those in parentheses are standard errors.

Several facts emerge here. First, it should be noted that the independent, economic variables are plagued by random error while the roll call tabulations of the dependent variables are nearly error free. This distribution of random error leads to somewhat understated partial coefficients, particularly for the dependence and development factors where the errors are probably greatest. The same unreliability also exaggerates the standard errors of the associations.

Second, notice that the partial associations (beta weights) are almost always higher for

[34] *An Econometric Study of International Trade Flows* (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1966). In his study of foreign trade *inter*dependencies, Russett, *International Regions*, shows the U.S. to be a key member of his "North and Central America" group in 1963.

[35] See Keohane, "Political Influence," p. 23.

[36] Bivariate correlation coefficients among all pairs of the four economic factors are so small that it is safe to interpret the partial associations between each of them and political compliance in a straightforward fashion; there is no significant multicollinearity among them.

Cold War votes than for Other issues, consistent with the second hypothesis. Some of these relationships, however, are themselves unexpected. For example, even though economic development is most strongly related to voting agreement, the *direction* of the association is the inverse of that predicted by the third hypothesis. Thus, dependencies such as Canada and Venezuela, with proportionately high per person productivity, are more prone to agree with the U.S. than are less developed dependencies such as Ethiopia, especially on Cold War roll calls. In theoretical terms, this positive association indicates that relative lack of economic development among the dependencies implies no corresponding heightening of compliance. Instead, the opposite association exists, and for reasons unanticipated by the present dependence theory.

The association of export dependence with voting agreement also assumes an inverse direction from the hypothesized one. Illustrative is a comparison of Liberia and Gabon, with very high dependence scores and Cold War agreement values of only .38 and .35 respectively, as opposed to marginally dependent Peru, El Salvador, and Nicaragua with agreement levels of .79, .79, and .94.

Table 5

Dependence and Cold War Compliance Averages

	Mean ED	Mean Cold War IA
Western Dependencies ($n = 15$)	.08	.66
Nonwestern Dependencies ($n = 6$)	.10	.28

Moreover, if the 21 subsystem members are subdivided into two groups according to whether they are in the western hemisphere, as in Table 5, an instructive comparison can be made. The six nonwestern dependencies average a much lower compliance level on Cold War votes despite a slightly higher dependence score average. The inference to be drawn is that western hemisphere dependence produces markedly more Assembly compliance than does dependence elsewhere in the world. And, to the extent that this tentative conclusion is correct, it is consistent with notions of geographical regions as identifiable subsystemic clusters of nations set apart by their interaction patterns.[37]

[37] One example of the controlling assumption that geographically-defined subsystems are valuable and defensible is Michael Brecher's "The Subordinate State System of Southern Asia," *World Politics*, 15 (January 1963), 213–255.

For both commodity and recipient concentrations the standard errors are sufficiently great so that no real confidence can be placed in their partial associations with voting in either issue category. But it does appear that recipient concentration can fairly be judged to have no effect upon dependencies' compliance, and the effect of commodity concentration is, at best, indeterminate.

Finally, the combined capacity of the four economic variables to account for variance in dependencies' compliance, measured by the squared multiple correlation coefficient (R^2), is .21 for Cold War votes and .18 for Others. In other words, the economic factors have only a modest impact on the voting behavior of the dependencies by this measure even though, as a group, these nations were earlier observed to differ markedly from other Assembly members in agreeing with the U.S. on Cold War issues.

To summarize, then, the dependencies proved to be distinctly compliant on Cold War voting occasions, so that the first hypothesis was apparently borne out in the context of the second. Characterizing the results concerning the third hypothesis is a more difficult task. The two economic factors expected to be of greatest importance *were* of greatest importance, but the signs of their partial regression coefficients were opposite to those hypothesized; the more economically developed dependencies tended to be in greater agreement with the U.S., as did those with relatively low export dependence scores. So what does all of this mean in broader terms? A few points of discussion are in order.

Discussion

This analysis of the behavior of U.S. dependencies in the mid-1960s prompts several points of discussion and speculation about the adequacy of the dependency theory advanced at the outset.

First, it is demonstrably true that the dependencies agreed with the U.S. more on Cold War votes than did the other countries in the study, consistent with the first and second hypotheses. What is not clear, however, is why this happened.

It may be, for example, that the dependencies were compliant because they were frequently reminded by the U.S. that their voting behavior on Cold War matters could affect their trade partnership. On the other hand, David Vital suggests that latent economic pressures are understood by dependencies: " . . . [possible sanctions] need not be put into full effect or even spelled out explicitly in diplomatic contacts for the desired political result to

be produced."[38] The aggregate data analyzed here cannot, of course, resolve the question.

The apparent absence of compliance on Other roll calls also merits some speculation. In keeping with the notion of issue salience, the fact that accord with the U.S. was higher for all nations on Other votes is relevant. This result may reflect the United States' willingness to accede to the wishes of other nations on issues it considered less salient and that they perceived to be important to their interests. If so, then U.S. agreement levels with its dependencies would not be expected to have been especially high on those occasions (Other votes) because it was not vulnerable to economic pressures from them; the economic ties were asymmetrical.

A second empirical result is that the dependency subsystem identified in this investigation was regional in two senses. On the one hand, its membership largely consisted of countries geographically clustered in the western hemisphere. But dependence also emerged as a regional phenomenon since the *western* dependencies exhibited the greatest degree of political compliance, the expected *consequence* of dependence.

Why was this so? Clearly the dependence theory, grounded in elementary international trade principles, is unable to account for the dramatically different compliance levels exhibited by the two subsets of dependencies. Indeed, greater doubt is cast on the appropriateness of the dependency theory by the discovered weakness of the total relationship between the dependency factors and political compliance.

Now, it may be that both of these threats to the theory could be silenced by fortifying the dependence theory, that is, by expanding it to include dependence upon foreign aid, international investment, and monetary relations, as well as upon trade. For example, it may be that western dependencies are more closely tied to the United States than are the other dependencies when several dimensions of economic dominance are considered simultaneously. Moreover, the merging of these economic possibilities might result in a greater statistical value for their combined relationship with compliance in the Assembly.

But attempting to defend an economic approach by suggesting its potential for expansion may seem too facile. Worse, such a strategy could become a barricade to further scientific inquiry if it were carried to extremes. Finally, and without prejudging the roles of unexamined economic influences, it nevertheless seems likely that some noneconomic factors affected the dependencies' voting behavior during the 1960s.

For example, governments of dependencies in the western hemisphere may have been more compliant because they feared the interventionist propensities of the United States, both overt (i.e., militarily) and covert, in "its own backyard." U.S. military ventures in Guatemala, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic had culminated in the "Johnson Doctrine" of 1965, a statement of intent to intervene whenever the U.S. perceived a communist threat in its hemisphere.[39] More recent covert intervention in Chile, officially acknowledged later in Washington, suggests that the "policeman's" active role in the hemisphere has been more frequent than military interventions alone would indicate.

A second noneconomic factor eliciting compliance from western dependencies might have been their fears of Castro's intent to export Communism in the region. In this example, contrary to the Johnson Doctrine notion, the U.S. and its dependencies in the hemisphere would have had a shared motive, a common, external threat perceived by the governments both of the dominant nations and of the more compliant subset of the dominated countries.

This study has not attempted to test such political influences on Assembly voting behavior. But the results presented here do indicate that factors other than the four trade-related determinants were at work. In other words, dependence relations have almost certainly been accompanied by many other types of motives that prompted Assembly delegates to cast their votes with and against the U.S. As Bruce Russett points out, some Assembly votes are based on domestic political considerations. At other times, roll call positions may reflect international, systemic pressures, even vote trading among delegations.[40]

Moreover, the character of global hierarchy is often said to have changed in important ways in the past decade. Accordingly, at least some of the salient motives of voting choice in the 1960s may no longer prevail. The growing scarcities of finite resources have already altered the fortunes of oil exporting countries. Whether

[38] Vital, *Inequality of States*, p. 90.

[39] See, for example, Thomas M. Franck and Edward Weisband, *Word Politics: Verbal Strategy Among the Superpowers* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972), especially chapter 5.

[40] This distinction between domestic and international factors is pursued by Russett, *International Regions*, chaps. 4 and 5.

or not comparable cartels will similarly reverse the economic circumstances of other poor societies, it seems likely that governmental leaders in dependencies will continue to be decreasingly compliant in their international economic and political behavior. (Recent anti-U.S. "majority tyranny" in the General Assembly is particularly suggestive in this regard.) If this is the case, then the ambiguous correspondence between theory and evidence found here can only decline in the absence of more adequate explanations of such international relations.

Nevertheless, a continuing focus on global hierarchies is encouraged by the findings of the research reported here and, more broadly, by the near certainty that international asymmetries will persist in the foreseeable future.

Primates and Political Authority: A Biobehavioral Perspective*

FRED H. WILLHOITE, JR.
Coe College

My central argument: There seem to be good reasons to believe that man's biological nature incorporates strong propensities to establish and sustain dominance-deference hierarchies within his social groupings; that is, the stratification of political authority, power, and influence may be *by nature* intrinsic to human social existence. If this hypothesis is tenable, a presupposition common to both liberal and radical political thought must be critically reconsidered and perhaps drastically revised.

The validity and utility of evolutionary-biological (or biobehavioral) analysis of political behavior are almost certainly not widely assumed, accepted, or even thought about very much, so far, by the great majority of political scientists. Nevertheless, this is a mode of analysis of human behavior that, in a variety of forms, is increasingly utilized by zoologists (especially ethologists, who study animal behavior), psychologists, anthropologists, and even a few sociologists.[1] Furthermore, there has been some writing along these lines by political scientists.[2]

Because numerous explanations and justifications of the basic premises of an evolutionary-biological perspective on human behavior appear in the sources which have been cited so far, I shall not present here any elaborate statement and defense of this approach.[3] Put very briefly, it involves assuming as the fundamental paradigm for the study of all living things (including man) the modern "neo-Darwinian" theory of evolution: species diverge and evolve as a result of the interactions of genetic variability, mutation, genetic recombination, and natural selection for fitness in given environments.[4] Since not merely the physical structure of an animal but also its behavior determines its evolutionary fitness, natural selection shapes the behavioral capabilities and propensities of every species and every individual.[5] Although in the hominid (prehuman and human species) line, generalized learning ability and intelligent adaptability have been strongly selected for, it is legitimate

* I am greatly indebted to Duane M. Rumbaugh, Georgia State University, for inspiring me to plunge into the primate literature, and to R. R. Larsen, Dalhousie University, and Roger D. Masters, Dartmouth College, for reading an earlier draft of this paper. Their criticisms were invaluable, but, of course, I alone should be held responsible for this final version.

[1] E. g., zoologists: Konrad Lorenz, *Studies in Animal and Human Behaviour*, Vol. II, trans. by Robert Martin (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971); N. Tinbergen, "On War and Peace in Animals and Man," *Science*, 160 (June 28, 1968), 1411–1418; Robert Bigelow, "The Evolution of Cooperation, Aggression, and Self-Control," in *Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, 1972*, ed. James K. Cole and Donald D. Jensen (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1972), pp. 1–57; psychologists: John Nash, *Developmental Psychology: A Psychobiological Approach* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey; Prentice-Hall, 1970); Donald O. Hebb, *Textbook of Psychology* (Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Co., 3rd ed., 1972), esp. chap. 11, "Emotion and Motivation: The Social Context"; anthropologists: J. N. Spuhler, "Sociocultural and Biological Inheritance in Man," in *Genetics*, ed. David C. Glass (New York: Rockefeller University Press, 1968), pp. 102-110; V. Reynolds, "Open Groups in Hominid Evolution," *Man*, 1 (December, 1966), 441–452; Lionel Tiger and Robin Fox, *The Imperial Animal* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971); sociologists: Bruce Eckland, "Genetics and Sociology: A Reconsideration," *American Sociological Review*, 32 (April, 1967), 173–194; Allan Mazur and Leon S. Robertson, *Biology and Social Behavior* (New York: Free Press, 1972).

[2] E. g., Peter A. Corning, "The Biological Bases of Behavior and Some Implications for Political Science," *World Politics*, 23 (April, 1971), 321–370; Roger D. Masters, "Genes, Language, and Evolution," *Semiotica*, 2,4 (1970), 295–320; Fred H. Willhoite, Jr., "Ethology and the Tradition of Political Thought," *Journal of Politics*, 33 (August, 1971), 615–641. For a cataloguing of political science articles influenced in a variety of ways by biological considerations, see Albert Somit, "Review Article: Biopolitics," *British Journal of Political Science*, 2 (April, 1972), 209–238.

[3] I would especially recommend to the curious reader, however, two of the most clearly written introductions to biobehavioral thinking: Robin Fox, "The Cultural Animal," in *Man and Beast: Comparative Social Behavior*, ed. J. F. Eisenberg and Wilton S. Dillon (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1971), pp. 273–296; Bigelow, "The Evolution of Cooperation, Aggression, and Self-Control." A work that may become a basic point of reference for all biobehavioral thinking is Edward O. Wilson, *Sociobiology: The New Synthesis* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1975).

[4] For lucid explanations of this theory, see Theodosius Dobzhansky, *Mankind Evolving* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962); George Gaylord Simpson, *The Meaning of Evolution* (New Haven: Yale University Press, revised ed., 1967), esp. chap. 14, "Forces of Evolution and Their Integration."

[5] For a review and explanation of some of the experimental evidence and basic theory on this point, see Gerald E. McClearn, "Behavioral Genetics: An Overview," *Merrill-Palmer Quarterly of Behavior and Development*, 14 (January, 1968), 9–24.

to infer that we have inherited both cognitive and affective biases which significantly and differentially influence our learning processes.[6] That is, because we are the products of an evolutionary history, we are genetically "programmed" to learn and persist in certain kinds of behaviors much more readily than is the case with other possible behaviors (and probably also, to a limited degree, to respond in stereotyped ways to certain types of stimuli). This does not necessarily mean that a particular behavior is *inevitable*, rather that heredity significantly affects the *probability* of its development.[7]

Setting out from these premises, how might we discover what kinds of evolved behavioral propensities in man may be relevant to comprehending and theorizing about political behavior? This effort invariably requires speculation about the nature of man's evolution, given the paucity, so far, of knowledge of the human behavioral genotype. Speculation can be, of course, more or less well grounded in and consistent with available evidence. The principal types of data used thus far in efforts to reconstruct the course of hominid evolution are studies of the behavior of other animal species (especially subhuman primates), interpretations of prehominid and hominid fossils, and observations of the behavior of contemporary Stone Age peoples. There are major problems in the evolutionary interpretation of each of these categories of data, but new discoveries of considerable significance and suggestiveness are constantly being reported — especially in the areas of primate behavior and hominid fossil-hunting. Reconstructions based on scientifically conscientious speculation seem at least deserving of serious consideration by all students of human behavior.

Relevance of Primate Studies

So far as scientific evidence is concerned, I shall focus primarily upon studies and interpretations of subhuman primate behavior, a field which has developed rapidly only in the past fifteen years. Carefully drawn analogies (and, to some degree, perhaps, homologies)[8] between behavior patterns in monkeys and apes and human behaviors are both legitimate and enlightening. A leading primate behavior theorist and an anthropologist conclude: " . . . to understand human societies, one needs to discover the lineaments of them in subhuman primate societies. This now seems possible."[9]

Monkeys and apes are considered to be of great significance for the study of man primarily because they are our nearest evolutionary relatives. Among the major primate groups, divergences from common ancestors occurred, probably, from about ten to fifty million years ago. Most recently on this time scale predecessors of present-day great apes (chimpanzees, gorillas, orangutans) and of hominids diverged; next most recently, precursors of Old World monkeys (e.g., macaques, baboons) diverged from the primate line that eventually led to man; and long before that time, the New World monkeys (e.g., spider monkeys, squirrel monkeys) had differentiated from the primate line which ultimately produced Old World monkeys, apes, and hominids. An eminent primatologist points out that man shares a considerable degree of genetic potential with apes and monkeys and that anthropoid primates have been very conservative species which have departed little from the ancestral pattern of primate structure. Thus, he concludes, it is quite reasonable to assume that studies of ape and monkey behavior can pro-

[6] Nash, *Developmental Psychology*, pp. 59, 116, 158, 233; David A. Hamburg, "Emotions in the Perspective of Human Evolution," in *Expression of the Emotions in Man*, ed. Peter H. Knapp (New York: International Universities Press, 1963), 300–317; Sherwood L. Washburn and David A. Hamburg, "The Study of Primate Behavior," in *Primate Behavior: Field Studies of Monkeys and Apes*, ed. Irven DeVore (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), pp. 5–6.

[7] The computer "programming" analogy is developed in effective heuristic fashion in Tiger and Fox, *The Imperial Animal*, chap. 1, "Beginning Biogrammar." For a wealth of clearly explicated experimental evidence for the biobehavioral perspective, see *Biological Boundaries of Learning*, ed. Martin E. P. Seligman and Joanne L. Hager (New York: Appleton-Century-crofts, 1972).

[8] For a helpful attempt to specify the levels of comparison between human behavior and that of other species, see Roger D. Masters, "Functional Approaches to Analogical Comparison Between Species," Paper presented at Conference on the Logic of Inference from Animal to Human Behavior, sponsored by the International Council on the Social Sciences, 1973. Masters distinguishes between a biological "analogy," which refers to common functions served by similar behaviors, and "homology," in which similarities between species stem from a common evolutionary ancestry. (Thus "those characteristics which are more or less common to all primates" might well constitute homologies. [Masters, personal communication.])

[9] Michael R. A. Chance and Clifford J. Jolly, *Social Groups of Monkeys, Apes and Men* (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1970), p. 209. The following are examples of anthropologists' attempts to reconstruct the origins of man and of his species-typical behavioral propensities, largely on the basis of primate studies: Reynolds, "Open Groups in Hominid Evolution"; Robin Fox, "In the Beginning: Aspects of Hominid Behavioural Evolution," *Man*, 2, (September, 1967), 415–433; C. J. Jolly, "The Seed-Eaters: A New Model of Hominid Differentiation Based on a Baboon Analogy," *Man*, 5 (March, 1970), 5–26.

vide indirect evidence for the impact of evolution on man's behavior. Especially is this the case if the species studied lives in an environment similar to that which early man probably inhabited (presumably because in different ecological settings differing phenotypical behaviors will be manifested by separate populations of the same species — if the genotypical behavioral range of a species is relatively broad).[10]

In regard to my central argument, then, what might we learn from primate behavior studies that may help us to comprehend a behavioral pattern ubiquitously noted in human societies — the differential distribution of authority, power, and influence (political stratification)? Essentially, I agree that "political institutions, and particularly high ranking political roles, seem functionally analogous to dominance hierarchies such as those found among many primates."[11] But further, this question must be considered: how likely does it seem that these functional similarities stem, in part, from evolved behavioral propensities common to man and other primate species?

Difficulties and complications immediately arise in attempting to discern the behavioral referents of "dominance" in various studies of primate behavior. (Other terms which are sometimes used, apparently as synonyms of "dominance," are "status hierarchy" and "rank order.") Frequently the direction and outcome of agonistic encounters (threats and attacks) are used as indicators of dominance; in other cases a primary measure is differential access to incentives (e.g., food, estrous females, favored resting places); and sometimes a study focuses on leadership (or "forefronting") of group movement. These — and other proposed measures of rank order — are not invariably intercorrelated in every group of every primate species that has been studied.[12] Despite formidable methodological difficulties and, sometimes, conceptual ambiguity, almost every study of primate social groupings among a wide variety of species has discerned definite rank differentiations among group members. Very frequently these relationships have been more clearly evidenced in deferential and submissive behaviors than in assertive and intrusive activities. This point is emphasized by Hans Kummer, a leading student — both in field and in laboratory settings — of baboon behavior; Kummer asserts that it is the general rule among primate species that younger and weaker individuals defer to older and stronger ones and that males rank higher than females of the same age. Each group member learns its own rank of dominance. Fighting to determine or clarify rank order is relatively infrequent (but can be decisive when it does occur). The dominance order within a group seems to result primarily from some individuals learning — through experience — automatic deference to certain others, with respect to agonistic encounters or access to incentives.[13]

Four Primate Species

Credence may more readily attach to these generalizations if the nature and structure of

[10] John Napier, *The Roots of Mankind* (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1970), p. 219. An important animal behavior approach that supplements significantly the primatologists' efforts to understand human behavior is the study of predators. Since man evolved as a hunter-gatherer, "human social systems are the product of the selective forces operating on man the primate and man the carnivore . . . " (George B. Schaller and Gordon R. Lowther, "The Relevance of Carnivore Behavior to the Study of Early Hominids," *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology*, 25 [Winter, 1969], 336). Study of hunting species may reveal types of selective forces and convergent patterns of adaptation intrinsic to this way of life — despite the enormous phylogenetic distance between predators and man. Evidence thus far is somewhat equivocal, but there appear to be intraspecies competition and some forms — widely varying — of dominance-submission behavior in lions, hyenas, wild dogs, and wolves. The analogies between wolf pack structure and behavior and human social groups are especially striking. On lions, see George B. Schaller, *The Serengeti Lion: A Study of Predator-Prey Relations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), esp. chap. 5; on hyenas, Hans Kruuk, *The Spotted Hyena: A Study of Predation and Social Behavior* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), esp. chap. 6; on wild dogs, Hugo and Jane van Lawick-Goodall, *Innocent Killers* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1971), pp. 49–101; on wolves, Jerome H. Woolpy, "The Social Organization of Wolves," *Natural History*, 77 (May, 1968), 46–55, and L. David Mech, *The Wolf: The Ecology and Behavior of an Endangered Species* (Garden City, New York: Natural History Press, 1970), esp. chap. 3. For a preliminary attempt to compare the behavior of primates and carnivores to presumed behavior patterns of man's ancestors, see Schaller and Lowther, "The Relevance of Carnivore Behavior to the Study of Early Hominids."

[11] Roger D. Masters, "On Comparing Humans — and Human Politics — with Animal Behavior," Paper presented to 1973 International Political Science Association Congress, p. 10.
Congress, p. 10.

[12] Irwin S. Bernstein, "Primate Status Hierarchies," in *Primate Behavior: Developments in Field and Laboratory Research*, Vol. I, ed. Leonard A. Rosenblum (New York and London: Academic Press, 1970), pp. 71–109.

[13] Hans Kummer, *Primate Societies: Group Techniques of Ecological Adaptation* (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1971), pp. 58–61. The tentativeness of all generalizations must be persistently kept in mind in considering observational data from such a recently developed and rapidly changing field as primate behavior study.

dominance hierarchies in some particular primate groups are succinctly reviewed. I have singled out for this treatment studies of rhesus macaques, savanna-dwelling baboons, gorillas, and chimpanzees — primarily because one or more of these species has been commonly treated as the primate from which we might draw the most nearly valid analogies concerning the behavior of our prehominid and early hominid ancestors.[14]

The rhesus macaque is a primarily terrestrial monkey native to India and some neighboring areas of southern Asia. The representatives of this species whose behavior has been most intensively studied, however, live on Cayo Santiago, a small island off the east coast of Puerto Rico; these are descendants of a breeding stock transplanted to this location by a primatologist in 1938.[15]

In his study, Kaufmann found in a troop of about 150 monkeys a clear-cut linear dominance hierarchy among the adult males, as determined by physical displacements of one animal by another and by the direction of aggressive and submissive signals. There appeared to be distinct rank orders both for different groups of males and for individuals within those groupings. Most dominant were mature adult males in a "central hierarchy." Next in line were young adult males who tended to act together as a group to defend against attacks on one of them by other males; some of these young males were beginning to infiltrate the central hierarchy. Lowest in the male rank order were animals that were mainly orphans or sons of females in other bands; because of their usual location in relation to the rest of the band, these are referred to as "peripheral males." (In the study of macaques in India, a similar band structure was found. There was, however, less clear-cut ranking of every individual male, because two males who ranked lower than another individual would frequently team up to become dominant over him.[16] This kind of "coalition behavior" will be noted as significant also for savanna-dwelling baboons and chimpanzees.)

What are the social functions of the dominance hierarchy in the rhesus band? The "alpha" (most dominant individual) male was usually followed by the females in the band who had young infants. Although he infrequently initiated group movement, an initiative was seldom successful unless he participated in it. When the band was on the move, the males in the central hierarchy tended to remain in the center of its ranks, along with most of the females and infants. These dominant males also intervened to stop nearly every fight that was observed to break out between any other members of the band; this was done usually by running toward the combatants and threatening them visually or vocally. Finally, a positive correlation was noted between males' ranks and the extent of their mating behavior; presumably the higher ranking males were most successful in fathering offspring.[17]

Savanna-dwelling baboons live in numerous areas of southern and eastern Africa, and their behavior has been studied fairly extensively in the field.[18] These monkeys are close evolutionary kin to the macaques, and are similar to them behaviorally in many ways. Thus a type of male dominance hierarchy found among some baboon troops appears to be a linear rank order with one adult male clearly and consistently in the alpha position.[19] But in other troops the dominance hierarchy involves a more complex form of the "teaming" or "coalition" behavior observed among macaques in India. (In these studies, dominance was determined by noting relatively stereotyped aggressive sequences among males and, to a lesser degree, by differential access to incentives such as estrous females and food provided by human observers.)[20]

Usually (though not invariably), if there are three or more adult males in the troop, the more complex kind of hierarchy develops. For example, in one troop there were six fully adult males. Three of these animals frequently

[14] For such assertions about baboons and macaques, see Napier, p. 219; about chimpanzees, see Alison Jolly, *The Evolution of Primate Behavior* (New York: Macmillan, 1972), p. 132.

[15] For a study of this species in one of its native habitats, see Charles H. Southwick, Mirza Azhar Beg, and M. Rafiq Siddiqi, "Rhesus Monkeys in North India," in *Primate Behavior*, ed. DeVore, pp. 111–159. Most of the description and analysis of rhesus behavior in the text is drawn from one of the Cayo Santiago studies: John H. Kaufmann, "Social Relations of Adult Males in a Free-ranging Band of Rhesus Monkeys," in *Social Communication Among Primates*, ed. Stuart A. Altmann (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), pp. 73–98.

[16] Southwick *et al*, pp. 144–151.

[17] Kaufmann, *passim*.

[18] This account is based on K.R.L. Hall and Irven DeVore, "Baboon Social Behavior," in *Primate Behavior*, ed. DeVore, pp. 53–110; and on I. DeVore, "Male Dominance and Mating Behavior in Baboons," in *Sex and Behavior*, ed. Frank A. Beach (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965), pp. 266–289.

[19] Such a structure was reported in five troops by Hall and DeVore, p. 54.

[20] DeVore, "Male Dominance and Mating Behavior in Baboons, p. 269.

teamed with one another to defend against challenges or attacks from other adult males. None of the other three males in the band was ever seen to co-operate with any other individual. Thus, although one of these latter was individually the most dominant male in the band, any two or all three of the "co-operators" together were dominant over him. The latter trio were therefore considered to be the "central hierarchy" of the band. In another band, the significance of "coalition behavior" for dominance structure became clearly evident when one member of a two-male central hierarchy disappeared. Almost at once a formerly subordinate male displaced the remaining member of the central hierarchy and was soon joined in a new coalition of that type by a male that had only recently joined the band.[21] Membership in the troop's central hierarchy seemed to facilitate a male's success in copulating with females at the peak of estrus (when they are most likely to conceive), even as compared to individually *more* dominant males outside the central hierarchy.[22]

The social functions of the dominance hierarchy appear to be quite similar to those discerned in bands of macaques. Troop members ordinarily orient their attention to and follow the cues of the most dominant males. Thus, in troop movements, even though less dominant males usually go ahead of the troop, these animals sometimes get temporarily separated from the body of the troop because the central hierarchy males have taken another direction. As with the macaques, the most dominant males ordinarily remain in the center of the troop on the move, along with females and their infants. As soon as any strange or predatory animal is sighted (usually signalled by a barking sound from one of the peripheral males ahead, behind, or at the side of the troop), the central hierarchy males rush to confront in concert whatever danger may be present. Also like macaques, dominant male baboons — and almost exclusively the most dominant — frequently intervene to break up fights among other members of the troop, usually by means of noisy and menacing, agonistic threats which seldom result in actual fighting. In sum, "the main characteristics of baboon social organization . . . are derived from a complex dominance pattern among adult males that usually ensures stability and comparative peacefulness within the group, maximum protection for mothers with infants, and the highest probability that offspring will be fathered by the most dominant males."[23]

The primate species which are phylogenetically nearest to man are the African great apes — the gorilla and the chimpanzee.[24] The gorilla is an endangered species now confined to certain lowland and mountainous rainforest areas of central Africa. Only the mountain gorilla has thus far been studied in the wild, but considerable attention has been given to its dominance-oriented behavior.[25]

Gorillas live in relatively permanent groups of from two to thirty individuals. They wander daily over large home ranges, feeding on relatively abundant types of plants. A typical group consists of one or more fully mature ("silver-backed") males, several females, half a dozen juveniles and infants, and one or more less mature ("black-backed") males. Also some "lone males" were observed (though no lone females); these animals seemed to associate freely with certain groups but never remained with any group for an extended period of time.

Group organization is quite cohesive. It features a central core composed of a dominant silver-backed male and all of the females and young. All other males, both silver-backed and black-backed, tend to assume peripheral positions as the group spreads out over a relatively small area (rarely exceeding two hundred square feet) to feed. Rank order largely correlates with body size; silver-backed males are dominant over all black-backed males, females, and young. If there are two or more silver-backed males in a group, they are arranged in a linear dominance hierarchy.

Dominance is most often expressed with respect to positions along narrow trails or in favored sitting places. A subordinate animal ordinarily moves aside to be supplanted by a dominant individual; the latter's mere approach or brief stare at the subordinate is usually a sufficient stimulus to effect this change. Occasionally the dominant animal gives the lower-ranking one a light tap with the back of the hand, which always produces movement by the subordinate.

[21] DeVore, p. 280.
[22] *Ibid.*, pp. 274, 281.
[23] Hall and DeVore, p. 71.
[24] For a lucid explanation of the evidence for this evolutionary relationship, see S. L. Washburn and Ruth Moore, *Ape Into Man: A Study of Human Evolution* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), pp. 11–29.
[25] This description is based primarily on George B. Schaller, "The Behavior of the Mountain Gorilla," in *Primate Behavior*, ed. DeVore, pp. 324–367. For a much more elaborate account of the same study, see George B. Schaller, *The Mountain Gorilla: Ecology and Behavior* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963).

The dominant male in a gorilla group functions as its leader. Every group member seems to be constantly aware of the activity of the "alpha" male, and cues reflecting a change in the activity of the group are taken from him. Every part of the daily routine — travel, location of rest stops and feeding places, time and place of nesting — appears to be largely determined by the leader. In one case of a perceived external threat (the human observer), the leader dropped behind the fleeing group to face the intruder. When the group is moving rapidly, the leader is at or near the front of it; when its movements are slow, he is often located in the center or near the end of the group. Maintenance of order does not appear to be a significant function of the dominant male-leader — primarily because intragroup aggressiveness is confined to staring, snapping at, or bluff-charging another group member. Even these kinds of interactions were extremely rare.[26]

The final species included in this brief survey is the chimpanzee, which lives in rainforest and woodland areas of central Africa.[27] Until very recently, it was believed that chimpanzees do not live in closed, permanent groups, as do savanna baboons and macaques. Jane Goodall reported that, within a large home range, chimpanzees move about in small temporary groups which may consist of any combination of age and sex classes: "The only group that may be stable over a period of several years is a mother with her infant and young juvenile offspring."[28]

But in 1971, dramatic changes began to occur in the life of the Gombe Reserve (Tanzania) chimpanzee population which Goodall and her colleagues have been observing for a decade and a half. The whole large group suddenly divided into two separate groups, which occupied distinct territories and became overtly aggressive toward each other. Young males now "patrol" the boundaries between their group's territory and their "enemy's." These terms may seem overly anthropomorphic, but when such "patrols" sight a lone chimp not be longing to their group, they are likely to chase that individual and attack viciously if the outsider is caught. Several all-out bloody fights between members of these two groups have been witnessed, and at least three infants and three adults have been fatally wounded since early 1974.[29]

The early field reports on chimpanzee behavior[30] also reported such a paucity of dominance-submission interactions that Goodall questioned the feasibility of applying the dominance concept to a local chimpanzee population as a whole. Further study has persuaded her, however, that hierarchy and dominance are central features of chimpanzee group life. Although the hierarchy is not a neat and rigid progression of linear dominance, both high- and low-ranking individuals usually have clear-cut statuses. An individual's rank may vary, depending upon the social-behavioral context (e.g., the presence or absence of other family members), an individual's current motivation level, or the animal's "mood."[31]

However, Goodall determined that, in general, "the social status of each individual was . . . fairly well defined."[32] In dyadic encounters — usually competition for bananas provided by the observers — which animals would prevail became highly predictable. Furthermore, some animals frequently vacated favored resting places when approached by certain others. In such interactions, all females were normally subordinate to all mature males.

The male dominance structure is somewhat similar to that of savanna baboons, although dominance-deference interactions appear to be less frequent among chimpanzees than among baboons. The basic common feature is the

[26] Much more aggressiveness and activity than Schaller noted has been observed by Dian Fossey, who is currently engaged in a much longer-term study of mountain gorillas than was Schaller's. E.g., she observed some skirmishes between gorilla groups and, in three cases, saw lone males enter a group and engage in fights in which infants were killed (Jane Goodall, "Intra-specific Aggression," Lecture delivered to Human Biology Core Course, Stanford University, October 17, 1975).

[27] Most of our information on chimpanzee behavior comes from studies done by or under the direction of Jane Goodall, whose observations in the field began in 1960 and are still continuing. To date (January, 1976) her most comprehensive scientific report is Jane van Lawick-Goodall, "The Behaviour of Free-Living Chimpanzees in the Gombe Stream Reserve," *Animal Behaviour Monographs*, 1, part 3 (1968), 165–311. See also Jane Goodall, "Chimpanzees of the Gombe Stream Reserve," in *Primate Behavior*, ed. DeVore, pp. 425–473 (Jane Goodall and Jane van Lawick-Goodall are the same person); also Vernon Reynolds and Frances Reynolds, "Chimpanzees of the Budongo Forest," in the same volume, pp. 368–424.

[28] Van Lawick-Goodall, p. 167. In their study, the Reynoldses concurred (pp. 393–396).

[29] Goodall, "Intra-specific Aggression"; see also Michael T. Malloy, "Man See, Man Do," *National Observer* (December 6, 1975), 1, 18.

[30] Those of Goodall and the Reynoldses in *Primate Behavior*.

[31] Jane Goodall, "Social Hierarchy and Dominance," Lecture delivered to Human Biology Core Course, Stanford University, October 13, 1975.

[32] Van Lawick-Goodall, p. 212.

presence of co-operative, or "coalition"-type behavior within the dominance-competition context in both species. As with baboons, two chimpanzees may combine to express dominance over a single animal to which both "coalition" partners are individually subordinate. But at any time within a group, one male clearly occupies the "alpha" position; he most frequently threatens and sometimes attacks the other males but is almost never attacked and seldom threatened by any of them. Infrequently, certain young but mature males try to displace the current alpha male. Within the Gombe population, three successful attempts have been observed, and in two cases the challenger was supported closely in agonistic encounters by another mature male (known in one case to be the challenger's brother). Some males seem much more highly motivated to engage in dominance competition than do others, and intelligence seems to be more important than size and strength as a determinant of success in rising to the alpha position.[33]

Discerning the adaptive functions of dominance-deference behavior in chimpanzees is very difficult, and the leading observers of their behavior in the wild have largely refrained from speculating on this point. The recent events at Gombe suggest the possibility that the hierarchical order may serve, in most circumstances, to restrain overt expressions of the dangerous — even deadly — aggressiveness which these animals have now surprisingly manifested. But why they are that aggressive is another unsolved evolutionary puzzle; the aggressiveness might be, in part, a phylogenetic holdover from an earlier, savanna-dwelling phase of chimpanzee evolution.[34] But perhaps, ironically, comparisons with human behavior might prove to be the most promising route for arriving at some understanding of intraspecifically lethal, group-territorial aggressive behavior in chimpanzees.

Primate-based Stratification Concepts

A sociologist has recently argued that biologically based proclivities may well be a cause of dominance-deference behavior in various primate species, including man.[35] Mazur points out that status differentiation within established face-to-face groups exists in all known human cultures. Extracting from the sociological literature seven characteristics typical of such status orders, he seeks to compare the behavior of seven primate species — ranging from the most primitive in evolutionary terms, the tree shrew, to man's nearest relatives, chimpanzees and gorillas — with respect to these traits of human groups. On the basis of admittedly incomplete evidence, Mazur concludes that most of these status-relevant behaviors are manifested in subhuman primate species and that a trend seems to exist for more of these traits to appear in species which are closer to than those which are more distant from man on the evolutionary time-scale. He concludes that status differentiation *as such* (i.e., the underlying pattern of motivation for the great variety of particular forms this phenomenon assumes among different groups in diverse cultures) very probably has a "noncultural" (phylogenetic) basis. Indeed, he tentatively advances an even broader suggestion: "Perhaps sociologists whose interests are limited to humans should accept cross-species behaviors as 'given' and requiring no further explanation, as most of us accept hunger and the sex drive as given."[36]

The relevance of primate behavior studies to the understanding of political stratification in human societies may be clarified somewhat through consideration of two theoretical conceptions that have been advanced by primatologists. One of these is an essentially functional concept: Bernstein notes that in numerous species of Old and New World monkeys

[33] Van Lawick-Goodall, p. 212; Goodall, "Social Hierarchy and Dominance."

[34] According to Robin Fox, recent Japanese work indicates that the chimpanzee once had a wider distribution and lived in open territory. When faced with open country, chimpanzee groups became tightly organized in apparent expectation of predatory attacks; for example, such groups exclude young, subadult males. (Robin Fox, "Alliance and Constraint: Sexual Selection in the Evolution of Human Kinship Systems, in *Sexual Selection and the Descent of Man 1871–1971*, ed. Bernard Campbell [Chicago: Aldine, 1972], p. 295.)

[35] Allan Mazur, "A Cross-Species Comparison of Status in Small Established Groups," *American Sociological Review*, 38 (October, 1973), 513–530.

[36] *Ibid.*, pp. 513-514, 517-525, 526. Mazur's argument strikes me as consistent with the primate data and as logically persuasive. I believe that he is unnecessarily restrictive, however, in asserting that "there is no biological justification" for concluding that "large-scale social stratification must also be a noncultural characteristic" (p. 527). While it is certainly correct that macro-stratification has not been observed in nonhuman primates, that is fundamentally because of man's most important species distinction — an enormously developed symbolizing capacity, manifested primarily through language. In a book which Mazur cites because of his apparent disagreement with its authors on this point, Tiger and Fox argue cogently that the macrostructures of human societies exist only because of man's symbolic-cultural capacities but that symbolism mainly and fundamentally expresses variations on a finite number of behavioral themes which may be discerned by means of thorough and careful cross-species comparisons. (*The Imperial Animal*, pp. 10–20, 34–35, 217–18.)

and apes (including the species reviewed above, except perhaps for the chimpanzee), a 'control role," "defending group or troop members against internal and external sources of disturbance, has been recognized . . ." This social role has been noted in nearly all species which manifest strong intragroup dominance relationships and also in some species in which rank order is either difficult to discern or very poorly developed.[37]

Recently Bernstein has suggested that an established rank order within a primate group contributes to the regularity and predictability of individuals' responses and thus to the ordered distribution of roles — essentially to the maintenance of order — within the group. He even concludes that intragroup aggression seems "to be motivated *primarily* by efforts to preserve established social position and to enforce expected patterns of social behavior, rather than resulting from active competition leading to conflict."[38] In sum, social order itself — at least among a number of primate species — may be mainly a consequence of individuals' motivations to establish and maintain places for themselves in a dominance-deference rank order.

A somewhat more highly developed conception — a kind of "proto-theory" — has been formulated by Michael Chance and elaborated by him in collaboration with Clifford Jolly.[39] Chance is leery of functional generalizations, given the fragmentary state of current data on primate behavior. He considers a structural conception to be much more tenable and thus advances the idea of "attention structure" as the behavioral common denominator in most, if not all, rank-oriented primate groups. Instead of differential access to incentives,

> A more rewarding way of defining the dominance status of a supremely dominant individual is that he or she is the *focus of attention* of those holding subordinate status within the same group. . . .
> A redefinition of dominance is now proposed on the assumption that the attention-binding effect of an animal in a group is essentially the quality which puts it in a behaviourally focal position, and which also tends to place it near the group's spatial centre. The dominant animal therefore may be said to dominate the attention of others at most, if not all, times, and usually without specific actions to do so.[40]

In this perspective, the focus is on the behavior of subordinates as much as if not more than on that of dominant animals, and the differential distribution of group members' attention does appear to hold consistently across group structures in many more primate species than is the case with aggressive dominance or linear rank order. Among savanna baboons and macaques the central hierarchy males are very much the predominant focus of attention, both of females, who remain relatively near them, and of peripheral males, who most often remain a certain distance away from the spatial center of the troop. Members of a gorilla group seem to take nearly all their behavioral cues from the dominant silver-backed male, while other mature males remain in locations peripheral to the core of the group. Processes of group movement and of inter-male agonistic competition in chimpanzees indicate that some of these animals tend to exert an attention-binding effect on the others.[41] The "attention structure" concept also seems to account for rank order behavior among species not specifically discussed above, such as Japanese and bonnet macaques and hamadryas baboons.[42]

Of critical importance for Chance's proto-theory is the "concept of attention structure as a *cause* as well as an effect" of dominance.[43] For it is on this hypothesis that Chance and Jolly base their interpretation of charismatic leadership (in Weber's sense) in human societies. Rather than being attended to because of his position in the official dominance hier-

[37] Bernstein, "Primate Status Hierarchies," p. 74.

[38] Irwin S. Bernstein and Thomas P. Gordon, "The Function of Aggression in Primate Societies," *American Scientist*, 62 (May–June, 1974), 308.

[39] The initial formulation occurs in M. R. A. Chance, "Attention Structure as the Basis of Primate Rank Orders," *Man*, 2 (December, 1967), 503–518; see also Chance and Jolly, *Social Groups of Monkeys, Apes, and Men*, pp. 173–175.

[40] Chance, p. 509. Emphasis in the original.

[41] A particularly dramatic instance of rank-order change — one male's displacing another in the alpha position — can be readily interpreted as demonstrating the importance of attention structure among chimpanzees. This transformation was caused by an adult male's discovering some empty kerosene cans, seizing them, and using them to make an unusually horrendous noise during a ritualistic "charging run," one of the principal forms of dominance competition among adult males of this species. The attention that he thereby drew to himself persisted, and — after several nonviolent agonistic contests — he was deferred to by all other group members, including the previous alpha male. See Jane van Lawick-Goodall, "Some Aspects of Aggressive Behaviour in a Group of Free-living Chimpanzees," *International Social Science Journal*, 23, 1 (1971), 93–95; also van Lawick-Goodall, *In the Shadow of Man* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1971), pp. 112–117.

[42] Chance and Jolly, p. 174. Some criticisms of the "attention structure" conception are mentioned briefly in Alison Jolly, *The Evolution of Primate Behavior*, pp. 192–193.

[43] Chance, p. 511. My emphasis.

archy, the charismatic individual attains some kind and degree of dominance by means of his capacity to attract the attention of individuals who then become his adherents. In times of severe social crisis, confused and frightened people are more likely to attend to individuals who promise them personal or political salvation solely on the authority of that individual's distinctive personhood or the doctrine which he seems to embody. Because such individuals tend to receive attention far out of proportion to their objective ability to remedy the perceived crisis, "in attempting to explain charismatic movements we should look for the operation of an ethologically based attention-binding mechanism." Further evidence for such a "mechanism" is that not infrequently political leaders "capture the primitive allegiance of groups of men without necessarily having displayed a policy at that stage."[44]

Several anthropologists have attempted thus far to apply Chance's "attention structure" concept to the analysis of human political and social status hierarchies.[45]

I shall single out for brief discussion Larsen's formulations, since he seeks to integrate Bernstein's "control role" into the "attention structure" framework. Specifically, Larsen speculates that the control role — "defending group or troop members against internal and external sources of disturbance" — is the primary *function* of the centripetal hierarchical attention *structure*.[46]

From this perspective, Larsen seeks to reinterpret Weber's typology of traditional, legal, and charismatic authority. It seems more parsimonious to propose that there may be only one basic *type* of authority — a centripetal attention structure — and that Weber's "types" represent various stages or manifestations of this pattern. "Charismatic leadership" would thus "be viewed as a raw expression of attention structuring and the process of recreating centripetal hierarchy." This "primitive adaptive process" meets the urgent needs of followers in crisis circumstances, for it "facilitates group cohesion, integration, and stress reduction." Traditional and legal authority can be seen, then, as resulting from the routinization and institutionalization of centripetal attention structures (Weber's "routinization of charisma"), and "successful routinization involves providing the same satisfactions as the primitive pattern does."[47]

Evolution and Dominance

The argument that propensities to learn and persist in some form of dominance-deference behavior may well inhere in the human genotype requires some support from the highly controversial sphere of speculations about man's evolutionary history. The hominid fossil record is extremely fragmentary, certainly does not speak for itself, and obviously includes no fossilized behavior (though much can be discerned about diet from teeth, posture and gait from leg bones, manual dexterity from hand bones, and culture from artifacts associated with bones). Nevertheless, holding that we have inherited behavioral proclivities requires some kind of attempt to reconstruct how and why certain behaviors may have evolved — that is, what their adaptive value could have been for our evolutionary ancestors.

Because this topic is very broad and complex, and to do it justice would require extended separate treatment, I shall focus on only one speculative reconstruction[48] — Robert Bigelow's "The Evolution of Cooperation, Aggression, and Self-Control."[49] This account very ably integrates paleontological, anatomical, genetic, ecological, psychological, historical, anthropological, and ethological data (including a significant emphasis on primate behavior) into an explanatory theory of human evolution in which dominance-deference behavior plays an essential part. (The reader should keep very much in mind, however, that Bigelow's version of man's evolution is presented here only as an *example* of such a reconstruction; it is in no sense "proved" or "definitive" and on numerous points is open to honest disagreement and criticism.) Bigelow's central concern is to explain the evolutionary growth in size of the human brain. The fossil record seems to indicate that the brain in the hominid line has at least doubled and perhaps tripled in average size during the past three million years, and that this trend was apparently an accelerating process, with the bulk of the increase occurring during the past million years or less. Within the perspective of evolutionary time, this is an extremely brief period for a structure as incredibly complex as the

[44] Chance and Jolly, pp. 208-209.

[45] See, e.g., Lionel Tiger, "Dominance in Human Societies," *Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics*, 1 (1970), 298–301; Tiger and Fox, *The Imperial Animal*, pp. 39–51; R. R. Larsen, "Leaders and Non-Leaders: Speculation on Charisma," Paper presented to 1973 Southern Political Science Association Meeting.

[46] Larsen, p. 3.

[47] *Ibid.*, pp. 7–8.

[48] For some other representative viewpoints, see fn. 9.

[49] See fn. 1.

brain of *Homo sapiens* to develop. (An individual's brain size *per se* does not necessarily signify a particular level of intelligence, but in comparisons between species, size correlates very highly with complexity of organization, hence with species-typical intelligence.) Thus some distinctive selective pressures must have been working upon the hominid line; Bigelow's controversial hypothesis is that the most influential of these forces (in conjunction with generally accepted ones such as tool-making and tool-use) was intergroup competition among hominids — not limited to but definitely including aggressive violence.[50]

According to Bigelow, it seems possible, even likely, that this is how we evolved: Early hominids, as primates, lived in social groups; intragroup communication and co-ordination were necessary to protect these ground-dwellers against predators such as lions and leopards.[51] Hominids would have needed a capacity to respond aggressively against attacks, coupled with an ability to control potentially disruptive aggression during intragroup encounters. Groups competed occasionally with others for food and mates, though natural selection would have minimized such competition when hominids were seriously vulnerable to predators and thus needed to attend primarily to their defenses against other species. When such intergroup contests did occur, however, their outcome normally was determined by capacities for aggressive and intelligent group response (which necessitates intragroup cooperation).[52]

As brains and, consequently, social capacities, evolved, abilities to deal more effectively with predators increased so that hominid intergroup competition could, and presumably did, intensify (largely for the territories most capable of supporting a hunting-gathering way of life). On the average the most co-operative, intelligently self-controlled groups would have succeeded in driving competing groups into less desirable peripheral areas. Successful human groups were the selective force which pushed less intelligently co-operative groups into relatively inhospitable habitats, severely lessening their chances of contributing to the genetic future of the species. As intelligence increased, some individuals would have become capable of perceiving the advantages of co-operation with groups other than their own; this would have required not only intelligence but self-control in the form of inhibitions against attacking former enemies. A primary motive of intergroup co-operation, presumably, was to compete more effectively with still other human groups, and the selective premium on an optimal combination of intragroup (or intra-coalition) co-operation and intelligent self-control for the sake of effective intergroup competition would have increased. Success stemming from these traits, in a positive feedback process, would have selected for increased size and complexity of the brain.[53]

At some unknown point in hominid evolution, linguistic communication emerged (presumably as a result of selective pressures for more effective communication, building upon a foundation made up of relatively high intelligence in combination with a typical primate capacity for vocalization of signals).[54] This made possible even more highly co-ordinated intragroup activity and may well have intensified group integration. But language differences made communication even more difficult with members of other groups and would have acted as an additional impetus to intergroup misunderstanding and hostility. Thus, "conceptual and emotional differences between 'us' and 'them' would have been accentuated."[55]

Within this scenario for man's evolution, self-control is critical:

> Capacities for self-control are provided by the actual physical structure of the brain, particularly the cerebral cortex. The result of human evolution was not an array of bodiless "instincts," but a network of physical nerves and endocrine organs. As this physical organization became more complex and efficient it provided greater capacities for learning from experience, for the repression of emotional drives, and hence for more intelligent

[50] Bigelow, pp. 1–3. That there was an important degree of prehistoric intergroup violence is perhaps Bigelow's most controversial — and controverted — point. This is a fairly typical critique of it by an anthropologist: " . . . the evidence for intergroup violent competition is exceedingly weak when we look at modern hunter-gatherer groups, the pre-historic tool assemblages, and fossil remains. I do agree, however, that there probably was competition between groups and that it was most likely linked to relative efficiency of resource exploitation and rate of population growth rather than aggressive interaction." (R. R. Larsen, personal communication.) Goodall's recent observations, discussed above, of group-territorial aggression in chimpanzees may provide some support for Bigelow's speculations.

[51] Note the stress on the evolutionary importance of predation pressures on savanna baboons, in Irven DeVore and K. R. L. Hall, "Baboon Ecology," in *Primate Behavior*, ed. DeVore, p. 49.

[52] Bigelow, pp. 3–4.

[53] *Ibid.*, pp. 4–5.

[54] For relevant speculations, see Charles F. Hockett and Robert Ascher, "The Human Revolution," *Current Anthropology*, 5 (June, 1964), 135–147.

[55] Bigelow, pp. 42–43.

self-control. Human capacities for learning, communications, government, science, and art are products of biological evolution, just as running, or any other manifestation of animal behavior, is an expression of the biological potential of interacting muscles, bones, and nerves.[56]

"Self-control" (or apparent inhibition of basic drives) is evidenced in many primates—for example, in thirsty baboons waiting till their group as a unit moves to a water source, in an adult male hamadryas baboon's refraining from copulating with members of a neighbor's "harem," and in a central hierarchy savanna baboon's learning not to respond aggressively and competitively to the initiatives of his "coalition partners." In this context, the dominance hierarchy within a primate group can be seen as an evolved control system at a supra-individual level which tends to reinforce the self-control systems built into the nervous systems of individual group members.[57]

Man, Bigelow believes, is a typical primate in these respects. Without using the precise terms, he emphasizes the "control" function of dominance (and of the rules, laws, and customs enforced by dominant authorities) and, implicitly, the significance of a "centripetal attention structure" for coordinating vital intragroup co-operative efforts during the course of hominid evolution. We have inherited this readiness to learn dominance-deference behavior, and, Bigelow asserts, we still cannot do without effective dominance hierarchies. Like our ancestors, we combine capacities for violence and for self-control, but the latter is not automatically sufficient to control the former. We have learned to extend our co-operative self-control from the small scope of prehistoric clans and tribes to that of groups comprising hundreds of millions, but "We are still learning, and until we have learned to live in peace with one another on a global scale we will have to be restrained — by force, if necessary."[58]

Leaders and Followers

From a perspective which seeks to encompass studies and theories of primate behavior and scientific speculations, such as Bigelow's, about the course and behavioral effects of man's evolution, it may prove useful to attempt to reinterpret in a summary way some social-psychological materials on leader-follower behavior. Fiedler's attempts to describe the nature of leadership in face-to-face groups appear to fit readily within the dominance-deference conception analyzed above: "The leader is one who succeeds in getting others to follow him"[59] (focal point of an "attention structure"). "Leadership, essentially, means power over other people . . . we shall here define the leader as the individual in the group who has the task of directing and coordinating task-relevant group activities"[60] (the "control role").

Fiedler strongly emphasizes the interactional, contextual character of leadership: "there are no leaders where there are no followers. Above all, leadership is a relationship."[61] This accords well, I believe, with ethological-evolutionary perspectives. But before trying to clarify that point, it is necessary to discuss briefly the biological conception that (in its vulgar form) some individuals are "born leaders" (or possess "innate dominance").[62] This idea should not be dismissed out of hand, even though it is obviously very much subject to abuse. Fiedler cites a study which found significant correlations between leadership and certain personality traits — e.g., intelligence, alertness, verbal facility, dependability, aggressiveness, sociability, cooperation, adaptability.[63] It is reasonable to assume that genetic capacities for developing these characteristics (given, of course, a supportive environment) vary widely among individuals. More specifically, Bigelow speculates that individual differences in "social intelligence" — the ability to predict the likely responses of others and to control one's emotional reactions under pressure — may rest, in part, upon a phylogenetic basis.[64]

In addition to abilities conducive to effective leadership, motivation to acquire high rank may also involve an innate component:

> . . . There are chiefs because there are, in any human group, men who, unlike most of their companions, enjoy prestige for its own sake, feel a strong appeal to responsibility, and to whom the burden of public affairs brings its own reward. These individual differences are certainly emphasized and "played up" by the different cultures, and to unequal degrees. But their clear-cut existence in a society as little competitive as the Nam-

[56] Bigelow, p. 6.
[57] *Ibid.*, pp. 27, 29, 31.
[58] *Ibid.*, p. 52.
[59] W. H. Cowley, "Three Distinctions in the Study of Leaders," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 23 (July-September, 1928), 144, quoted in Fred E. Fiedler, "Leadership" (Morristown, New Jersey: General Learning Press, 1971), p. 2.
[60] Fiedler, pp. 1, 2.
[61] *Ibid.*, p. 2.
[62] A popularized but stimulating discussion of this idea is presented in Robert Ardrey, *The Social Contract* (New York: Atheneum, 1970), pp. 102–136.
[63] Fiedler, p. 4.
[64] Bigelow, pp. 48–51.

bikuara [the Amazon Indian tribe described in the article] strongly suggests to my mind that their origin itself is not cultural. They are rather part of those psychological raw materials out of which any given culture is made. Men are not all alike; and, in primitive societies . . . these individual differences are as keenly perceived and worked out as in our so-called "individualistic" civilization.[65]

However, no case has yet been made that there are any specific genes for generalized dominance or group leadership. It seems more likely that innate individual differences do exist in the capacity for developing certain personality traits which may enable an individual to become a leader in some circumstances but not in others. This hypothesis is compatible with the conclusion that "a person does not become a leader by virtue of his possession of any one particular pattern of personality traits, but the pattern of personal characteristics of the leader must bear relevant relationship to the present characteristics, activities, and goals of the group of which he is leader."[66]

This returns our attention to the subordinate-follower aspect of dominance-leadership, specifically to the "notion of submissiveness as a basic need in those who follow."[67] Much to this point, I believe, are Stanley Milgram's famous (even notorious) social-psychological "obedience" experiments.[68] They involved placing naive subjects in what they were told was a setting designed to test the effects of punishment on auditory memory. The subject would be seated at a genuine-looking (though phony) "shock generator" and instructed to give word tests to the experimenter's confederate, whom the subject believed to be a volunteer participant like himself. Each time the confederate made an error, the experimenter would order the subject to administer an electric shock to the "learner" by closing a switch. The switches were labeled at 15-volt intervals, from 15 through 450 volts. The experiment was actually intended, of course, to determine how many subjects would obey the "scientific authority's" commands to inflict punishment (supposedly) on a person who had done them no harm.

The experiment was run in many versions, and the principal result was quite astounding. Although both students of psychology and psychiatrists had predicted prior to the experiments that fewer than one-half of one percent of the subject would go all the way to 450 volts on the "shock panel," the actual range in most of the experimental variations was from 30 to 65 percent "fully obedient." Even when the confederate, in an adjoining room, banged on the wall and screamed about his weak heart, begging the subject to stop, 60 percent of the subjects were completely obedient to the experimenter.[69]

In Milgram's interpretation, this extremely surprising outcome resulted from many of the subjects forsaking their own autonomous judgment or "conscience" within the experimental context and entering into an "agentic state." That is, the compliant subjects ceased to evaluate or feel responsible for their own actions and came to consider themselves solely as obedient tools of the scientifically authoritative experimenter (all subjects were told that the experimenter would assume full responsibility for any harm suffered by the "shock victim"). Milgram believes that the rate at which the subjects assumed the "agentic" role indicates that the experiments must have tapped motivational sources too profound to be accounted for wholly in terms of the idiosyncracies of individuals' social conditioning. He turns, therefore, to evolutionary, biobehavioral theorizing as a mode of explaining his experimental results.

Essentially, he stresses the existence and importance of dominance structures within many animal societies and the probable survival values of hierarchy — including efficient division of labor, firmness of social organization, and maintenance of internal group order. He believes that natural selection has also built into the human species a propensity to create and maintain hierarchical social relationships, which entails a propensity to learn readily deference to authority: " . . . we are born with a potential for obedience, which then interacts with the influence of society to produce the obedient man." When such a person finds himself in the presence of a perceived authority-figure, his propensity to enter the "agentic

[65] Claude Lévi-Strauss, "The Social and Psychological Aspects of Chieftainship in a Primitive Tribe: The Nambikuara of Northwestern Mato Grosso," in *Comparative Political Systems: Studies in the Politics of Pre-Industrial Societies*, ed. Ronald Cohen and John Middleton (Garden City, New York: Natural History Press, 1967), pp. 61–62.

[66] Cecil A. Gibb, "Leadership," in *The Handbook of Social Psychology*, vol. IV, ed. Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 2nd ed., 1969), p. 226.

[67] *Ibid.*, p. 252.

[68] First reported in Stanley Milgram, "Behavioral Study of Obedience," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 67 (October, 1963), 371–378; reviewed, analyzed, and interpreted in Stanley Milgram, *Obedience to Authority* (New York: Harper & Row, 1974).

[69] Milgram, *Obedience to Authority*, pp. 30–35.

state" is "exceedingly strong, and the shift is not freely reversible."[70]

The evolutionary theorizing of the late C. H. Waddington may help clarify further both the phylogenesis and ontogenesis of Milgram's "potential for obedience." Waddington stressed the protracted character of infant and childhood dependence (a trend that becomes progressively marked in primate species the nearer their evolutionary relationship to man). This dependence is both made possible and required by the human species' very great reliance upon learning as the individual's primary means of developing adaptive behavior. One ability which must be learned is what Bigelow called "self-control." It seems that the mechanism which we have inherited for controlling our own behavior normally involves accepting completely the authority of those on whom we are dependent when very young. The enormous dependence of our species upon cultural life, including moral norms, has resulted in the evolution of a tendency to "overlearn" and overgeneralize submissiveness to authority-figures and the norms which they supposedly represent.[71]

The evidence and ideas herein discussed that bear upon the dynamics and possible evolved mechanisms of "followership" or submissive behavior appear to provide strong support for Chance's and Larsen's stress upon the importance of the active role of subordinates in the "centripetal attention structure" of a dominance hierarchy. It seems quite likely, then, that phylogenetically determined propensities are profoundly influential on both sides of the leader-follower relationship. That hypothesis is strongly supported by a leading theorist of behavioral evolution: "Social individuals must actually inherit a kind of switch mechanism, which allows them to assume either the dominant or the subordinate role according to circumstances."[72]

To this point in my argument I have attempted, by discussing behavior, analogies, and theories concerning primate behavior, scientific speculation about man's evolution, and some social phychological evidence and concepts, to indicate why it is at least probable that "it is in the nature of human beings as members of a species to create hierarchical orders, some members of which necessarily constitute an elite."[73]

Because that hypothesis is very likely to be misunderstood, I should like — before attempting to explore some of its implications for normative political theory — to state as clearly as possible what my argument does *not* include or imply. I am not asserting that political hierarchies are or ever have been founded exclusively on our genetic proclivities; these can only be expressed through particular, distinctive, and varying cultural patterns and circumstances. I do not argue that economic, educational, and family differences among people do not critically affect individuals' placement within political hierarchies. I am not arguing that any single *type* of dominance hierarchy is the only "natural" pattern; nor do I mean that dominance must necessarily be harsh and repressive and involve extremes of stratification. Finally, I am not asserting, nor do I believe, that deliberate attempts to construct or reconstruct orders of political stratification are necessarily futile, in any sense "unnatural," or doomed to failure; I very definitely do not mean to imply that whatever is, is inevitable. The last thing I desire is to revivify the justly discredited ideas of "Social Darwinism."

The circumstances within which human behavioral capabilities evolved make it quite unlikely that the normal dominance hierarchy within hominid groups constituted a harsh and repressive tyranny. Our ancestors lived by means of hunting and gathering their food until the development of settled agricultural patterns about 8-10,000 years ago. Our phylogenetically conditioned behavioral propensities were shaped largely by the exigencies of leading a successful predatory existence.[74] Among the requirements of such a life are co-operation and integration of all mature males in the

[70] Milgram, pp. 123–125, 134. The possibility that Milgram had instead tapped a hidden wellspring of sadistic aggression is belied by the outcome of one version of his experiment. Subjects were allowed to choose the shock level they would use to punish the "learner." Only one of forty moved all the way up the panel to the "450" switch (*ibid.*, pp. 70–72).

[71] C. H. Waddington, *The Ethical Animal* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1960), pp. 155–174. Submissive obedience can be, of course, horrendously destructive. E.g., note Hannah Arendt's observation that the vaunted aggressive toughness of Nazi SS men was actually, with few exceptions, "nothing but a myth of self-deception, concealing a ruthless desire for conformity at any price . . . " (Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* [New York: Viking Press, 1963], p. 157.)

[72] V. C. Wynne-Edwards, "Population Control and Social Selection in Animals," in *Genetics*, ed. David C. Glass, p. 162.

[73] Tiger, "Dominance in Human Societies," p. 295.

[74] One of the best brief discussions of the impact of hunting on the evolution of human behavior is Sherwood L. Washburn and C. S. Lancaster, "The Evolution of Hunting," in *Man the Hunter*, ed. Richard B. Lee and Irven DeVore (Chicago: Aldine, 1968), pp. 293–303. See also fn. 10, above.

hunting group. In those circumstances, it seems more than likely that "dominance must tend toward the mild 'leadership' type . . . "[13]

Further, as Tiger and Fox point out, humans must have developed a profound need for significant participation in face-to-face groups. Thus, they aver, we are so often frustrated by the remoteness and impersonality of bureaucracy because it is premised on a denial of our craving for a "primate politics" which involves dealing with a few well-known persons face-to-face. Yet bureaucracy —made possible by the symbolizing abilities of the cerebral cortex, the most recently evolved part of the human brain — persists. It does so not only because of its functional indispensability in complex industrialized societies but because its structure builds upon other motivations which were essential for a successful hunting life — loyalty and orderliness, a sense of belonging to an in-group and hostility to outgroups, hierarchy and competition.[14]

Possible Normative Implications

But however mild or harsh particular dominance structures may be or need to be, some kind of dominance will exist in any human society, along with deferential and obedient patterns of behavior. The evolutionary, primate behavior-based argument for this conclusion is clearly summarized by Jerome H. Barkow:

> How do we know . . . that human prestige-striving and nonhuman primate social dominance really share a common origin, that is, are homologous? Since our ancestors were nonhuman primates and primates exhibit social ranking, our ancestors presumably were socially ranked. We evolved from these ancestors while organized in cooperative bands of hunters and gatherers . . . , and organization implies social ranking. It would seem that at no point during our phylogenesis did we lack social hierarchy. If human and nonhuman social dominance have apparently been continuous, they must necessarily be homologous. Cultural systems of social rank are based on, not opposed to, our primate heritage.[17]

It thus seems probable that Thomas Aquinas's Aristotelian view is correct: " . . . it is natural for man, more than for any other animal, to be a social and political animal, to live in a group. . . . If, then, it is natural for man to live in the society of many, it is necessary that there exist among men some means by which the group may be governed."[18]

I would suggest that this conclusion provides us with a reasonably secure hypothetical basis for theorizing about political obligation and about the problems of shaping political institutions to be optimally responsive to human needs and demands. In the remainder of this discussion, I shall focus primarily on political obligation.

The great progenitors of modern political thought — Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau — share a critical premise: the radically artificial, contrived, contingent character of any and all political authority. Despite the very important differences among them, all three theorists deny that structures of dominance and deference inhere in human nature and concur on the fundamental significance of the question, what can possibly justify the existence of any kind of political authority and obligation? The answer common to all three: only the consent of individuals.

Hobbes and Locke severely qualified this principle for the sake of political order and stability (Hobbes in fact almost, but not quite, qualified it out of existence.) Rousseau, however, attempted in an absolutely serious and literal way to make of it the sole foundation of the polity. Man was originally free — independent, individually isolated except for brief encounters; by virtue of haphazard circumstances developed small-scale societies of mutual accord; but then fell into the chains of extreme dependence and servitude because of the effects of covetousness as manifested in private property.[19] We now know, of course, as Rousseau could not, that every primate species lives within some kind of ordered social group, and that man was never absolutely "free" in the sense of complete isolation and

[13] William Etkin, *Social Behavior from Fish to Man* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Phoenix Books, 1967), p. 140.

[14] Tiger and Fox, *The Imperial Animal*, pp. 48–51. Therefore it seems likely that, in evolutionary terms, "consent" is as old as, in fact coterminous with, "command" in human authority structures. This may be viewed as some degree of validation of Hannah Arendt's insight into the "elementary dynamics" of political life — namely, her recurrent emphasis upon the spontaneity of small-scale participatory political groups during most modern revolutionary upheavals and her insistence upon popular consent as the basis of effective political power. See Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution* (New York: Viking Press, 1963), esp. pp. 259–285; Arendt, "Reflections on Violence," *Journal of International Affairs*, 23, 1 (1969), 14–15.

[17] Jerome H. Barkow, "Prestige and Culture: A Biosocial Interpretation," *Current Anthropology*, 16 (December, 1975), 554.

[18] St. Thomas Aquinas, *On Kingship*, in *The Political Ideas of St. Thomas Aquinas*, ed. Dino Bigongiari (New York: Hafner, 1953), pp. 175, 176.

[19] Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Discourse on the Origin and Foundation of Inequality Among Mankind* (1755).

independence.[80] Further, we have seen that dominance hierarchies exist because they have been adaptive in primate evolution — and in species in which, even by analogy, we cannot say that there is "private property."

Nevertheless, Rousseau was led to set impossible conditions for the legitimacy of authority (though he considered it wise ordinarily to obey all *de facto* authority[81]). From premises like Rousseau's it was logical to conclude, as nineteenth-century anarchists and many socialists did, that putting an end to economic inequality and proletarian servitude would eventually bring the "withering away" of political authority. The government of men will be replaced by the administration of things, as "The society that will organize production on the basis of a free and equal association of the producers will put the whole machinery of state where it will then belong: into the museum of antiquities, by the side of the spinning wheel and the bronze ax."[82]

In no way do I underestimate or denigrate the great contributions of political theorists from Hobbes to Marx toward discrediting and undermining the authority of anachronistic, oppressive, and dysfunctional hierarchies. But a generalized and possibly justified suspicion of all political authorities is not really an adequate reason for remaining attached to beliefs which seem to bear little or no relationship to empirical reality.

For a specific recent example of such a viewpoint, consider Robert Paul Wolff's ideas on political obligation.[83] He assumes that all men have free will and reason, are thereby responsible for their choices, and hence have a *right* to wholly autonomous individual self-governance. Even more relentlessly consistent than Rousseau, Wolff concludes that "all authority is equally illegitimate, although of course not therefore equally worthy or unworthy of support. . . . There would appear to be no state whose subjects have a moral obligation to obey its commands."[84]

Presumably Wolff does not mean his theory of political obligation to be counterempirical and thus, I believe, an irrelevant fantasy, for elsewhere he reveals a peculiar conception of man's relationship to nature: " . . . while the natural world really does exist independently of man's beliefs or desires, and therefore exercises a constraint on his will which can at best be mitigated or combatted, the social world is nothing in itself, and consists merely of the totality of the habits, expectations, beliefs, and behavior patterns of all the individuals who live in it."[85] But it is the fundamental premise of evolutionary biology that man's social behavior is totally a part of the "natural world." If one does not assume the "social world" to be supernatural, it can *only* be "natural." And, given man's primate social nature, there seems to be no more reason to base a normative theory on the assumption that political stratification and authority are contingent and ultimately dispensable than to spend one's life pondering the consequences for society of a dramatic mutation which would suddenly permit every human being to fly without mechanical assistance. Neither project is likely to get off the ground.

The realistic starting point for thinking about political obligation would appear to be not the question, what can justify authority *per se*, but a question something like this: What *kind(s)* of authority structure can be justified under what types of political and social circumstances? In itself, political authority is neither legitimate nor illegitimate; it simply *is*.[86]

In a sense, I am implying the need for an Aristotelian approach to political theory. I do not at all mean that one could or should accept Aristotle's metaphysical premises, ethical system, or political conclusions — but rather that one might set out from the now well-grounded premise that man is *by nature* a political animal and concentrate one's efforts upon trying to

[80] Sherwood L. Washburn and David A. Hamburg, "The Implications of Primate Research," in *Primate Behavior*, ed. DeVore, p. 612.

[81] Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Emile, or Education*, trans. Barbara Foxley (New York: E. P. Dutton, Everyman's Library, 1911, reprinted 1963), p. 274.

[82] Friedrich Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*, in *Marx and Engels: Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy*, ed. Lewis S. Feuer (Garden City, New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1959), p. 394. It should be noted that Engels did not believe that all hierarchical authority would disappear under communism. In an essay on authority, he asserted that authority in the factory was a functional requirement of industrial production and thus unavoidable. In the same essay, however, Engels reiterated: "All socialists are agreed that the political state, and with it political authority will disappear as a result of the coming social revolution, that is, that public functions will lose their political character and be transformed into the simple administrative functions of watching over the true interests of society." ("On Authority," in *Basic Writings*, ed. Feuer, p. 485.)

[83] Robert Paul Wolff, *In Defense of Anarchism* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1970).

[84] *Ibid.*, p. 19.

[85] *Ibid.*, p. 76.

[86] Cf. Mazur, p. 526.

discern the empirical and normative relationships between particular kinds of societies and differing *types* of political authority structures.

Finally, this quasi-Aristotelian biobehavioral perspective on authority and political stratification seems likely to inspire concern about discovering and preserving effective restraints upon the wielders of political authority. If one believes that hierarchical authority is a historically bounded phenomenon that will disappear in the socially transformed future, one will oppose overweening and arbitrary authority *only* until one's own movement or party gains absolute power (Leninism is the overwhelmingly relevant example). But if one believes to the contrary that political authority structures are very likely to exist, no matter what movement or party rules or what kinds of socioeconomic transformations occur, then one will consider the structure and operations of the authority system to be a problem of both pressing and permanent significance — especially for the great majority of people who are not members of a "central hierarchy."

Referring again to subhuman primate behavior, one should note in this context the intricately adaptive nature of dominance in species such as the savanna baboons. The central hierarchy males keep order within the troop, protect females and their offspring from predators, lead troop movement, and apparently do most of the breeding — passing on the genetic components of their greater than average capacities for co-operation, intelligent leadership, and aggressive defense. Thus males who achieve dominance invariably behave so as to protect the best interests of the troop as a whole.

It is more than evident that in groups and societies of our species this kind of automatic fit between success in dominance competition and effective substantive leadership no longer exists. Presumably a baboon-like congruence between them was present during the hundreds of thousands of millennia when our ancestors lived in small groups which could not survive without effective leadership and co-ordination of efforts in hunting, food-sharing, and group protection. But in populous, complex societies, political authorities are usually removed from the immediate contexts in which their decisions are implemented. They do not therefore get immediate or necessarily reliable feedback on their wisdom or effectiveness — something which no prehistoric hunter chief could avoid when he and his group either fed well or went hungry.

The transferring of authority structures from the context of face-to-face interaction to that of an ultra-symbolic remoteness also makes it much more difficult for the governed to determine how their own condition is actually affected by the decisions of political authorities.[87] And, of course, historical experience indicates that individuals who achieve high political rank may be too ignorant, arrogant, insensitive, or incompetent to cope satisfactorily with important social problems.

Yet dominance structures there will be in social groupings of the human species, and therefore discovering methods to make and keep them responsive to the substantive needs and desires of the society as a whole is a perennial dilemma. Although our complex societies have lost the automatic fit between dominance and adaptiveness typical of primate groups in their normal habitats, there has been in man an enormous development of a relevant generalized trait characteristic of nearly all primate species — the ability to learn how to adapt to varied circumstances.[88] Using that ability and building, no doubt, on our evolved capacity for self-control, men long ago learned and taught the desirability of subjecting the dominant as well as the subordinate to the restraint of custom and then to the more rationalized "rule of law": "Man, when perfected, is the best of animals; but if he be isolated from law and justice he is the worst of all."[89] And, from an evolutionary perspective:

> Laws and social customs are not unnatural impositions from a source somewhere outside biology. They arise from interactions between the cerebral cortex and other parts of a single body, and from interactions between the brains and eyes

[87] See Murray Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964).

[88] E.g., female savanna baboons were placed within a group of hamadryas baboons; within an hour each female had learned to remain near and follow the male which had threatened or attacked her. This is normal behavior for a hamadryas female but precisely opposite the usual behavior of a female savanna baboon among males of her own species. Conversely, hamadryas females placed among savanna baboons soon learned not to follow individual males as these females had always done among their own kind. (Kummer, *Primate Societies*, pp. 99–100.) The example cited above (fn. 41) of a rank order change in a chimpanzee group can be viewed as an individual's learning to use a newly available resource — noise-making tin cans — as a device to inhibit the dominance behavior of the alpha male, making it possible for the innovator to rise quickly to the top of the group hierarchy.

[89] Aristotle *Politics* 1253a, trans. Ernest Barker (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 7.

Political Processes and Public Expenditures: A Re-examination Based on Theories of Representative Government

R. KENNETH GODWIN
and
W. BRUCE SHEPARD
Oregon State University

Beginning with Dawson and Robinson, several investigators have attempted to predict local government expenditures from political process variables such as party in power, level of citizen participation, party structure (reformed/unreformed), governor's power, and level of interparty competition.[1] In a large majority of these studies, these variables have not consistently predicted expenditure levels after socioeconomic attributes have been controlled.[2] Our purposes in this article are

(1) To argue that too little attention has been given to theoretical formulations in which political process variables act as linkage mechanisms. The inattention has resulted in the application of inappropriate tests for the effect of political variables on public policies;

(2) To present a method of analysis that, unlike those commonly employed, tests the linkage role of political process variables in policy determination; and

(3) To point out that the research findings based on such methods are compatible with traditional theories of representative government concerning the role which political process variables play in the determination of public policies.


A reconceptualization of the role of political structures and processes in the provision of goods and services may be initiated with several assumptions. First, assume that any given citizen has a demand curve for a service provided by his government such that for every level of price per unit of service provided, the citizen desires a given number of units (see Figure 1). If this assumption is accurate, then so long as the amount of the good provided is at the tax rate equal to the marginal utility of the private good foregone, the citizen's preferences have been accurately represented.

If we can further assume that the production costs curve of the government intersects with the demand curve of the citizens, then accurate representation is possible. In Figure 1, accurate representation would be at point B. If, however, the government supplies a level of the service which does not lie on the demand curve there is an error in the linkage between the expressed preference for a service and the supply. Notice that whether the government provides too little (point A) or too much (point C), the citizen will not be satisfied, and there is an error in the representation of the preference of the citizen by his government.

In making the leap from individual demand to collective demand for public service, previous studies of public expenditures have generally employed socioeconomic variables as surrogate measures of collective demand. Although these socioeconomic variables may not be entirely satisfactory operationalizations of collective demand, their use does appear reasonable. For example, as an individual's income increases, he may wish to purchase more goods from the public sector as well as the private sector. He may desire better educational facilities, police protection, or recreational facilities because he is now capable of paying for these. Or in the case of inferior

[1] See for example: Richard E. Dawson and James A. Robinson, "Inter-Party Competition, Economic Variables and Welfare Policies in the American States," *The Journal of Politics*, 25 (1963), 265–289; Richard I. Hofferbert, "The Relation Between Public Policy and Some Structural and Environmental Variables in the American States," *The American Political Science Review*, 60 (March, 1966), 73–82; Ira Sharkansky and Richard I. Hofferbert, "Dimensions of State Politics, Economics, and Public Policy," *The American Political Science Review*, 63 (September, 1969), 867–879; Ira Sharkansky, "Problems of Theory and Method: Environment, Policy, Output, and Impact," paper delivered at Conference on Measurement of Public Policies in the American States, Ann Arbor, July 28 – August 3, 1968; and Thomas R. Dye, *Politics, Economics, and the Public: Policy Outcomes in the States* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966).

[2] For one of the more recent articles and comments on the impact of political variables after controls are made for socioeconomic variables, see Brian R. Fry and Richard R. Winters, "The Politics of Redistribution," *American Political Science Review*, 64 (June, 1970), 508–22; and John L. Sullivan, "A Note on Redistributive Politics," *American Political Science Review*, 66 (December, 1972), 1301–05.




goods[4] — perhaps public health care — less of the inferior good may be desired as increases in income allow for the purchase of substitute goods — e.g., private health care. Similarly, the urban or rural character of an individual's environment may be expected to determine, at least in part, whether he prefers a higher percentage of the government's budget to be spent on the purchase of open space for recreation or for highways which enable him to travel to nearby markets.

Political process variables have generally been treated as causing expenditure levels in the same sense that increases in income, education, or urbanization cause various expenditure levels. Previous studies have placed both socioeconomic variables and political process variables in a single regression equation which is used to predict the level (or distribution) of expenditures in a given state or municipality. While the use of socioeconomic indices as surrogate measures for collective demand is justified, such a treatment is inappropriate for *political process* variables. Using political variables in this manner is inconsistent with those models of representative government which view representation as a process through which the demands of citizens are linked to policy

[3] Albert Breton in *The Economic Theory of Representative Government* (Chicago: Aldine, 1974) has argued that the effect of price on the supply curve should be insignificant — i.e., the tax (price) of public services is constant per unit and has no effect on the shape of the supply curve. If this is the case, Figure 1 would be similar to the figure below.

Demand and Supply of a Public Service



Notice that this assumption by Breton would not change any of the following arguments.

[4] On income prompted demand shifts for inferior goods, see Paul A. Samuelson, *Economics*, 8th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970) p. 408.

outputs. Political process attributes should be viewed not as *determinants* of the shape or location of the demand curves of citizens, but as *modifying variables* which either facilitate or inhibit the accurate translation of demands into outputs, i.e., as mediational.

Perhaps we can illustrate the difficulties with previous research concerning public expenditures by returning to the original article by Dawson and Robinson.[5] In their article they hypothesize that environmental conditions are *mediated* by political variables,[6] not that the role of the political variables is *independent.* Dawson and Robinson, however, expected that the political variables (in their study the level of interparty competition) would increase the particular public service (welfare expenditures) because they believed there were excellent reasons for postulating that this particular service was being undersupplied. Using quotes from V. O. Key, Jr. cited by Dawson and Robinson, we can easily see the rationale behind this expectation:

> In the two-party states the anxiety over the next election pushes political leaders into serving the interests of the have-less elements of society, thereby putting the party into the countervailing power operation.[7]
>
> . . . in the one-party states it is easier for a few powerful interests to manage the government of the state without party interference since the parties are not representative of the particular elements that might pose opposition to the dominant interest groups. [8]
>
> . . . over the long run the have-nots lose in a disorganized politics. They have no mechanism through which to act and their wishes find expression in fitful rebellions led by transient demogogues who gain their confidence but often have neither the technical competence nor the necessary stable base of political power to effectuate a program.[9]

In other words, Key believed that unless there were active competition for support for lower-class demands, these demands would go unrepresented. Key was not hypothesizing that political variables, in and of themselves, should exercise an independent effect on expenditure demands. Rather, he was postulating that political mechanisms for aggregating preferences and guiding them through the political system, *when they were effective,* forced the political process to come closer to approximating the demands for services of a larger proportion of the citizenry. With this conceptualization one could plausibly hypothesize that interparty competition would decrease welfare expenditures when the majority of the active citizenry feels that such expenditures have exceeded their demands.[10] As Breton has pointed out:

> One of the most basic problems of welfare economics and one that has plagued that field of inquiry since its very beginning is that of finding out whether non-market organization leads to over- or to underinvestment in certain activities. . . . One should not be surprised . . . to discover that in practice there is overinvestment in some activities and underinvestment in others.[11]

As Breton's comments suggest, increased interparty competition need not consistently affect welfare expenditures in a single direction. Rather, interparty competition and other political variables must be related to the degree of error by a political system in approximating citizen demands (and to the extent that increased party competition increases the accuracy of the approximation, welfare expenditures may be either increased or decreased). For this reason, the inclusion of political variables along with socioeconomic variables in a partial correlation analysis or in a regression equation with welfare expenditures as the dependent variable implies a model which is conceptually inappropriate both to the original expectations of Key and Dawson and Robinson, and to conventional theories of representative government as well.

The Role of Political Variables In Accurate Representation

Although the point may seem trivial, there must be some set of mechanisms—institutions, organizations, decision rules—which link the

[5] Dawson and Robinson, "Inter-Party Competition."
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 266.
[7] V. O. Key, Jr. *Southern Politics in State and Nation* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951) p. 337.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 337.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 307. Beginning with Dawson and Robinson, the hypothesis that the have-nots lose in a disorganized politics has been repeatedly examined through the study of welfare expenditures and interparty competition. One of the more recent studies finding support for the hypothesis (after allowing for interaction betwen interparty competition and "legislative professionalism") is provided by Edward G. Carmines, "The Mediating Influence of State Legislatures on the Linkage Between Interparty Competition and Welfare Policies," *American Political Science Review,* 68 (Sept. 1974), 1118–1124.
[10] Possible examples of interparty competition forcing a reduction in welfare expenditures are provided by those Scandinavian countries which have been dominated for a long period by Socialist parties; these parties' recent losses in strength have been popularly explained by a "taxpayers' revolt" against welfare expenditures.
[11] Breton, *The Economic Theory of Representative Government,* pp. 192–193.

demands of citizens for the services of government to the policies. This, of course, has been postulated by Herring, Key, Truman, Downs, and other writers on the roles of political parties, interest groups, and elections as the major function of the political system. The difficulty for the researcher is in testing which processes and institutions are performing their linkage function without direct knowledge of whether public services are being over- or undersupplied in relation to citizens' demands. The remaining section of this paper is devoted primarily to the solution of this difficulty.

A theory of democratic representation must postulate some mechanism for linkage between masses and elites or the governed and the governors. Luttbeg has suggested that four traditional models of linkage can be found in political theory.[12] These are the rational-activist, the political-parties, the pressure-groups, and the socialization models. In these models, it is expected that either because of some mechanisms of coercion which the governed can apply to the governors or because of the socialization process which produces political leaders, neither the characteristics of political institutions nor those of political leaders will affect the level or composition of expenditures. Instead, the expected functions of political institutions and leaders are to aggregate the preferences of citizens for services and to translate these directly into the demanded services. That is to say, the governors attempt to implement the wishes of their constituents. Thus as representational mechanisms, political process variables would not be expected to cause particular shapes or locations of demand curves for expenditures. Rather, they would be expected to cause or explain the degree of variation between preference inputs to the representational system and policy outputs.

If political variables are to create a "demand" for expenditures, this "demand" would be caused by specific interests or ideological orientations of the political leadership. That is to say, the political leadership would not be translating (or representing) citizen preferences, but would be using their own preferences to determine expenditure levels or other policy outputs. We will label these conceptions of policy determinants "nonlinkage models." Only in these models would process variables determine the level and distribution of services independently of environmental characteristics.

[12] Norman R. Luttbeg, *Public Opinion and Public Policy: Models of Political Linkage* (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1968), pp. 1–10.

A brief review of each model of linkage may clarify these distinctions. The rational-activist model of linkage is expected to work as follows:

> The individual is expected to be politically informed, involved, rational, and, above all, active. On the basis of an informed and carefully reasoned set of personal preferences and an accurate perception of the various candidates' positions, the voter is expected to vote for those candidates who best reflect his personal preferences. Thus, if an office holder or candidate neglects the public's wants and demands, the public will sense it and may deny him support in the next election.[13]

A second model of linkage between the governed and their governors is the political parties model. Briefly stated, this model relaxes the requirements which are placed upon the citizen by the rational-activist model. While the citizen must still be aware of the issues, he must only know the positions of the different political parties and choose the party which most closely approximates his own position. The citizen does not need to keep up with all candidates' positions on all issues or their actions while in office. The citizen must, however, know where the parties stand and vote for the party of his or her choice.

The third model described by Luttbeg is the linkage provided by pressure groups. This conception of linkage, like the two above, depends on the votes of the citizens for its coercive aspects. Proponents of this model view individuals as members of social groups and see their preferences for services as being both partially derived from and represented by the interests of the group. Thus, to the extent that the members of a group have leaders who present their interests to elected officials, these officials know what their constituents desire. For linkage to occur, a group's leaders must keep watch over the programs and actions of elected officials and the members of a group need only know and heed the electoral choices advocated by the leaders of the group.

In the fourth model, the socialization description of linkage, much of the coercive power attributed to the electorate in the first three models is replaced by the socialization of leaders. This socialization may be of two types. In its simplest formulation, belief-sharing, Luttbeg postulates that when society is sufficiently homogeneous, it does not matter who are the governors and who are the governed. "Leaders give expression to public wants and demands merely because they share preferences with the

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 4.

public."[14] Although such homogeneity between the rulers and the ruled is difficult to imagine when the governmental unit is the nation, state, or metropolitan area, it is not difficult to see how such a process might work in a water, light, or fire district.

Role-playing is the second and more complex formulation of linkage through socialization. The role-playing model postulates that leaders are socialized to believe in a conception of representation which causes them to attempt to represent their constituency's interests whether or not the electorate can coerce them to do so. Thus, a representative will attempt to develop a set of expenditures which closely approximates the preferences of the governed.

The determination of policy outputs may not depend upon linkage. This could occur in at least two situations. First, the political decision makers might produce policies which are not desired by the citizens but are believed by the decision makers to be in the citizens' "best interests." In the second situation, the incentive structures internal to legislatures and bureaus might require that the decision makers respond to these pressures rather than to citizen preferences. If the policy choices made by decision makers are a function of institutional incentive structures, then those political structure variables thought to covary with the relevant incentive structures may be treated as independent or intervening variables in a model of policy determinants.[15] Political structure variables may also be treated as intervening or independent variables if—due to selection or recruitment biases—decision makers' conceptions of best interests are a function of particular political structures. However, if political structures affect only the opportunity for decision makers to base policy on concepts of best interests, then political structure variables remain mediational, affecting the degree of congruence between preference inputs and policy choices.

The vast majority of studies concerning the impact of political variables upon public expenditures have treated political process variables as determinants of policy levels and types. They are, therefore, designed to test the assumption that policy outputs in the United States are of the form postulated in the nonlinkage models. Findings of no significant independent correlation between political process variables and most expenditure patterns and levels provide evidence that the assumption is often incorrect.

Unfortunately, if one is wedded to single-equation regression models containing socioeconomic and political process variables as the independent variables or causal modeling techniques with political process variables as the intervening variables, then one can do no more than test for the presence or absence of the nonlinkage models. A failure to find evidence for these models may be reassuring to those who hope that representation takes one of the "more democratic" forms; but this mode of analysis does not and cannot reveal which of the alternate types of linkage is operative. Therefore, questions of major theoretical importance remain unanswered.

It is difficult to see how major theoretical and practical questions can be addressed by the commonly employed logic for studying policy determinants. From the perspective of linkage theory, process variables need not cause particular levels or types of policy. They may, however, play an important role as policy determinants to the extent that they influence conformance or disparity between citizen preferences and policy outputs. To analyze the rational-activist, political-parties, interest-groups, or socialization linkage processes requires that one focus on something other than policies as dependent variables. One must study "translation errors" or discrepancies between citizen demands and political system output.

Assuming the availability of a measure of translation error, one may use each of the four models of linkage to deduce hypotheses relating political structure variables to translation error. Within the logic of a given linkage model, certain political structures and conditions should yield specifiable increases or decreases in the amount of translation error. For purposes of illustration, sample hypotheses are given in Table 1.

Empirical analyses which reveal relationships similar or dissimilar to those in Table 1 will permit conclusions about which of the types of linkage is operative.[16] For example, if

[14] Luttbeg, p. 7.

[15] An excellent discussion concerning how the presence or absence of an intervening variable model may be detected can be found in Charles F. Cnudde and Donald J. McCrone, "Party Competition and Welfare Policies in the American States," *American Political Science Review*, 63 (September, 1969), 858–866.

[16] Using the aggregate data normally available for the study of state and local expenditures, one cannot distinguish the belief-sharing and role playing conceptions of the socialization model. If individual data on citizen preferences, elite preferences, and elite perceptions of citizen preferences are available, then one may be able to determine which of these submodels is more appropriate. The two socialization submodels are not competing models: both could be operative.

Table 1. Illustrative Hypotheses on the Relationships Between Political Process Variables and Translation Error for Political Linkage Models

	Relationships Hypothesized Between Specified Variables and Translation Error Under the Assumptions of a Given Linkage Model	
Linkage Model	Variable	Hypothesized Relationship with Translation Error
Rational-Activist	Educational level of population	—
	Newspaper readership index	—
	Level of political participation	—
Political Parties	Degree of party competition	—
	Measures of party strength	—
	Prevalence of nonpartisan elections	+
Interest Group	Indices of interest group strength	—
	Size and activity of interest group memberships	—
	Percentage of labor force which is unionized	—
Socialization	Gini coefficient of income inequality	+
	Religious heterogeneity	+
	Racial heterogeneity	+

translation error is: (a) strongly and inversely related to party competition and party strength; (b) strongly and directly correlated with prevalence of nonpartisan elections; and (c) weakly associated with other variables, then one may conclude that, for the units analyzed, the political-parties model best describes the predominant type of political linkage.[17]

By reformulating the role of political variables, one may do more than test hypotheses such as those in Table 1. Some have recently pointed to the need to study political processes as dependent upon policy.[18] In the mode of analysis we are advocating, it is possible to explore whether a single form of linkage is operative across a wide set of policies or whether different types of policies elicit different types of linkage. This may be done by studying translation errors for a variety of policies. For example, linkages of the interest-group type may be suggested by patterns of translation error arising from distributive expenditures. In the case of more redistributive expenditures, the political-parties model may best conform to the observed pattern of translation errors.[19]

The mode of analysis proposed here may

(None of Luttbeg's models are competing in the sense that they make opposing assumptions. See John L. Sullivan, "Linkage Models in the Political System," in *Public Opinion and Public Attitudes*, ed. Allen R. Wilcox (New York: Wiley, 1974), pp. 637–659.

[17] The analyses may also reveal evidence on nonlinkage models. A finding of consistently high translation errors would support a hypothesis that expenditures are determined according to one of the nonlinkage models. Stated differently, one might suspect that a nonlinkage model is operative only when surrogate measures for citizen preferences (e.g., socioeconomic variables) poorly account for variation in expenditure levels. The "explanatory power" of socioeconomic variables could then be further studied for relationships to political process variables thought to facilitate operation of a nonlinkage model. This is the approach of Robert Lineberry and Edmund Fowler in "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities," *American Political Science Review*, 61 (September, 1967), 701–716. Evidence of such relationships may permit one to speak of policy biases created by particular political process variables. In nonlinkage models, decision makers' values directly affect expenditure levels. Where most decision makers' values deviate from citizen preferences in a similar direction, then those political process variables which facilitate operation of a nonlinkage model (e.g., low party competition, reformed municipal structures) may appear to affect expenditure levels independently.

[18] See for example: Lewis A. Froman, Jr., "The Categorization of Policy Contents," in *Political Science and Public Policy*, ed. Austin Ranney (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1968), pp. 41–52; and Michael D. Reagan, "Policy Issues: The Interaction of Substance and Process," *Polity*, 1 (Fall, 1968), 36–51.

[19] For a definition and discussion of distributive and redistributive policies, see Theodore J. Lowi, "American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies and Political Theory," *World Politics*, 16 (July, 1964), 677-715; and Robert Salisbury and John Heinz, "A Theory of Policy Analysis and Some Preliminary Applications," a paper presented to the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September, 1968. Printed in *Policy Analysis in Political Science*, ed. Ira Sharkansky (San Francisco: Markham, 1970), pp. 39–60.

also allow one to detect whether type of linkage covaries with such variables as region of the country (when studying state policies) or city size (when analyzing municipal expenditures). This may be done by testing relationships such as those hypothesized in Table 1 within subsets of the units of analysis, those subsets defined by the variables of interest (e.g., region, city size). To illustrate, relationships consistent with the hypotheses advanced under the rational-activist model may typify smaller towns. For large cities, evidence may favor the political-parties model.

The suggested analyses may offer more than the study of political linkage in a manner consistent with existing theory. The models of linkage as presented by Luttbeg lacked integration in an encompassing theoretical framework indicating the type of representation that will occur under particular conditions. Analyses of linkage by policy and political jurisdiction categories provide the opportunity for discoveries that could develop and integrate linkage theory.

To use the suggested mode of analysis in empirical work requires that one operationalize the concept of translation error. Conceptually, translation error may be defined as the absolute value of the difference between actual expenditure level and the expenditure level desired by the collectivity of citizens in a political jurisdiction.[20]

Unfortunately, what may be conceptually simple is not operationally simple. Initially, one may observe that collectivities exist only as abstractions and so do not have directly measurable desires. Therefore, the desires of a collectivity must be defined as a function of individual preferences: that function being some aggregation rule. But as Mueller has indicated, members of the mass public have a difficult time in specifying their preferred mix of public services.[21] Similarly, aggregation rules are not easily known. If the rule were strictly majoritarian and if each citizen had full information and an equal probability of participating in an expenditure decision (or if participation probabilities were unassociated with expenditure preferences, then the amount spent on each expenditure category would reflect exactly the citizen with median preferences.[22] These informational, probability, and majoritarian assumptions are not, however, empirically accurate.[23]

There are not entirely satisfactory solutions to these problems. But given certain assumptions, one can propose a readily estimated measure of translation error. One may assume, as previous studies did, that an individual's social class and the characteristics of his environment will determine his preferences for public services.[24] Or more weakly, one may assume that characteristics such as social class, race, and place of residence are so highly correlated with individual preferences as to be acceptable surrogate measures for preferences in many policy arenas. Then assuming an aggregation rule closer to logrolling than to majority rule,[25]

[20] Note the necessity of using absolute values of the differences. If these were not used, then one is back to the largely atheoretical position that particular political variables affect the *direction* of translation errors. With absolute values, one is specifying that political variables, as linkage mechanisms, affect or cause the *degree* of translation error.

[21] Eva Mueller, "Public Attitudes Toward Fiscal Programs," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 77 (May, 1963), 210–234.

[22] For a mathematical proof that such a preference pattern would be exhibited in public expenditure patterns, see Thomas Borcherding and Robert Deacon, "The Demand for the Services of Non-Federal Governments," *American Economic Review*, 62 (December, 1972), 891–901.

[23] Discussions and demonstrations of the empirical inappropriateness of these assumptions abound in the political science literature. For discussions of the absence or presence of information, see Bernard Berelson et al., *Voting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954); Angus Campbell et al., *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964); V. O. Key, *The Responsible Electorate* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966); and Eva Mueller, "Public Attitudes Toward Fiscal Programs." For discussions of probability of participation, see Lowi, "American Business," Robert Dahl, *Who Governs* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), and Lester W. Milbrath, *Political Participation* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965). For discussions of majoritarian decision making, see Dahl, *Who Governs*, and the many discussions of community power and decision making. A more extensive review of much of the literature relating to these assumptions can be found in Sullivan, "Linkage Models."

[24] This assumption is, of course, simply stating that an individual's attitudes and values are primarily the products of the conditions in which he lives. Whether one accepts a behaviorist (stimulus-response) or cognitive orientation to psychology, this is a reasonable assumption.

[25] There are a large number of both theoretical and empirical reasons for assuming such an aggregation rule. Breton, *The Economic Theory of Representative Government*, has shown that most governments supply more than a single service, that this feature allows representatives certain discretion in the development of the mix of services provided, and that logrolling types of decision rules will be used by the representatives. Similarly, the studies of political decision making in cities and states show that decision rules close to those posited in descriptions of pluralism do, in fact, dominate the decision making process. For a more complete discussion of decision rules and their implications for politics, see James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, *The Calculus of Consent* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1962).

one can express the level of expenditure desired by a community as a function of socioeconomic characteristics and price factors. The equation below illustrates such a function.[26]

$$Y_{ij} = a + b_1X_{1j} + b_2X_{2j} \ldots b_nX_{nj} + b_{n+1}P_{1j} + b_{n+2}D_{1j} + e_{ij},$$

where

Y_{ij} = desired per capita expenditures for expenditure category i in political jurisdiction j
a = constant
X's = socioeconomic characteristics of political jurisdiction j
P_{ij} = per capita intergovernmental transfers to political jurisdiction j for expenditure category i
D_{ij} = per capita debt of political jurisdiction j for expenditure category i
e_{ij} = error term
b's = beta weights

If it is assumed, as almost all the evidence previously mentioned would indicate, that process variables do not independently affect observed expenditure levels, then observed expenditures may be used as the dependent variable in order to estimate the coefficients and the constant in the above equation. Once the constant and coefficients are estimated, then Y_{ij} can be estimated for each political jurisdiction. Translation error for expenditure category i and jurisdiction j is then operationalized as the absolute value of the difference between Y_{ij} and the observed level of expenditure in category i for jurisdiction j. As operationalized, the measure may then be used for the analyses previously discussed.[27]

The measure of translation error presented above has the advantage of not requiring any data in addition to those data which are usually gathered in quantitative, public-policy determinant studies. While the measure requires assumptions that one might wish to avoid, it should serve to redirect such studies toward a more theoretically germane mode of analysis. It is hoped that measures of translation error will be refined through attention to individual preferences and aggregation rules. But additional resources expended on improved measurement will be productive only after inappropriate modes of analysis have been dropped and more appropriate modes explored.

Empirical Support for Linkage Theories

As we have noted above, perhaps the most obvious support for the credibility of our proposed approach is the failure of previous studies of political process variables to show an impact either on expenditure levels or on distribution (with the possible exception of welfare expenditures) or on other policy outputs. In addition to this indirect support, several empirical studies of public policies tested process variables for their moderating impact. Lineberry and Fowler in their article, "Reformism and Public Policies," found that in "unreformed" cities, socioeconomic variables explained a significantly higher proportion of city taxes and expenditures than did these same variables in "reformed" cities.[28] This indicates that parties in cities do structure conflict and bring order and focus to public demands and thereby act in accordance with the political parties linkage model described above.

Support for the impact of process variables on policy outputs other than taxes and expenditures has also been empirically demonstrated. Crain, in *The Politics of School Segregation,* found that elected school boards did not inject their own liberalism into board policy as much as appointed board members who were less likely to reflect the demands of the mass public and interest groups.[29]

Empirical support for the socialization models has also been recently demonstrated. Morgan has shown that the belief sharing mecha-

[26] A more precise estimation of public expenditures and their determination would require a multiple equation model in which the endogenous variables would include per capita expenditures, transfer payments, and debt. The exogenous variables could be the socioeconomic characteristics of the political jurisdiction. For examples of these models see Borcherding and Deacon, "The Demand for the Services of Non-Federal Governments," and Theodore C. Bergstrom and Robert P. Goodman, "Private Demand for Public Good," *American Economic Review* 63 (June, 1973), 280–296.

[27] One may no longer distinguish the relative "importance" of environmental and political variables by the variance explained in a common dependent variable when Y_{ij} is treated as a function of environmental variables and $|Y_{ij} - \hat{Y}_{ij}|$ is treated as a function of political variables. Restrictions on the ability to focus on statistically "explained" variance may be a blessing in disguise. As in most empirical work guided by theory, one's interest is in testing the structure and direction of relationships between operationalized theoretical concepts in the linkage models. The empirical congruence of alternative structural relationships may be of major theoretical relevance even when little statistically "explained" variance is at issue. In fact, the linkage models predict that little variance will remain in $|Y_{ij} - \hat{Y}_{ij}|$: most of the variance in Y_{ij} will be explained by environmental variables. The theoretical issue is not, "how important are political variables?" Rather, the issue is: "how are political variables important?"

[28] Lineberry and Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies."

[29] Robert Crain, *The Politics of School Desegregation* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1968).

nism for linkage is applicable in smaller suburban communities in which electoral procedures are not of sufficient strength to require leaders to be responsive to community interests.[30] In addition, Verba and Nie have reported that more homogeneous communities, where higher levels of consensus on policy preferences exist among citizens, show a higher concurrence between the citizens and public officials on policy outputs.[31]

The above studies only begin to test the relationships between process variables and policy outputs which are suggested by the various linkage models. They do indicate, however, the value of returning to the literature on the role of elections, parties, and pressure groups in aggregating and translating preferences.[32]

Summary

The generally weak relationships obtained when political process variables are treated as independent variables predicting public policies have been widely reported. We have argued that such findings do not contradict the significance of political process variables as posited in theories of political linkage. Rather, the methods used fail to permit testing of the range of propositions which can be devised from the theories.

As has been shown, it is possible to make such tests using an alternate mode of analysis that focuses on the study of translation errors —discrepancies between observed policies and the policies desired by citizens of a political jurisdiction. This method of analysis not only permits the examination of existing propositions, but also affords opportunities to explore those relationships which should contribute to the further development of linkage theory.

When faced with the findings of conventional studies of process variables as policy determinants, political scientists usually respond by searching for more and "better" measures of process and policy variables. If existing theories of political linkage are accurate, then the search is vain (leading only to the danger—if the search is long enough—of imputing meaning to those statistically significant associations which regularly occur by chance). There is no denying the importance of measurement problems; but in order to advance research on policy determinants significantly, we argue that researchers need first adopt modes of analysis capable of detecting those policy effects of process variables posited in the existing theory concerning the functions of elections, parties, pressure groups, and socialization of leaders.

[30] David R. Morgan, "Political Linkage and Public Policy: Attitudinal Congruence Between Citizens and Officials," *Western Political Quarterly*, 26 (June, 1973), 209–223.

[31] Sidney Verba and Norman Nie, *Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972).

[32] This literature concerning the aggregation and transmission of preferences forms the heart of parties and pressure group theories and dates back to such influential works as Pendleton Herring, *The Politics of Democracy* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1940); Avery Leiserson, *Administrative Regulation: A Study of Representation* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942); V. O. Key Jr., *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups* (New York: Crowell, 1942); and David Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York: Knopf, 1951).

Crude Communism and Revolution

DAVID RESNICK
Cornell University

The scholarly study of Marx has been deeply affected by the rediscovery and publication of his early writings, especially the so-called *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*. The recovery of these manuscripts was extraordinarily significant because they gave rise to a radical reinterpretation of the entire corpus of Marx's work. They did not simply represent the discovery of some hitherto unknown phase of Marx's intellectual development. It was well known that Marx was interested in Hegelian philosophy as a young man, but the assumption was that his early writings were primarily of biographical interest; they were important for understanding the genesis of Marx's mature thought, not a key to interpreting them. The revival of interest in the Hegelian roots of Marxism, and the study of Marx's early writings have led to an attempt to provide a general overview of Marx's work which sees the later mature published writings as merely representing a shift in style and emphasis.[1]

Shlomo Avineri is perhaps the most influential and subtle defender of this view. In the introduction to his important study of the social and political thought of Marx he states: "Marx's later writings merely articulate the conclusions at which he arrived at this early stage of his intellectual odyssey. The various economic, social and historical studies undertaken by Marx are but a corollary of the conclusions he drew from his immanent critique of Hegel's political philosophy."[2] Thus, if the early works were once seen as immature, youthful, pre-Marxist writings, the later works are now to be read as mere corollaries of these very works. Though the focus of Marx's work shifted from philosophy to economics, the focus of scholarly work on Marx has shifted from economics to philosophy. This can lead to distortions and misinterpretations of both Marx's early work and his later work. Too great a stress on the Hegelian heritage and the problem of continuity can prevent us from actually reading Marx. The attempt to understand the later writings in the light of the early writings not only gives a misleading reading of the later writings, but tends to project Marx's more developed insights and arguments upon his earlier theorizing.

In a recent article entitled "Marx's Vision of Future Society"[3] Shlomo Avineri makes many of the same points about Marx's account of the stages of socialism as he does in his book *The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx*.[4] I should like to re-examine the problem since I find myself in rather serious disagreement with Avineri. I shall try to demonstrate that Marx's discussion of the stages of socialism in the *Critique of the Gotha Program* should not be taken as a key to understanding the *Paris Manuscripts of 1844* or vice versa. According to Avineri, when Marx risks a discussion of future society he usually views it in terms of two temporal stages which Avineri dubs Stage I and Stage II. He bases his account of Stage I on two texts, the *Paris Manuscripts* and the *Critique of the Gotha Program*, and claims that Marx's remarks about Stage I in the latter text can be spelled out in more detail by considering his discussion of "crude communism" in the *Paris Manuscripts*. He notes that when Marx mentions "crude communism" he is obviously referring to communist theories other than his own, yet "the language of the manuscript as well as the parallels with the *Critique of the Gotha Program* make it clear that he is talking about what he considers also a historical stage in future development."[5] I find this claim very implausible. I see no warrant in the language of the text for believing that Marx thought of "crude communism" as the next historical stage; nor do I find the parallels with the *Critique of the Gotha Program* persuasive.

In the *Critique of the Gotha Program* Marx explains why he goes into some detail about "equal right" and "fair distribution." He does so

[1] See Franz Mehring, *Karl Marx, The Story of His Life* (Ann Arbor, 1962). For an account of the revival of interest in the Hegelian roots of Marxism, and the history of the debate about the interpretation of the early writings see Irving Fetscher, "The Young and the Old Marx," in *Marx's Socialism*, ed. by Shlomo Avineri (New York, Liber-Atherton Press, 1973), pp. 36–59.

[2] Shlomo Avineri, *The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx* (Cambridge: University Press, 1969), p. 5.

[3] Shlomo Avineri, "Marx's Vision of the Future," *Dissent*, Summer, 1973, pp. 323–331.

[4] Shlomo Avineri, *The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx*.

[5] Avineri, "Marx's Vision of the Future," p. 327.

in order to show what a crime it is to attempt "to force on our Party again, as dogmas, ideas which in a certain period had some meaning but have now become obsolete verbal rubbish," and to pervert the realistic outlook of the party "by means of ideological nonsense about right and other trash so common among the democrats and French Socialists."[6] In addition, Marx points out that in general it is a mistake to put the principal stress on the problem of distribution, since the distribution of the means of consumption is only a consequence of the distribution of the means of production. "Vulgar socialism (and from it in turn a section of democracy) has taken over from the bourgeois economists the consideration and treatment of distribution as independent of the mode of production and hence the presentation of socialism as turning principally on distribution. After the real relation has long been made clear, why retrogress again?"[7] I believe that crude communism is the name Marx uses in 1844 to refer to the theories of some vulgar French Socialists; if there is any meaningful parallel between the two texts, it lies in Marx's rejection of such theoretical positions, and his belief in the importance of correct theory for the working-class movement.

David McLellan in his study of Marx's early writing suggests that by "crude communism" in the *Paris Manuscripts* Marx may be referring to two groups, the *Travailleurs Egalitaires* and the *Humanitaires,* which were mentioned by Engels in his article, "The Progress of Social Reform on the Continent," published in 1843. According to Engels, the former "were just like the Babouvists of the great revolution, rather "rough hewn"; they proposed to turn the world into a community of workers and thus to abolish every refinement of culture, science and art as useless, dangerous and aristocratic luxury"; and the latter were "particularly known for their attacks on marriage, the family and similar institutions."[8] Whether or not McLellan is correct about this historical point—and there is absolutely no reason to doubt him—it is important to note that Marx was never an egalitarian. I believe that Marx thought of egalitarianism as an expression of what might be called "The French Ideology," that is to say, politics.

The importance of correct theory for Marx rests on the relationship between theory and practice. If perchance the working class were seized by incorrect theory, then the outcome of a seemingly successful proletarian revolution would not be socialism as Marx understands it. Why else struggle against utopian socialists, bourgeois socialists, reactionary feudal socialists, anarchists, bourgeois democrats, and all the rest? Avineri is worried about the problem of transition: "If the description of Stage I in the *Paris Manuscripts* can sometimes be likened to a society reminiscent of the Soviet Union, what are Marx's guarantees that one may not be stuck in Stage I?"[9] Marx was certainly worried about such a problem; but crude communism of the *Paris Manuscripts* is not Stage I, a healthy infant society destined to grow into a full fledged socialist society. If it ever came into existence it would be merely another manifestation of the evils of capitalism; it would be a bloody abortion.

A Comparison of Two Societies

Since I wish to argue that the *Paris Manuscripts* do not contain a description of the next stage of society which is parallel to the one in the *Critique of the Gotha Program,* I shall refer to what Avineri calls Stage I in the latter as the "cooperative society," and Stage I in the former as simply "crude communism." In order to convince us that the cooperative society is the same as crude communism Avineri points to certain fundamental features which they share; in both "there is no private property in the means of production; everyone is employed by society, and there is an equality of wages."[10] In his book he is a bit more careful, and points out that there is a difference between the two texts on the equality of wages. He notes that in the *Critique of the Gotha Program* "though wages are not egalitarian (and in this respect this description varies from the *Manuscripts*) but depend on production, the principle underlying wage differentials (to each according to his work) remains egalitarian and preserves the bourgeois element of property rights related to commodities as objects of consumption."[11]

Yet this is not a superficial difference, it is absolutely crucial; once we have grasped the implications of this difference, the parallels between the two texts will seem less significant, and Avineri's assertion that, in respect to the cooperative society, "understanding its tone de-

[6] Karl Marx, *Critique of the Gotha Program* in *The Marx-Engels Reader,* ed. by Robert C. Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1972), p. 388.
[7] *Ibid.,* p. 389.
[8] David McLellan, *Marx Before Marxism* (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), p. 182.
[9] Avineri, "Marx's Vision of the Future," p. 329.
[10] *Ibid.,* p. 327.
[11] Avineri, *The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx,* p. 225.

pends on reading the earlier sketch" will take on a rather different meaning.[12] The important theoretical point is that crude communism is a totally egalitarian society; it is not the result of merely retaining one element of bourgeois right. It is founded on the belief that social ills are the result of the inequalities created by private property; thus, the solution it proposes is to generalize the bourgeois principle, "all men are created equal" (the French Revolutionary principle), and apply this ruthlessly to all forms of inequality. Marx demands a cooperative society which has abolished private property in the means of production, a conclusion which is deduced from an understanding of the dynamics of capitalism; he is rather clear that such a cooperative society is thoroughly inequalitarian and that it transcended the naive hostility to private property which characterized the earlier stages of the socialist movement.

In order to bring out the difference between an egalitarian standard for assigning claims to the objects of consumption, which characterizes the cooperative society and the thorough going egalitarianism as a principle for society itself, which is crude communism, I shall briefly discuss the supposed parallels. In the cooperative society the value of both work and the means of consumption is expressed in terms of socially necessary labor time rather than money. Each worker contributes to the social product, but instead of money wages he receives labor script. His salary is not the exact equivalent of his contribution because a certain amount is deducted for the social fund, yet it enables him to appropriate objects from the common stock for his own use by exchanging his labor script for them. This scheme of distribution employs the same principle as that which regulates the exchange of commodity equivalents in capitalism, so far as this is an exchange of equal values: "a given amount of labor in one form is exchanged for an equal amount of labor in another form." This creates an equal right, but it is still bourgeois right because "the right of the producers is *proportional* to the labor they supply; the equality consists in the fact that measurement is made with an *equal standard*, labor."[13] He goes on to point out that applying an equal standard, labor, as a principle of distribution guarantees an *unequal* distribution of commodities:

> But one man is superior to another physically or mentally and so supplies more labor in the same time, or can labor for a longer time; and labor, to serve as a measure, must be defined by its duration or intensity, otherwise it ceases to be a standard of measurement. This *equal* right is an unequal right for unequal labor. It recognizes no class differences, because everyone is only a worker like everyone else; but it tacitly recognizes unequal individual endowment and thus productive capacity as natural privileges. *It is, therefore, a right of inequality, in its content, like every right.*[14]

Marx then points out another source of inequality: even if two laborers perform the same amount of work and have the same natural endowments, one may be married and the other single, one may have more children than another and the like; thus, with an equal performance of labor and hence "even with an equal share in the social consumption fund, one will in fact receive more than another, one will be richer than another, and so on."[15] Therefore the equal right of labor in the cooperative society which Marx envisages in the *Critique of the Gotha Program* justifies *inequalities* of wealth on the basis of natural privileges; it recognizes and rewards the unequal distribution of talents and abilities; but does not recognize claims based upon differences in need, such as the possession of a family.

Crude communism as Marx envisages it in the *Paris Manuscripts* is a society characterized by greed, envy and animality; it is driven by a hostility to private property as such: "the dominion of *material* property bulks so large that it wants to destroy *everything* which is not capable of being possessed by all as *private property*. It wants to abstract *by force* from talent, etc. For it, the sole purpose of life and existence is direct, physical *possession*"[16] (emphasis in original). Yet as we just saw, rather than trying to eliminate talent by force or any other means, the cooperative society, if anything, encourages individuals to exercise their talents; it incorporates talents concretely as a basic assumption of the distribution of the means of consumption. The argument of the

[12] Avineri, *Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx*, p. 225.

[13] Marx, *Critique of the Gotha Program*, p. 387.

[14] *Ibid.*

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 388.

[16] Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* (Selections), in Tucker, p. 68. Note: I have tried to cite readily available translations of Marx's works, but have made slight modifications whenever I thought it helpful. Throughout I have used "transcendence" as a translation of *aufheben* in its various forms, and "alienation" as a translation of *entfremdung* in its various forms. It is always useful to consult the original German, especially when it comes to Marx's more philosophical works. Since some of my analysis of the *Paris Manuscripts* departs from traditional scholary interpretations, all references to the manuscripts will be accompanied by citations to the Marx-Engels *Gesamtausgabe* (Berlin: Marx-Engels Verlag, 1932) I, 3, pp. 111–12, hereafter referred to as *MEGA*.

crude communist seems to be that talent is not something which everyone can possess like a loaf of bread: we can take the property of the rich and divide it up amongst ourselves, but we cannot divide up the talents of the talented, therefore let's eliminate talent as a natural fact.

Marx then goes on to note that the hostility to private property manifests itself in an animal form by "counterposing to *marriage* (certainly a *form of exclusive private property*) the *community of women,* in which a woman becomes a piece of *communal* and *common* property. It may be said that this idea of the *community of women* gives away the *secret* of this as yet completely crude and thoughtless communism."[17] Needless to say there is absolutely nothing about women becoming communal property in the cooperative society. If anything, Marx's remark about the inequalities of wealth caused by the fact that one worker has more children than another might imply that he envisages the existence of a rather traditional family. A cooperative society based on the common ownership of the means of production entails a distinction between *producers* and *means of production;* certainly women are producers, not means of production. The suggestion that the first stage of socialism entails viewing women as property is certainly bizarre.

After showing how crude communism universalizes "human lust" by setting up a community of women, Marx describes how it universalizes human avarice, or the lust for objects. Avarice reappears in a disguised form as envy, and the universalization of envy leads to levelling:

> The thoughts of every piece of private property—inherent in each piece as such—are *at least* turned against all *wealthier* private property in the form of envy and the urge to reduce to a common level, so that this envy and urge even constitute the essence of competition. The crude commonism is only the consummation of this envy and of this levelling-down proceeding from the *preconceived* minimum. It has a *definite, limited* standard. How little this transcendence of private property is really an appropriation is in fact proved by the abstract negation of the entire world of culture and civilization, the regression to the *unnatural* simplicity of the *poor and undemanding* man who has not only failed to go beyond private property, but has not yet even attained to it.[18]

Once again there is nothing about levelling down in the cooperative society; the equal standard of labor does not level down the world of wealth to make everyone's wealth equal.

Only after making these observations does Marx say that "the community is only a community of *labor,* and an equality of *wages* paid but by the communal capital—the *community* as the universal capitalist."[19] This description is very similar to one which Marx employs to characterize Proudhon's theory in an earlier section of the *Manuscripts.* He says, "Indeed, even the *equality of wages* demanded by Proudhon only transforms the relationship of the present-day worker to his labor into the relationship of all men to labor. Society is then conceived as an abstract capitalist."[20] But whether society is conceived of as an abstract capitalist or a universal capitalist, it is not pictured as a cooperative society based on the common ownership of the means of production in crude communism; indeed, there is no cooperation at all.

I take it that the equality of wages in crude communism means that everyone is to be paid the same irrespective of the social value of his work; universal envy would preclude paying a skilled and talented worker any more than an unskilled and bumbling one. The demand is not to increase the total pool of social wealth so that everyone may have more; rather, it entails keeping a watchful eye on your neighbor to make sure he doesn't get any more than you do. Marx exposes the true nature of the crude communist's understanding of a truly human community; equality of wages and the community of work may seem to establish such a community, but their view of the sexual relationship, and their view of work itself betrays them. Crude communism is an extreme egalitarianism which demands the elimination of talents, the redistribution of property out of envy, and the universal prostitution of women out of lust. Such a society would seem very far removed from Stage I of socialism.

But if crude communism in the *Paris Manuscripts* is Marx's way of referring to a grossly inadequate communist theory, and not the first stage of future socialist society, then what of his own theory of communism—communism as "the positive transcendence of private property"? Avineri assigns it to Stage II, parallel to what is referred to in the *Critique of the Gotha Program* as a higher phase of communist society. I believe that this is also a mistake, and arises from reading Marx's early writing in the light of his later work. While an understanding of the philosophical concepts of his early writ-

[17] Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts* in *The Marx-Engels Reader,* ed. Tucker, p. 68; *MEGA,* p. 112.
[18] *Ibid.,* p. 69; *MEGA,* p. 112.
[19] *Ibid.; MEGA,* p. 112.
[20] *Ibid.,* p. 66; *MEGA,* p. 92.

ing may help to explicate his later work, a knowledge of the arguments of his later work may also obscure the philosophical concepts of the early writings. I shall try to show that what is called *Kommunismus* in the *Paris Manuscripts* is very different from the *kommunistische Gesellschaft* in the *Critique of the Gotha Program;* I shall argue that it is not intended to correspond to a future *society* at all; it is best understood as a theory which corresponds to a revolutionary movement which will bring about the truly human society. If we want a name for the form of future society envisaged in the *Paris Manuscripts,* an appropriate name would be socialism, and this society is not discussed in terms of stages.

In order to understand what Marx meant by communism in the *Paris Manuscripts* we must see Marx himself historically. When he wrote the *Paris Manuscripts* he thought of himself as a follower of Feuerbach and conceived of the enterprise he was engaged in as positive criticism. Communism was the outcome of the German positive criticism of political economy, and only from this perspective can we understand how Marx thought that communism was related to the next phase of history.

I hope that my discussion of the parallels between crude communism and the cooperative society has at least raised some doubts as to whether Marx thought that crude communism is the next historical stage. But the persuasiveness of the claim that he did rests upon taking what Marx said in 1844 as an amplification of what he said in 1875; to clinch the argument we have to investigate the language of the *Paris Manuscripts.*

The Meaning of Crude Communism

Marx first mentions crude communism in the *Paris Manuscripts* after he has listed a number of social theories, all French. He then asserts that communism is the positive expression of the transcendence of private property, and that its first form is "crude, unthinking communism." Marx starts his discussion of the various theories by making the following cryptic remark: "The overcoming of self-alienation follows the same course as self-alienation."[21] In order to understand the meaning of this, we have to see it as a reference to the positive criticism of political economy: "the overcoming of self-alienation," whatever its other possible meanings, refers to the analytical movement that theory must perform in order to comprehend the phenomenon of private property as alienated labor. I shall discuss the possible historical meaning of this statement below.

In the manuscript given the title "Alienated Labor" which comes before this section, Marx has criticized political economy for proceeding from the fact of private property, but not explaining it. He then goes on to explain private property as alienated, externalized labor, and summarizes his partial results as follows:

> We have considered the act of alienation of practical human activity, labor, in two of its aspects. 1) The relation of the worker to the *product of labor* as an alien object exercising power over him . . . 2) The relation of labor to the *act of production* within the *labor* process. This relation is the relation of the worker to his own activity as an alien activity not belonging to him. . . . We have yet a third aspect of alienated labor to deduce from the two already considered.[22]

Marx then launches into a discussion of man as a species being and concludes: "in alienating from man 1) nature, and 2) himself, his own active functions, his life-activity, alienated labor alienates the species from man."[23] Thus Marx explains private property as alienated labor alienates the *species* from man."[24] Thus (2) the activity of production, and (3) species-being.

Marx also uses the same three aspects to comprehend the transcendence of private property understood as self-alienation. He says:

> *Private property* is first considered only in its objective aspect—but nevertheless with labor as its essence. Its form of existence is therefore *capital,* which is to be transcended "as such" (Proudhon). Or a particular form of labor — labor levelled down, parcelled, and therefore unfree — is conceived as the source of private property's *perniciousness* and of its humanly alienated existence: for instance, Fourier, who, like the physiocrats, also conceived agricultural labor to be at least the *exemplary* type, whilst *Saint-Simon* declares in contrast that *industrial labor* as such is the essence, and now also aspires to the *exclusive* rule of the industrialists and the improvement of workers' condition.[25]

Thus we have the first two aspects, the object and the activity of production. Marx then says, "finally, *communism* is the positive expression of transcendence of private property — at first as *universal* private property."[25] He then goes on to discuss how communism is related to

[21] *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts,* Tucker, p. 68; *MEGA,* p. 111.

[22] *Ibid.,* p. 60-61; *MEGA,* p. 86.
[23] *Ibid.,* p. 61; *MEGA,* p. 87.
[24] *Ibid.,* p. 68; *MEGA,* p. 111.
[25] *Ibid., MEGA,* p. 111.

man as a species-being, the type of community it posits, how it expresses man's essence and the like. The first form is the one which only generalizes and completes the relations of private property and is called crude communism. I have outlined its main features above, but I wish to point to Marx's concluding summary statement: "the first positive transcendence of private property—*crude* communism—is thus merely one *form* in which the vileness of private property, which wants to set itself up as the *positive community, comes to the surface.*"[26]

He then briefly mentions the second type of communism.

> Communism a) of a political nature still — democratic or despotic; b) with the transcendence of the state, yet still incomplete and being still affected by private property (i.e., by the alienation of man). In both forms communism already knows itself to be reintegration or return of man to himself, the transcendence of human self-alienation; but since it has not yet grasped the positive essence of private property, and just as little the *human* nature of need, it remains captive to it and infected by it. It has, indeed, grasped its concept, but not its essence.[27]

Finally he goes on to discuss the third form of communism:

> *Communism* as the *positive* transcendence of *private property* or *human self-alienation,* and therefore as the real *appropriation of the human* essence by and for man; communism therefore as the complete return of man to himself as a *social* (i.e., human) being — a return become conscious, and accomplished within the entire wealth of previous development. This communism, as fully-developed naturalism, equals humanism, and as fully-developed humanism equals naturalism.[28]

It is rather clear that Marx identifies himself with this third form of communism, which we might call true communism. He has just proved that it is superior to all other communist theories because it is the only theory of the transcendence of private property which truly transcends private property in theory. All communist theories stand on a higher theoretical level than theories like Proudhon's and Fourier's which negate only one aspect of private property. This explains his comment to Ruge in a letter written just before he composed the *Paris Manuscripts* in which he sets out what he is going to prove. He says, "Communism saw the origin of other socialistic doctrines like those of Fourier, Proudhon, etc., not accidentally but necessarily in opposition to itself."[29] Communist theories raise the problem of community, of man's alienation from his species-being; but hitherto existing communist theories have not as yet grasped fully the nature or essence of man. A true communist theory must not only grasp private property as alienation, it must grasp all its aspects. Marx has thus "dialectically" proven the superiority of his theory to the attempt of political economy to explain the movement of private property, and the attempt of various socialist and communist theories to transcend the movement of private property. Hitherto existing proletarian movements have not succeeded in overthrowing private property, and I believe it is a deep assumption of Marx's early writings that only a movement which is based on a theory that transcends private property in theory, will be able to transcend actual private property in practice. I also believe that, with suitable terminological changes, this statement holds true for Marx's later work as well.

We have just seen how Marx criticized the inadequate communist theories because they still remained infected by private property; since they have not yet grasped all the aspects of private property as alienation of the human essence, they are still entrapped. Crude communism is merely universal private property. It posits the abolition of private property in a negative way; it negates private property without grasping its positive essence; it posits the negation of private property, but is not itself truly positive; it is the negative expression of the abolition of private property. It is a theory mired in negativity, infected by private property, and thus it posits the abolition of private property by the negation of private property. True communism, on the other hand, grasps the positive nature of private property, and thus expresses the abolition of private property in a positive way; it expresses the abolition of private property as the negation of the negation. True communism is the positive overcoming of private property as the expression of human alienation; it overcomes alienation because it is the negation of the negation: it is no longer infected by the negativity of private property. True communism is the positive expression of the abolition of private property

[26] *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts,* Tucker, p. 70; *MEGA,* p. 113.
[27] *Ibid., MEGA,* pp. 113-14.
[28] *Ibid., MEGA,* p. 114.
[29] Marx, letter to Ruge, in *Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society,* ed. and translated by L.D. Easton and K. H. Guddat (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1967), p. 213.

because it is not merely the negation, it is the negation of the negation.

I have gone through this bit of dialetics in order to bring out the significance of the following quotation from the *Paris Manuscripts* in which Marx *explicitly* mentions communism as the next stage of history:

> Communism is the position as the negation of the negation, therefore the *actual* phase necessary for the next stage of historical development in the process of human emancipation and recovery. *Communism* is the necessary form and dynamic principle of the immediate future, but communism as such is not the goal of human development — the form of human society.[30]

But if Marx thought that crude communism was necessary for the next stage, because it will correspond to crude socialist theories or some such, he would have referred to communism as the negation. Only true communism is the negation of the negation, and thus only true communism is the phase necessary for the next stage of historical development.

But if true communism is only the next phase of man's liberation, but not the form of human society, what is? Why is true communism only the negation of the negation and not, as it were, in Feuerbachian terms the true positive, positively grounded on itself? Just before he refers to communism as the negation of the negation Marx tells us why socialist man would no longer need atheism in order to overcome the alienation of man from nature:

> Socialism as socialism no longer stands in need of such a mediation: it proceeds from the *practically and theoretically sensuous consciousness* of man and of nature as the *essence*. It is man's *positive self-consciousness* no longer mediated through the transcendence of religion, just as *actual life* is positive, no longer mediated through the transcendence of private property, through *communism*. Communism is the position as the negation of the negation . . . etc.[31]

Marx is drawing a distinction between communism as a revolutionary movement as, say, the union of critical philosophy and the proletariat, and socialism which is the outcome of such a revolutionary process; communism is not a type of society but the means by which a society will be brought into existence.

In the section of the *Paris Manuscripts* given the title, "Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy as a Whole," where Marx is performing the task of positive criticism of Hegel and attempting to reveal the positive or useful aspects of Hegel's dialectic, he discusses the concept of *Aufheben*, or transcendence, as a movement, the movement of externalization taking back itself (Das *Aufheben*, als gegenständliche, die Entäusserung in sich *zurücknehmende* Bewegung). *Aufheben* actually entails the reappropriation of man's objective being through the destruction of the alienated character of the objective world. He once again draws the analogy between atheism and communism:

> Just as atheism as the transcendence of God is the emergence of theoretical humanism, so communism, the transcendence of private property, is the vindication of actual human life as man's property, the emergence of practical humanism. Or, atheism is humanism mediated with itself through the transcendence of religion, and communism is humanism mediated with itself through the transcendence of private property. Only through the transcendence of this mediation, which is, however, a necessary premise, emerges *positive* humanism, humanism emerging positively from itself.[32]

Thus communism is a movement of civil society to transcend private property; it is a movement whose essence is the transcending of private property, but it in turn will be transcended. Yet understood as a movement, it has its history in both theory and practice. Marx certainly knew that communism did not begin with his writing the *Paris Manuscripts* in 1844. To the extent that the statement "the transcendence of self-alienation follows the same course as self alienation" (Die Aufhebung der Selbstentfremdung macht denselben Weg wie die Selbstentfremdung)[33] has a historical meaning, it refers to the past history of the communist movement; it is not about the future of socialist society. Avineri apparently interprets this as a statement about the stages of socialism, understood as the society which is to be established after the proletarian revolution. He says that Marx adds something to the discussion of stages which he presents in the *Critique of the Gotha Program:*

> In the *Mansucripts* Marx adds a further dimension, making the stages of development of communism parallel the stages of the development of communist ideas. The less sophisticated stage of communism seems also to correspond to a less sophis-

[30] Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* (Selections) in Tucker, p. 79; *MEGA*, p. 126.
[31] *Ibid.*, pp. 78-79; *MEGA*, pp. 125-26.
[32] Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* in Easton and Guddat, p. 331; *MEGA*, pp. 166-67.
[33] *MEGA*, p. 111.

ticated and more primitive socialist theory. This enables Marx to acknowledge the immense contribution of the first and more primitive theories of socialism while demonstrating their utter insufficiency. He can even point to their dialectical necessity for the full emergence of his own synthesis, but this implies that by themselves they are unsatisfactory.

To Marx the main defect of these socialist theories, and the main defect of the first stage of socialist society, is that they see the abolition of private property only objectively.[24]

This is a rather neat argument, but aside from acknowledging a debt to other socialists, what is the "dialectical necessity" which makes the stages of the future society correspond to the stages of the development of socialist ideas?

Avineri's argument turns on taking "the transcendence of alienation" as referring to a process which will occur in future society. Existing society has a great deal of alienation, alienation is maximized if you will; but alienation will only be overcome in stages, since there is too much of it to eliminate at once. Primitive socialist theories have only understood part of what is necessary to overcome alienation; but a more adequate socialist theory comprehends more, i. e., it overcomes more alienation in theory. Thus a more adequate socialist theory corresponds to a higher stage of socialist society, and a less adequate one to a lower stage. Since Marx says that the overcoming of self-alienation follows the same course as self-alienation, he must mean that the actual overcoming of alienation in future society will follow the same course as the theoretical overcoming of alienation.

I believe that any such interpretation is deeply mistaken and comes from the attempt to project Marx's later formulations upon his earlier theorizing; however useful the theory of alienation is to a deeper understanding of Marx's later work, on this point it leads to a distorted account of how Marx perceived the relation of communist theory to communist practice. In order to see why there is no reason at all to believe that Marx saw any "dialectical necessity" for a socialist society to parallel inadequate and incomplete socialist theories, we must try to reconstruct what Marx thought the task of critical theory entailed; how he conceived of the relationship between a theory which has transcended alienation and a movement which is the positive expression of the transcendence of private property; and why the criticism of other socialist and communist theories was significant.

[24] Avineri, *The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx*, p. 222.

Critical Theory and Revolutionary Practice

In September of 1843 Marx wrote a letter to Ruge in which he announces his forthcoming trip to Paris, and reflects on the task of critical philosophy. It entails, among other things the criticism of communist theories:

> I am not for setting up a dogmatic standard. On the contrary, we must attempt to help the dogmatists make their dogmas clear to themselves. Especially *communism*, this is a dogmatic abstraction; I have in mind actually existing communism, as Cabet, Dezamy, Weitling, etc., teach it, not some other imagined or possible one. This communism is itself only a separate phenomenon of the humanistic principle, infected by its opposite, private advantage. Dissolution of private property, therefore, is in no way identical with communism, and communism saw the origin of other socialistic doctrines like those of Fourier, Proudhon, etc., not accidentally but necessarily in opposition to itself, because communism itself is only a special one-sided realization of the socialist principle. And the entire socialistic principle, in turn, is only one side of the *reality* of human nature.[25]

I believe that the *Paris Manuscripts* carry out this program of criticism. Marx goes on to say that he does not face the world in a dogmatic way by attempting to announce some new principle:

> We merely show the world why it actually struggles; and the awareness of this is something the world *must* acquire even if it does not want to. The reform of consciousness exists *merely* in the fact that one makes the world aware of its consciousness, that one awakens the world out of its own dream, that one *explains* to the world its own acts . . . It will be evident that there is not a big blank between the past and the future, but rather it is a matter of *realizing* the thoughts of the past. It will be evident, finally, that mankind does not begin any *new* work but performs its old work consciously. Therefore, we can express the aim of our periodical in *one* phrase: A self-understanding (critical philosophy) of the age concerning its struggles and wishes. This is a task for the world and for us.[26]

Thus the task of philosophy is to criticize consciousness, to bring out the inadequacies of the existing modes of understanding the world; to transcend, if you will, all forms of alienated consciousness; and thus to correct and instruct

[25] Marx, letter to Ruge, in Easton and Guddat, pp. 212-13.

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 214–15.

movements which attempt to abolish the conditions causing alienation, by means of a consciousness that has not yet itself transcended alienation.

In an article entitled "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, Introduction," which Marx wrote between autumn of 1843 and January of 1844 and published in the *Deutsch Französische Jahrbücher*, he proclaims that

> As philosophy finds its *material* weapons in the proletariat, the proletariat finds its *intellectual* weapons in philosophy. And once the lightning of thought has deeply struck this unsophisticated soil of the people, the *Germans* will emancipate themselves to become *men*. Let us summarize the result: the only emancipation of Germany possible *in practice* is emancipation based on *the* theory proclaiming that man is the highest essence of man. In Germany emancipation from the *Middle Ages* is possible only as emancipation at the same time from *partial* victories over the Middle Ages. In Germany *no* brand of bondage can be broken without *every* brand of bondage being broken. Always seeking *fundamentals*, Germany can only make a *fundamental* revolution. The *emancipation of the German* is the *emancipation of mankind*. The *head* of this emancipation is *philosophy*, its heart is the *proletariat*.[37]

The theory which proclaims that man is the highest essence of man is Feuerbach's, and even the metaphor of the unity of head and heart refers to a passage of the *Principles of the Philosophy of the Future*.[38] In August of 1844 while Marx was working on the *Paris Manuscripts* he sent a copy of this article to Feuerbach expressing his admiration for Feuerbach's work and proclaiming:

> In these writings you have given — whether intentionally I do not know — a philosophical basis to socialism, and the communists, too, have immediately understood these works in this sense. The unity of man with man, which is based on the real difference between men, the concept of a human species drawn down from the heaven of abstraction to the real earth, what can this be but the concept of society?[39]

In the Preface to the *Paris Manuscripts* he also acknowledges his great debt to Feuerbach, since positive criticism in general and thus German positive criticism of political economy are founded on the discoveries of Feuerbach.[40] It seems clear that Marx thought the theory that would penetrate the German proletariat was theory which based itself on Feuerbach.

In another article he wrote in August of 1844 Marx refers to his earlier "Critique of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*" for an understanding of the special talents of the German proletariat. He says, "It must be granted that the German proletariat is the *theorist* of the European proletariat, just as the English proletariat is its *economist* and the French proletariat its *politician* . . . only in socialism can a philosophical people find its suitable practice, thus only in the *proletariat* can it find the active element of its emancipation.[41] Thus it is the task of critical philosophy, of German positive criticism, to construct a theory for the emancpation of the proletariat, and thus the emancipation of mankind. While German economic and political conditions lag behind England and France, its theory is more advanced; German theory cannot be content with criticizing merely some aspect of existing reality, it must be truly radical; it cannot rest with overcoming alienation in one sphere, it must transcend all forms of alienation.

A primitive socialist theory is primitive because of the fact that it arose in more advanced political and economic conditions; that is to say, it does not comprehend fully the essence of private property as human self-alienation. Thus it cannot become the theory of a movement which will transcend private property, because it has not as yet transcended private property in theory. In the *Paris Manuscripts* Marx observes that

> Equality in the *groundwork* of communism is its *political* justification (Bergründung), just as when the German justifies it by conceiving of man as *universal self-consciousness*. It goes without saying that the transcendence of alienation proceeds from the form of alienation which is the *dominant* power, in Germany *self-consciousness*, in France *equality*, because politics; in England the real, material *practical* need taking itself as its standard. It is from this point that Proudhon is to be criticised and appreciated.[42]

Thus other socialist theories are to be understood as theories which are still enmeshed within alienation; only German theory has man-

[37] Marx, "Toward the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law: Introduction," in Easton and Guddat, pp. 263-64.

[38] Ludwig Feuerbach, *Principles of the Philosophy of the Future*, in *The Fiery Brook: Selected Writings of Ludwig Feuerbach*, translated by Zawar Hanfi (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1972), p. 243.

[39] McLellan, *Marx Before Marxism*, p. 194.

[40] Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* (Selections), in Tucker, p. 54; *MEGA*, p. 34.

[41] Marx, *Critical Notes on "The King of Prussia and Social Reform"* (1844), in Easton and Guddat, p. 353.

[42] *MEGA*, p. 134.

aged to break through. Marx then refers to true communism, the negation of the negation, which is his own theory, a theory which has completely broken through alienation and thus overcomes it in consciousness, and says:

> In order to transcend the *idea* of private property, the *idea* of communism is completely adequate; it takes *actual* communist action in order to transcend actual private property. History will create it, and this movement, which we already recognize in *thought* as self-transcending will in reality involve a severe and protracted process.[43]

Thus Marx is claiming that there will be a communist movement based upon theory which will bring forth the new society. The actual communist action which he contemplates is action based upon correct communist theory—theory which fully comprehends the essence of private property as self-alienation, and thus itself transcends alienation in theory.

German positive criticism has created such a theory, and it will probably be the German proletariat which is just emerging that will be infused with this theory, and thus accomplish what no other movement to transcend private property has accomplished. There is no dialectical necessity for the German proletariart to repeat the stages of socialist theory, since it has only just come into existence; it does not possess the English proletariat's belief in economic solutions, nor the French proletariat's faith in political solutions. It has only theory, and since German positive criticism has broken through the alienation of German philosophy, and since the German proletariat has no illusions because it has no history, it will be the class to succeed in actually transcending private property and abolishing alienation in all its forms. It is the task of German critical theory to prevent the emerging proletariat from being infected by other socialist ideas; only thus will it avoid repeating the failures of other socialist and communist movements.

[43] *MEGA*, p. 134.

I do not think that Marx in 1844 had any clear idea of what a socialist society would look like. He was attempting to prove that radical revolution was necessary in Germany and the world; and a radical revolution requires both a material element (a radical class), and a theoretical element (a radical theory). Such a revolution would go further than the French revolution; it would not be simply a political revolution, but a total social revolution of world historical significance. It is the task of criticism to break through all the illusions of civil society, and thus to provide the true theory for the class born without illusions, created by civil society but not a class of civil society—a class destined to create a totally new society which will have abolished the alienation of practical life, just as critical theory has abolished the alienation of the theory of practical life.

Even if my account of Marx's theory in 1844 is correct, it is still the case that he came to believe that communist society will develop in stages. However much the *Paris Manuscripts* anticipate Marx's later work, there is no question that Marx learned a great deal more about existing society and the proletariat. The more one reads the *Grundrisse* and *Capital* the odder seems the suggestion that communist society must repeat the stages of outmoded socialist theories. I have tried to show that Marx did not even believe this in 1844. I have tried to demonstrate that Marx never thought that crude communism was the first stage of future society; and I have felt that a brief discussion of what Marx thought the task of critical philosophy was in 1844 would be more or less adequate. An explanation of the necessarily limited nature of the first stage of socialism as Marx outlines it in the *Critique of the Gotha Program* would entail a much lengthier discussion of Marx's later critique of political economy; just as Marx's conclusion that socialism will entail stages is a more sophisticated view than the one he held in 1844, so its explanation must rest on his more developed theory.

Comment on Resnick's "Crude Communism and Revolution"

SHLOMO AVINERI
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

The main point of issue between David Resnick's interpretation of Marx's views about socialism and my own hinges upon what "crude communism," as described in the *Paris Manuscripts* of 1844, stands for. Resnick thinks "crude communism" is merely a critical characterization of a number of communist *theories* preceding Marx, most of them French; I claimed that "crude communism" is *both* a description of earlier communist *theories* criticized by Marx *and* a rough delineation of what the first stage of future communist *society* may turn out to be.[1] Athough there are a number of other issues in Resnick's thoughtful article with which I might like to disagree, we have here, in the meaning of "crude communism," a central element in the interpretation of Marx, and I will therefore limit myself in my response to what I hope might be a further clarification of the issues involved.

Let me start from a point of agreement: despite our disagreement about the 1844 *Manuscripts*, both Resnick and myself agree that at least in the *Critique of the Gotha Program* Marx envisaged *two* stages of socialist society and believed that only in the second stage would socialism be fully realized. Resnick calls Stage I in the *Critique* the "co-operative society";[2] he goes into considerable detail about the nature of this stage in his article, and his discussion is mainly aimed at showing how utterly different this "co-operative society" is from the "crude communism" of the *Paris Manuscripts*. I agree with the substance of what Resnick says about this "co-operative society." Yet despite his being aware of the lim ited horizons of this society, which is still en meshed within the constricting concepts o bourgeois right, Resnick seems to me to hav overlooked the fact that Marx himself explicitl pointed out some immanent shortcomings o this society, and that these shortcomings ar very similar to some of the attributes of th "crude communism" of the *Paris Manuscripts* Thus, despite the quite wide-ranging discussio of the "co-operative society," Resnick fails t quote or even mention the following sentenc from the *Critique of the Gotha Program* whic sums up Marx's awareness of the ambivalen nature of Stage I of socialist society:

> What we have to deal with here is a communis society, not as it has *developed* on its own founda tions, but, on the contrary, as it has *emerged* fro capitalist society; which is thus in every respect economically, morally and intellectually, stil stamped with the birth marks of the old society from whose womb it emerges.[3]

Why is it that this has been overlooked b Resnick? The answer is simple enough: if Mar had not written these words, one would be abl to surmise that the "co-operative society," whil still retaining a bourgeois conception of right as an egalitarian distributive criterion, is al ready in every other respect a full-blooded so cialist society and hence cannot in any wa whatsoever be likened to the "crude commu nism" of the *Paris Manuscripts*, irrespective o the question whether this "crude communism' is a mere underdeveloped *theory* of communisn or the first *historical* stage of future communis society. But in the paragraph just quoted abov and omitted by Resnick, this "co-operative so ciety" of the *Critique of the Gotha Program* i explicitly characterized by Marx as bein "stamped [*behaftet*] with the birth marks" o old, bourgeois society. Are these empty words' A society thus stamped, "economically, morall and intellectually," with the stigmata of bour geois society is a very imperfect society indeed certainly not as near-ideal as Resnick make this "co-operative society" appear in his article In the same paragraph Marx goes on to say tha in this society "the same principle prevails a

[1] In this I followed the interpretation initially suggested by Robert C. Tucker, *Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx* (Cambridge, 1961), pp. 154–6. This interpretation has recently been challenged also by Michael Evans, *Karl Marx* (London, 1975), p. 150, without, however, suggesting any evidence.

[2] Resnick seems to take the term "co-operative society" from the text of the *Critique of the Gotha Program* itself, see: Karl Marx/Frederick Engels, *Selected Works* (Moscow, n.d.), I, 22. The German original, however, is "genossenschaftliche Gesellschaft," which is better translated as "associational society"; see, Marx-Engels, *Werke* (Berlin, 1962), XIX, 19. This is, incidentally, also the term suggested by Marx in the *Communist Manifesto* for the society emerging from the proletarian takeover. But for simplicity's sake, I have decided to follow Resnick's terminology and refer to the first stage of socialist society as described in the *Critique of the Gotha Program* as "co-operative society."

[3] *Selected Works*, II, 23.

that which regulates the exchange of commodities, as far as this is the exchange of equal values," i.e., this society is still characterized by forms of alienation, since it is still ruled by commodity exchange. Had Resnick referred to this characterization of the "co-operative society" by Marx in such ambivalent terms, it would have been much more difficult for him to claim that it is so totally different from the "crude communism" of the *Paris Manuscripts*.

I find Marx's usage of the phrase "economic, moral and intellectual" extremely intriguing and significant, as Marx does not use those terms lightly. In my mind, at least, they seem to evoke a direct echo of the raw nature of "crude communism." Is it too much to suggest that the "economic" birth marks suggest the purely distributive nature of the economic measures of "crude communism," that "moral" stands for the problem involved in the relation to women and that "intellectual" refers to the "abstraction from talent" envisioned by Marx as characterizing "crude communism" in the *Paris Manuscripts*? Am I reading too much into the text? If I am, then I would greatly appreciate an alternative suggestion about what exactly did Marx mean by these "economic, moral and intellectual" birthmarks with which the first stage of socialism is stamped in the *Critique of the Gotha Program*. It seems to me to be too cavalier to overlook this statement when it is quite obvious that Marx registers here a strong reservation about the nature of the first stage of future society, a reservation clearly reminiscent of all that is so repulsive in "crude communism."

This reservation in the *Critique of the Gotha Program* and the context in which it appears have further consequences for the understanding of the underlying structure of Marx's argument about the nature of the transition from captalism to socialism. This transition has to be dialectical, i.e., it cannot be achieved by "leaps" but through an historical process in which every change has to be mediated through the process of *Aufhebung*—a transcendence (here I fully agree with Resnick's rendering of this difficult Hegelian term) which implies (a) abolition, (b) raising to a higher level as well as (c) preservation. Each element in a given historical situation has to be brought to full fruition before it can be transformed and transcended. Hence the bourgeois notion of "equal rights" is brought in Stage I of socialist society (let us continue to call it by the name Resnick gave it, the "co-operative society") to its utmost realization, and it is this ultimate realization which brings out the intrinsic contradictions of this society as well as the potentiality for novel forms inherent in the old structure. The immanent *injustice* in bourgeois concepts of equal rights can never be brought out in bourgeois society itself, for bourgeois society itself can never fully realize this concept. Only the first stage of socialism can *fully* realize and thus also bring out the utter insufficiency of the bourgeois quest for equal rights, as Marx suggests in the *Critique of the Gotha Program:*

> [But] one man is superior to another physically or mentally and so supplies more labor in the same time. . . . This *equal* right is an unequal right for unequal labor. *It is, therefore, a right of inequality in its content, like every right.*[4]

Stage I of socialism as described in the *Critique* is thus merely a negative transcendence of bourgeois society ("negation of the negation"); despite its incompleteness, it is through such a negative transcendence that the ultimate, *positive* transcendence of private property can be achieved; it is only in the second stage, which has the first stage as its dialectical precondition, that "the narrow horizon of bourgeois right [can] be crossed."[5]

Is this so very different from what Marx postulates in the *Paris Manuscripts*? We know, and Resnick acknowledges, that in the *Critique of the Gotha Program* Marx deals with historical stages, not with different theories of socialism, and these stages are necessary given Marx's dialectical understanding of historical development. But let us suppose for a moment that the text of the *Critique of the Gotha Program* had been obscure and cryptic, as I readily grant that the text of the *Paris Manuscripts* is. Could we then not make a convincing argument that given the defects of Stage I (the "co-operative society" of the *Critique*), that Marx could not conceivably have had such a defective society in mind as a stage of future development, and hence one must view this as a mere critique of an undeveloped socialist *theory*—say of Lassalle, whose views are after all very heavily criticized in the same piece of writing? In other words, could not the same argument which Resnick makes about "crude communism" of the *Paris Manuscripts* also be made about the "co-operative society" of the *Critique of Gotha Program?*

If Resnick is right and the *Paris Manuscripts* in their discussion of "crude communism" (as well as of "true communism") refer merely to *theories* of communism, not to historical stages,

[4] *Selected Works*, II 24 (italics in the original).
[5] *Ibid.*

two further difficulties arise: first, it would then appear that Marx totally divorces a discussion of communist theory from historical reality; in such a reading, Marx in 1844 just juxtaposed an underdeveloped theory of communism to his "true" communism, and left it at that, without bothering at all about the historical context in which it could come about. It is precisely at the same period in his development that Marx emphasized the unity of theory and practice, and the *Paris Manuscripts* were written after the *Introduction to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right* in which the historicity of communist future society had been discussed by Marx in some detail. Furthermore, in the *Paris Manuscripts* themselves Marx correlates the theory of classical political economy with the capitalist mode of production. It would be most surprising and indeed inconceivable that given these theoretical premises Marx would then deal with theories of communism, including his own theory of what Resnick calls "true communism" without at all bothering about its realization, thus leaving it completely abstract. One would have expected him to discuss at least his own theory of communism in relation to an historical, albeit future, dimension as well, and hence view it as a model for a stage of historical development. In Resnick's reading, the discussion of communism in the *Paris Manuscripts* is completely divorced from the level of historical reality, a theoretical discussion wholly separate from historical praxis. This just does not fit into any interpretation of Marx's thought with which we are familiar.

Second, I have tried to show above why a model of *two* stages of socialism, as envisaged in the *Critique,* is immanent in Marx's dialectical understanding of historical change. It would therefore again create theoretical difficulty to suppose that in 1875 he was aware of the dialectical dimension of historical change which necessitates stages, whereas in 1844 (when he was so much more imbued with Hegelian concepts and terminology), such a dialectical dimension escaped his mind and he would be ready to espouse a full-fledged "theory of communism" realizing itself without mediation, "developed on its own foundation," jumping, like Minerva, fully armed straight from Jupiter's brow.

In my book I pointed out that one of the differences between the "crude communism" of the *Paris Manuscripts* and Stage I in the *Critique of the Gotha Program* relates to a different conception of the function of equality and egalitarian criteria in both society. While "crude communism" is postulated as a harshly egalitarian society, the "co-operative society" of the *Critique* uses equal measures for the distribution of wealth and is consequently an unequal society (Resnick is right that I should have emphasized this distinction more forcefully in the *Dissent* article). But the point is that despite the difference, in both models *equality* is the core of the distributive system, and what unites both models is that at this stage of future society socialism is purely *distributive* and is not yet premised on the productive abundance Marx envisages as the precondition for a full-fledged socialist society. This is evidently clear in "crude communism," which is stigmatized by Marx as a "regression to the unnatural simplicity of the poor and wantless individual who has not only not surpassed private property but has not yet even attained it."[6] The same point is implied when in the *Critique of the Gotha Program* Marx says that only in "the higher stage of communist society" have the "productive forces also been increased with the all-round development of the individual, and all the springs of co-operative wealth flow more abundantly"[7] — a state of affairs obviously not yet achieved in Stage I, the "co-operative society." Again, if "crude communism" is merely a description of theories of communism discarded by Marx as underdeveloped, then these theories have something very basic in common with the "co-operative society" of the *Critique* — a merely distributive understanding of the nature of a communist society; thus the "co-operative society" is very similar to various underdeveloped theories of socialism, and the clearcut dichotomy Resnick postulates between the systematic meaning of the *Paris Manuscripts* (mere discussion of the theories of communism) and the *Critique of the Gotha Program* (a detailed discussion of future historical stages of socialist societies) is hopelessly blurred.

Finally I would like to turn to the textual evidence of the *Paris Manuscripts* and to indicate those elements in the texts which suggest to me that Marx is dealing here with varieties of communist theory *as well as* with stages of future communist society.

One should first be made aware of the fact that the text in which this discussion appears, entitled by the editors of the *Manuscripts* "Private Property and Communism" (there is no title in the original ms.) is a commentary, or a lengthy addition or footnote, to another text *which has been lost.* The text starts with

[6] Karl Marx, *Early Writings,* ed. T. B. Bottomore (London, 1963), pp. 153–4.
[7] *Selected Writings,* II, 24.

The words "ad pag. XXXIX", and then, a paragraph later, there is another annotation reading "ad ibidem." The pages to which this citation refers have been lost, so what we have is a truncated manuscript, and this goes a long way to explain the slightly cryptic and esoteric nature of the references in the text.[8]

In this truncated text there are a number of references which suggest that the various types of communism described there are related to each other in a temporal sequence:

But the antithesis between propertylessness and property is still (*noch*) . . .

Private property is first (*erstens*) considered . . .

Finally (*endlich*) communism . . .

Communism in its first form (*in seiner ersten Gestalt*) . . .

The first positive transcendence of private property . . .

Communism, still (*noch*) political in nature . . .[9]

One could perhaps argue that such a temporal sequence could also refer to various theories of communism as they unfold over time. But at the end of this sequence of various forms of communism we have an unequivocal explicit statement:

Thus the whole historical development, both the *real* genesis of communism (the birth of its empirical existence) and its thinking consciousness, is its comprehended and conscious process of becoming.[10]

The discussion, therefore, even when it relates to theories of communism has a much wider connotation: it is a discussion both of the "real genesis of communism" as well as of its "thinking consciousness," i.e., the different theories related to its development. There is in Marx's attitudes to previous theories of communism something reminiscent of Hegel's inclusion of previous schools of philosophy into his own system: they all represent merely a partial truth, but this partial truth was necessary towards the emergence of the ultimate synthesis which incorporates them in its totality. Just as Hegel's philosophy is a dialectical *Aufhebung* of all previous philosophies and contains their essential truth while discarding the inessential and arbitrary elements within them, so Marx's theory of communism is related to previous communist theories. But just as to Hegel every philosophy represented in the form of reflection *(Nach-denken)* the spirit of an age, there may be something similar in Marx's attitude to socialist theories: they represent not only an underdeveloped level of revolutionary consciousness within a not yet fully developed capitalist society, but also, as the "co-operative society" of the *Critique of the Gotha Program* shows unambiguously, partial stages of communist realization. If Marx's theory of communism reflects (or, one should probably say, projects) the ultimate form of socialism, so less articulated theories of communism may reflect (or project) earlier, less articulated, and less differentiated forms of future communist development.

This should not be construed to suggest that Marx envisaged socialist society as having to pass through *all* the various forms of socialist theories: yet whenever Marx described future society (and as we know, he was very reluctant to do so), in the initial stages of this future society one can always discern the footprints of the undeveloped theories of communism. By and large, all these theories had to Marx one common denominator — their inability to grasp the true nature of private property, and hence their inability to overcome it. In his *theory,* Marx claims to have overcome this limitation, but how could this transcendence be achieved on the level of historical, practical *action?* I see no indication in Marx suggesting that his mere discovery in *theory* of the principle of private property would ensure its realization in historical development; society itself, and not only its philosophers or theorists, will have to overcome in practice what has already been transcended in theory. Mere interpretation does not change the world, and though it is a necessary condition for such change, it is not a sufficient one. As Marx himself wrote in the *Paris Manuscripts,* it is the whole historical development, both the "real genesis of communism . . . and its thinking consciousness" which are involved. This is the unity of theory and praxis, and Resnick's interpretation would leave us facing precisely those dichotomies which Marx set out to overcome.

[8] See the pagination of the original mss. as reported in *Werke,* Ergänzungsband I (Supplementary volume I), 533.

[9] *Early Writings,* pp. 152, 153, 154, 155.

[10] *Ibid.,* p. 155.

Rejoinder

DAVID RESNICK

I wish to thank Avineri for his response, and attempt to reply in ways which will bring out the differences which exist in our reading of Marx. Much of his criticism centers around the claim that my analysis of communism in the early manuscripts betrays an insufficient attention to the unity of theory and practice. From my reading "it would then appear that Marx totally divorces a discussion of communist theory from historical reality" (p. 1148). In addition my reading would commit Marx to the belief that "his mere discovery in *theory* of the principle of private property by himself would ensure its realization in historical development" (p. 1149). It was certainly not my intention to offer such a reading. Indeed I quoted Marx's statement that "in order to transcend the *idea* of private property, the *idea* of communism is completely adequate; it takes actual communist action in order to transcend *actual* private property."[1] My discussion of Marx's early theory of revolution was intended to make concrete his understanding of the relation of revolutionary theory to revolutionary action. As far as I can see our disagreement does not arise because Avineri's reading of Marx incorporates the unity of theory and practice while mine does not; it turns directly on the interpretation of the unity of theory and practice in the early writings.

Nor do I think that my reading implies that Marx separates his discussion of communist theory from historical reality, it is simply that Avineri and I disagree as to what Marx thought that historical reality was. Our most fundamental disagreement — indeed the source of a great many different concrete points of interpretation — concerns the subject of history in the early manuscripts. There is no question that in the *Critique of the Gotha Program* Marx is discussing types of societies, and that he outlines future historical development as the movement from capitalist society, to the lower stage of communist society, to the higher stage of communist society. But I argue in my paper that the *Paris Manuscripts'* *Kommunismus* should not be equated with *kommunistische Gesellschaft* of the *Critique of the Gotha Program;* the subject matter in the *Paris Manuscripts* is a movement, not a type of society.

From the point of view of the *Critique of the Gotha Program* to ask whether we have achieved the higher stage of communism is to ask what type of a society we are living in; from the perspective of the *Paris Manuscripts* to ask a similar question is to ask what stage have we arrived at in the struggle between capital and labor — i.e., has the revolutionary movement of the proletariat reached its highest and most mature stage? In the *Paris Manuscripts* communism is discussed purely dialectically. Marx says in the *Paris Manuscripts* "*Communism* is the necessary form and dynamic principle of the immediate future, but Communism as such is not the goal of human development — the form of human society."[2] Marx speaks of communism as itself being transcended since it only exists as the negation of the negation, as a movement which struggles against private property. In the *Critique of the Gotha Program* Marx speaks of the higher stage of communism, but he does not say that this stage will in turn be transcended; if we are to accept Avineri's claim that the two texts outline essentially the same course of future history, then we are stuck with the problem of explaining why Marx thought that communism had to be transcended in the *Paris Manuscripts* but not in the *Critique of the Gotha Program.* We could interpret those passages as referring to crude communism not true communism, but we are presented with a pseudo-problem which can be solved only by text torturing, or some elaborate dialectical argument. I submit that my solution is simpler, more cogent, and adequately explains all the relevant passages.

If we accept my claim that communism in the *Paris Manuscripts* refers to a movement, then the objection that my treatment is unhistorical has little to recommend it. As I said in my paper, communism understood as a movement has a history both in theory and practice, and to the extent that Marx's discussion of inadequate communist theories has a historical meaning it refers to the past history of the communist movement. I also believe that Marx's account of this history, as well as the characterization of different communist move-

[1] Marx-Engels, *Gesamtausgabe* (Berlin: Marx-Engels Verlag, 1932), I/3, p. 134, hereatfer referred to as *MEGA.*

[2] *Ibid.,* p. 126.

ments in terms of their origin in different nations with different levels of political, economic and intellectual development is heavily indebted to Engels's article, "Progress of Social Reform on the Continent."[3] In this article Engels gives what he calls a sketch of the history of communism in France. He speaks of Babeuf's communism arising from the first French revolution, and the second revolution of 1830 giving rise to another more powerful communism. This communism spread rapidly during the mid-1830s in the large manufacturing towns of France. Engels says:

> Various secret associations followed each other, among which the "Travailleurs Egalitaires," or Equalitarian Working Men, and the Humanitarians, were the most considerable. The Equalitarians were rather a "rough set," like the Babouvists of the great revolution; they purposed making the world a working-man's community, putting down every refinement of civilisation, science, the fine arts, etc., as useless, dangerous, and aristocratic luxuries, a prejudice necessarily arising from their total ignorance of history and political economy. The Humanitarians were known particularly for their attacks on marriage, family, and other similar institutions. Both these, as well as two or three other parties, were very short-lived, and the great bulk of the French working classes adopted, very soon, the tenets propounded by M. Cabet, "Père Cabet" (Father C.), as he is called, and which are known on the continent under the name of Icarian Communism.[4]

He also says of these Icarian Communists that "they have embodied in their plans everything rational they found in Saint-Simon and Fourier; and, therefore, are very much superior to the old French Communists."[5] In his analysis of Fourier he makes the crucial observation, "There is one inconsistency, however, in Fourierism, and a very important one too, and that is, his nonabolition of private property."[6]

It is my belief that in the *Paris Manuscripts* Marx offers a critical analysis of communism based upon Engels historical sketch. Engels distinguishes two stages of the modern communist movement, the crude stage and the contemporary Icarian Communist stage. If we turn to the *Paris Manuscripts* we see that Marx analyzes communism in three stages; his discussion is numbered (1), (2), and (3).[7] Under (1) he discusses crude communism; under (3) he sets forth what I have called "true communism," Marx's own theory, the necessary form and dynamic principle of the immediate future; but under (2) he gives only the briefest outline; he calls it "Communism (a) of a political nature still — democratic or despotic (b) with the transcendence of the state, yet still incomplete, [*aber zugleich noch unvollendetem*] and being still affected by private property (i.e. by the alienation of man)."[8] I believe that under (2) Marx had in mind the higher type of communism that Engels describes. Marx characterizes what we have been calling "crude communism" as "this as yet completely crude and thoughtless communism [*dieses noch ganz rohen und gedankenlosen Kommunismus*],"[9] but when he refers to the Communism of Cabet in a later passage he characterizes it as "the still immature communism [*noch unvollendete Kommunismus*] which seeks proof of itself in various historical phenomena opposed to private property."[10] Thus Marx distinguished crude and thoughtless communism from the higher but still incomplete type represented by the Icarian communists.

This second higher form is dialectically related to other theories and movements because it unites the rational plans of the utopian socialists with the demand for the abolition of private property put forth by early crude working class movements arising from the French revolution. Marx held that his own theory raises this historical movement to a higher level because it incorporates all the positive moments embodied in the history of the struggle against private property, but adds to it an understanding of the positive nature of private property as well as the human nature of need.

On the First Stage of Communist Society

In my article I argued that what I called the co-operative society, the lower stage of communist society as depicted in the *Critique of the Gotha Program* was so different from what Marx calls "crude Communism" in the Paris Manuscripts as to hardly support the claim that Marx thought of crude communism as an outline of the first stage of future communist society. In his reply Avineri says that in my comparison of the two societies I depict the co-operative society as "near ideal," and that

[3] Frederick Engels, "Progress of Social Reform on the Continent" in Karl Marx, Frederick Engels *Collected Works*, Vol. 3 (New York: International Publishers, 1975), pp. 392–408.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 397.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 398.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 395.
[7] *MEGA*, pp. 111–114.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 113.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 112.
[10] *Ibid.*, p. 114.

if I had attended to Marx's description of "the imanent shortcomings" of this society it would become apparent that the differences are far outweighed by the similarities. Specifically he says that I fail to mention or quote the following passage which sums up Marx's awareness of the ambivalent nature of the first phase of communist society:

> What we have to deal with here is a communist society not as it has *developed* on its own foundations, but, on the contrary, just as it *emerges* from capitalist society; which is thus in every respect, economically, morally and intellectually, still stamped with the birthmarks of the old society from whose womb it emergers.[11]

Avineri then asks what I trust is merely a rhetorical question, "Why is it that this has been overlooked by Resnick?" He claims to see in the phrase "economic, moral, and intellectual" a direct echo of crude communism and offers the tentative suggestion that by "economic," Marx meant to suggest the purely distributive nature of "crude communism"; that "moral" stands for the problem of the relation to woman; and that "intellectual" refers to "abstraction" from talent. But he also says that he would be interested in an alternative suggestion.

First, I would like to note that I did not simply overlook this passage. The main focus of my article was on Marx's early writings, and as I observed in the last page of my article an explanation of the necessarily limited nature of the first stage of communist society as Marx outlines it in the *Critique of the Gotha Program* would entail a lengthy discussion of the later works, especially the *Grundrisse* and *Capital*. But since Avineri claims that it is "too cavalier" of me to overlook this problem, I feel called upon to at least enter the lists. While I do not intend to offer the detailed analysis which this topic demands, I would like to present a different interpretation of the co-operative society from that offered by Avineri. I hope this will shed some light on what Marx meant by the limitations of the co-operative society, and in addition explain why he thought that such a society could serve as a foundation for a higher stage of communism while a society organized along the lines of "crude communism" could not.

In his response Avineri claims that crude communism and the co-operative society share one fundamental limitation whether one thinks of them as theories of socialism or as future socialist societies. He says as theories they both have "a merely distributive understanding of the nature of communist society," (p. 1148); and also that "what unites both models is that at this stage of future society socialism is purely *distributive* and is not yet premised on the productive abundance Marx envisages as the precondition for a full-fledged socialist society" (p. 1148). I think that this is an incorrect interpretation of the theory of the first stage of socialism which Marx presents in the *Critique of the Gotha Program*. The tendency to think of socialism in terms of distribution is one of the theoretical weaknesses he detected in the *Gotha Program* itself. After discussing the problem of distribution in the first stage of socialism Marx says: "Quite apart from the analysis so far given, it was in general a mistake to make a fuss about so-called distribution and put the principal stress on it. Any distribution whatever of the means of consumption is only a consequence of the *distribution* of the conditions of production themselves."[12] For Marx the most fundamental feature of a socialist society, whether fully developed or not, is that it rests upon a qualitatively different mode of production from that of capitalist society. Marx very clearly points out that "vulgar socialism (and from it in turn a section of the democracy) has taken over from the bourgeois economists the consideration and treatment of distribution as independent of the mode of production and hence the presentation of socialism as turning principally on distribution. After the real relation has long been made clear, why retrogress again?"[13] Indeed it is very difficult to understand what Marx says about distribution without a thorough grounding in Marx's theory of production.

This leads me to another criticism of Avineri's account of the first stage of socialism. He cites the following passage from Marx's account of this stage in the *Critique of the Gotha Program*: "the same principle prevails as that which regulates the exchange of commodities, as far as this is the exchange of equal values"[14] and takes it to mean that "this society is still characterized by forms of alienation, since it is still ruled by commodity exchange." I take it Marx's belief that a society ruled by commodity exchange would be characterized by alienation, rests upon his analysis of commodities, especially the famous section of *Capital*

[11] Karl Marx, *Critique of the Gotha Program* in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, ed. by Robert C. Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1972), p. 386.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 388.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 388.
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 387.

in which Marx describes the fetishism of commodities. Although alienation as a central analytic concept is absent from Marx's later published writings — it still plays a very important role in the *Grundrisse* — his discussion of commodities shows that he is dealing with similar themes in a different language. If we accept this view, then the claim that the cooperative society as outlined in the *Critique of the Gotha Program* is ruled by commodity exchange is extremely important. If Marx believed this, then I would agree with Avineri that he would be very ambivalent about it; I simply do not think that he had any such belief.

Rather than a society ruled by commodity exchange, the cooperative society, I would argue, is presented as a society which is characterized by the *absence* of commodity production; and this very absence of commodity production is a necessary condition for progress to a higher stage of comunmist society. I believe the analytical model for the first stage of communist society as discussed in the *Critique of the Gotha Program* is contained in the section of *Capital* entitled "The Fetishism of Commodities and the Secret thereof." Marx asks us to picture to ourselves

> . . . a community of free individuals, carrying on their work with the means of production in common, in which the labour-power of all the different individuals is consciously applied as the combined labour-power of the community. . . . The total product of our community is a social product. One portion serves as fresh means of production and remains social. But another portion is consumed by the members as means of subsistence. A distribution of this portion amongst them is consequently necessary. The mode of this distribution will vary with the productive organization of the community, and the degree of historical development attained by the producers. *We will assume, but merely for the sake of a parallel with the production of commodities, that the share of each individual producer in the means of subsistence is determined by his labour-time.* Labour-time would, in that case play a double part. Its apportionment in accordance with a definite social plan maintains the proper proportion between the different kinds of work to be done and the various wants of the community. On the other hand, it also serves as a measure of the portion of the common labour borne by each individual, and of his share in the part of the total product destined for individual consumption. The social relations of the individual producers, with regard both to their labour and to its products, are in this case perfectly simple and intelligible, and that with regard not only to production but also to distribution[15] (emhasis added).

Marx then goes on to say "The life-process of society, which is based on the process of material production, does not strip off its mystical veil until it is consciously regulated by them in accordance with a settled plan."[16] The mode of distribution which Marx suggests in this model of a co-operative society in *Capital* is exactly the same as the one he describes in the *Critique of the Gotha Program.*

In addition, to characterize this principle of distribution according to contribution to the social product as still bourgeois right because "the same principle prevails as that which regulates the exchange of commodities, as far as this is exchange of equal values" (pp. 1146–47) is very different from claiming the principle of equal rights applies to the exchange of commodities as it does in capitalist society itself. In *Capital* Marx observes that the nature of the exchange of commodities itself imposes no limit on the working day, on the amount of surplus value which the capitalist can extract from the worker. In capitalist society labor itself becomes a commodity, and this creates an inherent contradiction in the concept of equal rights in exchange. In reference to the determination of the working day Marx notes: "There is here, therefore, an antinomy, right against right, both equally bearing the seal of the law of exchanges. Between equal rights force decides. Hence is it that in the history of capitalist production, the determination of what is a working-day, presents itself as the result of a struggle, a struggle between collective capital, i.e., the class of capitalists, and collective labour, i.e., the working-class."[17] It is clear that in capitalist society the exchange of commodities is more than simply the exchange of equal values; the equality of rights in capitalist society obscures the conflict between capital and labor which is a necessary feature of a society built upon the extraction of surplus value.

Thus we can see that the equality of rights in distribution which characterized the first stage of communist society is not the full fledged bourgeois equality of rights under the law of exchange of capitalist society, since the exploitation of labor by capital has been abolished. Furthermore, the equality of rights in distribution is adopted by a communist society

[15] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 1 (New York: International Publishers, 1967), pp. 78–79.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 80.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 235.

— a society which has eliminated commodity production, and thus does not suffer the form of alienation which is inherent in such a form of production; a society in which "the social relations of the individual producers, with regard both to their labour and to its products, are perfectly simple and intelligible, that with regard not only to production but to consumption."[18]

What I have just said by no means implies that the first stage of communist society, the cooperative society, is very close to an *ideal* society; I have said nothing about the development of individual talents and abilities, the level of material production, the relative proportion of free time and socially necessary labor time, and the division of labor. In short, I have not assumed that this society is a truly wealthy society in human terms, and it is only such a society which conforms to Marx's understanding of the higher stage of communism. Yet we must not forget that he did assume that the lower stage, the cooperative society, would provide the material preconditions for the further development of man himself and thus enable humanity to move on to a higher stage of society.

The principle "to each according to his work" which Marx advocates for the first stage of socialism is not an egalitarian principle of distribution. Yet it does have the advantage of requiring no radical alteration in human nature; it is not an idealistic or utopian principle, but one directly related to the experience of labor itself; the more you work, the more you make. Marx may very well have thought that what was needed at this stage was a nonexploitative incentive system which would appeal to workers; and that the adoption of a more egalitarian distributive principle would significantly restrict output and prevent the achievement of a sufficient social surplus product for investment in new means of production. The most important problem from the point of view of distribution is not the distribution of the portion of the total social product destined for individual consumption, but the allocation of the total social product itself to different sectors of the economy.

For Marx a crucial factor in economic development is the use of the social surplus product in order to transform the means of production. In the transition from feudalism to industrialism the private extraction, appropriation, and use of the social surplus product in the form of surplus value was absolutely necessary; but Marx argues that the private ownership of the means of production is no longer an efficient method of operating an advanced industrial society. He believed that the collective ownership and operation of the means of production would overcome the inefficiencies of capitalism such as the business cycle, unemployment, poverty, and the like. Despite whatever experience we have had with economic planning in the 20th century, there is no question that Marx thought it would be a more productive and less wasteful economic form than free market capitalism. But Marx also presents a qualitatively different, though related indictment of capitalism — i.e., that it prevents the formation of the social surplus product which could potentially be generated by the efficient operation of an advanced industrial economy.

The theoretical problem of socialist economic development is how to use the enormous increase in the total social product in the most efficient way to promote the goals of socialism. The theoretical weakness of egalitarianism is the inability to confront this basic problem, because distribution is regarded as if it were independent of the mode of production. Assuming that the collective ownership of the means of production and a planned economy creates a relatively affluent society, this society would still suffer from inequalities; egalitarian socialism would create pressure to distribute the social surplus product in the form of subsidies to the relatively inefficient producers. This approach characterizes the type of liberal welfare economics which attempts to combine economic efficiency understood in terms of a high level of material production with social justice by means of taxation and transfer payments. Such a scheme tries to realize the moral ideal of equality with a minimal negative impact on production. As I read him, Marx is claiming that we need to justify a relatively high rate of savings in an affluent socialist society in order to prevent the dispersal of the social surplus product to achieve egalitarianism.

By emphasizing distribution, egalitarian socialism reveals that it is still operating with a very narrow view of consumption, a view more appropriate to a capitalist society and a free market economy. In the *Grundrisse* Marx speaks of the need to acquire a new understanding of wealth and economic efficiency, and this requires a systematic rethinking of the process of production and consumption itself. In classical political economy, consumption was understood primarily in terms of a using

[18] Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1, p. 79.

up and destruction of resources; economic savings occurred by reducing consumption. Marx speaks of " . . . the development of power, of capabilities of production, and hence both of the capabilities as well as the means of consumption." He observes:

> The capability to consume is a condition of consumption, hence its primary means, and this capability is the development of an individual potential, a force of production. The saving of labour time is equal to an increase of free time, i.e. time for the full development of the individual, which in turn reacts back upon the productive power of labour as itself the greatest productive power. From the standpoint of the direct production process it can be regarded as the production of fixed capital, this fixed capital being man himself. . . . Free time — which is both idle time and time for higher activity — has naturally transformed its possessor into a different subject, and he then enters into the direct production process as this different subject. This process is then both discipline, as regards the human being in the process of becoming; and at the same time, practice, experimental science, as regards the human being who has become, in whose head exists the accumulated knowledge of society.[19]

The thrust of Marx's argument is that human beings do not merely consume material goods, they consume life experience itself. The process of material production, labor, is at the same time a process of consumption from the point of view of the laborer, the consumption of the life experience of laboring. Marx thus provides a justification in terms of economic efficiency for the investment of resources in what is now known as human capital.

What Marx is suggesting is that such investment will yield nonmonetary gains, gains which could not be measured according to the criteria developed for evaluating the profitability of investment in a capitalistic society. What is needed is a new criterion for evaluating the economic efficiency of investment of the social surplus product which does not depend upon some form of increase in material production. In the *Critique of the Gotha Program* Marx speaks of overcoming the effects of the division of labor and the development of a sector of the economy which is intended for the common satisfaction of needs. He says, "From the outset this part grows considerably in comparison with the present-day society and it grows in proportion as the new society develops." In effect, what Marx is pointing to is a very significant market failure of capitalist society, the radical underconsumption of life experience itself in the great mass of humanity.

The phrase "from each according to his ability, to each according to his need" assumes that both ability and need have been fully developed. Capitalist society as Marx envisaged it restricts the exercise of human ability and perverts the nature of human needs; only with the appropriation of the total social product by the associated producers is it possible rationally to invest in the transformation of society such that each is fully able and willing to contribute according to his abilities, and to consume according to a human understanding of needs. Only from this perspective, I believe, can we begin to understand what Marx means by the limitations of the first stage of socialism, and why he thinks that we can pass into a higher stage only "after labor has become not only a means of life but life's prime want"; why the necessary condition for this stage is that "the productive forces have also increased with the allround development of the individual."[20] Marx's theory of the development of communist society is not based upon a millennial expectation of the second coming of the dialectic which will transform human consciousness and mysteriously liberate humanity from the curse of economics. Both the limitations and potentials of the first stage of communist society cannot be grasped until we concentrate on the primacy of the means of production, and come to see consumption and distribution as a consequence of the mode of production. This was Marx's method for understanding society, and I submit that it is also a good method for understanding Marx. We have become very sensitive to the philosophical problems embedded in Marx's economic concepts, but it might be time to reverse the trend and once again attempt to see economic problems behind Marx's philosophical speculations.

[19] Karl Marx, *Grundrisse* (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), pp. 711–712.

[20] *Critique of the Gotha Program*, Tucker, p. 388.

Explaining Party Cohesion in Congress: The Case of Shared Policy Attitudes*

HELMUT NORPOTH
University of Cologne, Germany

Contrary to the chronic laments of the "responsible parties" advocates and their contemporary apostles,[1] it is generally "party" which in one way or another emerges as a force without rival in legislative decision making in Congress.[2] Roll-call votes typically reveal splits along party lines, even though few if any floor votes pit just about all members of one party against all members of the other party.[3]

"Party," nevertheless, has remained an elusive concept in the American legislative context, for there is little party organization, whether within Congress or without, which would seem capable of molding the voting decision of the individual congressman. The elected party leaders, for example, are not credited by most observers with much direct influence on decisions of their party colleagues.[4] Sanctions against deviance from the party line lack the force of deterrence. Yet the imprint of party on legislative decisions remains visible.

The apparent lack of party discipline has prompted some analysts to suggest that "party" is only a shorthand for "constituency." Members of the same party are said to vote together because they come from the same kinds of local districts and respond alike to the same

* This article is adapted from the author's doctoral dissertation, "Sources of Party Cohesion in the U.S. House of Representatives" (The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1974). Acknowledgements are due Gudmund R. Iversen, Warren E. Miller, Donald E. Stokes and Herbert F. Weisberg for comments on the dissertation. I am also grateful to Russ Dalton and Lanny Dodd for encouraging advice. The data used in this analysis were originally collected by Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, and were made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

[1] See David S. Broder, *The Party's Over* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972) as well as the classic report of the APSA, *Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System*, Report of the Committee on Political Parties (New York: Rinehart, 1950).

[2] See Julius Turner, *Party and Constituency* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1951); Julius Turner and Edward V. Schneier, Jr., *Party and Constituency*, revised edition (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970); David B. Truman, *The Congressional Party* (New York: Wiley, 1959); Donald R. Matthews, *U.S. Senators and their World* (New York: Random House, Vintage Books, 1960); Gerald Marwell, "Party, Region and Dimensions of Conflict in the House of Representatives, 1949–1954," *American Political Science Review*, 61 (June, 1967), 390–399; Michael J. Sapira, "The House and the Federal Role: A Computer Simulation of Roll Call Voting," *American Political Science Review*, 62 (June, 1968), 494–517; and Cleo Cherryholmes and Michael J. Shapiro, *Representatives and Roll Calls* (New York: Bobbs Merrill, 1969). The work by Cherryholmes and Shapiro comes closest to an assessment of party within the full context of legislative behavior. For an extensive review of the literature on party voting, see W. Wayne Shannon, *Constituency and Congressional Voting* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1968), pp. 3–63.

[3] In purely descriptive terms, the role of party in roll call voting has gradually declined. In 1921, nearly one of every three roll calls showed a split in which more than 90 per cent of the members of one party opposed more than 90 per cent of the members of the other party. In 1967, barely three of every hundred roll calls met that standard. See Turner and Schneier, *Party and Constituency*, p. 17. Even while this secular decline was under way, it was common for a congressional session up until the mid 1960s to witness a majority of Democrats oppose a majority of Republicans on most roll calls. During every session from 1966 until 1970, however, only a third of the roll-call votes fitted that description. See Frank J. Sorauf, *Party Politics in America*, 2nd ed. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1972), p. 351. However intriguing these symptoms may be, hinting at both a long-term as well as an accelerated recent decline of the party factor in roll-call voting, they lie outside the scope of this analysis.

[4] See Truman, *The Congressional Party*, pp. 203–226; Matthews, *U.S. Senators*, pp. 123–129; and John E. Jackson, "Statistical Models of Senate Roll-Call Voting," *American Political Science Review*, 65 (June, 1971), 451–470. Some of the conditions under which party leadership may affect the voting decisions of representatives are examined by Lewis A. Froman, Jr. and Randall B. Ripley, "Conditions for Party Leadership: The Case of House Democrats," *American Political Science Review*, 59 (March, 1965), 52–63. For a more extended discussion of the activities, organization, and influence of party leadership, see Randall B. Ripley, *Party Leaders in the House of Representatives* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1967). For a look at the Senate, see Ralph K. Huitt, "Democratic Party Leadership in the Senate," *American Political Science Review*, 55 (March, 1961), 331–344. Unlike the U.S. Congress, state legislatures have been found to be more heavily dominated by the party leadership. See, for example, Susan Welch and Eric H. Carlson, "The Impact of Party on Voting Behavior in a Non-partisan Legislature," *American Political Science Review*, 67 (September, 1973), 854–867. Also see Sarah McCally Morehouse, "The State Political Party and the Policy-Making Process," *American Political Science Review*, 67 (March, 1973), 55–72. Morehouse argues that the governor, through the control of the party's nominating organization, brings about party cohesion.

kinds of pressures.[5] But in analyses based on this contention, "party" never dissolves quite so neatly into the constituency components. And even if it did, the question of what made congressmen vote along party lines would only be shifted to another level, for "constituency" can have a variety of meanings and exert influence through a variety of mechanisms.[6]

Conceptually, the alternative to cohesion based on discipline is cohesion based on shared policy goals.[7] That is to say, members of a given party vote alike because they tend to agree on policy and not because they fear sanctions or expect favors. Such policy agreements would largely result from the way in which candidates are selected, whether through careful screening by party officials, supporting coalitions and primary voters or through self-selection of candidates along ideological lines. Regardless of the specific selection mechanism, representatives of a given party would face legislative issues with a similar outlook on policy which would distinguish them from members of the other party (or parties).

It is the purpose of this study to examine the impact of shared policy attitudes on legislative decision making. The central hypothesis states that party cohesion, i.e., the extent to which parties vote in unison, is rooted in shared policy attitudes. The empirical analysis of this hypothesis which follows attempts to do the following:

1) assess the degree to which House representatives differ by party in their attitudes towards important political issues.
2) compare, within a given domain of policy, the attitude locations of the parties with their respective locations during roll call voting, and determine the closeness of fit between a party's attitude and its roll-call record.
3) develop a special statistical model designed to measure the relative impact of shared attitudes vs. individual attitudes on roll-call voting.
4) briefly explore the process through which shared attitudes become translated into votes along party lines. Special attention is paid in this part to key representatives whose advice is highly valued by their House colleagues.

Theoretical and Methodological Overview

Party cohesion in legislative voting is hypothesized to be rooted in policy attitudes shared by members belonging to the same party. Matthews has suggested this explanation of party cohesion in his study of Senate voting,[8] and others have attempted to explain in this way the cohesion of British and Canadian Parliamentary Parties.[9] The reformatory party government literature postulated a unified programmatic orientation as one way to achieve more cohesive legislative parties in the future.[10]

That representatives share policy orientations sounds plausible; so plausible, in fact, that few observers have bothered to measure the extent of such sharing.[11] Kingdon's study of congressional candidates' beliefs and strategies is a welcome exception. His findings demonstrate sharp contrasts in the issue appeals that Democrats and Republicans offer the electorate: hardly any Democratic candidate

[5] This view is best expressed by Lewis A. Froman, Jr., *Congressmen and Their Constituencies* (Chicago: Rand McNally 1963), p. 89. Like his study, most of the other studies devoted to this relationship rely on the demography of the congressional district in their attempt to measure the presumed influence of the local constituency. Besides Froman, pp. 92–96, see Turner and Schneier, *Party and Constituency*, pp. 222–225; also Thomas A. Flinn, "Party Responsibility in the States: Some Causal Factors," *American Political Science Review*, 58 (March, 1964), 60–72; Duncan MacRae, Jr., "The Relationship Between Roll Call Votes and the Constituencies in the Massachusetts House of Representatives," *American Political Science Review*, 46 (December, 1952), 1046–1055; and David R. Mayhew, *Party Loyalty Among Congressmen* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966).

[6] For the development of complex linkages between the local constituency and legislative decision making, see, above all, the pioneering study by Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," *American Political Science Review*, 57 (March, 1963), 45–56; also Raymond A. Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Lewis A. Dexter, *American Business and Public Policy* (New York: Atherton Press, 1963); and John W. Kingdon, *Candidates for Office* (New York: Random House, 1968).

[7] See the lucid theoretical delineation of the two rival models of party government in Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, *Representation in the American Congress*, Part I, chap. 2, mimeo.

[8] See Matthews, *U.S. Senators*, p. 133.

[9] See Leon D. Epstein, "Cohesion of British Parliamentary Parties," *American Political Science Review*, 50 (June, 1956), 360–377; also Allan Kornberg, "Caucus and Cohesion in Canadian Parliamentary Parties," *American Political Science Review*, 60 (March, 1966), 89. For a recent probe of party differences in policy attitudes in the British House of Commons, see Allan Kornberg and Robert C. Frasure, "Policy Differences in British Parliamentary Parties," *American Political Science Review*, 65 (September, 1971), 694–703.

[10] See the APSA report, *Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System*.

[11] The studies of McClosky *et al.* cover a somewhat wider spectrum of party activists. See Herbert McClosky, Paul Hoffman and Rosemary O'Hara, "Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Party Leaders and Followers," *American Political Science Review*, 54 (June, 1960), 406–427.

had conservative issue appeals, and hardly any Republicans had liberal ones.[12]

These issue appeals are more than fleeting campaign promises, for they are firmly rooted in the supporting coalitions of candidates: "Not a single Democrat in this study perceived his supporting coalition as including business and professional groups but not labor, and not a single Republican listed a coalition which included organized labor but not business and professional people."[13] Unless such perceptions are pure fantasies, the two parties — outside the South — rest on different socio-structural foundations.[14] A certain social support goes hand in hand with a certain issue orientation, and both of them square with a certain party affiliation. Representatives of a given party can reasonably be expected to face the legislative workload with a basically similar outlook on policy matters.

Maintaining that candidates of a given party share policy attitudes, however, is not the same as saying that representatives are affected in their voting decisions by such shared policy attitudes. How much influence are attitudes likely to exert on behavior in the institutional context of the legislative world?[15] Attitudes covering a range of political issues would seem to help a representative respond consistently to the variety of legislative bills that he must face, shortening considerably his decision time. Policy attitudes, in fact, have been found to correlate fairly strongly with roll-call voting in a number of policy areas.[16] Such zero-order correlations at the very least establish the fact that representatives vote largely in accordance with their policy attitudes. That much seems beyond dispute.

The hypothesis, however, that attitudes — even those with a fairly specific policy reference — exert a direct influence on legislative voting has met with strong criticism.[17] The legislative scene, it is argued, confronts the individual representative with a workload of immense volume and complexity. He is faced with sheer insurmountable problems of information gathering and processing. These problems are presumed to curtail severely the influence that a representative's attitude may exert on his voting decisions. The way he handles these problems, it is suggested, is by specialization, on the one hand, and reliance on the judgment of trusted colleagues, on the other. The division of labor embodied in the committee system encourages such specialization and generates voting cues in situations where a legislator is unfamiliar with the subject matter of a given bill. In selecting a source of information and advice on such bills, most congressmen are said to turn to members of committees which have dealt with those bills.[18] In and through committees legislative proposals receive the precise and detailed shape in which they reach the ordinary legislator on the House floor.

I have no quarrel with this view but, at the same time, would not necessarily deduce from it the irrelevance of attitudes to legislative decision making. To be sure, on bills pertaining to his domain of specialization a committee member enjoys a prominent position, but not every member of that committee is equally attractive to every House colleague outside the committee. Congressmen have been found to be much better acquainted with members of their own party than with those of the other party, and this preference extends to consultation on important policy matters as well.[19] This pattern of choice, I contend, greatly contributes

[12] See Kingdon, *Candidates for Office*, pp. 122–123.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 144.

[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 55–66; Kingdon strongly argues that these ties do not imply control. The representative is not "owned" by the coalition supporting him nor does he feel he owes it any favors. Instead, he shares from the outset the policy goals of those groups.

[15] The literature on the notion, definition, and impact of attitudes is vast. See, for example, Daniel Katz and Ezra Stotland, "A Preliminary Statement to a Theory of Attitude Structure and Change," in *Psychology: A Study of Science*, vol. 3, ed. Sigmund Koch (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959), pp. 424–465. For a discussion of the role of attitudes in the realm of political behavior, see Fred I. Greenstein, *Personality and Politics* (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1969).

[16] See Miller and Stokes, "Constituency Influence;" also John L. Sullivan and Robert E. O'Connor, "Electoral Choice and Popular Control of Public Policy: The Case of the 1966 House Elections," *American Political Science Review*, 66 (December, 1972), 1256–1268.

[17] That a representative's predisposition cannot have a strong effect on his voting decisions is strongly argued by Arthur H. Miller in his doctoral dissertation, "The Impact of Committees on the Structure of Issues and Voting Coalitions: The U.S. House of Representatives, 1955–1962" (The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1971), p. 6.

[18] See the vivid testimony cited by Arthur G. Stevens in his dissertation, "Informal Groups and Decision-making in the U.S. House of Representatives" (The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1970), pp. 54–59; also see Charles L. Clapp, *The Congressman: His Work and as He Sees It* (Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1963), pp. 149, 292. A more rigorous assessment of this relationship is presented by Miller, "Impact of Committees," pp. 158–208.

[19] See Clapp, *The Congressman*, pp. 14–17. Also consult John W. Kingdon, *Congressmen's Voting Decisions* (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), p. 78.

o the effect of shared policy attitudes on legisative voting.

The hypothesized effect is largely indirect. hared policy attitudes are regarded as the asis for choosing certain informants from the anks of one's own party. These informants hen act in their own sphere of specialization n the basis of shared policy attitudes. The verage House member, in turn, following the ue of his informant, casts a partisan vote hich bears the imprint of shared policy attiudes. This, in very condensed form, is the hypothesized linkage between shared policy attitudes and party voting to be examined in this nalysis.

The data for this analysis came from the Representation Study conducted by Miller and Stokes in 1958–59.[20] This complex set of data includes interviews with about one third of the members of the 85th and 86th Congress (1957–60). The sample of congressmen was drawn from congressional districts located within the sampling frame of the mass election surveys conducted by the Michigan Survey Research Center in 1956. For every incumbent included in this sample, his nonincumbent challenger in the 1958 congressional election was also interviewed, provided the incumbent was challenged. The combined sample consists of 251 individuals.

This data set was chosen because of the invaluable information it contains on the policy attitudes of congressmen, the key concept of this enterprise. Such attitudes were ascertained for three classical dimensions of partisan conflict, namely the federal government's involvement in "social welfare," its involvement to protect "Negro civil rights," and the United States' role in "world affairs."[21] These dimensions were salient not only during the 1950s but even more so — with Johnson's Great Society Program, voting rights legislation and the escalation of the Vietnam War — during the 1960s. To be sure, the composition of Congress has greatly changed since 1960 and with it perhaps the importance of the concepts examined here. Short of a retest with data on a recent Congress, the findings reported below merely suggest rather than establish the pattern of party voting in the present-day House of Representatives.

In the analysis which follows, southern Democrats are treated as a separate partisan group.[22] This step, I believe, is strongly justified by the amply documented split between southern and nonsouthern Democrats in Congress not only over racial issues but issues of foreign policy and economic and social policy as well.[23]

Shared Policy Attitudes

The first step in the analysis involves a look at the extent of attitudinal cohesion among representatives of the three party groups. The shared policy attitudes have been estimated by the arithmetic mean of scale items endorsed by members of the same party group. In order to assess the extent to which these attitudes are shared within the three party groups, I rely on eta^2, the correlation ratio.[24]

The attitude positions of the three party groups emerge with clear and statistically significant distinction in all three domains, as revealed by Figure 1. In the domain of foreign policy, nonsouthern Democrats take the most internationalist position while their southern colleagues prove to be most isolationist. The

[20] Two files, made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research (I.C.P.R.), contain the data used for this analysis: *The Representation Study: The Candidate File*, 1970, and *Candidates and Constituents*, 1971, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

[21] Within the domain of "social welfare," the issues include public housing, full employment, aid to education, and the federal development of atomic energy. The "civil rights" items refer to Negro voting rights, the establishment of a Fair Employment Practices Commission, and school desegregation. The "foreign policy" issues include foreign economic aid, foreign military aid, aid to neutral countries, and the general theme of isolationism vs. involvement abroad. For a wording of the questions, see I.C.P.R., *The Candidate File*, pp. 28–43. The items within each of the three policy domains have been combined into Guttman scales, and these scales are used whenever policy attitudes are examined in this analysis. For details of the scale construction, see I.C.P.R., *The Candidate File*, pp. 219–222.

[22] The South is considered to include the eleven states of the former Confederacy plus the four border states of Maryland, Kentucky, Oklahoma, and West Virginia.

[23] For such evidence, see Turner and Schneier, *Party and Constituency*, pp. 171–179; also Truman, *The Congressional Party*, p. 149; H. Douglas Price, "Are Southern Democrats Different? An Application of Scale Analysis to Senate Voting Patterns," in *Politics and Social Life*, ed. Nelson W. Polsby, R. A. Dentler, and P. A. Smith (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1963), p. 755; and Shannon, *Constituency*, pp. 81–94. The early development of the Republican-Dixiecrat coalition is traced by V. O. Key, Jr., *Southern Politics* (New York: Vintage Books, 1949).

[24] Since the data are weighted, the significance of the differences was tested by relying on the unweighted N for finding the degrees of freedom in the F-table. For information on the assignment of weights, consult I.C.P.R., *The Representation Study: The Candidate File*. With a random sample of about 120 observations and three groups, any value of eta^2 exceeding .06 (eta = .25) is significant at the .05 level. For a detailed presentation of eta^2, see Linton C. Freeman, *Elementary Applied Statistics* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965), pp. 120–130, 199–209.




Figure 1. Attitude Locations of House Representatives by Party in Three Policy Domains.

Republicans, located between the two Democratic groups, take a position which is closer to the isolationist than to the internationalist end of this scale. This pattern also holds consistently for each particular item composing the foreign policy scale except for the item involving military aid. On this issue, nonsouthern Democrats proved less internationalist, i.e., less generous with military aid, than did the other two party groups. On the whole, the differences in this domain, while significant, are small. None of the three party groups is, by its attitude, closely identified with a specific course in foreign policy. One would not expect a high level of voting cohesion against this backdrop of attitude differences.

In the civil rights domain, the distinctions between the three party groups are far more impressive. With the gulf separating the two Democratic groups turning out as vast as expected, one may pause to note the distinctive position with which Republicans emerge in this domain. Representatives of the party of Lincoln and the abolition of slavery approve integration far less wholeheartedly than do Democrats outside the South. The roots are planted for an occasional coalition between Republicans and southern Democrats even in this domain.

The social welfare domain most sharply reveals differences in party attitudes. Republicans and Democrats from outside the South confront each other from opposite ends of the social welfare continuum. While southern Democrats take a position in the middle of it they are slightly closer to the Republicans. On the whole, the attitudes of southern Democrats have proved more compatible with those of Republicans than with those of their own party colleagues outside the South. The so-called "conservative coalition" in House voting has a firm root in the policy attitudes of the partisan groups forming it.

The reliance on the arithmetic mean in portraying the attitudinal locations of the parties may invite some questions and criticism. One might ask whether or not these means indicate positions which are shared by a majority of party colleagues in the House. A party polarized over a given issue may be characterized by a mean position which has few if any occupants. Likewise, a few colleagues located at one extreme of a scale may unduly shift the mean of the whole group away from the point where most of the members are found.

As Table 1 demonstrates, the mean party position in most instances points closely to the scale portion where a majority of members of any party group — often an overwhelming majority — happens to be located. Only two exceptions need to be noted: Southern Democrats in the social welfare and Republicans in the civil rights domain. Their mean values of 1.98 and 1.33, respectively, identify thinly populated scale areas. Southern Democrats are divided on social welfare issues into two wings, the larger one finding a comfortable alliance with Republicans and the smaller making a congenial partner for nonsouthern Democrats. Republicans exhibit a similar split over civil rights issues, with one wing sharing the southern and the other one sharing the nonsouthern position of the two Democratic groups.

The discussion of shared attitudes thus far has focused on representatives who have served in Congress. Their policy attitudes have been ascertained at a certain moment of their political careers. It is conceivable that their atti-

Table 1. Percentage of House Representatives Sharing the Mean Attitude of their Party Group by Issue Domain[a]

Party Group	Foreign Policy	Civil Rights	Social Welfare	(Weighted N)[b]
Nonsouthern Democrats	54.5 (2,3)	78.6 (2,3)	83.4 (3,4)	(204)
Southern Democrats	60.2 (1,2)	88.9 (0,1)	36.5 (1,2)	(232)
Republicans	51.0 (1,2)	29.9 (1,2)	78.7 (0,1)	(280)

[a] The pair of adjacent scale positions surrounding the partisan mean is given in parentheses below the percentage figures.

[b] The unweighted N includes 42 nonsouthern Democrats, 34 southern Democrats, and 52 Republicans.

tudes have changed, in a systematic way, as the result of age or legislative experience since entering Congress. The data at hand are too limited for a full examination of this question. But what can be investigated is the fit between the party attitudes of incumbents and those of candidates aspiring to the office of congressman. Should their attitudinal locations match closely, the party attitudes of representatives would seem unaffected by congressional experience and could be regarded as widely shared partisan goals.

In Figure 2 the attitude locations of incumbents face those of nonincumbent candidates in the three policy domains. It may appear that the Republican as well as the southern Democratic nonincumbents are taking, in all three domains, far more "contemporary" positions than do their incumbent party colleagues — "contemporary" referring to internationalist, integrationist, and liberal, respectively. But these differences seldom reach statistical significance (only among Republicans in the social welfare and among southern Democrats in the foreign policy domain). And nonsouthern Democrats reveal differences which are neither striking nor significant. Thus the mean party attitudes of representatives, on the whole, seem very little influenced by the legislative setting. Instead these attitudes hint at a platform also shared by fellow partisans outside Congress, at least by those who pass the hurdle of party nomination. In one way or another, then, the differences in policy attitudes found among representatives can be traced to the selection of candidates for congressional office. Each of the three party groups manages to recruit candidates whose policy outlook fits the partisan mold.

Party Positions: Attitudes vs. Voting

Shared policy attitudes, so runs the hypothesis of this paper, are supposed to leave a major imprint on the voting decisions of representatives. One way to test this proposition is by comparing the roll-call positions of the parties with their attitudinal positions.[25] A test of this sort requires comparable scales of attitude and behavior; not only must the domain of policy be equivalent in both instances, but the measured scores must be comparable as well — a condition achieved here by the use of standardized scores, expressing both attitudinal and roll-call scores as standard deviations from their respective means.

The standardized mean positions are displayed in Figure 3 for incumbents of the three party groups. In all three domains, the rank order of attitudinal positions is the same as the rank order of roll-call positions. That is to say that a party group which professes more liberal attitudes than another one also votes more liberally than the other one. Of course, with only three objects to be ranked, such an agreement in rankings can easily occur by chance alone. But to encounter it in three domains is not so easily done by chance, the probability being less than .005.[26] As a result, the finding that the three parties considered here have the same rank in both attitude and voting in three domains is not at all trivial.

Figure 3, moreover, reveals the goodness of fit between a party's attitude and its roll-call position, with the match between the two being closest in the social welfare domain. The impression conveyed by the configuration in that domain suggests that representatives, on the whole, vote in strict accordance with their party's attitude. Such a result squares nicely with the finding of a sharp attitudinal cleavage between the parties in this domain.

In the foreign policy domain, however, the parties' vote positions do not match as closely their attitudinal locations. In fact, among Republicans, whose behavior suggests perfect harmony between attitude and voting, the match is worst. The party is sharply split over foreign policy roll calls, with one wing — Republicans from coastal states — acting very much like nonsouthern Democrats, while the opposite wing — Republicans from interior states — shares the isolationist position taken by south-

[25] For each of the three policy domains, the data set of the Representation Study contains Guttman scales of roll-call votes, one scale for the 85th Congress and another one for the 86th. The social welfare scale for the 85th Congress is made up of items referring to public housing, aid to education, area development, and appropriations for various agencies of the Departments of Labor and Health, Education and Welfare. The items of the foreign policy scale (85th Congress) include a variety of foreign aid votes. And the civil rights scale (85th Congress) consists of items dealing with the Civil Rights Act of 1957. For a more detailed reference to the titles of the bills and a description of the scale construction, see I.C.P.R., *The Candidate File*, pp. 226–229. For the roll-call scales pertaining to the 86th Congress, see I.C.P.R., *Candidates and Constituents*, pp. 619-624.

[26] Three objects can be ranked six different ways, and each ranking can form a pair with any other one of the six, including itself. This results in 36 pairs of such rankings, six of which are in agreement. Thus the probability of independently ranking three objects the same way twice is 6/36 or .167. The probability of obtaining such a result in three different domains independently, therefore, is $(.167)^3$ or .0046.




Figure 2. Attitude Locations of House Incumbents (I) and Nonincumbent Candidates (N) by Party in Three Policy Domains




Figure 3. Roll-Call and Attitude Positions of Party Groups in the House of Representatives (Standardized Means)

ern Democrats. The less than perfect overlap between attitudes and voting positions accomplished by the party groups in the foreign policy domain is closely tied to the feeble distinction of foreign policy attitudes noted above.

The civil rights configuration also reveals some discrepancies between the voting positions of the parties and their attitude locations. Southern Democrats shift to an even more segregationist position than their shared attitude would suggest, and Republicans pay a heavier tribute to their historical legacy in racial policy than their shared attitude would have led one to expect. In this domain party attitudes differed noticeably — although not as much as in the social welfare domain; but their ability to generate corresponding voting positions is somewhat weaker by comparison.

The slippage between attitude and voting in this domain might be explained by constituency influence. On civil rights issues, representatives have been shown to be closely attuned to the opinion of their local constituencies.[27] It is very likely, therefore, that southern Democrats are acting on perceptions, which are widely shared within this group, that their constituencies demand a far more restrictive policy in this domain than they would offer themselves; likewise, Republicans are moved by shared perceptions of their constituencies to stronger action than their own attitudes would demand.

Despite some noted slippage between attitude and voting, a certain pattern emerges quite visibly. In all three domains the two party groups which stand closest to one another on the attitude continuum also turn out closest in roll-call voting. Thus voting coalitions observed in floor decision making mirror the attitudinal configurations of the party groups. Even though the focus on mean positions has obscured sizeable individual shifts as well as wholesale moves by some intraparty wings, these mean values hint at the approximate locations of most members of the respective party groups.

Measuring the Effect of Party Attitude on Individual Behavior: The Statistical Model

The analysis so far has established that the three party groups differ substantially in their attitudes toward controversial matters of policy, although not equally so in all policy domains, and that the shared attitude of a party group points to its position taken during roll-call voting, although again in one domain more closely than in another one. But since none of the party groups, save nonsouthern Democrats in one instance,[28] achieve unanimity in either attitudes or voting, individual variation from respective party positions waits to be taken into account. Such individual variation may severely curtail the role of party in the event that attitudes and voting positions prove highly correlated among individuals within party groups, or it may simply introduce some random "noise" surrounding the well separated party positions. In order to shed some light on this question, I propose a statistical model aimed at simultaneously estimating the effects of individual attitude and partisan attitude on individual roll-call behavior.[29] That is to say, the effect of shared policy attitudes is to be assessed in the presence of individual deviations from those shared attitudes.

The hypothetical situation of a pure group (party) effect is displayed in Figure 4. The roll-call positions of members of three groups have been plotted against their attitudinal positions. The groups are ranked the same way on both the attitude and the roll-call axis. Within each of the groups, however, an individual's attitude fails to be linearly related to his vote, a condition which is indicated by the zero slope found within each group. In other words, the group molds the behavior of the individual who belongs to it. However much an individual's attitude deviates from the group voting standard, such deviations are randomly distributed instead of being systematically related to an individual's policy attitude. This model has been labeled "model of group effect only." By drawing a single line with a positive slope through the three clusters of points, one could still visualize an overall

[27] The importance of a congressman's perception of constituency opinion in the civil rights domain is emphasized by Miller and Stokes, "Constituency Influence."

[28] The zero variance displayed by nonsouthern Democrats in roll-call voting on civil rights bills is rather exceptional and is not duplicated in the subsequent Congress (86th). But the lack of any variance shown by the data for the 85th Congress is not the result of sampling oddities. The sample mean of 6.0 lies well within the neighborhood of the population mean of all nonsouthern Democrats, amounting to 5.9 with a standard deviation of 0.62.

[29] The basic ideas for this model have emerged from a great deal of communication betwen the author, Gudmund Iversen, and Lawrence Boyd. See Gudmund R. Iversen, "Recovering Individual Data in the Presence of Group and Individual Effects," *American Journal of Sociology*, 79 (September, 1973), 420–434, as well as Lawrence Boyd's doctoral dissertation, "Multiple Level Analysis With Complete and Incomplete Data" (The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1971). Both authors also provide an extensive bibliography of the literature on group, structural, and contextual effects.




Figure 4. A Model of Group Effect Only

relationship between an individual's attitude and his voting, but that slope would vanish once the group positions are held constant.

As an alternative consider a model which, in addition to the group effect, also recognizes an individual effect (e.g., the representative's own attitude). Such a model would obtain when the slopes of the within-group relationship were allowed to become non-zero, while the group means remain different and in the same rank-order on both axes. An example of such a model is depicted in Figure 5. It should be noted that all the within-group slopes are listed as equal, a condition which indicates that the same relationship between attitude and voting holds for each group.

But such a pattern is just a special case within the class of "models combining a group effect with an individual effect." Another special case of that class worth noting arises when the within-group slopes vary systematically with the group positions. One might suppose that the higher the group position on X is, the steeper the slope is going to be for that group. The possibility of such "interaction" between the individual position on X and the group position on X, which need not be positive, has been included here along with individual and group effects taken separately.

In order to develop the equation representing this complex model, let us designate the voting position of individual j in group i as Y_{ij}, his attitudinal position as X_{ij}, the intercept and the slope of the linear relationship between X and Y within his group as a_i and b_i respectively, and the random disturbance associated with his voting position as e_{ij}. The basic relationship between an individual's attitude and his vote can then be represented by

$$(1)\quad Y_{ij} = a_i + b_i(X_{ij} - \bar{X}_i) + e_{ij} \qquad (i = 1,2, \cdots, k) \qquad (j = 1,2, \cdots, n_i)$$

Expression (1) defines the parameters of the within-group relationship, one set of a and b coefficients for each group of individuals. By measuring the individual predictor X_{ij}, as de-




Figure 5. A Model Combining Group and Individual Effects

viation from the group mean $\overline{X}_i$, the model guarantees the independence between the individual and the group variable. Unless eliminated, the substantial overlap between the two variables would jeopardize the estimation of their coefficients.

In order to introduce the "group effect," let us postulate a linear relationship between group means on X and Y (with the disturbance term omitted for sake of simplicity):

$$(2)\quad \overline{Y}_i = A_0 + A\overline{X}_i \quad (i = 1,2, \cdots, k)$$

Such a linear relationship between group attitude ($\overline{X}_i$) and group voting position ($\overline{Y}_i$) was suggested by the display of locations in Figure 3. Note that the coefficients in (2) have been capitalized in order to distinguish them for the individual level coefficients in (1). By taking group averages on both sides of equation (1) one obtains another expression for $\overline{Y}_i$, namely:

$$(3)\quad \overline{Y}_i = a_i$$

By combining (2) with (3) one finds that

$$(4)\quad a_i = A_0 + A\overline{X}_i$$

A link has now been established between the individual model and the group model of the relationship between X and Y. The intercepts of the individual (within-group) relationship a_i have been expressed as a function of the group means on X. Going one step further and entering (4) into (1) leads to:

$$(5)\quad Y_{ij} = A_0 + A\overline{X}_i + b_i(X_{ij} - \overline{X}_i)$$

Thus, both the group and the individual effects are now included in one model, the two effects being independent of each other. Expression (5) still provides for a separate individual effect b_i for each group. In the event that this effect can be considered equal for all groups, it can be replaced by a constant b. If, on the other hand, this effect is supposed to vary systematically with the group means on X, b_i ought to be replaced by a linear function. This kind of variation, which is denoted as "interaction," is captured by (6), the disturbance term having been omitted:

$$(6)\quad b_i = B_0 + B(\overline{X}_i - \overline{X}) \quad (i=1,2, \cdots, k)$$

B_0 denotes that part of the individual relationship which is constant throughout the groups, and B refers to the other part whose size depends on the value of $\overline{X}_i$, this being taken as a deviation from the overall mean $\overline{X}$. B indicates the interaction between individual and group effects. By substituting (6) into (5) one gets:

$$
\begin{aligned}
Y_{ij} &= A_0 + A\overline{X}_i \\
&\quad + [B_0 + B(\overline{X}_i - \overline{X})](X_{ij} - \overline{X}_i) \\
&= A_0 + A\overline{X}_i + B_0(X_{ij} - \overline{X}_i) \\
&\quad + B(\overline{X}_i - \overline{X})(X_{ij} - \overline{X}_i)
\end{aligned} \tag{7}
$$

The model presented in (7) allows for the simultaneous estimation of the effects of group position $\overline{X}_i$; of individual position $(X_{ij}-\overline{X}_i)$; and of the multiplicative combination (interaction) of both. Defining this term as the product of deviations from means—$(X_i-\overline{X})(X_{ij}-\overline{X}_i)$—keeps its correlation with each of the other two predictors at a low level. Had the interaction term instead been measured by the product of X_{ij} and $\overline{X}_i$, it would have been so highly correlated with each of them that the least-squares estimation would not have yielded best unbiased estimates. The way the interaction is defined in (7) eliminates such unwanted collinearity and provides for best unbiased estimates.

Estimates of the Model and Discussion

The model developed in the previous section and summarized in equation (7) accounts well for the roll-call voting of House representatives. The multiple R^2 varies from .38 (foreign policy, 86th Congress) to .72 (civil rights, 85th Congress). Table 2 presents these summary measures along with the standardized regression coefficients of the various effects.

The standard coefficients reveal that, in all policy domains, party, i.e., the shared attitude of a party group, proves far more influential than does the individual attitude. The latter effect is not reduced to insignificance, but is modest by comparison. Judging these results according to the typology of models introduced earlier, one would not want to identify this pattern with the "group effect only" model, but rather, in elaborating the earlier distinction, with a model combining a strong group effect with a weak individual effect.

It may come as a surprise that the civil rights domain, according to the coefficients presented in Table 2, does as well as or even better than the social welfare domain, as far as the strength of the party effect is concerned; recall that, in the aggregate, voting positions diverged somewhat from attitudes in the civil rights domain. One reason for the unusually high party effect in this domain lies in the surprisingly cohesive behavior of nonsouthern Democrats. Their voting record on civil rights, in fact, was unanimous during the 85th Congress. Such a complete lack of individual variance exhibited by one of the three groups strongly tilts the balance toward the "group effect only" side. What the balance might have been in the presence of some individual variation can be gleaned from the figures pertaining to the 86th Congress, where nonsouthern Democrats failed to duplicate their unanimous record of the previous Congress.

In the social welfare domain the strong showing of the party effect coincides with close proximity of shared party attitudes and party voting positions. The reason for this "coincidence" lies, I submit, in the marked partisan distinction of policy attitudes which was noted for this domain. Where party positions are sharply defined in the minds of representatives there is little room for deviation of individuals from the partisan standard.

Finally, the foreign policy domain also dis-

Table 2. Individual, Party, and Interaction Effects on Legislative Voting (Standardized Regression Estimates)

	85th Congress			86th Congress		
Predictor	Foreign Policy	Social Welfare	Civil Rights	Foreign Policy	Social Welfare	Civil Rights
Individual	.36	.26	.28	.36	.25	.31
Party	.53	.65	.79	.48	.76	.74
Interaction	−.12	−.01	−.22	−.12	−.08	−.18
Multiple R^2	.42	.48	.72	.38	.64	.64
(Weighted N)[a]	(652)	(655)	(678)	(721)	(710)	(720)

[a] The unweighted N varies from roughly 120 in the 85th Congress to roughly 130 in the 86th Congress.

lays the expected pattern. With a low degree f party distinction in the realm of attitudes s well as a modest match, in the aggregate, etween attitudes and votes, this domain was ot made for a pronounced party effect on oll-call voting. Compared with the other two lomains, the party effect ranks lowest, whereas he individual effect ranks highest, as could easonably be expected.

Thus far the assessment of the party effect as only occasionally paid attention to variaions of this effect among the three party roups. Not all of them contribute equally to he showing of the party effect in a given donain. Already noted was the extraordinary votng cohesion displayed by nonsouthern Demcrats in the civil rights domain during the 5th Congress. Representatives of the other wo party groups fall dramatically short of uch a level of cohesion. Moreover, individual ttitudes and voting records are significantly orrelated among the other two party groups.

Such a pattern is neatly summarized by the nteraction term. As built into the model, it is ensitive to systematic covariation between the nean party attitude and the slope — or correaion — of the within-group individual relaionship. The estimate for such interaction in he civil rights domain is −.22, indicating that he higher (integrationist) the party attitude is, he weaker the correlation between individual ttitude and voting will be. Nearly all the interaction estimates listed in Table 2 are negative, eing zero at best. This finding demonstrates hat nonsouthern Democrats, whose attitude neans are the highest in all domains (i.e., most iberal, internationalist, integrationist), show he lowest correlations between individual attiude and voting.[30] Compared with members of he other two parties, they rank last in reliance n individual attitudes in casting roll-call votes but rank first in the degree to which they are affected by their shared policy attitude.

As for policy domains, the concept of shared party attitudes performs best in the social welfare domain.[31] Here policy attitudes were found most sharply polarized along partisan lines as well as most closely matched, in the partisan aggregate, by voting positions on the House floor. And the reliance of representatives on their own particular attitudes was found to be at a "local minimum" in this domain. Saying, however, that covariation between individual attitudes and voting is slight does not imply that representatives sacrifice their own attitudes for the sake of party. Their own attitudes are located so closely around their party attitude, and the party groups are separated by such wide distances on the attitude continuum that conflict between individual attitude and party attitude and, thus, the need for sacrific rarely arise.

Shared Policy Attitudes and the Legislative Arena

Now that the importance of shared policy attitudes has been demonstrated, it remains to be shown how such attitudes are translated into party votes within the legislative arena. Perhaps this translation occurs instantly in the minds of most congressmen, especially when the party position is perceived with great clarity by all members. Even then, however, a representative may find it difficult, within a given policy domain, to relate each of the many bills with which he is not greatly familiar to the party attitude. The congressman who is not an expert on a given bill indeed requires some form of communication which spells out for him the party vote on that bill. Two questions can thus be posed: (1) who communicates voting cues to the congressman, and (2) do these cues benefit party cohesion?

[30] This finding can also be demonstrated by comaring the correlations between attitudes and roll-call oting within parties. When averaged across policy lomains, these correlations stand at a value of .28 for ionsouthern Democrats, at .43 for Republicans, and it .49 for southern Democrats. Herb Weisberg sugested to me that the more "individualistic" behavior f southern Democrats was a function of the broad lefinition of the South, which included four border tates along with the former Confederate states. One ould argue that if the Democratic representatives rom the border states were counted among the nonouthern Democrats, it would be the latter group which would exhibit the more marked covariation etween attitude and vote. While this might prove to e the case, it is worth noting, that southern Demcrats, even including Border representatives, were ound to be more united in their policy attitudes than were nonsouthern Democrats.

[31] A vast literature has documented and discussed the strength of the party factor in structuring roll-call voting in this domain of policy. Among the more recent publications, see Marwell, "Party, Region and Dimension of Conflict;" Shapiro, "Computer Simulation;" also consult Aage R. Clausen and Richard B. Cheney, "A Comparative Analysis of Senate-House Voting on Economic and Welfare Policy, 1953–1964," *American Political Science Review*, 64 (March, 1970), 138–152. Clausen and Cheney ((pp. 144–145) distinguish between an "economic policy" dimension and a "social welfare" dimension within the larger domain — not separated in this paper — of government intervention; they found that party was twice as strong a predictor of voting in the economic policy area as in the social welfare area.



Nearly every congressman interviewed in the sample at hand responded positively to the question of whether "there were other members of the House whose views you found especially valuable when it came to making your own decisions." This kind of consultation with trusted colleagues would seem likely to encourage party voting, for it occurs almost exclusively within the ranks of a party group. By the same token, not every representative takes his cue from the same trusted colleagues within his party group. The larger the number of such colleagues whose advice is sought and the wider the differences of their views, the less positive their contribution to party cohesion will be.

In order to examine the nature and strength of that contribution, the analysis turns, again, to the model (see expression [7]) which expressed a representative's roll-call position as a joint function of his own attitude, the party attitude, and the interaction between the two. This model can be applied separately to those representatives who, in a given domain, indicated strong reliance on consultation and to those who indicated otherwise. Such a test is feasible since not every representative sought advice with equal readiness in all three domains. Within a given domain, about one half of the representatives indicated that consultation in that domain was highly important for their own decisions, and the other half did not.[32]

The hypothesis that intensive consultation with trusted colleagues helps a representative vote in accordance with the shared attitude of his party group can be examined by comparing the estimates of the various effects obtained for the two sets of representatives. The figures presented in Table 3 reveal that in almost every instance the party effect relative to the individual effect as well as to the interaction effect is far greater among representatives who consult than among those who do not. To be sure, the party effect is not always enhanced by consultation, but the individual effect is diminished by it close to insignificance, particularly in the social welfare domain. The greater relative weight of the party effect among advice seeking representatives points to the intervening influence of trusted party colleagues on legislative voting.

These findings imply that shared attitudes form the basis for the information and advice provided by those key representatives referred

[32] For a construction of the consultation index and the frequencies, see the codebook for the *Candidate File*, variable numbers 82, 83, 86, 87, 88.

Table 3. Individual, Party, and Interaction Effects on Legislative Voting, with Control for Consultation with Colleagues

a. 85th Congress

Predictor (Standardized)	Foreign Policy		Social Welfare		Civil Rights	
	Consultation		Consultation		Consultation	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Individual	.23	.43	.06	.32	.19	.32
Party	.54	.49	.62	.65	.79	.78
Interaction	.02	−.27	.08	.01	−.18	−.19
R^2	.31	.52	.37	.51	.74	.73
(Weighted N)	(280)	(287)	(246)	(324)	(182)	(419)

b. 86th Congress

Predictor (Standardized)	Foreign Policy		Social Welfare		Civil Rights	
	Consultation		Consultation		Consultation	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Individual	.28	.34	−.08	.34	.30	.31
Party	.54	.45	.75	.75	.69	.76
Interaction	.11	−.37	.22	−.09	−.23	−.16
R^2	.31	.57	.54	.68	.70	.70
(Weighted N)	(294)	(232)	(231)	288)	(163)	(366)

to as "trusted colleagues." By relying on such information and advice, the ordinary House member casts a heavily partisan vote reflecting the shared attitudes of his party group. Partisan cohesion in House voting thus rests on the following four pillars: (1) representatives choose informants from the ranks of their own party group, (2) representatives as well as informants share policy attitudes, (3 informants reach their own voting decisions on the basis of shared attitudes, and (4) representatives adopt the decisions of their informants as guide for their own behavior.

Conclusions

Post-Burkean models of representation have reserved for political parties a crucial role as vehicles of representation of the popular will in modern democracies. One of the ways by which a party can play that role is for its representatives to act, during legislative decisions, with cohesion based on widely shared policy goals. This study has examined the influence of "shared policy attitudes" on the voting behavior of members of the U.S. House of Representatives. The findings make a strong case for such influence in the policy domain of social welfare issues. For one, the shared policy attitudes as measured by locations on an attitude scale indicate, with a good amount of precision, the locations of the party groups on the roll-call scale referring to the same domain of policy. Second, even though individuals deviate from their respective party attitude, and despite the fact that such deviations are to some extent matched by deviations from the party's roll-call position, the significance of this individual relationship pales by comparison with the match between party attitude and party voting.

These findings suggest a way to reconcile two approaches to legislative decision making, namely the approach based on the notion of "predisposition" and the approach based on the notion of "personal interaction."[33] The first views the indivdiual act of legislative voting as a response to one's ideological position—what I have called attitude; whereas the second views that act as the result of communication between the representative and other actors in the legislative arena, such as colleagues, legislative leaders, the administration or interest group representatives. The findings presented above have indicated that trusted colleagues leave a marked partisan impact on the voting records of congressmen. This tends to buttress the "personal interaction" hypothesis. On the other hand, these findings have also revealed the impact of predispositional factors, i.e., the shared policy attitudes of members of the same party group. This set of findings hints at a linkage between predisposition and personal interaction. By selecting informants from the ranks of their own party, congressmen pick colleagues whose attitudes they are most likely to share. In fact, it can be argued that his desire to find like-minded informants leads a congressman to a party colleague.[34] This choice sets the stage for shared policy attitudes to leave a partisan imprint on the ultimate voting decision of a congressman.

Even though some of the elusive traces of party in legislative behavior have been tracked, some elusiveness remains. One of the questions raised by this analysis is, Who are those informal partisan leaders known as "trusted colleagues?" Are they identical with the members of the committee dealing with a bill on which advice is sought? One might wish to examine both the degree to which these committee members rely on the shared party attitude for their *own* behavior and the degree to which they help their fellow party members in the House reach their decisions. Furthermore, the impact of these "informal" partisan leaders should be compared with the impact of the elected floor leaders in the House. A fuller understanding of the role of party in legislative decision making awaits consideration of these questions.

[33] For a review of these different approaches, see Arthur H. Miller, 'The Impact of Committees," chap. I; also Kingdon, *Congressmen's Voting Decisions*, chap. 3.

[34] For evidence on this point, see Kingdon, *Congressmen's Voting Decisions*, pp. 72–74.

Symmetric Spatial Games Without Majority Rule Equilibria*

RICHARD D. MCKELVEY AND PETER C. ORDESHOOK
Carnegie-Mellon University

Spatial models of election competition now constitute a major part of the application to political science of the rational choice paradigm. Critics, of course, may disagree over the empirical adequacy of a particular model's assumptions. Nevertheless, the path of spatial theory's development—commencing with Downs's seminal analysis[1]—exhibits a concerted effort to accommodate numerous theoretical and empirical considerations (with varying degrees of success), including multidimensional issue spaces, variations in the functional form of citizens' utility functions, alternative hypotheses about abstention and candidate objectives, risky strategies, sequential elections, the electoral college, sophisticated voting, and the proper conceptualization of spatial analysis as a substantively interpreted application of game theory and social choice theory. Undoubtedly, we should anticipate further developments, including models that address elections other than two party majority rule contests.

Despite the achievements of spatial theory, however, *all* models that seek an explicit prediction about candidate strategies focus on a single solution concept—pure strategy equilibria—and thereby suffer from a common and seemingly devastating shortcoming: they assume either that the election concerns a single issue or that citizens' preferences are distributed with perfect mathematical symmetry.[2] Even if every other restrictive assumption heretofore considered is satisfied, abandoning these two restrictions on preference renders spatial theory incapable of revealing propositions about the strategies candidates should adopt. We attribute this state of affairs to the fact that unless the assumption of unidimensional or symmetrically distributed preference is satisfied, the solution to the election game posited by spatial theory does not generally exist. In this essay we consider the game-theoretic extension of pure strategy equilibria—mixed minimax solutions—and we examine the possibility of using this extension to admit more general and more empirically reasonable analyses of election competition.

In the first section we introduce some elementary notation, and we review the general perspective of spatial theory and the reasons that sufficient conditions for majority rule equilibria are restrictive. Additionally, we discuss why spatial theorists are reluctant to extend their notion of a solution to mixed minimax strategies. The second section contains the main theoretical results of this essay. Specifically, after admitting the possibility that candidates adopt mixed strategies, we hypothesize that such strategies provide a reasonable solution to election games without pure strategy equilibria. Our hypothesis is based, first, on showing that for a general class of two-person zero-sum games, the support set of a mixed minimax solution (i.e., the set of pure strategies to which a solution assigns a nonzero probability) is restricted to a particular subset of the pure strategies. Second, we show that for the class of spatial games in which citizens' preferences are characterized by simple Euclidean distance functions, the support set of minimax solutions is limited to a well-defined subset of the issue space, and that for continuous densities of electoral preference, this support set typically is small. We conclude this section with the argument that this support set may be of special interest for even a sequential conceptualization of campaigns. In the third section we examine the frequently blurred distinction between spatial conceptualizations of two candidate elections and of committees. We conclude that while this distinction is unimportant if pure strategy equilibria exist, it is critically important otherwise. Specifically, the policies implied by solutions to the committee problem (i.e., solution concepts from n-person game theory) if pure strategy equilibria do not exist, differ generally from the policies adopted by candidates who abide by the minimax principle.

The Theoretical Context

Spatial models use a variety of assumptions about candidates and citizens. All models of two candidate competition, however, can be viewed simply as substantively interpreted two-person zero-sum games—games in which the players are the candidates, a strategy is a position on each of n dimensions (issues), and a candidate's payoff

* We wish to thank the National Science Foundation for their support of this research and Richard Mickelsen for his technical assistance.

[1] Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1957)..

[2] One exception to the use of this condition is Melvin J. Hinich, John O. Ledyard and Peter C. Ordeshook, "A Theory of Electoral Equilibrium: A Spatial Analysis Based on the Theory of Games," *Journal of Politics*, 35 (February, 1973), 154–193. There, however, the restrictive assumption of continuous concave-convex payoff functions is used.

e.g., probability of winning, expected plurality, and so on) is determined by each citizen's evaluation of respective strategies and a decision rule for revealing his preference. A model's prediction about the issue positions of candidates, then, follows from the game-theoretic notion of a solution—an equilibrium strategy pair, i.e., a pair of spatial positions such that once there, neither candidate possesses any incentive to deviate unilaterally.

In this essay, we focus on a limited class of models. Our procedure is to introduce that class by rigorously developing its game-theoretic structure and by conducting the analysis within that structure. Since spatial models share a common theoretical foundation, if not particular substantive assumptions, this provides a general perspective for resolving spatial theory's dependence on a single solution concept.

We begin formally by letting X denote the set of feasible alternatives or strategies, by letting C be the set of all voters, and by letting μ be a finite measure on C such that $\mu(A)$ represents the "number" of voters in the set $A \subseteq C$. (Note that the technical terminology of measure is used here to admit the possibility of a continuum of voters, as when the distribution of voter preferred points is approximated by a continuous density. If C is finite and if each voter possesses one vote, then μ is simply the counting measure.) Assuming now that each citizen $c \epsilon C$ possesses a utility function $U_c: X \rightarrow R$, such that he prefers x over $y \epsilon X$ if and only if $U_c(x) > U_c(y)$, individual preferences determine a majority preference relation over X thus:

> $x \epsilon X$ is *majority preferred* to $y \epsilon X$ (written $x \succ y$) if and only if $\mu(S_{xy}) > \mu(S_{yx})$,

and

> $y \epsilon X$ is *not majority preferred* to $x \epsilon X$ (written $x \precsim y$) if and only if $\mu(S_{xy}) \geq \mu(S_{yx})$,

where S_{xy} is the set of all citizens who strictly prefer x to y, i.e., $S_{xy} = \{c \epsilon C \mid U_c(x) > U_c(y)\}$, and S_{yx} consists of all citizens who strictly prefer y to x, i.e., $S_{yx} = \{c \epsilon C \mid U_c(y) > U_c(x)\}$. Thus, if $x \succ y$, x defeats y in a majority vote, while if $x \precsim y$, y does not defeat x. Using this preference relation we construct a two-person constant-sum symmetric game.[3] Specifically, we form the game (φ, X) by assuming that each player's strategy consists of the set X, that player 1's payoff function is

$$\varphi_1(x,y) = \begin{cases} 1 \text{ if } x \succ y \\ 1/2 \text{ if } x \sim y \\ 0 \text{ if } x \prec y, \end{cases}$$

and that player 2's payoff function is $\varphi_2(x,y) = 1 - \varphi_1(x,y)$.

To interpret (φ, X) as a spatial model of election competition under majority rule, then, we assume that (1) the players are candidates, where each candidate seeks to maximize his probability of winning; (2) all citizens vote unless they are indifferent; (3) a strategy $x \epsilon X$ is a position on each of n issues such that alternative positions on an issue are represented by a segment of the real line (thus $X \subseteq R^n$), and; (4) all citizens possess identical perceptions of each candidate's strategy.

One definition of a solution to (φ, X), now, is the notion of a pure strategy equilibrium:

Definition 1: (θ_1^*, θ_2^*) is a *pure strategy equilibrium pair* if and only if

$$\varphi_1(\theta_1^*, \theta_2) \geq \varphi_1(\theta_1^*, \theta_2^*) \geq \varphi_1(\theta_1, \theta_2^*)$$

for all $\theta_1, \theta_2 \epsilon X$.

Furthermore, if

$$\theta_1^* = \theta_2^* = \theta^*,$$

then θ^* is said to be an *equilibrium strategy*.

The problem with this solution concept, however, is that pure strategy equilibria need not exist. The simple illustration of the paradox of voting, in which $X = \{A,B,C\}$, and $A \succ B$, $B \succ C$, and $C \succ A$, is an admissible counter example to universal existence. For the spatial game, Plott's necessary and sufficient conditions and Sloss's generalization of them reveal, in fact, that spatial strategies satisfying Definition 1 exist only under extremely limited conditions—conditions such as unidimensional or symmetrically distributed preference.[4] In particular, if we represent citizens' utility functions by Euclidean distance, a pure strategy equilibrium exists only if *all* median lines of the electorate's preference distribution intersect at a common point.[5]

[3] Briefly, a two-person zero-sum game is symmetric if the strategy sets of both players are identical, if the value of the game to both players is zero and if $\varphi_1(x,y) = \varphi_2(y,x)$ for all x and y—i.e., if they interchange strategies, they interchange payoffs. A constant sum game, moreover, is equivalent to a zero-sum game since for any constant sum, there exists a positive monotonic transformation of the payoffs that renders the game zero-sum (e.g., substitute the payoffs, 1, 0, −1 for 1, 1/2, 0).

[4] Charles R. Plott, "A Notion of Equilibrium and its Possibility Under Majority Rule," *American Economic Review*, 57 (September, 1967), 787–806; and Judith Sloss, "Stable Outcomes in Majority Rule Voting Games," *Public Choice*, 15 (Summer, 1973), 19–48.

[5] See Otto A. Davis, M. DeGroot, and Melvin J. Hinich, "Social Preference Orderings and Majority Rule," *Econometrica*, 40 (January, 1972); and R. W. Hoyer and Lawrence S. Mayer, "Comparing Strategies in a Spatial Model of Electoral Competition," *American Journal of Political Science* (1974).

By relying wholly on this solution concept, then, spatial theory implicitly assumes that unless pure strategy equilibria exist, parsimonious propositions about the policy positions candidates adopt cannot be formulated. Consequently, a substantial amount of theorizing can be viewed not simply as the attempt to weaken assumptions or to ascertain the implications of alternative structures, but to establish sufficient conditions for a majority rule equilibrium. In fact, while assumptions are justified frequently because they are tractable, the definition of tractability usually is that they yield identifiable equilibria such as the electorate's median preference. Thus, since the existence of equilibria is unusual in even the simplest model, it is not surprising to find spatial theorists imposing restrictive or empirically untenable assumptions.

That pure strategy equilibrium solutions need not exist to two-person zero-sum games such as (φ,X) is, of course, well known. It is precisely this fact that led Von Neumann and Morgenstern to introduce the concept of a *mixed strategy* and to resolve partially the issue of an appropriate solution by proving that every such game with finite strategies possesses an equilibrium minimax solution in either pure or mixed strategies.[6]

Game theory, then, suggests a logical extension for spatial analysis in the event that pure strategy equilibria do not exist—namely, mixed minimax strategies. In conjunction with our assumptions about payoffs, for example, the cycle in which $X=\{A,B,C\}$ and $A\succ B\succ C\succ A$ yields the following two-candidate constant-sum game (payoffs are to Candidate 1):

		Candidate 2		
		A	B	C
Candidate 1	A	1/2	1	0
	B	0	1/2	1
	C	1	0	1/2

Figure 1

Although this game does not possess a pure strategy equilibrium, it has a mixed strategy equilibrium—$P_1=(1/3, 1/3, 1/3)$ and $P_2=(1/3, 1/3, 1/3)$. That is, by choosing a strategy randomly, each candidate guarantees himself an *expected* payoff of at least 1/2, and no other strategy provides such a guarantee.

Despite the mathematical closure of the problem provided by Von Neumann and Morgenstern, spatial theorists resist this extension.[7] Their argument is twofold. The first objection concerns the inherent lack of specificity of mixed strategies as to the spatial positions candidates eventually adopt. Pure strategy equilibria are appealing (especially if they are unique) because they identify unambiguously the policies candidates should advocate. Mixed strategies, on the other hand, by design seek to disguise a candidate's ultimate choice of policy. For the game in Figure 1, for example, every pure strategy is a possible outcome. For those, then, who desire explicit predictions about the policies engendered by majority rule procedures, the mixed strategy notion seems less than satisfactory.

The main thrust of our argument in the next section, however, is that while mixed minimax strategies necessarily entail some ambiguity, they can nevertheless limit considerably our expectations about the spatial positions candidates adopt.

The second argument against the use of mixed strategies in a simple spatial context concerns the dynamics of campaigns. Specifically, the most reasonable model of the extensive form of the election game is one in which candidates are permitted to sequentially adjust their spatial positions. A pure strategy for this extensive form game is not simply an element of X, but a "game plan"—a specification of a spatial response to an opponent's position for each and every adjustment period. Thus, if we retain our present conceptualization of pure strategies, we necessarily violate the conditions for regarding minimax strategies as solutions—the conditions being that both candidates announce their pure strategies simultaneously and neither player is permitted to alter his choice thereafter (e.g., payoffs are realized immediately). This violation seems unimportant, though, if the minimax strategy corresponds to a pure strategy equilibrium since neither candidate possesses any incentive to move unilaterally from the equilibrium. But, if the minimax strategy is mixed, the abstraction of spatial theory from the true extensive form of the election game seems to preclude its applicability. The essential problem is that the spatial positions candidates adopt in accordance with a mixed minimax strategy are not in equilibrium. Thus, if no prohibitions to sequential adjustment exist, at least one candidate should change his strategy

[6] John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior*, 2nd ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947).

[7] See, for example, William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook, *An Introduction to Positive Political Theory* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973), p. 340, and Richard D. McKelvey, "Policy Related Voting and Electoral Equilibrium," *Econometrica*, 43 (September, 1975), 815–843.

on the next move. For example, if the candidates abide by the mixed strategy (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) for the game we illustrate in Figure 1, Candidate 1 can find himself choosing A and losing the election because his opponent chose B. Clearly, he should shift to another alternative if permitted to do so, and not take solace from the fact that he chose A in accordance with a mixed minimax solution to a myopic model.

In this essay, however, we pursue the logical consequences of the hypothesis that candidates abide by mixed minimax solutions to the simple spatial game for several reasons. First, such an analysis seems an essential first step toward the construction of sequential models. Second, if we assume that the campaign consists of a sequence of simultaneous moves but that candidates possess sufficient spatial mobility at each move, then we should anticipate the choice of spatial positions in the support set for solutions to a myopic model. Finally, if the candidates adjust their strategies one after the other, but if their adjustments are designed to be secure against the opponent's history, then again we anticipate spatial positions within the support set. We elaborate these arguments later in the next section. First, however, we turn to the simple mixed strategy extension of the myopic model.

The Support of Mixed Minimax Strategies

To extend the analysis of (φ,X) to mixed strategies, let $\tilde{X}$ denote the set of probability measures over X (i.e., the set of all pure and mixed strategies).[8] Then, for any P_1, $P_2 \epsilon \tilde{X}$, we define φ_1 thus:

$$\varphi_1(P_1,P_2) = \sum_x \sum_y \varphi_1(x,y)P_1(x)P_2(y)$$

if P_1 and P_2 are discrete, or

$$= \int \left[\int \varphi_1(x,y)dP_1(x)dP_2(y) \right]$$

if P_1 and P_2 are continuous.

These definitions generate, then, a new symmetric, two-person constant-sum game, denoted $(\varphi,\tilde{X})$. Thus, if P^* is a minimax solution to this game, our objective is to establish the bounds on P^*, i.e., the subset of X to which P^* assigns positive measure. To do this we let

$$D_y = \{x \epsilon X \mid x \succ y\}$$

$$D_y^* = \{x \epsilon X \mid x \succsim y\}$$

[8] Formally, if B is a σ-algebra of sets in X, a probability measure P:B $\rightarrow$ R is a set function satisfying the usual probability axioms. I. e., for each A, BϵB, O $\leq$ P(A) $\leq$ 1 and A $\cap$ B $=$ Φ $\Rightarrow$ P(A) $+$ P(B) $=$ P(AUB). We use the notation P(x) $=$ P({x}).

That is, D_y consists of all strategies in X that strictly defeat y while D_y^* consists of all strategies in X that y does not defeat. Clearly, $D_y \subseteq D_y^*$.

The usual game-theoretic definition of domination states that a strategy x weakly dominates a strategy y if x is at least as good as y in every possible contingency and better in some. In the context of the above game, where the possible payoffs consist only of a win, a loss, or a tie, we express weak domination thus: For any x, $y \epsilon X$, x *weakly* dominates y iff $D_x^* \subseteq D_y$. After eliminating any or all weakly dominated strategies, we obtain the following definition:

Definition 2: A set $\Omega \subseteq X$ is said to be *admissible* if, for each $y \epsilon X$, with $y \notin \Omega$, there is an $x \epsilon \Omega$ such that

$$D_x^* \subseteq D_y.$$

We also define a weaker type of admissible set, which we call weakly admissible:

Definition 3: A set $\Omega \subseteq X$ is said to be *weakly admissible* if, for each $y \epsilon X$ with $y \notin \Omega$, there exists an $x \epsilon \Omega$ such that

$$D_x^* \cap \Omega \subseteq D_y \cap \Omega.$$

A set Ω is admissible, then, if for each $y \notin \Omega$, there exists an $x \epsilon \Omega$ such that $z \succsim x \Rightarrow z \succ y$ for all $z \epsilon X$. (Note that an admissible set can contain dominated strategies.) Further, since x is not majority preferred to itself ($x \sim x$), and since $x \epsilon X$, then $x \succ y$. A weakly admissible set, Ω, on the other hand, allows for the elimination of strategies that are dominated only in Ω. That is, Ω is weakly admissible if for every $y \notin \Omega$, there exists an $x \epsilon \Omega$ such that $z \succsim x \Rightarrow z \succ y$ for all $z \epsilon \Omega$. And as before $x \epsilon \Omega$ so $x \succ y$. Note that if the set Ω is admissible it is also weakly admissible, but a weakly admissible set need not be admissible. For example, successive elimination of dominated strategies results in weakly admissible sets that may not be admissible. Not all admissible sets can be obtained, however, by a successive application of domination.

To illustrate these ideas, consider Figure 2 and note first that no strategy is at least as good as another under all contingencies. Hence the set of all strategies $\{a,b,c,d,e,f\}$ is admissible, and no subset of this set is admissible. Nevertheless, the set $\{a,b,c\}$ is weakly admissible. For example, $d \notin \{a,b,c\}$ is defeated by a while everything in $\{a,b,c\}$ that defeats a, namely b, also defeats d. That is, with respect to the set $\{a,b,c\}$, a is at least as good as d and sometimes better.

	a	b	c	d	e	f
a	0	−1	1	1	−1	1
b	1	0	−1	1	1	−1
c	−1	1	0	−1	1	1
d	−1	−1	1	0	0	0
e	1	−1	−1	0	0	0
f	−1	1	−1	0	0	0

Figure 2

The value of isolating admissible sets derives now from the following well known result of game theory:

Theorem 1: If P^* is a minimax solution for the reduced game (φ,Ω) where $\Omega\subseteq X$ is an admissible set, then P^* is a minimax solution for the game $(\varphi,\tilde{X})$.

Actually, the same result holds for weakly admissible sets:

Theorem 2: If P^* is a minimax solution for the reduced game (φ,Ω), where $\Omega\subseteq X$ is a weakly admissible set, then P^* is a minimax solution for the game $(\varphi,\tilde{X})$.

Proof: Since P^* is minimax over Ω, it must be the case that

$$P^*(D_x\cap\Omega) \geq 1/2$$

for all $x\epsilon\Omega$—otherwise x defeats P^*. But, since Ω is weakly admissible, then for any $y\notin\Omega$, $\exists x\epsilon\Omega$ such that $D_x\cap\Omega\subseteq D_y\cap\Omega\subseteq D_y$, in which case $P^*(D_y)\geq P^*(D_x\cap\Omega)\geq 1/2$. Thus, P^* is minimax over X. Q.E.D.

It follows that mixed minimax strategies can be limited not only to admissible but to weakly admissible sets as well. From Theorem 2, then, the mixed strategy solution to the game we illustrate in Figure 2, excluding strategies *d*, *e*, and *f*, is a solution to the full game. In fact, the mixed strategy solution to this game is (1/3, 1/3, 1/3, 0, 0, 0)—i.e., zero probability is given to the three strategies not in the weakly admissible set $\{a, b, c\}$.

For these results to be of interest, we must show, within the context of our problem—spatial theory—that such sets necessarily exist. To this end, we offer the following theorem.

Theorem 3: The set of Pareto optimals in X is an admissible set.

Proof: Let $Q\subseteq X$ be the set of Pareto optimal pure strategies and let $y\notin Q$. Then, by the definition of Pareto optimality, there exists an $x\epsilon Q$ such that $U_c(x)\geq U_c(y)$ for all $c\epsilon C$ with ">" holding for at least one $c\epsilon C$. Suppose $z\epsilon D_x^*$. Then, $z\succsim x$. But, since x is strictly preferred to y by at least one voter, it follows that $z\succ y$. Hence, $z\epsilon D_y$, which implies that

$$D_x^*\subseteq D_y$$

Thus Q is admissible. Q.E.D.

Taken together, Theorems 1 through 3 state that if a minimax strategy exists to the game over X—pure or mixed—there exists at least one such strategy that gives positive weight only to Pareto optimal positions.[9] This conclusion can be viewed as uninteresting, though, since the set of Pareto optimals typically is large—in the spatial problem, with utilities as introduced below, it must encompass all ideal points and can include all of X (as when the distribution of preferences is given by a normal density). Note, however, that Theorems 1 and 2 make no use of spatial concepts, and in this sense they are completely general propositions about symmetric two-person zero-sum games given the appropriate assumptions about payoff. Our intent, then, is to add a particular spatial assumption about citizens' preferences and prove first that a well defined subset of the Pareto optimals is admissible in the resultant model. By way of example, we then suggest that the notion of weak admissibility can further restrict our expectations about candidate strategies.

The particular spatial model we consider is limited, but it is the basis for much theorizing. Specifically, assume that for all citizens $c\epsilon C$, there is an ideal point $x_c\epsilon R^n$ such that

$$U_c(x) = -(x - x_c)'(x - x_c) = -\|x - x_c\|^2 \qquad (2)$$

[9] Note that Theorems 1 and 2 do not imply that there cannot exist mixed minimax strategies that give positive weight to positions not in admissible or weakly admissible sets (recall that minimax strategies need not be unique). With respect to Theorem 3, however, it is straightforward to show that such strategies cannot exist outside of the Pareto optimals, Q. Briefly, from the definition of Pareto optimality we see that the weak inequality in expression (1) holds for all $z\epsilon X$, while strict inequality holds for at least one $z\epsilon X$, namely x. Thus, any strategy, P, that gives positive weight to some position not in Q, can be strictly dominated by a strategy P'. In the case of a finite strategy space, for example, if $P(y) \neq 0$ for some $y\epsilon Q$, we can define P' thus,

$P'(z) = P(z)$, $z\epsilon Q$, $z \neq x$

$P'(y) = 0$

$P'(x) = P(y) + P(x)$, $x\epsilon Q$, $x \succ y$

By successively applying this transformation for all y Q to which P gives positive weight, we arrive at a strategy that dominates P but which gives weight only to Q. This result is established elsewhere by Peter C. Ordeshook, "Pareto Optimality in Electoral Competition," *American Political Science Review*, 6 (December, 1971), 1141–1145.

actually, we can assume that $U_i(x)$ is any monotonically increasing function of $-\|x-x_c\|$).

Relegating proofs to an appendix, let H be a hyperplane in R^n (e.g., a line in two dimensions). Thus, H is a median hyperplane (e.g., line) if and only if it bisects the density of preferences in a particular direction—if and only if it divides R^n into two half spaces H^+ and H^- such that $\mu(H^+)\leq 1/2$ and $\mu(H^-)\leq 1/2$. A point $x\epsilon R_n$ is called a partial median if and only if it is the intersection of n distinct median hyperplanes. Letting I be the set of all such points and I^* its convex closure, we prove the following theorem in the appendix to this essay:

Theorem 4: Given expression (2), I^* is an admissible set.

The central corollary that follows from Theorems 1 and 4, then is,[10]

Corollary 1: Given expression (2), a minimax solution to the reduced game $(\varphi,\tilde{I}^*)$ is a minimax solution to the game $(\varphi,\tilde{X})$.

Note, moreover, that given our assumptions, the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium is that all median hyperplanes intersect at a common point. Under this condition I^* reduces to a point so that Corollary 1 can be viewed simply as a generalization of existing theory.[11]

The question, nevertheless, that we must now address if pure strategy equilibria do not exist concerns the size of the admissible set I^*. If this set is large relative to X or to the set of Pareto optimals, then our analysis fails to limit our expectations about the positions candidates ultimately adopt in campaigns. Stated differently, if I^* is large, we possess a theory that is nearly vacuous empirically since any observed strategy choice may be consistent with the hypothesis suggested by Corollary 1. But, if I^* is small and our expectations more limited, the theory is more

[10] An important issue that Theorem 4 and its corollary fail to address is whether minimax strategy solutions exist in simple multidimensional elections. We know from the minimax theorem that if X is finite such strategies necessarily exist. From a practical perspective, moreover, this is perhaps the most reasonable context of election competition in the sense that the real constraints on candidate strategies and their perceptions of alternatives may render the game finite. For an infinite strategy space, however, establishing existence is more problematical. This is especially true in our analysis since φ is not continuous (for a proof that continuous zero-sum games over closed convex strategy spaces possess minimax solutions see Guillermo Owen, *Game Theory* [Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders, 1968], pp. 76–78). We conjecture, nevertheless, that the class of spatial games being considered here always possess minimax solutions.

[11] If the number of voters is finite and even, this assertion is not strictly true, given our definition of a median in terms of hyperplanes. Thus, if C is odd or infinite, there exists a unique median in every direction, whereas for C even, median hyperplanes are not necessarily unique. That is, for C even, a median in a particular direction can be a bounded region (e.g., for two voters on a line, the median is the set of all positions between the two ideal points). If we extend our notion of a median to bounded regions, the assertion follows. The definition of medians in terms of hyperplanes is simply a convenience for reducing notational complexity.




Figure 3: Admissible Set for Three Voters




Figure 4: Admissible Set for Five Voters




Figure 5: Weakly Admissible Set for Three Voters

readily disproved and, therefore, potentially more powerful.

By way of several examples, we conclude that the admissible set I^* can be either large or small—depending on the electorate's preference distribution. In Figures 3 and 4 we offer two examples in which I^* encompasses the entire set of Pareto optimals. In Figure 3, three voter's ideal points are arrayed in a triangle so that the Pareto optimal set consists of the triangle and all points within it. It is readily verified, moreover, that at least two median lines intersect everywhere in the triangle and, thus, that I^* is "limited" to the Pareto optimals. In Figure 4, five voters are arrayed in a pentagon, so that the set of Pareto optimals consists of the pentagon and all interior points. The shaded star, on the other hand, corresponds to the set of all median line intersections, and we see that I^* again corresponds to the Pareto optimals.

We have, then, these two examples to demonstrate that our expectations about spatial strategies are not necessarily limited by Corollary 1. Nevertheless, we can reduce further our expectations about candidate positions by noting for the three-voter example that the shaded region in Figure 5 is a weakly admissible set.[12]

Weak admissibility, then, can be used to analyze games further if I^* is too large. Unlike the correspondence between I^* and admissible sets, however, there is no simple general geometric characterization for weakly admissible sets. Hence, in practical applications, an admissible set seems the more useful notion; but, to show that Theorem 4 can in fact limit our expectations about candidate strategies, recall that the usual context for spatial theory is large electorates. Suppose, then, that the electorate consists of a continuum of voters whose ideal points are distributed uniformly over the triangle and the pentagon. For these two examples, we denote I^* by the shaded set (see Figures 6 and 7). Clearly, I^* is substantially smaller than the set of Pareto optimals, which again is bounded by the triangle and pentagon.

Thus, in these two examples, the domain of mixed minimax strategies seems limited to a reasonably small region. In fact, if we assume that preferences are more concentrated near the center of the triangle and pentagon, I^* becomes even smaller. The implication of Figures 3 through 7, then, is that for finite, dispersed preferences, I^* can be large; but if we characterize preferences by continuous densities, I^* is smaller and substantively more interesting.

As a final check on this inference, we examine

[12] The identification of I^* in theory is simple in two-dimensions: identify all median lines and hence their intersections, and take the convex hull of these intersections. To generate Figure 8, however, a computer is essential to calculate and plot these median lines for the several values of λ. Identification of the weakly admissible set in Figure 5, on the other hand, is accomplished by trial and error. We note simply that a point at the center of the triangle dominates all of the excluded points within the triangle.




Figure 6: Uniform Distribution of Preferences over Triangle




Figure 7: Uniform Distribution of Preferences over Pentagon




Figure 8: I* for Bimodal Density

the class of nonsymmetric densities that result when two bivariate normals are weighted and summed (in which case all of R^2 is Pareto optimal). Weighting two standardized ($\sigma=1$) densities with means 0 and 5 by λ and $1-\lambda$ respectively, we know, of course, that for $\lambda=0$, 1/2, or 1, the resultant density is symmetric, and, hence, yields a pure strategy equilibrium. In Figure 8, we illustrate the form of I^* for several alternative values of λ that do not yield such equilibria.

The results here are gratifying, in terms of both the size and position of I^*. With respect to size, we see that the width of I^* is not unreasonably large in comparison to the distance between the modes of the preference density.[13] The posi-

[13] We note also that if we decrease the distance between the means of the two bivariate normals used to construct Figure 8 (or, equivalently, increase their variances), the size of I^* decreases. A distance of 5σ, moreover, seems the extreme of opinion polarization.

tion of I^*, moreover, confirms the intuitive supposition that if the electorate's preferences are bimodally distributed, the candidates' strategies will be drawn towards, but not wholly to, the largest mode. Interestingly, except for unidimensional contests, this supposition has not previously been established by spatial theory owing to its dependence on the more restrictive solution concept of pure strategy equilibria.

Despite Corollary 1 and the apparent constraint it places on mixed strategy solutions—at least for games with a continuum of voters—the question again arises: What should a candidate do if permitted to move after revealing his choice of pure strategy? Clearly, if the candidates must again reveal their next move simultaneously and if their current spatial positions do not prohibit mixed strategies over I^*, then Theorem 4 again pertains. That is, each move is simply a repetition of the game (φ, I^*), with the result that candidates choose strategies in I^*.

More interestingly, suppose that after their initial choice of positions, the candidates are permitted to make adjustments one after the other. Our question then is: Might sequential adjustments lead candidates to strategies outside of I^* or some smaller weakly admissible set? The reasons, even with sequential moves, for avoiding strategies outside of the admissible set I^* are obvious. Regardless of whether he is responding to his opponent's current position or to positions his opponent might take in the future, a candidate does at least as well with positions in I^*, and sometimes better than he does with positions outside of it. That is, if he is contemplating the strategy $y \notin I^*$, then there exists an $x \in I^*$ that is at least as good as y under *all* contingencies.

With respect to weakly admissible sets, which admittedly are more difficult to compute, there is a similar but somewhat weaker rationalization. Specifically, suppose Candidate 1 chooses a strategy, w, in the weakly admissible set Ω, and 2 chooses $z \in \Omega$, but that $z \succ w$. Thus, if afforded the opportunity, Candidate 1 prefers to alter his position and find a spatial strategy that renders him a winning rather than a losing candidate. Let $y \notin \Omega$ be such a strategy. Should the candidate move out of Ω to y? The definition of weak admissibility suggests that there is a "better" alternative in Ω, say x, which not only dominates z, but dominates y as well.

For another reason for supposing that candidates adopt strategies in I^* or in potentially smaller weakly admissible sets, consider the following sequential model: Each candidate records the frequency distribution, F, of all previous positions adopted by his opponent and candidates adjust their positions with perfect spatial mobility one after the other. Suppose also, that the candidates' adjustments proceed as in the "method of fictitious play." That is, the candidate with the next move chooses a strategy that is good against his opponent's history, F (i.e., guarantees him an expected payoff of at least a tie, given that his opponent chooses in accordance with the mixed strategy F). Clearly, F changes as the game proceeds. From the theory of finite zero-sum games, however, we know that the overall observed frequency of each candidate's choices approaches, in the limit, the mixed strategy to the myopic game.[14] It follows, then, that while the candidates cycle in a continual process of adjustment and readjustment, they remain in I^*.

This, of course, does not resolve all issues surrounding sequential elections contests—issues such as the effects of imperfect spatial mobility and information. Our analysis does show, nevertheless, that the support of mixed minimax strategies can provide a substantively satisfying constraint on strategic choice in both the static and sequential context.

Committees vs. Elections

The hypothesis that the notions of admissible and weakly admissible sets constrain the policy outcomes of an election assumes that candidates or political entrepreneurs compete for the votes of a passive electorate. Thus, the candidates motivate the social choice by their goal of electoral victory, while citizens simply endorse the candidates they most prefer. This may be a reasonable model for large electorates. In smaller voting bodies without candidates (e.g., committees), however, the voters themselves are the active participants in policy formation, in which case it is more appropriate to model the "election" as an n-person cooperative game and to use n-person solution theory to predict policy outcomes. Since the context of social choice determines the appropriate model, it is reasonable to expect that we can ascertain the effects of political entrepreneurship on policy by comparing the two-person and n-person solution concepts.

Owing, perhaps, to the correspondence between pure strategy equilibria and the core, the distinction between the two-person and n-person models is frequently blurred. That is, since pure strategy electoral equilibria are equivalent to the core of the corresponding n-person game, it is

[14] The theorem is outlined in Owen, *Game Theory*, p. 31, 36–37, and proved in Samuel Karlin, *Mathematical Methods and Theory in Games, Programming and Economics*, Vol. 1 (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1959), pp. 179–189. As proved, the theorem applies, of course, only to finite games. Thus, we can only conjecture that it applies to infinite solvable games as well.

tempting to conclude that the context of social choice does not affect policy. This, however, does not follow since the equivalence between the n-person and 2-person formulations has been shown only when a core or a pure strategy equilibrium exists. And, as we show here, by an example, if these solutions do not exist, this equivalence disappears. Thus, the context of choice affects public policy substantially.

As an example of a case in which the two-person and n-person formulations yield different outcomes, consider an electorate of three citizens with the following transitive preferences over $X=\{a, b, c, d, e, f\}$:

Citizen	*Preference*
1	$a \succ d \sim f \succ c \succ b \succ e$
2	$b \succ e \sim d \succ a \succ c \succ f$
3	$c \succ f \sim e \succ b \succ a \succ d$

Note that these preferences yield the majority dominance relations described in Figure 2. Thus, $\Omega=\{a,b,c\}$ is a weakly admissible set and

$$P(x) = \begin{cases} 1/3 \text{ if } x\epsilon\Omega \\ 0 \text{ if } x\notin\Omega \end{cases}$$

is the minimax solution to the resultant two-person game.

Consider now the $n(=3)$ person game that results from these preferences. Two solution concepts are considered usually to analyze such games—the V-solution and the Bargaining set.[15] Briefly, the V-solution consists of any set, V, that is both internally and externally stable, i.e., $V\subseteq X$ is a V-solution if and only if

(internal stability): $\forall x, y\epsilon V$, $x\sim y$

(external stability): $\forall y\notin V$, $\exists x\epsilon V$ such that $x\succ y$.

Similarly, a policy $x\epsilon X$ is a member of the Bargaining set if there is a coalition $B\subseteq N$ that can secure x and if every member of B can protect his interest in x against objections by other members of B.[16]

It is easy to verify now that $V=\{d, e, f\}$ is a unique V-solution to our game. Furthermore, V is also the bargaining set associated with the minimal winning coalitions in this game. But $V\cap\Omega=\Phi$. Stated differently, the V-solution and the Bargaining set possess no equilibrium properties for candidates.

In this example, then, the policies considered and ultimately proposed by candidates or political entrepreneurs differ completely from the policies that result from a cooperative play of the game. Which solution is "better" depends, of course, on which citizen's opinion you seek. Both solutions yield Pareto optimal outcomes. In this example, however, there is a tendency for the cooperative solution to extract as much as possible from the losers by giving them their least preferred outcomes, and to require compromise between the members of the winning coalition. The two-person solution allows some citizens to realize their most preferred outcome. We do not know, of course, whether these observations are generalizable, but we must conclude that the context of choice can affect outcomes.

Conclusions

One issue that we fail to address in this essay concerns a candidate's ability to compute an appropriate minimax strategy for a particular configuration of preferences. Doubtless, such a computation is exceedingly difficult—so difficult in fact that it seems to push the *as if* principle beyond credulity to argue that candidates act as if they calculate and use mixed minimax strategies. Our prediction about candidates, however, is not that they adopt a particular mixed strategy but, given our assumptions, that they eventually adopt a position in the admissible set I^* and, perhaps, a position in a potentially smaller weakly admissible set. Consider, then, the candidate who is unable to compute the appropriate solution strategy but who knows the general outlines of I^*. Should he choose a position in I^* or not? Our assumption, of course, is that he knows that for every $y\notin I^*$, there exists an $x\epsilon I^*$ that is at least as good and sometimes better against the opponent. Thus, even if he does not know the details of his opponents' strategy or how to calculate the mixed mimimax solution, there is a positive incentive to avoid positions not in I^*. Alternatively, if the candidates move sequentially in accordance with

[15] For a discussion of n-person majority games without side payments (the context of a spatial conceptualization of preferences) see Robert Wilson, "A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Social Choice," in B. Lieberman, ed., *Social Choice* (N.Y.: Gordon and Breach, 1971), pp. 393-408; and Wilson, "Stable Coalition Proposals in Majority Rule Voting," *Journal of Economic Theory*, 3 (September, 1971), 254–271.

[16] Usually, a bargaining set is defined in terms of a payoff configuration and a particular coalition structure. Here, however, exposition is eased if we consider only the payoff configuration x. Note also that payoffs are defined in game theory in terms of utility, whereas here x is a policy position. This transformation of terminology is of no consequence to our analysis owing to the 1 to 1 correspondence (given our assumptions about utility) between payoff configurations and spatial position.

the method of fictitious play, we know that they choose strategies in I^* and in the limit can be said to act as if they calculated mixed minimax strategies.

Relative to mixed minimax strategies, I^* is easy to compute—assuming, of course, that the candidate knows the electorate's preference density. Usually, however, even the best polls afford candidates knowledge only about the distribution of preferences along individual issues (i.e., the marginal densities of μ). But, except perhaps for exaggerated bimodal densities, I^* should generally be small in mass electorates. In fact, a good approximation to I^* is a small region about the intersections of the median lines of the known marginal densities.

In summary, then, our analysis extends one of the most pervasive conclusions of spatial theory—the power and importance of the electorate's "median" preference. Given our assumptions, *on the average we anticipate finding successful candidates at or near the electorate's median preference on each salient issue of the election even if the distribution of ideal points is not symmetric.*

Appendix: Proof of Theorem 4

Before proceeding to a formal proof of Theorem 4 we offer an informal description of the method of proof for the two-dimensional case. In Figure 9, I^* represents the convex closure of the set of partial medians. To show that I^* is an admissible set, for any point $y_0 \notin I$, we pick $x_0 \in I^*$ such that x_0 is the closest point to y_0 in I^*. Since I^* is convex, there is a hyperplane (line), H, that is perpendicular to and bisects the line connecting y_0 and x_0, such that y_0 is on one side and I^* is on the other side. Since there exists a median hyperplane, M_1, parallel to H (lemma 1) and since this median hyperplane passes through I^* (lemma 3) it follows that x_0 is closer to M_1 than is y_0. Thus, x_0 defeats y_0 (lemma 2). Now let z be any other point in X such that $z \gtrsim x$. Thus, there must exist a median M_2 in the direction of $z - x_0$ (i.e., perpendicular to the line connecting z and x_0) that is closer to z than to x_0 (lemma 2). Suppose now that, contrary to Theorem 4, $y_0 \gtrsim z$. By the same argument, there must exist a median M_3 in the direction $y_0 - z$ that is closer to y_0 than to z. But




Figure 9

this yields a partial median in the region S, which is impossible since S is on the wrong side of the separating hyperplane H. Thus, $z \succ y_0$, in which case I^* is an admissible set since for any $y_0 \notin I^*$, $\exists x_0 \in I^*$ such that $x_0 \succ y_0$ and $\forall z$, $z \succsim x_0 \Rightarrow z \succ y_0$.

More formally, let a *hyperplane* $H \subseteq R^n$ be any set of the following form:

$$H = \{x \in R^n \mid x.a = b\}$$

for some $a \in R^n$ and $b \in R$, and let $\overline{H}$ be the set of all hyperplanes. Thus, any $H \in \overline{H}$ partitions the space into three exhaustive disjoint sets, H, H^- and H^+, where

$$H^- = \{x \in R^n \mid x.\ a < b\}$$
$$H^+ = \{x \in R^n \mid x.\ a > b\}$$

A hyperplane, H, is defined as a *median hyperplane* if and only if $\mu(H^+) \leq 1/2$ and $\mu(H^-) \leq 1/2$. We define $\overline{M}$ as the set of all median hyperplanes, i.e.,

$$\overline{M} = \{H \in \overline{H} \mid \mu(H^+) \leq 1/2 \text{ and } \mu(H^-) \leq 1/2\}$$

We now state several elementary lemmas without proof that are used in the proof of Theorem 4.

Lemma 1: For any $a \in R^n$, there exists a $b \in R$ such that if $H = \{x \mid x.a = b\}$, $H \in \overline{M}$.

Stated simply, Lemma 1 asserts that there exists a median hyperplane in every direction. Notationally, we use b_a to denote some value of b associated with a particular $a \in R^n$ and

$$M_a = \{x \mid x.\ a = b_a\}$$

to denote a median associated with the vector a.

Our next lemma states that if $y, x \in R^n$, x is preferred to y by a majority of citizens if and only if a median in the direction $x - y$ is closer to x than to y.

Lemma 2: If $U_c(x) = \|x_c - x\|^2$ for all $c \in C$, then for any $x, y \in R^n$, $x \succsim y$ if and only if there is some b_{x-y} such that

$$b_{x-y} \geq \frac{(x+y)\cdot(x-y)}{2} = \frac{\|x\|^2 - \|y\|^2}{2}$$

where $x \succ y$ if "$>$" holds.

We now offer several additional definitions and a third lemma.

Definition A1: If $M_{a_1}, \ldots, M_{a_m} \in \overline{M}$ is a set of median hyperplanes generated by the vectors $a_1, \ldots, a_m \in R^n$, then the median hyperplanes are *independent* if and only if $\{a_1, \ldots, a_m\}$ are linearly independent.

Note that if $M_1, \ldots, M_n \in \overline{M}$ are independent,

$$\bigcap_{i=1}^{n} H_i$$

consists of a unique point. This follows because $\{x.a_i = b_i \mid 1 \leq i \leq n\}$ is a set of n linearly independent equations in n unknowns and, hence, possesses a unique non-trivial solution.

Definition A2: A vector $x \in R^n$ is called a partial median if there is a basis $\{a_1, \ldots, a_n\}$ for R^n such that

$$x \in \bigcap_{i=1}^{n} M_{a_i}$$

We use the notation I to denote the set of all partial medians in R^n and I^* to denote its convex closure. It is easy to show, now, that every median hyperplane passes through I^*.

Lemma 3: For every $M \in \overline{M}$, $M \cap I \neq \Phi$, and if $M_1, \ldots, M_k \in \overline{M}$ are independent, for $1 \leq k \leq n$, then

$$\left(\bigcap_{i=1}^{k} M_i\right) \cap I^* \neq \phi.$$

We proceed now to the proof of Theorem 4.

Theorem 4: Given expression (2), I^* is an admissible set.

Proof: Let $y_0 \notin I^*$. Since I^* is closed and convex, there exists an $x_0 \in I^*$ that minimizes the distance of y_0 to I^* as illustrated in Figure 8. We pick such an $x_0 \in I^*$ and claim that $x_0 \succ y_0$. This follows because

$$H = \{x \mid x \cdot (x_0 - y_0) = \frac{(x_0 + y_0)}{2} \cdot (x_0 - y_0)\}$$

in a separating hyperplane, i.e., $y_0 \in H^-$ and $I^* \subseteq H^+$. But then, since $M_{x_0 - y_0} \cap I^* \neq \Phi$ by Lemma 3, it must be the case that $M_{x_0 - y_0} \subseteq H^+$, or equivalently,

$$b_{x_0 - y_0} > \frac{\|x_0\|^2 - \|y_0\|^2}{2}$$

By Lemma 2, it follows that $x_0 \succ y_0$.

Now consider any other z with $z \succsim x_0$. Suppose $y_0 \succsim z$. From Lemma 3, this implies we can find b_{z-x_0} and $b_{y_0 - z}$ satisfying

$$b_{z-x_0} \geq \frac{\|z\|^2 - \|x_0\|^2}{2}$$

$$b_{y_0 - z} \geq \frac{\|y_0\|^2 - \|z\|^2}{2}$$

Let $x^* \epsilon M_{z-x_0} \cap M_{y_0-z}$. Then,

$$x^* \cdot (z - x_0) = b_{z-x_0}$$
$$x^* \cdot (y_0 - z) = b_{y_0-z}$$

or, adding these two expressions and combining with the sum of the previous inequalities,

$$x^* \cdot (y_0 - x_0) = b_{z-x_0} + c_{y_0-z} \geq \frac{\|y_0\|^2 - \|x_0\|^2}{2}$$

which is equivalent to

$$x^* \cdot (x_0 - y_0) \leq \frac{\|x_0\|^2 - \|y_0\|^2}{2}$$

Thus, it must be the case that $x^* \epsilon H^+$. But, since $x^* \epsilon M_{z-x_0} \cap M_{y_0-z}$ and since x^* is arbitrary, we must conclude that

$$(M_{z-x_0} \cap M_{y_0-z}) \subseteq H^- \cup H$$

This yields a contradiction of Lemma 3, i.e., since H is a separating hyperplane and $I^* \subseteq H^+$, the assumption that $z \succsim x_0$ and $y_0 \succsim z$ where $x_0 \succ y_0$, implies that

$$(M_{z-x_0} \cap M_{y_0-z}) \cap I^* = \phi.$$

Thus, for all $z \epsilon I^*$, $z \succsim x_0 \Rightarrow z \succ y_0$, in which case I^* is an admissible set. Q.E.D.

An Interorganizational Analysis of Power, Conflict, and Settlements in Public Sector Collective Bargaining

JAMES L. PERRY and CHARLES H. LEVINE
University of California, Irvine *Syracuse University*

The dramatic growth of unionism and collective bargaining in the public sector signifies a drastic departure from previous conceptions of the public employment relationship and previous patterns of public employee activity.[1] Concomitant with the rise of public sector unionism has been the increased interest social scientists have exhibited in the determinants of power, conflict, and outcomes in public sector collective bargaining. Despite increased scholarly interest, however, attempts at theory construction have fallen short because there has been a tendency to use conventional language consistent with the common discourse that occurs in the actual collective bargaining process; many scholars in the field have viewed idiographic orientations as the only means of validly approaching the subject; and the field has been dominated by scholars seeking melioristic solutions to employee relations problems in their research rather than focusing on theory building.[2]

In order to better understand public sector collective bargaining and to build theory about the phenomena, we need to develop a theoretical framework that allows for the systematic testing of propositions. Interorganizational theory, one approach that appears fruitful for constructing such a theory, is used in this study to capture major properties of the structure of public sector collective bargaining and to present and test some derived hypotheses. These hypotheses are tested with data gathered from a sample of 60 case studies of public sector collective bargaining in New York City from 1968 to 1972.

Theoretical Considerations

A public organization may be viewed as a coalition of individuals, "some of them organized into subcoalitions," whose "members include administrators, workers, appointive officials, elective officials, legislators, judges, clientele, interest group leaders, etc."[3] Drawing boundaries around the organizational coalition is difficult because organization members play a variety of roles. Nevertheless, the concept of organizational coalition can be simplified by

[1] One observer notes that in 1955 "the subject of labor relations in public employment could not have meant less to more people, both in and out of government." See Ida Klaus, "The Emerging Relationship," *Collective Bargaining in the Public Service*, ed. D. H. Kruger and Charles F. Schmidt, Jr. (New York: Random House, 1969), p. 11. Within 15 years, 2.3 million government employees held union membership and an additional 1.7 million government employees were members of associations, often functioning indistinguishably from unions. Municipal employees are represented for bargaining purposes by unions or associations in more than 1,300 communities. For statistics on the extent of public employee unionization and strike activities, see Tax Foundation, New York, *Union and Government Employment* (New York: Tax Foundation, May 1972), Tables 1 and 2, pp. 8–9, and Table 10, p. 29, and Richard H. Nelson and James L. Doster, "City Employee Representation and Bargaining Policies," *Monthly Labor Review*, 95 (November, 1972), 43–50. For a comparison of union and association behavior in the field of public education, consult J. Douglas Muir, "The Strike as a Professional Sanction: The Changing Attitude of the National Education Association," *Labor Law Journal*, 19 (October, 1968), 615–627.

[2] Scholars have adopted a number of approaches in their efforts to describe and explain conflict and outcomes in public sector collective bargaining. Liston, for example, attempts to explain the causes of public employee strikes merely by asserting that government workers in the lower classifications want higher salaries. See Robert A. Liston, *The Limits of Defiance: Strikes, Rights and Government* (New York: Franklin Watts, 1971). Wellington and Winter, in *The Unions and the Cities* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1971), Chapter 1, employ a conceptual framework which assumes "a municipality with an elected city council and an elected mayor who bargains with unions representing the employees of the city." The conceptual framework is for the most part undefined and unaccompanied by indicators or constructs for its operationalization. Drotning, Lipsky, and Foster take a broad positivist approach to public sector collective bargaining. The outcome of interest to Drotning et al. is the mode of conflict resolution — mediation, fact-finding or conciliation. Although the authors fail to operationalize their approach, a more fundamental problem is the absence of any formal explication of the theoretical relationships underlying the variables. See John Drotning, David Lipsky, and Howard Foster, "The Analysis of Impasse Procedures in Public Sector Negotiations," *Management of Personnel Quarterly*, 9 (Summer, 1971), 21–30. For one of the more promising recent attempts to explain conflict see Thomas A. Kochan, "A Theory of Multilateral Collective Bargaining in City Governments," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, 27 (July, 1974), 525–542.

[3] Richard M. Cyert and James G. March, *A Behavioral Theory of the Firm* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 27.

identifying coalition members for certain classes of decisions and for specified periods of time.[4] An organizational coalition may be distinguished from its various subcoalitions by the degree of autonomy it exercises in decision making and goal setting. A subcoalition's decisions are influenced by legitimated authority within a hierarchical structure of which the subcoalition is an integral part. In interorganizational relationships, on the other hand, "the individual decisions of two or more units are made on a more inclusive systemic level which includes these units."[5]

The establishment and perpetuation of an organizational coalition rests on an equilibrium between member contributions and organizational inducements.[6] For individual workers the inducements/contributions contract has both short-term and long-term implications. Thompson writes:

> Clearly there is a *quid pro quo* theme to the inducements/contributions contract, for it defines what is expected of individuals in terms of jobs needing to be done, and it defines the rewards which the organization pledges for the appropriate performance of such jobs. . . . As a unit in his career, the job provides the individual with an arena or *sphere of action* in which to seek solutions to his career problems, and thus to meet the demands placed on him by the social system.[7]

March and Simon note that each participant will continue his participation in an organization only so long as the inducements offered him are as great or greater than the contributions he is asked to make. They assert: "Where the contract is viewed as unchangeable, the only options are 'accept' or 'reject'."[8] In cases where the contract is viewed as changeable, however, the motivation of individuals to protect or enhance their "sphere of action" is reflected in the negotiation of inducements/contributions contracts.[9]

Since the action spheres presented by jobs differ, they require different strategies for the negotiation of the inducements/contributions contract.[10] Collective bargaining may be viewed as a special (though not uncommon) strategy for the negotiation of the inducements/contributions contract. Thompson emphasizes that "the content of the inducements/contributions contract is determined through power (political) processes."[11] Conceived as the dependence of the parties relative to one another,[12] the power of the individual in "routinized technologies" and "early-ceiling occupations" is severely limited in negotiation of the inducements/contributions contract.[13] Nonetheless, when there exist large numbers of individuals in similar occupational roles, opportunities develop for collective action as a strategy of negotiation. Under these conditions, the problems of defining and enforcing the employment contract become a matter of concern for all organizational participants:[14] "The higher wages, shorter hours, and better working conditions that unions demand are collective goods to the workers."[15]

Collective bargaining involves a transformation of the basic structure of the public organizational coalition. Rather than the individual negotiating for the protection and enhancement of his job, negotiation is pursued through the formation of a new and distinct organization.[16] For purposes of analyzing collective bargaining the employee union can be considered an autonomous organization, free from the decision-making constraints of an overarching organization, and sharing in the formation of policies that determine the public employment relationship. The operation of neither organization, however, can be understood merely as an aggregation of the goals of its members. Coleman writes: "The actions of a trade union and other mass-based collectives are not always toward goals collectively held, but the very existence of the collectivity is based upon action toward collective goals."[17]

To account for collective goals, Thompson suggests conceptualizing goals as the "future domains intended by those in the dominant

[4] Cyert and March, *A Behavioral Theory of the Firm*, p. 27.

[5] Roland L. Warren, "The Concerting of Decisions as a Variable in Organizational Interaction," *Interorganizational Decision Making*, ed. Matthew Tuite, Roger Chisolm, and Michael Radnor (Chicago: Aldine, 1972), p. 21.

[6] Equilibrium theory is presented and discussed in Chester I. Barnard, *The Functions of the Executive* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1938), and James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, *Organizations* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1958).

[7] James D. Thompson, *Organizations in Action* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), p. 106.

[8] March and Simon, *Organizations*, p. 83.

[9] Thompson, *Organizations in Action*, p. 106.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 109.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 106.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 107.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 110.

[14] See March and Simon, *Organizations*, p. 91.

[15] Mancur Olson, Jr., *The Logic of Collective Action* (New York: Schocken Books, 1968), p. 79.

[16] Although March and Simon indicate the trade union occupies an ambiguous position, they do classify it as an extraorganizational group. March and Simon, *Organizations*, p. 72.

[17] James S. Coleman, "Foundations for a Theory of Collective Decisions," *American Journal of Sociology*, 71 (May, 1966), 615–627, at 616.

coalition."[18] An organization's domain may be viewed as the claims which an organization stakes out for itself in terms of (1) range of products, (2) population served, and (3) services rendered.[19] The dominant coalition is conceived by Thompson as a subgroup of "interdependent individuals who collectively have sufficient control of the organization's resources to commit them in certain directions and withhold them from others."[20] In collective bargaining, two dominant coalitions each act to preserve or expand their domains through negotiation over the content of the inducements/contributions contract.

From this interorganizational relationship comes *conflict* and *contractual change*, and these are related to the nature of *goal divergencies, dependencies*, and the degree of *stability* in the relationship between the two organizations.

Following Cyert and March, the amount of *goal divergence* in the collective bargaining relationship can be understood in terms of the dimensions of each organization's goals (the future domains they view as important) and the strength of their preference for a particular outcome on a goal dimension.[21] The strength of an organization's preferences represents its "aspiration level" on any particular goal dimension. The organization's past goals, its past performance, and the past performance of other "comparable" organizations contribute to the organization's goal dimensions and aspiration levels.

In interorganizational relationships, power resides implicitly in the dependencies of organizations on one another. Pugh et al. focus on *organizational dependence* in the following manner: "The dependence of an organization reflects its relationships with other organizations in its social environment, such as suppliers, customers, competitors, labor unions, management organizations, and political and social organizations."[22] Within the environment of the union and the public organization exist a set of power-dependence relations—what Dill terms "task environment"—those actors in the environment which are relevant to goal attainment.[23]

Net power then results from a set of relationships between the organization and the elements of its pluralistic task environment. This admits the possibility that in collective bargaining the public organization may be powerful in relation to the union but dependent on other actors in its task environment to enforce its claims to domain. Thus, it becomes important for the organization to judge the amount and sources of support that can be mobilized for its goals, and to arrive at a strategy for their mobilization.

Although the public organization and the union organization negotiate a contract periodically, they must deal with each other continuously in handling disputes arising during the administration and interpretation of the contract. Walton and McKersie contend that the pattern of interaction between the organizations during contract administration directly influences the attitudes between the units that later affect contract negotiations.[24] Confined to the dyadic relationship between the union and public organization, *stability* refers to the degree to which prior structural features of the relationship expand or contract the capacity for joint decision making during collective bargaining.

In light of this distinction, the degree of stability in the relationship between the union and the public organization may be viewed as a product of the interactions between the two organizations prior to the initiation of contract negotiations. The interactions between the organizations during contract administration affect the development of the capacity for collaboration during contract negotiation by influencing the pattern and quality of information exchanged between the parties.[25] Also, the interactions prior to collective bargaining, directly influence attitudes between the parties which in turn determine how the organizations

[18] Thompson, *Organizations in Action*, p. 128.

[19] Sol Levine and Paul E. White, "Exchange as a Conceptual Framework for the Study of Interorganizational Relationships," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 5 (March, 1961), 583–601; and Thompson, *Organizations in Action*, p. 26.

[20] Thompson, *Organizations in Action*, p. 128.

[21] Cyert and March, *A Behavioral Theory of the Firm*, p. 115.

[22] D. S. Pugh, D. J. Hickson, C. R. Hinings, and C. Turner, "The Context of Organization Structures," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 14 (March, 1969), 91–114.

[23] William R. Dill, "Environment as an Influence on Managerial Autonomy," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 2 (March, 1958), 409–443, at 410. "Organization set" is a term analogous to "task environment" employed by William M. Evan in "The Organization-Set: Toward a Theory of Interorganizational Relations," *Approaches to Organizational Design*, ed. James D. Thompson (Pittsburgh, Pa.: The University of Pittsburgh Press, 1966), pp. 173–191.

[24] Richard E. Walton and Robert B. McKersie, *A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), chapter 6.

[25] Richard E. Walton, "Theory of Conflict in Lateral Organizational Relations," ed. J. R. Lawrence, *Operational Research in the Social Sciences* (London: Tavistock Publications, 1966), pp. 409–426,

view the continuity of the contract administration and contract negotiation phases of the relationship.[26]

These situational phenomena—goal divergence, stability, and organizational dependence—are conceptually distinct from the behaviors of the individual members of the union and public organization and affect the degree to which interorganizational behavior is oppositional, that is, the extent to which conflict takes passive or aggressive forms. This conceptualization of *conflictual behavior* is intended to encompass the whole range of oppositional behavior from manifest forms of "strategic maneuvering" to covert forms of passive resistance.[27] Within the interorganizational decision-making process, oppositional behavior may be triggered by either acts of the other organization or changes in situational contexts.

The collective agreement that terminates negotiations between the public and union organizations comprises the inducements/contributions contract agreed to during the collective bargaining process. The inducements/contributions contract represents a set of decisions of two individual organizations at a more inclusive systemic level because the organizations jointly establish their domains with regard to the public employment relationship until the negotiation of a new agreement. *Contractual change* refers only to the changes in the content of the inducements/contributions contract negotiated from the conclusion of one agreement to the conclusion of the subsequent agreement through the collective bargaining process. Inducements include such items as salary levels, monetary fringe benefits, union security provisions, and the control of the physical and health-related environment of the workplace. Although often implicit in the employment relationship itself and only suggested in the management rights clause, contributions items frequently specified in the contract include the length of the workweek, the residual rights of management, the grounds for disciplinary actions, and descriptions of job duties.

Table 1. Theoretical Definitions

Goal Divergence:
The degree of incompatibility between the goals of the union and public organization.

Stability:
The degree to which prior structural features of the relationship expand or contract the capacity for joint decision making during collective bargaining.

Organizational Dependence:
The degree of support from the task environments of the negotiating organizations.

Conflictual Behavior:
The degree of behavioral opposition between the union and public organizations during collective bargaining.

Contractual Change:
The degree of change in the content of the inducements/contributions contract.

Propositions and Operational Linkages

With the groundwork laid through the introduction of the interorganizational analytic framework, some of the concepts may be interrelated via formal theoretical statements. Preceding each proposition is a statement of the theoretical linkages and premises, and following each proposition is an exposition of supportive empirical evidence and the hypothesized operational linkages.

I. The choice of tactics for pursuing incompatible goals is likely to be influenced by the nature and radicalism of each organization's goals.[28] While goal divergence identifies the state of incompatibility or opposition between forces, the degree of conflictual behavior characterizes the behavioral outcome of the interactions between the organizations. The relationship between these concepts is not merely unidirectional since the escalation of conflict can be expected to influence the nature of the goal divergencies. As conflictual behavior escalates, there is a greater tendency for participants to associate only with those similarly oriented to the issues. This form of social support strengthens individual organizational members, highlights the incompatibility of goals, and solidifies the divergence of positions.

These relationships between goal divergence and conflictual behavior are particularly relevant for understanding strike behavior.[29] The union views the strike costs as costs to be recouped and revises its aspirations upward in an attempt to offset the costs of the strike. In response to the union action, management's resolve to avoid concessions on certain goal dimensions is likely to increase, and management may even be inclined to withdraw earlier concessions.

[26] Walton, "Theory of Conflict in Lateral Organizational Relations"; see also Walton and McKersie, *A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations.*

[27] Louis R. Pondy, "Organizational Conflict: Concepts and Models," *Administrative Science Quarterly,* 12 (September, 1967), 296–320, at 312.

[28] See Lewis A. Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1956), and Louis Kriesberg, *The Sociology of Social Conflicts* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973).

[29] See Walton and McKersie, *A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations,* pp. 56–57 for an extended discussion of this point.

Proposition I. In public sector collective bargaining, the greater the goal divergence, the greater the conflictual behavior; as conflictual behavior increases, goal divergence also increases.

Empirical and experimental evidence from Axelrod, Bell, and Deutsch and Kraus is supportive of the plausibility of the two-directional theoretical relationship between goal divergence and conflictual behavior.[30] The operational linkage for Proposition I is hypothesized to be a positive, S-curve relationship. When the degree of goal divergence is minimal, some conflictual behavior may exist, but not a sufficient amount to produce feedback consequences. At intermediate levels of goal divergence, a nearly linear relationship between goal divergence and conflictual behavior is anticipated. Goal divergence may further increase while the degree of conflictual behavior has approached or reached an upper limit, thus accounting for a leveling off in the operational linkage.

II. Schelling writes that bargaining necessitates some kind of collaboration or mutual accommodation even if only in the avoidance of mutual disaster.[31] The time and effort required by the public and union organizations to form mutually consistent expectations, the nature of the expectations, and the capacity to communicate or to destroy communication in collective bargaining depends on the stability of the relationship developed during interaction in administering the collective agreement.

In analyzing interunit conflict in organizations, Walton proposes that more flexible and informal decision rules and less frequent recourse to the use of outside arbiters is likely to increase the capacity for collaboration in joint decision making between the units.[32] The development of mutual attitudes toward one another is a product of the degree of positive or negative affect between the organizations throughout their relationship. It is during interaction in contract administration that the organizations develop mutual expectations, attitudes, and decision rules relevant to their later behavior during collective bargaining. It is this structure of interorganizational interactions which expedites agreement or, conversely, hinders agreement and the control of conflictual behavior during collective bargaining.

Proposition II. In public sector collective bargaining, the lesser the stability during contract administration, the greater the conflictual behavior during negotiations.

Newcomb; Loomis; Bixenstine, Levitt, and Wilson; and Hammond et al. provide experimental results that support this proposition.[33] Lincoln's case analysis of the 1966 New York City Transit Authority negotiations identifies instability in the system as an explanatory variable, for the strike which subsequently occurred.[34] Pruitt, in a theoretical analysis of stability between pairs of national decision-making units,[35] suggests that the operational linkage between stability and conflictual behavior may be a step function; i.e., when the level of stability reaches a critical state, it causes the likely degree of conflictual behavior to change radically. The operational linkage at the interorganizational level of analysis, however, is more likely to be a power function.

III. Within the context of public sector collective bargaining, the choice of negotiation strategies and the employment and timing of particular commitment tactics for the attainment of new organizational domains will depend upon the support each organization obtains within its task environment. The amount of asymmetry between the dependence positions of the organizations influences the success of strategic choices and in turn the degree of behavioral opposition.

Small imbalances in relative dependence continually reinforce the need for cooperation by highlighting the interdependencies of the

[30] Robert Axelrod's investigation of a series of situations in politics confirmed his hypothesis that the greater the conflict of interest in a strategic interaction, the greater the conflictual behavior. See Robert Axelrod. *Conflict of Interest* (Chicago: Markham Publishing, 1970); see also Inge Powell Bell, *CORE and the Strategy of Non-Violence* (New York: Random House, 1968), p. 59; and Morton Deutsch and Robert M. Kraus, "The Effects of Threat Upon Interpersonal Bargaining," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 61 (September, 1960), 210–225.

[31] Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960).

[32] Walton, "Theory of Conflict in Lateral Organizational Relations."

[33] T. M. Newcomb, "An Approach to the Study of Communicative Acts," *Psychological Review*, 60 November, 1953), 393–404; J. L. Loomis, "Communication, the Development of Trust and Cooperative Behavior," *Human Relations*, 12 (November, 1959), 305–315; V. E. Bixenstine, C. A. Levitt, and K. V. Wilson, "Collaboration Among Six Persons in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 10 (December, 1966), 488–496; K. R. Hammond, F. J. Todd, M. Wilkins, and T. O. Mitchell, "Cognitive Conflict Between Persons: Application of the Lens-Model Paradigm," *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 2 (October, 1966), 343–360.

[34] Albert A. Lincoln, "The New York City Transit Strike: An Explanatory Approach," *Public Policy*, 16 (1967), 271–292.

[35] Dean G. Pruitt, "Stability and Sudden Change in Interpersonal and and International Affairs," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 13 (March, 1969), 18–38.

organizations. As the asymmetry of relative dependence increases, the likelihood increases that persuasion as a means for reaching agreement will fail, stimulating greater behavioral opposition in the modes of transaction between the organizations. Large differences in relative dependence invite the stronger of the organizations to use coercion against the weaker organization to expand its domain. On the other hand, refusal by the stronger organization to make changes requested by the weaker organization stimulates greater conflictual activity by the weaker organization.

Proposition III. In public sector collective bargaining, the greater the asymmetry of relative dependence between the negotiating organizations, the greater the conflictual behavior.

Narrative and empirical support of the proposition is provided in studies by Terhune, Kerr and Siegel, and Zinnes.[36] A negatively skewed, positive curvilinear operational linkage is expected because beyond a certain level of asymmetry of relative dependence the likelihood of conflictual behavior is considerably reduced. Where an organization is so limited by its dependence position that it very nearly ceases to operate as an independent unit, the likelihood of conflictual behavior rapidly declines.

IV. The more substantial or encompassing a conflict, the greater the pressures from third parties for its solution.[37] In the public sector, as conflictual behavior persists or increases, efforts to arrive at agreement and achieve finality in the collective bargaining process generally lead to mediation or factfinding mechanisms. Concurrent with this phenomenon is the fact that as conflictual behavior between the union and public organization increases, agreement is less likely to be achieved by voluntary concession and reduction in demands. The anticipation of third party intervention may stimulate marginal concessions by the organizations and actual third party intervention may legitimate or require further concessions.[38] Thus, as conflictual behavior increases, the process is likely to produce greater change in the inducements/contributions contract.

Proposition IV. In public sector collective bargaining, the greater the conflictual behavior, the greater the contractual change.

Little empirical research has been undertaken to assess the plausibility of this proposition. However, one study of the effect of impasse during collective bargaining on negotiated salaries of teachers found better mean salary gains in some impasse districts.[39] The proposed relationship is expected to be clearly evident if all dimensions of the collective agreement are analyzed. The operational linkage between conflictual behavior and contractual change should be positive and linear. The slope of the function is expected to be substantially less than unity.

V. When it comes to a test of strength, the organization that can mobilize the most resources and trade on relationships within its task environment should achieve a more advantageous outcome. Even the expectation of losing at some future time may encourage the weaker organization to search for an immediate solution or offer a favorable concession to the stronger organization. The degree of imbalance in their relative strength is likely to affect the amount of the concessions that the weaker organization will have to offer in order to extract lesser concessions from the stronger organization or to reach final agreement. Since demands are almost always initiated by the union, changes in the contract will usually take the form of concessions to the union.

Proposition V. In public sector collective bargaining, the greater the asymmetry of relative dependence favoring the public organization, the lesser the contractual change; the greater the asymmetry of relative dependence favoring the union, the greater the contractual change.

This proposition is consistent with Gamson's theoretical analysis[40] and is supported in Rapoport's and Orwant's review of experimental games, particularly those of Flood and Caplow.[41] Lammers likewise found a strong

[36] Kenneth Terhune, "Motives, Situation, and Interpersonal Conflict Within Prisoner's Dilemma," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 8 (March, 1968), 1–24; Clark Kerr and Abraham Siegel, "The Interindustry Propensity to Strike — An International Comparison," *Industrial Conflict*, ed. Arthur Kornhauser, Robert Dubin, and Arthur M. Ross (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954), pp. 189–212; and Dina A. Zinnes, "An Analytical Study of the Balance of Power Theories," *Journal of Peace Research*, 4 (1967), 270–288.

[37] Bernard Berelson and Gary A. Steiner, *Human Behavior: An Inventory of Scientific Findings* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1964), pp. 619–620.

[38] Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, and Sidney Siegel and Lawrence E. Fouraker, *Bargaining and Group Decision Making* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960).

[39] Robert Arnold Mickler, "A Study of the Effect of Impasse During Collective Bargaining on Negotiated Salaries of Teachers" (Ph.D. dissertation, Maxwell School, Syracuse University, 1972).

[40] William A. Gamson, *Power and Discontent* (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1968).

[41] Anatol Rapoport and Carol Orwant, "Experimental Games: A Review," *Behavioral Science*, 7 (January, 1962), 1–37.




Figure 1: An Overview of the Model

relationship between relative strength of the parties and outcome.[42] The trace line for the operational linkage between relative dependence and contractual change should resemble a negatively sloping S-curve; the relationship is also expected to exhibit both upper and lower limits.

A diagrammatic summary of the theoretical relationships is presented in Figure 1; Table 2 presents a summary of the operational linkages. The broken lines in Figure 1 depict feedback between the outcome of the collective bargaining process in one period and its effect upon the variables in the succeeding period.[43] Because conflictual behavior is caus-

[42] Cornelius J. Lammers, "Strikes and Mutinies: A Comparative Study of Organizational Conflicts Between Rulers and Ruled," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 14 (December, 1969), 558–572. A laboratory simulation of interparty exchange during labor negotiations tested the effects of varying the level of social cues during negotiations on the outcome of bargaining. Increases in the level of social cues favorable to the union positively influenced the level of contractual change; social cues favorable to management led to a reverse outcome. See Ian R. Morley and Geoffrey M. Stephenson, "Interpersonal and Interparty Exchange: A Laboratory Simulation of an Industrial Negotiation at the Plant Level," *British Journal of Psychology*, 60 (November, 1969), 543–545.

[43] For an exploration of feedback processes in labor relations systems see A. Dale Allen, Jr., "A Systems View of Labor Negotiations," *Personnel Journal*, 50 (February, 1971), 103–114; and John T. Dunlop, *Industrial Relations Systems* (New York: Henry Holt, 1958).

Table 2. Summary of Operational Linkages

Relationship	Direction	Type	Limit
Goal Divergence and Conflictual Behavior	positive	S-curve	upper
Stability and Conflictual Behavior	negative	power	none
Asymmetry of Relative Dependence and Conflictual Behavior	positive	negative skew, curvilinear	none
Conflictual Behavior and Contractual Change	positive	linear	none
Asymmetry of Relative Dependence favoring one of the organizations and Contractual Change	negative	S-curve	upper and lower limits

ally dependent on goal divergence, stability, and asymmetry of relative dependence but causally prior to contractual change, it is depicted as an intervening variable in Figure 1.

Methodology

The practice of collective bargaining in the public sector has not triggered a bounty of empirical studies which have accumulated large bodies of comparative data. The dearth of research in this field partly stems from the realities of public sector collective bargaining and from the nature of measurement problems associated with the most relevant variables. These problems indicate that relatively inexpensive data collection procedures like the analysis of available aggregate data sets would be inadequate to test the propositions presented in this paper. To provide an appropriate setting to test the model, we had to select a field site with an adequate population of cases for the selection of a sample of cases, adequate archival records for the measurement of the variables, and a uniform legal and political framework within which collective bargaining takes place. For these reasons, the tests of the hypotheses focused on a cross-sectional analysis of public sector collective bargaining in one large municipality, New York City.

Collective Bargaining in New York City. In 1958, with the issuance of Executive Order No. 49, Mayor Robert Wagner initiated a program to implement collective bargaining practices prevailing in the private sector.[44] Horton writes: "The executive order quickly was dubbed the 'Little Wagner Act' and the city's civil service leaders called it their 'Magna Carta.' In retrospect, however, the City's new labor relations program hardly deserved these appellations."[45]

Collective bargaining procedures were altered in 1967 by Executive Order No. 52 which established independent, impartial tribunals to settle disputes arising in contract negotiations, contract administration, and representation elections.[46] Simultaneously, the New York State Legislature passed the Public Employees Fair Employment Act (Taylor Law) which exempted New York City from the jurisdiction of the State Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) on the condition that its system for collective bargaining be "substantially equivalent."[47] Thus, City policies were modified in accordance with the provisions of the Taylor Law to parallel State guidelines more closely.[48]

Sayre and Kaufman's contention that "no single ruling elite dominates the political and governmental system of New York City"[49] is characteristic of its labor relations activities. A multiplicity of public officials and agencies are involved in New York City government labor relations: the mayor, agency personnel, the Office of Labor Relations, the Office of Collective Bargaining, the Bureau of the Budget, the Department of Personnel, the City Council, and the Board of Estimate.[50] The governor and the State legislators are also occasional participants in City labor relations policy making.[51]

While the Office of Labor Relations provides the professional expertise in contract negotiations,[52] it is the Office of Collective Bargaining (OCB) that can be considered the governmental "core group."[53] The OCB is a tripartite board consisting of two members appointed by the mayor, two members appointed by a committee of municipal union leaders, and three members selected by unanimous vote of the mayoral and union appointees. The primary function of the OCB is the resolution of bargaining impasses. The Board of Certification, composed of three of the seven OCB members, is responsible for certifying employee bargaining representatives. In addition, arbitrability of grievances is de-

[44] New York City, Office of the Mayor, *Executive Order No. 49*, March 31, 1958.

[45] Raymond D. Horton, *Municipal Labor Relations in New York City* (New York: Praeger, 1973), p. 30.

[46] New York City, Office of the Mayor, *Executive Order No. 52*, September 29, 1967. See Horton, *Municipal Labor Relations in New York City* for an extended discussion of the evolution of New York City's collective bargaining law.

[47] New York State *Sessions Laws* (1967), Chapter 392.

[48] These procedures are spelled out in the New York City Collective Bargaining Law, New York City, *Administrative Code*, chapter 54. For the establishment of the Office of Collective Bargaining, see: New York City *Charter*, chapter 54, section 1173.

[49] Wallace Sayre and Herbert Kaufman, *Governing New York City: Politics in the Metropolis*, 2nd ed. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1965), p. 710.

[50] Horton, *Municipal Labor Relations in New York City*, p. 12.

[51] *Ibid.*

[52] The Office of Labor Relations was created by Mayor Lindsay in 1966. Its primary function is to represent the City government and units within its jurisdiction in collective bargaining. For an inside view of its operations see Anthony C. Russo, "Management View of the New York City Experience," *Unionization of Municipal Employees*, ed. Robert H. Connery and William V. Farr, (New York: The Academy of Political Science, Columbia University, 1971, pp. 80–93.

[53] Sayre and Kaufman, *Governing New York City*, p. 710.

termined by all OCB members in their role as the Board of Collective Bargaining.[54]

When the Office of Collective Bargaining started operations in January, 1968, there were approximately 400 bargaining units in existence.[55] Through consolidation of units, the number of bargaining units was reduced to 325 by 1971.[56]

The choice of New York City as the locus of research creates some dilemmas because New York's city government often is considered *sui generis* by researchers. It is larger and possibly more complex than any other United States city government.[57] The weight of several other factors, however, outweighed these considerations in the selection of New York City as the research site. First, a limited geographic area provided the opportunity to gather information that, dispersed over a larger region, would have been too costly and time consuming to collect. Second, testing the model on a sample of New York City cases did provide an opportunity to disconfirm the propositions, a consideration that took precedence over concern with external validity. Finally, where a comprehensive legal framework for public employment collective bargaining has been adopted by state and local jurisdictions, there tends to be marked similarities in statutory provisions.[58] Therefore, no compelling reason exists for contending *a priori* that an explanatory model tested on cases of public sector collective bargaining in New York City would be less valid for other settings with a comprehensive statutory framework.

Sample Selection. Specification of the population was achieved through the collection of comprehensive lists of collective bargaining settlements in New York City. A set of master lists,[59] prepared by the New York City Office of Labor Relations (OLR), contained identifying and descriptive information on collective bargaining settlements between New York City governmental units and various unions representing public employees from 1968 through 1972. Three sources, containing lists of public employee work stoppages during this period, were also consulted to assure that these cases were included on the master lists.[60] As a result of this process, the population encompassed 535 collective bargaining settlements.

The next step toward selecting the 60-case research sample was to identify the level of conflict during negotiations so that the population could be stratified. To achieve this objective, several sets of documents were consulted. First, the lists of public employee work stoppages were again utilized.[61] Second, all cases in which impasse, fact-finding, or mediation occurred were identified.[62] Third, *The New York Times Index* was utilized to identify negotiations, strikes, settlements, and other activities that may have been reported in *The New York Times*. Fourth, several civil service and local union publications proved to be valuable sources. *The Chief* and the *Civil Service Leader*, publications covering topics of general interest to civil service employees, provided information on a wide range of cases within the population; and the local publication of the AFSCME, *Public Employee Press*, yielded valuable information pertaining to many additional cases in the population. Stratification was based on a four category scale. Different

[54] Horton, *Municipal Labor Relations in New York City*, pp. 77–79.

[55] New York City, Office of Collective Bargaining, *Annual Reports, 1970–1971*, pp. 6–7.

[56] *Ibid.*

[57] Sayre and Kaufman, *Governing New York City*, p. 709, characterize New York City as "imperial" among American cities.

[58] On this point, compare the 1971 and 1973 versions of the following publications: U.S. Department of Labor, Labor Management Services Administration, Division of Public Employee Labor Relations, *Summary of State Policy Regulations for Public Sector Labor Relations: Statutes, Attorney General's Opinions, and Selected Court Decisions* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, November, 1971 and February, 1973). For a general discussion of the diffusion of similar institutional innovations, see Jack L. Walker, "The Diffusion of Innovation Among the American States," *American Political Science Review*, 63 (September, 1969), 880–889. For an analysis of public employment bargaining laws see Thomas A. Kochan, "Correlates of State Public Employee Bargaining Laws," *Industrial Relations*, 12 (October, 1973), 322–337.

[59] New York City, Office of Labor Relations, *Collective Bargaining Settlements by the Office of Labor Relations, 1968–1972* (mimeographed).

[60] New York City, Office of Collective Bargaining, *Annual Report — 1972*, pp. 23–24; New York State Public Employment Relations Board, *Detailed Listing of Public Employee Work Stoppages, New York State, 1968–1972*. (Mimeographed); Economic Development Council of New York City, *New York City's Public Sector Collective Bargaining, Looking Ahead in New York City*, No. 4 (New York: Economic Development Council of New York City, 1973), pp. 101–103.

[61] New York City, Office of Collective Bargaining, *Annual Report — 1972;* New York State Public Employment Relations Board, *Detailed Listing of Public Employee Work Stoppages;* and Economic Development Council of New York City, *New York City's Public Sector Collective Bargaining.*

[62] New York City, Office of Collective Bargaining, *Annual Report — 1968–1972*. The bulk of information was contained in these reports. Additional information on impasses was retrieved from other unpublished documents within the Office of Collective Bargaining.

conflict acts served to define minimum inclusion levels for each group. Group 1 included all cases where no conflictual acts were observed. Group 2 included cases in which impasses occurred but in which no overt conflictual acts were observed. Group 3 included all cases in which overt acts short of a strike were observed. Group 4 included all cases in which a strike did occur. Once stratification of the population had been completed, the final step in specifying the sample was to select 15 cases randomly from each of the four groups.[63]

Operational Measures

The indicators for each of the concepts defined in Table 1 are presented below. Because most of the indicators were developed specifically for this study, little attention can be given to the empirical validity of the indicators as they have been used in previous studies.

Goal Divergence. The number of demands submitted by the union at the initiation of negotiations was selected as the indicator of goal divergence. This indicator was chosen over others primarily for advantages of data availability, ease of accessibility, and completeness. Using an unobtrusive indicator to measure goal divergence also circumscribed many of the difficulties which could have been encountered in attempting to measure the variable with reactive instruments.

Ideally, the number of initial public organization demands should have been considered also. For the population utilized here, however, there were approximately thirty demands general to all collective bargaining negotiations in New York City.[64] Since the content of the demands was not published or available from a sufficient number of the involved organizations so that further analysis could be performed, the number of initial union demands was considered adequate for cross-sectional analysis.[65]

While this indicator was assessed on an *a priori* basis for its face validity, there was little evidence for assessing its empirical validity.[66] From an appendix of data from Hammermesh,[67] a median test was performed on the divergence of wage proposals. Dichotomizing the cases on the basis of whether a strike did or did not occur, and computing the probability for the marginal totals in a 2×2 contingency table produced a significant relationship at alpha $= .05$. Although this evidence is not substantial, it does point to the empirical validity of using initial bargaining demands to measure goal divergence.

Relative Dependence. In Pugh et al.[68] the size of the organizational unit relative to its parent organization was utilized to measure dependence. Relative size was found to intercorrelate substantially with other dimensions of dependence: status of organization unit (.68), organizational representation on policy-making body (.50), specializations contracted out (−.60), and vertical integration (−.40).[69] Pugh et al. concluded from these results, and from low intercorrelations with the dimensions of other concepts, that this indicator does tap "aspects of the dependence of the organization, particularly its dependence on external resources and power. . . ."[70]

A second consideration was how to operationalize the variable to measure the difference in the amount of dependence between the organizations. The operationalization selected rested on an additive assumption. The dependence score for the union organization was subtracted from the dependence score for the public organization. Under this approach, asymmetry of relative dependence favoring one of the organizations theoretically ranges from a lower limit of −1 (most favorable to the union organization) to an upper limit of +1 (most favorable to the public organization). This indicator was used to test Proposition V. The absolute value of this indicator was used to test Proposition III since the amount of asymmetry alone, and not which organization was favored, was hypothesized to be the significant determinant of conflictual behavior.

Stability. In order to measure this concept, data on the number of grievance arbitrations filed and the number of employees in the unit were

[63] An appendix containing the cases analyzed, the affiliations of the employee groups, and the year in which negotiations were conducted is available upon request from the authors.

[64] Communication from John T. Burnell, Director, Office of Labor Relations, March 23, 1974. The initial number of union demands was also supplied by the OLR.

[65] The content of the demands would have been extremely useful for further analysis, but the lack of uniformity in maintaining these as records within organizations and the often sensitive nature of their content militated against obtaining them.

[66] Daniel S. Hammermesh, "Who Wins in Wage Bargaining," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, 26 (July, 1973), 1146–1149, at 1147.

[67] *Ibid.*

[68] D. S. Pugh, D. J. Hickson, C. R. Hinings, and C. Turner, "The Context of Organizational Structures."

[69] *Ibid.*, p. 106.

[70] *Ibid.*, p. 107.

collected. Most of this information was available from the New York City Office of Collective Bargaining and Office of Labor Relations.[71] In cases where these data were not available from these sources, the data were obtained from union publications.

A time frame for isolation of the grievance arbitration data had to be selected so as to be compatible with the conceptualization of stability. The period beginning one year prior to the initiation of contract negotiations appeared to be an appropriate time span. Collecting grievance arbitration data for one year provided a sufficiently long, continuous span of time prior to negotiations to observe variance in the stability of relationship patterns.

The decision to utilize grievance arbitration data for the indicator of stability stemmed from several factors. First, grievance arbitration is generally recognized as an interorganizational mechanism for concerting the action of two or more organizations. Second, regarding the conduct of labor relations in New York City, Executive Order No. 52 required that "an employee organization certified for the unit of which the grievant is a member shall have the right to bring grievances unresolved at Step 2 of the general procedure . . . to impartial arbitration."[72] Third, previous research by Derber, Chalmers, and Stagner[73] suggested that the grievance process serves as a valid indicator of the stability of the labor-management relationship. Finally grievance arbitration data were easily accessible and inexpensive to collect.

Conflictual Behavior. Dubin points to the difficulty of developing adequate empirical indicators of conflictual behavior since "conflict behavior includes nonhomogenous acts . . ." and ". . . it is a major task to develop some measuring scale by which it is possible to equate a given number of units of personal abuse with the calling of a strike."[74] Dubin notes, however, that "some acts are more critical to the union-management relationship than others."[75]

Ivo and Rosalind Feierabend approach the measurement of conflictual behavior on the basis of observationally defined events representing different points on a scale.[76] Similarly, to analyze conflictual behavior in public sector collective bargaining, we chose to use a four-point scale, ranging from 1 (denoting absence of conflictual behavior) through 4 (denoting extreme conflictual behavior) to stratify the cases. Once the cases were selected, they were also ranked within the groups when distinctions could be made in the frequency or intensity of conflictual acts. The final scores for the cases ranged from 1 to 32.

Contractual Change. In scaling items within the contracts, weights were given to contract provisions on the basis of their increasing cost to the public organization or their favorableness to the union.[77] In the case of some contract provisions, the item was assigned a value of 0 or 1 depending on its presence or absence in the contract. For the remainder of the contract provisions, however, more specific ordinal scales were identifiable. By coding successive contracts on this basis, an index of contractural change was obtained by subtracting the values of the previous contract from those of the current contract. Despite an attempt to formulate an exhaustive set of provisions, it was unreasonable to assume that all provisions could be anticipated prior to analysis. Furthermore, some judgment was likewise exercised by the coder in assigning values to idiosyncratic provisions and deviations in particular contracts.

Findings

The operational relationships between the variables are examined graphically in Figures

[71] The number of employees in the bargaining unit was contained on the master lists used in sample selection. Most of the information on grievance arbitrations filed was obtained from internal records of the OCB.

[72] New York City, Office of the Mayor, *Executive Order No. 52*, p. 19.

[73] Milton Derber, W. Ellison Chalmers, and Ross Stagner, *The Local Union-Management Relationship* (Urbana, Ill.: Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations, 1960).

[74] Robert Dubin, "A Theory of Conflict and Power in Union-Management Relations," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, 13 (July, 1960), 501–508, at 501.

[75] *Ibid.*

[76] Ivo K. Feierabend and Rosalind L. Feierabend, "Aggressive Behaviors Within Politics, 1948–62: A Cross-National Study," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, (September, 1966), 249–271.

[77] The coding scheme employed here was constructed from a contract analysis instrument originally developed by Thomas A. Kochan and Hoyt N. Wheeler. See *Contract Analysis of Fire Fighter Labor Agreements* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Labor, Labor Management Services Administration, Division of Public Employee Relations, Contract No. L-72-157, February, 1973). Some additions and modifications were made in their original instrument to reflect provisions across employee groups and categories peculiar to New York City contracts. An appendix containing the clauses which were coded and the values assigned to the clauses is available upon request from the authors.




Figure 2. Operational Linkage Between Goal Divergence and Conflictual Behavior




Figure 3. Operational Linkage Between Stability and Conflictual Behavior




Figure 4. Operational Linkage Between Asymmetry of Relative Dependence and Conflictual Behavior




Figure 5. Operational Linkage Between Conflictual Behavior and Contractual Change




Figure 6. Operational Linkage Between Asymmetry of Relative Dependence Favoring One of the Organizations and Contractual Change




Figure 7. Operational Linkage Between Asymmetry of Relative Dependence Favoring One of the Organizations and Conflictual Behavior

Table 3. Correlates of Conflictual Behavior and Contractual Change[a]

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Goal Divergence		−.045 (.365)	.225 (.042)	−.283 (.014)	.492 (.001)	.613 (.001)
2. Stability			.076 (.282)	−.066 (.308)	.527 (.001)	.016 (.451)
3. Asymmetry of Relative Dependence				−.765 (.001)	.255 (.024)	.330 (.005)
4. Asymmetry of Relative Dependence Favoring One of the Organizations					−.373 (.002)	−.387 (.001)
5. Conflictual Behavior						.361 (.002)
6. Contractual Change						

[a] Pearsonian correlation coefficients rounded to the nearest one-thousandth. The figures in parentheses are levels of significance for n = 60. Variable values have been transformed to standard scores.


2 through 7. Only the relationship between asymmetry of relative dependence and conflictual behavior deviates from the hypothesized relationships. On the basis of the graphic analysis, the relationships between conflictual behavior and stability and asymmetry of relative dependence were linearized, and a correlation matrix was computed for the entire set of variables. The correlation coefficients are displayed in Table 3.

Expectations about the relationship between the initial number of union demands and conflictual behavior are borne out by the substantial positive correlation with the indicator of conflictual behavior. The relationship between stability (decreasing) and conflictual behavior also exhibits a substantial positive correlation. When a transformation based upon the revision of the hypothesized operational linkage suggested by Figure 4 is employed, the relationship between asymmetry of relative dependence and conflictual behavior is found to be significant. The hypothesized relationships between conflictual behavior, relative dependence and contractual change also accord with our predictions.

In addition to the lack of support for the hypothesized relationship between asymmetry of relative dependence and conflictual behavior indicated by the zero-order correlations, the

Table 4. Selected Bivariate Relationships Controlled for Goal Divergence and Conflictual Behavior

Relationship	Partial *r*	Control Variable
Stability and Conflictual Behavior	−.205 (.060)	Goal Divergence
Asymmetry of Relative Dependence and Conflictual Behavior	.122 (.179)	Goal Divergence
Asymmetry of Relative Dependence Favoring One of the Organizations and Conflictual Behavior	−.280 (.010)	Goal Divergence
Goal Divergence and Contractual Change	.537 (.001)	Conflictual Behavior
Asymmetry of Relative Dependence Favoring One of the Organizations and Contractual Change	−.291 (.013)	Conflictual Behavior
Stability and Contractual Change	.097 (.233)	Conflictual Behavior



a. *Determinants of Conflictual Behavior*

b. *Determinants of Contractual Change*

Figure 8. Determinants of Conflictual Behavior and Contractual Change

first-order partial correlations (Table 4) indicate further difficulties in the original formulation of the relationships. The revised relationship between asymmetry of relative dependence and conflictual behavior and the relationship between stability and conflictual behavior are reduced below the .05 level of significance when controlled for goal divergence. Although stability remains significant at the .06 level, the reduction in the significance of the relationship between asymmetry of relative dependence and conflictual behavior is substantial. On the other hand, controlling for goal divergence does not substantially reduce the significance of the relationship between asymmetry of relative dependence and conflictual behavior when the direction of asymmetry is specified (i.e., the relationship between the actual rather than the absolute value of the asymmetry of the relative dependence variable and the conflictual behavior variable). In addition, when conflictual behavior is utilized as the control variable to test the independent effects of goal divergence and asymmetry favoring one of the organizations, both relationships remain significant well below the .05 level. We had expected the relationships between goal divergence and contractual change to be substantially reduced according to the original formulation.

Based upon these findings, Figure 8 (a and b) presents revised models of the determinants of conflictual behavior and contractual change. The major changes in the models are represented by the specification of the direction of the asymmetry in explaining conflictual behavior and the addition of the direct linkage between goal divergence and contractual change. The operational linkage of Figure 7 indicates that the level of conflictual behavior decreases as a linear function of management's dependence on the union. That goal divergence accounts for a substantial amount of the contractual change in the revised model can be explained in part by inadequacies of the indicator used to measure goal divergence. The initial number of union demands appears to represent not only the divergence, but also the convergence of goals. It is also not a good measure of what was termed the aspirational or strength of preference dimension of the concept. The relationship between goal divergence and contractual change may be inexplicably strong for these reasons.

Another interesting phenomenon surfaces when the contractual change index is broken down into the three dimensions of salary adjustment, nonsalary cost changes, and noncost changes.[78] Table 5 displays the correlations be-

[78] These categories correspond to the frequently used empirical distinctions among wages, fringe benefits, and other terms and conditions of employment. Different terminology is used here to reflect more clearly the inclusion criteria for each category. Those provisions other than wages and salaries which either

Table 5. Zero-Order Correlations Between the Explanatory Variables and Three Contractual Change Dimensions

Explanatory Variables	Contractual Change Dimensions		
	Salary Adjustment	Nonsalary Cost Items	Noncost Items
Goal Divergence	.162 (.109)	.497 (.001)	.513 (.001)
Asymmetry of Relative Dependence Favoring One of the Organizations	−.104 (.214)	−.407 (.001)	−.227 (.040)
Conflictual Behavior	−.065 (.309)	.385 (.001)	.368 (.002)

tween the explanatory variables and these three dimensions of the inducements/contributions contract. None of the explanatory variables correlates at a significant level with salary adjustment, although they all exhibit significant correlations for the other two dimensions of contractual change. At least two complementary interpretations may be posited to account for these relationships.

One of the interpretations involves the temporal aspect of the collective bargaining process in the public sector. Downing suggests that it makes "good common sense — when it comes to the question of wages and fringe benefits, you do not want to have seniority problems hanging fire."[79] The key to adducing the importance of timing in relation to the composition of the items in the inducements/contributions contract is suggested by Stevens:

> The agenda-related point of interest is that even though a number of items are on the "same" agenda, they may in a sense be accorded separate "forums." . . . The significance of the attempt to distribute items on the "same" agenda among separate forums by pressing for seriatim treatment is conditioned by a provision strongly implied by the package settlement rule: Any agreements or proposals relating to individual items made during the course of negotiations are understood to be provisional and may be withdrawn if final agreement upon all items in dispute is not reached. . . .[80]

The importance of these statements for the discussion at hand rests on several assumptions. First, collective bargaining in the public sector may be partitioned into at least three time periods, each associated with an appropriate forum: (1) pre-impasse, two-party bargaining; (2) impasse, mediated bargaining; (3) post-mediation, power bargaining. Second, the grouping of agenda items for seriatim treatment depends on the organizations involved and varies from situation to situation. Noncost items may, for example, normally be agreed upon first in negotiations, but the second assumption suggests that there is sufficient variation from case to case so that the items which represent subordinate differences will vary. Finally, any package settlement should be viewed as having an upper bound above which management will refuse to agree and a lower bound below which the union will refuse to agree.

Within this framework, the statistical relationships between the dimensions of the contractual change index and the explanatory variables can be more easily understood. For example, take the case in which the agenda orderings of the organizations are consonant and salary is agreed upon in the first time period. Assume that agreement on this item brings the organizations close to their settlement points. Even if bargaining proceeds beyond this forum, it seems unlikely that adjustments in the other time periods will substantially change the focus of settlement in the earlier period. Furthermore, early agreement on

entailed a direct fiscal outlay or for which cost calculations could be made were placed in the nonsalary cost category. Items such as tuition reimbursement, uniform allowances, and meal allowances were included in this category. Among the items included in the noncost category were provisions covering contracting out, transfers, physical working conditions, and posting of vacancies.

[79] Thomas G. Downing, "Strategy and Tactics at the Bargaining Table," *Personnel*, 37 (January/February, 1963), 44–45.

[80] Carl M. Stevens, *Strategy and Collective Bargaining Negotiations* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), pp. 44–45.

salary does not preclude the importance of the explanatory variables in determining nonsalary cost and noncost outcomes in succeeding forums and time periods.

A second explanation relates to the visibility of salary adjustments and the proportion of the settlement allocated to each of the items in the inducements/contributions contract. The magnitude of the salary adjustment may vary inversely with the explanatory variables because of the need for the organizations to maintain or enhance future task-environment support. A weak union, for example, may pursue a large wage increase in preference to other inducements because of the immediate and visible gains its leaders are able to provide its rank-and-file members. Conversely, once the salary demands of strong unions become publicly visible it may be necessary for them to accept other, less visible inducements so that their current gains are not translated into loss of support in the future.

Conclusions

A summary of findings on the original theoretical propositions and operational linkages is presented in Table 6. Although these results do not advance our understanding of public sector collective bargaining processes sufficiently to draw any firm conclusions beyond the scope of the research, three areas of practical implication are suggested to us by this research: the need to give greater emphasis to public interest considerations in the collective bargaining process; the consequences of collective bargaining for internal resource allocation in public organizations; and the utility of the model for evaluating alternative policies or policy changes.

The research indicates that perhaps the scope of the public interest is too narrowly defined in the collective bargaining process. In the bilateral structure of negotiations the broader needs of the community tend to be ignored. As Kochan notes: "The issue which now must be confronted is how to devise a bargaining system for municipal employees which insures them the rights of 'first class citizenship' and still provides a voice for the pluralistic interests of the community."[31]

A second area of practical implication, related to public interest considerations, is the consequences of collective bargaining for the allocation of resources among subunits of the public organization. When the outcome of public sector collective bargaining tends to allocate scarce governmental resources according to union power, severe wage and benefit imbalances can develop which may have serious programmatic and personnel consequences. For example, program outputs may be reduced in one agency to maintain wage and benefit levels in another. Also, the betterment of working conditions for employees in some units may be

[31] Thomas A. Kochan, *City Employee Bargaining With a Divided Management* (Madison, Wis.: Industrial Relations Research Institute, 1971), p. 68.

Table 6. Summary of Findings of the Theoretical and Operational Relationships

Relationship	Confirmation Status	Expected Operational Linkage			Observed Operational Linkage		
		Direction	Type	Limits	Direction	Type	Limits
Goal Divergence and Conflictual Behavior	Confirmed	Positive	S-curve	Upper	Positive	S-curve	Upper
Stability and Conflictual Behavior	Confirmed	Negative	Power	None	Negative	Power	None
Asymmetry of Relative Dependence and Conflictual Behavior	Disconfirmed	Positive	Negative skew, curvilinear	None	Negative	Curvilinear	None
Conflictual Behavior and Contractual Change	Confirmed	Positive	Linear	None	Positive	Linear	None
Asymmetry of Relative Dependence Favoring One of the Organizations and Contractual Change	Confirmed	Negative	S-curve	Upper and lower limits	Negative	S-curve	Upper and lower limits

reflected in the resentment and lower morale of employees in other units.

The model could also be useful for evaluating alternative policy prescriptions. For example, a policy change designed to control the scope of bargaining could be evaluated on the basis of how it affects the values of the goal divergence variable over time. Similarly, the comparative effectiveness of state collective bargaining policies for state and local government employees could be evaluated on the basis both of how the policies affect the distributions of the explanatory variables and of how they limit the degree of conflictual behavior.

The greater part of the impact of collective bargaining on government operations and the public employment relationship most certainly lies in the future. It will probably be another decade before the rapid growth of public employee unionism slows appreciably. In the meantime, collective bargaining is bound to continue growing in use and evolving with experience. A disconcerting prospect is that collective bargaining in the public sector will continue to evolve toward the private sector model without adequate consideration being given to the differences in the two settings.[82]

[82] For a discussion of some of the contextual differences between collective bargaining in the public and private sectors, see George H. Hildebrand, "The Public Sector," *Frontiers of Collective Bargaining*, ed. John Dunlop and Neil Chamberlain (New York: Harper and Row, 1967, pp. 125–154; David T. Stanley, *Managing Local Government Under Union Pressure* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1972); Harry Wellington and Ralph K. Winter, Jr., *The Unions and the Cities;* and Gerald M. Pops, "A Decisional Analysis of Grievance Arbitration in the Public Sector" (Ph.D. dissertation, Maxwell School, Syracuse University, 1974).

Hollow Victory: The Minimum Winning Coalition*

RUSSELL HARDIN

University of Maryland, College Park

Introduction

More than a century ago, in 1868, former Representative Ransom Gillet (Democrat of New York, 1833–37) recalled that

> the way to enact a tariff bill was to provide protection for the local interests of enough representatives to ensure the bill's passage. "Interest and not principle," he said, "determines what shall be done. If votes from Louisiana and Texas are needed, sugar will come in for favor. If support is needed from Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota and Michigan, lead, copper and pine lumber are provided for. If the votes of Pennsylvania are wanted, coal and iron receive full attention. . . . The principle of protection under a tariff never expands beyond the objects necessary to carry a bill."[1]

In *The Theory of Political Coalitions*, William Riker proposed his "size principle," according to which: "In n-person, zero-sum games, where side-payments are permitted, where players are rational, and where they have perfect information, only minimum winning coalitions occur."[2] Riker's proof of the principle uses a clever incentive argument which allows him to escape from the morass of game theoretic solution theory. Over the past decade, the size principle has entered theoretical analyses as a basic assumption,[3] and it has spawned numerous empirical studies.[4] It

* I am grateful to the students of my spring 1973 graduate seminar in formal analysis in the Department of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania, for giving me cause to pursue the topic of this paper. I am also grateful to several colleagues for discussing the ideas in the paper at times when they hardly deserved inclusion in the class of ideas. William H. Panning especially deserves thanks for his criticisms and suggestions, and for calculating the probabilities of coalitions by size in a random legislature. William L. Ascher, Charles D. Elder, Edwin T. Haefele, Jack H. Nagel, Joe A. Oppenheimer, Dennis H. Paranzino, Kenneth A. Shepsle, Jeff Smith, Oran R. Young, and an anonymous reviewer — who together must constitute a winning coalition in some realm — all read earlier drafts of the paper and recommended extensions, revisions, and additional literature.

[1] *Guide to the Congress of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Research Service, 1971), p. 607.

[2] William H. Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), p. 32. The original presentation of the proof of the principle, at pp. 247–278, is somewhat involved. I will therefore generally refer to the briefer, clearer presentation in William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook, *An Introduction to Positive Political Theory* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1973), pp. 176–187. This later presentation is eminently accessible to anyone who has even limited patience for game-theoretic algebra. See also Riker, "A New Proof of the Size Principle," in *Mathematical Applications in Political Science*, II, ed. Joseph L. Bernd (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1966), pp. 167–174.

[3] Lawrence C. Dodd, "Party Coalitions in Multiparty Parliaments: A Game-Theoretic Analysis," *American Political Science Review*, 68 (September 1974), 1093–1117; Edwin T. Haefele, "Coalitions, Minority Representation, and Vote-Trading Probabilities," *Public Choice*, 8 (Spring 1970), 75–90, and "A Utility Theory of Representative Government," *American Economic Review*, 61 (June 1971), 350–367; Richard G. Niemi and Herbert F. Weisberg, "The Effects of Group Size on Collective Decision Making," in *Probability Models of Collective Decision Making*, ed. Niemi and Weisberg (Columbus, Ohio: Merrill, 1972), pp. 125–148; and Bruce M. Russett, "Components of an Operational Theory of International Alliance Formation," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 12 (September 1968), 285–301. See further the book length manuscript of Steven J. Brams, "Coalition Dynamics: Models of Coalition Formation in Voting Bodies" (New York University, 1971, mimeo.), esp. chapters 1 and 3.

[4] Most of the contributions to *The Study of Coalition Behavior*, ed. Sven Groennings, E. W. Kelley, and Michael Leiserson (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), either apply the size principle or discuss its relevance to various empirical problems. Michael Leiserson, "Factions and Coalitions in One-Party Japan," *American Political Science Review*, 62 (September 1968), 770–787, finds that the size principle fits coalition formation in the conservative Japanese Liberal-Democratic Party. David H. Koehler, "The Legislative Process and the Minimal Winning Coalition," in Niemi and Weisberg, pp. 149–164, argues that the size principle explains roll-call voting behavior in the United States House of Representatives. David W. Rohde, "A Theory of the Formation of Opinion Coalitions in the U.S. Supreme Court," in Niemi and Weisberg, pp. 165–178, applies the principle to Supreme Court decisions. Markku Laakso, "Riker's 'Size Principle' and Its Application to Finnish Roll-Call Data," *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 9 (1972), 107–118, applies the principle to a multiparty parliament.

Further references are given in Riker and Ordeshook, *Positive Political Theory*, pp. 192–194. In addition, Riker presents anecdotal evidence in support of the size principle from the collapse after victory of the wartime grand coalitions of 1815, 1917, and 1945; from the American presidential elections of 1824 and 1964–1968; and from the collapse after victory of recent national independence movements in colonial states. See further, *Positive Political Theory*, pp. 188–191, 194–196, and 199–201; and Riker, *Political Coalitions*, chap. 3.

has also been subjected to serious criticism.[5]

In what follows I will argue that, contrary to Gillet's common sense and Riker's game theory, the size principle should be expected to fail in application. The first part of the argument will be that the range of the theoretical validity of the principle is far more restricted than is apparent from Riker's proofs and discussions of it. In particular, it is valid only for a very narrow class of all zero-sum symmetric games (the class of supersymmetric games, which will be defined below) and for a similarly narrow class of all zero-sum asymmetric games (which are vaguely the asymmetric equivalent of supersymmetric games). The incentive argument for the size principle fails for the more general classes of all symmetric and asymmetric games.

The second part of the argument will be more general and hence more succinct. It appears that any model which predicts a tendency toward minimum winning coalitions would be theoretically insignificant and empirically untestable for games in which n is very large, as for instance in the House of Representatives. This follows because in such games almost all winning coalitions which are possible will fall within a few per cent of minimal size merely by chance.

After briefly discussing the game theoretic context of the size principle, I will first address theoretical issues and then empirical issues. Throughout, the concern is exclusively with zero-sum games, but the zero-sum condition will not be constantly reiterated.

An *N*-Person Zero-sum Game. In order to facilitate discussion of the derivation of the size principle, it will be useful to refer to an actual game. On the other hand, in order to maintain the reader's patience, I will restrain the urge to create ever more beautiful games to demonstrate ever more beautiful points. Hence, the reader will be burdened with only one tedious game matrix.

Consider the 5-person zero-sum game whose payoffs are allotted by majority decision from the set of outcomes presented in cursory form in Game 1:

Game 1

Player	A	B	C	D	E
Outcome I	0	0	0	0	0
Outcome II	20	20	20	−10	−50
Outcome III	20	20	20	−50	−10

If all possible permutations on Outcome II are included, the game is symmetric.[6] The only restrictions on the payoffs are that they sum to zero; that the majority coalition will allot to its members payoffs which sum to the value of the coalition; and that the payoffs be subject to the constraint of individual rationality, that is, no player will accept less than his security level. The *security level* of a player is the best payoff which he can unilaterally guarantee for himself even against a coalition of all the other players. The security level of players in Game 1 is −50. The *value*, or *characteristic function*, of a coalition is the total payoff which the coalition can guarantee its members no matter what players outside the coalition do. The possible majority coalitions in Game 1 include ten 3-player coalitions, five 4-player coalitions, and one 5-player coalition. The value of each 3-player coalition is 60. The value of each 4-player coalition is 50. And the value of the 5-player grand coalition, of course, is zero. The value of coalition ABC is represented as v(ABC).

Symmetry in Games. In general a game is said to be *symmetric* if the value of a coalition is a function only of the number of players in it. For instance, in Game 1 above, all 3-person coalitions have a value of 60. All 1-person coalitions have a value of −50. The condition for symmetry will be met if the payoff configuration faced by one player is identical to that faced by every other player, in which case the game will be called *identically symmetric*. The condition of symmetry can also be met under other payoff configurations, as for example if three players must choose by majority agreement among the three outcomes (1,1,−2), (2, −2,0), and (−2,1,1). In this game, the 3-person coalition has the value of 0; all 2-person coali-

[5] Barbara Hinckley, "Coalitions in Congress: Size and Ideological Distance," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 16 (May 1972), 197–207, and "Coalitions in Congress: Size in a Series of Games," *American Politics Quarterly*, 1 (July 1973), 339–359. Robert Lyle Butterworth, "A Research Note on the Size of Winning Coalitions," *American Political Science Review*, 65 (September 1971), 741–745. Riker rejects Butterworth's arguments in "Comment on Butterworth," *American Political Science Review*, 65 (September 1971), 745–747; and in Riker and Ordeshook, p. 186n. Norman Frohlich, "The Instability of Minimum Winning Coalitions," *American Political Science Review*, 69 (September 1975), 943–946. Oran R. Young, "The Size of Winning Coalitions: A Note on Riker's Size Principle," unpublished manuscript (University of Texas, Austin, 1972, typescript).

[6] All possible permutations can be generated by switching the labels of the players through all orderings. With five players, these number 51, or 120 outcomes.

tions have the value of 2; and all 1-person coalitions have the value of −2. In this game, the payoffs are not symmetric, but the values of coalitions are.[7] In order to determine whether a game is symmetric, it is necessary to know only the characteristic function form of the game, i.e., the values of coalitions. To determine whether a game is identically symmetric, it is necessary to know much more — the full matrix of payoffs.

Riker's Assumption of Symmetry. Riker tacitly introduces symmetry when he presents the graphs of Figure 1, which plot the values of coalitions against their sizes. On the horizontal axis are the sizes of coalitions ranging from *m*, the minimal winning size, to *n*, the total number of players in the game. On the vertical axis are the values, or characteristic functions, of the coalitions. One should not be confused by the multiplicity of curves actually plotted — each curve simply represents a typical game. For example, the flat curve labeled II represents a game in which every winning coalition has the value (or collective payoff) γ, except that the grand coalition of all *n* players has the value 0 (because the game is zero-sum). The payoff to the corresponding losing "coalition" is always the negative of the payoff to the winning coalition.

A conspicuous point of these graphs is that they can be plotted as single-valued curves only if all coalitions of a given size have the same value, i.e., if the game is symmetric. If in Game 1 the only outcome possible were that presented as Outcome II without allowing permutations, then possible 3-person coalitions would have the values 60, 30, −10, and −40; and 4-person coalitions would have the values 50, 10, and −40. Hence, this restricted game cannot be fitted into Riker's graphs.




Figure 1. Size and Value of Winning Coalitions

From Riker and Ordeshook, *Positive Political Theory*, p. 181. Copyright 1973 by Prentice-Hall, Inc.

[7] A more striking example of a game whose *normal form*, or matrix of payoffs, is distinctly asymmetric but whose *characteristic function form* is symmetric was proposed by J. C. C. McKinsey, *Introduction to the Theory of Games* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1952), pp. 351–353. The example is discussed in R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa, *Games and Decisions* (New York: Wiley, 1957), pp. 190–191.

Butterworth's and Shepsle's Assumptions of Symmetry. Butterworth likewise tacitly introduces the condition of symmetry when he presents symmetric counterexamples to Riker's size principle, and when he refers to "games with a nonpositively-sloped characteristic function" such as those represented by curves I and II in Figure 1. In his proof of his own "maximum number of positive gainers" principle, he does not invoke or need the symmetry condition. But he concludes by suggesting that "a most desirable line of development is to generalize the analysis of [his] principle beyond simple symmetric games."[8] A simple generalization is easily deduced and will be noted below. Indeed all that is required is to restate Butterworth's principle in words as general as his elegant proof.

In a recent defense of the size principle, Kenneth Shepsle explicitly assumes symmetry — "without seriously jeopardizing the argument," he says. He is right insofar as he means to say that an assumption which is necessary to an argument cannot sensibly be said to jeopardize it. But the assumption does jeopardize the applicability of any size principle which is based upon it, since it is an assumption which may not be met in contexts which interest us. Shepsle calls the assumption of symmetry "an anonymity condition," in that "the labels identifying the players in a coalition are not relevant to a determination of a coalition's worth . . . "[9] The notion has a persuasive ring, but it is not the commonplace "anonymity condition" of conventional game theory, which is meant to apply even to games which are not at all symmetric. In its conventional version, anonymity is a condition on *players' abilities*, not on the *structure of payoffs* in the game. Shepsle's condition is strictly a condition on the latter, whereas the conventional condition is a way of saying that we are not interested in the differential skill of the players but only in the logical structure of the game. For example,

[8] Butterworth, p. 745.

[9] Kenneth A. Shepsle, "On the Size of Winning Coalitions," *American Political Science Review*, 68 (June 1974), 505–518, at p. 506.

for a given 2-person game payoff matrix, our analysis of the rationality of various strategies is anonymous in that it does not take into consideration whether the row player is Buster Keaton, Anatol Rapoport, or a sophomore psychology student at a large state university.[10]

Theoretical Issues

In what follows I will first show that Riker's proof is insufficient. Then I will show that for the narrow class of supersymmetric games, Riker's incentive argument yields a valid proof of the size principle. Then I will generalize from the condition of supersymmetry to show that the principle is also valid for a highly restricted class of asymmetric games. Finally, I will comment on Butterworth's critique of the principle and his modification of it, on Shepsle's recent "favorable impression of the size principle's validity,"[11] and on von Neumann and Morgenstern's simple games.

Insufficiency of Riker's Proof. Riker's proof of the size principle is based on a consideration of the possible shapes of the graphs in Figure 1. He suggests that it is necessary to corroborate the principle for three cases, according as

I the slope is always negative,
II the slope is zero or negative,
III the slope is positive in part and negative in part.[12]

Riker concludes that the principle cannot be proved for case III, but that it is definitive for cases I and II. The actual proof for these two cases, however, is strictly algebraic rather than geometric. For case I, if S is a coalition which is winning, then by definition

$$v(S) > v(S+i).$$

Riker claims that *"it is always advantageous, regardless of the division* of [the payoffs to the members of a larger than minimum winning coalition], $(S+i)$, for the s members of S to eject person i."[13]

[10] In this respect, the interest of mathematical game theory is contrary to the interest of what are normally called games, such as basketball or chess. In chess, Boris Spassky will find it profoundly important to know whether it is Bobby Fisher or I who sits across from him. If the game theorists ever solve the game of chess (as tic-tac-toe has been solved), chess will lose its interest except among the ignorant (as tic-tac-toe can be played with interest only by the very young and the daft). Of course, game theorists have long been trying, and they may yet succeed. (Also of course, the class of the ignorant and daft may be much larger in the case of chess than in the case of tic-tac-toe.)

[11] Shepsle, p. 515.

[12] Riker and Ordeshook, *Positive Political Theory*, p. 182.

[13] *Ibid.*, emphasis added.

There are two points to be made about this claim before we turn to the proof of the size principle. First, the claim is not quite accurately worded, and as stated it may well be false.[14] The correct wording is:

> If $v(S_{r-1}) \geq v(S_r)$, then *some* $(r\text{-}1)$-member subcoalition of S_r has incentive to evict the other member. Lemma 1

In subsequent discussion, it will be assumed that Riker's proof is based on the statement in Lemma 1, which is proved in the following paragraph.

> PROOF OF LEMMA 1. Suppose S_r is a larger than minimum winning coalition. If the game is symmetric, then every coalition of r-1 players is also winning. Suppose $v(S_{r-1}) \geq v(S_r)$ by hypothesis. Let A, B, . . . be the players in S_r, and let their payoffs in S_r be p_A, p_B, ... Suppose that the payoff to A is at least as great as the payoff to any other player in S_r. Since $v(S_r) > 0$, it follows that $p_A > 0$. Now consider the coalition S_{r-1} whose members are B. C, . . ., i.e., which is $S_r - A$. Let the payoffs to the players in S_{r-1} be $p_B{}^1$, $p_C{}^1$, . . .
>
> We have,
>
> $$p_B{}^1 + p_C{}^1 + \ldots = v(\text{BCD} \ldots) \geq v(\text{ABCD} \ldots) = p_A + p_B + p_C + \ldots$$
>
> or,
>
> $$p_B{}^1 + p_C{}^1 + \ldots \geq p_A + p_B + p_C + \ldots$$
>
> Hence, $(p_B{}^1 + p_C{}^1 + \ldots) - (p_B + p_C + \ldots) \geq p_A > 0$. That is, the sum of the payoffs to the players B, C, D, . . . in S_{r-1} is greater than the sum of their payoffs in S_r. Hence, it is in their collective interest to evict A in order to form S_{r-1}.

It follows that, in any symmetric game in which S_r is a larger than minimum winning coalition and $v(S_{r-1}) \geq v(S_r)$, some winning subcoalition, S_{r-1}, of S_r has incentive to reduce the size of S_r by evicting the extra player. Note that *not every* winning subcoalition has such an incentive, because a single player, A, whose payoff in S_r is p_A, can profitably be evicted only if

$$p_A > v(S_r) - v(S_{r-1}).$$

[14] Assume by hypothesis that $v(S)-v(S+i) = \Delta$, where $\Delta > 0$. It is possible that the security level, q_i, of player i is less than $-\Delta$. Hence, it is possible that i was making side payments in excess of Δ to the members of S. If S now evicts i, its members collectively lose this excess over Δ. In Game 1 for example, if coalition ABCD has formed with payoffs (26, 26, 26, −28), then ABC cannot afford to evict D, although ABC would be of winning size and $v(\text{ABC}) > v(\text{ABCD})$.

This condition can be put into words which make the point clearer: If, in a larger-than-minimum-winning coalition, *S, the sum of the payoffs to the members of some winning subcoalition is less than the value of the subcoalition, then that subcoalition has incentive to form in the place of S.* The conditional of this statement will always be fulfilled for symmetric games in Riker's Cases I and II, and it can be met even in games which fall into Riker's Case III (the slope of the characteristic function is positive in part).

The second point to be made about Riker's claim (Lemma 1) is that, although he does not say so, Riker evidently assumes that demonstration of the validity of this claim is prima facie *sufficient* to prove the size principle (for Case I games). It should be clear, however, that the validity of Lemma 1 is at best only necessary for proving the size principle. According to Lemma 1, some winning subcoalition of any larger-than-winning coalition has incentive to reduce the size of the coalition. But then it might still happen that any coalition of minimum winning size has incentive to expand its size. In order finally to prove the size principle with his line of argument, Riker would have to show that this latter is not the case. But it may well be the case, as can easily be shown for Game 1.

Because Game 1 is a majority rule game, coalition ABC can by itself determine which of the three represented outcomes will occur. If ABC selects Outcome III, D loses 50 units. Hence, ABC might make D an offer: we will select Outcome II if you will make us a side payment of roughly half the difference in your payoffs at these two outcomes. That difference is 40 units. Suppose ABC lets D have 22 units of that difference and asks for 6 units to each of its three members. The full set of payoffs (with side payments calculated in) would then be (26,26,26,–28,–50). Note that this set of payoffs requires the cooperation in coalition of four players, one more than minimum winning, and all four members of the coalition are better off than they might have been outside the coalition.

Since Game 1 is identically symmetric, it follows that *every minimum winning coalition in the game has incentive to expand* from three players to four. That is to say that the incentive argument which Riker uses to demonstrate that *only minimum winning coalitions* occur can likewise be used in this game to demonstrate that *only larger than minimum winning coalitions* occur. Hence, this proof is insufficient reason to accept the size principle.[15]

The Size Principle in Supersymmetric Games. Riker turned to his incentive argument in order to escape the endless circularities of the von Neumann-Morgenstern solution theory, and still there is circularity. But I have only demonstrated that for at least one game which meets the definition of Riker's Case I, the incentive argument fails because it produces an infinite circular chain of expansions and contractions of coalitions. The question remains whether the demonstration generalizes to all games. The answer is that for one narrowly defined class of games, which can be called supersymmetric, Riker's incentive argument does not lead to circularity, but for apparently all other symmetric games it does. Hence, the size principle can be applied only to supersymmetric games, as will be argued below.

If for some game the incentive argument is not to lead to endless circularity, it must happen that in that game minimum winning coalitions do not have incentive to expand. In general there will always be incentive for a winning coalition to expand *except when the value of that coalition is equal to the negative sum of the security levels of the individual losers.* That is, always except when there is nothing more to be squeezed out of the losers.

If the number of players in a game is n, the number of players in a winning coalition S is $r(<n)$, the payoff to player j is p_j, and the security level of player i is $-q_i$, then the sum of the winnings of the winners is

$$v(S) = \sum_{j\in S} p_j \leq \sum_{i\in S} q_i. \qquad 1)$$

In symmetric games, all players have the same security level, $-q$, so that eqn. 1 reduces to

$$v(S) = \sum_{j\in S} p_j \leq (n-r)q.$$

Hence, if

$$\sum_{j\in S} p_j < (n-r)q,$$

the players in S have incentive to expand their coalition.

Note that there may be an incentive for winning coalitions of some sizes to expand and not for others. For example, there is obviously no in-

[15] Norman Frohlich has presented a related but substantially more elegant and more general demonstration of this conclusion in "The Instability of Minimum Winning Coalitions."

centive for a coalition of $n-1$ players to expand, because its value is q, and the single loser has nothing more to give. For symmetric games, the condition under which *no* winning coalition has an incentive to expand is

$$v(S_r) = (n - r)q, \qquad 2)$$

for all r for which S_r is winning. It is easily shown that this reduces simply to $v(S_m) = (n-m)q$, where m is the minimal winning number.[16]

We can call a game which meets the condition in equation 2 *supersymmetric*. For such games, Riker's incentive argument for the size principle has great appeal: in a supersymmetric game no winning coalition has incentive to expand, but every larger than minimum winning coalition has incentive to contract down to minimal winning size. The condition of supersymmetry is *sufficient* for the size principle to hold. It is also *necessary* to prevent the incentive argument from leading us into endless circles.[17]

A game can be supersymmetric without being identically symmetric, and vice versa. An easily represented class of supersymmetric games, however, is the class of identically symmetric majority rule games whose matrices of outcomes include all permutations on the outcomes $(n-m, n-m, \cdots, -m, -m, \cdots)$, where the payoff $n-m$ accrues to m players, the payoff $-m$ accrues to $n-m$ players, and

$$\frac{n}{2} < m \leq \frac{n}{2} + 1$$

(In order to let the world move on to other concerns in the event of extended lack of agreement, it is sensible also to include in the matrices an outcome in which each player's payoff is 0).

A Supersymmetric Example. To show the appeal of Riker's argument for a case in which the condition of eqn. 2 is met, consider a game which is a modification of Game 1. Let the game be identically symmetric and majority rule, but let the payoffs which are negative in any outcome be equal at –30 (instead of the –10 and –50 as shown). Every non-zero outcome is therefore a permutation on the payoffs (20, 20, 20, –30, –30). Suppose the coalition ABCD has formed with payoffs to its members (20, 20, 20, –30). The value of the coalition is 30. Rather than create a new term, let us follow Butterworth and refer to a member of a winning coalition whose payoff is negative as a *negative gainer.*

Now, according to Riker's argument, three members of ABCD have incentive to expel the fourth member. At first glance, it might seem that ABC should expel D, the negative gainer, but this first glance is deceiving. Since the distribution of payoffs to the coalition is (20, 20, 20, –30), the expulsion of D will gain ABC nothing. ABC has no incentive to expel D. Oddly, however, any subcoalition of D with two positive gainers has incentive to expel the third positive gainer. For example, if B, C, and D collude to expel A, they will gain 50 units to divide among themselves, so that all three can easily be made substantially better off.[18] As the new winning coalition, however, BCD has no incentive to expand by adding A or E.

It is easy to see that, beginning from any initial winning coalition in this game, and given any division of the spoils within that coalition, Riker's incentive argument will lead to a point at which there is no longer any incentive to expand or contract, and that point will always be when a three-person or minimum winning coalition has formed. Of course, it would still and would always be the case that each (or at least n-1) of the individual players has incentive to strive for a larger payoff through coalitional realignment or threat of realignment.

Asymmetric Games. Eqn. 1 suggests another possibility, which is that

$$v(S_r) = \sum_{i \in S_r} q_i \qquad 3)$$

in a game which is *not* symmetric. As an example of an asymmetric game, consider again Game 1 under majority rule with the *only* outcomes being those actually given and not including permutations on these. In this game, players A, B, and C have security levels of 0; D and E have security levels of –50. The value of ABC is 60; the negative sum of the security levels of D and E is 100. Clearly, ABC has incentive to expand.

But any three-player coalition which includes D and E has no incentive to expand. Consider CDE, which has the value of 0. The losers, A and B, have security levels summing to 0. In this game Riker's incentive argument leads any

[16] John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953, 3rd edition), p. 423. Equation 2 implies that S_{n-r}, the losing complement of S_r, is *flat*, that is, every member of S_{n-r} receives his security level. Every subset of a flat set is also flat. For a symmetric game it follows that, if the losing coalition S_{n-m} is flat, then S_p is also flat for every $p \leq n - m$.

[17] In the terminology of the previous footnote, the necessary and sufficient condition for Riker's argument to guarantee that only minimum winning coalitions form in a symmetric game is that all losing coalitions in the game be flat (where losing coalitions do not include blocking coalitions).

initial winning coalition through an inexorable series of expansions and expulsions which ends at a three-player coalition including D and E which has no incentive to do anything further. Hence, the size principle applies to this game. And there is Schellingesque irony in the end result: the two apparently weakest players are sure to be in the winning coalition.

As a rule, it is more difficult to give general analyses of asymmetric than of symmetric games. For symmetric games it was moderately simple to characterize the class of all games to which the size principle evidently applies. For asymmetric games, the task is more tedious. Clearly, a *necessary* condition for the size principle to hold in an asymmetric game is that eqn. 3 be fulfilled for *some coalition of minimal winning size*. A *sufficient* condition is that it be fulfilled for *every coalition of winning size*. The example in the foregoing paragraph, however, shows that this latter sufficient condition is not a necessary condition.

The class of games which meets the condition of eqn. 3, either for all winning coalitions or merely for some minimum winning coalition, is conspicuously narrow compared to the class of all games (it is trivially easy to construct asymmetric games which do not meet the condition, and a random zero-sum matrix generator might work for days before it cranked out a matrix that met it). Perhaps this class is as peculiarly narrow in the space of all majority rule games as the class of supersymmetric games is in the space of all symmetric majority rule games. In any case, it is at least clear that Riker's incentive argument produces endless circularity in an enormous array of asymmetric games, but that it leads to the size principle in a narrowly defined class of asymmetric games.

Butterworth's Modification of the Size Principle. Robert Butterworth has perceived from counterexamples that the size principle is not well founded, and he has suggested a modification which would salvage much of its import. He recommends and proves a principle of the "maximum number of positive gainers," according to which: "In n-person, zero-sum games with a nonpositively-sloped characteristic function, where side-payments are permitted, where players are rational, and where they have perfect information, the largest possible number of *positive gainers* that can occur is the number of players necessary to comprise a minimum winning coalition."[19]

Despite the geometric notion of "a nonpositively-sloped characteristic function," Butterworth demonstrates his principle algebraically rather than geometrically. If we generalize the assumptions involved in his proof, we can restate his principle in a fuller form without implicitly restricting it to symmetric games:

> The number of players necessary to compose a minimum winning coalition sets the upper limit on the number of positive gainers in any n-person zero-sum game where side-payments are permitted, where players are rational and have perfect information, and where, if S is a winning coalition, then for every i not in S,
>
> $$v(S) \geq v(S+i). \qquad (4)$$

The final condition in this statement can be met by some games which are not strictly symmetric, that is, whose characteristic functions are not single-valued functions of coalition size. Games which meet this condition can be called "quasi-symmetric."

In general, to assume that a genuine social interaction is analogous to a symmetric game is to assume that much of social structure is irrelevant to explanations of coalition formation. Unless we live in a state of anarchy, we are likely to play symmetric games only in the laboratory. Hence, it is useful to ask just how asymmetric a game can be while still qualifying as quasi-symmetric and thus coming under Butterworth's principle.

Consider a perfectly symmetric game of n players whose payoff structures are identical. Now let various payoffs be altered marginally while maintaining the zero-sum condition. If some players enjoy marginal gains while others suffer marginal losses, winning coalitions of a given size, say r, will no longer all have identical values. Rather, there will be a marginal spread from the maximum, $v_{max}(R)$, to the minimum, $v_{min}(R)$. Butterworth's logic would now not be violated so long as the minimum value at size r is greater than or equal to the maximum at size $r+1$, i.e.,

$$v_{min}(R) \geq v_{max}(R+i).$$

This condition will determine the amount of variance from symmetry permitted in individual players' payoffs. Other things being equal, one would expect that the larger the number of players in the game, the less the variance which

[18] The 50 units are the difference between the value of coalition BCD (which is 60) and the sum of the payoffs to B, C, and D in coalition ABCD (which is 10).

[19] Butterworth, "A Research Note," p. 744.

would be permitted. For situations in which social structure matters very much, the condition of quasi-symmetry might be met in very small committees but not in large committees. Hence, Butterworth's version of the size principle might apply to coalition formation in such small bodies as the United States Supreme Court,[20] but not to such large bodies as the United States House of Representatives (see further the discussion in the section on empirical issues).

Shepsle's Defense of the Size Principle. Endless circularity such as that implicit in the demonstration of the "Insufficiency of Riker's proof" (above) is the bane of game theory. All too often, if there is a second outcome which is superior to a first, then there is sure to be a third which is superior to the second but inferior to the first. Shepsle's apparent recognition of such paths of reasoning has led him to seek justifications for the size principle other than Riker's argument from incentives. Shepsle adduces an argument for a perfectly symmetric 5-person game (the game is not supersymmetric). But the argument is extraordinarily tenuous and abstruse: it is based on the notion of the "bargaining set" of Aumann and Maschler.[21] Riker's argument from incentives is substantially more compelling, as is perhaps even Representative Gillet's assertion from common sense.

When it comes to generalization beyond the 5-person case, Shepsle notes that "although existence results have been provided for stable sets in an impressive variety of games, the results, to a nongame theorist, appear highly incomplete and idiosyncratic."[22] The results are impressive for their variety only because such variety indicates how ungeneral and ungeneralizable the results are. And this pessimistic realization is likely to impress game theorists far more strongly than nongame theorists. Yet Shepsle concludes that, if "the usual assumptions about n-person zero-sum coalition processes are supplemented with assumptions about coalition intentions and capabilities, there are good reasons to expect minimum winning coalitions in all but the most extreme instances."[23] This claim is not supported by Shepsle's paper or any of his references. The strongest claim which is supported is that there are weak reasons to expect minimum winning coalitions in the instance of perfectly symmetric games with not more than five players. (With fewer than five players the problem is uninteresting: In majority rule games of fewer than five players, the losers cannot number more than one.)

Against Shepsle's claim for our good reasons to generalize from the 5-person case, von Neumann and Morgenstern hint of awe when they discuss the enormous rapidity with which the complexity of the analysis of games grows as the number of players increases.[24] With each additional player there is qualitative change. For three players there is a unique zero-sum game (it is symmetric). For four players, the space of all zero-sum games is 3-dimensional; for five players, 10-dimensional; for nine players, 246-dimensional — it seems absurd to contemplate the nature of such games. To turn to the symmetric games with which Shepsle deals, the 4-person symmetric game is unique. The space of the 5-person symmetric games is one-dimensional; of 9-person games, 3-dimensional; of 101-person symmetric games (the class which the United States Senate might be thought to play when in full attendance), 49-dimensional.[25] Above five persons,

[20] David Rohde argues that the size principle applies to the formation of "opinion coalitions" in the Supreme Court. Hence, although all nine members might agree in upholding or reversing a lower court ruling, the actual opinion of the majority is likely to be written through compromise among only five members (while the other members are left to write their own opinions, if they choose). The raw data Rohde presents do not support the size principle (as can be seen by combining his Tables 2 and 3 and comparing them to the random results of his Table 1). Therefore, he subjectively splits the cases according to whether they involve "threats" to the Court. The threatening cases yield greater than random occurrences of unanimous and overwhelming opinion coalitions and less than random occurrences of minimum coalitions, whereas the non-threatening cases yield greater than random occurrences of minimum "winning" opinion coalitions (as well as, oddly, greater than random occurrences of eight and nine member coalitions). See further Rohde, "A Theory of the Formation of Opinion Coalitions in the U.S. Supreme Court," pp. 176–177.

[21] Shepsle, "On the Size of Winning Coalitions," pp. 508–509. The notion of the bargaining set is developed in Robert Aumann and Michael Maschler, "The Bargaining Set for Cooperative Games," in *Advances in Game Theory*, ed. Melvin Dresher, L. S. Shapley, and A. W. Tucker (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 443–476.

[22] Shepsle, "On the Size of Winning Coalitions," p. 515.

[23] *Ibid.*

[24] Von Neumann and Morgenstern, *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior*, esp. pp. 330–332, 339, and 403.

[25] If the Senate does not confine itself to symmetric games, then it plays in a space of 10^{30} dimensions — a number which would stymie even the appropriations committee. But see Shepsle's footnote 8 and the paragraph to which it is footed; Shepsle, "On the Size of Winning Coalitions," p. 506.

game theory virtually collapses. The results are so few and so trivially narrow that Riker had no hope of deriving a general theory of coalitions within extant game theory (for more than two persons, game theory is largely a theory of coalitions). He therefore intelligently abandoned game-theoretic solution theory and resorted to an ad hoc but intuitively plausible argument from incentives, an argument which is commonplace in economics. The thought of reverting to solution theory at its present state of development cannot be seriously entertained by anyone whose purpose is as ambitious as Riker's effort to generalize about an important, broad class of political phenomena.

Addendum on Simple Games. Supersymmetric games resemble von Neumann and Morgenstern's *simple* games, but they are not equivalent. In supersymmetric games, as in simple games, losing coalitions are flat (see footnote 16) — that is, every player in a losing coalition loses as much as if he were standing alone against a coalition of all remaining players. Simple games differ from supersymmetric games, however, because in simple games every coalition is either winning or losing. It follows that if S is a coalition in a simple game and T is its complement, then either S or T is winning and the other is losing.

Hence, straightforward majority voting games for even numbers of players cannot be simple, although they can be supersymmetric. Similarly, majority games which require over-large majorities (e.g., two-thirds) can be supersymmetric but not simple. Majority games for odd numbers of players are called *direct majority games* by von Neumann and Morgenstern.[26] Such games can be both simple and supersymmetric.

In a phrase of von Neumann and Morgenstern, a losing player is "completely defeated" if his payoff is his security level.[27] We can generalize this descriptive phrase into an instructive definition: a coalition is *completely defeated* if its value is the sum of the security levels of its members, i.e., if it is flat. Obviously, a single player coalition is completely defeated when opposed by a coalition of all other players. In a simple game, every losing coalition is completely defeated. In a supersymmetric game in which a winning coalition has formed, the losing coalition is completely defeated. If we plot the values of winning coalitions by size for a simple or a supersymmetric game, the points will fall on the topmost graph in Figure 1.[28]

The very fact that losing coalitions in a game are completely defeated allows the size principle to be applied to the game. Among symmetric games it applies only to the supersymmetric games, which include the symmetric cases of simple games, i.e., the direct majority games. Since von Neumann and Morgenstern gave more than 80 pages over to simple games,[29] one might expect that Riker would have pursued their discussion in his derivation of the size principle, as in fact he appears to have done. After briefly mentioning simple games, Riker comments that they "are probably rare in nature," and "hence, little of practical value is likely to result from studying them."[30]

Riker's dismissal was perhaps too hasty, because the size principle is of little greater "practical value" than the study of simple games. Indeed, supersymmetric games are little more than an extension of the symmetric simple games to include games with even numbers of players and games in which winning coalitions must be larger than merely simple majority. The validity of the size principle is restricted to just such games (and to their asymmetric counterparts). But there seem to be no clear a priori grounds for declaring that such a restricted size principle is useless — as Riker's remark suggests it is.

Summary. In sum, both Riker's and Butterworth's claims appear to have analytical merit. But the merit of each is highly circumscribed. Under the terms of Riker's proof, his size principle can apply only to the rarefied class of supersymmetric games and their asymmetric counterparts. As Riker has well understood, even when the principle applies, there may be enormous coalitional instability. Butterworth's principle applies to the class of all symmetric zero-sum games as well as to those asymmetric games which meet the condition of equation 4, i.e., to quasi-symmetric games. Again, there may be enormous coalitional instability.

It should be clear that both principles apply to some games (the supersymmetric games). And it can easily be shown that each principle applies to games to which the other does not apply. The size principle applies to those asymmetric games in which the number of positive gainers will necessarily be more than minimal winning size because their security levels are

[26] Von Neumann and Morgenstern, *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior*, p. 431.
[27] *Ibid.*, p. 423.
[28] See further, *ibid.*, p. 428.
[29] *Ibid.*, pp. 420–503.
[30] Riker, *Political Coalitions*, p. 260.

greater than zero. And Butterworth's principle applies to *all* symmetric games.

Butterworth's principle is somewhat more general. But it is concomitantly perhaps less interesting, since it is not about coalitional size but about the number of positive gainers in a game. Hence it requires a clear notion of what constitutes a positive gain. Ironically, one of the greatest appeals of Riker's initial statement of the size principle was that it specified characteristics of a winning coalition rather than the apportionment of winnings within that coalition. As Anatol Rapoport notes, the results of game theory have been almost exclusively concerned with apportionment; but behavioral scientists are more typically concerned with coalitional structure. In politics, coalitions are conspicuously more tangible than payoffs (there may be exceptions, such as in the politics of graft). In game theory, the reverse is generally true. "In fact, seldom if ever can the behavioral scientist define payoffs in a conflict situation precisely enough to be realistically concerned with the question of their apportionment."[31] By modifying Riker's principle to require explicit measurement of payoffs, Butterworth has reasserted the inutility of game theory for generating predictive theories of political behavior.

It seems unlikely that Butterworth's principle can be applied outside the laboratory. It was a virtue of Riker's principle that it seemed testable in real situations. Alas, Butterworth's principle may be untestable, while the set of games to which Riker's principle can be applied may be too restricted to be of interest, as Riker's dismissal of simple games suggests.

Empirical Issues

Shepsle comments that "it is extremely unfortunate that much of the research on and criticism of the size principle is empirical in nature."[32] On the contrary it would seem that this is the point of a contribution to "positive political theory": to be empirically researched and criticized. If there is misfortune in the empirical work, it is that there is enormous disagreement over the empirical results. In positive theory, factual claims should be either true or false — not both.

A principal reason for disagreement among researchers has been a general failure to propose what constitutes a fair test of the size principle.[33] Those who assert that coalitions in legislatures tend to be of minimal winning size do not give us a base, or null model, for comparison. We need to know what might happen if the theory failed to apply. Since the size principle has the ring of a statistical assertion, it should be possible to find statistical null models against which to compare data from actual games such as legislative coalition formation. For instance, a null model which seems much too easy would be a mean winning coalition size halfway between minimal winning and unanimous size. If the data showed that the mean winning coalition size were merely closer to a bare majority than to unanimity, then the size principle would be supported; otherwise it would be rejected. Perhaps many of us would be surprised if even a Congress composed of all Democrats or all Republicans failed this test. Hence, we would want the size principle to survive a harsher test, such as the random voting behavior model which follows.

A Random Legislature. Assume for a moment that we have a legislature in which the conditions of Riker's principle are met and which is supersymmetric. Every vote by this body determines a winning coalition and a losing coalition. Each player, or legislator, faces the same matrix of outcomes as every other player. Assume also that each player is indifferent about which players join in his coalition — his concern is to be a winner and to gain as much as possible. (This assumption is implied in Riker's statement of his principle.) Under this set of conditions, the size principle is theoretically deducible. The assumption which Riker considers crucial in political analysis is that of individual rationality. It is this assumption which precludes larger than minimal winning coalitions. Let us therefore drop it for the moment and simply look at all winning coalitions which might form, including those which are not minimal winning.

If the legislature is not extremely small, the set of all winning coalitions in it will include many coalitions of minimal winning size, but only one coalition of the whole legislature. A plausible null model under the conditions of Riker's principle is one in which all winning coalitions are equiprobable. If every legislator flipped a coin to decide whether to join the heads or the tails coalition on each vote, the distribution of winning coalitions by size would fit this null model. This distribution is presented in Table 1 for legislatures ranging from

[31] Anatol Rapoport, *N-Person Game Theory: Concepts and Applications* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1970), pp. 286–287.

[32] Shepsle, "On the Size of Winning Coalitions," p. 516.

[33] Rohde, "A Theory of the Formation of Opinion Coalitions in the U.S. Supreme Court," is an exception.

Table 1. Percentage of Winning Coalitions by Size of Legislature and Percentage of Members in the Winning Coalitions

Percentage of Members in Winning Coalition / Size of Legislature	50–55%	50–60%	50–65%	50–70%
5	*	62.5%	62.5%	62.5%
9	*	49.2	49.2	82.0
15	39.3%	69.8	69.8	88.2
21	61.7	81.1	92.1	97.3
41	65.1	88.3	97.2	99.6
61	69.4	92.8	99.0	99.9
81 (Senate)	73.4	95.5	99.6	**
101	76.8	97.2	99.9	**
201	87.9	99.7	**	**
301	93.5	**	**	**
401 (House)	95.4	**	**	**

* The smallest winning coalition has more than 55% of the membership.
** More than 99.95%.

5 to 401 members in which a simple majority wins. The United States Senate would correspond roughly to a body of 81 members, and the House of Representatives to a body of 401 members, depending on attendance. In Table 1, the columns present the percentage of all winning coalitions which include more than half but less than 55, 60, 65, and 70 per cent, respectively, of the members. So for instance, in an 81-member legislature, 99.6 per cent of all winning coalitions include less than 65 per cent of the legislators.

From Table 1, it is clear that in large legislatures, the overwhelming majority of all winning coalitions will be near the minimal size just by statistical chance in this simple-majority, random-voting legislative model. Admittedly, this is a crazy model of legislative voting behavior.[34] Traditional discussions of congressional voting are concerned with those structural and attitudinal variables which prevent such random behavior. But the size principle abstracts from such traditional concerns to analyze voting as strictly an individualist effort to maximize utility. To test the size principle is to determine whether such an abstraction is valid in a particular instance, as is done for the House of Representatives below.

House Roll-call Voting. David Koehler has analyzed roll-call voting in the United States House of Representatives and claims to "demonstrate empirically that the members do tend to form minimal winning coalitions."[35] What he actually demonstrates is that the average size of winning coalitions on contested roll-call votes does not correlate very well with the size of the dominant party's majority. In order to determine more directly whether the size prin-

Table 2. Frequency of Occurrence of Majorities by Size

Size of majority %	House of Representatives (83rd–90th Congresses)[a] n	House of Representatives (83rd–90th Congresses)[a] %	Random voting in a 401 member body %
50–55	347	21.8%	95.4%
55–60	264	16.6	4.56
60–65	211	13.3	0.0061
65–70	170	10.7	0.00000016
70–75	145	9.1	—
75–80	121	7.6	—
80–85	120	7.5	—
85–90	83	5.2	—
90–95	132	8.3	—

[a] In "The Legislative Process and the Minimal Winning Coalition," Koehler presents the data graphically; hence, these figures are taken from David H. Koehler, "Coalition Formation and the Legislative Process" (paper presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, 1971), p. 48. The total number of House roll-call votes listed is 1,593. In addition there were 450 votes in which the majority exceeded 95%; these votes have been omitted from the percentages above, which therefore sum to 100 per cent.

[34] I owe this characterization to an anonymous reader of an earlier draft of this paper.

[35] Koehler, "The Legislative Process and the Minimal Winning Coalition," p. 155. For a contrary interpretation of House roll-call voting, see Hinckley, "Coalitions in Congress: Size and Ideological Distance."

ciple fits House voting behavior, we would want to compare the actual frequencies of coalitions of various sizes with their expected frequencies under a plausible null model, such as the random voting model of Table 1.

If the size principle applies very well to the House, then we should expect that the frequency of larger coalitions would be reduced, and the actual vote distribution should be nearer minimal size than the null model distribution. Table 2 presents Koehler's House roll-call data for eight Congresses and the null model distribution for a 401-member legislature. The size principle does not seem to apply. Whereas in actuality only 52 per cent of winning coalitions contained less than 65 per cent of those representatives voting, in a 401-member legislature run by flipping coins, 99.999999 per cent of all winning coalitions would contain less than 65 per cent of the membership. Furthermore, whereas very large coalitions are quite common in the House,[36] they would almost never happen in a random legislature.

Perhaps the random legislature is far too severe a test. The House data, however, do not even do well against the extremely easy test above in which the mean winning coalition size is halfway between simple majority and unanimity. If all the data are included (see the note to Table 2), then the mean winning coalition in several years of House roll-call voting comprised between 72 and 77 per cent of those voting,[37] as compared to the easy null model's 75 per cent.

It appears that legislative voting, at least in the recent House of Representatives, does not sufficiently approximate a symmetric n-person zero-sum bargaining game to permit application of the postulated size principle. It might be that for certain classes of issues, the House would more nearly approximate the conditions of the principle than it does for the general class of all roll-call votes. Unless such a case is found, however, Koehler's data suggest that what we should wish to explain is just the reverse of what the size principle implies, i.e., we should wish to explain why there is such a high degree of agreement on roll-call votes in the United States Congress.

Conclusion. The data in Table 2 imply merely that the conditions for the size principle are not met in the House of Representatives. Suppose there were a legislature in which those conditions were more nearly met. The figures of Table 1 suggest that in a body as large as the House, even if the inordinately stringent conditions for the size principle were actually met, then the principle would be virtually useless on a priori grounds. In a 401-person zero-sum bargaining game with supersymmetry and perfect information, *more than 95 per cent of all possible winning coalitions would be within five per cent of minimal size by chance.* That is, less than five per cent of all possible winning coalitions include more than 55 per cent of the players. Hence, at best the size principle, if it operated, could reduce this five per cent slack.

It follows that, even for the restricted realm to which it is applicable, the size principle could at most produce a marginal improvement in our expectations of coalition behavior in such a large body. And direct statistical test of the principle in a large legislature would probably be inconclusive at best. Since the conditions for the principle are extremely stringent, and since its import decreases as the size of the body to which it is applied increases, it seems unlikely that the principle is either useful or testable in bodies much larger than committees.[38]

This last point is a conclusion similar to that reached above for Butterworth's modification of the size principle. Butterworth's principle might be expected to apply to small bodies such as committees, but not to large bodies. Again, however, Butterworth's principle requires a measure of gains and losses, so that empirical tests of it will be far more complicated than tests of Riker's principle. Indeed, it seems utterly implausible that Butterworth's principle could be tested against House roll-call voting behavior, or even against nine-man Supreme Court behavior. One of the attractions of Riker's principle is that it is simply and directly testable even though the conditions which make for it are beyond easy test. The conceptual difficulties in testing Butterworth's principle, on the contrary, seem as severe as those involved in testing the conditions for it.

Summary

The proof of Riker's size principle is in-

[36] Note that more than 20 per cent of the House votes were nearly unanimous, and these votes are *not included* in Table 2.

[37] Koehler's data are reported in 5 per cent clusters. Hence, the mean cannot be calculated any closer, but a safe guess is probably near 74 per cent.

[38] Riker and Ordeshook, *An Introduction to Positive Political Theory*, p. 177, suggest on the contrary that the advantages of the size principle over other game theoretic solution notions lie "especially in games with very large numbers of players."

COMMUNICATIONS

The Supreme Court and Critical Elections: A Dissent

TO THE EDITOR:

In "The Supreme Court and Critical Elections" (*APSR*, 69 [Sept., 1975], 795–811) Richard Funston attempts to relate certain decisional patterns in the Supreme Court to national political realignments. Specifically, his primary question is whether "During realignment phases or, as they might be called, critical periods, was the tendency of the Court to declare federal legislation unconstitutional significantly greater than during noncritical periods of stable party competition" (p. 804). This is an interesting and important question since it is frequently asserted that the Court follows election returns. But the author goes on to assert that "To answer that [his] question, all that is necessary is to calculate the arithmetic mean for the total years of critical and noncritical periods" (p. 804). He then proceeds to make such calculations under various control conditions and concludes that " . . . as hypothesized, there has been a significantly greater tendency on the part of the Court during realignment periods to utilize its power to declare federal legislation unconstitutional, i.e., to oppose the law-making majority will, than during periods of political stability, when the Court is part of the dominant political majority" (p. 805). Unfortunately, given the author's procedures, we can have no confidence whatever in the validity of such a proposition for the reasons provided below.

We will bypass in the text the author's errors in data collection and the calculation of arithmetic means.[1] Although bothersome, their correction would not fundamentally alter the nature of the data or, presumably, the arguments Funston makes about them. But we must note other more worrisome problems at some length. Basically, Funston is suggesting a nonspurious correlation between critical/noncritical periods and the frequency of Court decisions nullifying congressional legislation. The distribution of such decisions, however, makes it clear that no such case can be made from the author's data. Of the 18 incidences of counter-majoritarian behavior by the Court during critical periods, 14 occurred during its famed 1933-36 clash with Congress over New Deal legislation. Similarly, 12 of the 14 decisions nullifying a law within four years of enactment occurred in 1933–36. The grossly disproportional contribution of this unique conflict detracts from the vitality of Funston's hypothesis. For in his own words, the hypothesis covers "long periods of time" and refers to "transitional periods" as plural phenomena (p. 796). It is therefore fair to consider how his hypothesis holds up when the New Deal realignment period is separated from the other realignment periods. Table 1 presents computations of Funston's counter-majoritarian coefficient for each of his tables after eliminating in the (a) row the New Deal realignment period and in the (b) row both the New Deal realignment period and the years

[1] Funston misclassifies one case. He lists *Monongahela Navigation Co. v. U.S.*, 148 U.S. 312 (1893), as one which strikes down legislation within four years of enactment. In fact, however, the statute found unconstitutional here was passed in 1888 or five years earlier. He also omits two cases from his list altogether: *Leary v. U.S.*, 395 U.S. 6 (1969), and *O'Callahan v. Parker*, 395 U.S. 258 (1969). Both are cited as declaring acts of Congress unconstitutional in Funston's only source book published after 1969, Philip Kurland, *Politics, The Constitution and the Warren Court* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), pp. 24–25, and are also so cited in *The Constitution of the United States: Analysis and Interpretation* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 1617. None of the laws struck down by these cases had been enacted within the preceding four years.

More serious is the author's miscounting. His realignment or critical periods constitute nine years rather than eight because they are inclusive of both election years. This inclusiveness is clear because the author includes cases from both the beginning and ending years in his computations of cases occurring in critical periods. Yet Funston explicitly says that there are only eight years per critical period (see, e.g., the commentary in his Table 2); moreover, his total number of critical years is 32 or four times eight. Thus the true denominator in his indices should be 36 and not 32 for the critical periods and 132 instead of 136 for the noncritical periods. The changed ratio of critical to noncritical years lowers the coefficients of counter-majoritarianism from 1.20 to 1.05 in his Table 2 and from 3.10 to 2.60 in his Table 3.

In making our calculations for this communication, we have used the same cases as Funston, a list of which he has kindly provided us. However, appropriate corrections have been made for the *Monongahela* case, and the *Leary* and *O'Callahan* cases have been added. In addition, in order to utilize critical periods of eight years as called for by Funston's research design, we have placed the first year of the realignment periods as he reports them (and the cases decided therein) in the noncritical period immediately preceding. Thus, Funston's inclusive nine-year period of 1928–1936 is replaced by the period 1929–1936; 1888–1896 by 1889–1896, and so on.

Table 1. Recomputation of Indices and Coefficients after Elimination of Selected Periods, by Funston's Tables 2–5.*

Author's Table *	Period Elim.	Critical Yrs. Index	Noncritical Yrs. Index	Counter-Majoritarian Coefficient
2	(a) 1929–36	.167	.559	.299
	(b) 1929–69	.167	.505	.331
3	(a) 1929–36	.083	.169	.491
	(b) 1929–69	.083	.204	.407
4	(a) 1929–38	.057	.187	.305
	(b) 1929–69	.057	.228	.250
5	(a) 1929–40	.122	.178	.685
	(b) 1929–69	.122	.218	.560

* The recomputations are based upon corrections discussed in footnote 1.

between the end of that period and 1969 inclusive. The latter years were eliminated because Funston argues that increased population, legislation, etc., produce more opportunities for counter-majoritarian behavior. If Funston is correct here, the elimination of both the New Deal period and subsequent years will control for this.

As the coefficient of counter-majoritarianism in each of the eight calculations presented in Table 1 is a fraction, it is clear that with either the New Deal realignment period alone eliminated or with both that period and subsequent years eliminated, the ratio of nullifications in noncritical periods exceeded that in critical periods. This finding, of course, is the direct opposite of Funston's conclusion and dramatically demonstrates the unique contribution of the New Deal cases to his analysis.

In a footnote Funston indicates his awareness of the New Deal era's disproportionate contribution of cases. He nonetheless defends his analysis by arguing that the burgeoning population, increased congressional legislation, and an expanding Supreme Court docket created more opportunities for the exercise of judicial review; and he concludes that judicial review in "the New Deal era appears to be less unique, though it remains one of great judicial activity" (fn. 67, p. 804). This defense is unconvincing. Indeed, with regard to caseload, it is erroneous in one respect. In the 1933–36 terms the Supreme Court averaged less than 200 opinions per year, while in the 1889–96 realignment period, the Court averaged more than 475 opinions per term. Even in the late 1850s, the Court was deciding nearly 300 cases per term.[2] One might argue, of course, that the Court was refusing to decide more cases in the 1930s than in earlier years, but most such denials do not consume much of the *justices'* time. It is true that Congress was passing more laws in the New Deal period than in earlier realignment periods, and intuitively we might expect a relationship to exist between the number of laws passed and the frequency of judicial review. In the 1889–96 period, Congress passed an average of 202 public laws per year; in the 1929–36 period the average was 334. While this is a 66 per cent increase, it pales in comparison to the 500 per cent increase in the number of times the Supreme Court struck down legislation passed within the previous four years. Finally, we can see no particular reason to believe that population is very closely related to the incidence of judicial review. Even so, there is again a considerable difference between the five-fold increase in the latter and the 95 per cent population increase between 1890 and 1930.

Even if one feels that it is not fair to exclude the New Deal realignment period from the calculations or, alternatively and despite our analysis just concluded, still feels the New Deal cases are not unique, it is possible to demonstrate that Funston's conclusion regarding tendencies in the Court is invalid. We have computed the index for each of the five non-critical and four critical periods for Funston's Tables 2–5. (The index is the average number of nullifications per year; averaging is necessary to control for the length of the periods surveyed.) We scored the noncritical periods as 1 and the critical periods as 2 and computed a product

[2] See Felix Frankfurter and James Landis, *The Business of the Supreme Court* (New York: Macmillan, 1927), pp. 60 and 297, for data on the Court's cases in the periods cited. Opinion frequency from the New Deal era came directly from the *U.S. Reports.*

moment correlation coefficient. If Funston's hypothesis is correct, the index should rise in the critical periods and fall in the noncritical periods. A perfect matching of the rising and falling of the index and the critical/noncritical scoring would produce a correlation coefficient nearing 1.00; thus to the extent that the coefficients attain or approach this figure, Funston's hypothesis would be supported.

The results, however, are as damaging to Funston's claims as are those presented in Table 1. While the correlations are in the direction needed to support his hypothesis, they are insignificant — ranging from .054 to .312.

Given the distribution of the data, these findings are hardly surprising. After all, in Funston's Tables 3, 4, and 5 there are no nullifications in the first four periods and in Table 2 there are none in two of the first four periods. And in all tables, the index for the critical periods beginning in 1889 is less than that for the subsequent noncritical period. The long and short of it is that there is simply no systematic rise and fall of Supreme Court countermajoritarian behavior in conjunction with critical elections.

It may be speculated that a more logical approach than that used by Funston will bear out the hypothesis that the Supreme Court's tendency to counter-majoritarianism increases during the so-called critical periods surrounding party realignment. Funston's research design identifies the SRC's eight year realignment phases as the critical years when counter-majoritarianism is expected to be at its greatest. But three of these four phases were *fully complete before* the new law-making coalition acceded to power, i.e., captured control of the Presidency and Congress. And in the fourth period (1929–36), four years went by before power shifted. It seems only logical, however, that the motivation and opportunity for the Supreme Court to strike down acts of Congress will occur after the new coalition is in a position to adopt legislation. It is anomalous to expect this beforehand. Yet seven-eighths of Funston's so-called critical years come beforehand. We think it makes more sense to use as the critical years the lag periods — *and the lag periods only*.[3] We define the lag period as that

[3] In his Tables 4 and 5, Funston introduces and uses the concept of the lag period, but he combines the lag periods with the realignment period rather than making calculations for them separately. He describes two variations of the lag periods, neither of which coincide with our definition of it.

Table 2. Breakdown of Laws Declared Unconstitutional During Lag Periods

Lag Period	Years	All Cases Declaring Acts of Congress Unconstitutional	Cases Declaring Acts Unconstitutional Within 4 years of Enactment
1829–36	8	0	0
1861–65	5	1	1
1897–1909	13	11	4
1933–40	8	13	12
Totals	34	25	17
Indices		.735	.500
Totals for Non-Lag Periods	134	71	21
Indices for Non-Lag Periods		.529	.157
Coefficient of Counter-Majoritarianism		1.389	3.185

Table 3. Computation of Indices and Coefficients Using Lag Periods as Critical Years and Eliminating Selected Periods, for all Cases and Four-Year Cases

Cases	Period Eliminated	Critical Years Index	Noncritical Years Index	C-M Coefficient
ALL	(a) 1933–40	.462	.529	.873
	(b) 1933–69	.462	.419	1.103
FOUR-YEAR	(a) 1933–40	.192	.157	1.223
	(b) 1933–69	.192	.181	1.060

period between the time the new coalition assumes control of the elective branches of government and the time its President appoints a sufficient number of justices to control the Supreme Court's decisions.

We have calculated the lag periods following the realigning elections. They are 1829–36, 1861–65, 1897–1909, and 1933–40. In Table 2 we show the incidences of counter-majoritarianism over the lag periods. The skewed contribution of the New Deal cases declines considerably for all cases declaring acts of Congress unconstitutional but it is still predominant (nearly 70 per cent) for the four year cases. The overall coefficients of counter-majoritarianism increase somewhat but not dramatically. In Table 3 we parallel Table 1 by eliminating the New Deal lag period and then the entire 1933–69 period. Here three of the four coefficients are not fractions. They are so minutely above the fractional level, however, as to offer no support for Funston's hypothesis. Finally, in the manner described earlier, we compute product moment correlations. For both all cases finding acts of Congress unconstitutional and the four-year cases, the result is positive but insignificant. (.129 and .375 respectively).

In sum, we obtain better results (in terms of supporting the hypothesis) by using only the lag periods rather than the realignment periods or a combination of the two. Nonetheless, this approach still does not enable us to confirm the hypothesis. Taken together, the best interpretation that can be put on the data is that, overall, there is no significant difference between the Court's counter-majoritarian behavior in the lag periods and that in noncritical years.

We can approach Funston's hypothesis from yet another angle — namely that of focusing on counter-majoritarianism during the noncritical years. If, as Funston argues, "the Supreme Court reflects the will of the dominant political forces" (p. 796) during these years, it would follow that the Court would not best serve the incumbent coalition by declaring its newly passed laws unconstitutional. Rather, to the extent that the Court engaged in judicial review, it would aid the incumbent coalition by striking down the laws adopted by the previous coalition. We would especially expect this in the first decade or so after the new majority had obtained control of the Court through the appointment process. The data dramatically belie this presumption, however. Sixteen of the 17 laws found unconstitutional during the ten-year periods were passed by the incumbent coalition. And the one exception was not passed by the previous coalition but by two coalitions preceding.

Finally, as everyone knows, the Court must sit and wait for prospective nullifying cases to be brought to it. The rate at which they are brought cannot be expected to be constant across periods. Nor can we assert that the rate will vary with length of period or with number of cases docketed in each period. Yet — whatever that rate — its variation is crucial to any inference regarding the inclination of the Court in the periods analyzed. Imagine, for example, that in a critical eight-year period the Court nullified legislation in 24 of 100 opportunities while in a noncritical eight-year span 16 of 32 statutes were voided. Funston would report the ratio of 24 to 16 as supportive of his "tendency" inference. But, clearly, the Court would be striking 24 per cent of the challenged statutes in the critical era as against 50 per cent of those questioned in the noncritical period. It follows inevitably that no inference about "tendency" of the Court to nullify federal law can be drawn absent appropriate attention to the opportunities for nullification.

As a consequence of the problems we have outlined, an overall conclusion about the Funston paper has two dimensions. First, if there were no other shortcomings, the null hypothesis — that there is no difference between the tendency of the Court to nullify congressional legislation in critical and noncritical historical periods — cannot be rejected given the distribution of the cases used by Funston. But of greater importance, the null hypothesis could not have been rejected — whatever the distribution of the cases — because of a basic defect in Funston's research design, as outlined above.

Having said all this, can we dismiss the notion that the Supreme Court has a greater tendency to overrule the Congress in certain historical periods than in others? Our analysis does not suggest that this inquiry should now be dismissed. It will remain an interesting but open question until evaluated by appropriate design and testing procedures mainly lacking in "The Supreme Court and Critical Elections."

BRADLEY C. CANON
S. SIDNEY ULMER
University of Kentucky

Funston Reply to Canon and Ulmer

TO THE EDITOR:

I very much applaud the refinements which Professors Canon and Ulmer have brought to

the continuing study of the relationship between judicial policy making and change within the larger American polity. In "The Supreme Court and Critical Elections," I noted (p. 807) that "much more work can and should be done in this area," including the use of "different and more sophisticated statistical techniques . . . to analyze the data presented here." Canon and Ulmer have done exactly that, and I can hardly complain if my own prescription generates conclusions different from those which I presented.

The essence of their criticism, however, has already been stated, more tersely and more elegantly, in Professor Paul Beck's letter commenting upon my article which appeared in this September's issue of the *Review*. Rather than reiterate at length fundamentally the same points already made in my response to Beck, I will simply refer the interested reader to that earlier exchange. Simply put, I believe Professors Canon and Ulmer have largely misconstrued the purpose and thrust of "The Supreme Court and Critical Elections." As I wrote in my response to Professor Beck, the article "was intended — and, I think, can and should so be read — as a synthetic rather than an original analytic effort. It was an attempt, as I stated in several places, to both integrate and test the assertions of certain leaders in our profession — most notably Dahl, but also Burnham — *on their own terms*."[1] Canon and Ulmer (note 3) credit me with introducing the concept of a "lag period" and criticize the logic of my use of that concept. Quite apart from the fact that I acknowledged this (pp. 807–08) and commented at length upon it, I did not introduce the concept. Professor Dahl did, and my use of the concept was the result of my understanding of his discussion of it, as I suggested in my footnote 72. Because I was seeking comparability with Dahl, I was not free to redefine his concept, though I would agree that Canon's and Ulmer's lag periods are more logical. Similarly, I am taken to task (note 1) for my use of *Monongahela Navigation Company* v. *United States*, 148 U.S. 312 (1893). But, again, comparability dictated its use, as a reading of Dahl's footnote 11 will show.[2]

My omissions of *Leary* v. *United States*, 395 U.S. 6 (1969), and *O'Callahan* v. *Parker*, 395 U.S. 258 (1969), were not an oversight. As I commented in the appendix, different people count the cases differently,[3] and within the bounds of reason Canon and Ulmer are free to count them as they wish. But the way I read these cases they are not examples of what I was talking about in "The Supreme Court and Critical Elections." I was concerned with cases declaring congressional statutes to be unconstitutional in whole or in part and not merely as applied. The criminal statutory presumption involved in *Leary* was held to be irrational and hence unconstitutional *unless* it could be said with substantial assurance that the presumed fact was more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which it depended.[4] To me this suggests that a change in the American drug scene would reinvigorate section 176a of the Narcotic Import and Export Act. Regarding *O'Callahan*, it need only be noted that the majority never specifically invalidated the three articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice under which O'Callahan was charged; it merely held that they could not be applied to this fact situation. As the dissenters point out, it was tradition rather than explicit provisions of the statute that were voided on this occasion.[5] That my reading of *O'Callahan* is at least plausible is, I think, supported by the result in *Relford* v. *Commandant*, 401 U.S. 355 (1971), sustaining a successful prosecution under the very

[1] I accepted Dahl's and Burnham's evidence and assumptions for purposes of replication. But the work of both has recently been subjected to serious criticism. Jonathan D. Casper, "The Supreme Court and National Policy Making," *American Political Science Review*, 70 (March, 1976), 50–63; Dorothy Buckton James, Book Review, *Political Science Quarterly*, 91 (Spring, 1976), 147–148. It is far too facile, however, for me simply to observe that Professors Canon's and Ulmer's quarrel lies with others than myself. I shall, therefore, attempt to respond to the more important of their specific objections.

[2] Robert Dahl, "Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker," *Journal of Public Law*, 6 (Fall, 1957), 279–295, 287 n. 11.

[3] C. Herman Pritchett, *The American Constitution*, 2nd edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), p. 166, and *The Constitution of the United States of America*, Sen. Doc. no. 39, 88th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Gov't Printing Office, 1964), pp. 1387–1402, report that sixty-five laws were voided by 1937. On the other hand, Professor Abraham identifies seventy-six; Henry Abraham, *The Judicial Process*, 3rd edition (New York: Oxford, 1975), pp. 288–291. Even for more recent decisions there is no agreement; thus, Professor Casper states that for the period 1958–74 there have been 28 instances of the exercise of the power of judicial review, while Professor Dionisopoulos counts thirty-two. Casper, "The Supreme Court and National Policy Making," pp. 53–54; Allan Dionisopoulos, "Judicial Control of Congress," (paper, Department of Political Science, Northern Illinois University, 1976).

[4] 395 U.S. at 36.

[5] 395 U.S. at 274 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

same provisions of the U.C.M.J. involved in *O'Callahan*.[6] Nevertheless, as I have said, Canon's and Ulmer's inclusion of these decisions is arguable. But, if they wish to count *Leary*, they should be consistent and include its companion case, *United States* v. *Covington*, 395 U.S. 57 (1969), as well.

As for Canon's and Ulmer's discussion of the Court's caseload, I must confess that I am puzzled about its relevance to "The Supreme Court and Critical Elections." That the Court averaged less than 200 opinions per year in the 1933–36 terms, while averaging more than 475 opinions per term during 1888–96, may or may not say anything about opportunities for the exercise of the power of judicial review. What was the percentage of *federal* legislation involved in these cases during these terms? Moreover, the consequences for judicial review of the change in congressional legislation from 1889 to 1936 cannot be fully explained simply by focusing upon the number of public laws enacted per year. Surely one must recognize a qualitative transformation in the scope, subject matter, and potential social impact of federal legislation during this period. Finally, my point concerning population increases was, I thought, simple enough. I didn't suggest that such increases were "very closely related to the incidence of judicial review." Rather, the point was that an increase in population, particularly when coupled with an expansion of the number and scope of federal laws, would increase the probability that the application of any one law to a particular individual or group would create a situation giving rise to a constitutional challenge and, thus, would increase the *opportunities* for the Court to exercise its power of judicial review.

At best, Canon and Ulmer have suggested that the conclusions based upon my analysis were potentially a product of the asymmetry in the coding rules as well as of the nature of the evidence itself,[7] a possibility which I did not attempt to conceal (p. 804, n. 67). The fundamental argument, however, is by no means disproven. It is true that Canon and Ulmer rather freely use words such as "invalid." But, upon careful reading, their criticisms seem excessively stated, going beyond that which their own analysis will support. For example, some of their findings "are in the direction needed to support the [Dahl-Dooley] hypothesis," though given their techniques these do not rise to the level of statistical significance. And, using their own definition of lag periods, they obtain "better results" than I I do not, therefore, understand Canon and Ulmer to argue that the Court is more likely to act in a counter-majoritarian manner during noncritical periods than during critical periods of partisan realignment, although at one point they do appear to do just that. Rather, their essential conclusion is much more modest: The evidence is inconclusive. Instances of judicial review, however, are but one body of data which may be used to examine the hypothesis that conflict between the judiciary and the popular branches does not occur randomly but is correlated with periods of electoral realignment, and a significant amount of research exists to sustain that hypothesis. Professor David Adamany's extensive historical survey of Supreme Court decision making during critical periods, though it reaches normative conclusions about the Court's function in American government much different from my own, offers support for the thesis advanced in "The Supreme Court and Critical Elections."[8] Sheldon Goldman and Thomas Jahnige have reported a distinct coincidence between Stuart S. Nagel's "Court-curbing" periods and realigning election cycles,[9] a finding corroborated by others.[10] And Adamany has adduced evidence, though slight, that Justices are more reluctant to resign after a realigning election.[11] In short, I may not have operationalized the variables well (though, I reiterate, that operationalization was dictated by concern for comparability), but Canon and Ulmer have not directly addressed — let alone invalidated — the fundamental thesis concerning periodicity in Supreme Court behavior which was advanced in "The Supreme Court and Critical Elections."

Finally, I emphasize again that mine was a preliminary study designed to stimulate further inquiry. Whether future research should pro-

[6] Neither did Casper, "The Supreme Court and National Policy Making," include *O'Callahan* as an example of the exercise of the power of judicial review.

[7] See also Casper, "The Supreme Court and National Policy Making," p. 56.

[8] David Adamany, "Legitimacy, Realigning Elections, and the Supreme Court," *Wisconsin Law Review* (September, 1973), pp. 790–846.

[9] Sheldon Goldman and Thomas P. Jahnige, *The Federal Courts as a Political System* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), pp. 261–268; Stuart S. Nagel, *The Legal Process from a Behavioral Perspective* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey, 1969), pp. 245–279.

[10] E.g., Wallace Mendelson, "Judicial Review and Party Politics," *Vanderbilt Law Review*, 12 (March, 1959), 447–457; John Roche, *Courts and Rights* (New York: Random House, 1961), pp. 22–24, 46.

[11] Adamany, "Legitimacy, Realigning Elections, and the Supreme Court," p. 824.

ceed along Canon's and Ulmer's statistical trail or Adamany's historical path I leave to the interests and skills of future researchers. However, in "The Supreme Court and Critical Elections," I noted (p. 807) "that this study represents but a very tentative first step. Not only does it suggest ways in which concepts and research from other areas of the discipline . . . can be utilized to address one of the classic problems of public law, it also illustrates the methodological and conceptual problems involved in such borrowing." While Professors Canon and Ulmer take issue with other points of my analysis and interpretation, it seems to me that their criticisms buttress me on this one.

RICHARD FUNSTON
San Diego State University

Evaluation of a Presidential Election Game

TO THE EDITOR:

Guillermo Owen's recent discussion of the disparities in power under the electoral college system for presidential elections (*American Political Science Review*, September 1975) ignores several important factors. The use of the Shapley value concept from game theory to evaluate the presidential election game is helpful in the exploration of the constitutional biases in the electoral college system. It is important to note, however, that the assumptions underlying the value are somewhat too restrictive for the electoral college game. Moreover, some of the simplifying assumptions made by Owen to facilitate his analysis appear to be of somewhat dubious empirical validity.

Though my criticism is specifically aimed at the paper by Owen, it also applies to other attempts to use an a priori constitutional index as a descriptive theory of electoral power. My remarks point to some of the limitations inherent in the use of the Shapley value for the analysis of voting games. The analysis of voting situations by the Shapley value from game theory certainly uses a theoretically interesting approach, though its utility as an empirical explanation of electoral power is somewhat questionable.

Owen shows, using appropriate simplifying assumptions, that disparities in power in the electoral college system stem from (a) the requirements that the number of electors for a state both be integer ("integrity factor") and include two electors to correspond to the state's Senate representation ("Senate factor"); (b) the usual practice of casting all of a state's electoral votes for the winner of the state, thereby increasing slightly the power of the largest states ("unit rule factor"); and (c) the greater influence a voter usually enjoys in the largest states because his ability to influence his state's vote tends to drop more slowly than the number of electoral votes the state casts ("decomposition factor"). Such factors have been discussed by others, including John Banzhaf.[1]

An analysis based on Shapley values ignores several other differences — not acknowledged by Owen — in the power of voters under the electoral college system. If some states had the same number of voters and electoral votes, for instance, then voters in these jurisdictions would have the same power under the Shapley value's assumptions. The disparities discussed by Owen do not occur when some jurisdictions are the same size. The actual power of voters in different states of the same size can vary, however.

Differences in actual power result because not all coalitions of states (or voters within a state) are equally likely to be formed. Equiprobable coalitions are required by the Shapley value as the value ignores "affinities" between players. A candidate's performance in a state, however, is frequently positively or negatively correlated with his performance in another particular state; indeed, the decision by individual voters within a state may be correlated. Thus the coalitions are not equiprobable. A candidate's performance in an individual state in the farm belt, for example, may be more indicative of his success in other states in the group than in the country as a whole. This results because voters in some subsets of states tend to have common interests and outlooks.

Voters in different states have different probabilities of influencing the selection of their state's electoral college slate. The Shapley value ignores this except through the "decomposition factor" in which the probability of a voter's influencing a state declines with state size, but less rapidly than state size (thus the total influence of a voter tends to rise with state size). The probability distribution of the median voter in a state will become more concentrated as state size increases as a consequence of the decomposition factor.[2] The decomposition fac-

[1] See John Banzhaf, "One Man, 3.312 Votes: A Mathematical Analysis of the Electoral College," *Villanova Law Review*, 13 (Winter, 1968), 304–332.

[2] See p. 85 of Lloyd S. Shapley, "Political Science: Voting and Bargaining Games," pp. 37–92 in *Notes of Lectures on Mathematics in the Behavioral Sciences: Lectures Given at the 1973 MAA Summer Seminar at*

tor does not capture all the reasons why the probability that a voter influences his state's result differs among states. Different probabilities, for example, might apply to voters in different states of equal size, even though the decomposition factor does not apply. Voters in close states are much more powerful than those elsewhere. States that are solidly in the camp of one party are less important than swing states in determining the winner of close elections. The swing state is more powerful because it is decisive in a larger proportion of the coalitions that actually form. This is illustrated by three-person arbitration panels in which neither the labor nor management representative matters. It is unlikely that those states on one side of the spectrum will ally themselves with those on the other side (except in a landslide). Coalitions which include swing states are most likely to form winning coalitions. This is another way in which the assumption of the Shapley value that all coalitions of states are equiprobable is violated. The individual voter is more crucial in a close state. The system also always disenfranchises those who do not support their state's winner because in no circumstances would it have mattered if such individuals did not vote. Banzhaf,[3] for example, does concede that the power measured by Shapley values does not equal the actual ability to affect the outcome of an election, but reflects the theoretical biases in the electoral college arrangement. Though Banzhaf believes that theoretical inequalities are the only type of bias on which we can focus in determining the fairness of a system, I argue that the system itself produces these other sorts of inequalities. This occurs because some states are biased or not independent of one another in presidential elections.

The Shapley value provides a measure of some of the constitutional biases inherent in the electoral college system. But because of assumptions underlying the value, the use of it implies by definition the neglect of certain disparities of power. The specific features of the real situation that ought to be captured in the power index obviously depend on how the numbers will be used. The symmetry imposed by the Shapley value might be useful in some situations, but it should not be utilized in all applications. The recognition that some coalitions form more easily than others led Owen to offer elsewhere[4] another concept to supplement the Shapley value. Owen's idea drops the assumption that all coalitions are equiprobable by permitting the players to have "affinities" with other players, thereby relaxing the symmetry inherent in the value.

In addition to my observations on the implicit assumptions made in using the Shapley value I also wish to comment on the plausibility of two of Owen's explicit assumptions. Although they facilitate the analysis, they are somewhat questionable. I think it is appropriate for Owen to use the assumptions in an abstract model. My point is that Owen overstates the plausibility of the assumptions, not that they should not be used. Owen assumes that all of the electoral votes in a state are cast for the candidate who carries the state and that the election is decided in the electoral college without reaching the House of Representatives. In order to justify the latter assertion he notes the infrequency of referral to the House (1800 and 1824 only) and maintains that George Wallace in 1968 expressed interest in making a deal in the electoral college rather than letting the House decide. It is certainly not clear that correctly characterized Wallace's 1968 objective. Even if such a deal occurred, it would then have violated the prior assumption that the electoral votes of a state are cast for the candidate who carries the state. Thus, an example cited by Owen in support of his assumptions must violate either that one or another. In the recent past the 1960 election also exemplifies a contest that that could have easily reached the House, even without a national third party.

Owen justifies his assumption that all the electoral votes in a state are cast for the candidate who carries the state by expressing doubt that the wandering electors of recent decades would have behaved in that manner in truly close elections. I would argue the reverse, however. Both the power and incentives of individual electors and groups of them to defect rise as the split of electoral votes gets closer. The close election, though, is the most relevant case for the computation of marginal power. This argument, in fact, suggests the desirability of abolishing the electors, even if the electoral college system is retained.

I think that the approach of Shapley values in the examination of the electoral college is useful. I also think, however, that one must

---

Williams College, Williamstown, Massachusetts. Notes by Henry A. Selby, Mathematical Association of America, 1973.

[3] See Banzhaf, p. 308.

[4] See Guillermo Owen, "Political Games," *Naval Research Logistics Quarterly*, 18 (Sept., 1971), 345–355. This is also discussed at pp. 76–78 of Shapley.

explicitly recognize the limitations imposed by its assumptions. The Shapley value develops only some of the sources of bias created by the constitutional framework of the electoral college system. Other kinds of bias caused by the electoral college must also be considered in the constitutional debate.

CHESTER SPATT
University of Pennsylvania

TO THE EDITOR:

Mr. Spatt's Comment brings up some points which I would like to answer. My hope is not to deny their validity or importance, but rather, to explain why such problems must arise. In general, his points fall into two categories: in the first place, there is the question of whether the Shapley value can actually measure the power of players in such a game; secondly, there is a question as to whether — in view of my simplifying assumptions — my calculations actually give a good approximation to the "true" Shapley value. I shall attempt to deal with these in turn.

1. The Shapley value, as originally developed (in an axiomatic manner), assigns an expected payoff to each n-person game — with the understanding that the game is entirely defined by its characteristic function. Thus it can take into account nothing which does not appear (at least implicitly) in the characteristic function; in particular it does not take into account personal affinities among the players, nor — as is here the case — the strong existing tendencies for the electorates of certain states (e.g., Alabama and Mississippi) to vote similarly.

Under the circumstances, I am the first to admit that the Shapley value does not properly evaluate the several voters' "ability to influence election outcomes." Two questions naturally arise: (a) Why, then, should we bother to study the Shapley value for such games? (b) How should the value concept be modified to take such affinities and voting patterns into account?

To answer (a), I feel that, from a theoretical (constitutional) point of view, the inequities reflected in the Shapley or Banzhaf values are more serious than those which are due to voting patterns, i.e., that constitution-writers should avoid the Shapley-value-measured inequities more seriously than they should avoid the others.

To make this point clear, let us consider the case of a Southern state, such as Alabama or Mississippi, in which the overwhelming majority (say 70 to 80 per cent) of the population belongs to the Democratic party. In that case, the remaining 20 or 30 per cent, who style themselves Republicans, are effectively disenfranchised: they cannot influence, say, the outcome of the gubernatorial or presidential elections, nor have they any hope of being elected to such office. To avoid this problem, there is perhaps something to be said for "breaking up" the Democratic party (as some Republicans would doubtless like); there is even something to be said for declaring Alabama (legally) a one-party state, outlawing the Republicans and all other parties, in much the same manner as Iran has recently been declared (by the Shah) a one-party state. One or the other of these measures might conceivably work; I would not however endorse them. I do feel, on the other hand, that the inbuilt inequities of the system (i.e., those measured by the Shapley value) should be corrected unless there is strong reason to maintain them.

To answer (b), I believe that the voting affinities among states should first of all be measured by some statistical technique such as, e.g., a factor analysis of election results. (I have in fact some unpublished results in this direction.) Once these affinities have been measured, some modification of the Shapley value concept should be used; footnotes 2 and 4 to Mr. Spatt's letters refer to two such modifications. (There may be others in the literature, but I am unaware of any.) We would then probably find that it is such "swing" states as New York and Ohio that influence elections most strongly. In any case, this is certainly something that should be done, if only to help presidential candidates plan their strategy.

2. It is clear that, in each of my simplifying assumptions, I was doing what all model-builders must do: willy-nilly one sacrifices accuracy for the sake of tractability. The trouble with a perfectly accurate model is that it would be as complex as the original system; thus the question is not whether my model was totally accurate, but rather whether the inaccuracies introduced were (a) small enough to make my results valuable as they stand, and (b) justified by the consequent economy of time and effort.

With regard to (a), I must admit that it is difficult to estimate the error introduced by my simplifications. I feel quite certain, however, that the errors are negligible when compared to the inequities measured; i.e., these inequities do exist and are almost exactly as given in my paper. I feel this is so because a deadlock in the electoral college is simply of such a low probability as to make very little change in my

calculations; similarly the probability that an election be changed by electors reneging on their pledges is too small to make much change in my figures. (I agree however with Mr. Spatt that it would be advisable to abolish the individual electors if not the electoral college; the fact that such an event has negligible probability does not mean that it should not be prevented.)

With regard to (b), I believe that there is simply no question; an attempt to dispense with my simplifications would have increased the necessary effort and computer time to astronomical levels, for what I consider a minimal increase in accuracy.

In brief, I thank Mr. Spatt for his comments, and agree with much of what he says. I wish moreover that someone would continue this work along the lines mentioned above. I feel nonetheless that my analysis is valuable both for practical and theoretic reasons, and believe that my paper gives accurate results.

GUILLERMO OWEN
Rice University

A Reanalysis of Achen's Critique of the Converse Model of Mass Political Belief

TO THE EDITOR:

I never expected to find myself defending Philip Converse's conception of the instability of political attitudes, but Christopher Achen's reinterpretation in the December, 1975 issue of the *Review* seems so strikingly mistaken that there is no alternative. These authors and others have struggled to explain the low correlations over time associated with administration of the same attitude questions to the 1956–58–60 SRC panel, and the following factors have been variously advanced:

A. "Real change." What everyone seems to have in mind here is measurable change in some definite metrical variable associated with the respondent—the sort of change we might measure in body weight, blood pressure, etc.
B. "Measurement error." A disturbance (generally assumed to be stochastic) imposed on the measurement process by imperfections in the measuring instrument: slop in the manometer gear train, keypunching errors, and what Achen refers to as "vagueness" in the questionnaire items.
C. "Randomness internal to the respondent, and his fault." This is the source advanced by Converse, and it has no clear parallel in (classical) physical measurement: the respondent, although lacking a real opinion or possessing only a very vague one, just blurts something out "at random," avoiding the embarrassment of admitting to no opinion.

After Achen develops a stochastic model used to estimate item unreliability (factor B), he exhibits corrected correlation coefficients associated with readministration of the items. For six of the eight political attitude items administered in 1958 and 1960, the corrected correlations range from 0.96 to 0.99; the housing and electricity item discussed by Converse yields a striking 0.98, compared to an uncorrected correlation of only 0.37 (the other uncorrected coefficients range from 0.44 to 0.57). It is evident that almost all of the very considerable change in responses between 1958 and 1960 must be attributed to measurement error; indeed, when one takes into account several approximations and imperfections in the process (sampling error, the use of the Pearson correlation coefficient in the absence of continuously distributed data, the probable correlation of Achen's disturbance terms u_1 and u_2, etc.), Achen finds no positive evidence whatever of changes due to factors A or C in responses to the housing and electric power item. Unfortunately, Achen's model begs the question: it is not only incapable of distinguishing between factors B and C — it attributes any C-type variance that may be present to factor B.

Before we begin to examine the model it is worth noting that although Achen refers to the critique of Pierce and Rose (in the June, 1974 *Review*) as "idiosyncratic" and to the reply of Converse as "powerful," Achen's approach is rather closer to that of Pierce and Rose than to that of Converse. The latter's "black-and-white" model assumes heterogeneity in the population: different dudes are subject to different stochastic processes — specifically, there is a group whose responses are quite stable over time, and a group whose answers obey some probability distribution. Both critical papers, however, assume homogeneity in the population: each respondent is subject to the same process.[1] Achen's model is as follows, where x is the respondent's "observed opinion" (his re-

[1] These comments refer principally to the first part of Achen's paper, to p. 1226; most of them apply as well to his multiple regression analysis, pp. 1227ff., but the latter does assume heterogeneity. This is purchased at the considerable price of assuming each random variable is realized only once (all sample sizes are one), introducing—obviously—a really desperate problem of sampling variation and estimation. It seems to me almost incredible that anyone would use estimates derived under such assumptions as the dependent variable in a multiple regression, but the whole issue is mooted by the fundamental problems in Achen's model that are discussed below. The sampling problem itself is considered in some detail in the Hunter and Coggin letter.

sponse), p is his "actual opinion," e is "measurement error," and $u_t = p_{t+1} - p_t$, with subscripts indicating observations at successive points in time. (Achen appears to regard factors A and C to be somehow combined in the u's — or alternatively the p's — with the e-terms isolating the effects of factor B, measurement error.)

$$x_1 = p_1 + e_1$$
$$x_2 = p_2 + e_2 = p_1 + u_1 + e_2$$
$$x_3 = p_3 + e_3 = p_1 + u_1 + u_2 + e_3$$

All these quantities are to be interpreted as random variables, and by "suitable" assumptions Achen estimates the variance of the e's, establishing that (in the case of the housing and electricity item) the e's greatly dominate the u's.

Stochastic models like this one are subtly pernicious, permitting definite algebraic manipulations and numerical conclusions while at the same time rendering the mind almost totally incapable of straight thought. And they appear so powerful: Achen's model, indeed, permits us to assess the relative influence of the u's and the e's, although neither p's nor u's nor e's is observed for any respondent. The reader should not blandly admire such an achievement, but should ask himself *if it is possible,* ignoring, for a moment, the details of the model itself. In this case, we have quantitatively distinguished the relative influence of question vagueness and what we might call respondent vagueness, although question vagueness is not some simple thing like a bloodstain on an interview schedule, but is only realized in the mind of the respondent, alongside the respondent's own vagueness, if any. Certainly every professor should realize that the distinction between vagueness in an (exam) question and vagueness attributable to the respondent is something about which we may form judgments and talk at length, but surely such a distinction will not yield fully and unequivocally to a nearly trivial application of the algebra of expectations. I convince no one by saying this: you are all intimidated by algebra.

So let us confront the algebra. Note that disturbances of type B and type C manifest themselves rather similarly to the outside observer, and that what Achen calls the "actual opinion," p, already includes whatever Converse disturbance may be present. It would be natural to represent this as follows, where w is the Converse disturbance and q is the real-underlying-honest-to-God-no-kidding opinion:

$$x_1 = q_1 + w_1 + e_1$$
$$x_2 = q_2 + w_2 + e_2$$
$$x_3 = q_3 + w_3 + e_3$$

In this case the w's and e's enter the equations symmetrically, and it is obvious that the separate variances cannot be estimated from the data. (Ah, but do we wish to assume there *is* such a thing as a q? One is uneasy with either answer, but for many respondents, much of the time, opinions are assuredly not merely white noise, and any model that assumes homogeneity of the population has little alternative but to include something like q. The letters column is obviously no place to resolve core issues in the philosophy of attitude measurement, or even to consider in detail the relationship between Achen's model and the far more elaborate Coombsian model — for categoric responses — which Achen briefly discusses. The technical deficiencies of Achen's model are quite independent of such considerations.)

Formally, Achen avoids the natural symmetry of the B-type and C-type disturbances by forcing them to enter his model unsymmetrically:

$$x_1 = p_1 + e_1$$
$$x_2 = p_1 + u_1 + e_2$$
$$x_3 = p_1 + u_1 + u_2 + e_3$$

Opinion *changes,* the u's, are said by Achen to include the Converse disturbances, and large estimated variances for the u's are said to indicate large Converse disturbances; small u's and large e's, on the other hand, indicate that measurement errors are dominant:

> In summary, when a voter is stable in his views and *all* observed variability is measurement error, correlations will be equal across time periods. At the other extreme, when a voter is unstable and there is *no* measurement error, correlations should become smaller at a predictable rate as time periods become more distant from each other. By observing where the data fall between these polar cases, the model estimates the measurement error in each survey question. (Achen, p. 1221)

But there are not *two* poles but at least eight, since each of the three factors A, B, C, may independently be present in varying amounts. Achen's summary is simply bizarre — the (affirmative) evidence for Converse disturbances is a particular pattern of declining (positive) correlations between more distant responses, although Converse made essentially the opposite inference: that declining correla-

tions imply "real" opinions and real opinion change, while constant correlations are to be explained by the black-white model. Strangely, Achen does not discuss this reversal.

Although Achen believes he has combined Converse-type and "true" changes in the u-terms, he has in fact caused C-type disturbances to be included in the estimated variance of the e's. The C-disturbances, like those of type B, are present equally in all sets of observations over time — they do not somehow magically cumulate as do the u's. The role of the u's is indeed peculiar: although their expectations have a simple interpretation (change in the mean of the responses over time), we will obtain large estimated *variances* for the u's only in a rather rare situation: heteroscedasticity in the observations over time, the variance of the observations increasing with the passage of time, for to each successive response is added a new random variable, which Achen generally assumes to be independent of the earlier u's. In the model each respondent sets off on his own random walk in one dimension, and they collectively drift farther and farther apart, a kind of expanding opinion universe. The failure of the data to look this way leads to low estimates of the u-variances, which Achen proceeds to misinterpret. The model is absurd: note how u_1, the "actual" opinion change between time 1 and 2, lies as a sort of mortmain on all subsequent responses, influencing them with undiminished force to the end of time. There are almost inexpressibly subtle confusions here between thinking of the u's as mere algebraic representations of changes, and thinking of them as random variables representing causes.

It is easy to see how a single scholar in the assiduous search for publishable results could create a paper such as this. Nevertheless, and without wishing to indict Achen, his friends or referees, I must say I am alarmed that such a bizarre and misleading model could find its way into print in the *Review*. There are, after all, a number of features of this paper which should cause any alert and careful reader to become suspicious:

(1) We should beware of any correlation of 0.98 in survey data, especially when it arises by "correcting" a correlation of 0.37, so that the vast majority of the relationship *lies in the correction.*
(2) The u's are said to represent changes in "actual" opinions, although Converse's thesis was that many responses lacked the foundations that the word actual ordinarily implies.
(3) The model purports to separate questionnaire vagueness from respondent vagueness, but no substantial explanation is given of how such a surgical separation may be achieved.
(4) The use of correlational evidence is virtually the reverse of Converse's use, again without explanation.
(5) The pattern of cumulation of the u's over time should cause any reader to suspect the model may not be stationary, and may establish $t = 1$, the beginning of the measurement process, as a preferred time with implications for behavior. It does have this fault, and again no explanation is offered.

That so much of this must have been missed by so many readers does indeed suggest there is a bit of vagueness around here—somewhere.

STEPHEN V. STEPHENS
Baltimore, Maryland

TO THE EDITOR:

In his article "Mass Political Attitudes and the Survey Response" (*ASPR*, 69 [December, 1975], 1218–1231), Christopher Achen has added another interesting chapter in the attempt to refute Converse's[1] argument that many of the people who respond to a survey question actually have no opinion on the point asked. Achen takes Converse to task for ignoring the possibility of unreliability or measurement error in survey items. It is perhaps fitting then that we take Achen to task for ignoring measurement error in *his* main dependent variable. In a nutshell the argument to be spelled out in this letter is this: The mathematical model presented by Achen is *not* mathematically inconsistent with the model presented by Converse. Thus evidence in favor of the Achen model is *not* evidence against the Converse model. The only evidence in Achen's paper which might differentiate between the two models is the evidence which Achen cites concerning individual differences in the amount of error of measurement in the survey response. Achen claims that the variability in error of measurement is too low to be consistent with the Converse model. However his evidence takes the form of multiple correlations between an *estimate* of the error for each person and various indicators of political interest and activity. Achen claims that the low multiple correlations which he observes are the result of a nil difference in the size of the errors of measurement from one person to the next. It is our con-

[1] Philip Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," *Ideology and Discontent*, ed. David E. Apter (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 206–61. Also Phillip Converse, "Attitudes and Nonattitudes: Continuation of a Dialogue," *The Quantitative Analysis of Social Problems*, ed. Edward R. Tufte (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1970), pp. 168–89.

:ention that the low multiple correlations are the esult of unreliability or error of measurement in he variable used by Achen to estimate the size of he error in each individual. We will show that eliability is at best .25 and may be as low as .09. With reliabilities that low, multiple correlations of .10 to .20 represent much stronger relations than is the case for well-measured dependent variables. Moreover, low reliabilities mean an increase in the relative impact of sampling error and hence a greatly lowered probability of finding statistical significance in individual beta weights. Thus if our calculations of the reliability of Achen's dependent variable are correct, then Achen's evidence against Converse is completely emasculated. This doesn't mean that Achen's claims are wrong, it just means that Achen presents no evidence to back up that claim. Actually Erikson[2] has offered *direct* evidence that political interest variables are not related to either test-retest correlations or to correlations between opinions in the SRC data.

Achen's dependent variable

Both Achen and Converse assert that the survey response can be analyzed into two components: i.e., written $x=t+e$, where t is the "true score" or expected answer to a series of hypothetically perfectly analagous questions, and e is a random response component. Converse goes on to assert, however, that people can be broken into two types: those who actually hold opinions for whom $e=0$, $t\neq 0$; and those who actually hold no opinion for whom $t=0$, $e\neq 0$. If we could directly measure the error term e, there would be no problem in testing the Converse model: we would simply tabulate σ_{ei}^2 for individuals i and see if the resulting distribution was bimodal at $\sigma_{ei}^2=0$ and $\sigma_{ei}^2=\overset{2}{e}\sigma$. But alas, the error component cannot be observed for single individuals unless we consider repeated measurements at different points in time, and then we have a confounding between apparent change due to independent errors of measurement and real change in true opinion. Thus the Converse black-and-white model is only asserted to fit perfectly for issues on which there is no change over the time interval considered. Similarly, the Achen measure of response error is only unconfounded with real change if there is none. Fortunately, the test-retest correlations corrected for attenuation shown in Achen's Table 1 show that there is little real change on most of the issues considered in the SRC data.

[2] Robert S. Erikson, "The SRC Panel Data and Mass Political Attitudes," presented at the 1975 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in San Francisco.

Consider the Achen estimate of the response error in an individual subject:

$$s_i = (x_{2i}-x_{1i})^2 + (x_{3i}-x_{2i})^2 - (x_{3i}-x_{1i})^2 + \text{constant}.$$

In the pure case in which there is no change over time in true score, this estimate becomes

$$s_1 = \overset{2}{e_2} - e_1e_2 - e_2e_3 + e_1e_3.$$

This score s_i is not the actual error variance σ_{ei}^2 for individual i but is related to the actual variance in precisely a true-score/observed-score relation. That is, the person's true score on s_i is the average of his scores on a hypothetical series of questions which are equivalent in content but with independently sampled errors of measurement. This average for the Achen estimator s_i is given by

$$\underset{i}{E}(s_i) = \overset{2}{\sigma_{ei}}$$

That is, the true score for s_i is the desired individual response error. However there is random variability in the score s_i produced by the randomness of the errors e_1, e_2, and e_3. The extent of this error is assessed by considering the same hypothetical set of equivalent responses as is considered in obtaining the true score; the error in s_i, however, is not the mean of those scores, but the variance:

$$\underset{i}{\text{Var}}\,(s) = \underset{i}{\text{Var}}\,(\overset{2}{e_2} - e_1e_2 - e_2e_3 + e_1e_3)$$

The scores e_1, e_2, e_3 are the successive response errors for person i. These response errors are independent, identically distributed (if there is no change in true score), and have mean 0. From these facts, we can show that the four components of the score s are uncorrelated (though not independent). For example, the lack of correlation between the component e_2^2 and the component e_1e_2 follows from the calculation of the following covariance

$$E(\{\overset{2}{e_2}\}\{e_1e_2\}) = E(\overset{3}{e_2}e_1) = E(\overset{3}{e_2})E(e_1)$$
$$= E(\overset{3}{e_2})0 = 0$$

The lack of correlation between components e_1e_2 and e_2e_3 follows from the covariance

$$E(\{e_1e_2\}\{e_2e_3\}) = E(e_1\overset{2}{e_2}e_3)$$
$$= E(e_1)E(\overset{2}{e_2})E(e_3)$$
$$= 0\ E(\overset{2}{e_2})\ 0 = 0.$$

Since the four components of s are uncorrelated, the variance of s is the sum of the four variances of the four components. That is, the variance in s for person i is

$$\underset{i}{\text{Var}}(s) = \underset{i}{\text{Var}}(e_2^2) + \underset{i}{\text{Var}}(e_1e_2) + \underset{i}{\text{Var}}(e_2e_3) + \underset{i}{\text{Var}}(e_1e_3).$$

The three product terms all have the same variance (since the errors are identically distributed if there is no change in true scores). The variance in e_1e_2 for person i is

$$\begin{aligned}\underset{i}{\text{Var}}(e_1e_2) &= E(\{e_1e_2\}^2) - \{E(e_1e_2)\}^2 \\ &= E(e_1^2e_2^2) - 0 \\ &= E(e_1^2)E(e_2^2) = \sigma_{ei}^2\sigma_{ei}^2 \\ &= \sigma_{ei}^4.\end{aligned}$$

The variance in the component e_2^2 for person i is

$$\begin{aligned}\underset{i}{\text{Var}}(e_2^2) &= E(\{e_2^2\}^2) - \{E(e_2^2)\}^2 \\ &= E(e_2^4) - \{\sigma_{ei}^2\}^2 \\ &= (\text{Raw kurtosis of } e) - \sigma_{ei}^4 \\ &= \sigma_{ei}^4(\text{standardized kurtosis of } e) - \sigma_{ei}^4.\end{aligned}$$

If we denote the standardized kurtosis of e for person i by K_i, then we have

$$\underset{i}{\text{Var}}(e_2^2) = \sigma_{ei}^4(K_i) - \sigma_{ei}^4 = (K_i - 1)\sigma_{ei}^4.$$

The value of the kurtosis K_i is the only number in our calculations which depends on the actual shape of the distribution of errors for a given subject. In the Achen analysis which preserved the original five point scale, the errors of measurement would usually be assumed to have an approximately normal distribution in which case the kurtosis would be $K_i=3$. However if the data were reduced to a two point, pro-con scoring as was done by Converse, then the kurtosis would be that of a binary variable which would vary with the probability of that binary. The minimum kurtosis would be the smallest possible value for a kurtosis: $K_i=1$ at a probability of .5. For probabilities different from one half the kurtosis increases to infinity near 0 and 1; with a kurtosis of 3 taken on at either a probability of .21 or .79.

We now have the true score of the error estimator s_i which is σ_{ei}^2. The variation of s_i about that true score for person i is given by

$$\begin{aligned}\underset{i}{\text{Var}}(s) &= \underset{i}{\text{Var}}(e_2^2) + 3\,\underset{i}{\text{Var}}(e_1e_2) \\ &= \sigma_{ei}^4(K_i - 1 + 3).\end{aligned}$$

In order to get the reliability of the error estimator s_i we need to consider averages and variances over people. For a given population, the true score variance is given by

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Var}(\sigma_{ei}^2) &= E(\{\sigma_{ei}^2\}^2) - \{E(\sigma_{ei}^2)\}^2 \\ &= E(\sigma_{ei}^4) - \sigma_e^4,\end{aligned}$$

where σ_e^2 is the overall or average error variance in the item response x. The error variance in the estimator s_i is the average of the error variances for each person separately, i.e., the error variance of s is

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Var}(\text{error in } s) &= E(\underset{i}{\text{Var}}(s)) \\ &= E(\sigma_{ei}^4\{K_i + 2\}).\end{aligned}$$

The reliability of the Achen estimator s is then given by

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Rel}(s_i) &= \frac{\text{Var (true scores for } s_i)}{\text{Var (true for } s) + \text{Var (error for } s_i)} \\ &= \frac{E(\sigma_{ei}^4) - \sigma_e^4}{\{E(\sigma_{ei}^4) - \sigma_e^4\} + \{E(\sigma_{ei}^4\{K_i + 2\})\}} \\ &= \frac{E(\sigma_{ei}^4) - \sigma_e^4}{E(\sigma_{ei}^4\{K_i + 3\}) - \sigma_e^4}.\end{aligned}$$

What are reasonable numerical values to expect for the reliability of the Achen estimator? That depends on assumptions about the kurtosis of the error distribution and upon the extent of variance in the individual response variances. For example, in the Achen five-point scoring, the roughly continuous error distribution for each person should have a typical kurtosis of about three. If the kurtosis were uniformly three, then we would have the following formula:

$$\text{Rel}(s_i) = \frac{E(\sigma_{ei}^4) - \sigma_e^4}{6E(\sigma_{ei}^4) - \sigma_e^4}.$$

There is no lower bound on how low this reliability can be, but there is an upper bound. The upper bound would be taken on if σ_e^4 were 0, i.e., if the original responses were all perfectly reliable. Thus setting σ_e^4 to 0 in the equation above yields an absolute upper bound on the reliability if the kurtosis is three:

$$\text{Rel}\,(s_i) < \frac{E(\sigma_{ei}^4)}{6E(\sigma_{ei}^4)} = \frac{1}{6}.$$

That is, the most reasonable estimate of the reliability of Achen's response error score is that it is somewhere less than .17. How much lower? That depends on the extent of the variability in the error variance from subject to subject. To the extent that Achen's main contention is true, there is little variation in σ_{ei}^2 from one subject to the next and hence the value of σ_e^4 would be very nearly as large as $E(\sigma_{ei}^4)$ and the reliability of the estimator score s_i would be very near zero.

What is the maximum reliability of the Achen response error estimation score s_i if we consider all possible statistical distributions? Believe it or not, the Achen estimator would be at its largest if the Converse black-and-white model were true! Assume that the black-and-white model is true and that half the population holds an opinion while half the population has none. For this Converse model, we have

$$\sigma_{ei}^2 = \begin{cases} 0 \text{ if person } i \text{ holds an opinion} \\ \sigma^2 \text{ if person } i \text{ has no opinion.} \end{cases}$$

The true score variance of s_i is then

$$\text{Var}\,(\sigma_{ei}^2) = \frac{\sigma^2}{4}$$

For binary scoring, a person who has no opinion has an error distribution with kurtosis of one. Thus

$$\underset{i}{\text{Var}}\,(s) = \begin{cases} 0 \text{ if person } i \text{ holds an opinion} \\ 3\sigma^4 \text{ if person } i \text{ has no opinion} \end{cases}$$

The error variance of the estimator s_i is then given by

$$E(\underset{i}{\text{Var}}\,\{s\}) = \frac{0 + 3\sigma^4}{2} = \frac{3}{2}\sigma^4.$$

Finally the Achen response error estimation score s_i is given by

$$\text{Rel}\,(s) = \frac{\frac{\sigma^4}{4}}{\frac{\sigma^4}{4} + \frac{3}{2}\sigma^4} = \frac{1}{7}.$$

To generalize this, let the proportion of persons who hold an opinion be p while the proportion of persons who have no opinion is denoted $q = 1 - p$. Then the reliability of the Achen estimator is given by

$$\text{Rel}_p\,(s) = \frac{pq\sigma^4}{pq\sigma^4 + 3q\sigma^4} = \frac{p}{p+3}.$$

As the number of persons who hold no opinion shrinks to zero, this reliability approaches the highest possible value for the Achen estimator, namely $\text{Rel}_1(s) = .25$.

What would Converse predict for the reliability of Achen's estimator? Converse never says just what portion of the population he believes to be in the "elite" category, but we can make estimates from other numbers which he does discuss. For example, in the original black-and-white model he presents an estimate of $r = .47$ for those who were constant on the first two observations of their attitudes. A little algebra shows that this implies that the proportion of persons who hold an opinion must be 31 per cent. The corresponding reliability would be .09.

Achen's multiple correlations

In response to our prepublication letter, Achen simply reiterated Footnote 20 which admits the existence of measurement error in his estimator, but claimed that it makes little difference. Consider, however, that Achen reported a range of .11 to .19 in his multiple correlations between estimated error s_i and composites of sophistication measures. Even if the reliability of his error estimator were as high as .25, it would mean that the multiple correlations corrected for attenuation would increase to a range of .22 to .38. Moreover, had a perfectly reliable measure been used, it is likely that the number of significant multiple correlations would have risen from 3 out of 8 to 8 out of 8.

In fact, if Converse is right then his data tend to suggest that the proportion of persons who have no opinion is not near 0 per cent, but is more like 69 per cent. If so, then the reliability of Achen's measure would only be .09. Correction for attenuation would then raise the multiple correlations from a range of .11–.19 to a range of .37–.63 and that would be very respectable for the Converse model.

It is our conclusion that although Achen's analysis was very sophisticated, it was vitiated by a failure to consider the reliability of his main dependent measure. The upshot of this error is that it leaves no evidence which tends to contradict the Converse model.

JOHN E. HUNTER
T. DANIEL COGGIN
Michigan State University

To The Editor:

The nonattitude hypothesis of Philip Converse is one of the most important developments in political science in recent years both because of its implications for the methodology of survey research and because of its relationship to democratic theory. I was pleased, therefore, to read the article by Christopher H. Achen in the December 1975 *APSR* titled "Mass Political Attitudes and the Survey Response" (pp. 1218–1231). Achen has given the discipline an alternative hypothesis to explain the Converse panel data: measurement error due to the ambiguity of the survey items.

However, Achen has not shown to my satisfaction that his explanation is a better way of accounting for the essentially random variation found by Converse. Perhaps I have missed something in his article, or misunderstood his model. If so, I am sure I will be corrected.

The heart of the Achen argument is found on page 1221. He states: "By the nature of the assumptions, all sources of observation error are implicitly counted as 'measurement error.'" Although he is referring in this passage to other kinds of error, such as assuming interval level data, the statement indicates what his mathematical notation confirms: that he is begging the question.

Achen has given us a method of separating out real attitude changes from random variations. This may be an advance over the Converse "black and white" model which assumed that respondents were absolutely stable in their opinions or picked the answers to Likert-type survey items at random. Thus by using the methods given by Achen we can see that the proportion of individuals giving random responses was not as great as Converse suspected. There still remains, however, a large group of individuals who are responding in an essentially random fashion. I cannot determine how Achen can tell whether these people are responding in this way because they do not understand the question or because they do not have an opinion on the question (nonattitude). Achen seems to have "assumed" that this variation is a product of question nonintelligibility.

Nor are his references to the social psychology literature on this subject very helpful. The tests which these folks use to determine reliability such as split-half, test/retest, and manipulation of shades of grey are not possible with the Converse panel data.

While Achen's computations will not help us determine whether the random responses are a product of item ambiguity or nonattitudes, the rest of his article sheds some light on this subject. It seems to me the low rate of random response on the party identification question shows, as Converse argued, that the cause of these strange responses is nonattitudes. If the voter can understand the difference between being a "strong" Republican and just being a regular old run-of-the-mill one, why can't they differentiate between strong and weak agreement on issues? Similarly, if the respondents seem able to understand the idea of "leaning" toward the Democrats, they should be able to comprehend issue questions.

On the other hand, the high level of random response to the church attendance question would seem to indicate that item ambiguity is the villain. The church attendance question seems to be much simpler than the issue items, and Achen is certainly right that such behavior is quite stable over time. So we have a rather mixed record on this point.

The regression results reported in the article are not much help either. Achen is correct when he indicates that Converse seems to base his mass/elite distinction on education or perhaps socioeconomic status in general. Thus the finding that random responses are not greater among those with little education seems, at first glance, to be evidence against the nonattitudes hypothesis. But this is cold comfort for the alternative item ambiguity argument. For the inability to comprehend fairly simple Likert items is surely related to education. In fact, I would argue that the Achen hypothesis is severely damaged by his regression results.

It is fairly easy to make the nonattitude hypothesis coincide with the Achen regression results. It seems likely to me that the formulation of attitudes on particular issues is not a product of education but a matter of interest. People have nonattitudes not because they are dumb but because their interests lie elsewhere. It is only the arrogance of political scientists which causes us to assume that people who are smart and well educated are more likely to share our concern with the political aspects of life in all instances.

If the random responses in the Converse panel data are the result of item ambiguity, that ambiguity might arise primarily from the differences between "agree" and "agree strongly" and between "disagree" and "disagree strongly." Achen suggests that this may be the case (p. 1220). I for one would certainly think that these measures of "strength" resemble the "shades of grey" choices used by C. H. Coombs

in his book, *A Theory of Data*, cited by Achen. It would be fairly easy to test for this possibility. Achen, or someone else who has access to the data, should collapse the responses into a simple trichotomy (agree, indifferent, and disagree) and apply appropriate statistical tests to see if the tendency to respond at random decreases greatly or disappears altogether. If it does not, this would seem to be additional evidence for the nonattitude hypothesis. I cannot believe that the "zone of greyness" around an individual's "most-preferred point" can extend from agreement to disagreement on these SRC questionnaire items. If it does, then I would argue that the real most-preferred point is indifference, which is more or less what the nonattitudes hypothesis posits.

My conclusion at this point is that at least some of these random responses are a product of item ambiguity and at least some are a product of nonattitudes. I suspect both Converse and Achen would agree. The question is the relative proportions of each kind of error source. There is no reason to believe that the proportions do not vary from question to question and from sample to sample in ways that are at this point unclear. The implications of this conclusion for survey research are the same as they were following the original Converse work. If we wish to measure attitudes on issues accurately, we will have to go to the extra trouble of using open-ended questions. And we will have to suffer the inconvenience of receiving responses that are ambiguous because of the variety of responses. We will have to search for new structures to give order to these responses. The implied structure of Likert items and additive scales does not reflect the reality of public opinion.

The implications of the nonattitude hypothesis for democratic theory are important, but in my opinion not as extreme as Achen suggests. My reading of Converse does not convince me that he believes the failure of an individual to have attitudes on one particular issue means he or she does not have attitudes on other issues. And democratic theory does not demand (recently) that the voter have an attitude on all issues, only that he or she have an attitude about some issues and vote accordingly. My own peculiar view of "democracy" is even less restrictive. I believe in the absolute right of political abstention (an activity that seems more and more reasonable). If one does not really care about things political, why should his or her participation be necessary for the fair and civilized process of decision making by everybody else? As long as the individual can move in and out of the political arena freely, why is lack of participation by the uncommitted important? In fact, such nonparticipation helps to solve some of the problems of "intensity" pointed out by Robert Dahl in his *Preface to Democratic Theory*.

THEODORE S. ARRINGTON
University of North Carolina at Charlotte

TO THE EDITOR:

Let me begin by concurring with Professor Stephens that in the *first* part of my discussion of "measurement error," I did not try to distinguish culpable vagueness from vagueness due to question wording. It is not statistically possible to do so in the first simple model I presented, so I temporarily lumped them together as part of the *e* terms (the measurement error). Indeed, later in the article, I state this explicitly: "Might it not be that this 'measurement error' is really a simple matter of not understanding the question?" (p. 1226)

Having used the first part of the article to separate real change (Stephens's type A) from measurement error, I then spent the final third of the text trying to disentangle culpable and nonculpable vagueness (Stephens's types B and C). I argued that if we are to assign "blame" for vagueness, we need some standard of judgment. For example, if we ask whether Hegel is inherently vague or merely difficult, we use the judgment of persons well acquainted with the subject matter. For survey questions, we may ask whether political sophisticates have less difficulty with the questions than the uninformed. To investigate this issue, I compared the estimated measurement error (the total of B and C) for well-educated citizens interested in politics, etc. with the error for the less educated, concerned, and so on. When these groups turned out to have similar average scores, I concluded that acquaintance with the subject matter did not seem to help much, and therefore most of the vagueness was probably due to the questions.

Mr. Stephens simply misinterprets the *u* terms (which are composed solely of real opinion change), and he seems to have overlooked the latter part of my paper entirely. His critique of the first part — that I do not distinguish types B and C — recapitulates my own criticisms on p. 1226, and I have no quarrel with it. I simply wish he had read on.

Most of Mr. Stephens's other complaints

about my work are based on mistakes in arithmetic. Three examples:

(1) He argues that my model forces real opinion change to appear small. Statistically speaking, he claims that the u terms are required to have small variances if the variance of the observations does not increase over time, e.g., that if $var\ (p+u_1) = var\ (p)$, then $var\ (u_1)$ must be zero. But of course, $var\ (p+u_1) = var\ (p) + var\ (u_1) + 2cov(p,u_1)$, so that it is perfectly possible for $var(u_1)$ to be large even if $var\ (p)$ and $var(p + u_1)$ are equal. We require only that p and u_1 be allowed to be negatively correlated, which indeed they were in my estimates. Mr. Stephens was no doubt thinking of the situation in which p and u_1 are uncorrelated, but I made no such assumption.

(2) He writes that I assume that all respondents behave the same. This is like saying that the calculation of a mean requires that we assume all individuals sampled are identical in score. In my estimates, with one exception, all the quantities needed are simple sums of individual scores, and the exception (the term, $E(x_2\text{-}x_1)E(x_3\text{-}x_3)$) reduces to a similar calculation if the expected true opinion change is the same across individuals. (This requires some similarity among respondents, but not too much.) Then, since the individual-level calculations are unbiased estimates of individual's measurement errors, so also is the sum an unbiased estimate of the *average* measurement error. Professor Stephens is surely familiar with the following result from the ordinary regression case: under fairly general conditions, we can interpret regression coefficients as estimates of the average coefficients in the sampled population, and there is no need to assume that every individual has the same true coefficients. The same kind of argument applies here. We can interpret my estimates as averages without requiring anything like perfect homogeneity.

(3) Mr. Stephens believes I am making a substantive assumption when I measure real opinion change from the position at the previous period, which makes the term u_1 appear at each time period. He says: "Note how u_1 the 'actual' opinion change between time 1 and 2, lies as a sort of mortmain on all subsequent responses, influencing them with undiminished force to the end of time." This is roughly like saying that making the unit of distance the foot influences all subsequent calculations of distance. Of course it does, but distance is still distance. It is perfectly possible here to rewrite the model so that u_1 appears only once, namely at time 2. Substantively, this means measuring opinion changes from the position at the *first* (rather than the previous) time period. If we rewrite all the old assumptions (Mr. Stephens doesn't suggest any new ones) in terms of these new measures, all the estimates will be the same as before. The difference is cosmetic. (I might add that Converse and I draw precisely the same conclusion when correlations among the observations decline over time: that real change has occurred.)

Finally, I should make it clear that I have no desire to defend my article to the last word. Some of the assumptions (mostly those Stephens doesn't mention) are very approximate, and the regression approach to separating the two kinds of vagueness is clumsy. Models are to be used, not believed; and they should be discarded when other scholars show how they can be superseded by other, more general approaches. John Jackson and Robert Erikson have both pointed out relevant difficulties in my procedures, and go on to improve and extend previous work with new models but, happily, similar conclusions. Similar findings or not, criticism of that sort can only be applauded. Among Professor Stephens's remarks, by contrast, the calmer and more accurate consist in reminding us that our models are far from perfect; and that is pretty tame stuff.

My comments on the other two letters are brief. Hunter and Coggin have performed interesting calculations to estimate the upward adjustment in R^2 that would occur for my regression results were the measurement error in the dependent variable corrected. Their findings are no doubt worth having, but they are irrelevant to my argument in the article. Contrary to these authors' belief that I based my case upon the R^2, I wrote precisely the opposite: "In fact, however, multiple R's and significance levels provide very little statistical evidence for the hypothesis in question (or, indeed, for most social science hypotheses)" (p.1227). I went on to make the point Hunter and Coggin raise, that the R^2 is biased downward, but I added that the regression coefficients were the relevant statistics and that they remain unbiased in the presence of measurement error in the dependent variable (footnote 20). Thus it is quite unimportant how much larger the R^2 should be; my argument, founded on the regression coefficients, would be unaffected.

Finally, I feel that Arrington's suggestions and speculations are interesting, and I am in sympathy with many of his remarks. Let me simply suggest one correction. As I mentioned in replying to Stephens, the dependent variable in the regression incorporates both item ambiguity and failure to understand the question. Thus if a variable like education or interest in the election influenced comprehension and comprehension were the major part of the dependent variable, "measurement error," as Arrington believes, then the variable should have

a large coefficient in the regressions I calculated. Neither these two nor any other variables possessed such a coefficient, and I therefore concluded that measurement error was mostly item ambiguity.

Arrington's intuition suggests that an individual can be vague between "agree" and "strongly agree," but not between "agree" and "disagree." If true, this hypothesis would certainly make possible far simpler discrimination between non-attitudes and item ambiguity. In fact, I tried for other reasons the test Arrington suggests (namely, collapsing the ends of the scale — see footnote 14) and found that measurement error was not much altered. On Arrington's view, the error must then be composed largely of non-attitudes. But of course this implication depends heavily on the supposition that vagueness never extends past the middle of the scale, and that postulate is in need of further research. For the present, my own intuitions are too vague to let me "agree" or "disagree."

CHRISTOPHER ACHEN
University of California, Berkeley

REVIEW ESSAYS

Government and the Media*

ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

The decline in public confidence in all institutions (the presidency, the Congress, the churches, business, education, and the press) stimulates evaluative literature about each. This review examines recent literature on the press.

The crisis of legitimacy is worldwide, so its causes are presumably also global. Consider some commonly offered explanations and how they apply to the press.

The demands for expanded participation in power: Addressed to the press, this claim is a demand for "access." Despite rebuff by the Supreme Court in the Tornillo case concerning the right of reply for a candidate (41 L. Ed. 2nd 730, 1974), there have been increasing calls for changing the concept of freedom of the press from that of a property right of media owners to a right of citizen access.[1]

Acceleration of social change (what Toffler calls future shock): Mass newspapers circulated for a century before radio and movies, but the latter reigned for only a quarter century before TV took pre-eminence as the public's news source, and now a quarter of a century later TV is beginning to face pay-TV, CATV, cassettes, and video recorders. Time, the great bestower of legitimacy, is hardly allowed to operate.

A general decline of illusions: High prin-

**Behind the Front Page.* By Chris Argyris. (San Francisco, Calif.: Jossey-Bass, 1974. Pp. 305. $12.50.)

Deadline for the Media: Today's Challenges to Press, TV & Radio. By James Aronson. (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1972. Pp. 327. $8.95.)

The Press and the Cold War. By James Aronson. (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1974. Pp. 308. $8.00.)

Congress and the News Media. Edited by Robert O. Blanchard. (New York: Hastings House, 1974. Pp. 506. $10.75, paper.)

The Reluctant Reformation: On Criticizing the Press in America. By Lee Brown. (N.Y.: David McKay Co., 1974, Pp. 224. $6.95.)

Don't Blame the People: How the News Media Use Bias, Distortion, and Censorship to Manipulate Public Opinion. By Robert Cirino. (New York: Vintage Books, 1972. Pp. 339. $2.45, paper.)

The News Twisters. By Edith Efron. (Los Angeles, California: Nash Publishing, 1972. Pp. 225. $7.95.)

News From Nowhere: Television and the News. By Edward Jay Epstein. (New York: Random House, 1973. Pp. 321. $7.95.)

Television and Presidential Politics. By Robert E. Gilbert. (North Quincy, Mass., The Christopher Publishing House, 1972. Pp. 335. $9.75.)

Free Press/Free People: The Best Cause. By John Hohenberg. (New York.: Columbia University Press, 1971. Pp. 514. $9.95.)

The Left-Leaning Antenna: Political Bias in Television. By Joseph Keeley. (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1971. Pp. 320. $8.96.)

Politics and the Press. Edited by Richard W. Lee. (Washington, D.C.: Acropolis Books, 1970. Pp. 186. $3.95.)

Lippmann, Liberty and the Press. By John Luskin. (University: The University of Alabama Press, 1972. Pp. 270. $7.95.)

What You Don't Know Can Hurt You: A Study in Public Opinion and Public Emotion. By Lester Markel. (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1972. Pp. 288. $2.95.)

The Imperative of Freedom: A Philosophy of Journalistic Autonomy. By John C. Merrill. N.Y.: Hastings House, 1974. Pp. 228. $5.95.) $5.95.)

Presidential Television. By Newton N. Minow, John Barlow Martin, Lee M. Mitchell. (New York: Basic Books, 1974. Pp 232. $8.95.)

The Adversaries: Politics and the Press. By William Rivers. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970. Pp. 274. $2.95.)

Reporters and Officials. By Leon V. Sigal. (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1973. Pp. 221. $11.50.)

To Kill a Messenger: Television News and the Real World. By William Small. (New York: Hastings House, 1970. Pp. 302. $8.95.)

Journalists at Work: Specialist Correspondents. By Jeremy Tunstall. (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1971. Pp. 304. $9.60.)

Your Right to Know. By Charles W. Whalen, Jr. (New York: Random House, 1973. Pp. 207. $5.95.)

Press, Politics and Popular Government. Edited by George F. Will. (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. 1972. Pp. 52. $3.00, paper.)

[1] Cf. Barron, "Access to the Press—A New First Amendment Right," 80 *Harvard Law Review*, 1641 (1967).

ciples are debunked by exposing the "real" motives behind them. Legitimizations of authority such as the journalistic claim to objectivity are challenged, for example, by psychoanalysis, sociology, or agnosticism.

Rising moral standards: Just as campaign practices that were once usual are now scandals, so yellow journalism is increasingly a thing of the past. Newspapers are now criticized if they are not balanced and probing — something few papers have ever been. There is a revolution of rising expectations.

These processes of delegitimization help account for the current spate of critical literature about the media of communication; attacked by some as sources of dissent, the media are labeled by others as establishment apologetics. In a polarized society any institution is berated by true believers from each side for not serving the truth as they see it.

Another factor behind the growing interest in the political role of the media in this country has been the decay of the class-based New Deal coalition that since 1932 shaped American politics. For a quarter century the central political debate was about social reforms proposed by the national Democratic leadership. For many voters the posture of that leadership provided a decision rule for issues. About three fifths of the California public had no trouble telling pollers whether they were for or against the (nonexistent) Metallic Metals Act; it was enough that it sounded like New Deal legislation. In the 1970s for many voters such an easy rule no longer holds. As class, ethnicity and party have waned as determinants of voter behavior, other forces, such as the media, become residual legatees of political influence. Since 1956, presidential elections have been in large part television shows, along with such other video events as the Army-McCarthy hearings, assassinations, and Watergate. In the 1930s and 1940s election analysts focused on ethnicity, party, and SES as explanatory variables. In the 1960s and 1970s, media campaigns and their imagery (sometimes called issues) have become increasingly interesting to election analysts.

Debate about the media in the hot summers of 1967 and 1968 centered on whether the eye of the TV camera promoted rioting, and also on its effect on the first TV-covered war: Did the media treatment of it betray the government or, alternatively, "the people"? In the first Nixon term, thanks to Spiro Agnew, the debate centered on charges of left-wing-elitism and on the media's reactive fear that a right-leaning government might clamp down on their freedom. In the second Nixon term the debate centered on Watergate; the media believed they saved our constitution, while the losers saw the media as a juggernaut before which even the presidency was helpless.

For political scientists these fleeting dramas in public debate are instances of general issues of political theory. The "adversary relationship" between media and government is an instance of checks and balances, with the media a "fourth branch of government."[2] Each branch has relations of competition, conflict, division of labor, and coordination with each of the other branches. The media supply information to the Congress and the Executive; they enable politicians to mobilize the public; and they criticize or check officials. Political scientists will recognize in the relationship not only adversary roles but also all the classic aspects of decentralized allocation of power including *both* competition and coordination.

Political scientists know the elusiveness of the concept of power, be it political power or the power of the press; it is hard to measure and it is reciprocal between superior and subordinate. Little of that subtlety enters the literature on the media. Its lack of sophistication is illustrated by pervasive use of the notion of "bias." Historiographers and social scientists understand the inevitable incompleteness and bias of any description of the empirical world. Description is selection, and selection applies obscure and value-laden notions of relevance and importance. That applies to reporting in the media too, but is seldom thoughtfully discussed in that context. Often the notion of bias is reduced to the question of whether each of two sides was given equal space. More abstruse matters such as "nonissues" or organizational imperatives that are familiar to political scientists, rarely appear in the literature on the press. Thus, though relevant to political scientists because of their subject matter, the books reviewed here, with exceptions, are faulted as social science analysis.

Organization Theory and the Media

First let us note some exceptions. Three significant books apply organization theory to the media. *Reporters and Officials* by Leon V. Sigal argues that "organizational processes and bureaucratic politics account for more of news content than, say, the political proclivities of

[2] Douglass Cater, *The Fourth Branch of Government* (New York: Vintage, 1959).

individual newsmen" (p. 5). *News From Nowhere* by Edward Jay Epstein relates network news to the organization of the teams that produce it. *Behind the Front Page* by Chris Argyris does likewise for an unnamed but barely disguised *New York Times.*

Argyris, a psychologist, has published case studies on organizational pathologies in business firms, the State Department and now a newspaper. His book is essentially a study in human relations, but it can be read differently by those interested in the social structure of media institutions. It describes the power conflict and mutual misperceptions between the editorial and news departments, and the relation of both to the publisher. An issue that arose during the period of Argyris's observation concerned the establishment of an op-ed page. Despite agreement on it, years went by without action. The news staff wanted it to be their channel for thoughtful interpretive writing, which they craved the opportunity to do. The members of the editorial staff were unwilling to breach the wall between news reporting and their own monopoly on expression of opinion; they opposed the increasingly political impulses of younger reporters. The publisher, in a classic bureaucratic stalemate, was unwilling to impose a divisive decision.

Sigal, Epstein, and Argyris describe how the structure of media organizations affects the content that emerges. Epstein describes how the budget constraint to a dozen camera crews shapes the network news' image of the world; he notes the consequences of the television networks' having few reporters, mostly generalists without close ties to those they cover, unlike newspaper reporters with beats. These authors avoid the naive notion of "bias," while explaining how stories are affected by the processes that generate them. The theme of Sigal's first chapter is "What the News Means Depends on How the News Gets Made." Using *The New York Times* and *Washington Post* as cases, he examines how cooperation, competition, and bargaining in a hierarchical organization with limited resources to allocate "makes" the news. We shall return to these three books later in this review.

Moralism and the Media

One sophisticated treatment of bias is *Press, Politics and Popular Government* (ed. George F. Will), with an essay by Robert Bartley, and thoughtful comments by Irving Kristol, Douglass Cater, and Paul Weaver. Bartley, of the *Wall Street Journal,* argues that the changing recruitment base of journalists from lower middle-class high school graduates to better-off college graduates promotes idealistic liberalism.[3] Irving Kristol, following Walter Lippmann, argues that despite college education, journalists lack the technical expertise to analyze complex matters. They substitute, he says, populist ideological formulae. But Paul Weaver maintains that the definition of the task as much as the character of the men shapes the content of the product; journalism is what Aristotle called epideictic writing whose method is amplification and whose purpose is praise or blame, rather than the deliberative writing for which Irving Kristol asks. The product may be good in its genre, but as analysis the product is "simpleminded moralism."

Journalists writing on journalism are moralistic too. Witness the discussion of "bias" among writers who charge the media with leftist leanings. Edith Efron presents the case best. Anecdotal instances, such as "The Selling of the Pentagon," can support any charge, but what is the overall balance of bias? Edith Efron at least has tried to count. She classified network news coverage of the 1968 campaign pro and anti the two sides and found that the TV news treatment was much more favorable to Humphrey than to Nixon.

Efron's content analysis was challenged in two CBS-commissioned studies, a methodological critique by Charles Winick and an independent content analysis by International Research Associates. Winick scores some points: Efron presents no check on coding reliability. Also "a candidate who conducts a cautious campaign, like Mr. Nixon in 1968, may get substantial favorable exposure which would not be counted at all in a content analysis of expressed opinions because it contained no opinion content."

On the other hand, on most of Winick's buckshot charges one has to rule for Efron. She used only the audio, not the video messages and covered only the 7 p.m. network news, but there is no obvious reason for rejecting that sample. The unpublished INRA content analysis of the pre-election Cronkite broadcasts gives evidence of both a scrupulous network attempt at mechanical equality and also of Efron's thesis of a more favorable treatment of Humphrey. Campaign news stories distributed mentions as follows: Nixon 63 per cent, Humphrey 61 per cent, Agnew 10 per cent, Muskie 10 per cent, other Republican cam-

[3] Cf. also Chandler's comments in Lee, *Politics and the Press,* p. 82.

paigners 13 per cent, other Democratic campaigners 15 per cent. The parallelism hardly seems coincidental. When classified by favorableness, however, "19 per cent of the paragraphs in which Nixon was mentioned were classified as favorable to him, and 19 per cent as unfavorable; the figures for Humphrey are 26 per cent favorable and 17 per cent unfavorable." Note that the neutral proportion was large and that this is less "bias" than Efron found, even though in agreement with her main claim.[4]

Network defenders have used Efron's weaknesses in execution as evidence that the very attempt to measure bias by counting the incidence of "pro" and "anti" items is impossible and evil. Yet the networks do the same thing to prove how systematically they even things up in minutes alloted to each candidate. The issue is not whether counts are possible, but whether they make for good journalism. Any journalistic rule other than deliberate matching will produce uneven coverage of different actors; counting can document the resulting difference.

But is deviation from 50-50 bad reporting? Under FCC regulation TV has to offer equal time to candidates under comparable terms, but that does not apply to news coverage. Are the media failing their duty if one campaign generates better news stories than the other? Should the media misreport reality so as to make the campaign an even contest? In covering scandals should equal space be given to the allegations and to denials by the accused? Should pleas for racial tolerance be balanced by equal expressions of bigotry? Must inculcations of national pride be balanced by masochistic self-denunciations?

Left-wing and right-wing critiques of the media have a common intellectual content, namely that the major media have a definable viewpoint far from their own. They show that the views of those who control the major media are neither randomly distributed nor their preferred ones. Undoubtedly the major media present a specialized picture of reality. One would welcome a study that dispassionately identified the character of newsmen's special perception of reality. Works such as Keeley's, Aronson's, and Cirano's are useful, if at all, only as sourcebooks for anecdotes about improper actions — in Keeley's case by those on the left, in Aronson's and Cirano's by those on the right. Consider, for example, Aronson's *The Press and the Cold War*. Many of the horror stories in it are accurate; the problem is to know which ones. Aronson impressively catalogs advance stories that appeared in the U.S. press about preparations for the Bay of Pigs invasion and how the press downplayed them. He notes the extensive contemporaneous reports on the so-called secret bombing of Cambodia, as well as the unwillingness of the press to argue with government denials. But then he denies that there were North Vietnamese sanctuaries across the Cambodian border or that a Ho Chi Minh trail through Laos existed. Given reporting like that, one can hardly allow much credence where one does not happen to know the facts independently.

Another criticism of the media is that they are corporations for profit with financial and personal links to other firms. One looks in vain for a good book on the implications of that, a book just as preoccupied with surprising findings about the looseness of couplings in the system as with surprising findings about the tight ones.

When that book appears it will use organization theory in noting how imperatives of the job shape the output. The organizational analyses already available (e.g., Sigal, Epstein, Argyris) deal with the editorial side of the news business: how editors, reporters, and video producers do their jobs. Those books do not explore the processes by which publishers raise capital, arrive at business judgments, and relate those judgments to editorial activities. The existing studies show that editorial and business processes are disjointed enough so that those in either world know relatively little about what goes on in the other. The few linking individuals are often immobilized by a conflict of roles. In the newspapers studied by Argyris and Sigal the result was neither financially or journalistically optimal.

The Journalist's Craft

Journalists' books on their professional problems resemble the media accounts based on organization theory in reflecting pragmatic awareness of the complex social and structural constraints on news production and in explaining why journalists do what they do. To understand is to forgive; the faults of the media emerge as consequence of life's complexities. While such books moralize over a spectrum from the defensive to the critical, what is more

[4] The dispute between Efron & CBS became so bitter as to prompt a second book: Edith Efron, *How CBS Tried to Kill a Book*. Los Angeles, Nash Publications, 1972.

important is that they are usually informed accounts.

Their viewpoint is reflected in the title, *To Kill a Messenger,* chosen by William Small, then manager of the CBS Washington Bureau. It alludes to one of newsmen's favorite clichés: when politicians or others complain about media stress on bad news, newsmen reply that the critics have turned their "anger on the messenger, the bearer of bad news." A similar cliché is the metaphor of the mirror. The media, we are told, reflect society; if we do not like the warts that we see, blame society, not the media.

There is little left to that neutral view by the time Edward Epstein finishes dissecting it. The organization of the news staff, economics, and time constraints shape what goes out as news. The news no more exists before newsmen create it than do issues before politicians create them. Whatever the seeds from which the news grows, the institutions of journalism shape the growth mightily.[5]

Small does not question that. Journalist that he is, he reports; he neither asserts nor denies. He relates the great moments of television; the Army-McCarthy hearings, the Checkers speech, the Kennedy assassinations, the 1968 Democratic Convention, the Vietnam War, and the urban riots. His book is a skillful defense of television which lays facts before the reader and lets the reader draw his or her own conclusions. He does not hide violence, the vast wasteland, network retreats before political pressure, and arranged news events such as the "Pot Party." He invites the public to share the existential dilemmas of media professionals who must cope with ratings, sponsors, political pressures, and uncertainty as they perform their job of public information.

Such journalists' books on government and the media, although written well, may be thin as social science. Three propositions sum up the theory in many of them. (1) The media are the people's tribune against government oppression. (2) Hence, media and government are adversaries. (3) A journalist should, therefore, publish whatever he can learn, however damaging to the government. John C. Merrill's *The Imperative of Freedom* argues for such journalistic autonomy as a normative philosophy. Merrill rejects such other journalistic criteria as the people's right to know, serving as a fourth branch of government, providing access to public debate, or professionalism, for these imply a responsibility, not just a freedom for the press. John Hohenberg, in *Free Press/Free People* elevates a similar approach to the organizing principle of a world history. He skips interestingly from ancient Sumeria through the invention of printing and the evolution of the newspaper, to the World Wars and the Cold War with the single theme of the courage of men who were resolved to get the news out. One is baffled by such declarations as "fifty years after Gutenberg, every necessary ingredient of a free press except one was in existence. The missing quality was courage."

Four normative issues loom large in journalists' books on their profession. First, should a journalist ever fail to publish what he knows? Several books here reviewed (e.g., Small's and *What You Don't Know Can Hurt You* by Lester Markel) describe episodes in World War II, the Bay of Pigs, and the Pentagon Papers, in which journalists who possessed secret information had to decide whether to publish it. Similarly, during riots the question arises whether the eye of the camera itself stimulates violence (or the reverse)[6] and whether the journalist should worry about being a causal agent. Such dramatic decisions, while important, are rare. One would like to read more about how reporters' and editors' everyday decisions are governed by such criteria as waiting till the moment is ripe, or until the whole story is at hand, protecting privacy on matters of no public significance, lack of reader interest, or just plain unimportance. Is a Senator's drunkenness a news story or not? The journalistic literature says too little about decisions *not* to publish, except for the dramatic cases of suppression of big stories in the supposed national interest.

A second normative issue concerns newsmen's privilege. Should a newsman have to reveal his sources to a court or grand jury? (That is the subject of Whalen's *Your Right to Know.*) The newsmen's argument (not generally accepted by the courts)[7] is that they must keep sources secret to obtain information for the public. Social scientists find themselves in the same situation. Political scientist Samuel Popkin went to jail rather than identify interview respondents. A pollster should presumably

[5] For a collection of papers on selectivity of reporting on various topics, see Stanley Cohen and Jack Young, eds. *The Manufacture of News: A Reader* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1973).

[6] Cf. Lang, pp. 153ff. In Lee, ed., *Politics and the Press.*

[7] See Branzburg v. Kayes, 33 L.Ed. 2nd 626, 1972.

take the same stand. But journalists generally argue that the press deserves a special privilege not to be confounded with the claims of scholars. Nonetheless, journalists are divided (exactly as the founding fathers were about a bill of rights) as to whether their privilege is protected or compromised by laws exempting them from testifying. An explicit grant of privilege implies that the granter also has the right *not* to grant.

A third widely discussed question is how far journalists' relation to government should be adversarial. Sigal's description of the many forms of cronyism between reporters and those on whom they report refutes definition of the actual relation as simply adversarial. The usual conclusion, however, is that they *should* be just that. The "clear responsibility" of American journalism, William Rivers says in *The Adversaries: Politics and the Press,* is "to stand as an adversary of government." Rivers nonetheless notes such complexities as the fact that if news is defined as conflict, conflict may be manufactured by reporting rather than just reported (p. 243). I have criticized the simple adversary notion in a contribution to the *Aspen Notebook on Government and the Media* (for that reason not reviewed here). That is a minority view among journalists; the prevailing view among journalists is that departure from an adversary role is corrupting. Sound or not, that belief is one source of the crisis of legitimacy or both government and the media.

A fourth normative issue that bothers newsmen is where, when, and how much their work should be criticized. Their usual justification for their profession is the value of criticism to society, but like most of us, they take criticism of themselves to be another matter. Lee Brown's *The Reluctant Reformation* presents a history of news criticism, including muckraking exposes, such as Upton Sinclair's *Brass Check,* professional codes such as ASNE's canons, reviews such as A. J. Liebling's columns in the *New Yorker,* as well as the more recent growth of journalism magazines (most notably the *Columbia Journalism Review),* and the institution of ombudsmen on some newspapers. He describes the formation of the National News Council, a citizen panel which issues findings on cases of alleged press abuse. Many, if not most journalists deplore such institutions. They see in the sanctionless News Council, whose judgments are but the free expression of views of some private individuals, the thin edge of a wedge of regulation. When public officials berate the press the usual press rejoinder is to charge a chilling effect on press freedom. Is not freedom of expression valid for those who criticize the press?

Beyond Journalism

The journalists' literature on journalism raises important issues, whether or not one accepts the answers. What is missing is something which has been at the heart of modern social science, the attempt to explain behavior in terms other than those of which the actor is himself aware. Microeconomics predicts an equilibrium different from any businessman's expectations. Dynamic psychology uses unconscious reactions to earlier experience to explain behavior. Voting models predict outcomes by variables other than the purposive campaign moves of the protagonists. Budget simulations are interesting because they deny that politicians' programs make much difference. The journalists' literature on journalism is mostly phenomenological reportage of what journalists think they are doing. Social scientists want a literature that explains journalists' behavior by variables of which the subjects themselves may be only partly conscious.

Three books already mentioned — Epstein's, Sigal's and Argyris's — meet that test. Media people do not like them because their authors do not share the newsmen's own perceptions of themselves; no one enjoys hearing his behavior explained in ways at odds with his own rationalizations.

A similar book from 1968 is *Politics and Television* by Kurt and Gladys Lang.[8] The Langs skillfully improvise quick but rigorous research on current events, documenting thereby how organizational and mechanical imperatives of TV coverage shape what reaches the viewer. In one nominating convention they observed how different network decisions on mechanics of coverage resulted in quite different portrayals. Their best-known study was of the return of MacArthur from Korea after he was fired by Truman. A TV camera van led the general's limousine down Chicago streets, photographing cheering people. For those standing at any one corner on the sidewalk the cheering was a minute's brief ebullience as the limousine went by. It was the camera's aggregation of those brief moments into a sustained clamorous ovation that made the news event.

A useful book representing another social research tradition is Jeremy Tunstall's *Journalists at Work,* which analyzes the careers and

[8] Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1968.

roles of 207 British specialist correspondents, their organizations, news sources, and competitive and collaborative relations. The author's basic instrument is a lengthy questionnaire covering recruitment, career line, motivations and satisfactions. Tunstall notes such organizational issues as the fact that only about one-tenth of the news reported finds its way into print, but mostly analyzes the professional orientation of journalists.

A popular subject of political campaign research in 1976 is the role of the media. That is a marked shift from the 1950s and 1960s, when election studies tended to minimize the media. Whatever conclusions are about to be reached concerning the media's effect on voting, they certainly do affect campaign styles. Gilbert, reviewing presidential campaigns from 1952 through 1968 notes how strategy has shifted from organizational maneuvering to direct television presentation of the candidate to the mass public. Television has also profoundly affected the manner of the presidency, offering unprecedented opportunities and temptations for charismatic leadership. Minow and his colleagues examine the changing practice of presidential press conferences and coverage with an eye to reforms.

Some Classic Formulations

Several older works anticipate much of what is being said today. Little was added between 1940 and 1970 to the insights already offered by George Simmel, Robert Park, Lincoln Steffens, Leo Rosten, or Walter Lippmann. As Tunstall notes, among organizational studies by 2,000 authors listed in March's *Handbook of Organizations* (1965), only one, Warren Breed's "Social Control in the Newsroom" (*Social Forces* [May, 1955], 326–335), dealt with the press. David Manning White's study of "The Gatekeeper" (*Journalism Quarterly* [Fall, 1950], 383–390), analyzed what the editor chose to publish and what to spike. Douglass Cater's *The Fourth Branch of Government* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1959), and Bernard Cohen's *The Press and Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963) examined the role of the press in the Washington scene. Cater's book is most notable for its identification of the press as a channel of communication essential to the management of government itself. Cohen deals, as do the later organizational analysts, with the reporter's job, his problems in getting and explaining foreign policy news, his interaction with policy makers, and the perceptions and use of the press by policy makers. Rosten in 1937 delineated the social system and psychology of *The Washington Correspondents* and their relationship to the men of power whose anterooms they inhabit. Earlier, Lincoln Steffens in his *Autobiography* (1931) described a symbiotic relation in which the newsman holds back some damaging things he knows about a politician as blackmail to obtain cooperation and information.

Still earlier, Walter Lippmann opened up most of the current issues about politics and the media (*Liberty and the News*, 1920, and *Public Opinion*, 1922). Lippmann's views, as recently presented by John Luskin, in *Lippmann, Liberty and the Press*, are often at odds with the accepted catechism of American newsmen. Lippmann was not a libertarian. He supported censorship in wartime, objected to obscenity, castigated yellow journalists for invading the privacy of public figures, and argued that the usefulness of journalistic crusading (now called investigative reporting) was over; what he preferred was informed analysis. He also argued against open diplomacy and destruction of administrative confidentiality. "In 1951," Luskin tells us,

> when Congress proposed to investigate the conduct of the Korean War and to publish secret papers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the proposal to publish, Lippmann said, though based on "the sacred right of the people to know all the facts," could result only in eventual concealment and falsification. Aware that letters they wrote, that memoranda and documents they signed might soon be publicized, officials would eventually utter words which would look good in print (p. 43).

Regardless of the current unpopularity of Lippmann's conclusions, one must admire the perceptiveness of his analysis of the forces operating on news production.

His treatment of stereotypes is still well remembered. Less remembered is what Luskin calls "his dissection of the press apparatus." Lippmann distinguished news from truth. "While the press can report the news well or badly, it can report the truth scarcely at all. The function of news is to signalize an event, the function of truth is to bring to light the hidden facts, to set them in relation to each other' " (p. 53). Lippmann analyzes factors in newspaper production, the pattern of recruitment, the economics of mass publication, competition, and the pressure of deadlines which restrict the press to reporting stereotyped fact. He ends by appealing for a greater role for the analyst, for the expert political scientist engaged in elucidation rather than crusading.

'The press," he said, "is like the beam of a earchlight . . . Men cannot do the work of the vorld by this light alone." "For other, less efractory light," Luskin says, Lippmann "sug-gested his favorite source of revelation, cadres of experts, proposing the establishment in each of the ten federal departments . . . of intelligence services divorced from policy makers" (p. 54). Today we call these think tanks.

Does social science analysis provide an antidote, as Lippmann believed, for the alienated, disruptive character of the press's reflection of society? One wonders. Perhaps if social scientists do not act with the social objectivity that Lippmann's ideal-type suggests, it may be because few of them have the social role and recognition that Lippmann proposes.[9] Those who come nearest to that mandarin-like status are working in places like Rand or the Council of Economic Advisors. The little available evidence on the personal political views of newsmen (cf. Epstein and Tunstall) and of academic social scientists (cf. Lipset) does not suggest systematic political differences between them. Yet independently of their own self-consciousness, perhaps differences arise from the organizational structure in which they are placed. Differences in their product may reflect differences in their degree of autonomy, their criteria of evidence, the impulse towards value-detachment among social scientists and toward moralism among journalists, or the frequent assumption of policy responsibility by social scientists in place of the adversary posture of the journalist. Such differences led Lippmann to view social research as less socially abrasive than journalism.

Lippmann argues, in effect, that while journalism contributes to a crisis of legitimacy, political science fosters healing. In the language of social critics, that distinction would be phrased as degrees of capture of each by the establishment. Regardless of the language used, Lippmann's point remains to be proved.

Books like Epstein's, Sigal's and Argyris's may start a serious effort to understand the journalist's role in relation to the political process: but a comparison of journalism's role with that of other intelligence professions such as social science remains to be made. The pattern of rewards in each profession is quite different. University professors of political science have in the past been paid more money and given more respect, more job security, and much more autonomy, but journalists have been given more access to public officials, and more recognition of their right to information. How each profession contributes to society's ability to function coherently or to the exacerbation of relations within it remains unclear.

[9] Cf. Everett C. Ladd and Seymour Martin Lipset: "The Politics of American Political Scientists," *PS*, IV (Spring 1971); and Lipset, Seymour Martin, and Everett G. Ladd, Jr.: "The Politics of American Sociologists," *American Journal of Sociology*, 78, (July, 1972).

Détente, Arms Control and Strategy: Perspectives on SALT*

COLIN S. GRAY

Hudson Institute

The books reviewed in this article demonstrate that strategic studies are today in a condition of conceptual contention and even innovation.[1] The purpose of this discussion is to explore some of the more important issues of strategic weapons and arms control policies as they are affected by the ongoing SALT process and as they are understood from the perspective of arms control theory and arms race management. The central questions that are posed throughout this analysis are, in general, "What do strategists think that they know about the interstate arms race and arms control adversary?" and, in particular, "What conceptual presuppositions are American strategists employing in assessing Soviet arms behavior and options for United States' strategic and arms control policies?". No review of "frontier" literature on the subject of the Soviet-American arms race and related matters can be policy-neutral; certainly no such claim is advanced here. Indeed, one persisting source of analytical weakness in strategic studies has been the under-recognition of hidden premises, tacit theories and communal biases that have, of necessity, colored analyses and policy recommendations. All strategic analysis is "interested" analysis.[2]

The works discussed in this article are addressed, at root, to one or more of the following questions: What drives the nuclear arms race? What does the record of 1958 to 1974 tell us concerning the nature, dynamics and purposes of arms control negotiations? What are the criteria of a desirable strategic posture for the medium and long terms? In what ways do Soviet strategic concepts, negotiating practices, and policy-making processes differ from those of the United States and which differences matter, and in what ways? In fact, a good proportion of the works here considered — and certainly of the reawakening journal literature — is not concerned explicitly with the systematic thinking through of problem areas in strategic studies. Rather is it devoted to policy appraisal, policy prescription, and what may politely be termed prophecy. These works are discussed on the basis that they typify contemporary strategic and arms control theory. It is my intention to explore theoretical concerns which transcend the shifts in focus in the more explicitly prescriptive literature. Although many of the books and articles discussed here were published several years ago, their relevance to theoretical understanding is in no important way diminished by that fact.

Prophecy is understood to refer to prognoses that do not rest upon systematic analysis. Even if a policy maker does not begin to understand how, for example, the Soviet system functions with respect to strategic policy processing, he might still predict future Soviet policy quite accurately because of his native wit, his general knowledge of international behavior, or his "feel" for the clearly emerging choice situations of the Soviet leadership. The inspired official prophet, however, should be able to make better use of his intelligence, his

**Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT.* By John Newhouse. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973. Pp. 302. $7.95)

SALT: Implications for Arms Control in the 1970's. Edited by William R. Kintner and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1973. Pp. 447. $11.95)

SALT: Problems and Prospects. Edited by Morton A. Kaplan. (Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Press, 1973. Pp. 251. $5.95)

Soviet Decision-Making For Defense: A Critique of U.S. Perspectives on the Arms Race. By Matthew P. Gallagher and Karl F. Spielmann, Jr. (New York: Praeger, 1972. Pp. 102. $12.00)

SALT: The Moscow Agreements and Beyond. Edited by Mason Willrich and John B. Rhinelander. (New York: The Free Press, 1974. Pp. 361. $9.95)

The Future of the International Strategic System. Edited by Richard Rosecrance. (San Francisco: Chandler, 1972. Pp. 219. No price quoted.)

[1] On the sources and nature of the strategic theoretical renaissance, see Colin S. Gray: "The 'Second Wave': New Directions in Strategic Studies," *RUSI Journal*, 118 (December, 1973), 35–41); and *Strategic Studies and Public Policy* (forthcoming), Chapter 11.

[2] Note the judgment in Arthur L. Burns, "Scientific and Strategic-Political Theories of International Politics," in *The Aberystwyth Papers: International Politics, 1919–69*, ed. Brian Porter (London: Oxford University Press, 1972). p. 58.

general knowledge, and his empathy, if he also understood the intellectual structure of his subject. American policy makers neither have understood the nature of the arms race that they were seeking to conduct and control, nor have they confounded this condition of ignorance by means of inspired accurate guesswork. Ideology has tended to occupy the space that should be filled with knowledge of the arms race adversary. When in doubt — as, for example, over Soviet intentions vis-à-vis SALT — all too few analysts have demarcated frankly a region of ignorance; instead Western ideas have been projected upon Soviet officials.[3]

The SALT exercise may be said wonderfully to have concentrated strategic minds. SALT has promoted a long overdue attention to the "arms race phenomenon," and has encouraged a widespread skepticism concerning the historical accuracy of erstwhile-presumed "driving forces."[4] Also, SALT has provided a well-nigh ideal forum for that "strategic dialogue" that many arms controllers believed would promote conceptual convergence and hence — probably a *non-sequitur* — parallel, mutual arms race restraint.[5] The trinity of "Détente, Arms Control and Strategy" in the title of this article reflects the fact that there are strategic and political analysts who tend to focus upon one to the relative neglect of the other two. As Ian Smart has explained, most Western European strategists and politicians value SALT as an instrument of political, rather than strategic, détente.[6] The small print of missile trade-offs and, indeed, even of United States targeting strategy, is deemed to be strictly of secondary significance provided two conditions are satisfied. First, the American security connection with NATO-Europe must continue to be seen to be firm; second, special NATO-European interests must not be the subject of exclusive superpower negotiation.

Next, one finds arms control advocates who are relatively unimpressed with whatever political confidence SALT I and SALT II may have engendered; they desire arms control agreements that do more than appear to promote a fragile political détente. According to the classical criteria, arms control should contribute signally to the diminution of the risk of war occurring; to the reduction of the probable damage likely to result from war; and to the reduction of the costs of defense preparation. The arms control technician, logically if narrowly, is unimpressed with such a *pro forma* arms control flourish as the SALT agreements of June 1974. He is similarly uninterested in many of the more usual criteria for a good — or, perhaps, a better — strategic posture. The SALT agreements on further restricting ABM deployment (to one site only) and the provision of a 150-kiloton "threshold" for underground nuclear tests were held to be strictly cosmetic, and if anything mildly supportive of the strategic arms race. Nevertheless, the "arms control should be about arms control" school of thought damned the Vladivostok accords of November 1974 with faint praise. *Arms Control Today* and the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* left their readers in no doubt that Vladivostok was not very promising as an arms control event — whatever it might or might not accomplish for détente.[7] The aggregate ceilings on strategic offensive forces and on MIRV launchers were too high (at 2,400 and 1,320 respectively), while the defense communities of both superpowers could continue to pursue qualitative improvement without any serious let or hindrance.

Finally, there are analysts who approach SALT in particular and arms control in general, almost solely with a view to improving a national strategic posture. Three different problem areas are addressed by the adherents to the three schools of (1) "SALT must succeed" — in aid of general political relations; (2) "SALT must produce meaningful measures of arms control"; and (3) "SALT must enhance or, at least, not detract from the effectiveness of our strategic posture." Though on very different grounds, school (3) has been scarcely less discontented with the Vladivostok framework agreement than has school (2). After all, Vladivostok endorsed a Soviet strategic postural transition from zero to 1,320 MIRV launchers — in a context of an American MIRVable (land-based) missile throw-weight of 2 million pounds, compared with an easily predictable Soviet throw-weight of 12 million pounds. Vladivostok prevents the United States from chasing the total Soviet throw-weight advantage: American throw-

[3] This argument permeates Gallagher and Spielmann.

[4] See Colin S. Gray: "The Arms Race Phenomenon," *World Politics*, 24 (October, 1971), 39–79; and *The Soviet-American Arms Race* (Farnborough, Hants., England: D. C. Heath, 1976).

[5] The pioneer statement of the promise of dialogue was Jeremy J. Stone, *Strategic Persuasion: Arms Limitations Through Dialogue* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967).

[6] Smart, "Perspectives from Europe," in Willrich and Rhinelander, pp. 187, 195–196.

[7] See the "ACA Policy Statement on the Vladivostok Accords," *Arms Control Today*, 4 (December, 1974) 3.

weight could not be augmented on a large scale before the mid-1980s."[8]

Although the protracted SALT experience has lent some urgency and focus to strategic issues, the renewed public debate over nuclear strategy reflects also the "ripening" of technological possibilities,[9] the personal convictions of particular public men, and the state of the Soviet-American strategic balance.[10] The essentiality of SALT for the revival of innovative strategic analysis cannot be demonstrated. It is more likely than not that the Soviet weapons programs that have been publicly cited as the catalyzing agents for American strategic postural revision, would have proceeded either with or without SALT.

There can be no strictly military-strategic analysis of the prospects for SALT. Interstate arms control negotiations and agreements reflect synergistic combinations of domestic and of international factors, while many texts on arms control betray an innocence of political considerations.[11] It is easy to dismiss assertions of innovation in strategic theory and analysis. The complexity that confronts an analyst of the nuclear arms race has, item by item at least, been apparent to strategists since the beginning of the nuclear age. For example, it can hardly be a revelation that bureaucrats play games. Nonetheless, resting in part upon an analytical confusion, "bureaucratic politics" is today one of the leading contenders in the arms race analytical stakes — for being *the* driving factor in the arms race.[12] The confusion is that what has been discovered, largely by former short-term academic bureaucrats, was the necessary truth that all large-scale public activity requires bureaucratic activity. Bureaucracy, and hence bureaucratic politics, is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for there being an arms race. I am not implying that "bureaucratic politics" is really just a synonym for bureaucratic activity: those who analyze in this vein have presented a fairly detailed theory of American bureaucratic activity. My contention is that the concept of "bureaucratic politics" promotes a level of analysis confusion. Academic strategists and foreign policy analysts who are sensibly persuaded that the analysis of "bureaucratic politics" has insights of importance to impart, need constantly to ask themselves "what kinds of question can and cannot this mode of analysis answer?"

There is much to recommend the aphorism that "strategic doctrines don't die; they just await the next policy review." While granting the historical recurrence of strategic conceptual debates, and the enduring features of arms races, there are still significant items of novelty to be discovered in present strategic contention. More important, novelty for its own sake has no value. To some degree each new generation of strategic and political analysts must rediscover, with undue fanfare, those nuggets of wisdom concerning, for example, desirable negotiating behavior or a preferred strategic posture, that comprised the intellectual currency of its forebears. Given the laudable quest for innovation that is one of the hallmarks of American political science, it is scarcely surprising that guardianship of past wisdom should often be neglected.[13]

Strategic Debate: The Role of the Scholar

Logical and reasonable arguments abound in the present strategy debate over United States strategic posture. But, in the best — really, the worst — American legal tradition, the issues in dispute are the subjects of the adversary proceedings of countervailing polemics. Damage Limiters, Minimum Deterrers, and Defensive Emphasizers put forward the best case they can make for their own wares. The result, predictably, is a barrage of overstatements. Strategic choice is a political exercise. In the interest of professional soul-purgation, the APSA might consider requiring the more robust strategic advocates among its membership to write a hostile critique of their own, recent *interested* strategic analyses.

The very public debate over the succeeding ABM proposals of the Johnson and Nixon Administrations *appeared* to effect a polarization within the defense/arms control com-

[8] The significance of a large disparity in missile throw-weight is debated in Paul H. Nitze, "Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Détente," *Foreign Affairs*, 54 (January 1976), 207–232; and Jan M. Lodal, "Assuring Strategic Stability: An Alternative View," *Foreign Affairs*, 54 (April 1976), 462–481.

[9] See Elizabeth Young, *A Farewell to Arms Control?* (London: Penguin, 1972), p. 195, fn. 51.

[10] See the testimony of James Schlesinger in Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organization, *U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Policies*, Hearing, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (March 4, 1974), pp. 13–14.

[11] See Stanley Hoffmann, *Gulliver's Troubles, Or the Setting of American Foreign Policy* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), p. 111.

[12] "Bureaucratic politics" may be approached through such works as Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), particularly chapter 5; and Morton H. Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974).

[13] See Hedley Bull, "The Theory of International Politics, 1919–1969," in Porter, ed., *The Aberystwyth Papers: International Politics, 1919–69*, pp. 48–54.

nunity.[14] It is probably more accurate, however, to argue that ABM deployment provided a litmus test issue which required analysts to adhere to their basic reference group. The ABM was a personal identity issue — the specific details of the argument were strictly secondary. In generic terms, one was pro or contra ABM.[15]

To the eventual benefit of all contenders over the protracted ABM issue, the most extreme of the ABM advocates, the Defensive Emphasizers led by Donald Brennan, developed a systematic critique of the extant dominant deterrence doctrine of mutual assured destruction (MAD).[16] Although very few strategic analysts chose to endorse Brennan's proposals for thick urban ABM defenses, to be deployed in the context of an arms control regime requiring a severe reduction in the arsenals of offensive weapons, very few strategic analysts were immune to Brennan's cogent denunciations of MAD doctrine. Brennan anticipated much of the fundamental challenge to orthodox deterrence doctrine that has emerged in recent years. Of considerable interest to future aspiring strategy innovators, is Brennan's belief that one important reason his critique of MAD was taken so seriously was that he was offering a very specific alternative (both conceptually and technologically).

The current debate over strategic forces is focused essentially upon three closely related issues: (1) their character, (2) their size, and (3) their firing and targeting doctrine.[17] Within the arms control community in the United States over the past decade, it has been believed that the political value of strategic forces must derive solely from their military worth. Hence, the pursuit of a militarily meaningless symmetry of strategic capabilities can result in no political rewards.[18] The proper measure for the sufficiency of strategic posture is thus held to be the demographic yardstick of assured destruction. Considered in terms of the threat of surface damage required in order to ensure that the consequences of a retaliatory strike would be unacceptable, it was calculated in the mid-1960s that the delivery of 400 "one megaton equivalents" (EMT) represented the cost-effective level of an assured destruction capability against the Soviet Union. As Alain Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith have explained, 400 EMT represents the "elbow" of the marginal cost curve.[19] Sharply diminishing *returns* (prompt Soviet fatalities and the percentage of Soviet industry destroyed) set in above that level of force loading. As a conceptual brake upon the expansion of offensive forces the assured destruction criterion of sufficiency has much to recommend it. If transposed from the realm of force structure planning into the realm of strategic war planning, however, assured destruction could bias the United States' strategic war plan in the direction of what Herman Kahn has termed a "wargasm" — an orgy of politically and militarily meaningless civilian slaughter.[20]

Closely allied to the conviction that the United States requires only sufficient EMT to devastate Soviet urban-industrial areas, is the notion that some kinds of flexibility in strategic planning are destabilizing. All hard-target (command and control facilities: ICBM silos)

[14] Illustrative of the divisions within the community was the (quite proper) investigation by the Operations Research Society of America of the professional quality of the operations research conducted pro and contra the ABM. See *Operations Research*, 19 (September, 1971). Even more revealing of animosity were the readers' letters in reply. See *Operations Research*, 20 (January-February, 1972), 205–246.

[15] See Herman Kahn, "The Missile Defense Debate in Perspective," in *Why ABM? Policy Issues in the Missile Defense Controversy*, ed. Johan J. Holst and William Schneider, Jr. (Elmsford, N.Y.: Pergamon, 1969), pp. 298–290.

[16] For example, Donald Brennan, "The Case for Population Defense," in *ibid.*, pp. 100–106.

[17] The principal official contributions to the strategy debate are James R. Schlesinger, *Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1975* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 4, 1974), pp. 3–6, 25–45; James R. Schlesinger, *Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1976 and 197T* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 5, 1975), pp. I-10–12, 13–17, II-1–11; Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Policies;* and Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organization, *Briefing on Counterforce Attacks*, Hearing, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (September 11, 1974).

[18] For example, see Abram Chayes, "Nuclear Arms Control After the Cold War," *Daedalus*, 104 (Summer 1975), 27.

[19] Alain Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, *How Much is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961–1969* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 207-208. Also see Ian Bellany, "The Essential Arithmetic of Deterrence," *RUSI Journal*, 118 (March, 1973), 28–34. EMT is a measure of the expected surface damage that should be inflicted by a number of re-entry vehicles, expressed as EMT = N.Y. 2/3. N is the number of warheads and Y is their total yield. Useful explanation may be found in Geoffrey Kemp, *Nuclear Forces for Medium Powers: Part I: Targets and Weapons Systems*, Adelphi Paper 106 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Autumn 1974), p. 26.

[20] Note the observation in Newhouse, p. 266. Former Secretary of Defense Schlesinger contended that, despite the rhetorical attention accorded strategic flexibility over the past decade, until the early 1970s the Department of Defense did not engage in a dedicated effort to program limited strategic use options. See Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Policies*, pp. 9, 18, 26.

counterforce capability is suspect, because it can only threaten the pre-launch survivability of the ICBM leg of the deterrent Triad of the other side. In other words, it must erode the confidence in its assured destruction capability.[21] These paragraphs have stated the core beliefs of what may fairly be termed the arms control establishment.[22] The Boswell of SALT I, John Newhouse, has written: "Thus, stability, a truly divine goal in the nuclear age, becomes the product of secure second-strike nuclear offenses on both sides. This offensive capability is known as assured destruction; it is the supreme dogma of the ascendant branch of the defense and arms-control communities."[23]

Very few arms controllers do adhere, any longer at least, to what might be termed a pure version of assured destruction doctrine. Partly in response to perceived changes in the state of the strategic balance, most advocates of an assured destruction-emphasizing strategic posture express some concern over the possible political implications of gross numerical and capability disparities. Above all, they deny their critics' contention that they are uninterested in targeting flexibility.[24] Straw targets and hyperbole on both sides have marred recent debate. Of importance for this article is not whether Albert Wohlstetter has been fair to Herbert York,[25] or vice versa,[26] still less which of the two is correct. Rather is it important that some students of strategy ar beginning to consider — in some cases to re consider after a long period of conceptu rigidity — the adequacy and even the validit of the strategic wisdom that was generated i the decade 1955–1965. This wisdom was cod ified, became fashionable, and was *the* set o respectable opinions in the middle and lat 1960s.[27] Until very recently, it could be sai that "the terms in which the area of nuclea weapons policy is discussed consist mostly o a rigidification of ten- or twenty-year-old doc trine."[28] In other words, we have been livin off our strategic theoretical capital. As a number of the works cited in this article attest, the protracted SALT experience has revealed the undue narrowness of our strategic concepts. The Emperor has no clothes for a new era. Nonetheless, much of the evidence to which strategic contenders refer is inherently ambiguous, or even unknowable.

Much of the babel of approval and disapproval that marked the announcement by former Secretary of Defense Schlesinger of a revised firing and targeting doctrine for the strategic war plan (the Single Integrated Operational Plan — the SIOP) was little more than the ritual utterances of rival strategic ideologies. Beneath the competing prescriptions for an effective negotiating posture for SALT, the charges that Dr. Schlesinger's limited strategic options would be "destabilizing," and the disagreements about the strategic and political value of technologies recommended in the FY's 1975, 1976, and 1977 defense budgets, lurk the following questions: Upon what premises does the proposition rest that some hard-target counterforce capability is destabilizing? Is stability a quality inherent in certain technological relationships, or is it a very subjective quality liable to strategic ideological variations in meaning?[29] What functions do super-power elites believe to be performed by

[21] Prominent examples of this argument may be found in Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky, "The Mutual-Hostage Relationship Between America and Russia," *Foreign Affairs*, 52 (October, 1973), 109–118; Herbert Scoville, "Flexible MADness?" *Foreign Policy*, 14 (Spring, 1974), 164–177; George W. Rathjens, "Flexible Response Options," *Orbis*, 18 (Fall, 1974), 677–688; and Jerome H. Kahan, *Security in the Nuclear Age: Developing U.S. Strategic Arms Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1975), chapter 6.

[22] See Colin S. Gray, "The Arms Race Is About Politics," *Foreign Policy*, 9 (Winter, 1972–73), 123–127.

[23] *Cold Dawn*, p. 9. Stability may be "a truly divine goal," but—in common with such other divine goals as peace and order—its empirical referents and the proper path to its attainment are far from being self-evident.

[24] See Panofsky, "The Mutual-Hostage Relationship Between America and Russia," p. 113; and Scoville, "Flexible MADness," pp. 168–170. On the fighting retreat currently being conducted by MAD adherents, see Albert Wohlstetter, "Threats and Promises of Peace: Europe and America in the New Era," *Orbis*, 17 (Winter, 1974), 1134–1138.

[25] See Albert Wohlstetter, "Alternative to Mass Destruction—Comments on the Addresses of Professor York and Mr. Clifford," in *Pacem in Terris III, Proceedings*, Vol. II (Santa Barbara, Cal.: Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1974).

[26] A forthright assault by York upon counterforce reasoning is "Reducing the Overkill," *Survival*, 16 (March/April, 1974), 70–74.

[27] Very much to the point are the comments and arguments in Donald Brennan, *Fashions in Military Technology Fifty Years Hence*, HI-951-P (Croton-on-Hudson, N.Y.: Hudson Institute, February 12, 1968), pp. 4–7; and Young, *A Farewell to Arms Control?* pp. 139–140.

[28] Michael M. May, *Strategic Arms Technology and Doctrine under Arms Limitation Agreements*, Research Monograph 37 (Princeton: Princeton University, Center of International Studies, October 1972), p. 15.

[29] See Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., "The Rationale for Super-power Arms Control," in Kintner and Pfaltzgraff, p. 4. For contrasting policy positions that share a devotion to a very technical understanding of stability, see the contributions by Richard Garwin (chapter 4) and Richard Perle (chapter 5) in Kaplan, *SALT: Problems and Prospects*.

strategic weapon arsenals? What drives the nuclear arms race, and from such an analysis, how can SALT reasonably be expected to induce reciprocal arms-race restraint? Any competent analyst is able to produce a good case for a variety of policy prescriptions, but such should not be his function — that is not what should be meant by a more *relevant* political science. If the so-called "post-behavioral revolution" in political science is to refer to anything that merits the title of scholarship, it must be to the systematic exploration of areas relevant to public policy.

The SALT Experience

Although SALT began in November 1969 and has brought forth three principal bursts of agreement (May 1972, June 1974, and November 1974) and a series of minor accords,[30] confident answers to the question posed by Bernard Brodie as the title of the first chapter of his magisterial study, *War and Politics* — "De quoi s'agit-il?" are in short supply.[31] The voluminous SALT literature yields such assertions as that SALT is *about* the meaning of deterrence; the codification of mutual deterrence via MAD doctrine; the ratification of parity; the future of détente; the curbing and eventual reversal of the nuclear arms race; the fashioning of a more cost-effective strategic posture; and the balance of bureaucratic power in Washington and in Moscow. The whole truth about SALT is to be discovered neither in the only extant "inside" account of American decision making—John Newhouse's *Cold Dawn* — nor in the less privileged prose of more scholarly analysts. It would seem that practically an entire generation of American arms controllers has expected the Soviet leadership to behave like a slightly backward collective American arms controller. These negative thoughts are prompted by the multitude of worthy, naive, and — for the Russians — rather insulting assertions that have studded the SALT, and more general strategic, literatures of recent years.[32]

For a blow-by-blow account of SALT policy making in Washington and of SALT negotiations in Helsinki, Vienna, Washington, and Moscow there is, unfortunately, no substitute for, or reliable cross-check upon, John Newhouse's book, *Cold Dawn.* Although many details of the United States' evolving negotiating stance in SALT I were revealed via the self-serving leak to such well-connected journalists as William Beecher (then) of *The New York Times*[33] and Chalmers Roberts of *The Washington Post, Cold Dawn* is no mere collage of previously revealed material. The book is indispensable as a behind-the-scenes interpretation of the history of SALT, but only in a very limited sense could one endorse the publisher's jacket blurb, which claims that *Cold Dawn* is "The Definitive and Revealing Account of The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks." Even allowing for commercially motivated hyperbole, readers' credulity should be restrained by two factors. First, although Newhouse was granted unique (in the SALT context) investigative privileges in interviewing Washington policy makers and in perusing many very sensitive documents (for example, *possibly* some NSSM's and NSDM's),[34] there is no way in which we are able to check his interpretations against his sources. In other words, only a person with full access to SALT personnel and documentation could assess the degree to which Newhouse was granted free-range privileges and the extent to which his sources were deployed in print in a balanced

[30] The texts of all of the SALT—and SALT-related — agreements through and including the results of the Brezhnev visit to the United States in June 1973, may be located in Willrich and Rhinelander, Appendices 1–10. A useful SALT bibliography is provided on pp. 348–354. Documentation on the Vladivostok accords is in *Survival,* 17 (January/February 1975), 32–33.

[31] (New York: Macmillan, 1973), pp. 1–28. Brodie attributes the question to Marshal Foch (p. 1).

[32] For example, see Roman Kolkowicz et al., *The Soviet Union and Arms Control: A Superpower Dilemma* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), pp. 34–37.

[33] The most notorious, or celebrated, of these leaks was the so-called "Beecher leak" of July 23, 1971. See *The New York Times,* July 23, 1971; Newhouse, *Cold Dawn,* pp. 224–225; and the testimony of Elliot L. Richardson in Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Nomination of Henry A. Kissinger,* Hearings, Part 2, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), pp. 276–277. A more recent example of a major leak is Aaron Latham, "Kissinger's Bluff Is Called," *New York Magazine,* 9 (April 12, 1976), 30–35. In this article the author claims to reveal how Kissinger negotiated very poorly indeed over cruise missiles and the *Backfire* bomber during his visit to Moscow in January 1976. Strong circumstantial evidence supports Latham's case, but the absence of specified sources for SALT leaks means that they must be regarded skeptically.

[34] NSSM: National Security Study Memorandum; NSDM: National Security Decision Memorandum. For Kissinger's version of what Newhouse was and was not permitted to investigate from original sources (human and documentary), see *Nomination of Henry A. Kissinger,* Part 1, pp. 109–112; and *ibid.,* Part 2, pp. 330–332. A very different perspective upon the access granted to Newhouse has been provided in William R. Van Cleave's review of *Cold Dawn,* "The SALT Papers: A Torrent of Verbiage or a Spring of Capital Truths?", *Orbis,* 17 (Winter, 1974), 1396–1401.

fashion. Second, *Cold Dawn* is a strongly committed work.[35] Naturally enough, Newhouse was granted access precisely because he was known to be trustworthy — a safe and friendly writer.

Newhouse has written a most valuable work, Nonetheless, a more skeptical writer granted similar in-house privileges should have been able to write a more balanced and a more valuable work. In the face of unknowable Soviet motivations (possibly uncertain and confused even to the Soviet leaders themselves), Newhouse does not admit that there might be a variety of tenable propositions; rather he plugs the lacunae with American arms controller-style Russians. Whether or not one shares Newhouse's strategic beliefs, it is difficult to excuse statements such as the following: "The talks were launched, not from a common impulse to reduce armaments, but from a mutual need to solemnize the parity principle—or, put differently, to establish an acceptance by each side of the other's ability to inflict unacceptable retribution in response to a nuclear attack";[36] ". . . both great powers want to stabilize spending on arms";[37] "Each [Super Power] assumes the other is negotiating because parity has been achieved.[38]

Newhouse may be correct, but no sources available to him could have offered convincing proof that his *postulated* rough symmetry of super-power concern was indeed the case.[39] John Newhouse's ideology has been singled out for particular attention here, solely because his is the only publicly available, detailed study of the course of SALT I. In the interest of balance one cannot turn to an alternative, unfriendly history. *Cold Dawn* offers a mountain of fascinating fact that is not available elsewhere, but the reader must be warned that the book also contains a mountain of supposition—and, unlike the case of a work of scholarship, there is no way in which fact and fancy (or possible fact) can be checked independently by a reviewer.

Given the classified nature of the relevant documentation, and the nonattributable status of much private official revelation, it must be admitted that a scholarly work, with sources that may be checked independently, could not be written. It is a law of life that officials, among others, tend not to reveal information or attitudes that are likely to damage their place in historical appraisal. *Cold Dawn* was written from the point of view of the National Security Council system in Washington. Newhouse was denied effective access to the SALT delegation. The frustrations of the SALT delegation, in the context of Henry Kissinger's "back channel" SALT diplomacy via Ambassador Dobrynin, are not very sympathetically covered in *Cold Dawn.*[40] For an understanding of SALT from the perspective of the delegation, *Cold Dawn* needs to be supplemented by a reading of the articles that Paul Nitze has written since he resigned from the delegation in June 1974. Nitze was the senior representative of the Department of Defense on the delegation from the very first SALT session beginning in November 1969.[41]

From the SALT literature, three edited works endeavor to analyze the diverse implications of the SALT experience for a variety of strategic and political problem areas, and adequately represent the scope of the strategic debate. The works edited by Morton Kaplan and by William Kintner and Robert Pfaltzgraff tend to the orientation that security is a function of defense capabilities, while the work edited by Mason Willrich and John Rhinelander is more sympathetic to the view that security is best attained via arms control and arms reductions.[42] Although few edited works ever present clear collective messages, it is not unfair to state that the analysis in the works edited by Kaplan and by Kintner and Pfaltzgraff tends to be highly critical of the strategic

[35] Newhouse's former Brookings colleague, Morton Halperin, emerges as a heroic figure in the quest for arms control. Reference is made to Halperin's "sturdy arms control bias" (p. 112), to "his open aversion to ABM's in all forms" (p. 112), and to the fact that "arms control is his passion" (p. 50). Newhouse's robust, almost lyrical, approving prose suggests very strongly that arms control concern has transcended scholarly enquiry and has become ideology.

[36] *Cold Dawn,* p. 2.

[37] *Ibid.,* p. 3.

[38] *Ibid.,* p. 3.

[39] For discussion of Soviet-American asymmetries, see Kintner and Pfaltzgraff, pp. 369–371; Walter C. Clemens, Jr., *The Superpowers and Arms Control* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1973), pp. 35–36, 59–61; William R. Van Cleave, "Political and Negotiating Asymmetries: Insult in SALT I," in *Contrasting Approaches to Strategic Arms Control,* ed. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1974), pp. 10–21; and Colin S. Gray, *The Soviet-American Arms Race,* chapter 3.

[40] See Alton Frye, "U.S. Decision Making for SALT," in Willrich and Rhinelander, p. 93. For a good example of possible (Kissinger's) image-damaging information not made available to Newhouse, see Clemens, pp. 43–44, fn.a.

[41] A fairly comprehensive statement of Paul Nitze's views on American SALT-related practices is "The Strategic Balance Between Hope And Skepticism," *Foreign Policy,* 17 (Winter 1974–75), 136–156.

[42] All three works are cited fully at the beginning of this article.

assumptions that guided American policy makers in their approach to SALT. The authors in the Willrich and Rhinelander volume tend to a more friendly analysis. Unfortunately, the two defense-oriented and highly critical works contain, with very few exceptions, analyses completed prior to the signing of the SALT I agreements on May 26th, 1972.

All three works attest to the renaissance of fundamental thinking on the frontiers of the sub-sub-discipline of strategic studies. In each book, authors question the orthodoxy that has been *de riguer* in the arms control citadels of the United States since the middle 1960s. Following on the protracted SALT experience, catalyzed by the need to sharpen analytical frameworks in order to cope better with SALT material, each work casts doubts upon the following beliefs: that mutual assured destruction is the final word on deterrence theory toward which all sophisticated strategic thinkers, of whatever national culture, must ultimately strain; that Soviet strategists either conceptualize in a fashion very similar to American strategists, or that such conceptualization may be induced as the product of American educational endeavor; that the nuclear arms race is driven essentially by an action-reaction mechanism between nation-states; and, finally, that arms control negotiations *are really about* the control of the arms race for mutual benefit.

With their firm adherence to the semi-organized arms control interest,[43] the contributors to the Willrich and Rhinelander work tend to be less thorough-going in their critique of the still-orthodox wisdom. With few exceptions, each contributor fairly frankly admits ignorance about the decision-processes and motives of the Soviet Union. The broad position of most of the authors about the soundness or unsoundness of the SALT I agreements is well known. In healthy contrast to John Newhouse, however, these authors indicate definite areas of ambivalence.[44] In his chapter in Willrich and Rhinelander, Marshall Shulman endorses the achievements of SALT I, but he also offers a balanced and sophisticated appraisal of those Soviet-American asymmetries—conceptual, decisional, political and economic—that could frustrate aspirations for a more civilized Soviet-American relationship.[45] Shulman concludes his chapter with the following judgment: "Here perhaps is the real significance of SALT I, for its most important accomplishment is to be found less in the substantive agreements reached than in the educational effect of the negotiating process."[46]

Shulman has implied on previous pages that Soviet leaders have *yet* to attain the level of strategic conceptual sophistication common to American arms controllers, but he also implies that there could well be some merit in the Soviet way of thinking about strategy and arms control. Shulman's argument contrasts sharply with the intellectual hubris to be found in Newhouse. Consider the following example of John Newhouse's thought:

> . . . defending people is the most troublesome of all strategic options, for stability demands each of the two societies stand wholly exposed to the destructive power of the other. Acceptance of this severe and novel doctrine illustrates the growing sophistication of Soviet thinking and some willingness to break with fixed attitudes, including the old Russian habit of equating security with territorial defense. And it points up the American interest in raising the Russian learning curve—in creating a dialogue that will encourage, however gradually, a convergence of American and Russian thinking about stable deterrence. Thinking about deterrence is mind bending even for initiates. It takes time and some knowledge of the weapons as well as the issues.
>
> The gap in such thinking is not just between the U.S. strategic community and the Russians, whose concern with these concepts is more recent. It is also between the Americans and their European allies, and between those Americans directly involved ["inhouse"] and those observing from the sidelines of academia.[47]

This is an example of intellectual arrogance that is usefully revealing of an attitude of mind that has limited the effectiveness of the strategic and arms control policies of the United States over the past decade. With this presumption of American conceptual superiority, a whole series of errors in prediction and possibly in policy action is more easily under-

[43] Apart from the operation of friendship networks, arms control interests now have extra-government institutional form in the Arms Control Association (ACA), while the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) has long conducted itself as an arms control lobby (for example, providing witnesses and prepared testimony for congressional hearings). *Arms Control Today* (monthly publication), published by ACA, was created to be both the "house journal" of the arms control community, and an effective instrument for the dissemination of the views of that community to interested outsiders.

[44] Most useful are the lists of identified gaps in current knowledge provided in Kintner and Pfaltzgraff, pp. 103, 381–382.

[45] "SALT and the Soviet Union," pp. 101–121.

[46] *Ibid.*, p. 121.

[47] Newhouse, *Cold Dawn*, pp. 3–4. This is very close to an assertion that "I (Newhouse has since moved "in-house," to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency) and my official friends know best, are the most expert—*by definition*."

stood. It is now fully revealed that the United States' intelligence community fairly consistently underestimated the rate of growth of Soviet ICBM and SLBM forces after 1965.[48]

The more defense-minded of the contributors to the books edited by Kaplan and by Kintner and Pfaltzgraff argue that the Soviet approach to the political utility of strategic forces, to the opportunities available in an arms control forum, and to the military functions of strategic forces are very dissimilar from dominant conceptions in the United States. Moreover, it is argued that a convergence of Soviet thought and practice with American thought and practice should not be expected. Indeed, Johan Holst suggests that it is far from obvious that doctrinal convergence would be conducive to a safer world.[49] This does not mean that serious business cannot be conducted in the SALT forum, nor need it mean that the dominant American approach to American strategic postural questions is invalid. What it does mean is that Soviet behavior must not be translated, by conceptual reflex, in terms of models drawn from and reflecting American behavior.

Although Shulman and others sensibly point to the "educational effect of the negotiating process itself," it is now apparent that SALT were better not viewed as a Soviet-American arms control seminar using American textbooks. SALT has undoubtedly raised the level of information concerning strategic issues at the most senior levels in both Moscow and Washington. In a sense, SALT has probably "politicized" particular strategic programs in that there has been higher level interdiction of the standard operating procedures of lower levels of bureaucracy. As of 1976, preliminary conclusions may be drawn with some confidence concerning the "educational effect" of SALT. Despite some of Dr. Kissinger's claims, there is no evidence that the American defense community has "cracked the code" of Soviet thinking about the structure and purposes of their strategic weapons posture.[50] Our comprehension of Soviet strategic thinking should have improved over the past six and a half years, if only because we have had that much extra time to observe and interpret the expansion and qualitative improvement of the Soviet strategic posture. It would seem, if the excellent chapters by Thomas Wolfe and William R. Van Cleave (in Kintner and Pfaltzgraff), by Johan Holst (in Kaplan), and by Marshall Shulman (among others) are to be believed, that Soviet strategic thinking provides no conceptual self-limiting features at all analogous to the American notion of a sufficiency of force for assured destruction.[51] Furthermore, Soviet leaders have offered no evidence that they believe it to be an important function of SALT to enhance American conceptions of strategic stability; and we still do not understand the role of strategic doctrine in the development of Soviet strategic posture. Indeed, as Johan Holst has suggested, it may be "the Soviet way" to develop the weapons first and to select the appropriate doctrine afterwards.[52]

Backward Russians?

Very many American arms controllers have seen in SALT a unique opportunity for the education of misguided or backward Russians. To those analysts skeptical about the arms control wisdom of the late 1960s, the SALT experience has yielded strong evidence supportive of their initial premises and prejudices. It is quite clear from the Soviet literature on America and on arms control that Soviet strategists are not ignorant of the fine flourishes of Western strategic thought. The unwillingness of the Soviet Union to accept American strategic conceptual tutelage would seem to stem from the uncongenial nature of Western thought; from a satisfaction with domestic strategic thought; and from a proper recognition of Soviet national interest.[53]

As many observers of American arms con-

[48] See Albert Wohlstetter, *Legends of the Strategic Arms Race* (Washington, D.C.: United States Strategic Institute, 1975).

[49] "Comparative U.S. and Soviet Deployments, Doctrines, and Arms Limitation," in Kaplan, *SALT: Problems and Prospects*, particularly pp. 56–57.

[50] For example, see the optimistic prognoses given in Henry Kissinger's Press Conference in Moscow on May 26, 1972, in Senate Committee on Armed Services, *Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitations of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, Hearing*, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1972), p. 99.

[51] In the words of George Rathjens, ". . . there is not the slightest evidence that it [the Soviet Union] accepts the concept of strategic sufficiency." In "Future Limitations of Strategic Arms," in Willrich and Rhinelander, p. 230.

[52] In "Comparative U.S. and Soviet Deployments, Doctrines, and Arms Limitation," in Kaplan, pp. 66–67. A clear statement to the effect that students of the Soviet Union do not understand the role of Soviet strategic doctrine vis-à-vis procurement decisions is David Holloway, "Strategic Concepts and Soviet Policy," *Survival*, 13 (November, 1971), 364–369.

[53] On the strong and very particular roots of Soviet strategic doctrine, see William T. Lee, "The 'Politico-Military-Industrial Complex' of the U.S.S.R.," *Journal of International Affairs*, 26 (1972), 79–83, 86;

trol diplomacy have noted, "the American way" both in *strategic* analysis and in arms control theorizing and practice has tended to be technical rather than political.[54] Unfortunately, the dominant Soviet—and, indeed, the NATO-European—approach to strategy and to arms control has been political. The technical arms control approach to SALT has been dominated by a laudable concern to ensure the maintenance of a condition of strategic stability, commonly defined as a context wherein the "first strike bonus" is close to zero. In other words, the smaller the difference in military effectiveness between a first strike and a second strike, the greater the measure of stability. If we subscribe to the adage that "by their deeds shall ye know them," it is apparent that Soviet leaders have elected to remain indifferent to American lectures on the subject of strategic stability. Despite a decade of American educational effort, Soviet leaders persist obdurately, by their weapon program deeds, in asserting that they are the best judges of their own security interests. They may be misguided, but it is well to take them seriously. The political sensitivity to the possible foreign policy consequences of visible strategic imbalances was a feature of Dr. Schlesinger's stewardship at the Department of Defense.[55] The Vladivostok accord provided, and almost certainly a SALT II treaty would provide, for parity on strategic offensive force levels. Unfortunately, two issues that appeared to be of only minor importance in Vladivostok, the American long-range cruise missile (LRCM) programs and the Soviet *Backfire B* bombers, have since assumed pre-eminent roles as blocks to the completion of a SALT II treaty. These weapons systems are neither clearly *strategic* nor clearly *tactical* in character. Therefore, even if all the LRCMs and *Backfires* eventually to be deployed could be identified by satellite reconnaissance, there could be little confidence that their military missions would be unambiguous.[56]

Many American arms controllers are still resisting the notion that each super-power is playing its SALT games in accordance with very different rules. Intimations that this might be the case may very occasionally be discerned in Newhouse and in Willrich and Rhinelander, but such unpleasant thoughts are not permitted seriously to muddy the text. Among the major edited works discussed here, this theme is developed only in the more defense-minded arguments deployed in Kaplan, in Kintner and Pfaltzgraff, and somewhat unevenly before the congressional committees that considered the SALT I package. It is unfortunate that a subject as important as the Soviet approach to SALT should become an issue in the domestic strategy/arms control debate in the United States. The available evidence indicates that the Soviet Union approaches all negotiations in a tough, competitive spirit.[57] If a Western government wishes to avoid "losing" a round of negotiations, it needs a strong bargaining position and a tough-minded attitude.

Despite the unprecedented dangers that attend a *nuclear* arms race, there is every reason to believe that Soviet leaders are convinced that military competition yields political gains.[58] One may not approve, but it is difficult to see how any other interpretation can be placed upon the evidence available concerning the course of SALT. Skeptical readers are advised to consider the details of the Soviet negotiating posture for SALT II, and the erosion of the posture of the United States—with the dénouement in Vladivostok.[59] SALT II

Thomas W. Wolfe, "The Convergence Issue and Soviet Strategic Policy," in *Rand: 25th Anniversary Volume* (Santa Monica, Cal.: The Rand Corporation, 1973), 137-150; Benjamin S. Lambeth, "The Sources of Soviet Military Doctrine," in *Comparative Defense Policy*, ed. Frank B. Horton III, A. S. Rogerson, and E. L. Warner III (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1974), 200–216; and William F. Scott, *Soviet Sources of Military Doctrine and Strategy* (New York: Crane, Russak, 1975).

[54] Frederick S. Wyle, "U.S., Europe, SALT, and Strategy," in Kaplan, *SALT: Problems and Prospects*, pp. 142–143; Clemens, *The Superpowers and Arms Control*, p. 55.

[55] Schlesinger, *Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1976 and FY 197T*, pp. I-13, II-7–8.

[56] See Richard Burt, "The Cruise Missile and Arms Control," *Survival*, 18 (January/February 1976), 10–17.

[57] On the Soviet approach to SALT, see Thomas W. Wolfe, "Soviet Approaches to SALT," *Problems of Communism*, 19 (September-October, 1970), 1–10; Thomas W. Wolfe, "Soviet Interests in SALT," in Kintner and Pfaltzgraff, pp. 21–54; Lawrence T. Caldwell, *Soviet Attitudes to SALT*, Adelphi Paper 75 (London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, February 1971); and Uri Ra'anan, "Soviet Decision-Making and the Strategic Balance: Some Reflections," in Pfaltzgraff, *Contrasting Approaches to Strategic Arms Control*, pp. 113–122.

[58] See Senate Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, *The Changing American-Soviet Strategic Balance: Some Political Implications*, Memorandum by Uri Ra'anan, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1972).

[59] The Vladivostok accords comprise a very poor set of agreements in *the longer run*, for the Soviet Union. I base this judgment on the fact that the principal future questions of strategic stability are not addressed in the accords. Those questions pertain to the vulnerability of missile silos, "counterforce matching" and

will not "cap the arms race" in the sense of depriving a dynamic strategic posture of political meaning. Even before SALT I placed a ceiling upon ICBM and SLBM deployments, the Soviet Union was switching from a quantitative to a qualitative arms racing path. Soviet leaders believe in negotiating from strength, in exploiting military strength for political gain (and certainly for gain in terms of the fine print of arms control regimes), and in purchasing a strategic posture that might have some military and political value should war ever occur. These beliefs run contrary to the way in which many Western analysts believe that strategic power ought to be approached in the nuclear age, and they certainly run counter to many of the more optimistic, early prognoses for SALT. The evidence of Soviet adherence to these beliefs, however, is proof neither of Soviet aggressive designs nor of Soviet backwardness. Soviet analysts and politicians, save for the consumption of gullible Westerners, have never endorsed the notion that SALT was an institution in which technical experts would seek to control a nuclear arms race that was evading political control.

The books by Newhouse, Kaplan, Kintner and Pfaltzgraff, and Willrich and Rhinelander necessarily eschew fundamental enquiry, given their topical mandates. These works, however, do not rest upon a well-ordered body of social scientific knowledge concerning arms race dynamics—either generic in scope or particular to the *nuclear* arms race. Authors differ about whether the United States should be more or should be less active in the arms race, but these opinions seem to stem more from fashions among their intellectual reference groups than they do from any deep understanding of which moves, in what circumstances, are likely to produce particular results.

The Schlesinger Shift

The reviving strategic debate of 1973–1976 has seen a struggle by analysts to emphasize the complexity of their subject matter. Such analysts as Fred Iklé, Albert Wohlstetter, Bruce Russett, and Graham Allison have been arguing that the more popular theorems that purport to explain how the nuclear arms race works and what the appropriate criteria should be for a sufficient nuclear deterrent are not good enough.[60] A large part of the present strategic debate is concerned with the appraisal of ideas and programs that their authors hope will remove the less satisfactory features of mutual assured destruction doctrine from the strategic policy of the United States.[61] Former Defense Secretary Schlesinger and his strategic advisers were not seeking simply to justify the latest products of the weapons laboratories, nor did they have as a dominant concern a determination to maximize American bargaining strength at SALT.[62] In his *Defense Report* for FY 1975, Schlesinger repudiated MAD doctrine, he affirmed the proposition that militarily marginal strategic forces might have political value, and—implicitly—he denied that the arms race was necessarily an exercise in futility.[63] The *Defense Report* for FY 1976 was even more explicit in its attempt at redefining the requirements of deterrence in an age of rough parity and mutual vulnerability.[64]

The present debate may center on the wisdom of pursuing a very substantial hard-target counterforce capability or the political salience of static criteria of strategic strength. But very close to the surface of debate are the still underanalyzed policy scientific questions pertaining to arms race dynamics, negotiating dynamics, and the appropriate criteria by which one should be able to design a *good* strategic posture.

Many adherents to a MAD-orientation are prepared to grant the limited validity of the criticisms that recently have been leveled at MAD doctrine. They are concerned, however,

to political perceptions of specific imbalances. See Colin S. Gray, "SALT II and the Strategic Balance," *British Journal of International Studies*, 1 (1975), 183–208.

[60] Fred C. Iklé, "Can Nuclear Deterrence Last Out the Century?" *Foreign Affairs*, 51 (January, 1973), 267–285; Wohlstetter, *Legends of the Strategic Arms Race;* Wohlstetter, "Threats and Promises of Peace: Europe and America in the New Era"; Bruce Russett, "Counter-Combatant Deterrence: A Proposal," *Survival*, 16 (May/June, 1974), 135–140; and Graham Allison, "Questions About the Arms Race: Who's Racing Whom?: A Bureaucratic Perspective," in Pfaltzgraff, *Contrasting Approaches to Strategic Arms Control*, 31–72.

[61] A good way into the debate is via *Orbis*, III (Fall, 1974), which contains eight articles on "the Military Balance, U.S. Strategic Forces, and the New Targeting Doctrine."

[62] Laurence Martin, "Changes in American Strategic Doctrine—An Initial Interpretation," *Survival*, 16 (July/August, 1974), p. 160.

[63] Schlesinger, *Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1975*, respectively pp. 32–41 (MAD doctrine), 27, 43–44 (political consequences of perceived strategic imbalance). Schlesinger argued that unless the United States gives evidence of a willingness to accept the current Soviet arms race challenge, the Soviet Union will be allowed a politically advantageous measure of strategic imbalance.

[64] Schlesinger, *Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1976 and FY 197T*, pp. II-1–9.

lest the pursuit of the best strategic doctrine fatally impair the efficacy of the working strategic doctrine that has, for nearly a decade, been the principal conceptual guide for United States strategic posture.[65] Furthermore, although it may be true that MAD doctrine is morally repugnant to civilized men, would be militarily irrelevant to any context, and is a prescription for a paralysis of political will, many strategists remain to be convinced that the proposed alternatives offer any significant improvement.

One of the more interesting statements in the books under review appears in Richard Garwin's contribution to Kaplan. Garwin writes:

> It is in the interest of both sides to have a stable but responsive strategic posture, but our knowledge of the structure and behavior of military-political-sociological systems is by no means adequate to support detailed analyses. Our posture must be simple if we want to be sure that it is really understood by the other side.[66]

Garwin might have argued that the United States should adopt a posture sufficiently simple to be understood by those Americans who are not strategic analysts—the President and (the present incumbents excepted) the Secretaries of State and Defense, for example. Unfortunately, the strategic postures that most obviously meet the criterion of simplicity are also, one could say necessarily, unlikely to be credible. MAD doctrine, understood to imply relatively massive attacks upon urban areas, is simple, but a diminishing number of Americans have any confidence that a MAD-orientated SIOP should be invoked in any resort save the last.[67] If strategic forces are to retain any political meaning, a president must ensure that his strategic posture allows for flexible employment. Clearly, the fewer options that one has, the less complex the calculations of the adversary should be. But the adversary will always confront the task of predicting political will. There should be some relationship between political will and strategic posture, but no amount of calculation can remove the residual unknowables.

Richard Garwin was correct to point to the limitations in American comprehension of the institutions and the processes that produce strategic policy decisions in the Soviet Union. However, Garwin does happen to be one of the firmest adherents to the arms control school which has imputed *American* concepts to the Soviet Union and has endorsed a mechanistic model of action-reaction as being crucial to the arms race. This model necessarily assumes that the super-powers act and react as collective strategic logicians. For example, Garwin writes that "the elimination of ABM would break a positive feedback loop leading to the arms race."[68] In simple action-reaction logic, Garwin is correct. But the history of Soviet and American MIRV programs after May 1972 demonstrates that the forces that drive major arms programs are more complex than many arms controllers had previously believed. Major weapons procurement is a field of redundant causation. Arms-race histories may be written that emphasize the momentum of technological innovation, or the games played by bureaucrats, or the threats perceived and misperceived abroad—all of which have partial validity.[69]

The congressional hearings held in the summer of 1972 to review the content and implications of the SALT I Treaty and Interim Agreement revealed that conceptual education was understood by the Soviet delegates to be beyond their mandate. The hearings offer a wealth of technical detail and reflect the imbalance of strategic theoretical opinion within the extra-official defense/arms-control community.[70] There were very few thorough-going critics of the ideas upon which the SALT I agreements were founded. A major potential value of the hearings, however, lay not in their role as a forum for the rehearsal of established attitudes and opinions, but rather in the possibility that officials—and particularly delegates—would hold forth about the insight gleaned into the working of Soviet strategic minds.

[65] The rise of assured destruction in official favor may be traced through Mr. McNamara's *Posture Statements* from 1964 until 1968. See Table I in Graham T. Allison and Frederic A. Morris, "Armaments and Arms Control: Exploring the Determinants of Military Weapons," *Daedalus*, 104 (1975), 110–111. Revealing in (I suspect) an unintentional way is Ralph Sanders, *The Politics of Defense Analysis*. (New York: Dunellen, 1973), p. 142. Also see Newhouse, *Cold Dawn*, pp. 66–68.

[66] "Superpower Postures in SALT: An American View," p. 98.

[67] *Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1976 and FY 197T*, pp. II-1–2.

[68] In "Superpower Postures in SALT: An American View," p. 113.

[69] See Ted Greenwood, *Making the MIRV: A Study of Defense Decision Making* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1975).

[70] The principal SALT-related hearings were the following: Senate Committee on Armed Services, *Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms;* Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements;* Hearings, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1972).

Newhouse has written that "in the formal meetings as well as during informal dinners and lunches, each side discovered a great deal about the other's attitudes."[71] If the United States delegation did learn a great deal about Soviet attitudes in the strategic field, then—judging from the evidence offered in *Cold Dawn* and in the four sets of congressional hearings—it must have been one of the best-kept secrets of modern times. Before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, the Chief Delegate to SALT, Gerard Smith, stated: "I think that the Soviets, as a result of the SALT negotiations, have moved toward accepting the concept of assured destruction. I would say that I don't know. I have no way of judging whether their doctrine, their national doctrine, says that this is their national strategic concept. I just don't know."[72]

As Hedley Bull has observed about the Washington and London Naval Arms Limitation regimes of the interwar years, common rationales need not be shared among the participants in an arms control regime.[73] However, given the scope for the qualitative improvement of weapons allowed to the Soviet Union in (and duly exercised during) the Interim Agreement of SALT I and in the Vladivostok accord for SALT II, more than idle academic interest is engaged in attempts to answer the questions of how the Soviet leaders conceive of the utility of strategic forces, and what they understand SALT to be about.

Facing Facts

If the Soviet Union is using SALT as a framework to support a détente that will gradually be redefined as the strategic balance moves more and more in the Soviet direction,[74] then a number of reasonable American responses are defensible. First, while eschewing short-term panic measures, one may endorse former Secretary of Defense Schlesinger's pursuit of an "essential equivalence." In practice this entails a substantial revision in strategic thought. In the Schlesinger version of responding to the perceived Soviet challenge, one must seek a great measure of symmetry — even in particular weapon categories. Also, one must seek a rough balance of counterforce capability and endeavor to maintain a strategic posture of such proportions that no unsophisticated politician is likely to be so impressed by a contemplation of the "static measures" of strategic (im)balance that he believes that the United States will lack the political will to act. Second, suppose one grants that SALT thus far has produced only poor bargains for the United States; still one might elect to remain relatively unmoved. The critics of counterforce doctrine are saying that MAD doctrine is sound (as good a doctrine as technology permits) and should not be abandoned simply because backward Russians still refuse to face contemporary military-technological facts.

Strategists are becoming aware of the time-specific and ethnocentric roots of their strategic wisdom. Not merely are central tenets of our deterrence theories the products largely of American scholarship, they also tend to be predicated upon a dyadic interstate context. An urban area ABM defense system may be heretical in terms of a dyad of strategic actors that are striving to contain their strategic competition by the acceptance of MAD concepts, but such an ABM system should be viewed in a far more favorable light were the superpowers to move into a nuclear proliferated world. The contributors to a recent book edited by Richard Rosecrance[75] have contemplated the deterrence problems of a world that might contain not six nuclear powers, but 16 or 26 or 36. These authors have sought to alert strategic analysts to the possible long-run consequences of MAD doctrine. Undeterrable leaders, nuclear accidents and miscalculation may be unlikely for one year, or for five—with the present five nuclear weapon powers (six, if India is included)—but how unlikely are these events over 25 or 50 years, with an unpredictable number of nuclear powers? Better ABM systems may not be the answer, but unless one chooses to put one's faith in chiliastic fantasies,[76] it is none too soon for strategists to begin contemplating how one should think about such an unfamiliar world.

The world of an archetypal American arms controller has been, and remains, a comparatively simple one—dominated by clear dichoto-

[71] Newhouse, *Cold Dawn*, p. 173. A very different view is Van Cleave, "Political and Negotiating Asymmetries: Insult in SALT I," pp. 16–19.

[72] *Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms*, p. 383.

[73] "Strategic Arms Limitation: The Precedent of the Washington and London Naval Treaties," in Kaplan, *SALT: Problems and Prospects*, p. 50.

[74] Probably the most trenchant critique of SALT I along these lines is Donald Brennan, "When the SALT Hit the Fan," *National Review*, June 23, 1972; more recent analysis in a similar vein is Nitze, "Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Détente."

[75] *The Future of the International Strategic System.*

[76] For one example of such fantasies, see Clemens' aspiration that arms control may move the superpowers from detente to entente. *The Superpowers and Arms Control*, p. 134.

nies. Weapon systems tend to be *either* stabilizing or destabilizing in their effects. Weapon systems are either first-strike in orientation—which is *bad*—or are second-strike in orientation—which is *good*. On its own terms, this form of analysis is logically impeccable. Unfortunately, Soviet leaders have proved to be unsympathetic to it.[77] With differing conceptual frameworks, the potential for misperception of strategic and political intentions was and remains profound. Furthermore, one learns from much of the American arms control community's comments upon SALT, that one is *either* serious about seeking to control the arms race, *or* one is not. In the former case one should subordinate opportunities for unilateral advantage in the interest of reaching reasonably balanced accords. Also, one should adopt the attitude that the nuclear arms race is a threat to all of humanity, and not a vehicle for national political gain.[78] Soviet leaders do not inhabit this Aristotelian world of either/or choices.

In the mid-1960s, it was expected that the Soviet Union would be content with a secure second-strike capability. According to American assured-destruction doctrine, this was all that the Soviet Union needed. Later in the 1960s, the Soviet Union was expected to be content with a parity in the "static measures" of strategic balance. As of 1976, the momentum of qualitative advance can only be explained plausibly as a bid for whatever political gain a favorable strategic imbalance will yield. In arms control terms, the Soviet Union may certainly be faulted for declining to explain the rationales behind her strategic programs, but the crucial and avoidable Western error was the enduring misconception that Soviet motivation could be explained in terms of American arms control theory.

In SALT I, as prospectively in SALT II, the Soviet Union laid the basis for a major hard-target counterforce capability vis-à-vis the United States which the United States would have great difficulty in matching. The Soviet Union was accorded the right to deploy 313 "heavy missiles" compared with none for the United States. Furthermore, the Interim Agreement failed to set any limits of importance upon the expansion of the volume of ballistic missiles and provided no lasting compensation for the greater throw-weight of Soviet missiles. In signing the ABM Treaty, the United States succeeded in trading an advanced American technology for an obsolescent Soviet technology, looking to a future in which Soviet missile throw-weight married to accurate MIRV's would put the United States in far more urgent need of a dedicated silo-defending ABM system than the Soviet Union.

Until the Vladivostok meeting, Soviet leaders asserted that the quantitative, asymmetrical limits upon the ICBM and SLBM inventories were completed business. The Soviet "concessions" at Vladivostok on equal aggregates for offensive delivery vehicles and MIRV launchers did not mark any change in the Soviet approach — appearances notwithstanding. Progress in SALT II negotiations was not registered prior to October-November 1974, partly because the United States was insisting upon an arms control regime that would discipline sharply the future hard-target counterforce capabilities of the Soviet Union.

The United States sought to secure an agreed level of MIRV launchers (in the region of 600–750) for the Soviet Union such that upgraded *Minuteman* silos (designed to resist blast overpressures up to 1,000 pounds per square inch) would be viable for more years into the 1980s than seemed likely without such an agreement. Because of the very large Soviet advantage in missile throw-weight over the United States, Dr. Kissinger sought a favorable asymmetrical limit on MIRV launchers. When this kind of proposal predictably failed to excite Soviet enthusiasm, the United States then proposed a common, relatively low limit for aggregate missile throw-weight. Such a scheme would, of course, have denied the Soviet Union any advantage from her large missile boosters and would place at a premium the American technical leads in missile accuracy and warhead design. The Soviet dismissal of these suggested bases for SALT II induced the United States to move from "fairly complex proposals to substantially more simple ones, and this permitted both sides finally to come to an agreement."[79]

[77] A former member of the SALT I delegation, Joseph Kruzel, has asserted that the ABM Treaty "had the dual effect of shutting off a new avenue of strategic arms competition and legitimizing the doctrine of assured destruction" in "SALT II: The Search for a Follow-On Agreement," *Orbis*, 17 (Summer 1973), p. 361. Unfortunately, it may be argued that the Soviet Union was very interested in constraining an ABM competition because of the anticipated superiority of United States' defensive technologies.

[78] In the words of a SIPRI author: "The strategic arms race should be recognized as a malignancy and dealt with cooperatively by those responsible for it." *SIPRI Yearbook, 1973* (New York: Humanities Press, 1973), p. xix.

[79] Dr. Henry Kissinger, Press Briefing in Vladivostok, November 24, 1974, official text (mimeo), p. 7.

Alas, the "breakthrough" at Vladivostok that, in Dr. Kissinger's euphoric words, enabled the superpowers to achieve "a cap on the arms race,"[80] was purchased at the price of future strategic instability. The very high common aggregates of Vladivostok mean that both sides are free to pursue the qualitative arms race as energetically as they choose;[81] that the missile silos of each superpower will be acutely vulnerable to a disarming attack in the 1980s; and that the Soviet Union, with her enormous advantage in missile throw-weight, will be able to dispense many more silo-killing MIRV's than will the United States. Whether or not these prospective facts should promote serious concern is a subject of current debate.

In a remarkable pioneering book, Matthew Gallagher and Karl Spielmann have sought to outline the ways in which American interpretations of Soviet behavior are probably in error.[82] Without seeking to present a portrait of an idiosyncratic Soviet Union impenetrable to Western analysts, the authors demonstrate the inapplicability of the simple logical models ("Shortcuts to Confusion" — the title of Chapter 1) that American arms controllers have wielded as the principal tools for the "cracking open" of the arms race system. The authors do not argue that American strategic concepts and notions of bureaucratic politics are necessarily invalid, for the United States; they argue that these notions should not be projected uncritically upon the Soviet Union. Only by accepting the divergence of Soviet practice in doctrine and procurement from the American model can the United States both compete effectively in the arms race and fashion a defense policy and a negotiating posture that is likely to induce cooperation from a very un-American adversary.

Conclusion

For the first time in a decade, the standard tenets of deterrence theory and of arms control doctrine are subject to widespread systemic criticism (the ABM debate of 1969 was, by and large, more limited in scope). Despite the prominence of such implicitly value-lader terms as "stability" and "parity" in the arms control literature, the notion of mutual assured destruction was conceived and rigidified in an era of quiet American confidence that a perpetual margin of superiority could be maintained. As of 1976, strategic theorists are beginning to realize that the past decade and a half has seen no substantial measures of arms control; that MAD doctrine reflected contemporary military-technological necessity and represented a very limited aspect of a deterrent relationship rather than a total and finite solution to nuclear strategic problems; that the Soviet Union is not usefully to be modeled by social scientific arms controllers in an American image; and that the rough and tumble of international politics cannot be avoided in the forum of protracted arms control negotiations.

American negotiating performance in SALT offers much negative instruction as to *How Nations Negotiate*.[83] Analysts seem to be so paralyzed by the conceptual difficulties attendant upon the use of such terms as "power" and "bargaining power" that serious study of the most important questions pertaining to negotiation is rare indeed.[84] Strategic analysts are coming to stress the urgent need to study Soviet policy on its own terms — and to seek to improve the level of our comprehension of how the Soviet political system processes strategic policy decisions.[85] A closer attention to Soviet behavior, a greater willingness to admit that there are regions of inquiry in which we are ignorant, and a diminished tendency to project our ideas upon others — all these should encourage strategic analysis that is less culture-bound, richer, and more relevant to a superpower strategic balance that is evolving in favor of the Soviet Union. The margin for tolerable error is diminishing.

[80] Kissinger, Press Briefing, Nov. 24, 1974, pp. 3, 6.

[81] For detail on the more important qualitative improvements that must be anticipated, see the section "New Strategic Technologies," in *Strategic Survey, 1974* (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975), pp. 46–50.

[82] *Soviet Decision-Making for Defense: A Critique of U.S. Perspectives on the Arms Race.*

[83] Fred Iklé's book with this title (New York: Praeger, 1967) serves as a devastating indictment of American negotiating practice in SALT from 1969 until 1976.

[84] Very much to the point is I. William Zartman, "The Political Analysis of Negotiation: How Who Gets What and When," *World Politics*, 26 (April, 1974), 385–399. Also see Zartman, ed., *The Analysis of Negotiation* (New York: Anchor, 1975); and the special issue of *Journal of International Affairs*, 29 (Spring, 1975), "An Era of Negotiation."

[85] An important work in this area is Arnold L. Horelick, A. Ross Johnson and John D. Steinbruner, *The Study of Soviet Foreign Policy: A Review of Decision-Theory-Related Approaches*, R-1334 (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, December 1973).

BOOK REVIEWS

Russell and Moore: The Analytical Heritage. By A. J. Ayer. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971. Pp. 254. $8.75.)

Here is the record of Professor Ayer's William James lectures, delivered at Harvard University in 1970. It is a book largely given over to a tactful exposition of Russell and Moore; but there is nothing on Russell's purely logical work and, except for a brief section in which Ayer describes an interesting connection between the paradox of analysis and the naturalistic fallacy, nothing on Moore's ethical writings either. In his Preface Ayer writes that his original intention had been to issue this volume as part of his study of Charles Sanders Peirce and William James: the earlier work has been published under the title *The Origins of Pragmatism,* so the quartet is now complete.

Twentieth-century philosophy is segmented, rather like an arthropod. In major intervals there is the revolt against idealism, logical atomism, logical positivism, which has acquired something like a retrospective moral grandeur among social scientists, linguistic analysis and ordinary language philosophy, logical analysis and the exaltation of quantification theory—this in the sense of W. V. O. Quine—and more recently, under the influence of work originally begun in modal logic, a partial revival of speculative metaphysics. Despite Ayer's inventive judgment that ". . . those who look upon him as an exponent of ordinary-language philosophy . . . are doing him an injustice" (p. 245), G. E. Moore is fixed firmly as an enthusiast for the limpid vernacular. For linguistic analysis generally Russell had dry contempt. But his own work of the 1930s and 1940s sometimes seems thin. It is the startling and original volumes of his early and middle years that for all their unquestioned carelessness have entered completely into the great canon of English philosophy. So Russell seen as an historical figure looms bulkily over the first third or so of this century's analytic history.

Ayer's discussion is not historical, and readers interested in thematic development might prefer John Passmore's *One Hundred Years of Philosophy* (London: Gerald Duckworth & Co., Ltd., 1957) or J. O. Urmson's *Philosophical Analysis* (London: Oxford University Press, 1956). The method works well in the long stretch of the book given over to Russell. Here are many of the famous doctrines: the theory of logical constructions; the theory of descriptions; logical atomism, broken by Ayer into two parts; neutral monism. The analysis is often adroit, especially in the section devoted to the theory of descriptions: Ayer neatly balances Russell's view against Strawson's. But there are certain matters of emphasis that seem unusual. Ayer urges that almost all of Russell's philosophy is driven "by his conception of what there is, or rather, of what there can rationally be thought to be" (p. 10), adding in frank perplexity that "the central part which this ontological question plays in Russell's treatment of philosophy has not . . . been at all widely recognized." But Russell's overriding concern has been with epistemology: ontology is a subject dominated by men with austere passions looking to record their conviction that the world is really the arena for a handful merely of the elementary particles, or the atomic facts, or that dynamically curved and empty space which, according to geometrodynamics, makes up the ultimate stuff of creation.

Ayer's discussion of Moore is less successful. Like Henry James, Moore wrote in a style at once persuasive and rebarbative. Ayer goes at it manfully in chapters that treat of Moore's refutation of idealism, the defense of common sense, abstract entities and Moore's concept of analysis. But Moore *is* a vastly more restricted philosopher than Russell, and it is difficult to maintain unflagging interest in a man who consumed himself with such questions as whether sense data have unexamined parts. Ayer concludes his discussion by drawing an interesting distinction between Moore's concept of analysis and Russell's: while Russell envisaged a *revision* of ordinary language as a result of analysis, Moore looked only to a more elaborate *description* of ordinary language. Curiously, Moore's commitment to description merely seems to have been offered in a largely ceremonial spirit, or so Ayer claims, since Moore's technical remarks on the theory of perception waddled over the bounds of ordinary language and the rules of usage that it suggests.

DAVID BERLINSKI

University of Puget Sound

Frantz Fanon. By David Caute. (New York: The Viking Press, 1970. Pp. 116. $4.95, cloth; $1.65, paper.)

Fanon. By Peter Geismar. (New York: Dial Press, 1971. Pp. 214. $6.95, cloth; $1.95, paper.)

Five years ago, on the dust jacket of his book, the publisher could announce without excessive advertising license that since Fanon's death in 1961, ". . . *The Wretched of the Earth* has become a key ideological document for radical movements across the globe, notably black militants in the United States." Today the book has its currency mainly in the reading lists of courses on revolution in academe. The militancy of the black movement in the United States has been suspended, and the blacks in Africa have found oppressors of their own race as their new rulers. Yet Fanon's work lives to remind us of the intensity of anti-white passion appeased neither by the achievement of political sovereignty in the former colonial areas nor by feeble attempts at amelioration of the black condition here at home.

The two biographies under review, sympathetic but not uncritical, differ in approach and quality. (A more recent biography, *Frantz Fanon, A Critical Study,* by Irene L. Gendzier [New York: Vintage, 1974]), provides a more comprehensive analysis of Fanon's politicization and evaluation of his influence on the Algerian revolution and elsewhere.) Caute's account is by far the more analytical and systematic presentation of Fanon's ideas. Geismar's, drawn largely from interviews and conversations with those who had known Fanon, is the more "personal," though it surprisingly lacks detail about individual and family influences on his early development. The portrait of Fanon that emerges from his admiring biographer is one of an intense and passionate—and often impatient, scornful and overbearing—man, who packed careers as a soldier, psychiatrist, writer, revolutionary and diplomat into the brief span of 36 years (1925–1961). He spent the last few months of his life ironically under treatment for leukemia in Bethesda Hospital, outside Washington, D.C., capital of the country he loathed, regularly visited by a member of the American diplomatic service who probably was a C.I.A. agent.

The sequence and themes of Fanon's writings are so interwoven with his own personality and personal development that psychological speculation is difficult to resist. In his review of the Geismar and Caute biographies (*New York Times Book Review,* March 14, 1975, p. 5), Albert Memmi, who, like Fanon, has had something original to say about the relations between colonizers and the colonized, suggests that Fanon ". . . sought the solution to his personal drama in political action and philosophy." Born in Martinique, Fanon thought himself French and white only to find in France that he was regarded as French West Indian and black. Nor did problems of color and solidarity among the oppressed resolve themselves in Algeria or Africa. He could neither assimilate with his oppressors nor could he return to his people and his past. Caught in this unresolvable tension, if I understand Memmi, Fanon was driven to propose a new man in a totally reconstructed world.

Whatever the merit of such psychological interpretation, Fanon's reputation and influence seem to rest now on *The Wretched of the Earth* (trans. Constance Farrington, [New York: Grove Press, 1966]), written in the last year of his life. The work hardly qualifies as a carefully constructed treatise in revolutionary theory. It is, as Caute notes, imprecise, lacking in clarity, bristling with generalizations usually unsupported by evidence, and often subsuming the activist and the ideal in a single categorical affirmation. Yet it is in Caute's opinion "one of the great political documents of our time" (p. 74). Geismar would take the edge off the criticisms leveled against *The Wretched* by characterizing it as an *"outil de combat,"* part of the war against colonialism, "the contribution of a skilled revolutionary propagandist" (pp. 200–201). True enough, but Fanon had intended it as a revolutionary theory for the Third World, and so it has been read.

The core of Fanon's theory is that the authentic revolutionary class in the Third World is the poor peasantry who have kept their moral values and their devotion to the nation intact. Based thus in the countryside and sparked by deviant nationalists who have become disaffected with the orientation of the nationalist parties, the revolution moves into the urban areas where the "Lumpenproletariat" —the classless idlers, pimps, prostitutes, and petty criminals—provide the spearhead. Fanon rejects the native proletariat, privileged in African society, as a revolutionary class, nor does he provide any role, as Mao Tse-tung did in his revolutionary strategy, for sections of the native bourgeoisie whom Fanon dismisses as "parasitical." Central to his theory

also is the function of violence as a liberating force. Violence is the ultimate psychological cathartic. Through violence "organized and educated by its leaders," the people will come to understand social truths. Violence is a political necessity in armed struggle *and* a means of social and moral regeneration to reunite the community divided by colonial policy. Psychologically it would serve to eradicate the inferiority complex of the colonized, erasing apathy and despair and laying the groundwork for the creation of a productive citizenry. Decolonization cannot be represented by the mere establishment of nationhood. Rather "decolonization is always a violent phenomenon . . . quite simply the replacing of a certain 'species' of men by another 'species' of men . . . the whole structure being changed from the bottom up" (*The Wretched of the Earth*, p. 29). Fanon calls for no less than a transformation of the consciousness of both the colonized and the colonizer.

Just as Marx has been faulted for expecting too much of the proletariat—a revolutionary consciousness that would provide the driving force for the transformation of society—so Fanon can be criticized for demanding too much of the peasantry and lumpenproletariat. Commentators along the political spectrum have not found it difficult to criticize Fanon's political ideas and the messianism embedded in his theory. (For a conventional Marxist critique, see Jack Woddis's, *New Theories of Revolution* reviewed in *APSR*, 68 [June, 1974], 1751–1752.) Among the *engagé*, however, there remains the conviction that Fanon's ideas are highly relevant to the most pressing problems of contemporary Africa: the improvement of the condition of the peasant masses and the materialization of values specific to the African context without reference either to capitalism or socialism. (E.g., Guy Martin's "Fanon's Relevance to Contemporary African Political Thought," *UFAHAMU*, vol. IV, no. 3 [Winter, 1974], 11–34.) At bottom, Fanon's life and work are testament to the psychological damage inflicted on both the colonizer and the colonized wrought by imperialism and to the inadequacy in human terms of any concept of decolonization that is equated with formal sovereignty.

BERNARD S. MORRIS
Indiana University

Civil Disobedience: Aid or Hindrance to Justice? By William Sloane Coffin, Jr., and Morris I. Leibman. (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprises Institute for Public Policy Research, 1972. Pp. 93. $5.75.)

Private Conscience and Public Law: The American Experience. By Richard J. Regan, S.J. (New York: Fordham University Press, 1972. Pp. 245. $8.00.)

Civil Disobedience and Democracy. By Elliot M. Zashin. (New York: The Free Press, 1972. Pp. 368. $7.95.)

Civil disobedience is generally recognized to be an extraordinary form of illegal action. Both its advocates and opponents recognize that it is different in nature from ordinary lawbreaking, and most agree that the difference consists in the motive, manner, and aim of the disobedience. Unlike ordinary criminals, the civilly disobedient are thought to act out of moral concern, publicly and nonviolently, for the purpose of avoiding evil or doing good. This common understanding gives such extraordinary disobedience a cloak of respectability and tends to cast the public controversy aroused by such disobedience in terms of reconciling the claims of morality with the requirements of public order and stability.

Civil Disobedience: Aid or Hindrance to Justice? may serve as an useful introduction to the issues raised by conscientious disobedience in protest of public law or policy. It records a debate between William Sloane Coffin, Jr. and Morris I. Leibman, and their discussion of the title issue with a panel of distinguished citizens. It is a swift and eloquent debate, not without impassioned exchange or insight, in which reasoned rhetoric blends with platitudinous demagoguery. Dr. Coffin asserts the primacy of individual conscience over all, and defends civil disobedience as a political weapon for the downtrodden in righteous pursuit of their heartfelt desires. Mr. Leibman condemns such lawless action as essentially unreasoning, uncivil and undemocratic—a threat to just order and useless for solving the complex problems of a technological "conglomerate" like the United States. Their remarks concerning the primacy of reason or will in public affairs, of persuasion or force, form the most suggestive and least conventional exchange regarding the relation of law and conscience to justice in civil society.

This relation is not a simple one in which reason or wilfulness is necessarily to be found on one side or the other in a conflict between law and conscience. However, the fact that law is no longer viewed as a rule of reason but

as the embodiment of a particular morality—if not merely the instrument of dominant interests—tends to make conscientious disobedience appear to be an authentic voice of righteousness raised in desperate opposition to established injustice. Richard J. Regan, S.J. rejects this common view of civil disobedience because it divorces legality from morality. He objects to the divorce because public laws in democratic societies express collective moral judgments and, in the United States at least, also recognize freedom of conscience. For this reason, "the issue in conflicts of conscience and law . . . is not simply one of morality versus legality, but, from the viewpoint of morality, one of competing moral judgments and, from the viewpoint of legality, one of conflicting legal claims" (pp. 185–86).

As a political scientist, Father Regan relinquishes to philosophers and theologians the task of assessing the competing moral claims of private conscience and public law. He has chosen instead to formulate generalizations descriptive of the legal status given to conscientious objection in the United States. To accomplish this object, he surveys the relevant Court decisions in an attempt to identify the different public interests at stake in the various conflicts with conscience, and to determine their relative importance. Similarly, he constructs a "typology of moral obligation" in an effort to distinguish the kinds of conscientious imperative and to determine their relative significance. The analysis is apparently intended to produce empirically grounded generalizations predictive of judicial behavior in future determinations of conflicts between law and conscience.

The result is disappointing for its formality. "The most salient conclusion from the cases surveyed is that no claim of conscience, however high, prevailed against a public interest ranked high"—or "even moderately high" (p. 190)—"by a majority of justices" (p. 188). On the other hand, "when Court majorities have rated unambiguously low the public interest at stake against private claims of conscience, the latter, of whatever quality, have been regularly vindicated" (p. 193).

This disappointing formality appears to be a necessary consequence of the formality inherent in Father Regan's method. It is impossible to make intelligible the relation of law and conscience in a political society without examining what each is. Perhaps recognition of this led Father Regan to include an interesting appendix outlining the prominent theories of conscience in the Western tradition, but he makes no attempt to determine which theory correctly describes what conscience is. Instead, he silently adopts one theory in constructing his typology of moral obligation, treats conscience phenomenologically as a matter of personal consciousness of guilt or moral integrity, and classifies the various claims of conscience as high, moderate or low according to the degree of obligation perceived in conscientious commands and prohibitions, or the degree of guilt felt for failure to follow them. Similarly, he makes no attempt to explain the Court's judgment of the high, moderate, or low significance of the public interest at stake in its decisions granting or refusing legal status to the claims of private conscience in matters of national security, public order, public welfare, the family or education.

This methodological modesty makes Father Regan's book valuable mainly for its succinct and comprehensive survey of the relevant Court cases. It also accounts for its almost fatal weakness—its failure to make intelligible the primacy of law which it amply demonstrates. In the conflicts of law and conscience, the public interest has always prevailed except in matters of little moment and, after all, it is the law which—in recognition of a public interest (p. 8)—accords to conscientious objection whatever legal status it happens to enjoy in the United States.

The destruction of this primacy of law in the minds of citizens appears to be a primary object of Elliot M. Zashin's *Civil Disobedience and Democracy*. As a product of the Berkeley milieu in the early 'sixties, Zashin became convinced that American society suffers from established injustices incapable of remedy by ordinary political action. Less theoretical than practical, his aim is to "legitimize civil disobedience as a democratic tactic," to actualize "its potential as an effective political technique" for securing social peace and justice in the United States (p. 1). His book aims overall to create the tolerance of civil disobedience necessary for its effectiveness as an instrument of the social and political change he so ardently desires.

To make civil disobedience respectable, to "legitimize" it, requires that law-abiding citizens be disabused of their conviction that conscientious disobedience in pursuit of political change is uncivil, undemocratic, and wrong. Zashin attempts to disarm them of this conviction through an interpretation of liberal democracy designed to support the view that civil disobedience is an unconventional but loyal form of political participation. His meth-

od is to weave by artful selection from the conflicting views of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Jefferson, Bentham, Mill, T. H. Green, and others, a coherent theory of civil disobedience as a natural extension of the liberal principle of government by consent of the governed. The argument is a prolix presentation of now familiar views of the "New Left."

Liberal democracy seeks to protect the individual as an autonomous moral agent. It intends "to minimize (his) subordination to purposes other than his own" (p. 35), and to avoid subjecting him to "ends and means with which he cannot feel any spontaneous interest in complying" (p. 61). The principle of consent is expressive of these ends. But genuine moral autonomy requires that consent be a fully informed expression of personal consciousness (p. 92), and voting studies have shown that most citizens do not consent in this way (p. 302). Certainly disaffected citizens do not assent to policies from which they dissent (p. 300). Government by consent thus appears to be a chimera rather than a genuine means of avoiding alienation (p. 303). (Indeed, feeling-put-upon may be a necessary consequence of government since all rule, even majority rule, involves ruling—a subordination of the ruled to the decisions of those who rule.) Fidelity to the principle of moral autonomy requires liberal democracy to find an alternative to rebellion and acquiescence for the powerless and the disaffected (p. 94). Politics, of course, is the true middle ground between rebellion and subjection. But for the politically ineffective civil disobedience seems a viable middle way between autonomy and alienation—between getting-one's-way and feeling-put-upon. By this subjectivist transvaluation of the aims of modern republicanism, Zashin can claim that "the intent of democracy is also the intent of civil disobedience" (p. 61).

But this tolerance-breeding charm may be broken either by the impatience of the alienated for what they desire, or by the fears of law-abiding citizens for the safety of the Republic. To assure the efficacy of civil disobedience, Zashin tries to persuade disaffected citizens of its utility and to convince satisfied citizens of its harmlessness. His method is to posit a suitable definition. To qualify as civil disobedience, unlawful political action must profess a higher obedience, intend neither open violence nor secret subversion, and accept punishment which is truly legal (p. 118). To still the fears of decent citizens he thus limits the lawless pursuit of conscientious desire, but the limits are not too stringent lest the alienated be driven to reject civil disobedience as a viable alternative to rebellion or acquiescence (p. 141). Civil disobedience is by definition made useful, harmless and loyal. Its advocates eschew "revolution . . . made in the old way." They wish only "to transform American political and social institutions in a radical way, but without betraying their adherence to democracy, equality and humanism" (p. 329).

It is perhaps pointless to criticize charming advocacy for superficial scholarship, conceptual confusion and fallacious argument. Certainly Zashin's tedious study is valuable for its unintended revelation both of the effects of ideology upon inquiry and of the nature of civil disobedience. Civil disobedience can be distinguished from both conscientious objection and ordinary lawbreaking by its emphatically political character. Arising here from a conscientious and abstract partisanship, it appears to be a timid—if not masked—species of civil war. At every decisive turn, the advocates of civil disobedience justfy this unlawful political action by their conscientious desire for a bloodless revolution in America.

ROBERT F. SASSEEN
San Jose State University

Tradition, Change, and Modernity. By S. N. Eisenstadt (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973. Pp. 367. $14.00.)

I know of no sociologist whose books and essays produce in me so great a feeling of utter helplessness as do those of Professor Eisenstadt. In 1957 I published my first review of one of his books (*From Generation to Generation*). That was his first piece of work written under the spell of Professor Parsons, who had spent the previous decade or so writing in such a fashion as to give all of the individuals who were prematurely anti-Parsonian for the wrong reasons a perfectly tenable place to stand. Professor Parsons had gone into his binary stage. He and his disciples took a bunch of concepts—now called "pattern variables"—and treated them as rigidly mutually exclusive rather than as differences of degree. Neither Parsons nor his disciples ever used them as though they were in fact binary. I referred to that then as the fallacy of misplaced dichotomies; in private conversations Professor Eisenstadt agreed that the categories were not dichotomous.

I feel helpless when I confront the work of Professor Eisenstadt because I believe him to have an excellent mind. I am also rather ar-

rogant about my own capacities. I find it extremely frustrating therefore when I cannot make head or tail of what he writes when I try to read it carefully. There are, after all, a group of people who consider themselves to be sociologists who have no truck with scientific analysis as such and are more properly to be judged on their humanistic contributions. Professor Eisenstadt has, as far as I know, no such pretensions to cover his tracks. Let me try to make the sources of my frustration explicit in terms of the text here for review rather than personal and autobiographical.

If the blurb for his book correctly represents his view of it, Professor Eisenstadt thinks the book focuses a collection of his essays on the patterns of change in contemporary and transient societies; explores the role of tradition in such changes; invokes comparisons among European countries, China, Japan, etc. to make his points; criticizes extant theories and suggests new approaches. I have tried to condense this fairly.

Professor Eisenstadt begins his book (pp. 4–5) by stating three qualitative dichotomies: liberty vs. authority, stability and continuity vs. change, and modern social rationalities vs. cultural orientations (presumably modern social rationality is not a cultural orientation). These qualitative dichotomies somehow get combined with ". . . the description and analysis of the structural and organizational aspects of different types of societies" (p. 7). Durkheim's distinction between mechanical and organic division of labor is cited as support for the relevance of such dichotomous tools (p. 8). What Professor Eisenstadt, along with most other sociologists, does not know is that Durkheim saw through this distinction in the very book in which he presented it (*De la division du travail social,* 1893). His discovery of "the non-contractual elements of contract" brought this distinction to a halt for him. As far as I know, he never used it subsequently. Of all the hundreds of people who created such a distinction, Durkheim alone saw through it and abandoned it. We do not give him appropriate credit.

Early in this book there is a subsection entitled "Modernization and Development—the New Paradigm" (p. 11). Professor Thomas Kuhn has taught us all to hitch up to the word "paradigm" where the less prestigious word "model" will haul all the intellectual freight aboard, but we need not pause for logomachy. Although "paradigms" are often referred to in this book, I do not recall a single clearly identified and stated paradigm.

As part of the promised "new paradigm" I expected a definition of the term "modern" or "modernization." Indices of modernization are often discussed, but I do not recall any clearcut definition of the concept. How can we tell (see page 25) what "modernization implies" when we cannot even tell what modernization *is,* except by empathy with Professor Eisenstadt?

I suppose my fundamental theoretical annoyance focuses on the word "tradition" as that term is used by Professor Eisenstadt. His index (see page 367) indicates that traditionalism is defined on page 156. I ask you to turn to page 156. There is something closer to a definition at the bottom of page 151, where we have the following quotation, "But whatever the difference between traditional societies, they all share the acceptance of tradition, of the givenness of some actual or symbolic past event, order, or figure as the major focus of their collective identity, as the delineator of the scope and nature of their social and cultural order and as ultimate legitimator of change and of the limits of innovation." But of course, by that definition, there are no nontraditional societies. No societies constitute a *complete* break with the past, no matter how radical their leaders and other members think of them as being. The problem with the word "traditional" as used in these contexts is that it is used to imply that some societies are that way and others are not. It is used as though it is a binary distinction, and that is false. There are societies whose members place a very heavy weight indeed on accepted precedent as the primary basis for legitimacy. (Incidentally, it is not true that the things done for "traditional" reasons are irrational. Given the means at their disposal, what people do for traditional reasons frequently coincides to a very high degree indeed with what it is rational to do.)

There are other peoples who, over a very much broader area of their social lives, justify performances by reference to rational scientific models, even though those are frequently spurious, but these peoples do not lack traditions. The remarkable thing about them is not that they have eliminated traditions but that they have managed to set them aside as much as they do. In the United States, for example—clearly a modern society in Professor Eisenstadt's eyes—state and local governance as presently constituted are clearly obsolete. We are not faced with a single problem, domestic or international, that has not had its solution impeded by state and local governance as pres-

ently constituted—and yet, those forms of state and local governance are supported almost entirely on traditional grounds. Consider our views of locally controlled schools, police forces, the Constitution, etc. The term "tradition" has its uses. Used as though some societies have traditions and some not—with all difficulties taken care of by ad hoc qualifications—it begs rather than answers questions. Durkheim understood this.

Nowhere does this emerge more clearly for me than in the sections on China (see pp. 261–280). For Professor Eisenstadt, terms like "traditionalistic" become synonyms for elements that don't seem to work as far as modernization is concerned. This term, along with the terms "transformative" and "patrimonial," puts robes on his and everyone else's hindsight, but all it seems to say again and again is that China failed to modernize.

To put the matter more simply, without the fancy words, the Chinese were faced with a classical problem: their requirements for high levels of coordination and control escalated at exactly the point in time that their previously existing bases for coordination and control—in this case, overwhelmingly, family stability—came apart at the seams as never before. Incidentally, without Professor Eisenstadt's advantage of hindsight, no one would have regarded modernity as the greatest threat to the Chinese. The Mongols completely conquered the Chinese in a sense that the forces of the "West" never did. Unlike the Japanese, who had a highly convertible basis for coordination and control, relatively independent of family and local political structures, the Chinese had to create a new set of controls. The leaders of the Kuomintang were not successful; the present leaders of China have clearly created such political structures. Where China will go from here remains to be seen. None of this comes out very clearly in Professor Eisenstadt's book, and he misses the point that would help him in the cases of Thailand and Japan, both of which were highly traditionalistic from many points of view. Presumably Japan was not "neo-traditionalistic" because she became highly modernized.

On page 268 we see the introduction of terms which again put robes on hindsight. No matter how radical and revolutionary the revolution of Sun Yat-Sen may look, we find out that, instead of being transformative, rational and modernist, it was nontransformative, neotraditional, and semipatrimonial. None of these terms is very clearly defined. With their qualifications, they simply mean that the regime in question was not "successful." Taiwan is a special puzzler for Professor Eisenstadt. The "success" in Taiwan, and to some extent that in Thailand, leads essentially to a conclusion with regard to his hypotheses—if one can identify them clearly—"sometimes yes; sometimes no."

On page 270, we find a reference to the relative mutual autonomy of the "social, cultural and political orders." This can only imply that it is possible for the social to be noncultural and nonpolitical, the cultural to be nonsocial and nonpolitical, and the political to be nonsocial and noncultural. Do such implications merit further discussion? Such usages lead Professor Eisenstadt further down in the same paragraph to observe, "This, of course, was also related to the fact that no church or cultural organization in China existed independently of the State." That whole way of putting things is so at variance with what we know about Buddhism that it is hard to know where to start. Yes, the Chinese government could license monks and nuns, but in no ordinary sense was there any sort of churchly dependence on the State—assuming the Imperial Chinese government to be a State. Should one even use the term "church" for the Buddhist organizations? The Buddhist organizations in a single *hsien* didn't necessarily relate to one another, much less did all of them combine into one sort of national organization or church. Professor Eisenstadt should know better than to impose Christian religious concepts on other religions. Buddhism is a puzzler for him. Taoism would be a howler, and that's not the end of religions in China. Professor Eisenstadt is so overwhelmed by what he sees in China of the elements of centralization—quite extraordinary for a relatively non-modernized society—that he almost completely misunderstands the role of decentralization there.

On page 277, Professor Eisenstadt refers to "partial groups such as families and regions." Whatever does he mean by the concept of "partial groups"? It seems to be self explanatory for him. I wish it were for me. On page 280 we have something of a conclusion about China—Professor Eisenstadt's last paragraph before going on to India. It seems that the present Chinese regime may or may not be successful in doing what the Nationalists attempted, but, either way, the Chinese heritage will prove to have been of great importance in "shaping the destiny of its encounter with modernity." Not only in China! Unless one is a mystic, the historical basis from which

change takes place is one of the most important factors in affecting the destiny of anything. (Incidentally, even in this he seems unalert to the fact that the historical base from which change took place for the Nationalists was after all somewhat different from that for the present People's Republic.)

Finally, Professor Eisenstadt's conclusions, pages 357–363, represent an interweaving of advice and analysis that is not to my taste. Taste aside, however, where I know the materials best, as in the case of China, I more often find myself in disagreement than agreement with him. I deeply regret that.

MARION J. LEVY, JR.
Princeton University

Socialism and Affluence. By The Fabian Society. (London: Fabian Society, 1967. Pp. 93. 12s.)

The Fifth Social Service: A Critical Analysis of the Seebohm Proposals. By The Fabian Society. (London: Fabian Society, 1970. Pp. 159. 30s £1.50, cloth; 18s 90p, paper.)

The Fabian pamphlet *Socialism and Affluence* was first published in 1967 and was reprinted in 1970. It is a group of four lectures, three of which were given by academics and the fourth by the late Richard Crossman a member of the Labour Cabinet from 1964–1970. Professors Abel-Smith and Townsend both make very strong pleas for larger expenditure on social services which they justify by reference to numerous social surveys recording widespread poverty amongst low earning families and pensioners. Unfortunately, the humanity and compassion which makes the works of Titmuss, Abel-Smith, and Townsend so attractive is not matched in these essays by a full analysis of the economic or political costs of providing better services to all those in need. With hindsight it is easy to see the danger of ignoring the harsh reality of economic circumstances; in 1966 the British could still delude themselves by referring to "affluence" as if American socioeconomic problems were similar to those of the U.K. The pressures imposed upon the 1966–70 Labour Government to pursue redistributive and other social welfare aims resulted not only in an increase in taxation from 36 per cent to 52½ per cent of national income (D. R. Myddleton, *The Power to Destroy* [London: Johnson, 1969]) but also to the party's decisive defeat in the 1970 election. Crossman in 1966 still had the moral courage to chide academics who could hope "that with luck the [economic] crisis should be over in a few months" (see p. 88 of Socialism and Affluence which refers back to Brian Abel-Smith's lecture, "Labour's Social Plans"); but with mounting political pressure for better social services and the organization of social welfare lobbies all efforts to curb expenditure failed.

The Fifth Social Service is a collection of nine essays published in 1970 which exemplify the gulf that exists between economic reality and the dreams of Fabians. The "fifth" service relates to the personal social services which provide for the needs of children, the elderly, and other vulnerable groups such as discharged prisoners and homeless families. In 1968 the Report of the Committee on Local Authority and Allied Personal Social Services (Seebohm Report HMSO 3703) was published and recommended very extensive changes in the organization of these services. Five of the Fabian essays constitute a critique of the Seebohm Report (essays by Peter Townsend on the objectives of the personal social services departments; Adrian Sinfield on social work, Peter Mittler on community mental health care, Michael Meacher on the needs of the elderly, and John Agate on hospital and community care of the aged).

Peter Townsend in the first essay suggests that the objectives of personal social services should be examined in the light of (1) the subjective views of consumers and experienced suppliers, (2) policy outcomes, and (3) a level of provision determined by "true objectivity." His concept of objectivity is not fully defined or operationalized and would appear to rest upon utopian ideals. The other authors develop Townsend's theme of "true objectivity" and therefore give relatively little thought to the identification of priorities or costs. Meacher supports a proposal for a one hundred per cent registration of elderly people so that they may be visited and have their needs assessed and satisfied. As most of the services are free or very heavily subsidized, the demands made by the elderly would inevitably absorb a large share of budgets intended not only for the elderly but also for other age groups. A lack of recognition of prevailing budgetary constraints is also apparent in other essays which recommend increases in expenditure without relating these to the amount of distributive justice already attained by increasing social security benefits and other services to which low-income consumers have access.

In Adrian Sinfield's essay the role of social workers is defined as the imparting of informa-

tion about rights, making services available, helping to communicate needs to those in authority, and encouraging action by the individual, family, and group on behalf of themselves and the community (p. 31). David Bull examines the difficulties encountered by voluntary workers giving information to the general public about a number of means-tested benefits administered by national and local government authorities. He discusses the political dilemmas which confront pressure group organizations campaigning for the withdrawal of selective benefits, and the introduction of universal schemes such as family allowances or higher basic pensions; and he expresses his anxiety that by increasing the efficiency of means-tested schemes, selective policies will thereby be strengthened and appear to be condoned by those who are politically opposed to them.

DELLA NEVITT
London School of Economics

Lexikon Zur Soziologie. Edited by Werner Fuchs et al. (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1973. Pp. 783. DM 29.)

The terminological apparatus of sociology is in a notoriously parlous state. The diversity of the linguistic, theoretical, and empirical traditions which contribute to (and contend for dominance within) the discipline; the practitioners' eagerness to signal the real or claimed novelty of their contributions through the use of neologisms; the fuzziness of the boundaries separating sociology from other disciplines—all these factors make the working vocabulary of sociologists cumbersome, discordant, imprecise, ill-ordered, often obscure. Hence the difficulties (and the attractions) of the enterprise, attempted in the book under review, of producing a reference book which would register, codify, possibly order that unwieldy patrimony of terms.

Such an undertaking involves, it seems to me, two basic "design decisions." In the first place it can strive to reduce that multiplicity, order that diversity, by giving the status of entries to relatively few terms, subordinating to each of these a number of others mentioned only within the presentation and discussion of the former; alternatively, it can treat as entries as many terms as possible, instead of ordering them into sets of more or less tightly coordinated terms. In the second place such a reference work may include only terms originating and circulating primarily within sociology *as such* (however understood), or on the contrary take up any terms in use within sociological discourse, whatever their origins and (so to speak) their citizenship.

The title itself of this thick, small-format book (A lexicon not *of,* but *for* sociology); the acknowledgment in the preface of differences not just in the interests and competences, but in the theoretical, methodological and ideological orientations of the five editors and eighty-two contributors; and above all the very large number of entries (some 6,000)—these characteristics indicate that with respect to each "design decision" the *second* of the above alternatives has been chosen. This is a repertory of definitions and capsule treatments of such terms as one may come across in reading sociological literature, whether themselves specifically sociological or not; in fact a great many of those here treated as entries are primarily in use in fields as diverse as ethology (e.g., "Imprinting"), statistics ("Histogram"), political science ("Division of powers"), or philosophy ("Erfahrungswelt"). Great care has been taken to present as clearly as possible each term; much less effort has gone (intendedly and, in my view, advisedly) into stipulating relations between individual terms. Furthermore, when a plurality of definitions or usages exist for a given term, each is distinctly articulated; thus four definitions are given for "Ideology," and six for "Law," for instance; and within many entries (e.g., "Feudalism"), a broadly Marxian/Marxist usage is juxtaposed to one or more others with different systematic backgrounds and ideological resonances. Furthermore, even somewhat idiosyncratic terms, specifically identified with only one author or school, are entered; and one may in fact wonder whether in selecting these the editors may have been rather *too* permissive. It is one thing giving entries to Max Scheler's "Ideal factors" and "Real factors," but another to treat as entries Dieter Claessen's "Sequence expectation" or F. H. Allport's "Pluralist ignorance."

To continue with a few doubts and criticisms, it is unclear what criterion has been followed in treating as entries the titles of a very few books (among these "Streetcorner society" and "Soldier, American"). Non-German terms (mainly English, some French) are very frequently referred to; but again it is not clear why in certain cases they are followed by a definition (as with "Career patterns"), while in other cases they are entered but only to refer the reader to the German equivalent for a definition (as with "Contrat social"), and finally in other cases yet they appear after a German term, purely as a translation of it (as

with "Skewness"). Furthermore, though the coverage of terms is impressive, the absence of some important ones appears unjustifiable. There are numerous entries beginning with "State," but no entry for "State" itself; "Weltanschauung party" and "Cadre party" are entries, but "Party" is not one. There are no entries for "Tax," "City," "Property," "Politics," "Cost-benefit analysis," "Hegemony," or "Contract." The book has no index, presumably because it has so many entries that it constitutes, as it were, its own index; yet one might like to have listed, for instance, all the authors and books mentioned *within* entries.

To test the quality of the treatment (always a tricky matter with reference works) I have read closely many hundred entries, as varied in theme and significance as "Curtosis" and "Ethnomethodology," or "Counterculture" and "Hermeneutics," and only very few of these have seemed to me lacking in clarity, precision, or insight. I have set a question mark, for instance, against the entry "Spirit of capitalism," which of course refers to Max Weber but fails to recognize that Weber treats strictly religious elements as causally connected with that "Spirit," but not as constitutive of it. And the last sentence of the entry "*Rechtsstaat*" ("A formal *Rechtsstaat* is sometimes found in dictatorships, e.g., in Germany at the beginning of the thirties") puzzled me: between 1930–33 the German republic may have been a purely formal Rechtsstaat but was no dictatorship; after 1933 it was a dictatorship, but was it a Rechtsstaat, formal or otherwise?

On the whole I find this a well-conceived and well-executed reference work, much to be recommended to those with enough German to make use of it, and not just to resolve difficulties originating from the reading of specifically *sociological* literature.

GIANFRANCO POGGI
University of Edinburgh

Interpretations of Fascism. By A. James Gregor. (Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Press, 1974. Pp. 281. No price listed.)

During the past decade A. James Gregor has become the most prolific and acute analyst to be found outside Italy of the philosophic components of Italian fascism. Even within Italy his work in this regard is only equalled or surpassed by that of Renzo de Felice, the great biographer of Mussolini. The present volume follows Gregor's study of *The Ideology of Fascism* (1969) and his *The Fascist Persuasion in Radical Politics* (1974); it will be followed by Professor Gregor's forthcoming study of the political and philosophical ideas of the young Mussolini.

The study of fascism comes rather more easily in the United States than in Western Europe, for even after thirty years, detachment is hard to achieve in countries that have actually experienced some form of fascism. This is perhaps demonstrated most graphically by the recent outpouring of abuse on Renzo de Felice in Italy following the appearance of the latest volume in his Mussolini biography, together with the brief *Intervista sul fascismo* (1975). If fascism is no longer a problem of West European politics, it is still a problem for West European ideology and culture.

Some of the reasons this is so are amply illustrated in the volume under review, which is the first systematic analysis in English of the principal theoretical efforts of the past fifty years to interpret Italian fascism. Ernst Nolte's introductory essay in his *Theorien uber den Faschismus* (1967) was a perspicacious attempt in the same direction, but limited by its very brevity, while the analytical essays in De Felice's *Il fascismo: Le interpretazioni dei contemporanei e degli storici* (1970), while much fuller, lacked the systematic clarity and conciseness of Gregor's work.

Gregor has organized the attempted interpretation of fascism, with primary reference to Italy, under six general themes or categories: (1) The consequence of "moral crisis"; (2) The consequence of psychological disabilities; (3) The consequence of the rise of "amorphous masses"; (4) The consequence of class struggle; (5) function of a particular stage of economic development; and (6) a manifestation of totalitarianism. In each case he presents a brief summary of the arguments of the leading exponents of the theory, and then proceeds to analyze each interpretation critically in terms of its logical consistency and verifiability, and the degree to which it can be corroborated by the known facts of the history of Italian fascism. The result is effectively to demolish the various conflicting loose general sets of ideas that have passed for theories or interpretations of fascism.

Somewhat surprisingly, among those scholars and writers reviewed, the ones who seem to have done the best job of self-criticism and correction of the most extravagant or flagrantly inaccurate aspects of the theories of their own "school" are some of the more serious and relatively objective East European

Communist scholars of the past fifteen years, such as Alexander Galkin in the Soviet Union and Mihaly Vajda in Hungary. Western Marxists, by contrast, seem proportionately almost more disposed to repeat the hoary Marxist shibboleths of the 'thirties in unrevised form.

Gregor concludes that what we are left with does not add up to an empirically verifiable theory of fascism, but rather some loose general suggestions and ideas that merely provide the beginning of an approach to the topic, once the more extravagant and demonstrably false theories have been discarded. This conclusion is convincingly supported by direct data and rigorous analysis.

One position that is largely overlooked by this approach, though Gregor does mention it in passing, is the general skepticism shared by such diverse scholars at Henry A. Turner, Jr., Karl D. Bracher, and Renzo de Felice that such a general political category as "generic fascism" can even be demonstrated to have existed. The significant differences between the various radical nationalist movements of Europe in the 1920's and '30's were so great that it has never been easy to establish their common identity completely or systematically.

I myself agree with Gregor that such a thing as "generic fascism" did exist in Europe during the period 1920–45, though I would restrict the category simply to fascist movements rather than speaking of "fascist systems" or regimes. Mussolini himself in his final reassessment did not believe that his dictatorship had been a fully fascist regime, and the study of interwar Italian institutions largely bears him out. The Mussolini regime was a political dictatorship geared to a large degree of institutional pluralism in the nongovernmental institutions of Italian society—monarchy, army, church, business, and even to some extent the judiciary and culture. The Fascist party did not itself rule but was increasingly constituted as a bureaucracy within and under the official state, quite distinct from the structure of either Nazi Germany or Communist Russia. This would leave us with only Nazi Germany as a "fascist system"—not enough to constitute a genus.

Whether or not such an interpretation is correct, it serves to underscore the main thrust of Gregor's book: the limitations of our empirical knowledge, but above all the weakness of our conceptualization of the fascist phenomenon in interwar Europe. The clearing away of useless, obfuscatory theoretical debris is indispensable before genuine progress can be made, and in this task Gregor's book serves the study of fascist politics very well indeed.

STANLEY G. PAYNE
University of Wisconsin

The Ideological Imagination. By Louis J. Halle. (Chicago, Ill.: Quadrangle Books, 1972. Pp. xiv, 174. $6.95.)

Professor Halle has written an urbane and learned "tract for the times" (p. vii) about ideology—not ideology in general, but a particular version called "totalitarian ideology." It is a personal "speculation" that skips along from topic to topic, thinker to thinker, in pursuit of a viable alternative intellectual and political commitment, which turns out to be, antithetically, "the commitment to non-commitment" (p. 140). Continuity is provided by the author's determined attempt to account for the origins and impact of ideological thinking and the attitudes he sees associated with it: intolerance, dogmatism, bigotry, mass irrationality, and the bifurcated *Weltanschauung* of what he labels "Manicheanism." Needless to say, Halle's opposition to "ideologists," past and present, and their mode of thought and action is manifest throughout.

The argument begins with the standard distinction between the liberal's accommodation of diversity, associated with Locke, and the totalitarian's imposition of conformity, identified initially with Rousseau. The author's own "ideological" orientation is revealed by his insistence that only the latter qualifies as "ideology," strictly speaking (pp. 5–6). "Ideological thinking" is correspondingly "normative thinking so sure of its own rightness as to be intolerant of dissent" (p. 116). The road to this kind of dogmatism is marked, first, by Hobbes's "subversive" elimination of the "authority of God" in matters political (pp. 18–22), and next by the introduction of a fictional popular sovereignty, which achieves its apotheosis in the Rousseauean myth of the general will. The political utopia of Rousseau is then nicely complimented by the asocial romantic rebellion of Jean-Jacques. This unique confluence of institutional myth-making and introverted romanticism, Halle contends, is the ideological basis for all subsequent experiments in totalitarian politics and professional revolutionary careers.

From here it is a short step to Marx, Engels, Lenin, Mussolini, and the whole pantheon of ideological anti-heroes, left and right, so familiar to this genre of writing. (Paren-

thetically, Hegel is notably absent because of enlightenment provided the author by Walter Kaufmann.) Marx and Marxism stand out as the *pièce de résistance* for post-1789 developments, and also supply the subject matter for Halle's most fruitful analysis. In these passages Marx emerges as a masterful "dramatist," setting the stage of history, composing lines for his actors, plotting a suitable dénouement, winning an audience. His facts were often mistaken, his concept of human nature dangerously dualistic, his predictions wrong, Halle maintains, but he possessed the ideologist's gift to command belief. It is precisely "as a dramatic vision, not as truth" (p. 75) that Marxism and other ideologies become historically influential. Of course, Halle also believes that the rise of ideology brings about an historical retrogression, even a "general intellectual debasement" (p. 121).

Having identified the forces of darkness, Halle goes on to propose a solution for the modern age, an odd amalgam of elements seemingly from J. S. Mill, Ortega, and W. G. Sumner. It rests on a demand for more profound "appreciation of our own ignorance" (p. 131). Because our knowledge consists at best of "partial, contingent, and tentative truths, mixed with error" (p. 134), Halle argues, creation of an open marketplace of ideas becomes the only rational social policy. Hope for salvation from mediocrity and mass society then lies with "individual minds." In one memorable aside we learn that Jefferson's America and Elizabethan England "were sordid and pitiful societies except as they were exalted by the virtue of a few individuals" (p. 130)! Man, we are told, is responsible "for himself alone" and is required only to "respect the rules" that make toleration possible. The measure of seriousness here is seen in an admonition to renounce "the common commitment to raising the moral standards and enhancing the understanding of others . . . to teaching others what is right and true" (p. 145). Evidently this is what "commitment to non-commitment" means. Placed alongside such advice, Halle's final assurance that we shall all profit from studying Plato's *Apology* (attached as an appendix) appears wholly incongruous.

As the author warns in his preface, much of his speculation is "wrong"—*responsibly* wrong, as he says—yet hopefully insightful. But how responsible and insightful? Aside from obvious limits to the individualistic prescriptions, the weaknesses of the diagnosis of ideology's pathology are those of any writing in this genre: accountability of past authors is assigned with summary justice, their explicit intentions are deliberately ignored, historical and social context is set aside, and the passion for synthesis becomes an obsessive preoccupation. Important differences among writers, distinctions among ideas, and effects of non-ideological factors are simply ignored. How interesting is a revival of the discredited view that Rousseau was the world's first ideologue, in face of all else that might be said about him? Is it enlightening, not to mention plausible, to hear that Schopenhauer, Darwin, Nietzsche, D. H. Lawrence, Freud, and Sorel all assisted the "revolt against reason" (pp. 97–8)? Surely the "ideological imagination," if it exists, is no more remarkable than the reactions it provokes.

LAWRENCE A. SCAFF
University of Arizona

From Kingdom to Commonwealth: The Development of Civic Consciousness in English Political Thought. By Donald W. Hanson. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970. Pp. xiv, 469. $15.00.)

This book has two central theses, both stated by the author in the opening chapter (pp. 39–40). It is, first of all, "an assessment of the place of medieval ideas in the achievement of constitutional government," and the author argues that "the medieval contribution was very slight." Second, it attempts to identify the "perspectives which not only contributed to the emergence of constitutional government but which also are central to its continued vitality"—summarized by Hanson as "the birth of public consciousness" in England in the seventeenth century.

As the title indicates, only English thought is considered, thus excluding both ecclesiastical and continental theory. Even in England no attention is given to the thought of Hobbes and Locke, although there are lengthy treatments of Bracton, Fortescue, Hooker, St. Germain, and Coke. The focus is on operative theory, closely related to contemporary English practice, and the argument is that there is only a very tenuous connection between "traditional" English political theory and practice before the Commonwealth period in the seventeenth century and the modern "consciousness of the public dimension" which emerged at the time and formed the theoretical prerequisite for constitutionalism. What is often mistaken for an earlier English constitutionalism, according to Hanson, is the medieval notion of "double majesty"—the belief that both the king and the magnates should

have a share in the government of England. Political authority in medieval England was personal and local. On a national level it was characterized by alternating periods of co-operation and violence between the king and the nobility—with the commons associated with them both in a minor and "distinctly subordinate" way in the late Middle Ages.

Utilizing this framework, Hanson then argues for a revision of the conventional views of pre-seventeenth century English constitutional theory. Bracton was not really arguing for the subordination of the king to the law but only for joint legislation by king and barons; Fortescue was not a theorist of mixed monarchy—because that theory is based on a differentiation of governmental functions which he did not hold; Hooker's work is "shot through with ambiguities" (p. 279), arguing at various times for the sovereignty of the king, the law, the body politic, and "the traditional doctrine of the joint supremacy of king and parliament,"; and Coke reformulated the doctrine of double majesty to apply to the relation of the common law and the royal prerogative and did not espouse either judicial review or the absolute supremacy of the common law. The doctrine of natural law provided an ethical standard which kings should observe, but not a higher law which could invalidate legislation that had been adopted jointly by the king and parliament. It was only with the assumption of omnicompetence by the Long Parliament in 1642 that Englishmen were impelled to undertake "a completely general discussion of the nature and purpose of society and government from a humanistic standpoint" and to achieve the "consciousness of the public dimension of political issues that separates the modern from the traditional political order of the Middle Ages" (p. 310).

What are we to make of this argument? The analysis of the individual theorists is careful and on the whole persuasive. Insofar as the book emphasizes the central importance of the theoretical changes in the seventeenth century, it makes a useful contribution—although, surprisingly, only one 25-page chapter is devoted to documenting the shift "from kingdom to commonwealth." There are serious problems, however, with the often-repeated insistence that medieval English political thought rested exclusively on a "traditional" notion of "double majesty" which had almost nothing to do with modern constitutionalism. The term itself does not appear in the sources, and (as the author's own conclusion on Hooker indicates) the thinkers he examines held different and potentially incompatible theories about the origin and exercise of political authority—theories which finally came into conflict in the seventeenth century. The participation of parliament in legislation and taxation was justified by all the medieval English theorists, however, because it was the corporate representative of the community of the realm, and this belief was not confined to what Hanson calls the "often hopelessly remote speculations of the sophisticated theorists of the age" (p. viii). As Fortescue noticed, this made a difference in the way that England was governed, and that difference can be described as a medieval form of constitutionalism, with "public," indeed even "civic," consciousness providing part of the justification for parliamentary participation. In reacting to the Whig "seamless web" theory of the development of English government, Hanson has downplayed the community-based elements in earlier English thought which enabled that theory to be persuasive in the first place, (e.g., Locke's quotations from Hooker). The medieval cases of royal deposition which he tries to argue away provide specific examples of the existence of an inchoate but operative "public consciousness" well before the seventeenth century. Even the civic consciousness—the awareness of one's role as citizen rather than subject—that resulted from the overthrow of the monarchy in the seventeenth century had its antecedents in concepts of community control of the ruler in earlier theory and practice (e.g., the conciliarists and the Huguenots whom the Puritan theorists cited at the time). What was novel in the seventeenth century was that constitutional theorizing (e.g., in Locke) now began with the individual, not the community. This important shift gets almost no attention from Hanson.

A final word should be said about the last chapter of the book which takes on a variety of issues that are only marginally related to its main purpose. It begins with a discussion of the applicability of liberal constitutionalism to the developing nations concluding that while a public consciousness exists among the leadership of the third world, it is unlikely that the historically particular political and ethical preferences embodied in liberal constitutionalist ideology will be adopted elsewhere. Then it criticizes a supposed tendency of modern liberalism to treat the state and government as epiphenomenal when in fact it was governmental needs and decisions that decisively shaped the course of English history and made modern liberty possible. Finally, the work con-

cludes with an impassioned defence of pluralism against the radical critics of liberalism on the left and the right. The three different topics, reflecting the intellectual history of the concerns of social scientists of the 'sixties (the book was completed in 1969), are only loosely connected with each other and with the rest of the work.

In sum, this is a provocative and original analysis which, despite some overstatement of its central theses, is useful in compelling us to reexamine and refine our understanding of the development of English constitutional thought.

PAUL E. SIGMUND
Princeton University

Some Cambridge Controversies in the Theory of Capital. By G. C. Harcourt. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1972. Pp. x, 272. $10.50, cloth; $4.95, paper.)

Professor Harcourt reviews a body of doctrine challenging the foundations of standard economics. The challenges, if valid, would confer increased respectability on ways of organizing production and income distribution guided more by politics and oriented less toward profit than the ways most amenable to standard analysis.

The title *Cambridge Controversies* is apt. The challenges emanate mainly from Cambridge University in England, while several prominent controversialists on the other side are based at MIT in Cambridge, Massachusetts. The English challengers are trying to resurrect and extend an approach to economic theory associated with David Ricardo and Karl Marx. They see an economy as more fully pervaded by technologically determined ratios of factor inputs to each other and to product outputs than modern orthodoxy envisages. Orthodoxy puts relatively more emphasis on how prices influence the proportions in which businessmen employ labor and other factors in particular lines of production, on how production and consumption patterns respond to prices, on price determination by supply and demand, and on the subjective element of human preferences in the market processes of determining outputs, prices, and incomes. Orthodoxy views an economy as a price system; the English challenge, more nearly as an interlocking of technologies.

Though this contrast is not of black and white, the two approaches carry different implications. In particular, orthodoxy upholds, and its English critics challenge, the marginal-productivity theory of functional income distribution. That theory sees the prices of factors of production (wage and interest rates, land rents, and so forth) as determined basically by supply and demand, with demand reflecting a factor's marginal contribution to the value of output. The theory is concerned with explaining, not justifying, the incomes of suppliers of productive factors.

In rejecting this explanation, the English critics take particular aim at the notion that the rate of interest or profit (they blur the distinction) corresponds to the marginal productivity of "capital" (in some sense or other of the word). They concoct numerical examples involving two (or more) techniques for producing a particular good. Technique A is the more economical at high rates of interest, B at intermediate interest rates, and A again at low rates. If the change from a higher to a lower rate of interest at one of the switch points brings a switch from the less to the more capital-intensive of the two techniques (which seems normal enough), then the switch back as the interest rate becomes still lower through the other switch point is paradoxical. The reduced interest rate brings adoption of a less, not more, capital-intensive technique. The whole idea of the interest rate as a price that rations a scarce factor of production seems shaken. Extensions of the analysis shake traditional notions of the productivity of thrift. The whole productivity explanation of factor prices and incomes—and with it, much of modern economic theory—runs into embarrassment.

Harcourt's book, especially if read in conjunction with *Capital and Growth: Selected Readings*, edited by Harcourt and N. F. Laing (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1971), serves as an introduction to an extensive literature. Cambridge-trained, Harcourt inclines toward the English side of the controversy.

In this reviewer's opinion, his side is wrong. It seems enamored of paradox for almost purely destructive purposes. Yet the would-be defenders of orthodoxy have not pinpointed the exact source of error. The trouble, it seems to me, lies in searching for a purely physical conception of "capital" (or whatever it is whose yield or price is the rate of interest). The paradoxes dissolve when we recognize that the amount of that factor required in a physically specified production process does indeed depend on its own price. (Gustav Cassel aptly called that factor "waiting"—waiting for value over time. To avoid technicalities here, may I refer to my "Toward Understanding Some Paradoxes in Capital Theory," *Economic Inquiry*, September, 1976.)

The controversies that Harcourt reviews would be terribly important if they referred to the real world. Actually, they refer not to reality but to paper-and-pencil exercises, to spurious problems spawned by inappropriate theoretical concepts. Economic theory has become its own subject matter; academic narcissism reigns.

Perhaps to compensate for his highly technical subject matter, Harcourt strains to write in a sprightly style. He uses arch, allusive language. Chapters or sections have headings such as "Main bout, round one," "Mouth guards out while we arrange a return bout," and "Excuse me, Professor Kaldor, but your slip is showing." Unfortunately, attempts at humor are not the same thing as clear exposition.

LELAND B. YEAGER
University of Virginia

Questions, Answers, Questions: From the Biography of a German Marxist. By Robert Havemann. Trans. by Salvator Attanasio. (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1972. Pp. 255. $7.95.)

This is a passionate statement on behalf of the union of socialism and freedom by a man living through their radical separation in the German Democratic Republic. Robert Havemann is "East Germany's most celebrated heretic," to use the inane formulation on the dust-jacket; he is also a most lonely heretic. Beyond his close friend, the political balladeer Wolf Bierman, and a tiny circle of kindred spirits, among them, Havemann's two sons, there is precious little. Revisionists of the older generation, such as Ernst Bloch and Hans Mayer, long ago departed for West Germany, while those somewhat younger, such as Wolfgang Harich, who was jailed for conspiratorial activities after the Hungarian Uprising, have made their peace with the regime. Havemann does not hesitate to attack the conformism of his fellow intellectuals (for example, Stefan Heym and Kurt Hager) in the face of neo-Stalinism, and in the face of his own expulsion from the Party, the Academy of Sciences and his chair as a theoretical chemist at the Humboldt University. Yet, and extraordinarily, he is neither despairing nor bitter. He grants, in a related context, that "as an old Communist I find all this especially depressing," yet an old Communist he remains. Otherwise, I think, he would be nothing.

The book, very cleanly translated, has a simple but potent format consisting of segments of Havemann's interrogation by State Security in 1966, interspersed with flashbacks to his experiences under Gestapo arrest near the end of the Second World War. Throughout, he weaves fascinating anecdotes relating mostly to Party history since 1945, and a series of succinct if often flawed discourses on the crisis of Marxian theory and movements today. The book closes with Havemann's depiction and denunciation of the 1968 trial, conviction and sentencing of his son, Frank, to eighteen months imprisonment for having distributed leaflets and painted wall-slogans in solidarity with the Prague Spring. Like his earlier political book, *Dialektik ohne Dogma?* (1964), originally a controversial series of lectures presented at Humboldt, this one has not been published in East Germany.

Havemann, it should be said, is clearly not in the philosophical current of many of the better-known (in the West) revisionists such as the Yugoslav *Praxis* group, Karel Kosik, and the associates of the "Budapest School." He is instead what might be termed a Left-wing Engelsian, that is, one who believes in an objective dialectic of nature, opts for the dynamic rather than mechanistic features of this position, and opposes on principle any "dogmatic occlusion." This begs certain questions raised long ago by Lukács's *History and Class Consciousness,* but in its East German context it is flammable enough, and one hesitates to stress its undialectical qualities.

The flashbacks to the Brandenberg-Görden Penitentiary point to the obvious question, and Havemann does not avoid it: are the differences between fascism and Stalinism significant enough to justify continued commitment to those states which call themselves socialist? As he realizes, to pose the question this way is virtually to answer it negatively, yet Havemann does not: "in spite of everything," including the "numerous practices in the GDR that, at least formally and most embarrasingly, recall the Thousand Year Reich," he proclaims the GDR a "decisively progressive step in German history"; he insists that it and other socialist states "have not irrevocably missed the connection with the future" (pp. 254–55); and that "the fruits of the Bolsheviks' victorious struggles have not yet been wholly squandered" (p. 131).

These convictions are not based—at least not in this book—upon analysis of concrete tendencies in the GDR or the socialist bloc. In fact, they appear to be refuted by the actual tendencies Havemann does see: on the one side, neo-Stalinism, and on the other—as the Chinese, toward whom he is not entirely un-

sympathetic, have said—a plunge into the waters of petty-bourgeois, Goulash socialism. Moreover, he offers two proposals for the realization of genuine socialism which, while bold, are ephemeral: first, "the semirevolution [October Revolution + Stalinism] can be made total only if the workers themselves take possession of the expropriated property of the capitalists. This means they must fight for full control over the means of production and the products produced" (p. 128). In this regard, Havemann elsewhere in the book relates his own anguished and unsuccessful attempt to talk restraint to rebellious workers in Berlin in 1953, adding that neither then nor now does he accept the official claim that the uprising was the work of the Western secret service.

If he is quiet regarding the actual prospects of an authentic socialist transformation of the GDR, Havemann is equally silent on the real chances of his second, broader proposal:

> The Czechoslovakian tragedy can lead to the tragic defeat of the whole world revolutionary movement. With fear and anguish we must contemplate the possibility of a war between the Soviet Union and China. . . . The unity of the world revolutionary movement must be restored, created anew. If a new barbarism is to be warded off, the Communists in the Soviet Union must draw the correct lessons from the events in Czechosolvakia and themselves embark upon the path they are at present fighting against with all the means at their disposal (pp. 170–171).

In both instances, between the ideal and reality lies the proverbial abyss, bridged only by the categorical imperative of the old Communist in a very bleak situation: "we must not," Havemann asserts, "succumb to hopelessness." He *still* holds to the 20th Party Congress as a beacon for rejuvenated socialism; earlier he had placed great store in Walter Ulbricht as a bearer of de-Stalinization; and he continues to see in the Czech experiment not a flicker of light decisively snuffed out, but a continuing ray of inspiration. These are at best fuzzy ideas which virtually announce the very hopelessness they were meant to overcome. Beneath them, however, lies a sensibility that is firm enough. It is crystallized in this passage, describing a small feature of one of his interrogations by State Security:

> There I was, sitting in my semicircular easy chair, which was slightly too small for comfort. These chairs with their greasy arms are like a poor man's imitation of the real thing, standing in a director's office in their hideous magnificence. I sat in a wretched little chair whose sham elegance was supposed to make it seem as though the person sitting in it was still a free man. It bothered me that my State had made something like this, that it did not find it beneath its dignity, and that I had now ended up in such a chair (p. 96).

Earlier this year, Havemann's essay, "Freiheit als Notwendigkeit," a compact critique of "consumer socialism" in the GDR, appeared in a volume on Solzhenytsin, the USSR and the Western Left, edited by Rudi Dutschke, long one of Havemann's admirers. Apparently, he was recently and may still be under house arrest.

PAUL BREINES
Boston College

Marxism and Form: Twentieth Century Dialectical Theories of Literature. By Frederick Jameson. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971. Pp. 432. $15.00.)

The success of fascism and Stalinism in the 1930s dealt a fatal blow to Marxist theoretical discourse in more ways than one. Whereas the forcible repression could have been weathered, the irreparable damage to traditional Marxist schemas arising from the new developments necessitated either a total rejection or a radical reconstitution. Efforts at reconstitution have been under way at least since the outbreak of World War I, when the bankruptcy of the Second International sent people like Lenin back to the books to figure out what had happened and rethink Marxist theory from its very roots. But the failure of the middle-European revolutionary surge around 1920 and the rise of the Third International within the remaining theoretical ruins choked out the promising work of those theoreticians whose efforts were already beginning to yield interesting results. Thus, kicked out of the German Communist Party, Korsch moved to the U.S., where both the isolation and the ensuing events gradually led him away from the Hegelian Marxism that he had sought to develop. No kinder fate befell the other two major Marxist thinkers, Gramsci and Lukács. One withered away in fascist jails from 1926 on, while the other, under pressure from both the official leadership of the Communist International as well as from internal theoretical inadequacies, capitulated to the prevailing travesties of Stalinism.

The facile enlightenment idea of universal history that Marxism had inherited, which held that communism, freedom, and equality were to be found at the end of the capitalist political rainbow, seemed rather to have led to Auschwitz and Siberia. And even after the defeat of fascism, the "Free World" countries

incorporated its *content* in the very process of rejecting its *form*. The Marxism that avoided degeneration into an ideology of Stalinist legitimation, had to be qualitatively different from any mode of enlightenment thinking. Thus, those few thinkers who remained Marxists managed to do so only by carrying out theoretical reconstitutions so profound that their Marxist credentials have been under constant attack from official Communist sources during the last forty years.

What further compounds their difficulty is the growth of the "culture industry" in a social context where all opposition is readily integrated and rendered functional to the very system which it opposes. In order to prevent this, the new Marxists have had to clothe themselves consciously in a prohibitive linguistic style which has greatly contributed to their remaining unknown and largely impenetrable to scholars more conventionally trained—especially in the English-speaking world. This is what makes Jameson's *Marxism and Form* such a welcome and much needed contribution. The book provides the first comprehensive English introduction to this new Marxist tradition whose relevance has yet to be fully evaluated. Although comprising a series of previously published essays on Adorno, Benjamin, Marcuse, Bloch, Lukács, and Sartre, plus a concluding chapter on "Towards a Dialectical Criticism," the whole hangs together very well and provides a lucid systematic presentation of an extremely difficult subject matter.

The subtitle, however, is deceptive. This book is *not* a mere treatise on literary criticism but, first and foremost, a work on political theory. In fact, in coming to grips with late capitalism, Marxist categories themselves undergo a fundamental change resulting in a shift of emphasis from economics as the primary conditioning dimension, to politics and culture as the new domains of class struggle. The decline of entrepreneurial capitalism and the rise of authoritarian states (mediated by welfarism whenever possible and fascism and Stalinism otherwise) collapsed the never too sharply separated "base" and "superstructure" in such a way that the cultural arena displaced the shop floor as the focus of Marxist theory. What in political *practice* presents itself as Maoism (the primacy of politics over economics), in political *theory* becomes, at least in the West, *critical theory* (the primacy of cultural criticism over political economy). Thus, Jameson's presentation ends up by covering the entire field of Marxist theory, notwithstanding his more limited avowed aims of merely dealing with aesthetics.

Of course, there is much room for controversy in Jameson's account of hermeneutics and phenomenology, and in his latent structuralism. More painstaking analyses than can be developed in a short review will probably show significant shortcomings in these areas. Yet Jameson's deficiencies are those of pioneers: hence their positive didactic function far overshadows their character as inadequacies. The book is a must for anyone interested in contemporary Marxist theory. Whether one ultimately agrees with Jameson is not as important as what can be gained by reaching that point through four hundred pages of first-rate presentation.

PAUL PICCONE
Washington University

Work, Creativity, and Social Justice. By Elliot Jaques. (New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1970. Pp. 262. $6.50.)

The Harried Leisure Class. By Staffan B. Linder. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970. Pp. 182. $7.00.)

Work in America. Report of a Special Task Force to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. Prepared under the Auspices of W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. (Cambridge, Mass.: The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1973. Pp. 262. $2.95.)

Work, Society and Culture. By Yves Simon. Edited by Vukan Kuic. (New York: Fordham University Press, 1971. Pp. 234. $7.50.)

It is hard to say which of these books is best; it is easy to say which is worst. The latter distinction goes to the collection of papers printed or read in the 'sixties, mostly in psychoanalytic journals and to psychoanalytic societies, padded by the addition of a few miscellaneous notes and articles, assembled by their author, Elliott Jaques, and published in 1970 under the title, *Work, Creativity, and Social Justice*. The data therein are old, the propositions limited (mainly to English factory workers and employees in one time and place), the theories antiquated (based largely on Melanie Klein), the language ingrown, sources few and isolated, standards low, narcissism high. The author expresses the hope that his work will be a contribution to interdisciplinary thought in art, literature, the social sciences, business and law. What the book does is reveal

how non-interdisciplinary are the author's own study and perspective.

The working population of industralized nations, has undergone a massive change in the twentieth century, moving from self-employment to wage/salary employment. The vast employment complex people find themselves in constitutes a new zone of society lying between state and family/individual, in the author's words, "The Intermediate Zone" (p. 2). The zone is organized hierarchically, perforce: in order to get work done and to make large-scale technology possible. Hierarchies, however, have not been arranged properly. As a result, work in industrial society contributes to the strengthening of psychopathological processes and to the eruption of violence. "All the conditions are present for the revival of the primitive paranoid schizoid situation" (p. 16). The industrial relations approach to overcoming these problems is grossly inadequate. What is needed is "apolitical science of the intermediate zone, with standards derived not from ethics or religion, but from the objective analysis of the nature of man" (p. 16).

What we have seems to be a political ideology in which the key phrases are work, hierarchy, conformity to consensus, equity and the right of individual appeal for same, the last being social justice. They remain, despite all claims, as the author himself said of other ideologies, a matter of opinion and political debate. It is not encouraging to see, in this work, that the application of psychoanalysis has moved so short and ragged a distance.

Three of these four books pay a homage to work that borders on devotion. The sole exception is Staffan B. Linder's, *The Harried Leisure Class*. The title is a misnomer, for the subject is not the leisure class; nor is the author interested in leisure. His main concern is time and what happens to it during periods of economic growth.

According to Linder, economists in their studies have concentrated too much on the concept of goods. When they first defined their central interest as the allocation of scarce resources, the evident problem was scarcity of goods or low productivity. Consumption, however, is not instantaneous, contrary to what standard economic theory takes for granted. Whatever is bought takes time to consume, maintain, and enjoy. "One may possibly *buy* more of everything, but one cannot conceivably *do* more of everything" (p. 83). The income elasticity of goods is not to be confused with the income elasticity of time. Their relation is not always constant and positive, as those have assumed who believed that as the general welfare increased, people would become successively less interested in further rises in income. Over the life cycle, consumption-time is inversely related to work-time and thus typically to income-producing time, as those might have pondered who have noticed that in rich countries a still higher economic growth rate has become the overriding goal of nations and individuals, the reduction in work-time has ceased, the service sector has not maintained resources, the reduction of material worries has not led to noticeable cultural advancement, and people are everywhere gasping for time.

Reduced to outline, the author's theses involve the effects of increased productivity on the allocation of time between work and non-work activities and between different consumption activities, on the volume of consumption goods, on the volume of personal (service) work, and on the quality of services. As they pass before one's eyes, one sees these effects as a procession of beggars: the deterioration of hospital care . . . the impossibly high costs of "servicing" the aged . . . the disutility of taking time to make rational decisions. And they have a new ineluctability. "We scrap old cars, but hang on to old bodies" (p. 54). How long will we continue to hang on to old bodies as the costs of their maintenance weigh heavier and heavier?

Whether the pricing mechanism does, or whether existing economic theory can, encompass the scare commodity of time is a problem the author throws down to economists. The conception of time he consciously adopts, however, time ticking off in a straight line, going from t_1 to t_2 along a continuum, running in a uniform, irreversible flow—this is the time of the world of industry, clock-time, machine-time. The author has himself adopted the work-world's "moving belt of time units" (p. 2). The conception, a simplified one, can profitably be used to add a temporal dimension to economic analysis. Deeper reflection, as the author might admit, would indicate that any culture with this conception already suffers from a shortage of time, and of space, too, exterior and interior.

This book of the Honorable Staffan Linder (member of the Swedish Parliament) comes from a tradition of economic theory. Each of the four books under review stems from a different intellectual tradition. Professor Jaques's book harks back to applied pschoanalytic theory. Yves Simon, whose book will be reviewed last, belongs to a line of Catholic philosophers,

while *Work in America* relies essentially on the methods of the American socioeconomic survey and employee relations studies of the last quarter century or so, and unknowingly, on the modern tradition of *le travail attrayant,* started by Charles Fourier, a century and half or more ago.

Work in America had its formal beginning on December 19, 1971 when Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare Elliot Richardson charged a "task force" (why not "study group"?) with "examining health, education and welfare problems from the perspective of one of our fundamental social institutions—work" (p. xi). On the whole the report is informative and useful. It is also somewhat important because it is "trendy": it discloses the way some college professors who have come to the attention of some businessmen and government officials are thinking. The book is useful for anyone who wishes to be brought up to date on recent studies and liberal thinking about the function of work in the United States, the work problems of various segments of the country—blue and white collar, young and old, managerial, female, and minority—the physical and mental health of jobholders, the design and redesign of jobs for job satisfaction, training and retraining for jobs, and job creation objectives in federal policy with particular reference to welfare programs. There are other things to commend it for. It was put together quickly (in about a year, evidently), in a moderately conscientious way and with a certain comprehensiveness. It is at its best when it unveils dreadful facts about the health, education, and welfare of workers—the mounting of industrial accidents, overeducation and the unemployment hidden within it, the mishandling of welfare policy.

But time and again the authors bump into, only to shy away from, the fundamental ideological problem of the report—the conflict of political democracy and economic exigencies. Thus, jobs of high status are "satisfying" (p. 19); yet most old and new jobs are "largely in middle and lower levels" (p. 20). What to do to raise the bottom level to the apex of this pyramid and keep it up there? The answer is to redesign jobs at the bottom so that they look like jobs at the top. "It then becomes crucial to infuse middle- and lower-level jobs with professional characteristics" (p. 20). The execution of this magnificent *trompe-l'oeil* would make a counter-Reformation painter blanch.

The ethical problems remain: in redesigned jobs the worker does not have autonomy, nor does he participate in those decisions that affect his life. He cannot elect to raise his own pay, promote himself, pick out which days and how many he would like to work, how much money he gets in retirement and when he should begin to take it, and meanwhile who, if anybody, should be his boss.

The report refers airily to the work ethic as though it were a superstition one should outgrow with one's second teeth. Yet one would have to return to Samuel Smiles, Poor Richard, Horatio Alger, and the monastic orders to find such a richly embroidered version of the Work Society. It even improves on the idea of competition: workers now should compete not with others but "with themselves over time" (p. 144). The complete individuals can learn to convenant with themselves in schools. As a matter of fact, schools—the last redoubts of non-work activity—have to be captured. They should be looked on as workplaces like any other workplaces, "influenced by and influencing other workplaces." There should be manpower training for all. "Also, if we all could type . . ." (p. 148)!

So fierce is its focus on work that the report did not dream of considering alternative directions for America. The new cloud-cuckooland it depicts goes beyond the Work Society into the workhouse. Leisure, which offhand one might expect to have some bearing on health, education, and welfare, not to mention on work, gets a single reference in the index: "Leisure, boredom in, 88."

The tradition of leisure is absent from *Work in America,* as it is also from *Work, Creativity, and Social Justice.* In the *Harried Leisure Class,* leisure appears faintly yet convincingly. In *Work, Society, and Culture* the tradition appears but only to be summarily judged and tossed aside.

The last, and least timebound of the four works in review is this *Work, Society and Culture.* It is least timebound in the sense that more than others, it could have been read a decade ago or can be read a decade hence with equal profit.

Unlike the half-anonymous authors of *Work in America,* Yves Simon says that "we must all acknowledge that there exists in work a permanent foundation for irksomeness" (p. 32). Giving the worker a dispatch case in which to carry his lunch will keep neither his coffee warm nor his beer cold nor his job satisfaction high. The irksomeness of work follows from a definition based on Veblen's classic formulation in *The Theory of the Leisure Class:* to work is "to turn things to human use," which

in Simon's reformulation takes on emphasis: to transform "physical nature for the purposes of man" (p. 113). Physical nature has laws of its own which anyone working on it (and the worker is the one who does the working) will soon find cannot be changed to suit personal convenience. Nature except in paradise is stubborn.

Simon knows that an important part of work—the part that includes most of the pleasure it allows—is the social aspect of working together. It is this aspect of work that recommends itself to him. While work in its sociality does not have the same profundity as acts of knowing, enjoying, or loving the same thing together, "it has something else: it occurs daily and it occupies far more space and time in human life than any other activity" (p. 72). Undoubtedly the sociality of work helps shape man into a social and political animal. It also provides the basis for the solidarity of workers.

Simon likes other things about work, such as the habit of honesty that grows out of wrestling with obstinate matter. The manual worker has either succeeded or not, and cannot hide his results, whereas the artist and intellectual can conceal their cheating. He likes the seriousness of work, too. It has to be done of necessity, and is therefore in earnest. One might suspect that the author after showing so much favor to work might not be displeased to see it develop into the prevailing ideology that the other three of these books under review recognize. Simon's enthusiasm does not carry that far. As he puts it, work has brought the "prevalence of the demiurgical ideal in our societies, sometimes called materialism" (p. 186), and this is not good.

Here the author might have taken recourse to the ideal of leisure, since he himself is no stranger to the classical tradition. The author frowns on leisure because it is not serious like work; it is frilly and flowery like *les honnêtes hommes* and the dandies.

Simon's remarks on leisure are haphazard. He is more interested in opposing to work the pole of contemplation and more interested still in religious contemplation. He feels he must offer a form of contemplation to offset today's obsession with physical nature. "Our best immediate chances to begin to develop the culture with a contemplative ideal may lie in promoting collaboration between all kinds of technical work and the fine arts" (p. 187).

The few remarks on technology seem naive; but evidently a platform of naiveté may be just the place, sometimes, from which to make penetrating insights. Whoever reads this book will find many things to turn his mind to.

SEBASTIAN DE GRAZIA
Rutgers University

The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, 1923–1950. By Martin Jay. (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown & Co., 1973. Pp. 382. $3.95, paper.)

This book is based not only on a very large amount of published material but also on interviews with past and present members of the Institute of Social Research; on the unpublished correspondence between Max Horkheimer, its Director since 1932, and Leo Lowenthal; on Horkheimer's scrapbooks and other unpublished documents and writings in the collections of Friedrich Pollock, Leo Lowenthal, and Paul Lazarsfeld. As a result, Professor Jay's work is indispensable for anyone interested in the intellectual activities of this circle of leftwing, bourgois radicals in exile. To a lesser extent it is also informative on the early history of the Institute under Carl Grünberg.

Professor Jay painstakingly presents the so-called "critical theory" developed by Horkheimer and Marcuse; Pollock's and Neumann's conflicting analyses of Nazism; and the integration of psychoanalysis into "critical theory," including the objections which Adorno and other members of the "inner circle" raised against Erich Fromm's ideas. The book contains also a chapter on Adorno's, Walter Benjamin's, and Leo Lowenthal's contributions to musicology, literary criticism, and popular culture, and a discussion of most of the work on prejudice and the "authoritarian personality." The final chapter deals with *Dialektik der Aufklärung*, written by Horkheimer and Adorno during the war and published in Amsterdam in 1947, as well as some other writings related to their "philosophy of history."

While the work published in English is well known in this country, other parts of the Institute's remarkable production have not received as much attention because of what Paul Lazarsfeld once referred to as "the idiocy of the Institute group," i.e., its decision to continue for many years publishing its writings in German. Horkheimer simply remarked that other refugees in America wrote English, because language served them "more in the struggle for existence than as an expression of the truth" (p. 114). Similarly, in 1942 when the Institute rejected proposals to be integrated into the Sociology Department of Columbia

University or Lazarsfeld's Bureau of Applied Social Research, Horkheimer complained, 'People don't want to [!] understand that there can be a group of scholars working under a director not responsible to big business or to mass-culture publicity" (p. 116). Surely, Horkheimer was not a happy man; in a sad letter to Lowenthal, written in 1943, he expressed his sense of isolation. At the same time he was strong-willed,' and "the inner circle" accepted his autocracy. When Ernst Kris asked Lowenthal about the Institute's attitude toward Freud, Lowenthal forwarded the inquiry to the Director for a response.

In some passages of Professor Jay's account his admiration for the work he presents goes too far. For example, he reports without a smile, ". . . even when discussing such artists as Valéry, Proust, George, and Hoffmannstahl [sic], for whom he had great respect, Adorno chose to discuss them in dialectical pairs in order to transcend the inherent insufficiency of individual accomplishments" (p. 178).

If such passages are minor flaws in an otherwise valuable study, the same cannot be said of Professor Jay's polemics: Especially, his views of the University in Exile established in 1933 by Alvin Johnson at the New School for Social Research are distortions of the truth. Without proof, Emil Lederer, the first dean of the University in Exile, is labeled "an old Institut foe" (p. 164), the Graduate Faculty itself as "the Institut's old competitor" (p. 284), and "the New School's ire" is said to have been aroused by "the Institut's Marxist tinge" and its "enthusiasm for Freud" (p. 133). This "ire" appears in Professor Jay's comments on *Studien über Autorität und Familie,* published in 1936. Professor Jay does not mention the very favorable reviews of this work by George A. Lundberg in *Social Forces,* by John Dollard in the *American Sociological Review,* and by T. H. Marshall in *The Sociological Review.* He states instead that the American academic community was slow in assimilating the "findings and methodology" of the volume "largely because of its appearance in German." But then he adds, "This process was not abetted by the extremely hostile review the work received in the New School's journal, *Social Research,* at the hands of Hans Speier," which reflected not only the aforementioned ire but also Max Wertheimer's "disdain for psychoanalysis" (p. 133). It should have been easy for Professor Jay to get his facts straight. Emil Lederer, an economist, had been close to the Austro-Marxists. While uninterested in speculation, he thought highly of Pollock's work. As far as I know, he was on good terms with Horkheimer, whom I met as a guest in Lederer's house in New York in 1936. The New School never competed with the Institute. It had a tradition of supporting radical and Communist American and European scholars before and after the Frankfurt refugees arrived in New York. Apparently, Professor Jay believes that criticism must be equated with hostility. Wertheimer was indeed critical of psychoanalysis, but this did not prevent him from offering a seminar at the New School jointly with Karen Horney as well as Kurt Riezler (who had recommended Marcuse to Horkheimer in 1932) and myself. I collaborated closely for several years with Ernst Kris, a distinguished psychoanalyst, who became a member of the Graduate Faculty at the New School. Franz Neumann, Otto Kirchheimer, and Herbert Marcuse were friends of mine, especially during the years we worked for the Federal Government. Prior to 1933, I had published many reviews in the Institute's *Zeitschrift,* and to this day Leo Lowenthal is my close personal friend. My review did not reflect any views but my own, and it was not hostile.

This is not all. Professor Jay reports that prior to publication the Institute excised the words "fascism," "communism," and "imperialist" in a manuscript submitted by Walter Benjamin. "It is abundantly clear," he concludes, "that the Institut felt insecure in America and wished to do as little as possible to jeopardize its position" (p. 205). In explaining this feeling of insecurity no sense of truth or honor restrains Professor Jay: he speaks of "the accusations of other refugees at the New School . . . previously mentioned" (p. 205). They are not mentioned.

To most of the unattached intellectuals of the Institute, political history was a subject for moral indignation, and one suspects that the everyday life of simple people was rather alien to them. Professor Jay has noticed the political myopia of the group: for many years, it denied the existence of anti-Semitism among the Germans during the Nazi period. In 1946, Horkheimer thought the Soviet Union the only country free of any anti-Semitism. Similarly, the group never felt challenged by its own theories to account for the fact that American capitalism had not turned fascist. Efforts to develop a political theory were made only by Franz Neumann and Otto Kirchheimer.

Professor Jay's book has been widely discussed in leftwing intellectual circles since its publication. Under the assumption that debate engendered by a work is a yardstick of its

merits, the book is a major contribution to social theory. Even those who do not make this assumption should readily admit that the book sheds a great deal of light on the pre-Nazi origins of certain intellectual trends in the Federal Republic.

HANS SPEIER
University of Massachusetts, Amherst

Charles E. Merriam and the Study of Politics. By Barry D. Karl. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974. Pp. 337. $15.00.)

Barry Karl's biography of Charles Merriam is excellent social and intellectual history. It is written in good evocative prose. Post–Civil War small-town Iowa, the New York of Seth Low and Henry George, the Chicago of Julius Rosenwald, Jane Addams, and Hinky Dink McKenna all come to life as settings in which Merriam sought and found himself.

Charles E. Merriam and the Study of Politics ought to have a prominent place in all those courses in which we initiate our students into the political science discipline. Merriam's life—the department he built, the students he trained and the students they trained, the research approaches and methods he fostered, the research programs he initiated, the institutions he created, the relations between research and public policy which he explored and tested—is a good part of the history of modern political science. Most of the major polemics of our contemporary intellectual life are illustrated in the problems he confronted; and something may be said in favor of the gentle and ironic way in which he usually finessed issues of this kind. An intellectually unpretentious man himself, he could spot a phony dilemma a mile away, scorned debaters' points, and sought to dissuade his students from the cultism into which their shiny new tools tempted them. If someone had told him that there were five methodological fallacies a political scientist could commit, he might have taken another sip of Scotch in the Shoreland bar and replied with his equivalent of "just as long as he loves his mother."

The father of behavioral political science was the son of that marriage of philosophy, law, and history out of which our discipline emerged, and he understood science as providing an increment of rigor added on to these older disciplines rather than an alternative to them. He took historically literate, legally and politically knowledgeable men like Leonard White and Quincy Wright and got them to look systematically at public attitudes affecting political recruitment, or the quantitative incidence of types of war over time. He gently chided Harold Gosnell when statistics carried him away, and stood in awe and bemused wonder at some of Harold Lasswell's turns of phrase and formulations. He would not have recognized our quantitative and mathematical types as *political* scientists at all; and he might have asked of the psychological reductionists who now see the limited explanatory hold personality variables have for politics, "Why this long detour?" And yet while their onesidedness might have troubled him, it cannot be said that he did not anticipate it. Somewhere in *New Aspects of Politics* is a remark to the effect that political scientists might have to lose their way in order to find it again. And he had both psychology and statistics in mind.

In a book consisting of fourteen chapters, Professor Karl devotes only three to Merriam as a professional political scientist: chapter 2, which provides a view of political science at Columbia at the turn of the century; chapter 3 on the University of Chicago and its department prior to his assumption of control; and chapter 8, which deals with the Chicago School, properly speaking. The other chapters deal with Merriam's years as a reform politician in Chicago, his role as chief of the American propaganda mission in Italy during World War I, his role in the formation of the Social Science Research Council in the 1920s, his interests in civic education at home and abroad, his leadership in what now seems to have been an early experiment in "Social Indicators"—the "Recent Social Trends" study of the Hoover administration—and finally his part in the New Deal National Resources Planning Board and the President's Commission on Administrative Management.

The bulk of the book thus deals with Merriam as politician, as institution-builder, and as research entrepreneur, and relatively little with the Chicago School and the behavioral revolution. The brief treatment of Merriam's building of the Chicago department whets the appetite for more. Actually the Chicago School, which has acquired mythic proportions in recent decades, was a quite small group of faculty and students who were creative over two decades, 1920 to 1940. By the end of the 1930s, Hutchins and those associated with him, through a combination of public scorn, affirmation of the intellectual superiority of logical formalism, and denial of promotions, had brought the golden age to a close, and shortly thereafter and quite literally put the department under the control of a committee.

The School thus was quite limited in time

and number and was dependent on Merriam's continued influence and vitality. Both had waned by the late 1930s, and Karl tends to gloss over this tragic denouement.

In his treatment of the Chicago School only the trail-breaking "Non-Voting" study with Gosnell is described in any detail. There is nothing on Leonard White's *Prestige Value of Public Employment,* Lasswell's *Propaganda Technique in the World War* and *Psychopathology and Politics,* Quincy Wright's *Study of War,* V. O. Key Jr.'s *Techniques of Graft,* and the many studies of the politics and government of the Chicago metropolitan area. The treatment of the Chicago School cries out for more substance.

In his narrative of the various facets of Merriam's career Barry Karl stresses the political maneuvering in which Merriam was the leading operator. At his best Merriam was a great intellectual coalition-maker. His earlier ventures as "reformer" and as populist in the pre–World War I period left him somewhat disillusioned and a bit cynical. He never mounted a white horse again. He combined a constant pursuit of good causes both within and outside the university, with a shrewd sense of where the resources were and how they might be brought together in winning coalitions. He was a winner in the university for enough time to give political science and the social sciences a new impulse for some time to come. He was a winner in the battle to form the Social Science Research Council, and gave national and even international scope to this vision of the social sciences. His ventures in national policy involved him in far more complicated games which he understood but could not effectively dominate. Barry Karl tells these stories very well indeed.

This image of Merriam as an institution builder and intellectual coalition maker doesn't square at all with the flat and tendentious treatment which Bernard Crick gave of Merriam and the Chicago school in his book on *The American Science of Politics* published in 1959 (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press). At the time that Merriam was making decisions about political science at the University of Chicago he was pluralist to the core, and he understood political parties, interest groups, the media of communication, and public opinion very well indeed. He was a man who pursued the good consistently and never lost his sympathy for the weak. But he understood what political power consisted of, and the tragic span between means and ends. And in political science, in contrast to some of those who believe they have been following in his wake, he never lost the thread of connection between a rigorous and empirical political science and the moral issues of political philosophy.

It is intriguing to speculate on Merriam's quandary in 1922 on the eve of the "Behavioral Revolution," when the offer came to take the Lieber chair at Columbia after Dunning's death. This was *the chair* in American political science, and Merriam was viewed as the natural successor to his old teacher and mentor. He had indeed half decided to accept the offer, and only wished to delay his decision while he was preoccupied with preparing the report of the Committee on Political Research of the American Political Science Association. He had unfurled the flag of the new political science in the May, 1921, issue of this journal, and was then engaged in converting his colleagues to his point of view. The probabilities are that had he followed Dunning at Columbia the profession would have gained a more conventionally productive scholar, but not the great adventurer and entrepreneur that he became by remaining at Chicago. He could bargain and get his own way in that brash and crude city of Chicago, and throw his weight mightily for a while in that university whose students—irreverent then as now—were wont to sing "Praise John from whom oil blessings flow."

GABRIEL A. ALMOND
Stanford University

The German Idea of Freedom: History of a Political Tradition. By Leonard Krieger. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1973. Pp. 540. $12.00, cloth; $3.75, paper.)

The German Idea of Freedom was first published in 1957. Its author is one of the many American historians of Germany whose education was interrupted by the war and finally completed in the late 'forties and early 'fifties. But the book itself belongs to a tradition of historiography which flowered in Germany after the turn of the century and was imported into the United States by émigrés such as Hajo Holborn, Krieger's teacher at Yale. Like the founders of this tradition (Wilhelm Dilthey, Friedrich Meinecke, Ernst Troeltsch), Krieger focuses on a series of major thinkers, whose ideas are seen in terms of their historical setting and influence. Moreover, the central questions which inform Krieger's book occupied all of this tradition's founding fathers: How did Gemany come to differ from the West? Why did the ideas and

institutions which helped to sustain liberal social and political institutions west of the Rhine fail to shape German realities? As the title suggests, Krieger concentrates on one strand in this complex of issues, what he calls the "peculiar German attitude toward liberty," an attitude which, he believes, persistently undermined Germans' ability to find theoretical and practical alternatives to the authoritarian power of the state.

Krieger begins his analysis with the concept of *Libertät,* "the representative expression of German political liberty in the old regime" (p. 14). *Libertät* was initially advanced by defenders of the aristocracy's corporate power, but it soon became inexorably linked with the theory and practice of state sovereignty. This linkage between freedom and the state remained the essential characteristic of the German idea of freedom, even when its social components and political dimensions changed. During the eighteenth century, for example, when "middle-class" officials moved into the vanguard of political reform, the ends and means of their efforts involved a commitment to both freedom and the expanding nexus of bureaucratic rule. In what are perhaps the finest and most fully realized sections of the book, Krieger shows how this tradition continued during the era of revolution and reform. In a series of brilliant chapters, the philosophical basis and the politics of reform are analyzed in order to demonstrate how Germans tamed and transmuted the revolutionary impetus into a bureaucratic "revolution from above." By 1815, Krieger argues, the basic typology of German liberalism had taken shape: on the left, a few radical critics of the state; on the right, bureaucratic reformers; and in between them, advocates of a constitutional "dualism" who sought a means of synthesizing popular participation and state power. At the same time, by 1815 nationalism had begun to be seen as a potentially powerful instrument for reconciling *Volk* and *Staat;* this became, as Krieger shows, an important element in the state's eventual triumph over the defenders of freedom.

The second half of the book traces the unfolding of these themes before and during the revolution of 1848, in the constitutional struggles of the 1860's, and in the new nation created by Bismarck after 1866. In the conclusion, Krieger looks ahead to the twentieth century and the experience of National Socialism, which was at once the most tragic consequence of liberalism's failure and the volcanic upheaval through which the "primal association between freedom and the traditional state" was finally destroyed (p. 470).

This summary obviously does not do justice to the range and depth of Krieger's analysis. His book, especially the first two-thirds, is beautifully crafted. His treatment of individual thinkers is always informative and provocative, even on those rare occasions when it is not fully convincing. Furthermore, his fine sense of social, economic, and political developments enables him to locate these individuals in a vividly drawn historical setting. By analyzing how external reality affects both the shape and significance of ideas, Krieger enriches the historiographical tradition within which he works. In my judgment, his chapters on Kant and Hegel are a model of how intellectual, political, social, and economic history can be joined in a coherent vision of the past. The book, of course, is not without flaws. Krieger's treatment of the period after 1850, for instance, strikes me as excessively schematic and elliptical. But on the whole, this is one of the three or four most important books on German history published by an American since 1945.

Despite its virtues, I do not think this book has had the impact and influence it deserves. It is often cited, but it has not been fully absorbed into the historical literature. Nor have those who are not specialists in German history paid as much attention as they should have to its substantive and methodological achievements. An important reason for this neglect is Krieger's style, which makes his work inaccessible to anyone unwilling to expend the time and effort a careful reading of the book requires. This stylistic difficulty, it should be noted, does not come from awkwardness or imprecision, but rather from a density which renders some passages almost impenetrable on first reading.

It is unfortunate that nothing was done to make Krieger's work more accessible in this edition. In fact, the University of Chicago Press simply reprinted the original version of 1957 without change or comment. It is also regrettable that the new edition contains no references to the work done on German history since the late 'fifties. While it is good to have *The German Idea of Freedom* back in print, it would have been even better if its reappearance had led the author to examine the relationship between his analysis and the scholarship which has appeared in the past two decades.

JAMES J. SHEEHAN
Northwestern University

Parenté et Politique: l'organisation sociale dans l'Ile d'Orléans. By Vincent Lemieux. (Québec: Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 1971. Pp. 250. $10.00.)

As the title indicates, this work explores the relationship between kinship and political life. Lemieux's central concern is with how different types of kinship structure might induce quite different kinds of political activity. Lemieux contends that such an effect of kinship on politics may be much more pervasive than has been generally recognized. Even in modern societies, politically relevant subgroups may roughly parallel kinship networks. The pattern of these kinship networks can greatly affect characteristics of the political action of these subgroups.

Lemieux proceeds to test this proposition by examining the kinship structure of a long-settled island in the St. Lawrence River near Quebec City—l'Ile d'Orléans. First, he compares the six parish communities on this island in terms of what he calls the "density" of kinship structures (as measured by the proportion of marriages that are endogamous to the parish and by the length of time that property has been held within the same family). He is able to show positive associations between the rank order of these communities along this "density" variable and their rank orders in levels of support for the federal Progressive Conservative Party and the provincial *Union nationale* party. Lemieux seeks to interpret these associations as a function of historical party policies, alleging that the policies of both parties were less prone to accentuate social differences and thus, were less interventionist than those of the Liberal Party. On this basis, he argues that these policies were more attractive to communities characterized by density of kinship ties. The interpretation is certainly provocative, allowing a greater role for "ideology" in the electoral processes of these communities than one might expect to find. At the same time, the argument might have been strengthened by more extensive supporting data—especially with respect to popular perceptions of the two parties. Lemieux's analysis is more fully persuasive when he explores the association between kinship structures and political competitiveness. Here, the aspect of kinship structures receiving the greatest attention is the proportion of marriages involving social mobility (*hypergamie de statut*). Lemieux argues that such a pattern is motivated by a social competitiveness among families that results, in turn, in a greater degree of competitiveness in the political arena. Using several different measures of *hypergamie* and of political competition, Lemieux once again finds the expected association of rank orders among the six parish communities. Finally, Lemieux seeks to show how aspects of kinship patterns affect political life in a more indirect fashion through their influence on levels of information, economic prosperity, and social solidarity. While Lemieux can show rank-order associations between kinship patterns and each of these variables, he acknowledges that in each case other factors might also have contributed to the state of the variables.

The final step in Lemieux's demonstration of the importance of kinship patterns to the political life of l'Ile d'Orléans is to construct a model to explain variations across the parish communities in support for political parties. A control is introduced for levels of long-standing party identification. The model is restricted to the remaining variation in party support. It seeks to explain this variation as a function of the relative ability of the parties to relate appropriately to four characteristics of the parish communities (all of which have been interpreted as consequences of kinship patterns). These variables are political competitiveness and the three above-mentioned variables of information, prosperity, and social solidarity. In terms of the data on party behavior that Lemieux presents, the model has a very high predictive power in each of three general elections. To this extent, Lemieux's overall thesis is sustained. (At the same time, an unknown proportion of the predicted variation may be traceable not to aspects of kinship structure but to other antecedent variables.)

Especially stimulating is Lemieux's concluding chapter, in which he attempts to relate his findings about l'Ile d'Orléans to the political life of Quebec as a whole. Lemieux contends that prior to the 1960s, Quebec was marked by a lower level of politicization than was true of the other Canadian provinces. For him, this can be explained in terms of the five characteristics of kinship patterns that he analyzed in l'Ile d'Orléans. Each of these variables, he indicates, has been less favorable to politicization in the case of Quebec. This argument does raise questions that can be adequately resolved only through further research. Nevertheless, it provides the basis for a highly suggestive interpretation of Quebec politics, offering a significant alternative to the dominant explanations of Quebec politics which have focused primarily upon the social composition and ideologies of French-Canadian

elites to explain lower levels of politicization.

In sum, *Parenté et Politique* is an impressive and highly significant work. Through an imaginative use of anthropological materials, Lemieux has developed a strikingly innovative and promising approach for the study of political life in even relatively "modern" societies. It can only be regretted that this volume, like much of the work of *québécois* social scientists, has not yet been translated into English and thus has failed to receive as widespread a recognition as it deserves.

KENNETH MCROBERTS
York University, Toronto

Prophet of Community: The Romantic Socialism of Gustav Landauer. By Eugene Lunn. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973. Pp. 448. $13.75.)

This is a good book, in spite of some weaknesses; it is also a timely book, because Gustav Landauer's ideal of a society without a state, without big industries and cities, organized into small communities and based on human fellowship has a close affinity to tendencies in the New Left. Professor Lunn has on the whole succeeded well in drawing a picture of the very complex mentality of Landauer, who based his anarcho-socialist ideas upon mysticism, who was a romanticist, an admirer of the Middle Ages, an anti-Marxist, a Shakespearean scholar and a historian, concerned with the analysis of revolutions. Only at a few points does Lunn's effort to explain Landauer's thinking and striving break down. Lunn, for instance, is not very successful in explaining why Landauer took little cognizance of the important developments in the libertarian movement outside Germany in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. A leading philosopher of anarcho-socialism, one would think, should have paid attention to the rise of revolutionary syndicalism in the French and Italian labor movements, to the abandonment of anarchism proper (but not of all libertarian ideas) by Paul Brousse and other Frenchmen, and to the heated controversies among anarchists in the Latin countries and in Russia about terrorism. Yet Lunn merely says that Landauer was at times "mesmerized by the conditions in Germany" (p. 207) and that he was opposed to anarcho-syndicalism because it was an urban movement. But if a man of Landauer's intellectual breadth really limited his scope so much and even failed to appreciate the tendencies similar to his own in so large a movement as the Confédération Générale du Travail, one would like to know more about the reasons.

Less satisfactory than Lunn's analysis of Landauer's personal development is his discussion of the societal framework within which Landauer had to operate. The book tries to explain the socioeconomic milieu of Swabia to which Landauer was so much attached, but the attempt does not reach far below the surface. The same is true of the milieu in Munich which became the scene of Landauer's tragic attempt to realize his ideas in the South Bavarian *Raeterepublik* of April 1919. Lunn adduces a number of important facts that could have helped to explain the relationship between Landauer's anti-urbanism and the *Blut und Boden* mystique of the German reactionary romanticists. But the effort at such an explanation remains unconvincing because the author does not have enough insight into the forces at work in Germany during the early 20th century. Moreover, he creates a semantic obstacle to an adequate analysis by applying the term "*voelkisch*" to all romantic ruralism, not only to that of the racist variety; I do not think that the term has ever been free of racist connotation, at least not since the 1870s.

Lunn deals with the great riddle of the last phase of Landauer's life: how he could have brought himself to support the Munich *Raeterepublik*. Of course, it was not the Communist *Raeterepublik*, which was established only in the backlash of the abortive Social Democratic coup of mid-April 1919, but the much milder form which had been created by left-wingers of the Independent Socialist party. But how could a man of Landauer's intelligence fail to see that in the Europe of 1919 any government of workers' councils could only maintain itself through the support of Soviet Russia and that it would therefore inevitably drift toward communism, which Landauer hated as much as Social Democracy? Lunn says that "through personal tragedies"—the loss of his wife Hedwig in 1918—"and severe disappointments with the course of the revolution . . . , Landauer had become a very impatient man" (p. 327). Perhaps not only was he impatient but also his judgment had been impaired by these circumstances; lacking a better explanation, we shall probably have to accept this as the most plausible. Landauer's assassination by "white" soldiers, however tragic in itself, spared him the pain of having to realize that for his concept of communitarian anarcho-socialism there was no room between the forces of conservatism, of the cen-

tralized welfare state of the Social Democrats, and of totalitarian communism.

CARL LANDAUER
University of California, Berkeley (Emeritus)

Engels, Manchester, and the Working Class. By Steven Marcus. (New York: Random House, 1974. Pp. xiii, 271. $8.95.)

The experience of Friedrich Engels in Manchester is a shock felt round the world, now registered as far as Moscow, Peking, and Havana, and still reverberating. In 1844, after twenty months of Manchester, full of walking and thinking about the city, Engels wrote *The Condition of the Working Class in England,* which was not translated into English until the American edition of 1887. Marcus, a specialist in Victorian literature who teaches in Columbia University, offers a work of "historical reclamation" to rescue the meaning of that text from its two inadequate English translations and to place it in a new context. He demonstrates that it is larger than a monument of socialism, wider than an interpretation of the industrial revolution, and greater than a document of urban history, locating it as an early classic in the modern-postmodern literature of incomparable extreme experience.

He argues persuasively that in Manchester, the paradigm of the modern city, the industrial revolution wrought such demoralization and dehumanization that experience passed the boundaries of language and imagination. Words failed. Convincingly, he demonstrates that the literary critic, whose domain is the whole realm of discourse, can interpret that breakdown of language and consciousness. He suggests that while Marx and Engels were busy detaching themselves from German philosophy, the very method of Hegel offered Engels a way of grasping the order of contradictions, a way to a new consciousness, and a language to represent the horrors of the industrial city. He also exposes the life, work, and personality of Engels to different kinds of analysis.

The book refreshes the context of Engels's work. It is an important study, but excruciatingly mannered. It is also inconclusive. We are led away from an interesting beginning through a disappointing middle to a place without conclusion (the last chapter is named "In Place of a Conclusion"). With all its promise, the inquiry carries the seeds of its own distraction, turning the inspection of Engels into a display of fashions that range from ethology—informing us that shelter is important—to inspirations drawn from ego psychology. The author fumbles with psychobiography, dressing Engels in the latest styles of identification and ambivalence, and rendering scant justice to the condition of Engels in 1844, or to the genesis of certain "men of a new kind"—the revolutionary critics—in the new age. The personal crises of Engels's life cycle do not illuminate his response to the collective crisis of language and consciousness, or penetrate what Marcus calls (p. 108) "the relation of writing to praxis."

Today, we may still read the surface of the city by walking the Engels trail in the streets of Manchester. If we pause near where he stood on Ducie Bridge, viewing the most hideous dwellings he had ever seen, we find the old horrors displaced by the railroad. The walls of the present bridge are too high to reveal anything but a large graffito which reads, "All Out on May Day." Since Engels stood there, language and consciousness have never been the same.

E. V. WALTER
University of Manchester, England

Patterns of Dominance. By Philip Mason. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971. Pp. 377. $4.50.)

Race relations, undoubtedly, are one of the most meticulously researched subjects in the social sciences. Anthropologists, psychologists and sociologists, of course, have long been engaged in prolific analyses of its various aspects, and recently there has been a spate of contributions by economists (e.g., Gary S. Becker, *The Economics of Discrimination* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957]) and political scientists (e.g., Alvin Rabushka, *A Theory of Racial Harmony* [Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1974]).

The issue, therefore, highlighted in this work has been treated by a host of scholars either following the trail blazed by their predecessors or striving to carve out some territory of their own. As in other fields so crowded with contributions, truly original studies have been few and infrequent.

Yet, Mason explicitly (although rather unpretentiously) aims at breaking new ground. More specifically, taking a skeptical view of inquiries in which methodological and theoretical precision are sometimes bought at the high cost of removing the analysis from total reality, he relies (in a manner reminiscent of S. N. Eisenstadt, *The Political Systems of Empires* [Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1962]) on the comparative method, abstracting items from dif-

ferent societies in an attempt to find, so to speak, the "laws" of racial history. Thus:

> A lack of sufficient width seemed to me a weakness in many studies of race relations; again and again one found writers putting forward explanations for some phenomenon which did not hold good as soon as the terms of reference were broadened. . . . This book began many years ago with one simple thought. Why was the situation as between black and white in South Africa so different from that in Brazil or the Caribbean? Was it in fact so different as it seemed to be on the surface? It seemed worth trying to analyze, in various parts of the world, situations in which different ethnic groups were living together in harmony or tension, and to enumerate and assess the changing factors present in each case, trying to reach some conclusions as to why one situation was tense and another relaxed (p. ix).

The particular societies singled out for the purpose of this commendable comparative attempt comprise the African empires, Athens and Sparta, the Aztecs and the Incas, Brazil, the Caribbean, India, South Africa and Spanish America, but considerable insight is also provided into the dynamics of race relations in several other parts of the world, (both in the geographical and temporal sense). The investigation is comprehensive in coverage, often illuminating and eminently readable.

The principal contribution of the undertaking lies in its determining of the main patterns of racial dominance to have crystallized throughout the world prior to and following the European colonial expansion. The author questions the empirical validity of the sequence designed for the United States (presupposing smooth unbroken progress toward racial harmony) and establishes that racial encounters ordinarily assume forms such as complete *domination* of one group over the other (e.g., South Africa), *paternalism* (e.g., British India) or *competition* (e.g., American North). The anatomy of each of these three configurations is carefully dissected and their emergence firmly grounded in appropriate historical and socioeconomic contexts.

The presentation, however, is not without limitations. To begin with, the work is so saturated with minutiae that the reader has to stretch his faculties in order to see the theoretical wood behind the factual trees. Evidently Mason, not unlike the bulk of his colleagues at the Institute of Race Relations in London, is more concerned with generating new data than interpreting them theoretically. And in view of the frailties of some of the recent theoretical constructs, his strategy of letting the facts speak for themselves is likely to be sympathetically received in certain quarters. The general value of the study, though, would have been enhanced had he imposed on these reams of useful information a tighter analytical framework and struck a better balance between data and theory. Schermerhorn's "inductive typology" illustrates the potential of such an approach (R. A. Schermerhorn, *Comparative Ethnic Relations* [New York: Random House, 1970]).

By the same token, it might be argued that the theoretical explications resorted to in the book are of insufficient scope. There is, for instance, no dearth of reference to the writings of Banton and van den Berghe. No serious attempt, on the other hand, is made to turn to account the propositions of additional "macro-level" theorists and none of the "micro-level" ones. The writer is admirably unwilling to over-simplify a complex factual reality, but to a point of rendering it too simple (compare, for example, with Hubert M. Blalock, *Toward a Theory of Minority-Group Relations* [New York: Wiley, 1967]).

Finally, nowhere in the text is there any substantial discussion of the methodological questions involved in the study of comparative race relations. In tracing and juxtaposing the patterns of racial dominance, Mason implicitly faces problems of combining the diachronic and synchronic perspectives, deduction, induction and the like. Still, he appears reluctant to bring them into the open (along the lines of Henry Teune and Adam Przeworski, *A Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry* [New York: Wiley, 1969]).

In conclusion, the author has delineated painstakingly and vividly most of the major racial conflicts. At the same time, he has fallen short of producing a much needed macroscopic theoretical framework for his subject.

M. MUSHKAT, JR.
Victoria University of Wellington

The French Right (from de Maistre to Maurras). Edited and introduced by J. S. McClelland. (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1971. Pp. 320. $2.45, paper.)

Gobineau: Selected Political Writings. Edited and introduced by Michael D. Biddis. (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1971. Pp. 254. $2.25, paper.)

Max Stirner: The Ego and His Own. Selected and introduced by John Carroll. (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1974. Pp. 266. $3.45, paper.)

Race and Race History and Other Essays by Alfred Rosenberg. Edited and introduced by Robert Pois. (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1974. Pp. 204. $2.95, paper.) (Roots of the Right. General Editor: George Steiner).

> The rule of the road is a paradox quite,
> Both in riding and driving along;
> If you keep to the left, you are sure to be right,
> If you keep to the right you are wrong.

Henry Erskine, who penned these lines, was an eighteenth-century Englishman; but his words, *mutatis mutandis,* apply in our time as well.

"Much of the crisis of identity and society that has overshadowed twentieth century history comes from an impulse towards total politics," writes George Steiner in the General Editor's Preface that opens every volume in the series "Roots of the Right." This he connects in turn with the attack upon the theory of man as a rational animal, an attack whose most radical version, using the concept of the Fall of Man, has come from elitist, racist and totalitarian dreamers and publicists of the Right. Hence these "black books" designed to provide source material concerning political and philosophical programs that have "come so near to destroying our civilization."

A good idea! But it is not quite clear what civilization this material helped to destroy, or what it did to destroy it. The strands of thought revealed or, rather, ravelled in these books are scarcely peculiar to the Right; and a useful task, not here performed, would be to disentangle them from similar tendencies that are politically neutral, or put to different uses in some other camp. The impulse toward totalitarian politics, for example, is visible in many past societies, not to speak of the present, and the modern means to satisfy it are products of technology, not ideology. Elitist views are no monopoly of the Right, from the Old Testament to *What Is To Be Done?* The basic contradictions between liberty and equality had revealed themselves as early as 1793. Nationalistic doctrine was associated with the Left (Gobineau scorned it) until a more convenient rationalization of conflict took its place. The popular mind, weaned on Christianity and envy, did not need theorists of race to suspect aliens and hate the Jews. Liberalism and parliamentary institutions were criticized by Left as well as Right, and discredited by their own failures (or successes: nothing fails like success!). The men whose texts are cited in these volumes provided not inspiration but rationalization of attitudes based on traditional prejudices and current experience.

But here is a thread to follow: "What unites the Right ideologically in France is the fundamental attack on reason and the rights of man," writes J. S. McClelland in his introduction to the volume on *The French Right,* which runs from Joseph de Maistre to Maurras, by way of Taine, Drumont, Sorel, Le Bon and Barrès, to culminate with Claudel's ode *to the Marshal* [Pétain]. Yet the attack on reason was less fundamental than he (or Steiner) claims, and it was directed not against its utilization but against its exaggeration. Taine, for whom reason, like health, is only a momentary achievement and a happy accident, wanted to put its possibilities in perspective. He simply agrees with Robert Bridges, whose

> Reason kens he herits in
> A haunted house. Tenants unknown
> Assert their squalid lease of sin
> With earlier title than his own.

That was a point of Barrès as well. As for Maurras, his belief in reason, armed with logic, subjected him to that *folie de la raison* which is the penalty of ideas carried to their logical conclusion.

It was not reason such men opposed, but abstraction. All claimed to pit liberties against liberty, concrete against abstract notions, and, as Maurras stressed, *interests.* They opposed or claimed to oppose those for whom ideas have more substance and personality than men. They did not realize that they themselves identified general interests with particular ones (connected with certain social groups or intellectual traditions); but neither did their opponents, who argued from concrete wrongs to abstract rights. All this could be quite interesting. But such complex aspects of the relationship between Right and Left are never broached; indeed, the Left is practically absent from these pages. Yet what was the Right about, if not about the Left?

The reader's bewilderment (or the absence of an indication that bewilderment might be an appropriate beginning in his quest) is emphasized by the inclusion in the series of Max Stirner, whose ideal society was a union of selfish individuals, enemies of the state against which he preached rebellion intended to exalt and to assert not a new order, only the self.

Though Stirner influenced Nietzsche and was attacked, viciously and at length, by Marx, his extreme anarcho-egoism led rather to the exploits of the *bande à Bonnot* than to those of the *fascios*. The suggestion that it provides one of the roots of the Right is certainly unorthodox. Mr. Carroll fairly admits that the case for inclusion is scarcely overwhelming, but argues from Mussolini's enthusiasm about "Stirner, Nietzsche, Goethe, Schiller, Montaigne, Cervantes, etc." We might ask why from this list of *agents provocateurs* we (or Mr. Carroll) should pick Stirner rather than Montaigne—or "*etc.*"? We would do better, though, to accept the suggestion implicit in this method, and extend the search for roots to include Karl Marx, a far less equivocal contributor to Mussolini's thought.

No student of fascism can afford to ignore the socialist (and syndicalist) roots of that radicalism which, disillusioned with the growing bureaucratization, *embourgeoisement*, perhaps humanization, of the organized Left, took up positions "of the Right." McClelland, aware of this problem, includes Georges Sorel; and also Maurice Barrès, whose youthful politics were explicitly socialist, although increasingly and, after 1896, insistently, "national." In France, but not only in France, the origins of socialism lay in nationalism, the origins of nationalism in the philosophy of reason and the rights of man. A pretty tangle of roots, worth some attention.

Nor does racism, represented by Gobineau and Rosenberg, yield a less equivocal harvest. Arthur de Gobineau, of course, elitist and anti-democrat, is properly brought forth as a source (or confirmation) of prejudices inextricably connected with a certain section of the Right. But Gobineau was no anti-Semite in the contemporary sense of the term: his Semites were negroid inhabitants of the Middle East and the Mediterranean basin, including obviously Arabs, harbingers of the historical decline that was his obsession and the major theme of his works. His elitist racial theories suggested how one could be a patriot (he wasn't) while despising one's fellow-citizens (he did). More important, though, anti-Semitism in the nineteenth century was no preserve of the Right. Quite the contrary. Gobineau's contemporary, Alphonse Toussenel, was a radical "of the Left," and passages from his *Les Juifs, rois de l'époque. Historie de la féodalité financière* (1845) would have deserved inclusion in the series. Racism, duly enhanced by Darwinist strains, was for the cultivated. Anti-Semitism was endemic in the masses. Until revealed as the socialism of fools, resentment of Jews rising to truculent hatred was characteristic of socialist propaganda right through the century (see the works of Edmund Silberner).

There as on other planes, the cry for justice, first raised on the Left, was echoed on the Right as well. In both cases, justice *for* as often as not meant justice *against*—against those who had something others wanted. Typically, the *numerus clausus*, devised in East and Central Europe against "encroaching" Jews, reappears today in the United States in the shape of educational quotas and other proportional affirmations of a "fairer" social policy. Meanwhile, Right or Left, the essence of politics remains the same: who gets what, and from whom. The rationalizations, devised to philosophize on the way to the trough or to the slaughterhouse, continue to differ.

Professor Steiner, who must know this, evidently had a deeper reason for launching his series: to show those readers who may have doubted it how excruciatingly boring such writings can be. He has succeeded. This reader at least, staggers forth from the search for roots and makes a wild grab for lighter reading—perhaps the *Critique of the Gotha Program!*

EUGEN WEBER
University of California, Los Angeles

Reflections on the Causes of Human Misery and Upon Certain Proposals to Eliminate Them. By Barrington Moore, Jr. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970, 1972. Pp. 201. $7.95.)

This publication traditionally divides books for review into four major fields. Perhaps the most telling comment upon the work under review is that it fits into each of the categories and more. It is, indeed, global in its vision, both in the geographical sense and in the way it cuts across the traditional fields of inquiry. Yet while Professor Moore's work is in the unified social science tradition of Marx and Weber, it does not purport to provide definitive answers to the problem of human misery; rather, as the title suggests, it offers reflections and invites the concerned reader to join issue with the author on them. Few readers are apt to agree with most of Moore's wide-ranging arguments. The book's net effect upon most readers will be alternatively to enlighten, infuriate and challenge them. And, I suspect, this mixture of responses is precisely what Moore hopes will occur.

The book's central purpose is to explore the problem of that portion of human misery which

arises from institutional arrangements. Misery which stems from one's individual psyche is outside the scope of the work. While he concedes that the notion of happiness is highly relative, misery cuts across cultural and national lines and is, therefore, unitary. The four principal categories of social misery are: "(1) the ravages of war; (2) poverty, hunger and disease; (3) injustice and oppression; and (4) persecution for dissident beliefs" (p. 2). Moore's cardinal premise is that "human beings do not want a life of suffering, at least for its own sake. . . . [Therefore] human society ought to be organized in such a way as to eliminate useless suffering" (p. 5).

At the outset one wonders whether Moore's conception of human suffering as unitary is an adequate one. Clearly much suffering and its acceptance by large numbers are closely connected with institutional arrangements and social action, but it may also be inevitable or unforeseen. For example, while the scandalous failure of American society to care for many of its elderly is attributable to institutional failure, medical advance simply does not permit the alleviation of much additional suffering of the aged. But of even greater consequence is Moore's failure to note explicitly that suffering is often inextricably bound together with happiness, and is therefore much less absolute than Moore allows. For example, one may put up with and indeed relish suffering here and now in order to achieve happiness in the future. Virtually any World War II battle film graphically illustrates the point; soldiers suffer the privations of the war in order to achieve the "better world" which will surely come after the termination of hostilities.

Unfortunately for Moore's concept of unitary misery, a multitude of situations arise in which participants perceive suffering to be well worth the cost because of some gratification which will take place in the future. Further, the gratification may occur in either the realms of the natural or mystical. Moore's hypothesis thus does not aid us in responding to the difficult problem of differentiating the circumstances in which suffering should be borne from those in which it should not be. His hypothesis does not advance an argument which would, for example, help us to distinguish "good" wars from "bad" ones, and unless we accept his unconditional implication that suffering has no future benefits, we cannot join issue with Moore's *prescriptive* arguments.

The problem is further complicated by the justification often given for inflicting suffering on others, that we may be saving them from even greater suffering. Sometimes, of course, this may constitute a rank rationalization, but at other times it may largely be true. The bulk of cases in which we are called upon to make such judgments, however, are unclear in their implications. Aceording to Fogel and Engerman, Negro slaves lived better than the urban proletariat and far better than African peasants. Perceptions of these conditions might have been used in part to justify slavery. But obviously the case of slavery is far more complicated. Again, the infliction of a great deal of misery upon Vietnamese peasants by American forces has been justified by some on the ground that it saved them from worse fates. Again, the issue is complicated, and again Moore's unity of misery notion does not advance us very far in evaluating such events, even within a shared preference for altruism.

Notwithstanding one's difficulties with this central notion, Moore's book has so much substance that I would strongly urge anyone concerned with the human condition to read it and reflect upon its arguments. At times the brevity of Moore's formulations is admirable, particularly in his discussion of the conditions which may lead to revolution, a subject on which he is an acknowledged expert. At other times, however, the brevity of his discussion leads him to oversimplify the issues of a complex subject. For example, his discussion of various Marxist explanations of the phenomenon termed "imperialism" simply does not do justice to the arguments criticized; no matter how fairly opposing views may be stated, ten pages are simply insufficient to deal adequately with a subject on which volumes have been written. A reader who has examined both Magdoff's work supporting the Leninist thesis and Benjamin Cohen's attack upon it, will be grossly dissatisfied with Moore's brief treatment. Yet even here the reader will profit by some of Moore's insights.

The final chapter of the book is Moore's attempt to forecast the future of American society. Aware that "the inevitable is seldom what anybody expected" (p. 104), he proceeds cautiously in this endeavor. The four possibilities examined fit within the traditional terms "reaction," "reform," "revolution," and "chaos and near-total collapse." The chapter was obviously conceived during a period in which student unrest and radicalism were far more salient than they are in the middle 1970s. The discussion appears to be somewhat dated; the notion that youth will lead us through a social transformation is not taken seriously today. Moreover, Moore's major concerns—high mili-

tary expenditures, scientific effort devoted toward destructive ends, "compulsive and socially wasteful" forms of consumption, poverty and the failure of the public sector to provide adequate services and amenities—have become supplemented in the short period since he wrote the chapter by other crucial issues. The problems of stagflation and high levels of unemployment and the supply-demand-price issue of scarce resources, especially those providing energy, have risen rapidly to the top of the agenda. Any discussion of America's and the world's prospects for revolution, reform, reaction, or "coming-apart" would have to take these facts very much into consideration. Yet they are absent here. This is not to fault Moore, but merely to point out the dangers of such prognostication, even given the author's disclaimers.

Toward the end of this book Moore states that there are enough questions raised "to keep many scholars busy for their whole lifetime." If one views the book as raising crucial questions and providing acute insights and not answers, which is what I believe the author intended, it must be highly recommended. Moreover, it is extremely well-written, and completely free of social science jargon. One hopes that other scholars will take up the gauntlet thrown by Moore, thereby justifying Moore's efforts in providing us with his valuable book.

ALAN STONE
University of Houston

Governance and Population: The Governmental Implications of Population Changes. Edited by A. E. Keir Nash. (Washington, D.C.: The Commission on Population Growth and the American Future, 1972. Pp. 342. $3.75.)

In his introductory chapter to this collection of essays, Nash advises the reader not to expect many conclusions or in-depth analyses. Because relationships between demographic and political variables have been generally neglected by political scientists, this volume is primarily exploratory. Nash hopes, however, that these works will "kindle the interest of students and scholars of political science in the implications of population changes" (p. 13).

The essays are divided into three general areas: the impacts of population changes on the American political system; potential policies available to U.S. governments to reduce the population growth rate; and the consequences of population size, growth rates, and other characteristics for international relations.

Eight chapters in this volume deal with the interrelationships between population levels and distribution, the structure of U.S. governmental institutions, and the implications of these interrelations for effective representation, the efficient production of public goods, and equity in the distribution of these goods. As Professor Nash indicates, these essays can be placed within the existing debate over the adequacy of pluralism as a system of political decision making.

The inclination of most of the contributors to this section to accentuate the negative aspects of population growth is perhaps best demonstrated in Roger Davidson's analysis of population and the adequacy of political representation by the U.S. House of Representatives. Davidson concludes that there is little room to question an overall negative relationship between the increasing size and heterogeneity of governmental units and effective representation in Congress (p. 78). This conclusion is based on the deduction that if a representative has a larger, more heterogeneous population to represent, he will not be able adequately to meet the larger number and variety of demands.

Although such a conclusion may seem reasonable, it ignores some rather critical issues which might have been examined. For example, do we have any evidence that once we are at the level of hundreds of thousands of constituents per representative, it is significantly more difficult to represent 400,000 than 300,000 persons? Davidson presents no evidence that senators, who generally have much larger constituencies, are less representative than congressmen. He ignores the history of groups, especially minorities, that have turned to the President, the representative with the largest and most heterogeneous constituency, rather than to local, state, or congressional officials to secure representation. Davidson nowhere mentions the possible beneficial consequences which increased size and heterogeneity may have for the protection and representation of minority interests. Certainly Madison's *Federalist No. 10* would suggest that there may be such benefits.

The consequences of increasing population levels and heterogeneity are also important issues in the chapters dealing with state and local governments. Issues quite familiar to students of urban politics are raised in the debate over the desirability of consolidation of existing special districts and large numbers of local governmental units within SMSA's.

In possibly the best of these chapters, Daniel Elazar presents his familiar arguments for the

opportunities for both adequate representation and efficient production of public services provided by a federal rather than unitary system. He adds to his previous work by suggesting means by which federalism effectively copes with the problems created by increasing population size and heterogeneity. Along with the arguments provided by Elazar, Robert Drury presents data attempting to show that local governments have adequately responded to population shifts through changes in their expenditure patterns.

Countering the chapters by Elazar and by Drury are essays by John Grumm, Michael Danielson, and Allen Manvel who argue that the fragmented patterns of local governments encourage both inefficiency in the provision of services and inequities in the distribution of these services. Again using familiar arguments, these writers suggest that consolidation would lead to economies of scale and reverse the financial problems faced by center cities when citizens with greater resources but lesser needs move to suburbs beyond the taxing power of the core areas.

Although these five essays effectively present many of the issues involved in the debate over consolidation of local governmental units, the analysis of these issues is generally superficial. While Elazar and Danielson take completely opposite positions on the ability of fragmented versus consolidated governments to represent their constituents, neither of the authors attempts to develop a definition of representation, much less measure it. In the discussion of the efficient production of public services, expenditure data are used rather than measures of service levels or quality. In addition, no writer examines arrangements whereby revenues might be collected on a regional basis for equity reasons, but dispersed in a more decentralized manner so that neighborhoods with different preferences for various public services could have a greater opportunity to maximize these preferences.

In the section dealing with potential and acceptable population policies the most useful chapter is that of Theodore Lowi who uses his previously developed typology of distributive, redistributive, regulatory and constituent policies to show that those policies which are likely to be acceptable to either decision makers or the general public are not likely to have major impacts on fertility rates. Lowi's essay is valuable in showing that frameworks previously developed in political science may be profitably applied in the population field.

The two essays dealing with international relations are quite different both in the substantive material examined and in the quality of the work. The chapter by A.F.K. Organski and his associates is one of the best in this collection. The distinction made between a nation's total population and the portion of that population which is useful to the nation for the purposes of influencing actions in other nations is a useful contribution to the literature. In sharp contrast to the Organski et al. chapter, is the essay by Robert North and Nazlie Choucri. Their contribution appears carelessly written and inadequately documented. (For example, the reader is told that "the correlation between China's violence behavior toward the Soviet Union is .89" [p. 266]. The reader is not told, however, how this correlation was produced, to what time period or events it refers, or what other variables, if any, are controlled.) The inadequacies of this chapter are especially unfortunate because North and Choucri develop important questions concerning the complex interrelationships between population characteristics, natural resources, and international conflict. Since their chapter in the Commission Reports is a preliminary analysis of data which they are currently analyzing in greater depth, it can be expected that their later publications will be more clearly and carefully written.

In summary, Nash's warning concerning the general lack of depth in the analyses presented in the volume is certainly appropriate. Nevertheless the volume is useful to political scientists in at least two ways. First, the essays remind us that Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau, and many of the utopians were correct in assuming that the population levels and characteristics of a citizenry are important in determining a government's representative potential. And second, the essays make clear that in almost every subfield of political science demographic variables must be included in our theories and models, and their omission seriously weakens the potential contribution of our work.

R. KENNETH GODWIN
Oregon State University

Anarchy, State and Utopia. By Robert Nozick, (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1974. Pp. 334. $12.95.)

Anarchy, State and Utopia is a salty pemmican of candor, argumentative wit, brilliant language, reactionary naughtiness. It is, above all, stunningly simple. One examines the pages again and again to make sure that Robert Nozick has indeed offered up a philosophy of state

whose main argument is, in its intricacy, roughly on par with an ordinary mousetrap:

(1) people have some inviolable rights of person and property (cock the spring),
(2) any state which tries to do more than protect these rights must use means, such as taxation of earnings, which violate some of these rights (latch the bar),

so that,

(3) only "minimal," rights-regarding states are legitimate (snap!)

The mice whose necks fall to this device have scampered about the pantry for a long time. In constitutional form, Nozick would bring us back to an idealized eighteenth-century state, concerned to protect the voluntary ebb and flow of market towns, unconcerned by the misery of dislocated (or merely incompetent) workers, unrevulsed by vulgar prejudice, tolerant of economic inequality, unconcerned by market-determined inequities in the essentials of medicine or the frills of child-rearing. His analysis would likewise liberate us from the nagging criticism of souls like Jefferson (e.g., the Declaration), Marx, the Fabians, Tawny, Fanon, Mao, even John Rawls and his detractors. Most of all, Nozick's theory promises to free us of the suspicion that we should use state power to amend the inequalities of income and property worked by the market. We are given the libertarian slogan,

From each as they choose, to each as they are chosen (p. 160),

by which the author evidently intends,

From each as they choose *within the limits of wealth and income,* to each as they are chosen *by those with wealth and income.*

The central implication is that one is *entitled* to whatever he earns or inherits under the rules of market capitalism. If the ends cannot justify the means as Lenin would have it, then the means can on Nozick's telling justify the ends. Justice concerns itself not with *what* you have but with *how* you got it. Both moral philosophy and the state are enjoined to let the market work its way. This is, so far as I can see, the book's main point.

Why does an argument so simple (so stubbornly unresponsive to our trouble, so blithely *innocent*) read so well and win for itself such acclaim in American life? I can think of three answers, each partial and incomplete.

First, the book is comforting. We—the "we" who bestow literary and intellectual acclaim—are creatures of modest privilege in market society. One needs no vulgar Marxism, only common sense, to see a seductive *liaison* between ourselves and the libertarian right. What a marvelous book it is which attacks both the Internal Revenue Service and the whining moralism of our recently departed students. I must, for example, admit smiling at the look of my June payroll stub on Nozick's view that, "Taxation of earnings from labor is on a par with forced labor" (p. 169). And it is fun to think about applying some tincture of Nozick to the federal bureaucracy. These titillations have their reality, but it would be wrong and unfair to credit the book's success to them alone.

A second thought: the book is in fact a subtle and compelling analysis of the state and its problems. It is true that the main thesis sketched out above is accompanied by several companion arguments, some of them interesting and at least one of them genuine. Some of these are interesting without being relevant. Nozick asks us to wonder whether man can look upon animals as his (edible) inferiors without risking the prospect that some still cleverer race will eventually look upon (eat?) him in the same way. This (like his analysis of "experience machines") is a chilling moral joke. Here, and in his good-natured *badinage* with the reader (e.g., p. 87), Nozick is a charming companion. But if the book is to cash any deep philosophical claim, it must do so in connection with one of three themes:

(1) *The side-constraint theory of rights:* Some rights, notably those which protect person and property, are to be given absolute value. Government is to do what it can without *any* infringement of these rights, without any "utilitarianism of rights," under which one right (say, open housing) is traded off against another (say, the right to sell or not to sell a house as one pleases). This is, of course, just a restatement of the book's main argument: How does Nozick justify it? By reference to the individual's inviolability and by the way market voluntarism corresponds on its surface to the Kantian requirement that each be treated as an end in himself.

This, however, assumes that markets *do* treat persons as ends in themselves; This is a mixed truth in the best of cases (in every transaction, each of us is *both* end and means), and it is simply false if some of us occupy the position of marginal labor in an unregulated economy. There is a hint here about the book's third and deepest appeal: It assumes away our worst

trouble, here by ignoring the vulnerability of persons who lack market leverage.

(2) *The hidden-hand derivation of a minimal state:* Beginning somewhat vaguely with a Lockean state of nature, each of us wants to protect what he possesses from aggression by others. Protection becomes a commodity, sold by competing firms or associations. Eventually, a *de facto* monopoly is arrived at and transformed into a minimal state which protects everyone's rights *de jure*. Given the author's strictures, the process of development is arrested here, and further state power never comes into being. Hence, the minimal state is explained and justified.

This is, I think, twice defective as an exercise in justification. First, we are never convinced that the process of development as given holds any justificatory force. Second, the story as Nozick tells it assumes away the major reasons for a more-than-minimal state. Imagine what would become of the "hidden-hand" if either: (i) there were a proletariat which had nothing to gain from protection and everything to gain from anarchic change, or (ii) there existed a subpopulation, X, (say, Blacks or Jews or heretics) which was hated and despised by another subpopulation Y. In either case, a demand would exist not just for defense but for *aggression*, and nothing like Nozick's result could be expected. No noncoercive solution would present itself in these less equalitarian cases. I draw the inference that Nozick sees no need for a redistributive, nonminimal state precisely because the cleavages which provoke the demand for such a state are assumed away. A third thesis seems to me more genuine:

(3) *The Wilt Chamberlain critique of end-state theories for allocation:* Suppose we adopt some principle which, like Rawls's difference principle, judges social allocations good or bad by their net results (end-states) without regard to the historical path by which these results are achieved. Then suppose someone, like Wilt Chamberlain with his basketball, devises a way to make a bundle of cash not given him in our end-state distribution at T_1. By T_2, the rest of us will have happily paid up, Wilt will be rich, the T_1 allocation destroyed. It seems to follow that we must either abandon our principle or renege on the freedom to dispose of one's just share.

This is a deadly serious problem. It is no newer than the old story of freedom versus equality, but it is not less deeply problematic. Its shadow is readily discerned by the meddlesome compromises of welfare policy by government (e.g., A.F.D.C.). Its implications for political economy in general are numerous, complicated, and important. It needs facing, and Nozick forces it upon us with wit and candor.

This is not to say that Nozick himself entirely escapes the dilemma. His minimal state argument presumes the caveat that earnings are properly won, and (one infers) that earnings are not arbitrarily denied. But suppose we switch from the Chamberlain example to the very different cases of Satchel Page and Jim Thorpe. It is not that they earned too much but too little, and they earned so little because of raw and simple prejudice worked out in the marketplace. Here, as before, Nozick assumes away the arbitrary and unjust effects of market life which precede the just demand for state intervention. This, in addition to its moral comfort and its intrinsic quality, is a third major appeal of the book—it invites us to assume away our trouble. To finish: this is a finely crafted work, ultimately too optimistic to suit our case.

DOUGLAS RAE

Yale University

Welfare: The Social Issues in Philosophical Perspective. By Nicholas Rescher. (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1972. Pp. 186. $7.95.)

American welfare policy has tended to be the province of economists, sociologists, and professionals in welfare practice. The field badly needs philosophical treatment, especially in relation to democratic theory. This admirable book provides such a treatment in outline. It is an individual and original statement nonetheless well connected to the work of other philosophical social theorists, primarily in Britain. Political scientists will find its clarification of concepts distinctly helpful for the analysis of policy and implicitly suggestive about the political conditions of the "welfare state."

Starting with ordinary language Professor Rescher defines welfare as, primarily, the requisites of personal well-being in physical health, material circumstances, and mental or emotional condition. He insists on distinguishing welfare from happiness; welfare simply consists in certain "consensus requisites" of happiness. It is a profile (not a single, central tendency) of its several components. Thus, as a subject of policy, it comprises several categories

in each of which the aim is to sustain a sufficient minimum condition subject to objective statement and evaluation. The attributes of minimality (Rescher's term) and objectivity are critical both in defining and limiting state responsibility; and, in Rescher's view, they permit the direction of large sectors of welfare policy by social indicators. Although the justification of a sufficient modern welfare policy lies in social interdependence and "system malfunctions," the focus of welfare policy can be posed in terms of personal needs, not "wants," that are "socially actionable"—i.e., mensurable and administrable.

Issues of method—for example, the relative roles of income supports and social services—are not much considered here, but Rescher's succinct discussion of conceptions of poverty (Chapter 6) is easily worth the price of the book for anyone supporting a family of four on an academic salary. The most general methodological recommendations—that increasing productivity is politically preferable to pure redistribution, as is indirect promotion to relief, and that the comprehensive provision of sufficient welfare is economically feasible in modern, affluent societies—are conceptually unexceptionable, though they leave a host of technical difficulties unaddressed. But *Welfare* is not intended as a technical treatise in social policy. The critical issues for Rescher have to do with values and their rational malleability. A society whose members will internalize the welfare of others through the recognition of interdependencies and the pragmatic common understanding of needs can resolve or obviate numerous technical issues of welfare. "Beyond the welfare state" the trick is to transcend *distributive* welfare through *collective* welfare "regarding the publicly shared conditions of our common environment."

Thus it turns out that the "welfare state," ministering to welfare as Rescher has defined it, presents some inevitable disadvantages: a negative, categorical emphasis on disaster prevention rather than life enhancement; a growing threat of centralization and state control; a utilitarian economic preoccupation; an endemic failure to redeem the dependent population on which it concentrates rhetorically; and a set of malign side effects for initiative, responsibility, authority, and contentment. Rescher is arguing, as he observes at the outset, that men tend to misjudge their own welfare despite (or because of) its proper limitations and distinction from "happiness," and that democratic political and administrative measures necessarily tend to default on welfare. The policies of a postwelfare state and the values of a postindustrial society would entail the substantial dismantling of centralized welfare bureaucracy while sustaining the appropriate minimal elements of welfare. Indeed, Rescher argues—or, at least, asserts—they *will*. Here the argument takes a familiar postindustrial turn in its prognosis of a "positive" politics of improvement, satisfaction, and quality of life; an altered balance and articulation of governmental and voluntary action; "a new emphasis on the subcultures, regionalisms, and parochialisms of a pluralistic society. The forging of social cohesion amid the multiplicity and variety needed for a full life in a mass society is beyond doubt a central problem of the postwelfare state" (p. 175).

For Rescher this argument is more than prognosis; it is a diagonsis of our present condition. The frustrations of the welfare state are ineluctable; the advocated transformation of the welfare state is, while apparently not inevitable, nevertheless desirable and consistent with certain emergent welfare-state values. The argument is schematic, leaving qualifications and negations to the imagination; but it is not at all an argument of radical perfectionism, and it amply suggests the tensions of tomorrow implicit in the politics of today. Among many such arguments, that of this book is particularly worth attention. Its conclusions are debatable, but its perspectives on the substance of "welfare" and its emphasis on the elements of "value" in the politics of welfare are important.

CHARLES E. GILBERT
Swarthmore College

The Government of Poland. By Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Translated by Willmoore Kendall. (Indianapolis, Ind. The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1972. Pp. xxxix, 116. $6.00.)

Rousseau's *Government of Poland* is an important but little-read part of his works. Kendall's offering is thus a real contribution to the literature of political theory.

An outstanding merit of this offering is Kendall's own fine introduction. The translation to which it is keyed is adequate but not particularly outstanding. Kendall's essay is nearly one third as long as the translation it introduces and, since most of its interesting points refer to that translation, its relatively pedestrian quality is disappointing. But in my opinion, the introduction by Kendall, together with the scarcity of translations of the work, make the whole offering well worth reading.

Kendall's introduction, "How to read Rousseau's Government of Poland," is both subtle without being obscure and precise without being dry. Its peculiar charm is, perhaps, that in it Kendall manages to demonstrate his points without insisting. He does this by showing us how he reads Rousseau, rather than by lecturing us on how we ought to read Rousseau. This is not to say that his conclusions are, or ought to be, universally agreeable to the concerned student of this relatively unknown work —a work which Kendall, correctly I think, calls, "this pearl of great price" (p. xviii); but, even when we disagree, either with a particular point made or, as is more likely to be the case, with the scope of applicability claimed for a point made, we note a combination of quiet reflectiveness and quick canniness which is encouraging to the tyro in these studies as well as sobering to more advanced students.

Kendall's treatment is more than broadly reflective, however, since it is also learned and detailed. We find here a refreshingly straightforward presentation of the quite complicated system of election-electors-voting mechanics, etc., in operation in Poland during the period addressed by Rouseau's text. Kendall's presentation of Poland's factual (a) militiary situation (p. xix), (b) imperative mandate (p. xx), (c) system of elector-selection (xxi-xxii) and, (d) federal machinery (p. xxii) is terse and crystal clear.

After having laid out the historical constitution of the historical Poland of Rousseau's lifetime, Kendall then shows us that Rousseau's *Government of Poland* does not address itself substantively to any of these characteristics of the historical Poland's historical regime. His address to the *oddness* of Rousseau's gift to a "Poland" which is far different from the historical Poland whose regime Kendall describes so clearly is very provocative, and this point is then used to provide a soberly persuasive groundwork for his central thesis that the *Poland* is to be read with extreme care if its true purpose is to be grasped. That true purpose, Kendall argues, can be seen best by a consideration of Rousseau's thoughts concerning the children of Israel under Moses; these were to become the dispersed, displaced Jewry which, without a homeland, was still a "national" people 2 millennia later (xiii). Kendall argues that Rousseau envisages the Poles groaning under the Russian yoke as constituting the new Jews—which suggests, if we may be permitted to follow out Kendall's thought further, that Rousseau ironically enough presents himself in the *Poland* as a new "Moses" to the Poles in the Russian house of bondage, and the *The Government of Poland* is presented as a new *"Exodus."* Kendall's argument encourages us to wonder whether perhaps Rousseau does not here indicate a future evolution of all of Europe into a congeries of Swiss-like federations of relatively autonomous cantons. This quite distinct possibility made good sense out of Rousseau's text of the *Poland* in critical places; without it, we are led to wonder if after all—as Rousseau himself so modestly suggests —Jean-Jacques is not accurate when he says of himself (p. 2) "Now, . . . I am barely able to tie one idea to another. . . ." Kendall's argument leads to the likelihood that Jean-Jacques Rousseau is thinking very well indeed, and that he wishes to teach each of the "enchained" peoples of Europe to be, so to speak, a new "Jewry" until all the other, hitherto oppressive "Philistines" or "Egyptians" become liberated from what in them makes them foolish enough to undertake self-destructive expansionist wars, (see chap. XII, pp. 79-81). Under Kendall's reading, Rousseau is a new Moses to the Poles and a new St. Paul, at the very least, to the militarists of his Europe.

And finally, before a word on the translation, we must mention Kendall's remarks relating the *Poland* to the *Social Contract* as Plato's *Laws* are related to *The Republic* (xvii). The notion of the *Poland* as supplying Rousseau's practical *"morale provisoire"* to his theoretical *Social Contract* is a most provocative one—since it adumbrates what is perhaps *the* political phenomenon of the non-Western blocs, i.e., infinitely "socialized" peoples being thereby prepared for a millennium lacking any social impositons.

Kendall's translaton seems less vigorous and pointed than his commentary. On p. 7, (Pléiade, III, 957), we find Rousseau praising Numa as the true founder of Rome. Kendall makes two sentences out of one and in the process quite badly misemphasizes the original, a critically important statement of Rousseau's. Kendall has Rousseau say that Numa *first* united the members of Romulus' robber-band to one another and all of them to the soil by means of certain mild institutions; and that Numa *then* made the city sacred using apparently frivolous rituals. Kendall's translation has:

> He did this by transforming the robbers into citizens, not so much by means of laws, however—of laws they had, in their rustic poverty, scant need—as by mildly restrictive institutions that bound each of them to the rest and all of them to the soil; and, finally,

> by making their city sacred in their eyes by means of those rites, apparently idle and superstitious, whose strength and influence so few people have understood. . . .

The correct emphasis is:

> He did this by transforming them into citizens, less by laws . . . than by certain mild institutions which attached them to one another and all of them to the soil by means of finally making their city sacred. . . .

That is, Rousseau says that these robbers were transformed into citizens through (*par*) certain mild institutions which bound them together and to the soil *because finally* Numa rendered the city sacred—*en rendant enfin leur ville sacrée*. . . . (Cf. *Social Contract*, I, Ch. VI for a definition of *ville* and *cité*.) In this crucial passage of the *Poland*, the problem is precisely for Numa to render, finally, *une ville*—a village —into *une cité*—into a city.

For Rousseau, a city *is* a village rendered sacred and, ultimately, Rousseau's ambition, if we may judge from the *Poland*, is to be the new Numa to Europe.

RICHARD B. CARTER
Windham College

Historians of Modern Europe. Edited by Hans A. Schmitt. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1971. Pp. 338. $11.00.)

Historians of Modern Europe is a collection of thirteen essays by former students of S. William Halperin. The authors, with one exception, currently hold academic posts in American universities. The exception, Pierre Renouvin, is at the Sorbonne. In the introduction, the editor, Hans A. Schmitt, describes the book as part of the University of Chicago tradition of presenting to a retiring, esteemed professor a "*Festschrift* with a theme" (xviii). Schmitt also provides a brief summary of Halperin's academic accomplishments.

The theme of *Historians of Modern Europe* is historiography, meaning here the study of historians rather than the methods of historians, the philosophy of history, or even the history of historical writing. Each of the thirteen essays is about a different historian. The book is divided into two parts: "Anglo-American Perspectives", with essays about Arnold Toynbee, Carlton Hayes, Oscar Halecki, Hans Kohn, A.J.P. Taylor, and J.L. Hammond, and "Continental Perspectives" with essays about Adolfo Omodeo, Gaetano Salvemini, Federico Chabod, and Gioacchino Volpe (Italian); Gerhard Ritter (German); and Ernest Labrousse and Jacques Chastenet (French). Each of these historians lived in the twentieth century and wrote at least one essay about modern European history.

Unlike *Ideas in History*, edited by Richard Herr and Harold Parker, a previous volume in the Chicago tradition, *Historians of Modern Europe* does not have a conclusion. The introduction does not mention the thirteen essays, and one must infer from the dedication page and the tradition that the authors are former students of Halperin's. The essays are not related to each other and are not uniform in the subjects they treat. In short, the book lacks unity. Each essay must be taken on its own merits.

Edward Whiting Fox discusses Arnold Toynbee's paradoxical commitment to prophecy and free will and Toynbee's resolution of the problem by distinguishing between "sub- and self-conscious action" (p. 9). Carter Jefferson describes Carlton J.H. Hayes's belief that the "idealism of the masses causes war, not economic imperialism or combative instinct" (p. 20). Hayes justified his belief on the grounds that nationalism produces international anarchy (his phrase) which was the "general cause of World War I" (p. 18). Kenneth Lewalski shows how Oscar Halecki resolves the dichotomy between the specific and the general by maintaining that only the "triumph of the kingdom of God and the end of time" are "predetermined" (p. 60), and those general ends are unspecifiable.

Perhaps Louis L. Snyder's analysis of Hans Kohn's treatment of nationalism will most interest political scientists. Kohn maintains that there have been many different types of nationalism which need to be distinguished from the current deterioration of nationalism into a kind of "primitive pagan tribalism" (p. 68). H. Russell Williams criticizes A.J.P. Taylor's *Origins of World War II*, while Henry Winkler surveys the "historical achievement" (p. 119) of J.L. Hammond in defending the idea that the industrial revolution made worse the conditions of the working classes in Europe.

The four essays on Italian historians emphasize the connection between history and politics, particularly the treatment of Italian unification and the rise and rule of Benito Mussolini. Charles Delzell's essay on Adolfo Omodeo, A. William Salomone's on Federico Chabod, and George Peck's on Gaetano Salvemini describe academic opponents of fascism who helped bring about the Republic. Edward R. Tannenbaum finds that Gioacchino Volpe willingly embraced fascism. Volpe's accommodation to the regime cost him his post after the defeat of Italy in World War II.

William Harvey Maehl's essay on Gerhard

Ritter depicts the fascinating way responsibility for the emergence of Hitler is translated into an historiographical controversy about Bismarck. Ritter opposed the Nazis while defending Bismarck against the charge that he prepared the way for Hitler.

William Savage portrays Jacques Chastenet's attempt to understand the fall of France in 1940 as a loss of faith resulting from the accomplishments of a patriotic objective—the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine at the end of World War I. Pierre Renouvin's study of Ernest Labrousse describes the popularity of the *Annales* school in France and it's emphasis on social-economic history. Labrousse's four volume *Economic and Social History of France since the 16th Century* is typical of this school in its focus on internal social conflict as the principal, but by no means the only, cause of domestic and international policies.

This book would be of greater interest to political scientists if it had a conclusion. Such a conclusion could have been built around the historians' different uses of inevitability, their working resolution of such problems as that of "presentism," or their contribution to twentieth-century historiography. As they stand, these essays will probably be of greatest interest to readers who want to know the historian before they read his history.

ROBERT WOITO
YMCA Community College, Chicago

The Writings of Henry D. Thoreau: Walden. Edited by J. Lyndon Shanley. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971. Pp. 409. $10.00.)

The Writings of Henry D. Thoreau: The Maine Woods. Edited by Joseph J. Moldenhauer. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972. Pp. 486. $12.50.)

The Writings of Henry D. Thoreau: Reform Papers. Edited by Wendell Glick. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1973. Pp. 403. $13.50.)

The first three volumes in the new Princeton collection of *The Writings of Henry D. Thoreau* surpass all existing editions of these particular Thoreau writings in both content and quality. Indeed, their publication is the fruition of attentive scholarship at its best. For those interested in the political philosophy of Thoreau, the respective editors of these volumes have restored purity to the manuscripts, insofar as possible, and have aided considerably in renewing an interest in Thoreau. Approved by the Center for Editions of American Authors, the volumes are prepared according to the Center's guidelines of copy-text, which are to produce the author's writings as closely as possible to his intention—i.e., unmodernized texts that would have met with his approval. The respective editors, all of whom are acknowledged scholars in the field of American literature, display meticulous and exhaustive editorial skills. All of the writings are appended with indexes, historical and introductory essays, textual notes, and where appropriate, tables of emendations and variations. No interpretation of Thoreau's philosophy is attempted.

It is an understatement to say that Thoreau's writings are more relevant today than when first written, offering refreshing inquiries of the hyperactive technocratic society. But Thoreau also furnishes alternatives by providing an intellectual handbook for purposeful living, not simply a retreat from civilization. Rather, he promises a life of deliberate simplicity designed to allow everyone to share in the products of nature as well as to liberate the psyche from crass materialism. Thoreau may not be the savior for postindustrial society but clearly he must be consulted in developing norms for its political guidance.

Walden, of course, is Thoreau's classic and most comprehensive expression of his philosophical assumptions. The editor, J. Lyndon Shanley of Northwestern University, reviews the cosmopolitan appeal of *Walden,* pointing out that previous editions have been translated into more than twenty languages. Thoreau worked on *Walden* for approximately eight years from 1846 to 1854. Hence, it is perhaps his most carefully developed work. It is the single best record of philosophical underpinnings—his basic tenets of transcendentalism, individualism, economics, society and politics.

Much of the commentary on Thoreau concentrates on his deification of nature and his political individualism. Yet most commentators fail to link the two. Indeed, the pristine physical environment is fundamental to Thoreau's thought as the real-world reflection of higher laws. It provides the raw material for the physical needs of life as well as important intellectual and spiritual lessons. Similarly, nature is the reflection of diversity and freedom, values to be emulated in political society. Political individualism for Thoreau, however, is not possessive individualism allowing for an unrestricted appropriation of nature. The acquisition of food, shelter, clothing and fuel—"the necessaries of life"—are justified by "whatever, of all that man obtains by his own exertions, has been from the first, or from

long use has become, so important to human life that few, if any, whether from savageness, or poverty, or philosophy, ever attempt to do without it" (p. 12). Material possessions are thus essential only to satisfy basic physical needs. Possession beyond these needs is a violation of higher laws and contributes to an economy of waste. Consequently, property held unnecessarily also is a violation of the natural rights of those seeking sustenance.

Thoreau makes few explicit references to the state in *Walden,* but he clearly establishes his complex relationship to the state both in his refusal to pay taxes and consequent imprisonment and in his dictum that the individual must be obedient "to the laws of his being, which will never be one of opposition to a just government, if he should chance to meet with such" (p. 323). Obviously, Thoreau is not in opposition to all government but only to those not in conformity with his notion of justice, a matter of individual conscience.

The Maine Woods, edited by Joseph J. Moldenhauer of the University of Texas, consists of three essays based on Thoreau's journeys to the Maine wilderness. Written sporadically over a fifteen year period (1846–61), it includes "Ktaadn," "Chesuncook," and "The Allegash and the East Branch." Essentially a detailed record of his journeys, the essays are frequently overlooked by political theorists in their assessment of Thoreau. Although much of *The Maine Woods* may be politically irrelevant, what does emerge of significance is Thoreau's endorsement of positive governmental actions. In "Chesuncook," Thoreau, learning that the state of Maine had voted to grant money to each school district for providing a water-trough by the roadside to be used by travelers, responds: ". . . a piece of intelligence as refreshing to me as the water itself. That legislature did not sit in vain" (p. 88). Thoreau concludes "Chesuncook" by arguing for the establishment of "national preserves" for the purpose of protecting against the commercial exploitation of the wilderness. These explicit expressions of support are rare indeed for Thoreau.

Reform Papers is edited by Wendell Glick of the University of Minnesota at Duluth. Included in this volume are eleven of Thoreau's essentially political essays: "The Service," "Paradise (To Be) Regained," "Herald of Freedom," "Wendell Phillips Before Concord Lyceum," "Resistance to Civil Government," "Slavery in Massachusetts," "A Plea for Captain John Brown," "Martyrdom of John Brown," "The Last Days of John Brown," "Life Without Principle," and his heretofore unpublished essay, "Reform and the Reformers." Although the latter essay never received Thoreau's finishing touches, Glick felt it was near enough to completion to be included in the volume.

In "Reform and the Reformers," written before 1845, Thoreau does not focus on a particular political problem but addresses the matter of reform in general. The reformers, as distinguished from conservatives (whose heads have "a puny and deficient look"), are those people attempting to change established norms and institutions—political, social, or religious. While Thoreau admires their zeal and agrees that "something must certainly be done" to correct the servile condition of humankind, he maintains the reformer is not much more credible than the rest of the ignorant masses. Thoreau asserts that the reformer preaches reform because of his own personal failures or weaknesses. The real prescription for reform, to convince Thoreau, is the deed. Not until the reformer can demonstrate "a small specimen of his own manufactures" (p. 184) is the reformer worthy of a sympathetic audience. Clearly, one of Thoreau's "specimens" is resistance to the State; in its most forceful form, resistance is revolution. And here, "Reform and the Reformers" provides an important and relative perspective to Thoreau's notion of revolution: "Most revolutions in society have not power to interest, still less alarm us, but tell me that our rivers are drying up, or the genus pine dying out in the country, and I might attend" (p. 195). Given the role of nature in his world view, it is not surprising to find Thoreau supporting revolutions in behalf of the natural environment.

There is a great deal more to Thoreau's political ideas in these volumes (particularly *Reform Papers),* all of which emanate from a superstructure of nature. But no single label is an appropriate representation of his thought. Only a strange mosaic of impressions begins to explain his brand of politics: transcendentalist, theist, temperate revolutionary, individualist, libertarian, humanitarian and pragmatist. Obviously, more of Thoreau's political philosophy is found in his other writings, particularly his journal entries. Should forthcoming volumes in this new collection be of comparable scholarship (as it appears they will be), political theorists will have new and authoritative material to work with. Indeed, the Princeton edition of Thoreau's writings is a welcome tribute to his political ideas.

DAVID M. ATKINSON
Pacific Lutheran University

Politics and Deviance. Edited by Ian Taylor and Laurie Taylor. (Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Books, Inc., 1973. Pp. 217. $2.10, paper.

Inheritors of a Marxist tradition in social science have revealed how an explicitly political body of research and theory might confront an under-laborer conception of theory and research, shaking the latter from its prepolitical slumbers. The Taylor collection is an addition to that literature; it contains eight original essays designed to correct the belief that deviance is an individual pathology by showing how it can be judged properly only by considering the goals and outcomes of laws and customs rather than by examining only what societies define as deviant. Genuine deviance entails inegalitarian goals and outcomes injurious to people's physical needs and human dignity. In essays on such diverse subjects as: excesses of heroes in mystery stories, the psychiatrist's defense of tradition on college campuses, lawful and unlawful crimes among American corporations, and self-conscious deviant actions among hippies and the Weathermen, the contributors expose current standards of deviance and criminality as reflections of the ideology of the powerful.

Constructing the basic criterion of deviance on a measure of social injury, the essayists still leave the meaning of the concept a puzzle. If one takes seriously the contemporary argument that man has no essential or given nature, then there may be no respectable way for one to judge the goodness of the new conditions, or to know that the claims of progress are genuinely more humane. In the absence of a principle of humanity, it is hard to determine which kinds of criminality are justifiable and which are not, because they are injurious to a person's humanity. It is difficult to know if current practices should be called deviant because they are socially injurious or socially injurious because they are deviant. One is forced to retreat to political or conventional claims about justice and injustice or criminality. Such claims and their limitations are to be found in the opening of Plato's *Republic*. If criminality is only a set of conventions, then any empirically based theory of deviance will only reflect some set of customary practices or political values.

The essays were initially papers read at an annual National Deviancy Conference, over a period of six years, beginning in 1968. The Conference was a forum for those social scientists committed to raising the political consciousness of students of deviance. The language of the essays is designed to appeal to both the reason and emotions of the reader. One technique used by some essayists is ridicule, accompanied by minor exaggerations and simplifications. My understanding of ridicule is that its effectiveness depends upon being able to touch those weaknesses in an opponent about which he is likely to feel sensitive, and when combined with some form of exaggeration, its effectiveness depends on its ability to shock one's opponents into moderating their objectionable practices. This advice is found in treatises on rhetoric and can be found in operation in the work of even such a sober political thinker as Machiavelli. Disappointingly, the ridicule and exaggeration in the Taylor collection are more viscous and lacking in grace. Even a reader sympathetic to the writer's position is not likely to find the efforts succeeding in their aims. For example, it seems to me to be heavy handed for writers on deviance to defend their own theoretical and empirical efforts by calling current research by others not sharing an ideological bent, deviant and inherently spurious. Two other minor difficulties are worthy of note. On occasion an author will admit the unavailability of adequate hard data to support the argument of the essay. Moreover, there does not appear to be a consistent use of the term "ideology" among the various papers.

There may be no way to delineate clear criteria for deviance that would soften the vicious character of labeling people as naturally different. One might even be drawn to conclude that all discussion of deviance in a contemporary context is, in theoretical terms, indistinguishable from silence, and that the subject of deviance is ineffable and thus a matter about which there can be no legitimate theory. One may counter such exaggeration in considering vigorously the arguments presented in this volume edited by the Taylors. The essays present a concerted effort at understanding a most complex subject, and, as such, constitute a testament to the concerns of contemporary social scientists for an escape from ideology, in its original sense. By reminding us all how the character of present political systems are revealed in the ways they demarcate the bounds of normalcy, this book reveals its most significant virtue—it leads the theoretically-minded reader to consider more completely such questions as: Is it true that all political societies rest on a foundation of perpetual crime? Is there some similarity between changes in definitions of deviance and the process of middle-classification? Is age, both in

individuals and polities, a significant independent variable in explaining the way deviance is defined? And what are the necessary elements for a philosophically justifiable theory of deviance?

MARTIN PLAX
Cleveland Heights, Ohio

Campaign Finance in America. By David W. Adamany. (North Scituate, Mass.: Duxbury Press, 1972. Pp. 274. $4.50, paper.)

Professor David Adamany has provided us with another carefully researched and highly informative study of campaign finance. Although the book's title (*Campaign Finance in America*) claims too much, for this is primarily a study of political finance in Connecticut, the book is more than a narrow monograph on a single state. Adamany is an experienced and knowledgeable student of campaign finance, and this book represents an extension and enlargement of his earlier work in the field, especially his excellent study of Wisconsin. Moreover, the author's empirical interest is guided by both a theoretical and comparative perspective that places his discrete findings in the widest possible context.

The book is divided into eight chapters: an introductory theoretical chapter; four descriptive chapters analyzing campaign costs, the allocation of campaign monies, and the sources of campaign funds; three chapters exploring regulatory problems and public policy issues. The study begins with a theoretical overview of the role of money in the political process. Borrowing from Dahl's resource theory, and supplementing it with concepts from exchange and incentive theories, Adamany views money as an important political resource which politicians use to influence the specific choices or strategies of others. Because it is so easily converted into other resources and transferable from place to place, it is one of the most useful ingredients of political combat. Yet, as he correctly notes, money is only one of many political resources, and there is little evidence to support the commonly held view that money is the basic determinant of electoral victory. Money's effectiveness depends on how wisely politicians exchange it for other resources or use it as an incentive for political action.

The core of the book consists of an intensive analysis of campaign finance in Connecticut based on empirical information gleaned from campaign finance reports for the years 1966 and 1968. Every effort is made to broaden the findings by placing them in a comparative context. Meticulously the author explores the overall costs of campaigns in Connecticut, and while he finds that these costs have risen sharply (from 20 to 40 per cent annually), he argues that it depends on one's perspective whether they are to be judged too high. If these costs are evaluated in terms of the total wealth of our society, then they seem to be a small price to pay for democratic selection of our leaders. Indeed, it might be argued that our elections are underfinanced. But if these costs are viewed from the perspective of the politicians who must raise the money from private sources, these costs might be considered as exorbitant. This latter view has obviously led to recent legislation on how much candidates can spend.

After demonstrating the sharp increase in campaign expenditures, the author undertakes an examination of some factors which might explain these rising costs. In a simple and direct way he explores the relationship of the following factors to spending: constituency size, campaign technology, price level, political organizations, and electoral competition. He concludes that "a review of the elements determining the level of political expenditures suggests that most are related to changes in the social or economic structure of the society, to political circumstances beyond the control of individual politicians, and to changes in technology" (p. 77). Unfortunately, most of this analysis is purely descriptive, merely demonstrating that there is an association between these variables and spending. It does not "explain" the variance in spending in any statistical sense. With variables that can be operationalized, it might be more useful to develop a statistical regression model and actually find out how much of the cost of politics can be explained in these terms.

How politicians allocate money among the various items of expenditure and why they choose these spending strategies are little understood. The relative effectiveness of mailers, newspaper ads, and television, is widely disputed among politicians. It has been said, facetiously, that although half the money spent on campaign activities is wasted, no one knows which half. Adamany shows that situational factors such as size of district, density of population, congruence of media areas with political boundaries, incumbency, and electoral strength introduce considerable regularity in the political expenditure patterns of candidates.

Adamany's discussion of the policy issues raised by the American system of political finance should be required reading for every reformer interested in improving the present

situation. In the last two years since the completion of this book, the federal government and forty or so of the states have adopted new campaign finance regulations. While on the whole the old laws were mostly ineffective, many of these recent statutes are based on the false assumption that money buys elections or that it is the root of all evil in politics. As Adamany correctly points out, any controls over campaign finance should be designed to sustain, not restrict, legitimate campaign activities and to expand, not limit, political competition.

JOHN R. OWENS
University of California, Davis

The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House. By James David Barber. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1972. Pp. 479. $5.95, paper.)

It is very much to the credit of James David Barber that in his *The Presidential Character* he tries to break new ground by shifting the focus of discussion in political science from institutional or role analysis to the interaction of "character, world view, style, power situation, and climate of expectations" in determining presidential performance. Since terms such as "character" do not admit of universal definitions, and since, further, Barber attaches special and sometimes shifting meanings to certain words and concepts, the reader cannot always evaluate for himself the predictive interaction of the key variables, or assess their individual weights, in specific cases. But overall, "character is the way the President orients himself toward life—not for the moment, but enduringly" (p. 8). "World view," on the other hand, refers to a president's "primary, politically relevant beliefs, particularly his conceptions of social causality, human nature, and the central moral conflicts of the time" (pp. 7-8). "Style," by no means the same as "stylishness, charisma, or appearance . . . is how the President goes about doing what the office requires him to do. . ." (p. 7).

The interactions of character, worldview, and style with the "power situation" and "climate of expectations" determine and are even predictive of presidential behavior. They also make possible comparisons between presidents organized in terms of what Barber calls "baselines" of "activity-passivity" and "positive-negative affect." If I understand Barber correctly, he has in mind here not so much a fourfold table with each box scored simply plus or minus, but a scale, the values of which display a considerable range of possibilities. Between the extremes of activity and passivity, Barber notes, "Presidents array themselves on the high or low side of the activity line" (p. 11). The other "baseline" of "positive-negative affect" refers to "how [the President] feels about what he does. Relatively speaking, does he seem to experience his political life as happy or sad, enjoyable or discouraging, positive or negative in its main effect" (p. 11).

Applying these "baselines" to the presidents, Barber includes among the "active-positives" Franklin D. Roosevelt, Truman, and Kennedy. Wilson, Hoover, and Johnson, the "active-negative" presidents, revealed in their performance a "contradiction . . . between relatively intense effort and relatively low emotional reward for that effort" (p. 12). The "active-negative" president is "ambitious, striving upward, power-seeking. His stance toward the environment is aggressive and he has a persistent problem in managing his aggressive feelings. His self-image is vague and discontinuous" (pp. 12–13). Barber regards Taft and Harding, the "passive-positive" presidents, as "receptive, compliant, other-directed . . . whose life is a search for affection as a reward for being agreeable and cooperative rather than personally assertive" (p. 13). Finally, the "passive-negative" presidents, Coolidge and Eisenhower (the latter so classified with certain reservations), are those "who do little in politics and enjoy it less. . ." (p. 13).

It should be interesting for the reader of this review to pause now and ask himself two questions: (1) Where did Barber, whose book apparently was written in late 1971, place Nixon on his performance scale?; and (2) Where would the reader himself, applying Barber's "baselines," place Nixon *now*, that is, from the vantage point of 1976? Barber in 1971 viewed Nixon as an "active-negative" president—although, as was the case with Eisenhower, not without qualifications—and almost five years later, I, at least, if I confined myself to Barber's typologies would not challenge that designation. Indeed, it is all the more remarkable that *The Presidential Character*, which is not free of major weaknesses, was extremely accurate in predicting Nixon's performance in the remaining years of his White House tenure. Certainly, one can argue with this or that interpretation of a president's behavior in office, but with the exception of Gary Wills, no one before Watergate came as close as Barber to penetrating Nixon's character armor and delineating the inner dynamics of his *modus operandi*. Barber's comprehension of the essential Nixon necessarily re-

lates to his concept of the "active-negative" president, but the "fit" of concept and man is so close as to suggest that the concept could almost have been developed with Nixon in mind, and indeed almost a quarter of the book is devoted to Nixon.

Consider, for example, Barber's description of the "active-negative" character as "an accumulative personality, one which tends to experience compromise as an erosion of the ego. . . . The process takes time: the frustrations of power pile up slowly but steadily, until the temptation to reassert one's integrity and manhood by some adamant stand becomes irresistible" (p. 418). Or:

> With his remarkable flexibility regarding issues and ideologies, Nixon can be 'defeated' any number of times on specific questions of policy without feeling personally threatened. His investment is not in values, not in standing fast for some principle—although, if he were to stand fast, his doing so would certainly be rationalized in terms of principle. His investment is in himself, and Nixon's self is taken up with its management (p. 442).

Or even more:

> "Threats to his independence in particular—the sense that he is being controlled from without because he cannot be trusted, because he is weak or stupid or unstable—will call forth a strong inner response. . . . Only when a crisis gathers around him, one he cannot escape by moving on to some alternative crisis, and he experiences a sense of entrapment is he likely to move toward the classic form of rigidification" (p. 442).

Certainly this 1971–72 assessment of Nixon is impressive, even taking into account the fact that Barber did not foresee, any more than any one else foresaw, the rigidifications of Watergate, the diversion of campaign funds to personal expenditure, and the income tax returns. And if Barber in the end turned his back, so to speak, on his own analysis in writing that Nixon after re-election in 1972 would have before him presidential "models of heroes" in pursuing virtue rather than power, thereby implying that Nixon might yet become a great president, so did many another political scientist foreswear Nixon's unsavory political history in supporting him against McGovern. While there were features of Nixon's involvement in Watergate that were unprecedented even for him, the lying and cheating, the evasiveness, the sordid money-grubbing, and the attempt to manipulate public sentiments and emotions were hardly new.

Perhaps the principle merit of *The Presidential Character* is that it emphasizes the importance of character structure in political behavior, whether or not it develops typologies that are useful in understanding and predicting presidential performance. As Barber himself notes, the typologies require a good deal of further refinement, but since the presidency exists in an increasingly uncertain and chaotic world, it is far from clear how far they can or will be refined in the direction of accurate prediction. Unfortunately, such refinement, quite apart from the world situation, is not promoted by Barber's use of language that is exceedingly loose and imprecise where it is not downright folksy or whimsical. A question that asks whether a president experiences political life as "happy or sad, enjoyable or discouraging" is poorly phrased. One suspects that Barber took pains not to write his book in the language of pedantic academese, but he was not careful enough on the other side to avoid a breezy conversational and occasionally overdramatic form of expression. Terminological precision, we all need to remind ourselves, is the enemy of neither creative thinking nor felicitous writing.

But even had Barber fully satisfied the requirements of methodological rigor and clarity of expression, he would have failed to capture the complexities of character that surfaced during the presidency of Nixon, most of which were unpredicted and remain unexplained. For it is the training of the clinic, not of the academy, that provides at least some understanding of Nixon's behavior, and insofar as the Nixon presidency serves as an introduction to future presidencies, the newer as well as the traditional approaches to that institution cease to be relevant. It is not that Nixon was a liar and a bungler, or that he swore more than his predecessors; other presidents have lied and bungled, and Johnson probably used as many four-letter words off-the-record. Nixon may have been the first White House incumbent who endeavored to become rich by corruptly exploiting his position, but what makes the Nixon presidency truly unique is the climate of paranoia that permeated the White House and clouded the thinking of Nixon and his closest associates. It was a climate that generated the worst suspicions of opponents and critics, and produced opinions that were guarded even in their estimates of friends. It was also a climate that did not hesitate to bend the Constitution, laws, and customs of the land to Nixon's own use, which use included the systematic abuse, on a scale still not fully known, of the powers and prerogatives of his office. Finally, it was an angry climate of vin-

lictiveness and the relentless pursuit of those stigmatized as the enemy, a climate that treated politics as a war in which there are no atrocities, no victims, no regrets—only winners and losers.

For these reasons alone, it seems both incorrect and unfair to place Nixon in the "active-negative" company of Wilson, Hoover, and Johnson, although there is a sense, *not* Barber's sense, in which Nixon was both active and negative. "The loss of the leader in some sense or other," Freud wrote in 1922 (Sigmund Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* [New York: Liverright, 1949; first published 1922], p. 49), "the birth of misgivings about him, brings on the outbreak of panic . . . mutual ties between the members of the group disappear, as a rule, at the same time as the tie with their leader. The group vanishes in the dust. . . ." That the United States has been moving in this direction for some time, partly as the result of successive crises of the presidency, and that the Nixon debacle vastly accelerated the move, seem all too apparent.

ARNOLD A. ROGOW
The City University of New York

Military Manpower Procurement: A Policy Analysis. By Steven B. Canby. (Lexington, Mass.: Heath-Lexington Books, 1972. Pp. 320. $12.50.)

Faculty seminars of the Harvard Institute of Politics have produced some genuine contributions to our discipline. Now a 1967 seminar on Selective Service has led to this thorough and excellent policy study.

Readers, however, should be forewarned. This is a reference book for researchers and serious students of the subject. The book has all the grinding efficiency and functionality of a Rand study (parts of it were) or a tech manual for an M-60 tank.

Students from many disciplines who dabble in policy analysis will want to examine this book even if they do not read it from cover to cover. For it is an example of first-rate policy analysis which makes it painfully clear why such analysis is more talked about than done. It requires data, analytical skills, an unflagging thoroughness and a "white paper pragmatism" few of us possess. Nor are publishers battering down professional doors to publish books like this. (Heath-Lexington deserves credit.)

The essence of the book is simple; the analysis exhaustingly complex. Chapter I sets forth 17 criteria for assessing the relative merit of alternative military manpower procurement systems. Chapter II, which Professor Canby rightly feels is the heart of the book, discusses the criteria in detail and uses them to assess six alternative procurement systems: selective service; voluntarism; lottery; universal service; sequential service; and mixed systems.

The basic framework that underlies Canby's analysis and the 17 criteria for assessment is drawn from Samuel Huntington. It posits that viable military policies must rest upon an equilibrium of contending national security needs and domestic demands. The resulting dynamic tension is often expressed by juxtaposed concepts like "nation in arms" and "maintaining a strong, scientific and economic mobilization base"; or by "equal treatment" vs. "differential treatment based on state needs."

It was the loss of just such an equilibrium which led to the effective demise of the Selective Service and to analyses by Canby and others.

The criteria for analysis and evaluation of procurement alternatives are comprehensive, examining virtually every facet or aspect of military manpower procurement. The footnotes and relevant bibliography will be particularly useful to students.

The conclusion Canby draws is that some methods of procurement meet certain criteria better than others. Which criteria should be met and therefore which procurement system is appropriate depends on the circumstances: total mobilization; limited war; or peacetime deterrence. Logically then the ideal system would be a gear shift or sequential system that permitted moving from one to another to match conditions.

Unfortunately, Chapter 2, which is so central to the book, is unnecessarily "heavy going" in spots. For example, "The draft subsidy (or externality) places society at point 1 on the lowest shown Scitovsky community indifference curve. If all the inefficiencies and externalities could be removed, society could reach the social optimum of mutual tangency at point 5 on the highest attainable Scitovsky curve" (p. 15). It may be a little unfair to cite the quote without the chart, but not very.

I was puzzled by the bases for some assertions or conclusions. For example Canby asserts that "The five most important criteria are manpower demands, industrial production, budget cost, ex-ante equity, ex-post equity" (p. 62). These might indeed be the most important but it depends on whom you asked. How the author reached that conclusion is not clear. He makes no claim that his preceding analysis led him to it.

There are some small publishing flaws that are particularly annoying to someone using the book for reference purposes. The type face used on subheadings is inconsistent, as is the numbering of appendices.

The other chapters in the book are really ancillary to the first two. Part two (chaps. 4-7) are, as the author says, "highly specialized" (p. xix). Each is important and useful but less so to casual readers than to students of some special aspect.

Chapter 3 explores the claims and counterclaims for exemptions and shows that deferments, in anything but a total mobilization like World War II, create more costs and problems than they solve. Chapter 4 is a short but esoteric discussion of factors to be considered in "costing out" military manpower. Chapter 5 is an in-depth treatment of the existing military pay system, its budegtary costs, and the costing of a volunteer military. The constant influx of cheap draft-induced labor, efforts to raise professional pay over the years, and poorly perceived income-in-kind to professionals led to a badly skewed military pay system. No one, not even the careerists and retirees whom the system relatively favored have been satisfied. The author insists that this picture can be reversed and better aligned with civilian practices at lower costs than most economists and the Department of Defense have estimated.

Chapter 6 considers the budget cost of a volunteer military. The author claims that his estimates ($2.1 to $2.5 billion) are much lower because of a methodology that considers long-run cost implications. Chapter 7 is a short one reviewing the faulty assumptions and the air of unreality in which decision makers in military manpower have operated since World War II. It re-emphasizes the book's dedication to re-establishing a lost equilibrium between military and structure and domestic goals.

Canby himself may have provided the best characterization of his work in an off-hand and ingenuous remark on the Harvard faculty seminar! "In recent years several groups and authors have come forth with menus of domestic goals related to military manpower procurement. The most famous has been the Marshall Commission; the most comprehensive, the Harvard faculty seminar on selective service." The same can be said of Canby's book. It is certainly the most comprehensive work on the subject to date.

GARY L. WAMSLEY

University of Kansas

For Peace and Justice: Pacifism in America, 1914–1941. By Charles Chatfield. (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1971 Pp. 447, $11.95.)

For many years accounts of interwar pacifism have been one-sided and polemical. According to analyses offered during the Cold War period, such doctrines as universal disarmament and mandatory neutrality merely proved that pacifists were intellectually incapable of confronting the facts of international life after 1918. Even treatments of American churches rejoice in the triumph of "political realism" and the consequent waning of a "utopian" anti-war stance. It was the philosophy of Reinhold Niebuhr, not that of A. J. Muste, that was celebrated by both "action-intellectuals" and historians.

Only as a result of the Vietnam trauma have historians taken a more dispassionate look. Now, for the first time, scholars are beginning to look carefully at how pacifists themselves perceived the events of the 1920s and 1930s. The author is eminently qualified to make this reexamination. He has written several seminal articles, serves as an editor of the Garland Library of War and Peace, and recently was president of the Conference on Peace Research in History. Now, in his first book, he offers an unmatched account of the interwar peace crusade.

Chatfield begins by showing how World War I transformed a broadly based peace movement, radicalizing the pacifist wing and making it far more alert to issues of civil liberties, imperialism, commercial competition, and war profits. Forced to challenge the Progressive doctrine of inevitable progress, pacifists—as early as 1918—started to ask whether some forms of conflict might be necessary for reform. In some cases, they saw war resistance itself as a means of social change.

In his second part, the author traces the history of the new activist peace organizations (such as the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, the Fellowship of Reconciliation, and the National Council for the Prevention of War) emerging from the Great War. Chatfield shows the interlocking directorate of these peace societies, as well as prominent pacifist activity in fostering trade unionism, the rights of blacks, civil liberties, and democratic socialism.

Chatfield then turns to the ideology of pacifism, revealing how quickly such war opponents adopted "revisionist" and "devil theory" interpretations of World War I. During the interwar period, pacifists continually sought

total disarmament, debated class war, wrestled with Gandhian doctrines of nonviolence, and affirmed that military struggle resulted from unequal distribution of world markets and resources.

In the last part, the author indicates how pacifists worked with isolationist Congressmen in fostering the Neutrality Acts and the Ludlow Amendment. Only in 1939, with the advent of World War II, did pacifists abandon broad coalitions and concentrate upon reenforcing their own constituencies. Henceforth, and during the Second World War, pacifism was forced to look inward.

Skillfully combining intellectual and institutional history, *For Peace and Justice* may well go down as a classic. The portraits of peace leaders are deftly drawn, and political and ideological trends are handled with skill. Although Chatfield writes with appreciation of the pacifist movement, he always preserves his detachment and treats Niebuhr as appreciatively as Muste and peace lobbyist Frederick J. Libby. Seldom have the manuscripts at the Swarthmore College Peace Collection, oral history projects, and unpublished dissertations been used to such advantage. The extensive bibliographical essay is definitive.

The book does contain some flaws. Occasional spelling mistakes are irritating, factual errors even more so. On p. 321, for example, there are three misstatements concerning the founding of the America First Committee. (In all fairness, it should be noted that the paperback edition, published by Beacon in 1973, corrects many of these mistakes). The organization is not always clear, often jumping from event to ideology without sufficient transition. Chatfield usually refrains from appraising varied pacifist positions, although he is one of the historians best qualified to comment and evaluate them.

In sum, however, *For Peace and Justice* will be consulted frequently—and deservedly—for years to come.

JUSTUS D. DOENECKE
New College, University of South Florida

Discrimination, Personality, and Achievement: A Survey of Northern Blacks. By Robert L. Crain and Carol Sachs Weisman. (New York: Seminar Press, 1972. Pp. xiv, 224. $9.95.)

Comparative Studies of Blacks and Whites in the United States. Edited by Kent S. Miller and Ralph Mason Dreger. (New York: Seminar Press, 1973. Pp. xiv, 572. $18.50.)

Both of these volumes constitute contributions to the understanding of American race relations. And both are overpriced productions of the same publisher in the series of "Quantitative Studies in Social Relations" edited by Peter Rossi.

Beyond these similarities, however, these two books could not be more different. The first by Crain and Weisman is a free-wheeling, imaginative analysis of survey data in the empirical sociological tradition. The second is a restrained review of comparative black-white research of the late 1960s in the stodgy tradition of the *Psychological Bulletin.*

Discrimination, Personality, and Achievement reports an extensive analysis of a 1966 survey of black Americans conducted by the National Opinion Research Center for the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. The Commission was interested in determining the effects of attending desegregated versus segregated schools. Hence, N.O.R.C. sampled 1,651 black men and women, aged 21 to 45, residing in 25 northern metropolitan areas. Middle-class black districts in the smaller metropolitan areas were oversampled so as to insure a sufficient number of alumni of interracial schools. The interview contained almost 500 questions and required an average of two hours. Many of the questions were utilized in another N.O.R.C. national survey that contained 1,326 white respondents; these data provide comparisons with those from the black respondents.

Crain and Weisman organize their analysis around the testing of a central theorem derived from both Abram Kardiner and Martin Luther King, Jr.: *Discrimination leads to psychological disability, which in turn prevents achievement.* Ideologically popular in the 1950s and early 1960s, and out of favor now, this theorem is relentlessly pursued in a lively, if sometimes exasperating, manner.

In general, the Kardiner-King theorem is supported by these cross-sectional and retrospective data; but the multivariate complexity of the issue also becomes clear. Consider several of the far-from-obvious findings: For the southern-born, what their parents told them about race appears to be more important for later achievement than whether they grew up in a broken home. For the northern-born, whether they attended interracial elementary schools appears to be more important (for achievement) than whether they grew up in a so-called "culturally deprived" home.

The original focus of the study on the effects of interracial schools also illustrates the complexity of this domain. The principal results are that interracial education is related to a

greater sense of security combined with some inhibition of aggression. These personality differences seem to explain why the black products of desegregated schools are much better educated, earn somewhat more money, and report being "happier." But the consistency of the racial experience in schools is also important. Elementary school desegregation does not relate to personality differences for those first raised in the South. And those associations with desegregated education that relate to interaction with whites (such as job information) are strongest at the high-school level.

The wide-ranging analysis touches on many thorny issues that have been subjected to considerable speculation. Coming from a broken home, for example, is related to lowered income for men and less educational attainment for women. Men from one-parent homes are more violently aggressive, feel less "happy," and possess less "internal control." These factors in turn relate to the respondent's own marital history. But Crain and Weisman also demonstrate that "homes broken by death are at least as damaging as those broken by separation" (p. 121).

Region of birth is another interesting variable. Black southern migrants possess lower self-esteem. But blacks born in northern ghettos seem to react to segregation by externalizing rather than internalizing their feelings and go "about in an unhappy rage" (p. xi). These personality distinctions then relate to achievement differences. And southern migrant men earn more money despite receiving less formal education.

Crain and Weisman close with an essay on the policy implications of their findings. They argue that housing desegregation has brighter prospects for being attained than school desegregation does. They even go so far as to call housing segregation "a house of cards," which, if it begins to collapse, "will fall of its own weight" (p. 187). Consequently, the authors recommend initiating desegregation efforts with new, expensive housing in the outer suburbs, followed by desegregating areas progressively closer in from these suburbs until the black housing need is met. Low-income white and black housing should be desegregated last.

This volume, then, provides some fascinating data, penetrating analyses, and thoughtful ideas. Its chief strength lies in its willingness to tackle explosive issues and reach currently unfashionable conclusions. "The new militancy," for example, is described as not "a prescription for change" but "merely a conservative defense of the attitudinal status quo . . ." (p. 152).

The book, however, could have benefited from considerable editing. The writing is often too casual to be persuasive. And those who insist on precision will be constantly annoyed by the many loose attributions of cause and the general neglect of the relevant race-relations literature. These same criticisms could be leveled against Crain's 1969 volume on *The Politics of School Desegregation*. Yet Crain conducts the studies and writes the books that the field needs. The irritating weaknesses of his style should not detract from the fact that these works are important contributions.

While Crain breaks new ground, Miller and Dreger have made careers of organizing comparative racial research from a psychological perspective. In 1960, they published a 42-page review of the field in the *Psychological Bulletin*. In 1968, they wrote a whole monograph supplement of the *Bulletin* that updated their review through 1965. Now this tome, published in 1973, covers the comparative literature from 1966 into 1970. As the field has rapidly expanded, the reviews have become increasingly lengthy, and this one has chapters by 19 authors.

The coverage is guided by a psychological view of what is important. While there are separate chapters on racial experimenter effects, language abilities, intellectual functioning, temperment, self-concept, social perceptions, and mental health, race and political behavior is relegated to one 25-page chapter. Among the 19 writers, 12 are in southern institutions, 11 are psychologists and psychiatrists, and only one is a political scientist.

The chapters are uneven and overlap considerably in places, as is typical of such contributed works. (Only one of the chapters, a behavior-genetic analysis by Jerry Hirsch, is a reprint.) Two of the nonpsychological chapters offer unusually effective and succinct summaries—Robert Malina's on biological substrata and Leonard Savitz's on black crime. Surprisingly, a number of seminal works from the 1966–1970 period go unmentioned in the relevant chapters (e.g., the 1967 U.S. Commission on Civil Rights Report, *Racial Isolation in the Public Schools*, in the chapter on the effects of desegregation).

There is little attempt to draw the diverse chapters together, and there are no summary or policy implications chapters. One interesting theme emerges, though, and divides the writers: Is there a separate black American culture with its own codes and speech? Joan

Baratz enthusiastically argues, "Yes," in writing on language; Jacquelyne Jackson answers, "No," in writing on family organization. Both could be correct if the ideological implications underlying the issue were defused.

The political chapter by James Clark reviews black political socialization and conventional political behavior. Clark also summarizes the research on unconventional political behavior, especially riot participation and its correlates. He then looks at racial reactions to violence, confidence in government, and black militancy. From his review, Clark derives a four-cell table of black orientations based on political efficacy and trust in the political system.

Comparative Studies of Blacks and Whites in the United States provides, then, an extensive overview of race research of the late 1960s. While it often reads like the *Encyclopedia Britannica,* the volume represents a useful initial place to check on the racial research literature.

THOMAS F. PETTIGREW
Harvard University

Biracial Politics: Conflict and Coalition in the Metropolitan South. By Chandler Davidson. (Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State University Press, 1972. Pp. 301. $11.95.)

This volume is a valuable, but disappointing, addition to a growing literature on black politics in the South. Davidson provides an excellent case study of racial politics in Houston in the 1960s. The disappointment arises from the less than convincing treatment given broad questions about the adequacy of the political process in providing socioeconomic justice for blacks and what strategy will best promote realization of this justice.

Houston is the largest, most rapidly growing city in the South and the same adjectives apply to Houston's black community. Since World War II the black population in Harris County, which includes Houston, has increased from 100,000 to nearly 450,000. During this period, the local black population has moved from virtual political impotency to playing a pivotal role in local politics.

The strength of Professor Davidson's study is his careful analysis of the social, organizational and electoral environment of Houston blacks in the midst of this transition. For example, the depressing impact on effective black participation of electoral contrivances like poll taxes, annual registration which closed for the year in January, at-large elections with a place system, and the unit rule in political party meetings are detailed. Davidson stresses the disparities in income, education, housing, and occupations that persisted in Houston after blacks entered the local political process. He concludes, "There does not seem to be any clearcut connection between the political pressures exerted by Negro interest groups, Negro politicians, and the Negro electorate on the one hand, and progress in obtaining benefits on the other" (p. 138). Even if blacks expand their gains at the ballot box, Professor Davidson questions whether this alone will make much difference in realizing a "just society" in which Negroes receive a "just share" of social and economic rewards. That realization, the author contends, will come only when blacks are able to exercise influence over the economic structure that distributes such unequal rewards to the racial populations.

Given this pessimistic assessment of existing black electoral prospects, how is racial justice to be secured? Davidson dismisses the alternatives of violent revolution and black separatism, urging instead the creation of "a biracial coalition . . . with economic goals radical enough to mobilize large sectors of the less affluent of both races" (p. 220). The author considers and rejects criticisms of this coalitional strategy, arguing that the class interests of blacks and have-not whites provide a suitable base to build a new political majority. Evidence supporting the plausibility of this progressive coalition is gleaned from a study of 20 Houston elections during the 1960s wherein it appears that low-income whites were more likely to vote for black-supported candidates than were middle- or upper-income whites. Some data from New Orleans and Atlanta were also included, but the tendency of low-income whites to back the same candidates as did blacks was less pronounced. Davidson attributes this difference to the noneconomic focus of elections in these cities as opposed to Houston. That being the case, he says the lesson for southern progressives is to define political issues in economic rather than social status terms so that "the ordinary southern white voter is effectively cross-pressured by appeals to his economic needs" (p. 219).

There are several problems with this argument about the ineffectiveness of current black electoral action and the likelihood that a new progressive coalition could remedy this situation. In the first place, Davidson's case study focuses on a narrow time slice—basically the mid 1960s—in the middle of a transitional era in Houston politics. The consequences of this narrow focus become evident when one notes

that almost all the electoral devices that Davidson describes as being used to reduce black political strength are no longer operative. In Houston and most other southern cities, it is much easier today for potential black electoral strength to be converted into effective political power than was the case in the 1960s. In Houston, New Orleans, and Atlanta, where blacks have been instrumental in electing mayors, this new political clout is reflected in substantive rewards like jobs at city hall. Urban blacks in the South have not yet gained a proportionate share of the rewards distributed through local political processes, but recent achievements have been significant.

The hazards of generalizing from a limited data base are evidenced by an examination of recent Houston elections. In the hard-fought mayoral contests of 1969, 1971 and 1973, for example, the candidates that were overwhelmingly backed by blacks drew their lowest support from low-income whites—a pattern at variance with what Davidson found earlier. Such results, coupled with similar patterns in contests like the Atlanta mayoral election in 1973, suggest to me the great difficulties confronting those seeking to create a stable electoral coalition of blacks and low-income whites.

Davidson might argue that the "real" issues of southern politics are class questions that cut across racial lines, but there is little empirical evidence that low-income whites in southern cities perceive issues in this fashion. Their perception of reality is more often one of conflict with blacks over housing and educational or job opportunities for they think it is their homes, their schools, their jobs that are threatened by the growing urban black populations. Without question, some interests shared by blacks and low-income whites lead them to support the same candidates on occasion (as in national contests where broad economic issues like employment policies are salient), but there remain persistent conflicts between low-income whites and blacks that continue to be reflected in other electoral contests. Current attempts to build permanent electoral coalitions in the South will almost certainly flounder on these conflicts.

In summary, Davidson has produced a first-rate case study of racial politics in Houston. In my opinion, however, he has understated the results and the meaning of black electoral participation and exaggerated the prospects for a stable, class based, coalition capable of substantially redistributing socioeconomic resources through the political process.

RICHARD MURRAY
University of Houston

Behind the Trail of Broken Treaties. By Vine Deloria, Jr. (New York: Delta, 1974. Pp xv, 263. $2.95.)

The States and Their Indian Citizens. By Theodore W. Taylor. (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, 1972. Pp. xxi, 307. $2.25.)

"Sometimes Indians are 'the hardest goddamned people on earth to help.' " (Taylor, p. 127.)

There is a crisis in Indian affairs, going far deeper than such recent "media events" as the "Trail of Broken Treaties" caravan to Washington, D.C. in 1972 and the confrontation at Wounded Knee in 1973. Deloria contends that this crisis is the inevitable result of flaws in American democratic theory and practice which deny to tribal peoples the political and cultural autonomy that treaty law supposedly guarantees to them. Collective, tribal interests are suppressed in favor of a concept of arbitrary, individual interest. Indians are thus forced to create a forum in which the tribe qua tribe can compel the attention of the American political system.

Deloria, a lawyer, argues that this need not be the case. Indian tribes are, or should be under treaty law, semi-autonomous and self-determining communities. Indian political rights as "nations" (tribes), he argues, were never extinguished through the treaty process, in spite of the fact that treaties often required signatory tribes to acknowledge the political sovereignty of the United States (p. 129). Federal court decisions emphasize that such stipulations " 'in no way divested the plaintiff tribe of its sovereign power to enter into treaties with the United States on equal terms. . . .' " (p. 138). This is the basis for "contract sovereignty" as guaranteed, defined, and delineated in treaty law. For Deloria it is the basis for a new federal relationship with the tribes.

The usual claim of "pragmatists" in Indian policy today is that it is too late to redress the grievances of the past. Indians are too few, too politically and economically impotent, too little endowed with the capacity for self-improvement. Deloria chooses to counter these arguments with a comparative study of the political, economic, and educational profiles of various independent and semi-independent states recognized internationally. The Navajo reservation is larger than a number of United Nations member states, including Denmark, Switzerland, Belgium, Israel, Lebanon, etc. And, although Indian population figures are small, particularly on a tribe-by-tribe basis, they still

compare with those of the smaller UN members, such as Qatar, the Maldives, Tonga, etc. pp. 166, 170).

The argument, of course, is that "contract sovereignty" is akin to "protectorate" status, which has "a long history of acceptance in international diplomatic practice, even though at times the states in question have had difficulty maintaining their independence" (p. 168). Such recognition would "clarify the status of Indian tribes and eliminate the inconsistencies that are presently found in the federal relationship with Indians" (p. 159). Deloria ends the book by outlining steps to accomplish this reworking of the federal principle, based on negotiation between the tribes and the federal government.

"The idealism in this idea," Deloria acknowledges, "is obvious" (Deloria, p. 260). So perhaps are some of the flaws. Legal arguments about Indian sovereignty are controversial; the international parallels shakey. The mysteries of independence and dependence often seem to defy rational analysis. Most serious is the absence of a thorough-going discussion of the dynamics of an American politics which would permit so drastic a re-structuring of political reality on behalf of Indians. Deloria raises far more questions than he answers. But they are provocative questions, reaching beyond the Indian case.

It is, of course, possible to deal with the Indian issue in a narrow sense, stressing unique legal and historical status in comparison with other minorities and political interests in the US. By drawing example and inspiration from a wider arena, however, Deloria draws attention to a universal problem of community rights. Particularly in democratic societies, the issue lies in the tension between the institutionalization of individual rights and the persistence of a demand for community rights. Two responses are possible here: first, to foreclose the issue by insisting on the inevitability of the disintegration of community interests in favor of individual ones; or, secondly, to broaden the issue by raising anew the classic questions of democratic theory about the roles of individuals and groups in democratic society. Taylor, to whom we now turn, chooses the former strategy.

The States and Their Indian Citizens is a response to the concept of the "new federalism," with its stress on the de-centralization of Federal authority to the States. This is a very different kind of "federalism" from that which Deloria proposes, and its consequences are dramatic for the Indian population, for whom federal ties symbolize their unique legal and historical status. Taylor is neither theoretical nor speculative, and his work does not lend itself to the same type of discussion as Deloria's work. It is, in fact, largely descriptive, giving information on the status and activities of Indian communities on a state-by-state basis. Particularly useful are the questionnaires submitted to 50 state governments and to some 245 chairmen of federally recognized Indian groups, and the compilation of their responses (cf., Taylor, Appendices L and M). The absence of explicit theory, however, only underlines that which is implicit.

Taylor's book suffers from a number of serious problems, not least of which is the author's largely uncritical reflection of the Bureau of Indian Affairs' attitude toward Indian policy, which in turn represents a predisposition in American society to assume the inevitable disappearance of communal interests. It is only in light of this assumption that Taylor can defend the argument that government-sponsored policies of enforced acculturation were ultimately in the best interests of the Indians, and that "permissive acculturation" was simply impossible in the absence of a "conducive environment" (p. 15). This is far too critical an issue to be glossed over so casually. Why and how in "pluralistic" American society did there come to be no alternatives? Why wasn't the environment conducive?

A major shortcoming of this book is its failure to examine the tensions among the states, the federal government, and the various Indian tribes. This is crucial. Indians have traditionally viewed the attempts to extend state jurisdiction into "Indian country" (such as Public Law 280 and House Concurrent Resolution 108) as a threat to their special legal status, and have resisted strongly. To ignore this context is to miss the significance of the whole question of the state role in Indian affairs.

Another problem is the author's unwillingness to take seriously the legal—and perhaps also moral—claims of Indian tribes on American society. While disparaging the claims of "professional" Indians to legal redress (p. 125), he urges them on to pursue individual "self-sufficiency." Are there not, in Taylor's sense, "professional" Southerners, corporate businessmen, labor leaders, etc.? Are their claims invalidated? And why the unquestioned primacy of individualism over collective interests and rights?

Taylor is not unsympathetic to the Indian case, but is rather often insensitive to its legal and theoretical ramifications, especially in the area of individual versus collective rights and the problem of the tyranny of the majority.

This brings up the second possible response to the issues Deloria raises, the theoretical one. Federalism is essentially an administrative concept, referring to relations among governmental units. Rights, on the other hand, are pre-eminently vested in the individual in Anglo-American democratic theory. The Indian tribe falls between these two stools. Under the present system, the recognition of the tribe as a political entity must grow out of one of two statuses: first, as an assimilated, solely governmental unit (cf., the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934); secondly, as the mere aggregate of individual interests of citizens who happen to be Indians (cf., the Indian Bill of Rights of 1968). The tribe-qua-tribe disappears in both these contexts, for it is more than a unidimensional political unit and certainly more than the mere aggregate of individual interests.

The issue here is ultimately the status of the community, the collective rather than aggregated individual interest, in democratic societies where competitive individual interest has been the foundation of policy. The "discovery" of the individual as the basis of all political and social authority was one of the crowning achievements of early modern political theory in Europe. The consequent rejection of absolutist collective authority, whether vested in church or state, was inevitable.

It is important to note two things, however. First, the pre-eminence of communal responsibilities and interests over individual rights does not necessarily lead to tyranny, particularly within a tribal, rather than state political structure. Secondly, the persistence of group loyalties, broadly conceived, undermines the traditional assumption of classical democratic theory that groups acting as expressions of individual interest function only where the direct expression of those interests is curtailed. Clearly re-examination of the role in democratic society, not merely of tribal groups, but of "groups" as a general category, is needed.

In avoiding clear-cut statements about the political status of communities and of groups based on race, religion, ethnicity, class or whatever, democratic theorists have tended to imply that competitive individual self-interest in the economic—and political—marketplace is the only basis for democratic societies. Self-interest is assumed to underlie any and all "group" memberships, its shifting nature precluding permanent groups and alliances in the "open" society. This is clearly a serious underestimation at best of the ways in which community and group membership may channel and direct the expression of individual interest. It also fails to allow for the enforced permanence of racial, ethnic, and religious groups bound together by discrimination, where individuality may not be recognized. More important, however, is the failure to explore the nature of the community, the collective interest group, more thoroughly.

The discussion of the tribe is really an exploration of broader dimensions of the idea of the group. The tribal community is more than a unidimensional religious, political or social status. Rather, it encompasses all of these and more. Not merely a mechanical aggregate of its parts—built of political or religious or social allegiances alone—the tribal community is more than the sum, irreducible. It is, in a way, the arbiter of what the individual can be and thus of what his interests are, rather than vice versa. On this idea of collective interest democratic theory is largely silent.

The issue of possible reconciliation of these two concepts of vested rights, individual and collective, stands as a challenge to contemporary political theory. American policy has, in the Indian case, traditionally chosen to resolve through abolition of the Indian system the ambiguities of the issue. Deloria has suggested that one alternative to this is to look to the international arena for solution to a dilemma which is not unique to this society. Taylor chooses to reflect the argument that the special status and claims of the Indian communities are merely historical anomaly, and that the substitution of state for federal jurisdiction merely confirms the trends assumed in democratic theory.

In these positions both the "Indianist" and the theorist have fuel for argument. The tribal community as a living institution, rather than an anthropological artifact, is little known to political scientists. Exploring various aspects of tribalism may prove very fruitful to social science and to all those concerned with the fate of democratic societies.

FRANCES SVENSSON
University of Michigan

Labyrinths of Democracy: Adaptations, Linkages, Representation, and Policies in Urban Politics. By Heinz Eulau and Kenneth Prewitt. (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs Merrill, 1973. Pp. xxxi, 713. $15.00, cloth; $9.00, paper.)

Labyrinths of Democracy, the master report of a comparative study of eighty-two city councils in the San Francisco Bay region, is a very important book. Yet it is a book whose importance is not likely to be quickly understood.

First of all, it was consciously written as a group-level study. This meant that the authors had to be aware at all times of whether they were aggregating individual properties, whether they were making statements about the integral properties of the groups themselves, or whether they were relating the groups to the still more inclusive contexts in which they were situated. Further, since *Labyrinths* stands almost alone as a group-level analysis, the authors were forced to devise many operational indicators—for example, a stratification index, an index of interaction, a measure of role differentiation, and so on—for the concepts they used. This pioneering effort should lead to other group level studies. Yet it has been more than two decades since Herbert Simon reminded us that "complexity in any body of phenomena has generally led to the construction of specialized theories, each dealing with the phenomena at a particular level," and if we are just beginning systematic theorizing at the group level, one cannot be very optimistic about how rapidly our colleagues will pick up this lead.

Second, this study is very tightly integrated. No review can do more than suggest the richness contained in the 700+ pages, 30 chapters, and some 226 figures and tables, but concepts are linked together in chapters, chapters are linked together in sections, and the sections are linked together in the "adaptations, linkages, representations, and policies" sequence of the subtitle. In the section showing how the group adapts to its environment, for instance, five forms of social relations, opinion leadership, cosponsorship, opposition potential, friendship, and expertise, are related to each other, to stratification, and to the external and internal complexity of the council. In the following chapter, six governing practices, general exchange, limited exchange, bargaining, compromise, coalition formation, and ministration, are similarly analyzed and then related to the forms of social relations. In succeeding chapters, there are equally detailed accounts of social climate, patterns of interaction, and role orientation. All of this leads up to three decision structures, unipolar, bipolar, and nonpolar, which are in turn related to three models called conflict, permissiveness, and fragmentation. The flavor of this tight analysis may be suggested by almost any summary quotation, as this from p. 206:

> The effect of *stratification* (on decision structure) is ambiguous. In the larger cities, high *stratification* makes for *conflict* and *constraint* in the *decisional structure,* while in the small cities it makes for *harmony* and *permissiveness. Social climate* has a more consistent effect. In both large and small cities, an *antagonistic climate* makes for *conflict* and *fragmentation* but favors *constraint.* The *political governing style* is conducive to *fragmentation, conflict,* and *constraint* in the large but not in the small cities. *Politicized interaction* makes for *conflict* and, to a lesser extent, *constraint* in the larger cities but for *fragmentation* and *conflict* in the smaller cities. *Role differentiation* favors *harmony* and *permissiveness* and, to a very limited extent, *integration* in the larger cities but makes for *fragmentation, permissiveness,* and *conflict* in the smaller cities. (Emphasis added.)

Each of the words I have emphasized in this quotation are concepts to which Professors Eulau and Prewitt have given specific denotations and for which they have devised measures. (Moreover, this section is followed by others dealing in turn with council ties to the electorate and interest groups, with the quality of representation, and the resulting public policies.) This is a most impressive analysis, but it is not the type of reading for one's nightstand nor the light phrasing that enlivens conversations.

Finally, *Labyrinths* cuts across the specializations into which political science is divided. Since it presents a view of how community policy is formulated, it could be seen as a contribution to urban politics. Since it is concerned with questions of linkage and representation, it certainly fits into legislative politics. Since it carefully compares processes across governmental units, it has something to say to comparative politics. Since it is an example of how theorizing is an integral part of the research process, it should be consulted by theorists. Yet I suspect that *Labyrinths* will be seen ultimately as illuminating that oldest subject matter, governance. And on this, it is well to close with the authors' words (p. 611): "Even if it were possible to identify all the relevant variables, and even if our tools of inquiry were perfect, democratic governance would [still] prove elusive as a topic of investigation. The more we know and the more reliably we know it, the more complex will democratic governance appear to be."

JOHN H. KESSEL
The Ohio State University

From Contraband to Freedman: Federal Policy Toward Southern Blacks, 1861–1865. By Louis S. Gerteis. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1973. Pp. 255. $11.50.)

One experience unique to black Americans has been a basic change in their place in the

body politic. White Americans rebelled in 1775 to preserve ancient liberties as Englishmen. Red Americans still battle to maintain tribal autonomies. Black Americans ceased to be chattels during the Civil War and since then have been trying to better themselves from a fundamentally changed legal position in the society.

Louis Gerteis, in an important book, examines with discernment the federal government's role in an early stage of that development, the transition from contraband to freedman. In doing so, he calls into question just how basic the change of emancipation was. This process took place under the chaotic conditions of civil war during which: "The decisions made . . . shaped postwar policies toward the freedman and in large measure precluded the possibility of radical social reconstruction in the South" (p. 7).

The northern army proved more zealous than the southern in exerting its power to enforce law and order upon unfamiliar Negroes. (The Confederates, by and large, depended on their women-folk and the slaves, themselves, to maintain stability while concentrating on the unsuccessful fight against Yankee invaders.) Union soldiers herded black refugees into displaced persons' camps where they were forced to work in field gangs growing crops in the camps. Other blacks were required to contract to work for carpetbagger planters in the Mississippi Valley or local planters in the occupied sections of Louisiana. The contracts provided that rations be supplied and wages paid. Often the required wages were omitted, and the army aided the planters by enforcing the work provisions of the contracts. Gerteis contends that the union officers "had no theories about plantation operations which differed from those held by [southern] planters" (p. 94).

Gerteis does not think the stage of transition from contraband to freedman held any promise of basic social change for those who had recently been slaves. They were still held captive in a plantation system. He dismisses the Port Royal experiment on the sea islands, where former slaves became independent farmers, as an irrelevant exception; and he insists that the black communal farming experiment at Davis Bend, Mississippi—despite a profit of $159,200 in 1865—pointed to no useful future because it was so closely controlled by army officers committed to the gang labor methods of the plantations system. Professor Gerteis is a careful scholar, and it cannot be denied that his sober reappraisal of the period corrects some excessively optimistic views held a short time ago by historians eager to see in Reconstruction bright signals for total success in the Civ Rights Movement. Nevertheless, in dismissin some of the more hopeful experiments i building a better life for the freedmen whic carried over into Reconstruction, he does nc see that an experiment can have value despit limited immediate success. Even hopes that ar dashed are important.

Gerteis discounts the usefulness of norther allies and omits local white southerners (scala wags) who accepted the changed place o black southerners. And, by focusing on fed eral policy, he sells the freedmen themselve a bit short. He fails to recognize, for example the dominant reason why army officer Thomas Conway, who had been a defender of the labor camps, became, as a Freedmen's Bureau offi cial, an advocate of the distribution of land to black farmers: It was pressure put on him by black constituents. The Southern freedmen came out of slavery with generations of experience of dealing with the plantation system and planters. They knew what they did not want—work in a field gang—and what they did—an independent farm. Gerteis shows us that obstacles to the achievement of independence were raised everywhere, and yet the freedmen were not merely victims. They struggled; and the struggles, remembered by later generations, made the transition from contraband to freedman an important time. Since then, in just over one hundred years, black Americans have made gains within a hostile society at a rate that is perhaps unprecedented in the history of once-enslaved peoples.

WILLIAM S. MCFEELY
Mount Holyoke College

Government Competition in the Electric Utility Industry: A Theoretical and Empirical Study. By Richard Hellman. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972. Pp. 500. $25.00.)

Regulation by independent administrative agency has come under increasing attack by political scientists, economists, lawyers and practitioners. At the same time, greater attention is being directed toward possible avenues for changing the basis for government involvement in the public utility industries. It is particularly appropriate, therefore, that Richard Hellman's study should appear at this time.

Professor Hellman argues that there are three principal options for industry organization and social control in the public utility field. These are (1) publicly-owned monopoly, (2) privately-owned monopoly operating under

government regulation, and (3) government competition. Hellman believes that government competition is clearly the outstanding choice if one wants to promote the public interest. He notes that "government competition may . . . be defined in terms of two criteria: First, as a new displacement, threatened or actual, of an existing utility company; and second, as any threatened lowering of rates" (p. 48).

According to Hellman, the most important contribution of government competition lies in the area of dynamic pricing and promotion of service which, in turn, enhances the public welfare by assuring that more service will be available at lower rates. He argues that such an objective cannot be adequately achieved by recourse to publicly owned monopolies or to regulated private monopolies. Traditional regulation is viewed as static and passive, and incapable of motivating acceptable corporate behavior. Interestingly, Hellman welcomes "competitive interaction" between both private and publicly owned electric utilities, so that the motivation for superior performance may come from either a public or a privately owned utility seeking to outperform the other.

Hellman seeks to place the development of government competition in the electric utility industry in historical perspective, and elements of his argument are supported by history. For example, TVA provides an excellent illustration of successful government participation in the electric power field. On balance, if one accepts most of Hellman's arguments regarding the past benefits of government competition, three major questions still remain to be analyzed. Unfortunately, they receive little or no attention from Hellman, but they must be considered an integral part of any proposal that government competition be adopted as a substitute for commission regulation in the future.

First, the process of introducing competition or rivalry into the public utility field can give rise to unique problems of price discrimination and cross-subsidization. Unless the threat of potential competition is prevalent in all markets served by an established utility, the firm will tend to employ earnings from monopoly markets to facilitate underpricing or limit-entry pricing in potentially competitive markets. This practice will be facilitated by the high proportion of overhead costs which characterize these industries. Experience has shown that both private and public enterprises (e.g., the Bell System and the U. S. Postal Service) will employ such pricing strategies when confronted by selective competitive pressures. The results will have an adverse effect on the improved performance which Hellman seeks.

Second, experience indicates that competition in the public utility industries is not necessarily self-reinforcing. In part, public enterprises appear to lose their zest to compete over time (as demonstrated by Hellman's discussion of the New York Power Authority after 1950). But this diminution of competitive vigor also stems from the fact that both private and public firms, once established in their respective spheres of influence, may simply choose to coexist rather than incur the risk associated with continued competition.

Third, according to Hellman, competition leads to progressively lower prices and aggressive promotional practices. At present many environmentalists discourage the use of electricity and promote conservation. Neither public nor privately owned utilities have been inclined to innovate in this area of rate design, and it would be valuable to have Hellman's assessment of the contribution of competition under such circumstances.

Despite the claims made for government competition in electricity, there still appears to be a major role for some form of regulation or social control by an appropriate government agency. The need to establish pricing guidelines, the need to maintain industry flexibility, and the need to recognize national priorities all point to such involvement. Professor Hellman has demonstrated that the process of regulatory reform must not overlook the contribution that could be made by government enterprises operating in a competitive fashion as a constraint on corporate power and as an inducement to superior performance.

HARRY M. TREBING
Michigan State University

The Politics of Electoral College Reform. By Lawrence D. Longley and Alan G. Braun. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1972. Pp. 222. $2.95, paper.)

The recent presidential election makes timely this concise but thorough examination of the perennial issue of the electoral college and what, if anything, should be done about it. Professors Longley and Braun conclude that nothing less than direct popular voting for president will satisfy their specified criteria of democracy, legitimacy, and effectiveness of the winner, and invigoration of politics through the two-party system.

After a foreword by Senator Birch Bayh, whose electoral reform efforts are applauded

elsewhere in the book, Longley and Braun review the origins and history of the electoral college. They give special attention to 1960, when the closeness of the race threatened to produce an electoral vote at odds with the popular vote, and 1968, when it seemed quite possible that the Wallace third party campaign would result in neither major party candidate's receiving an initial electoral vote majority and would therefore bring on a season of bargaining either among the electors or in the House of Representatives. The mischievous possibilities of slates of unpledged electors, such as appeared in 1960, and "faithless electors," who appeared in both 1960 and 1968, are pointed out, plus the usual "what might have been" analyses of changes in the outcomes that would have resulted from slight popular vote shifts in certain states.

In a somewhat mechanistic way, the authors review the features of the various reform possibilities: the automatic plan (elimination of the electors with the state electoral votes registered directly), the proportional plan (split of each state's electoral votes according to its popular votes), the district plan (separate choice of electors in each congressional district), direct and nationally pooled popular voting, and several hybrids. A separate chapter argues in detail for direct national popular voting, with a provision for run-off between the two top candidates if neither gets over 40 per cent of the total vote. The run-off feature is felt to be necessary in order to produce a winner with a recognized mandate.

In their historical material and general approach, Longley and Braun follow the pathway marked out several years ago by Neil Peirce in *The People's President*. Their arguments for the direct vote are buttressed by tables, largely derived from the work of John F. Banzhaf III, showing deviations in the respective states from the per state average of voting power of citizen voters under the electoral college and the various reform plans. These calculations are supplemented by special work for this study by John H. Yunker showing state deviations from the national average voting power per citizen voter. These data illustrate the advantaged position of large-state voters produced under the present system of casting each state's electoral votes as a unit, which of course would not be changed under the automatic plan. They also show the advantages that would go to small-state voters under the district or proportional plans. There are further analyses of the effects of the present and various reform systems on regions, urban, suburban, and rural residents, and foreign stock, black, and blue-collar voters.

In arguing for the direct popular vote, the authors note and dispose of the principal arguments that have been used against it. The idea that the states, as such, have a significant stake in presidential voting is brushed aside. It is pointed out that direct voting would insulate against election fraud and maladministration by eliminating the temptation to try to swing large blocs of electoral votes by tinkering with a few returns in closely contested big states. Competition would be enhanced by the incentive for all parties to get out their maximum vote in all states. Finally, and most crucially, the authors reject the argument that the direct vote may undermine the two-party system by attracting a multiplicity of candidates. They point out that it would take a remarkably strong third-party candidacy—much stronger than Wallace's in 1968, for example—plus a very close contest between the major party candidates to force a run-off. They have faith that the 40 per cent plurality and the indivisible nature of the presidency itself will protect us against a proliferation of minor parties.

The book's most original contribution is a detailed narrative and analysis of the strong, but ultimately unsuccessful, drive for electoral college reform in the 91st Congress. In 1969, with the memory of the Wallace threat still fresh, a resolution for a constitutional amendment providing for the direct popular vote passed the House of Representatives. On the Senate side, however, it took a year and a half of maneuvering—complicated by the Haynsworth and Carswell nomination fights which swirled around the same committee—for the reformers led by Senator Bayh to beat off the other plans and get a direct vote resolution to the floor. By now it was late in 1970, and a classic filibuster ensued. Southern Democrats with conservative Republican support held out successfully through a month's debate and two attempts at cloture. If a two-thirds vote for cloture could not be mustered, it was doubtful that the two-thirds necessary to pass a constitutional amendment could be secured either.

In its strong advocacy of the direct vote, this book differs from the recent comparable study for the Brookings Institution by the late Wallace Sayre and Judith Parris, who traversed much of the same ground and concluded that the uncertain hazards of change outweighed the visible advantages. Pay your money and take your choice.

LAURIN L. HENRY
University of Virginia

The Citizens' Council: Organized Resistance to the Second Reconstruction: 1954–1964. By Neil R. McMillen. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1971. Pp. 397. $10.95.)

This book is a history of the southern White Citizens' Councils and of the efforts of the Councils and related groups to resist racial integration during, essentially, the decade immediately following the *Brown* decision of 1954. In considerable detail, Professor McMillen describes the Councils' origin and their expansion throughout the South, and he notes the varying degrees of influence they attained in their attempt to resist desegregation. His description of Council activities emphasizes that diversity characterized the movement in general, even within states. He attributes this diversity to the cultural heterogeneity increasingly characteristic of the southern region. The author concludes that ethnological factors primarily influenced the pattern of white southern resistance to desegregation, but he suggests that other factors were also important in shaping the racial attitudes of particular southern communities. He finds that the quality of state and local political leadership "profoundly affected" popular responses to desegregation. As the Councils' inability to prevent the advance of integration became apparent, the movement began to decline—a trend that began not long after the Little Rock incident. By 1961, he concludes, "It had all but disappeared in the peripheral states, and in the Deep South, where its power and prestige had always been greatest, the movement was demoralized and in disarray" (p. 362). Following the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the organization focused its attention mainly on the private school movement.

The author devotes two chapters to the content of Council thought. At the outset, he notes that the Council movement failed to develop "a systematic intellectual framework in which to operate" (p. 159). Council attitudes varied from region to region in the same manner as the movement's growth and influence, and because of this "intra-organization heterogeneity" were often contradictory and incongruous. Nevertheless, McMillen finds that there were some general beliefs with which the entire movement could agree. Fundamentally, he says, Council ideology was founded on the notions of racial segregation and white supremacy. Council doctrine thus reflected a basically racist point of view. White Citizens' Councils are frequently linked with other ultra conservative groups, and McMillen finds many similarities between Council ideology and that of other right-wing organizations. He sees the Councils' overriding concern with race, however, as a distinguishing characteristic of Council ideology. Indeed, "Council thought was essentially monistic. Racial difference was the ultimate reality before which all other issues paled in significance" (p. 204). McMillen also sees the Councils' official policy of following "strictly legal" methods of defiance as a feature that distinguished them from the more extremist of the southern resistance groups. He concludes, in fact, that "whatever may have been the theoretical relationship between the explosive atmosphere [the Council organization] so often created and the actual outbreak of violence, there is no tangible evidence which suggests that it engaged in, or even overtly encouraged, criminal acts" (p. 360). In a chapter on "the politics of racial integrity," McMillen describes the Councils' efforts to gain political power and points up their characteristically varying roles in the political life of southern states. He also describes the Councils' excursions into national politics, where their activity mainly took the form of efforts to influence the outcome of presidential elections through involvement in independent elector and third-party movements.

As the book's title indicates, McMillen has not attempted a history of the organized southern resistance movement in its entirety. He has focused his study on the activities of the Citizens' Councils, and his efforts have produced a carefully drawn, comprehensive history of the Council movement. Much has been written about the Citizens' Councils, and their more prominent characteristics are well known. McMillen's contribution lies in his approach to his subject: he supplies the detailed information that is necessarily lacking in less complete treatments of the Councils. The book is written in a forthright, lively style; it is well documented and includes a bibliographical essay. As McMillen makes clear, the Citizens' Councils, although always a minority, exerted a strong influence for a time on the racial policies of southern states, especially those in the Deep South. His history of the Councils should be of interest to those desiring information about this facet of race relations in the recent South.

JAMES D. THOMAS
The University of Alabama

The Budgeting and Evaluation of Federal Recreation Programs, or Money Doesn't Grow on Trees. By Jeanne Nienaber and Aaron Wildavsky. (New York: Basic Books, 1973. Pp. 172. $8.95.)

Time has not been kind to PPB, the planning-programming-budgeting system promulgated for the United States Government by President Johnson on August 25, 1965. A decade later, few signs remain of the innovation that once stirred the world of budgeting. The formal structures of PPB were quietly dismantled some years ago, and now even the term provokes disdain.

While PPB still was alive, Professors Jeanne Nienaber and Aaron Wildavsky set out to study its operation in two federal agencies—the National Park Service and the Forest Service. (They also took a limited look at the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation.) The bulk of their investigations were conducted during 1969, at a time that PPB already was moribund in some agencies but before its formal termination in 1971. The authors made no attempt to bring their story up to date, so that when it was published late in 1973, the situation already was different from that described in their book.

Nienaber and Wildavsky have produced four sets of essays, only loosely connected to one another: (1) Why organizations can't evaluate, (2) how traditional budgeting is done, (3) how PPB wasn't done, and (4) paying for recreation. These themes are prefaced by a brief discussion of the criteria used to appraise the application of PPB in the study agencies. The authors acknowledge that since there are no "accepted criteria" for gauging success or failure and no way of specifying "proper outcomes," they therefore are impelled to examine the "processes through which the decisions leading to these outcomes are made" (p. x). The book thus suffers from the affliction attending most discussions of PPB. The authors' own perspectives and preferences take command. What should be a straightforward empirical account of budget practices in several federal agencies turns instead into still another polemic contra reform. As a consequence, PPB remains almost as unstudied today as it was a decade ago.

This nonempirical cast appears in the first essay, "Evaluation as an Organization Problem," an insightful and lively consideration of why self-evaluating organizations rarely exist. This essay comes at the start of the book; it is not at all informed by the discussion of budget practices in later chapters. Yet it is the most valuable part of the book (though it has also appeared in substantially the same form as an article in the *Public Administration Review*), for it explains why organizations both covet and fail to do much self evaluation. The basic message of Nienaber/Wildavsky "is that evaluation and organization are to some extent contradictory terms" (p. 3), a thesis which is forcefully presented by portraying the probable fate of "evaluative man" in an organization. As an outsider, the evaluator always is at risk of losing either his independence or his influence. He cannot have it both ways: serving his organization loyally and yet steering it away from its traditional course. The organization wants commitment; evaluative man gives it skepticism. The evaluator puts deeds and goals to the stern test of public good; the organization relates instead to clienteles and self interests. The organization strives for stability, evaluation impels it to change.

Despite these intractable difficulties, Nienaber and Wildavsky value the evaluative ethic. Like the ancients, they too seek to join knowledge and power. They suggest that the political role of evaluation be recognized and that politics and evaluation "be joined together so that each becomes part of the other" (p. 35).

The authors next turn to traditional line-item budget practices in the National Park Service and Forest Service. They concentrate on the preparation of estimates by field units, with attention to the forms used for the submission of requests. But they fail to penetrate to the bowels of the study organizations, to examine how the budget is put together piece by piece, or how conflicts and pressures are handled in the field or in Washington. The authors view agency budgeting primarily as a matter of maintaining existing facilities, though they also refer to the inevitable tensions between maintenance and expansion strategies.

Throughout the discussion, Nienaber and Wildavsky take it for granted that the agencies were operating under extremely tight budgets, with no money for new programs, and perhaps not even enough to properly maintain existing facilities. These budget realities seem to have colored the entire budget preparation process, driving out planning and analysis. It is unfortunate that some 100 pages after these constraints were reported, the authors challenge them in a back-of-the-book footnote, pointing to the high growth rates experienced by the two agencies.

The third section of the book consists of two chapters on program budgeting. The authors confess that it is "exceedingly difficult to appraise the PPB system in terms of its utility or its decision-making value" (p. 89). Nevertheless, they offer a tentative conclusion which

is much more favorable to PPB than is usually found in Wildavsky's writings: traditional budgeting is most appropriate for routine activities such as maintenance; PPB-type processes might be most appropriate for planning and development purposes. They also acknowledge that "an important function of the PPB system thus is, in practice, its ability to generate data that support agency or departmental goals and objectives."

Having tendered this favorable statement, the authors in the next chapter return to a more conventional view of PPB, focusing on the program structure used in the Department of Agriculture and on difficulties of integrating PPB with the routines of traditional budgeting. Nienaber and Wildavsky conclude this discussion with an erroneous statement: "Students of administrative irony may note that PPBS was abolished in the context of a circular that dealt largely with simplification of paper work" (p. 142). PPB suffered many indignities, but its demise was announced in a memorandum dealing with agency budget submissions for the next fiscal year.

The final portions of the book are wholly divorced from the preceding sections. Nienaber and Wildavsky assess who should pay for recreation benefits and how the recreation programs of the federal government should be financed. They carefully balance environmental and developmental interests and offer some sensible suggestions for increasing the federal investment in recreation facilities.

The book is better in its parts than in the whole. Not closely linked together, the parts should be of interest to persons studying evaluation, budgeting, or recreation.

ALLEN SCHICK
Congressional Research Service

Cable Television U.S.A. By Martin H. Seiden. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972. Pp. 272. $16.50.)

The Invisible Resource. By Harvey J. Levin. (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971. Pp. 432. $12.00.)

These two books are both rewarding and frustrating reading for students of public policy toward broadcasting. They are rewarding because they provide careful, detailed descriptions of the regulatory policies of the F.C.C., one in the limited field of cable television regulation, the other in the whole area of spectrum allocation as it affects various radio and television uses as well as more specialized uses. They are frustrating because they are studies of the policies themselves and the consequences which flow from the policies, with little or no attention given to the procsses by which these policies are shaped. But each makes substantial criticisms of the F.C.C.'s policies as they stand, criticisms which if accepted would entail a fairly comprehensive alteration in the policies of the Commission.

Seiden's book, an outgrowth of his dissertation at Columbia University, reviews the regulation of cable television through the 1972 revised rules. It contains a wealth of data not available elsewhere on cable television penetration and its regulation. It also presents a very useful review of the various court cases which have shaped both the authority of the F.C.C. and the policies it has pursued. For these strengths alone the book is a very welcome addition to the literature.

The central argument of the book is that the F.C.C. has seriously hampered the growth of the cable television industry by the erection of formidable regulatory barriers to the economic viability of cable television firms. These barriers, Seiden argues, reflect the fears of the most powerful broadcasting interests, most notably networks, stations, and station groups, fears about the likely inroads a thriving cable industry might make into their own profitability. Seiden minimizes the bases for such fears. He further points out that these same interests have themselves made sizable investments in the fledgling cable industry, an industry which is bound to remain financially dwarfed by the networks and stations, even if released from regulatory bondage.

Because the advent of a "wired nation" would result in a greater variety and flexibility of broadcast services, Seiden bemoans the "mind-boggling complexity" of F.C.C. cable rules. He suggests that such regulation as is necessary could better be done by local governments which in his view are better placed to adopt rules suited to their needs.

The F.C.C. is also the bogeyman of Levin's study of the allocation of spectrum space to all broadcast uses, though the implications of Levin's study, if accepted, are far more profound. An economist, Levin has examined the interplay between competition and regulation in spectrum allocation. He advocates the introduction of a modified free market for spectrum space. Because the F.C.C. through license grants and through the arbitrary reservation of certain portions of the spectrum for particular uses—AM, FM, and land-mobile radio; VHF, UHF, and educational television

—has prevented the maximum utilization of scarce and valuable spectrum space, the marginal value of the broadcast-and-common-carrier spectrum to next-best users has risen steadily, he argues.

He points out that the licensing-allocation function of the Commission confers sizable franchise value without at all guaranteeing diversification of program choices, healthy competition and the technological innovations that would result, and maximum local services, goals to which the F.C.C. has given consistent lip service.

Despite the convincing case each author makes for his criticisms of F.C.C. policies, neither gives attention to the processes by which these policies have been made. Therefore, each has written a traditional study of public policy by comparing governmental outputs against some putative rational model—a model which ignores the dilemmas of public policy makers enmeshed in a power system that constrains their choices.

Nonetheless, each author has assembled very useful data for students of public policy, and each book will stand for some time as the authoritative treatment of its specialized subject.

FRANK WOLF
Drew University

History of U.S. Political Parties. Edited by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. Vol. I: 1789–1860, From Factions to Parties. Vol. II: 1860–1910, The Gilded Age of Politics; Vol. III: 1910–1945, From Square Deal to New Deal; Vol. IV: 1945–1972, The Politics of Change. (New York: Chelsea House Publishers in association with R. R. Bowker Co., 1973. Pp. 3544. $135.00 for the set.)

This massive and costly collection of essays and documents about American politics was written and edited by historians for historians. Political scientists will be able, with some effort, to pick some tasty raisins here and there from the veritable ocean of cereal, and the packaging may make the goodies a bit easier to find than by the usual rummaging through libraries' card catalogues and stacks. But scholars interested in parties *as institutions* will find the collection of little utility.

Schlesinger's package is mislabeled. It is called "History of U.S. Political Parties," but its contents touch only one segment of that vast subject. Its materials are concerned with *national* politics only, and its 3544 pages contain hardly a word on state and local politics and parties. Moreover, even at the national level it deals only with *presidential* politics: there is almost nothing on the history of the parties in Congress or in the national committees. Even the powerful Congressional Caucus of the period 1796–1824 is barely mentioned.

In addition, the presidential parties are conceptualized, discussed, and documented strictly as arenas for conflict among individuals and factions seeking nominations and control of platforms, never as actual or potential performers of electoral and governing functions. Hence the essays on the various parties and historical periods concentrate mainly on the rise and fall of contenders for nominations and add an occasional bit about platform struggles. The documentary materials following each essay include letters and speeches of party leaders, resolutions by state legislatures, party manifestoes and platforms, newspaper reports and editorials, magazine articles, and some of the proceedings of national conventions. One looks in vain for such materials on the *institutional* development of parties as the calls for and rules governing the national conventions, the resolutions establishing the first national committees in 1848 and 1854, debates over the unit rule, two-thirds rule, and bonus votes, and texts of the early presidential primary laws. Indeed, the only such materials in the entire collection are the 1971 reports of the McGovern-Fraser and O'Hara commissions.

Accordingly, the reader who wants to know what many people prominent in presidential politics from the 1790s to now have said about issues and about each other will find this collection useful. But the reader who wants to know how American national parties have become what they are today will still have to depend on the documentary materials in libraries and on the analyses of Ostrogorski, Ford, Schattschneider, Hofstadter, Key, Epstein, and others whose names and ideas are absent from these particular eleven inches of Professor Schlesinger's extensive personal shelf.

AUSTIN RANNEY
American Enterprise Institute

Merger Politics: Local Government in Tidewater Virginia. By David G. Temple. (Charlottesville, Va.: Published for the Institute of Government by The University Press of Virginia, 1972. Pp. xv, 225. $12.00.)

During the two decades following World War II the most frequently proposed solution for the metropolitan problem was the consolidation or merger of small, fragmented governments into a single, viable, area-wide

unit. Although widely suggested, only in Virginia did this proposal enjoy any degree of success. There, four mergers or consolidations were achieved between 1957 and 1963; one represented the merger of two cities, and three involved city-county consolidation. This study examines the events associated with these four mergers.

Professor Temple focuses on the various steps and stages in the process of merging these units of local government. Within this framework, he examines the conditions and events which motivated the consolidation movements and the environmental context at the time, describes what took place at each of the political and legal stages of the procedure, and indicates the major changes that occurred in the local governmental structures and procedures following consolidation. His data sources were the relevant legal documents, official and unofficial documents of the former governments and study groups, newspaper accounts, and interviews of available significant actors in each of the cases.

Why were these mergers successful? Temple concludes that the two cities were combined because of a fear that political control in one would soon be in the hands of blacks and that such an outcome would be detrimental to certain interests in both cities. In three instances of city-county consolidation, the immediate concern was impending annexation of urban county areas by an adjacent city. Under the Virginia practice of city-county separation, annexation removes the area and its residents and improvements from county jurisdiction and makes them a part of the annexing city. Behind these immediate reasons, however, was the desire of certain interests to maintain as much of the political status quo as possible. Under a consolidated city government these interests could no longer be annexed by an "enemy" city and would have a continued opportunity to pursue and influence desired goals in the new, if enlarged, unit of government.

Temple views these mergers as basically political actions, but clearly the political interests of oligarchies dominated. The movements for merger were initiated by a self-selected few, the bargaining and negotiations over the governmental structures to be included in the new city charter extended only to incumbent office holders, and the securing of the requisite legislative approvals were carried out by and confined to the same self-selected few, usually incumbent, elected officials. Only in the campaigns for the merger referendum were the general citizenry really participants, and even here the leaders followed tried and true political campaign tactics—claims of dire consequences if merger were not successful, and paternalistic assurances that the leaders had the best interests of the area at heart. This strategy worked, for each referendum was approved by a substantial margin.

Temple presents an interesting case study of a rather unusual happening in American local government. His major interest is in the events associated with each step of the merger procedure, and the study is a good general tour through the difficulties encountered at each of the stages from initiation to termination. As he notes, however, a particular combination of time, events, conditions, and effective leadership made these mergers somewhat unique—a conclusion reinforced by the subsequent failure of five other attempts at city-county consolidation in Virginia. Temple's study preceded these failures, but a comparison might lead to a clearer understanding of the critical variables involved in local government mergers.

CHESTER W. BAIN
University of South Carolina

Black Politics: A Theoretical and Structural Analysis. By Hanes Walton, Jr. (Philadelphia, Pa.: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1972. Pp. 246. $7.95, cloth; $4.95, paper.)

This book apparently has two major purposes. It is designed to "explore black politics north and south from the colonial period to the present day" and "to set forth some theoretical insights and generalization about black political maneuvering and manifestations in this country" (pp. xvi–xvii). While the latter task is not fulfilled, the book has merit in that it does carry out the former goal.

In the book's first chapter, Professor Walton correctly charges that studies of black politics have had two major deficiencies. First, they have examined black electoral behavior to the exclusion of other forms of political activity. Second, the studies have concentrated upon the numerous differences between the electoral behavior of northern or southern blacks, giving little attention to the similarities. To correct these deficiencies, Walton offers a new conceptual framework to guide research in the area.

His framework consists of: (1) four stages which are distinguished by different levels of black political activity, (2) events, such as the 1965 Civil Rights Bill, which move blacks across the states, and (3) the decision-making process which determines the content of the

events. The framework essentially posits that blacks can exhibit four levels of political activity and that the actual level blacks in a particular locality achieve is a function of the type of events produced by the local political environment.

As the author desires, the framework forces researchers to view black electoral behavior as only one facet of black political behavior and to give attention to the commonalities between the political experiences of blacks. The framework presents at least as many problems as it adequately addresses, however. For example, when Walton distinguishes between his stages, he treats levels of black political activity as absolutes. This procedure seems analytically naive. Blacks are a particular racial subgroup in the American political arena affected by the same pressures—though perhaps by some additional ones—toward participation or passivity as other subgroups. Thus to make a valid assessment of black political activity levels, we should consider these levels relative to those of other subgroups. Furthermore, Walton offers the readers little insight about the events in the larger political arena which could cause changes in black political activity levels.

Most of the merit of this work lies in the book's succeeding eleven chapters in which Walton presents a wealth of information about the nature of black participation in American politics from the colonial era to the present. He describes the roles blacks have played in electoral politics, machine politics, party politics, pressure-group politics, presidential politics, public office, and as citizens of urban centers. Although the narrative is uneven and sometimes confusing in these chapters, much of the information has never before been provided in book form.

The book is additionally useful to the scholar in this area because of its extensive bibliography citing literature on black politics, conveniently listed according to subject matter.

CAROLYN SUE WILLIAMS
Xavier University

The Politics of Progress. By Raymond E. Wolfinger. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974. Pp. 416. $10.95.)

Long-awaited by readers of Robert A. Dahl's *Who Governs?*, Raymond Wolfinger's dissertation research now finally published under the same title promised in a Dahl footnote but substantially revised in light of controversies sparked by the earlier, seminal work, is must reading for those who remain concerned about power and democracy in urban, industrial societies, if only because these data help place Dahl's own analysis in a more complete empirical context. Indeed, the subsequent pluralist/neo-elitist debate, by clarifying and narrowing the issues, has made the subject matter of Wolfinger's study all the more central.

For one thing, the study focuses on the one issue area which all sides have conceded was critically important to New Haven's future: the redevelopment of the city's central business district. Second, within the urban renewal policy arena, Dahl's own, highly abbreviated discussion leaves open the possibility of conflicting interpretations not easily resolved without adducing further information. We are now fortunate to have available nearly two hundred pages of detailed information on Mayor Richard Lee and his urban renewal program (as compared to less than fifty in Dahl's study) to assist the reader in drawing his own conclusions. Third, in the course of providing details on policy formation, Professor Wolfinger tells us a good deal, if not quite enough, about whose homes and businesses were condemned for redevelopment, the specific uses to which the redevelopment tracts were put, and various relocation practices. In short, any instructor who still finds (as I do) that Dahl's study of New Haven is a valuable introduction to urban politics owes it to his class discussions to peruse this volume with care.

Wolfinger himself denies that his study is "part of the 'community power' genre," though he admits that "it does contain a good deal of evidence relevant to propositions that have been developed in that literature" (p. 9). Instead he states that the volume is designed to serve two other purposes: (1) "to explain how important innovative policies were conceived and executed in New Haven" and (2) "to use findings about New Haven to test and revise prevailing theories about local politics" (p. 1). In pursuit of the second purpose, Wolfinger discusses in two splendid chapters the continuing significance of ethnic and machine politics. Indeed, Wolfinger departs significantly from Dahl in his much greater appreciation of the significance of the machine-style character of New Haven's Democratic organization. He demonstrates quite convincingly that machine politicians are quite indifferent to policy questions as long as their control over patronage is not disturbed, that popular mayors can use their prestige and control over material incentives to centralize power, but also that activist, modernizing urban programs can at times

:opardize the interests of (and therefore ıayoral relationships to) traditional party or-;anizations. Wolfinger's discussion of these ubjects is focused, intelligent, and nicely :ocumented.

As valuable as are many of the discussions ɔn these and other worthy topics, the heart of he study revolves around Wolfinger's attempt o "explain how important innovative policies vere conceived and executed in New Haven" (p. 1). Successful pursuit of this objective requires that it be directly connected to his second purpose of testing theories about local politics; only if an explanation is theoretically grounded can it be generalized beyond the particulars of Mayor Lee's New Haven regime. In this regard, Wolfinger's central argument is that "in New Haven the mayor played the leading role in policy formation. . . . More than anything else, urban renewal policy resulted from his ambitions, not those of private groups" (p. 12). Although in an important respect discussed below, Wolfinger's contention is certainly correct, this explanation, by itself, is not theoretically satisfying. As Wolfinger himself points out in his closing chapter, heroic leadership appears only infrequently and erratically on the local political scene. What then is there about these circumstances which can be generalized to urban politics as a whole? What are the conditions that permitted Lee's leadership in New Haven's redevelopment and not elsewhere?

The answers to these questions implicit in Wolfinger's analysis suggest the direction that pluralist theory has taken in the decade since *Who Governs?* For Dahl, it was critical to show that power was widely shared among the various social, ethnic and racial groups in the city. Wolfinger makes no effort to identify socially diverse sources of influence on policy formation; on the contrary, only a small number of businessmen and developers are taken into the confidence of Mayor Lee and his top administrative staff. But Wolfinger does not conclude from these findings that a ruling elite has come to power; he emphasizes instead the fortuitous nature of many of the events that he describes. The redevelopment of the central business district was begun because a Gamble store happened to fold; it gained key support because the National Bank needed a larger, more modern structure; determined opposition came from a jeweler whose new store had to be demolished; and it finally succeeded because Yale University fortunately funded a developer unable to raise cash elsewhere. Given the multiplicity of forces that accidentally shaped even important policies, no ruling elite can be detected.

Along with this emphasis on complexity, one finds a tendency to disaggregate and decompose all units of analysis to the level of the individual. In Dahl's analysis, political and social groups help form the context for political action; Wolfinger, sharply distinguishing himself from group theorists, disaggregates much further, finding it difficult even to speak of the interests of central-business-district businessmen. In commenting on an important issue in the pluralist/neo-elitist debate, for example, Wolfinger notes that developer Stevens influenced policy but lost money, while Malley's department-store executives had little influence over project design but in the end made money on redevelopment. By disaggregating to the individual, Wolfinger tries to show that manipulators of power need not coincide with its beneficiaries.

Such an interpretation has its appeal, especially when the details are described with as much vigor and felicity as in this study. The difficulty is the atheoretical quality of such an enterprise. As Andrew MacFarland has observed, if pluralism simply means multiple causality, reciprocal influences, and continually changing processes, then its contribution to political theory has sharp limits. Analysis tends to degenerate into description, and the facts that must be included in a coherent account grow almost endlessly. As with post-Wagnerian romantic music, the ambiguity, modification, and subtleties of nuance are so manifold, the score is so thick, as it were, that the demand for a new simplifying structure grows irresistible.

Given his individualist orientation, it is somewhat surprising that Wolfinger does not borrow more extensively from the political economy literature in his analysis of the problems of collective action in New Haven. Had he done so, he might have interpreted Mayor Lee less as a Superstar who cajoled and compelled others to follow his lead and more as a brilliant political entrepreneur who enticed others to give to a common cause. Much of the case that redevelopment was *not* a businessman's plot rests on the grounds that Lee had to make extraordinary efforts to induce individual businessmen to contribute to his urban renewal drive. But as Olson and other economists have demonstrated, a policy can be in the collective interest of businessmen and still lack the support of individual businessmen, all of whom may wish to "free ride" on

the efforts of others. Recently, Frolich et al. have noted that leaders can provide collective goods by convincing individuals that their efforts will be matched by others. From this perspective, Lee seems to have been a very successful leader who helped central-district businessmen achieve a collective outcome of benefit to most of them. It takes nothing away from Mayor Lee's skills as a political entrepreneur to note that he chose to put his energies to the service of such a cause rather than, say, behind a massive low-income housing program for New Haven's *poor*. To make such an observation, however, requires that one find categories other than the "individuals" analytically appropriate.

In its details, the study, even for post-Watergate readers, is ruthlessly honest about the "warts" of the American political system; Mayor Lee had good political reasons for objecting to its publication as long as he remained in office. As with the special prosecutor's office, however, the book has mired itself in facts at the cost of understanding the significance of the events under investigation.

PAUL E. PETERSON
The University of Chicago

Java in a Time of Revolution. Occupation and Resistance, 1944–1946. By Benedict R. O'G. Anderson. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972. Pp. xv, 494. $15.00.)

It is not easy to do justice to a book of such excellence as this in a short review. Professor Anderson has given us a superb piece of historical reconstruction of the first ten months of Indonesia's "revolution," or struggle for independence, in 1945–46, sketching out the various social and political forces at work with a sharpness of perception that will probably never be bettered by a foreigner. At the same time, he has forced us to look at Indonesian politics from a new and highly revealing angle, challenging many of the assumptions that have previously been made about the political processes at work there.

His major contribution has been to revise what might be called "the Sjahrir version" of the Indonesian revolution by rehabilitating the reputation of Sutan Sjahrir's great rival, Tan Malakka, showing the significance of his role and actions against a strikingly different backdrop. Most previous writers have followed G. McT. Kahin's pioneering account of those events, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1952) in which the political parties, with Sjahrir's Socialist Party bulking much larger among them than its later history seems to warrant, were seen as emanations of a great upsurge of mass political consciousness, their ideological doctrines reflecting the views of the major groupings within Indonesian society. Anderson shows us in devastating detail that the parties were in fact "little more than clusters of small personal cliques . . . None . . . had as yet any organized base among the masses, even in the urban areas" (p. 230). The party politics of Indonesia's first year of struggle for independence could virtually be depicted, he says, in terms of the maneuvering of five key cliques, none notably stronger than the others, against a background of debate over the merits of conducting the struggle by strategy of *diplomasi* (negotiations — seeking to exert pressure on the Dutch through the British and Americans) or *perdjuangan*, armed conflict. But more important, he argues, were the rise of the army, of the many irregular *"strijdorganisaties"* and of the *pemuda* (youth) movement with its distinctive *"pemuda* consciousness" moulded by the social upheaval accompanying the collapses of Dutch authority.

One of Anderson's central arguments and assumptions is that if Tan Malakka and the advocates of *perdjuangan* had prevailed in their internal struggle for power with the Sjahrir-Sukarno group of exponents of *diplomasi*, the course of Indonesian history would have been radically different. Because the latter policy was directed towards gaining international support and recognition it was incompatible with a radical social program. "From this came the deepening malaise of the post-independence years, and later tragedies" (p. 407). In a significant aside (p. 408), Anderson suggests that if Sukarno had thrown his weight behind Tan Malakka and the strategy of *perdjuangan*, Indonesian history might have followed a quite different course, perhaps more comparable with that taken under Ho Chi Minh's leadership by the Viet Minh. This is an intriguing and important hypothesis, but not, I think, a fully persuasive one.

Anderson's whole approach to the events of this period rests, in fact, on the assumption that a more militantly revolutionary strategy such as the DRV's would have worked—i.e., it would have been successful in mobilizing the masses against Dutch colonial rule and would have proved victorious sooner or later in forc-

ing the Dutch to abandon their hold there, even if it took a much longer and more bloody struggle to achieve it, as in Vietnam. This hypothesis undoubtedly deserves consideration, for it has perhaps been brushed aside too quickly by previous writers. Conceivably Tan Malakka's strategy would have been just as successful — and it might have been better for the country's sociopolitical health in the long run. It is interesting to note that General Nasution, whose ideological presuppositions are very different from Anderson's, shares the view that Indonesia's leaders made a serious mistake in not pressing the resort to armed struggle and seizing weapons by force from the Japanese immediately after they surrendered. He may be right. Possibly such a course of action would have deterred the British from reoccupying Java and Sumatra and thus forestalled the Dutch come-back in 1946–47, which would have entailed a very different course of events. But I doubt it. Because the strategic and political situation in Java in 1945–46 was so very different from that in Vietnam, it would have been highly improbable that a campaign based solely on armed struggle and a spurning of negotiations with the Dutch and British could have been maintained for long. (Even Ho Chi Minh felt he had to negotiate with the French in 1946, before he was driven to conclude that war was unavoidable.) If Tan Malakka and Sukarno could have worked together along the lines advocated by the former, they would have found themselves forced by circumstances into much the same sort of hot-and-cold mixture of *perdjuangan* and *diplomasi,* requiring compromises with the Dutch, that the Sukarno-Hatta-Sjahrir governments pursued, with ultimate success in 1949. Moreover, if we assume that a guerrilla conflict might have held the colonial forces at bay into the 1950s, as in Vietnam, we are thrust into a realm of speculation about what attitude the USA would have taken after the outbreak of the Korea War towards a left-wing national liberation movement in Indonesia. If instead of opposing the Dutch, the U.S. had then supported them, as it did the French, would the Indonesians have won their independence? It is hard to imagine. I suspect they were lucky to get it when they did, for their success in exploiting international pressures on the Dutch in 1948–49 would not have been nearly so easy to achieve after 1950. That is not the end of the argument, of course. And inconclusive though the debate will remain, Anderson has put us in his debt by challenging us to reconsider so much of the conventional wisdom about that fascinating piece of history.

J. A. C. MACKIE
Monash University, Australia

Israel and The Palestinians. Edited by Shlomo Avineri. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971. Pp. 168. $10.00.)

Crushed between the anvil of Jewish nationalism and the hammer of Pan-Arabism, the proud people of Palestine have an unhappy lot, and their problem can hardly be ignored by any book which purports to be a comprehensive study of the fast-moving events in the Middle East. Remarkably, this collection of essays, written after the bloody Jordanian Civil War in 1971, contains not one independent essay on either the PLO, its leader Arafat, or its radical splinter groups which are the most dynamic and powerful Palestinian political and military structures. Thus, even though it was written between 1969 and 1971 this book is already obsolete.

Among its redeeming qualities, however, is that it was written mostly by Israelis and that several of them, like Moshe Dayan, former defense minister, and two retired generals and Arabists, Harkabi and Peled, have addressed themselves to the Palestinian problem. In fact, most of the essays are translations from articles in the Israeli papers, especially *Maariv,* where the debate over Palestine and the Palestinians began as soon as the ceasefire was signed on June 10, 1967. The selections in the book are but a few taken from a multitude of articles written by Israelis of all persuasions, occupations, and roles about the future of Palestine and the Palestinians. In fact, one could speak of Israeli Palestinian ideology as a literature which seriously competes with the Palestinian studies curriculum in Beirut (connected with The American University) as the center of Palestinian activism, and of their scribological and ideological writings. The major thesis of the Israeli Palestinian ideology is put forth by both Professors Avineri and Shamir. Avineri discusses Israel's reluctant but "inconvenient realization that the Palestinian Arabs are a political force that, whatever its ultimate military weakness and the terroristic nature of much of its activity, has to be taken seriously" (p. 14), and that not since 1948 has there been a public discussion in Israel about the Palestinians comparable to what is now going on (p. 15). The essays demonstrate that pub-

lic leaders like Moshe Dayan are sensitive to the issue. Arie Eliav, for example, the former secretary general of the Israeli Labor Party also called for accepting the claim of the Palestinians for a political identity of their own.

But the issue being debated is no longer whether there is a Palestinian consciousness or a Palestinian political identity. The critical issue now is who should rule the Palestinians: the Hashemites, the "moderates" (those who accept a West Bank-Gaza solution), the notables, the clients of Israeli administration, or the maximalists led by the PLO and Arafat and their radical splinter groups. Of the authors, only Professor (retired general) Yehoshafat Harkabi addresses this question. Harkabi argues that it is neither the moderates nor the notables who determine political and regime orientations for the Palestinians. Rather, he says, their rejection of Israel is a deeply felt ideological one. Harkabi writes, "In the presence of the Palestinians' intention to annihilate us we cannot promise ourselves to become soft, and at times cannot even assume a humanistic stance, and this is a self-contradiction" (p. 6). Harkabi's antagonist, Professor Shamir, former head of Shiloah Middle Eastern Center at the University of Tel-Aviv, calls Harkabi's thesis on Arab intransigence a myth. Shamir argues that in the post-Six-Day-War period, new Arab approaches emerged, as the Arabs saw that trying to destroy Israel was futile. He says the Arabs hoped to put an end to the struggle by utilizing the opportunities created after the war, salvaging Palestinian society by improving Palestinian living conditions and "obtaining a reasonable minimum of national goals" (p. 25). Thus Shamir challenges Harkabi saying that "by concentrating only on the literature published in the Arab states, he [Harkabi] diverts attention away from the no less significant development among the West Bank-Palestinians and ignores what could have become the cornerstone of a promising new Israeli approach to the problem of peace" (p. 29).

The PLO and the Arab states answered Shamir at the Rabat Conference that met in November 1974. There the PLO, not the West Bank Palestinians, was recognized as the political group speaking for the Palestinians. Shamir's pipe dream of a West Bank-Israeli sponsored Palestinian state had few voices supporting it in 1971 and none in 1975. Thus the debate became futile and the issue obsolete.

The PLO, although it represents less than 25 per cent of a population of 2.3 million i the Palestinians' most powerful political anc military group. With the help of the "Arat Rejection Front" those who wanted no part o: Kissinger's mediation, Syria, Algeria and Libya set the tone in Rabat for recognizing the Palestinian entity. They made a case for the establishment of a secular "democratic" Arat Palestine. It would be an Arafat state dominated by Suni Arabs and made up of Palestine, Israel, and ultimately Jordan.

Unfortunately, Harkabi's thesis turned out to be correct. His vindication was not due to foresight but to the Arab mood in the period after the 1973 war. As yet no Israeli intellectual has found the proper formula for the Palestinians, nor would Avineri and Shamir accept the Arafat solution. The PLO not only does not recognize Israel but its term "secular democratic state" is a euphemism for the annihilation of Israel. No Israeli cabinet, however reasonable, can accept an Arafat-dominated Palestine. Nor will the Hashemite Kingdom accept Arafat and the PLO's independent state unless imposed by their Arab brethren. Since Israel has no intention of bringing about its own destruction and the PLO has not abandoned its grandiose plan for the United Suni Arab-dominated Palestine, the tragic plight of the Palestinians is no closer to solution than it was in 1948. The PLO, not Israel, must change its formula. Otherwise, the Palestinians, a proud, politically conscious people, will remain stateless. An all-or-nothing formula is no cornerstone for new Israel-Palestinian relations.

AMOS PERLMUTTER
The American University

Peasant Society in Konku: A Study of Right and Left Subcastes in South India. By Brenda E. F. Beck. (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1972. Pp. xx, 334. $16.50.)

It is perhaps unusual that a book which has little to do with politics specifically should be reviewed in the *APSR*, but then this is a remarkable book. It is a masterly job of social science detective work and an exemplary form of anthropological inquiry. The task Professor Beck sets for herself is to examine the interrelationship of the social and territorial organization of various castes in the Konku region of South India, an area corresponding roughly to modern Coimbatore District of Tamil Nadu. Following the residents' own con-

ception of local social structure, Beck analyzes the social organization of Koṅku in terms of five nesting, territorial units; the region as a whole, the subregion, the village revenue unit, the hamlet, and the individual household. What emerges is a clear picture of a bifurcated prestige structure characterized by rivalry between groups basing their claims on the control of territory and of the local labor force (those castes traditionally identified as of the "right," a term of dichotomous distinction with no value implications as such) and those which base their claims on the acquisition of material wealth, self-acclaimed ritual superiority, and, more recently, education (those of the "left").

At each level of social organization, the two blocs are distinguished by differences in customs and traditions, but at the lower levels of the caste hierarchy, these differences decline as a result of the commanding influence of the land-owning dominant caste of the right division, the Gounders (transliterated as KavuNTars), over the economically dependent lower castes of the left division. Beck argues that "the ability to control agricultural production is the key factor in understanding KavuNTar dominance, and their exclusive power position is the key to the development of the extensive social oppositions observed" (p. 268). She concludes that "only where landed, political power and ritual purity — the two major routes to status in Hindu India — remain largely separate, can a right-left division . . . be expected to develop fully. In the classical Indian worldview, material wealth by itself is inadequate as a third, parallel route to prestige. Unless it is combined with one or both of the other status criteria, it cannot contribute to social superiority over more than the lowest-ranking groups. Thus people who possess material wealth but who have been traditionally excluded from land ownership tend to develop an interest in ritual purity in order to offset the inferior power of their riches" (p. 267).

The system of transliteration employed is cumbersome and often requires real effort to recognize what might otherwise be a familiar Tamil name. Perhaps the best example is that of the dominant caste of the Koṅku region. Usually written as "Gounder," it is here transliterated KavuNTar, without identifying the term with the more ordinary usage. Moreover, the index includes Tamil names only in this scheme of transliteration — rendering it difficult to use. Nadar becomes NāTār; Siva (the god), Civā; Chola (the kingdom), Cōra; etc. But this is a minor irritant in an otherwise superb study.

ROBERT L. HARDGRAVE, JR.
University of Texas at Austin

Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan. By Ralph Braibanti. (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1966) Pp. xxiii, 569. Price not listed.)

Ralph Braibanti's major work concerning the study of the Pakistani bureaucracy was completed in 1965 and published in 1966. It is unfortunate that it has taken more than ten years for a review of its contents to appear in the pages of this journal because *Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan* is one of the more noteworthy displays of scholarly writing on Pakistan. Indeed, it stands among the finer volumes produced by American South Asianists. As the title implies, this is more than a general narrative and analysis of administrative development in Pakistan. Professor Braibanti is a meticulous scholar with an extraordinary interest in detail. He has succeeded in putting together a reference book which is must reading for anyone doing research in Pakistan's administrative history, organization, function, and developmental problems. The author has carefully included in this elaborate bibliographic essay virtually all the significant and many of the obscure works bearing on the subject up to the time of the book's publication. It is to be hoped that Professor Braibanti will consider the possibility of doing a second volume on the subject so that the material released during the period 1965–1976 can be brought to the attention of academic and government researchers the world over. Under the leadership of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the Pakistan government has instituted sweeping administrative reforms and the changing bureaucratic system could use Braibanti's perceptive examination.

This book is divided into six substantive chapters with a seventh reserved for the author's general observations. It also includes a lengthy set of appendices which is somewhat rare today, in this era of high-cost printing. There are also a number of tables scattered throughout the book which are especially helpful in grouping some of the basic parameters of Pakistan's administrative government. Braibanti traces the historic development of the bureaucratic apparatus in Pakistan, but he is

more concerned with identifying, classifying, and evaluating the public records published during 1947–1965. It is the author's contention that the study of government and political processes in Pakistan must lead to an examination of the bureaucratic system and its operations. Braibanti was among the few Americans of the period to view Pakistan as an *administrative state* in which politicians or "popular" representatives were actually subordinate to the higher career bureaucrats. The author served as an advisor to Pakistan's Civil Service Academy, the elite training institution for probationers entering the privileged services before 1973. Moreover, his tour of duty began in the midst of a period of martial law which was to last forty-four months. He was also on the scene to witness the re-emergence of the political parties and ultimately the drafting and promulgation of the Ayubian constitution of 1962.

In spite of all the references to a democratic political system it was clear to Professor Braibanti that the bureaucracy would be more not less prominent in the new presidential system detailed by the 1962 constitution. The system of rural and local government known as basic democracies was reinforced by this constitution, and here too the bureaucracy was given a preeminent role. On the one hand, Professor Braibanti is impressed with the efficiency as well as ability of Pakistan's bureaucratic elite. He certainly sees its role as vital in the maturation of the country's economic and political institutions. On the other hand, he is convinced that sophisticated political processes come with time, experience, education and overall human and environmental change. Professor Braibanti suggests it is for these reasons that Pakistanis were resigned to the fact of bureaucratic dominance in the country's earlier stages of growth. And it is this general condition which permitted the bureaucrats to perpetuate their self-serving superiority myth. But Braibanti is also quick to comment on the instability of bureaucracy during periods of increasing popular awareness. One cannot fault the author for not predicting the tragedy that was to befall Pakistan in 1971, but a careful reading of the chapters on the history and organization of the bureaucracy, local government, and administrative reform, carry hints of the disaster that eventually overwhelmed the country.

Professor Braibanti's fascination with legal systems and particularly the one that the Pakistanis inherited from their British overseers is obvious throughout the book. Chapter Five, which concentrates on legal research, reveals inextricable linkages between the legal and bureaucratic systems. Professor Braibanti helps us to understand why in Pakistan the legal system protected the bureaucrats and seldom the politicians or parliamentarians. Nevertheless, the author is strengthened in his belief that the bureaucracy's power is constrained by statutes, legal custom, and tradition. In general, the administrators were expected to assist the country in its democratic quest. One can only speculate about the author's impressions concerning events after 1965 — especially the concerted attack on the higher bureaucracy in the later stage of the Ayub decade, throughout the Yaya Khan interregnum, and finally up to the time Zulfikar Ali Bhutto announced that the country would no longer tolerate a privileged, elite class of bureaucrats and ordered their dissolution. The amalgamation of the services, the disbanding of the long dominant Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP), the virtual politicization of the administrators have their antecedents, and the sources are to be found in this volume.

As noted at the outset, this is not just another narrative on the Pakistan condition. Professor Braibanti's book is unique because it represents a thorough examination of available research materials on the subject of bureaucracy in Pakistan. As such it will always be an important instrument for students of Pakistan's government.

LAWRENCE ZIRING
Western Michigan University

Irish Unionism 1: The Anglo-Irish and the New Ireland, 1885 to 1922. By Patrick Buckland. (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1972. Pp. 363. $16.25.)

Irish Unionism 2: Ulster Unionism and the Origins of Northern Ireland, 1886 to 1922. By Patrick Buckland. (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1973. Pp. 207. $11.50.)

It is said that the events of centuries ago are still fresh memories in Northern Ireland. Perhaps there, more than anywhere, the past still lives in the present. But is it a real or an imaginary past? Until recently it was largely an imaginary past. In fact, in both northern and southern Ireland particular versions of Irish history have been used as weapons in intercommunal conflict. History as ideology is always a dangerous thing because it perverts the culture and deters serious scholars, who fear to tamper with popular myths. But in recent

years Irish history has been undergoing a major revision. Robert Kee's *The Green Flag* (New York: Delacorte, 1972), for example, is a model of sensitive revisionism, and one should also mention two courageous books by ministers in the present (December 1975) Irish government, *States of Ireland* by Conor Cruise O'Brien (New York: Pantheon, 1972) and *Towards a New Ireland* by Garrett FitzGerald (London: C. Knight, 1972). One important reason for the new revisionism has been the latest phase in the continuing tragedy of sectarian conflict in Northern Ireland beginning in 1968. So divisive, and apparently insoluble, has this conflict become that serious attempts are being made to clear away the historical shibboleths of both Protestants and Catholics to determine if there exist clues in the past which will help Ireland out of its despair. Emerging from this review is a more balanced account of Ireland during the years of English conquest and occupation, together with a challenge to the romantic revolutionary tradition and the cult of the gunman. There is also a willingness to question the value of the 1916 Easter Rising and the War of Independence. More important, however, for our purpose, is a growing understanding among the Catholic, nationalist Irish in the Irish Republic that there exists, in Northern Ireland, a Protestant Irish nation, or at the very least a subculture, which can no more be coerced into a Dublin parliament today than it could in 1914.

Patrick Buckland is not a revisionist in the sense of one who consciously seeks to reinterpret the past with a view to illuminating the present. Only toward the end of Volume Two does he seriously consider the importance of the past for the present. These two volumes are for the most part descriptive rather than interpretive, but they do present valuable information which can only confirm the revisionist view of the Irish Protestants. Indeed, Buckland writes about not one but two Irish Protestant communities. The first, the Southern Unionists, represented the Ascendancy—Anglo-Irish landlords, elitists, Anglicans, paternalists, a genuine upper class. Because they were scattered throughout the south and represented a small minority overall, their vulnerability obstructed an Irish settlement prior to 1917. But they were the first to realize that home rule was inevitable. They came to fear desertion by both the British government and the Ulster Unionists and therefore moved, in 1917, to protect their property and their status in an Irish parliament. Most of Volume One deals with this *rapprochement*, beginning with the Irish Convention of 1917–1918. They failed, ultimately, and were extinguished as a political force in southern Ireland.

In the north, however, the Protestant majority had a very different character. It represented every social class, from the Belfast laborer to the landed aristocracy. Indeed, the support of the urban working class helps to explain the tradition of sectarian violence, street battles and shipyard brawls, associated with the northern Unionists. Furthermore, the northern Protestants contained a majority of conservative Presbyterians, descendants of the so-called Scotch-Irish, and the historical memories of the whole of Ulster included the Battle of the Boyne and the defeat of the Catholic James II. As Catholic nationalism prospered in the nineteenth century Ulster Unionists did not seek accommodation but retreated into a siege mentality. They were determined to protect their religion, property, status and the union with Britain by resort to civil war, if necessary. This was no idle boast, as Buckland makes clear, although many nationalists still refuse to believe the Unionists meant war. Unionism represented much more than Orange bigotry. If Volume One explains, in part, at least, why a united Ireland was impossible before 1914, Volume Two makes absolutely clear why it has been impossible ever since. What Protestant resistance in the north finally earned was not the maintenance of the union but the creation of a new, six-county, Northern Ireland where the pattern of sectarian hostility was institutionalized as Protestant supremacy. Furthermore, if ever there was any hope of Catholics and Protestants making a new start in the new state, it was surely destroyed by the inauspicious early years which were set amidst the civil war in the south. It was during those years that the Protestant government of Northern Ireland, feeling itself besieged by Catholic, revolutionary nationalism, introduced the despotic Special Powers Act and the infamous "B Specials." Not until Britain belatedly took Northern Ireland under direct rule fifty years later were the Protestants to surrender those powers.

The story of these two Protestant communities is extremely important, but Buckland at times reduced it to a rather parochial and even pedestrian level. This may be because he writes from the Protestant perspective, and his most original contribution is in his use of Protestant papers and documents. The views of the Irish nationalists and the British government are de-

liberately neglected. He does not pretend to present the Irish Question as a whole. A political scientist seeking explanations in history for a contemporary dilemma will find these books incomplete. Furthermore, Buckland might well have shortened his study by cutting some of the detail on the internecine conflicts of the Southern Unionists and combining the two volumes into one. However, these are reliable sources. They do present the perspectives of the two unionist communities in Ireland in a manner which is well researched and generally well documented. They are, therefore, important for those who believe, with this reviewer, that any solution to the Irish problem must begin with a clear understanding of the critically important evolution of Protestant Unionism in the years from 1885 to 1922.

ALAN J. WARD
College of William and Mary

A Study of Chinese Communes, 1965. By Shahid Javed Burki. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: East Asian Research Center, Harvard University Press, 1969. Pp. 101. $6.00.)

Ten years after the data were collected, and six years after publication, Shahid Javed Burki's slim booklet *A Study of Chinese Communes, 1965* remains a beacon in modern Chinese studies for two reasons. First, it is one of the best collections on rural China at one point in time, 1965. It does not contain extensive data; but it stands out as a small oasis in the desert of ignorance about rural China in the 1960s. Second, Burki's book demonstrates that it is possible to collect significant information in China in the context of a guided tour. It should be examined by scholars who plan to travel to China, to assist in developing a research methodology.

Mr. Burki was a member of a three-man delegation from Pakistan which traveled in China in Summer 1965 for a six-week study of communes. The delegates interviewed officials in Peking, but these reports are not particularly helpful, because it is often difficult to know the precise material included. For example, does Table 1, Use of Mechanized Equipment in Chinese Agriculture, 1957–1964 (p. 5) include mechanical equipment used for irrigation? Although Burki implies it does, other figures suggest that mechanical pumping equipment alone has more horsepower available than the aggregate shown in this table.

The strength of Burki's booklet is the systematic collection from thirteen communes of micro-data on technical transformation, collective income and expenses, wages, etc. Virtually no other source has as much information on the private plots, which Burki discovers provide 10 to 30 per cent of family income on roughly 5 to 10 per cent of the cultivated land. Burki might have pointed out that the high productivity of the private sector does not indicate inefficiency of collective farming; land used for vegetables and animal raising always produces much higher cash income per unit area than land used for grains. The importance of the private sector to family income is, however, vividly demonstrated. In general Burki shows China's agriculture to be gradually modernizing.

One wishes Burki had "massaged" his data a bit more and looked for more relations between education and research, technical transformation, and income growth. While the sample is too small for any conclusive statistical analysis, more hypotheses could have been generated on the sources of agricultural growth.

Scholars traveling to China may wish to borrow Burki's methodology. It consists of having a narrow focus, but probing deeply. If Burki's group visited the Great Wall, the museums, schools and factories, such visits were kept to a minimum. At the communes, they asked questions in a vocabulary and in categories which were well understood by the cadres. They systematically collected information on the same questions at many communes, so we can begin to specify the diversity of experiences in China and perhaps see the vague outline of the distribution of various experiences. If other visitors to China have the opportunity to do this sort of focused, systematic analysis, our understanding of China can continue to grow.

BENEDICT STAVIS
Cornell University

The Strategy and Structure of British Enterprise. By Derek Channon. (Boston, Mass.: Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1973. Pp. xvii, 257. $12.00.)

This is a revised version of the author's prize-winning dissertation submitted to the Harvard Business School in 1970–71. It is one part (thus far, the only published part) of a coordinated research project directed by Bruce Scott to study the evolution of industrial enterprise in five countries: France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Professor Channon, following Alfred Chand-

er, suggests that there is a natural evolution of the *strategy* and *structure* of industrial enterprises: in strategy, from the production of a single item to a diversified, multiproduct output; and in structure, from a functional management to a multidivisional structure. Corporations naturally evolve from the classic single-product, entrepreneurial type to the more complex multiproduct, multidivision managerial organization characteristic of mid-twentieth century capitalism. Within the multiproduct stage, there is a similar evolution: other products are introduced, but one is dominant; then the firm produces a number of related products; finally, it begins to produce a range of unrelated products, and frees itself from a dependence upon any particular raw material, technology, or market. Thus, structure and strategy evolve toward the modern conglomerate model.

To test this framework, Channon examined the production strategies and internal structural development of the one hundred largest industrial enterprises in Britain during the twenty-year period from 1950 to 1970. This is the meat of the book, and the detailed chapters on the groups of firms which Channon studied — the "undiversified enterprises," the "technological diversifiers," and the "acquisitive diversifiers," — make rewarding reading for anyone interested in the modern British economy.

But while the book provides a very useful view of the recent development of British industrial enterprises, it also raises a number of serious questions, particularly for the student of politics. First is the way the author deals with the concept of development. He includes a neat but very brief overview of the "British industrial environment" in which he reviews changes in the pattern of supply and demand, the growth of competition, and the impact of technological change in this period. But Channon makes no effort systematically to relate these changes in the environment of industry to the changes taking place within enterprises. (Indeed, he fails to explore the most interesting relationship upon which he touches several times: the differential impact of competition on different industries.) Instead, the author seems to see the process in almost nineteenth-century terms as "the natural process of corporate evolution," an autonomous and "inevitable" (his term) process which requires no further explanation.

Because of this starting-point, Channon devotes little attention to those factors which might have initiated, influenced or limited the process of change. In particular, he minimizes the role of government. Except for anti-monopoly legislation, the impact of public policy is ignored or treated cursorily. Yet, while government "planners" have found how difficult it is to exert influence on individual firms, it is still hard to believe that neither successive governments' macroeconomic policies (twenty years of "Stop-Go") nor the detailed intervention in industry which became increasingly frequent during this period affected patterns of industrial development and change.

Channon makes no bones about his belief that the free operation of the large multinational conglomerate is central to the health of the modern economy. Government's role should be limited to preparing the way for these organizations, and then repairing the damage that they do: "Government should address its policies toward smoothing this process [of corporate evolution] and relieving the social problems it creates rather than attempting to hold back the inevitable" (p. 244).

The author argues that there is a natural and inevitable process of corporate evolution toward the American conglomerate model, and he identifies Britain's national economic goals with the achievement of this objective. The "American model of industrial society" is not the only possible choice, but it is the one Britain has chosen: "An alternative model of industrial society, such as the Japanese, also seems to work well, but Britain has chosen to use the American model" (p. 245). Channon's data, however, while revealing increasing product diversification among these large firms, do not indicate that Britain is in fact moving in this direction. What he describes is a range of types, not a pattern of development. As he points out, the largest and most important British firms are among those which have not diversified beyond a dominant product (largely because of government control), and this has not changed significantly in recent years. Those firms, the "acquisitive diversifiers," which have moved closest to the conglomerate model have done so out of market weakness, and they have not been particularly successful.

The nature of the conglomerate is to be guided by available markets rather than by products; it aims to realize maximum profits by selling whatever can be sold to whomever will pay for it. This market orientation cuts across deeply held values in British society, not only in industry but in the British political culture as well, where both Tories and socialists reject the notion of the "acquisitive society"

(though, to be sure, not necessarily "Liberal-Conservatives" of the Joseph-Thatcher variety). At the same time, in Britain (as in the United States) there is increasing popular concern with the dangers of a "consumer society." It is not clear that Britain has chosen the "American model" of industrial society (even if this accurately fits the United States, which is questionable). The future pattern of industrial organization remains an open question, and one in which governments will be increasingly involved. Channon's book is an extraordinarily useful examination of British industry, but its major premise needs to be re-examined.

STEPHEN BLANK
The Conference Board

Workers' Self-Management in Algeria. By Ian Clegg. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971. Pp. 249. $2.95.)

Révolution et Autogestion Rurale en Algérie. By Gérard Duprat. (Paris: Armand Colin, 1973. Pp. 486. 98F.)

If, as the late Joseph Levenson suggested (*Confucian China and Its Modern Fate,* [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965] III, p. 124), the Chinese Marxists made their revolution "against the world to join the world, against their past to keep it theirs, but past," western Marxism has never adequately coped with the rise of ethnic and national as opposed to class identities. Ian Clegg's work is no exception. His analysis is clear, excellently written, and honest—a model textbook for students of North Africa or comparative revolution. But the interpretation must be criticized. What Clegg sees as fundamental — class conflict in independent Algeria — can better be viewed as the efforts of some Algerians and their foreign advisors to establish a framework of political discourse for a fragmented elite. More than in most newly independent countries, public efforts to define Algerian identity were phrased in Marxist rhetoric, but the superstructure of ideology and legislation did not reflect underlying class interests. Rather the search for an ideology to guide the revolution reflected the need of very disparate segments of the elite for some consensus on national purpose that might legitimate their new statuses.

Until 1965, when Boumedienne removed Ben Bella from office, *autogestion,* or workers' self-management, was the regime's principal legitimating myth. Clegg rightly points out that practice had considerably diverged from theory even before Boumedienne's coup and consequently that the coup "was not a counter revolution in a classic sense," but it does no follow that "the coup was part of a class struggle that was already under way" (p. 134) Clegg argues that the workers who in 1962 and 1963 took over the estates and businesses of departed settlers engaged in an "action of seizing the means of production" which "can objectively, only be described as a class action' (p. 109). He admits that in most cases the workers' motives were hardly revolutionary, but still the awkward conclusion is that "they were driven by material necessity to give actuality to their objective situation as the negation of capitalism" (p. 172). Clegg is making the behavioralist assumption that the meaning of an action can be neatly (and undialectically) separated from the intent of its author.

The other protagonist in Clegg's class struggle is the new middle class which emerged in Algeria's new state bureaucracy. It is upwardly mobile, but its life style and control of the means of production define it economically as a class. "This dual formulation of an elitist life-style and objective relation to the means of production and political power has close parallels with the class characteristics of the Russian bureaucracy" (p. 115). But Clegg's formulation requires this class to pull itself up by its bootstraps and create its means of production. He admits that it existed only in "embryonic" form under Ben Bella (when Algeria was living in administrative chaos precipitated by an unusually abrupt transfer of power from the French), yet he wishes to ascribe the eclipse and defeat of *autogestion* to the machinations of this class. Curiously, he and virtually everybody else who has tried to analyze Algeria's class structure have overlooked indigenous landowners. These are dismissed as anti-Western, "not a coherent political force," and only tenuously related to Algerian politics (p. 111), yet their presence is considerably less metaphorical and metaphysical than that of the administrative bourgeoisie. In the modern sector, 8500 Algerians each owned more than 100 hectares, and their family ties with top officials were known to many Algerians if not to Marxist publicists. Considerably more astute and revolutionary than the proponents of Algerian *autogestion,* Boumedienne saw where the real danger to his revolutionary design lay. He quietly consolidated control over his administrative infrastructure, and then in 1972 launched an agrarian reform to break the economic basis

of any alliance between landowners and segments of the bureaucracy. Hypnotized by his vision of class struggle, Clegg missed a real political one.

If, moreover, the state is by definition counter-revolutionary, so also are its economic plans — investment in capital-intensive heavy industry that Algerian planners hope will be the armature of a thriving industrial society. Consistent with his vision, Clegg argues, in fact, that industrialization is "economic lunacy" (p. 188), except in the cases of big countries like the Soviet Union or China. So, too, comprehensive trade blocs "in competition with neo-imperialism" are ruled out as impracticable. Presumably Clegg would also consider impracticable, if not reactionary, Boumedienne's leadership in OPEC and his efforts to effect a fundamental transformation of terms of trade in favor of the third world. But then, on Clegg's view little can be expected of the third world other than to serve occasionally, as with Algerian self-management, as a laboratory for recycling outworn nineteenth-century ideas.

Duprat's work covers much the same ground as Clegg's, from the emergence of *autogestion* in 1962 to its reorganization under the supervision of state directors in 1969. Duprat's analysis is also informed by a rich understanding of Marxism and other political theories, notably those of Rousseau and Proudhon. But here the similarities end. Whereas the pieces of Clegg's narrative cohere in a theoretical design which may be criticized, Duprat's theories illuminate the pieces as in a kaleidoscope which rejects any simple design. If his work thus comes considerably closer to Algerian realities, it remains as difficult as these realities for the reader to apprehend. I confess to having read it twice during a period of more than a year without being able to decipher any overall thrust, and I tentatively infer the fault to lie with the writer rather than the reader. Turgidly written, poorly edited, and without an index, this thesis for the Faculty of Letters, Nanterre, nevertheless deserves a favorable review on two counts.

First as a study of ideology which tries not to be ideological, it deciphers Algerian utterances, clarifies code words, and sympathetically analyzes logical contradictions and the political or factional tensions underlying them. It does not reduce ideas to social classes or class struggle but rather seeks to understand how perceptions of class, influenced by ideological developments outside Algeria, could provide specific political references for people attempting to construct political space out of the legacy of revolution. Unlike Clegg, who reduces the Algerian revolution to verbal hassles over *autogestion*, Duprat accepts the fact that Algeria experienced a revolution between 1954 and 1962. He also argues (against the oversimplified view that the FLN did not have "an ideology") that a "revolutionary project" emerged implicitly from the years of struggle and was articulated in a variety of suggestive if inconsistent declarations by diverse groups within the FLN. One available symbol, first mentioned in a trade union declaration in 1961, was *autogestion*. Its establishment as a myth, its life history, and finally its death were significant mainly as phases in Algerians' searches for public meanings. If *"l'autogestion arrive à sa maturité sans atteindre l'âge de raison"* (p. 443), the death of the myth also closed one gap within Algeria's revolutionary experience between theory and practice.

Second, the work is exceptionally rich in political detail, relating what was happening on the self-managed estates with intra-elite politics in Algiers. Duprat gathered invaluable written materials from a trade-unionist active in Ain-Temouchent, an *arrondissement* west of Oran. He was also able personally to interview many of the workers who tried to manage farms in the area. Some of their attitudes and motivations make fascinating reading. Their ambivalence toward the state — resentment against external interference coupled with expectations of outside assistance — is good evidence for Duprat's contention that *autogestion* itself stimulated a countervailing bureaucracy. Unfortunately his data are neither quantified nor elaborated in an extended case study of *autogestion* in Ain-Temouchent. The book, then, unlike Clegg's is probably for Algerianists only.

CLEMENT HENRY MOORE
The University of Michigan

Comparative Political Socialization. Edited by Jack Dennis and M. Kent Jennings. (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1970. Pp. 135. $3.95.)

The slender volume of five studies is a useful addition to the field of comparative political socialization. Each is based wholly or in part on sample surveys. Joseph Adelson, whose work with adolescents also includes projective techniques, chose not to report on these results, which is regrettable. All their studies make a serious effort to set the inquiry into a larger theoretical context. The success of this effort is, however, at times severely restricted by the

very method of the sample survey or by the type of survey with which the authors had to content themselves. This is noticeable in the piece by Kenneth Prewitt, George Von Der Muhl, and David Court, which offers extremely sophisticated thoughts on the not-always-defensible way in which political socialization scholars have treated certain independent variables, such as age. The very design of their own study, however, does not permit them the type of inquiry they advocate (a fact of which they are fully aware), so that instead they had to choose "the strategy which approximates the ideal socialization study" (p. 78). None of the five studies concentrate on very young children, but instead concentrate on adolescents or adults, whose political orientations presumably have more direct political import.

Of the five articles, two are cross-national. Jack Dennis and Donald McCrone report on the development of party identification in western democracies. Judith Gallatin and Joseph Adelson report on the development of political thought in three nations. A comparison of the two studies clearly illustrates the differences in approach between the psychologist and the political scientist. The Gallatin and Adelson piece essentially is a learning study that asks when and how the young person begins to apply formal operations (to use Piaget's terms) to political thinking. Dennis and McCrone instead study the strength of party attachment, the transmission from parent to child, and variations therein across nations, as well as the possible explanations for such variations. Their focus — even if only indirectly — is the political system; Gallatin and Adelson's is the individual.

One of the most interesting findings in the latter piece is that formal operations in political thought seem to develop much later than they do in other intellectual endeavors. The authors conclude that "in all likelihood, this apparent lag in political thinking is a function of the child's narrower social perspective" (p. 111). Another explanation, however, suggests itself. Could it be that home and school ignore the task of "engaging" young people politically? If 15-year-olds can be taught formal operations in algebra and moral thought, one may be permitted to wonder if the same could not be done for politics. The differences in responses among children of different nationalities parallel, as the authors point out, those observed for adults in Almond and Verba's *Civic Culture*. Whether they or Almond and Verba should make these generalizations without understanding what some of the practices mean in different national settings is another question. It is a question one could direct to each of the volume's sections.

Dennis and McClure document that party identification is strongest in the U.S. and U.K., and least strong in France. Rather than look for familial differences, one might trace strength to the stability and small number of parties. Thus I feel certain that pre-World War II German adolescents would have greatly paralleled those of postwar France, not because of any intrinsically similar family patterns but because of the similarity in voter volatility. Where parents vote Communist one year and then desert that party in the next election, young people are not apt to develop stable party identifications regardless of the reticence or openness of family political discussion.

Intra-nation comparisons are made in the essays by Akira Kubota and Robert Ward; by Daniel Goldrich; and by Prewitt et. al. Kubota and Ward imaginatively test the assertion of discontinuities in Japanese politics as expressed in stability of party identification. Their conclusions offer a corrective to the frequently asserted charge of the sharp generational break in postwar Japan. Their study offers ample illustrations of the difficulties encountered in cross-national comparisons. They observe that "don't know" responses are considerably higher in Japan than in the U.S. and suggest that this might be indicative of greater political instability. An alternative explanation is feasible. Maybe genuine not knowing is of the same magnitude in both countries, but American youngsters may be more likely to volunteer an opinion even when they lack knowledge. Again, we can only caution that few conclusions should be drawn from cross-national data unless we are certain of the cultural equivalence of the concepts used and the responses received.

Prewitt and associates performed a most ingenuous analysis of the impact of the school environment on attitude development and/or change (religious orientations in this case) among adolescents enrolled in Tanzanian religious and government schools. This is one of the few field studies that actually controls for differences in school environment, although others have talked about the importance of schooling. Some of the tables lend themselves to different interpretations from those given by the authors, but the significance of the piece lies in the attempt to provide a contextual analysis.

Therein also lies the importance of the Goldrich piece on the *poblador* of Latin America.

He relates actual political experiences (encountered in the attempt to secure housing) to political attitudes, something political scientists have promised to do for years but have seldom done. Goldrich's piece also has the distinction of being the only one in the volume on adult political socialization — another sadly neglected area.

The selections have all the virtues and drawbacks of the whole field of political socialization research. None deals with the *process* of socialization; none is longitudinal; national histories are not as integral a part of the designs as they should be. All, however, show considerably more theoretical concern and sophistication than was the case 10 years ago. All are carefully executed and will add significantly to the slowly growing volume of comparative socialization research.

ROBERTA S. SIGEL

Rutgers University

British Factory—Japanese Factory: The Origins of National Diversity in Industrial Relations. By Ronald Dore. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973. Pp. 432. $11.75.)

Modernization has been considered a process that began in England and Western Europe and then spread, or is still spreading, to the rest of the world. The convergence theory holds that this process will gradually bring all societies into conformity.

Dubious of all grand theories, Ronald Dore, the well-known English Japan specialist and sociologist, has reviewed this hypothesis in the light of a detailed study of industrial relations in two highly industrialized societies. His findings will be shocking to some. He finds that Japanese workers have undergone a "social democratic revolution" (p. 115), whereas British workers have not. The result is that the British workers — class conscious and suspicious of employers — are organized horizontally by trades and are thus buffeted by the labor market from one enterprise to another on the basis of work opportunities and pay, having gained their present "rights" only incrementally in a dogged battle that still goes on with management and at times goes against them. By contrast, the Japanese workers experienced a sudden revolutionary breakthrough in the first few years of the American Occupation that among other things gave them "maximum hours, minimum holidays, overtime provisions, etc., which were more generous than in any other capitalist country" (p. 116). And even when the Occupation embarked on its anti-Communist "reverse course," rescinding a number of the rights previously given (and still not entirely recovered), Japanese industry had totally accepted the union as a legitimate bargaining agent in wages and protection of persons with rights to full facilities within the factory. Japanese industry had also accepted "the abolition of all but monetary distinctions between the formerly separate 'statuses' of staff and manual workers" (p. 119). One of the many consequences of the lack of this "social democratic" revolution for British industry is that the continuing class hostility prevents the realization of that full cooperation between management and workers that is seen in Japanese factories. Enjoying "tenure" and a pay system based substantially on seniority, Japanese workers are organized in "enterprise unions" in which they feel an allegiance to the company and work hard for the corporate prosperity. They are thus "organization-oriented" rather than "market-oriented." Seeing this as a world trend, Dore asks if Britain is catching up to Japan (Chapter 13).

Answering affirmatively, he ends up by supporting a convergence theory after all, but one differing from most others in three respects. (1) He recognizes that the desire for social equality comes to modify the linearly increasing technological complexity that would otherwise create hierarchy. (2) He finds that terms and conditions of employment, therefore, tend to be less influenced by the labor market than by what the functions within the enterprise call for. (For example, the Japanese worker, confident of not losing his job, is much more amendable than the British to being moved around to different tasks within the larger enterprise.) And (3) he argues that the later developing societies can jump ahead of the earlier developers in various ways (which the Japanese have done in education, personnel management, etc., as well as in achieving closer, and in that sense, more egalitarian, personal relations).

Still, Dore does not contend that the need for handling complex technology and organization and the need to achieve status equality necessarily impose identical institutional solutions on all advanced industrial economies (p. 419). In short, the world of the future will not be monotonously uniform for three reasons: (1) the pre-industrial histories of various nations continue to pattern them differently; (2) so do their peculiarities of geography, popula-

tion, etc.; and (3) how and when they industrialized makes a great difference.

Despite the prospects of continued future diversity, Dore's hypothesis is that the main trend of industrialism in the world is toward the organization man rather than toward the man who values individualism and "freedom." The "rationality" involved works better in large-scale enterprise (than in small business), fed by an educational system based on the "merit" of success in examinations. One can discern unmistakably the face of Max Weber behind Dore's approach here, but that is hardly comforting to people who hold dear the values of individual liberty.

The methodology used in this study is almost faultless ("apples" truly being compared with "apples"), the historical scholarship impressive, and the writing superb (a real pleasure to read). Nevertheless, on the basis of recent trends in Japanese society, I have the optimistic feeling that Japanese society has already begun to undergo a series of profound social changes that may well undermine the almost idealized (but frightening) image of the hard-working, submissive, and group-oriented Japanese labor force, described by Dore. This can already be seen in the widespread reaction in Japan to the headlong dash toward economic growth at the expense of the environment and of the quality of life, taking the form of citizens' movements, individualism, and nonconformity. But these are changes only beginning to affect the society whose industrial relations are meticulously analyzed here. Indeed this study has much to offer the political comparativist of both developing and industrialized countries, as well as those interested in political sociology and economy, and it once again demonstrates how important is the in-depth, truly comparative and integrated, study, still so rare, of which this is a remarkable example.

GEORGE O. TOTTEN
University of Southern California

Arabs and Berbers. From Tribe to Nation in North Africa. Edited by Ernest Gellner and Charles Micaud. (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1972. Pp. 448. $15.00.)

Arabs and Berbers, a work published in 1972 by Ernest Gellner and Charles Micaud with eighteen collaborators, stimulates a dualistic and contradictory interpretation. To a certain extent, it provides a representative sampling of various studies devoted to the traditionally antithetical problem of Arab and Berber societies. Seen thus, the book is indeed a logical outcome of this question. At the same time however, it opens a new chapter in the study of political anthropology of the Maghreb, for it challenges that very issue. Even in the introduction by E. Gellner, the well known division between two populations considered ethnically irreducible is presented as the outcome of an entire network of artifices, if not of a deliberate mystification. Furthermore, a reading of the various contributions admirably reflects this ambivalence: continued prevalence of the theory of Arab-Berber (pseudo)-opposition as well as criticism and ultimate dismissal of the same theory. In other words, the authors of *Arabs and Berbers* prove that the myth is still alive even as they denounce it.

"Divide the adversary" is an old formula in war or political strategy. The "discovery" of a Berber minority and recognition of its importance (or rather fabrication of it for political manipulation) date back to French colonization, to colonial ethnologists, and to the theoreticians and politicians of colonialism; more specifically, they spring from Algeria at the end of the last century. The "Kabyle myth" of the years 1840–1870 represented a primary attempt, but at the time, the endeavor consisted of a search for the "good savage" and those native pillars of colonization who were capable of helping the French cultivate the land if not run the country. By 1890–1900, there was no longer any question of an attempted political and economic recuperation of the "Kabyle" minority. The triumphant colonial system sought to confirm its supremacy. To that end, it pitted two groups against one another by emphasizing their differences. In the extreme, we fall into wittingly opposed stereotypes: the lazy Arab, a thief and ever-potential traitor; the industrious Berber, upright and loyal. For it was imperative to valorize the numerically inferior of the two groups. Whence special legislation; Kabyle representation within the "Délégations financières," that assembly of mere façade; Berber cultural politics; schools . . . and so on.

Berberism is thus, first and foremost, a political construct and the Berber-Arab antinomy an instrument of domination. What currently obfuscates comprehension of the issue is the work of the social sciences which propagated the theory and then categorized the mentalities and modes of behavior. When officially invited to prove the scientific grounds for such a compartimentalization into two races, the colonial ethnologists hardly strove

to seek proof of the assertion. To cite but one example, in 1910 E. Doutté and E.-F. Gautier exploited in behalf of the "Gouvernement général" of Algiers the findings of an *Enquête sur la dispersion de la langue berbère*, a study which proved the progressive recession of Berber in response to the extension of Arabic. Intended to facilitate the reinforcement of pro-Berber politics, the study justified *a posteriori*, a choice already made, rather than preparing that choice.

A reading of the major authors, Hanoteau and Letourneux, Masqueray — from whom Durkheim borrowed the concept of segmentarity so widely diffused by Ernest Gellner — confirms the growing interest in studying the Berbers in Algeria. And we find the traces of such an attitude immediately following the occupation in Morocco. Augustin Bernard has left us a "mission in Morocco" (in the form of a report to the Governor General of Algeria) which merely reproduces on Moroccan soil the ethnics divisions elaborated with regard to the neighboring country. Edmund Burke III demonstrates admirably (pp. 175–199) the influence of Hanoteau and Letourneux which extended as far as Lyautey's entourage, and can be recognized in the drafting of the *dahir* of September 1914. It is regrettable, however, that no author sought to pinpoint the true sources of berberism within the ethnic literature of Algeria. Moreover, the same criticism can be leveled against the work as a whole, for it is decidedly slanted toward Morocco, whereas Algeria is the subject of only four of the twenty-three studies which compose the collection.

But this French "invention" could not help influencing not only the scholars and politicians but also those most directly concerned, namely, the Berber-speakers themselves who were constantly reminded how much their life styles, rules and laws, religious policies, economy, culture and organization differed from those of the Arabs. Thus the image presented to them by the Europeans brought about alterations within the very society that had been observed. The colonized group underwent an unconscious internalization of those values that had been filtered through the colonial analysis. And, in part, this is one of the basic themes of the work: how an academic myth altered the very society which it purported to explain.

The first part, therefore, examines the "traditional base." The real issue, it would seem, is not to rediscover the tribe (and, "tribe *and* nation in North Africa" would be a more fitting substitute than "from tribe to nation . . .") but rather to understand the connotations of the word "tribe" in the Morocco of 1918, 1945, and finally in 1970. In this vein, it is interesting to compare Mrs. Vinogradov's paper on a *Taraf* Berber tribe before the protectorate with David Seddon's observations on the ethnic populations of Northeastern Morocco from 1870 to 1970. It seems that the word tribe has become a mere appelation, an administrative term with no real sociological base. The true dissimilarities then, are not to be found between Arabs and Berbers, but between groups factions, and clans. The determining factors are the relations of various groups with the central power, the inequalities of wealth, and the intensity of bonds of friendship or enmity.

Several contributions in the second part carry us further along in the same direction. Louis-Jean Duclos points out that first and foremost, the national unity of Morocco, even before colonization, transcended ethnic divisions. This unity, moreover, continued to develop despite the French government's policy of favoring Berber elements. For example, Abdeslam Ben Kaddour has shown that Berbers occupied key posts more because the French had placed them there than because of any alleged Berber superiority. With the advent of the nationalist movement, ethnic rivalries created or inflamed by the colonialists diminished. And above and beyond considerations of independence, nothing indicates that the resurgence of certain particularisms is due exclusively to ethnic motives. It is certainly not shown, for example, in Octave Marais' analysis of the political evolution of independent (post-colonial) Morocco, nor in William B. Quandt's study on the Berber minority within the political elite of Algeria; moreover Jeanne Favret's article which opens the third part, "Ethnicity and Social Change," establishes that the agitation in Kabylie and in Aurès after 1962 is a manifestation of supernationalism, of ultra-integrationism rather than of a policy of separatism.

The final section of the book is devoted to the *"coup manqué"* of Skirat, to use the term of John Waterbury; the concluding statements are made by Charles Micaud. As already stated, the major portion of the work vacillates between the desire to maintain the Arab-Berber dichotomy as a means of investigating the past and present, and the temptation to demystify that very dichotomy, once and for all. Ernest Gellner states in the introduction that he purposely allowed each contributor to express him/herself as he/she saw fit. The same am-

biguity marks the recent work by Montagne: *The Berbers, Their Social and Political Organization* (translated and introduced by D. Seddon; Preface by E. Gellner [London: Frank Cass, 1973]), as well as the reprinting of Anthony Wilkins's 1900 study: *Among the Berbers of Algeria.* Are Berber studies being renewed in the United States and in England? Are they concerned with refurbishing those concepts initially forged by colonial anthropologists? Or is there an attempt to rethink berberism by trying to understand who designed it and for what purpose? In the meantime, all of these studies point to one fact: that contemporary studies teach us less about the Berbers of North Africa than about France and her political entanglements, about a France ensnared by a myth that she herself created.

JEAN-CLAUDE VATIN

Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Aix-en-Provence, France

Decision-making and Power in the British Conservative Party: A Study of the Indian Problem. By Sailesh Ghandra Ghosh. (Calcutta: Oceania Publishing House, 1972. Pp. 235. $8.00.)

The policy adopted toward the independence of India was a forerunner of the liberal attitude taken toward the winding-up of the British Empire after 1945. As early as 1917, the Montague Declaration had recommended the establishment of partially responsible government in India. The years between 1929 and 1934 saw the evolution of a new policy, which culminated in the Government of India Act of 1935. While the Viceroy was still to exercise exclusive control in some areas, the Act set up a Federation in India with strong provincial rights and an increased measure of responsible government at the center.

Throughout the 1929–1934 period, the Conservative leader Baldwin lent his support to a greater measure of independence for India. Many in his party, however, were outraged at what they saw as "surrender" to the militant nationalists led by Gandhi, and went all out to reverse Baldwin's position. These intraparty dissensions form the focus of this work by Professor Ghosh, who now teaches at the University of New South Wales. His major purpose is to use the India question to throw light on the distribution of power in the Conservative party through an analysis of its decision-making processes.

Ghosh contends that previous accounts of the distribution of power in the Conservative party, notably that of R. T. Mackenzie in *British Political Parties,* have been too concerned with the structural sources of power giving a misleading picture of the role of the leader. Instead, Ghosh contends that "power in the Conservative party is dispersed" (p. 15) and that "in spite of his formal power, Baldwin could not decisively influence the Conservatives' decision" (p. 5). The bulk of the book is dedicated to showing the limits put on Baldwin's power by the dissent of his followers.

The author succeeds quite admirably in demonstrating a number of areas in which Baldwin was forced to modify his position under pressure from party colleagues. For instance, backbench pressure caused him to modify his support for the Dominion Status Declaration of 1929. Similar pressure forced him to support the cautious posture of the Conservative delegation to the Round Table Conferences of 1931–1932. Third, the expressed fears of the leaders of the National Union and the regionally powerful Manchester Chamber of Commerce resulted in stronger safeguards for British trade in the 1935 India Act than the 1933 White Paper had advocated.

While it does show the limits on Baldwin's power, however, the book is less useful in providing a general theory of power in the Conservative party relevant to the student of contemporary British politics. It lacks both a rigorous theoretical framework, and a statement of conclusions linking the author's contentions directly to his evidence.

A particularly crucial omission is any attempt to place this study within the context of the post-1867 Conservative party. For instance, the reader begins this book with the notion that the 1922 Committee is perhaps the crucial constituency whose support a Tory leader must maintain, while the National Union is, according to Ostrogorski and Mackenzie, a mere "handmaid" to the party in Parliament. One is therefore perturbed that, although the 1922 Committee is relegated to a very indirect treatment, the National Union's deliberations receive extended attention.

Furthermore, I wonder whether India was an appropriate issue to use in the search for greater understanding of the distribution of power in the Conservative party. Party revolts on Suez, Rhodesia, and the Common Market suggest that Tory dissension and overt rebellion are most acute on questions of empire or national sovereignty, a category clearly encom-

passing India. In addition, one should hesitate to draw general conclusions about Conservative leadership from the experience of Baldwin. Despite his long tenure in the office, he was in some ways the least successful and most vulnerable leader of his party in the period between Balfour and Heath.

A final drawback is that the book has been very poorly indexed and proofread.

These weaknesses, however, should not detract from the strengths of the book. Ghosh has provided an interesting description of the pattern of dissent on the question of India policy and its role in causing Baldwin to modify his position. He has also provided a suggestive counter to those modern studies of political power which stress its accretion and concentration rather than its limits and diffusion.

GEOFFREY LAMBERT
University of Manitoba, Winnipeg

Red Square at Noon. By Natalia Gorbanevskaya. Introduction by Harrison E. Salisbury. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972. Pp. 288. $7.95.)

On August 25, 1968, as Ms. Gorbanevskaya reports in this careful account, seven Soviet citizens peacefully demonstrated in Red Square in protest against the Soviet-organized military intervention which began the massive process of repression and intimidation that was to put an end to the effort of the Communist government of Czechoslovakia, led by Alexander Dubcek, to "revive socialism" in that country. The expression "to revive socialism" is taken from the appeal "to the Communist Parties of the whole world," issued by the Czechoslovak Communist Party's Extraordinary 14th Congress, on August 22, 1968 and reprinted in this volume (pp. 22–24). The governments of the five Warsaw Pact states involved in the intervention (the USSR, Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary and Poland — Rumania did not participate) of course presented their action as one undertaken in defense of the "achievements of socialism" in Czechoslovakia.

Thus, two very different interpretations of socialism, and also of democracy, clashed. On the one side was an essentially Stalinist, and — if the term democracy has more than demagogic value — obviously reactionary conception. It postulates that an infallible and omnipotent party apparatus must impose its will on the membership of the ruling party and on the "masses" of the USSR and other "socialist" polities. This pattern of rule is viewed by the Kremlin as the proper application of "Leninist" principles. Opposed to this was the approach of the Dubcek forces in Czechoslovakia and of the Democratic Movement in the USSR (some of its participants were Communists, some were not), who believed that to pretend that socialism could exist without democracy was to make a mockery of the very idea of socialism. These anti-Stalinist, democratic reformers were prepared to run great risks in defense of their convictions.

Of the seven Soviet citizens who defied their government by organizing a sit-down demonstration at the historic Execution Ground, near the Kremlin, five (Larisa Bogoraz, Konstantin Babitski, Vadim Delone, Vladimir Dremlyuga, and Pavel Litvinov) were tried on charges of maliciously slandering the Soviet state and social system (under Article 190/1 of the RSFSR Criminal Code) and of grossly violating public order (Article 190/3 of the same code).

As became clear from statements of the prosecution, and also of the judge (who echoed the prosecution, and severely obstructed the defense) at the trial in October, 1968, the first charge was based on the prosecution's interpretation of banners carried by the demonstrators, which urged withdrawal of the occupation forces and otherwise criticized the intervention. The second charge was supported by witnesses clearly assigned by the Soviet authorities to this task; other witnesses, who supported the defendants' arguments, and those of defense attorneys (four of the accused had attorneys; Bogoraz conducted her own defense) that no disturbance of traffic or public order had occurred, were not permitted to testify. Despite the flimsiness of the government's case, the five persons who were tried received severe sentences of detention in forced labor camps or exile.

The other two participants in the demonstration were declared insane, and spent time in "special psychiatric hospitals" under security police (KGB) auspices. One of these, Victor Feinberg, who had four of his upper front teeth knocked out by plainclothes operatives during the demonstration, was recently permitted to leave the USSR. The other, the poetess Gorbanevskaya, the compiler of this book, had, at the time of the writing of this review, been released from confinement, but had been refused permission to leave the USSR.

Gorbanevskaya's careful and apparently full record is useful and interesting in a number of connections. For one thing, like other remark-

able accounts of Soviet political trials of the 1960s, such as Alexander Ginzburg's record of the Sinyavski-Daniel affair, or Pavel Litvinov's compilation on the trial of Ginzburg and Yuri Galanskov, *Red Square at Noon* sheds light both on the progress made since the death of Stalin in reducing the inhumanity of the Soviet judicial process and on the vast distance still to be covered before anything like the "rule of law" can be said to have come into existence in the USSR.

Even more important, perhaps, than what documents such as this tell us about contemporary justice in the USSR and related matters, is what they indicate about political change in the future. Of course, the efforts of people like Bogoraz, Litvinov, Academician Andrei Sakharov, and others to promote "democratization" in the USSR have failed. However, the facts that the effort could be made at all, that it was made, and that even in the highly sensitive field of foreign policy, some Soviet citizens dared to protest, are significant. Perhaps at some future date such efforts will be more successful than they were in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

But if the Red Square demonstrators established a precedent that may inspire future reformers who, one hopes, will be more fortunate than their predecessors, their fate is also a warning. Not only was the Soviet regime able to crush them with ease, but — and this is discouraging — there is every reason to believe that the Soviet "masses" were at best indifferent to the libertarian message of the Litvinovs, the Grigorenkos, and the Sakharovs, and at worst downright hostile.

It could of course be argued that the organizers of the demonstration were foolhardy to challenge the Kremlin on such a sensitive issue as the invasion of Czechoslovakia, in view of the taboo in Soviet political culture against such open defiance of policies not only decided upon but, in this case, already implemented. However, Anatoli Yakobson, a leader of the Democratic Movement, in a letter included in this volume, effectively countered criticism of this nature when, noting that since the Sinyavski-Daniel trial no arbitrary act of the authorities had passed without public protest, he added, "That has the makings of a precious tradition, a start to people releasing themselves . . . from humiliating fear and participation in evil" (p. 285). But, of course, one can agonize over whether history will mourn the activists of the Soviet Democratic Movement as martyrs or celebrate them as prophets. In the meantime careful study of the words and deeds of the Soviet democratizers, and of the Kremlin's response thereto, is indispensable to understanding contemporary Soviet domestic policy, which in turn shapes and constrains Moscow's foreign policy.

FREDERICK C. BARGHOORN
Yale University

The Politics of Soviet Agriculture, 1960–1970. By Werner G. Hahn. (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972. Pp. vii, 311. $12.50.)

Focusing upon the policy debates between 1960–70, Werner Hahn presents a chronology of the agricultural issues that affected the political careers of Soviet leaders. Professor Hahn's approach is "to identify individual leaders' positions on issues through careful study and comparison of their statements through the years, to identify the role of these leaders and their viewpoints in disputes and decisions, and to compare personnel shifts and career patterns with policy changes and political disputes" (p. xii).

Although the book contains an extremely useful collection of data, it lacks an explicit theoretical perspective and is particularly weak on analysis. No attempt is made to relate the vast amount of information to the broader context of Soviet political behavior nor to the current theoretical discussions among Soviet specialists. Hahn has evidence, for example, to challenge some of the assumptions of interest group theorists. His data demonstrate that power struggles and policy debates occur among individuals rather than groups. A model of patron-client relationships would be the most applicable to his study, since he refers continually to the purging or promotion of a leader's protégés at lower levels of the party and government hierarchies.

Hahn's book is divided into two parts. Part One begins with the 1959 harvest disaster in Kazakhstan and the demotion of Khrushchev's supporters, N. I. Belyayev and A. I. Kirichenko. It recounts that by the beginning of 1961, Khrushchev managed a comeback and installed a new team (T. D. Lysenko, K. G. Pysin, G. I. Voronov) to implement his agricultural programs; the team soon split, with Voronov and Pysin becoming the dominant forces. Despite the chapter headings, Hahn de-emphasizes Khrushchev's personal leadership and pays particular attention to the careers of Voronov and Lysenko between 1962–65. He tells us that

the 1962 party re-organization initially put Voronov in a powerful position regarding agriculture (in March) and then contributed to his decline (in November). After the 1963 Virgin Land drought, Voronov began to oppose Khrushchev and to support the alternative views of A. I. Berayev and Sh. Sh. Khayrullin. Voronov also continued his opposition to Lysenko (who still had Khrushchev's support). Lysenko's own position had been weakening at least since March 1962 and reached its nadir in early 1965. Hahn concludes this section with the fall of Khrushchev and the reversal of his policies.

Part Two describes the conflict between Voronov and Polyanskiy (1965–70) in terms of the former's support for organizational reforms that would reduce costs of production and increase agricultural efficiency, and the latter's preference for investing more resources in agriculture. They differed also on the issue of more direct state control over kolkhozes (Voronov) versus an elective administrative system for kolkhozes (Polyanskiy). Hahn considers D. S. Polyanskiy the chief spokesman for the agriculture lobby, which suffered a setback when Brezhnev supported the transfer of funds to consumer goods in March 1967. This was later reversed, however, when Brezhnev joined Polyanskiy to increase the resources for agriculture after the meat crisis of 1969. Voronov fought this policy and implemented his own programs in the RSFSR, which contributed to his final defeat after the Brezhnev-Polyanskiy position prevailed at the 24th Party Congress.

Hahn claims that the second part of his book shifts its emphasis from debates over agricultural organization and the techniques to be used in agricultural production (1960–65) to debates over priorities between agriculture and industry (1965–70). He attributes this to the (relative) lack of public discussions of agricultural techniques after 1965, but admits that differences may have persisted within the political leadership. This seems to be an artificial distinction, since the competition between industry and agriculture is clearly visible in the earlier period (e.g., pp. 102–116), and the disagreements over agricultural policies are prevalent throughout the rest of the book. Hahn shows how the amount of resources invested in agriculture vis-à-vis industry depended indirectly on the agricultural output of the previous year, i.e., greater investments usually followed droughts or meat shortages. But it is difficult to assess these expenditures outside the context of the nonagricultural demands being made at the same time.

What conclusions can be drawn from the substantive material presented in Hahn's book? In terms of political behavior, we see a continual hustling among secondary leaders to improve their own status in the Kremlin hierarchy and to have their policies prevail. Hahn's study demonstrates again that Soviet political conflict is not limited to a narrow circle of Politburo leaders; policy debates on agriculture involve many individuals, including leaders of territorial party organizations and agricultural scientists.

One also receives the impression of perpetual movement and uncertainty among the top leaders. Difficulties in Soviet agriculture seem to stem, in part, from the inability of the leadership to implement a given policy for any length of time. Due to the differences of opinion among the secondary leaders and the inability of the primary leader to impose his policies upon them, there is a continual shifting of programs as the political situations of individuals change. To a certain extent, this is a circular relationship because agricultural problems themselves are a factor in the realignment of political positions. Nevertheless, the personal career interests of individuals, their reluctance to compromise viewpoints, and the lack of long-term programs have clearly contributed to the failures of Soviet agricultural policies.

Most of Hahn's presentation is based upon inferences from the Soviet press. Although generally adequate, there is not enough documentation for some of the speculative judgments and assertions regarding "purges" and other changes in personnel. Nevertheless, Hahn has provided a useful source of data on the relationships between agricultural disputes and individual political positions in the Soviet Union between 1960–70. His extensive reportage is followed by several appendices, including the membership of the Central Committee Bureau for the RSFSR and the Heads of Central Committee Sections for the RSFSR, which are valuable reference materials for students of Soviet politics.

LINDA L. LUBRANO
American University

Liberal Politics in the Age of Gladstone and Rosebery: A Study in Leadership and Policy. By D. A. Hamer. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972. Pp. 368. $16.25.)

This is a book on internal party tactics. It is a close-grained, meticulous piece of scholarship

of the type traditional in British historiography, and, within the canons of that genre, it is excellent. How did the party organism function? How was it supervised, directed, kept alive? From extensive research in private papers and other documentary materials, Hamer sees a party afflicted with an inability to stick together once it won elections. To this internal dilemma, as Professor Hamer believes, the party leaders bent their most determined thoughts, and not to the realization of a great vision of what the British nation should become. Men like Joseph Chamberlain argued for the broad front tactic, pursuing social reform across a wide spectrum and thus attracting wide support. Gladstone, ever the man of passion and great causes, sought the unifying element instead in campaigns against single evils: Disraeli's imperialism, or the national refusal to satisfy Ireland's demand for Home Rule. By this means, he hoped to bury the fissiparous inclinations of the "sections" that made up the party — the temperance enthusiasts, Welsh Methodists, land reformers, and the like. Conviction did not lie behind these party tactics, only a concern for holding the party together.

As Hamer sees the matter, then, a party is to be understood in basically structuralist terms. That is, it does things for reasons arising out of its inner organizational needs, not because it is drawn onward by some motivating social vision which it wishes to bring into reality. This is a venerable viewpoint, and it is here argued with great skill and scholarly eclat. Indeed, the author is summary in his dismissal of the work of other scholars — especially, so it seems to happen, that of American scholars. The result, however, is a book in which the terms of reference have a dated air. A revolution in scholarship has occurred in the past fifteen years, with regard to the way in which we understand and undertake to explain party behavior, and it is regrettable that Hamer has not availed himself of this work. Political scientists like V. O. Key, Jr. and Walter Dean Burnham in this country have elaborated the concepts of the critical election and voting cycles, which would have greatly aided Hamer's analysis. Hamer mentions approvingly, but seems unable to make use of, the work of the brilliant Cambridge historian John Vincent, who has uncovered the roots of party life in networks of social groupings in the country at large, and party motivations in a sense of dramatic encounter with bitterly disliked social influences ranged behind the opposition party. G. R. Searle, another Cambridge-trained British scholar, has written an important book whose concepts would have greatly illuminated the problems Hamer was working on: *The Quest for National Efficiency: A Study in British Politics and Political Thought, 1899–1914* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1971). Robert Wiebe, in this country, has written a similar work: *The Search for Order, 1877–1920* (New York, Hill and Wang, 1967). Of course, Lee Benson and Samuel Hays have led the emergence of the "new political history," with its close exploration of ethnocultural influences. All of this has given us quite a new framework for conducting research into party history. Books written without benefit of these new vantage points are no longer very convincing.

Thus, where Hamer dismisses the "sections" (ethnocultural groupings) as unfortunate irritants, the new scholarship would find them of the essence of party thought and action. To treat such influences as simply a matter for party tactics is to ignore whole territories of thought and feeling. In doing so, Professor Hamer has lost sight of that vision of the British nation that gave British Liberalism its true momentum and character.

ROBERT KELLEY
University of California, Santa Barbara

Culture and Politics in Indonesia. Edited by Claire Holt. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1972. Pp. 348. $15.00.)

All of these essays seek to delineate what Clifford Geertz, in his afterword to the volume, describes as the "politics of meaning" which lies behind and subtly but profoundly influences the countless acts, conflicts, and passions of the overt political arena. In a country as diverse and eclectic as Indonesia, as he stresses, such an enterprise is a daunting one, especially since there exists no accepted methodology for engaging in the enterprise and all too little in the way of comparable studies in other cultures.

The authors adopt a variety of approaches, according to their interests and dispositions. In their analyses of Javanese millenarianism and Indonesian legal culture, Sartono Kartodirdjo and Daniel Lev call upon Western sociological theory to capture and dissect their phenomena. William Liddle examines primordialism as it expresses itself in and through party politics in North Sumatra by more explicitly political science techniques. Benedict Anderson and Taufik Abdullah, by contrast, seek to penetrate long-established cultural norms impinging on

political ideas in order to explicate the ways in which those ideas manifest themselves in systems and movements of contemporary significance.

Anderson in a brilliant piece of cultural analysis teases out the Javanese idea of power from artistic and literary sources, while Abdullah traces the manner in which Minangkabau religious leaders sought to come to terms with change within their own universe of ideas.

The electicism of the methodologies represented therefore fits well with the electicism of the general subject of discussion, and there appears to be little value in weighing one against another in view of the richness of the insights gained from them all into a wide range of political activity relevant not only to the Indonesianist but also to the many other scholars concerned in different milieus with similar topics or the "politics of meaning" generally.

Geertz sees these essays as important in shedding light upon the continued inability of the Indonesians to reconcile their diversity with the imperatives of a nation state as they conceive it. This is certainly one way of viewing their contribution. Anderson and Kartodirdjo, for example, both show that the ethos of the dominant groups in Indonesia has taken scant account of divergent currents of radicalism that run deep among the Javanese. The Islamic reformers discussed by Abdullah, and the lawyers struggling for a place in social life have fared no better, and both to varying degrees constitute actual or potential sources of disaffection for any centralized regime in Indonesia. Yet, as Geertz himself points out (p. 323), "most of the larger nations of Europe grew out of a cultural heterogeneity hardly less marked," so wherein lies the crucial difference in their political histories? Surely not in the mere refusal to come to terms with diversity, as Geertz suggests, since these same European states displayed a similar reluctance (and some, such as Austria-Hungary, paid dearly for it; others may yet do so).

A good deal of the answer, I suspect, lies in the exogenous pressures which Indonesia and other ex-colonial countries have faced in confronting all their problems, including that of defining and managing the nation state itself. This is no new insight, least of all to Geertz himself, but we need to be reminded of it when we throw up our arms in the air at the seemingly irrational ways in which Indonesian leaders try to manipulate their sociocultural environment.

The great merit of these essays is to bring home to us how strong and deep-rooted the cultural patterns of Indonesia remain, and how they intrude into the most "modern" sectors of political life. They add substantial weight to the arguments of those who emphasize that the means to lasting and beneficial change in the new states lies not in an all-out war against tradition, but through a complex and selective adaptation of it. It cannot be said that Western policy makers, or the present Indonesian leaders who defer to their advice, have taken heed. Herein lies the grounds for the pessimism that infuses Geertz's conclusion; herein lies the unstated but pervasive lesson to be learned from a reading of these essays as a whole.

REX MORTIMER
University of Papua New Guinea

Trade Unions and Politics in Ceylon. By Robert N. Kearney. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971. Pp. 195. $10.00.)

The purpose of this book is to describe and categorize the political action and associations of trade unions in Sri Lanka (Ceylon). While the main focus of the study is on the interaction between labor organizations and political parties, the author also analyzes the functioning of Ceylonese trade unions in their capacity as bargaining agents for the organized labor force in Sri Lanka. Dealing primarily with post-1960 developments, the author refers on occasion to the background of earlier events.

Professor Kearney's study brings certain characteristics of Ceylonese trade unions into relief. There is first the prodigious growth in the number and membership of trade unions in Sri Lanka since 1947 when that country obtained independence. In 1948 the total membership of unions which submitted an annual report to the Commissioner of Labor was 158,178. Twenty years later, the reported membership of Ceylonese trade unions had grown to nearly one and a half million, approximately 10 per cent of the island's population. Two other characteristics of Ceylonese trade unions, however, have conspired to weaken the political potential of what on the surface has been an impressive record of growth. Most important is the fragmentation of the Ceylonese labor movement. In 1967, for example, 75 per cent of the 1,239 unions which filed an annual report had less than 250 members and of these only a fourth had a membership exceeding 50. This fragmentation, despite the organization of many of these unions into larger federations, has made it difficult for the working class in

Sri Lanka to act as an effective political bloc. Intense rivalry between labor organizations and among their leaders is another characteristic of Ceylonese trade unions. At every level of organization — the trade union, the federation, and the political party to which many trade unions are attached — both personal and political rivalry inhibits cooperative action.

These characteristics of Ceylonese trade unions, as well as the fact that Sri Lanka remains a predominantly agricultural country in which the majority of the gainfully employed are not unionized, could lead one to underestimate the political significance of trade unions in Sri Lanka. On the contrary, they are critically important for at least two reasons, according to Professor Kearney. In the first place, trade unions have organized workers in vital sectors of Sri Lanka's highly vulnerable economy. The tea estates, on which Sri Lanka depends heavily for foreign exchange, are dominated by powerful communalist trade unions of Indian Tamil workers. Public service personnel and workers in the port facilities have each been organized into unions whose leadership has been marked by competence and sophistication. Strikes by these unions can paralyze Sri Lanka's economy, and governments have had, on occasion, to invoke emergency measures. Furthermore, Ceylonese trade unions are highly politicized. Strikes have been used as a weapon with which to threaten or undermine governments, and governing parties have sought to form alignments with leaders of labor organizations in order, for one thing, to avoid politically-motivated strikes. This is especially true of the large number of unions which are affiliated with parties in Sri Lanka.

The degree to which trade unions are politically committed to parties forms the basis of Professor Kearney's typology of Ceylonese labor organizations. One type consists of party-sponsored trade unions. Established through the initiative of parties and maintaining close organizational links to the sponsor, this type of union is directly manipulated for political reasons. Organized into large federations, party-sponsored unions enroll, according to Kearney, from one fourth to one third of all organized employees in Sri Lanka. Party-oriented unions form a second type, differing from the first in that a party "cannot always depend on automatic acquiescence in the course of action it proposes" (p. 97). Originating independently of party initiative, this type of union is brought into an association with a party by the assumption of leadership in the union by party members. The third type of union described by Kearney is the politically uncommitted labor organization. It is distinguished by the fact that it avoids "the kind of close partisan association and predictable political behaviour which is typical of party-oriented unions" (p. 120).

Conceptually, Kearney's classification is a useful ordering device which may be applicable in the study of trade unions in the intensely political environments of developing states. I say this despite the analytical and empirical flaws that mar the author's otherwise well-conceived scheme. Kearney's classification of Ceylonese labor organizations falls short, partly because empirical support for his types is inadequate and partly because subjects are bent to fit the mold. Typologies of party-oriented and politically uncommitted unions, for example, are drawn from profiles of a few unions, readily accessible to the researcher, which the author describes in order to substantiate and illustrate the type. The reader is left unconvinced of the representative character of these unions, especially since the names, number, and membership of the labor organizations included in these types are not given. More serious is the fact that profiles of some unions used to exemplify types are distorted. The Ceylon Mercantile Union, which Kearney categorizes as party-oriented, was founded under the aegis of a party. While it is true that its leadership was assumed later by members of another party, the union has taken great pains to insure an identity separate from that of the party to which its leaders belong and to retain a nonpartisan posture regarding political questions.

A tendentious argumentation is also employed in regard to the unions whose profiles are drawn to illustrate politically uncommitted unions. Indian Tamil unions, which Kearney argues are typical of this category, are avowedly political entities, quasi-party in origin and behavior, and they have been consistently committed to the communalist and other interests of the community they represent. They function as much like parties as like unions.

Others of Kearney's examples are more relevant, and there is some basis for his categorization of Ceylonese trade unions. Had the whole of his scheme been more carefully considered and researched, his work would have been more theoretically useful.

CALVIN A. WOODWARD
University of New Brunswick, Canada

The Changing Pattern of Political Power in Iraq, 1958 to 1971. By Lorenzo Kent Kimball. (New York: Robert Speller & Sons, Publishers, Inc., 1972. Pp. ix, 246. $7.95.)

This is a survey of Iraqi politics. Following an initial section on power and nationalism, purportedly the central concepts, Professor Kimball proceeds to an essentially chronological account, emphasizing the period since the 1958 Revolution.

This is not a totally bad book. Most of the factual mistakes — like giving Syria as an example of a country in which a multiparty system has been "relatively successful" (p. 34) or saying that Iraq was the first independent Arab state (p. 57) — are peripheral to the author's main concern. With condensation and minor revisions, it might be turned into a readable popular account. The author usually writes relatively well.

But the book was apparently intended to be something more. According to the blurb on the jacket (perhaps not written by the author of the book), it is "an original contribution," and its heavy documentation gives it the form, but hardly the substance, of serious scholarship.

The account is generally superficial. To cite one example, analysis of the dynamics of the post-1968 regime is largely limited to standard biographical information on President Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr, described as "the acknowledged leader of the coup and the Government" (p. 144). Such a figure as Siddam Husayn al-Takriti — who, rather than President al-Bakr, has often been regarded as the most powerful person in the regime — is not even mentioned.

The book is padded with digressions into subjects that are only indirectly relevant, such as the Lebanese crisis of 1958 (pp. 88–89) and the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 (pp. 127–128). Long-winded official statements provide poor substitutes for analysis, and the appendices (pp. 185–239) are unnecessarily extensive.

Furthermore, the research is not thorough. Minimal references are made to Iraqi sources. Unwise use of sources is sometimes made; for example, an unconfirmed generalization, pejoratively worded, is made about the late President Abdul Salem Aref (p. 92), citing *Near East Report*, a hostile, partisan newsletter. Carelessness is shown in matters like using a book published in 1960 as a source for figures on oil production in 1962 (p. 67).

The analysis of power and nationalism — particularly the former — is generally well done (though unoriginal), but is essentially tacked on, with little application throughout the book. The author's claim (p. viii) that this is a study of the conflict between pan-Arabism and local nationalism — "using the struggle for power in Iraq as the prime example" — does not bear scrutiny. The occasional attempts to relate these concepts to Iraqi politics seem forced and artificial. Thus, at the end of his historical survey, the author reaches the pedestrian conclusion that "the struggle for power in Iraq began early in the history of the Islamic Empire" (p. 59).

Insofar as Kimball deals with conflicting concepts of nationalism, he consistently depreciates pan-Arabism. Whether or not one shares his feelings, the author fails to make a convincing case. One might reasonably conclude that state interests prevail over commitment to pan-Arabism, but to say, as Kimball does (p. 118), that Arab nationalism "does not play a significant role in the struggle for power" is to go dangerously far. Arab nationalism is also equated far too simplistically with Islamic sentiment. At one point, the book lists "being a Muslim" as a basic ingredient of the Arab identity (p. 76), ignoring the existence of non-Muslim Arabs, some of whom have been leading Arab nationalists.

In conclusion, this book is of virtually no value to specialists on Middle Eastern politics, although the general discussion of power will interest some political scientists. Both political scientists and general readers may find it a convenient short introduction to Iraq, but its value in this regard is marred by serious deficiencies.

GLENN PERRY

Indiana State University

The Patterns of Mass Movements in Arab Revolutionary-Progressive States. By Enver M. Koury. (New York: Humanities Press, Inc., 1970. Pp. 308. $11.00.)

Koury's book deals with five "revolutionary-progressive" states: Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Syria and Iraq. Prior to World War II, some of these states (e.g., Algeria) were dominated directly by the colonial power, others (e.g., Egypt), indirectly through a local elite and a net of treaties and agreements. All of them are developing nations and thus share with other developing countries the problems of scarcity and the challenges of development. Unlike other developing nations, however, these states, after the ascendancy to power of revolutionary leaders, are undergoing rapid changes involv-

ing the transformation of their societies into a social order compatible with the objectives of their respective revolutions — industrialization and modernization. In order to achieve these objectives quickly, the revolutionary leaders have sought to "bypass the evolutionary process of change by short-cut solutions" (p. 14). Single parties, in the form of mass movements, have been formed to serve both as a social base of the revolution and as its agent of change and of political expression within the state. They have attained popularity and support mainly through promises to bridge the "is ought to be" gap in their societies.

In his analysis, Professor Koury uses Rex O. Hopper's four-stage model of the revolutionary process. The first stage is characterized by uncoordinated mass discontent and unrest. The conditions which give rise to this state stem both from the gap between aspirations and reality and from the recognition that the traditional systems will not be able to bridge this gap. In the second stage, discontent and unrest are transformed into organized forces; the intellectuals ("the great men of knowledge") assume an important role in the affairs of their respective countries and thus set the stage for the "men of revolutionary action" to initiate their activities. In this stage, the existing order is discredited. The third stage is typified by conflicts between traditional elites ("conservative" and "liberal") and new elites ("radical"). This conflict is expressed in uprisings and counter-uprisings in which the radical elites take over and dictatorial rule is established. The last stage is characterized by actions aimed at legalizing and stabilizing the revolutionary government through the recruitment of mass support and the establishment of single mass parties. In this stage, the men of revolutionary organization "exploit what the great men of knowledge first conceived and the men of revolutionary action then instituted" (p. 189), in order to organize the revolutionary mass movements with the aid of such tools as "mass psychology, propaganda, communication media, slogans and ideas" (p. 192).

Although the book represents a useful addition to the better literature on the contemporary Middle East, a few reservations are in order: The author rightly observes that the Arab revolutionary leaders "share and embody the frustrations and hopes of their followers" (p. 138). The explanation of these frustrations is, it seems to me, incomplete if it is limited to the social and economic planes, important as these are, to the neglect of the political. The humiliation suffered by the Arab countries in the Arab-Israel war of 1948 has left its mark on later developments in these countries. It is no accident that the initial coups d'état took place after the 1948 war and that their leaders (e.g., Zaim and Shishaky of Syria, Nasser of Egypt, and Qassem and Aref of Iraq) fought on Israeli fronts. The experience of these defeated army officers in the field revealed the impotency of their traditional societies in the face of a progressive and modern one. Consequently, these disillusioned officers posed a challenge to the established authority in their respective countries, which set the revolutionary process in motion.

In a study of this nature, extending over the broad geographic area from Algeria in the west to Iraq in the east, with all its cultural differences, generalizations are necessary in order to point out the general patterns. But some of the author's generalizations are not applicable in equal measure to all the Arab revolutionary-progressive states (for example, in the section on the struggle for power, Iraq is not discussed, nor is Syria, except for the period of its union with Egypt); other generalizations can be applied not only to those states but also to non-revolutionary Arab states (as in the section on the men of revolutionary organization). In the process of reviving national consciousness, leaders quite often refer to past national glories, whether those from the "distant past" or the "immediate past," in which the nation takes pride. This is true of all nations, especially those at a certain level of national development; it is certainly true of the Arab states whether or not they are included in the revolutionary category, e.g., Jordan.

In addition, the doubts raised by the author regarding the continuity of the single-party regime upon the death of the leader (pp. 258–9) have proved unjustified, at least in the case of Egypt. After Nasser's death, the powers of office were constitutionally transferred to Sadat. And finally, a clearer definition of such terms as "totalitarian government" (which is often confused with authoritarian government), "natural group," "functional group," etc., would have been beneficial.

Despite these shortcomings, the book's important contribution to the understanding of the contemporary Middle East will be appreciated by students of that area.

SUBHI ABU-GOSH
The Israel Institute of Applied Social Research, Jerusalem

Economic Development and the Reponse of Labor in Scandinavia: A Multi-Level Analysis. By William M. Lafferty. (Oslo: Universitets-forlaget, 1971. Pp. 360. NK 48.00.)

It is unfortunate that political scientists have tended to ignore the Scandinavian countries. Although they rank low in power and population, and are scarcely exotic, they do offer congenial testing conditions for cross-national comparisons. Sweden, Norway, and Denmark are rich in data almost to a fault, similar enough to make comparison inviting, yet sufficiently different to make it interesting.

One of the most prominent exceptions to this neglect of Scandinavia is the literature dealing with the relationship between industrialization and the rise of the strong labor movements typical of all three countries. The classical statement of that relationship has been expressed in what Lafferty refers to as the Bull-Galenson hypothesis, formulated originally in 1922 by the Norwegian historian Edvard Bull, Sr., and paralleled by the later work of Walter Galenson. To paraphrase the hypothesis: the tempo, timing and intensity of a country's industrialization has been the most important factor in conditioning the character of its labor movement. The more sudden and rapid the industrialization, the more radical the labor response was likely to be, which explains why the Norwegian Labor Party was more radical than its counterparts in Denmark and Sweden.

While a number of other scholars, notably Lipset and Kornhauser, have incorporated the hypothesis in their work, it has never been subjected to any genuinely systematic empirical investigation. It is this task that Lafferty sets out to accomplish.

It is practically impossible to do justice to the scope and depth of his methodological apparatus in any brief account. He has drawn on a wide variety of American and Scandinavian thinkers: Mancur Olson, Lipset, Asbjørn Bjørnset, W. W. Rostow, Rokkan, Gösta Carlsson, and Ulf Torgersen, to mention but a few.

Lafferty's model is, in his own words, a "multi-level, ecologically-based data structure" (p. 22). It begins by developing, on the total-system level, a macrodynamic analysis of labor's response to industrialization (recast in the language of economic development) in the three countries, ranging from "highly abstractive comparison of total-system indicators to comparison of politico-historical context" (p. 24). There follows a contextual analysis of both individuals and group structures (the Labor Party and trade unions) within Norway. His third project, not yet completed, will involve an ecological-base analysis of labor's electoral response.

The study is unusually careful, methodical and sophisticated. It exemplifies as well as any comparable effort in recent years the enormous complexity that is inevitably involved when one attempts to subject a classical historical-descriptive hypothesis to systematic empirical treatment.

But it would be unfair to suggest that the book will appeal only to aficionados of methodological arcana, or that its findings are necessarily bound to the confines of Scandinavia. Although the conclusions are not drawn boldly, and while the general hypothesis seems to be confirmed, much evidence in the book suggests that factors other than economic development may have been every bit as influential in shaping the character of the working-class movement. Much of the analysis points instead to the importance of national-historical factors, e.g., the fact that Liberal-Labor cooperation was closer and more durable in Sweden and Denmark than it was in Norway. The presence of event-specific variables, such as the independence issue in Norway, clearly were important during the early period of the socialist movement. Structural considerations — e.g., the presence or absence of proportional representation, or the decentralized nature of Norwegian social structures in general — provide yet another variable of some potency. Finally, one can even move a half-step in the direction of the "great man" theory, for there were pronounced variations in the kind of leadership that emerged in the nascent socialist parties (e.g., Martin Tranmael in Norway, and the contrasting figure of Hjalmar Branting in Sweden).

The data generally confirm traditional views on the sequence of industrialization — first Denmark, then Sweden, and last of all, Norway. It does, however, cast some doubt on the assumption that the Norwegian experience was the most intense. There is furthermore considerable evidence that the putative Norwegian "radicalism" which earlier scholars had inferred from very limited evidence, may have been not much more than intraparty rhetoric.

After having followed an imposing series of intricate arguments in the book, the average reader could be left with a feeling of incompleteness, partly because this volume does not

purport to be more than a segment of the total project. But the sense of incompleteness may also be in some measure a product of the research strategy itself. The author spins such a fine and complicated methodological web that the conclusions tend to get lost in it. The findings are certainly substantial enough to merit greater delineation than they receive.

The study is skewed toward Norway, perhaps unavoidably since the Norwegian Labor Party is the deviant case, but the result is that the sections on Sweden and Denmark are not as detailed as they might have been. The book does not, for example, mention the highly important popular movements in Sweden at the turn of the century. An account of these would have added considerably to the discussion of the legitimation thresholds through which the various socialist movements passed (pp. 129–131).

But, minor flaws notwithstanding, the book will perform a real service for students of comparative politics if it does no more than expose the complexity of reality. Its major value is not that it generates new and seductive theories but that it demonstrates in a thoroughly professional way the marvelously subtle convolutions inherent in any systematic data-based examination of economic and political development.

JOSEPH B. BOARD
Union College

Slums Are for People: The Barrio Magsaysay Pilot Project in Philippine Urban Community Development. By Aprodicio A. Laquian. (Honolulu, Hawaii: East-West Center Press, 1971. Pp. 245. $9.00.)

Those People: The Subculture of a Housing Project. By Colette Pétonnet. Trans. by Rita Smidt. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, Inc., 1973. Pp. 293. $11.50.)

Pétonnet and Laquian explore two different communities of the poor — different types in far different parts of the world, using different research techniques. Pétonnet writes a vivid, thorough description and analysis of an urban housing project in France, based on a classical ethnographic experience. Laquian reports the impact of a community development action research experiment in the Philippines, drawing generalizations from a survey of an important squatter community in Manila. Dr. Pétonnet, an anthropologist associated with the CNRS (National Center for Scientific Research) in Paris, worked as a solitary urban ethnographer. Dr. Laquian, who was deputy director of the Local Government Center in the College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, organized a team of more than two dozen researchers and community workers seconded from seven different agencies. In both cases the research was carried out in 1966.

Both communities are new and both are labeled "transitional," which means that they live in the interstices of those public intentions, rationales, and fantasies called urban plans, shaped — in different ways — by the Great Hiatus between official starts and finishes, which holds the real meaning of urban space in our time.

The families of La Halle, waiting for years to get into the HLM moderate-rent public housing, dwelt precariously as "occupants," inferior to tenants because they lacked the protection of leases, remaining vulnerable to eviction for nonpayment of fees or for "misbehavior." They responded passively to their public fate as a stigmatized population stored in a sanitary container on the edge of the city by withdrawing into a social life of warm camaraderie within the project and into a personal life of extreme liberty, impatient of any restraint.

In Manila, however, fugitives from calamities of the village responded aggressively to the Great Hiatus of the metropolis. After the Tondo Foreshore was raised from the sea, and while government and business interests crept toward shaping the area for port facilities, the migrants who settled Barrio Magsaysay seized the gift of dawdles and wrangles at the top to rush, squat, and organize on government property, and to begin their struggle for title — a patient, intelligent, legal and political campaign to make secure their precarious tenure on ambiguous land.

In La Halle, one is struck by the extreme lack of political interests, the total absence of political organization, and the alienation from routine political processes. For any ordinary problem, whether it involved school, courts, or housing needs, the residents avoided intermediaries and insisted on going to the top — to the head of a ministry or even to the President of the Republic. They wrote long letters full of trust and hope to the chief of state. Questioning ten residents about this practice, the author learned that every one of them had written directly to General de Gaulle. It worked. After years of waiting, a letter to the General brought results in a matter of days.

In Barrio Magsaysay, one is impressed by the energy of political life, the extent of participation, the solidarity, and the sense of com-

nunity power. The people worked through obbies and pressure groups, stalked politicians, ısed every means the system offered, and managed to get some results. "The political strength of the squatters, arising from their unity and organization, had given them the legal right to stay where they were" (p. 74).

Feared as an explosive menace, more than 600,000 squatters lived in Manila at the time of the research, more than a third of the metropolitan population. Laquian argues that the virtues of the barrios outweigh their dangers. The research discloses that despite their deprivation of physical amenities, the residents felt comfortable socially, and 70 per cent of the people interviewed declared they were unwilling to move out of Barrio Magsaysay. The emotional warmth and security, mutual aid, and social controls in the communities not only help the migrant survive city life, but even transform him from a peasant to an urban man. Slums and squatter communities are shock absorbers, transitional way stations, halfway houses to modernity, and should be cultivated rather than demolished, says Laquian. Besides, since their demolition is impossible without immense trauma to the rest of society, the only solution is to rationalize slums, not to eliminate them. The author concludes with a plan for slum communities designed by the government and organized through community development programs. He moves from the experiment in Manila to offer some generalizations about "induced social change" in the developing nations.

Not everyone will share Laquian's faith in planning, his interest in changing motivations, or his scheme for engineering modal personalities. Some of his own information indicates that the admirable vitality in the barrio depends on a spontaneity that would scarcely survive governmental rationalization. He also suggests that community development programs harmonize the need of the community to develop its resources and the urge of the government to control the squatter settlements. Not everyone will swallow that claim. The book is warmed by the author's humane concern for the squatters, and it contains useful material that demolishes some stereotypes about barrio life. Most of it, however, reports quantitative data drawn from the survey, coming alive only in a few pages that describe real people and events, hinting at the dynamics of the community. Otherwise, the picture is static and dim. One wishes for observations of the barrio equal to Pétonnet's view of the project.

Pétonnet's study describes how heterogeneous people dumped under the same scorn—"We in La Halle" — hearing outsiders claim "those people are savages," create a warm community with common values, struggle with privations, experience space and time in a special way, go through stages of the life cycle, raise and endure their children, complain of loneliness, fight and fear each other, yet dwell together in considerable harmony. Europeans, Arabs, and Jews from North Africa, as well as people from metropolitan France and other parts of Europe grow more like each other and lose some of their ethnic differences. Moslems and Jews live side by side without hostility. It is an important book on milieux for the poor, because, believe it or not, no one else has published a thorough ethnography of a housing project. It rectifies stereotypes about project life and even leads one to speculate that some day public housing may be revealed as a great involuntary experiment with diversity. As W. F. Whyte recognizes in his Foreword to the translated edition, Pétonnet's work carries the inspiration for a new program of research — the comparative ethnography of social problems.

E. V. WALTER
University of Manchester, England

The Great Fear of 1789: Rural Panic in Revolutionary France. By Georges Lefebvre. Translated by Joan White. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1973. Pp. 234, $7.95.)

The Men of the First French Republic: Political Alignments in the National Convention of 1792. By Alison Patrick. (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972. Pp. 407. $15.00.)

Georges Lefebvre's *La Grande Peur de 1789* is now available in English for the first time since it was published more than forty years ago, in 1932. It is high time that Lefebvre's book became accessible to students and scholars who do not read French, so that they may become acquainted at first hand with this subtle and sometimes elusive classic by one of the greatest historians of the French Revolution.

Fear, panic, and rumors were widespread in France during the summer of 1789. Poverty, unemployment, and famine created general unrest. In certain sections of the country there were large-scale peasant revolts against the seignorial régime. Peasants feared for the safety of their crops as the harvest approached, and the vagrants who roamed the countryside, seeking work and begging for food, were often taken for brigands. Town and country feared

and suspected each other as riots occurring in one kind of place were blamed on machinations by the other.

But Lefebvre distinguishes between the generalized fear of brigands and the epidemic of local panics that appeared in revolutionary France and the characteristic phenomena which, in his view, constituted the Great Fear. This consisted of five or six currents of rumor and panic, which Lefebvre isolates and traces in great detail. They occurred almost simultaneously, between July 20 and August 6, 1789, and were distinctive in both their substance and in the speed with which they spread.

According to Lefebvre, the substance of the Great Fear seems to have differed from that of other panics in two ways. One was a heightened consciousness of danger. There had always been fear of vagrants, but the security measures taken by cities and towns in 1789 led the people in the countryside to believe that more vagrants than ever had scattered across the countryside. Vagrants had often been confused with brigands, and there had always been fear of brigands, in the sense that "the appearance of the brigands was possible and much dreaded." But during the Great Fear, people were convinced that the brigands were there; "they were there in the flesh, they could be both seen and heard" (p. 137). The other essential element of the Great Fear noted by Lefebvre is more fundamental. The vagrants-turned-brigands, whose presence was felt as real, were not ordinary brigands. They were somehow linked in the minds of the fearful with an aristocrats' plot against the Third Estate. Just as it was believed, quite correctly, that there was collusion between the aristocracy and foreign powers, encouraged by the *émigrés*, it was widely believed that the aristocrats had turned a kind of army of vagrants out into the countryside to injure the peasants and destroy their homes and crops. The Great Fear was not fear of brigands; it was fear of counter-revolution.

The other distinguishing characteristic of the Great Fear cited by Lefebvre was its movement. There were numerous localized panics in France, but the Great Fear traveled. In fact, Lefebvre tells us that it traveled at a speed of about four kilometers an hour (during the day). Each of the currents of the Great Fear appeared at a particular place on a given date and traveled elsewhere, along routes which Lefebvre charts in detail, carried sometimes by ordinary people, but more often by people of standing or the authorities themselves, who increased the panic by dutifully taking fanciful rumors seriously lest they themselves be accused of collusion with the plotting aristocrats. Fresh panics were set off en route, sometimes when peasants marching to the rescue were themselves taken for brigands. In one of the most fascinating historical accounts ever written, Lefebvre traces in detail the routes of the currents of fear, with the result that we learn, among other things, that a panic which started in Ruffec (in what is now Charente) on July 28 reached Lourdes, near the Spanish frontier, on August 6; that the Ruffec fear (which moved east and north, as well as south) met the Maine fear (which began somewhere west of Chartres) at the town of Loches (southeast of Tours); and that more currents of fear flowed into Millau (in what is now the Aveyron) than any other town.

The striking originality of this work, as George Rudé points out in his introduction, is that "rumor, panic and fear . . . are presented as a new and significant dimension in the historical process" (p. xiii). Perhaps paradoxically for a work with such a central theme, it is its passion for detail on a relatively narrow range of matters — the itineraries of the currents of fear — that most impresses. The linkages between the fear itself and other historical processes are less clearly presented. We can accept the proposition that the Great Fear both reflected and increased peasant opposition to the aristocracy, but other related questions go unanswered. We do not learn, for example, why the Great Fear appeared where it did but not elsewhere, why the Great Fear followed a peasant uprising only in the Mâconnais, but not in other areas of popular revolt, or why revolt followed the Great Fear only in the Dauphiné but not elsewhere.

The translation by Joan White is generally faithful, but there are some lapses. On p. 153 the word "often" in the original appears as "most often," with results that are somewhat puzzling in the light of later remarks, and on p. 155 the text does not include what Lefebvre himself said in the original version, that he assumed that the Great Fear was spontaneous and not deliberately contrived.

Alison Patrick's *The Men of the First Republic* is a carefully researched and detailed analysis of the composition and behavior of the French National Convention, which was elected in the fall of 1792 just after the downfall of the monarchy. The author, an Australian scholar, proceeds first by assigning the Deputies to three main political groups, the well-known Gironde, Mountain, and Plain, each of which she further divides into three subgroups.

Then, on the basis of the four roll-call votes taken during the trial of Louis XVI in January, 1793, and the two roll-call votes on the impeachment of Marat in April and the reinstatement of the Commission of Twelve in May, both of which could be expected to reveal deep political conflicts, Patrick examines the extent to which the groups previously established displayed consistent patterns of behavior. Later chapters examine the extent to which there appears to have been consistency between the political outlook of the departmental assemblies which elected the members of the Convention in September 1792 and that of the Deputies whom they elected, and the prior political experience, the age, and the occupational backgrounds of the Deputies.

Patrick produces a number of findings of considerable importance to ongoing debates about the character of political conflict during the period of the Convention and the distribution of attitudes among various political, social and economic groups. She finds, for example, that the Montagnard element in the Convention was quite large and received considerable support from the Plain, that the core of Montagnard strength came from the Deputies who had previously sat in the Legislative Assembly, that the Convention contained a consistently right-wing group, which Patrick classifies as a subgroup of the Plain, and that there is little evidence to support the notion that differing political attitudes at the time were related to differences in wealth or social status among the Deputies. The book contains a valuable account of the elections of 1792, and the author's painstaking research generally provides a wealth of information related to the Convention beyond those aspects mentioned briefly here.

The author, however, appears to be unfamiliar with methods of scaling or of index construction which could have been employed to great advantage in her analysis of the roll-call votes taken in the Convention. Data such as those presented in Table 5, which relates overall voting at the trial of Louis XVI to the initial classification of the Deputies into groups and subgroups, and in Table 23, which relates the overall voting to the prior political experience of the Deputies, could have been presented more economically if Patrick had given index scores to the Deputies and reported the appropriate means and standard deviations. Such scores could also have been employed to analyze the political behavior of the various age and occupational and other subgroups with which the author is concerned.

In his introduction to Lefebvre's *The Great Fear of 1789*, George Rudé suggests that the study of such phenomena as fear and panic requires that the traditional methods of history be enriched with statistical methods and computer analysis. The same may be said of the historical study of legislative behavior. But if Patrick has not done all that she might by way of analysis, she has supplied in meticulously detailed appendices such data as the complete list of Deputies, their ages and occupations, their votes on the six crucial roll-calls, and the groups and subgroups to which she assigned them. Moreover, this wealth of data, which others may reanalyze, is appended to a fine work of historical scholarship which enlightens us greatly about the Convention's place in revolutionary France.

ROY PIERCE
University of Michigan

Fifty Fighting Years: The South African Communist Party, 1921–1971. A. Lerumo. (London: Inkululeko Publications. 1971. Pp. 216. £1.25.)

Race and class are a volatile combination. The South African Communist Party since its founding in 1921 has struggled with little success to reconcile conflicting loyalties. This semi-official party history, by a veteran African journalist and party militant, was first published in the London journal, *African Communist*. It is a remarkably candid account accompanied by a useful collection of documents.

Lerumo's party history begins with a strained Marxian analysis of South African history, finding the pre-European societies in a state of primitive communism, and holding British imperialism and monopoly capitalism at least as responsible as Afrikaaner nationalism for subsequent oppression. Candor emerges with a frank denunciation of the Party's attempt in the 1920s to win white working-class support by implicitly endorsing anti-African demands such as racial job reservation. Checked by the Eighth Communist International in 1928, which ordered the Party to support an independent native republic, the Party suffered a disastrous period of extreme sectarianism, bureaucracy and loss of support. During the Depression according to Lerumo it spurned poor whites, many of whom turned to extreme right-wing Afrikaaner nationalism.

This Party history skips over the nightmarish 1939–1941 period. Always supine before Moscow, the South African Party switched overnight from a denunciation of World War II to enthusiastic support of South African entry after the German invasion of the USSR. Its

all-out support for the war won it new adherents and a modest measure of popularity, somewhat exaggerated by Lerumo. The dénouement came swiftly, however, as the newly elected Nationalist government pushed through the 1950 Suppression of Communism Act, outlawing the Party and swooping up hundreds of supporters.

The author cogently describes the Party's futile response to the governments' onslaught on its existence. The Central Committee, totally unprepared for underground activity, agreed to voluntarily dissolve the Party. Since then a new underground Party has emerged in South Africa with a legal wing in exile in London. Formally committed to armed revolutionary struggle and allied with the African National Congress (a body which the Party had fought for years as representing only the African bourgeoisie), the illegal party has yet to make much of a mark. It seems, however, judging from this book, to have arrived at a coherent, plausible explanation of its past and a new set of Marxian beliefs for the future.

Lerumo has succeeded in making the best possible case for the South African Communist Party by acknowledging its past errors and its limited role. His partisan account makes useful reading for students of South African politics, providing the documents and inside analyses on which a more balanced view of the Party can be based.

AARON SEGAL

Cornell University

Political Participation in Modern Indonesia. Edited by R. William Liddle. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1973. Pp. 206. $7.50, paper.)

The five essays and the introduction contained in *Political Participation in Modern Indonesia* examine widely varied subjects but break new ground in our understanding of Indonesian politics—which is refreshing given the near-stagnation that Indonesian political studies appeared to have suffered in recent years.

From 1949 to 1962 a bloody rebellion took place in West Java, the homeland of the Sundanese, a people about whom little has yet appeared in scholarly print. This was a major rebellion whose purpose was to establish an Islamic state. From 1957 through 1961, *each year* approximately 1,000 Dar'ul Islam fighters were killed; 9,000 houses destroyed; while the Government side lost approximately 300 soldiers and 1,200 civilians.

Karl Jackson and Johannes Moeliono in their "Participation in Rebellion: The Dar'ul Islam in West Java" examine 19 villages that had followed very different courses: to fight for the DI, to resist it, and to swing back and forth between the two sides. Three villages, one from each group, are subject to intensive scrutiny.

"During the data analysis stage of the research, variables other than traditional authority were tested and found wanting. Systematic differences correlating positively with the political behavior of the villages were not found for variables such as religious values, income, education, mass-media exposure, and density of national symbolism. . . . The traditional linkages binding leader with followers within villages and the bonds that spread outward from the village leaders to the supravillage world were found to be the most powerful determinants of each village's political participation." (pp. 14–15)

To quote from the findings of the village that fought actively and at considerable cost for the DI: "The story of how this village became involved in the rebellion is similar to the sketches of decision making for the progovernment and the swing village. Although the results are very different, the elements constituting the process are the same. The set of long-term, highly personal linkages between advisor-advisee, teacher-pupil, and superior-subordinate are vested with traditional authority allowing the bapak (father) in each dyad to mobilize the anak buah (literally, children) for action by activating a personal loyalty bond" (p. 48). Within the essay is an excellent study of what is traditional authority within the Sundanese village.

Donald Emmerson's "Bureaucratic Alienation in Indonesia: The Director General's Dilemma" is an analysis of 1,859 answers to a competition in a 1968 issue of "Selecta," Indonesia's most popular weekly. The journal posed a problem for its readers: three candidates are proposed to the director general of a state organization. The position to be filled is an important one, and all three candidates are fully qualified, although in different ways, to fill the position. The public was asked: "Who in your view should be chosen to be installed as the leader of the corporation. . . . And what is your reason?"

The respondents most probably came from the intermediate strata of politically aware and socially mobilized Indonesians, but not from the elite or lower classes. The findings are complex, and the degree of alienation from and critical view of the bureaucracy is analyzed according to many variables. Emmerson notes

in his conclusion that the bureaucracy has redundant personnel, is ubiquitously corrupt, has a poverty-ridden reward structure, is ineffective in performance, and faces monumental tasks. "Bureaucratic alienation under such circumstances is rational. . . . It is based on reality. The problem for Indonesians is not how to adapt to that reality but how to change it" (p. 106).

Masjumi, the modernist Islamic political party, was banned by Sukarno in 1960. In February 1968 the new military regime refused to permit its reorganization, but did tolerate the formation of the Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Parmusi). Allan Samson, in "Religious Belief and Political Action in Indonesian Islamic Modernism," examines one of the basic causes of Parmusi's ineffectiveness. Parmusi, as Masjumi before it, contained three main religious factions, whose religious and political outlook he explores in depth: the fundamentalists, the reformists, and the accommodationists. Much research is still required on so-called Indonesian Islamic Modernism, and Samson does note of the reformists that their refusal to subject the basic doctrine of the Koran and Hadith to critical analysis "invites the question of just how modern Islamic modernism really is" (p. 130).

The Suharto regime intervened heavily to ensure accommodationist leadership for Parmusi — that is, in favor of those whose political philosophy is more pragmatic and indeed approaching secular thought, and who sought cooperation with non-Islamic organizations. This intervention necessarily led to the withdrawal of fundamentalist and reformist support, and the winning of a mere 5.4 per cent of the total vote in the 1971 general elections compared with Masjumi's 20.9 per cent in 1955. The government has subsequently forced Parmusi to fuse into a larger Moslem party.

Eliseo Rocamora's "Political Participation and the Party System: The PNI Example" lays to rest the traditionally held view of the PNI as the conservative party of civil servants and opportunist businessmen. He provides a careful study of the changing nature of the party from its founding in 1946 to October 1965. His greatest contribution concerns the PNI during the period of Guided Democracy, 1959–1965. The PNI not only expanded, but altered its character in a genuinely radical direction. The student, youth, and labor organizations grew rapidly, gained entry to the party's central leadership, and brought with them a radical ideology and organizational drive competing with those of the Communist Party. The younger leaders were from lower social strata and, increasingly, from the Outer Islands. But the PNI-left was, of course, politically eliminated by the subsequent military regime.

William Liddle provides both a brief Introduction and an essay on "Modernizing Indonesian Politics." In the Introduction he points to how little is known about politically important factors in Indonesia. *Within* Java these include the military, the bureaucracy, the extent and intensity of *aliran* loyalties, and the influence of traditional culture on decision-making processes and policy implementation; they include just about everything *outside* Java.

"Modernizing Indonesian Politics" is a study of the ideology and political thinking and maneuverings of the organizationally fragmented, secular, modernizing intellectuals in the period 1967–1969. Liddle argues that their utopia, a "modern" society, owed much to the egalitarian, industrialized, welfarist community envisioned by Sutan Sjahrir, although they jettisoned much of his Marxist content. Eager to rid Indonesia of its "backward" traditional society and culture, these intellectuals searched for formulae to ensure the victory of "modernists" in the upcoming national elections. Many tied themselves to the military regime and to the military-created GOLKAR which proceeded to sweep the farcical elections of 1971.

In Liddle's view, the secular modernists are as far out of touch with the realities of Indonesia as was the PSI (Indonesian Socialist Party) in the 1950's. They are urban, from higher social strata, and westernized. They are ignorant and suspicious (also fearful?) of the peasantry. Moreover, their mentors in the officer corps give no indication of sharing the same utopian dream.

In sum, *Political Participation in Modern Indonesia* opens to our understanding diverse but important aspects of recent Indonesian political history. And most of its authors do so in a way clearly sympathetic to the fate of the great mass of Indonesians who are poor and whose own voices have been largely silenced by military dictatorship.

DONALD HINDLEY
Brandeis University

China: Management of a Revolutionary Society. Edited by John M. H. Lindbeck. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1971. Pp. 391. Index. $12.50, cloth; $4.95, paper.)

It is unusual to find a symposium volume in which the papers are of uniformly high quality, and which are still timely after five years of

political typhoons. The nine immortals who contributed to this volume met in the summer of 1969 for a conference on Government in China, and their contributions were edited by the late John Lindbeck, who also wrote an introduction outlining the rationale of the book: to exemplify work by scholars as involved in the revolution in political science as they are with the Chinese revolution, and to merit attention for their use of "political science concepts, methods and data" (p. xi) as well as for their analysis of China. In a codicil, Gabriel Almond suggests that hitherto various hypotheses and theories of political development, for example, have not been thoroughly applied to China. "The principal reason for this failure grows out of the isolation of Chinese studies, and the slow penetration of notions such as these into the study of Chinese politics" (p. 382). He sees this study moving toward theoretical and methodological sophistication by the "importation" (p. 377) of conceptual tools, etc. from other branches of political, social, and behavioral science.

I can imagine some equally ethnocentric retorts, reminding us of the famous London newsboy's placard "fog in Channel — Continent isolated." Lindbeck puts it the other way: "Political science has now begun to accommodate the Chinese experience" (p. xi). A totally detached observer might see the fascination of this book as arising from its nature as a report by one set of "sorcerers" on the attempts of another set to redefine and justify their role. The first set has been defined by Benjamin Schwartz (more kindly than by Stan Andreski) as "a large assortment of CIA operatives, Pentagon strategists, professional Communist experts, games-theoreticians, political scientists and others" who seek to impose their ("Western") models and conceptual schemes on the infinitely varied flow of events; the other set is of course the elite of the PRC and especially Mao and his colleagues, who have been struggling for 25 years to keep their "politics in command" — with the techniques they learned during the 25 years before, and in another world.

Under the rubric "Authority and the Masses," Lucian Pye and Chalmers Johnson introduce some of the dilemmas of participation and authority which are exemplified in the case studies by Peter Schran on control and "self-reliance" in economic management, by Victor Li on the two models of a legal system, and by Donald Munro on the two-line struggle in Education. Michel Oksenberg reveals the nuts and bolts of top-level policy making under Mao, 1949–68; Frederick Teiwes marshals a mass of statistical data to clarify provincial politics and the key issue of central vs local power, which recurs throughout the book. He shows that in the provinces and in public, local leaders are the arm of the Center — but in Peking they may become spokesmen of their constituency (p. 137). Donald Klein dissects a representative bureaucratic organism, the Foreign Affairs *Hsi-t'ung,* and Ellis Joffe describes the restructuring of the Army under Lin Piao which prepared its intervention in the politics of the Cultural Revolution and the instructive events of Fall 1971. His narrative illustrates the continuing relevance of Pye's observation (p. 14) that in spite of its ideological dressing, the traditional Chinese system was ultimately dependent on military power; and this, as Ping-ti Ho points out, has largely determined its authoritarian character. While the purely military or professional viewpoint treats ideological dressing (political work) as "guaranteeing the fulfillment of concrete jobs," the generalist medicine men naturally argue that politics must guarantee their leadership — Party leadership — over the Army and "exercise the commanding and leading function" (p. 373).

Relating traditional forms of social participation to conditions preceding the victory of the Communists and their initial success in mass mobilization, Pye notes that the behavior of Chinese groups does not fit Western theories of mass politics; they did not make demands on, or compete to influence, the formal structure of government. Their members were subjects, not citizens. Johnson recalls Weberian and other theories of authority and traces the Mao regime's shifts in justifying its power: as leader of national liberation, as a development dictatorship, and by an ideology of personal authority — the Mao cult. One should now add the revival of Legalism. What emerges from Pye and Johnson is the slipperiness of our Latin words applied to Chinese ambiguities: participation slides easily into involvement and involuntary commitment, as described by Mu Fu-sheng and Bao Juo-wang. Authority need not depend so much on a "belief system" which legitimizes, as on a justifying emergency ("there's a war on!") or politics of resource reallocation (I'm in charge to see you all get your watery soup). K'ang Yu-wei put it succinctly in 1902: The suffering from universal autocratic rule will be less than the suffering from war and chaos caused by the existence of "boundaries" between States, families and so on. Like the refugees in the *Romance of the*

Three Kingdoms" and the People in Mao's essay on the correct handling of contradictions, our cultural ancestors too welcomed a Caesar and what Richard Falk calls the "Imperial solution" to a time of chaos. But robbing Peter to feed Paul also requires force, even if you call it building socialism (Oksenberg, p. 113). The role of arbiter between resource-hungry bureaucracies and social groups may justify a policy of divide and rule, but it also creates a tension between the ruler's image as Protector of the Poor and his job as top bureaucrat. K'ang, again, disarmingly illustrates the dilemma when he suggests that his cadres, though enjoying suitable emoluments, will all live and look like everyone else, "to show complete equality." (Ta T'ung Shu, tr. L. G. Thompson, Allen & Unwin, London 1958, p. 220.)

The related problems of "self-reliance" and "egalitarianism" vs. centralized control and élitism are so clearly illustrated in Li on Law, Schran on Management and Munro on Education that the ambiguities in these concepts also appear; reliance on the masses, *tzu-li keng-sheng* and decentralization slide into the attitude noted by Lord Macartney in the eighteenth century — that any technical problem can be solved by "putting more coolies on it" — and egalitarianism slides into the suppression of what J.-J. Rousseau called "partial societies," intermediate between the sole embodiment of the general will and the marching millions. This is why, as Pye notes, use of "mass movements" and group life to achieve wealth and power for the state may have institutionalized them as an alternative to, rather than powerhouse of, development — and led to privatisation rather than participation in the normal meaning. If Confucius wanted gentlemen but got players, perhaps Mao wanted little generals, and got massive choreography. In practice, the physical limitations on control and planning of the economy led to handling of routine mainly by lower levels and planning of expansion by higher levels; the difficulties of imposing a Soviet-style external model of law led to handling of routine, minor deviancy informally and prophylactically by group pressure — the internal model. The conflicting requirements of selecting trained manpower for industry and defence of the borders *and* cementing the worker-peasant alliance on the home front by limiting social polarization led to ambiguous formulas for education, such as the combination of work and study, interpreted as cover for a two-stream elitist system by the "'Liu Shao-ch'i revisionists" and as a ladder for the underprivileged by the motley forces of the Cultural Revolution. As Munro pertinently argues, in the struggle between these two lines there was a good deal of sense on both sides. The ultimate dilemma is that the blend of initiative and discipline into which Mao tries to harmonize the irreconcilables is characteristic of an army; and the contradictions which the official media now blame on the persistence of the bourgeois State apparatus and of the collectively-owned rural sector, wage differentials, etc. cannot be resolved until the elimination of the dangers arising from the existence of other States; notably the USSR.

IAN W.A.C. ADIE
The University of New South Wales

National Liberation: Revolution in the Third World. Edited by Norman Miller and Roderick Aya. (New York: The Free Press, 1971. Pp. 307. $7.50, cloth; $3.95, paper.)

National Liberation Fronts, 1960–1970. Edited by Donald C. Hodges and Robert E. A. Shanab. (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1972. Pp. 350. $8.95, cloth; $2.95, paper.)

The comparative study of revolution is a tricky business. "Revolution" can be ethnic, national, transnational, international, and can be defined in terms of various thresholds of violence and change. The possibility of even more imprecision is introduced in the subfield, "national liberation." Does the term refer to the removal of foreign occupation troops, the psychological uplifting of a people? Or is it a signal, a code word, for something entirely different, the establishment of a preferred type of ideological rule in the interests of certain powers, regardless of the form of the struggle that ensued for the achievement of power by a given group? All these questions must be posed in considering the present volumes inasmuch as the term is used for everything from "personal" liberation (if within the United States) to the struggle of one faction, incredibly, in a *civil* war.

Miller and Aya's study is a useful, if odd, combination of analytical attempts to disentangle some of the confusions existing in thought about the "revolutionary situation," and one-sided or polemical attacks on, primarily, the United States. Manfred Halpern tries to understand "incoherence" in the modern world, and sees clearly that the various types of revolutions are neither primarily plots emanating from "international communism" nor necessarily the result of unmitigated West-

ern perfidy. The Guevaras on one side and the Rostows on the other, he argues, "have become mere tacticians, separating violence from political transformation except in the realm of myth" (p. 18). The neglected revolution — of modernization — "is not a peculiar burden carried temporarily by the underdeveloped, but rather history's first common, world-wide revolution," where most of the breaking of traditional connections is "unintended and uncontrolled" (p. 19).

In contrast, consider C. L. R. James's fascinating account of what he terms the revolution in the Gold Coast. "The people of the Gold Coast could count on no direct support from anywhere" (p. 102), he writes, as if a century of anticolonial agitation in Britain, the active work of Clement Attlee's Labour government, the continuing struggle of such people as Fenner Brockway (as he then was), and organizations like the Fabian Society, were for naught. James asserts that, were Ghana to break into civil war, "British imperialism — disguising itself in the mantle of the United Nations — will go in again to protect British life and British property" (p. 104). Such theses must be established to prove his central assertion, that it was the "people," in some inchoate but pertinent sense of the term, who had "liberated" the Gold Coast, not the British, and certainly not the educated elite of the colony. C. L. R. James is in fact one of the last of the "old pan-Africanists," the group that gathered around George Padmore in London, organized the 1945 pan-African conference in Manchester, and championed Kwame Nkrumah. Read as a primary source, for understanding of that particular group, this essay is invaluable to the political scientist; but it is not social science.

Some of the essays combine analysis and polemics, for example, Mr. Eqbal Ahmad's insightful essay on revolutionary warfare and counterinsurgency. Mr. Ahmad scores a number of points on the counter-revolutionaries of the 1960s, but is so one-sided as to lack credibility. When he states that it is "probably impossible for counterinsurgency experts to perceive the truth, for doing so entails admitting a revolution's legitimacy and their own side's lack of it" (p. 184), he is noting that his mind is closed to the many instances where insurgencies lacked wide popular support, as was the case in the Philippines (on which he gets his facts wrong in any case (p. 148).

Quotes out of context, where an unlikely purpose is served, also occur. Mr. Ahmad is convinced that "Western liberalism has been concerned essentially with procedural freedoms while neglecting substantive ones." Sir Robert Thompson, thus, "has a fundamentally bureaucratic view of the problem" of insurgencies, a conclusion derived from Sir Robert's assertion that the bias of his quoted book, " 'is heavily weighted on the administrative and other aspects of an insurgency' " (p. 176), as if administrative capacity is not central to the establishment of equity and fairness in governance.

If in this first volume some of the writers are distressed at America's alleged inability to perceive the realities of popular revolutions, in the other volume, that of Hodges and Shanab, no such concern is evinced, since such an ability is not expected. "National liberation" does not mean, in the popular sense, the unshackling of a people: it is rather a codeword for a movement whose *ends* (if not whose immediate interests) coincide with those of one or the other international Communist power. "National liberation" is no longer, for example, the "democratic struggle against the survivals of feudalism" as it was prior to 1917. From that date a second wave began, under "the influence of the October Revolution," and it was directed against "not only foreign imperialist domination, but also native oligarchies." Likewise, nationalism in the Third World "has thus increasingly merged with communism . . . it is now part of the main antagonism of our times — the struggle between capitalism and socialism" (p. 29). We learn that "virtually the entire world is up in arms against U.S. efforts to dominate the world economically and politically, if not always militarily. . . . If the past half-century is any indication of the future, then we may expect the continued mushrooming of national liberation fronts and a steady contraction of capitalist influence in the Third World" (p. 7). The changes in Eastern Europe in the late 1940s by Communist parties are more indicative of what the authors mean by liberation (p. 29) than what might otherwise be taken to be a classic instance, the expulsion of Nazi troops in 1945. Thus the "liberators" of Thailand are the Communist guerrilla movements which have operated actively in the kingdom's extremities since 1965 (without however having attracted a popular base).

The kind of double-think that such a frame of mind necessitates produces many euphemisms. King Hussain's devastating success against the Palestine guerrillas in 1971 is a situation in which the government "tried to restrict the activities of the guerrillas" (p. 102). That which is permitted in the unedited contributions by "revolutionary leaders" is often equally interesting. We learn from the president

of the People's Republic of the Congo that "regionalism and tribalism appear in Black Africa with colonialism. Before that they did not exist" (p. 203).

"National liberation" also encompasses the struggles of the "blacks, Puerto Ricans, Chicanos, and American Indians" (p. 8). Puerto Ricans, indeed, rank fifth, in numbers, of the world's "subject peoples" (p. 317), after the Quebecois, and the Portuguese, South Africans, and American blacks. Apparently the persecuted minorities in numerous Third- (or Fourth-) World states (what are left of the Hutu in Burundi, for example) do not count; nor apparently, do whole nations whose independence was lost (for example the Baltic and Turkic Central Asian states) or whole peoples, among whom the anticolonial revolution has yet to be permitted to develop (despite Lenin's promise, before and after his assumption of power, to grant the right of "secession" to them).

If the first volume suffers from being a mixture of the naive and analytical, the second suffers, from a scholarly point of view, from a lack of analytical organization. Schematically the book is organized geographically, around regions, with sections combining interviews with favorite guerrilla leaders, selections from classic studies, and exhortations by hopeful leaders eager to proclaim the established government a fraud. But the book's editors are not attempting to make a contribution to the comparative study of revolution. They are trying to foster a particular kind of revolution. Beneath the sheep's clothing of what appears to be a serious study of an important topic, is something about which it might be appropriate to cry wolf. What Morris Janowitz said of guerrilla warfare in its relation to the examination of international relations applies here, namely that "the consequences of guerrilla warfare are a study area in which the assertions of ideologists and advocates serve as substitutes for effective analysis of realities and limitations" (Morris Janowitz, "Toward a Redefinition of Military Strategy in International Relations," *World Politics*, XXVI [July 1974], 478).

W. Scott Thompson
The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

Politics in North Africa: Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. By Clement Henry Moore. (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Co., 1970. Pp. 360. $4.95, paper.)

This fine study was published long ago, but has stood the test of time very well and still today deserves a review, however long overdue. Although it forms a part of the well-known Little, Brown series of texts in comparative politics, it is far more than a textbook: it is an admirable theoretical essay and a generally very successful application of the modern tradition of structural-functional analysis to the study of the North African states. It will probably be of greatest use to readers who already know a good deal about North African history and society and to those who already are familiar with the standard literature of the past two decades on comparative political change.

Much of Moore's concern is to establish a genuinely comparative frame of analysis, something surprisingly rare among scholars in the comparative field. He seeks to show how the differing historical circumstances of the three countries—notably, their various "colonial dialectics" with France—have left each of them with its own pattern of institutional capacities for response to social challenges. Thus, while the fundamentals of ecology, social structure, and culture are quite homogeneous in North Africa, the politics of the three states are each highly distinctive.

Professor Moore, in his own independent way, is very much an heir to the tradition of modern comparative theory established by the likes of Easton, Almond, Deutsch, and Huntington, in his preoccupation with the differentiation and interplay of inputs and outputs and in his efforts to gauge the mechanisms of stability in each political system. His membership in this tradition leads him naturally to share in its main virtues and problems. In North Africa, where each of the regimes has now lasted a very long time by contemporary world standards and, moreover, seems acutely conscious of the requisites of survival, it is instructive to learn in some detail from Moore how the art of survival is practiced in each instance and what the general rules of policy are that it imposes on each ruler. Bourguiba in Tunisia, for instance, with his strong Destourian Socialist Party and commitment to modernization, was pretty much impelled during the first dozen years of independence to keep seeking opportunities to expand his regime's impact on the wider population, while King Hassan of Morocco has sought to keep it to a minimum and Boumedienne in Algeria has been highly selective.

It is likewise useful to follow Moore's tracing of the varying capabilities of the three governments in the "extractive," "regulatory," "distributive," and "symbolic" realms (e.g., respectively, tax-collections, reform, social

services, propaganda), and the relationship of their performances to the measure of support to be had from their narrow or extended "stability groups" and "core combinations" (terms which he has borrowed from Ilchman and Uphoff). With the aid of such concepts, plus an encyclopedic store of information, Moore is able to explain in systematic fashion how King Hassan's search for widespread but scattered, and competitive, elements of support in the society (his "stability group," i.e., all those whose more or less passive support provides the basis of his legitimacy) has meant that his "core combination" of active collaborators is less close-knit and reliable than those of Boumedienne and Bourguiba. Boumedienne cultivates an extended stability group so little, and relies on the support of a homogeneous inner circle so heavily, that he is all the more free to make unfettered rational choices in economic policy, such as the heavy priority given to industrialization at the expense of agriculture, employment, and consumption. Thus Algeria is by no means the mobilization regime it is cracked up to be.

On the other hand, perhaps Moore's preoccupation with mechanisms of equilibrium, however much it may be shared by the North African political actors themselves, gives us a picture that is a little too narrow and a little too tidy. Is the process of self-maintenance necessarily the most significant thing worth exploring in the political systems of North Africa? And how do we gear our understanding of these countries to such important but unpredictable events as a senile president's clinging to office in Tunisia, the windfall for national budgets of oil and phosphate price rises, or the spectacularly futile attempts of conservative Moroccan army officers to eliminate their conservative king?

MALCOLM H. KERR
University of California, Los Angeles

Mixed Enterprise: A Developmental Perspective. By Lloyd D. Musolf. (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Company, 1972. Pp. 172. $10.00.)

How do governments make use of the various possible relationships between government and private enterprise for economic and consequently social and political development? This constitutes an important problem area, and the author breaks new ground in surveying it. In between purely public and private enterprises a significant variety exists of combinations of industrial relationships relevant for economic development planning. The concept "mixed enterprise" is reserved for domestic, intersectoral firms whose ownership is shared between the public and private sector. It is thus distinguished from multinational and even joint enterprises in which the sharing of ownership may be absent.

Professor Musolf usefully points out that economic development involves a choice about the public/private-sector mix, and his survey of strategies in nine countries can provide itself a measure of economic development philosophies. Furthermore, in exploring the impact of mixed enterprise on economic development, he examines the relationship between mixed enterprises and a number of important political questions such as: Can an influence equilibrium between the public and private partners be maintained once established? (He thinks not.) Will the government sector dominate the private sector in less-developed countries? (He thinks so.) And, what happens to mixed enterprises over time in the development process? (He thinks they probably decline.) In order to address these issues the author surveys the basic relationships between government and the economy—why and how is government interested in economic planning and commercial ventures? How is public enterprise related to national development?

The author's general survey of government enterprises is an important contribution, and the author well describes the current varieties of relationships between public enterprises and economic development planning. The remainder of the volume is devoted to surveys of mixed enterprise strategies in a number of countries. We learn, for example, that nonideological economic development goals dominated the history of mixed enterprise. Mixed enterprise emerged inductively from failures and weaknesses in private enterprise. The Japanese, especially, were successful in forming enterprises and transferring them to the private sector. The Pakistanis have not been as successful in a similar effort, and India, for ideological reasons, has not allowed private participation in government-initiated enterprises even when such participation has been urged. Israel, Taiwan, and Mexico have been more "successful" at using mixed enterprise in their national economic planning, while mixed enterprise has not been used much in the United States until very recently.

The main problem with the volume is the absence of a structuring principle, a set of theoretical criteria for choosing the countries selected for the survey. At a minimum, to test

the impact of public and mixed enterprise on national development, it would be useful to select countries at similar levels of "development," both with and without mixed enterprise. Essentially, the volume is descriptive and introductory. My central quarrel is with the author's treatment of development. Surely, the author could have gone beyond vaguely equating industry and finance with modernization. And exactly what kinds of basic questions can we address through learning about the public/private sector? The author alludes to the success of the "Japanese pattern" of beginning enterprises and then transferring them to the private sector. But unless the author controls for a host of exogenous dimensions, e.g., the degree of political institutionalization, the rate and sequence of change in the Japanese case, what do we learn?

Despite these reservations I believe that the author has provided a service by addressing an important set of issues in a development context.

ROGER W. BENJAMIN
University of Minnesota

Rural Thai Government: The Politics of the Budgetary Process. By Clark D. Neher. (DeKalb, Ill.: Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Northern Illinois University, 1972. Pp. 63. $3.00 paper.)

The budgetary processes of local government institutions in Thailand have received little attention to date, and this brief monograph represents a useful attempt to fill a gap in an important aspect of Thai government and politics. Based on his research in Chiang Mai province of northern Thailand, Professor Neher presents conclusions on the overall structure of local government organizations and then illustrates the process of budgetary allocation for local development projects through case studies in two communes (*tambon*) of two different districts of this province.

The monograph contains a review of the formal structure of local administration. Neher concentrates on techniques by which the commune council (*sapha tambon*) allocated revenues made available to it through local land taxes. Failure to mention the various roles of the Village and Tambon Development Committees sponsored (and supported financially) by the Community Development Department is surprising; these committees also allocate financial resources (from the CD budget) for local development projects, and often have an over-lapping membership with the commune council.

Greater difficulties arise from Professor Neher's emphasis on the "local government budget." The impact of the budgetary process on the residents of rural Thailand is determined far more by decisions on how to allocate central government revenues within any particular province or district than by decisions of the commune council on allocation of the relatively minuscule amount of money at their disposal during the period under study. Analysis of budgetary politics needs to include the vastly larger amount of construction project activity under way through the various agencies, and budgets, of the central government: roads, wells, irrigation facilities, all the rest. A detailed focus on allocation of 11,700 baht (about $585) for one year by the council in one commune fails to supply the necessary perspective.

Nevertheless, Neher's descriptions of the council meetings in which project priorities for the coming year are determined provides useful insights into rural Thai politics: the relative roles of the District Officer, local politicos, and ordinary villagers; the degree of lobbying and particularistic interest-group pressures; the extent of information available to participants; villager expectations for certain kinds of responses and results when dealing with officials of the central government. As political participation increases in rural Thailand, which has happened in many areas since overthrow of the nation's military rulers in October 1973, these issues gain in relevance to the broader study of Thai politics.

Professor Neher's study of rural budgetary procedures and the role of commune councils became more important as a result of allocation decisions made in the spring of 1975 by the newly elected civilian coalition government headed by M. R. Kukrit Pramoj. In order to gain additional support in the House of Representatives and accelerate political decentralization, the new Prime Minister announced a special fund of $125 million (2.5 billion baht) to be made available for rural development projects—$25,000 (500,000 baht) for each *tambon*. These monies are being allocated by commune councils such as those studied by Neher; neither the District Officer nor others in the central government's bureaucracy can override the decisions of this local government institution. This is infinitely more money than these rural leaders have ever before had available on which to exercise their budgetary and political priorities; and the sum was increased to 3.5 billion baht in the 1976 national budget. This monograph, by

providing insights into how these institutions allocated some 10,000 baht per year, gives us a better basis for understanding the problems and potential in allocating fifty times this amount under Kukrit's innovative and controversial new effort.

DAVID MORELL
Princeton University

Socialist, Anti-Semite, and Jew: German Social Democracy Confronts the Problem of Anti-Semitism, 1918–1933. By Donald L. Niewyk. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1971. Pp. x, 254. $8.95.)

The extent to which anti-Semitism permeated various segments of German society in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has proved to be an extremely complex question and may be impossible to answer definitely. The increasing intensity with which anti-Semitic policies were pursued by the National Socialist regime after 1933, culminating in the murder of at least five million European Jews, left the understandable but unproved impression that all Germans either hated Jews or at best were indifferent to their past persecutions and contemporary suffering. It is this larger problem that has motivated Donald Niewyk to address himself to the more manageable task of describing the "attitudes and actions" of German Social Democrats toward Jews and anti-Semitism during the years of the Weimar Republic. If the implications of this study hold up, then a very substantial segment of German society was free of anti-Semitic prejudices.

Two themes are central to Niewyk's work. The first is that the Social Democratic party consistently and vigorously opposed Judeophobia and promoted friendly relations with the Jewish community. Although he does present evidence of a few anti-Semitic statements by socialists, Niewyk concludes emphatically that "the marginal infiltration of anti-Jewish opinions among individual Social Democrats remained almost unmeasurable" (p. 210). This point is made repeatedly as Niewyk documents how Social Democrats responded to anti-Semitic propaganda and other attacks on Jews. The second theme is more interpretive. While Social Democrats rejected anti-Semitism, Niewyk argues that they underestimated its seriousness and significance. They failed to understand that anti-Semites did in fact hate Jews as Jews. The Social Democratic misunderstanding rested on an erroneous explanation — the "plot theory" — that maintained that Jews were "merely convenient scapegoats" and that the actual goal of anti-Semites was to destroy the Weimar Republic and the Social Democratic Party. Although a few Social Democrats leaned toward other theories, for example, psychological interpretations of Judeophobia, the "plot theory" was never dropped, and, the author concludes, it blinded socialists from seeing the genuine danger in anti-Semitism.

The central points have been made judiciously, but some aspects of the book are not entirely satisfying. As Niewyk himself admits, his evidence is not adequate to demonstrate that rank-and-file Social Democrats fully and always agreed with the party's denunciations and explanations of anti-Semitism. On this issue, the limits of Niewyk's narrow documentary approach are evident. He is too inclined to treat anti-Semitism chiefly in terms of doctrinal and policy statements and does too little to approach it as a multifaceted phenomenon involving a web of emotions that may be felt but not necessarily acted upon. The author hardly touches on the psychological complexities embedded in anti-Semitism. One longs for more analysis that differentiates kinds and levels of Judeophobia. On another matter, greater attention to attitudes found in the Communist party would have created a larger context for evaluating the opinions to which organized labor as a whole was exposed. Finally, since Social Democratic thinking on anti-Semitism and Jews did not change dramatically during the years of the Weimar Republic, there is a dulling sense of repetitiousness as the story proceeds. This sense is compounded by an organizational scheme that is itself repetitious. But Niewyk's study is, within its range, sound and reliable, offering a fine beginning for further exploration and refinements on Social Democratic sentiments on anti-Semitism.

VERNON L. LIDTKE
The Johns Hopkins University

Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science. By Robert A. Packenham. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1973. Pp. xxii, 395. $15.00.)

Robert Packenham epigrammatically summarizes as follows the key ideas of American "liberal myopia" as they have been applied to foreign aid and other interventionist policies since World War II: Change and Development Are Easy; All Good Things Go Together; Radicalism and Revolution Are Bad; Distributing Power Is More Important Than Accumulating Power. He then goes on to show us how these principles undergird both the *doctrines* of the

practitioners of foreign aid and the social science *theories* pertaining to political development. The author makes a good case that the best framework for understanding doctrines and theories of foreign assistance between 1947 and 1968 (and later?) is provided by writers like Louis Hartz, Daniel Boorstin, David Potter, Carl Degler, and others who have explicated this country's unique experience with the liberal tradition.

The shift of attention from Western Europe to the Third World did involve the astonishing assumption that relatively small economic inputs would produce enormous transformations. Somewhat dizzied by the successes of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, we developed strategies of intervention elsewhere that were based on profoundly unrealistic notions of multiplier effects in economic aid programs. Furthermore, our commitment to such premises and to the assumptions the author describes were so strong, we were unable to interpret rapidly enough when our interventionist policies were doomed and equally unable to adapt when boomerang effects upset our own domestic equilibrium.

Often as not our policies encouraged abroad increases in instability, radicalism and violence. Finding our impulses to build democratic mirror images frustrated, we tended to support any regime, however conservative or reactionary, that would at least spare us the additional frustration and fear produced by political instability and radical movements. This posture was as true of the Kennedy years as it was of the presidential policies that preceded and followed him. Rhetoric and preachments about democracy aside, the Kennedy administrative practice heavily confirmed that national security, anticommunism, and economic development were much higher-priority goals than the encouragement of democratic regimes. Our model of democracy was itself distressingly parochial, too often overstressing populistic norms, too uncritically wedded to the American liberal idea that checks, balances, decentralization, and other methods of distributing rather than accumulating or concentrating power were desirable.

As an example of this last point, Professor Packenham discusses the so-called Fraser Amendment which was incorporated as Title IX of the Foreign Assistance Act. Title IX represented the first time that explicit political goals were written into foreign assistance legislation. Packenham notes the amendment's emphasis on local government and political participation in voluntary associations and in local developmental schemes. Despite his personal experience in Washington, the author seems to have missed two critical aspects of the wording and intention of Title IX. First, the emphasis on local rather than national government and politics was designed to avoid trouble with congressmen (and perhaps national leaders abroad) who would not endorse overt language about our intentions to affect *national* government. It did not in this sense reflect one of the four liberal norms. Second, Title IX itself is a very good example of the influence (for better or worse) of academic theorists on those who make and try to implement public policy. As such its existence runs counter to what the author has to say about the impact of the theorists on the practitioners.

The description of the relationship between these two groups — the officials who make and apply doctrines and the professors who spin and try to sell theories — constitutes the most interesting, troublesome, and provocative aspect of this book. Packenham offers us an intriguing, somewhat contradictory interpretation of the relationship between the social scientists who were interested in political development and the officials who administered foreign aid for two decades. As theorists and as individuals, he says these scholars had little influence; indeed most of them (including the most luminous names in the academic firmament) were not well connected and were largely unknown in Washington (pp. 243–249). Whatever may have been going on in the academy (and Packenham finds astonishingly more intellectual agreement there than was or is the case), theories of political development were more ignored than utilized in our foreign policy. Furthermore, he says, "The theories not only *were not* used very much; they also *should not* have been used very much because they had little to offer policymakers and could not have improved policy a great deal even if they had been more widely employed" (p. 254).

I think Packenham is right, not only because (as many of us were saying in the very literature Packenham examines, or examines in part) the conceptual status of the political development literature is a highly parochial Tower of Babel. The so-called theories of political systems and development for the most part are not theories at all. These formulations are made at so great a level of abstraction as to put off any policy maker who, unlike some undergraduates, will quickly see the poverty of high-flown abstractions, cosmic classification schemes, and simplistic platitudes about government that often masquerade as policy ad-

vice. It is a pity that Packenham did not pay more attention to the differences among the social scientists whom he has too readily lumped together.

Packenham then says that these same academic elites *did* have an impact on policy makers, not so much as individuals but as representatives of organizations like Rand, Brookings, or the Council on Foreign Relations; as consultants, researchers, and conference organizers associated with a handful of universities headed by Harvard, MIT, and Yale and financed by the leading American foundations. That influence turns out to be, in the author's view, a sheer abdication of the responsibility of the social scientist. Rather than criticize and provide alternatives to leading policy doctrines, the social scientist supports them; rather than challenge what the policy maker does he endows these things with legitimacy. Far from suggesting conspiracy or even strong patterns of cooptation, Packenham notes that when social scientists and government officials see themselves as jointly involved in a common endeavor "the government does not need to coerce or buy off the social scientists in order to inhibit criticism." The liberal tradition blunts conflict by making these elites ideological bedfellows (p. 303).

Packenham goes on from here to weaken his own argument and indeed to erode away the generous and self-critical impulse that underlies the book itself. For example, he says (p. 306) that the social scientist should be neither a critic nor an advocate but should "search for truth." Yet this is part and parcel of the behavioral posture of some scholars that leads, as Packenham himself shows, to advocacy masquerading as scientific truth, and to a neglect and abandonment of the *critical* function which necessarily and always must have an underlying normative base. It seems to me well established in our theory if not in our practice of social science that a critical skepticism toward things as they are in society is essential.

The book's concluding pages are the most revealing. Having lamented the abstracted empiricism and the prescriptive arrogances he finds in the political development literature, the author defines political development as *"the will and capacity to cope with and to generate continuing transformation toward whichever values seem appropriate in the particular context"* (p. 338, italics in original). Appropriate to whom? Not specified. What values? Economic development, personal freedom, and socioeconomic justice. In that order? Well, that depends, because if there is too sharp a conflict with personal freedom, " . . . it might be necessary to accept lower rates of progress in economic development and socio-economic justice." (p. 339).

Which is exactly where many of us started before the intellectual homogeneity Packenham deplores began to break apart. Packenham himself seems to be showing us exactly how thick are the liberal blinders he has explored. He leaves us with the true but nevertheless scarcely reassuring direction that "ultimately, discovering satisfactory new paradigms and ideologies will probably require original research, a penetrating vision, a powerful creative thrust, rigor, logic, with a capacity for integration and synthesis" (p. 358).

Who wants to lead off?

JOSEPH LAPALOMBARA
Yale University

Yugoslav Communism and the Macedonian Question. By Stephen E. Palmer, Jr. and Robert R. King. (Hamden, Conn.: The Shoe String Press [Archon Books] 1971. Pp. 247. $10.00.)

Tito's break with Stalin in 1948 brought with it many revelations of disputes that had been hidden behind the curtain of the proclaimed fraternal solidarity of the socialist regimes and communist parties. One such dispute, perhaps the most bitter, was the historic Macedonian question in modern Marxist dress. It had been a part of the secret history of the guerrilla activity in the Balkans during World War II, the subject of high-level negotiation and of decisions by the Comintern and by Stalin himself, and the central — and insoluble — element in plans for Balkan or South Slav federation debated endlessly by Communist leaders before, during, and after the war. The Macedonian question was used by the Communist powers against Greece at the time of the civil war in that country, but when the break with Tito came, Stalin chose to use it against Yugoslavia, and the Bulgarian leadership was only too glad to play that game. Tito fought back, the conflict over Macedonia came out into the open, and it has been there ever since.

Stephen Palmer is a Foreign Service Officer who served in Belgrade and in Sarajevo in the 1950s, the time when much of the new material on relations among the Communist regimes was being published. The hitherto secret history of the Macedonian question was brought to light in a series of publications of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ),

notably in volume VII of *Istorijski Arhiv KPJ* and in the records of the first congress of the Communist Party of Macedonia held in 1949. Palmer during a year's leave at Indiana University made full use of this material to write a monograph for Western readers. His manuscript, a well-written study on a subject of both historical and contemporary significance, encountered massive indifference on the part of American commercial and academic publishing houses. Apparently Macedonia was a far-away land of which we knew, and needed to know, nothing. Over a decade later, with Robert R. King of Radio Free Europe as co-author, the book finally made its appearance in 1971. King, a first-rate scholar, has drawn on his own extensive knowledge of nationality questions in southeastern Europe to enlarge the study and bring it through the 1960s. It does not, however, go very deeply into the political battles and press campaigns of those later years, in which the Macedonian question has been a barometer of Yugoslav-Bulgarian and Yugoslav-Soviet relations.

The heart of the book is still Palmer's original portrayal of the strategy Tito developed to establish the primacy of his partisan movement in the Vardar valley during the war and to keep Macedonia within Yugoslavia thereafter. This book does not give the last word on this subject — new material has now appeared in the recently published memoirs of Vukmanović-Tempo, the executor of Tito's wartime strategy in Macedonia, and in the work of the Yugoslav journalist and historian, Slobodan Nešović, on Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations. Nevertheless it tells the story clearly, and with a rare understanding of the complex pattern of Communist politics superimposed on Balkan realities. The authors' long acquaintance with Communist methods and jargon and their understanding of the historical background of the Macedonian question (in so far as it can be comprehensible to anyone) serve them well.

They give full credit to the foresight of Tito and his colleagues in choosing to go all out in support of a "Macedonian nationality," and thus not only to atone for the Great Serb imperialism of Yugoslavia's past but also to undermine the Macedonian-Bulgarian sentiment which had seemed the only alternative. Although the Yugoslavs were not able to extend their Macedonian Republic to include ethnic brothers beyond the old frontiers of the Yugoslav state — and the fear that they would do so confirmed Greece and Bulgaria in their position that no people of Macedonian nationality existed on their side of the border — nevertheless, the creation of the Macedonian Republic as one of the six constituent republics of the federated Yugoslav state was a master stroke. How big a gamble it was, and perhaps still is, appears from the authors' frank conclusion that they do not know whether in fact a Macedonian nationality exists. The Communist leaders of Yugoslavia and of the Macedonian Republic have labored mightily to create that nationality, and their handling of internal and international questions over the past generations has given them the appearance of success.

In the present international configuration, things are likely to remain as they are. But if one considers some of the possibilities — say, a striking Soviet success in disrupting a post-Tito Yugoslavia or bringing it back within the fold, or a Soviet failure to hold Bulgaria as a subservient ally — then the old questions about Macedonia would rise again: conflict among the Balkan states over where the frontiers should be and where the Macedonians belong; or the age-old dream of Balkan federation in which a united Macedonia should have its place.

JOHN C. CAMPBELL
Council on Foreign Relations, New York

Modernizzazione e Sviluppo Politico. By Gianfranco Pasquino. (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1970. Pp. 304. Lire 4000.)

Militari e Potere in America Latina. By Gianfranco Pasquino. (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1974. Pp. 288. Lire 5000.)

In the first of these two books Professor Gianfranco Pasquino, of the Universities of Bologna and Florence, summarizes and interprets for the Italian reader the bulk of theoretical American literature on comparative politics. He makes an earnest attempt at integrating the various trends of thought in the "political development school," and spends a good deal of time finding out whether they are value free or not. The first three chapters, dedicated to this theme, are therefore quite ambitious but not very successful in fulfilling their aim. The remaining ones offer detailed and quite useful accounts of the thinking of Samuel Huntington, Gabriel Almond, and David Apter. For the Italian reader not yet prepared to cope with the texts themselves this work can be useful as a general introduction. For those already familiar it can provide a stimulating critique.

In his other book, on the military in Latin America, Pasquino comes to grips with a spe-

cific problem, and makes a more original contribution toward understanding it. The focus is theoretical and comparative, centered on four countries: Argentina, Peru, Chile, and Brazil. There is a chapter for each of these countries, covering the recent decades of its history. A good description of the facts is given, intertwined with theoretical interpretations and hypotheses of the middle range type. This combination, not very common and not at all easy to achieve, makes the book useful not only for courses on Latin America but also for others of a more general nature. The author's approach seems to be a mixture of the "political development theory" plus a sort of implicit neo-Marxism, reasonable in its exposition but quite radical in some of its conclusions. Secondary sources are used, not very deep in detailed information but solid enough in themselves.

The Argentine chapter is particularly successful in integrating propositional analysis with facts. The rapidity of socioeconomic changes and expansion of political participation are put in the forefront as causes of political decay in that country. Following Germani, Pasquino links the mobilization of internal migrants to the spread of *peronismo*. Pasquino analyzes the social origins of the Armed Forces while indicating that what happens to the military is not only a military problem, or a result of characteristics of that group, but also the outcome of tensions in other parts of society (p. 51).

The professionalization of the armed forces reappears in the various country studies and in the final theoretical summary as a central variable. As they become more technically competent, passing through advanced schools and seminars, the military acquire greater confidence in themselves and in their capacity to perform some of the tasks left undone by other social classes. The "permanent takeover" attitude spreads, as evidenced in Brazil and Peru, however contrasting the ideological orientations of their armed forces. Nor are they simple defenders of the interests of the oligarchy, or of the middle classes. A multitude of factors must be taken into account, making difficult though not impossible a theoretical analysis. The author clearly sees this, but occasionally he oversimplifies, as when, concluding his book, he states that military intervention can only "retard and aggravate sociopolitical problems, making a frontal confrontation with the lower classes almost inevitable" (p. 268).

The Peruvian chapter is to be commended for a clear analysis of the role of SINAMOS (National System to Support Social Mobilization) and the so-called industrial community. Both are seen as utilizing methods of mobilization and mass control, directed against the influence of grass-roots political movements. Of these there are two varieties: the old, established, and rather well-known APRA, and the new, potentially more dangerous radical left. The bitter hostility of the military to APRA is one of the classical enigmas of Peruvian politics. Pasquino reviews the evidence and various interpretations, though he does not seem to me to give appropriate consideration to the continued strength and vitality of the APRA. The fact that the APRA did not organize the rural masses actively enough must be seen not as evidence of its decayed vigor but as a direct result of its preponderance among the urban and plantation workers and lower middle classes. The weight of its union apparatus forced it to look after the demands of its members and supporters, shirking the more hazardous strategy of incorporating vast unorganized masses of Indians and peasants. Interestingly enough, it was Belaundismo in the 'sixties, based on higher social strata than Aprismo, which made inroads among those groups, and now it is among those very groups that the military regime can probably find a more receptive audience.

The Chilean chapter is more policy oriented, concerned with a strategy for the left. The effort is marred by several oversimplifications, as when it is taken for granted that "the whole progressive Latin American sociological school (has shown) the middle classes and other middle strata . . . to be incapable of an autonomous reforming function" (p. 157). The author criticizes the Communist parties of Chile and the rest of the continent for holding opposite views. His main recommendation is to give more importance to the organization of the "marginal" population (p. 158), and to keep in mind that toward the Armed Forces the only appropriate solution is the one adopted by the Bolivian revolution of 1952 and by Fidel Castro: they must be destroyed (p. 154).

In the Brazilian study we see again the marginal population given a central role as constituting a very serious danger to the system. This fact, not always accepted by political analysts, deserves closer attention, as it is certainly a time-bomb on the Brazilian political scene, making an adaptation to a pluralist political system more difficult. On the other hand, Pasquino's view about the unrepresentative nature of the pre-1964 political structure seems exaggerated. The parties of the Vargas

complex (Social Democrático and Trabalhista), together with their main opponent, the Uniao Democrática Nacional, are described as though they had been almost on the vanishing point, representing a smaller and smaller section of the electorate, based on statistics which show that the straight party vote was a diminishing percentage of the total (p. 172). This evidence may indicate the oscillation of alliances or the opportunism of leaders, but not the decay of parties. At this writing (several years after the book was finished) the party system of Brazil, however straitjacketed by the military government, has reappeared with rather high spirits and good health.

In an appendix the main theoretical points made in the text are summarized and developed, giving the gist of the author's argument, worth translating to make them available to the English reader.

TORCUATO S. DI TELLA
University of Belgrano, Buenos Aires

Public Expenditures in Communist and Capitalist Nations. By Frederic L. Pryor. (Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1968. Pp. 543. $8.50.)

Public Expenditures in Communist and Capitalist Nations was commissioned by the Yale Economic Growth Center and the Center for Research on Conflict Resolution at the University of Michigan and published seven years ago. It is a thoroughly researched and copiously documented quantitative study in which Frederic Pryor addressed himself to three objectives: comparing market and centrally planned economies; extending the positive theory of public finance; and refocusing the study of comparative economic systems. Whether or not these laudable, though hardly modest, goals have been achieved, it is a book that deserves more attention than it has received, not least of all from political scientists. Pryor has selected a sample of fourteen nations in the Euro-American world and divided them into two groups of seven, those allocating resources through the market and those through central planning. Included in the former and ranked in descending order of per capita GNP are the USA, West Germany, Austria, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Yugoslavia; and in the latter, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, USSR, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria. Using data from 1950 through 1962 for time-series comparisons and in 1956 and 1962 for cross-sectional comparisons, Professor Pryor relies largely on multivariate regression analysis to measure the influence of economic systems and the level of economic development on public consumption expenditures — most importantly for defense, welfare and health, and education, and, secondarily, for administration, internal security, nonmilitary security, and research and development. Whenever possible he analyzes the behavior of these expenditures with respect to substitution relations, centralization, stability, and incidence, the first of these having to do with the extent to which public expenditures become substitutes for private expenditures and the last with their impact on the distribution of income.

Pryor has taken on the statistical problems — inadequate and incomparable data sources; sticky aggregation difficulties; ambiguities in interpreting tests of statistical significance — that inhere in these ambitious intentions for good reasons. Specialists in comparative economic systems traditionally have been less concerned with making systematic comparisons of the performance of different types of economic systems than with the institutional, historical, and ideological circumstances that distinguished capitalist, communist, and fascist economies from one another. Following World War II, however, as the state became increasingly involved in the management of capitalist economies, and as communist economies flirted with market-type reforms in trying to overcome the micro-economic inefficiencies that were plaguing them, it appeared to many observers that these economies were converging. The so-called convergence thesis is no better grounded in systematic quantitative analysis than were the earlier views of the great "isms." Comparative observations like these need the data base that Pryor has set out to build. And he is certainly right in comparing a set of market economies and a set of centrally planned economies to minimize the force of idiosyncratic conditions in particular societies. Moreover, since governments establish and maintain the institutional and legal framework within which resources are allocated, they serve as a most appropriate focus for comparing economic systems.

In a book so thoroughly committed to a quantitative methodology and so carefully researched one expects that its conclusions will neither shatter our perceptions of, nor shock our values about, economic systems. *Public Expenditures in Communist and Capitalist Nations* is no *Time on the Cross,* that recent controversial exercise in cliometrics which appears to cast slavery in the ante-bellum American South in a more favorable light than hitherto. We learn that the economic system vari-

able is relatively unimportant in accounting for differences in public consumption expenditures and that ideological, customary, or political factors are becoming less important with the tempering of cold-war dogmatism. The level of economic development "plays a statistically significant role in the cross-section analysis . . . for only internal security, foreign aid, and research and development. For military, welfare, education and health expenditures, on the other hand, this *per capita* income variable has little explanatory power" (p. 287). Again, "For welfare expenditures and, to a lesser extent, health expenditures, there seems to be an upward limit to the public expenditures/GNP ratio, such that those nations with the lowest relative expenditures have the fastest increase in public consumption expenditures" (p. 291).

These all-too-brief examples of Pryor's conclusions are typical of his judicious and restrained approach to this vast comparative enterprise — a consequence, no doubt, of the sobering influence of quantitative data. In fact, he may have been overly cautious. At any rate he felt constrained to stand off from the evidence which supported the convergence thesis. "Indeed, in a great many more important respects the two economic systems are very different and, let me add without proof, are *not* becoming more similar" (p. 310 emphasis in text), a statement which suggests that even the most indefatigable researcher may sometimes feel oppressed by his numbers.

In conclusion, I should note that Pryor has placed most of the statistical data in a series of appendices which account for more than one-third of the book. This helps those readers who would have found the complete quantitative story dense and difficult to penetrate while concentrating the data base of the study for those who are as interested in quantitative methodology as in substantive conclusions. Unfortunately, the publishers have not been as considerate of the reader as Pryor has; there are an unconscionable number of typographical errors which certainly should have been caught by the editors. Finally, it is not clear why Pryor insists on calling all current government expenditures "public consumption." Surely expenditures on education or research and development represent investment rather than consumption.

KARL DE SCHWEINITZ, JR.

Northwestern University

Industrial Society in Communist China. By Barry M. Richman. (New York: Vintage Books, 1972. Pp. 968. $4.95, paper. Hardbound edition, 1969, $15.00.)

Barry Richman, Professor at the Graduate School of Business Administration, University of California, Los Angeles, went to China rather unexpectedly more than a decade ago and was able to gather detailed statistics on thirty-eight Chinese economic enterprises of all types. At the time, his data were unique and he hurried to publish them in a form that would be understandable to the general reader and yet would contribute to specialist knowledge of Mainland China's management and economic development. These form two of the purposes of the present volume. The author also desired to assess the Chinese experience by referring to his own general model of such processes and by comparison with his previous work on Indian and Soviet management. Finally, the author wanted to publish a volume on contemporary China that would serve as a guide to understanding that country as a whole, not merely its management practices.

After a decade, Richman's data are still invaluable because they fill a gap in the period just before the Cultural Revolution and complement the more extensive statistics compiled by many observers since. More important, the administrative situation and policy direction described in early 1966 is much more analogous to the post-Cultural Revolutionary present than to the intervening years of turbulence. Thus, far from being outdated by the quick march of events in China, this book continues to have relevance for the serious student of the People's Republic. If carefully mined, it contains a wealth of material useful for historical comparison in the author's fields of competence. Finally, the intervening decade has not been unkind to his more extensive analysis of such areas as education, social attitudes, and law in China.

But the original problems of the work, originally published in 1969, persist. One is that the author, like many others writing on China, attempts to do too much within one cover. It is impossible for him to fulfill the ambitious aims listed above without moving onto insecure factual grounds and without enlarging the book to a length that most readers will not wish to tackle. It would possibly have been better if Richman had published his notebook of economic and management data — that, after all, is the enduring legacy of his visit — and refrained from the temptation to discourse, seemingly, on all of China for many different audiences. The author falls short of this objective.

Another problem is the author's ambitious attempt to place an exposition of Chinese management techniques and economic develop-

ment within the context of a theoretical model. This also required significant expansion of the length and complexity of the discourse. The first hundred pages are thus devoted to the theoretical model and the next four-hundred fifty to the "environmental" factors informing China's economic performance since 1949. Additional material is then introduced to describe the course of China's economic development, including comparisons with the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, and India. Only in chapters 8–12, comprising the last 250 pages of the volume, do we come, finally, to most of Richman's own findings based on his own observations. The book, thus, is really two volumes with the most important material introduced only in the second. Given this length, the reader is tempted to consult only those sections that are of immediate interest to him, causing the volume to lose its intended unity. Ultimately, it turns into a handbook.

A third problem aggravates the second. This is the author's overblown writing style and his tendency to make too many claims for his own work. The nearly one thousand pages could have been reduced by at least a third, thereby making the new material more accessible to, and easing the burden on, the reader. The reader also tires of Richman's overuse of direct references to himself and his work, especially when coupled with the words "significant" and "first-hand."

For the political scientist, the volume does hold some general attractions. It is a work on political economy — as all worthy works on China must be — and thus breaks down the artificial barriers between the two fields. It wisely views Chinese economic development not merely in the context of post-1949 history but also of pre-1949 Chinese events, of the modernization-development pattern in comparable foreign states, and of generally applicable principles of industrial management. It also treats Chinese industrial development as the rational product of environmental constraints, both physical and sociopolitical. And it stresses the constant contradiction between the Party's ideological imperatives and the demands of managerial, technical, and economic rationality.

It is well that Richman appreciates the many influences on Chinese industry. The fundamental problem of the work, however, is that it draws attention to too many factors of importance. Despite his attempt to embed Chinese industrial development in the framework of comparative management theory and practice, his good sense makes him realize that the operative principles of one field will not explain even part of the story. Lacking one or a few parsimonious and overarching principles or ideas, Richman is driven to trying to include and explain everything, and ends up leaving some of the most important questions unanswered. (One of these is the relationship of industry to agriculture in China; this is still the supreme determinant of economic activity in that country and informs the content of much of Peking politics as well. Richman ignores this issue almost entirely.) If the author had been slightly less ambitious, he would have been less tempted to introduce so much extraneous information that, in the end, makes it impossible for the reader to decide what is the central aspect of the topic. By moving outside his area of expertise, moreover, Richman is constrained to advance many questionable assertions and to generalize on the basis of quite incomplete data. Lastly, Richman did not attempt, in this edition, to take account of the implications of the Cultural Revolution for the period of the early 1960s, at the end of which his visit occurred. Many of the events he observed in the deceptive calm of mid-1966 were the very causes of the disorders that followed almost immediately upon his departure from China.

Nonetheless, much of the volume remains of worth and, thanks to a reasonably detailed index, latter-day readers can look up facts and comparisons, many of which are not to be found elsewhere. For this reason alone, the book belongs on the shelf of serious scholars of China, comparative politics, and economic development.

THOMAS W. ROBINSON
University of Washington

The Sword And The Scepter: The Problem Of Militarism In Germany. Volume 3: **The Tragedy Of Statesmanship—Bethmann Hollweg As War Chancellor (1914–1917).** Volume 4: **The Reign of German Militarism And The Disaster Of 1918.** By Gerhard Ritter. (Coral Gables, Fla.: University of Miami Press, 1972 and 1973. Pp. vii, 611 and viii, 496. $18.00 each.)

The late Gerhard Ritter was always more interested in writing about individuals than about the impersonal forces that influence the historical process, and this was never more evident than in his great work on German militarism. The first volume of this comprehensive study of the endemic conflict between civilian and military authority concentrated upon Bismarck's successful struggle against Chief of Staff Moltke for the control of policy during the wars of 1866 and 1870; and the bulk of the second was devoted to an analysis of the theories of Schlieffen and Tirpitz and a

description of the corrosive effects that their authority had upon German statecraft before 1914. The third and fourth volumes, now available in the excellent translation of Heinz Norden, are in the same mode, the former being dominated by the melancholy figure of Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, who finally lost the battle for civilian supremacy that Bismarck had fought so robustly, the latter by Ludendorff, who, in his bland arrogance, proved that all of Bismarck's fears of military encroachment upon the sphere of national policy were justified.

In recent years, the policy of Bethmann Hollweg has been a subject of lively debate among historians, and Fritz Fischer *(Griff nach der Weltmacht,* 1961) and his followers have sought to prove that, far from being an opponent of the grandiose schemes of the soldiers, Bethmann was as much an expansionist as they. This thesis Ritter rejects, and his third volume raises serious questions about Fischer's use of documents and his tendency to generalize from inadequate data. His own view — and it is supported by the recent publication of the diaries of Bethmann's secretary, Kurt Riezler — is that Bethmann always regarded the ambitions of the soldiers as unrealistic and their intrusions into the sphere of policy determination as dangerous, but that he never possessed the cheerful self-confidence and combativeness of Bismarck and hence was ineffective in maintaining his position. In Ritter's view, he was too much the intellectual, lacking a "wholly secure instinct for power," and was too conscientious to stand up to the willful unconditionality of people like Ludendorff. Moreover, even if his temperament had been less scrupulous, he was handicapped by the fact that, in wartime, popular opinion is (at least this was true during the first World War, and not only of Germany) apt to support the soldiers in any difference with politicians.

Nevertheless, Bethmann was not a weakling, and he fought more doughtily for civilian control than might have been expected—far more so (although Ritter does not make this point) than the English Prime Minister Asquith did. If in the crisis of 1914 he was overborne by the technical arguments of the soldiers and swept into a war from which he expected the worst, he steadily resisted Chief of Staff Falkenhayn's attempts to intervene in political matters, won a signal victory over Tirpitz and the admirals in 1915 in the matter of submarine warfare, and fought stubbornly for three years to prevent a self-defeating definition of German war aims by the military and the greedy economic interests. Indeed, as Ritter points out, it was his determination to keep the door open for a negotiated peace that led him to make his worst mistake, which was to urge the Emperor to replace Falkenhayn with the team of Hindenburg and Ludendorff in the hope that the popularity of the latter would give him the necessary backing to pursue moderate and negotiable war aims. In reality, the new High Command made a compromise peace impossible by being much more demanding than their predecessor had been.

Once the scales had fallen from his eyes, the Chancellor did what he could to remedy his error, and the most interesting chapters of Ritter's third volume describe his desperate attempts to extricate himself from a war which he knew could no longer be won by military means alone. His efforts were resisted by the men he had elevated to power, whose ambitions in Poland defeated any hope for a separate peace with Russia, whose insistence on retaining Belgium made negotiation with the West impossible, and whose demand for unrestricted submarine warfare brought the United States into the war. But, as Ritter makes clear, Bethmann's defeat would not have come if the soldiers had not always enjoyed public support, and if they had not found allies among civilian politicians, whose real interests might have been supposed to lie in supporting the Chancellor. It is ironic and tragic that men like the Centrist politician Matthias Erzberger and the future chancellor in the Weimar period, Gustav Stresemann, should have played key role in denying Bethmann parliamentary support in July 1917, and thus assuring his fall.

Erzberger — always much more naive than his biographer Klaus Epstein was willing to admit—may have hoped that Bethmann would be succeeded by someone (preferably Bülow) who would be more capable of controlling the soldiers. If so, he was sadly mistaken; and Ritter's fourth volume shows the full consequences of this faulty judgment. In the post-Bethmann period, all authority was in Ludendorff's hands. It is true that on one occasion Chancellor Hertling attempted to delineate in writing the appropriate limits of military authority in political matters, but he lost heart before the ink was dry on the paper, and no one tried again. It was Ludendorff who forbade new initiatives in the direction of negotiated peace; it was Ludendorff who insisted against all reason that military victory was inevitable and demanded the dismissal of those officials, like Foreign Minister Richard von Kühlmann, who had doubts; and it was Ludendorff who, as late as

October 1918, long after the failure of his much-touted spring offensive, went on dreaming of German Rivieras in the Crimea and German bridges from the Caucasus to India. Ritter is surely correct in suggesting a similarity between Ludendorff in 1918 and Hitler in 1944–1945, both lost in their delusions, and both incapable of restraint because there was no one around them with the courage to face up to them and refuse their demands.

Ritter had hoped to conclude his work with two essays dealing with the forms that the problem of militarism assumed after 1918: one on the Weimar years, the second on the Third Reich, a period in which, by a curious reversal, it was the soldiers who sought to restrain the blind militarism of the civilian leaders. He died in 1967 before he could complete this epilogue. This is regrettable, but in no way diminishes the stature of this magisterial study.

GORDON A. CRAIG
Stanford University

The Right Wing In France From 1815 to de Gaulle. By René Rémond. (Philadelphia, Penn.: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 2nd ed. 1969. Pp. 465. $10.00.)

This second American edition of Professor Rémond's elegant, erudite, and influential work (the first appeared in 1966) is a translation of the revised French third edition. It brings the account up to 1967, with a postface on the Events of 1968 which contributes little either to the previous analysis of the French Right, or to an understanding of the Events of May, witnessed by the author at close hand at Nanterre. But the final chapter, thoroughly revised to carry the study from 1940 through 1967, is full of interest. The author's shrewd remarks on the Republican Independents and their affinity with the Orleanist tradition have since been confirmed by the election of 1974 in which Giscard d'Estaing captured the conservative majority from the Gaullists and thus made himself president of France.

The author modestly suggests in his preface that "here and there" he has used the insights of the social sciences. In fact, the book remains a classic example, in the best French tradition, of the traditional study of the evolution of ideas, climates of opinion, and movements. Readers ought not, therefore, to look for much political science or political sociology. What they will find, in abundance, are shrewd *aperçus,* psychological insights, and historical analogies, based on wide reading, substantial research, broad sympathies and profound understanding. These qualities are displayed to good effect in the analyses of Orleanism; of the evolution of one branch of legitimism into a sort of "national Catholicism" under the stress of colonial wars and the challenge of communism; and of Bonapartism and its various nationalist and antidemocratic successors from Boulangism to the leagues of the 1930s, and later to a fraction of the OAS. Professor Rémond suggests that Gaullism finally succeeded in reuniting the democratic strain in Bonapartism, present in it since the Revolution, with the nationalist current which had submerged it from Boulangism onwards. Gaullism thus revived the Bonapartist tradition by bringing it back to its popular origins, restoring the alliance of democracy and nationalism.

In short, this is a sophisticated work of scholarship, designed to stimulate and provoke as well as to inform; it is directed to those already conversant with French history and traditions, not to beginning students. The latter will be puzzled by the author's allusive style, compounded by an inelegant translation, whose sentence structure and phraseology constantly remind one of French constructions. Non-French readers will be further confused not only by careless proofreading but by (for example) "Incomparable Chamber," "immitigably," and "interposed persons." The translator has also succumbed to the bad French habit of misspelling proper names, e.g. "Moseley" (spelled correctly in the French text). Finally, Professor Laux confuses, in an explanatory footnote, the constitutional limits on the legislative omnicompetence of the Assembly with the Gaullist conceit of a presidential "reserved sector," revealed by Chaban Delmas in 1959 to a Gaullist party conference.

In short, this classic essay is still well worth reading, preferably in French, but also in this adequate though imperfect translation.

D. B. GOLDEY
Lincoln College, Oxford

Modernization Without Revolution: Lebanon's Experience. By Elie Adib Salem. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973. Pp. 174. $7.95.

No Arab country has maintained a parliament, free enterprise, respect for a large number of different religious communities, and relative prosperity for as long as Lebanon. After three decades, is it valid to summarize this Lebanese experience as modernization without revolution?

Elie A. Salem, professor at the American

University of Beirut, educated in the United States and with an insider's knowledge as well of Lebanese politics, offers us an interpretation much more complex, subtle, and skeptical than the book's title implies. Salem defines modernization comprehensively as adapting, transforming and replacing traditional institutions. His honest and sensitive scholarship compels him, however, to focus on the reasons why Lebanon could not move beyond limited adaptations. He thus helps to explain, though this was not his intention, the limits upon change that led to the current civil war.

Salem analyzes Lebanese politics until now as "a mix of tradition and modernity, feudal vestiges and capitalism, [religious] confessionalism and secularism, democracy and plutocracy, rugged individualism and narrow communalism" (p. 52). To govern such a society with a government said to be based upon "conciliation and consensus" (p. 4) raises serious questions: Who decides on agendas and whose agreement is required; indeed, What are the limits of agreement? The leaders of the seventeen religious communities—usually the descendants of established and rich families—govern through cliques and clubs where they bargain with the remainder of a similar elite already successful in business, army, and church or thanks to their connections with foreign embassies. The poor —much more often Muslims than Christians— have little to bargain with in such a system, and hence receive the least. The intellectuals, dependent on the same system of preferment, are allowed to speak as a Greek chorus. Their hesitations and exhortations, worries and predictions turned out to be correct, but they were not allowed to alter the established laws of change.

Among the small groups which are in charge of political brokerage, parliament is only one of the leading clubs, and not the most powerful. No one, except at times the President, is moved to act as broker for the public interest; no one —not even he—speaks for a national constituency. Naturally, the Lebanese bureaucracy, as Salem shows in an especially vivid and effective chapter, knows for whom it is supposed to be working. Now it serves as a "bottleneck" to modernization, because of overcentralization, outmoded procedures, lack of technical skill and equipment, religious loyalties and job quotas, nepotism, bribery and laxity of performance. But any "modernization" of the bureaucracy itself which would "disregard professional, personal, familial, and factional considerations would be extremely difficult" (p. 105).

Salem's judgment on the future of the bureaucracy applies to the future of Lebanon's political system: "Lebanon's communal society has established a political formula that can both accommodate change and introduce moderate reforms, provided they do not seriously shake the foundations of the political power structure" (p. 138). This formula reflects "the constraints of confessionalism, factionalism, and personalism" (p. 38). Indeed, "jockeying for power, balancing the distribution of power among many players," and making sure that the game itself can continue—all these make "heavy claims on the time of the players and leave inadequate time or room for modernization politics" (p. 73). No wonder development planning, which Salem analyzes in particular detail, moves "cautiously, hesitantly, haphazardly, and inconsistently" (pp. 73-74).

One does not have to transform or replace anything in order to go as far as Lebanon has gone. If tradition has already taught a people the advantages of bargaining and brokerage among the already powerful, they may also be well prepared to make economic and political deals in the modern age—as long as all essential values remain convertible. People must not come to want fundamentally new kinds of relationships. The talented must continue to prefer the laming but cosy security of existing solidarity groups to the trials of fostering creativity. The poor, exploited, and excluded must not turn their very condition into an issue. Adapting is an age-old skill that has become the least effective mode for meeting the problems of the modern age. What is required instead is the capacity to overcome the cleavages and rigidities that arise in every society still trying to preserve its inherited pattern of relationships. That capacity also requires the persistent creation and nourishing of fundamentally new relationships. If this kind of transformation is the new and permanent revolution of the modern age, then it must be said that modernization has barely begun in Lebanon. People who seek to avoid this kind of revolution tend to bring upon themselves other, more old-fashioned kinds of revolution.

MANFRED HALPERN
Princeton University

Elites in the People's Republic of China. Edited by Robert A. Scalapino. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1972. Pp. 669. $15.00, cloth; $4.95, paper.)

The study of Chinese Communist politics has progressed from an examination of institutions and policy statements, through an analysis of leadership, ideology and elite solidarity, to a

concern with the nature, causes and consequences of elite and social cleavage. This volume gained impetus from the Cultural Revolution's demonstration that the Chinese leadership and polity were highly fragmented and that these divisions provided the basis for social mobilization and coalition building.

This edited volume is composed of articles by fourteen scholars; each treats a different level or segment of the Chinese polity. Consequently, this endeavor has the coherence problems common to many edited volumes. The absence of thematic continuity, however, is particularly serious when analyzing elites. It is difficult to imagine what meaningful definition of elites could have been employed to lump together articles about the Central Committee, provincial level leaders, minorities officials, cadres in Shanghai and Canton, professors at Peking University, and a single student. Even more inexplicably, there is no significant analysis of the Politburo, the Military Affairs Commission, or the Standing Committee of the State Council. In addition, because the book covers such diverse facets of the society and polity, the reader is left with the impossible task of figuring out how, if at all, these various levels and strata interact. Despite these difficulties, however, several of the individual articles are good and employ techniques of leadership and policy analysis that will be examined below.

Elite analyses have been based on a rainbow of assumptions about which variables are most closely linked to elite behavior. Some analysts assert that elite behavior is best predicted by aggregate attribute data, others believe that organizational affiliation is primary, while still others believe the perceptions of elite members are the crucial variables. This book gives voice to all three perspectives.

Waller (in his article about the Kiangsi Soviet's Central Executive Council and the Eighth Central Committee) and Scalapino (in his article comparing the composition of the Eighth and Ninth Central Committees) *seem* to assume that aggregate socioeconomic, geographic, educational, and career characteristics are linked to elite political behavior. Two points must be made: First of all, as Waller candidly noted, attribute data are highly fragmentary, thereby reducing the confidence that can be placed in subsequent conclusions. Key data on socioeconomic background, education, occupation, and foreign exposure are all spotty. Don Klein makes this point in his excellent paper analyzing the resources available to the scholar attempting to undertake a study of the Chinese elite. Even more fundamentally, Scalapino offers the reader no guidance in predicting elite behavior from the aggregate attribute data he provides. In the absence of some theoretical or empirical assertion about the relationship between elite attributes and elite behavior, one wonders toward what end all these data were collected? On what basis were certain variables deemed "important" and others unimportant?

The second genre of elite analysis represented in this volume views individual elite members as parts of specific organizations. "The Organization," in turn, is alleged to determine, or shape, the elite member's interests, objectives, and perceptions. The Whitson piece adopts this perspective: ". . . decisions and viewpoints within any government are structured by groups of organizations, members of which develop special interests and career investments in the survival and power of those organizations" (p. 381). This mode of analysis, though promising, has shortcomings. For one thing, members of the elite usually have several organizational affiliations, leaving the analyst to decide which ties are most closely linked to an individual's policy behavior. For instance, are the actions of a military garrison commander best explained by his ties to the Communist party, the field army to which he belongs, the military region in which he is situated, the local garrison where he lives, or the service with which he is identified? It is plausible that different policy issues would tap different organizational loyalties. Theodore Lowi's work is suggestive in this regard. William Parish has pinpointed a further difficulty which is that many of the phenomena Whitson believes indicative of purposive organizational behavior (e.g., patterns of personnel assignment) are better explained by assuming random behavior (*China Quarterly*, 56, 1973, 667-699).

Finally, one must be extraordinarily careful in ascribing "interests" to any organization. Halperin and Kanter prudently note (in *Readings in American Foreign Policy*) that organizational interests are very hard to define without a high degree of certainty about the context in which an organization's leaders view an issue. This suggests that organizational perspectives would benefit by more precise perceptual data and the use of intensive case study material.

The volume's final genre of elite analysis might be broadly termed the "perceptual school" (related to the work of George, Holsti, and Leites). From this perspective one asks, how did the specific individuals or "groups" perceive the problems and devise strategies to solve them? Richard Baum's study of lower and

middle-level rural "party power holders" (*Tang-ch'üan P'ai*) is excellent, and displays sensitivity to the fact that many possible motivations may produce any given action (p. 542). Baum charts the succession of strategies these cadres employed to protect themselves, their organizations, and their policies during the Cultural Revolution. Chang's essay analyzes the political strategies used by China's provincial leaders during the Cultural Revolution. Montaperto's essay, while *NOT* dealing with an elite by any stretch of the imagination, provides intensive motivational data on one Cultural Revolution era student.

The major difficulty with the perceptual approach, as with notions of organizational interest, is the great uncertainty about "real" elite perceptions and the linkages such perceptions have to policy behavior. Also, one must be careful not to infer motivations without sufficient data. For instance, Chang asserts that ". . . toward the end of May, the provincial leaders' feelings of uncertainty and anxiety gave way to those of apprehension. . . . They knew too well from the experiences of past campaigns that they could be adversely affected by actual or potential 'guilt by association' " (pp. 504–505). I *intuitively* subscribe to this line of argument but must note the absence of data demonstrating that provincial leaders *did* perceive things this way. Data were only gathered to show that leaders *should* have felt that way.

In this extensive volume, we see political scientists dealing with China begin to utilize an increasingly broad range of research strategies, drawing upon the socialization, organizational, and perceptual literatures. All the individual studies take as their starting point the assumption that elite and social solidarity are not givens. White's study of leadership in Shanghai (along with the pieces by Baum and Chang) moves beyond that and attempts to explore the interaction between elite and social cleavages.

Evaluating the book as a whole, one notes two overriding difficulties: First, the concept of elite is never spelled out and, as a consequence, each author employs his own definition of the term. Also, it is never clear what range of political and social events the concept of elite is useful in explaining. Second, to assume that a given category of persons (by reason of hierarchical position) constitutes an elite is to obscure a major point of contention: "Who" makes policy, and are the actors most salient to one policy area equally important across the entire spectrum of issues? Much of what we know about organizations and bureaucratic politics (e.g., from Allison, Etzioni, Holsti, and Selznick) suggests that formal position in the hierarchy is, at best, a very imperfect guide to lines of actual policy-making authority and importance.

What, then, is a next step to take in building upon the advances which this volume represents? The field might now move from the narrow analysis of leadership to the analysis of policy formulation in specific policy areas. With this orientation, one can utilize aggregate attribute data, organizational perspectives, and the perceptual literature without eliminating the possibility of finding a policy-making system in which lower participants play a vital role. Also, such a policy orientation will make it easier to clarify the relationships between leadership and organizations at different levels in the system.

DAVID M. LAMPTON
Ohio State University

Comparative Political Corruption. By James C. Scott. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972. Pp. x, 166. $7.95, cloth; $3.00, paper.)

Although part of a series intended for "the undergraduate student of comparative politics," this intelligent, generally accurate, and thought-provoking little book was obviously meant for Professor Scott's professional colleagues as well. Indeed, since Arnold Heidenheimer's excellent analysis and reader *Political Corruption* (1970) lamentably has been withdrawn from circulation by Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Scott's book is the only comparative study of political corruption currently in print. It reflects the increased interest in political corruption during the late '60s and early '70s among political scientists and especially students of less developed areas. Professor Scott's own research on corruption (published in various journals), as well as new information and thought, is incorporated in the book.

Comparative Political Corruption falls into three parts. The first part defines political corruption and argues that the phenomenon should be investigated as a special case of political influence. The second and third parts are respectively comparative analyses of administrative and electoral corruption. Definition of the field is an important problem for students of corruption since it influences not only what they are studying but their perspective on the subject. Scott, following J. S. Nye, defines corruption as "behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public office (elective or appointive) because of private-regarding (per-

sonal, close family, private clique) wealth or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence" (p. 4). Most students of the subject would agree that corruption involves violation of the norms of a political regime. More controversial is Scott's decision to limit corruption to violations resulting from material inducements. He is certainly in good company in adopting this restricted view, since "corruption" for centuries has frequently been associated with bribery, and since such authorities as Heidenheimer and Nye continue in the tradition. Other traditions, however, include other types of influence besides wealth and status. Thus, the British Corrupt and Illegal Practices Act of 1883 considered as types of electoral corruption not only bribery and treating but also "personation" (a type of fraud) and "undue influence," which involved the use of "force, violence and restraint."

It is important to distinguish various methods of corruption for purposes of political analysis, since one can often substitute for another and since particular methods may be associated empirically with types of regimes or stages of political development. I would argue that political corruption as a field for research is too narrowly defined if limited to one cause of the violation of regime norms; namely, particularistic material incentives. Scott, by distinguishing between corruption on the one hand and fraud and intimidation on the other, finds that the Nkrumah regime in Ghana ceases to be of relevance to the study of corruption after 1960 when material inducements became less important in maintaining Nkrumah's rule and fraud and intimidation became dominant. Surely those who supported the formal norms of the Ghanian regime were just as outraged when Nkrumah and his colleagues violated them by fraud as when they violated them by bribery. In eliminating fraud and intimidation from his concept of violence, Scott may underestimate the degree of corruption in modern political systems where there does appear to be a marked decline in bribery and similar practices. If Watergate is any guide, fraud and intimidation may well be the dominant forms of corruption in modern societies.

Scott devotes the bulk of his book to comparative analyses of administrative corruption based mainly on case studies of early seventeenth-century England and contemporary Thailand, and of electoral corruption based mainly on eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century England and contemporary Ghana and India. Corruption of and by bureaucrats, he observes, is the distinctive pattern of corruption in autocratic regimes in which electoral competition is of little or no significance. When victory in electoral competition becomes necessary to remain in office and yet the electorate fails to be motivated by ideological and policy inducements, then electoral corruption is likely to be found. Scott's examination lays special stress on the use of electoral corruption by political machines, the discussion of which alone is more than worth the price of the book.

Scott occasionally overstrains his comparisons of pre-twentieth-century English and contemporary Afro-Asian corruption, although he is clearly correct in his general position that European regimes of the past were in certain significant respects, including corruption, similar to many of those in Africa and Asia today. Inevitably he is more familiar with some of his cases than others. Many historians would, for example, find his suggestion that ideological and policy considerations were relatively unimportant in Jacobean England misleading to say the least. Moreover, by assuming that during that period he is dealing with what he calls "proto-corruption" (not illegal and thus, in his view, not corrupt), Scott is making an historical error, since bribery of officials has been illegal in England since medieval times. He also fails to indicate the way in which corruption as perceived by anti-court elites—the so-called Country party—undermined the legitimacy of the Stuart regime. Corruption, because it can occur only when formal regime norms supported by some parts of society are violated, will inevitably lead to some degree of disaffection toward the norm violators. When the disaffected are politically powerful and have other reasons as well for opposing those perceived as corrupt, the latter can find themselves in serious trouble. Their actions are viewed not only as wrong but also as illegitimate while the actions of their opponents, whatever other their actual motives, gain in legitimacy.

WILLIAM B. GWYN
Tulane University

Democracy and Political Change in Village India: A Case Study. By A. H. Somjee. (New Delhi: Orient Longmans Ltd., 1971. Pp. xxvii, 189. Rs 25.00.)

Confronted by earlier failures, governments in many less-developed countries are seeking to redefine strategies of rural development. They have been joined in this effort by numerous international agencies, i.e., The World Bank

(IBRD), the FAO, and the ILO. In this reassessment, the role of structural-institutional factors has received increasing attention. Therefore one turns to Somjee's study of institutional change in rural India with considerable interest. India's attempts at planned institutional and social-structural change span almost three decades, and have been the object of a substantial amount of research.

What Professor Somjee has given us is a case study of the impact of the introduction of a local village panchayat (council), elected by universal adult suffrage, upon the traditional social and political systems of a village in the State of Gujarat, near the city of Baroda. He has conducted research in this village on a number of occasions since 1959. The historical perspective which accrues from these earlier studies adds an important dimension to this work. Six of the seven chapters are concerned with politics at the local village level. A seventh chapter assesses the impact upon village politics of the General Elections of 1967.

His work confirms numerous earlier findings. One consequence of adult suffrage has been a redefinition of the criteria for leadership. Status, as determined by land ownership, wealth, and high caste membership continues to be perceived as a requisite for leadership. To it has now been added skill in bargaining, and the ability to mobilize a significant number of followers as a basis for entry into the coalition-making process which invariably follows local elections. The study also confirms the role of ascriptively defined groups, rather than individuals, as the essential building blocks of rural political alliances. Within this context, the need to secure majority support has led to the bridging of social divisions within the rural polity, resulting in intricate alliances of caste groups from all levels of the status hierarchy. In the process, some leverage has accrued to lower-caste groups, but not very much. Finally the study also confirms earlier findings of the rapid generational shift in leadership, following the introduction of local self-government. In the village under study, a bifurcation of leadership roles has taken place in which members of the older generations continue to exercise social leadership, whereas political leadership has shifted to the hands of the younger generation.

In his analysis of the failure of the village panchayat to become an effective representative institution within the village, Somjee has made a useful contribution at a descriptive level. He identifies two patterns of behavior within the village as having undermined the effectiveness of the panchayat. The first of these he characterizes as "the direct approach," by which he means the tendency of villagers to bypass the panchayat as an institution for local conflict resolution and decision making, and to approach district level administrators and political leaders directly, seeking their intervention in local problems. This practice, a continuation of traditional pre-independence patterns of behavior throughout India, was condoned, and even encouraged, by officials at higher levels of authority. They used these opportunities to build their own support. The net effect was to remove from the panchayat issues upon which it could have taken decisions, and hence established its effectiveness. The author characterizes the second pattern of behavior which undermined the panchayat as "the mass approach," an essentially populist stance, encouraged by a Gandhian worker who came to the village, and sought to bring about total community involvement in local affairs. The net effect of the mass approach was to blur the role the panchayat as a representative institution for the village. Finally, Somjee describes the ways in which higher authorities frustrated attempts by the panchayat to raise financial resources. These actions on the part of the authorities would seem to indicate that they were not seriously committed to making the panchayats effective instruments of local self-government.

While not ostensibly a part of his analytic framework, two other factors of considerable importance for students of rural development and institution building are discussed by Somjee. The first of these is the opening up for villagers, particularly the landless, of employment opportunities in the nearby city, Baroda, completely outside the control of the village economy. The second factor is the marked increase in opportunity for both primary and secondary education in the village. Both of these changes facilitated challenges to social and political structures which critically influenced the entire system of distribution of power within the village. This, in turn, reinforced the overall impact of majority rule in the elective process. Ironically, while the institution of the panchayat was ineffective, the net consequence of its introduction was to significantly alter power relationships within the village.

I was disappointed in this study for several reasons. Analyses of village politics have been undertaken for several decades in rural India, yet there is little evidence here that any significant methodological advances to systematic assessment have been made. Basically what was utilized in collecting data for the first six chapters of the study was the anthropological par-

icipant observer technique. All of the predictable limitations upon generalizations which arise out of a case study so defined are present. The final chapter discusses the impact of the General Election of 1967 on village politics. We are told that a systematic sample was drawn based upon the village voting list and a survey conducted. The presentation of data leaves much to be desired. In almost all instances only raw data are presented, with no percentages and few cross tabulations. Furthermore, since Somjee makes no attempt to assess the statistical significance of findings, the reader cannot evaluate his argument that national politics has had a "destructuring impact" upon the village.

The empirical findings of this study seem to support the view that planned, structural-institutional intervention is able to bring about significant changes in political behavior. Unfortunately this book does not make a contribution to the development of theory in this regard.

RALPH H. RETZLAFF
The Agricultural Development Council, Inc., Singapore

Soviet Criminal Law and Procedure: The RSFSR Codes. 2nd edition. Introduction and Analysis by Harold J. Berman. Trans. by Harold J. Berman and James W. Spindler. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966, 1972. Pp. 399. $12.00.)

It is a pleasure to welcome the second edition of this fine volume. In its basic format the book remains unchanged. As before, it contains a good literal translation of three pieces of Soviet legislation—the RSFSR Criminal Code, the RSFSR Code of Criminal Procedure, and the Law on Court Organization of the RSFSR —*and* a long (125 pp.) introductory essay by Professor Berman, which treats such topics as the history of the codes and of changes in them and the role of the procuracy and of the legal profession in Soviet criminal law and procedure. The decision to prepare a new edition of this book just six years after the first one was prompted by the large number of changes made in Soviet criminal legislation during the interim, so many as to render the original translation obsolete.

Readers familiar with the first edition will also discover that the excellent introductory essay by Professor Berman now includes a new section on the criminal codes and criminal procedure codes of the other republics (written by Mr. William Butler), a more detailed discussion of the problems of translating Russian legal language (largely to answer critics of the first edition), and an extended chapter five "Changes in the 1960 RSFSR Codes, 1961–1971," (written with the collaboration of Mr. Butler). It is this chapter on recent changes in Soviet criminal and criminal procedure legislation which has particular interest for political scientists since it provides both an overview of trends in Soviet criminal policy of recent years and a useful analysis of the relevance of Soviet criminal legislation for the control of political dissidence.

In assessing trends in Soviet criminal policy during the 1960s, Professor Berman claims that despite some changes in the direction of leniency or of rationality, the general tendency was for penalties to be made harsher (p. 71). Without doubt this interpretation stands as a correct description of the decade of the 1960s as a whole; yet, in my view, it leaves a somewhat inaccurate impression of the direction of Soviet criminal policy during the second half of the 1960s and by implication in the early 1970s as well. The bulk of the changes in Soviet criminal law during the 1960s which increased the severity of punishment came in the first half of the decade, and, as Professor Berman indicates, constituted a reaction to the extreme leniency of some provisions included in the new code of 1960. This reaction, however, was short-lived, and the "law and order" mood of the early 1960s gave way in the later half of the decade to an *eclectic* criminal policy. Some of the measures introduced in these years resulted in harsher sanctions, others in milder ones; most shared the common aim of reducing and preventing crimes with whatever tactics seemed most likely to succeed in the light of current scholarship and practical experience.

Professor Berman's treatment of the legal control of dissent in the 1960s begins with an analysis of the changes in the criminal law prompted by the prosecutors' difficulties at the Sinyavsky-Daniel trial—changes which "now make it possible to catch almost any strong expression of political dissent" within the ambit of one or another provision of the criminal code" (p. 83). The discussion then proceeds to the procedural aspects of "political trials," a matter of considerable importance for the conflict between regime and dissenters. "The underlying dilemma," writes Berman, "is that the Soviet political authority seeks to legitimate its struggle against dissent by reliance upon the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure, while the dissenters invoke the same codes to legitimate their opposition" (p. 89). Thus, Professor Berman puts in a nutshell the importance of Soviet criminal law and pro-

cedure for an understanding of dissent and its control in the USSR.

In its presentation as well as in its substance this book is a model of its kind. There is a comprehensive index (prepared by Malcom Hinden), as well as a glossary of Russian legal terminology, and appendices useful to the specialist.

PETER H. SOLOMON, JR.
University of Toronto

Angola. By Douglas Wheeler and René Pelissier. (New York: Praeger, 1971. Pp. 296. $11.00.)

Most literature covering the anticolonial insurgencies that felled Portugal's *ancien regime* is lopsidedly Afro-centric. It slights the European dimension of wars which were ultimately "lost" in Portugal itself. The volume under review represents an important exception. Its first, longest (155 pp.), and most valuable section constitutes an excellent summary of European-African interaction during some five centuries of Portuguese presence. In it Professor Douglas L. Wheeler, a careful, thorough researcher, has drafted a clear and concise history drawing upon the full range of primary sources available before the coup of 1974.

Neglectful of neither the precolonial history of Angola nor the complex motives and patterns of Portuguese penetration, Wheeler presents a judicious, well-balanced overview. As background reading to the political drama of contemporary Angola these first six chapters are unexcelled. They reflect the patient labor of an historian who has dug deep in the archives, then organized and analyzed his data with dispassion. Especially insightful are Wheeler's appraisal of the role of Angolan *assimilados* (pp. 93–98) and his assessment of race relations (pp. 106–08, 111–115) in colonial society. His chapter on "Angola and the Republic, 1910–1926," suggests interesting historic parallels at a time when Portugal's Second Republic, 1974–?, no less troubled and fragile than the first, is trying to extricate itself from the wreckage of collapsed empire. Wheeler concludes his historical synthesis with a survey of Angola under Antonio Salazar's *Estado Novo* that focuses on the genesis of the impending clash between Portuguese and African nationalism.

The collision that ensued led, after thirteen years of insurgency, to the death of Portugal's Eurafrican illusions. René Pélissier, a French writer who has specialized in the military history of Portuguese- and Spanish-speaking Africa, describes this collision of the 1960s in three chapters (pp. 159–239) that contrast sharply with those that precede. With a confident, often acid, pen he chronicles and judges, relying largely on inadequately acknowledged secondary sources and interviews with Portuguese military and government officials in Angola. The result is a provocative, sometimes insightful, but error-plagued and tendentious analysis of the first ten years of the Angolan war.

After noting quite properly that "any study of Angolan problems must be an exercise in scepticism" given the unreliability of documents, informants and reportage, Pélissier throws caution to the winds. His assertions and speculations are often plausible and intriguing but left unsupported by evidence: e.g., the notion that Lucio Lara (not Agostinho Neto) "is now perhaps the most active and important MPLA leader" (pp. 164–5); that the Congolese *Parti de la Solidarité Africaine* (PSA) was somehow implicated in Angolan affairs (pp. 167 and 174); that the American Committee on Africa helped to strengthen UPA "contacts with the Baptist Church" (p. 169); that "not only Angolans but a sizable number of troublemakers from the Léopoldville population" invaded northern Angola in March 1961 (p. 181); or that in spite of the war there was overall "a decided improvement in Angolan race relations" (p. 235). An uncritical acceptance of official Portuguese versions of events is the distorting variable. Pélissier relates as unquestioned fact reports of drugged insurgents massacring whites, *mestiços*, and ethnic rivals and derides nationalist leadership as unworthy and incompetent. The uprising of 1961 was "a caricature of a successful nationalist revolt" (p. 177). And occasionally, Pélissier's facts are clearly wrong. Rather than seeking to "rejoin" the MPLA (which he claims never to have belonged to) in 1964–65, the Ovimbundu leader, Jonas Savimbi, refused to join on terms offered and chose instead to form his own movement (p 224).

If one accepts Pélissier's work on its own terms, however, as a pungent, personally engaged critique of an African insurgency, its value is quickly apparent. His stress on ethnic disunity, leadership shortcomings, and strategic errors may be Gallic but is also insightful. For example, he writes tellingly of the UPA insurgency in northern Angola:

> It began with a massacre, and continued with a more skillful form of guerrilla warfare. The UPA enjoyed the support of the Bakongo masses but it had forced them to abandon their means of livelihood and, instead of

making hundreds of thousands of combatants of them it only created refugees. More serious, the flight of the Bakongo into the bush, though giving it short-term support, deprived it of the indispensable complicity of a settled population, essential to a long struggle (p. 187).

Pélissier outlines timid administrative reforms such as the new labor code that followed the outbreak of hostilities in 1961, credits the nationalists with hastening their advent but at great human cost, and reflects on the irony of "a war which slowly exhausts Portugal" but infuses the purchasing power of 50,000 European soldiers, new settlers and foreign investment in mineral extraction, and thus "develops Angola" (p. 199). And in the light of subsequent events, Pélissier's assessment of the Portuguese military was prescient: he found "a lack of enthusiasm among some Portuguese officers" who, viewing victory as problematic, did not "go to the limit of their human and material resources" and suffered from bad morale (p. 230).

The volume ends with a short wrap-up chapter by Douglas Wheeler in which he underscores the economic development in Angola during the war years, argues that of all European colonizers the Portuguese "have maintained the friendliest and least race-conscious relations with black Africans" (and the French?) and concludes that nationalist divisions made the possibility of Angolan independence during the next decade "rather remote" (p. 250). Indeed, had nationalist insurgents in Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique not been much more effective than their Angolan counterparts, had it all depended upon Angolan nationalists, such an assessment might have proved right on target. With sobering foresight, Wheeler conjectures that "if Angola were given independence tomorrow, the resulting loss of life might well make the Congo crisis of 1960–64 pale in comparison."

A series of well-designed maps, a useful, select bibliography, separate indices for names and subjects, and a table of Angolan organizations with their common abbreviations add to the usefulness of a volume of uneven but lasting merit.

JOHN MARCUM
University of California, Santa Cruz

Economics and World Order from the 1970s to the 1990s. Edited by Jagdish N. Bhagwati. (New York: The Free Press, 1972. Pp. 365. $3.95, paper.)

How successfully can social scientists predict the future? Of what value is the conference mode for doing so? Is it possible to compile a sensible volume based on the contributions of a diverse group of scholars? Insofar as domestic and international seminars appear to have become the hallmark of our time, and increasing numbers of books based on papers contributed to such meetings are being published, it is reassuring that, even though *Economics and World Order* was written before the Limits to Growth thesis and the energy crisis had burst upon us as the preoccupations of our generation, it is worthy of attention.

This volume, which deals with the wide range of issues implied by a futuristic look at the preferred world economic order in the years 1990–2000 and the paths by which an optimal society might be attained, had its origins in the World Order Models Project of the World Law Fund. By combining papers presented at a 1969 meeting in Northfield, Massachusetts, with a number of invited contributions and an introduction by Jagdish Bhagwati, who edited the papers, the volume seeks to be comprehensive, multidisciplinary, and consciousness-raising. To fill this tall order, of course, would have been a monumental task. What is surprising, therefore, is not that the book falls short of its objectives, but that it comes so close to fulfilling them.

In the lead article Bhagwati establishes parameters and makes clear that the primary economic value toward which the preferred world order should aim is better welfare for the world's poor people (a strong point of the volume is its emphasis on people rather than nations); he also asserts that international and intranational income disparities are near the center of the issue. Bhagwati's introduction mixes conventional and unconventional wisdom in dealing with issues such as foreign aid, brain drain, science and technology, and it concludes with the questionable propositions that world famine is unlikely and that world population growth will gradually diminish and is no cause for alarm.

Subsequent articles by P. N. Rosenstein-Rodan and Thomas Weisskopf present traditional liberal and New Left perspectives, respectively, on the outlook for the poor. Each contribution, in its own way, has an air of unreality: Rosenstein-Rodan brilliantly and succinctly describes the evolution of economic disparities since 1800 and the steps needed to narrow them in the next several decades, but he leaves the reader without any feeling for whether, or to what extent, the needed steps

will be taken; Weisskopf's argument is so heavily laden with assertion and value judgment that it requires an act of faith to agree with his thesis that elites will "ultimately give way to revolutionary movements" (p. 66). Similarly, the two articles contributed by socialist authors, Jozef Pajestka and Lev V. Stepanov, are unlikely to move readers other than those who are already committed. These contributions both suffer badly from (1) the false assumption that only doctrinaire socialism has the capacity to satisfy social values and (2) the authors' felt need to make as many unkind comments about capitalism as possible.

The next four articles provide meaty, if not always balanced, analysis of the role of international institutions. The late Stephen Hymer has written a trenchant attack on the social and economic impact of multinational corporations, unfortunately not paired with another article taking the opposite viewpoint. Both Harry Johnson's analysis of international trade and payments arrangements and Robert Triffin's discussion of how the world monetary system should and may become substantially more internationalized by the year 2000 are workmanlike and comprehensive. These pieces have the particular virtues of first, not being dominated by the theme of how the situation of poor countries can be aided irrespective of other goals and, second, taking a serious view of how growing international interdependence has led to—and may continue to lead to—a better world order. Jan Tinbergen has written a faintly optimistic essay and, in dealing with the "development decade" concept and various global development strategies, he seeks to broaden the perspective in which the issues of development are considered.

The last third of the book, which deals with the new world order from the perspective of various developing regions, is uneven. It includes articles on Latin America by Osvaldo Sunkel and Carlo Diaz-Alejandro, on Africa by Dharam Ghai and Ali Mazrui, on China by Shigeru Ishikawa, and on India by Pitambar Pant. These regional views are instructive, particularly the analyses of Dias-Alejandro and Mazrui, but they often fail to go beyond a regional perspective. (For example, more is made of the Latin American Free Trade Association and the Central American Common Market than is justified by economic theory or prospective economic or political relationships among the countries concerned.) To the extent that the authors of these regional articles are especially prone to wishful thinking, have differing values, and do not clearly define the objective to be reached by the end of the century or th paths for moving in those directions, thes papers illustrate the inevitable problems whic dog any effort to deal with futuristic and har subjects. Similarly, these and earlier article deal with isms such as capitalism with littl feeling for the impurity of the systems as ac tually practiced. Illustratively, there is no effor anywhere in the book to distinguish difference among non-Communist industrialized coun tries or to recognize the prevalence of mixe economic systems.

The great strength of this book, aside from its presentation of a stimulating panoply of related ideas, is that it makes a coherent case for rapid social change and suggests the means whereby it may occur. Although Bhagwati and his coauthors could not have foreseen the realignment of world economic power which followed the 1973 Middle East War and could not have known that the Third World political coalition in the United Nations would loom as a potential power as early as 1974, they have addressed their respective subjects at a level which makes these real-world events understandable. The happy explanation for this is that most of the articles are written from more than a narrow economic perspective; they are broadly based in the world of political economy and focus on issues which are so critical that they are bound to remain relevant.

LAWRENCE A. VEIT
Council on Foreign Relations

The Moscow Agreements and Strategic Arms Limitation. By Hedley Bull. Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence, No. 15. (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1973. Pp. 50. No price indicated.)

This brief study of the 1972 SALT agreements undertakes first to measure them against the goals of arms control. In considering whether they have reduced the likelihood of war, Hedley Bull does not discuss the common assertion that the very placing of limits on arms has decreased tension and the likelihood of war; he has long criticized the notion that arms races, as such, cause wars. Rather, he concerns himself primarily with how the agreements have affected the possibility of a partial disarming strike by one side. Professor Bull shows very well (p. 13) how the agreements have not enhanced second-strike deterrence; he concludes that limiting the vulnerability of fixed land-based missiles is the most important task of present negotiations. Bull's own sugges-

tions are not, however, very promising. Bull goes on to refute concisely the widespread belief that the Moscow accords enshrine the purely deterrent strategy of Mutual Assured Destruction. Indeed, the SALT accords have, since Bull wrote, probably contributed somewhat to acceptance of Secretary of Defense Schlesinger's "counterforce" strategy.

Turning to the political meaning of the Moscow agreements, Bull concludes that "the terms of the interim agreement [on offensive forces] are remarkably one-sided" in favor of the Soviet Union. But critics' fears of the agreements' effects on American attitudes towards her allies are very exaggerated, even if their "general thrust" is correct. Bull mentions only in passing the possibly much more important question of allied attitudes towards the United States.

Bull's presentation of SALT clarifies the issue very impressively. The reader may wonder, however, whether some further motives and results should not have been treated. To take the simplest examples, Bull does not choose to discuss the evident attempt of each side to disarm the other's superiority (Soviet missile payload, American ABM technology). When the Soviets brought up American Forward-Based Systems in Europe and "provocative attacks" by third powers, they may have shown a second intent to sow trouble between a nation and its allies. Another, less fully intentional, result of the SALT negotiations has been an *increase,* rather than a decrease, in many weapons. Formal comparison calls attention to weak areas; new weapons are cultivated as bargaining chips for negotiations and as payoffs to bureaucratic groups for supporting an agreement. Examples are the Trident submarine, the B-1 bomber, and cruise missiles. These side-effects of SALT may in turn have important consequences for future arms control. Cruise missiles, for instance, may reopen the question of air defense and make limited nuclear strategies more feasible. Both cruise missiles and the B-1 will make U.S. strategic forces more asymmetrical with the Soviet missile force and may tend to increase negotiating complications and uncertainties about the political effects of the strategic balance: it will be harder to guess whether the overall strategic balance or the missile balance is the politically relevant fact. Time has also seen the ambiguities in the SALT terms grow into charges of cheating; this is another of the aspects of SALT which the author surely perceived but chose not to explore, whether for brevity or because of his focus on arms control. But one of the things the student of arms control wants to know is whether arms control agreements are the best way to achieve arms control. This is the question raised by the secondary effects of SALT discussed above. It is a question that Bull does not address. As a consequence, he did not write as interesting a study as he could have written, although it does furnish those interested in arms control or in U.S.-Soviet relations an unusually clear-headed evaluation of the SALT agreements.

CHARLES H. FAIRBANKS, JR.
Yale University

Annals of International Studies: Hydrospace in International Relations (Volume 4—1973). Edited by Lucius C. Caflisch. (Geneva: The Alumni Association of the Graduate Institute of International Studies, 1973. Pp. 372. Belgian francs 400.)

This fourth volume in the series *Annals of International Studies* is an ably edited and relatively comprehensive collection of essays on the law of the sea and related problems. Though its publication came too early for its contributors to have taken into account the actual proceedings of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, *Hydrospace in International Relations* ranks high among books dealing with the problems of ocean space. The fourteen essays, authored by some of the most distinguished scholars in the field, are almost all clearly written and well documented. They are substantial enough to interest the specialist. At the same time, they provide the uninitiated with a broad and systematic overview of the complex issues associated with the law of the sea.

The essays, reflecting the interests and perspectives of a variety of academic disciplines and geographic areas, are divided into three general groups. Under "general topics" are included papers on the interests of the developing countries by Ram P. Anand, on Latin American interests by Ralph Zacklin, and on the interests of the land and shelf-locked states by Vladimir Ibler. Under "special topics" are included two papers on strategic and military problems—demilitarization and denuclearization of the oceans by Edward D. Brown, and Western European interests in the Indian Ocean by Jacques Freymond; two on economic problems—ocean resources and global mineral supplies by Richard L. Gordon, and the importance of nodule mining to the world nickel

industry by Herbert D. Drechsler; and five relating specifically to legal problems—coastal state jurisdiction by Leo J. Bouchez, the archipelagos problem by Geoffrey Marston, marine fisheries by Albert W. Koers, oil pollution by Lucius Caflisch, and the General Assembly's "Declaration of Principles" (1970) by Krzysztof Skubiszewski. Under "the future regime of hydrospace" are included two papers—on the creation of an international machinery to manage the seabed by Moritaka Hayashi, and on the law of sea-mining by Louis Henkin. The book also includes an appendix containing a number of useful documents pertaining to sea law.

Much that has transpired at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea was anticipated in these papers. The Conference, which was launched as an effort to rewrite the law of the sea, quickly expanded into a confrontation between the rich industrial states and the poor "third world" states over the political and economic reconstruction of the global order. The confrontation has been particularly harsh with respect to the creation of a regime of the deep-seabed and ocean floor (the area lying beyond the limits of national jurisdiction of coastal states), where vast quantities of valuable ferromanganese nodules are known to lie. Most of the papers in this volume reflect this rich-poor controversy, testifying to the enormous political (and ideological) handicap under which this Conference has labored.

Anand's paper ("Interests of the Developing Countries and the Developing Law of the Sea") describes sympathetically the grievances and the goals of the developing countries. The grievances are the familiar ones of poverty, the growing "development gap," and the inequitable distribution of world resources, for which the developed countries are held responsible, at least in part. The goals are, first, to secure for the developing states "the largest possible share of the resources of the seabed" (p. 23), by extending the scope of the territorial sea, for example, or by establishing an economic resource zone within which coastal states would exercise more or less exclusive control of both living and non-living resources to a distance of 200 miles from land; and second, to deny whatever is left to the developed states. This last is to be achieved by embodying in the new legal regime of the high seas the principle that the resources of the deep oceans (particularly the mineral resources of the ocean floor) are the "common heritage of mankind," to be exploited for the common good—most especially, for the good of the developing countries. Anand is aware of the contradictions in these goals: claims by developing *coastal* states to mammoth economic resource zones rather substantially diminish the area of sea space remaining for the "common heritage"—or for the developing *landlocked* states. But in remarking that the developing countries "have stood solidly behind this concept" (p. 22) of the common heritage, he may have overstated their unanimity and underestimated the degree to which the concept has been drained of any meaning—to no small extent by the "selfish" actions of the developing countries themselves.

The irony in the dispute between developed and developing states over control of ocean resources is that the only major resource with any chance of becoming the property of all mankind—the ferromanganese nodules—may result in the enrichment of very few. The nodules, which carpet up to 25 per cent of the ocean floor, do contain rich concentrations of many metals, chief among them copper, cobalt, nickel, and manganese. And there are estimates that US investments in nodule mining alone may exceed $6 billion before the end of the century. But much of the excitement over nodule mining rests on the assumption that terrestrial supplies of these minerals are limited and, in some cases, approaching exhaustion. Gordon's paper ("Ocean Resources and World Mineral Supplies") casts considerable doubt on the "exhaustion" theory, arguing that the "resource pessimists" have simply not proved their case. Ocean miners (and public policy makers), he points out, should not bank on increasing scarcity to raise prices to such levels as are required to compensate for the high costs of deep ocean mining. For if the assumption of mineral scarcity proves unwarranted, so may ocean mining. Essentially the same point is made by Drechsler ("The Significance of Nodule Mining to the World Nickel Industry"). Noting that estimated world reserves of nickel (one of the most valuable components of the nodules) rose from 16 to 75 million tons in the 10-year period 1963–1973—an amount "sufficient for 125 years at the estimated 1970 world production rate of 600,000 tons" (p. 133)—Drechsler concludes that "there is little reason to expect that many nodule mines will be producing nickel before the year 2000" (p. 139).

The supreme irony, of course, is that the global struggle to control these seabed resources has outstripped in intensity virtually every other issue before the Third United Nations Conference. Even if the nodules one day prove of great value, as many believe they will, they are today nowhere mined commercially

and their future value remains largely speculative. The law of the sea is stalked today as much by the ocean's unknown future as by its known past.

The book has a number of limitations. Some topics (e.g., economic resources) are treated at considerable length and from several perspectives, while others (e.g., preservation of the marine environment, the straits question, and scientific research) are only barely touched upon. Several papers (e.g., Caflisch, "Some Aspects of Oil Pollution from Merchant Ships") will appeal only to those steeped in the legalisms of marine jurisprudence. Two of the shorter papers are in French, which may authenticate the multinational character of the volume, but at the expense of its full accessibility to American readers. Unavoidably, the swift passage of events in the realm of ocean law has "dated" some of the materials considered. But there are enough outstanding papers in this volume to reward the reader amply. Indeed, this may well be the best general collection of essays on the international problems of the oceans yet published.

ROBERT G. WIRSING
University of South Carolina

The Communist International, 1919–1943. By John Lewis Evans. (Brooklyn, N.Y.: Pageant-Poseidon Ltd., 1973. Pp. 194. $7.95.)

Outline History of the Communist International. By the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1971. Pp. 563. $5.00.)

Soviet Russia Masters the Comintern: International Communism in the Era of Stalin's Ascendancy. By Helmut Gruber. (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1974. Pp. 544. $3.95, paper.)

The Third International or Comintern was indeed a strange historical phenomenon. As conceived by Lenin in 1916, it was designed to replace what he felt was a bankrupted Second International which had betrayed socialism when many of its members and constituent groups supported national ambitions in World War I. Enunciated in Lenin's April Thesis, the concept of a Third International became part of the Russian Bolshevik's revolutionary program in 1917. Revolution and Civil War, however, delayed its founding until March, 1919 when the poorly attended Organizational Congress of the Comintern met in Moscow. Viewed by many western Socialists as something less than desirable, the Third International was from the beginning dominated by Russian leadership. The organization had two integrated objectives. Publicly the Comintern was to plan, promote, and direct the pending world socialist revolution. Its unpublicized objective was to aid the Bolshevik's Civil War effort against the White Armies and foreign interventionists, and thus help to protect the socialist experiment in Soviet Russia. As Helmut Gruber writes: "In one of those strange ironies of history the Comintern was both inspired by and the victim of the Russian Revolution" (p. 509).

Until it was quietly and mercifully dissolved in May, 1943, the Comintern had a long and inglorious record of failures both as a socialist international and after 1925, as an organizational tool of Stalin's foreign policy. Even its limited accomplishments were ephemeral and in the end proved to be ideologically destructive to the dream of a world socialist order.

In recent years considerable interest in the Comintern has been shown by Western historians and political scientists, and a number of excellent analyses and accounts have appeared. For example, one thinks immediately of the work produced by Branko Lazitch and Milorad Drachkovitch (*Lenin and the Comintern,* Stanford, 1972), and of the documentary collections edited by Jane Degras (*The Communist International 1919–1943: Documents,* London and New York, 1956, 1960, Vol. I: 1919–1922, Vol. II: 1923–1928). It would be nice to be able to report that the three volumes being reviewed here have something to add to our knowledge and understanding of the Comintern and its activities. Unfortunately, that is only the case with one of them.

Evans's *The Communist International, 1919–1943* is a book which really has to be read to be believed because no review could ever do it justice. After the first chapter the reader's reaction is one of shock and wonder as to why anything of this quality should have been published. After the second chapter, one is simply disgusted and appalled thinking of the number of trees sacrificed to produce the paper for this volume. By chapter three, however, the reader can settle down and begin to enjoy this book in a masochistic sort of way. One approaches each new page with satanic anticipation as to how many spelling errors and misprints will be counted (e.g., Li Tao-chao for Li Ta-chao, p. 96; Kugomintang for Kuomintang, p. 93), and what odd commentary will be found next. For example:

> The future fate of the Third International was very closely tied up with domestic events

> in Russia. Lenin asked the Zimmerwald Union, to which the Left tenuously adhered, to help bring pressure on the socialist groups in Russia to withdraw their support from the Provisional Government. The Bolsheviks led the Zimmerwald Left, and they were to lead all Russia. There was just no end to their achievements; a new international would make them rulers of the whole world, and it was inconceivable that it could fail. After November, 1917, the term Zimmerwald Left was dropped and Bolshevik took its place (pp. 21–22).
>
> The international Bolshevik movement did not go out of existence on May 15, 1943. It stayed alive and is alive today. However, the aspect of world Bolshevism that was called the Comintern ceased to exist after 1943 (p. 176).

Although promoted as an overall history of the Third International, the book in its own mysterious way deals primarily with Comintern activities in Germany, France, China, and Spain. Even in the best books the Spanish and Chinese Civil War situations are recognized as highly complex. Here they are treated in such a disjointed manner that the complexity becomes chaotic.

Unless the reader possesses a fair knowledge of international communist activities he will find this book nearly incomprehensible. One reason is that the work is so poorly organized. Paragraphs often seem to be inserted at random, with no relevance to what came before or to what follows. Biographical sketches, which belong in footnotes, are interpolated into the text effectively ruining whatever continuity the section attempted to maintain. According to the publisher, the book is a revision of the author's M.A. thesis. One can only charitably assume that it is a thesis sadly mutilated by scissors and paste, and then further disfigured by editorial incompetence. If the thesis contained any new material or original analysis, it was certainly lost before the work found its way into print. According to the bibliography, the book is based almost entirely on secondary sources, and even these are too often handled in a rather cavalier fashion. In his conclusion the author writes: "In the history of the Third International from 1915–1943, three periods of its activities have been distinguished, *although not always clearly*" (p. 176). To that one can only add, Amen!

The *Outline History of the Communist International* is mistitled "A Detailed and Exhausting History . . ." would be more appropriate. Here the reader will find more minutiae on the Comintern than he or she ever wanted to know: all presented in an agonizingly pedantic style. It is a typically Soviet historical study, produced by a committee of eight authors headed by A. I. Sobolev, with an obvious ideological bias.

Every phase of Comintern development and all personages involved are portrayed as dictated by the correct Party line as of 1971, the date of publication. This is the Comintern's history as seen in the Brezhnev-Kosygin period of interpretation. Here one finds the wise, all-knowing Lenin skillfully establishing a theoretical and organizational structure for world revolutionary leadership. There is the pragmatic, but slightly overbearing Stalin dexterously formulating and implementing Comintern policies and activities. Then, of course, there is the muddle-headed, diabolical Trotsky subverting the Comintern with his mistaken permanent revolution theories and insatiable political ambition. In this study the Comintern's problems seldom, if ever, originate in Moscow but arise from ineffective implementation in the field because of local Communists' inexperience, ignorance, or corrupting nationalistic attitudes.

The western reader will regard the volume's interpretations and analyses of events with incredulity. One example will suffice. In 1943 the fact that the Comintern was arbitrarily abolished by Stalin because it had become an embarrassment to the Soviet Union's war-time alliance with the capitalist West is not mentioned. Instead the *Outline History* tells us that the Comintern was abolished only after long deliberation among party representatives from around the world who finally voted *unanimously* for dissolution because "under the conditions of the war the existence of the Communist International was used by the reactionaries to slander the Soviet Union and the communist parties of the different countries" (p. 512).

The final chapter of the *Outline History,* entitled "Traditions of the Comintern and the Present-Day Communist Movement," lays great stress on the heritage of the organization in creating international solidarity among the world proletariat and the downtrodden masses, and on its legacy for a bright future of world communism under the guidance and leadership of the USSR. Then, near the end, the authors inform us that

> a heavy blow to the unity of the world communist movement has been dealt by the Mao Tse-tung group, which has sunk to anti-Leninist positions and is pursuing a Left-

ist adventurist policy of great-power chauvinism in the international arena and the world communist movement.

> The opportunist degeneration of Mao Tse-tung and his group is a logical evolution and consummation of their erroneous political and theoretical views which the Comintern had once combated (p. 558).

So much for the heritage of communist international solidarity and for the Comintern's legacy to the modern world!

After Evans and the *Outline History* one turns with relief to Gruber's *Soviet Russia Masters the Comintern.* Although making no really new contribution to historical knowledge, this volume does provide a good coverage of the 1924–1929 period. It is the second volume in Gruber's projected trilogy on the fate of international communism from World War I to 1939. The first volume, *International Communism in the Era of Lenin,* appeared in 1967 and received generally favorable criticism. We now await volume three on *International Communism in the Shadow of Fascism.*

The basic theme of this book is obvious from the title. The years 1924 to 1929 witnessed the complete bolshevization of the Comintern. The organization was turned away from its international objectives, becoming merely an additional vehicle to further the foreign policy objectives of the Soviet Union. The Comintern was indeed forced by Stalin to align its activities with his doctrine of "Socialism in One Country"—a transformation closely associated with Stalin's own triumphant rise to totalitarian power within the Soviet political structure. Although Stalin must bear primary responsibility for the Comintern's character in the second half of the 1920s, Professor Gruber emphasizes that Stalin was working from a contradictory theoretical base for the Third International established by Lenin in the early 1920s.

> The Comintern's move toward a more hierarchical structure was in part a continuation of precedents established by Lenin who, in an attempt to avoid the lack of focus and indiscipline of the Second International, sought to transfer the rigid organization of his bolshevik party to the Third International. The bolshevik leaders of the Comintern chose to build on these precedents in part because all of Leninist practice had already been mystified and given the force of law by those struggling for the succession (pp. 506–507).

Trotsky too must share the responsibility for the bolshevization of the Comintern. His much publicized opposition to Stalin's foreign policy and Comintern activities came after the bolshevization process had become irrevocable, and only when the organization was displaying an ineptitude which could no longer be ignored.

This volume is divided into two parts. The first deals with the bolshevization process and the second with "the Comintern and Colonial Peoples." The two parts are each divided into three sections. For example, part two covers the theoretical ambiguity of the Comintern's approach to the colonial empires in Africa and Asia, and then moves on to investigate in depth China as the "Waterloo of Comintern colonial policy: prologue and dénouement."

Gruber's comments on China in the 1920s are perceptive and interesting. Stalin's Comintern policy for China displayed a wide ranging incompetence that is almost uncanny. If a wrong option was available, it was selected. If a false reading and analysis of the situation could be made, it was done. If bad and misleading counsel to the Communist Party of China was conceived in Moscow, it was always given. When the ailing fortunes of the CCP finally reached rock bottom after 1927, it was the Soviets' view that the "inept leadership" of the Chinese party had to accept the blame. The Comintern/Stalin policy could never have been wrong. It is little wonder that Mao Tse-tung developed a healthy suspicion in the 1920s that Moscow might not be the fountainhead of all wisdom; that Stalin's aid and advice was determined first and foremost by Soviet national interests; and that the welfare and success of foreign communist parties was a low priority in the Kremlin. The bitter seeds of the Sino-Soviet dispute had been deeply planted.

Each section of the Gruber book is introduced by a clear, carefully constructed historical essay followed by a selection of documents chosen to illustrate the basic tenets set forth in the essay. The sections end with a brief selection of "further readings." The volume also contains a helpful selected general bibliography and a very competent and useful index. This work can be recommended without hesitation as a sound introductory text on international communism in the 1920s. It should prove useful as collateral reading in courses on the history of Soviet foreign policy.

Readers may recall that during the 1920s western reaction to the Comintern was one of apprehension and concern: "The Great Red Scare." Looked at historically, an amused response might have been more appropriate. Nevertheless, the Comintern was an interesting experiment and a fascinating institution. The

three volumes reviewed above have a certain fascination of their own in demonstrating how an historical occurrence can be discussed and evaluated from different ideological positions, and from divergent bases of intellectual preparation.

JOHN W. STRONG
Carleton University, Ottawa

Regionale Verflechtung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Empirische Analysen und Theoretische Probleme. By the Forschungsinstitutes der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, e.V. Bonn, Band 33. (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1973. Pp. 311, DM 34.00.)

One of the remarkable phenomena that attended the emergence of the Federal Republic of Germany (BRD) has been the resurgence of interest in international politics and economics. Long before the *Wirtschaftswunder* started to take effect, associations and societies concerned with international affairs, foreign policy, and related matters mushroomed in Germany. Some of these attained national repute. The *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik,* in particular, became internationally renowned. Indeed, its right arm, the Research Institute has become an outstanding source of reference in the study of international politics.

The book under review, the Institute's latest accomplishment, consists of twelve essays produced by a variety of authors. The collective enterprise was initiated by Waldemar Besson, well-known for his expertise in and publications on the Federal Republic's foreign policy. The untimely death of Besson, a few years ago, did not cause the ambitious project to founder. By then workshops had been established in which a number of highly qualified political scientists and political executives were to participate. Although care was taken to blend the theoretical and practical approaches, the executive group (generally those who face the day-to-day problems resulting from the BRD's involvement in regional organizations) contributed disproportionally to the undertaking. The list of executives participating in the workshops included names well-known to the German public such as Katherina Focke, Ellinor von Puttkamer, and Per Fischer. Their contributions, however, have in a sense remained invisible because the task of formulating the results of the workshops was often left to lesser luminaries. Also, one cannot help thinking that the executive group should have been balanced by the inclusion of scholars who through their writings made clearly visible imprints on the discipline. One wonders why Heinrich End and Uwe Nerlich were not included in either panels or papers. Even more curious is the omission of Dr. Helga Haftendorn, who was associated with the Research Institute for several years, and who has recently established herself as a foremost authority in the field through her monumental book *Abrüstungs- und Entspannungspolitik zwischen Sicherheitsbefriedigung und Friedenssicherung.*

The mix of "officials, politicians and theoreticians" (as Reinhard Lohrmann classifies the contributors in a brief foreword) has naturally affected approach and performance. Diversity and unevenness invariably attend collective intellectual endeavors, but in this instance the problem might have been overcome to some extent had a general editor been made responsible for structuring and disciplining the *Schriften.* Since no one appears to have assumed that role, the essays vary widely in theme, tenor and treatment. Thus Erwin Häckel's essay that immediately follows the Foreword is highly theoretical, attempting to arrive at a conceptualization of regional alignment (the latter term, rather than *entanglement* would seem preferable, at least in this context, as a translation of *Verflechtung*). One may not always agree with Häckel. The assumption, e.g., that regional organizations may be viewed as useful and necessary vehicles in the development of world unity has been thoroughly eroded by recent experiences, and is certainly no longer as prevalent as its *auctor intellectualis* (Etzioni) maintained at the time (p. 31).

However that may be, Häckel represents Academe *in optima forma.* The essay on the European Communities and the Federal Republic of Germany which appears to concentrate on the *Verflechtung* (in this instance to be translated as *integration*) of the national and the community policies, conveys the view of an official, and perhaps also the official view. The author, Dr. Ulrich Everling, at the time of writing a top official of the Federal Ministry of Economics and Finance, bases his arguments by and large on German source material, some of it included in articles which he himself contributed to scholarly journals.

The *Schriften* thus explore the position and the commitments of the *Bundesrepublik* in their regional context. They by and large address themselves to the assets and liabilities resulting from NATO- and EEC-membership, the intricacies of the *Bundesrepublik*'s position and its relation to its partners. The American reader in particular will be intrigued by the

German perception of the organizational politics of defense. Then again, he may be struck by the fact that no mention at all is made of the important policy differences between the USA and the BRD, particularly during the Kennedy administration when the relationship between Germany and its allies had virtually reached its nadir. The philosophy behind burden sharing (the *Leitmotiv* during the Nixon years) is also analyzed from the German perspective (in Wilfried Hofmann's essay, pp. 143–65).

Finally, one has to bear in mind that although a timely analysis of the *Bundesrepublik*'s involvement in regional organization must be applauded, its usefulness may be limited in terms of time. Perhaps one should not exaggerate the built-in obsolescence of contemporary assessments; but the new Europe changes fast, and any analysis of any aspect of its structure may appear dated within a few years. To mention but one example: most of the preparatory work of the *Schriften* had been conducted before the Europe of Six changed into a Europe of Nine. What relevance, one must ask, do the problems of the former set have to those of the latter?

In sum, the present volume is destined to remain relatively obscure in the United States. As things stand, it appears unlikely that German and American scholarship will experience a *Verflechtung* that would make the book required reading in graduate course work on this side of the Atlantic. Its contents will not make waves, its sources (unfortunately, the volume lacks an index as well as a bibliography) are not likely to be cited in future papers or brandished at future conventions. This is unfortunate because a book that has been the fruit of so much specialist effort deserves a better fate.

HENRI J. WARMENHOVEN
Virginia Commonwealth University

Foreign Affairs and the Constitution. By Louis Henkin. (Mineola, New York: The Foundation Press, 1972. Pp. 553. $11.50.)

In *Foreign Affairs and the Constitution* Louis Henkin seeks to fill a void of long standing. He maintains that while there have been distinguished studies of presidential or congressional power in foreign affairs, they permit "only peripheral vision . . . of the rest of the scene" (p. ix). Quincy Wright gave a broad overview in his work, but new considerations have arisen in the half-century since it appeared. Failure to fill the void stems from the notion that constitutional law counts for little in foreign affairs, the fact the Court has said little in the area, etc. In his mind the effects are costly, for although the role of politics in foreign affairs is ample, the politics itself is often shaped by the Constitution.

Mr. Henkin argues that the "abiding uncertainties" turn on the distribution of political powers between President and Congress "singly and together, in conflict and cooperation" (p. 10). Other areas also generate constitutional questions: international organizations, the role of the states and courts, individual rights. Let us say a word on his discussion of these lesser areas of controversy before we turn to his analysis of the greater.

America's participation in international organizations has posed no significant difficulties in Mr. Henkin's view. Obligations fall on the American government, not individual citizens. The government is under no *constitutional* obligation to honor any treaty. Should future participation impinge directly on individuals within the United States new constitutional issues, without precedent, would arise.

Mr. Henkin holds that judicial review, which has had a small role on questions of states rights or Separation, and a more substantial one on individual rights, "has flourished as the courts have staunchly upheld the supremacy of treaties and of acts of Congress or of the President over inconsistent state action" (p. 210). He gives a lucid exposition of the *Sabbatino* case, with its implication for Act of State doctrine and determination of international law for the states.

He feels that federalism showed its limitations in foreign affairs long before it "began to be a wasting asset in American life generally" (p. 228). Problems arise, for example over the distinction between the Treaty denied the State and the Agreement or Compact, with Congress's consent, allowed it. Mr. Henkin's main theme is the limitations of state power, as under the Commerce and Supremacy Clauses, and the additional restraints implied in *Zschernig* v. *Miller*. He believes, nevertheless, in the "abiding relevance of federalism" derivative in part from constitutional, in larger part from political, considerations.

In the final area of lesser controversy, the author stresses that Mr. Justice Sutherland exempted foreign affairs "from the rigors of limitations on delegation inherent in the separation of powers" in *Curtiss-Wright*, but affirmed the applicability of other constitutional limitations. Their vitality is evident in cases which turn on individual rights, e.g., the bearing of due process on the right to travel abroad

or of "just compensation" on more generous leeway for the Court of Claims in instances of "taking for public use."

The major areas of controversy with which Mr. Henkin is concerned stem from the fact that in domestic affairs the constitutional consequences of Separation are more or less agreed; in foreign affairs they are determined by no "natural" division. "As they have evolved, the foreign relations powers appear not so much 'separated' as fissured, along jagged lines indifferent to classical categories of government" (p. 32).

The most jagged of these lines is that between the "President's conduct of foreign relations, including the use of force for foreign policy purposes, and the power of Congress to declare for war" (p. 100). However, as a "matter of constitutional doctrine" the President "begins to exceed his authority only if he wilfully and recklessly moves the nation toward war, and a responsible President, loyal to his constitutional oath, should stop, or seek the authorization of Congress" (p. 100). Happily "that constitutional issue is becoming hypothetical for it is increasingly difficult to make an authentic case that the President has taken the country into war without Congressional authorization in advance or ratification soon after" (100–101).

Under Mr. Henkin's analysis it is less the constitutional issue that is likely to become hypothetical than the ability of Congress to make effective its constitutional responsibilities. Once any considerable number of Americans is engaged in military action through presidential initiative, Congress may find itself faced with a Hobson's choice if it seeks to exercise its check by reduction of appropriations or through disengagement. The attempted exercise of constitutional responsibilities in the former instance risks imposition of unbearable burdens on America's fighting forces; in the latter it is undermined by the inability of a state to terminate conflict through its sole initiative.

"A President can insist that the 'line' between war and foreign policy by means short of war is the constitutional imperative delimiting his domain from that of Congress," Mr. Henkin asserts. But this hardly resolves the dilemma. Is the President true to his oath when he draws that line as broadly as he deems necessary, barring explicit withdrawal of congressional support, or is he under obligation to draw it strictly, through the changing phases of its exercise, in the absence of specific congressional authorization? Here Mr. Henkin's clarity in formulation of the issue is not matched by clarity in its resolution.

In his conclusion the author rightly discounts proposals that seek remedies through drastic amendments or the denial of power, and puts his emphasis on more effective legislative-executive *modus vivendi et operandi* and the more balanced exercise of power.

Mr. Henkin's book makes a notable contribution to the task of building a new national consensus in foreign affairs, as much by its tone as by its terms. Its hallmark is concern to weigh competing claims with scrupulous care. In lucidity, comprehensiveness, and thoroughness, it offers rich resources to us all.

WHITTLE JOHNSTON
University of Virginia

The Nineteenth-Century Foreign Office: An Administrative History. By Ray Jones. (New York: Humanities Press, 1971. Pp. 224. $11.00.)

This is a contribution to the history of the British civil service. The main themes addressed are the division of labor within the Foreign Office between intellectual and mechanical work; the devolution of work from the under-secretary to the junior clerks; and the regulation of admission to the service by competitive but limited examinations. The changing responsibilities and status of the posts within the hierarchy are chartered and explained, including the decline of the Chief Clerk and the Parliamentary Under-Secretary. The importance of having been Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary in connection with rising to the position of Permanent Under-Secretary is incidentally brought out, as is the hold of the Private Secretary on appointments and consequently on the character of the Office. There is a useful appendix and, in chapter 2, some tables, providing biographical information about Clerks recruited between 1824 and 1906. All the relevant material has been used, some of it for the first time, and the bibliography is particularly well presented.

The picture that emerges is of a rather inbred institution with a distinct sense of identity, highly conscious of the differences between it and other departments and determined to maintain them; of a body of men making from time to time adjustments to their working routine which kept the Office always slightly behind the times. In this perspective, reduced in many respects to its proper proportions, the Foreign Office is revealed as concerned less with *la*

haute politique than with administering itself, and as engaged in a rearguard action lasting fifty years to withstand the leveling influence of a Treasury determined that the F.O. Establishment should cost the country as little as possible and consistently refusing to countenance increases in personnel simply because the volume of business was otherwise unmanageable. The impression given is that the Foreign Office was there, like the cavalry in war, to give tone to what would otherwise be an unseemly brawl.

The author is not concerned with the impact on foreign policy of the developments he describes. He assumes too much when he says (p. 143) that foreign policy was formulated within the administrative arrangements he has investigated. It is doubtful whether this was the case even after the Reforms which took effect from 1 January 1906 and for which Lord Lansdowne and the "old guard" of Sanderson and Villiers here get the credit they deserve. As it is, no symbolic value is attached to the fact that the Cabinet ceased to meet in a room in the Foreign Office late in 1856. Nevertheless, this is a valuable work of reference, to be placed alongside the Foreign Office Lists. Many historians will have reason to be grateful to Dr. Jones for his work in this field.

KEITH WILSON
University of Leeds, England

The Rationale for NATO: European Collective Security—Past and Present. By Morton A. Kaplan. (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research and Stanford, California: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1973. Pp. 94. $3.00, paper.)

The first half of the book deals with the origins and early developments of NATO. On the whole, this part is a well balanced, level-headed analysis of American and Soviet post-war policies with an emphasis on the French-German dichotomy and its impact on US relations to Europe.

One would also agree with Professor Kaplan in his assessment of NATO's problems in the 'seventies. While the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact (WTO) allies keep increasing their military capabilities in an apparent preparation for a blitz-like, hard and sudden strike against the West, the NATO countries stick to their old-time strategy of a defence based on gradual mobilization and a slow conventional build-up.

There is also logic reasoning in his proposition that if the countries in the West are unable to respond quickly and effectively to a blitz-strike from the East, they should look for ways to slow down the delay and thus gain time to mobilize.

Doubts and objections start cropping up, however, when Professor Kaplan proceeds to discuss the practical measures which he recommends to implement his dissuasion strategy. Partly to avoid a Soviet first strike on nuclear sites, partly to convince the East Europeans that NATO would not hit back at the US and its national territories, Kaplan feels that the United States should withdraw its 250 Pershing missiles for tactical nuclear delivery from Central Europe. He also feels that the quick reaction aircraft (QRA) designed for nuclear strikes, should be withdrawn. As a compensation he suggests "a more credible linkage" of the Polaris/Poseidon nuclear forces and a further development of USA's quick-transfer capability.

First, given the present Soviet military deployment in Eastern Europe, one wonders how the Warsaw Pact allies could feel assured that a NATO response would hit Soviet forces only, with no damage to their own territories. Moreover, although the WTOs might prefer to sit on the sidelines in a NATO-USSR confrontation, it seems very unlikely that the Soviet Union would allow them to do so. So far from growing looser, the Soviet grip on its Eastern European allies has become harder and firmer since the Czech crisis in 1968, partly through a de facto acceptance of the Brezhnev doctrine, partly as a result of increasing Western weakness and growing Soviet strength.

Second, while the suggested withdrawals probably would leave the WTOs undissuaded, their effect on US's West European allies might be quite serious. The rationale for NATO—as they see it—is to provide a credible US support to the defence of Western Europe. Their long-standing worries about a substantial reduction of US troops in Europe have been further augmented by such detente measures as SALT I, which made many of them question the long-term validity of America's strategic deterrence. Should the local nuclear deterrence also be weakened by a withdrawal of major means for tactical nuclear delivery, the West Europeans might see it as another indication of a gradual US "thinning out" process in Western Europe.

One traces in this book a perception of Europe, which though widely shared, may not reflect the situation. The West Europeans may

comply with American withdrawal policies such as those suggested by Dr. Kaplan, but the long-term psychological effect on their evaluation of the US as a European mainstay may prove more important than the short-term gains from limited withdrawal arrangements. In this, as in many other respects, his book provides a useful illustration.

NILS ØRVIK
Queen's University, Ontario

Vietnam: The Origins of Revolution. By John T. McAlister, Jr. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1971. Pp. 365. $2.95, paper.)

This work adds to John T. McAlister's consistently provocative analyses of the political underpinnings of the two Indochina wars. His previous penetrating studies provide essential background to the development of conflict in Indochina, including research on the complex non-Vietnamese highland ethnic group struggle permitting the Viet Minh to develop a small military capability and leading to the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu. In the present work, McAlister has written the foremost statement in English on the significance that World War II, and especially the Japanese role during and immediately following that war, had upon later events in Indochina. Excellent scholarship utilizing documents previously exploited by only a handful of scholars results in a search in depth for typically underrated influences. Sources include the rarely mined Service Historique de l'Armie (French Army Archives), limited publication editions of Sureté General studies and of World War II British and American foreign offices, materials of the prominent French scholar on Indochina, Paul Mus, and a wealth of relatively fugitive French sources.

Although revolution is the theme and the presentation is succinct, the history Professor McAlister has written is also comprehensive. He considers such important influences on the origin of revolution as the historical background of precolonial Vietnam, the colonial experience, the impact of the World War II Vichy and Japanese interregnum, and the British and Chinese occupation period. Of considerable interest are his treatments of vastly complicated internal Chinese politics as they affected the Viet Minh; the role of various Vietnamese political parties, sects, and personalities who fought both the French and the Viet Minh in the mid-1940s; and the sociological, economic and military situation in Vietnam on the brink of the First Indochina War. McAlister also analyzes the incidence o the August revolution, compares the revolu tion in both the North and South after th Japanese surrender, and unravels the intricacie of internal French politics during the period The complexity of Vietnamese history is amply documented by the facts McAlister provides on Japanese assistance to the Viet Minh, including weapons, weapons production, and cadre training, as well as their aiding and building southern anti-Viet Minh military and paramilitary forces. This aspect of the presentation is an invaluable guide to the innumerable interconnections among political groups in Vietnam which so greatly influenced the Indochina wars.

McAlister includes discussion of numerous significant events including the Japanese coup de force, the allied victory over Japan without invasion of the Indochinese mainland, the decision permitting Great Britain and China to occupy along prescribed territorial lines, the death of President Roosevelt, the rape of the economy of the North by the Chinese and decisions of Chinese warlords permitting the Viet Minh to survive, and China's policy of accepting concessions from the French.

Yet having described numerous influential events beyond control of the Viet Minh, McAlister presents conclusive evidence that successful revolution is not the result of chance. Utilizing his mass of data, he analyzes the Viet Minh's genius for organization, its superiority over competing indigenous political groups, its ability to compromise with the French even at the risk of internal dissension, and its tenacity in the long period of rebuilding in the highlands.

Although the history in *Vietnam: The Origins of Revolution* stops with the beginning of the First Indochina War, the seeds of all later fruits of success, failure, and ultimate triumph for the Viet Minh are here. While undoubtedly nothing can be considered inevitable in predicting the course of a revolution, the characteristics McAlister ascribes to the Viet Minh greatly explain its long-range success as a revolutionary force.

CHARLES A. JOINER
Temple University

Common Market and American Antitrust: Overlap and Conflict. Edited by James A. Rahl. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1970. Pp. 476. $32.50.)

This is Volume 4 of the European Common Market Antitrust Project of the Special Committee on the European Common Market of

the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (Breck P. McAllister, Chairman). The first three volumes covered business regulation in the original six common-market nations; this one explores the interface between the antitrust laws of the Communities and of the United States. Nobody with a sense of history can be indifferent to the parallels between the two systems. In the United States, after the Civil War, markets expanded as trade barriers were lowered by the railroads, and so also after 1957 in Western Europe as manmade barriers came down. In each case, competition became more intense, and inefficient firms were hard hit as hitherto protected enclaves were invaded. One result was the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890. When the European Communities were established, the connection between the wider ambit of trade and the maintaining of competition was obvious, and the Treaties wrote it into their organic law. Thereby, they assumed the same problem of jurisdiction over corporations affiliated to or dependent on sovereign states outside their own boundaries.

The foreign impact of American antitrust is an old story which has attracted able scholars into a difficult area: "For a field which has witnessed so much litigation, this one unfortunately has been relatively unenlightened by expositions in the formal opinions themselves . . . " (xii).

The book first sketches the history of the Communities and the general objectives of securing the benefits of free trade. (It is sad to reflect how ready were all members in late 1973 to dishonor the article providing for unimpeded movement of goods, when they prevented oil shipments to the Netherlands.) The conflict between economic planning and competition proved to be less difficult than the extent to which the Community law was supreme and could therefore override national law where it was more or less restrictive. There follows, logically enough, a very useful summary of the abiding issue—antitrust laws, Violation may result from acts no matter where committed, but must those acts be a direct restraint on United States trade and commerce, or does any substantial restraint, however indirect, suffice? Either way, one needs an economic analysis to see whether any effect exists. The authors are curiously noncommital about the ruling on Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company (92F Supp. 947 [D. Mass. 1950]) which, in effect, says that investment to manufacture abroad rather than at home would be a restraint, illegal if done as part of any kind of combination. The treatment of extraterritorial jurisdiction of the Communities is of course more conjectural, since the record is so much shorter.

The extraterritorial procedure and enforcement are examined in considerable detail. The well known Dyestuffs case was, at the time of writing, still on appeal to the European Court of Justice, which has subsequently affirmed (2 CCH Common Market Reporter Paragraph 8169 [1972]). The ECJ, in addition to moving toward the American stress on patterns of conduct implying conspiracy, seemed to me to hedge or limit the sweep of the Commission decision which "constitutes assertion of personal jurisdiction over alien firms on grounds which appear to be as broad as, if not broader than, those relied upon under American law" (137). In effect, the ECJ found that the parent firms outside the Common Market were really there through their subsidiaries, so that the problem was unreal anyway. I suspect that the authors of this work would be less than satisfied with the ECJ decision. In any case, the detailed survey of conflict in chapter 4, although impossible to summarize, well repays a reading. Restraint of competition by government enterprises, in theory subject to the antitrust laws, in practice an object of official and public solicitude, is a sleeping giant. The most celebrated conflict over antitrust jurisdiction, however, has involved neither the Common Market nor government enterprises but the Swiss jeweled watch industry, in combination with the American. The Swiss government opposed the Department of Justice in the American courts with unprecedented vigor and lack of restraint. They lost on liability but probably succeeded in moderating the relief. Efforts at international consultation, notification, and more rarely actual cooperation, are few and not impressive, yet the need is so apparent that the attempt will stumble on.

The book is an impressive treatment of a difficult and almost unbearably complex subject; the authors manage to be exhaustive in their treatment without losing the thread of logic. Twenty years hence, much of the content will be outmoded, yet it will have been replaced only interstitially, like an animal body renewing itself.

M. A. ADELMAN
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Politics of Central Asia. By Ram Rahul. (New York, Barnes & Noble Books, 1973. Pp. 183. $9.00.)

This is a survey of penetration of Central Asia (the area defined in broad traditional

terms) by the great powers, with China, Russia, Britain, and India as the main actors. The title is thus a misnomer since the book does not really deal with the politics of local states. Written by an Indian scholar, it offers new insights, but it is disappointing because it is more descriptive than analytical and is based almost exclusively on secondary Western sources. Two appendices list agreements between the People's Republic of China (App. I), the Soviet Union (App. II), and the border states.

The main part of the book is devoted to a blow-by-blow account of treaties and agreements marking boundary settlements. Described segment by geographic segment, the history of each piece of boundary is carried through from earliest entries to the present. Rulers, agents of foreign powers, topographic landmarks, and place names pass in front of the reader in a somewhat confusing kaleidoscope; there are no maps to help. Leaders of Central Asia's two great religions, Buddhism and Islam, are singled out for special treatment in two chapters. In an interesting account, *lamas* and *mullahs* are seen as defenders of local interests, but frequently also as instruments of foreign penetration; in modern times they serve the aims of cultural and peace diplomacy of the two powers now dividing the region: the Soviet Union and China.

From the Indian vantage point, the author offers a special perception of the relative role played by the two powers. In their contest for primacy in Central Asia, the Soviet Union is seen as the stabilizing influence and a benign power. China is the aggressor, its efforts to extend influence in contiguous regions being seen as a prelude to disaster: "China is not only claiming territories in Soviet Central Asia, . . . but also trying to secure the secession of the Soviet Central Asian republics . . . thereby destroying . . . the very basis of the Soviet Union — a union of peoples of many races and creeds. . . . Not only has China now crossed the man-made Great Wall . . . but it has also essayed the great walls erected by nature itself — the Altai, Himalaya and other mountain ranges. . . . Its conflict with the [Soviet Union] has . . . profound implications for all mankind. [It] . . . may result in a great cataclysm" (pp. 130–131).

Notwithstanding the past imperialism of the Tsars, the Soviet Union is not regarded as an imperialist power. Since 1917 it has "finally turned its back on imperialism" (p. 97), a statement which flies in the face of obvious evidence. The author himself cannot sustain the logic of his argument in the discussion of the Soviet policy towards southwestern neighbors. He is sympathetic to the Soviet Union's ambitions to extend influence into Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan, "the area of its aspirations" (p. 91), but states that Russia's general policy in that area "has always been to attach and/or draw them to itself," the goal pursued now by diplomatic rather than military means (p. 89). He feels that the three countries no longer fear Russia (p. 14), but acknowledges nevertheless, that the Turks still "passionately believe that the Soviet Union is bent . . . on either annexation or domination" (p. 92). The section on Iran, incidentally, totally omits the 1945–46 Soviet occupation of northwestern Iran, the narrative moving directly from 1927 to 1945 (p. 84). Available evidence also makes doubtful some other assertions, such as that the Soviet Central Asian republics enjoyed full autonomy in the nineteen twenties (p. 14), or that the formation of an "independent People's Government of Mongolia" and its pro-Soviet orientation, have been a matter of entirely free choice (p. 13).

In the assessment of the role of China, the author's concern, naturally enough, centers on the threat to India's security. He feels that the PRC pursues the old concept of the "Central Kingdom" which comprehends no other relationship with the border states than that of "suzerain-vassal" (p. 39), that it feels it "has the moral right to claim any territory that had at any time been the part of its empire (p. 15), and that "China's present more-than-mere border confrontation with India [is] to get India to acquiesce to China's power complex in Asia" (p. 39). In this light India's policy to extend protectorate over Himalayan border states (an extension of the old British policy), is seen as a legitimate pursuit of national interests.

The book does not offer new factual information or analytical insights, but it can be assumed that its obvious pro-Soviet and anti-Chinese bias is shared by a number of Professor Rahul's fellow academics (he heads Central Asian studies at the University of New Delhi) and Indian intellectuals. For this reason it is of interest to an American reader.

TERESA RAKOWSKA-HARMSTONE
Carleton University, Ottawa

The Analysis of International Politics. Edited by James N. Rosenau, Vincent Davis and Maurice East. (New York: Free Press, 1972. Pp. 397. $12.95.)

To honor Harold and Margaret Sprout, the editors have assembled eighteen essays by as many authors. They suggest that these essays bear in a variety of ways on major themes in the work of the Sprouts—the linkages between domestic and foreign policies and politics, the changing nature of the international system, the role of science and technology in international affairs, the contribution of comparative foreign policy studies, the role of ecological factors, and the making of military policy.

The papers by and large do not primarily seek to test or criticize the work of the Sprouts. The papers can usefully be viewed as a collection of snapshots of the state of international relations studies and the state of mind of some leading scholars in the late 1960s and early 1970s. They reflect the earlier divisions and issues in the field, early signs of work which has since been developed substantially, and attempts to come to grips with the issues raised by the Vietnam War and the domestic protest it engendered. Many of the authors reveal rather candidly their own continuing search for a general intellectual and philosophical posture toward the study of international politics.

Before turning to some general impressions suggested by these snapshots, it is important to note that at least four of the essays provide significant substantive contributions in their own right. Richard Falk treats the relationships between the superpowers and proximate zones they dominate to suggest structurally different ways of thinking about international relations. Dina Zinnes systematically uses quantitative studies to test for relationships among the external environment, perceptions on the part of decision makers, and foreign policy actions. Chadwick Alger draws on multiple methods to measure and elucidate the effects of public debate, negotiation between and among regional groups, and delegate interaction on the progress of the U.N. General Assembly toward consensus. Maurice East exploits aggregate data for the 1948–64 time period to clarify on a systemic basis the relationships between discrepant economic positions and prestige among nations and the incidence of international violence.

What general impressions do the papers leave? First, they suggest in many cases a recognition of the inadequacy of radical simplifications. Charles McClelland notes and welcomes a shift away from an ungrounded, umbrella theory in a systems metaphor. J. David Singer rejects assertions of a lack of cross-over in the work of those styled as theorists and others styled as empiricists. He also challenges assertions that analysts of international politics must choose between the pursuit of normative concerns and of formal science. Morton Kaplan argues rather elegantly that both those who would treat international politics as deterministic and those who would treat it as random deprive man of the freedom to act purposefully to affect international outcomes. While he disposes of the argument that the degree of predictability of international politics is the negative of the degree of freedom, he does not promote the conception of foreign policy as "one of decisions based on simple rules to control a deterministic world" (p. 103). Instead he suggests that international politics and policy must be thought of as a very complex matter in which numerous semi-autonomous actors strive to achieve some sort of regulation based on a combination of freedom and constraint. Charles Hermann contends that the analysis of foreign policy cannot appropriately be seen as equivalent to the analysis of capabilities. And Klaus Knorr usefully complicates the notion of capabilities by pointing out the fallacies of pretending that capabilities are certain, are mensurable in the absence of some stipulated objectives and contingencies, and are solely confined to military attributes. Attempts to simplify the set of attributes of nations fare no worse than attempts to simplify the set of actors in international politics. Oran Young makes a strong case for the importance of actors other than the nation-state and argues that failure to consider these other participants distorts analysis.

One is struck by the sense of openness and re-assessment these themes convey. But one is also struck by how much they reveal (1) a continued pre-occupation with chronic intellectual issues that are inherently unresolvable and (2) a lack of consensus on the basic elements with which the analysis of international politics ought to deal.

This lack of consensus seems to be compounded by a lack of useful operationalizing of the basic concepts thrown about in the literature of international relations. For example, James Rosenau asserts that experts do not know how to conceptualize the notion of "environment," and Charles Hermann comments on the difficulty analysts have in thinking clearly about what they mean by foreign policy. Burton Sapin calls attention to an inability to define the elements of foreign policy performance. The conceptual foundations seem particularly weak when one seeks starting points for efforts to evaluate and design international policies and political institu-

tions and national foreign policies and foreign policy institutions.

The reflections of several authors on attempts to move directly to empirical studies in order to facilitate resolution of conceptual difficulties are discouraging. Ernst Haas makes the point quite clearly that numerous empirical studies on the sources of internal conflict yield only a hodgepodge of results. Dina Zinnes finds that a largely different set of studies on the relationships between domestic and international attributes and between perceptions and actions yield only mixed results in the absence of systematically introduced alternative conditions.

Complicating the field of international politics, recognizing the needs for refining basic concepts, and calling for more multidimensional conceptual frameworks to guide empirical work amount to asserting that analysts of international politics need to make much more demanding choices in the formulation of their questions and priorities.

Do the papers suggest what some of those choices and priorities should be? Bruce Russett in his call for macroscopic analysis of the factors that limit political choice and consequence, presents one set of suggestions. He argues that broad social, economic, and technological characteristics of international politics and the participants in it matter more than the microscopic features of politics and decision making. Hermann would disagree. Neither proposes a set of empirical steps to resolve the dispute or, more reasonably, to clarify the information gain, be it for prediction or explanation from differing mixes of the two sorts of analysis.

Finally, the papers are interestingly sparse in their policy implications. Russett does argue that the importance of his "nonpolitical" variables and the gross stabilities they suggest warrant skepticism about interventionist foreign policy and imply that occasions for foreign policy decision are often best met by abstention and delay rather than by assertive actions. Yet he does not deal with dilemmas raised by the presence of other assertive participants in international politics and the need for coordinated abstention. Raymond Tanter claims that forecasting based on causal analysis can be applied to international politics but supports his argument mainly with examples of forecasting activities rather than instances of intellectually soundly based forecasts. While Russett says that even solely inductive forecasts can be helpful, he notes their vulnerability to gross changes in the international system. Sapin admits our inability to determine what difference one rather than another kind of foreign policy machinery makes for foreign policy performance. And while Vincent Davis is critical of McNamara's managerial style with regard to Vietnam, he does not convincingly demonstrate why a different style would have mitigated that disaster.

The analysis of international politics is clearly as rich and diverse as the Sprouts have long contended, and it offers ample opportunity for creative work. Yet there is little indication that the field has evolved a coherent intellectual orientation capable of producing either strong theory or particularly soundly based policy predictions and prescriptions.

DAVIS B. BOBROW
University of Maryland, College Park

International Institutional Law: Vol. I, Structure; Vol. II, Functioning and Legal Order. By Henry G. Schermers. (Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1972. Vol. I: Pp. xxiv, 303. DF1. 53.00; Vol. II: Pp. xvii, 487. DF1. 82.00.) 82.00.)

This book is a substantial contribution to an emerging area of study which includes the constitutional and administrative law of public international organizations. Unlike the previous literature in that field it is a comprehensive treatise based on comparative study of many organizations and covering the whole range of normative material on their status, structure, and functioning; earlier work concentrated either upon a single organization or upon comparative study of a single topic. Professor Schermers, the Director of the Europa Institute of the University of Amsterdam and of the postgraduate International Course on European Integration, has previously published in Dutch a comparative study of the specialized agencies affiliated with the United Nations (*De gespecialiseerde organisaties, hun bouw en inrichting*), upon which he has built in this more comprehensive treatise.

The range of topics seems adequately to cover "institutional" law, but there will certainly be disagreement about the adequacy of the treatment of some topics. The legal status, and the privileges and immunities, of international civil servants, as well as the vexing issues of their sometimes conflicting national and international loyalties, may well deserve examination in greater depth. Volume I begins with a classification of international organizations and properly excludes from further consideration the private organizations (i.e.,

nongovernmental organizations and international companies). It then examines the character and conditions of membership in public international organizations; and the organization, functions, and powers of their governing organs both representative and professional, considered from the standpoint of policy-making, control, and judicial functions. Volume II begins with a detailed analysis of the decision-making process in international agencies, including the methods of voting and the rules for entry into force of decisions. It then proceeds to financing and budget making. Finally it examines the legal order of the organizations as determined by their constitutional instruments and general international law, and the consequent internal and external status of agency regulations. One chapter presents the limitations of the international legal personality such organizations are considered to possess. There is a full treatment of the interpretation of basic instruments and of the resolution of disputes about their interpretation, followed by examination of the means available for enforcement of the rules of international agencies through supervision, sanctions against member states and individuals, or use of the legal machinery of member states. Possibilities of increased coordination of agencies are discussed, and their external relations examined primarily in the context of the basic framework of treaty relationships which supports them.

Professor Schermers's basic assumption is that a body of international common law relating to the status, structure, and functioning of public international agencies is emerging from the common elements in their constitutional interpretation and practice, and that this common law can be formulated on the basis of a comparative study of that practice. He has performed a very great amount of spadework in bringing together the necessary materials, inserting into the text in fine print hundreds of examples drawn from the practice of organizations which illustrate the points under discussion, with footnote references to the documentation. He has also provided in Volume I a useful 18-page bibliography of works discussing these organizations. As a systematically organized repository of source materials for the comparative study of international organizations, the work will be invaluable to teachers and students whatever they may think of its success as an exposition of a body of international common law.

Professor Schermers has not very explicitly examined the theoretical basis of this common law. It would seem that since the competencies of public international organizations are determined by the basic treaties which serve as their constitutional instruments, any common law of such organizations must arise from the explicit authorization or with the tacit consent of the member states and may become general or particular international law as those organizations enjoy comprehensive or only limited state membership. The materials show that when questions arise on which the constitutions are silent, interpretation has filled the gaps by resort to general principles of law and borrowings from the practice of other organizations; hence there is evidently an assumption that the member states assent to the use of such sources in developing institutional law.

Although Schermers does not elaborate such a theoretical framework, he assumes it, for he provides abundant materials about the relationships of public international agencies among themselves and with their member states. But the picture which emerges from these materials is not a tidy one. As he points out, both the member states and the governing organs of the international organizations interpret the legal status and competencies authorized by basic instruments, with the result that differences of construction occur. There is not as yet much provision for formal resolution of such differences by institutional apparatus. When cooperative attitudes exist (as they generally do in international administrative agencies, where political issues are less sharp than in the multifunctional organizations), informal resolution is often possible. But in the face of sharp differences the position of member-states can be intractable and can force adjustment by the organizations. Since the attitudes of member states are far from uniform, this does not make for a steady growth of common law.

The enforcement of legal rules developed by international organizations, which is discussed at length, is also ultimately dependent in many cases upon the legal agencies of the member states. There is considerable variation, however, in the availability of such national implementation and in the effectiveness with which it is applied. Schermers feels that the organizations do have some limited form of international legal personality with defined competencies, and that they can in spite of the difficulties inherent in the present international system gradually increase their effectiveness. He advocates better coordination of the separate agencies, particularly those affiliated with the United Nations, to avoid overlapping

functions, to engage in joint planning and reporting, and to exchange staff personnel. Such coordinated agencies might move toward the development of an international civil service and become more effective instruments for dealing with multi-faceted international problems such as development.

In the organization of his book Professor Schermers has increased his difficulties by casting his net very widely, for he throws together extremely disparate types of organization. Could not one provide a more coherent view of the common law of single-function international administrative agencies, which have a good deal in common in their organization and procedures, than appears when they are bundled together with the complex structures and problems of the United Nations and the European Community? The financial problem of United Nations peacekeeping seems to belong to a different order of things than the financing of such administrative agencies. The practice of the International Court of Justice has little relevance to that of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, still less to that of the Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine. At times the comprehensiveness of the treatise results in a stringing together of descriptions of unrelated agencies which obstructs the central purpose—i.e., to extract common elements of structure and procedure.

It is also true that the author rather frequently, when confronted with no very clear evidence of a generally accepted rule or practice, offers his personal opinion about what the practice ought to be. These opinions are certainly welcome as the considered view of a close student of international organization, and they invariably reflect Professor Schermer's desire to contribute to the effectiveness of the organizations. But they seem at times to be conclusions more appropriate in the comparative study of international organizations than in the adumbration of rules of customary international institutional law. They tend to reinforce a feeling that the materials collected do indeed reveal some common principles and practices, but only in a rudimentary stage of development, with considerable lacunae, and with not a few instances of frustration in the face of political forces still working at cross purposes.

These limitations would probably be freely admitted by Professor Schermers, and they do not detract from the solid contribution made by his painstaking work. It is to be hoped that he may find time and inclination to continue to expand his materials in successive editions to keep pace with what is likely to be an expanding field of institutional practice.

Professor Schermers' work is carefully organized, thoroughly documented, and written in a direct, clear style. It is not free from some minor solecisms of diction and grammar resulting from his writing in a foreign tongue, but none appears to obscure the meaning.

CHARLES H. MCLAUGHLIN
University of Minnesota

The Logic of World Power: An Inquiry into the Origins, Currents, and Contradictions of World Politics. By Franz Schurmann. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974. Pp. 593. $15.00.)

The Logic of World Power is the most exciting and significant study of world politics to appear in recent years. Franz Schurmann, well known for his China studies and for his leading role in the antiwar movement, brings a diverse background effectively to bear in this volume. Schurmann accords a shaping centrality to the Vietnam experience but does not dwell on the policy aspects of the war except to illuminate structural features of American foreign policy and of world politics more generally considered.

Oddly enough, the idiosyncratic quality of the book does not detract from its significance. Schurmann's study provides a comprehensive and original account of how Vietnam policy flowed naturally from the evolving global role of the United States in the period since World War II. It also concentrates upon the interactions among the United States, the Soviet Union, and China, the links between domestic politics and foreign policy especially as illuminated by organization theory and bureaucratic politics, and the causative impact of economic factors and forces upon the interplay of states. In his handling of each of these themes, Schurmann makes sensitive use of his mixture of personal and academic concerns, producing a book that undoubtedly arose as a personal effort to make sense of America's place in the world after the Vietnam debacle. Impressively, Schurmann's feeling for generalization and gift for conceptual clarity transmute his personal quest into a work of lasting scholarly stature.

The book is divided into three principal sections: "Arcana of Empire," an account of the main drift of American foreign policy after World War II up to Vietnam; "Russia, China, and America," an exploration of the shift from amity to enmity in Sino-Soviet

relations in the context of a shared, but diverse, adversary relationship to the United States; "Vietnam," an explanation of ideological and bureaucratic motivation underlying the American involvement, followed by a heavy stress on the political conduct of the war as portrayed in the Pentagon Papers, and culminating in Schurmann's assessment of how the U.S. failure in Vietnam will affect world politics and America's global role in the years ahead. Each section provides a comprehensive interpretation of the issues from an original point of view; each is a separate *tour de force* that is not only brilliant but persuasive as well.

Briefly, Schurmann believes that the United States in the period after World War II moved to assume the mantle of empire that had fallen from a weakened Great Britain. According to Schurmann, the American urge to establish an imperial world order originated with Franklin Roosevelt's vision of a peaceful world system extending the Soviet-American wartime alliance into the postwar world under the aegis of the United Nations. Roosevelt's death in 1944 prevented such a vision from ever being tested; Truman's ascendancy to the presidency coincided with both Soviet anxiety about America's nuclear monopoly and Soviet ambitions in Eastern Europe, thereby producing a new nexus of Great Power conflict. For Schurmann the Truman Doctrine of 1947 embodied the idea of containment in an active, authoritative form, and simultaneously gave birth to an imperial mission of global scope based on maximum control over developments throughout the entire non-Communist world, with the rationale of opposition to Soviet expansion serving partly as pretext, partly as explanation.

From Truman the imperial torch was passed to John F. Kennedy, whose presidency injected a new element of idealism into American foreign policy. In Schurmann's words: "President John F. Kennedy came to power with a grand design to do what Roosevelt had dreamed of: spread a Pax Americana over the entire world which would guarantee security from war, stability for all, and development for the poor. Kennedy's progressivism and his imperialism were inseparable" (p. 419). The dualism of the Kennedy years was typified by two of its most characteristic innovations—the Peace Corps and the Green Berets. American imperial energy was dissipated in Vietnam, where the quest for control was frustrated by revolutionary nationalism and the idealism was tarnished beyond recognition by the practical imperatives of military necessity in a deteriorating situation. Schurmann is not shrill, however, and he appreciates the extent to which the American idealistic impulse was both genuine and appreciated, even in Vietnam. Indeed, it is this realization that makes Schurmann's thesis especially valuable, because he is able to illuminate the way in which the imperial motivation, when effectively challenged by revolutionary nationalism, ineluctably if unwittingly produces barbarous behavior that entails waging indiscriminate and cruel warfare against civilian society.

Schurmann's argument is subtle and multifaceted, but part of the originality of his interpretation is to assign principal responsibility for the imperial outlook to centrist, liberal Democrats rather than to right-wing conservative Republicans. Schurmann also shows that America's imperial posture flowed from a set of internationalist economic concerns connected more closely with the restoration of a world market system than with the narrower goal of American business expansion *per se*. That is, American foreign business activity was encouraged, but at the longer-term expense of the national economy itself, a process suggestive of the earlier overseas flight of British capital. In the end, Schurmann seems ambivalent about the future, believing on the one side that Vietnam crushed the imperialist impulse, and on the other that it may yet reemerge in the form of a new idealistic quest, this time perhaps under the banner of "interdependence."

Beyond this line of substantive interpretation, Schurmann makes a central distinction between ideological politics and interest politics. In this regard the imperial mandate emanated from a broadly based popular consensus that arose initially from the desire of most Americans for a peaceful and decent world, and then was sustained—until the Vietnam failure and détente—by a more negative but essentially similar conviction that American power must be spread broadly to preclude Communist aggression. Within the parameters set by this ideological consensus, foreign policy is shaped by the dynamics of bureaucratic politics and reflects the complex bargaining outcomes of contending governmental and nongovernmental interest groups Schurmann is at his best when he describes the bureaucratic processes through which a government—any government—often finds itself taking contradictory steps in order to neutralize contending coalitions of interest groups. Such a process is familiar to students of the defense budget and arms control, but

Schurmann's achievement is to demonstrate its relevance to *all phases* of the foreign policies of *all governments*. With great feeling for cultural and ideological texture, Schurmann demonstrates that whether one is talking about the policies of China, the Soviet Union, or the United States one is talking about a shared process of intragovernmental conflict resolution carried on in deliberate isolation from public understanding. One is left with the feeling that perhaps the business of government is too shoddy to bring out into the open, even in a country such as contemporary China which Schurmann admires for a variety of well-specified reasons.

As a consequence, Schurmann's book certainly confirms a cynical view of state power, although the policy implications of such a view are nowhere considered in the book. It could be, although Schurmann is nowhere explicit, that the only path to humane governance is by deconcentrating and decentralizing political power, especially in the large states, and by reconstructing local and intermediate institutions.

Of course, one cannot do justice to Schurmann's achievement in a short review. It would be easy to dissent from Schurmann's judgment at this or that point. He often makes controversial assertions without sufficient care or documentation (e.g., that the United States committed genocide in Vietnam or that the atomic bomb was the essential structuring feature in the post–World War II period). Nevertheless, the cumulative effect of Schurmann's line of interpretation is persuasive, and his analysis is always instructive. Whether one agrees or disagrees, one cannot fail to learn. Let me put my evaluation in more professional terms: The next time a graduate student asks which three books in international relations to read for minimal literacy, I will now be able to say in a tone of assurance that one of them must be *The Logic of World Power*. For the other two, there are numerous candidates!

RICHARD A. FALK
Princeton University

The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy. By Robert W. Tucker. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971. Pp. ix, 156. $7.50, cloth; $2.75, paper.)

When a mainstream political science international relations specialist writes a book endorsing, even if somewhat reluctantly and patronizingly, the radical revisionism of the 1960s, the event may be of some note in intellectual history, apart from the intrinsic merits of the endorsement. When five years later another mainstreamer is asked to review the endorsement for this journal, a further stage in assimilationism may have been reached. I imagine this is two steps forward—though arguably, in the meantime, author Robert Tucker may have taken one step backward elsewhere in waving an American big stick about Arab oil (*Commentary*, January 1975, pp. 21–31). Meanwhile also a burgeoning political economy literature about American foreign policy (Thomas Paterson, Theodore Moran, Steven Rosen, James Kurth, and several others, plus additional contributions by stalwarts Gabriel Kolko, Harry Magdoff, and Richard Barnet) leaves Tucker's examples of radical revisionism questionably representative. Nonetheless, Tucker's own points seem still sufficiently pertinent to warrant concentrating a review of limited length on them rather than on their relation to the subsequent evolution of ideas.

Tucker's central point, approached again and again from various directions, is succinctly stated near the end:

> The radical critique has forced us to acknowledge the extent to which an obsessive self-interest has been central in American foreign policy. . . . In its insistence that American diplomacy has been driven throughout by self-interest, the lesson radical criticism conveys is that America has behaved very much as other great powers have behaved, and that if there is a quality unique to American diplomacy it consists in the greater than usual disparity between ideals professed and behavior. This lesson may not have been the intention of radical critics—certainly this was not their primary intention—but its corrective value is not diminished for that reason (p. 148).

Their "primary intention," which Tucker is at pains to reject, is to demonstrate varieties of economic determinism and thus to magnify the repulsiveness of America's selfishness and promote resistance to it by contrasting it (explicitly or implicitly) with the altruism she would supposedly show if her capitalism were replaced by thoroughgoing socialism.

Tucker mistrusts such socialism; and against the economic determinism of those whom he groups, with some conscious procrusteanism, as radicals (principally William A. Williams, Gabriel Kolko, and Harry Magdoff), Tucker accords his own primacy to the balance of

power. Hobbes, Niebuhr, and Morgenthau reverberate throughout Tucker's critique:

> Radical criticism will not confront the eternal and insoluble problems inordinate power creates, just as it will not acknowledge that men possessed of this power are always ready to use it if only in order to rule over others. In the radical weltanschauung there is little, if any, appreciation that dominion is its own reward and that men may sacrifice material interest in order to rule (or, for that matter, to be emulated). There is also little, if any, appreciation that expansion may be rooted in an insecurity that is not simply self-generated (p. 151).

The radicals are right that America behaves selfishly, much more than she imagines; but so do all great powers, capitalist and socialist—a "phenomenon as old as human history," Tucker is fond of repeating, and one most likely to continue, because of age-old defensive pre-emptive aggressiveness and because of common pride and power lust apart from economic gain.

Tucker does not really come to grips with the Marxist problem of the prospects for transforming human personality under socialism; in effect, he dismisses the idea, relying on "human history" and a mildly suspicious interpretation of Soviet experience. Yet the persistence with which he asserts the primacy of security roots over economic roots of action in nearly all periods of international relations and particularly in twentieth-century American foreign policy evinces resolve to preclude the socialist solution while incorporating most of the rest of radical revisionism. Tucker is not content to argue, as I would, that American foreign policy could not have been conducted without *multiple* sources of support: practitioners and influentials whose minds are on security (like Tucker), *and* others whose minds are on profits, *and* others whose minds are on social stability, *and* others whose minds are on bestowing the blessings of Americanization on lesser breeds, and others who . . . etc. It seems to me that the location of leadership vis-à-vis followership (in an analysis at this high level of generality) is no more important than recognizing that leaders are not leaders unless they are somehow attractive to followers. And in my view business interests do at least fit among the sets of followers that are likely to have a long-term contingent veto over American foreign policy whether or not they normally have the initiative in policy making; moreover, fundamental business interests do enjoy some privilege in that American leaders whoever they are have learned an obligation to preserve "the American way of life," which involves mixed economy capitalism. Whose purposes, then, should normally be said to be prevailing becomes a subtle problem of analysis in which it is not clear to me that Tucker bests the radicals he studied. And if socialist consciousness-raising were really somehow able to nullify the prestige of American business, international security-consciousness would indeed remain, but the world would be more changed than Tucker enjoys contemplating.

Another miscue (this time many of the radicals are more to blame) is Tucker's concentration on undercutting the argument that America since 1945 has been aggressively thrusting to achieve a world integrated for capitalism through U.S. hegemony; whereas, it seems to me, the argument most worth considering is that American took over and refurbished the family estate of a world that had already been integrated for capitalism by British and French parents that were now becoming too infirm to guard the family estate themselves. To be sure, there were the British/American and the French/American father/son quarrels that Kolko emphasizes; but Magdoff in effect sees that the family ties were fundamental. From the latter perspective, without having to adopt the Marxist dialectical contradication, Tucker should not find the view that there is now a European and Japanese capitalist "empire by (American) proxy" too "difficult to reconcile with the view that our principal Capitalist allies are also our principal adversaries . . . in the imperialist network" (p. 133).

One might point to other inadvertently slippery encounters in the 1915–65 historical sections that compose much of the book. Yet to overemphasize them would be unfair. Tucker's book is an honest effort to assimilate radical revisionism. It should be welcomed, for it advances the day when contributions of Marxist *analysis* can be freely utilized in research and policy making even by those who firmly continue to oppose Marxist *prescriptions*. Not all American elites will shrink from their own image when they come to see it more clearly along with the image of others worldwide in some neo-Marxist mirror.

H. Bradford Westerfield
Yale University

INDEX TO VOLUME LXX

Aberbach, Joel D. and Bert A. Rockman. *Clashing Beliefs Within the Executive Branch: The Nixon Administration Bureaucracy.* 456

Abramson, Paul R. *Generational Change and the Decline of Party Identification in America: 1952–1974.* 469

Abueva, Jose V. *Ramon Magsaysay: A Political Biography.* Reviewed by A. B. Villanueva. 597

Abu-Gosh, Subhi. Review of Enver M. Koury, *The Patterns of Mass Movements in Arab Revolutionary-Progressive States.* 1341

Achen, Christopher. *Communication: A Reanalysis of Achen's Critique of the Converse Model of Mass Political Belief.* 1231

Action for a Change: A Student's Manual for Public Interest Organizing. Ralph Nader and Donald Ross. Reviewed by Dale Rogers Marshall. 620

Adamany, David W. *Campaign Finance in America.* Reviewed by John R. Owens. .. 1298

Communication: Crossover Voting and the Democratic Party's Reform Rules. .. 536

Adelman, Irma and Cynthia Taft Morris. *Economic Growth and Social Equity in Developing Countries.* Reviewed by Karl de Schweinitz, Jr. 232

Adelman, M. A. Review of James A. Rahl, ed., *Common Market and American Antitrust: Overlap and Conflict.* 1384

Adie, Ian W. A. C. Review of John M. H. Lindbeck, ed., *China: Management of a Revolutionary Society.* 1349

Adler-Karlsson, Gunnar. Review of Paul Alpert, *Partnership or Confrontation? Poor Lands and Rich.* 235

Adorno, Theodor W. *Negative Dialectics.* Reviewed by Gillian Rose. 598

The Adversaries: Politics and the Press. William Rivers. Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234

The Advisory Function of the International Court in the League and U. N. Eras. Michla Pomerance. Reviewed by Edward Gordon. 291

The Afro-Asian Movement: Ideology and Foreign Policy of the Third World. David Kimche. Reviewed by Frank H. H. King. 1005

After Yalta: America and the Origins of the Cold War. Lisle A. Rose. Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* 560

Agenda Building as a Comparative Political Process. Roger Cobb, Jennie-Keith Ross, and Marc Howard Ross. 126

Agor, Weston H. Review of Fidel Castro, *Fidel in Chile: A Symbolic Meeting Between Two Historical Processes.* 674

Agpalo, Remigio E. *The Political Elite and the People: A Study of Politics in Occidental Mindoro.* Reviewed by Aprodicio A. Laquian. 639

Agrarian Policies and Problems in Communist and Non-Communist Countries. W. A. Douglas Jackson, ed. Reviewed by Roy D. Laird. 658

Agrarian Reform in Latin America. Robert J. Alexander. Reviewed by Peter Ranis. 233

Aid to Russia, 1941–1946: Strategy, Diplomacy, the Origins of the Cold War. George C. Herring, Jr. Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* 560

Alcock, Norman Z. *The Emperor's New Clothes and Other Irreverent Essays for the Seventies.* Reviewed by Louis Kriesberg. 663

The War Disease. Reviewed by William R. Thompson. 599

Alexander, Robert J. *Agrarian Reform in Latin America.* Reviewed by Peter Ranis. 233

Review of Carroll Hawkins, *Two Democratic Labor Leaders in Conflict: The Latin American Revolution and the Role of the Workers.* 242

Alexander, Yonah. *The Role of Communications in the Middle East Conflict: Ideological and Religious Aspects.* Reviewed by Joel S. Migdal. 664

Alinsky, Saul D. *Rules for Radicals: A Pragmatic Primer for Realistic Radicals.* Reviewed by Dale Rogers Marshall. ... 620

Alker, Hayward R., Jr., Karl W. Deutsch, and Antoine H. Stoetzel. *Mathematical Approaches to Politics.* Reviewed by Charles Lewis Taylor. 600

Allardt, Erik. Review of Ann-Katrin Hatje, *Befolkningsfrågan och Välfärden: Debatten om familjepolitik och nativitetsfrågan under 1930- och 1940-talen.* 653

Allende's Chile. Kenneth Medhurst, ed. Reviewed by Michael J. Francis. 249

Allworth, Edward, ed. *The Nationality Question in Soviet Central Asia.* Re-

viewed by G. Jukes. 234
Almond, Gabriel A. Review of Barry D. Karl, *Charles E. Merriam and the Study of Politics.* 1278
Alpert, Paul. *Partnership or Confrontation? Poor Lands and Rich.* Reviewed by Gunnar Adler-Karlsson. 235
Alves, Marcio Moreira. *A Grain of Mustard Seed: The Awakening of the Brazilian Revolution.* Reviewed by Peter McDonough. 987
The American Condition. Richard N. Goodwin, Reviewed by George Kateb. .. 636
American Foreign Policy in the Congo, 1960–1964. Stephen R. Weissman. Reviewed by M. Crawford Young. 300
Ameringer, Charles D. Review of Gordon K. Lewis. *The Virginia Islands: A Caribbean Lilliput.* 1007
The Analysis of International Politics. James N. Rosenau, Vincent Davis and Maurice East, eds. Reviewed by Davis B. Bobrow. 1386
Anarchy, State and Utopia. Robert Nozick. Reviewed by Douglas Rae. 1289
Anderson, Benedict R. O'G. *Java in a Time of Revolution. Occupation and Resistance, 1944–1946.* Reviewed by J. A. C. Mackie. 1320
Anderson, Robert W. Review of Brian Irving, ed., *Guyana: A Composite Monograph.* 658
Angola. Douglas Wheeler and René Pelissier. Reviewed by John Marcum. 1372
Annals of International Studies: Hydrospace in International Relations, Vol. 4—1973. Lucius C. Caflisch, ed. Reviewed by Robert G. Wirsing. 1375
An, Tai Sung. *The Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute.* Reviewed by Thomas W. Robinson. 665
The Anti-Communist Impulse. Michael Parenti. Reviewed by Geoffry S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* 560
APSA Presidential Address, 1975. *"The Divine Science": Political Engineering in American Culture.* Austin Ranney. 140
APSA Presidential Address, 1975, Introduction to. Pendleton Herring. 139
Aquarone, Alberto. *Le Origini Dell' Imperialismo Americano.* Reviewed by A. F. K. Organski. 666
Arabs and Berbers: From Tribe to Nation in North Africa. Ernest Gellner and Charles Micaud, eds. Reviewed by Jean-Claude Vatin. 1332
Archbold, W. A. J. *Outlines of Indian Constitutional History (British Period).* Reviewed by Manindra K. Mohapatra. ... 640
Area Handbook for the Khmer Republic. Donald P. Whitaker et al. Reviewed by Stanley J. Heginbotham. 270
Argyris, Chris. *Behind the Front Page.* Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234
The Arms Trade with the Third World. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Reviewed by Colin S. Gray. .. 297
Armstrong, John A. *Mobilized and Proletarian Diasporas.* 393
Aronson, James. *Deadline for the Media: Today's Challenges to Press, TV and Radio;* and *The Press and the Cold War.* Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234
Arrington, Theodore S. *Communication: A Reanalysis of Achen's Critique of the Converse Model of Mass Political Belief.* 1230
Asbell, Bernard. *The F. D. R. Memoirs: A Speculation on History.* Reviewed by Paul T. Heffron. 210
Atkinson, David M. Review of J. Lyndon Shanley, ed., *The Writings of Henry D. Thoreau: Walden;* Joseph J. Moldenhauer, ed., *The Writings of Henry D. Thoreau: The Maine Woods;* Wendell Glick, ed., *The Writings of Henry D. Thoreau: Reform Papers.* 1295
Attribution: Perceiving the Causes of Behavior. Edward E. Jones, David E. Kanouse, Harold H. Kelley, Richard E. Nisbett, Stuart Valins, and Bernard Weiner, eds. Reviewed by Peter W. Sperlich. 617
Auerbach, Philip Hone. Review of Herman Kahn and Barry Bruce-Briggs, *Things to Come: Thinking about the Seventies and Eighties.* 205
Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies and Future. Alfred Stepan, ed. Reviewed by Ronald M. Schneider. 997
Avineri, Shlomo. *Comment on Resnick's "Crude Communism and Revolution."* .. 1146
Hegel's Theory of the Modern State. Reviewed by Patrick Gardiner. 602
Avineri, Shlomo, ed. *Israel and the Palestinians.* Reviewed by Amos Perlmutter. . 1321
Axline, W. Andrew. Review of Ernest H. Preeg, *Economic Blocs and U.S. Foreign Policy.* 292
Aya, Roderick and Norman Miller, eds. *National Liberation: Revolution in the Third World.* Reviewed by W. Scott Thompson. 1351
Aydelotte, William O., Allan G. Bogue, and

Robert William Fogel, eds. *The Dimensions of Quantitative Research in History.* Reviewed by Joel H. Silbey. 603
Ayer, A. J. *Russell and Moore: The Analytical Heritage.* Reviewed by David Berlinski. 1257
Ayres, Robert L. *Communication: Development and Strategy in Latin America.* ... 550

Baaklini, Abdo I. Review of George M. Haddad, *Revolutions and Military Rule in the Middle East: The Arab States, Vol. III—Egypt, The Sudan, Yemen and Libya.* 241
Bach, Stanley. Review of John W. Kingdon, *Congressmen's Voting Decisions.* 977
Baehr, Peter R. Review of George W. Keeton and Georg Schwarzenberger, eds., *The Year Book of World Affairs, 1973.* 283
Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates: Colonial Past, Present Problems, and Future Prospects. Muhammad Sadik and William P. Snavely. Reviewed by Fred J. Khouri. 259
Bain, Chester W. Review of David G. Temple, *Merger Politics: Local Government in Tidewater Virginia.* 1316
The Baku Commune, 1917–1918: Class and Nationality in the Russian Revolution. Ronald Grigor Suny. Reviewed by Stanislav Kirschbaum. 971
Baldwin, Elaine. *Differentiation and Cooperation in an Israeli Veteran Moshav.* Reviewed by Khayyam Z. Paltiel. 236
Bamba, Nobuya. *Japanese Diplomacy in a Dilemma: New Light on Japan's China Policy.* Reviewed by Hideo Sato. 274
Bank, Richard M. and Steven R. McCarl. *"Virtue, Obligation and Politics" Revisited.* 886
Barber, Benjamin R. *The Death of Communal Liberty: A History of Freedom in a Swiss Mountain Canton.* Reviewed by Jürg Steiner. 198
Barber, James David. *The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House.* Reviewed by Arnold A. Rogow. 1299
Barber, James P. Review of Thomas Karis and Gwendolen M. Carter, *From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa, 1882–1964, Vols. I and II.* 246
South Africa's Foreign Policy, 1945–1970. Reviewed by Leonard Thompson. 668
Barghoorn, Frederick C. Review of Natalia Gorbanevskaya, *Red Square at Noon.* .. 1335
Barkan, Joel D. *Comment: Further Reassessment of "Conventional Wisdom": Political Knowledge and Voting Behavior in Rural Kenya.* 45
Barker, Bernard, ed. *Ramsay MacDonald's Political Writings.* Reviewed by James G. Kellas. 60
Barker, Charles A., ed. *Power and Law: American Dilemma in World Affairs.* Reviewed by Adda B. Bozeman. 66
Barney, William L. *The Secessionist Impulse: Alabama and Mississippi in 1860.* Reviewed by LaWanda Cox. 62
Barritt, Denis P. and Charles F. Carter. *The Northern Ireland Problem.* Reviewed by John H. Whyte in *Recent Writing on Northern Ireland.* 59
Barros, James, ed. *The United Nations: Past, Present, and Future.* Reviewed by Harold K. Jacobson. 27
Beck, Brenda E. F. *Peasant Society in Konku: A Study of Right and Left Subcastes in South India. Reviewed by* Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr. 1322
The Becket Conflict and the Schools: A Study of Intellectuals in Politics in the Twelfth Century. Beryl Smalley. Reviewed by Ernest L. Fortin. 208
Beck, Lewis White, ed. *Philosophy of War.* Reviewed by Terry Nardin in *Philosophy and International Violence.* 952
Beck, Paul Allen. *Communication: Critical Elections and the Supreme Court: Putting the Cart after the Horse.* 930
Beck, Robert H. Review of Raymond Boudon, *Education, Opportunity, and Social Inequality: Changing Prospects in Western Society.* 605
Befolkningsfrågan och Välfärden: Debatten om familjepolitik och nativitetsfrågan under 1930- och 1940-talen. Ann-Katrin Hatje. Reviewed by Erik Allardt. 653
Behind the Front Page. Chris Argyris. Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234
Behind the Trail of Broken Treaties. Vine Deloria, Jr. Reviewed by Frances Svensson. 1306
Beichman, Arnold. Review of William R. Corson, *Consequences of Failure.* 214
Belfast: Approach to Crisis. A Study of Belfast Politics, 1613–1970. Ian Budge and Cornelius O'Leary. Reviewed by John H. Whyte in *Recent Writing on Northern Ireland.* 592
The Beliefs of Politicians: Ideology, Conflict and Democracy in Britain and Italy. Robert D. Putnam. Reviewed by Leon D. Epstein. 253

Beloff, Max. Review of Phillip Darby, *British Defense Policy East of Suez, 1947–1968.* 674
Benjamin, Gerald. *Race Relations and the New York City Commission on Human Rights.* Reviewed by Stephen M. David. 624
Benjamin, Roger W. Review of Lloyd D. Musolf, *Mixed Enterprise: A Developmental Perspective.* 1354
Bentham's Political Thought. Bhiku Parekh, ed. Reviewed by Wilfrid Harrison. 963
Bergsten, C. Fred, ed. *The Future of the International Economic Order: An Agenda for Research.* Reviewed by Benjamin J. Cohen. 277
Berlin im geteilten Deutschland. Dieter Mahncke. Reviewed by Wolfgang F. Dexheimer. 663
Berlinski, David. Review of A. J. Ayer, *Russell and Moore: The Analytical Heritage.* 1257
Berman, Bruce J. Review of E. A. Brett, *Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa: The Politics of Economic Change, 1919–1939.* 237
Bernd, Joseph L. and James F. Herndon, eds. *Mathematical Applications in Political Science, VII.* Reviewed by Kul B. Rai. 202
Bettelheim, Charles. *Cultural Revolution and Industrial Organization in China: Changes in Management and the Division of Labor.* Reviewed by D. Gordon White. 641
Between State and Nation: Regional Organizations of the United States. Martha Derthick. Reviewed by Thomas R. Dye. 632
Beyond Dogma and Despair: Toward a Critical Theory of Politics. Fred R. Dallmayr. 64
Beyond the New Deal: Harry S. Truman and American Liberalism. Alonzo L. Hamby. Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* 560
Bhagwati, Jagdish N., ed. *Economics and World Order from the 1970s to the 1990s.* Reviewed by Lawrence A. Veit. . 1373
Reviewed by Robert Gilpin in *The Political Economy of the Multinational Corporation: Three Contrasting Perspectives.* 184
Biddis, Michael D., ed. *Gobineau: Selected Political Writings.* Reviewed by Eugen Weber. 1284
Bienen, Henry. *Kenya, the Politics of Participation and Control.* Reviewed by L. Gray Cowan. 642
Binder, Leonard. Review of Itamar Rabinovich, *Syria Under the Ba'th, 1963–66: The Army-Party Symbiosis.* 254
Biracial Politics: Conflict and Coalition in the Metropolitan South. Chandler Davidson. Reviewed by Richard Murray. 1305
Black, Cyril E. and Richard A. Falk, eds. *The Future of the International Legal Order. Vol. III: Conflict Management* and *Vol. IV: The Structure of the International Environment.* Reviewed by G. Schwarzenberger. 670
Black Ghetto Riots and Campus Disorders: A Subcultural and Philosophical Study of Democratic Legitimacy and American Political Violence, 1964–1970. Roger B. Canfield. Reviewed by Ralph A. Rossum. 625
The Black Muslims in America. C. Eric Lincoln. Reviewed by Hanes Walton, Jr. 209
Black Politics: A Theoretical and Structural Analysis. Hanes Walton, Jr. Reviewed by Carolyn Sue Williams. 1317
The Blacks in Canada: A History. Robin Winks. Reviewed by Mildred A. Schwartz. 1004
Blanchard, Robert O., ed. *Congress and the News Media.* Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234
Blanco, Hugo. *Land or Death: The Peasant Struggle in Peru.* N. Allen, trans. Reviewed by Larry L. Pippin. 643
Blank, Stephen. Review of Derek Channon, *The Strategy and Structure of British Enterprise.* 1326
Blum, John Morton, ed. *The Price of Vision: The Diary of Henry A. Wallace, 1942–1946.* Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* 560
Board, Joseph B. Review of William M. Lafferty, *Economic Development and the Response of Labor in Scandinavia: A Multi-Level Analysis.* 1343
Bobrow, Davis B. Review of James N. Rosenau, Vincent Davis and Maurice East, eds., *The Analysis of International Politics.* 1386
Boggs, George T. and John M. Paxman, eds. *The United Nations: A Reassessment —Sanctions, Peacekeeping, and Humanitarian Assistance.* Reviewed by Lynn H. Miller. 1011
Bogue, Allan G., William O. Aydelotte, and Robert William Fogel, eds. *The Dimensions of Quantitative Research in History.* Reviewed by Joel H. Silbey. 603
Boudon, Raymond. *Education, Opportunity, and Social Inequality: Changing Prospects*

in Western Society. Reviewed by Robert H. Beck. 605
Boulding, Kenneth E. Review of Matthew Melko, *52 Peaceful Societies*. 206
Bound with Them in Chains: A Biographical History of the Antislavery Movement. Jane H. Pease and William H. Pease. Reviewed by Peter Kolchin. 224
Bozeman, Adda B. *Review of Charles A.* Barker, ed., *Power and Law: American Dilemma in World Affairs*. 669
Brady, Linda P. Review of Dusan Sidjanski, ed., *Political Decision Making Processes: Studies in National, Comparative and International Politics*. 264
Braibanti, Ralph. *Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan*. Reviewed by Lawrence Ziring. 1323
Braun, Alan G. and Lawrence D. Longley. *The Politics of Electoral College Reform*. Reviewed by Laurin L. Henry. 1311
Braun, Nicole Condorelli. *Commissaires et Juges dans les Communautés Européennes*. Reviewed by Ernst B. Haas. 671
The Brazilian-American Alliance, 1937–1945. Frank D. McCann, Jr. Reviewed by Thomas E. Skidmore. 1007
Breines, Paul. Review of Robert Havemann, *Questions, Answers, Questions: From the Biography of a German Marxist*. 1271
Breton, Albert. *The Economic Theory of Representative Government*. Reviewed by William A. Niskanen. 605
Brett, E. A. *Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa: The Politics of Economic Change, 1919–1939*. Reviewed by Bruce J. Berman. 237
British Defence Policy East of Suez, 1947–1968. Phillip Darby. Reviewed by Max Beloff. 674
British Factory—Japanese Factory: The Origins of National Diversity in Industrial Relations. Ronald Dore. Reviewed by George O. Totten. 1331
Brody, Richard A. *Communication: Whom Did Wallace Hurt in 1968?* 924
Browning, Frank and Dorothy Forman, eds. *The Wasted Nations: Report of the International Commission of Enquiry into United States Crimes in Indochina, June 20–25, 1971*. Reviewed by Douglas Kinnard. 278
Brown, Lee. *The Reluctant Reformation: On Criticizing the Press in America*. Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media*. 1234
Brown, Robert. *Rules and Laws in Sociology*. Reviewed by Arthur L. Stinchcombe. 199
Brown, Thad A., Arthur H. Miller, Warren E. Miller, and Alden S. Raine. *A Majority Party in Disarray: Policy Polarization in the 1972 Election*. 753
Bruce-Briggs, Barry and Herman Kahn. *Things to Come: Thinking about the Seventies and Eighties*. Reviewed by Philip Hone Auerbach. 205
Bruneau, Thomas C. Review of Guillermo A. O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics*. 992
Buchan, Alastair. Review of George H. Quester, *The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation*. 1012
Buckland, Patrick. *Irish Unionism 1: The Anglo-Irish and the New Ireland, 1885 to 1922;* and *Irish Unionism 2: Ulster Unionism and the Origins of Northern Ireland, 1886 to 1922*. Reviewed by Alan J. Ward. 1324
Budge, Ian and Cornelius O'Leary. *Belfast: Approach to Crisis. A Study of Belfast Politics, 1613–1970*. Reviewed by John H. Whyte in *Recent Writing on Northern Ireland*. 592
The Budgeting and Evaluation of Federal Recreation Programs, or Money Doesn't Grow on Trees. Jeanne Nienaber and Aaron Wildavsky. Reviewed by Allen Schick. 1313
Buenker, John D. *Urban Liberalism and Progressive Reform*. Reviewed by Robert E. O'Connor. 212
Building a New Japan: A Plan for Remodeling the Japanese Archipelago. Kakuei Tanaka. Reviewed by Ardath W. Burks. 267
Bull, Hedley. *The Moscow Agreements and Strategic Arms Limitation*. Reviewed by Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr. 1374
Bunche, Ralph J. *The Political Status of the Negro in the Age of FDR*. Reviewed by Robert E. Martin. 211
Burdette, Franklin L. Review of James MacGregor Burns, *Uncommon Sense*. .. 213
The Bureaucratization of the World. Henry Jacoby. Reviewed by John H. Hallowell. 660
Burki, Shahid Javed. *A Study of Chinese Communes, 1965*. Reviewed by Benedict Stavis. 1326
Burks, Ardath W. Review of Kakuei Tanaka, *Building a New Japan: A Plan for Remodeling the Japanese Archipelago*. 267
Burman, Ian D. *Lobbying at the Illinois Constitutional Convention*. Reviewed by William L. Day. 625
Burns, Eveline M. Review of Herbert Harvey Hyman, ed., *The Politics of Health*

Care: Nine Case Studies of Innovative Planning in New York City. 220
Burns, James MacGregor. *Uncommon Sense.* Reviewed by Franklin L. Burdette. 213
Burtle, James and Sidney E. Rolfe. *The Great Wheel: The World Monetary System, a Reinterpretation.* Reviewed by Susan Strange. 1015
Butterworth, Charles E. Review of François Hotman, *Francogallia.* Latin text by Ralph E. Giesey. J. H. M. Salmon, trans. 613

Cable Television U.S.A. Martin H. Seiden. Reviewed by Frank Wolf. 1315
Caflisch, Lucius C., ed. *Annals of International Studies: Hydrospace in International Relations, Vol. 4—1973.* Reviewed by Robert G. Wirsing. 1375
The Cairo Documents: The Inside Story of Nasser and His Relationship with World Leaders, Rebels, and Statesmen. Mohamed Heikal. Reviewed by R. H. Dekmejian. 279
Callaghan, James. *A House Divided: The Dilemma of Northern Ireland.* Reviewed by John H. Whyte in *Recent Writing on Northern Ireland.* 592
Campaign Finance in America. David W. Adamany. Reviewed by John R. Owens. 1298
Campbell, John C. Review of Stephen E. Palmer, Jr. and Robert R. King, *Yugoslav Communism and the Macedonian Question.* 1358
Review of William Shawcross, *Crime and Compromise: Janos Kadar and the Politics of Hungary Since Revolution.* 263
Canby, Steven B. *Military Manpower Procurement: A Policy Analysis.* Reviewed by Gary L. Wamsley. 1301
Canfield, Roger B. *Black Ghetto Riots and Campus Disorders: A Subcultural and Philosophical Study of Democratic Legitimacy and American Political Violence, 1964–1970.* Reviewed by Ralph A. Rossum. 625
Canon, Bradley C. and S. Sidney Ulmer. *Communication: The Supreme Court and Critical Elections: A Dissent.* 1215
Carroll, John, compiler. *Max Stirner: The Ego and His Own.* Reviewed by Eugen Weber. 1285
Carter, Charles F. and Denis P. Barritt. *The Northern Ireland Problem.* Reviewed by John H. Whyte in *Recent Writing on Northern Ireland.* 592
Carter, Gwendolen M. and Thomas Karis. *From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa, 1882–1964, Vols. I and II.* Reviewed by James P. Barber. 246
Carter, Richard B. Review of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Government of Poland.* Wilmoore Kendall, trans. 1292
Casper, Jonathan D. *The Supreme Court and National Policy Making.* 50
Castberg, Frede. *The European Convention on Human Rights.* Reviewed by Ernst B. Haas. 671
Castro, Fidel. *Fidel in Chile: A Symbolic Meeting Between Two Historical Processes.* Reviewed by Weston H. Agor. .. 674
Caute, David. *Frantz Fanon.* Reviewed by Bernard S. Morris. 1258
The Challenge of Urban Reform: Policies and Programs in Philadelphia. Kirk R. Petshek. Reviewed by Miriam Ershkowitz. 224
The Changing Pattern of Political Power in Iraq, 1958 to 1971. Lorenzo Kent Kimball. Reviewed by Glenn Perry. 1341
Channon, Derek. *The Strategy and Structure of British Enterprise.* Reviewed by Stephen Blank. 1326
Charles E. Merriam and the Study of Politics. Barry D. Karl. Reviewed by Gabriel A. Almond. 1278
Charvet, John. *The Social Problem in the Philosophy of Rousseau.* Reviewed by Judith N. Shklar. 606
Chatfield, Charles. *For Peace and Justice: Pacifism in America, 1914–1941.* Reviewed by Justus D. Doenecke. 1302
Chevalier, Louis. *Laboring Classes and Dangerous Classes in Paris during the First Half of the Nineteenth Century.* Reviewed by Louise A. Tilly. 644
China: Management of a Revolutionary Society. John M. H. Lindbeck, ed. Reviewed by Ian W. A. C. Adie. 1349
China's Trade with the West: A Political and Economic Analysis. Arthur A. Stahnke, ed. Reviewed by Daniel Tretiak. 295
Chiu, Hungdah. *Communication: China and the Taiwan Question.* 551
Christol, Carl Q. Review of Lillian L. Randolph, *Third-Party Settlement of Disputes in Theory and Practice.* 1013
Cirino, Robert. *Don't Blame the People: How the News Media Use Bias, Distortion, and Censorship to Manipulate Public Opinion.* Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* ... 1234
The Citizens' Council: Organized Resistance to the Second Reconstruction: 1954–1964. Neil R. McMillen. Reviewed by James D. Thomas. 1313

Civil Disobedience: Aid or Hindrance to Justice? William Sloane Coffin, Jr. and Morris I. Leibman. Reviewed by Robert F. Sasseen. 1259
Civil Disobedience and Democracy. Elliot M. Zashin. Reviewed by Robert F. Sasseen.. 1259
Claeys, Paul H. *Groupes de pression en Belgique, Les groupes intermédiaires socio-économiques, Contribution à l'analyse comparative.* Reviewed by L. Huyse. 645
Clarke, Colin G. Review of Carl Stone, *Class, Race and Political Behaviour in Urban Jamaica.* 998
Clarke, James W. Review of F. Chris Garcia, *Political Socialization of Chicano Children: A Comparative Study with Anglos in California School.* 218
Clashing Beliefs Within the Executive Branch: The Nixon Administration Bureaucracy. Joel D. Aberbach and Bert A. Rockman. 456
Class, Race and Political Behaviour in Urban Jamaica. Carl Stone. Reviewed by Colin G. Clarke. 998
Clausen, Aage R. *How Congressmen Decide: A Policy Focus.* Reviewed by Michael L. Mezey. 626
Clegg, Ian. *Workers' Self-Management in Algeria.* Reviewed by Clement Henry Moore. 1328
Clinton, Richard L., ed. *Population and Politics: New Directions in Political Science Research.* Reviewed by John G. Grumm. 608
Cobb, Roger, Jennie-Keith Ross, and Marc Howard Ross. *Agenda Building as a Comparative Political Process.* 126
Coffin, William Sloane, Jr. and Morris I. Leibman. *Civil Disobedience: Aid or Hindrance to Justice?* Reviewed by Robert F. Sasseen. 1259
Coggin, T. Daniel and John E. Hunter. *Communication: A Reanalysis of Achen's Critique of the Converse Model of Mass Political Belief.* 1226
Cohan, A. S. and R. D. McKinlay. *Performance and Instability in Military and Nonmilitary Regime Systems.* 850
Cohen, Benjamin J. Review of C. Fred Bergsten, ed., *The Future of the International Economic Order: An Agenda for Research.* 277
Cohen, Marshall, Thomas Nagel, and Thomas Scanlon, eds. *War and Moral Responsibility.* Reviewed by Terry Nardin in *Philosophy and International Violence.* 952
Cohen, Ronald and John Middleton, eds. *From Tribe to Nation in Africa.* Reviewed by Michael F. Lofchie. 238
Cohler, Anne M. Review of Thomas L. Pangle, *Montesquieu's Philosophy of Liberalism: A Commentary on The Spirit of the Laws.* 962
Cohn, Rubin G. *To Judge with Justice: History and Politics of Illinois Judicial Reform.* Reviewed by Byron W. Daynes. .. 628
Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT. John Newhouse. Reviewed by Colin S. Gray in *Detente, Arms Control and Strategy: Perspectives on SALT.* 1242
Colonialism in Africa, 1870–1960: A Bibliographical Guide to Colonialism in Sub-Saharan Africa. Peter Duignan and L. H. Gann. Reviewed by Emmet V. Mittlebeeler. 648
The Coming Crisis in Israel: Private Faith and Public Policy. Norman L. Zucker. Reviewed by Paul Ritterband. 273
Comment: Further Reassessment of "Conventional Wisdom": Political Knowledge and Voting Behavior in Rural Kenya. Joel D. Barkan. 452
Comment on "A Majority Party in Disarray." Frederick T. Steeper and Robert M. Teeter. 806
Comment: Political Methodologies in Disarray: Some Alternative Interpretations of the 1972 Election. David E. RePass. 814
Comment on Resnick's "Crude Communism and Revolution." Shlomo Avineri. 1146
Comment: What Have You Done for Me Lately? Toward an Investment Theory of Voting. Samuel Popkin, John W. Gorman, Charles Phillips, and Jeffrey A. Smith. 779
Commissaires et Juges Dans Les Communautés Européennes. Nicole Condorelli Braun. Reviewed by Ernst B. Haas. 671
Common Market and American Antitrust: Overlap and Conflict. James A. Rahl, ed. Reviewed by M. A. Adelman. 1384
Communication: Cross-over Voting and the Democratic Party's Reform Rules. David Adamany. 536
Communication: Funston Reply to Canon and Ulmer. Richard Funston. 1218
Communication: Julius Turner Revisited: Primary Elections as the Alternative to Party Competition in "Safe" Districts. Harvey L. Schantz. 541
Communication: More on Political Violence. Ernest van den Haag. 556
Communication: Multi-Level Analysis in

State Politics. William Lyons and David R. Morgan. 159
Communication: The Relative Impact of State and National Forces: A Comment on Rose's "National and Local Forces in State Politics." John Wanat and Phillip W. Roeder. 163
Communications: Alliance Behavior in Nineteenth-Century Europe.
Fred H. Lawson 932
Patrick J. McGowan and Robert M. Rood 934
Communications: China and the Taiwan Question.
Hungdah Chiu. 551
Yung Wei. 552
Allen S. Whiting. 552
Communications: Critical Elections and the Supreme Court: Putting the Cart after the Horse.
Paul Allen Beck. 930
Richard Funston. 932
Communications: Development and Strategy in Latin America.
Karen L. Remmer. 548
Robert L. Ayres. 550
Communications: Evaluation of a Presidential Election Game.
Chester Spatt. 1221
Guillermo Owen. 1223
Communications: Issue Areas and Differentials in Bureaucratic Power.
Dennis D. Riley. 929
Fred W. Grupp, Jr. and Alan A. Richards. 930
Communication: Social Change and Political Mobilization in the United States: A Methodological Note. Jesse F. Marquette. 545
Communication: The Social Stratification and Governmental Inequality Hypothesis: A Rejoinder. Richard Child Hill. 154
Communication: Social Stratification and Governmental Inequality. Max Neiman. 149
Communications: A Reanalysis of Achen's Critique of the Converse Model of Mass Political Belief.
Stephen V. Stephens. 1224
John E. Hunter and T. Daniel Coggin. .. 1226
Theodore S. Arrington. 1230
Christopher Achen. 1231
Communications: The Social Phenomenology of Alfred Schutz.
Kazuhiko Okuda. 174
N. Patrick Peritore. 178
Communications: Stability of Partisan Attachments.
James W. Hottois. 552
Douglas Dobson and Douglas St. Angelo. 554
Communication: State Public Policy and Variance Analysis: A Reply to Wanat and Roeder and to Lyons and Morgan. Douglas D. Rose. 166
Communication: The States' Role in Public Policy: A Clarification. Douglas D. Rose. 926
Communication: The Supreme Court and Critical Elections: A Dissent. Bradley C. Canon and S. Sidney Ulmer. 1215
Communication: What Gordon Tullock Really Said. Gordon Tullock. 924
Communication: Whom Did Wallace Hurt in 1968? Richard A. Brody. 924
Communism in Korea, 2 vols. Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-Sik Lee. Reviewed by Princeton Lyman. 260
The Communist International, 1919–1943. John Lewis Evans. Reviewed by John W. Strong. 1377
Comparative Political Corruption. James C. Scott. Reviewed by William B. Gwyn. .. 1368
Comparative Political Socialization. Jack Dennis and M. Kent Jennings, eds. Reviewed by Roberta S. Sigel. 1329
Comparative Political Violence. Fred R. von der Mehden. Reviewed by Cynthia H. Enloe. 269
Comparative Studies of Blacks and Whites in the United States. Kent S. Miller and Ralph Mason Dreger, eds. Reviewed by Thomas F. Pettigrew. 1303
The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy: A Survey of Scientific Findings. Patrick J. McGowan and Howard B. Shapiro. Reviewed by Frederic S. Pearson. 661
Compassion: Toward a Science of Value. William Eckhardt. Reviewed by James Chowning Davies. 611
The Conduct and Misconduct of Foreign Affairs: Reflections on U.S. Foreign Policy Since World War II. Charles W. Yost. Reviewed by Earl C. Ravenal. 302
Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies. Eric A. Nordlinger. Reviewed by Fred R. von der Mehden. 250
Conflicts and Conspiracies: Brazil and Portugal, 1750–1808. Kenneth R. Maxwell. Reviewed by Donna Guy. 1008
Congressional Quarterly Service. *Congress and the Nation, Volume III (1969–1972)* and *Guide to the Congress of the United States.* Reviewed by Norman J. Ornstein. 628
Congressmen's Voting Decisions. John W. Kingdon. Reviewed by Stanley Bach. ... 977
Congress and the Nation, Volume III (1969–1972). Congressional Quarterly Service. Reviewed by Norman J. Ornstein. 628
Congress and the News Media. Robert O. Blanchard, ed. Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola

Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234
Conquerors and Confucians: Aspects of Political Change in Late Yüan China. John W. Dardess. Reviewed by L. Carrington Goodrich. 647
Consequences of Failure. William R. Corson. Reviewed by Arnold Beichman. 214
Cooper, Joseph. *The Origins of the Standing Committees and the Development of the Modern House.* Reviewed by Richard E. Damon. 631
Corson, William R. *Consequences of Failure.* Reviewed by Arnold Beichman. 214
Cowan, L. Gray. Review of Henry Bienen, *Kenya, the Politics of Participation and Control.* 642
Cox, LaWanda. Review of William L. Barney, *The Secessionist Impulse: Alabama and Mississippi in 1860.* 623
Craig, Gordon A. Review of Gerhard Ritter, *The Sword and the Scepter: The Problem of Militarism in Germany. Vol. 3: The Tragedy of Statesmanship — Bethmann Hollweg as War Chancellor (1914–1917); Vol. 4: The Reign of German Militarism and the Disaster of 1918.* 1363
Crain, Robert L. and Carol Sachs Weisman. *Discrimination, Personality, and Achievement: A Survey of Northern Blacks.* Reviewed by Thomas F. Pettigrew. 1303
Creating the European Community. R. C. Mowat. Reviewed by Stuart A. Scheingold. 288
Crime and Compromise: Janos Kadar and the Politics of Hungary Since Revolution. William Shawcross. Reviewed by John C. Campbell. 263
Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria: A Documentary Sourcebook, 1966–1970. A. H. M. Kirk-Greene. Reviewed by Richard L. Sklar. 247
Crowley, F. K. *Modern Australia in Documents.* Reviewed by Murray Clark Havens. 646
Crude Communism and Revolution. David Resnick. 1136
The Cultural Ecology of Chinese Civilization: Peasants and Elites in the Last of the Agrarian States. Leon E. Stover. Reviewed by John K. Fairbank. 266
Cultural and Political Aspects of Rural Transformation: A Case Study of Eastern Nigeria. David R. Smock and Audrey C. Smock. Reviewed by Robert Melson. ... 265
Cultural Revolution and Industrial Organization in China: Changes in Management and the Division of Labor. Charles Bettelheim. Reviewed by D. Gordon White. 641
Culture and Politics in Indonesia. Claire Holt, ed. Reviewed by Rex Mortimer. .. 1338
Dallmayr, Fred R. *Beyond Dogma and Despair: Toward a Critical Theory of Politics.* 6
Damon, Richard E. Review of Joseph Cooper, *The Origins of the Standing Committees and the Development of the Modern House.* 63
Dams, Parks and Politics: Resource Development and Preservation in the Truman-Eisenhower Era. Elmo Richardson. Reviewed by Jeanne Nienaber. 98
Darby, Phillip. *British Defence Policy East of Suez, 1947–1968.* Reviewed by Max Beloff. 674
Dardess, John W. *Conquerors and Confucians: Aspects of Political Change in Late Yüan China.* Reviewed by L. Carrington Goodrich. 647
Davidson, Chandler. *Biracial Politics: Conflict and Coalition in the Metropolitan South.* Reviewed by Richard Murray. .. 1305
David, Stephen M. Review of Gerald Benjamin, *Race Relations and the New York City Commission on Human Rights.* ... 624
Davies, James Chowning. Review of William Eckhardt, *Compassion: Toward a Science of Value.* 611
Davis, Harold Eugene. *Latin American Thought: A Historical Introduction.* Reviewed by Thomas W. Walker. 610
Davis, Vincent, James N. Rosenau and Maurice East, eds. *The Analysis of International Politics.* Reviewed by Davis B. Bobrow. 1366
Daynes, Byron W. Review of Rubin G. Cohn, *To Judge with Justice: History and Politics of Illinois Judicial Reform.* 628
Day, William L. Review of Ian D. Burman, *Lobbying at the Illinois Constitutional Convention.* 625
Deadline for the Media: Today's Challenges to Press, TV and Radio. James Aronson. Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234
The Death of Communal Liberty: A History of Freedom in a Swiss Mountain Canton. Benjamin R. Barber. Reviewed by Jürg Steiner. 198
Decision-making and Power in the British Conservative Party: A Study of the Indian Problem. Sailesh Ghandra Ghosh. Reviewed by Geoffrey Lambert. 1334
Decline or Renewal: France Since the 1930s. Stanley Hoffmann. Reviewed by Dorothy Pickles. 655
De Grazia, Sebastian. Review of Elliot Jaques, *Work, Creativity, and Social Justice;* Staffan B. Linder, *The Harried Leisure Class;* Special Task Force to the Secretary of Health, Education and Wel-

fare, *Work in America,* Prepared under the Auspices of the W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research; and Yves Simon, *Work, Society and Culture.* 1273
Dekmejian, R. H. Review of Mohamed Heikal, *The Cairo Documents: The Inside Story of Nasser and His Relationship with World Leaders, Rebels, and Statesmen.* .. 279
Deloria, Vine, Jr. *Behind the Trail of Broken Treaties.* Reviewed by Frances Svensson. 1306
Democracy and Political Change in Village India: A Case Study. A. H. Somjee. Reviewed by Ralph H. Retzlaff. 1369
Democrats and Progressives: The 1948 Presidential Election as a Test of Postwar Liberalism. Allen Yarnell. Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* 560
Dennis, Jack and M. Kent Jennings, eds. *Comparative Political Socialization.* Reviewed by Roberta S. Sigel. 1329
de Paor, Liam. *Divided Ulster.* Reviewed by John H. Whyte in *Recent Writing on Northern Ireland.* 592
The Department of Health, Education and Welfare. Rufus E. Miles, Jr. Reviewed by Harold Seidman. 222
Derthick, Martha. *Between State and Nation: Regional Organizations of the United States.* Reviewed by Thomas R. Dye. .. 632
de Schweinitz, Karl, Jr. Review of Frederic L. Pryor, *Public Expenditures in Communist and Capitalist Nations.* 1361
Review of Irma Adelman and Cynthia Taft Morris, *Economic Growth and Social Equity in Developing Countries.* ... 232
Detente, Arms Control and Strategy: Perspectives on SALT. Colin S. Gray. A review essay on Matthew P. Gallagher and Karl F. Spielmann, Jr., *Soviet Decision-Making for Defense: A Critique of U.S. Perspectives on the Arms Race;* Morton A. Kaplan, ed., *SALT: Problems and Prospects;* William R. Kintner and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., eds., *SALT: Implications for Arms Control in the 1970's;* John Newhouse, *Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT;* Richard Rosecrance, ed., *The Future of the International Strategic System;* Mason Willrich and John B. Rhinelander, eds., *SALT: The Moscow Agreements and Beyond.* 1242
Deutsch, Karl W., Hayward R. Alker, Jr., and Antoine H. Stoetzel. *Mathematical Approaches to Politics.* Reviewed by Charles Lewis Taylor. 600
Developmental Personnel, A Psycho-Social Study Across Three States in India. B. C. Muthayya and I. Gnanakannan. Reviewed by Dan Fritz. 988
Dexheimer, Wolfgang F. Review of Dieter Mahncke, *Berlin im geteilten Deutschland.* 663
The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, 1923–1950. Martin Jay. Reviewed by Hans Speier. 1276
Dick, William M. *Labor and Socialism in America: The Gompers Era.* Reviewed by David Kettler. 215
Differentiation and Co-operation in an Israeli Veteran Moshav. Elaine Baldwin. Reviewed by Khayyam Z. Paltiel. 236
The Dimensions of Quantitative Research in History. William O. Aydelotte, Allan G. Bogue, and Robert William Fogel, eds. Reviewed by Joel H. Silbey. 603
Discrimination, Personality, and Achievement: A Survey of Northern Blacks. Robert L. Crain and Carol Sachs Weisman. Reviewed by Thomas F. Pettigrew. 1303
Di Tella, Torcuato S. Review of Gianfranco Pasquino, *Modernizzazione e Sviluppo Politico* and *Militari e Potere in America Latina.* 1359
Divided Ulster. Liam de Paor. Reviewed by John H. Whyte in *Recent Writing on Northern Ireland.* 592
Dobson, Douglas and Douglas St. Angelo. *Communication: Stability of Partisan Attachments.* 554
Doenecke, Justus D. Review of Charles Chatfield, *For Peace and Justice: Pacifism in America, 1914–1941.* 1302
Don't Blame the People: How the News Media Use Bias, Distortion, and Censorship to Manipulate Public Opinion. Robert Cirino. Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234
Dore, Ronald. *British Factory—Japanese Factory: The Origins of National Diversity in Industrial Relations.* Reviewed by George O. Totten. 1331
Dreger, Ralph Mason and Kent S. Miller, eds. *Comparative Studies of Blacks and Whites in the United States.* Reviewed by Thomas F. Pettigrew. 1303
Driver, Edwin D. *World Population Policy: An Annotated Bibliography.* Reviewed by Dorothy M. Stetson. 648
Duby, Georges. *The Early Growth of the European Economy: Warriors and Peasants from the Seventh to the Twelfth Century.* Reviewed by David Herlihy. .. 611
Duignan, Peter and L. H. Gann. *Colonialism in Africa, 1870–1960: A Bibliographical Guide to Colonialism in Sub-Saharan Africa.* Reviewed by Emmet V. Mittlebeeler. 648

Duprat, Gérard. *Révolution et Autogestion Rurale en Algérie.* Reviewed by Clement Henry Moore. 1328
Dye, Thomas R. Review of Martha Derthick, *Between State and Nation: Regional Organizations of the United States.* 632
Dynamische Demokratie: Zur konkreten Utopie gesellschaftlicher Gleichheit. Anton Pelinka. Reviewed by George Schwab. .. 964

The Early Growth of the European Economy: Warriors and Peasants from the Seventh to the Twelfth Century. Georges Duby. Reviewed by David Herlihy. 611
East German Civil-Military Relations: The Impact of Technology, 1949–72. Dale Roy Herspring. Reviewed by James H. Wolfe. 654
East, Maurice, James N. Rosenau and Vincent Davis, eds. *The Analysis of International Politics.* Reviewed by Davis B. Bobrow. 1386
Eckhardt, William. *Compassion: Toward a Science of Value.* Reviewed by James Chowning Davies. 611
Eckstein, Alexander. Review of Christopher Howe, *Wage Patterns and Wage Policy in Modern China, 1919–1972.* 657
Economic Blocs and U.S. Foreign Policy. Ernest H. Preeg. Reviewed by W. Andrew Axline. 292
Economic Development and the Response of Labor in Scandinavia: A Multi-Level Analysis. William M. Lafferty. Reviewed by Joseph B. Board. 1343
Economic Growth and Social Equity in Developing Countries. Irma Adelman and Cynthia Taft Morris. Reviewed by Karl de Schweinitz, Jr. 233
Economic Methods and the Effectiveness of Production. E. G. Liberman. Reviewed by Gregory Grossman. 618
The Economics of Colonialism: Britain and Kenya, 1870–1930. Richard D. Wolff. Reviewed by Robert L. Tignor. 271
Economics and World Order from the 1970s to the 1990s. Jagdish N. Bhagwati, ed. Reviewed by Lawrence A. Veit. 1373
Reviewed by Robert Gilpin in *The Political Economy of the Multinational Corporation: Three Contrasting Perspectives.* .. 184
The Economic Theory of Representative Government. Albert Breton. Reviewed by William A. Niskanen. 605
Education, Opportunity, and Social Inequality: Changing Prospects in Western Society. Raymond Boudon. Reviewed by Robert H. Beck. 605
Edwards, George C. III. *Presidential Influence in the House: Presidential Prestige as a Source of Presidential Power.* 101
Efron, Edith. *The News Twisters.* Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234
Einhorn, Eric S. Review of Erik Rasmussen, ed., *Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. VII/1972.* 255
Eisenstadt, S. N. *Tradition, Change, and Modernity.* Reviewed by Marion J. Levy, Jr. 1261
Eisinger, Peter K. Review of David Sears and John B. McConahay, *The Politics of Violence: The New Urban Blacks and the Watts Riot.* 985
El-Ayouty, Yassin. Review of Abderrahman Robana, *The Prospects for an Economic Community in North Africa: Managing Economic Integration in the Maghreb States.* 256
Elections and Public Policy. Benjamin Ginsberg. 41
Elites against Democracy: Leadership Ideals in Bourgeois Political Thought in Germany, 1890–1933. Walter Struve. Reviewed by Wayne C. Thompson. 1000
Elites in the People's Republic of China. Robert A. Scalapino, ed. Reviewed by David M. Lampton. 1366
Elliott, Robert C. *The Shape of Utopia: Studies in a Literary Genre.* Reviewed by Rodney W. Kilcup. 973
Emmerson, John K. and Leonard A. Humphreys. *Will Japan Rearm? A Study in Attitudes.* Reviewed by Richard Storry. .. 649
The Emperor's New Clothes and Other Irreverent Essays for the Seventies. Norman Z. Alcock. Reviewed by Louis Kriesberg. 663
Emy, H. V. Review of Laurie Oakes and David Solomon, *The Making of an Australian Prime Minister.* 991
Energy Under the Oceans: A Technology Assessment of Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Operations. Don E. Kash, Irvin L. White, and others. Reviewed by Charles O. Jones. 282
Engels, Frederick and Karl Marx. *The Revolution of 1848–49: Articles from the "Neue Rheinische Zeitung."* Reviewed by David-Hillel Ruben. 206
Engels, Manchester, and the Working Class. Steven Marcus. Reviewed by E. V. Walter. 1283
Enloe, Cynthia H. Review of Fred R. von der Mehden, *Comparative Political Violence.* 269
Epstein, Edward Jay. *News From Nowhere: Television and the News.* Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234

Epstein, Leon D. Review of Robert D. Putnam, *The Beliefs of Politicians: Ideology, Conflict, and Democracy in Britain and Italy*. 253
Erickson, Richard J. *International Law and the Revolutionary State: A Case Study of the Soviet Union and International Law*. Reviewed by Peter B. Maggs. 675
Ernst, Joseph Albert. *Money and Politics in America, 1755–1775: A Study in the Currency Act of 1764 and the Political Economy of Revolution*. Reviewed by Alan Tully. 635
Ershkowitz, Miriam. Review of Kirk R. Petshek, *The Challenge of Urban Reform: Policies and Programs in Philadelphia*. .. 224
Eulau, Heinz and Kenneth Prewitt. *Labyrinths of Democracy: Adaptations, Linkages, Representation, and Policies in Urban Politics*. Reviewed by John H. Kessel. .. 1308
The European Convention on Human Rights. Frede Castberg. Reviewed by Ernst B. Haas. 671
European Monetary Unification and Its Meaning for the United States. Lawrence B. Krause and Walter S. Salant, eds. Reviewed by Edward A. Kolodziej. 284
Evans, John Lewis. *The Communist International, 1919–1943*. Reviewed by John W. Strong. 1377
Evolution and International Organization: Toward a New Level of Sociopolitical Integration. Volker Rittberger. Reviewed by Werner J. Feld. 1014
Executive Ombudsmen in the United States. Alan J. Wyner, ed. Reviewed by William B. Gwyn. 230
Explaining Party Cohesion in Congress: The Case of Shared Policy Attitudes. Helmut Norpoth. 1156
Ezrahi, Yaron. Review of Jean-Jacques Salomon, *Science and Politics*. 967

The Fabian Society. *Socialism and Affluence*, and *The Fifth Social Service: A Critical Analysis of the Seebohm Proposals*. Reviewed by Della Nevitt. 1264
The Failure of Democracy in South Korea. Sungjoo Han. Reviewed by Han-Kyo Kim. 649
Fainstein, Norman I. and Susan S. Fainstein. *The Future of Community Control*. 905
Fainstein, Susan S. and Norman I. Fainstein. *The Future of Community Control*. 905
Fairbank, John K. Review of Leon E. Stover, *The Cultural Ecology of Chinese Civilization: Peasants and Elites in the Last of the Agrarian States*. 266
Fairbanks, Charles H., Jr., Review of Hedley Bull, *The Moscow Agreements and Strategic Arms Limitation*. 1374
Falk, Richard A. and Cyril E. Black, eds. *The Future of the International Legal Order. Vol. III: Conflict Management* and *Vol. IV: The Structure of the International Environment*. Reviewed by G. Schwarzenberger. 670
Falk, Richard A. Review of Franz Schurmann, *The Logic of World Power: An Inquiry into the Origins, Currents, and Contradictions of World Politics*. 1390
Fan, K., ed. *Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao: Post Revolutionary Writings*. Reviewed by Stuart R. Schram. 200
Fanon. Peter Geismar. Reviewed by Bernard S. Morris. 1258
The F. D. R. Memoirs: A Speculation On History. Bernard Asbell. Reviewed by Paul T. Heffron. 210
Feinstein, Estelle F. *Stamford in the Gilded Age: The Political Life of a Connecticut Town, 1868–1893*. Reviewed by Richard E. Welch, Jr. 636
Feld, Werner J. Review of Volker Rittberger, *Evolution and International Organization: Toward a New Level of Sociopolitical Integration*. 1014
Ferrell, Robert H. Review of Ruth B. Henig, ed., *The League of Nations*. 678
Fidel in Chile: A Symbolic Meeting Between Two Historical Processes. Fidel Castro. Reviewed by Weston H. Agor. 674
The Fifth Social Service: A Critical Analysis of the Seebohm Proposals. The Fabian Society. Reviewed by Della Nevitt. 1264
Fifty Fighting Years: The South African Communist Party, 1921–1971. A. Lerumo. Reviewed by Aaron Segal. 1347
52 Peaceful Societies. Matthew Melko. Reviewed by Kenneth E. Boulding. 206
Finch, Elizabeth A. *The Politics of Regional Integration: A Study of Uruguay's Decision to Join LAFTA*. Reviewed by Russell H. Fitzgibbon. 279
FitzGerald, Garret. *Towards a New Ireland*. Reviewed by John H. Whyte in *Recent Writing on Northern Ireland*. 592
Fitzgibbon, Russell H. Review of Elizabeth A. Finch, *The Politics of Regional Integration: A Study of Uruguay's Decision to Join LAFTA*. 279
Flucht in den Mythos: Die Deutschnationale Volkspartei und die Niederlage von 1918. Annelise Thimme. Reviewed by Lewis Hertzman. 972
Fogel, Robert William, Allan G. Bogue, and William O. Aydelotte, eds. *The Dimensions*

of Quantitative Research in History. Reviewed by Joel H. Silbey. 603
Fokkema, D. W. *Report from Peking: Observations of a Western Diplomat on the Cultural Revolution*. Reviewed by G. Eric Hansen. 239
Ford, W. Scott. *Interracial Public Housing in Border City*. Reviewed by Leonard S. Rubinowitz. 217
Review of Nathaniel S. Keith, *Politics and the Housing Crisis Since 1930*. 220
Foreign Affairs and the Constitution. Louis Henkin. Reviewed by Whittle Johnston. 1381
Forman, Dorothy and Frank Browning, eds. *The Wasted Nations: Report of the International Commission of Enquiry into United States Crimes in Indochina, June 20–25, 1971*. Reviewed by Douglas Kinnard. 278
Formisano, Ronald P. Review of Stephen E. Patterson, *Political Parties in Revolutionary Massachusetts*. 981
For Peace and Justice: Pacifism in America, 1914–1941. Charles Chatfield. Reviewed by Justus D. Doenecke. 1302
Forschungsinstituts der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik. *Regionale Verflechtung Der Bundesrepublik Detuschland: Empirische Analysen und Theoretische Probleme*. Reviewed by Henri J. Warmenhoven. 1380
Fortin, Ernest L. Review of Beryl Smalley, *The Becket Conflict and the Schools: A Study of Intellectuals in Politics in the Twelfth Century*. 208
Foster, Frank F. Review of Joel Hurstfield, *Freedom, Corruption, and Government in Elizabethan England*. 245
Foundations of Political Action: An Exchange Theory of Politics. Sidney R. Waldman. Reviewed by Robert J. Sickels. ... 975
Four Theories in Search of a Reality: James Burnham, Soviet Communism, and the Cold War. John P. Diggins. 492
Francis, Michael J. Review of Kenneth Medhurst, ed., *Allende's Chile*. 249
Francogallia. François Hotman. Latin text by Ralph E. Giesey. J. H. M. Salmon, trans. Reviewed by Charles E. Butterworth. ... 613
Frankovic, Kathleen A. Review of Dennis P. Sobin, *The Working Poor: Minority Workers in Low-Wage, Low-Skill Jobs*. 226
Frantz Fanon. David Caute. Reviewed by Bernard S. Morris. 1258
Freedman, Ann and Constance Smith. *Voluntary Associations: Perspectives on the Literature*. Reviewed by G. David Garson. 970
Freedom, Corruption, and Government in Elizabethan England. Joel Hurstfield. Reviewed by Frank F. Foster. 24
Freeland, Richard M. *The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism: Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and Internal Security, 1946–1948*. Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay*. ... 560
Free Press/Free People: The Best Cause. John Hohenberg. Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media*. 1234
The French Deputy: Incentives and Behavior in the National Assembly. Oliver Woshinsky. Reviewed by William H. Hunt. 271
French, Peter A., ed. *Individual and Collective Responsibility: The Massacre at My Lai*. Reviewed by Terry Nardin in *Philosophy and International Violence*. .. 952
The French Right (from de Maistre to Maurras). J. S. McClelland, ed. Reviewed by Eugen Weber. 1284
Fried, John H. E. *The Great Nuremberg Trial*. A review essay on *The Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Nov. 14, 1945–Oct. 1, 1946*, with a new introduction by Gerhard L. Weinberg, and *Report of Robert H. Jackson: The International Conference on Military Trials, London, 1945*. 192
Friedman, Isaiah. *The Question of Palestine, 1914–1918: British-Jewish-Arab Relations*. Reviewed by Aaron S. Klieman. 676
Fried, Robert C. *Party and Policy in West German Cities*. 11
Fritz, Dan. Review of B. C. Muthayya and I. Gananakannan, *Developmental Personnel, A Psycho-Social Study Across Three States in India*. 988
From Aid to Recolonization: Lessons of a Failure. Tibor Mende. Reviewed by Susan Aurelia Gitelson. 286
From Contraband to Freedman: Federal Policy Toward Southern Blacks, 1861–1865. Louis S. Gerteis. Reviewed by William S. McFeely. 1309
From Kingdom to Commonwealth: The Development of Civic Consciousness in English Political Thought. Donald W. Hanson. Reviewed by Paul E. Sigmund. 1268
From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa, 1882–1964, Vols. I and II. Thomas Karis and Gwendolen M. Carter. Reviewed by James P. Barber. 246
From Tribe to Nation in Africa. Ronald Cohen and John Middleton, eds. Reviewed by Michael F. Lofchie. 238

Fuchs, Werner et al., eds. *Lexikon Zur Soziologie.* Reviewed by Gianfranco Poggi. 1265
Functionaries. F. William Howton. Reviewed by Lloyd A. Rowe. 614
Funston, Richard. *Communication: Critical Elections and the Supreme Court: Putting the Cart after the Horse.* 932
Communication: Funston Reply to Canon and Ulmer. 1218
Furniss, Norman. Review of Martin O. Heisler, ed., *Politics in Europe: Structures and Processes in Some Postindustrial Democracies.* 243
The Future of Community Control. Norman I. Fainstein and Susan S. Fainstein. 905
The Future of the International Economic Order: An Agenda for Research. C. Fred Bergsten, ed. Reviewed by Benjamin J. Cohen. 277
The Future of the International Legal Order. Vol. III: Conflict Management and *Vol. IV: The Structure of the International Environment.* Cyril E. Black and Richard A. Falk, eds. Reviewed by G. Schwarzenberger. 670
The Future of the International Strategic System. Richard Rosecrance, ed. Reviewed by Colin S. Gray in *Detente, Arms Control and Strategy: Perspective on SALT.* 1242

Gaddis, John Lewis. *The United States and the Origins of the the Cold War, 1941–1947.* Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy—A Review Essay.* 560
Gallagher, Matthew P. and Karl F. Spielmann, Jr. *Soviet Decision-Making for Defense: A Critique of U.S. Perspectives on the Arms Race.* Reviewed by Colin S. Gray in *Detente, Arms Control and Strategy: Perspectives on SALT.* 1242
Gamer, Robert E. Review of Theodore Geiger and Frances M. Geiger, *Tales of Two City-States: The Development Progress of Hong Kong and Singapore.* 240
Gann, L. H. and Peter Duignan. *Colonialism in Africa, 1870–1960: A Bibliographical Guide to Colonialism in Sub-Saharan Africa.* Reviewed by Emmet V. Mittlebeeler. 648
Garcia, F. Chris. *Political Socialization of Chicano Children: A Comparative Study with Anglos in California Schools.* Reviewed by James W. Clarke. 218
Gardiner, Patrick. Review of Shlomo Avineri, *Hegel's Theory of the Modern State.* 602
Garson, G. David. Review of Constance Smith and Ann Freedman, *Voluntary Associations: Perspectives on the Literature.* 970
Geiger, Frances M. and Theodore Geiger. *Tales of Two City-States: The Development Progress of Hong Kong and Singapore.* Reviewed by Robert E. Gamer. 240
Geiger, Theodore and Frances M. Geiger. *Tales of Two City-States: The Development Progress of Hong Kong and Singapore.* Reviewed by Robert E. Gamer. 240
Geismar, Peter. *Fanon.* Reviewed by Bernard S. Morris. 1258
Gellner, Ernest and Charles Micaud, eds. *Arabs and Berbers: From Tribe to Nation in North Africa.* Reviewed by Jean-Claude Vatin. 1332
Generational Change and the Decline of Party Identification in America: 1952–1974. Paul R. Abramson. 469
The German Idea of Freedom: History of a Political Tradition. Leonard Krieger. Reviewed by James J. Sheehan. 1279
Gerteis, Louis S. *From Contraband to Freedman: Federal Policy Toward Southern Blacks, 1861–1865.* Reviewed by William S. McFeely. 1309
Ghosh, Sailesh Ghandra. *Decision-making and Power in the British Conservative Party: A Study of the Indian Problem.* Reviewed by Geoffrey Lambert. 1334
Gilbert, Charles E. Review of Nicholas Rescher, *Welfare: The Social Issues in Philosophical Perspective.* 1291
Gilbert, John H., ed. *The New Era in American Foreign Policy.* Reviewed by Howard H. Lentner. 677
Gilbert, Robert E. *Television and Presidential Politics.* Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234
Gilpin, Robert. *The Political Economy of the Multinational Corporation: Three Contrasting Perspectives:* A review essay on Kari Levitt, *Silent Surrender: The American Economic Empire in Canada;* Jagdish Bhagwati, ed., *Economics and World Order: From the 1970's to the 1990's;* and Raymond Vernon, *Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises.* 184
Ginsberg, Benjamin. *Elections and Public Policy.* 41
Gitelson, Susan Aurelia. Review of Tibor Mende, *From Aid to Recolonization: Lessons of a Failure.* 286
Glick, Wendell, ed. *The Writings of Henry D. Thoreau: Reform Papers.* Reviewed by David M. Atkinson. 1295
Gnanakannan, I. and B. C. Muthayya. *Developmental Personnel, A Psycho-Social Study Across Three States in India.* Reviewed by Dan Fritz. 988

Gobineau: Selected Political Writings. Michael D. Biddis, ed. Reviewed by Eugen Weber. 1284
Godwin, R. Kenneth. Review of A. E. Keir Nash, ed., *Governance and Population: The Governmental Implications of Population Changes.* 1288
Godwin, R. Kenneth and W. Bruce Shepard. *Political Processes and Public Expenditures: A Re-examination Based on Theories of Representative Government.* 1127
Goldey, D. B. Review of René Rémond, *The Right Wing in France From 1815 to de Gaulle.* 1365
Goodrich, L. Carrington. Review of John W. Dardess, *Conquerors and Confucians: Aspects of Political Change in Late Yüan China.* 647
Goodwin, Richard N. *The American Condition.* Reviewed by George Kateb. 636
Gorbanevskaya, Natalia. *Red Square at Noon.* Reviewed by Frederick C. Barghoorn. 1335
Gordon, Edward. Review of Michla Pomerance, *The Advisory Function of the International Court in the League and U. N. Eras.* 291
Gorman, John W., Samuel Popkin, Charles Phillips, and Jeffrey A. Smith. *Comment: What Have You Done for Me Lately? Toward An Investment Theory of Voting.* 779
Governance and Population: The Governmental Implications of Population Changes. A. E. Keir Nash, ed. Reviewed by R. Kenneth Godwin. 1288
Governing Without Consensus: an Irish Perspective. Richard Rose. Reviewed by John H. Whyte in *Recent Writing on Northern Ireland.* 592
Government Competition in the Electric Utility Industry: A Theoretical and Empirical Study. Richard Hellman. Reviewed by Harry M. Trebing. 1310
Government and the Media. Ithiel de Sola Pool. A review essay on Chris Argyris, *Behind the Front Page;* James Aronson, *Deadline for the Media: Today's Challenges to Press, TV & Radio* and *The Press and the Cold War;* Robert O. Blanchard, ed., *Congress and the News Media;* Lee Brown, *The Reluctant Reformation: On Criticizing the Press in America;* Robert Cirino, *Don't Blame the People: How the News Media Use Bias, Distortion, and Censorshp to Manipulate Public Opinion;* Edith Efron, *The News Twisters;* Edward Jay Epstein, *News From Nowhere: Television and the News;* Robert E. Gilbert, *Television and Presidential Politics;* John Hohenberg, *Free Press/Free People: The Best Cause;* Joseph Keeley, *The Left-Leaning Antenna: Political Bias in Television;* Richard W. Lee, ed., *Politics and the Press;* John Luskin, *Lippmann, Liberty and the Press;* Lester Markel, *What You Don't Know Can Hurt You: A Study in Public Opinion and Public Emotion;* John C. Merrill, *The Imperative of Freedom: A Philosophy of Journalistic Autonomy;* Newton N. Minow, John Barlow Martin, and Lee M. Mitchell, *Presidential Television;* William Rivers, *The Adversaries: Politics and the Press;* Leon V. Sigal, *Reporters and Officials;* William Small, *To Kill a Messenger: Television News And The Real World;* Jeremy Tunstall, *Journalists at Work: Specialist Correspondents;* Charles W. Whalen, Jr., *Your Right To Know;* George F. Will, ed., *Press, Politics and Popular Government.* 1234
Graber, Doris A. Review of Ithiel de Sola Pool, ed., *Talking Back: Citizen Feedback and Cable Technology.* 633
A Grain of Mustard Seed: The Awakening of the Brazilian Revolution. Marcio Moreira Alves. Reviewed by Peter McDonough. 987
Gray, Colin S. *Detente, Arms Control and Strategy: Perspectives on SALT.* A review essay on Matthew P. Gallagher and Karl F. Spielmann, Jr., *Soviet Decision-Making for Defense: A Critique of U.S. Perspectives on the Arms Race;* Morton A. Kaplan, ed., *SALT: Problems and Prospects;* William R. Kintner and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., eds., *SALT: Implications for Arms Control in the 1970's;* John Newhouse, *Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT;* Richard Rosecrance, ed., *The Future of the International Strategic System;* Mason Willrich and John B. Rhinelander, eds., *SALT: The Moscow Agreements and Beyond.* 1242
Review of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *The Arms Trade with the Third World;* and Miles D. Wolpin, *Military Aid and Counterrevolution in the Third World.* 297
The Great Fear of 1789: Rural Panic in Revolutionary France. Georges Lefebvre. Reviewed by Roy Pierce. 1345
The Great Nuremberg Trial. John H. E. Fried. A review essay on *The Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Nov. 14, 1945–Oct. 1, 1946,* with a new Introduction by Gerhard L. Weinberg, and *Report of Robert H. Jackson: The Interna-*

tional Conference on Military Trials, London, 1945. 192
The Great Wheel: The World Monetary System, a Reinterpretation. Sidney E. Rolfe and James Burtle. Reviewed by Susan Strange. 1015
Gregor, A. James. *Interpretations of Fascism.* Reviewed by Stanley G. Payne. 1266
Griffith, Robert and Athan Theoharis, eds. *The Specter: Original Essays on the Cold War and the Origins of McCarthyism.* Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy—A Review Essay.* .. 560
Griffith, Robert. *The Politics of Fear: Joseph R. McCarthy and the Senate.* Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* 560
Grossman, Gregory. Review of E. G. Liberman, *Economic Methods and the Effectiveness of Production.* 618
Groupes de pression en Belgique, Les groupes intermédiaires socio-économiques, Contribution à l'analyse comparative. Paul H. Claeys. Reviewed by L. Huyse. 645
Gruber, Helmut. *Soviet Russia Masters the Comintern: International Communism in the Era of Stalin's Ascendancy.* Reviewed by John W. Strong. 1377
Grumm, John G. Review of Richard L. Clinton, ed., *Population and Politics: New Directions in Political Science Research.* 608
Grupp, Fred W., Jr. and Alan R. Richards. *Communication: Issue Areas and Differentials in Bureaucratic Power.* 930
Guide to the Congress of the United States. Congressional Quarterly Service. Reviewed by Norman J. Ornstein. 628
Guyana: A Composite Monograph. Brian Irving, ed. Reviewed by Robert W. Anderson. 658
Guy, Donna. Review of Kenneth R. Maxwell, *Conflicts and Conspiracies: Brazil and Portugal, 1750–1808.* 1008
Gwyn, William B. Review of Alan J. Wyner, ed., *Executive Ombudsmen in the United States.* 230
Review of James C. Scott, *Comparative Political Corruption.* 1368

Haas, Ernst B. Review of Frede Castberg, *The European Convention on Human Rights;* and Nicole Condorelli Braun, *Commissaires et Juges dans les Communautés Européennes.* 671
Haddad, George M. *Revolutions and Military Rule in the Middle East: The Arab States, Vol. III—Egypt, The Sudan, Yemen and Libya.* Reviewed by Abdo I. Baaklini. ... 241
Hahn, Werner G. *The Politics of Soviet Agriculture, 1960–1970.* Reviewed by Linda L. Lubrano. 1336
Halle, Louis J. *The Ideological Imagination.* Reviewed by Lawrence A. Scaff. 1267
Haller, Walter. *Supreme Court und Politik in den USA: Fragen der Justiziabilität in der höchstrichterlichen Rechtsprechung.* Reviewed by Francis H. Heller. 637
Hallowell, John H. Review of Henry Jacoby, *The Bureaucratization of the World.* 660
Halpern, Manfred. Review of Elie Adib Salem, *Modernization Without Revolution: Lebanon's Experience.* 1365
Hamblin, Robert L., R. Brooke Jacobsen, and Jerry L. L. Miller. *A Mathematical Theory of Social Change.* Reviewed by Samuel A. Kirkpatrick. 202
Hamby, Alonzo L. *Beyond the New Deal: Harry S Truman and American Liberalism.* Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay* 560
Hamer, D. A. *Liberal Politics in the Age of Gladstone and Rosebery: A Study in Leadership and Policy.* Reviewed by Robert Kelley. 1337
Hansen, G. Eric. Review of D. W. Fokkema, *Report from Peking: Observations of a Western Diplomat on the Cultural Revolution.* 239
Hanson, Donald W. *From Kingdom to Commonwealth: The Development of Civic Consciousness in English Political Thought.* Reviewed by Paul E. Sigmund. 1268
Han, Sungjoo. *The Failure of Democracy in South Korea.* Reviewed by Han-Kyo Kim. 649
Harcourt, G. C. *Some Cambridge Controversies in the Theory of Capital.* Reviewed by Leland B. Yeager. 1270
Hardgrave, Robert L., Jr. Review of Brenda E. F. Beck, *Peasant Societies in Konku: A Study of Right and Left Subcastes in South India.* 1322
Hardin, Russell. *Hollow Victory: The Minimum Winning Coalition.* 1202
Harijan: A Journal of Applied Gandhiism, 1933–1955. Vols. I-XIX. Reviewed by Paul F. Power. 651
Harper, Alan D. *The Politics of Loyalty: The White House and the Communist Issue, 1946–1952.* Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* 560

The Harried Leisure Class. Staffan B. Linder. Reviewed by Sebastian de Grazia. 1273
Harrison, Wilfrid. Review of Bhiku Parekh, ed., *Bentham's Political Thought.* 963
Harris, Rosemary. *Prejudice and Tolerance in Ulster: A Study of Neighbors and "Strangers" in a Border Community.* Reviewed by John H. Whyte in *Recent Writing on Northern Ireland.* 592
"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay. Geoffrey S. Smith. Review of John Morton Blum, ed., *The Price of Vision: The Diary of Henry A. Wallace, 1942–1946;* Richard M. Freeland, *The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism: Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and Internal Security, 1946–1948;* John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1947;* Robert Griffith, *The Politics of Fear: Joseph R. McCarthy and the Senate;* Robert Griffith and Athan Theoharis, eds., *The Specter: Original Essays on the Cold War and the Origins of McCarthyism;* Alonzo L. Hamby, *Beyond the New Deal: Harry S. Truman and American Liberalism;* Alan D. Harper, *The Politics of Loyalty: The White House and the Communist Issue, 1946–1952;* Susan M. Hartmann, *Truman and the 80th Congress;* George C. Herring, Jr., *Aid to Russia, 1941–1946: Strategy, Diplomacy, the Origins of the Cold War;* Richard S. Kirkendall, ed., *The Truman Period as a Research Field: A Reappraisal, 1972;* Robert J. Maddox, *The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War;* Norman D. Markowitz, *The Rise and Fall of the People's Century: Henry A. Wallace and American Liberalism, 1941–1948;* Michael Parenti, *The Anti-Communist Impulse;* Thomas G. Paterson, *Soviet-American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War;* James T. Patterson, *Mr. Republican: A Biography of Robert A. Taft;* Lisle A. Rose, *After Yalta: America and the Origins of the Cold War;* Edward L. Schapsmeier and Frederick H. Schapsmeier, *Prophet in Politics: Henry A. Wallace and the War Years, 1940–1965;* Joseph M. Siracusa, *New Left Diplomatic Histories and Historians: The American Revisionists;* Athan Theoharis, *Seeds of Repression: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of McCarthyism,* and *The Yalta Myths: An Issue in U.S. Politics, 1945–1955;* and Allen Yarnell, *Democrats and Progressives: The 1948 Presidential Election as a Test of Postwar Liberalism.* 560
Hart, Jeffrey A. Review of John J. Weltman, *Systems Theory in International Relations: A Study in Metaphoric Hypertrophy.* 975
Hartmann, Susan M. *Truman and the 80th Congress.* Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* 560
Haskel, Barbara G. Review of Stein Rokkan, ed., *Scandinavian Political Studies, Volume 8/1973.* 995
Hassner, Pierre. Review of Institut de Sociologie, Centre de sociologie de la guerre, *Le nationalisme, facteur belligène.* 203
Hatje, Ann-Katrin. *Befolkningsfrågan och Välfärden: Debatten om familjepolitik och nativitetsfrågan under 1930- och 1940-talen.* Reviewed by Erik Allardt. 653
Havemann, Robert. *Questions, Answers, Questions: From the Biography of a German Marxist.* Reviewed by Paul Breines. 1271
Havens, Murray Clark. Review of F. K. Crowley, *Modern Australia in Documents.* 646
Hawkins, Carroll. *Two Democratic Labor Leaders in Conflict: The Latin American Revolution and the Role of the Workers.* Reviewed by Robert J. Alexander. 242
Hayward, Fred M. *A Reassessment of Conventional Wisdom About the Informed Public: National Political Information in Ghana.* 433
Heffron, Paul T. Review of Bernard Asbell, *The F. D. R. Memoirs: A Speculation on History.* 210
Hegel's Theory of the Modern State. Shlomo Avineri. Reviewed by Patrick Gardiner. 602
Heginbotham, Stanley J. Review of Donald P. Whitaker et al., *Area Handbook for the Khmer Republic.* 270
Heikal, Mohamed. *The Cairo Documents: The Inside Story of Nasser and His Relationship with World Leaders, Rebels, and Statesmen.* Reviewed by R. H. Dekmejian. 279
The Heirs of Stalin: Dissidence and the Soviet Regime, 1953–1970. Abraham Rothberg, ed. Reviewed by D. Pospielovsky. .. 966
Heisler, Martin O., ed. *Politics in Europe: Structures and Processes in Some Postindustrial Democracies.* Reviewed by Norman Furniss. 243
Held, Virginia, Sidney Morgenbesser, and Thomas Nagel, eds. *Philosophy, Morality, and International Affairs.* Reviewed by Terry Nardin in *Philosophy and International Violence.* 952

Heller, Francis H. Review of Walter Haller, *Supreme Court und Politik in den USA: Fragen der Justiziabilität in der höchstrichterlichen Rechtsprechung.* 637
Hellmann, Donald C. Review of Harald B. Malmgren, ed., *Pacific Basin Development: The American Interests.* 221
Hellman, Richard. *Government Competition in the Electric Utility Industry: A Theoretical and Empirical Study.* Reviewed by Harry M. Trebing. 1310
Henderson, William. *West New Guinea: The Dispute and its Settlement.* Reviewed by Ralph R. Premdas. 244
Henig, Ruth B., ed. *The League of Nations.* Reviewed by Robert H. Ferrell. 678
Henkin, Louis. *Foreign Affairs and the Constitution.* Reviewed by Whittle Johnston. 1381
Henry, Edward L., ed. *Micropolis in Transition: A Study of a Small City.* Reviewed by Russell D. Murphy. 219
Henry, Laurin L. Review of Lawrence D. Longley and Alan G. Braun, *The Politics of Electoral College Reform.* 1311
Herlihy, David. Review of Georges Duby, *The Early Growth of the European Economy: Warriors and Peasants from the Seventh to the Twelfth Century.* 611
Herndon, James F. and Joseph L. Bernd, eds. *Mathematical Applications in Political Science, VII.* Reviewed by Kul B. Rai. .. 202
The Hero's Children: The Post-War Generation of Eastern Europe. Paul Neuburg. Reviewed by Paul Hollander. 989
Herring, George C., Jr. *Aid to Russia, 1941–1946: Strategy, Diplomacy, the Origins of the Cold War.* Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* 560
Herring, Pendleton. Introduction to APSA Presidential Address, 1975. 139
Herspring, Dale Roy. *East German Civil Military Relations: The Impact of Technology, 1949–72.* Reviewed by James H. Wolfe. 654
Hertzman, Lewis. Review of Annelise Thimme, *Flucht in den Mythos: Die Deutschnationale Volkspartei und die Niederlage von 1918.* 972
Hibbs, Douglas A., Jr. *Industrial Conflict in Advanced Industrial Societies.* 1033
Hidén, Mikael. *The Ombudsman in Finland: The First Fifty Years.* Reviewed by Robert B. Kvavik. 655
The Higher Realism of Woodrow Wilson and Other Essays. Arthur S. Link. Reviewed by Richard J. Stillman II. 619
Hildebrand, David K., James D. Laing, and Howard Rosenthal. *Prediction Analysis in Political Research.* 509
Hill, Richard Child. *Communication: The Social Stratification and Governmental Inequality Hypothesis: A Rejoinder.* 154
Hindley, Donald. Review of R. William Liddle, ed., *Political Participation in Modern Indonesia.* 1348
Historians of Modern Europe. Hans A. Schmitt, ed. Reviewed by Robert Woito. 1294
A History of Regulatory Taxation. R. Alton Lee. Reviewed by Clara Penniman. 978
History of U.S. Political Parties, Vol. I: 1789–1860, From Factions to Parties; Vol. II: 1860–1910, The Gilded Age of Politics; Vol. III: 1910–1945, From Square Deal to New Deal; Vol. IV: 1945–1972, The Politics of Change. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., ed. Reviewed by Austin Ranney. ... 1316
Hochman, Harold M. Review of Sar H. Levitan, *Programs in Aid of the Poor for the 1970s.* 979
Hodges, Donald C. and Robert E. A. Shanab, eds. *National Liberation Fronts, 1960–1970.* Reviewed by W. Scott Thompson. 1351
Hoffmann, Stanley. *Decline or Renewal: France Since the 1930s.* Reviewed by Dorothy Pickles. 655
Hohenberg, John. *Free Press/Free People: The Best Cause.* Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234
Hollander, Paul. Review of Paul Neuburg, *The Hero's Children: The Post-War Generation of Eastern Europe.* 989
Hollow Victory: The Minimum Winning Coalition. Russell Hardin. 1202
Holt, Claire, ed. *Culture and Politics in Indonesia.* Reviewed by Rex Mortimer. .. 1338
Hotman, François. *Francogallia.* Latin text by Ralph T. Giesey. J. H. M. Salmon, trans. Reviewed by Charles E. Butterworth. 613
Hottois, James W. *Communication: Stability of Partisan Attachments.* 552
A House Divided: The Dilemma of Northern Ireland. James Callaghan. Reviewed by John H. Whyte in *Recent Writing on Northern Ireland.* 592
House, Jonathan M. Review of Judith M. Hughes, *To the Maginot Line: The Politics of French Preparation in the 1920's.* 245
How Congressmen Decide: A Policy Focus. Aage R. Clausen. Reviewed by Michael L. Mezey. 626
Howe, Christopher. *Wage Patterns and Wage Policy in Modern China, 1919–1972.* Reviewed by Alexander Eckstein. 657
How People Get Power: Organizing Oppressed Communities for Action. Si Kahn. Reviewed by Dale Rogers Marshall. 620

Howton, F. William. *Functionaries.* Reviewed by Lloyd A. Rowe. 614
Hsieh, Alice Langley. Review of Yuan-li Wu and Robert B. Sheeks. *The Organization and Support of Scientific Research and Development in Mainland China.* 272
Huber, Joan. Review of Roland Mousnier, *Social Hierarchies: 1450 to the Present.* Peter Evans, trans. 1009
Hughes, Judith M. *To the Maginot Line: The Politics of French Military Preparation in the 1920's.* Reviewed by Jonathan M. House. 245
Humphreys, Leonard A. and John K. Emmerson. *Will Japan Rearm? A Study in Attitudes.* Reviewed by Richard Storry. .. 649
Hunter, John E. and T. Daniel Coggin. *Communication: A Reanalysis of Achen's Critique of the Converse Model of Mass Political Belief.* 1226
Hunter, Robert E., ed. *The United States and the Developing World: Agenda for Action.* Reviewed by Raymond C. Miller. 679
Hunt, William H. Review of Oliver Woshinsky, *The French Deputy: Incentives and Behavior in the National Assembly.* 271
Hurstfield, Joel. *Freedom, Corruption, and Government in Elizabethan England.* Reviewed by Frank F. Foster. 245
Huyse, L. Review of Paul H. Claeys, *Groupes de pression en Belgigue, Les groupes intermédiaires socioéconomiques, Contribution à l'analyse comparative.* 645
Hyman, Herbert Harvey, ed. *The Politics of Heath Care: Nine Case Studies of Innovative Planning in New York City.* Reviewed by Eveline M. Burns. 220

The Ideological Imagination. Louis J. Halle. Reviewed by Lawrence A. Scaff. 1267
The Ideological Origins of Black Nationalism. Sterling Stuckey. Reviewed by Hanes Walton, Jr. 209
Ideology in the 1972 Election: Myth or Reality—A Rejoinder. Arthur H. Miller and Warren E. Miller. 832
The Imperative of Freedom: A Philosophy of Journalistic Autonomy. John C. Merrill. Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234
The Indispensable Enemy: Labor and the Anti-Chinese Movement in California. Alexander Saxton. Reviewed by Wen H. Kuo. 984
Individual and Collective Responsibility: The Massacre at My Lai. Peter A. French, ed. Reviewed by Terry Nardin in *Philosophy and International Violence.* 952
Indonesia After Sukarno. J. M. van der Kroef. Reviewed by Michael Leifer. 1003
Industrial Conflict in Advanced Industrial Societies. Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr. 1033
Industrial Society in Communist China. Barry M. Richman. Reviewed by Thomas W. Robinson. 1362
Institut de Sociologie, Centre de sociologie de la guerre. *Le nationalisme, facteur belligène.* Reviewed by Pierre Hassner. 203
The Institute of Marxism-Leninism, Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. *Outline History of the Communist International.* Reviewed by John W. Strong. 1377
International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. David L. Sills, ed. Reviewed by Ralph Ross in *On the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.* 939
International Institutional Law: Vol. I, Structure; Vol. II, Functioning and Legal Order. Henry G. Schermers. Reviewed by Charles H. McLaughlin. 1388
The International Labor Movement in Transition: Essays on Africa, Asia, Europe and South America. Adolf Sturmthal and James G. Scoville, eds. Reviewed by E. M. Kassalow. 1001
International Law and the Revolutionary State: A Case Study of the Soviet Union and International Law. Richard J. Erickson. Reviewed by Peter B. Maggs. 675
International Studies and the Social Sciences: Problems, Priorities, and Prospects in the United States. James N. Rosenau. Reviewed by Kenneth W. Thompson. 1016
An Interorganizational Analysis of Power, Conflict, and Settlements in Public Sector Collective Bargaining. James L. Perry and Charles H. Levine. 1185
Interpretations of Fascism. A. James Gregor. Reviewed by Stanley G. Payne. 1266
Interracial Public Housing in Border City. W. Scott Ford. Reviewed by Leonard S. Rubinowitz. 217
The Invisible Resource. Harvey J. Levin. Reviewed by Frank Wolf. 1315
Ireland since the Famine. F. S. L. Lyons. Reviewed by John H. Whyte in *Recent Writing on Northern Ireland.* 592
Irish Unionism 1: The Anglo-Irish and the New Ireland, 1885 to 1922. Patrick Buckland. Reviewed by Alan J. Ward. 1324
Irish Unionism 2: Ulster Unionism and the Origins of Northern Ireland, 1886 to 1922. Patrick Buckland. Reviewed by Alan J. Ward. 1324
Irving, Brian, ed. *Guyana: A. Composite Monograph.* Reviewed by Robert W. Anderson. 658

Israel and the Palestinians. Shlomo Avineri, ed. Reviewed by Amos Perlmutter. 1321

Jackman, Robert W. *Politicians in Uniform: Military Governments and Social Change in the Third World.* 1078
Jackson, Robert H. *Report on The International Conference on Military Trials, London, 1945.* Reviewed by John H. E. Fried in *The Great Nuremberg Trial.* ... 192
Jackson, Robert J. Review of Vincent Lemieux, *Le Quotient Politique Vral.* .. 248
Jackson, W. A. Douglas, ed. *Agrarian Policies and Problems in Communist and Non-Communist Countries.* Reviewed by Roy D. Laird. 658
Jacobsen, R. Brooke, Robert L. Hamblin, and Jerry L. L. Miller. *A Mathematical Theory of Social Change.* Reviewed by Samuel A. Kirkpatrick. 202
Jacobson, Harold K. Review of James Barros, ed., *The United Nations: Past, Present, and Future.* 275
Jacoby, Henry. *The Bureaucratization of the World.* Reviewed by John H. Hallowell. 660
Jaher, Frederic C., ed. *The Rich, the Well Born and the Powerful: Elites and Upper Classes in History.* Reviewed by Suzanne Keller. 615
Jameson, Frederick. *Marxism and Form: Twentieth Century Dialectical Theories of Literature.* Reviewed by Paul Piccone. .. 1272
Japanese Diplomacy in a Dilemma: New Light on Japan's China Policy. Nobuya Bamba. Reviewed by Hideo Sato. 274
Japan's Foreign Policy, 1868–1941: A Research Guide. James William Morley, ed. Reviewed by Chalmers Johnson. 287
Jaques, Elliot. *Work, Creativity, and Social Justice.* Reviewed by Sebastian de Grazia. 1273
Java in a Time of Revolution. Occupation and Resistance, 1944–1946. Benedict R. O'G. Anderson. Reviewed by J. A. C. Mackie. 1320
Jay, Martin. *The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, 1923–1950.* Reviewed by Hans Speier. 1276
Jenkins, George D. and Kenneth W. Post. *The Price of Liberty: Personality and Politics in Colonial Nigeria.* Reviewed by Robert Melson. 993
Jennings, M. Kent and Jack Dennis, eds. *Comparative Political Socialization.* Reviewed by Roberta S. Sigel. 1329
Jensen, Richard. Review of Samuel T. McSeveney, *The Politics of Depression: Political Behavior in the Northeast, 1893–1896.* 980
Johnson, Chalmers. Review of James William Morley, ed., *Japan's Foreign Policy, 1868–1941: A Research Guide.* 287
Johnston, Whittle. Review of Louis Henkin, *Foreign Affairs and the Constitution.* ... 1381
Joiner, Charles A. Review of John T. McAlister, Jr., *Vietnam: The Origins of Revolution.* 1384
Jones, Charles O. Review of Don E. Kash, Irvin L. White, and others, *Energy Under the Oceans: A Technology Assessment of Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Operations.* 282
Jones, Edward E., David E. Kanouse, Harold H. Kelley, Richard E. Nisbett, Stuart Valins, and Bernard Weiner, eds. *Attribution: Perceiving the Causes of Behavior.* Reviewed by Peter W. Sperlich. 617
Jones, Ray. *The Nineteenth-Century Foreign Office: An Administrative History.* Reviewed by Keith Wilson. 1382
Journalists at Work: Specialist Correspondents. Jeremy Tunstall. Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234
Jukes, G. Review of Edward Allworth, ed., *The Nationality Question in Soviet Central Asia.* 234

Kahn, Herman and Barry Bruce-Briggs. *Things to Come: Thinking about the Seventies and Eighties.* Reviewed by Philip Hone Auerbach. 205
Kahn, Si. *How People Get Power: Organizing Oppressed Communities for Action.* Reviewed by Dale Rogers Marshall. 620
Kanet, Roger E., ed. *The Soviet Union and the Developing Nations.* Reviewed by Bernard P. Kiernan. 280
Kanouse, David E., Edward E. Jones, Harold H. Kelley, Richard E. Nisbett, Stuart Valins, and Bernard Weiner, eds. *Attribution: Perceiving the Causes of Behavior.* Reviewed by Peter W. Sperlich. 617
Kaplan, Morton A., ed. *SALT: Problems and Prospects.* Reviewed by Colin S. Gray in *Detente, Arms Control and Strategy: Perspectives on SALT.* 1242
Kaplan, Morton A. *The Rationale for NATO: European Collective Security—Past and Present.* Reviewed by Nils Ørvik. 1383
Karis, Thomas and Gwendolen M. Carter. *From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa, 1882–1964, Vols. I and II.* Reviewed by James P. Barber. 246
Karl, Barry D. *Charles E. Merriam and the Study of Politics.* Reviewed by Gabriel A. Almond. 1278
Kash, Don E., Irvin L. White, and others.

Energy Under the Oceans: A Technology Assessment of Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Operations. Reviewed by Charles O. Jones. 282
Kassalow, E. M. Review of Adolf Sturmthal and James G. Scoville, eds., *The International Labor Movement in Transition: Essays on Africa, Asia, Europe and South America.* 1001
Kateb, George. Review of Richard N. Goodwin, *The American Condition.* 636
Kearney, Robert N. *Trade Unions and Politics in Ceylon.* Reviewed by Calvin A. Woodward. 1339
Keeley, Joseph. *The Left-Leaning Antenna: Political Bias in Television.* Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234
Keeton, George W. and Georg Schwarzenberger, eds. *The Year Book of World Affairs, 1973.* Reviewed by Peter R. Baehr. 283
Keith, Nathaniel S. *Politics and the Housing Crisis Since 1930.* Reviewed by W. Scott Ford. 220
Kellas, James G. Review of Bernard Barker, ed., *Ramsay MacDonald's Political Writings.* 604
Keller, Suzanne. Review of Frederic C. Jaher, ed., *The Rich, the Well Born and the Powerful: Elites and Upper Classes in History.* 615
Kelley, Harold H., Edward E. Jones, David E. Kanouse, Richard E. Nisbett, Stuart Valins, and Bernard Weiner, eds. *Attribution: Perceiving the Causes of Behavior.* Reviewed by Peter W. Sperlich. 617
Kelley, Robert. Review of D. A. Hamer, *Liberal Politics in the Age of Gladstone and Rosebery: A Study in Leadership and Policy.* 1337
Kenya, the Politics of Participation and Control. Henry Bienen. Reviewed by L. Gray Cowan. 642
Kerr, Malcolm H. Review of Clement Henry Moore, *Politics in North Africa: Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia.* 1353
Kessel, John H. Review of Heinz Euleau and Kenneth Prewitt, *Labyrinths of Democracy: Adaptations, Linkages, Representation, and Policies in Urban Politics.* 1308
Kettler, David. Review of William M. Dick, *Labor and Socialism in America: The Gompers Era;* Carl Reeve, *The Life and Times of Daniel De Leon;* and Sally M. Miller, *Victor Berger and the Promise of Constructive Socialism, 1910–1920.* 215
Khouri, Fred J. Review of Muhammad Sadik and William P. Snavely, *Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates: Colonial Past, Present Problems, and Future Prospects.* 259
Kiernan, Bernard P. Review of Roger E. Kanet, ed., *The Soviet Union and the Developing Nations.* 280
Kilcup, Rodney W. Review of Franco Venturi, *Utopia and Reform in the Enlightenment;* and Robert C. Elliott, *The Shape of Utopia: Studies in a Literary Genre.* 973
Kimball, Lorenzo Kent. *The Changing Pattern of Political Power in Iraq, 1958 to 1971.* Reviewed by Glenn Perry. 1341
Kimche, David. *The Afro-Asian Movement: Ideology and Foreign Policy of the Third World.* Reviewed by Frank H. H. King. .. 1005
Kim, Han-Kyo. Review of Sungjoo Han, *The Failure of Democracy in South Korea.* .. 649
Kingdon, John W. *Congressmen's Voting Decisions.* Reviewed by Stanley Bach. .. 977
King, Frank H. H. Review of David Kimche, *The Afro-Asian Movement: Ideology and Foreign Policy of the Third World.* 1005
King, Robert R. and Stephen E. Palmer, Jr. *Yugoslav Communism and the Macedonian Question.* Reviewed by John C. Campbell. 1358
Kinnard, Douglas. Review of Frank Browning and Dorothy Forman, eds., *The Wasted Nations: Report of the International Commission of Enquiry into United States Crimes in Indochina, June 20–25, 1971.* 278
Kintner, William R. and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., eds. *SALT: Implications for Arms Control in the 1970's.* Reviewed by Colin S. Gray in *Detente, Arms Control and Strategy: Perspectives on SALT.* 1242
Kirkendall, Richard S., ed. *The Truman Period as a Research Field: A Reappraisal, 1972.* Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* 560
Kirk-Greene, A. H. M. *Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria: A Documentary Sourcebook, 1966–1970.* Reviewed by Richard L. Sklar. 247
Kirkpatrick, Samuel A. Review of Robert L. Hamblin, R. Brooke Jacobsen, and Jerry L. L. Miller, *A Mathematical Theory of Social Change.* 202
Kirschbaum, Stanslav. Review of Ronald Grigor Suny, *The Baku Commune, 1917–1918: Class and Nationality in the Russian Revolution.* 971
Kirst, Michael W. and Frederick Wirt. *The Political Web of American Schools.* Reviewed by Harmon Zeigler. 987

Kitamura, Hiroshi. *Psychological Dimensions of U.S.-Japanese Relations.* Reviewed by Ichiro Miyake. 1006
Klieman, Aaron S. Review of Isaiah Friedman, *The Question of Palestine, 1914–1918: British-Jewish-Arab Relations.* 676
Kolchin, Peter. Review of Jane H. Pease and William H. Pease, *Bound with Them in Chains: A Biographical History of the Antislavery Movement.* 224
Kolodziej, Edward A. Review of Lawrence B. Krause and Walter S. Salant, eds., *European Monetary Unification and Its Meaning for the United States.* 284
Koury, Enver M. *The Patterns of Mass Movements in Arab Revolutionary-Progressive States.* Reviewed by Subhi Abu-Gosh. 1341
Krause, Lawrence B. and Walter S. Salant, eds. *European Monetary Unification and Its Meaning for the United States.* Reviewed by Edward A. Kolodziej. 284
Krieger, Leonard. *The German Idea of Freedom: History of a Political Tradition.* Reviewed by James J. Sheehan. 1279
Kriesberg, Louis. Review of Norman Z. Alcock, *The Emperor's New Clothes and Other Irreverent Essays for the Seventies.* 663
Kuo, Wen H. Review of Alexander Saxton, *The Indispensable Enemy: Labor and the Anti-Chinese Movement in California.* .. 984
Kvavik, Robert B. Review of Mikael Hidén, *The Ombudsman in Finland: The First Fifty Years.* 655

Laboring Classes and Dangerous Classes in Paris during the First Half of the Nineteenth Century. Louis Chevalier. Reviewed by Louise A. Tilly. 644
Labor and Socialism in America: The Gompers Era. William M. Dick. Reviewed by David Kettler. 215
Labyrinths of Democracy: Adaptations, Linkages, Representation, and Policies in Urban Politics. Heinz Eulau and Kenneth Prewitt. Reviewed by John H. Kessel. 1308
Lafferty, William M. *Economic Development and the Response of Labor in Scandinavia: A Multi-Level Analysis.* Reviewed by Joseph B. Board. 1343
Laing, James D., David K. Hildebrand, and Howard Rosenthal. *Prediction Analysis in Political Research.* 509
Laird, Roy D. Review of W. A. Douglas Jackson, ed., *Agrarian Policies and Problems in Communist and Non-Communist Countries.* 658
Lambert, Geoffrey. Review of Sailesh Ghandra Ghosh, *Decision-making and Power in the British Conservative Party: A Study of the Indian Problem.* 1334
Lampton, David M. Review of Robert A. Scalapino, ed. *Elites in the People's Republic of China.* 1366
Landauer, Carl. Review of Eugene Lunn, *Prophet of Community: The Romantic Socialism of Gustav Landauer.* 1282
Land or Death: The Peasant Struggle in Peru. Hugo Blanco. N. Allen, trans. Reviewed by Larry L. Pippin. 643
Lane, Robert E. Review of Milton Rokeach, *The Nature of Human Values.* 965
LaPalombara, Joseph. Review of Robert A. Packenham, *Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science.* 1356
Laquian, Aprodicio A. Review of Remigio E. Agpalo, *The Political Elite and the People: A Study of Politics in Occidental Mindoro.* 639
Slums Are For People: The Barrio Magsaysay Pilot Project in Philippine Urban Community Development. Reviewed by E. V. Walter. 1344
Lasswell, Harold D. Review of Anthony Wilden, *System and Structure: Essays in Communication and Exchange.* 976
Latin America: From Dependence to Revolution. James Petras, ed. Reviewed by Kenneth Medhurst. 250
Latin American Thought: A Historical Introduction. Harold Eugene Davis. Reviewed by Thomas W. Walker. 610
Lawrence, David G. *Procedural Norms and Tolerance: A Reassessment.* 80
Lawson, Fred H. *Communication: Alliance Behavior in Nineteenth-Century Europe.* 932
The League of Nations. Ruth B. Henig, ed. Reviewed by Robert H. Ferrell. 678
Lee, Chong-Sik and Robert A. Scalapino. *Communism in Korea,* 2 vols. Reviewed by Princeton Lyman. 260
Lee, R. Alton. *A History of Regulatory Taxation.* Reviewed by Clara Penniman. 978
Lee, Richard W., ed. *Politics and the Press.* Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234
Lefebvre, Georges. *The Great Fear of 1789: Rural Panic in Revolutionary France.* Reviewed by Roy Pierce. 1345
The Left-Leaning Antenna: Political Bias in Television. Joseph Keeley. Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234
Leibman, Morris I. and William Sloane Coffin, Jr. *Civil Disobedience: Aid or Hin-*

drance to Justice? Reviewed by Robert F. Sasseen. 1259
Leifer, Michael. Review of J. M. van der Kroef, *Indonesia After Sukarno.* 1003
Lemieux, Vincent. *Parenté et Politique: l'organisation sociale dans l'Ile d'Orléans.* Reviewed by Kenneth McRoberts. 1281
Le Quotient Politique Vrai. Reviewed by Robert J. Jackson. 248
Lengle, James I. and Byron Shafer. *Primary Rules, Political Power, and Social Change.* 25
Lentner, Howard H. Review of John H. Gilbert, ed., *The New Era in American Foreign Policy.* 677
Leonard, David K. Review of Donald Rothchild, *Racial Bargaining in Independent Kenya: A Study of Minorities and Decolonization.* 258
Lerumo, A. *Fifty Fighting Years: The South African Communist Party, 1921–1971.* Reviewed by Aaron Segal. 1347
"Lessons" of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy. Ernest R. May. Reviewed by Donald E. Nuechterlein. 981
Levine, Charles H. and James L. Perry. *An Interorganizational Analysis of Power, Conflict, and Settlements in Public Sector Collective Bargaining.* 1185
Levin, Harvey J. *The Invisible Resource.* Reviewed by Frank Wolf. 1315
Levitan, Sar H. *Programs in Aid of the Poor for the 1970s.* Reviewed by Harold M. Hochman. 979
Levitt, Kari. *Silent Surrender: The American Economic Empire in Canada.* Reviewed by Robert Gilpin in *The Political Economy of the Multinational Corporation: Three Contrasting Perspectives.* 184
Levy, Marion J., Jr. Review of S. N. Eisenstadt, *Tradition, Change, and Modernity.* 1261
Lewis, Gordon K. *The Virgin Islands: A Caribbean Lilliput.* Reviewed by Charles D. Ameringer. 1007
Lexikon Zur Soziologie. Werner Fuchs et al., eds. Reviewed by Gianfranco Poggi. 1265
Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science. Robert A. Packenham. Reviewed by Joseph LaPalombara. 1356
Liberal Politics in the Age of Gladstone and Rosebery: A Study in Leadership and Policy. D. A. Hamer. Reviewed by Robert Kelley. 1337
Liberman, E. G. *Economic Methods and the Effectiveness of Production.* Reviewed by Gregory Grossman. 618
Liddle, R. William, ed. *Political Participation in Modern Indonesia.* Reviewed by Donald Hindley. 1348
Lidtke, Vernon L. Review of Donald L. Niewyk, *Socialist, Anti-Semite, and Jew: German Social Democracy Confronts the Problem of Anti-Semitism, 1918–1933.* .. 1356
The Life and Times of Daniel De Leon. Carl Reeve. Reviewed by David Kettler. 215
Lincoln, C. Eric. *The Black Muslims in America.* Reviewed by Hanes Walton, Jr. 209
Lindbeck, John M. H., ed. *China: Management of a Revolutionary Society.* Reviewed by Ian W. A. C. Adie. 1349
Linder, Staffan B. *The Harried Leisure Class.* Reviewed by Sebastian de Grazia. 1273
Link, Arthur S. *The Higher Realism of Woodrow Wilson and Other Essays.* Reviewed by Richard J. Stillman II. 619
Lippmann, Liberty and the Press. John Luskin. Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234
Lobbying at the Illinois Constitutional Convention. Ian D. Burman. Reviewed by William L. Day. 625
Local Autonomy in China During the Cultural Revolution: The Theoretical Uses of an Atypical Case. Lynn T. White III. ... 479
Lofchie, Michael F. Review of Ronald Cohen and John Middleton, eds., *From Tribe to Nation in Africa.* 238
The Logic of World Power: An Inquiry into the Origins, Currents, and Contradictions of World Politics. Franz Schurmann. Reviewed by Richard A. Falk. 1390
London, Kurt L. Review of Charles B. McLane, *Soviet-Asian Relations.* 286
The London *Sunday Times* Insight Team, *Northern Ireland: A Report on the Conflict.* Reviewed by John H. Whyte in *Recent Writing on Northern Ireland.* 592
Longley, Lawrence D. and Alan G. Braun. *The Politics of Electoral College Reform:* Reviewed by Laurin L. Henry. 1311
Loshak, David. *Pakistan Crisis.* Reviewed by George M. Platt. 660
Lubrano, Linda L. Review of Werner G. Hahn, *The Politics of Soviet Agriculture, 1960–1970.* 1336
Lucas, Paul R. Review of Harry M. Ward, *Statism in Plymouth Colony.* 228
Lunn, Eugene. *Prophet of Community: The Romantic Socialism of Gustav Landauer.* Reviewed by Carl Landauer. 1282
Luskin, John. *Lippmann, Liberty and the Press.* Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234
Lyman, Princeton. Review of Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-Sik Lee. *Communism in Korea,* 2 vols. 260

Lyons, F. S. L. *Ireland since the Famine.* Reviewed by John H. Whyte in *Recent Writing on Northern Ireland.* 592
Lyons, William and David R. Morgan. *Communication: Multi-Level Analysis in State Politics.* 159

McAlister, John T., Jr. *Vietnam: The Origins of Revolution.* Reviewed by Charles A. Joiner. 1384
McCann, Eamonn. *War and an Irish Town.* Reviewed by John H. Whyte in *Recent Writing on Northern Ireland.* 592
McCann, Frank D., Jr. *The Brazilian-American Alliance, 1937–1945.* Reviewed by Thomas E. Skidmore. 1007
McCarl, Steven R. and Richard M. Bank. *"Virtue, Obligation and Politics" Revisited.* 886
McClelland, J. S., ed. *The French Right (from de Maistre to Maurras).* Reviewed by Eugen Weber. 1284
McConahay, John B. and David Sears. *The Politics of Violence: The New Urban Blacks and the Watts Riot.* Reviewed by Peter K. Eisinger. 985
McDonald, Ronald H. Review of Arturo C. Porzecanski, *Uruguay's Tupamaros: The Urban Guerrilla.* 252
McDonough, Peter. Review of Marcio Moreira Alves, *A Grain of Mustard Seed: The Awakening of the Brazilian Revolution.* 987
McFeely, William S. Review of Louis S. Gerteis, *From Contraband to Freedman: Federal Policy Toward Southern Blacks, 1861–1865.* 1309
McGowan, Patrick J. and Howard B. Shapiro. *The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy: A Survey of Scientific Findings.* Reviewed by Frederic S. Pearson. .. 661
McGowan, Patrick J. and Robert M. Rood. *Communication: Alliance Behavior in Nineteenth-Century Europe.* 934
McKelvey, Richard D. and Peter C. Ordeshook. *Symmetric Spatial Games Without Majority Rule Equilibria.* 1172
Mackie, J. A. C. Review of Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution. Occupation and Resistance, 1944–1946.* .. 1320
McKinlay, R. D. and A. S. Cohan. *Performance and Instability in Military and Nonmilitary Regime Systems.* 850
McLane, Charles B. *Soviet-Asian Relations.* Reviewed by Kurt L. London. 286
McLaughlin, Charles H. Review of Henry G. Schermers, *International Institutional Law: Vol. I, Structure; Vol. II, Functioning and Legal Order.* 1388
McMillen, Neil R. *The Citizens' Council: Organized Resistance to the Second Reconstruction: 1954–1964.* Reviewed by James D. Thomas. 1313
McRoberts, Kenneth. Review of Vincent Lemieux, *Parenté et Politique: l'organisation sociale dans l'Ile d'Orléans.* 1281
Macropolitics: International Relations in a Global Society. Richard W. Sterling. Reviewed by Kenneth N. Waltz. 296
McSeveney, Samuel T. *The Politics of Depression: Political Behavior in the Northeast, 1893–1896.* Reviewed by Richard Jensen. 980
Maddox, Robert J. *The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War.* Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* 560
Magee, John. *Northern Ireland: Crisis and Conflict.* Reviewed by John H. Whyte in *Recent Writing on Northern Ireland.* 592
Maggs, Peter B. Review of Richard J. Erickson, *International Law and the Revolutionary State: A Case Study of the Soviet Union and International Law.* 675
Mahncke, Dieter. *Berlin im geteilten Deutschland.* Reviewed by Wolfgang F. Dexheimer. 663
A Majority Party in Disarray: Policy Polarization in the 1972 Election. Arthur H. Miller, Warren E. Miller, Alden S. Raine, and Thad A. Brown. 753
The Making of an Australian Prime Minister. Laurie Oakes and David Solomon. Reviewed by H. V. Emy. 991
Malmgren, Harald B., ed. *Pacific Basin Development: The American Interests.* Reviewed by Donald C. Hellmann. 221
Manuel de Pratique Diplomatique: L'Ambassade. Farag Moussa. Reviewed by Francis O. Wilcox. 1010
Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao: Post Revolutionary Writings. K. Fan, ed. Reviewed by Stuart R. Schram. 200
Mao Tse-tung on Revolution and War. M. Rejai, ed. Reviewed by Stuart R. Schram. 200
Marcum, John. Review of Douglas Wheeler and René Pelissier, *Angola.* 1372
Marcus, Steven. *Engels, Manchester, and the Working Class.* Reviewed by E. V. Walter. 1283
Markel, Lester. *What You Don't Know Can Hurt You: A Study in Public Opinion and Public Emotion.* Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234
Markowitz, Norman D. *The Rise and Fall of the People's Century: Henry A. Wallace and American Liberalism 1941–1948.* Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* 560

Marquette, Jesse F. *Communication: Social Change and Political Mobility in the United States: A Methodological Note.* .. 545
Marshall, Dale Rogers. Review of Saul D. Alinsky, *Rules for Radicals: A Pragmatic Primer for Realistic Radicals;* Si Kahn, *How People Get Power: Organizing Oppressed Communities for Action;* Ralph Nader and Donald Ross, *Action for a Change: A Student's Manual for Public Interest Organizing;* Dick Simpson, *Winning Elections: A Handbook in Participatory Politics;* and Michael Walzer, *Political Action: A Practical Guide to Movement Politics.* 620
Martin, John Barlow, Newton N. Minow and Lee M. Mitchell. *Presidential Television.* Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234
Martin, Robert E. Review of Ralph J. Bunche, *The Political Status of the Negro in the Age of FDR.* 211
Marxism and Form: Twentieth Century Dialectical Theories of Literature. Frederick Jameson. Reviewed by Paul Picconne. ... 1272
Marx, Karl and Frederick Engels. *The Revolution of 1848–49: Articles from the "Neue Rheinische Zeitung."* Reviewed by David-Hillel Ruben. 206
Mason, Philip. *Patterns of Dominance.* Reviewed by M. Mushkat, Jr. 1283
Mathematical Applications in Political Science, VII. James F. Herndon and Joseph L. Bernd, eds. Reviewed by Kul B. Rai. .. 202
Mathematical Approaches to Politics. Hayward R. Alker, Jr., Karl W. Deutsch, and Antoine H. Stoetzel. Reviewed by Charles Lewis Taylor. 600
A Mathematical Theory of Social Change. Robert L. Hamblin, R. Brooke Jacobsen, and Jerry L. L. Miller. Reviewed by Samuel A. Kirkpatrick. 202
Max Stirner: The Ego and His Own. John Carroll, compiler. Reviewed by Eugen Weber. 1285
Maxwell, Kenneth R. *Conflicts and Conspiracies: Brazil and Portugal, 1750–1808.* Reviewed by Donna Guy. 1008
May, Ernest R. *"Lessons" of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy.* Reviewed by Donald E. Nuechterlein. 981
Medhurst, Kenneth, ed. *Allende's Chile.* Reviewed by Michael J. Francis. 249
Medhurst, Kenneth. Review of James Petras, ed., *Latin America: From Dependence to Revolution.* 250
Melko, Matthew. *52 Peaceful Societies.* Reviewed by Kenneth E. Boulding. 206
Melson, Robert. Review of David R. Smock and Audrey C. Smock, *Cultural and Political Aspects of Rural Transformation: A Case Study of Eastern Nigeria.* 265
Review of Kenneth W. Post and George D. Jenkins, *The Price of Liberty: Personality and Politics in Colonial Nigeria.* 993
Mende, Tibor. *From Aid to Recolonization: Lessons of a Failure.* Reviewed by Susan Aurelia Gitelson. 286
The Men of the First French Republic: Political Alignments in the National Convention of 1792. Alison Patrick. Reviewed by Roy Pierce. 1345
Merger Politics: Local Government in Tidewater Virginia. David G. Temple. Reviewed by Chester W. Bain. 1316
Merrill, John C. *The Imperative of Freedom: A Philosophy of Journalistic Autonomy.* Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234
Mezey, Michael L. Review of Aage R. Clausen, *How Congressmen Decide: A Policy Focus.* 626
Micaud, Charles and Ernest Gellner, eds. *Arabs and Berbers: From Tribe to Nation in North Africa.* Reviewed by Jean-Claude Vatin. 1332
Micropolis in Transition: A Study of a Small City. Edward L. Henry. ed. Reviewed by Russell D. Murphy. 219
Middleton, John and Ronald Cohen, eds. *From Tribe to Nation in Africa.* Reviewed by Michael F. Lofchie. 238
Migdal, Joel S. Review of Yonah Alexander, *The Role of Communications in the Middle East Conflict: Ideological and Religious Aspects.* 664
Miles, Rufus E., Jr. *The Department of Health, Education and Welfare.* Reviewed by Harold Seidman. 222
Militari e Potere in America Latina. Gianfranco Pasquino. Reviewed by Torcuato S. Di Tella. 1359
Military Aid and Counterrevolution in the Third World. Miles D. Wolpin. Reviewed by Colin S. Gray. 297
Military Manpower Procurement: A Policy Analysis. Steven B. Canby. Reviewed by Gary L. Wamsley. 1301
Miller, Arthur H., Warren E. Miller, Alden S. Raine, and Thad A. Brown. *A Majority Party in Disarray: Policy Polarization in the 1972 Election.* 753
Miller, Arthur H. and Warren E. Miller. *Ideology in the 1972 Election: Myth or Reality—A Rejoinder.* 832
Miller, Jerry L. L., Robert L. Hamblin, and R. Brooke Jacobsen. *A Mathematical*

Theory of Social Change. Reviewd by Samuel A. Kirkpatrick. 202
Miller, Kent S. and Ralph Mason Dreger, eds. *Comparative Studies of Blacks and Whites in the United States.* Reviewed by Thomas F. Pettigrew. 1303
Miller, Lynn H. Review of John M. Paxman and George T. Boggs, eds., *The United Nations: A Reassessment—Sanctions, Peacekeeping, and Humanitarian Assistance.* 1011
Miller, Norman and Roderick Aya, eds. *National Liberation: Revolution in the Third World.* Reviewed by W. Scott Thompson. 1351
Miller, Raymond C. Review of Robert E. Hunter, ed., *The United States and the Developing World: Agenda for Action.* 679
Miller, Sally M. *Victor Berger and the Promise of Constructive Socialism, 1910–1920.* Reviewed by David Kettler. 215
Miller, Warren E., Arthur H. Miller, Alden S. Raine, and Thad A. Brown. *A Majority Party in Disarray: Policy Polarization in the 1972 Election.* 753
Miller, Warren E. and Arthur H. Miller. *Ideology in the 1972 Election: Myth or Reality—A Rejoinder.* 832
Minow, Newton N., John Barlow Martin, and Lee M. Mitchell. *Presidential Television.* Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234
Mr. Republican: A Biography of Robert A. Taft. James T. Patterson. Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith, in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* .. 560
Mitchell, Lee M., Newton N. Minow, and John Barlow Martin. *Presidential Television.* Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234
Mittlebeeler, Emmet V. Review of Peter Duignan and L. H. Gann, *Colonialism in Africa, 1870–1960: A Bibliographical Guide to Colonialism in Sub-Saharan Africa.* 648
Mixed Enterprise: A Developmental Perspective. Lloyd D. Musolf. Reviewed by Roger W. Benjamin. 1354
Miyake, Ichiro. Review of Hiroshi Kitamura, *Psychological Dimensions of U.S.-Japanese Relations.* 1006
Mobilized and Proletarian Diasporas. John A. Armstrong. 393
Modern Australia in Documents. F. K. Crowley. Reviewed by Murray Clark Havens. 646
Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics. Guillermo A. O'Donnell. Reviewed by Thomas C. Bruneau. 992
Modernization Without Revolution: Lebanon's Experience. Elie Adib Salem. Reviewed by Manfred Halpern. 1365
Modernizzazione e Sviluppo Politco. Gianfranco Pasquino. Reviewed by Torcuato S. Di Tella. 1359
Mohapatra, Manindra K. Review of W. A. J. Archbold, *Outlines of Indian Constitutional History (British Period).* 640
Moldenhauer, Joseph J., ed. *The Writings of Henry D. Thoreau: The Maine Woods.* Reviewed by David M. Atkinson. 1295
Money and Politics in America, 1755–1775: A Study in the Currency Act of 1764 and the Political Economy of Revolution. Joseph Albert Ernst. Reviewed by Alan Tully. 635
Montesquieu's Philosophy of Liberalism: A Commentary on The Spirit of the Laws. Thomas L. Pangle. Reviewed by Anne M. Cohler. 962
Moore, Barrington, Jr. *Reflections on the Causes of Human Misery and Upon Certain Proposals to Eliminate Them.* Reviewed by Alan Stone. 1286
Moore, Clement Henry. *Politics in North Africa: Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia.* Reviewed by Malcolm H. Kerr. 1353
Review of Ian Clegg, *Workers' Self-Management in Algeria;* and Gérard Duprat, *Révolution et Autogestion Rurale en Algérie.* 1328
Morell, David. Review of Clark D. Neher, *Rural Thai Government: The Politics of the Budgetary Process.* 1355
Morgan, David R. and William Lyons. *Communication: Multi-Level Analysis in State Politics.* 159
Morgenbesser, Sidney, Virginia Held and Thomas Nagel, eds. *Philosophy, Morality, and International Affairs.* Reviewed by Terry Nardin in *Philosophy and International Violence.* 952
Morley, James William, ed., *Japan's Foreign Policy, 1868–1941: A Research Guide.* Reviewed by Chalmers Johnson. 287
Morris, Bernard S. Review of David Caute, *Frantz Fanon;* and Peter Geismar, *Fanon.* 1258
Review of Thomas G. Paterson, *Soviet-American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War.* 289
Morris, Cynthia Taft and Irma Adelman. *Economic Growth and Social Equity in Developing Countries.* Reviewed by Karl de Schweinitz, Jr. 232

Mortimer, Rex. Review of Claire Holt, ed., *Culture and Politics in Indonesia.* 1338
The Moscow Agreements and Strategic Arms Limitation. Hedley Bull. Reviewed by Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr. 1374
Moses, Carl C. Review of James D. Theberge, *Russia in the Caribbean.* 300
Mousnier, Roland. *Social Hierarchies: 1450 to the Present.* Peter Evans, trans. Reviewed by Joan Huber. 1009
Moussa, Farag. *Manuel de Pratique Diplomatique: L'Ambassade.* Reviewed by Francis O. Wilcox. 1010
Mowat, R. C. *Creating the European Community.* Reviewed by Stuart A. Scheingold. 288
Murphy, Irene L. *Public Policy on the Status of Women: Agenda and Strategy for the 70s.* Reviewed by Norma Noonan. 223
Murphy, Russell D. Review of Edward L. Henry, ed., *Micropolis in Transition: A Study of a Small City.* 219
Murray, Richard. Review of Chandler Davidson, *Biracial Politics: Conflict and Coalition in the Metropolitan South.* ... 1305
Mushkat, M., Jr. Review of Philip Mason, *Patterns of Dominance.* 1283
Musolf, Lloyd D. *Mixed Enterprise: A Developmental Perspective.* Reviewed by Roger W. Benjamin. 1354
Muthayya, B. C. and I. Gnanakannan. *Developmental Personnel, A Psycho-Social Study Acoss Three States in India.* Reviewed by Dan Fritz. 988

Nader, Ralph and Donald Ross. *Action for a Change: A Student's Manual for Public Interest Organizing.* Reviewed by Dale Rogers Marshall. 620
Nagel, Thomas, Marshall Cohen and Thomas Scanlon, eds. *War and Moral Responsibility.* Reviewed by Terry Nardin in *Philosophy and International Violence.* 952
Nagel, Thomas, Virginia Held, and Sidney Morgenbesser, eds. *Philosophy, Morality, and International Affairs.* Reviewed by Terry Nardin in *Philosophy and International Violence.* 952
Nardin, Terry. *Philosophy and International Violence.* A review essay on Lewis White Beck, ed., *Philosophy of War;* Marshall Cohen, Thomas Nagel, and Thomas Scanlon, eds., *War and Moral Responsibility;* Peter A. French, ed., *Individual and Collective Responsibility: The Massacre at My Lai;* Virginia Held, Sidney Morgenbesser, and Thomas Nagel, eds., *Philosophy, Morality, and International Affairs;* Richard A. Wasserstrom, ed., *War and Morality.* 952
Nash, A. E. Keir, ed. *Governance and Population: The Governmental Implications of Population Changes.* Reviewed by R. Kenneth Godwin. 1288
Le nationalisme, facteur belligène. Institut de Sociologie, Centre de sociologie de la guerre. Reviewed by Pierre Hassner. ... 203
The Nationality Question in Soviet Central Asia. Edward Allworth, ed. Reviewed by G. Jukes. 234
National Liberation Fronts, 1960–1970. Donald C. Hodges and Robert E. A. Shanab, eds. Reviewed by W. Scott Thompson. 1351
National Liberation: Revolution in the Third World. Norman Miller and Roderick Aya, eds. Reviewed by W. Scott Thompson. 1351
Native Fascism in the Successor States, 1918–1945. Peter F. Sugar, ed. Reviewed by Alex Pravda. 1002
The Nature of Human Values. Milton Rokeach. Reviewed by Robert E. Lane. 965
Negative Dialectics. Theodor W. Adorno. Reviewed by Gillian Rose. 598
Neher, Clark D. *Rural Thai Government: The Politics of the Budgetary Process.* Reviewed by David Morell. 1355
Neiman, Max. *Communication: Social Stratification and Governmental Inequality.* 149
Neuburg, Paul. *The Nero's Children: The Post-War Generation of Eastern Europe.* Reviewed by Paul Hollander. 989
Nevitt, Della. Review of The Fabian Society, *Socialism and Affluence,* and *The Fifth Social Service: A Critical Analysis of the Seebohm Proposals.* 1264
The New Era in American Foreign Policy. John H. Gilbert, ed. Reviewed by Howard H. Lentner. 677
Newhouse, John. *Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT.* Reviewed by Colin S. Gray in *Detente, Arms Control and Strategy: Perspectives on SALT.* 1242
New Left Diplomatic Histories and Historians: The American Revisionists. Joseph M. Siracusa. Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* 560
The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War. Robert J. Maddox. Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* 560

News From Nowhere: Television and the News. Edward Jay Epstein. Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234
The News Twisters. Edith Efron. Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234
Nexon, David. Review of Richard Sennett, *The Uses of Disorder: Personal Identity and City Life.* 986
Nienaber, Jeanne and Aaron Wildavsky. *The Budgeting and Evaluation of Federal Recreation Programs, or Money Doesn't Grow on Trees.* Reviewed by Allen Schick. 1313
Nienaber, Jeanne. Review of Elmo Richardson, *Dams, Parks and Politics: Resource Development and Preservation in the Truman-Eisenhower Era.* 983
Nie, Norman H. and Sidney Verba. *Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality.* Reviewed by Jerrold G. Rusk in *Political Participation in America: A Review Essay.* 583
Niewyk, Donald L. *Socialist, Anti-Semite, and Jew: German Social Democracy Confronts the Problem of Anti-Semitism, 1918–1933.* Reviewed by Vernon L. Lidtke. 1356
1984 Revisited, Prospects for American Politics. Robert Paul Wolff, ed. Reviewed by Joseph A. Schlesinger. 229
The Nineteenth-Century Foreign Office: An Administrative History. Ray Jones. Reviewed by Keith Wilson. 1382
Nisbett, Richard E., Edward E. Jones, David E. Kanouse, Harold H. Kelley, Stuart Valins, and Bernard Weiner, eds. *Attribution: Perceiving the Causes of Behavior.* Reviewed by Peter W. Sperlich. 617
Niskanen, William A. Review of Albert Breton, *The Economic Theory of Representative Government.* 605
No Clear and Present Danger: A Skeptical View of the U.S. Entry into World War II. Bruce M. Russett. Reviewed by Morton J. Tenzer. 293
Noonan, Norma. Review of Irene L. Murphy, *Public Policy on the Status of Women: Agenda and Strategy for the 70s.* .. 223
Nordlinger, Eric A. *Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies.* Reviewed by Fred R. von der Mehden. 250
Norpoth, Helmut. *Explaining Party Cohesion in Congress: The Case of Shared Policy Attitudes.* 1156
Northern Ireland: Crisis and Conflict. John Magee. Reviewed by John H. Whyte in *Recent Writing on Northern Ireland.* ... 592
The Northern Ireland Problem. Denis P. Barritt and Charles F. Carter. Reviewed by John H. Whyte in *Recent Writing on Northern Ireland.* 592
Northern Ireland: A Report on the Conflict. London *Sunday Times* Insight Team. Reviewed by John H. Whyte in *Recent Writing on Northern Ireland.* 592
Nova, Fritz. *Political Innovation of the West German Federal Constitutional Court: The State of Discussion on Judicial Review.* 114
Nozick, Robert. *Anarchy, State and Utopia.* Reviewed by Douglas Rae. 1289
Nuechterlein, Donald E. Review of Ernest R. May, *"Lessons" of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy.* 981

Oakes, Laurie and David Solomon. *The Making of an Australian Prime Minister.* Reviewed by H. V. Emy. 991
O'Brien, Conor Cruise. *States of Ireland.* Reviewed by John H. Whyte in *Recent Writing on Northern Ireland.* 592
O'Connor, Robert E. Review of John D. Buenker, *Urban Liberalism and Progressive Reform.* 212
O'Donnell, Guillermo A. *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics.* Reviewed by Thomas C. Bruneau. 992
Okuda, Kazuhiko. *Communication: The Social Phenomenology of Alfred Schutz.* .. 174
O'Leary, Cornelius and Ian Budge. *Belfast: Approach to Crisis. A Study of Belfast Politics, 1613–1970.* Reviewed by John H. Whyte in *Recent Writing on Northern Ireland.* 592
The Ombudsman in Finland: The First Fifty Years. Mikael Hidén. Reviewed by Robert B. Kvavik. 655
On the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. Ralph Ross. A review essay on David L. Sills, ed., *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.* ... 939
Ordeshook, Peter C. and Richard D. McKelvey. *Symmetric Spatial Games Without Majority Rule Equilibria.* 1172
The Organization and Support of Scientific Research and Development in Mainland China. Yuan-li Wu and Robert B. Sheeks. Reviewed by Alice Langley Hsieh. 272
Organski, A. F. K. Review of Alberto Aquarone, *Le Origini Dell' Imperialismo Americano.* 666
Le Origini Dell' Imperialismo Americano. Alberto Aquarone. Reviewed by A. F. K. Organski. 666

The Origins of the Standing Committees and the Development of the Modern House. Joseph Cooper. Reviewed by Richard E. Damon. 631
Ornstein, Norman J. Review of Congressional Quarterly Service, *Congress and the Nation, Volume III (1969–1972)*, and *Guide to the Congress of the United States.* 628
Orren, Karen. *Standing to Sue: Interest Group Conflict in the Federal Courts.* .. 723
Ørvik, Nils. Review of Morton A. Kaplan, *The Rationale for NATO: European Collective Security—Past and Present.* 1383
Outline History of the Communist International. The Institute of Marxism-Leninism, Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. Reviewed by John W. Strong. 1377
Outlines of Indian Constitutional History (British Period). W. A. J. Archbold. Reviewed by Manindra K. Mohapatra. 640
Owen, Guillermo. *Communication: Evaluation of a Presidential Election Game.* .. 1223
Owens, John R. Review of David W. Adamany, *Campaign Finance in America.* .. 1298

Pacific Basin Development: The American Interests. Harold B. Malmgren, ed. Reviewed by Donald C. Hellmann. 221
Packenham, Robert A. *Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science.* Reviewed by Joseph LaPalombara. 1356
Page, Benjamin I. *The Theory of Political Ambiguity.* 742
Pakistan Crisis. David Loshak. Reviewed by George M. Platt. 660
Palmer, Stephen E., Jr. and Robert R. King. *Yugoslav Communism and the Macedonian Question.* Reviewed by John C. Campbell. 1358
Paltiel, Khayyam Z. Review of Elaine Baldwin, *Differentiation and Co-operation in an Israeli Veteran Moshav.* 236
Pangle, Thomas L. *Montesquieu's Philosophy of Liberalism: A Commentary on The Spirit of the Laws.* Reviewed by Anne M. Cohler. 962
The Political Psychology of Religion in Plato's Laws. 1059
Parekh, Bhiku, ed. *Bentham's Political Thought.* Reviewed by Wilfrid Harrison. 963
Parenté et Politique: l'organisation sociale dans l'Ile d'Orléans. Vincent Lemieux. Reviewed by Kenneth McRoberts. 1281
Parenti ,Michael. *The Anti-Communist Impulse.* Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* 560
Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality. Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie. Reviewed by Jerrold G. Rusk in *Political Participation in America: A Review Essay.* 583
Partnership or Confrontation? Poor Lands and Rich. Paul Alpert. Reviewed by Gunnar Adler-Karlsson. 235
Party and Policy in West German Cities. Robert C. Fried. 11
Pasquino, Gianfranco. *Modernizzazione e Sviluppo Politico*, and *Militari e Potere in America Latina.* Reviewed by Torcuato S. Di Tella. 1359
Paterson, Thomas G. *Soviet-American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War.* Reviewed by Bernard S. Morris. 289
Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* 560
Patrick, Alison. *The Men of the First French Republic: Political Alignments in the National Convention of 1792.* Reviewed by Roy Pierce. 1345
Patterns of Dominance. Philip Mason. Reviewed by M. Mushkat, Jr. 1283
The Patterns of Mass Movements in Arab Revolutionary-Progressive States. Enver M. Koury. Reviewed by Subhi Abu-Gosh. 1341
Patterson, James T. *Mr. Republican: A Biography of Robert A. Taft.* Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* 560
Patterson, Stephen E. *Political Parties in Revolutionary Massachusetts.* Reviewed by Ronald P. Formisano. 981
Paxman, John M. and George T. Boggs, eds. *The United Nations: A Reassessment—Sanctions, Peacekeeping, and Humanitarian Assistance.* Reviewed by Lynn H. Miller. 1011
Payne, Stanley G. Review of A. James Gregor, *Interpretations of Fascism.* 1266
Pearson, Frederic S. Review of Patrick J. McGowan and Howard B. Shapiro, *The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy: A Survey of Scientific Findings.* 661
Peasant Society in Konku: A Study of Right and Left Subcastes in South India. Brenda E. F. Beck. Reviewed by Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr. 1322
Pease, Jane H. and William H. Pease. *Bound with Them in Chains: A Biographical History of the Antislavery Movement.* Reviewed by Peter Kolchin. 224

Pease, William H. and Jane H. Pease. *Bound with Them in Chains: A Biographical History of the Antislavery Movement.* Reviewed by Peter Kolchin. 224
Pelinka, Anton. *Dynamische Demokratie: Zur konkreten Utopie gesellschaftlicher Gleichheit.* Reviewed by George Schwab. 964
Pelissier, René and Douglas Wheeler. *Angola.* Reviewed by John Marcum. 1372
Penniman, Clara. Review of R. Alton Lee, *A History of Regulatory Taxation.* 978
Performance and Instability in Military and Nonmilitary Regime Systems. R. D. McKinlay and A. S. Cohan. 850
Peritore, N. Patrick. *Communication: The Social Phenomenology of Alfred Schutz.* 178
Perlmutter, Amos. Review of Shlomo Avineri, ed., *Israel and the Palestinians.* ... 1321
Perry, Glenn. Review of Lorenzo Kent Kimball, *The Changing Pattern of Political Power in Iraq, 1958 to 1971.* 1341
Perry, James L. and Charles H. Levine. *An Interorganizational Analysis of Power, Conflict, and Settlements in Public Sector Collective Bargaining.* 1185
Perspectives on Urban America. Melvin T. Urofsky, ed. Reviewed by Betty H. Zisk. 227
Peterson, Paul E. Review of Raymond E. Wolfinger, *The Politics of Progress.* 1318
Pétonnet, Colette. *Those People: The Subculture of a Housing Project.* Reviewed by E. V. Walter. 1344
Petras, James, ed. *Latin America: From Dependence to Revolution.* Reviewed by Kenneth Medhurst. 250
Petshek, Kirk R. *The Challenge of Urban Reform: Policies and Programs in Philadelphia.* Reviewed by Miriam Ershkowitz. 224
Pettigrew, Thomas F. Review of Robert L. Crain and Carol Sachs Weisman, *Discrimination, Personality, and Achievement: A Survey of Northern Blacks;* and Kent S. Miller and Ralph Mason Dreger, eds., *Comparative Studies of Blacks and Whites in the United States.* 1303
Pfaltzgraff, Robert L., Jr. and William R. Kintner, eds. *SALT: Implications for Arms Control in the 1970's.* Reviewed by Colin S. Gray in *Detente, Arms Control and Strategy: Perspectives on SALT.* ... 1242
Phillips, Charles, Samuel Popkin, John W. Gorman, and Jeffrey A. Smith. *Comment: What Have You Done for Me Lately? Toward An Investment Theory of Voting.* 779
Philosophy and International Violence. Terry Nardin. A review essay on Lewis White Beck, ed., *Philosophy of War;* Marshall Cohen, Thomas Nagel, and Thomas Scanlon, eds., *War and Moral Responsibility;* Peter A. French, ed., *Individual and Collective Responsibility: The Massacre at My Lai;* Virginia Held, Sidney Morgenbesser, and Thomas Nagel, eds., *Philosophy, Morality and International Affairs;* Richard A. Wasserstrom, ed., *War and Morality.* 952
Philosophy, Morality, and International Affairs. Virginia Held, Sidney Morgenbesser, and Thomas Nagel, eds. Reviewed by Terry Nardin in *Philosophy and International Violence.* 952
Philosophy of War. Lewis White Beck, ed. Reviewed by Terry Nardin in *Philosophy and International Violence.* 952
Piccone, Paul. Review of Frederick Jameson, *Marxism and Form: Twentieth Century Dialectical Theories of Literature.* 1272
Pickles, Dorothy. Review of Stanley Hoffmann, *Decline or Renewal: France Since the 1930s.* 655
Pierce, Roy. Review of Georges Lefebvre, *The Great Fear of 1789: Rural Panic in Revolutionary France;* and Alison Patrick, *The Men of the First French Republic: Political Alignments in the National Convention of 1792.* 1345
Pippin, Larry L. Review of Hugo Blanco, *Land or Death: The Peasant Struggle in Peru.* N. Allen, trans. 643
Platt, George M. Review of David Loshak, *Pakistan Crisis.* 660
Plax, Martin. Review of Ian Taylor and Laurie Taylor, eds., *Politics and Deviance.* 1297
Poggi, Gianfranco. Review of Werner Fuchs et al., eds., *Lexikon Zur Soziologie.* 1265
Political Action: A Practical Guide to Movement Politics. Michael Walzer. Reviewed by Dale Rogers Marshall. 620
Political Compliance and U. S. Trade Dominance. Neil R. Richardson. 1098
Political Decision Making Processes: Studies in National, Comparative and International Politics. Dusan Sidjanski, ed. Reviewed by Linda P. Brady. 264
The Political Economy of the Multinational Corporation: Three Contrasting Perspectives. Robert Gilpin. A review essay on Kari Levitt, *Silent Surrender: The American Economic Empire in Canada;* Jagdish Bhagwati, ed., *Economics and World Order: From the 1970's to the 1990's;* and Raymond Vernon, *Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises.* 184
The Political Elite and the People: A Study of Politics in Occidental Mindoro. Re-

migio E. Agpalo. Reviewed by Aprodicio A. Laquian. 639
Political Innovation of the West German Federal Constitutional Court: The State of Discussion on Judicial Review. Fritz Nova. 114
Political Participation in America: A Review Essay. Jerrold G. Rusk. Review of Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie, *Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality.* 583
Political Participation in Modern Indonesia. R. William Liddle, ed. Reviewed by Donald Hindley. 1348
Political Parties in Revolutionary Massachusetts. Stephen E. Patterson. Reviewed by Ronald P. Formisano. 981
Political Processes and Public Expenditures: A Re-examination Based on Theories of Representative Government. R. Kenneth Godwin and W. Bruce Shepard. 1127
The Political Psychology of Religion in Plato's Laws. Thomas L. Pangle. 1059
Political Socialization of Chicano Children: A Comparative Study with Anglos in California Schools. F. Chris Garcia. Reviewed by James W. Clarke. 218
The Political Status of the Negro in the Age of FDR. Ralph J. Bunche. Reviewed by Robert E. Martin. 211
The Political Web of American Schools. Frederick Wirt and Michael W. Kirst. Reviewed by Harmon Zeigler. 987
Politicians in Uniform: Military Governments and Social Change in the Third World. Robert W. Jackman. 1078
Politics of Central Asia. Ram Rahul. Reviewed by Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone. 1385
The Politics of Depression: Political Behavior in the Northeast, 1893–1896. Samuel T. McSeveney. Reviewed by Richard Jensen. 980
Politics and Deviance. Ian Taylor and Laurie Taylor, eds. Reviewed by Martin Plax. 1297
The Politics of Electoral College Reform. Lawrence D. Longley and Alan G. Braun. Reviewed by Laurin L. Henry. 1311
Politics in Europe: Structures and Processes in Some Postindustrial Democracies. Martin O. Heisler, ed. Reviewed by Norman Furniss. 243
The Politics of Fear: Joseph R. McCarthy and the Senate. Robert Griffith. Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* 560
The Politics of Health Care: Nine Case Studies of Innovative Planning in New York City. Herbert Harvey Hyman, ed. Reviewed by Eveline M. Burns. 220
Politics and the Housing Crisis Since 1930. Nathaniel S. Keith. Reviewed by W. Scott Ford. 220
The Politics of Loyalty: The White House and the Communist Issue, 1946–1952. Alan D. Harper. Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* 560
Politics in North Africa: Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. Clement Henry Moore. Reviewed by Malcolm H. Kerr. 1353
The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation. George H. Quester. Reviewed by Alastair Buchan. 1012
Politics and the Press. Richard W. Lee, ed. Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234
The Politics of Progress. Raymond E. Wolfinger. Reviewed by Paul E. Peterson. .. 1318
The Politics of Regional Integration: A Study of Uruguay's Decision to Join LAFTA. Elizabeth A. Finch. Reviewed by Russell H. Fitzgibbon. 279
The Politics of Soviet Agriculture, 1960–1970. Werner G. Hahn. Reviewed by Linda L. Lubrano. 1336
The Politics of Violence: The New Urban Blacks and the Watts Riot. David Sears and John B. McConahay. Reviewed by Peter K. Eisinger. 985
Pomerance, Michla. *The Advisory Function of the International Court in the League and the U. N. Eras.* Reviewed by Edward Gordon. 291
Pool, Ithiel de Sola. *Government and the Media.* A review of Chris Argyris, *Behind the Front Page;* James Aronson, *Deadline for the Media: Today's Challenges to Press, TV & Radio* and *The Press and the Cold War;* Robert O. Blanchard, ed., *Congress and the News Media;* Lee Brown, *The Reluctant Reformation: On Criticizing the Press in America;* Robert Cirino, *Don't Blame the People: How the News Media Use Bias, Distortion, and Censorship to Manipulate Public Opinion;* Edith Efron, *The News Twisters;* Edward Jay Epstein, *News From Nowhere: Television and the News;* Robert E. Gilbert, *Television and Presidential Politics;* John Hohenberg, *Free Press/Free People: The Best Cause;* Joseph Keeley, *The Left-Leaning An-*

tenna: Political Bias in Television; Richard W. Lee, ed., *Politics and the Press;* John Luskin, *Lippmann, Liberty and the Press;* Lester Markel, *What You Don't Know Can Hurt You: A Study in Public Opinion and Public Emotion;* John C. Merrill, *The Imperative of Freedom: A Philosophy of Journalistic Autonomy;* Newton N. Minow, John Barlow Martin, and Lee M. Mitchell, *Presidential Television;* William Rivers, *The Adversaries: Politics and the Press;* Leon V. Sigal, *Reporters and Officials;* William Small, *To Kill a Messenger: Television News and the Real World;* Jeremy Tunstall, *Journalists at Work: Specialist Correspondents;* Charles W. Whalen, Jr., *Your Right to Know;* George F. Will, ed., *Press, Politics and Popular Government.* 1234

Pool, Ithiel de Sola, ed. *Talking Back: Citizen Feedback and Cable Technology.* Reviewed by Doris Graber. 633

Popkin, Samuel, John W. Gorman, Charles Phillips, and Jeffrey A. Smith. *Comment: What Have You Done for Me Lately? Toward An Investment Theory of Voting.* 779

Population and Politics: New Directions in Political Science Research. Richard L. Clinton, ed. Reviewed by John G. Grumm. 608

Porzecanski, Arturo C. *Uruguay's Tupamaros: The Urban Guerrilla.* Reviewed by Ronald H. McDonald. 252

Pospielovsky, D. Review of Abraham-Rothberg, ed., *The Heirs of Stalin:* Dissidence *and the Soviet Regime, 1953–1970.* 966

Post, Kenneth W. and George D. Jenkins. *The Price of Liberty: Personality and Politics in Colonial Nigeria.* Reviewed by Robert Melson. 993

Power and Law: American Dilemma in World Affairs. Charles A. Barker, ed. Reviewed by Adda B. Bozeman. 669

Power, Paul F. Review of *Harijan: A Journal of Applied Gandhiism, 1933–1955. Vols. I–XIX.* 651

Pravda, Alex. Review of Peter F. Sugar, ed., *Native Fascism in the Successor States, 1918–1945.* 1002

Prediction Analysis in Political Research. David K. Hildebrand, James D. Laing, and Howard Rosenthal. 509

Preeg, Ernest H. *Economic Blocs and U.S. Foreign Policy.* Reviewed by W. Andrew Axline. 292

Prejudice and Tolerance in Ulster: A Study of Neighbors and "Strangers" in a Border Community. Rosemary Harris. Reviewed by John H. Whyte in *Recent Writing on Northern Ireland.* 592

Premdas, Ralph R. Review of William Henderson, *West New Guinea: The Dispute and its Settlement.* 244

The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House. James David Barber. Reviewed by Arnold A. Rogow. 1299

Presidential Influence in the House: Presidential Prestige as a Source of Presidential Power. George C. Edwards III. 101

Presidential Television. Newton N. Minow, John Barlow Martin and Lee M. Mitchell. Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234

The Press and the Cold War. James Aronson. Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234

Press, Politics and Popular Government. George F. Will, ed. Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234

Prewitt, Kenneth and Heinz Eulau. *Labyrinths of Democracy: Adaptations, Linkages, Representation, and Policies in Urban Politics.* Reviewed by John H. Kessel. 1308

The Price of Liberty: Personality and Politics in Colonial Nigeria. Kenneth W. Post and George D. Jenkins. Reviewed by Robert Melson. 993

The Price of Vision: The Diary of Henry A. Wallace, 1942–1946. John Morton Blum, ed. Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* 560

Primary Rules, Political Power ,and Social Change. James I. Lengle and Byron Shafer. 25

Primates and Political Authority: A Biobehavioral Perspective. Fred H. Willhoite, Jr. 1110

Private Conscience and Public Law: The American Experience. Richard J. Regan, S.J. Reviewed by Robert F. Sasseen. 1259

Procedural Norms and Tolerance: A Reassessment. David G. Lawrence. 80

Programs in Aid of the Poor for the 1970s. Sar H. Levitan. Reviewed by Harold M. Hochman. 979

Prophet of Community: The Romantic Socialism of Gustav Landauer. Eugene Lunn. Reviewed by Carl Landauer. 1282

Prophet in Politics: Henry A. Wallace and the War Years, 1940–1965. Edward L. Schapsmeier and Frederick H. Schapsmeier. Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in

"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay. 560
The Prospects for an Economic Community in North Africa: Managing Economic Integration in the Maghreb States. Abderrahman Robana. Reviewed by Yassin El-Ayouty. 256
Pryor, Frederic L. *Public Expenditures in Communist and Capitalist Nations.* Reviewed by Karl de Schweinitz, Jr. 1361
Psychoanalysis and the Law. C. G. Schoenfeld. Reviewed by Stanley Rothman. 969
Psychological Dimensions of U.S.-Japanese Relations. Hiroshi Kitamura. Reviewed by Ichiro Miyake. 1006
Public Affairs Television and the Growth of Political Malaise: The Case of "The Selling of the Pentagon." Michael J. Robinson. 409
Public Expenditures in Communist and Capitalist Nations. Frederic L. Pryor. Reviewed by Karl de Schweinitz, Jr. 1361
Public Policy on the Status of Women: Agenda and Strategy for the 70s. Irene L. Murphy. Reviewed by Norma Noonan. .. 223
Pugh, T. B. Review of Arthur J. Slavin, ed., *Tudor Men and Institutions: Studies in English Law and Government.* 207
Putnam, Robert D. *The Beliefs of Politicians: Ideology, Conflict, and Democracy in Britain and Italy.* Reviewed by Leon D. Epstein. 253

Quester, George H. *The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation.* Reviewed by Alastair Buchan. 1012
The Question of Palestine, 1914–1918: British-Jewish-Arab Relations. Isaiah Friedman. Reviewed by Aaron S. Klieman. .. 676
Questions, Answers, Questions: From the Biography of a German Marxist. Robert Havemann. Reviewed by Paul Breines. .. 1271
Le Quotient Politique Vrai. Vincent Lemieux. Reviewed by Robert J. Jackson. .. 248

Rabinovich, Itamar. *Syria Under the Ba'th, 1963–66: The Army-Party Symbiosis.* Reviewed by Leonard Binder. 254
Rabinowitch, Alexander and Janet Rabinowitch, eds. with Ladis K. D. Kristof. *Revolution and Politics in Russia: Essays in Memory of B. I. Nicolaevsky.* Reviewed by Leonard Schapiro. 993
Rabinowitch, Janet and Alexander Rabinowitch, eds., with Ladis K. D. Kristof. *Revolution and Politics in Russia: Essays in Memory of B. I. Nicolaevsky.* Reviewed by Leonard Schapiro. 993
Race and Race History and Other Essays. Alfred Rosenberg. Robert Pois, ed. Reviewed by Eugen Weber. 1285
Race Relations and the New York City Commission on Human Rights. Gerald Benjamin. Reviewed by Stephen M. David. 624
Racial Bargaining in Independent Kenya: A Study of Minorities and Decolonization. Donald Rothchild. Reviewed by David K. Leonard. 258
The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy. Robert W. Tucker. Reviewed by H. Bradford Westerfield. 1392
Rae, Douglas. Review of Robert Nozick, *Anarchy, State and Utopia.* 1289
Rahl, James A., ed. *Common Market and American Antitrust: Overlap and Conflict.* Reviewed by M. A. Adelman. 1384
Rahul, Ram. *Politics and Central Asia.* Reviewed by Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone. . 1385
Rai, Kul B. Review of James F. Herndon and Joseph L. Bernd, eds., *Mathematical Applications in Political Science, VII.* .. 202
Raine, Alden S., Arthur H. Miller, Warren E. Miller, and Thad A. Brown. *A Majority Party in Disarray: Policy Polarization in the 1972 Election.* 753
Rakowska-Harmstone, Teresa. Review of Ram Rahul, *Politics of Central Asia.* .. 1385
Ramon Magsaysay: A Political Biography. Jose V. Abueva. Reviewed by A. B. Villanueva. 597
Ramsay MacDonald's Political Writings. Bernard Barker, ed. Reviewed by James G. Kellas. 604
Randolph, Lillian L. *Third-Party Settlement of Disputes in Theory and Practice.* Reviewed by Carl Q. Christol. 1013
Ranis, Peter. Review of Robert J. Alexander, *Agrarian Reform in Latin America.* 233
Ranney, Austin. APSA Presidential Address, 1975: *"The Divine Science": Political Engineering in American Culture.* 140
Review of Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., ed., *History of U.S. Political Parties.* ... 1316
Rasmussen, Erik, ed. *Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 7/1972.* Reviewed by Eric S. Einhorn. 255
The Rationale for NATO: European Collective Security—Past and Present. Morton A. Kaplan. Reviewed by Nils Ørvik. ... 1383
Ravenal, Earl C. Review of Charles W. Yost, *The Conduct and Misconduct of Foreign Affairs: Reflections on U.S. Foreign Policy Since World War II.* 302
A Reassessment of Conventional Wisdom About the Informed Public: National Political Information in Ghana. Fred M. Hayward. 433

Recent Writing on Northern Ireland. John H. Whyte. Review of Denis P. Barritt and Charles F. Carter, *The Northern Ireland Problem;* Ian Budge and Cornelius O'Leary, *Belfast: Approach to Crisis. A Study of Belfast Politics, 1613–1970;* James Callaghan, *A House Divided: The Dilemma of Northern Ireland;* Liam de Paor, *Divided Ulster;* Garret FitzGerald, *Towards a New Ireland;* Rosemary Harris, *Prejudice and Tolerance in Ulster: A Study of Neighbors and "Strangers" in a Border Community;* The London *Sunday Times* Insight Team, *Northern Ireland: A Report on the Conflict;* F. S. L. Lyons, *Ireland since the Famine;* Eamonn McCann, *War and an Irish Town;* John Magee, *Northern Ireland: Crisis and Conflict;* Conor Cruise O'Brien, *States of Ireland;* Richard Rose, *Governing Without Consensus; an Irish Perspective.* 592

Red Square at Noon. Natalia Gorbanevskaya. Reviewed by Frederick C. Barghoorn. 1335

Reeve, Carl. *The Life and Times of Daniel De Leon.* Reviewed by David Kettler. .. 215

Reflections on the Causes of Human Misery and Upon Certain Proposals to Eliminate Them. Barrington Moore, Jr. Reviewed by Alan Stone. 1286

Regan, Richard J., S.J. *Private Conscience and Public Law: The American Experience.* Reviewed by Robert F. Sasseen. .. 1259

Regionale Verflechtung Der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Empirische Analysen und Theoretische Probleme. Forschungsinstituts der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik. Reviewed by Henri J. Warmenhoven. 1380

Rejai, M., ed. *Mao Tse-tung on Revolution and War.* Reviewed by Stuart R. Schram. 200

Rejoinder to "Comment" by Shlomo Avineri. David Resnick. 1150

The Reluctant Reformation: On Criticizing the Press in America. Lee Brown. Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234

Remmer, Karen L. *Communication: Development and Strategy in Latin America.* 548

Rémond, René. *The Right Wing in France From 1815 to de Gaulle.* Reviewed by D. B. Goldey. 1365

RePass, David E. *Comment: Political Methodologies in Disarray: Some Alternative Interpretations of the 1972 Election.* 814

Reporters and Officials. Leon V. Sigal. Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234

Report from Peking: Observations of a Western Diplomat on the Cultural Revolution. D. W. Fokkema. Reviewed by G. Eric Hansen. 239

Report of Robert H. Jackson: The International Conference on Military Trials, London, 1945. Reviewed by John H. E. Fried in *The Great Nuremberg Trial.* .. 192

Rescher, Nicholas. *Welfare: The Social Issues in Philosophical Perspective.* Reviewed by Charles E. Gilbert. 1291

Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan. Ralph Braibanti. Reviewed by Lawrence Ziring. 1323

Resnick, David. *Crude Communism and Revolution.* 1136

Rejoinder to "Comment" by Shlomo Avineri. 1150

Retzlaff, Ralph H. Review of A. H. Somjee, *Democracy and Political Change in Village India: A Case Study.* 1369

Révolution et Autogestion Rurale en Algérie. Gérard Duprat. Reviewed by Clement Henry Moore. 1328

The Revolution of 1848–49: Articles from the "Neue Rheinische Zeitung." Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. Reviewed by David-Hillel Ruben. 206

Revolution and Politics in Russia: Essays in Memory of B. I. Nicolaevsky. Alexander and Janet Rabinowitch, eds., with Ladis K. D. Kristof. Reviewed by Leonard Schapiro. 993

Revolutions and Military Rule in the Middle East: The Arab States, Vol. III—Egypt, The Sudan, Yemen and Libya. George M. Haddad. Reviewed by Abdo I. Baaklini. 241

Rhinelander, John B. and Mason Willrich, eds. *SALT: The Moscow Agreements and Beyond.* Reviewed by Colin S. Gray in *Detente, Arms Control and Strategy: Perspectives on SALT.* 1242

Richards, Alan R. and Fred W. Grupp, Jr. *Communication: Issue Areas and Differentials in Bureaucratic Power.* 930

Richardson, Elmo. *Dams, Parks and Politics: Resource Development and Preservation in the Truman-Eisenhower Era.* Reviewed by Jeanne Nienaber. 983

Richardson, Neil R. *Political Compliance and U.S. Trade Dominance.* 1098

Richman, Barry M. *Industrial Society in Communist China.* Reviewed by Thomas W. Robinson. 1362

The Rich, the Well Born and the Powerful: Elites and Upper Classes in History. Frederic C. Jaher, ed. Reviewed by Suzanne Keller. 615

The Right Wing in France From 1815 to de Gaulle. René Rémond. Reviewed by D. B. Goldey. 1365
Riley, Dennis D. *Communication: Issue Areas and Differentials in Bureaucratic Power.* 929
The Rise and Fall of the People's Century: Henry A. Wallace and American Liberalism, 1941–1948. Norman D. Markowitz. Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* 560
Rittberger, Volker. *Evolution and International Organization: Toward a New Level of Sociopolitical Integration.* Reviewed by Werner J. Feld. 1014
Ritterband, Paul. Review of Norman L. Zucker, *The Coming Crisis in Israel: Private Faith and Public Policy.* 273
Ritter, Gerhard. *The Sword and the Scepter: The Problem of Militarism in Germany. Vol. 3: The Tragedy of Statesmanship—Bethmann Hollweg as War Chancellor (1914–1917); Vol. 4: The Reign of German Militarism and the Disaster of 1918.* Reviewed by Gordon A. Craig. 1363
Rivers, William. *The Adversaries: Politics and the Press.* Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* ... 1234
Robana, Abderrahman. *The Prospects for an Economic Community in North Africa: Managing Economic Integration in the Maghreb States.* Reviewed by Yassin El-Ayouty. 256
Robinson, Michael J. *Public Affairs Television and the Growth of Political Malaise: The Case of "The Selling of the Pentagon."* 409
Robinson, Thomas W. Review of Barry M. Richman, *Industrial Society in Communist China.* 1362
Review of Tai Sung An, *The Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute.* 665
Rockman, Bert A. and Joel D. Aberbach. *Clashing Beliefs Within the Executive Branch: The Nixon Administration Bureaucracy.* 456
Roeder, Phillip W. and John Wanat. *Communication: The Relative Impact of State and National Forces: A Comment on Rose's "National and Local Forces in State Politics."* 163
Rogow, Arnold A. Review of James David Barber, *The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House.* 1299
Rokeach, Milton. *The Nature of Human Values.* Reviewed by Robert E. Lane. .. 965
Rokkan, Stein, ed. *Scandinavian Political Studies, Volume 8/1973.* Reviewed by Barbara G. Haskel. 995
The Role of Communications in the Middle East Conflict: Ideological and Religious Aspects. Yonah Alexander. Reviewed by Joel S. Migdal. 664
Rolfe, Sidney E. and James Burtle. *The Great Wheel: The World Monetary System, a Reinterpretation.* Reviewed by Susan Strange. 1015
Rood, Robert M. and Patrick J. McGowan. *Communication: Alliance Behavior in Nineteenth-Century Europe.* 934
Rosecrance, Richard, ed. *The Future of the International Strategic System.* Reviewed by Colin S. Gray in *Detente, Arms Control and Strategy: Perspectives on SALT.* 1242
Rose, Douglas D. *Communication: State Public Policy and Variance Analysis: A Reply to Wanat and Roeder and to Lyons and Morgan.* 166
Communication: The States' Role in Public Policy: A Clarification. 926
Rose, Gillian. Review of Theodor W. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics.* 598
Rose, Lisle A. *After Yalta: America and the Origins of the Cold War.* Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* 560
Rosenau, James N. *International Studies and the Social Sciences: Problems, Priorities, and Prospects in the United States.* Reviewed by Kenneth W. Thompson. 1016
Rosenau, James N., Vincent Davis and Maurice East, eds. *The Analysis of International Politics.* Reviewed by Davis B. Bobrow. 1386
Rosenberg, Alfred. *Race and Race History and Other Essays.* Robert Pois, ed. Reviewed by Eugen Weber. 1285
Rosenn, Keith S. Review of Stuart B. Schwartz, *Sovereignty and Society in Colonial Brazil: The High Court of Bahia and Its Judges, 1609–1751.* 262
Rosenthal, Howard, David K. Hildebrand, and James D. Laing. *Prediction Analysis in Political Research.* 509
Rose, Richard. *Governing Without Consensus: an Irish Perspective.* Reviewed by John H. Whyte in *Recent Writing on Northern Ireland.* 592
Ross, Donald and Ralph Nader. *Action for a Change: A Student's Manual for Public Interest Organizing.* Reviewed by Dale Rogers Marshall. 620
Ross, Jennie-Keith, Roger Cobb, and Marc Howard Ross. *Agenda Building as a Comparative Political Process.* 126

Ross, Marc Howard, Roger Cobb, and Jennie-Keith Ross. *Agenda Building as a Comparative Political Process.* 126
Ross, Ralph. *On the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.* A review essay on David L. Sills, ed., *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.* ... 939
Rossum, Ralph A. Review of Roger B. Canfield, *Black Ghetto Riots and Campus Disorders: A Subcultural and Philosophical Study of Democratic Legitimacy and American Political Violence, 1964–1970.* 625
Rothberg, Abraham, ed. *The Heirs of Stalin: Dissidence and the Soviet Regime, 1953–1970.* Reviewed by D. Pospielovsky. 966
Rothchild, Donald. *Racial Bargaining in Independent Kenya: A Study of Minorities and Decolonization.* Reviewed by David K. Leonard. 258
Rothman, Stanley. Review of C. G. Schoenfeld, *Psychoanalysis and the Law.* 969
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. *The Government of Poland.* Wilmoore Kendall, trans. Reviewed by Richard B. Carter. 1292
Rowe, Lloyd A. Review of F. William Howton, *Functionaries.* 614
Ruben, David-Hillel. Review of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. *The Revolution of 1848–49: Articles from the "Neue Rheinische Zeitung."* 206
Rubinowitz, Leonard S. Review of W. Scott Ford, *Interracial Public Housing in Border City.* 217
Rules and Laws in Sociology. Robert Brown. Reviewed by Arthur L. Stinchcombe. .. 199
Rules for Radicals: A Pragmatic Primer for Realistic Radicals. Saul D. Alinsky. Reviewed by Dale Rogers Marshall. 620
Rural Thai Government: The Politics of the Budgetary Process. Clark D. Neher. Reviewed by David Morell. 1355
Rusk, Jerrold G. *Political Participation in America: A Review Essay.* Review of Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie, *Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality.* 583
Russell and Moore: The Analytical Heritage. A. J. Ayer. Reviewed by David Berlinski. 1257
Russett, Bruce M. *No Clear and Present Danger: A Skeptical View of the U.S. Entry into World War II.* Reviewed by Morton J. Tenzer. 293
Russia in the Caribbean. James D. Theberge. Reviewed by Carl C. Moses. 300

Sadik, Muhammad and William P. Snavely. *Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates: Colonial Past, Present Problems, and Future Prospects.* Reviewed by Fred J. Khouri. 259
St. Angelo, Douglas and Douglas Dobson. *Communication: Stability of Partisan Attachments.* 554
Salant, Walter S. and Lawrence B. Krause, eds. *European Monetary Unification and Its Meaning for the United States.* Reviewed by Edward A. Kolodziej. 284
Salem, Elie Adib. *Modernization Without Revolution: Lebanon's Experience.* Reviewed by Manfred Halpern. 1365
Salomon, Jean-Jacques. *Science and Politics.* Reviewed by Yaron Ezrahi. 967
SALT: Implications for Arms Control in the 1970's. William R. Kintner and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., eds. Reviewed by Colin S. Gray in *Detente, Arms Control and Strategy: Perspectives on SALT.* 1242
SALT: The Moscow Agreements and Beyond. Mason Willrich and John B. Rhinelander, eds. Reviewed by Colin S. Gray in *Detente, Arms Control and Strategy: Perspectives on SALT.* 1242
SALT: Problems and Prospects. Morton A. Kaplan, ed. Reviewed by Colin S. Gray in *Detente, Arms Control and Strategy: Perspectives on SALT.* 1242
Sasseen, Robert F. Review of William Sloane Coffin, Jr. and Morris I. Leibman, *Civil Disobedience: Aid or Hindrance to Justice?;* Richard J. Regan, S.J., *Private Conscience and Public Law: The American Experience;* and Eliot M. Zashin, *Civil Disobedience and Democracy.* 1259
Sato, Hideo. Review of Nobuya Bamba, *Japanese Diplomacy in a Dilemma: New Light on Japan's China Policy.* 274
Saxton, Alexander. *The Indispensable Enemy: Labor and the Anti-Chinese Movement in California.* Reviewed by Wen H. Kuo. 984
Scaff, Lawrence A. Review of Louis J. Halle, *The Ideological Imagination.* 1267
Scalapino, Robert A. and Chong-Sik Lee. *Communism in Korea,* 2 vols. Reviewed by Princeton Lyman. 260
Scalapino, Robert A., ed. *Elites in the People's Republic of China.* Reviewed by David M. Lampton. 1366
Scandinavian Political Studies, Volume 8/1973. Stein Rokkan, ed. Reviewed by Barbara G. Haskel. 995
Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 7/1972. Erik Rasmusson, ed. Reviewed by Eric S. Einhorn. 255
Scanlon, Thomas, Marshall Cohen, and Thomas Nagel, eds. *War and Moral Re-*

sponsibility. Reviewed by Terry Nardin in *Philosophy and International Violence*. . . 952
Schantz, Harvey L. *Communication: Julius Turner Revisited: Primary Elections as the Alternative to Party Competition in "Safe" Districts*. 541
Schapiro, Leonard. Review of Alexander and Janet Rabinowitch, eds., with Ladis K. D. Kristof, *Revolution and Politics in Russia. Essays in Memory of B. I. Nicolaevsky*. 993
Schapsmeier, Edward L. and Frederick H. Schapsmeier. *Prophet in Politics: Henry A. Wallace and the War Years, 1940–1965*. Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay*. 560
Schapsmeier, Frederick H. and Edward L. Schapsmeier. *Prophet in Politics: Henry A. Wallace and the War Years, 1940–1965*. Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay*. 560
Scheingold, Stuart A. Review of R. C. Mowat, *Creating the European Community*. 288
Schermers, Henry G. *International Institutional Law: Vol. I, Structure; Vol. II, Functioning and Legal Order*. Reviewed by Charles H. McLaughlin. 1388
Schick, Allen. Review of Jeanne Nienaber and Aaron Wildavsky, *The Budgeting and Evaluation of Federal Recreation Programs, or Money Doesn't Grow on Trees*. 1313
Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr., ed. *History of U.S. Political Parties, Vol. I: 1789–1960, From Factions to Parties; Vol. II: 1860–1910, The Gilded Age of Politics; Vol. III: 1910–1945, From Square Deal to New Deal; Vol. IV: 1945–1972, The Politics of Change*. Reviewed by Austin Ranney. 1316
Schlesinger, Joseph A., Review of Robert Paul Wolff, ed., *1984 Revisited, Prospects for American Politics*. 229
Schmitt, Hans A., ed. *Historians of Modern Europe*. Reviewed by Robert Woito. ... 1294
Schneider, Ronald M. Review of Alfred Stepan, ed., *Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies and Future*. 997
Schoenfeld, C. G. *Psychoanalysis and the Law*. Reviewed by Stanley Rothman. ... 969
Schram, Stuart R. Review of K. Fan, ed., *Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao: Post Revolutionary Writings;* and M. Rejai, ed., *Mao Tse-tung on Revolution and War*. 200
Schurmann, Franz. *The Logic of World Power: An Inquiry into the Origins, Currents, and Contradictions of World Politics*. Reviewed by Richard A. Falk. 1390
Schwab, George. Review of Anton Pelinka, *Dynamische Demokratie: Zur konkreten Utopie gesellschaftlicher Gleichheit*. ... 964
Schwartz, Mildred A. Review of Robin Winks. *The Blacks in Canada: A History*. 1004
Schwartz, Stuart B. *Sovereignty and Society in Colonial Brazil: The High Court of Bahia and Its Judges, 1609–1751*. Reviewed by Keith S. Rosenn. 262
Schwarzenberger, Georg and George W. Keeton, eds. *The Year Book of World Affairs, 1973*. Reviewed by Peter R. Baehr. 283
Schwarzenberger, G. Review of Cyril E. Black and Richard A. Falk, eds., *The Future of the International Legal Order. Vol. III: Conflict Management* and *Vol. IV: The Structure of the International Environment*. 670
Science and Politics. Jean-Jacques Salomon. Reviewed by Yaron Ezrahi. 967
Science and Rule in Bacon's Utopia: An Introduction to the Reading of the New Atlantis. J. Weinberger. 865
Scott, James C. *Comparative Political Corruption*. Reviewed by William B. Gwyn. 1368
Scoville, James G. and Adolf Sturmthal, eds. *The International Labor Movement in Transition: Essays on Africa, Asia, Europe and South America*. Reviewed by E. M. Kassalow. 1001
Sears, David and John B. McConahay. *The Politics of Violence: The New Urban Blacks and the Watts Riot*. Reviewed by Peter K. Eisinger. 985
The Secessionist Impulse: Alabama and Mississippi in 1860. William L. Barney. Reviewed by LaWanda Cox. 623
Seeds of Repression: Harry S Truman and the Origins of McCarthyism. Athan Theoharis. Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay*. 560
Segal, Aaron. Review of A. Lerumo, *Fifty Fighting Years: The South African Communist Party, 1921–1971*. 1347
Seiden, Martin H. *Cable Television U.S.A.* Reviewed by Frank Wolf. 1315
Seidman, Harold. Review of Rufus E. Miles, Jr., *The Department of Health, Education and Welfare*. 222
Sennett, Richard. *The Uses of Disorder: Personal Identity and City Life*. Reviewed by David Nexon. 986
Shafer, Byron and James I. Lengle. *Primary*

Rules, Political Power, and Social Change. 25
Shanab, Robert E. A. and Donald C. Hodges, eds. *National Liberation Fronts, 1960–1970.* Reviewed by W. Scott Thompson. 1351
Shanley, J. Lyndon, ed. *The Writings of Henry D. Thoreau: Walden.* Reviewed by David M. Atkinson. 1295
The Shape of Utopia: Studies in a Literary Genre. Robert C. Elliott. Reviewed by Rodney W. Kilcup. 973
Shapiro, Howard B. and Patrick J. McGowan. *The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy: A Survey of Scientific Findings.* Reviewed by Frederic S. Pearson. 661
Shawcross, William. *Crime and Compromise: Janos Kadar and the Politics of Hungary Since Revolution.* Reviewed by John C. Campbell. 263
Sheehan, James J. Review of Leonard Krieger, *The German Idea of Freedom: History of a Political Tradition.* 1279
Sheeks, Robert B. and Yuan-li Wu. *The Organization and Support of Scientific Research and Development in Mainland China.* Reviewed by Alice Langley Hsieh. 272
Shepard, W. Bruce and R. Kenneth Godwin. *Political Processes and Public Expenditures: A Re-examination Based on Theories of Representative Government.* ... 1127
Shklar, Judith N. Review of John Charvet, *The Social Problem in the Philosophy of Rousseau.* 606
Sickels, Robert J. Review of Sidney R. Waldman, *Foundations of Political Action: An Exchange Theory of Politics.* .. 975
Sidjanski, Dusan, ed. *Political Decision Making Processes: Studies in National, Comparative and International Politics.* Reviewed by Linda P. Brady. 264
Sigal, Leon V. *Reporters and Officials.* Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234
Sigel, Roberta S. Review of Jack Dennis and M. Kent Jennings, eds., *Comparative Political Socialization.* 1329
Sigmund, Paul E. Review of Donald W. Hanson, *From Kingdom to Commonwealth: The Development of Civic Consciousness in English Political Thought.* 1268
Silbey, Joel H. Review of William O. Aydelotte, Allan G. Bogue, and Robert William Fogel, eds., *The Dimensions of Quantitative Research in History.* 603
Silent Surrender: The American Economic Empire in Canada. Kari Levitt. Reviewed by Robert Gilpin in *The Political Economy of the Multinational Corporation: Three Contrasting Perspectives.* 184
Sills, David L., ed. *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.* Reviewed by Ralph Ross in *On the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.* 939
Simon, Yves. *Work, Society and Culture.* Reviewed by Sebastian de Grazia. 1273
Simpson, Dick. *Winning Elections: A Handbook in Participatory Politics.* Reviewed by Dale Rogers Marshall. 620
The Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute. Tai Sung An. Reviewed by Thomas W. Robinson. 665
Siracusa, Joseph M. *New Left Diplomatic Histories and Historians: The American Revisionists.* Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* 560
Skidmore, Thomas E. Review of Frank D. McCann, Jr., *The Brazilian-American Alliance, 1937–1945.* 1007
Sklar, Richard L. Review of A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, *Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria: A Documentary Sourcebook, 1966–1970.* .. 247
Slavin, Arthur J., ed. *Tudor Men and Institutions: Studies in English Law and Government.* Reviewed by T. B. Pugh. 207
Slonim, Solomon. *South West Africa and the United Nations: An International Mandate in Dispute.* Reviewed by Marinus Wiechers. 294
Slums Are For People: The Barrio Magsaysay Pilot Project in Philippine Urban Community Development. Aprodicio A. Laquian. Reviewed by E. V. Walter. ... 1344
Smalley, Beryl. *The Becket Conflict and the Schools: A Study of Intellectuals in Politics in the Twelfth Century.* Reviewed by Ernest L. Fortin. 208
Small, William. *To Kill a Messenger: Television News and the Real World.* Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234
Smith, Constance and Ann Freedman, *Voluntary Associations: Perspectives on the Literature.* Reviewed by G. David Garson. 970
Smith, Geoffrey S. *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* Review of John Morton Blum, ed., *The Price of Vision: The Diary of Henry A. Wallace, 1942–1946;* Richard M. Freeland, *The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism: Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and Internal Security, 1946–1948;* John Lewis Gaddis, *The*

United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1947; Robert Griffith, *The Politics of Fear: Joseph R. McCarthy and the Senate;* Robert Griffith and Athan Theoharis, eds., *The Specter: Original Essays on the Cold War and the Origins of McCarthyism;* Alonzo L. Hamby, *Beyond the New Deal: Harry S Truman and American Liberalism;* Alan D. Harper, *The Politics of Loyalty: The White House and the Communist Issue, 1946–1952;* Susan M. Hartmann, *Truman and the 80th Congress;* George C. Herring, Jr., *Aid to Russia, 1941–9146: Strategy, Diplomacy, the Origins of the Cold War;* Richard S. Kirkendall, ed., *The Truman Period as a Research Field: A Reappraisal, 1972;* Robert J. Maddox, *The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War;* Norman D. Markowitz, *The Rise and Fall of the People's Century: Henry A. Wallace and American Liberalism, 1941–1948;* Michael Parenti, *The Anti-Communist Impulse;* Thomas G. Paterson, *Soviet-American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War;* James T. Patterson, *Mr. Republican: A Biography of Robert A. Taft;* Lisle A. Rose, *After Yalta:America and the Origins of the Cold War;* Edward L. Schapsmeier and Frederick H. Schapsmeier, *Prophet in Politics: Henry A Wallace and the War Years, 1940–1965;* Joseph M. Siracusa, *New Left Diplomatic Histories and Historians: The American Revisionists;* Athan Theoharis, *Seeds of Repression: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of McCarthyism,* and *The Yalta Myths: An Issue in U.S. Politics, 1945–1955;* and Allen Yarnell, *Democrats and Progressives: The 1948 Presidential Election as a Test of Postwar Liberalism.* 560

Smith, Jeffrey A., Samuel Popkin, John W. Gorman, and Charles Phillips. *Comment: What Have You Done for Me Lately? Toward An Investment Theory of Voting.* 779

Smock, Audrey C. and David R. Smock. *Cultural and Political Aspects of Rural Transformation: A Case Study of Eastern Nigeria.* Reviewed by Robert Melson. .. 265

Smock, David R. and Audrey C. Smock. *Cultural and Political Aspects of Rural Transformation: A Case Study of Eastern Nigeria.* Reviewed by Robert Melson. .. 265

Snavely, William P. and Muhammad Sadik. *Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates: Colonial Past, Present Problems, and Future Prospects.* Reviewed by Fred J. Khouri. 259

Snetsinger, John. *Truman, the Jewish Vote, and the Creation of Israel.* Reviewed by Alan Fisher. 225

Sobin, Dennis P. *The Working Poor: Minority Workers in Low-Wage, Low-Skill Jobs.* Reviewed by Kathleen A. Frankovic. 226

Social Hierarchies: 1450 to the Present. Roland Mousnier. Peter Evans, trans. Reviewed by Joan Huber. 1009

Socialism and Affluence. The Fabian Society. Reviewed by Della Nevitt. 1264

Socialist, Anti-Semite, and Jew: German Social Democracy Confronts the Problem of Anti-Semitism, 1918–1933. Donald L. Niewyk. Reviewed by Vernon L. Lidtke. 1356

The Social Problem in the Philosophy of Rousseau. John Charvet. Reviewed by Judith N. Shklar. 606

Solomon, David and Laurie Oakes. *The Making of an Australian Prime Minister.* Reviewed by H. V. Emy. 991

Solomon, Peter H., Jr. Review of *Soviet Criminal Law and Procedure: The RSFSR Codes,* 2nd ed. Harold J. Berman and James W. Spindler, trans. 1371

Some Cambridge Controversies in the Theory of Capital. G. C. Harcourt. Reviewed by Leland B. Yeager. 1270

Somjee, A. H. *Democracy and Political Change in Village India: A Case Study.* Reviewed by Ralph H. Retzlaff. 1369

South Africa's Foreign Policy, 1945–1970. James Barber. Reviewed by Leonard Thompson. 668

South West Africa and the United Nations: An International Mandate in Dispute. Solomon Slonim. Reviewed by Marinus Wiechers. 294

Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises. Raymond Vernon. Reviewed by Robert Gilpin in *The Political Economy of the Multinational Corporation: Three Contrasting Perspectives.* 184

Sovereignty and Society in Colonial Brazil: The High Court of Bahia and Its Judges, 1609–1751. Stuart B. Schwartz. Reviewed by Keith S. Rosenn. 262

Soviet-American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War. Thomas G. Paterson. Reviewed by Bernard S. Morris. 289
Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revi-*

sionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay. 560
Soviet-Asian Relations. Charles B. McLane. Reviewed by Kurt L. London. 286
Soviet Criminal Law and Procedure: The RSFSR Codes, 2nd ed. Harold J. Berman and James W. Spindler, trans. Reviewed by Peter H. Solomon, Jr. 1371
Soviet Decision-Making for Defense: A Critique of U.S. Perspectives on the Arms Race. Matthew P. Gallagher and Karl F. Spielmann, Jr. Reviewed by Colin S. Gray in *Detente, Arms Control and Strategy: Perspectives on SALT.* 1242
Soviet Russia Masters the Comintern: International Communism in the Era of Stalin's Ascendancy. Helmut Gruber. Reviewed by John W. Strong. 1377
The Soviet Union and the Developing Nations. Roger E. Kanet, ed. Reviewed by Bernard P. Kiernan. 280
Spatt, Chester. *Communication: Evaluation of a Presidential Election Game.* 1221
Special Task Force to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. *Work in America.* Prepared under the Auspices of the W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. Reviewed by Sebastian de Grazia. 1273
The Specter: Original Essays on the Cold War and the Origins of McCarthyism. Robert Griffith and Athan Theoharis, eds. Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* 560
Speier, Hans. Review of Martin Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, 1923–1950.* 1276
Sperlich, Peter W. Review of Edward E. Jones, David E. Kanouse, Harold H. Kelley, Richard E. Nisbett, Stuart Valins, and Bernard Weiner, eds., *Attribution: Perceiving the Causes of Behavior.* 617
Spielmann, Karl F., Jr. and Matthew P. Gallagher. *Soviet Decision-Making for Defense: A Critique of U.S. Perspectives on the Arms Race.* Reviewed by Colin S. Gray in *Detente, Arms Control and Strategy: Perspectives on SALT.* 1242
Stahnke, Arthur A., ed. *China's Trade with the West: A Political and Economic Analysis.* Reviewed by Daniel Tretiak. 295
Stamford in the Gilded Age: The Political Life of a Connecticut Town, 1868–1893. Estelle F. Feinstein. Reviewed by Richard E. Welch, Jr. 636
Standing to Sue: Interest Group Conflict in the Federal Courts. Karen Orren. 723
States of Ireland. Conor Cruise O'Brien. Reviewed by John H. Whyte in *Recent Writing on Northern Ireland.* 592
The States and Their Indian Citizens. Theodore W. Taylor. Reviewed by Frances Svensson. 1306
Statism in Plymouth Colony. Harry M. Ward. Reviewed by Paul R. Lucas. 228
Stavis, Benedict. Review of Shahid Javed Burki, *A Study of Chinese Communes, 1965.* 1326
Steeper, Frederick T. and Robert M. Teeter. *Comment on "A Majority Party in Disarray."* 806
Steiner, Jürg. Review of Benjamin R. Barber, *The Death of Communal Liberty: A History of Freedom in a Swiss Mountain Canton.* 198
Stepan, Alfred, ed. *Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future.* Reviewed by Ronald M. Schneider. 997
Stephens, Stephen V. *Communication: A Reanalysis of Achen's Critique of the Converse Model of Mass Political Belief.* 1224
Sterling, Richard W. *Macropolitics: International Relations in a Global Society.* Reviewed by Kenneth N. Waltz. 296
Stetson, Dorothy M. Review of Edwin D. Driver, *World Population Policy: An Annotated Bibliography.* 648
Stillman, Richard J. II. Review of Arthur S. Link, *The Higher Realism of Woodrow Wilson and Other Essays.* 619
Stinchcombe, Arthur L. Review of Robert Brown, *Rules and Laws in Sociology.* .. 199
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. *The Arms Trade with the Third World.* Reviewed by Colin S. Gray. 297
Stoetzel, Antoine H., Hayward R. Alker, Jr., and Karl W. Deutsch. *Mathematical Approaches to Politics.* Reviewed by Charles Lewis Taylor. 600
Stone, Alan. Review of Barrington Moore, Jr., *Reflections on the Causes of Human Misery and Upon Certain Proposals to Eliminate Them.* 1286
Stone, Carl. *Class, Race and Political Behaviour in Urban Jamaica.* Reviewed by Colin G. Clarke. 998
Storry, Richard. Review of John K. Emmerson and Leonard A. Humphreys, *Will Japan Rearm? A Study in Attitudes.* 649
Stover, Leon E. *The Cultural Ecology of Chinese Civilization: Peasants and Elites in the Last of the Agrarian States.* Reviewed by John K. Fairbank. 266

Strange, Susan. Review of Sidney E. Rolfe and James Burtle, *The Great Wheel: The World Monetary System, a Reinterpretation.* 1015
The Strategy and Structure of British Enterprise. Derek Channon. Reviewed by Stephen Blank. 1326
Strong, John W. Review of John Lewis Evans, *The Communist International, 1919–1943;* The Institute of Marxism-Leninism, Central Committee of the C.P.S.U., *Outline History of the Communist International;* and Helmut Gruber, *Soviet Russia Masters the Comintern: International Communism in the Era of Stalin's Ascendancy.* 1377
Struve, Walter. *Elites against Democracy: Leadership Ideals in Bourgeois Political Thought in Germany, 1890–1933.* Reviewed by Wayne C. Thompson. 1000
Stuckey, Sterling. *The Ideological Origins of Black Nationalism.* Reviewed by Hanes Walton, Jr. 209
A Study of Chinese Communes, 1965. Shahid Javed Burki. Reviewed by Benedict Stavis. 1326
Sturmthal, Adolf and James G. Scoville, eds. *The International Labor Movement in Transition: Essays on Africa, Asia, Europe and South America.* Reviewed by E. M. Kassalow. 1001
Sugar, Peter F., ed. *Native Fascism in the Successor States, 1918–1945.* Reviewed by Alex Pravda. 1002
Suny, Ronald Grigor. *The Baku Commune, 1917–1918: Class and Nationality in the Russian Revolution.* Reviewed by Stanislav Kirschbaum. 971
The Supreme Court and National Policy Making. Jonathan D. Casper. 50
Supreme Court und Politik in den USA: Fragen der Justiziabilität in der höchstrichterlichen Rechtsprechung. Walter Haller. Reviewed by Francis H. Heller. .. 637
Sutton, Antony C. *Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1930 to 1945.* Reviewed by Carl B. Turner. 1017
Svensson, Frances. Review of Vine Deloria, Jr., *Behind the Trail of Broken Treaties;* and Theodore W. Taylor, *The States and Their Indian Citizens.* 1306
Swanson, Roger Frank. Review of Bruce Thordarson, *Trudeau and Foreign Policy: A Study in Decision-Making.* 268
The Sword and the Scepter: The Problem of Militarism in Germany. Vol. 3: The Tragedy of Statesmanship — Bethmann Hollweg as War Chancellor (1914–1917); Vol. 4: The Reign of German Militarism and the Disaster of 1918. Gerhard Ritter. Reviewed by Gordon A. Craig. 1363
Symmetric Spatial Games Without Majority Rule Equilibria. Richard D. McKelvey and Peter C. Ordeshook. 1172
Syria Under the Ba'th, 1963–66: The Army-Party Symbiosis. Itamar Rabinovich. Reviewed by Leonard Binder. 254
Systems Theory in International Relations: A Study in Metaphoric Hypertrophy. John J. Weltman. Reviewed by Jeffrey A. Hart. 975
System and Structure: Essays in Communication and Exchange. Anthony Wilden. Reviewed by Harold D. Lasswell. 976

Tales of Two City-States: The Development Progress of Hong Kong and Singapore. Theodore Geiger and Frances M. Geiger. Reviewed by Robert E. Gamer. 240
Talking Back: Citizen Feedback and Cable Technology. Ithiel de Sola Pool, ed. Reviewed by Doris A. Graber. 633
Tanaka, Kakuei. *Building a New Japan: A Plan for Remodeling the Japanese Archipelago.* Reviewed by Ardath W. Burks. .. 267
Taylor, Charles Lewis. Review of Hayward R. Alker, Jr., Karl W. Deutsch, and Antoine H. Stoetzel, *Mathematical Approaches to Politics.* 600
Taylor, Ian and Laurie Taylor, eds. *Politics and Deviance.* Reviewed by Martin Plax. 1297
Taylor, Laurie and Ian Taylor, eds. *Politics and Deviance.* Reviewed by Martin Plax. 1297
Taylor, Theodore W. *The States and Their Indian Citizens.* Reviewed by Frances Svensson. 1306
Teeter, Robert M. and Frederick T. Steeper. *Comment on "A Majority Party in Disarray."* 806
Television and Presidential Politics. Robert E. Gilbert. Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234
Temple, David G. *Merger Politics: Local Government in Tidewater Virginia.* Reviewed by Chester W. Bain. 1316
Tenzer, Morton J. Review of Bruce M. Russett, *No Clear and Present Danger: A Skeptical View of the U.S. Entry into World War II.* 293
Theberge, James D. *Russia in the Caribbean.* Reviewed by Carl C. Moses. 300
Theoharis, Athan and Robert Griffith, eds. *The Specter: Original Essays on the Cold War and the Origins of McCarthyism.* Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* 560
Theoharis, Athan. *Seeds of Repression: Harry*

S. Truman and the Origins of McCarthyism, and *The Yalta Myths: An Issue in U.S. Politics, 1945–1955*. Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1955—A Review Essay*. 560

The Theory of Political Ambiguity. Benjamin I. Page. 742

Thimme, Annelise. *Flucht in den Mythos: Die Deutschnationale Volkspartei und die Niederlage von 1918*. Reviewed by Lewis Hertzman. 972

Things to Come: Thinking about the Seventies and Eighties. Herman Kahn and Barry Bruce-Briggs. Reviewed by Philip Hone Auerbach. 205

Third-Party Settlement of Disputes in Theory and Practice. Lillian L. Randolph. Reviewed by Carl Q. Christol. 1013

Thomas, James D. Review of Neil R. McMillen, *The Citizens' Council: Organized Resistance to the Second Reconstruction: 1954–1964*. 1313

Thompson, Kenneth W. Review of James N. Rosenau, *International Studies and the Social Sciences: Problems, Priorities, and Prospects in the United States*. 1016

Thompson, Leonard. Review of James Barber, *South Africa's Foreign Policy, 1945–1970*. 668

Thompson, Wayne C. Review of Walter Struve, *Elites Against Democracy: Leadership Ideals in Bourgeois Political Thought in Germany, 1890–1933*. 1000

Thompson, William R. Review of Norman Z. Alcock, *The War Disease*. 599

Thompson, W. Scott. Review of Norman Miller and Roderick Aya, eds., *National Liberation: Revolution in the Third World;* and Donald C. Hodges and Robert E. A. Shanab, eds., *National Liberation Fronts, 1960–1970*. 1351

Thordarson, Bruce. *Trudeau and Foreign Policy: A Study in Decision-Making*. Reviewed by Roger Frank Swanson. 268

Thoreau, Henry D. J. Lyndon Shanley, ed., *The Writings of Henry D. Thoreau: Walden;* Joseph J. Moldenhauer, ed., *The Writings of Henry D. Thoreau: The Maine Woods;* Wendell Glick, ed., *The Writings of Henry D. Thoreau: Reform Papers*. Reviewed by David M. Atkinson. 1295

Those People: The Subculture of a Housing Project. Colette Pétonnet. Reviewed by E. V. Walter. 1344

Tignor, Robert L. Review of Richard D. Wolff, *The Economics of Colonialism: Britain and Kenya, 1870–1930*. 271

Tilly, Louise A. Review of Louis Chevalier, *Laboring Classes and Dangerous Classes in Paris during the First Half of the Nineteenth Century*. 644

To Judge with Justice: History and Politics of Illinois Judicial Reform. Rubin G. Cohn. Reviewed by Byron W. Daynes. .. 628

To Kill a Messenger: Television News and the Real World. William Small. Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media*. 1234

To the Maginot Line: The Politics of French Military Preparation in the 1920's. Judith M. Hughes. Reviewed by Jonathan M. House. 245

Totten, George O. Review of Ronald Dore, *British Factory—Japanese Factory: The Origins of National Diversity in Industrial Relations*. 1331

Towards a New Ireland. Garret FitzGerald. Reviewed by John H. Whyte in *Recent Writing on Northern Ireland*. 592

Trade Unions and Politics in Ceylon. Robert N. Kearney. Reviewed by Calvin A. Woodward. 1339

Tradition, Change, and Modernity. S. N. Eisenstadt. Reviewed by Marion J. Levy, Jr. 1261

Trebing, Harry M. Review of Richard Hellman, *Government Competition in the Electric Utility Industry: A Theoretical and Empirical Study*. 1310

Tretiak, Daniel. Review of Arthur A. Stahnke, ed., *China's Trade with the West: A Political and Economic Analysis*. 295

The Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Nov. 14, 1945-Oct. 1, 1946, with a new introduction by Gerhard L. Weinberg. Reviewed by John H. E. Fried in *The Great Nuremberg Trial*. 192

Trudeau and Foreign Policy: A Study in Decision-Making. Bruce Thordarson. Reviewed by Roger Frank Swanson. 268

The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism: Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and Internal Security, 1946–1948. Richard M. Freeland. Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay*. 560

Truman and the 80th Congress. Susan M. Hartmann. Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay*. 560

Truman, the Jewish Vote, and the Creation of Israel. John Snetsinger. Reviewed by Alan Fisher. 225

The Truman Period as a Research Field: A Reappraisal, 1972. Richard S. Kirkendall, ed. Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* 560
Tucker, Robert W. *The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy.* Reviewed by H. Bradford Westerfield. 1392
Tudor Men and Institutions: Studies in English Law and Government. Arthur J. Slavin, ed. Reviewed by T. B. Pugh. 207
Tullock, Gordon. *Communication: What Gordon Tullock Really Said.* 924
Tully, Alan. Review of Joseph Albert Ernst, *Money and Politics in America, 1755–1775: A Study in the Currency Act of 1764 and the Political Economy of Revolution.* 635
Tunstall, Jeremy. *Journalists at Work: Specialist Correspondents.* Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234
Turner, Carl B. Review of Antony C. Sutton, *Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1930 to 1945.* 1017
Two Democratic Labor Leaders in Conflict: The Latin American Revolution and the Role of the Workers. Carroll Hawkins. Reviewed by Robert J. Alexander. 242

Ulmer, S. Sidney and Bradley C. Canon. *Communication: The Supreme Court and Critical Elections: A Dissent.* 1215
Uncommon Sense. James MacGregor Burns. Reviewed by Franklin L. Burdette. 213
The United Nations: Past, Present, and Future. James Barros, ed. Reviewed by Harold K. Jacobson. 275
The United Nations: A Reassessment—Sanctions, Peacekeeping, and Humanitarian Assistance. John M. Paxman and George T. Boggs, eds. Reviewed by Lynn H. Miller. 1011
The United States and the Developing World: Agenda for Action. Robert E. Hunter, ed. Reviewed by Raymond C. Miller. 679
The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1947. John Lewis Gaddis. Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* 560
Urban Liberalism and Progressive Reform. John D. Buenker. Reviewed by Robert E. O'Connor. 212
Urofsky, Melvin T., ed. *Perspectives on Urban America.* Reviewed by Betty H. Zisk. 227
Uruguay's Tupamaros: The Urban Guerrilla. Arturo C. Porzecanski. Reviewed by Ronald H. McDonald. 252
The Uses of Disorder: Personal Identity and City Life. Richard Sennett. Reviewed by David Nexon. 986
Utopia and Reform in the Enlightenment. Franco Venturi. Reviewed by Rodney W. Kilcup. 973
Valins, Stuart, Edward E. Jones, David E. Kanouse, Harold H. Kelley, Richard E. Nisbett, and Bernard Weiner, eds. *Attribution: Perceiving the Causes of Behavior.* Reviewed by Peter W. Sperlich. 617
van den Haag, Ernest. *Communication: More on Political Violence.* 556
van der Kroef, J. M. *Indonesia After Sukarno.* Reviewed by Michael Leifer. 1003
Vatin, Jean-Claude. Review of Ernest Gellner and Charles Micaud, eds., *Arabs and Berbers: From Tribe to Nation in North Africa.* 1332
Veit, Lawrence A. Review of Jagdish N. Bhagwati, ed., *Economics and World Order from the 1970s to the 1990s.* 1373
Venturi, Franco. *Utopia and Reform in the Enlightenment.* Reviewed by Rodney W. Kilcup. 973
Verba, Sidney and Norman H. Nie. *Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality.* Reviewed by Jerrold G. Rusk in *Political Participation in America: A Review Essay.* 583
Vernon, Raymond. *Sovereignty at Bay:* The *Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises.* Reviewed by Robert Gilpin in *The Political Economy of the Multinational Corporation: Three Contrasting Perspectives.* ... 184
Victor Berger and the Promise of Constructive Socialism, 1910–1920. Sally M. Miller. Reviewed by David Kettler. 215
Vietnam: The Origins of Revolution. John T. McAlister, Jr. Reviewed by Charles A. Joiner. 1384
Villanueva, A. B. Review of Jose V. Abueva, *Ramon Magsaysay: A Political Biography.* 597
The Virgin Islands: A Caribbean Lilliput. Gordon K. Lewis. Reviewed by Charles D. Ameringer. 1007
"Virtue, Obligation and Politics" Revisited. Richard M. Bank and Steven R. McCarl. 886
Voluntary Associations: Perspectives on the Literature. Constance Smith and Ann Freedman. Reviewed by G. David Garson. 970
von der Mehden, Fred R. *Comparative Political Violence.* Reviewed by Cynthia H. Enloe. 269
Review of Eric A. Nordlinger, *Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies.* 250

Wage Patterns and Wage Policy in Modern China, 1919–1972. Christopher Howe. Reviewed by Alexander Eckstein. 657
Waldman, Sidney R. *Foundations of Political Action: An Exchange Theory of Politics.* Reviewed by Robert J. Sickels. 975
Walker, Thomas W. Review of Harold Eugene Davis, *Latin American Thought: A Historical Introduction.* 610
Walter, E. V. Review of Aprodicio A. Laquian, *Slums Are For People: The Barrio Magsaysay Pilot Project in Philippine Urban Community Development;* and Colette Pétonnet, *Those People: The Subculture of a Housing Project.* 1344
Review of Steven Marcus, *Engels, Manchester, and the Working Class.* 1283
Walton, Hanes, Jr. *Black Politics: A Theoretical and Structural Analysis.* Reviewed by Carolyn Sue Williams. 1317
Review of Sterling Stuckey, *The Ideological Origins of Black Nationalism;* and C. Eric Lincoln, *The Black Muslims in America.* 209
Waltz, Kenneth N. Review of Richard W. Sterling, *Macropolitics: International Relations in a Global Society.* 296
Walzer, Michael. *Political Action: A Practical Guide to Movement Politics.* Reviewed by Dale Rogers Marshall. 620
Wamsley, Gary L. Review of Steven B. Canby, *Military Manpower Procurement: A Policy Analysis.* 1301
Wanat, John and Phillip W. Roeder. *Communication: The Relative Impact of State and National Forces: A Comment on Rose's "National and Local Forces in State Politics."* 163
Ward, Alan J. Review of Patrick Buckland, *Irish Unionism 1: The Anglo-Irish and the New Ireland, 1885 to 1922;* and *Irish Unionism 2: Ulster Unionism and the Origins of Northern Ireland, 1886 to 1922.* 1324
Ward, Harry M. *Statism in Plymouth Colony.* Reviewed by Paul R. Lucas. 228
The War Disease. Norman Z. Alcock. Reviewed by William R. Thompson. 599
War and an Irish Town. Eamonn McCann. Reviewed by John H. Whyte in *Recent Writing on Northern Ireland.* 592
Warmenhoven, Henri J. Review of Forschungsinstituts der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, *Regionale Verflechtung Der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Empirische Analysen und Theoretische Probleme.* 1380
War and Morality. Richard A. Wasserstrom, ed. Reviewed by Terry Nardin in *Philosophy and International Violence.* 952
War and Moral Responsibility. Marshall Cohen, Thomas Nagel, and Thomas Scanlon, eds. Reviewed by Terry Nardin in *Philosophy and International Violence.* .. 952
Wasserstrom, Richard A., ed. *War and Morality.* Reviewed by Terry Nardin in *Philosophy and International Violence.* .. 952
The Wasted Nations: Report of the International Commission of Enquiry into United States Crimes in Indochina, June 20–25, 1971. Frank Browning and Dorothy Forman, eds. Reviewed by Douglas Kinnard. 278
Weber, Eugen. Review of J. S. McClelland, ed., *The French Right (from de Maistre to Maurras);* Michael D. Biddis, ed., *Gobineau: Selected Political Writings;* John Carroll, compiler, *Max Stirner: The Ego and His Own;* Alfred Rosenberg, *Race and Race History and Other Essays,* Robert Pois, ed. 1284
Weinberger, J. *Science and Rule in Bacon's Utopia: An Introduction to the Reading of the New Atlantis.* 865
Weiner, Bernard, Edward E. Jones, David E. Kanouse, Harold H. Kelley, Richard E. Nisbett, and Stuart Valins, eds. *Attribution: Perceiving the Causes of Behavior.* Reviewed by Peter W. Sperlich. 617
Weisman, Carol Sachs and Robert L. Crain. *Discrimination, Personality, and Achievement: A Survey of Northern Blacks.* Reviewed by Thomas F. Pettigrew. 1303
Weissman, Stephen R. *American Foreign Policy in the Congo, 1960–1964.* Reviewed by M. Crawford Young. 300
Welch, Richard E., Jr. Review of Estelle F. Feinstein, *Stamford in the Gilded Age: The Political Life of a Connecticut Town, 1868–1893.* 636
Welfare: The Social Issues in Philospohical Perspective. Nicholas Rescher. Reviewed by Charles E. Gilbert. 1291
Weltman, John J. *Systems Theory in International Relations: A Study in Metaphoric Hypertrophy.* Reviewed by Jeffrey A. Hart. 975
Westerfield, H. Bradford. Review of Robert W. Tucker, *The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy.* 1392
Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1930 to 1945. Antony C. Sutton. Reviewed by Carl B. Turner. 1017
West New Guinea: The Dispute and its Settlement. William Henderson. Reviewed by Ralph R. Premdas. 244
Whalen, Charles W., Jr. *Your Right to*

Know. Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media*. 1234
What You Don't Know Can Hurt You: A Study in Public Opinion and Public Emotion. Lester Markel. Reviewed in Ithiel de Sola Pool, *Government and the Media*. .. 1234
Wheeler, Douglas and René Pelissier. *Angola*. Reviewed by John Marcum. 1372
Whitaker, Donald P. et al. *Area Handbook for the Khmer Republic*. Reviewed by Stanley J. Heginbotham. 270
White, D. Gordon. Review of Charles Bettelheim, *Cultural Revolution and Industrial Organization in China: Changes in Management and the Division of Labor*. 641
White, Irvin L., Don E. Kash, and others. *Energy Under the Oceans: A Technology Assessment of Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Operations*. Reviewed by Charles O. Jones. 282
White, Lynn T. III. *Local Autonomy in China During the Cultural Revolution: The Theoretical Uses of an Atypical Case*. 479
Whiting, Allen S. *Communication: China and the Taiwan Question*. 552
Whyte, John H. *Recent Writings on Northern Ireland*. Review of Denis P. Barritt and Charles F. Carter, *The Northern Ireland Problem;* Ian Budge and Cornelius O'Leary, *Belfast: Approach to Crisis. A Study of Belfast Politics, 1613–1970;* James Callaghan, *A House Divided: The Dilemma of Northern Ireland;* Liam de Paor, Divided *Ulster;* Garret FitzGerald, *Towards a New Ireland;* Rosemary Harris, *Prejudice and Tolerance in Ulster: A Study of Neighbors and "Strangers" in a Border Community;* The London *Sunday Times* Insight Team, *Northern Ireland: A Report on the Conflict;* F. S. L. Lyons, *Ireland since the Famine;* Eamonn McCann, *War and an Irish Town;* John Magee, *Northern Ireland: Crisis and Conflict;* Conor Cruise O'Brien, *States of Ireland;* Richard Rose, *Governing Without Consensus: an Irish Perspective*. 592
Wiechers, Marinus. Review of Solomon Slonim, *South West Africa and the United Nations: An International Mandate in Dispute*. 294
Wilcox, Francis O. Review of Farag Moussa, *Manuel de Pratique Diplomatique: L'Ambassade*. 1010
Wildavsky, Aaron and Jeanne Nienaber. *The Budgeting and Evaluation of Federal Recreation Programs, or Money Doesn't Grow on Trees*. Reviewed by Allen Schick. 1313
Wilden, Anthony. *System and Structure: Essays in Communication and Exchange*. Reviewed by Harold D. Lasswell. 976
Will, George F., ed. *Press, Politics and Popular Government*. Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media*. 1234
Willhoite, Fred H., Jr. *Primates and Political Authority: A Biobehavioral Perspective*. 1110
Williams, Carolyn Sue. Review of Hanes Walton, Jr. *Black Politics: A Theoretical and Structural Analysis*. 1317
Will Japan Rearm? A Study in Attitudes. John K. Emmerson and Leonard A. Humphreys. Reviewed by Richard Storry. 649
Willrich, Mason and John B. Rhinelander, eds. *SALT: The Moscow Agreements and Beyond*. Reviewed by Colin S. Gray in *Detente, Arms Control and Strategy: Perspectives on SALT*. 1242
Wilson, Keith. Review of Ray Jones, *The Nineteenth-Century Foreign Office: An Administrative History*. 1382
Winks, Robin. *The Blacks in Canada: A History*. Reviewed by Mildred A. Schwartz. 1004
Winning Elections: A Handbook in Participatory Politics. Dick Simpson. Reviewed by Dale Rogers Marshall. 620
Wirsing, Robert G. Review of Lucius C. Caflisch, ed., *Annals of International Studies: Hydrospace in International Relations, Vol. 4 – 1973*. 1375
Wirt, Frederick and Michael W. Kirst. *The Political Web of American Schools*. Reviewed by Harmon Zeigler. 987
Woito, Robert. Review of Hans A. Schmitt, ed., *Historians of Modern Europe*. 1294
Wolfe, James H. Review of Dale Roy Herspring, *East German Civil-Military Relations: The Impact of Technology, 1949–72*. 654
Wolf, Frank. Review of Martin H. Seiden, *Cable Television U.S.A.;* and Harvey J. Levin, *The Invisible Resource*. 1315
Wolff, Richard D. *The Economics of Colonialism: Britain and Kenya, 1870–1930*. Reviewed by Robert L. Tignor. 271
Wolff, Robert Paul, ed. *1984 Revisited, Prospects for American Politics*. Reviewed by Joseph A. Schlesinger. 229
Wolfinger, Raymond E. *The Politics of Progress*. Reviewed by Paul E. Peterson. ... 1318
Wolpin, Miles D. *Military Aid and Counter-revolution in the Third World*. Reviewed by Colin S. Gray. 297
Woodward, Calvin A. Review of Robert N. Kearney, *Trade Unions and Politics in Ceylon*. 1339
Work in America. Special Task Force to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Wel-

fare. Prepared under the Auspices of the W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. Reviewed by Sebastian de Grazia. 1273
Work, Creativity, and Social Justice. Elliot Jaques. Reviewed by Sebastian de Grazia. 1273
Workers' Self-Management in Algeria. Ian Clegg. Reviewed by Clement Henry Moore. 1328
The Working Poor: Minority Workers in Low-Wage, Low-Skill Jobs. Dennis P. Sobin. Reviewed by Kathleen A. Frankovic. 226
Work, Society and Culture. Yves Simon. Reviewed by Sebastian de Grazia. 1273
World Population Policy: An Annotated *Bibliography.* Edwin D. Driver. Reviewed by Dorothy M. Stetson. 648
Woshinsky, Oliver. *The French Deputy: Incentives and Behavior in the National Assembly.* Reviewed by William H. Hunt. 271
The Writings of Henry D. Thoreau: The Maine Woods. Joseph J. Moldenhauer, ed. Reviewed by David M. Atkinson. 1295
The Writings of Henry D. Thoreau: Reform Papers. Wendell Glick, ed. Reviewed by David M. Atkinson. 1295
The Writings of Henry D. Thoreau: Walden. J. Lyndon Shanley, ed. Reviewed by David M. Atkinson. 1295
Wu, Yuan-li and Robert B. Sheeks. *The Organization and Support of Scientific Research and Development in Mainland China.* Reviewed by Alice Langley Hsieh. 272
Wyner, Alan J., ed. *Executive Ombudsmen in the United States.* Reviewed by William B. Gwyn. 230

The Yalta Myths: An Issue in U.S. Politics, 1945–1955. Athan Theoharis. Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* 560
Yarnell, Allen. *Democrats and Progressives: The 1948 Presidential Election as a Test of Postwar Liberalism.* Reviewed by Geoffrey S. Smith in *"Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics and Diplomacy, 1945–1954—A Review Essay.* ... 560
Yeager, Leland B. Review of G. C. Harcourt, *Some Cambridge Controversies in the Theory of Capital.* 1270
The Year Book of World Affairs, 1973. George W. Keeton and Georg Schwarzenberger, eds. Reviewed by Peter R. Baehr. 283
Yost, Charles W. *The Conduct and Misconduct of Foreign Affairs: Reflections on U.S. Foreign Policy Since World War II.* Reviewed by Earl C. Ravenal. 302
Young, M. Crawford. Review of Stephen R. Weissman, *American Foreign Policy in the Congo, 1960–1964.* 300
Your Right to Know. Charles W. Whalen, Jr. Reviewed by Ithiel de Sola Pool in *Government and the Media.* 1234
Yugoslav Communism and the Macedonian Question. Stephen E. Palmer, Jr. and Robert R. King. Reviewed by John C. Campbell. 1358

Zashin, Elliot M. *Civil Disobedience and Democracy.* Reviewed by Robert F. Sasseen. 1259
Zeigler, Harmon. Review of Frederick Wirt and Michael W. Kirst, *The Political Web of American Schools.* 987
Ziring, Lawrence. Review of Ralph Braibanti, *Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan.* 1323
Zisk, Betty H. Review of Melvin T. Urofsky, ed., *Perspectives on Urban America.* ... 227
Zucker, Norman L. *The Coming Crisis in Israel: Private Faith and Public Policy.* Reviewed by Paul Ritterband. 273

Low Cost Group Insurance Available to APSA Members

APSA INSURANCE PLANS

Group Life Insurance
$30,000 protection with gradual reductions after age 50
Lifetime coverage as long as you are a member of APSA
Optional Dependent Life Coverage

Accidental Death and Specific Loss
Worldwide Coverage
Permanent Total Disability Benefits

Hospital Cash Plan
$20 or $40 each and every day hospitalized
Payable for up to 365 days for each
period of hospital confinement
Benefits begin with the first day of hospitalization
Daily benefits are doubled if you are hospitalized for cancer

For further information write to:

Director, Insurance Programs
The American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

A Cricket in the Thorn Tree

Helen Suzman and the Progressive Party of South Africa
By Joanna Strangwayes-Booth
This biography of Helen Suzman, who for thirteen stormy years (1961-1974) was the sole representative of the Progressive Party in the South African parliament, summarizes the history of South African politics in recent years.
320 pages $12.50

FOUNDING PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

Two Hundred Years of Democracy on Trial
Edited by George J. Graham, Jr., and Scarlett G. Graham
A most appropriate celebration of the United States Bicentennial is a serious assessment of the principles upon which the nation was founded and an investigation of how they have evolved and endured during two hundred years of experience.
384 pages $17.50

POLITICS AND BUDGETING IN THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION

By Francis W. Hoole
This book approaches the WHO program in policy-making terms and focuses on the political struggle involved in the budgetary process. "[Hoole's] effort to test propositions through computer simulation is most successful." —Aaron Wildavsky
(International Development Research Center, Studies in Development, No. 11)
240 pages $10.00

DON'T MAKE NO WAVES... DON'T BACK NO LOSERS

An Insider's Analysis of the Daley Machine
By Milton L. Rakove
"A fascinating look at how the public's business has been handled in Chicago."—*New Republic*
". . . an authoritative and absorbing history of the Daley machine. . . . a comprehensive and refreshingly fair view of the Chicago organization." —*Chicago*
312 pages, photos paper $3.95 cloth $10.00

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS

A Critique and Approach to the Study of Public Administration
By Gary L. Wamsley and Mayer N. Zald
"Wamsley and Zald have confronted the paradigm problem in public administration by proposing a framework that links the field's traditional concerns with politics and management to organizational sociology. . . . valuable reading for students of public organization." —*American Political Science Review*
128 pages (a reprint) paper $3.50

INDIANA UNIVERSITY PRESS
Tenth and Morton Streets • Bloomington, Indiana 47401

HERE IS A "NUTS AND BOLTS" TEXT THAT REALLY DOES PROVIDE A FULL, FACTUAL, DESCRIPTIVE ACCOUNT OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT... leaving the instructor free to discuss the deeper questions of analysis and value!

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT
Structure and Process

Michael A. Krasner, Queens College of the City University of New York;
Stephen G. Chaberski, City College of the City University of New York;
D. Kelly Jones, Davidson College

This **NEW** text is a *thorough, concise, objective,* and *lively* presentation of the basics of American national government and politics. For a book of its easily manageable size, it includes unusually detailed information on the actual workings of the presidency, the Congress and its committees, the judiciary, and the bureaucracy, as well as interest groups and political parties. Its comprehensiveness, straightforwardness, and relative brevity make it suitable for a wide variety of course approaches. A major departure from most brief texts is the book's inclusion of a chapter on the media, a case-study on policy making, and a chapter on current issues and trends.

OTHER OUTSTANDING FEATURES OF THIS TEACHING TEXT INCLUDE —

- *Up-to-the-minute results* of the 1976 presidential and congressional elections.
- *Chapter contents* at the beginning of each chapter to facilitate the reader's grasp of the highlights and structure of the discussion.
- Key concepts, organizations, offices, etc., in *boldface* in the text.
- *End-of-chapter glossaries* of the boldface words, aiding the reader's study and review.
- A brief list of suggested supplementary readings for each chapter.
- The *Constitution* in the appendix.
- An *Instructor's Manual* with extensive test questions compiled by **Professor Thomas Scism** of Eastern Illinois University.

1977 384 pages (approx.) paper

$4.95

Macmillan

Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc.
100A Brown Street, Riverside, New Jersey 08075

New and forthcoming additions to Little, Brown's distinguished Political Science list...

Politics in France

Third Edition
Henry W. Ehrmann

Since 1971, when the Second Edition of this leading study of politics in France appeared, that country has gone through one national referendum, one parliamentary election, one presidential election, and a rather drastic restructuring of its party system. This new Third Edition will help students understand these important events in both their new and old contexts. Prof. Ehrmann was also prompted to write this revision by the continuing, impressive output of studies on modern French politics. Ehrmann critically reviews the most important discussions and indicates major areas that remain open for further investigation.

Paper 372 pages August 1976 $5.95

Cases in Comparative Politics

Third Edition
James B. Christoph
Indiana University
Bernard E. Brown
City University of New York

Extensively revised and updated, this new Third Edition of CASES IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS features eight case studies—two each on Britain, France, German, and the U.S.S.R.—that examine foreign and domestic policy-making in those countries. All of the cases were written by specialists expressly for this volume. New cases on university reform in France, codetermination in West Germany, and Ostpolitik have been added to this edition, and important new material has been incorporated into all the other cases. An introductory section deals with the case method in comparative politics and the concept of decision-making.

Paper 350 pages August 1976 $5.95



Political Socialization

Second Edition
Richard E. Dawson
Washington University
Kenneth Prewitt
University of Chicago
Karen Dawson
Washington University

Designed to introduce students to the process of political socialization, this book is organized around three basic issues: (1) What is learned through political socialization? (2) When and how does political socialization take place? (3) Through what social relationships and associations does political learning take place? In the new Second Edition, the authors have maintained the successful format of the original, while making significant changes in content and chapter order. A chapter comparing system and hegemonic theories of political system stability replaces the chapter on political culture. Chapters IV and V offer a more specific interpretation of the sequence and development of political outlooks (especially through childhood and adolescence). The latest thinking and research findings have been incorporated throughout.
Paper approx. 250 pages March 1977
$5.95 tent.

Behind the Scenes in American Government

People, Personalities, and Politics
Peter Woll
Brandeis University

The premise of this new reader is that the character and style of political leaders and the people around them have a profound impact on the political process. Prof. Woll has culled highly readable selections from popular media sources that show how different personalities interact with political institutions and processes to shape government. There are fascinating vignettes on party politicos, a pressure group leader, a Washington lawyer, a political reporter, Presidents and First Ladies, judges, a Cabinet Secretary and presidential advisor, and a top-level bureaucrat. BEHIND THE SCENES IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT was designed to bring politics alive for students. It is appropriate for use with any basic text. An Instructor's Manual is available.
Paper approx. 400 pages March 1977
$6.95 tent.

Power and Interdependence

World Politics in Transition

Robert O. Keohane
Stanford University
Joseph S. Nye
Harvard University

Two widely-known and highly-respected political scientists have developed a new theoretical approach to the analysis of contemporary world politics. This approach is based on the assumption that traditional, "realist" models of world politics are inadequate for understanding contemporary reality. Keohane and Nye argue that *transnational politics* – based on, or arising from, various economic interdependencies – is a force that tends to counteract, even negate, the nation-state thesis. This original approach is applied to the analysis of two issue-areas – international monetary policy and the oceans – plus two country relationships – the U.S./Canada and the U.S./Australia.

Paper approx. 300 pages
November 1976 $5.95 tent.

War, Peace, and International Politics

David W. Ziegler
Western Washington State College

Organized around the dramatic theme of war and its prevention, this new text provides an unusually coherent introduction to some of the basic concepts and propositions of international politics. The explicit intent of the author has not been to provide exhaustive coverage of the field, but rather to excite the interest of students. Ziegler takes a traditional, state-centered approach to his subject, providing a proper context for an understanding of the current literature that reacts against this orientation. Wherever possible he provides concrete illustrations of abstract concepts. An Instructor's Manual is available.

Paper approx. 464 pages
March 1977 $8.95 tent.


America in the Seventies

Problems, Policies, and Politics

Allan P. Sindler
University of California, Berkeley

AMERICA IN THE SEVENTIES features six *original* case studies – written by outstanding experts in their respective fields – on American politics and policy. It covers the major institutions of national government, as well as major current issues: busing, crime, affirmative action, impeachment, congressional reform, party reform. Its purpose is to involve and stimulate students and to promote class discussion.

Paper approx. 320 pages February 1977
$6.95 tent.



Felony Justice

An Organizational Analysis of Criminal Courts

James Eisenstein
Pennsylvania State University
Herbert Jacob
Northwestern University

In this important new book James Eisenstein and Herbert Jacob offer a comparative analysis of felony dispositions in three cities: Chicago, Detroit, and Baltimore. Their analysis is based on extensive observations and interviews in the field, as well as court and prosecutor file data on 4500 defendants. An explicit organizational approach facilitates understanding of the various patterns that emerge.

Paper approx. 280 pages
November 1976 $5.95 tent.

The Measure of Justice

An Empirical Study of Criminal Law Change

by RICHARD A. BERK, HAROLD BRACKMAN, and SELMA L. LESSER

A Volume in the QUANTITATIVE STUDIES IN SOCIAL RELATIONS Series

The long, heated debate over the ultimate sources of our criminal law reflects a variety of competing and complementary theoretical perspectives, including pluralism, conflict, consensus, and others. This timely study attempts to empirically evaluate some of the merits of these different approaches, using longitudinal data on the California Penal Code from the years 1955 to 1971. In addition to a traditional qualitative historical analysis of the period, it codes nearly 700 revisions in the law and analyzes them through Time Series techniques. Longitudinal trends for 12 different kinds of criminal law, including law affecting defendant rights, person crimes, property crimes, and crime without victims are plotted and described.

Using both the qualitative analyses and the findings of multivariate statistical procedures, the book proposes and tests various explanations for the over time patterns discovered. It finds that all of the perspectives have serious problems in accounting for the empirical data, but that the consensus model has the least to offer. The study concludes that the detailed content of our criminal law has far more to do with the exercise of political power than with fundamental notions of what is morally correct.

1976, about 300 pp., in preparation
ISBN: 0-12-091550-2

The New Jersey Income-Maintenance Experiment, VOLUME 1

Operations, Surveys, and Administration

edited by DAVID KERSHAW and JERILYN FAIR
with a Foreword to the Series by Robert J. Lampman

A Volume in the INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH ON POVERTY MONOGRAPH Series

The New Jersey Income-Maintenance Experiment is a three-volume series on the graduated work-incentive experiment dealing with a negative income tax and sponsored by the Office of Economic Opportunity from 1967 to 1972. The experiment is also noteworthy as an example of a critical cost-effectiveness study of a social program.

This first volume provides a nontechnical description of the experiment and its operations. It features: a summary of the history and results of the experiment; descriptions of the essential operating elements—selection of sample families, methods by which data were collected from the families, and the administration of the transfer payments; analysis of certain research and technical issues raised during the experiment; review of the more interesting and complex administrative problems faced as the experiment progressed.

1975, 246 pp., $15.00/£9.15
ISBN: 0-12-405050-6

Rebellion, Revolution and Armed Force

A Comparative Study of Fifteen Countries with Special Emphasis on Cuba and South Africa

by D. E. H. RUSSELL

A Volume in the STUDIES IN SOCIAL DISCONTINUITY Series

Recently banned in South Africa, this unique book is a systematic study of fourteen twentieth-century rebellions—seven successful and seven unsuccessful—with special emphasis on the behavior of the establishment armed forces in each instance. It begins by comparing the oppressiveness of the regimes of pre-rebellion Cuba and present-day South Africa. Finding the South African regime even more oppressive than the Cuban regime, the author argues that, according to most theories of the etiology of rebellion and revolution, a rebellion should have occurred in South Africa. This leads to a re-evaluation of prevailing theories of the nature of rebellion in the light of detailed analysis of the fourteen actual rebellions.

Written with precision and style, the volume contains such unusual features as: development of an original typology of rebellion, and redefinition of the terms "rebellion" and "revolution"; systematic examination of the concept of "regime oppressiveness"; emphasis on the importance of regime military variables rather than rebel military variables.

1974, 192 pp., $16.00/£9.75
ISBN: 0-12-785745-1


Send payment with order and save postage plus 50¢ handling charge.
Prices are subject to change without notice.

ACADEMIC PRESS, INC.

A Subsidiary of Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers
111 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10003
24-28 OVAL ROAD, LONDON NW1 7DX

"The CQ ***Guide to Congress*** is not only an invaluable historical reference for students of Congress, but an indispensable daily working tool in my congressional office and in the House Republican Conference which I chair. The new edition is a critical update, covering as it does the jarring events and landmark accomplishments of the last half-decade: the Watergate and intelligence inquiries and revelations, the impeachment proceedings, the warpowers and budget reforms, and the major power shifts and institutional changes in the Congress over the past few years."

—John B. Anderson (R Ill.)
Chairman, House Republican Conference



Guide to Congress

SECOND EDITION

1,100 pages, 8½ x 11"
LC No. 76-41925
November 1976.
Clothbound. $49.50.

Just Published - Second Edition

Announcing publication of a second edition of the book widely accepted as *the* reference on the U.S. Congress. This is no coffee-table edition—**Guide to Congress, Second Edition** belongs in every public library, college and high school in the country.

The first edition, published in 1971, was selected by the American Library Association as one of the "Outstanding Reference Books of 1971." The late Paul H. Douglas, former senator from Illinois, wrote, "It is a magnificent work, the best of its kind—reliable, accurate and fair."

But new legislation and changes in procedure prompted by Watergate, Vietnam and an increasingly Democratic Congress have outdated this standard reference work—hence this extensively revised second edition.

All the recent reforms are included plus scholarly but easily understandable explanations of how Congress works, its powers and the pressures upon it. Charts, a 225-page Appendix and a 45-page Index.

CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY INC.
Box 70, 1414 22nd St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037

Please mail _____ copies at $49.50 each of **Guide to Congress.**
Enclose payment and CQ will pay shipping
Mail to _____

_____

_____ Zip _____

The Finnish Dilemma

Neutrality in the Shadow of Power

George Maude. ☐ The author shows how consciousness of the basic dilemma inherent in Finland's security policy has led the country into an active foreign policy which seeks to promote multilateral relations and détente in the world without threatening the balance between the West and the Soviet Union. (Royal Institute of International Affairs)

1976 160 pp. $13.25

March 1939: The British Guarantee to Poland

A Study in the Continuity of British Foreign Policy

Simon Newman. ☐ Making full use of the new documents available, this work examines the origin and consequences of the British guarantee to Poland in March 1939. Although this study concentrates on an individual episode in the history of British foreign policy towards Hitler, the episode is used as a means of portraying a tenable, well-argued and well-documented interpretation of that policy in 1938 and 1939.

1976 264 pp. $14.25

On Capitalist Underdevelopment

André Gunder Frank. ☐ By presenting the history of underdevelopment in terms of political and economic changes which have affected it from its sixteenth-century beginning to the present, the author supports his thesis that underdevelopment is just as much a product and power of capitalism as is development.

1976 124 pp. paper $1.90

Second City Politics

Democratic Processes and Decision-Making in Birmingham

Kenneth Newton. ☐ How effective are the political institutions and processes which are supposed to guarantee the responsiveness and responsibility of political élites to citizens? To answer this question, Kenneth Newton draws on recent research in Birmingham, England, using it to test some of the main theories of democracy in urban society.

1976 284 pp.; 32 tables; figs. paper $11.00

The District

A Study in Decentralization in West Malaysia

J.H. Beaglehole. ☐ Based on research on the State of Kelantan in Malaysia, this study examines the consequences of political change and development policies for the colonial administrative legacy. The author discusses the actual working of district administration, and explores the particular problems of the interaction of administration and politics in an opposition state within a federal system. (Hull Monographs on South-East Asia)

1976 128 pp.; tables; map paper $6.75

Prices are subject to change.

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
200 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10016

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION AND THE

UNIVERSITY CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

ANNOUNCE

A New Annual Reference Publication

UNITED STATES POLITICAL SCIENCE DOCUMENTS

United States Political Science Documents (USPSD) is the published version of a computer-based file of political science information being developed continually by the University Center for International Studies, University of Pittsburgh, in conjunction with the American Political Science Association.

Over the past ten years the political, social, and policy sciences have been inundated with an increasing flow of journal information. Not until now has a convenient sorting, filing, and evaluation process been developed to enable the academic community to keep up with the masses of information in a timely manner. This is why *USPSD* was created.

Volume I of *USPSD* will include between 2,000 and 2,500 documents published during 1975. The set will be available from UCIS Publications during the summer of 1976. For further information or to place your order, write to UCIS Publications at the address below.

USPSD will enable you conveniently to keep abreast of all the major journals in the field of political, social, and policy science, such as:

American Political Science Review
Comparative Political Studies
Comparative Politics
Economic Development and Cultural Change
Foreign Affairs
Foreign Policy
International and Intercultural Communication Annual
International Development Review
International Education and Cultural Change
International Interaction
International Organization
International Relations
International Studies Quarterly
Journal of Conflict Resolution
Journal of International Affairs
Policy Analysis
Policy Studies Journal
Studies in Comparative Communism
Studies in Comparative International Development
World Affairs
World Politics

USPSD will be an annual reference publication which examines and analyzes every article in over 120 major political, social and policy science journals.

Each entry in *USPSD* provides:

1. Author;
2. Title;
3. Journal Source and pagination;
4. An Abstract that describes the scope, purpose, methods employed, and results obtained in each article;
5. A listing of Special Features that include titles of all tables, graphs, figures, and maps used in each article;
6. A listing of Authors Cited in footnotes or references;
7. A listing of Key Subject Descriptors attributed to each article;
8. A listing of the major Geographic Areas referred to in each article;
9. A listing of Proper Names of organizations, political institutions, laws, etc. mentioned in each article.

USPSD will be published annually in TWO PARTS. The abstracts of the journal articles will comprise PART II and include those items listed above. PART I consists of five indexes to all the articles abstracted in Part II; they are divided according to:

1. Author(s) of each article;
2. Descriptor Subjects that are attributed to each article (The descriptions are taken from over 3,000 terms listed in the Political Science Thesaurus);
3. Geographic Areas referred to in each article;
4. Proper Names of organizations, political institutions, laws, etc. mentioned in each article;
5. Journal in which each article is published.


USPSD can be purchased as a two volume set—PARTS I & II—or PART I, the indexes, can be purchased separately. Prices for both are as follows:

	Regular price	APSA-member price
PARTS I & II (Index & documents)	$90.00	$75.00
PART I (Index only)	$75.00	$60.00



University Center for International Studies
Publications Section
University of Pittsburgh
G-6 Mervis Hall
Pittsburgh, PA 15260
USA

The Political



The Politics of Power
A Critical Introduction to American Government
IRA KATZNELSON,
University of Chicago
MARK KESSELMAN,
Columbia University

"This is precisely the book I have been seeking for introductory courses in American politics and as a supplement for more advanced courses. It is a first-rate job, making valuable and sophisticated criticisms of American politics and social science and making them in a convincing and sophisticated manner."
—MARGARET LEVI, University of Washington

"An excellent book...presents an exciting and penetrating analysis of America's crisis in democratic rule. It has ignited terrific class discussions."
—WILLIAM J. STEVENSON, University of Wisconsin

Paperbound. 513 pages

Dilemmas of Democracy
Readings in American Government
Edited by PETER COLLIER

"*Dilemmas of Democracy* is the perfect reader for our American Government courses. I am greatly impressed."
—PAUL B. DAVIS, University of Utah

"This is an excellent collection indeed. The emphasis of this reader is in the right place for our times. Rather than trying to encompass the vast complexity or the minutiae of our vast governmental enterprise, this reader goes selectively into key issues and problems for citizens as they face the whole baffling confusion of government from day to day."
—REED M. SMITH, Wright State University

Paperbound. 385 pages

Clear and Present Dangers
A Conservative View of America's Government
M. STANTON EVANS,
Chairman, American Conservative Union


"Stan Evans has written an extraordinary book, sound in principle and insightful in analysis, that promises to be among the foremost conservative writings of the decade."
—PHILIP M. CRANE, U.S. House of Representatives

"This excellent book makes it possible for the first time to provide students with a responsible conservative analysis of U.S. government and politics."
—ANTHONY BOUSCAREN, Le Moyne College

"Virtually guarantees lively class discussions and student participation."
—ROBERT E. BARTLETT, Jr., Southeast Missouri State College

Paperbound. 433 pages

Winners in '76



The Chief Executive
THIRD EDITION
LOUIS W. KOENIG,
New York University

Described in its previous edition as "the best full-length study of the Presidency we now have,"* this Third Edition of *The Chief Executive* has again earned a reputation as the preeminent textbook in its field. The voting record: instructors at more than 200 colleges and universities, coast-to-coast, have adopted it for their courses this year.

*quoted in *U.S. News & World Report*, December 2, 1968

Paperbound. 452 pages

Cold War and Détente
The American Foreign Policy Process Since 1945
PAUL Y. HAMMOND,
University of Pittsburgh

"This is an excellent work, concise, yet well researched. Rather than merely being another postwar history, Hammond's narrative is decidedly analytical, enabling the reader to discern those underlying political dynamics affecting foreign policy choices. Enriching the text are Hammond's penetrating critiques of presidential failures and successes in handling international demands...In short, *Cold War and Détente* is a fine source for anyone who wishes to grasp the essentials of the American foreign policy process in the postwar era."
—LARRY ELOWITZ, Georgia College
from a review in *Military Affairs*

Paperbound. 370 pages

Congressional Power
Congress and Social Change
GARY ORFIELD,
The Brookings Institution

"It's just excellent. It will really help to stimulate new interest in Congress. It puts Congress in a whole new dynamic context."
—JAMES DAVID BARBER, Duke University

"...excellent—readable, intelligent, and a welcome addition to the literature on the Congress."
—NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, *Washington Post*, February 2, 1975

"The reader should find the treatment of popular stereotypes of Congress and the numerous criticisms of Congress refreshing."
—WESTON H. ANGOR, *Perspective*, June 1975

Paperbound. 339 pages

Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc.
New York · Chicago · San Francisco · Atlanta

REMAKING FOREIGN POLICY
The Organizational Connection
Graham Allison and Peter Szanton

"The most searching look at organizational issues in foreign affairs we have had for a generation. Must reading for scholars, commentators and, above all, new administrators. Allison and Szanton break new ground."—RICHARD E. NEUSTADT. This thoughtful critique of the foreign policy establishment shows how time and again—in Viet Nam, during the Middle East crisis, in the nuclear disarmament talks—*organizational* weaknesses led to failures in policy and implementation. If the dismal record of the past decade is to be improved, profound restructuring of the lines of information and authority must occur; the authors' recommendations are concrete and certain to provoke controversy.
Just published $10.95

THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
Walter Berns

In this provocative new interpretation of the First Amendment, Professor Berns argues that democracy depends on the *character* of the people and that law should help foster "those decent habits required for self-government." Thus, concludes Berns, the Supreme Court has strayed from the intentions of the Founding Fathers in, for example, extending freedom of speech to pornography, or in withholding public aid from parochial schools. "Powerful. . . . Hits the mark. . . . A contribution beyond measure."—HON. JOSEPH T. SNEED, *United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.*
Just published $12.50

THE GOVERNMENTAL HABIT
Controlling the Economy from Colonial Times to the Present
Jonathan R. T. Hughes

In this first history of governmental control of the American economy, Professor Hughes (author of the widely acclaimed *The Vital Few*) demonstrates that, contrary to common belief, interference with our economic affairs enjoys a long and popular history in this country and that, despite its patchwork inefficiency, it is unlikely that Americans will replace it with rational public policy any time soon.
Due January $11.95

KISSINGER
The European Mind in American Policy
Bruce Mazlish

Cutting through the gossip and polemics, this sensitive profile probes Kissinger's background—his childhood, his family's expulsion from Nazi Germany, his "Americanization" in the U.S. Army, his unusual patrons and connections—and looks at his "Europeanization," in turn, of U.S. foreign policy. "A first-rate job. . . . Mazlish puts his finger on the key factors in Kissinger's career . . . and he discusses these factors in a dispassionate, intelligent, provocative fashion."—STANLEY KARNOW, *Washington Post Book World.*
Just published $10.95

THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO
Translated with Notes and an Interpretive Essay by Allan Bloom

A classic text currently used in leading colleges and universities.
Cloth $15.00, Paper $5.75

NEW. SIGNIFICANT.
BASIC
BASIC BOOKS INC.
10 EAST 53RD ST, NEW YORK 10022

MASSACHUSETTS

Corporatism and Development
The Portuguese Experience

Howard J. Wiarda,
University of Massachusetts, Amherst

Professor Wiarda argues that corporatism—distinct from both liberalism and totalitarianism—is the Iberic-Latin American response to the major twentieth-century issues of capitalism, industrialization, and mass society. He examines the development of corporatist political ideology from Greek and Roman times to the present, using Portugal as a case study of corporatist practice. He documents the growth, transformation, and decline of Portugal's modern corporate state, concluding that though corporatism has failed to live up to its theoretical promises, it must not be dismissed as a model of analysis.

February 1977, 375 pp., cloth, $20.00

The Politics of Autonomy
A Kantian Reading of Rousseau's Social Contract

Andrew Levine,
University of Wisconsin, Madison

This volume is organized around three propositions: that resolution of the conflict between moral autonomy and legitimate state authority is the central problem in the *Social Contract*; that Rousseau understood this conflict better than the other contract theorists, notably Hobbes and Locke; and that Rousseau anticipated the attempt by Marx and other nineteenth-century thinkers to transcend traditional contractarian thought.

"The book is undogmatic, original and very easily understood. . . . In short, this is a first-rate book. . . "—Robert Paul Wolff.

December 1976, 208 pp., cloth, $12.00

University of Massachusetts Press Amherst, Massachusetts 01002

Problem selecting a text for your course?

Duxbury Press has the answer

Politics, Change and the Urban Crisis

by Bryan T. Downes, *Chairperson, Division of Public Affairs, School of Community Service and Public Affairs at the University of Oregon*

Downes develops a dynamic alternative to the Banfield-Moynihan model of urban politics. The first of the 'new generation' urban texts to organize on an anti-pluralist base, it treats change as both a goal and a perspective. The emphasis is on *policy* — past, present and future — and citizen participation.

September 1976. 6½ x 9¼. 325 pages. Paperbound.

Public Bureaucracy: Perspectives and Values

by James A. Medeiros, *U.S. Public Health Service and* David E. Schmitt, *Northeastern University*

A brief, lucidly written "invitation to public administration" kind of text. Medeiros and Schmitt explore the major issues and controversies in modern public administration within a three-pronged integrated framework — It evaluates strategies for: 1.) improving upon the *technical* base of bureaucracy (machine bureaucracy); 2.) improving organizational performance by improving its *human* base (*humane* bureaucracy); 3.) improving organizational performance by improving its *political* base (*political* bureaucracy).

December 1976. 6½ x 9¼. 200 pages. Paperbound.

The Chicano Political Experience: Three Perspectives

by F. Chris Garcia, *University of New Mexico and* Rudolph O. de la Garza, *The Colorado College*

The first text to provide a balanced, concise overview and analysis of the Chicano in the United States political system, past and present. The book assumes no previous knowledge of the American political system or of the Mexican-American people. Three dominant and competing theories of power distribution in the U.S. are employed to form the framework for the text — *pluralist, elite* and *internal colonialism* perspectives are provided on each aspect of the Chicano political experience.

December 1976. 6½ x 9¼. 200 pages. Paperbound.


In the problems lie the answers

Begin with the problems, how they are defined and confronted, then follow them through the formidable machinery of public policy.

That's the strategy behind the success of AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF PUBLIC POLICY. It has given the students a clear perception of the organic, shifting nature of the public policy process.

When the Jones text first appeared in 1970, the resurgence of interest in focusing on public policy as the key to understanding American politics was just emerging. The book was a pathbreaker.

Now Duxbury Press is proud to announce



An Introduction to the Study of Public Policy, 2nd edition

by Charles O. Jones, *Maurice Falk Professor of Politics, University of Pittsburgh, and Editor of the American Political Science Review*


- 4/5 of the text rewritten, infusing new conceptual material throughout
- New cases in energy, pollution, education, mental health, poverty
  An added chapter examining appropriations
- Research input from the author's recent book CLEAN AIR
  Equally provocative for introductory and advanced courses in American Politics and public policy

A framework-setting core text. February 1977. 5⅞ x 9. 272 pages. Paperbound.

Duxbury Press has the answers to your course needs. For more information on these and other Duxbury texts write:

Duxbury Press Box JA-12, 6 Bound Brook Court, N. Scituate, MA 02060

Announcing publication of:



ORDER FORM

Enclosed please find my check for $_____ for _____ copies.

Please bill my office $_____ for _____ copies.

Bulk Orders	APSA Departmental Service Member	Non-Member
10 copies	$ 3.00	$ 4.00
50 copies	12.50	17.50
100 copies	20.00	30.00

(Single copies are available for fifty cents each, prepaid.)

SEND TO: _____

_____

_____ Zip_____

Return this form with check to: Departmental Services Program
American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

Voting behavior... threat of nuclear mishap ... treatment of criminals and the mentally ill

America Votes:

What You Should Know About Elections Today

by Kevin Mulcahy and Richard Katz, both of Queens College, C.U. N.Y.

Here is an examination of the who, what, why, and how of American voting patterns today.

Drawing from Presidential, Congressional, state, and local election data, the authors explore the impact of issues, education, age, class, section of country, party identification, and a host of other variables to show why people vote the way they do.

Ready Paper $2.95 (02378-8)
Cloth $8.95 (02379-6)

The Nuclear Power Controversy

An American Assembly Book

Edited by Arthur Murphy, Columbia University

Nuclear power—is it the answer to an energy-hungry nations's prayer or a spectre of technological disaster?

In *The Nuclear Power Controversy,* seven authorities from the fields of atomic energy, economics, science, law, and technology offer information on key aspects of the current nuclear energy debate.

Ready Paper $3.95 (62557-4)
Cloth $9.95 (62558-2)

Decarceration:

Community Treatment and the Deviant—A Radical View

by Andrew Scull, University of Pennsylvania

Are early release programs, community rehabilitation centers, and half-way houses effective in treating criminals and the mentally ill? Or are such programs a danger to society and to the deviants themselves?

In *Decarceration,* Andrew Scull answers these and other questions, showing how the real reason behind these "reforms" is the state's urgent need to cut the cost of social control and its increasing ability to substitute welfare for institutionalization.

Ready Paper $3.95 (19764-0)
Cloth $8.95 (19765-7)

Spectrum Books on issues that matter.

At your bookstore.

Prentice-Hall, Inc. Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 07632

Teachers: for examination copies, contact your local Prentice-Hall field representative.

What's New from Winthrop Politics, and

Available December 3...

THE LOGIC OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 2nd Edition
Steven Rosen — The Australian National University and Brandeis University; **Walter Jones** — Northeastern University

This new edition of a widely adopted international relations text maintains its reputation for clarity, readability and lucid organization as well as its theoretical organization, which stresses perceptual theory (views of major actors in the contemporary international system and its components). *New in this Second Edition* is a chapter on America's major allies — Western Europe, Canada, Japan — with perspectives on them woven throughout the book. Also includes updated information on arms technology and national attitudes.

1977 448 pp. Paper $7.95

Available Now...

CONTEMPORARY POLITICS: EUROPE
Alexander J. Groth, Robert J. Lieber, Nancy I. Lieber — all of The University of California, Davis

New in 1976 and already acclaimed as the most innovative, up-to-date comparative government text available. A rare and excellent introduction to public policy questions and processes. Covers *standard* countries usually treated in most comparative government courses (Britain, France, Germany, Soviet Union) plus the *alternative* systems of government (Spain, Portugal, Greece, Yugoslavia).

1976 512 pp. Cloth $12.50

Available March 15...

DYNAMICS OF PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY: AN INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
Fred A. Kramer — University of Massachusetts, Amherst

A new basic text, with strong focus on organization theory and attention to modern management techniques.

1977 320 pp. Cloth $10.95 (est.)

Available March 15...

PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY, 2nd Edition
Fred A. Kramer — University of Massachusetts, Amherst

New revision of a unique set of readings with appeal to political science, public administration, business, and social welfare courses.

1977 200 pp. Paper $4.95 (est.)

Available March 15...

AMERICAN POLITICS IN A BUREAUCRATIC AGE: CITIZENS, CONSTITUENTS, CLIENTS, AND VICTIMS
Eugene Lewis — Hamilton College

Dynamic, provocative text, which argues that control of the public policy process has shifted to the public bureaucracy.

1977 250 pp. Paper $6.95 (est.)

in International Relations, Bureaucracy...

Available March 15...

AN INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL ANALYSIS
David Apter — Yale University

This much-needed introductory political science text reviews the several schools of thought in the growth of the discipline — Political Philosophy, Institutionalism, Behavioralism, Pluralism, Structuralism, and Developmentalism — and discusses the future of Political Science.

1977 400 pp. (est.) Cloth $11.95 (est.)

Available February 1...

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM: A RADICAL APPROACH
Edward S. Greenberg — University of Colorado

This new interpretation of our political system goes further than other 'alternative' texts for American Government courses. It is also the first text in political science which uses a Marxist approach to the study of American political life within a modern textbook format. Instructor's Manual by Steven Quick (Holy Cross College) available.

1977 480 pp. Paper $7.95

Available Now...

LEADERSHIP AND CHANGE:
THE NEW POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN ELECTORATE
Warren E. Miller and **Teresa E. Levitin** — both of Center for Political Studies, The University of Michigan

This just-published, already widely acclaimed text is the most recent, up-to-date analysis of American voting behavior over the past quarter century. An excellent candidate for your courses on Electoral and Voting Behavior, Public Opinion and Participation, Political Behavior, Political Sociology, and Political Parties.

1976 256 pp. Paper $6.95 Cloth $12.50

Prices subject to change without notice.

For further information, or to order examination copies of any of these texts, please write to: Richard J. Marran, Dept. WJ-089, Winthrop Publishers, Inc., 17 Dunster Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138.



Winthrop Publishers

Montesquieu and the Old Regime

Mark Hulliung

Was Montesquieu an "aristocratic liberal" or a "feudal reactionary?" In this reinterpretation Hulliung suggests that both characterizations are mistakes, in that they assume that Montesquieu was the supporter of aristocracy, of feudalism, of "intermediate bodies." Against these views the author argues that Montesquieu vigorously attacked the old social order, extolling England as the most free and progressive of nations. In sum, far from being an apologist for the old regime, Montesquieu was perhaps its most formidable critic. Hulliung draws upon all of Montesquieu's writings in highlighting the themes that were his lifelong concerns, and examines Montesquieu's relationship to other thinkers, especially Aristotle, Machiavelli, Bodin, Richelieu, and Bossuet.

272 pages, $11.50

Bail Reform in America

Wayne H. Thomas, Jr.

This is a study of major national efforts in the past 15 years to reduce the impact of money, and the lack of it, in determining whether a criminal defendant obtains freedom prior to trial. Thomas offers the results of a national study on bail reform since its beginning with the Manhatten Bail Project of 1961 and a survey of the major operational changes in the bail system since then. The successful use of release on own recognizance in the Manhatten Bail Project sparked bail reform legislation and lead to the development of other pretrial release mechanisms. Thomas concludes that the challenge of bail reform is to integrate existing pretrial release options in a comprehensive plan to provide the quickest, least restrictive form of release for defendants consistent with maintaining the integrity of the criminal justice system.

288 pages, $10.00

Reform and Revolution in China

The 1911 Revolution in Hunan and Hubei

Joseph W. Esherick

The 1911 revolution marked the end of the Chinese empire, but the ensuing years of warlordism demonstrated the weakness of republican institutions. Esherick seeks the political and social origins of the Revolution in two provinces, Hunan and Hubei, which throughout the period 1895-1913 were important centers of reform. Previous studies have stressed the vitality of the late imperial reform movement, and have suggested that, but for a failure in imperial leadership, the reforms could have become a viable alternative to revolution. Esherick sees the reforms as having facilated the creation of a new urban elite, which was as much interested in inhancing its own power as in reviving China.

335 pages, $15.00

Now in paperback

Curing the Mischiefs of Faction

Party Reform in America

Austin Ranney

"Ranney . . . is considered one of the most penetrating commentators on American party politics. His work combines a deep understanding of the workings of a two-party system in a complexly divided nation and a continuing preoccupation with the effects on democracy of different possible ways of organizing political parties . . . Presented with clarity, perspective, and fluency in a way that makes the book . . . must reading for students of American parties." —*Choice*

230 pages, $3.25

At bookstores



UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS
BERKELEY 94720

Social Limits to Growth
A Twentieth Century Fund Study

Fred Hirsch

$10.00

Fred Hirsch argues brilliantly that the limits on extension of welfare through growth are social as well as economic. In the future the debates should not be couched in terms of "how much growth" or of "no growth," but of why the affluent compete among themselves and how they create social scarcity. Kenneth Boulding comments, "(This) is an important book and a major contribution to social thinking and economics."

The Dynamics of Soviet Politics

Paul Cocks, Robert V. Daniels, and Nancy Whittier Heer, *Editors*

Russian Research Center Studies, 76

$17.50

Expert authors offer here an inside view of the workings of a closed political system. Their work, building upon the achievements of Soviet studies over the last thirty years, covers new ground that will enable future studies of Soviet politics and social practices to move ahead unencumbered by stereotypes and mystification.

The African Diaspora

Interpretive Essays

Martin L. Kilson and Robert I. Rotberg, *Editors*

$18.50

Since 1500, ten million Africans have left their homelands for destinations in the old and new worlds. *The African Diaspora* is the first book to chronicle and interpret this long, painful, but sometimes rewarding exodus. The editors, leading authorities on African, Caribbean, and black American history and politics, have assembled sixteen essays that delve into the ways in which Africans became exiles and how they responded to their new environment. This long-needed book corrects many myths of exodus and adaptation.

The United States and the Southern Cone

Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile

Arthur P. Whitaker

American Foreign Policy Library

$20.00

"As fine as anything Whitaker has ever written. . . . I think that it will rank for many years to come as among the most successful general syntheses that the Latin American field has produced since World War II."—Fredrick B. Pike

Whitaker writes about the closely linked cone countries from the time of their liberation to the present. He also treats each nation as a separate entity and traces its relations with the United States.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS

CAMBRIDGE, MA 02138



Supplementary Empirical Teaching Units in Political Science:

New computer related instructional materials whereby students learn important substantive topics in American politics as they learn methods of analysis.

Seven SETUPS: American Politics Are Available Now for Class Use

1. *Voting Behavior: The 1972 Election* by Bruce D. Bowen, C. Anthony Broh, Charles L. Prysby.
2. *Political Socialization Across the Generations* by Paul Allen Beck, Jere W. Bruner, L. Douglas Dobson.
3. *Political Participation* by F. Christopher Arterton, Harlan Hahn.
4. *The Supreme Court in American Politics: Policy Through Law* by John Paul Ryan, C. Neal Tate.
5. *U.S. Energy, Environment and Economic Problems: A Public Policy Simulation* by Barry Hughes.
6. *Representation in the United States Congress: 1973* by Ray A. Geigle and Peter J. Hartjens.
7. *The Dynamics of Political Budgeting: A Public Policy Simulation* by Marvin K. Hoffman.

Four SETUPS: Cross-National and World Politics Will Be Available for Class Use, Winter 1977

1. *Comparative Voting Behavior* by Herbert B. Asher, Bradley Richardson.
2. *The Budgetary Process in Cross-National Perspective* by John Creighton Campbell, John M. Echols.
3. *Conflict in the Middle East: A Public Policy Simulation* by Karen Ann Feste.
4. *Are Political Values Really Changing?* by Charles Taylor.

Each SETUPS is a module that can be taught in one to two weeks. SETUPS were designed to supplement instruction in introductory courses. But SETUPS have been field tested successfully in upper division courses. SETUPS were developed by faculty in workshops supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation to the American Political Science Association and hosted by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, summer, 1974 and summer 1975.

Each SETUPS Module Includes a Monograph and a Data Set

The monograph is a 5½" x 8½" paperback of approximately 100 pages with:

1. A substantive essay on the topic.
2. Analytical exercises.
3. Instructions about how to do the exercises.
4. Suggestions for further readings and exercises.
5. A code book for the data set.

The data sets are prepared and distributed by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. SETUPS data can be ordered for use with SPSS, OSIRIS or as card image.

Each SETUPS will cost $3.50. Lower prices are arranged for bulk orders. An order for 25 or more SETUPS will entitle you to the data sets for *all the SETUPS* at no extra charge.

To Order SETUPS

Order the SETUPS monographs from the American Political Science Association through your bookstore. Ask your bookstore to include your name when they place the SETUPS order with APSA. When we confirm the bookstore order, we shall send you a data-specification form if your school does not have the SETUPS data set already.

Announcing

Giovanni Sartori's

PARTIES AND PARTY SYSTEMS

A Framework for Analysis

"The appearance of the first volume of Giovanni Sartori's *Parties and Party Systems* is the most important event in political parties' scholarship since Ostrogorski opened the subject to systematic inquiry at the turn of the century. It draws on a remarkable historical depth and systematizes and interprets contemporary knowledge of parties and party systems in Europe, the Americas, Africa and Asia. It is theoretically subtle and profound, methodologically sophisticated and rigorous. It will be the leading work in the field for a long time to come."—GABRIEL ALMOND, *Stanford University*

"Readers of Professor Sartori's long awaited book on political parties will not be disappointed. It will be for the next generation of scholarly work on parties what Duverger's was for the last. One may agree or disagree with what Sartori has to say but for many years to come his will serve as the authoritative statement that every serious discussion of political parties will have to take into account."—ROBERT A. DAHL, *Yale University*

"The first major general book on its topic in two decades. Required reading for all who seek to understand political parties."
—FRED GREENSTEIN, *Princeton University*

This first volume of Giovanni Sartori's two-volume work is fully self-contained. The second volume is in preparation.

Cloth $32.50 Paper $10.95

Cambridge University Press



32 East 57th Street, New York, N.Y. 10022

MASS SOCIETY AND POLITICAL CONFLICT

Towards a Reconstruction of Theory

SANDOR HALEBSKY

This volume critically analyzes, and offers alternatives to, one of the major contemporary interpretations of the origin of support for radical or extremist political behavior—the political theory of mass society. Cloth $19.95 Paper $6.95

THE PRACTICE OF RIGHTS

RICHARD E. FLATHMAN

Professor Flathman sets forth a systematic theory of individual rights based on concepts of practice or sets of practices. He challenges aspects of both traditional liberal thought and communitarian conceptions of the relationship between the individual and political society. $15.95

CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND THE ENVIRONMENT

HUGH STRETTON

The author presents a theory of socialism which includes a radical revision of socialist ideas of alienation and puts questions of land, city and environmental use at the center of its social-democratic program. Cloth $19.95 Paper $6.95

THE MAKING OF MODERN BELIZE

Politics, Society and British Colonialism in Central America

C. H. GRANT

The most detailed study of Belizean politics ever attempted, examining the processes and institutions from the seventeenth century through the 1974 general election. $32.50

LIBERIA AND SIERRA LEONE

An Essay in Comparative Politics

CHRISTOPHER CLAPHAM $10.95

THE CRITICAL PHASE IN TANZANIA 1945-1968

Nyerere and the Emergence of a Socialist Strategy

CRANFORD PRATT $19.95

Cambridge University Press

32 East 57th Street, New York, N.Y. 10022



Existential Marxism in Postwar France

From Sartre to Althusser

MARK POSTER

"Poster has construed his subject in so wide a fashion as to have written a virtual intellectual history of modern France. His book articulates the resources and dilemmas of two of the most significant modes of thought in the modern world. . . . No other English-language study covers so much ground."—*Fredric Jameson, University of California* $17.50

On War • CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ

Edited and Translated by MICHAEL HOWARD and PETER PARET
With Commentaries by PETER PARET, MICHAEL HOWARD, and BERNARD BRODIE

On War constitutes the most significant attempt in Western history to understand war, both in its internal dynamics and as an instrument of policy. Since the work first appeared in 1832 it has influenced generations of soldiers, statesmen, and intellectuals. The present edition for the first time returns to the original German to make a classic of Western thought available to the English-speaking world in a reliable and readable text. *Written under the auspices of the Center of International Studies, Princeton University* • $18.50

The Irish Triangle

Conflict in Northern Ireland

ROGER H. HULL

"This is the first major analytic study of the Irish conflict that develops guidelines for appraisal and settlement. It promises to be an exceedingly useful volume."—*Richard A. Falk, Princeton University.* In his examination of the struggle, Hull sympathetically presents the views from Dublin, London, and Belfast, his analysis of them, and his own conclusions. $15.00

Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution

H. GORDON SKILLING

For about eight months in 1968 Czechoslovakia underwent rapid and radical changes that were unparalleled in the history of communist reform; in the eight months that followed, those changes were dramatically reversed. Skilling provides a comprehensive analysis of the events of 1968, assessing their significance both for Czechoslovakia and for communism generally. *Written under the auspices of the Centre for Russian and East European Studies, University of Toronto*

Cloth, $45.00 • Limited Paperback Edition, $15.00

Imperial Germany and a World Without War

The Peace Movement and German Society, 1892-1914

ROGER CHICKERING

This book provides the first thorough examination of the peace movement in pre-World War I Germany, concentrating on the factors in German politics and society that account for the movement's weakness. The author draws on a wide range of documents to survey the history, organization, and ideologies of the peace groups, placing them in their social and political context.

Cloth, $27.50 • Limited Paper back Edition, $10.50

Now In Paperback

DÉTENTE IN EUROPE: Real or Imaginary?
JOSEF KORBEL • Paper, $3.95 • Cloth, $12.50

THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF ROUSSEAU
ROGER D. MASTERS • Paper, $4.95 • Cloth, $17.50

Princeton University Press • Princeton, New Jersey 08540

W
DE
G

Walter de Gruyter
Berlin · New York

Parliaments of the World

A Reference Compendium
Prepared by Valentine Herman with the collaboration of Françoise Mendel
Edited by Inter-Parliamentary Union
1976. Large-octavo. XII, 985 pages. Bound DM 168,–; $70.00
ISBN 3 11 006975 X

Parliaments of the World is an exhaustive survey of all aspects of the composition, organisation and operation of 56 Parliaments as well as their legislative, budgetary and control functions. It takes the form of a series of 70 tables with country-by-country entries, each table being preceded by explanatory text.

The book contains material gathered during an international enquiry conducted by the International Centre for Parliamentary Documentation, a department of the Inter-Parliamentary Union.

Parliaments of the World is deliberately conceived as a compilation of data displayed for each country in turn, avoiding judgements and evaluations. The result is a reference compendium of lasting interest to scholars as well as to parliamentarians, politicians, journalists and all people involved in the work and life of parliamentary institutions.

$-price is subject to change without further notice.

For USA send orders to
Walter de Gruyter, Inc., 3 Westchester Plaza, Elmsford, New York 10523

New Editions of Distinguished Texts

Democracy for the Few

Second Edition

Michael Parenti

- A best-selling analysis and critique of American government and politics, *Democracy for the Few* has been hailed as:

  "By far the best American government text I've seen."
  —William A. Barnes, Ohio State University—Lima

  "...a first class study—a creative piece of work beyond what one normally refers to as a textbook."
  —H. H. Wilson, Princeton University

  "An outstanding book which launches an intelligent, well-reasoned, frontal assault on the sacred cows of American politics."
  —H. Michael Erisman, Mercyhurst College

- The Second Edition, while retaining the basic structure and size of the First, includes updated materials and examples, and expanded chapters on the media, law and order, and political economy.

  February 1977 approx. 320 pages, illustrated
  paperbound, $4.95 (tentative)

State Politics in the United States

Second Edition

Kenneth T. Palmer, *University of Maine—Orono*

- Widely used in courses on state and local government and American government, *State Politics in the United States* has been cited as:

  "The best short text on state politics I have seen."
  —Paul C. Schmidt, California State University

  "Concise and penetrating analysis of the fundamental patterns of state politics." *—Bill Jackson, Mobile College*

- This thoroughly revised and updated edition features helpful chapter summaries and includes new material on intergovernmental relations, public policymaking, public opinion, state bureaucracies, and state environmental differences.

  February 1977 approx. 240 pages, illustrated
  paperbound, $4.95 (tentative)

from St. Martin's Press

American Government
A Brief Introduction

Second Edition

Max Skidmore, *Southwest Missouri State University*
and
Helen Marshall Carter, *University of Texas at El Paso*

- Brief, comprehensive, and flexible, here is the second edition of a highly successful, provocative core text for courses in American government.

  "Exactly what I've been looking for—a short, pithy book that lays out the broad outlines of American government and how it actually performs . . . an ideal core book."
  —William Jenkins, Wayne State University

- Thoroughly updated, the Second Edition includes material on Watergate, congressional reform, the Ford presidency, and the 1976 elections.
- A revised and expanded Instructor's Manual is available.

February 1977 approx. 256 pages, illustrated
paperbound, $4.95 (tentative)

Technology and Man's Future

Second Edition

edited by
Albert H. Teich, *George Washington University*

- A new, extensively revised edition of a highly acclaimed text—

  "An important, provocative work, particularly useful in the study of change." *—Avtar Singh, East Carolina University*

  "In a class by itself as a selection of readings on the subject."
  —Lester G. Hawkins, SUNY at Albany

- Organized to provide maximum flexibility, the articles include some of the most significant contemporary thought on the relationship between technology and society—the only book now available that gives thorough coverage of the "limits of growth" debate and issues of assessment and control.

February 1977 approx. 300 pages paperbound, $4.95 (tentative)

For complimentary examination copies, please write (specifying course titles and approximate enrollments) to:

St. Martin's Press
P.O. Box 5352
New York, N.Y. 10017

FREE THE GSS 76

THE 1976 GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEY

contains 1,499 souls willing to tell all about:

- Party Identification
- Presidential Vote
- Political Ideology
- Confidence in Institutions
- Political Toleration
- Spending Priorities
- Abortion,Busing,Crime, Drugs, Foreign Affairs, Gun Control, Taxes, etc.

DISTINGUISHING CHARACTERISTICS:

* 5th Annual National Survey
* Replicates Many Earlier Surveys
* NORC conducted, NSF funded
* Available to All Researchers
* Proven Teaching Aid
* $200 for Data Set (13¢ a Respondent)

To help liberate the 1976 GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEY contact

Roper Public Opinion Research Cntr

Williamstown, MA. 01267

From the "Red Scare" to Women's Rights, the fight for civil liberties goes on...

THE PULSE OF FREEDOM: American Liberties, 1920-1970s spans five decades of this country's struggle to maintain and enlarge basic human rights. Six scholar-historians chart the course of this often bitter struggle: the amnesty drive for World War I conscientious objectors; the Scopes "monkey trial"; the curbs on liberty during World War II; the McCarthy years; the beginnings of school desegregation in the 50s; and the large-scale civil rights advances and student protests.

THE PULSE OF FREEDOM tells the stories behind the fight by the American Civil Liberties Union and others against suppression of or injustice for men and ideas of the widest possible spectrum: for black sharecroppers and members of the Ku Klux Klan; for an accused murderer and an antiwar demonstrator; for a dismissed teacher and a member of the American Nazi Party. "There is no better survey of this kind in print!" —*The Nation*. "Fine and authoritative." —*Library Journal*


THE PULSE OF FREEDOM

AMERICAN LIBERTIES: 1920-1970s

Edited by Alan Reitman


Foreword by Ramsey Clark

A Mentor Book MJ1484/$1.95



NEW AMERICAN LIBRARY
EDUCATION
120 Woodbine Street
Bergenfield, New Jersey 07621

MENTOR NAL



TIRED OF ELECTION YEAR HOOPLA?

OUR TEXTS PROMISE REASON, NOT RHETORIC

AMERICAN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT,
Thirteenth Edition
1977, 512 pages, $12.95*

AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT,
Thirteenth Edition
1977, 640 pages, $14.95*

John H. Ferguson and Dean E. McHenry

The most thorough revision in the thirty-year history of these highly successful texts. More than 50% rewritten, both books have been reduced in length, and the writing has been made simpler, clearer, and more readable for today's student.

Features you'll find in both texts

- Results of the 1976 presidential election are analyzed
- Traditional political concepts and practices are re-examined in light of current issues
- Thoughtful coverage is given to revenue sharing, election financing, Congressional reform and counter-reform, the energy crisis and the Federal response to it, and other contemporary issues

Features you'll find in AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT

- Increased emphasis on citizen participation at the local level
- New discussion of finances and services including state and local debt
- Five chapters that explore in depth state and local government and the problems and challenges they face

College Division
McGraw-Hill Book Company

1221 Avenue of the Americas
New York, N.Y. 10020

UNDERSTANDING AMERICAN POLITICS THROUGH FICTION,
Second Edition
Myles L. Clowers,
San Diego City College,
and Lorin Letendre,
CTB/McGraw-Hill and Cabrillo College

Organized to accommodate either the topical (institutions) or the systems approach, this paperback features writers from the entire political spectrum. *New to this edition:* A new chapter on the Constitution; a new chapter on policy; and new selections on political polling, political campaigning, interest groups, nativism and ethnic politics, bureaucratic discretion of the CIA, and plea bargaining. 1977, 356 pages, paper, $4.95*

POLICE ADMINISTRATION,
Fourth Edition
The late Orlando W. Wilson
and Roy Clinton McLaren,
Chief of Police, Arlington, Virginia
and former Director, Field Operations Division, International Association of Chiefs of Police

This text covers all aspects of police administration, establishing a coherent system which is internally consistent. *New to this edition:* A new chapter on team policing; a new chapter on management theory and organizational behavior; and new material on the impact of women and minorities in law enforcement, the implications of several important pieces of recent legislation, management by objectives, zero-base budgeting, enhancement of productivity, crime resistance, SWAT, hostage negotiation, and technological advances. 1977, 768 pages, $13.95

*Instructor's manuals are available for these texts.


Prices subject to change.

THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION,
Third Edition
C. Herman Pritchett,
University of California, Santa Barbara

Now in its third edition -- the classic analytical examination of the Constitution. More than 1,000 Supreme Court cases are analyzed or cited. *New to this edition:* Coverage of every important constitutional issue that has arisen, since the last edition -- including capital punishment, affirmative action, exclusionary zoning, abortion, and executive privilege, 1977, 704 pages, $16.50

GOVERNING URBAN AMERICA,
Fifth Edition
Charles R. Adrian,
University of California, Riverside,
and Charles Press,
Michigan State University

Written with sympathy for the problems of local government officials, this text presents a realistic appraisal of strengths and weaknesses of both government and citizens. *New to this edition:* New approaches to urban financing, especially revenue sharing; analysis of the trend toward structural change; reorganized and rewritten chapters on urban public and metropolitan areas; coverage of recent developments such as "neighborhood" government and minority and women candidates. 1977, 512 pages, $12.95



College Division
McGraw-Hill Book Company

1221 Avenue of the Americas
New York, N.Y. 10020

DAVID McKAY COMPANY, INC.

publishers

750 Third Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10017

949-1500

Cable: DAVMACAY NEW YORK

Edward Artinian
Vice President / Director
College Department

1 December 1976

Dear Political Scientist:

David McKay is proud to announce the publication in April of THE ELECTION OF 1976 by Gerald M. Pomper, chairman of the political science department at Rutgers University. This book offers an early interpretation of the crucial election of 1976 by five specialists in American politics.

In seven chapters the authors will analyze the Presidential nominations, the Presidential election, the issues of the campaign, the Congressional election and legislative prospects, the likely course of the new administration, important state and local elections, and the significance of the 1976 contest in the long-term development of American history.

The contributors of the essays include Ross K. Baker, Wilson Carey McWilliams, Jr., Henry A. Plotkin, Charles E. Jacob, and Gerald M. Pomper.


This volume will supplement every American politics text and bring it up-to-date. It will be 176 pages and priced at only $3.95 in paperback, be sure to order your desk copy now.

Sincerely,

Edward Artinian

EDWARD ARTINIAN

EA/su




NOW AVAILABLE

The 5th edition of the authoritative compilation of Ph.D. and Masters programs in political science is completely revised and now contains the *names and fields of specialization of all faculty in graduate departments.*

$4.00 (prepaid)

Available Direct From:
The American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036


PUBLICATIONS FROM UNITED NATIONS



DEMOGRAPHIC YEARBOOK 1974

The twenty-sixth issue of the Demographic Yearbook contains 1974 statistics of area, population, natality, mortality, nuptiality and divorce for every country of the world, latest available data on expectation of life and a 7-year trend of international arrivals and departures. Data on the economic characteristics of the population are shown, including labour force participation rates by age and sex as well as various cross-classifications of population by industry occupation, status, age and sex. The Special Topic for this edition is: Mortality Statistics.

Order No.E/F.75.XIII.1
Clothbound $42.00



STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 1975

Important compilation of statistics from countries throughout the world covering a wide range of economic and social subjects, including: population, agriculture, manufacturing, construction, transport, trade, balance of payments, national income, education and culture. Improved statistical coverage has enabled the YEARBOOK to widen the territorial scope of many of its tables and to provide more comprehensive and accurate world and continental aggregates.

Order No.E/F.76.XVII.1
Clothbound $42.00

United Nations Publications
Room LX-2300
New York, N.Y. 10017

or

United Nations Publications
Palais des Nations
1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland

OXFORD

Freedom and the Court
Third Edition

HENRY J. ABRAHAM, University of Virginia. This well-known work articulates the role of the United States Supreme Court in its continuing endeavor to identify and justify the lines and limits that our democratic system imposes in an effort to reconcile the rights of individuals and society. In this Third Edition, the author focuses on major issues of public law, such as freedom of expression, racial and political equality, criminal justice, and religion.

February 1977 480 pp. cloth $17.95 paper $4.50

Karl Marx Reader

Edited by DAVID McLELLAN, University of Kent. This volume provides a full account of the thought of Karl Marx. The arrangement of the readings is chronological, thus emphasizing the development of Marxian thought. Much of the material in this book has never been published in English or found in popular volumes of Marx readings.

Spring 1977 752 pp. cloth $12.00 paper $5.95

Party Dynamics
The Democratic Coalition and the Politics of Change

RICHARD L. RUBIN, Columbia University. A penetrating analysis of the weakening of past relationships within the Democratic party, this book also provides insights into the dynamics of the American party system.
". . . Professor Rubin has rendered great service in this taut, fact-laden book. He does not waste or mince words." —George Daly in **New York Law Journal**

1976 220 pp. cloth $9.95 paper $4.00

Secrecy and Foreign Policy

Edited by THOMAS M. FRANCK, New York University; and EDWARD WEISBAND, State University of New York, Binghamton. In this collection of twenty-four readings, leading legislators, policy makers, lawyers, and journalists probe the delicate balance between the people's right to know and the government's need for confidentiality, as seen in such cases as Watergate, the Pentagon Papers, and the question of "executive privilege."

1974 (paper, 1976) 480 pp. cloth $15.95 paper $4.00

The Brazilian Communist Party
Conflict and Integration 1922 - 1972

RONALD H. CHILCOTE, University of California, Riverside. The author examines the history, structure, and potential of the Communist Party of Latin America's largest nation in "an invaluable book for those interested in understanding the Latin American Left." —Joseph A. Ellis, City College of New York. "I think this will stand as the definitive work on the Brazilian Communist Party in English." —James Nelson Goodsell, **Christian Science Monitor**

1974 380 pp. $17.50

Prices and publication dates are subject to change.

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
200 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10016

Listing and Order Form for Publications of the AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

Quarterly journal of scholarly articles and book reviews in political science. Included in APSA membership. Back issues: $10.50 per copy; $42.00 per volume.

PS

Quarterly journal of Association news and articles of professional concern. Included in APSA membership. Back issues: $2.00 per copy; $8.00 per volume.

DEA NEWS FOR TEACHERS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Newspaper on education and the curriculum. Included in APSA membership.

ANNUAL MEETING PROGRAM

Final program for APSA Annual Meeting. Included in Annual Meeting Registration. Extra copies: $.50.

APSA ANNUAL MEETING PAPERS**

Hard copies, $3.00 each.

APSA ANNUAL MEETING PROCEEDINGS**

Microfilm reels of all papers, 1901-1912; 1956-present. $22.00 per reel. (approx. 7 reels per meeting.)

CUMULATIVE INDEX TO THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW**

1906-1968, $6.50.

CUMULATIVE INDEX TO THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL MEETINGS**

Key word index to all papers included in proceedings of Annual Meetings for 1904-1912; 1956-1970: $18.50.

WOMEN IN POLITICAL SCIENCE: STUDIES AND REPORTS, 1969-71 OF THE APSA COMMITTEE ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION**

PB 486, $6.00 microfilm; $16.50 Xerographic reprint (U.S. prices).

POLITICAL SCIENCE THESAURUS

A major reference tool in political science; this volume represents the terminology control device for a computer-based information retrieval service. Individuals: Hardback: $20.00; Paper: $15.00. Institutions: Hardback: $30.00; Paper: $25.00.

APSA BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY (Sixth Edition, 1973)

Biographical information on over 7,000 Association members, plus names and addresses for approximately 12,500 members. Members: Hardback: $7.50; Paper: $5.00. Non-Members: Hardback: $12.50; Paper: $10.00.

APSA DIRECTORY OF MEMBERS: ANNUAL SUPPLEMENT TO THE APSA BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY

Names and current addresses of all APSA members. $3.00 each.

GUIDE TO PUBLICATION IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

Co-sponsored by the APSA Committee on the Status of Women and the Women's Caucus for Political Science. $1.00.

ROSTER OF WOMEN IN POLITICAL SCIENCE (4th edition)

Biographical information on women political scientists. $3.00 each for members; $5.00 for non-members.

ANNUAL APSA DIRECTORY OF DEPARTMENT CHAIRPERSONS

Names and addresses of Chairpersons of departments offering political science at four-year institutions. $20.00 each.

PERSONNEL SERVICE GUIDELINES FOR EMPLOYERS AND APPLICANTS

Pamphlet containing information and guidelines for members of the APSA Personnel Service and for employers listing their vacancies in the Personnel Service Newsletter. No charge.

PERSONNEL SERVICE NEWSLETTER

Monthly listing of positions for political scientists. APSA Members: $8.00 subscription.

CAREERS AND THE STUDY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE: A GUIDE FOR UNDERGRADUATES

A monograph discussing the relationship between political science knowledge and skills and careers in law, government, business, journalism, teaching, etc. $.50 each; bulk rates available.

**Order from: Customer Service Department, University Microfilms, 313 North First Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106.

CAREER ALTERNATIVES FOR POLITICAL SCIENTISTS: A GUIDE FOR FACULTY AND GRADUATE STUDENTS by Thomas E. Mann

A monograph containing practical advice for obtaining nonacademic employment. $1.00 each.

GUIDE TO GRADUATE STUDY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

Compilation of Ph.D. and Masters programs in political science. The 1976 Guide is revised and expanded to include listings of faculty and fields of specialization. $4.00 each.

SOURCES OF FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR POLITICAL SCIENTISTS: RESEARCH EDUCATION, PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT BULLETIN 1: SUPPORT FOR PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT: FELLOWSHIPS AND TRAINEESHIPS

Information on post-doctoral fellowships, internship programs, special training support and foreign travel grants available to faculty and advanced graduate students. $1.00 each.

GLOBAL DIMENSIONS IN U.S. EDUCATION

A joint publication of the APSA Committee on Pre-Collegiate Education, the Education Commission of the International Studies Association, and the Center for War/Peace Studies of the N.Y. Friends Group, Inc. Four publications: The Elementary School, The Secondary School, The University, The Community. $1.50 each, $5.00 per set.

COMPARING POLITICAL EXPERIENCES

Complete description of an alternative course for high school government instruction. $2.75 each.

SETUPS: AMERICAN POLITICS

Supplementary Empirical Teaching Units in Political Science

New computer related instructional materials whereby students learn important substantive topics in American politics as they learn methods of analysis. *Voting Behavior: The 1972 Election* by Bruce D. Bowen, C. Anthony Broh, Charles L. Prysby. *Political Socialization Across the Generations* by Paul Allen Beck, Jere W. Bruner, L. Douglas Dobson. *Political Participation* by F. Christopher Arterton, Harlan Hahn. *Representation in the United States Congress: 1973* by Ray A. Geigle, Peter G. Hartjens. *The Supreme Court in American Politics: Policy Through Law* by John Paul Ryan, C. Neal Tate. *U.S. Energy, Environment and Economic Problems: A Public Policy Simulation* by Barry Hughes. *The Dynamics of Political Budgeting: A Public Policy Simulation* by Marvin K. Hoffman. For information and price list write: APSA Division of Educational Affairs. $3.50 each; lower price on bulk orders.

INSTRUCTIONAL RESOURCE MONOGRAPHS

Guides on materials and methods for teaching and learning in political science. *A Guide to Library Sources in Political Science: American Government* by Clement E. Vose. $6.50 hardback; $4.00 paperback. *PSI and Political Science: Using the Personalized System of Instruction to Teach American Politics*, edited by Ralph B. Earle Jr. $3.50 paperback. *Simple Simulations*, by Charles Walcott with Anne Walcott. $3.50 paperback. *Computer-Assisted Instruction in Political Science*, edited by Jonathan Pool. $4.00 paperback. *U.S. Census Data for Political and Social Research: A Resource Guide*, $4.00, and *U.S. Census Data for Political and Social Research: A Student Manual*, $2.50, both by Phyllis G. Carter. *The Case of the Unreturned Cafeteria Trays* by Lloyd S. Etheredge, $1.00 each.

LEGISLATIVE SERVICE PROJECT MANUALS

Individual manuals available for: Kansas, Kentucky, Montana, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island. $2.50 each.

POLITICAL SCIENCE AND STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

A volume on the current and future state of research and educational programs in the field of state and local government. $3.75 each.

APSA MEMBERSHIP MAILING LISTS AND LABELS

For information and price list, contact Membership Secretary, APSA.

APSA POLITICAL SCIENCE DEPARTMENT CHAIRPERSONS MAILING LABELS

For information and price list, contact APSA Departmental Services Program.

Order Form

I am enclosing a check for $_____, for _____

_____ (list publications).

Name _____


Address _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

Order from: American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

(All orders must be prepaid)

TWO VITAL TOPICS FOR TODAY FROM SAGE PUBLICATIONS




$10.00

- How much can the crime rate be reduced by changing the police, the courts, the prisons, or the law?

Criminologists, sociologists, politicians, and citizens have argued this question for years. But what if the question is itself meaningless? What if neither repression *nor* reform is an effective response to crime—because *neither* makes a difference in the crime rate!

This sobering conclusion is suggested by ROGUES, REBELS, AND REFORMERS, a landmark analysis of urban crime and conflict. Drawing on a major comparative study of the last 150 years of crime and punishment, this book is dramatic evidence that not only is there no easy solution to the dilemma of crime in our times, but that for modern democratic societies crime may well be one of the inevitable prices we pay for freedom. This important new study, written by Ted Robert Gurr—professor of political science at Northwestern University, author of *Why Men Rebel* and coauthor of *Violence in America*—draws on data from London, Stockholm, Sydney, and Calcutta—with important implications for the rest of the world.

192 pp. L.C. 76-17370



$10.00

- The Soviets will have preclusive first-strike capability by 1981.
- The U.S. will be forced to choose between surrender—or war!

These are some of the controversial conclusions of PEACE ENDANGERED by R. J. Rummel, professor of political science at the University of Hawaii. An analysis of international behavior and the strategic arms balance, this compelling book cannot be ignored by anyone interested in foreign affairs, détente, deterrence, or world peace. Dr. Rummel's thought-provoking conclusions, based on in-depth analysis and research, will have to be taken seriously even by the most devoted proponents of détente.

A selection of the Library of Political and International Affairs.

189 pp. L.C. 76-17372

SAGE Publications

The Publishers of Professional Social Sciences
275 South Beverly Drive ● Beverly Hills ● California 90212

New from Columbia

THE COMMITTEE OF ONE MILLION
"China Lobby" Politics, 1953-1971
STANLEY D. BACHRACK

Stanley Bachrack tells the story of the "Committee of One Million," a foreign policy interest group formed to pressure the American government *not* to recognize the People's Republic of China or accept its membership in the United Nations. Here is a disturbing account of a group which continued its self-imposed role as "watchdog" of American China policy up to the admission of the People's Republic of China in the UN in 1971. $14.95

SKEPTICAL SOCIOLOGY
DENNIS H. WRONG

This unique volume contains the finest and most enduring essays by Dennis H. Wrong, one of America's best-known sociologists. Among the topics discussed by this vital and stimulating thinker are the Freudian, Marxian, and Weberian heritages in sociology; social class in America; power and politics; and the sociology of the future. $14.95

PENSION PLANS AND PUBLIC POLICY
WILLIAM C. GREENOUGH and
FRANCIS P. KING

This new book examines in-depth the public policy issues surrounding the three major old-age income support systems in the U.S. today—Social Security, pension plans of private employers, and public employee retirement plans. Legislators, decision-makers in business, government and labor, and individuals covered under one or more of these retirement systems will appreciate this cogent analysis of how business and public policy can significantly affect the ability of pension plans to meet economic and social objectives in the post-ERISA era. $15.00



COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS
Address for orders: 136 South Broadway, Irvington, New York 10533

3rd Edition

A textbook for the 70's *Flexible binding*

on GOVERNMENT and POLITICS

KOUSOULAS

This lucid, comprehensive and balanced introduction to Political Science, now available in a thoroughly revised, updated new edition. Widely used.

Discussion Questions
Annotated Bibliography
Glossary of terms
Instructor's Manual

DUXBURY PRESS
A Division of Wadsworth
6 Bound Brook Court
North Scituate, Mass. 02060

Cornell University Press

Timely new books...

The Supreme Court and the Commander in Chief

By CLINTON ROSSITER. With an introductory note and additional text by RICHARD P. LONGAKER. This classic study of presidential power is once again made available with the reissue of this book in a new, expanded edition. New material brings the book up to date, covering vital events of the past 25 years. Cloth, $15.00; Paper, $3.95

Political Violence

By TED HONDERICH. *Is political violence justifiable?* Taking a philosophical rather than an activist view, Ted Honderich deals with moral and philosophical arguments that have been offered for and against political violence. He offers an elegantly written, lively critique of certain presuppositions and inconsistencies of liberal-democratic thinking about political violence. Cloth, $7.95

Energy Supply and Government Policy

Edited by ROBERT J. KALTER and WILLIAM A. VOGELY. In fourteen essays written from different perspectives, nationally known specialists offer perceptive analyses of our energy-supply problems and realistic proposals for solving them.
Cloth, $18.50; Paper, $5.95

America as an Ordinary Country


U.S. Foreign Policy and the Future

Edited by RICHARD ROSECRANCE. "Timely and forceful....Knowledgeable, temperate and lucidly written, the essays range from *detente* and multinational corporations to the European Community and the Far East. A constructive international effort that deserves a wide readership."—*Publishers Weekly.* Cloth, $9.75

Disaster by Decree

The Supreme Court Decisions on Race and the Schools

By LINO A. GRAGLIA. This provocative book takes a sharply critical view of the Supreme Court rulings that led to forced busing. "A telling critique of the difficulties inherent in our major social and, of course, legal dilemma."—*Library Journal.* "An acute analysis of ...the most important decisions that the Court has composed in this century."—*Philip B. Kurland, University of Chicago.*
Cloth, $11.50



CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS ITHACA AND LONDON

Students, professors, and those interested in the study of politics and government are invited to become members of the AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION.

JOIN APSA

Membership includes:

The American Political Science Review—quarterly journal of scholarly articles and book reviews in political science;

PS—quarterly journal of association news and articles of professional concern;

DEA News—quarterly newspaper on educational materials and methods;

Opportunity to register in the APSA Personnel Service—currently lists the largest number of political science teaching and research positions.

Attend the APSA Annual Meeting, September 1-4, 1977, Washington, D.C.

Name_____

Mailing Address_____

_____

_____ Zip_____

This is an application for membership. Upon receipt of this form we will mail you a membership card and begin a year's subscription to the *American Political Science Review* and *PS*.

Student	$12 ☐
Annual:	
If your annual income is under $12,000	$25 ☐
$12,000-14,999	$30 ☐
$15,000-19,999	$35 ☐
$20,000-24,999	$40 ☐
$25,000-29,999	$45 ☐
Over $30,000	$50 ☐

Add $2 for foreign postage.

Please send with remittance to:

Membership Secretary
AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

THE POLITICS OF DIVISION, PARTITION, AND UNIFICATION

Edited by RAY EDWARD JOHNSTON

128 pp. Oct., 1976 LC 75-23973 ISBN 0-275-55660-3 $16.50

POLITICAL CULTURE IN ISRAEL

Cleavage and Integration among Israeli Jews

EVA ETZIONI-HALEVY

ca. 350 pp. Feb., 1977 LC 76-24350 ISBN 0-275-23790-7 ca. $21.50

CURRENT RESEARCH IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM

An Analysis and Bibliographic Guide to the Soviet System

LAWRENCE L. WHETTEN

172 pp. Dec., 1976 LC 76-19553 ISBN 0-275-23550-5 $16.50

SOVIET-ASIAN RELATIONS IN THE 1970s AND BEYOND

An Interperceptional Study

BHABANI SEN GUPTA

384 pp. Dec., 1976 LC 76-24368 ISBN 0-275-23740-0 $25.00

WELFARE POLICY MAKING AND CITY POLITICS

SHARON PERLMAN KREFETZ

238 pp. Nov., 1976 LC 76-12860 ISBN 0-275-23140-2 $18.50

URBAN GOVERNANCE AND MINORITIES

Edited by HERRINGTON J. BRYCE

238 pp. Dec., 1976 LC 75-44875 ISBN 0-275-23500-9 $18.50

PLURALISM IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

Edited by MELVIN M. TUMIN and WALTER PLOTCH

ca. 240 pp. Jan., 1977 LC 76-12877 ISBN 0-275-23310-3 ca. $15.00

A FULL EMPLOYMENT PROGRAM FOR THE 1970s

Edited by ALAN GARTNER, WILLIAM LYNCH, JR., and FRANK RIESSMAN

160 pp. May, 1976 LC 75-36408 ISBN 0-275-22810-X $15.00

PSS Student Edition: ISBN 0-275-89560-2 $4.95

ENVIRONMENTAL MODELING AND DECISION MAKING

The United States Experience

HOLCOMB RESEARCH INSTITUTE

ca. 176 pp. Dec., 1976 LC 76-28798 ISBN 0-275-24190-4 $16.50

Praeger Publishers 200 Park Avenue, N.Y., N.Y. 10017

PRAEGER SPECIAL STUDIES



American Government and Politics Today
Second Edition

Charles P. Sohner, El Camino College

Covering national and state government, this text emphasizes those aspects of government which personally concern the potential voters in your class—civil rights and political participation. In the new Sohner, you'll find an even more readable text for your students in addition to an exciting new chapter that introduces material on social, economic, and foreign policy. The revision includes additional material on population shifts, church-state relations, ethnic politics, domestic spying, impeachment, and recent developments in other areas. Instructor's Manual containing test questions and summaries of topics in each chapter available.

January 1976, 385 pages, illustrated, paper, approx. $7.50

California Government and Politics Today
Second Edition

Charles P. Sohner

January 1976, 68 pages, paper, approx. $1.75

Scott Foresman College Division

For further information write to
Jack Bevington, Department SA
Scott, Foresman College Division
1900 East Lake Avenue Glenview, Illinois 60025

A Rationale for Innovation . . .

University Press of America presents a new concept in academic publishing that addresses directly two of this industry's foremost challenges:

The demands of a volatile environment.

As curriculums require more frequent revisions due to advances in the social and technical sciences, the traditional text, with its lengthy gestation period, can become quickly outdated.

The needs of a competitive academic profession.

Due to conventional processes that are becoming ever more costly, the traditional publishing industry no longer affords adequate opportunity for deserving professors to become published.

An Innovative Alternative.

The University Press of America's new concept is a vastly simplified approach to publishing, developed by academics, that effectively counters these growing challenges.

Its acceptance is best evidenced by the more than 100 new University Press of America titles to be found in a growing number of respected colleges and universities.

For complete details, including titles now available in the various disciplines, please write: James E. Lyons, Editor-in-Chief, University Press of America, 4710 Auth Place S.E., Washington, D.C. 20023– or phone (301) 899-9600.

New from University Press of America

■ **COOPERATION AND CONFLICT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: PAPERS ON A REGIONAL SUBSYSTEM,** *edited by Timothy M. Shaw and Kenneth A. Heard,* Dalhousie University. Contributors include: Douglas Anglin, Larry Bowman, Zdenek Cervenka, Ken Grundy, Charles Harvey, Christopher Hill, Sheridan Johns, Arthur Keppel-Jones, Christian Potholm, Don Rothchild, Tim Thahane, and J. E. Spence.
479 pp. 0-8191-0005-6 **$9.45**

■ **CHICANO POLITICS: A THEORETICAL AND BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS OF CHICANOS IN AMERICAN POLITICS,** *by Maurilio E. Vigil,* New Mexico Highlands University. A groundbreaking attempt to explore the social and political currents of Chicano life—historical origins, political culture, voting behavior, Mexican-American organizations and the influence of Chicano leaders. 370 pp.
370 pp. 0-8191-0110-9 **$9.45**

University Press of America™

Established for Academics, by academics.

International Arms Control

Issues and Agreements

Edited for The Stanford Arms Control Group by John H. Barton & Lawrence D. Weiler. This is an exhaustive analysis of national and international arms control: its history, philosophy, cultural context, technology, economic and political ramifications, achievements, and future prospects. The book will assist the general reader in understanding and forming intelligent opinions on such issues as the role of doctrine in the military, difficulties posed by rapidly changing technology, and the value and limitations of arms control as a way to prevent war. An appendix contains the text of eighteen major arms control agreements, and the volume concludes with discussion questions and suggestions for further reading. Cloth, $18.50; paper, $12.95

Holistic Thought in Social Science

D. C. Phillips. This book is a highly readable synthesis and critical examination of the character, history, and utility of holism ("A part cannot be understood in isolation from the whole"), especially as seen in its long conflict with the mechanistic or analytic method of viewing reality. After identifying the points at issue, the author examines holism as manifested in various social scientific systems of thought, notably general systems theory, structuralism, functionalism, and Gestalt psychology. He concludes that "the analytic or mechanistic method . . . is such a moderate and reasonable position that no scientist, not even a holist, can avoid putting it into practice. By contrast, holism—taken seriously—is an eminently unworkable doctrine." $8.50



Stanford University Press

Thomas Y. Crowell Company
1977

Political Reform

Compelling . . . Original . . . Realistic . . .

William J. Crotty
Northwestern University

For a number of years, issues of political reform have been at the forefront of our politics, disrupting old alliances and fostering new ones. Much furor has arisen over the three areas that Professor Crotty, a widely known student of our political system, brilliantly discusses in his important new book. They are, in order, **voter registration, campaign finance,** and **political parties and the nominating system.**

The approach is appropriately historical in part. Equally important are Crotty's evaluation of current proposals and his own recommendations for specific reforms placed in the broad context of evolving change within the American democratic experiment.

Illustrative material culled from the Watergate scandals shows us how deep, serious, and urgent our problems are.

American Legislative Processes

Behavioral... Comprehensive... Empirical...

Jack R. Van Der Slik
Southern Illinois University

How do legislators interact with the public, the political system, and each other to form policy? To answer this and related questions, Van Der Slik looks at the interrelationships among legislatures and legislators, the people, other actors and institutions in the society, and foreign political systems. Not content with analyzing decision making and intralegislative behavior at only the national level, Van Der Slik includes material on state and local legislatures as well. He treats his subject matter empirically—what legislators are like, how they make decisions, and how they organize themselves. Van Der Slik writes for students: he uses jargon-free, clear, readable English.


Don't overlook . . .

FOR YOUR POLITICAL PARTIES COURSE
Joyce Gelb & Marian L. Palley
TRADITION AND CHANGE IN AMERICAN PARTY POLITICS
☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆
1975 $10.50 323 pp.

For further information,
write to Joan H. Greene,
Thomas Y. Crowell Company,
666 Fifth Avenue,
New York, New York 10019

UNIVERSITETSFORLAGET

PUBLISHERS TO THE NORWEGIAN UNIVERSITIES



ELITE STRUCTURE AND IDEOLOGY
John Higley, G. Lowell Field and Knut Grøholt

A general theory of how elites and non-elites have interacted in dozens of historical and contemporary societies to produce specifiable political outcomes.
82-00-01498-1 367 pp., charts, biblog. U.S. rights: Columbia University Press.

INTEREST GROUPS IN NORWEGIAN POLITICS
Robert B. Kvavik

The purpose of this book is threefold: to provide a descriptive survey of interest groups and the interest group system in Norway, to contribute to the theory of interest groups in general, and to foster the debate on democratic processes in Norway in particular.
82-00-01477-0 206 pp., charts, biblog. $ 11.00

AMBIGUITY AND CHOICE IN ORGANIZATIONS
James G. March and Johan P. Olsen

Explores the consequences of ambiguity for decision-making processes in organizations. The book contains important contributions by Søren Christensen, Michael D. Cohen, Harald Enderud, Kristian Kreiner, Pierre Romelaer, Kåre Rommetveit, Per Stava and Stephen S. Weiner. $ 20.00

THE POLITICAL IMPLICATION OF NORTH SEA OIL AND GAS
Martin Saeter and Ian Smart

What kind of basis for cooperation should be adopted by North Sea states: a cooperative framework limited to North Sea states alone, or an adaption of already existing organizations?
U.K. and U.S. rights: IPC Science and Technology Press, Ltd., Guildford, U.K.

THE SCANDINAVIAN OPTION. Opportunities and Opportunity Costs in Postwar Scandinavian Policies
Barbara G. Haskel

The study is of foreign policy decisions and the process of international bargaining. This is the first comprehensive political analysis of the major cases in postwar Scandinavian relations and the decision of Norway and Denmark to join NATO.
82-00-01561-0 Approx. 250 pp. Forthcoming Sept. Approx. $ 13.00

BULLETIN OF PEACE PROPOSALS

To motivate research, to inspire future oriented thinking, to promote activities for peace. Since 1970. One volume a year, 4 issues per volume. Subscription $ 15.00.

INQUIRY

An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy and the Social Sciences.
Since 1958. One volume a year, 4 issues per volume.
Subscriptions: Institutions $ 15.00, Individuals $ 12.00
ISSN 0020-174X

JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH

Since 1964. One volume a year, 4 issue per volume.
Subscription $ 15.00
ISSN 0022-3433

Distribution offices:

UNITED KINGDOM
Global Book Resources Ltd.
37 Queen Street
Henley on Thames
Oxfordshire, RG9 1AJ.

NORWAY
Box 307
Blindern
Oslo 3

UNITED STATES
Box 142
Boston, Mass. 02113

Japan: The Paradox of Progress

edited by Lewis Austin

The essays in this interdisciplinary volume examine the effects of rapid change on the character of Japanese society. Augmenting description with analysis and prediction, they sketch a composite portrait of a country in which old and new coexist, sometimes ironically. The discussion of Japan's experience suggests hypotheses about the future of advanced industrial society in general. $20.00


The Donegal Mafia

An Irish Political Machine

Paul M. Sacks

"This is the first study which analyzes contemporary Irish politics using the techniques of contemporary political science. An interesting and thoughtful study."
—Richard Rose

"An important contribution to the general study of machine politics and a valuable corrective to certain prevailing assumptions."—Conor Cruise O'Brien $15.00





Rural Responses to Industrialization

A Study of Village Zambia

Robert H. Bates

"Bates handles a wide range of fundamental problems concerning the place of rural society in political development. In particular, he connects the socioeconomic with the political and governmental in a way thoroughly unprecedented. Nothing comparable to the richness of Bates's data can be found in any extant study I'm aware of. A major breakthrough."—Martin Kilson $20.00

The Moral Economy of the Peasant

Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia

James C. Scott

Demonstrates that the fear of food shortages explains many otherwise puzzling technical, social, and moral arrangements in peasant society. Using lower Burma and Vietnam as examples, Scott shows how the transformations of the colonial era systematically violated the peasants' "moral economy" and created a situation of potential rebellion. $15.00

Yale University Press **New Haven and London**

From Halsted Press,

A Division of John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

WEST GERMANY:
An Introduction
By Gunther Kloss, University of Manchester.
1976 180 pp. $19.75
Provides a wealth of statistical material, integrated with clear narrative and analysis.

CRISIS MANAGEMENT:
Conflict, Confrontation and Diplomacy
By Philip Williams, University of Aberdeen.
1976 240 pp. $17.50
Combines theoretical analysis and actual case studies to examine both pre-nuclear and nuclear crises in detail.

THE DYNAMICS OF THE ARMS RACE
Edited by D. Carlton and C. Schaerf.
1975 244 pp. $17.95

BRAZIL SINCE 1964:
Modernisation under a Military Regime
By Georges-Andre Fiechter.
1975 296 pp. $30.00
Examines the impact of the professional military on the politics and policies of a developing country.

THE U.K. IN 1980:
The Hudson Report
By the Hudson Institute.
1975 127 pp. $12.50

Prices are subject to change without notice

OPEC AND THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY
By M.S. Al-Otaiba, Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, United Arab Emirates.
1975 187 pp. $14.50
Provides a rare insight into the thinking of the men who control an industry vital to the prosperity of today's world.

PROCEDURAL JUSTICE:
A Psychological Analysis
By J. Thibaut and L. Walker, both of the University of North Carolina.
1975 150 pp. Cloth $9.95; Paper $4.95
(A Lawrence Erlbaum Associates publication)
Focuses on the comparative effects of systems and procedures, and the use of scientific method in assessing studies done in the U.S., England, France, and Germany.

SOCIAL JUSTICE AND ITS ENEMIES:
A Normative Approach to Social Problems
By T.F. Hoult, Arizona State University.
1975 450 pp. Cloth $18.95; Paper $8.95
(A Schenkman publication)
Offers a multidisciplinary view of social problems, illustrating systematically the idea that social problems are created to the degree that injustice prevails.

EXPLORATIONS IN GOVERNMENT:
Collected Papers 1951–1968
By W.J.M. Mackenzie.
1975 350 pp. $17.75

HALSTED PRESS

These books are available for **30 days free examination**
from Dept. 31, Halsted Press, A Division of John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
605 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016. A5694-67

New Concepts in Poli Sci from DORSEY

available March

MANAGING THE PUBLIC SECTOR

Grover Starling, University of Houston (Clear Lake City)

Completely new, this practitioner-oriented text blends relevant theory with how-to-do-it techniques drawn from an exciting variety of sources. It provides a coherent, up-to-date, and highly readable overview of public administration.

available February

COMPARATIVE POLITICS: Notes and Readings, Fifth Edition

Edited by **Roy C. Macridis,** Brandeis University, and **Bernard E. Brown,** City University of New York (Graduate School and Lehman)

This classic reader has been expanded and updated, 50 per cent of the material in this edition is new. The authors provide the best presentation of the basic building blocks in the systematic study of comparative politics. **(paperbound)**

available March

COMPARING PUBLIC POLICIES: United States, Soviet Union, and Europe


Richard L. Siegel and **Leonard B. Weinberg,** University of Nevada (Reno)

Presents a comprehensive study of the sources, content and results of government policy in the United States, Soviet Union, and six European countries. The text uses a dual organizational framework: (a) distributive, regulative, and extra-active policies, and (b) welfare, warfare, and post-industrial policies. **(paperbound)**

Examination copies for adoption consideration available on request; please indicate course title and text presently used.

THE DORSEY PRESS • Homewood, Illinois 60430

Write for our complete catalog



UTOPIA AND REVOLUTION
Melvin J. Lasky

In this remarkable intellectual history, Lasky charts five centuries of confrontation between visions of utopia and movements toward violent social change.

736 pages Cloth $29.95 to 12/31/76
$35.00 thereafter

LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY
Volume 2: The Mirage of Social Justice
Friedrich A. Hayek

Hayek argues in the second volume of his comprehensive three-part study of law and liberty that the unexamined pursuit of "social justice" will contribute to the erosion of personal liberties.

240 pages Cloth $10.00

THE PEASANTS OF THE MONTES
The Roots of Rural Rebellion in Spain
Michael R. Weisser

Through wide-ranging and imaginative scholarship, Weisser shows that rural Spanish anarchism was not a reaction to modernization, but a search for an alternative to the benefits of urban life.

168 pages Cloth $11.50

The University of Chicago Press

Chicago 60637

The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire

From the First Century A.D. to the Third

Edward N. Luttwak

"A wide-ranging historical analysis of Roman strategy and the changing patterns of Roman statecraft — including both intriguing analogies and suggestive contrasts to the evolving international position of the United States." — *James R. Schlesinger, Former Secretary of Defense*

Edward N. Luttwak is a professional defense analyst who has served as a consultant to the secretary of defense. In the light of his knowledge of modern strategic analysis, he here undertakes the first systematic and sustained investigation of Roman strategy during the period of imperial autocracy. Of great sophistication, the strategies of the empire are still eminently worth studying, he believes. The Romans undoubtedly had a genius for governance that was expressed most of all in their very subtle and economical use of military force. $12.95

America's Mass Media Merchants

William H. Read

A seasoned newsman charts the rise of the American mass media and examines the implications of their global penetration. He documents in detail the transnational development of AP and UPI, the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post-Los Angeles Times* news services, the *International Herald Tribune, Newsweek, Time,* and *Reader's Digest.* The international distribution of American movies and television programs is also scrutinized. But how the world came to love Lucy represents to many third world, Communist, and even Western countries a disturbing intrusion of American values into ethnic cultures. While sensitive to fears of "cultural imperialism," Read finds *information sovereignty* to be an unacceptable alternative to the *free flow* principle. His lively and argumentative book is the first contribution to the dialogue from a liberal, critical, but not anti-media stance. $12.50

Prelude to Power

The Parisian Radical Press, 1789-1791

Jack Richard Censer

The Parisian radical press was born of the turmoil of 1789, which spawned both the political journalists and the political factions. Treating the events from the perspective of popular culture, Censer provides an in-depth analysis of the influence of the press on the populace which will be of great interest to political scientists. He combines a quantitative measurement of ideas with an examination of the more impressionistic examples of press technique. $12.50

Johns Hopkins

The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, Maryland 21218

From GLP . . .

texts designed to keep students on target




BUREAUCRACY AND THE MODERN WORLD

Victor A. Thompson (University of Florida)

This comprehensive text offers a moral or philosophical basis for organization without sacrificing the behavioral understanding gained in recent years. It sets forth the moral assumptions of modern institutions, especially those engaged in providing goods and services, both public and private.

1976 150 pages paper, $5.95



CORRUPTION IN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM

Larry L. Berg (University of Southern California), Harlan Hahn (University of Southern California), John R. Schmidhauser (University of Southern California)

The purpose of this book is to assist students and other citizens in a reappraisal of the sources of—and reasons for—the systemic corruption found in the very structure of American politics.

1976 224 pages paper, $4.50



CONGRESSIONAL REFORM IN THE SEVENTIES

Leroy N. Rieselbach (Indiana University)

Indicating why Congress has not initiated public policy and suggesting that beneath this surface deference lies Congress' spirit of independence, this text discusses the first serious reform movement in the United States Congress in nearly three decades.

1977 160 pages paper, $3.95

For examination copies, write Director of Marketing

GLP *GENERAL LEARNING PRESS*

Morristown, New Jersey 07960

Available in Canada from GLC Publishers, Ltd., Agincourt, Ontario

ELSEVIER

Scholarly publishing since 1581

Painters and Politics

The European Avant-Garde and Society, 1900-1925

Theda Shapiro, *University of California-Riverside*

Based largely on unpublished materials, some unknown to art historians, PAINTERS AND POLITICS examines the political activities and social attitudes of a generation of avant-garde painters in Western Europe: the French Fauves and Cubists, the German Expressionists, and the Italian Futurists.

A landmark study for both art and social historians, this tastefully illustrated book will also fascinate anyone interested in avant-garde art and the European cultural scene.

1976 300 pages $15.00

Revolutions and Revolutionaries

Four Theories

Barbara Salert, *Washington University*

This study of revolution is a critical evaluation of four theories of revolution: rational choice theory, psychological theory, structural functionalism, and Marxism. These theories range from psychological explanations of motivations that induce people to join revolutionary movements to broad social explanations that focus on the socioeconomic and political conditions of societies that experience widespread violence. **1976 170 pages $12.95**

Power, Politics and Progress

Social Change in Rural Peru

William Foote Whyte, *Cornell University and* **Giorgio Alberti,** *University of Bologna*

A description and analysis of peasant movements and the politics of community and regional change in a developing nation. Based on a 10-year research program, the story is told in simple, straightforward language. The field research is then examined in order to draw general conclusions on peasant movements and revolutionary theory; conflict, cooperation and power in peasant communities, and planned change and political processes. The authors also show how to examine developments at the community level in the context of major national changes in the distribution of power. **1976 336 pages $15.00**

Hitler Among the Germans

Rudolph Binion, *Brandeis University*

HILTER AMONG THE GERMANS is a unique investigation of the psychodynamics of Adolf Hitler's rise and rule. The inner sources of Hitler's control over the German people are carefully uncovered as Binion traces the origins of Hitler's anti-Semitism and his extraordinary power to excite enthusiasm and disarm opposition. The wealth of new facts and insights presented in HITLER AMONG THE GERMANS makes it a landmark of historical scholarship.

"A remarkable book, notable in particular for its formidable scholarship and original research."
— John Toland **1976 224 pages $12.00**

ELSEVIER NORTH-HOLLAND
NEW YORK 52 VANDERBILT AVENUE NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10017

CAREER ALTERNATIVES FOR POLITICAL SCIENTISTS

A Guide for Faculty and Graduate Students

Thomas E. Mann



A Publication of the
Departmental Services Program

$1.00 (prepaid) 20 pages

Available direct from:
The American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

Announcing the new, thoroughly updated

Revised Second Edition of

AN INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

By KENNETH PREWITT & SIDNEY VERBA

The Second Edition of this widely used text is being revised for publication in February in order to incorporate political developments through the 1976 elections. Chapters 9, 10, and 11, on political parties and elections, congress, and the presidency, are completely rewritten to reflect campaign events and election results. The remainder of the book will stand as published last February.

AN INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN GOVERNMENT is well-known for its unique focus on political capitalism which considers how capitalism has shaped American democracy. The book stresses the recurring patterns, structures, and processes that give meaning to political activity, providing students with a clear analytical understanding of the institutional and behavioral aspects of American government.

Tentative: 585 pages; $12.95. February 1977. ISBN 0-06-045281-1. Study Guide: $4.95; ISBN 0-045288-9. Instructor's Manual.

To request examination copies, write to Lilian Schein. Dept. 354. Please include course title, enrollment, and present text.



1817

10 East 53d Street
New York, N.Y. 10022

Harper & Row



STAR PERFORMERS

in Urban Government courses

NEW Third Edition—POLITICAL POWER & THE URBAN CRIS S

Alan Shank, SUNY at Geneseo. A concise, up-to-date reader, this new edition maintains an emphasis on urban policy as it relates to urban political power. The articles concentrate on the 1970's, reflecting such new factors in the urban situation as environmental and energy demands, population trends, and public employee unions. Citizen participation and trends in local government are included. 1976, paperbound, 5-1/2 x 8-1/2, 570 pp.

in State-Local courses

STATE AND LOCAL POLITICS

David R. Berman, Arizona State University. This introductory text examines such traditional concerns of political science as federalism, constitutional relations, and governmental institutions in light of behavioral research. State and local governments in various parts of the country are discussed with regard to espoused values and the current issues confronting political systems. Includes name index, subject index, bibliography, and listing of selected readings. 1975, hardbound, 7 x 9-1/4, 301 pp.

Holbrook Press, Inc.

Dept. A93, 470 Atlantic Ave.
Boston, Massachusetts 02210



New Editions of Well-Known Texts

The most widely used text in undergraduate and graduate public administration courses

MODERN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
FOURTH EDITION

Felix A. Nigro and Lloyd G. Nigro

No other text so succinctly covers the theoretical and conceptual elements of the field and then so clearly relates these aspects to concrete examples from present practices and current relationships. The new Fourth Edition is thoroughly revised to reflect recent developments in the theory, practice, and problems of public administration. Tentative: 480 pages; $12.95. January 1977. ISBN 0-06-044843-1. *New!—Instructor's Manual.*

Emphasizes principles and broad methodologies rather than detailed procedures

PUBLIC PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION
SEVENTH EDITION

O. Glenn Stahl

"The great majority of U.S. public personnel managers and many abroad have been brought up on one or another edition of this classic text."—*Public Personnel Review*/The Seventh Edition gives increased attention to unionization, relations between public management and unions, issues of equal opportunity and affirmative action, and environmental considerations. 575 pages; $16.95. August 1976. ISBN 0-06-046387-2.

Reorganized to provide an ideal introduction to public administration

THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY
SECOND EDITION

Alan A. Altshuler and Norman C. Thomas

This reader for graduate courses in federal politics, bureaucracy, and public administration explores the problems involved in reconciling American society's dependence on large-scale public bureaucracy with the ideals and processes of mass democracy. The forty articles in this edition (of which 27 are new) are organized to parallel standard course presentations. Tentative: 400 pages; $9.95/paper. January 1977. ISBN 0-06-040246-6.

A unique comparative approach to the study of American government

AMERICAN DEMOCRACY IN WORLD PERSPECTIVE
FOURTH EDITION

William Ebenstein, C. Herman Pritchett, Henry A. Turner, and Dean Mann

515 pages; $10.95/paper. January 1976. ISBN 0-06-041866-4. *Instructor's Manual.*

To request examination copies, write to Lilian Schein, Dept. 354. Please include course title, enrollment, and present text.

10 East 53d Street
New York, N.Y. 10022

1817

Harper & Row

New from Texas Press

Science and Ceremony

The Institutional Economics of C. E. Ayres
Edited by William Breit
and William Patton Culbertson, Jr.
Here is the first major appraisal of the work and influence of C. E. Ayres, the leading American institutionalist economist in the post–World War II era.
"The essays in this volume are not meant as a monument to Ayres. They are meant to tell what he thought and what he did. They do show his range of interests, his diligence, his originality of mind and method."—from the Foreword by John Kenneth Galbraith
210 pages $14.95

Also Available:

Toward a Reasonable Society
The Values of Industrial Civilization
By C. E. Ayres
301 pages $10.50

A Search for Solvency
Bretton Woods and the International Monetary System, 1941–1971
By Alfred E. Eckes, Jr.
355 pages $10.00

University of Texas Press
P.O. Box 7819
Austin 78712

INSTRUCTIONAL RESOURCE MONOGRAPHS

A Guide to Library Sources in Political Science: American Government
by Clement E. Vose

Information and evaluation for teachers, librarians, and students on U.S. government publications, general reference books, library facilities, and their utilization.

PSI and Political Science: Using the Personalized System of Instruction to Teach American Politics
edited by Ralph B. Earle, Jr.

As a guide to the development of an alternative (to lecture and discussion sections) method of teaching and learning, this monograph is a collection of essays on the objectives, organization and impact of using the personalized system of instruction in political science. Examples are given on topics in American politics.

Simple Simulations
by Charles Walcott with Anne Walcott

A selective guide to the development, applicability and impact of simulations and games, with examples for the design of original role playing exercises.

Computer-Assisted Instruction in Political Science
edited by Jonathan Pool

A guide to the theory, design and application of computer-assisted instruction for interactive teaching and learning in political science. Examples from several subfields, including political philosophy.

U.S. Census Data for Political and Social Research: A Resource Guide
by Phyllis G. Carter

A guide to the acquisition—in print and on computer tape—and instructional application of U.S. Census Bureau data on: population and housing, governments, economy, Congressional districts. Also, answers to the exercises in the Students Manual.

U.S. Census Data for Political and Social Research: Students Manual
by Phyllis G. Carter

A guide and exercise book, student instruction in basic data analysis for solving problems on political and social questions, with references to data on population, housing, governments, and Congressional districts, gathered by the U.S. Census Bureau.

ORDER FORM

_____ *A Guide to Library Sources in Political Science: American Government,* by Clement E. Vose ($4.00 paperback, $6.50 hard cover).

_____ *PSI and Political Science: Using the Personalized System of Instruction to Teach American Politics,* edited by Ralph B. Earle, Jr. ($3.50 paperback).

_____ *Simple Simulations,* by Charles Walcott with Anne Walcott ($3.50 paperback).

_____ *Computer-Assisted Instruction in Political Science,* edited by Jonathan Pool ($4.00 paperback).

_____ *U.S. Census Data for Political and Social Research: A Resource Guide,* by Phyllis G. Carter ($4.00, or $2.50 when accompanied by a note that 10 or more copies will be ordered by student).

_____ *U.S. Census Data for Political and Social Research: Students Manual,* by Phyllis G. Carter ($2.50 paperback).

Name _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

Send form prepaid to: Division of Educational Affairs, American Political Science Association, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

Critical Choices for Americans

Critical Choices for Americans, a fourteen-volume work on urgent problems that face the United States and the world at the beginning of America's third century, will appear through 1976 and into 1977 under the imprint of Lexington Books.

A wide range of subjects is covered including: energy, the environment, and economics; population, food, and land use; raw materials; criminal justice and the law; education; and foreign relations and national defense. A major portion of the work concerns ideas about America, extensive analyses of different regions of the world, and the quality of life of communities and individuals.

The Commission on Critical Choices for Americans, brought together by Nelson A. Rockefeller in 1973, commissioned 128 of the best minds in the world to highlight alternatives facing America. Their subjects include energy, the environment, population, food, land use, criminal justice, education, defense, and extensive analyses of regions of the world.

About the series in general, **TIME Magazine** said:

"NEW STARTS FOR AMERICA'S THIRD CENTURY . . . What emerges from these essays is the sense that in nearly every important field, ideas that dominated for half a century or more are giving way. New notions are being pursued and older ideas, discarded earlier in the 20th century, are being re-examined . . . Different though the various views of human nature may be, the very use of the term implies that there is something permanent and irreducible in man and that his resistance to outside manipulation is a kind of triumph."


The books are:

Volume I	**Vital Resources. 288pp. $14.95**
Volume II	**The Americans: 1976. 400pp. $15.95**
Volume III	**How Others See Us. 144pp. $11.95**
Volume IV	**Power & Security. 240pp. $12.95**
Volume V	**Trade, Inflation & Ethics. 320pp. $15.95**
Volume VI	**Values of Growth. 192pp. $10.95**
Volume VII	**Qualities of Life. 544pp. $20.95**
Volume VIII	**Western Europe: The Trials of Partnership. 448pp. $19.95**
Volume IX	**The Soviet Empire: Expansion & Detente. 480pp. $19.95**
Volume X	**The Middle East: Oil, Conflict & Hope. 544pp. $22.95**
Volume XI	**Africa: From Mystery to Maze. 480pp. $19.95**
Volume XII	**China & Japan: A New Balance of Power. 352pp. $16.95**
Volume XIII	**Southern Asia: The Politics of Poverty & Peace. 384pp. $16.95**
Volume XIV	**Latin America: Struggle for Progress. 224pp. $13.95**

Special Series Price—$200.00

For additional information, please contact:
Lexington Books, 125 Spring Street, Lexington, Massachusetts 02173,
or call (617) 862-6650 or (212) 924-6460.

A Raytheon Company



A concise guide to theories on motivation used in the analysis of political behavior. Exercises are included on the applications of the theories to political events and situations.

$1.00 (prepaid)

ORDER FORM

Please send me _____ copies of *The Case of the Unreturned Cafeteria Trays.*

Name _____

Address _____

_____

Send form prepaid to:

DIVISION OF EDUCATIONAL AFFAIRS
American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

Our Books in Political Science: *And what your colleagues are saying about them*

AMERICAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION:
Concepts and Cases
Carl E. Lutrin and Allen K. Settle

In this lively, issues-oriented basic text, case studies help illustrate the concepts and scope of public administration, the controversies, and the practical problems plaguing this nation's public servants.
1976. 392 pages. $12.95 cloth.

LUTRIN AND SETTLE PROVIDE A THOROUGH AND INTERESTING COVERAGE OF THE FIELD. I WAS QUITE IMPRESSED WITH THIS PRESENTATION. NORMALLY YOU SIMPLY LEAF THROUGH AN EXAMINATION TEXT, BUT I CAUGHT MYSELF READING THIS ONE. CASE STUDIES ARE QUITE APPROPRIATE AND WELL ORGANIZED AS WELL.
William R. Mangun, Salisbury State College, Maryland

THE SUPREME COURT AND CIVIL LIBERTIES POLICY
Richard C. Cortner

This text is an in-depth review of six seminal cases representing the most important fields in which the U.S. Supreme Court has enunciated significant civil liberties policies in recent years.
1976. 225 pages. $4.95 paper.

AN EXCELLENT BOOK THAT FILLS A MAJOR GAP BETWEEN CASEBOOKS AND SINGLE-ISSUE CASE STUDIES. IT IS WELL-WRITTEN, QUITE COMPREHENSIBLE TO THE AVERAGE STUDENTS. THE CASES USED ARE EXCITING TO THE STUDENT AUDIENCE
S. Eugene Clark, California State College at Bakersfield

WOMEN: A Feminist Perspective
Jo Freeman (ed.)

Edited by a political scientist, WOMEN is a collection of scholarly writings on women by women from a wide range of academic disciplines.
1975. 487 pages. $7.50 paper.

I think it's excellent. Freeman is one of the best scholars on women currently — if not the best. It is one of the few anthologies that is scholarly yet from a feminist perspective. Although my name is Freeman, she is not a relative. I just happen to admire her work a great deal.
Bonnie Cook Freeman, University of Texas

LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS: A Developmental Approach
Edward J. Williams and Freeman J. Wright

The authors provide fresh insight by analyzing the development of Latin America as a whole rather than taking the usual country-by-country approach, and address the sociological and economic questions that have affected its politics.
1975. 480 pages. $12.95 cloth.

I was particularly impressed by the lucid, readable writing style. The clear presentation of the developmental process provided in the opening chapter should be most helpful in "setting the scene". The essential historic background is clearly and concisely summarized. The developmental process in Latin America is fully and understandably presented
Louis G. Kable, University of Missouri — Columbia

INSIDE FOREIGN POLICY: The Department of State Political System and Its Subsystems
John H. Esterline and Robert B. Black

Drawing upon their 40 years of experience, the authors give an insider's view of struggles for power in Washington and our embassies abroad, contradicting the commonly held view that the importance of the State Department in foreign policy formulation has declined.
1975. 271 pages. $5.95 paper.

"Those who study the conduct of America's foreign affairs . . . will be exposed to sharp analysis and shrewd observations of the 'realities' seldom alluded to in the customary and more ponderously written text on foreign policy."
USIA WORLD, June '75

PUBLIC OPINION: Its Formation, Measurement, and Impact
Susan Welch and John Comer (eds.)

Written primarily from a political science perspective, this book analyzes the influence of the government, society, and the media on public opinion, and the impact public opinion has on policy making.
1975. 541 pages. $7.50 paper.

THIS IS A VERY DISTINGUISHED COLLECTION OF READINGS CONTAINING STUDIES AND THEORETICAL ARTICLES BY SOME OF THE MORE PRESTIGIOUS RESEARCHERS IN THE FIELD.
John Norton, Lebanon Valley College, Pennsylvania

THE UNEASY PARTNERSHIP: The Dynamics of Federal, State and Urban Relations
Richard D. Feld and Carl Grafton (eds.)

A practical analysis of urban problems: welfare, the environment, technology, and high education — how these problems impact on the federal system and vice versa.
1973. 322 pages. $5.95 paper.

LUCID PRESENTATION OF THE FEDERAL SYSTEM. A DEVELOPMENTAL VIEW OF GREAT USEFULNESS TO FIRST-TIME STUDENTS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION.
Frances E. Winslow, Kean College, New Jersey

for examination copies, please write:
MAYFIELD PUBLISHING COMPANY
285 Hamilton Avenue / Palo Alto, California 94301

ROUSSEAU'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

AN EXPOSITION AND INTERPRETATION

RAMON M. LEMOS

In his detailed analyses of *Discourse on the Origin and Foundation of Inequality among Men*, *Discourse on Political Economy*, and *The Social Contract*, Lemos refutes the claims of some critics that Rousseau's writings abound with obscurities and inconsistencies. By providing a detailed clarification of the development of the philosopher's political theory, the difficulties presented by the successive texts, and the apparent contradictions between them, the book presents Rousseau's work as an intelligible and coherent system of thought. 344 pages / $14.50

THE SHOTGUN BEHIND THE DOOR

LIBERALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION

PHILIP ABBOTT

Foreword by Russell Kirk

Plagued by the image of the state as a shotgun behind the door, the liberal has justified government by the only appeal available to him, prudence. Philip Abbott reformulates the liberal response to the problem of political obligation by accepting the initial premises of liberal ethical theory and the political impluses which emerge from it while discarding the theories of political obligation that have been attached to it.

"A very stimulating and timely work"—*Library Journal.*


"This is a well-written, stimulating, thoughtful essay. It is well worth the time invested in carefully reading it through"—*Virginia Quarterly Review.* 212 pages / $8.00

THE UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA PRESS
ATHENS 30602

★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★★

". . . the most thorough and the most convincing study of the emergent elites of the 'new politics' that I have seen. . . . This study is an example of contemporary political science at its best."

—Nelson W. Polsby



The New Presidential Elite
Men and Women in National Politics

By **Jeane Kirkpatrick**

Professor of Political Science, Georgetown University

American politics, suggests the author of **The New Presidential Elite,** is being transformed in important and fundamental ways. She believes that a "new breed" of men and women are actively involved in the majority party, and that their motives, goals, ideals, and patterns of organizational behavior are different from those of the people who have dominated American politics in the past. This book provides an in-depth study of these new managers and the new politics they champion.

The New Presidential Elite is the first large-scale study of convention delegates in two decades. It is based on interviews with 1,300 delegates to the 1972 Democratic and Republican National Conventions and mail questionnaires completed by some 55 percent of the delegates. It deals with the political backgrounds and experience, the attitudes and perceptions, and the orientations toward issues, candidates, parties, and male-female roles of a large number of active political participants.

The study, which was funded jointly by Russell Sage Foundation and The Twentieth Century Fund, suggests that new political types and patterns of participation were present among the delegates to the 1972 Democratic convention. Jeane Kirkpatrick identifies women as one part of the new "presidential elite," and discusses their present role in American politics. She analyzes the social, cultural, psychological, and political characteristics of the women who have become active, and explores some of the potential consequences of their activity.

"I want to state as strongly as I possibly can my conviction that The New Presidential Elite *is one of the very few truly outstanding works I have ever read that genuinely meld the micro with the macro and the empirical with the theoretical. I believe its publication will constitute a major event in political science scholarship."*

—Austin Ranney

"The interview data are skillfully examined in the light of significant modes of political analysis, and I am sure that the richness of the result will be widely appreciated by social scientists, commentators and active political advisors of every kind."

—Harold D. Lasswell

1976. 606 pages. $20.00

Published by **Russell Sage Foundation** and **The Twentieth Century Fund.**

Order directly from the distributor:
Basic Books, Inc., 10 East 53 Street, New York, N.Y. 10022

★★★ ★ ★ ★★★★ ★ ★★★★★★★★★★★

Have you checked...
TIAA's new life insurance rates?

The traditional "best buy" in life insurance is now even better, and you'll be startled to find how little it costs to own all the family protection you need. To illustrate,

at *any* issue age below 35 for men and 40 for women, a $50,000 TIAA policy now costs less than $100; and $100,000 policies are under $180.



These are yearly net costs after current dividends (dividends not guaranteed) for policies issued on the popular 20-Year Decreasing Term plan. For exact information on this plan and what $50,000 or $100,000 immediate coverage would cost at your age,

Either telephone collect...
the TIAA LIFE INSURANCE ADVISORY CENTER at (212) 490-9000
and ask for an Insurance Counselor:



or send this coupon...
to receive information by mail.
In either case there are no strings attached and no one will call on you.

Life Insurance Advisory Center
TEACHERS INSURANCE & ANNUITY ASSOC.
730 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017

Without obligating me in any way, please send full information on TIAA's new rates, including personal illustrations of TIAA policies issued at my age.

G1276

Name and Title _____ Date of Birth _____

Address _____

City, State, Zip _____

Nonprofit Employer (college, university, private school, etc.) _____

Eligibility for TIAA life insurance is extended to persons employed by colleges, universities, private schools, and certain other nonprofit educational or scientific institutions.

TIAA CREF *The College World's Insurance Company*

In the 1990's:

A World Federation Of Cultures

In this attempt to outline a "preferred world" for the end of this century, noted African scholar Ali A. Mazrui writes about a global culture that is tragically out of balance, that ignores most of the civilizations of the world and elevates only the Western heritage. If we are to move towards a better future, we must maintain the trend towards a world culture, making that culture less Eurocentric and more representative of the riches of the human race.

> "Ali A. Mazrui proposes . . . a world federation of cultures. There are to be five 'world languages' —English, French, Russian, Chinese and Arabic . . . Each country is to declare its allegiance to one of these five. Each schoolchild is to learn three languages—a world language, a 'regional' language, and a national or subnational language . . . The idea warrants serious discussion."
>
> —*Political Science Quarterly*

> "Makes the case that the human community might be better off if it could free itself from the domination of a Eurocentric world culture, and urges the establishment of a global political system that will represent people by cultures as well as power."
>
> —*The Humanist*

A world Federation of Cultures is the latest in a series of books produced by the World Order models Project of the Institute for World Order. WOMP is a five-year effort to bring together scholars from eight regions of the world to apply world order science to the current planetary predicament and to address the issues of militarism, famine, loss of freedom and ecological deterioration through a humane perspective. Of WOMP, *Foreign Affairs* wrote:

> ". . . The first fruits of the ambitious World Order Models Project of the Institute for World Order . . . Consciously highly normative, they present both a diagnosis of the present human condition and proposals for the radical transformation of global society . . . An important and obviously highly controversial series."

17 JUL 1978


Books in the series:

ON THE CREATION OF A JUST WORLD ORDER — **$9.95**
Edited by Saul H. Mendlovitz, President, Institute for World Order

A STUDY OF FUTURE WORLDS — **$15.00, paper $6.95**
By Richard Falk, Albert E. Milbank Professor of International Law and Practice, Princeton University

FOOTSTEPS INTO THE FUTURE — **$8.95, paper $3.95**
By Rajni Kothari, Founder and Director of the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies in Delhi

A WORLD FEDERATION OF CULTURES — **$14.95**
By Ali A. Mazrui, noted African scholar



Soon to be published:
Books by Horacio Godoy and Gustavo Lagos of Latin America, Johan Galtung (a transnational perspective) and Yoshikazu Sakamoto of Japan.

To order, write to:

The Free Press
A Division of Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc.
200 D Brown Street
Riverside, New Jersey 08075

INSTITUTE FOR WORLD ORDER
1140 Avenue of the Americas
New York, N.Y. 10036

CALCUTTA CENTRAL LIBRARY